The South China Sea: Lynchpin

of the Shifting Strategic Balance

Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor
Presentation to Conference on the South China Sea:
Impact on Major Power Relations and Regional Stability
co-organized by the Centre of Asia and Globalization and the
Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney
Sydney, February 10-11, 2017
 1. Introduction
Geographic scope of South China Sea
Semi-enclosed sea duty to cooperate under
UNCLOS
Security of commercial and military sea lanes
Resources: oil, gas, fisheries
China produces estimates 3.5 top 27.6 times
larger that U.S. Energy Information Agency
Fisheries pollution, depletion, , environmental
degradation
 Militarization as a Spectrum
To give a military To make preparations
character to for war

Dual civil-
military

Red Line?
 2. South China Sea
in International Politics
New Model/Type of Major Country/Power
Relations
2013 Sunnylands Summit
2014 irreconcilable differences emerge
G2 power sharing
Pressure to support NTGPR
Expanding core Interests
Cyber espionage
Artificial islands
Obama Administrations Rebalancing towards the
Asia-Pacific (January 2012)
 Chinese Militarization
Fishing fleet, maritime militia and Coast Guard
Master Plan to construct forward operating
bases
Airfields constructed on Fiery Cross, Subi and
Mischief Reefs
Xi Jinping: China does not intend to pursue
militarization (White House Rose Garden, 25/915)
Military Exercises
Combat Air Patrols
Further Militarization
of Artificial Islands
Reinforced
hangars next
to airfields
Close in
Weapons
Support
Anti-Aircraft
Guns
 United States Militarization
Constant U.S. naval and air presence since end of
Second World War
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines
Rebalancing
Maritime security assistance, naval patrols, port visits by
nuclear subs, rotational military presence, LCS in
Singapore, maritime air patrols
Freedom of Navigation Operational Patrols (FONOPs)
Close-in aerial surveillance/military activities in EEZ and
military alert zone
Provocative and Decisive Action
Scarborough Shoal Case Study
March/April 2016
 Scarborough Shoal
April 19-21, 2016

A-10 Thunderbolt (Warthog)

and HH-60 Pave Hawk Helicopters
Scarborough Shoal
EA-18 Electronic Warfare Growlers
USS JohnC. C.
USS John Stennis
Stennis Strike
and USS Group
Ronald Reagan Carrier
Strike Groups Conduct Dual Carrier Operations
 Chinese Response
to U.S. Militarization
Rebalancing root cause of current tensions
Shadowing U.S. Navy ships on patrol
Staging confrontations
USNS Impeccable (2009), USS Cowpens (2013)
Unsafe air intercepts
P-8 Poseidon, EP-3E Aries, RC-135
Electronic jamming of drones
Seizure of Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (drone)
U.S. military activities used as pretext for further
Chinese militarization
 3. China, the United States
and the Region
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Phnom Penh (2012)
Failure to issue joint communique
Chinese investment of Scarborough Shoal
Philippines makes Claim to Arbitral Tribunal
ASEAN China Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers,
Kunming, June 2016
Arbitral Tribunal issues Award (12 July 2016)
Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte places Award
in limbo
United States and Southeast Asia
Obama Administration engages ASEAN
U.S. national interest in South China Sea (2010)
U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summits (2015 and 2016)
Maritime safety and security
full respect for legal and diplomatic processes
Other lawful uses of the sea
Unimpeded lawful maritime commerce
Non-militarization, address common challenges in
maritime domain
Sunnylands Special Leaders Summit (February 2016)
 China, the U.S and ASEAN
Strategic rivalry challenges ASEAN regional
autonomy and being in the drivers seat
3rd ADMM-Plus, Kuala Lumpur no Joint Declaration
Post-Award ASEANs overall position on the South
China Sea has been strengthened
4 key documents adopted at 49th AMM
Kavi Chongkittavorn
ASEANs 28th/29th Summit endorse Foreign
Ministers
China and ASEAN Code of Conduct framework
 4. Trump Administration
and China
Trump tweet: Did China
ask us if it was OK to
devalue their currency
(making it hard for our
companies to compete),
heavily tax our products
going into their country
(the U.S. doesn't tax
them) or to build a
massive military complex
in the middle of the
Trump takes phone call from President Tsai Ing-wen.
Later: Everything is under negotiation including one
South China Sea? I don't
China Interview with Wall Street Journal think so! (4/12/16)
 4. Trump Administration
and China
Confirmation Hearings 11-12 January
Rex Tillerson, Secretary
of State
island-building stops
access to those islands
also is not going to be
allowed
General James Mattis
Secretary of Defense
keep positive relations
with China
counterbalance
Before Senate Armed Services [Chinas] bullying role
Committee and
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee
 White House Press Secretary
Sean Spicer
Does President Trump agree with
Tillersons comments?
I think the U.S. is going
to make sure that we
protect our interests
there. Its a question of if
those islands are in fact
in international waters
and not part of China
proper, then yeah, were
going to make sure that
we defend international
territories from being
taken over by one
country (20 January).
Defense Secretary Mattis in Tokyo
What we have to do is exhaust all
efforts, diplomatic efforts, to try and
resolve this [South China Sea dispute]
properly. Our military stance should be
one that reinforces our diplomats At
this time we do not see any need for
dramatic military moves at all.
February 4, 2017.
The South China Sea: Lynchpin
of the Shifting Strategic Balance

Carlyle A. Thayer, Emeritus Professor

E-mail: c.thayer@adfa.edu.au