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Zack Voell VECTOR Only

Generic: Unilateral Sanctions Fail


By: Zack Voell
October 2008

1. Opening/Closing Quote

Quote by Pope John Paul II during visit to Cuba


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“The manifest failure of U.S. policy prompted Pope John Paul II during his historic visit to Cuba in January 1998 to declare that
sanctions are "always deplorable, because they hurt the most needy."

2. Unilateral Sanctions have little or no effect

Unilateral Sanctions are little more than expressions of opposition


Richard N. Haass, [Vice President and Director House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade], “Use and Effect of
Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, published by Brookings Institute, May 17, 1999,
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/1999/0527sanctions_haass.aspx, (ZV)
As a rule, unilateral sanctions tend to be little more than statements or expressions of
opposition except in those instances in which the tie between the United States and the
target is so extensive that the latter cannot adjust to an American cut-off.

Advocates of Unilateral Sanctions admit their impact is only second best


Richard N. Haass, [Vice President and Director House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade], “Use and Effect of
Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, published by Brookings Institute, May 17, 1999,
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/1999/0527sanctions_haass.aspx, (ZV)
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“Even advocates of unilateral sanctions would admit that their impact is second best. The
problem is that it is often extremely difficult to garner international support for particular sanctions. Prospects for
succeeding in bringing others on board tend to reflect a range of factors, including
commercial stakes, policy preferences, and the availability of funds to compensate lost
revenues.”

Sanctions may inflict some pain but largely fail


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“Even if sanctions inflict some pain on the target country, they typically fail because of
the nature of regimes most likely to become targets of sanctions. Human rights abuses tend to vary
inversely with economic development. Governments that systematically deprive citizens of basic human rights typically intervene in
daily economic life, resulting in underdeveloped and relatively closed economies. Such nations are the least sensitive to economic
pressure. The autocratic nature of their governments also means that they are relatively insulated from any domestic discontent caused
by sanctions. If
anything, sanctions tend to concentrate economic power in the hands of the
target government and reduce that of citizens.”

Unilateral sanctions are rarely effective


Jennifer Cummings, [journalist], “NFTC President Testifies That Unilateral Iran Sanctions Legislation Would Come at a “Heavy
Price”, April 8, 2008, published by USA-ENGAGE, http://www.usaengage.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=443&Itemid=61, (ZV)
“In testimony delivered today before the Senate Finance Committee, National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC) President and
USA*Engage Co-Chair Bill Reinsch expressed serious concern about the unilateral approach to sanctions contained in the Iran
unilateral sanctions are rarely
Counter-Proliferation Act of 2007 (S. 970). During his testimony, Reinsch noted that
effective, would limit any progress made on the U.S. diplomatic front, and would
endanger multilateral diplomacy by putting in place unilateral sanctions with
extraterritorial reach.”

3. Unilateral Sanctions simply do not work

US markets will be handed over to foreign countries by sanctioned countries


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“For example, today the United States accounts for 20% of world exports of agricultural
equipment and 16% of world exports of telecommunications equipment. The "offending"
countries need not buy such products from us; the most likely impact of unilateral
sanctions is simply to hand markets over to foreign competitors.”

Unilateral Sanctions simply do not work


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Unilateral sanctions simply do not work. There are no examples of U.S. unilateral
economic sanctions changing the basic character or significant policies of a foreign
nation.”

US Unilateral Sanctions largely fail


Middle Eastern Policy Review, “Policy Brief #9; U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions”, December 13,
2002, http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/12-13-02.asp, (ZV)
“Unilateral U.S. sanctions have been increasingly applied in the Gulf, though they have largely failed to
bring about desired changes of behavior on the part of targeted countries such as Iran and Iraq.
This has led many regional experts to argue that sanctions, once tools of policymaking, now constitute de facto U.S. policy in and of
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themselves. To be more effective in the future, U.S. policy should aim for internationally supported sanctions that are increasingly
targeted and better balanced with incentives. They should also contain provisions for expiration unless explicitly renewed.”

It is practically guaranteed that unilateral sanctions will fail


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“Defenders of sanctions often cite South Africa as a success, but sanctions were not the only reason apartheid fell; the fall of the
Soviet Union contributed to the climate of reform. Moreover, sanctions against South Africa differed from most U.S. sanctions today
in two key respects. One, they were multilateral, while the large majority of sanctions imposed by the United States since 1993 have
been unilateral. Second, the apartheid government in South Africa was answerable to a limited but still sizable electorate of about 5
million whites, which made the government more sensitive to outside pressure. Given
that multilateral sanctions
against a semi-democratic government were not sufficient to force change, it is virtually
guaranteed that unilateral sanctions against a dictatorship will fail.”

Historically Unilateral Sanctions Fail


Jennifer Cummings, [journalist], “NFTC President Testifies That Unilateral Iran Sanctions Legislation Would Come at a “Heavy
Price”, April 8, 2008, published by USA-ENGAGE, http://www.usaengage.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=443&Itemid=61, (ZV)
“Citing a recent report from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Reinsch noted that historically unilateral
sanctions fail to achieve their intended purpose and are therefore largely ineffective in
changing the behavior of sanctioned regimes. “Given that the regime has learned how to survive decades of
sanctions, more pressure by the United States alone is very unlikely to convince Iran to change its
behavior. Instead, the best hope of altering Iran’s behavior is through vigorous and unified multilateral pressure in concert with
our allies and Security Council partners, combined with direct diplomacy with Iran,” Reinsch stated.”

Unilateral Sanctions are an unwelcome obstacle to both parties


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“The attempt to punish foreign governments through unilateral sanctions and secondary
boycotts is an unwelcome obstacle on the road to greater freedom of commerce. That
development bodes ill for U.S. citizens, for America's diplomatic relations with our major
trading partners, and for the poor of the targeted nations who are the most likely victims
of economic sanctions.”

Trade Deficits are no reason to implement sanctions


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“The Clinton administration made a wise decision in 1994 when it de-linked human rights from trade and granted China its annual
waiver for MFN. The next logical steps are to give China a multiyear waiver and to facilitate China's entry into the World Trade
Organization. One emerging complaint against China is its significant trade "surplus'' with the United States. Trade
deficits,
particularly between two nations, are not important economic indicators, do not represent
job "losses,'' and should not be used to justify actions that restrict the flow of goods and
services between nations.”

The US imposing Unilateral Sanctions has started an international fad


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
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“First, resort[ing] to unilateral sanctions has become almost a fad. A recent study of the National
Association of Manufacturers found that, in the past four years, the U.S. imposed unilateral sanctions
for foreign policy reasons 61 times. The 35 targeted countries account for over 40% of
the world's population and about one-fifth of the potential export markets for American
goods, services, and farm products.”

Unilateral Sanctions simply FAIL!


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“Second, unilateral sanctions do not work. Unfortunately, the current popularity of unilateral sanctions is badly misplaced. In the
vast majority of cases, these measures fail to impose a significant burden on their
intended targets. This reflects the tremendous expansion of global trade and the intense competition among exporters that
exists today in virtually every industry. There are few goods, services or technologies that cannot now be acquired from a wide variety
of sources.”

a. Because other global suppliers will fill in the gap

Other global suppliers will fill in the gap for the sanctioned country
Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“If Washington seeks to punish another country by unilaterally withholding exports, such
as farm products, computers, or oil-drilling services, other global suppliers stand ready to
fill the gap.”

i. ie. General Trade Sanctions

Trade sanctions rarely succeed


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“Trade sanctions seldom work because of the competitive global marketplace and the
nature of regimes most likely to arouse America's ire. Although the United States is by
far the world's largest economy, its global economic leverage is limited.

The US is not a major exporter of importer


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“The United States accounts for only 13 percent of the world's merchandise exports and
16 percent of its imports.”

ii. ie. High-tech sanctions

Sanctions of high-tech products fail


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“Export controls on high-tech goods suffer from two fatal flaws: The first is that similar
technology can often be obtained off the shelf from foreign competitors. Export controls succeed
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The second flaw
only in cutting U.S. firms out of fast-growing foreign markets without enhancing national security one bit.
is that whatever controls are written into law are quickly outdated by Moore's law of
technological advancement. Today's "supercomputer" inevitably becomes tomorrow's
high-end PC.

4. Unilateral Sanctions hurt the Sanctioning country

The thought process of applying sanctions lacks wisdom and sense


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“With exports presently accounting for a third of our economic growth, one must
question the wisdom of applying sanctions to 20% of our export markets. That may not
hurt much now, with our economy purring along impressively, but the hurt will unquestionably be felt in
the future.”

5. Examples of Unilateral Sanctions Failing

a. Persian Gulf

Unilateral Sanctions against Persian Gulf


Middle Eastern Policy Review, “Policy Brief #9; U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions”, December 13,
2002, http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/12-13-02.asp, (ZV)
“By the 1990s, unilateral U.S. sanctions in the Gulf were not producing the desired policy
outcomes, in large measure because of the increasing ability and willingness of other
states to provide banned goods and services to those countries sanctioned by the United
States.”

b. Iraq

Unilateral Sanctions against Iraq


Middle Eastern Policy Review, “Policy Brief #9; U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions”, December 13,
2002, http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/12-13-02.asp, (ZV)
“Perhaps the most notable multilateral sanctions regime imposed on a Gulf state in the 1990s was that against Iraq on 6 August 1990
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), following Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. The UNSC also imposed a
multilateral sanctions regime on Libya (beginning with Resolution 748 of 31 March 1992), in response to the Libyan government's
failure to cooperate with the United Nations (UN) in establishing responsibility for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.2 In
addition to these, U.S. unilateral sanctions against both Libya and Iran remained in force,
culminating in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), which introduced sanctions
against foreign firms investing in either country's energy sectors.3 Significantly, those
sanctions imposed by the United States unilaterally during the 1990s were much more
likely to stem from acts of Congress than from executive orders.”

c. Cuba

Unilateral Sanctions are failing against Cuba


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
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“America's ongoing embargo against Cuba illustrates the failure of sanctions. When the
United States first imposed a comprehensive trade embargo in 1961, Cuba was
conducting most of its trade with the United States. Since then, sanctions have utterly
failed to influence the government of Fidel Castro, which has used the embargo to excuse its own policy
failures and gain international sympathy.”

US Maintained failing sanctions in Cuba


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“The 35-year economic embargo of Cuba, a tiny country less than 90 miles from our
coast, is a monument to the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic sanctions as a foreign
policy tool. Yet, as Table 53.1 shows, the United States maintains sanctions against a number of
countries, and several others are likely targets of future sanctions.”

d. Iran

Sanctions against Iran are doomed to failure


Islamic Republic News Agency, “Sobhani: US' unilateral sanctions against Iran to fail”, October 28, 2007,
http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-17/0710288353180627.htm, (ZV)
“Director General of the American Affairs Department at Foreign Ministry Ahmad Sobhani said here Sunday that the US'
unilateral sanctions against Iran are doomed to failure. Sobhani said in an interview that the US sanctions
and its statesmen's hostility to Iran's Islamic Revolution are not something new and the sanctions date back to as far as 28 years ago.”

Sanctions in Iran is a classic example of unilateral failure


Richard N. Haass, [Vice President and Director House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade], “Use and Effect of
Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, published by Brookings Institute, May 17, 1999,
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/1999/0527sanctions_haass.aspx, (ZV)
Iran is also a textbook example of how unilateral American sanctions can be little more
than a windfall for European companies who otherwise would have difficulty competing.

e. South Africa

Facts say that S. Africa was another example of failure


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Supporters of sanctions often point to South Africa as a success story, but the facts tell a
different tale. It is unrealistic to credit the U.S. congressional vote for sanctions in
October 1986 with the overthrow of apartheid. It was not outside forces but powerful and
well-organized domestic political forces that, after a three-decades-long struggle,
achieved the peaceful overthrow of an anachronistic system that had no moral standing.”

f. Libya

US sanctions on Libya; Unilateral Sanctions have unintended negative consequences


Middle Eastern Policy Review, “Policy Brief #9; U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions”, December 13,
2002, http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/12-13-02.asp, (ZV)
“Another example of the unintended negative consequences of U.S. sanctions is the
revenue that has been accrued by the government of Libya through national exploitation
of U.S.-held oil leases, including, notably, the Waha Concession. U.S. sanctions on Libya forced U.S.
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companies to discontinue active involvement in 1986, thereby allowing the Qaddafi
regime to reap a substantial windfall from purely domestic operation of U.S.-held
properties. In effect, U.S. sanctions designed to limit the resources of the Libyan
government have actually led Tripoli to garner millions of dollars in oil revenues that
would have otherwise gone to U.S. companies.”

6. Unintended Negative Effects of Unilateral Sanctions

a. Negative effect #1: Wrong message sent

Sanctions send the wrong message about the sanctioned country


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
U.S. government restrictions send the wrong message about America's belief in the
positive influence of private investment and fail to recognize that U.S. companies help
foster greater economic and political freedom for people in developing nations.

b. Negative effect #2: Diplomatic relations hurt

Unilateral Sanctions harm diplomatic relations with other friendly countries


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Such sanctions harm our diplomatic relations with friendly countries, as evidenced by the threat of
our major trading partners to retaliate against American measures that penalize their companies. Other nations object
particularly to the extraterritorial authority the U.S. government assumed over citizens of
foreign countries.”

Unilateral Sanctions general political friction


Middle Eastern Policy Review, “Policy Brief #9; U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions”, December 13,
2002, http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/12-13-02.asp, (ZV)
“An arguably less palpable (but equally noteworthy) negative consequence of U.S.
unilateral sanctions in the Gulf is that ILSA's secondary sanctions provisions have
generated political friction and economic feuding between the United States and its
European allies.”

c. Negative effect #3: US economy hurt

Unilateral sanctions make sanctioning country hurt


James A. Paul, [executive director of the Global Policy Forum] and Senwan Akhtar, [B.S., University of Pennsylvania; J.D.
candidate, School of Law, New York University], “Sanctions: An Analysis”, published by the Global Policy Forum, August, 1998,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/anlysis2.htm, (ZV)
Unilateral sanctions can even backfire, harming exporters in the sanction-imposing
country most of all. In the 1980 grain embargo, US farmers suffered more than Soviet
consumers.

Unilateral Sanctions will hurt the US economy


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Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
If and when we have a downturn in our domestic economy, people will be clamoring for
export related jobs--at which time we'll unhappily discover that we've given them away
through unilateral sanctions.

Gradually Unilateral Sanctions hurt the US more than the sanctioned country
Richard N. Haass, [Vice President and Director House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade], “Use and Effect of
Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, published by Brookings Institute, May 17, 1999,
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/1999/0527sanctions_haass.aspx, (ZV)
“Over time, economic sanctions tend to lose their bite. In a global economy, unilateral
sanctions tend to impose greater costs on American firms than on the target who can
usually find substitute sources of supply and financing. The impact of such sanctions can
be offset by factors beyond our control, as in the case of Iran where increases in the price
of oil more than compensated for any penalty introduced as a result of U.S. policy. Iran is
also a textbook example of how unilateral American sanctions can be little more than a windfall for European companies who
otherwise would have difficulty competing.”

Unilateral Sanctions hurt US companies and increased proliferation of trade


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Current sanction policies have hurt American companies while accomplishing little else.
More engagement with the outside world, through increased tourism and a proliferation
of trade and investment activity, is more likely to encourage the changes we would all
like to see take place in Cuba, Burma, and elsewhere. Since dictatorships thrive by controlling the populace
and finding scapegoats for domestic problems, greater interchange with the democratic, market-oriented United States would
accomplish more than isolation.”

d. Negative effect #4: American influence & prosperity threatened

Unilateral sanctions have hurt US global influence and prosperity in the past
Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“Third, unilateral sanctions threaten America's prosperity and global influence. Incredibly,
we seem to have forgotten the lessons of past embargoes. The Institute for International Economics
concluded that U.S. sanctions cost $15 billion to $19 billion in lost exports in 1995, which
translates into a loss of 200,000 jobs in the export sector. Beyond the direct damage of
current sales and jobs lost, unilateral sanctions generate extensive downstream effects.
The loss of a sale of a fleet of aircraft sacrifices the sale of related service contracts,
upgrades, and replacement parts, as well as long-term commercial relationships that can
generate new sales in the future. Therefore, the job loss over time will far exceed that
attributable to the initial sanctions decision.”

Example: Soviet Grain embargo/President Carter


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade
Sanctions”, October 23, 1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
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“The case of the Soviet grain embargo is a classic illustration of this. When
President Carter imposed the embargo against Russia to protest the invasion of
Afghanistan, the Russians simply turned to other suppliers, all of whom were
delighted to seize market share from the United States. Russia paid a bit more for grain than if
it had bought from us, but not much more. By the time President Reagan terminated the
embargo, American farmers had lost $2.3 billion in sales. Seventeen years later,
we have not yet restored our Russian grain exports to pre-embargo levels.”

Example: Siberian Pipeline materials


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade
Sanctions”, October 23, 1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“As in the case of the grain embargo, once foreign competitors establish a beachhead in
markets the U.S. has abandoned, for whatever reason, the losses to American
workers and farmers multiply. When the United States banned exports of
equipment for use in building the Siberian pipeline in the early 1980s, Europe and
Japan gained a foothold in the previously U.S.-dominated market for arctic
drilling equipment, which they fully exploited.”

Example: Japanese Soybean ban


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade
Sanctions”, October 23, 1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“When the United States banned soybean exports to Japan in 1973, the Japanese
invested in Brazilian soybean production. The U.S. share of world soybean
exports then fell dramatically, and today Brazil is still our toughest export
competitor.”

Constant use of unilateral sanctions hurt foreign confidence in US suppliers


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“Over time, the cumulative effect of the repeated resort to unilateral sanctions is a loss of
confidence in American suppliers and America as a place to do business. If we do not take action
to shore up that basis of trust and America's image as a reliable business partner, we will place in jeopardy the robust export sector that
has contributed so much to our current economic prosperity. Sapping
our economic strength, in turn, will
reduce America's political influence on the world stage.”

Unilateral Sanctions have unintended Negative consequences


Middle Eastern Policy Review, “Policy Brief #9; U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Unilateral U.S. Sanctions”, December 13,
2002, http://www.mepc.org/forums_briefs/12-13-02.asp, (ZV)
“Whatever the successes of largely unilateral U.S. sanctions in the Gulf, such sanctions
have also produced unintended negative consequences. Perhaps the most pervasive of
these is growing "anti-Americanism" among the populations of Gulf states caused by,
among other things, the perception that U.S.-led UN sanctions on Iraq are largely
responsible for the suffering and impoverishment of Iraqi civilians. Though many within and outside
the U.S. government believe that it is rather Saddam Hussein's hoarding and misuse of UN oil-for-food monies that perpetuates the
plight of his people, the Iraqi dictator has nevertheless managed to reap propaganda value from U.S. and UN sanctions.”
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Unilateral Sanctions cause loss of US exports, profits & jobs
Richard N. Haass, [Vice President and Director House Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Trade], “Use and Effect of
Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, published by Brookings Institute, May 17, 1999,
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/1999/0527sanctions_haass.aspx, (ZV)
“But it is also important to contemplate the side-effects of unilateral American sanctions.
These consequences transcend lost American exports, profits and jobs. In the case of Cuba, U.S.
sanctions may have made it easier for the Castro regime to maintain control over the Cuban economy and society. There and
elsewhere (including Iran), American sanctions have been exploited as justifications for regime repression and excuses for regime
incompetence. Sanctions may have had the perverse effect of weakening civilian rule in Pakistan and increasing its focus on nuclear
weaponry.”

7. Unilateral Sanctions should not be implemented in the future

The US should abandon unilateral sanctions


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Undoing current sanctions and refraining from imposing new unilateral sanctions
against Burma, China, Nigeria, and other nations is the best policy course for the United
States. Such sanctions are ineffective, eschew normal diplomatic channels, and
undermine our international relations. U.S. companies are often hurt, not only directly,
but indirectly because they gain a reputation as unreliable suppliers. Congress should at a minimum
adopt reforms that make clear to the public the costs of such sanctions to individual companies and the U.S. economy as a whole.
We should abandon the practice of attempting to improve the conduct of other nations by
restricting the freedom of our own citizens.”

Embargo’s have completely lost international support


Daniel T. Griswold, [director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute], “Going Alone on Economic Sanctions
Hurts U.S. More than Foes”, November 27, 2000, CATO Institute, http://www.freetrade.org/node/216, (ZV)
“Although the embargo once enjoyed a measure of international support, today no other
nation stands behind it. The reason is obvious: nearly 40 years after its imposition, the
embargo has only hurt American companies and the Cuban people, while leaving the
Castro regime firmly entrenched with little prospect of change.”

8. Other countries recognize the failure of Unilateral Sanctions

France, Italy, Britain, Germany know the failure of Unilateral Sanctions


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“It is vainglory to believe that by adopting unilateral sanctions America is "leading by
example,'' since nations throughout the world not only have refused to support recent
U.S. sanctions but have actively opposed them. Leaders in France, Italy, Britain,
Germany, and much of the rest of the world view economic sanctions as
counterproductive and generally favor them only in extraordinary circumstances, such as
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war. Great Britain, for example, never supported the sanctions against South Africa and believes its constructive engagement policy
was successful.”

Other Countries are doing the exact opposite of US Unilateral Sanctions


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Our major trading partners are unlikely to support any future congressionally imposed ban on doing business in Burma. To have any
hope of effectiveness, such a boycott would require the cooperation of China, Singapore, and other Asian nations, which is not likely
to happen. In fact, Asian countries are choosing, not isolation, but closer engagement with
Burma, having invited it to participate in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. As
has happened elsewhere in the world, U.S. unilateral sanctions against Burma will serve
primarily to transfer business from American to foreign firms without accomplishing
larger goals. To date, those U.S. corporations that have pulled out of Burma have seen their investments replaced by companies
from Singapore and Western Europe.”

a. Impact: Option of success removed

American Trade sanctions will fail


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Without multilateral support, American trade sanctions can succeed only if a U.S.
company is a monopoly supplier of a good or service to the targeted nation, which is not
the case virtually anywhere in the world. In the absence of a monopoly, U.S. unilateral
sanctions simply transfer business from an American company to a foreign competitor in
the same market.”

9. Multilateral Sanctions/Global Trade Engagement have proven success

Sanctions are not the answer but rather Global engagement


CATO Handbook for Congress; 105th Congress, “53, Unilateral Sanctions”, accessed October 7, 2008,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-53.html, (ZV)
“Since dictatorships thrive by controlling the populace and finding scapegoats for
domestic problems, greater interchange with the democratic, market-oriented United
States would accomplish more than isolation.”

Multilateral sanctions advance American Interests


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“Not all sanctions are ineffective. In particular, multilateral sanctions have often
advanced American interests. The extraordinary consensus to oppose Soviet
expansionism led to 40-years of effective export restraints imposed by the anti-
Communist allies through CoCom, the Coordinating Committee on East-West Trade. Since the end of the Cold War,
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multilateral sanctions against Iraq and Serbia have also curbed activities hostile to U.S.
interests.”

Multilateral sanctions are a far better option as apposed to unilateral


Clayton K. Yeutter, [Former U.S. Trade Representative; former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture], “Testimony Before the Subcommittee
on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means: Hearing on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions”, October 23,
1997, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/trade/105cong/10-23-97/1023yeut.htm#N_1_, (ZV)
“If diplomacy fails, and it sometimes will, then let's examine multilateral sanctions as an
option, not unilateral ones. Unilateral sanctions are the easy answer in these situations,
which is one reason why we often choose them. Diplomacy is hard work, and it takes
time, which does not suit our penchant for a quick response. Puttinge allies in the Gulf War, a coalition
brilliantly pulled together by President Bush. That is one reason the War was a success for us, and it is also the reason that multilateral
sanctions have an infinitely higher probability of success than do unilateral sanctions. Putting it in crass political terms, if all we want
is "an issue," if all we want is to tell our constituents that we're "doing something," then we might as well use unilateral sanctions even
But if we really want to affect abhorrent behavior elsewhere
though they'll accomplish little or nothing.
in the world, we ought to demand of ourselves the patience to do it right. In this case that means starting with
diplomacy, and then moving, if necessary, to a multilateral sanctions effort.”

Multilateral sanctions work better than unilateral sanctions


William A. Reinsch, [Under Secretary for Export Administration Department of Commerce], “Before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on U.S. Agricultural Sanctions Policy for the 21st Century”, published by the U.S. Department of Commerce; Bureau of
Industry and Security, May 11, 1999, http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/archive99/warmay11_99test.html, (ZV)
“First, when we look at the broad outline of sanctions policy, it is clear that multilateral
sanctions are generally more effective in enforcing international norms, advancing U.S.
interests and defending U.S. values. Multilateral sanctions maximize international
pressure while minimizing damage to the U.S. economy. Unilateral sanctions are usually
much less effective since there are few products or services for which the United States is the only producer. For agricultural
products, the large number of alternative suppliers means that unilateral sanctions may do more damage to U.S. farmers than to their
intended target. The President's decision takes this into account.”

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