Syria is divided

Assad vs rebels

The Syrian civil war is not just a humanitarian crisis. There are also important
strategic considerationsincluding Iran and other regional players like Turkey
that must be considered.

The past year has seen the slow-motion slaughter of many Syrians. Assad has
carefully avoided the destruction of large populations. The worlds response
has been countless international gatherings asserting sympathy for the Syrian
opposition, feeble efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and the thunder
of imprecations, mostly American, that skewer the Russians but pass little
ammunition or other help to the besieged opposition. Once again, another UN
resolution is under consideration to bring the Chinese and Russians around to
a cease fire, while a tireless Kofi Annan is asked to produce his quiet magic as
if Syria were Kenya.

The deepening humanitarian crisis is generating more militant proposals:

significant support to the opposition, including the establishment of
humanitarian zones and the direct provision of more arms and training. While
welcome to the opposition, these zones would require the protection of outside
military forces and do little to change the situation except by lowering the
intensity of some fighting. And these measures have little support. Policy
makers are concerned that such efforts will generate mayhem and civil war in
Syriaas if what they are witnessing were not a civil war, or perhaps just a
minor one. We seem to console ourselves with the notion that Assads fall is
inevitable, that his Russian and Chinese friends will grow tired of isolation and
embarrassment, and we can stand back knowing that right will ultimately
triumph. The Syrian people will just have to suffer a little more.
Perhaps Washington believes Assads end is indeed close, and therefore a
serious American military effort is unnecessary. That does not look likely from
the latest fightingnor from the increasing Congressional pressures to take
aggressive military measures and the administrations request for military
options from the Pentagon.

The Post-Assad Region

The notion of a more serious and concerted U.S.-led military option to end
Assads rule understandably has received little attention so far. Many fear it
would deepen the existing civil war and spread disorder to other countries.
There would, of course, be significant costs to such an operationprobably
more than Washington bargains for. This is not another Kosovo war with no
casualties, which gave Americans misleading notions about American power.
Syria has air defenses whose destruction would be costly at a time when the
United States is trying to reduce defense expenditures. And it would involve
U.S. forces in a war of uncertain duration that they do not want.

A Syrian intervention would not be Iraq redux. But it would require something
Americans are not very good atbringing the various Syrian parties together
(no mean problem with their strong sectarian differences) to help create a
post-Assad world. Nor is a new Syria likely to be a short-term burden; the law
of unintended consequences inevitably prevails in war. It would also be a
terrible political problem for the Obama administration.

A military attack on Syria would need the whole-hearted political and material
support of Turkey and Arab states. That is by no means assured. Until a year
ago, the Turkish government romanced Assad. Now, it is at the forefront of
trying to get rid of him, but it has done little to make that happen other than
promoting international support, accepting refugees and providing a haven for
Syrian opposition leaders. In a potential toppling of Assad, Turkey would need
to establish a protected zone in Syria for the opposition and those fleeing any
fighting. The Turkish government, however, is not enthusiastic about a
military effort in Syria; it would not have a UN imprimatur or support of the
Turkish public. The politically besieged Turkish military is averse to invading
an Arab country and concerned that a Syrian Kurdish entity might emerge
from Syrias internal disorder.

Arab support, particularly the Saudis, who talk much about supplying arms to
the opposition but apparently do little, is also politically indispensable. It is
not clear that support would be available, and the Arabs could well split.

Containing Iran

Nevertheless, there are ample reasons for considering a dramatically different

approach, and not only for humanitarian reasons. A Syrian intervention might
help with a larger and pressing Iranian problem by removing its chief client
and regional ally from the scene. Strategically, Washington would send a far
tougher message to the Iranian leadership to halt their nuclear-weapon
aspirations than any it has delivered to date.

To have this effect on Iran, President Obama must first send an unmistakable
message to Assad: unless he is prepared to give up power, his government will
be destroyed. Such a military effort cannot win UN approval and requires a
coalition of the willing. Once again the U.S. military would be indispensable in
doing the fightingthe destruction by air of many of Assads key facilities and
his ability to manage a continuing war, rather than simply enabling and
equipping the opposition to Assad.

Iran likely believes this kind of an American-led attack on Syria will not
happen. An attack on Syria, however, could constitute a truly defining moment
for the much bigger Iranian nuclear issue. Tehran would find it highly difficult
to intervene directly in Syria and would face a humiliating loss and greater
isolation in the region. It would be a huge political shock with possibly vast
internal repercussions.