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1AC
1AC Plan
The United States Federal Government should substantially
restrict private sector greenhouse gas emissions in areas
where it retains exclusive regulatory jurisdiction by requiring
federal agencies to apply a proxy carbon price in regulatory
decisions based on a social cost of carbon value consistent
with limiting climate change to 2 degrees Celsius.
1AC Carbon Assets
Emissions cuts are failing to keep pace with Paris pledges now,
locking in a late and abrupt low-carbon transition; risks policy
collapse and catastrophic warming through a hard landing
Daniel Gros 16, Director of Economy and Finance @ Centre for European Policy
Studies, Dirk Schoenmaker, Feb 2016, Reports of the Advisory Scientific Committee
No 6 / February 2016 Too late, too sudden: Transition to a low-carbon economy and
systemic risk, By: ESRB Advisory Scientific Committee ESRB ASC Report No 6 /
February 2016 European Systemic Risk Board,
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_ASC_6_1602.pdf
Previous and current emission reduction pledges suggest a highly uncertain environment regarding the speed and
Despite the increasing frequency of
timing of the transition to a low-carbon economy.
declarations about the importance of climate change and the growing consensus around a
new agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
global emissions continue to grow . It is therefore hard to forecast the
true speed at which emissions might be abated.
bubble are fully realised, fossil fuel firms will initially continue to make
large investments in developing reserves that will only increase the total
amount of stranded assets [113]. They finance new investments partly with
retained profits (equity capital) and partly with debt (bonds and loans). If
fossil fuel firms were to stop investing in the development of new
reserves , which would happen in the low-carbon breakthrough scenario,
they would not need to obtain new loans and issue new bonds to finance
those investments. They would also have a larger cash flow available to
repay existing loans and bonds (or to increase dividend payments or buy back shares). This
would limit future losses for shareholders and creditors resulting from
the carbon bubble.
could then run into funding and liquidity problems, not because of actual
One of the most studied risks to the financial system stemming from ecological
imbalances is the so called carbon bubble (Carbon Tracker, 2011), or the overvaluation of fossil-fuel
Staying within a 2C
reserves and related assets should the world manage to tackle global warming.
temperature rise puts a limit on future carbon emissions and hence on the amount of
fossil fuels that can be burned, requiring a sharp bending of the current
trend (Figure 1)4.
This could strand many existing fossil fuel reserves. Without carbon sequestration, McGlade and
Ekins (2015) estimate that if global warming is to be kept below 2C up to 2050, approximately 35 percent of known
oil reserves, 52 percent of gas reserves and 88 percent of coal reserves are unburnable (Table 1). The numbers are
slightly lower if carbon is sequestrated.
Private oil, gas and coal mining companies own about a quarter of fossil fuel
reserves; sovereigns and their oil, gas and coal companies own the remainder . If a
large part of these reserves cannot be extracted or extraction becomes commercially
unviable, the valuation of these companies and their ability to repay their
Though these exposures and potential losses are large, on their own they will
probably not cause a systemic crisis in a healthy economy and financial
sector. However, the effect of the bursting of the carbon bubble will
not be limited to the oil, gas and coal sectors alone . A sudden
transition will be a shock to all sectors that use fossil fuels as an input,
either in the production or in the use of their products and services. There are potentially major
implications between sectors (electricity powered high speed trains versus fossil fuel jet planes)
and within sectors (car manufacturers that specialise in electric cars versus heavy car manufacturers).
The financial impact will therefore be much greater than the numbers
here indicate .
If the transition is sudden and late, the financial system could be affected by
its exposure to carbon-intensive real and financial assets. Moreover, reduced energy
supply and increased energy costs would impair macroeconomic activity, as the hard landing forces a rapid
transition away from fossil-fuel based energy production.
evoking the shades of 1913. By now he is looking like a prophet. By 2014, as the security situation in
the South China Sea deteriorated, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe cast China as the
equivalent to Kaiser Wilhelms Germany; and the fighting in Ukraine and in Iraq is a sharp
reminder of the dangers of escalation. Lessons of 1914 are about more than simply the
dangers of national and sectarian animosities. The main story of today as then is the
precariousness of financial globalization , and the consequences that political leaders draw
from it. In the influential view of Norman Angell in his 1910 book The Great Illusion, the
interdependency of the increasingly complex global economy made war
impossible. But a quite opposite conclusion was possible and equally
plausible and proved to be the case . Given the extent of fragility, a clever
twist to the control levers might make war easily winnable by the
economic hegemon. In the wake of an epochal financial crisis that almost
brought a complete global collapse, in 1907, several countries started to
think of finance as primarily an instrument of raw power, one that could and should
be turned to national advantage. The 1907 panic emanated from the United States but affected the rest of the
world and demonstrated the fragility of the whole international financial orderThat r. The aftermath of the 1907
crash drove the then hegemonic power Great Britain - to reflect on how it could use its financial power. Between
1905 and 1908, the British Admiralty evolved the broad outlines of a plan for financial and economic warfare that
would wreck the financial system of its major European rival, Germany, and destroy its fighting capacity. Britain
used its extensive networks to gather information about opponents. London banks financed most of the worlds
trade. Lloyds provided insurance for the shipping not just of Britain, but of the world. Financial networks provided
the information that allowed the British government to find the sensitive strategic vulnerabilities of the opposing
alliance. What pre-1914 Britain did anticipated the private-public partnership that today links technology giants
such as Google, Apple or Verizon to U.S. intelligence gathering. Since last year, the Edward Snowden leaks about
the NSA have shed a light on the way that global networks are used as a source of intelligence and power. For
Britains rivals, the financial panic of 1907 showed the necessity of mobilizing financial powers themselves. The
United States realized that it needed a central bank analogous to the Bank of England. American financiers thought
that New York needed to develop its own commercial trading system that could handle bills of exchange in the
same way as the London market. Some of the dynamics of the pre-1914 financial world
are now re-emerging . Then an economically declining power, Britain,
wanted to use finance as a weapon against its larger and faster growing competitors, Germany
and the United States. Now America is in turn obsessed by being overtaken by China
according to some calculations, set to become the worlds largest economy in 2014. In the aftermath of
Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or
unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate
tensions leading to trade wars among interdependent states that in turn
increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may
increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition
(Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but
include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this
context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea)
are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance
decisions for war and peace are taken by
(Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth,
very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations . International
relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national
If leaders on
decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities.
either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nations
decline then they may blame this on external dependence , appeal to anti-
foreign sentiments , contemplate the use of force to gain respect or
credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred
by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a
dangerous shift could happen abruptly , i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party
or against a third party.
Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to
escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from
either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a
territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the
world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state
peace more precarious . If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations
(Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social
This could have unforeseen consequences
distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions.
in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor
to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so . Deterrence
could lose its credibility : one of the two great powers might gamble that the
other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might
engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.
The magnitude of risk is huge, and the tail risk matters the
most43 trillion dollars worth of assets could be lost, roughly
equal to 30% of ALL global assets
Brian Gardner 15, managing editor for The Economist Intelligence Unit's thought
leadership division in EMEA, with Christopher Watts, peer reviewed by 19 experts in
global finance and climate change including Al Gore, THE COST OF INACTION:
RECOGNISING THE VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://www.eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of
%20inaction_0.pdf
[Numbers to words]
The asset management industryand thus the wider community of
investors of all sizes is facing the prospect of significant losses from the
effects of climate change. Assets can be directly damaged by floods, droughts and severe storms, but
portfolios can also be harmed indirectly, through weaker growth and lower asset returns. Climate change
is a long-term, probably irreversible problem beset by substantial
uncertainty . Crucially, however, climate change is a problem of extreme risk :
this means that the average losses to be expected are not the only source
of concern; on the contrary, the outliers , the particularly extreme
scenarios, may matter most of all.
To highlight the relevance of climate change to the asset management industry and beyond, this research estimates
the value at risk (VaR)1 to 2100 as a result of climate change to the total global stock of manageable assets (the
The worlds current stock of manageable assets is estimated to
climate VaR).
be US$143trn [one hundred forty-three trillion] . The resulting expected
losses to these assets identified in our findings, in discounted, present
value terms, are valued at US$4.2trn [four point two trillion]roughly on a
par with the total value of all the worlds listed oil and gas companies or
Japans entire GDP. This is the average (mean) expected loss, but the value-
at-risk calculation includes a wide range of probabilities, and the tail
risks are far more serious .
A report has warned that investors could be hit hard amid changes in short-term
market swings , triggered by climate impact concerns .
University of Cambridge experts said global investment portfolios could see losses of
up to 45%.
No investor was "immune from the risks posed by climate change", they added.
In a recent speech to the City, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney said climate change would "threaten
financial resilience".
The report, Unhedgeable Risk: How Climate Change Sentiment Impacts Investment, was commissioned by the
University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainable Leadership (CISL) and the Investment Leaders Group.
The authors said the report's findings added to previous studies that had analysed the direct, physical effects of
climate change on long-term economic performance.
climate change, even in the short run ," explained CISL Sustainable Economy director Dr Jake
Reynolds.
"It is surprisingly difficult to distinguish between risks that can be addressed by an individual investor through smart
hedging strategies and ones that are systematic and require much deeper transformations in the economy to deal
with," he added.
that could emerge at any time , such as an extreme weather event or the outcome of the UN climate
talks in Paris.
Two degrees: limiting average global temperature rise to 2C (3.6F) above pre-industrial levels, a strategy favoured
by climate experts
Baseline: where past trends continue (business-as-usual) and there is "no significant change in the willingness of
government to step up actions on climate change"
No mitigation: no "special consideration of environmental challenges, rather the hope of pursuing self-interest will
allow adaptive responses to any climate change impacts as they arise"
These scenarios were applied to four "typical investment portfolios" in order to understand the resilience or
vulnerability of investments to climate-related shifts in market confidence.
"One of the key findings (from the modelling) is that it reveals the potential for very
significant , short-term financial impacts for investors whereas previously, I think, a
lot of the analysis had pointed to the longer term, multi-decadal impacts," explained CISL Finance Sector director
Andrew Voysey.
1AC Mitigation
Paris is accelerating the green paradox --- signal of climate
policy without implementation -- immediate emissions limits
are the only way of staving off irreversible climate change
Laurence J. Kotlikoff 16, William Fairfield Warren Professor at Boston University,
a Professor of Economics at Boston University, a Fellow of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a Research Associate of the
National Bureau of Economic Research, President of Economic Security Planning,
Inc., et al., 10/3/16, Will the Paris Accord Accelerate Climate Change?,
http://www.kotlikoff.net/sites/default/files/paris-accord-accelerate%20%287%29.pdf
In the 2015 Paris Accord, 195 countries agreed to limit the planets temperature rise to 2 above pre-industrial
levels. The Accord calls for moderate measures through 2025 and tougher
measures thereafter. Unfortunately, the Accord includes neither an enforcement mechanism nor any
compliance deadlines. Consequently, the Accord represents a voluntary arrangement
that countries may fail to honor until they have been identified and called to account, both of
which can take time. The Accord did accomplish one thing . It sent dirty-
energy producers a clear message that their days are number .
This use it or lose it message that reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal
will become stranded assets may be accelerating fossil fuel extraction
and CO2 emissions . Since 2010, global oil production has risen by 10 percent,1 global coal production by
9 percent,2 and global natural gas production by 11 percent.3 Yet slower, not quicker release of
CO2 is critical to limiting the planets temperature rise. Hence , the Paris
accord, in not mandating immediate emission-limitation policy , may
actually be accelerating climate change . This is Sinn (2008)s well known
Green Paradox.
This paper illustrates the Green Paradox arising from delaying climate change
policy . Our vehicle is a two-period OLG model featuring dirty and clean energy. Dirty energy, referenced
as oil, is exhaustible and in inelastic supply. Clean energy, referenced as solar,
eventually supplies all energy needs but, depending on policy, this outcome may,
paradoxically, occur too soon to prevent irreversible climate
damage . Indeed, the earlier solar takes over, the worse matters can be for
the climate.
The life-cycle model is the appropriate framework for studying climate policy since it captures the negative
externality current generations impose on future generations in using fossil fuels. Climate policys natural objective
is to achieve an abatement path that makes no generation worse off and at least some generations better off. The
search for such efficient abatement policies moves the climate-policy debate from the realm of ethics to that of
economic efficiency.
Our reference here to ethics alludes to the use of infinite-horizon models in which optimal climate policy is set
based on the infinitely-lived, representative agents time-preference factor. The recent paper by Golosov et al.
(2014) is an example. Its optimal carbon tax formula depends critically on the representative agents time-
preference rate.4 But Altonji et al. (1992, 1997), Hayashi et al. (1996), and other studies, particularly Lee and
Mason (2011) analyses of the postwar change in the shape of the age-consumption profile, provide strong evidence
against the intergenerational altruism required by single-agent models. Indeed, were such intergenerational
altruism ubiquitous, there would be no reason to analyze climate change policy. Agents with such preferences would
set optimal climate policy to protect their progeny. This is true even if one considers different clans within a single
country or in different countries. As shown in Kotlikoff (1983) and Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), the assumption of
intergenerational altruism combined with the assumption that agents from different clans become altruistically
linked with one another implies effective altruistic linkages across essentially everyone on the planet. In this case,
there is global agreement on enacting first-best dirty energy policy. Stated differently, a climate-change policy
problem cant arise in models with infinitely-lived agents because such agents would automatically internalize the
externality.
This said, were intergenerational altruism ubiquitous and operational, Golosov et al. (2014)s elegant and
impressive paper would provide an excellent guide to the planets single dynasty for setting abatement policy. But
since this appears not to be the case, their model and similar models must be viewed as entailing the optimization
of social welfare functions in which the time-preference rate becomes a central parameter for optimal carbon policy.
Since there is no economic basis for choosing the preferences of social planners, "optimal" carbon policy devolves
into a matter of ethical conviction.
If one leaves ethics aside and focuses on economics in the context of selfish life-cycle agents, optimal policy
analysis becomes a matter of determining the set of policies that produce Pareto improvements. Once that set is
determined, the job of the economist is finished and it is up to policymakers to determine what policies, if any, to
undertake.
The natural means of achieving an efficient climate policy is levying a time-varying carbon tax rate, but using, as
climate
needed, generation-specific redistribution to achieve a Pareto improvement. Unfortunately, as we show,
Still, our models main message would surely carry over to far more detailed models, including models with more
complex preferences, uncertainty, and statedependent policies. The reason is that our model is about the expected
time-path of policy and the point that getting the policy timing wrong can be worse
than running no policy whatsoever .5 To be sure, our point that optimal policy
requires immediate action can be seen in the optimal tax policies computed by Cai et al. (2013),
Golosov et al. (2014), and others. But the literature seems devoid of, or at least short on, studies examining the
cost of policy delay.
Existing private sector pricing methods & infrastructure
planning fail - erodes the capacity for rapid US mitigation,
which is critical to meeting climate objectives. Failure triggers
stranded assets, investors losses, and disrupts the capital
allocation decisions necessary to hit our GHG targets
Alison Cassady 16, Director of Domestic Energy Policy, Center for American
Progress, Gqynne Taraska, Associate Director of Energy Policy, April 2016, Proxy
Carbon Pricing, Center for American Progress, https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/13143140/CarbonPricing.pdf
State and federal governments have two primary motivations to use a proxy carbon price to evaluate the long-term
government
financial viability of their investments and decisions in a carbon-constrained world. First,
officials should be motivated by fiscal prudence and the need to prepare
the U nited S tates and its local economies for the global pivot to clean
energy. If a fossil fuel investment becomes stranded due to carbon
constraints in the future , it will do more than harm the investors
bottom line. Unwise commitments to carbon-intensive energy
infrastructure could leave the broader U.S. economy unable to adapt
quickly in a world that needs to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius above
preindustrial levelsthe generally recognized ceiling above which climate change could be catastrophic. Second,
government actors should be motivated by the commitment to propel the low-carbon shift domestically.
Infrastructure projectssuch as pipelines, power plants, and fossil fuel
export terminalshave lifetimes that measure in decades. Given that such
projects drive climate change cumulatively rather than on an individual
basis, government officials need a tool that evaluates potential projects
in the context of their consistency with a low-carbon future rather than
solely in the context of their individual climate effects. A proxy carbon price could be
one such tool. Government officials could apply a proxy price to a proposed
First they claim that global mean surface temperature has gone up only very slowly. They
add that the world is barely half a degree Celsius (0.9 degrees Fahrenheit) warmer than it was about 25 years
In fact, the World Meteorological Organisation has warned that the last five years are the
ago.
warmest such period since instrumental records began in the 19th century , and that
the average global temperature for 2015 is likely to be about 1 centigrade degree
higher than the average during the pre-industrial era, before the burning of fossil fuels started
to dump large volumes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser downplay the significance of this rise in global mean surface
the
temperature, which may seem small compared to local daily fluctuations. But it should be remembered that
global mean surface temperature during the last Ice Age was only about 5 centigrade
degrees lower than today. During the last major interglacial period (PDF), which ended about 116,000
years ago, global mean surface temperature was no more than 2 centigrade degrees higher than today, but the
polar land-based ice sheets on West Antarctica and Greenland were much smaller, and global mean sea level was
This shows the profound consequences of what
between 5 and 10 metres higher than today.
may appear to be relatively small changes in global mean surface temperature .
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser next seek to obscure the impacts of the rise in global mean surface temperature that
has already occurred, falsely claiming that on a global scale, as scientists keep confirming, there has been no
increase in frequency or intensity of storms, floods or droughts. This is blatantly misleading.
the
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser try to hide the true picture on floods and droughts by ignoring the fact that
impact of climate change varies between regions , which means some parts of the world are
becoming drier while other parts are becoming wetter.
Hence the IPCC noted that (PDF) although the most evident flood trends appear to be in northern high latitudes,
where observed warming trends have been largest, in some regions no evidence of a trend in extreme flooding has
been found.
And on drought, the IPCC found that it is likely that the frequency and intensity of drought has increased in the
Mediterranean and West Africa and decreased in central North America and north-west Australia since 1950.
Similarly the data for storms across the world also presents a complex picture, but the IPCC noted that it is virtually
certain there has been an increase in the frequency and intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones since the
1970s in the North Atlantic basin.
the attempt by Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser to focus only on global trends is really an
Hence,
obfuscation of the evidence of regional changes.
They also turn a blind eye to the growing number of studies that have analysed how
climate change has increased the probability of different types of extreme weather .
Recent research by scientists around the world found that climate change influenced the probability of the
frequency and severity of many extreme weather events in 2014.
While it is true that the world is becoming better at reducing the death toll from natural disasters, such as extreme
weather events, Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser fail to acknowledge that the lives and livelihoods of millions of
people are being exposed to greater risks because of climate change , as the Global
Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (PDF) pointed out earlier this year.
The authors next move on to the hoary old chestnut of polar sea ice. They state that Arctic sea ice has recently
sea ice extent in the
melted more in summer than it used to in the 1980s. Again, this is misleading. In fact,
Arctic has been reducing through all seasons. This year, the peak winter extent was
the lowest on record, and the summer extent has been decreasing at a rate of about
13 per cent per decade, according to the United States National Snow and Ice Data Center. On current
trends, the Arctic could become entirely ice free during summer months over the course of
this century.
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser try to muddy the water further by referring to Antarctic sea ice, which has been
increasing in extent. The reasons for this are unclear, although scientists are confident that it does not disprove
global warming.
They also refer to one recent study that suggests the land-based ice in East Antarctica and the interior of West
Antarctica is increasing, although other scientists have questioned its significance compared with many other
studies that have found strong overall decreases. In addition, recent research has suggested that parts of the
West Antarctic ice sheet may already have become destabilised .
Next Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser claim that sea level rise continues its centuries-long slow rise about a foot a
century- with no sign of recent acceleration. This is simply wrong. The IPCC concluded (PDF): The
rate of sea
level rise since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the
previous two millennia. Research published in May 2015 found evidence for a further
acceleration in global sea level rise during the last decade . The IPCCs projections indicate
that if atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases continue to rise at a steep rate, global sea level could be
between about 1.5 and 2.5 feet higher by the end of this century compared with the start,
with further big rises over the decades and centuries to follow.
But even the corrected version contains serious mistakes. For instance, it claims that among 11 previous estimates
of the worldwide economic impacts of global warming by 2.5 centigrade degrees, three found net benefits. Yet the
of the 26 estimates of the economic impact of
data table shows just one positive value. In fact,
warming collected by Professor Tol, only two are positive, and in both cases omitted
important consequences, such as changes in extreme weather.
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser quote from Professor Tols paper about the likely economic impacts that might be
expected during this century: The welfare change caused by climate change is equivalent to the welfare change
caused by an income change of a few percent. However, Professor Tols confident conclusion is undermined by the
shortcomings and limitations highlighted by the IPCC in its assessment of the economic impacts (PDF):
Global economic impacts from climate change are difficult to estimate. Economic impact estimates completed over
the past 20 years vary in their coverage of subsets of economic sectors and depend on a large number of
assumptions, many of which are disputable, and many estimates do not account for catastrophic changes, tipping
points, and many other factors. With these recognized limitations, the incomplete estimates of global annual
economic losses for additional temperature increases of ~2C are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income (1 standard
deviation around the mean) (medium evidence, medium agreement). Losses are more likely than not to be greater,
rather than smaller, than this range (limited evidence, high agreement). Additionally, there are large differences
between and within countries. Losses accelerate with greater warming (limited evidence, high agreement), but few
quantitative estimates have been completed for additional warming around 3C or above.
Indeed, the integrated assessment models used to estimate the economic impacts of climate change are
considered by many researchers to be extremely inadequate, with Professor Robert Pindyck declaring in a recent
paper: These models have crucial flaws that make them close to useless as tools for policy analysis.
As a result of these crucial flaws, these estimates of the economic impacts represent a stark contrast to the
scientific evidence of the risks from climate change. For instance, the IPCC report (PDF) concluded:
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation,
warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe,
widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). In most scenarios without
additional mitigation efforts (those with 2100 atmospheric concentrations >1000 ppm CO2-eq),
warming is more likely than not to exceed 4C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 .
The risks associated with temperatures at or above 4C include substantial species
extinction, global and regional food insecurity, consequential constraints on common
human activities and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (high confidence). Some risks of
climate change, such as risks to unique and threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events,
are moderate to high at temperatures 1C to 2C above pre-industrial levels.
Viscount Ridley and Dr Peiser go on to assert that upper end of the IPCCs estimates of the value of climate
sensitivity, defined as the warming resulting from a doubling of the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide, is looking even more implausible in theory and practice.
However, the IPCC report (PDF) noted that the values of equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), the long-
term warming due to a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration, and the transient climate response (TCR), the
short-term warming resulting from a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration over 70 years, can be
estimated using a number of methods , including by being diagnosed from climate models,
constrained by analysis of feedbacks in climate models, patterns of mean climate and variability in models
compared to observations, temperature fluctuations as reconstructed from paleoclimate archives, observed and
modelled short-term perturbations of the energy balance like those caused by volcanic eruptions, and the observed
Based on an assessment of studies
surface and ocean temperature trends since pre-industrial times.
using the full range of methods, the IPCC concluded that there is a 66 per cent probability
that the value of the TCR lies in the range 1C to 2.5C , and a 66 per cent
probability that the ECS value lies between 1.5C and 4.5C.
Butthe authors justify their contrary conclusion by cherry-picking recent studies that
support their assertion that climate sensitivity must have a low value . They refer to a
2013 study by Alexander Otto and co-authors, but this was taken into account by the IPCC report. They also refer to
they ignore all of the other recent
a more recent study by Bjorn Stevens published this year. But
papers on climate sensitivity, such as studies by Miguel Martinez-Boti and co-authors, Steven Sherwood
and co-authors, and Thomas Frlicher and co-authors. The final report (PDF) of an international workshop for
there is no consensus that the
researchers held in Ringberg, Germany, earlier this year revealed that
value climate sensitivity lies towards the bottom of the IPCC range. So the authors
assertion about climate sensitivity is simply not supported by a consideration of the full range of recent research.
defining threat to global stability in the twenty-1st century, and they see
significant implications for the role and focus of security professionals.
The level of engagement is becoming widespread. In April 2010, 33 retired generals and admirals wrote to the
United States Senate majority and minority leaders, stating that climate change is threatening Americas security
[...] it exacerbates existing problems by decreasing stability, increasing conflict, and incubating the socioeconomic
conditions that foster terrorist recruitment. the State Department, the National Intelligence Council, and the CIA all
agree, and all are planning for future climate-based threats.1
The analysis by defense experts recognizes the very long-term nature of a changing climate, and the risk that
self-reinforcing climate feedbacks could push the issue beyond humanitys
capacity to control it. This was strongly articulated in a comprehensive review of the subject by the
Royal United Services Institute, a respected British defense think tank, which concluded: In the next decades,
climate change will drive as significant a change in the strategic security environment as the end of the Cold War.
If uncontrolled, climate change will have security implications of similar
magnitude to the World Wars , but which will last for centuries .2
Given the scale of such a threat, it is encouraging that our defense experts are paying attention. Even a cursory
it will have far-reaching impacts on the
examination of the science suggests that
geopolitics and security of the world, inevitably involving the military,
which will be forced to respond to conflicts triggered by food and refugee
crises and managing the consequences of failed states .
THIS IS NOT JUST ONE MORE SECURITY THREATIT COULD BE THE DEFINING SECURITY
Is the climate threat that serious? Statements that argue climate change will have security implications of similar
magnitude to the World Wars that will last for centuries make it sound less like a threat to national security and
more like a threat to the stability of civilization.
To determine the severity of the climate threat and to frame the relationship between climate change and conflict, it
is useful to return to the roots of conflict itself. Conflict has been and always will be a part of human society and
plays an important role in the geopolitical landscape of the world. the inevitability of conflict suggests that the goal
should be to manage rather than eliminate it. To accomplish this goal, there are two options: reduce the causes or
manage the consequences. The latter option is well understood and the markers of success or failure are clearer,
partly because it is easier to identify actions and measure progress. For example, land mines can be dealt with by
treaties and the impact of these treaties measured by the extent of the weapons use. Similarly, nuclear
nonproliferation can be judged by the number of nations with weapons. Dealing with such issues in this way is a
process with which we are familiar; likewise with intervening early in conflicts to prevent escalation by actions such
as deploying peacekeeping forces.
The focus on reducing the causes of conflict, however, is both less developed and more complicated, partly because
causes are generally numerous and interrelated. Since conflict is inevitable, a further complicating issue is that
what we think of as causes are more often actually multipliers they
create the conditions in which conflict caused by other issues can be
triggered or accelerated . A good case in point was extreme weather and
its resulting impacts during 2010 and 2011, with droughts in Russia and floods
in Canada causing a global spike in food prices that saw wheat prices double in seven months.
Noting that such food price increases were widely seen as a triggerthough not a causeof the Arab Spring, Sarah
Johnstone and Je8rey Mazo, writing in the journal Survival, argued that this was a textbook example of what
analysts mean when they talk of complex causality and the role of climate change as a threat multiplier.3 this
complexity makes issues like climate change fiendishly messy and all the more diffcult
to manage . Perhaps as a result, while policy makers analyze and plan for climate change as a security threat,
they rarely advocate action to reduce the threatat least not with the same strength of commitment as with other
security questions, such as terrorism or rogue-state nuclear programs.
It is in this context that we will face a century where these more diffuse and indirect causesnot just climate
change, but poverty, food and resource constraint, and refugee flowscould well be the major global drivers of
conflict. This view, particularly with regard to climate change, is now widely held by an increasing number of senior
military officers and foreign policy experts around the world. For example, Rear Admiral Neil Morisetti, the United
Kingdoms Climate Security Envoy, said, the impact of climate change is likely to be most severe in areas where it
coincides with other stresses, such as poverty, demographic growth, and resource shortages: areas through which
much of the worlds trade already passes. We are also in agreement that climate change will accelerate global
Concern about the climate
instability and that it is likely to shape our future missions and tasks.4
The findings of this report agree with those of the con6dential assessment of the security implications of climate
change made by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Thomas Fingar, the former chairman of the NIC, which
coordinates the United States 16 intelligence agencies told Congress that climate change, if left unchecked, has
wide-ranging implications for national security because it will aggravate existing problems, especially in already
vulnerable areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East.7 According to an NIC briefing document, by
placing added stress on resources, climate change will exacerbate internal state pressures, and generate
interstate friction through competition for resources or disagreement over responses and responsibility for
migration.8
While conflict has many causes, the concern of defense experts is that climate change and other resource
constraints, such as food supply, will tip the balance, thereby increasing conflict and ultimately causing the collapse
of states. In 2010, the Pentagons Quadrennial Defense Review acknowledged that climate change would act as an
accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the
world.9 Another study examining the correlation between temperatures and civil war in Sub-Saharan Africa in
recent decades concluded that civil wars in the region are likely to increase by th0 percent by 2030.10 that level of
conflict likely means millions of deaths and an international impact. A more complete and more disturbing picture is
provided in Gwynne Dyers book Climate Wars. 11 Dyer, a military and international affairs
journalist with a solid understanding of climate change science, portrays
the collapse of the E uropean U nion in the 2030s. In his scenario, northern African refugees overrun
southern Europe, and southern Europeans flee to the northern states to escape an expanding Sahara. Dyer
sees potential for nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan over water
resources and a completely militarized U nited S tates Mexico border as the
United States seeks to keep out massive waves of immigrants.
In light of these and many other studies with thorough analysis by credible global experts in climate science, food
supply, resource constraint, and economics, it is not hard to conceive of a serious, collapse-inducing global crisis.12
- A series of wars raging in the Middle East and elsewhere over water .
- the drowning of people and nations in low-lying islands during storm surges.
- the global insurance industry going into insolvency in the face of a series
of climate disasters and the run-on effects in the banking industry of using
uninsured assets as debt collateral.
- the collapse of global share markets when the risks of all these scenarios are priced into share portfolios, including
what is referred to as the carbon bubblean inevitable collapse in the value of fossil fuel assets if the world acts to
slash carbon dioxide emissions.13
WE SHOULD ASSUME THE WORLD WILL NOT YET RESPOND TO THESE RISKSTHE SITUATION WILL DETERIORATE
CONSIDERABLY BEFORE STRONG ACTION IS TAKEN
Given the geopolitical and security implications of climate change, the worlds foreign policy, military, and security
establishments should be paying a great deal of attention to these issues as matters of some urgency. As suggested
by the assessments discussed earlier, many experts are already concluding that climate and resource issues pose
major risks. So is that enough? Isnt this just one more in a series of potential causes of conflict and threat
multipliers that needs attention? In short, no. Because of its complexity and capacity to exacerbate other risks,
climate change is likely to be the defining cause of conflict, security, and economic risk of the coming century. To
understand why, we will look at the context of the global response to the climate risk to date. this brings us back to
where we started: the nature of conflict, the trends that exacerbate it, and the poor record in e8ectively managing
such causes.
an ambitious climate agreement that would produce certainty for long-term investment
decisions . 48 By strengthening the temperature target and adopting carbon neutrality as the long-term goal,
theParis Agreement does indeed send a clear signal to global markets, marking out the
long-term direction of travel for the global economy. However, the lack of detail
on the time frame for and path way towards long-term carbon neutrality has
weakened the strength of the signal . Furthermore, the Paris Agreement put in place a
framework for creating governance mechanisms, but postponed the tricky task of agreeing
specific rules. The parties renewed international support for developing and expanding
carbon markets, endorsing the creation of a new type of carbon asset, so-called internationally
transferred mitigation outcomes. They also established an UNFCCC-governed mechanism that will support
international transfers of emission reductions, but without agreeing the specific rules and procedures that will
govern it; these will need to be agreed by future COPs. And finally, the Paris conference became a catalyst for the
creation of a wide range of voluntary initiatives that engage business actors and others in collaborative efforts to
Paris
reduce emissions, promote best-practice models and encourage technology transfer.49 In this way, the
accordcan become an orchestrator of climate action well beyond the realm of
traditional international governance, drawing on the governance capabilities of
other actors that the climate regime itself lacks .50
1AC Solvency
Current SCC values underestimate risk and will wreck the
transition to a global low carbon economy by locking in too low
of a carbon price
Mark C. Trexler 8-9, 16, PhD from Berkeley in International Environmental Policy,
Lead Author for the IPCC, 30+ years of regulatory and energy policy experience,
8/9/2016, A Back Door National Price on Carbon?,
http://climatographer.com/2016/08/09/carbon-price/
Minnesota recently engaged in an administrative proceeding to update its externality values for power sector
should adopt
planning. The proceeding quickly turned into a contested decision-making as to whether the state
the federal Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), currently set at ~$41/ton CO2 (2015
dollars). Peabody Coal and others decided to use the proceeding to litigate the whole topic of climate
change, in addition to the specifics of the SCC.
The Administrative Law Judges decisionIn the Matter of the Further Investigation Into Environmental and
Socioeconomic Costs Under Minnesota Statutes is a detailed 150+ pages. The ALJ concluded that climate change
is real, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Changes work is a reasonable representation of the best available
science, and the federal SCC is the best available measure of the damages associated with CO2 emissions.
The idea that an ALJ would spend a year taking testimony on every key aspect of climate change and the SCC in
order to rule that climate change is indeed real seems a bit absurd; are ALJs in every state going to litigate climate
change? Yet the ruling does have potentially significant implications. Heres why:
The U.S. government inter-agency task force that came up with the
federal Social Cost of Carbon intended that the SCC be used for regulatory
rulemaking. A number of efforts are underway, however, to use the SCC in
other environmental and policy decision-making processes , from Minnesotas
externality values to the c ost- b enefit a nalysis underpinning federal coal
leasing (among others). New York just took a huge step towards deploying the
SCC more broadly, using it in establishing a minimum price for power from the
states nuclear plants. If the SCC continues to spread in this and other way, it could
quickly turn into a back-door national carbon price with BIG impacts.
Until now, the SCC had not been challenged in a courtroom . The Minnesota
ruling at least suggests the SCC might stand up to a more formal judicial
challenge .
At the end of the day there are real risks in basing climate policy on the kinds of
economic analysis and choices found in the SCC . You could win the battle and lose the
war , as Dietz et al. make clear in their April 2016 Nature Climate Change journal article Climate value at risk
of global financial assets. The authors use one of the models that underlies the federal SCC to evaluate the value
at risk from climate change for the worlds portfolio of investment assets. They conclude that a Business as Usual
(BAU) of 2.5oC of warming by 2100 would likely cost investors 1.77% of the value of their global assets.
Successfully reducing climate change to 2oC would reduce that cost to 1.18%.
social cost of carbon currently in use by the U.S. government range from
$11 to $105 per metric ton in 2015 depending on the discount rate and
the projected severity of climate effects and increase over time .30 A
logical next step would be for government officials to use the social cost
of carbon as a proxy price when evaluating the financial viability of
potential long term investments . The social cost of carbon has the
advantage of being already established as an interagency metric and
representing a range of values, which can be used as a stress test for
potential investments..
Alternatively , government agencies could tie the proxy price to the price
needed to drive a reduction in emissions of more than 80 percent from
2005 levels by 2050 the U.S. midcentury decarbonization goalor a
price that is consistent with the scenario of limiting warming to 2
degrees Celsius. The International Energy Agency, or IEA, estimates that applying a $140
carbon price economy wide by 2040 would be consistent with emissions
reductions compatible with the 2-degree Celsius goal .31 Government
officials could use this as the basis for a proxy price when reviewing
infrastructure projects. Using a proxy carbon price in energy infrastructure permitting decisions This section
focuses on federal permitting for energy infrastructure, the shape of which will
determine if the world is able to stave off the worst effects of climate
change . In 2012, the IEA examined cumulative carbon emissions from the global energy system and warned that the
worlds existing power plants, factories, and other infrastructure had
already locked in almost four-fifths of the global carbon budgetthe
amount of carbon pollution the world can emit before 2035 without
exceeding a 2-degree Celsius increase of warming and triggering
dangerous climate change.32 The U.S. government, in close coordination with the states,
plays a key role in permitting many types of long-lived energy-related
infrastructure, such as interstate and cross-boundary pipelines and
transmission lines , fossil fuel export facilities , and power plants . Numerous
federal and state agencies share permitting responsibilities, and the permitting process differs by agency and type of project.
Broadly speaking, however, two stages of the permitting process offer the potential for government agencies to use their discretion
to apply a proxy price to inform decision-making: during the environmental review phase and during the assessment of
nonenvironmental factors. Environmental review For major federal actions, the National Environmental Policy Act, or NEPA,
requires the relevant federal agency to assess a proposed projects potential environmental effects on the human environment and
examine alternatives to mitigate these effects.33 NEPA is an important tool for federal agencies to inform federal decision-makers of
the potential environmental consequences of a decision before that decision is made. To assess the long-term financial viability of an
infrastructure project, however, federal regulators need to do more than examine the direct and indirect greenhouse gas impact of a
proposed project; they also need to assess how the project would perform in a carbon-constrained world. NEPA focuses on direct
effects of the proposed project on the environment and indirect effects that are reasonably foreseeable.34 As a result, the NEPA
review process does not provide an obvious opportunity to evaluate the effects of a carbon price on the financial viability of a
project. One recent and high-profile environmental impact statement, however, offers a lens into how federal regulators could
incorporate a proxy price into the environmental assessment of certain projects.
President-elect Donald Trump has long insisted he would pull the U nited S tates out of the
Paris Agreement, but few climate experts meeting here seem willing to take him at
his word . Diplomats and environmental advocates assembled for the first U.N. talks since nearly 200
motivate Trump to soften his climate views , zeal for its standing in the
world would, many predicted . Bucking international sentiment on climate
change could cost him in ways the candidate Trump might not have
realized. "He's had very little contact with world leaders," said Joe Ware, a
spokesman for Christian Aid. "He'll now be having weekly contact with world leaders
who will all be saying to him, 'Whatever you do, don't go and screw up our
planet, thanks very much.'" If he does, it won't help him win their
cooperation in other areas.
Case Econ DA
2AC TL
Plan outweighs any short term slowdown its manageable a
real hard landing isnt
Jake Reynolds 15, Director, Sustainable Economy @ University of Cambridge
Institute for Sustainability Leadership, Unhedgeable risk How climate change
sentiment impacts investment, 2015,
http://www.cisl.cam.ac.uk/publications/publication-pdfs/unhedgeable-risk.pdf
Themacroeconomic analysis shows that the transition to a low-carbon
economy carries increased economic costs in the short term, but that
longer term discounted benefits make a transition more than worthwhile .
The sheer scale of structural change required for the global economy to
shift away from a future dominated by fossil fuels towards a low-carbon
economy requires tremendous investment in new capital infrastructure , in
r esearch and d evelopment, and in new business models. This transition period
lasting years will be costly to the global economy. However, the alternative may well be worse: results
from the macroeconomic analysis show that the No Mitigation scenario triggers a global
recession for three consecutive quarters , shrinking the global economy by as much as 0.1
per cent each quarter.
By comparison, the Two Degrees scenario grows at just 0.3 per cent per quarter, whereas the Baseline model offers
the fastest near-term growth, reaching 0.7 per cent per quarter. Over a longer time horizon (2015-
2050), however, the Two Degrees scenario is shown to outperform the Baseline
by 4.5 per cent with a discount rate of 3.5 per cent . While the degree of benefit varies
by portfolio type, all portfolios experienced short-term losses and long-term benefits in this scenario. Clearly, it is
only after the learning process, technological progress and construction of
new infrastructure systems are complete that the positive benefits of the
new low- carbon economy begin to accrue. Again, this process contrasts with the
No Mitigation scenario, where economic output never recovers , but is
supressed indefinitely below Baseline . mitigated.
The plan is key to green growth --- that outweighs fossil fuel
losses
Rick McGahey 14, teaches economics and public policy at the Milano School of
International Affairs, Management and Urban Policy at the New School. He served as
executive director of the Congressional Joint Economic Committee and as assistant
secretary for policy at the Department of Labor in the Clinton administration, "A
carbon tax will create jobs for Americans", October 3,
www.cnn.com/2014/10/03/opinion/mcgahey-climate-change/
(CNN) -- Critics of climate action like to say that helping our environment
would hurt our economy . Climate-change denier Sen. Jim Inhofe has written that "manmade catastrophic global
warming was the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the American people" and that cap-and-trade legislation could cause the loss of
over 4 million jobs. Inhofe's views matter since he could become the new chairman of the Committee on Environment and Public
Works if Republicans win the Senate in the November elections. But three new studies show climate
action can improve the economy and create jobs . Though transitioning to
clean energy future will cause some disruption, unchecked environmental
damage would cause catastrophic economic loss. So how can climate
action help economy? Business leaders and economists said in a report
that new technologies can spur both economic growth and better climate
outcome. Finance experts at the International Monetary Fund -- hardly a
bunch of tree-huggers -- made a similar point. In their paper about carbon
pricing, they concluded that higher carbon prices can benefit individual
countries even if others don't match them. And economist Robert Pollin and his
colleagues have shown that for every $1 million of investment in clean energy,
the U.S. can create 16.7 jobs compared with only 5.3 jobs from fossil fuel
investments . Overall, green energy investments combined with carbon taxes
can create 2.7 million jobs in areas such as renewable energy, construction, manufacturing, transportation,
new technologies and services -- even taking into account the transitional job loss from
fossil fuel industries . We should pay attention to these ideas. American energy policy is backwards. Federal and
state governments give out over $20 billion in annual subsidies for fossil fuel exploration and production, which benefit highly
if the U.S. implements even a modest
profitable companies such as Exxon Mobil, Shell and BP. But
federal carbon tax, we could generate $170 billion by 2030 to create jobs
and build bridges, roads and schools, reduce budget deficits, and cut
taxes to spur private investment. Without carbon taxes, we treat our environment -- air, oceans and fresh
water -- as a garbage dump where we fill up excess carbon. But the garbage can is overflowing because carbon emitters don't pay
the full price for carbon emissions. Think of it this way: It's like a bad neighbor who dumps garbage in the neighbors' yards. That
person saves money, but everyone else pays to clean up the foul mess and the entire neighborhood suffers. Just like with trash,
carbon taxes must bear the full cost of their negative effects. The first dollar of any carbon tax must help communities and workers
in the transition to green economy. In fact, many fossil fuel job losses already have taken place. West Virginia coal mining
employment fell from 120,000 in 1950 to 25,000 by 2011. Carbon taxes are not the real threat to coal miners and their communities
-- greedy energy companies are. These companies make profit but leave fewer jobs and harm communities. Compensation to job
losers, paid from carbon tax revenues, can be modeled after federal programs such as the Trade Adjustment Assistance for
displaced trade workers or the Pentagon's program that helps communities that lose military bases. There are successful policies
that have reshaped market incentives to give clean energy and green jobs a fair chance. In 2011, Germany expanded wind turbines
and solar energy, aiming to replace all nuclear power. Thirty percent of the country's electricity is now derived from renewables.
Germany's massive investments are driving down wind turbine and solar technology prices, making them more cost-effective. Los
Angeles, urged by an alliance of environmentalists, unions and community organizations, is changing a basic city service -- the
commercial trash pickup -- to cut emissions from garbage trucks, increase recycling and encourage industries to use recycled
materials,to achieve a "zero waste" target by 2050. These new trash policies will also create better, safer and higher-paying jobs.
the next ten to fifteen years and increase thereafter. The v alue a t r isk varies
depending on the degree of warming. The Economist Intelligence Unit calculates the average (mean)
expected loss across scenarios as $4.2tn in financial assets. Under the
extreme scenario of 5-6C of global warming,8 $13.8tn of financial assets
would be destroyed (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015).
The increase in natural disasters will likely affect the insurance industry in
particular. Losses from natural disasters have increased fourfold over the past thirty years (see Figure B4),
particularly uninsured losses. In the short term, insured losses pose challenges for the profitability and resilience of
and increasing share of uninsured losses
the insurance industry, while the costs of the large
The insurance industry might also face losses due to liability risks . As the
physical implications of climate change materialise, some firms (e.g. in the carbon-intensive energy sector)
might face liability claims for their contribution to such change . The insurance
industry might be affected in their role as insurer of third-party liability claims (see PRA, 2015). In the medium- to
long-term, these losses both from natural disasters and from liability claims might shift even
more to the household and non-financial sectors as more risks become
uninsurable.
T restrictions
2AC T Restriction Pauline
Government proxy pricing is a restriction on emissions
Sanford J. Lewis 16, environment and securities law attorney, former part time
instructor of Environmental Law in graduate programs at Tufts University and
U.C.L.A, former legal director for the National Toxics Campaign Fund, JD Michigan
Law, Re: Shareholder Proposal to Exxon Mobil Corporation Regarding stranded
assets due to climate change policy on behalf of New York State Common
Retirement Fund, Feb 22,
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb16/ExxonMobilNYSCRF_2016.pdf
Exxon Mobils optimistic appraisal of the lack of effective government regulation to
implement the 2 degree scenario is also reflected in its process of setting a carbon price internally for purposes of
As stated in the Companys 2014 Report: We also address the
investment decisions.
potential for future climate-related controls, including the potential for restriction
on emissions , through the use of a proxy cost of carbon . The proxy cost
seeks to reflect all types of actions and policies that governments may take over the
Outlook period [through 2040] relating to the exploration, development, production,
transportation or use of carbon-based fuels. Our proxy cost, which in some areas may approach
$80/ton over the Outlook period, .isnot the same as a social cost of carbon, which we believe involves
countless more assumptions and subjective speculation on future climate impacts. It is simply our effort to quantify
what we believe government policies over the Outlook period could cost to our investment opportunities. 16
before it. That phrase suggests the need to identify not merely a condition
governance that does not already exist, but all of them do require governance. A price on carbon is the
most obvious example: it takes a government to set and collect a carbon tax, or to establish emissions trading as a legal
requirement. Re-thinking regulation is another example. As we saw in the recent U.S. Supreme Court case involving the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission versus the Electric Power Supply Association , public utility commissions must be empowered
(no pun intended) to adapt to new conditions. Demand-response pricing requires changes in the ways utilities operate,
which requires reform of our regulatory structures or at least changes in our
interpretation and implementation of them. An integrated grid could in theory be built by the private sector, but it took the
federal government to build a nationwide system of electricity delivery and it will likely take the same to update that
system to maximize renewable utilization. However, 30 years of antigovernment rhetoric have persuaded many citizens that
government agencies are necessarily ineffective (if not inept) and erased our collective memory of the many domains in which
democratic governance has worked well. The demonization of government, coupled with the opposing romanticization of the magic
of the marketplace, has so dominated our discourse that many people now find it difficult to imagine an alternative analysis. Yet
history offers many refutations of the rhetoric of government incapacity, and gives us grounds for reasoned belief in the
capacity of democratic governance to address climate change. Placing the demands of democracy at the center of our
thought also helps us to sort through the various options available to address climate change. One potent argument for carbon
pricing is that market-based mechanisms help to preserve democracy by maximizing individual choice. The political right wing has
said many untrue things about climate change, but conservatives are correct when they stress that properly functioning markets are
To the extent that we can address climate change in bottom-
intrinsically democratic, and top-down decision making is not.
up rather than top-down ways, we should make every effort to do so. Where we cant, democratically elected government can
(and should) step in to build infrastructure, to foster research and development, to create reasonable
incentives and eliminate perverse ones, and to adopt appropriate regulatory
structures. This will require leadership, but of a kind that is completely compatible with democracy. Professor Stehr is
correct: now is not the time to abandon democracy; it is the time to recommit to it.
Oil DA
2AC Saudi Oil DA
Oil prices headed down increased production, fundamentals,
low demand OPEC meeting doesnt solve
Panos Mourdoukoutas 11/13, Professor and Chair of the Department of
Economics, LIU Post in New York, Oil Is Heading Back To $20s, Forbes,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2016/11/13/oil-is-heading-back-
to-20s/#7a6a247e70cf
Oil bulls had a good ride in the last eight months. The black gold rallied, from mid-$20s in
January to the mid-$50s in late October. But economic fundamentals have turned bumpy
for oil bulls in the last couple of weeks, with oil heading towards the $40-
mark rather than the $60-mark as some had expected. And things will continue to
be bumpy in the near future . Oil is heading back to the January lows, as
hopes of an OPEC output freeze have been fading. In fact, OPEC members like
Iran, Libya, Iraq, and Nigeria have been raising rather than cutting oil
output since the Algiers meeting, according to recent industry reports.
Then there are American frackers, the new swing producers in the oil marketa role
previously played by Saudi Arabia. And they are ready to fill in any supply
slack, as soon as prices head north, by bringing oilrigs back on line . Thats
what happened back in July, as oil prices hovered near the $50 mark. Oil rigs were up for four weeks, according to
Baker Hughes, which keeps a weekly tally on the number of rigs in operationa trend that accelerated as oil
continued to trade around $50 in September and October. Overall, 165 oil rigs came back to operation since the
American frackers
late January, helping raise US output and cut foreign oil imports in recent weeks.
role as swing producers will become even more important under the new
administration, which is expected to ease fracking regulations. To make
matters worse for the bulls, global oil demand remains sluggish at best. The world
economy continues to grow at a slow pace under an increasing debt
burden.
The evidence suggests that the carbon bubble is central to Saudi Arabias
decision making. U.S. State Department cables released by WikiLeaks
reveal a Saudi regime that is worried about the impact of climate
legislation on national income. Eighty per cent of the Kingdoms budget is derived from the
petroleum sector, so the prospect of not being able to sell the countrys vast oil
reserves due to global emission limits poses a massive economic and
political threat to the ruling monarchy . Saudi officials are very
concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their
income, wrote the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia in a memo in 2010. As global concern over
climate change intensifies, the Saudis have begun factoring in the reality of
peak demand. In 2013, before oil prices started tumbling, Ali al-Naimi,
Saudi Arabias petroleum minister, told reporters demand will peak way
ahead of supply. In the lead up to climate negotiations in Paris , he acknowledged that in
Saudi Arabia, we recognize that eventually, one of these days, we are not going to
need fossil fuels. I dont know when, in 2040, 2050, or thereafter. This admission is
aligned with the scientific consensus on climate change. What makes it
remarkable is that the comment comes from the oil minister of the
worlds preeminent petrostate . The Saudis have snapped out of denial
and are actively working to diversify their economy and plan for a post-
carbon world. According to Naimi, the Kingdom plans to become a global
power in solar and wind energy.
Domestic production link turn US oil increasing now causes
supply competition -- the plan stops that drilling approval
and infrastructure will be a key determinant
Natalie Regoli 11-1-16, lead major projects partner in Baker & McKenzie's
Houston office, Crude Oil Exports from the US: Current Issues and Future Outlook,
http://www.texaslawyer.com/home/id=1202770449445/Crude-Oil-Exports-from-the-
US-Current-Issues-and-Future-Outlook?
mcode=1202619848557&curindex=1&slreturn=20160930164627
There are some indications that exports may now be starting to rise. Global
oil trading company Trafigura recently announced it is moving 5 to 7 million
barrels of crude from the U.S. gulf coast to the U.K. and the Netherlands. The
same company recently opened an office in Midland, Texas, where it will focus on moving
Permian Basin-produced oil "around the globe to the best market ," according to
the company's director of North America operations. Whether exports will begin increasing
more rapidly depends on the economics. If U.S. production remains low, and
the gap between the price of West Texas Intermediate (the U.S. benchmark) and Brent crude (the global
benchmark) remains narrow by historical standards, it is difficult to see how exports really
take off. However, if the price of WTI returns to something lower relative to Brent, exporting more crude may
begin to make sense for more players in the market. Some energy analysts have suggested there is an opportunity
for expanded exports from the U.S. due to the June 26 expansion of the Panama Canal. This past summer the
Panama Canal Authority inaugurated a new set of locks which allow for the transit of larger ships. This was the first
such expansion since the canal was completed in 1914. Despite some speculation to the contrary, the expansion of
the canal is unlikely to have a major impact on crude oil flows. This is because crude is typically loaded on vessels
classified as Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) or Ultra-Large Crude Carriers (ULCCs), both of which are still too
large to transit the Panama Canal even with the new locks. Some petroleum products including propane are often
loaded on smaller vessels, some of which can transit the existing and new canal depending the ship's hull design.
Therefore, although the canal expansion may increase exports of certain petroleum products, there is unlikely to be
Now that the ban has been (mostly) lifted, other
a major impact on crude exports.
there is a renewed urgency in Riyadh of the need to reduce the economys dependency on oil.
Wood Mackenzie estimates that Saudi Arabia needs an oil price of $92 a barrel to
balance its budget this year a stark indication of the challenge facing
the kingdom in the current oil price environment . Kuwait has the lowest fiscal break-even
of $57 a barrel. Oil prices are currently trading around $46 a barrel and the
failure to put in place a deal that was agreed in Algiers in September
would bring more pain for producer nations. The consequences are clear
and the experience of the past two years has been noted, said Mohammed
Barkindo, the secretary-general of Opec said on Tuesday.
No middle east war---all players in the region are pragmatic
and will balance accordingly
Hadar 11/2/11former prof of IR at American U and Mount Vernon-College. PhD
in IR from American U (Leon, Overhauling U.S. Policy in the Middle East,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/overhauling-us-policy-the-middle-east-6087)
power in the Middle Easttriggered in part by eroding American influence in the region is bringing to the fore
realpolitik concerns that likely will overcome ideological considerations in
the new Middle East. The Israel-Hamas prisoner exchange, the U.S. role in Libyas civil war and the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq all point in that direction.
Lets begin with the prisoner exchange. The interesting thing about the exchange of one Israeli soldier for more than 1,000 jailed Palestinians was not that it happened, but that it happened now, when
Islamist influence seems to be on the rise in Egypt.
Israeli leaders, with the support of most of the public and the elites, have been negotiating a deal along these lines for the last five years with Egyptian security officials playing the main role as
mediator.
But following the fall of Hosni Mubaraks pro-American in Egypt, the conventional wisdom in Cairo and Jerusalem was that the Israeli-Hamas negotiations would collapse. Pundits were predicting
that the fall of a pro-American leader committed to the peace accords between Israel and Egypt would make it difficult for any new government to embrace policies perceived as beneficial to Israel.
In fact, anti-Israel rhetoric and demonstrations emanating from Tahrir Square and elsewherecoupled with the growing diplomatic strains between the ruling Israeli Likud government and Islamist
Turkish leaders and the continuing military tensions between the Jewish state and the Ayatollahs in Tehranseemed to play directly into Israeli fears of being surrounded by a hostile Muslim entity.
Yet this nightmare scenario assumed that the Muslims in the Middle East
Egyptians, Turks, Iranians and Saudis as well as multiple tribes, sects and ethic groupswere going to form
a unified political and military front to confront Israel. This scenario is based in part on real fears about the policies of Iran and Turkey and the
rhetoric emanating from the Arab Street. But such fears have been amplified by Israeli ultra-
assistance to Egypt that have induced the Egyptians to refrain from going to war with
Israel. The 1979 accord reflected the reality that the evolving power balance
led both Israel and Egypt to conclude that a war between them would be too
costly and detrimental to their interests .
The global and regional developments since 1979 have strengthened the determination
of both sides to maintain peace . Egypt, economically bankrupt and
unable to feed and educate its own people, is certainly not positioned to
pursue military confrontation with Israel.
Moreover, the rise in power and influence of Egypts Muslim Brotherhood makes it more likely that
future governments in in Cairo will have an interest in co-opting Gaza Strip Hamas
leaders, whose movement is a political offshoot of the Islamist party founded
in Egypt in 1928.
In a way, Hamas may be evolving into a client (mini)state of a more Islamist-oriented Egypt. In that context, Egypts interest would be in
That Turkey has also played an active role in negotiating the Israel-Hamas
prisoner exchange is also an encouraging sign, notwithstanding the stresses in the relationship between Ankara and Jerusalem.
The Turks have no interest in exacerbating tensions between Israel
and its Arab neighbors because that could destabilize the Middle
East, Turkeys new diplomatic and economic frontier .
Its probably not realistic to expect the emergence of a diplomatic and military axis between
Egypt and Turkey that would join with Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf oil sheikdoms to
counter the influence of Iran and its satellites in Iraq and Lebanon and to manage the power transition in Syria. Turkey and Iran, after all, share
common interests in curbing Kurdish irredentism inside their borders. Unlike the Saudis and the Israelis, Turkey wants
to avoid a military confrontation between the United States and Iran.
But the reemergence of new cooperative and competing centers of power in the
Middle East Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabiaprovide the United States, the European Union (EU) and Israel with new strategic
opportunities. Instead of wasting time and resources on fantastical
freedom agendas and countering the imaginary or real influence of political Islam, a more effective policy would be
to hedge ones strategic bets by forming ad hoc partnerships with these players to advance concrete interests.
Hence, in the aftermath of the agreement with Hamas, Israel could improve its relationship with Cairo and Ankara and perhaps even create the conditions for some sort of coexistence with Hamas-
ruled Gaza. This could, not coincidentally, put more diplomatic pressure on the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.
Indeed, the Israeli-Egyptian-Turkish collaboration that led to the prisoner exchange is one example of such a creative strategic approach that seeks new opportunities rather than fixating on old
threats.
What this suggests for the United States is that there may be cost-effective ways of securing American interests in the Middle East at a time of political change there and of diminishing American
military and economic resources. Libya offers a better approach than Iraq. Rather than pursuing hegemonic and ideologically driven policies, the United States could provide incentives for other
players to handle some of the heavy lifting.
Indeed, the Iraq War could provide a case study of how not to pursue U.S. interest in the Middle East. President George W. Bush and his neoconservative advisers disregarded the ethnic and sectarian
realities in Iraq and the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Thus they helped shift power in Iraq from the Arab-Sunnis to the Arab-Shiites, all the while strengthening Iran.
That policy only harmed U.S. interests while failing to advance democratic values in Iraq, and it antagonized regional partners (Saudi Arabia; Turkey) as well as global players with interests to protect.
The EU, for example, might have provided military and financial support to a more modest project aimed at containing Saddam Husseins Iraq.
In Libya, on the other hand, it was the European powers that took the military lead in bringing about regime change. America encouraged Britain and France to do so while it accepted a supporting
military role.
a relatively large shock, this may trigger further shocks elsewhere in the
financial system and the broader economy . The following overview briefly outlines the
main propagation channels for individual financial institutions. What could occur if an individual pension fund
suffers losses: If the loss is large, or the funding ratio of the pension fund was already low, the employer may be
required to make an additional one-off contribution to the pension fund to cover the funding shortfall. Whether such
an obligation exists depends on the pension contract; for most pension funds, the employer may be under pressure
to make a higher contribution but there is no automatic obligation. The cost of an extra contribution may cause an
unexpected loss for the employer. If the loss is large or the funding ratio of the pension fund was already low, the
pension premiums for employees may be increased or the pension entitlements for employees and pensioners
reduced.This could have an effect on consumer confidence and demand and
hence the economic cycle. Increasing premiums has a direct effect on the
net income of employees. Decreasing entitlements has a smaller direct effect on the
income of pensioners only, but may reduce confidence among a broader group of
consumers. If the loss is large, the pension fund may lower its risk profile to reduce the risk of further losses.
In general, pension funds do this by increasing the proportion of their assets in relatively safe assets, especially low-
risk sovereign bonds, at the expense of high-risk asset classes such as listed equities, private equity and real
estate. To some extent, such a shift happens automatically if the share values of fossil fuel companies fall and a
pension fund does not rebalance its asset mix. However, a pension fund may also actively reduce its equity
investments and investments in other high-risk assets categories. Such behaviour could have a broader effect on
specific financial markets. If an individual bank suffers losses: The market value of the bank
will fall, generating losses for shareholders of the bank. If the loss is large, the risk premium
for the banks market funding will increase and the credit rating of the
bank could be adjusted downwards. This reduces the value of the bonds
issued by the bank, generating losses for bondholders. If the loss is large, the bank may try to restore its
capital ratio by reducing the size of its balance sheet. In other words, the bank could restrict new
lending, especially to high-risk segments such as small and medium
enterprises, to reduce its overall risk exposure as its capacity to bear risks has been decreased. This
could lead to higher borrowing costs or even unavailability of credit for
small businesses that are dependent on the bank and cannot easily switch to another source of credit. If
a bank with investment banking operations suffers large losses on financial investments for its own account,
traders may try to quickly sell the high-carbon assets to limit their losses .
In contrast to pension funds, it is likely that the behavioural response would be
quick and only affect the market for high-carbon assets, but it could potentially have a
broader effect on stock markets. If the loss is very large and the banks capital buffers were
already low, this may trigger the need for recapitalisation. Depending on the banks funding structure and the
market situation, private recapitalisation could take place through a claim emission, imposing further losses on
existing shareholders, or the conversion of subordinated debt, imposing losses on holders of subordinated debt
securities, including pension funds and insurance companies. When the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
comes into force, the bail-in of senior bondholders will become a possibility. (The compromise text of the directive
was agreed upon in December 2013 and is to be formally adopted by the EU Parliament and the Council). If further
the government of the banks
recapitalisation is needed and a private solution is not possible,
home country may need to provide a capital injection. This may be the case if
uninsured corporate and institutional depositors start to withdraw their money and the bank faces
difficulties in obtaining market funding , depleting the banks liquidity
buffers and creating a real danger that the bank cannot survive on its own .
In the current situation, the government may then need to step in to restore confidence. This
will increase the governments debt burden and exposes the government
to large financial risks. (The EUs single resolution fund that was agreed on in December 2013 will
initially consist of national compartments. In the coming years, the capacity of the fund therefore
mainly depends on contribu-tions from the national banking sector, which will be insufficient to
dedicated industrial clusters, for example, harbours for offshore wind. Large deployment
levels bring about economies of scale , a high level of specialisation and
increased efficiency.
Prizes CP
Fail
Innovation cant come close to solving
Jeroen van den Bergh 13, Research Professor, Institute of Environmental Science
& Technology of Universitat Autnoma de Barcelona, January 2013, Environmental
and climate innovation: Limitations, policies and prices, ScienceDirect,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162512001862
Important environmental innovations which will reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to the atmosphere are thus likely to take a considerable amount
of time. However, climate change is occurring at a rapid pace , and the
question is not whether we can find innovative solutions at some time in
the future but whether we can realize these sufficiently rapidly [50]. There is no
doubt that with enough time available we will be able to achieve almost anything in terms of renewable energy
technologies, of course within thermodynamic limits.But time is not on our side . This is
illustrated by history, which shows that the full realization of energy
transitions in specific countries, such as (from wood) to coal, to oil, and to
electrification took some 200, 85 and 65 years, respectively [16]. Virtually
all economic studies, regardless of the particular model and assumptions used, show that the
major part of the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the coming
decades is unlikely to be realized through technological innovation. Instead,
it will come from environmental regulation that alters consumer and producer decisions
about environmentally relevant inputs and outputs. This in turn will cause changes in the
production input structure and in the sector and demand structure of
national economies. Undoubtedly, this will involve the adoption of (already existing) technologies,
possibly with minor improvements, but it will not depend on extended innovation
patterns and major technological breakthroughs. This conforms to predictions by the
International Energy Agency, which state that most reductions in GHG emissions in the coming decades will come
from a more efficient use of fossil fuels and not innovations in renewable energy [17]. To understand the difference
between innovation and substitution, notice that production depends on the factors labor, capital and
environmental or energy input (or waste output). Technological change can take different forms, namely neutral
technical change and biased technical change which alters the relative productivity of the associated input factor.
Evidently, technological change will alter the opportunities for energy
substitution in production. There is a long-standing debate on capital-energy substitution in
production. According to reviews of econometric studies of aggregate production functions by Koetse et al. [23],
some 75% of the estimates suggest that energy and capital are either complements or weak substitutes. This
suggests that investment in production capital, which is necessary for most technical innovations, may not be very
effective in terms of reducing energy use and associated pollutive emissions. Acemoglu et al. [1] have presented a
general model with dirty and clean alternatives to examine whether innovation can ultimately lead to a sustainable
economy, and if so, under which conditions. They find that if the alternatives are complementary, then long run
growth needs to be stopped to avoid environmental disaster. In this case technological innovation is not fast enough
Various studies can be
to overcome the environmental effects of scale increases due to income growth.
cited to illustrate the relative contribution of technological innovation to
solving enhanced global warming. For example, a CGE study for the USA by a famous modeling
team [20] finds that over 20252040, induced technical change (ITC) reduces the
cost of economic adjustment by no more than 8%. Using a very different dynamic
optimization model for the world, Hedenus et al. [14] find that ITC (in this case carbon pricing) reduces the net
present value (NPV) of abatement costs with 310% compared with the case of exogenous technical change
(extrapolating historical trends). Moreover, specific innovation policies, such as subsidies, feed-in tariffs and green
certificates, further reduce the NPV with 47%. These magnitudes are consistent with other studies [7], [12] and
[34]. Popp [36] uses energy-related patents as a proxy for energy innovation, and finds that 1/3 of the overall
All these
response of energy use to prices was due to induced innovation, and 2/3 to factor substitution.
studies suggest that innovation and innovation policy cannot be used as
an excuse for not implementing stringent environmental regulation of
climate-relevant emissions.