Gashem Baksh v CA of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
Facts: In August 1986, while working as a waitress in
Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21
years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old
exchange student from Iran who was studying
medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close and
intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem
later offered to marry her at the end of the semester.
Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where
they expressed their intention to get married. Marilous
parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to
the wedding. They even started looking for animals to
slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his
apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in
no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his
promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is
already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou
went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded
her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed
marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to
have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he,
being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs
and traditions.
Issue:
Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
Is Article 21 of the Civil Code applicable in the case?
Held:
[I]The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concept of torts or quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving
of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept his and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
Now, if someone promises or agrees to marry
his or her lover, and at the last minute backs out on
the promise, will it constitute as an actionable wrong?
The answer is no. But one can sue for recovery of
actual damages, like wedding expenses.
The act of marrying is a personal obligation,
therefore legally; a demand for specific performance is
simply out of the questionbeing tantamount to
involuntary servitude. Our laws do not provide specific
reliefs for cases arising purely from a breach of ones
promise to marry another. Although, there was
supposed to be a chapter on breach of promise to
marry proposed by the Code Commission but it was
deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code
apparently because of lessons from other countries,
that the action readily lends itself to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men
(Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949,
2352).
However, the Court has allowed moral or
exemplary damages not so much on the breach of
promise but of the fraud or deceit and the consequent
pain and humiliation suffered. This is pursuant to
Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides that
any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
In Baksh vs. CA (219 SCRA 115), it was held -
[T]hat where a mans promise to
marry is in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a
woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle
her to accept him and to obtain her
consent to the sexual act, could justify
the award of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the
willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such
injury should have been committed in
a manner contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy.
Exxon vs Baker
1
Facts: In 1989, petitioners (collectively, Exxon) sever remedies from their causes of action, see
supertanker grounded on a reef off Alaska, spilling Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 . There is
millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy
Sound. The accident occurred after the tankers the entire field of pollution remedies, nor is it likely that
captain, Joseph Hazelwoodwho had a history of punitive damages for private harms will have any
alcohol abuse and whose blood still had a high alcohol frustrating effect on the CWAs remedial scheme. Pp.
level 11 hours after the spillinexplicably exited the 1015.
bridge, leaving a tricky course correction to unlicensed
subordinates. Exxon spent some $2.1 billion in cleanup 3. The punitive damages award against Exxon was
efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations excessive as a matter of maritime common law. In the
occasioning fines, settled a civil action by the United circumstances of this case, the award should be limited
States and Alaska for at least $900 million, and paid to an amount equal to compensatory damages. Pp. 15
another $303 million in voluntary payments to private 42.
parties. Other civil cases were consolidated into this
one, brought against Exxon, Hazelwood, and others to (a) Although legal codes from ancient times
recover economic losses suffered by respondents through the Middle Ages called for multiple damages
(hereinafter Baker), who depend on Prince William for certain especially harmful acts, modern Anglo-
Sound for their livelihoods. At Phase I of the trial, the American punitive damages have their roots in 18th-
jury found Exxon and Hazelwood reckless (and thus century English law and became widely accepted in
potentially liable for punitive damages) under American courts by the mid-19th century. See, e.g.,
instructions providing that a corporation is responsible Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371. Pp. 1617.
for the reckless acts of employees acting in a
managerial capacity in the scope of their employment.
(b) The prevailing American rule limits punitive
In Phase II, the jury awarded $287 million in
damages to cases of enormity, Day v. Woodworth, 13
compensatory damages to some of the plaintiffs;
How. 363, 371, in which a defendants conduct is
others had settled their compensatory claims for $22.6
outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton,
million. In Phase III, the jury awarded $5,000 in punitive
and reckless indifference for others rights, or even
damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion against
more deplorable behavior. The consensus today is that
Exxon. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Phase I jury
punitive damages are aimed at retribution and
instruction on corporate liability and ultimately
deterring harmful conduct. Pp. 1721.
remitted the punitive damages award against Exxon to
$2.5 billion.
(c) State regulation of punitive damages varies. A
few States award them rarely, or not at all, and others
Issue:
permit them only when authorized by statute. Many
Held: 1. Because the Court is equally divided on
States have imposed statutory limits on punitive
whether maritime law allows corporate liability for
awards, in the form of absolute monetary caps, a
punitive damages based on the acts of managerial
maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages,
agents, it leaves the Ninth Circuits opinion undisturbed
or, frequently, some combination of the two. Pp. 2123.
in this respect. Of course, this disposition is not
precedential on the derivative liability question. See,
e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 . Pp. 710. (d) American punitive damages have come under
criticism in recent decades, but the most recent studies
tend to undercut much of it. Although some studies
2. The Clean Water Acts water pollution penalties,
show the dollar amounts of awards growing over time,
33 U. S. C. 1321, do not preempt punitive-damages
even in real terms, most accounts show that the
awards in maritime spill cases. Section 1321(b)
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards
protects navigable waters , adjoining shorelines,
remains less than 1:1. Nor do the data show a marked
[and] natural resources, subject to a saving clause
increase in the percentage of cases with punitive
reserving obligations under any law for damages
awards. The real problem is the stark unpredictability
to any privately owned property resulting from [an
of punitive awards. Courts are concerned with fairness
oil] discharge, 1321(o). Exxons admission that the
as consistency, and the available data suggest that the
CWA does not displace compensatory remedies for the
spread between high and low individual awards is
consequences of water pollution, even those for
unacceptable. The spread in state civil trials is great,
economic harms, leaves the company with the
and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive
untenable claim that the CWA somehow preempts
damages that dwarf the corresponding
punitive damages, but not compensatory damages, for
compensatories. The distribution of judge-assessed
economic loss. Nothing in the statute points to that
awards is narrower, but still remarkable. These ranges
result, and the Court has rejected similar attempts to
2
might be acceptable if they resulted from efforts to
reach a generally accepted optimal level of penalty and
deterrence in cases involving a wide range of
circumstances, but anecdotal evidence suggests that is
not the case, see, e.g., Gore, supra, at 565, n. 8. Pp.
2427.
(e) This Courts response to outlier punitive
damages awards has thus far been confined by claims
that state-court awards violated due process. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U. S. 408 . In contrast, todays enquiry arises under
federal maritime jurisdiction and requires review of a
jury award at the level of judge-made federal common
law that precedes and should obviate any application
of the constitutional standard. In this context, the
unpredictability of high punitive awards is in tension
with their punitive function because of the implication
of unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict
carries. A penalty should be reasonably predictable in
its severity, so that even Holmess bad man can look
ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in
choosing one course of action or another. And a
penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a
fair probability of suffering in like degree for like
damage. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 . Pp.
2829.
(f) The Court considers three approaches, one
verbal and two quantitative, to arrive at a standard for
assessing maritime punitive damages. Pp. 2942.
(i) The Court is skeptical that verbal
formulations are the best insurance against
unpredictable outlier punitive awards, in light of its
experience with attempts to produce consistency in the
analogous business of criminal sentencing. Pp. 2932.
(ii) Thus, the Court looks to quantified limits.
The option of setting a hard-dollar punitive cap,
however, is rejected because there is no standard
tort or contract injury, making it difficult to settle upon
a particular dollar figure as appropriate across the
board; and because a judicially selected dollar cap
would carry the serious drawback that the issue might
not return to the docket before there was a need to
revisit the figure selected. Pp. 3239.
(iii) The more promising alternative is to peg
punitive awards to compensatory damages using a
ratio or maximum multiple. This is the model in many
States and in analogous federal statutes allowing
multiple damages. The question is what ratio is most
appropriate. An acceptable standard can be found in
the studies showing the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory awards. Those studies reflect the
judgments of juries and judges in thousands of cases
as to what punitive awards were appropriate in
circumstances reflecting the most down to the least
blameworthy conduct, from malice and avarice to
recklessness to gross negligence. The data in question
put the median ratio for the entire gamut at less than
1:1, meaning that the compensatory award exceeds
the punitive award in most cases. In a well-functioning
system, awards at or below the median would roughly
express jurors sense of reasonable penalties in cases
like this one that have no earmarks of exceptional
blameworthiness. Accordingly, the Court finds that a
1:1 ratio is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases.
Pp. 3942.
(iv) Applying this standard to the present case,
the Court takes for granted the District Courts
calculation of the total relevant compensatory
damages at $507.5 million. A punitive-to-compensatory
ratio of 1:1 thus yields maximum punitive damages in
that amount. P. 42.
472 F. 3d 600 and 490 F. 3d 1066, vacated and
remanded.
ANDAMO VS IAC
Quasi-delicts; Elements of quasi-delict.A careful
examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that
the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a
quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he
must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad
Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in
Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of
respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances,
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land,
caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners'
crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers
during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action,
docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
3
Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed
another action against respondent corporation, this
time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court.
Issue:
Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim
damages for destruction caused by respondents water paths
and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and
2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.
Held:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted
complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present,
to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths
and contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners.
There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court
applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code
and held that "any person who without due authority
constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or
communication between a creek or a lake and a river,
thereby causing loss and damages to a third party who,
like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the
payment of an indemnity for loss and damages to the
injured party. While the property involved in the cited
case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact
remains that petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges
that petitioners have sustained and will continue to
sustain damage due to the water paths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation.
Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged
presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal
connection between the act and the damage, with no
pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties
make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. It
must be stressed that the use of one's property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe
upon the rights and interests of others. Although we
recognize the right of an owner to build structures on
his land, such structures must be so constructed and
maintained using all reasonable care so that they
cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can
withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If
the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on
a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict
and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is
actually charged also criminally), to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article
2177 of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES
EDGARDO L. LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents
BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO,
FACTS: Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount
an academic institution operated and maintained by Child L
Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked ins
boys comfort room in Marymount. He started to panic so he
and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. H
decided to open the window to call for help. As he opened the w
Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timot
hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple p
injuries.
He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against
the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors which
includes the Spouses Limon. They claim that the school
was negligent for not installing iron grills at the window
of the boys comfort room. CLC, in its defense,
4
maintained that there was nothing defective about the
locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of
Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC
further maintained that it had exercised the due care
and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the
safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents. The
respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court of
Appeals who affirmed the trial courts ruling in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the school was negligent for the
boys accidental fall.
RULING: YES.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of
evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2)
the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other
person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence and the damages incurred.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed
to provide precautionary measures to avoid harm and
injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix
a defective door knob despite having been notified of
the problem; and (2) failure to install safety grills on
the window where Timothy fell from.
During trial, it was found that the lock was defective.
The architect witness testified that he did not verify if
the doorknob at the comfort room was actually put in
place. Further, the fact that Timothy fell out through
the window shows that the door could not be opened
from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that
something was wrong with the door, if not the door
knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the
accident was of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for
the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within
the exclusive management or control of the person
charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it
that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in
working condition. The fact that a student had to go
through the window, instead of the door, shows that
something was wrong with the door.
As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners
contend that there was no such requirement under the
Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such
window, as petitioners themselves point out, was
approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was
within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the
door, not functioning. Petitioners, with the due
diligence of a good father of the family, should have
anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a
non-working door, would attempt to use the window to
call for help or even to get out. Considering all the
circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to
sustain a finding of liability on petitioners part.
Petitioners argument that CLC exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of its employees is not decisive. Due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
is applicable where the employer is being held
responsible for the acts or omissions of others under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In this case, CLCs
liability is under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
premised on the fact of its own negligence in not
ensuring that all its doors are properly maintained.
The Courts pronouncement that Timothy climbed out
of the window because he could not get out using the
door, negates petitioners other contention that the
proximate cause of the accident was Timothys own
negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were
the product of a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated
from CLCs own negligence.
PETITION DENIED.
HUANG VS PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS
Facts: On June 11, 1995, Delia and Huang went for a
swim at the Dusit hotel. At around 7:00 p.m., the
hotels swimming pool attendant informed them that
the swimming pool area was about to be closed. The
two proceeded to the shower and dressed up but when
they came out, the entire swimming pool area was
already pitch black and nobody else was around but
the two of them. They then proceeded to the main door
but it was locked. Delia then looked for the phone so
the petitioner followed. Petitioner then saw a phone at
the lifeguard counter but while slowly walking towards
the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned
out to be the folding wooden counter top, fell on
petitioners head that knocked her down almost
unconscious.
Delia got a hold of the house phone and
notified the operator of the incident. The hotel staff
arrived but it took them 20-30 mins to arrive. Three
hotel chambermaids assisted petitioner by placing an
ice pack and applying some ointment on her head.
After petitioner had slightly recovered, she requested
to be assisted to the hotels coffee shop to have some
rest. Petitioner demanded the services of the hotel
physician.
Dr. Dalumpines arrived but instead of
immediately providing medical assistance, she
requested that a waiver be signed otherwise, the hotel
management will not render any assistance. Petitioner
refused to do so. Thereafter, the petitioner after eating
dinner left the hotel. She then started to feel
extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an
uncomfortable feeling in her stomach, which lasted
until the following day. Petitioner was constrained to
stay at home, thus, missing all her important
appointments with her patients. She also began
experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches that
caused her three (3) sleepless nights. Thereafter, she
5
decided to consult Dr. Noble, a neurologist from Makati
Medical Center and revealed that the MRI showed that
her head was bruised and that petitioner has a very
serious brain injury. Petitioner also consulted Dr.
Adapon who required an EEG that showed that she has
a serious condition- a permanent one. Her condition did
not get better; hence, she consulted a neurosurgeon,
Dr. Sibayan who required an X-ray who likewise found
the same results as the previous doctors.
Petitioner then sent a demand letter seeking payment
of 100,000,000 representing loss of earnings on her
remaining life span but the letter was unheeded. Later
on, petitioner when to the US and consulted Dr.
Steinberg and Dr. Diokson from Mount Sinai Hospital
who both found that she has "post traumatic-post
concussion/contusion cephalgias-vascular and
neuralgia. She returned to the Philippines and the
doctors advised her to just relax and take her
medications and take a therapy for her neck pain. In
1996, she consulted Dr. Lopez, a ophthalmologist for
her poor eyesight who stated that she has a permanent
and serious detached eye. Out of frustration, she
consulted another doctor, Dr. Pardo, where she
disclosed that she had a stroke at age 18 due to mitral
valve disease.
The diagnosis of Dr. Pardo showed that, she developed
the following injuries: 1. Cerebral Concussion and
Contusion 2. Post-traumatic Epilepsy 3. Post-
concussional Syndrome 4. Minimal Brain Dysfunction 5.
Cervical Sprain, chronic recurrent. The doctor opined
that such injuries resulted from the events that
occurred on June 11, 1995.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the complaint is one for violation of
an Implied Contract so that res ipsa loquitur is
applicable in this case?
2. Whether or not respondents are liable for the injury
sustained by the petitioner based on the theory of
quasi-delict?
Held: 1. No. The allegations in Huangs Complaint
constitute a cause of action for quasi-delict, which
under the New Civil Code is defined as an act, or
omission which causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence.
2.Huang utterly failed to prove the alleged negligence
of Dusit Hotel.
The trial court similarly observed that the records
revealed no indication that the head injury complained
of by petitioner was the result of the alleged 11 June
1995 accident.
Firstly, petitioner had a past medical history which
might have been the cause of her recurring brain
injury.
Secondly, the findings of Dr. Perez did not prove a
causal relation between the 11 June 1995 accident and
the brain damage suffered by petitioner. Even Dr. Perez
himself testified that the symptoms being experienced
by petitioner might have been due to factors other
than the head trauma she allegedly suffered. It bears
stressing that petitioner had been suffering from
different kinds of brain problems since she was 18
years old, which may have been the cause of the
recurring symptoms of head injury she is experiencing
at present. Absent, therefore, of any proof establishing
the causal relation between the injury she allegedly
suffered on 11 June 1995 and the head pains she now
suffers, her claim must fail.
Thirdly, Dr. Teresita Sanchezs (Dr. Sanchez) testimony
cannot be relied upon since she testified on the
findings and conclusions of persons who were never
presented in court. Ergo, her testimony thereon was
hearsay.
Fourthly, the medical
reports/evaluations/certifications issued by myriads of
doctors whom petitioner sought for examination or
treatment were neither identified nor testified to by
those who issued them. Being deemed as hearsay,
they cannot be given probative value. Even assuming
that petitioner suffered head injury as a consequence
of the 11 June 1995 accident, she cannot blame
anyone but herself for staying at the hotels swimming
pool area beyond its closing hours and for lifting the
folding wooden counter top that eventually hit her
head.56
For petitioners failure to prove that her serious and
permanent injury was the result of the 11 June 1995
accident, thus, her claim for actual or compensatory
damages, loss of income, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorneys fees, must all fail.
Quasi delict governs because she was only a guest of
Delia. the pertinent provision of Art. 2176 of the Civil
Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called
quasi-delict."
Quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
PETER PAUL PATRICK LUCAS, et al. vs. DR.
PROSPERO MA. C. TUAO
DOCTRINES:
6
In a medical negligence suit, the patient or his heirs, in
order to prevail, is required to prove by preponderance
of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that
degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other
persons in the same profession; and that as a
proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs
suffered damages.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or
the improper performance of such duty, by the
attending physician when the patient is injured in body
or in health constitutes the actionable malpractice.
FACTS: Herein petitioner, Peter Lucas, first consulted
respondent, Dr. Tuao, on a complaint of soreness and
redness on his right eye. The respondent, after a series
of examinations, found that the former was suffering
from conjunctivitis or sore eyes and prescribed the
use of the Spersacet-C. However, after the petitioners
condition seemed to have worsened, he sought for the
respondents second finding wherein the latter said
that his condition had progressed to Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC), a viral infection. The respondent
then prescribed the use of Maxitrol, a steroid-based
eye drop. The petitioners condition worsened
overtime, yet he obediently complied with all the
prescriptions and orders of the respondent.
Four months later and after the petitioner suffered from
significant swelling of his right eyeball, headaches,
nausea and blindness on this right eye, he sought for
the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Aquino. Dr. Aquino
found that the petitioner had been suffering from
glaucoma and needed to undergo laser surgery, lest he
might suffer from total blindness.
After reading the literature on the use of the medicine
Maxitrol, Fatima, one of the petitioners herein and
Peter Lucas wife, read that one of the adverse effects
of prolonged use of steroid-based eye drops could
possibly be glaucoma. Peter, Fatima, and their two
children instituted a civil case for damages against
herein respondent for medical malpractice.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners amply proved that Dr.
Tuao failed to exercise diligence in the performance of
his duty as petitioner Peter Lucas physician.
Held:
No. Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence
required of Dr. Tuao under the circumstances, the
Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate the
attendant facts of the case at hand to be able to state
with confidence that the acts complained of, indeed,
constituted negligence and, thus, should be the subject
of pecuniary reparation.
In medical negligence cases, also called medical
malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient
relationship between the doctor and the victim. But
just like any other proceeding for damages, four
essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3)
injury; and (4) proximate causation, must be
established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements
must co-exist in order to find the physician negligent
and, thus, liable for damages.
As the physician has the duty to use at least the same
level of care as that of any other reasonably competent
physician would use in the treatment of his patient,
said standard level of care, skill and diligence must
likewise be proven by expert medical testimony,
because the standard of care in a medical malpractice
case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of
experts in the field. The same is outside the ken of the
average layperson.
There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or
the improper performance of such duty, by the
attending physician when the patient is injured in body
or in health [and this] constitutes the actionable
malpractice. Hence, proof of breach of duty on the part
of the attending physician is insufficient. Rather, the
negligence of the physician must be the proximate
cause of the injury.
Air France v Carrascoso
Facts: Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil
engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila -
Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of
Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat
because there was a "white man" who had better right
to the seat. As a result, he filed a suit against Air
France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and
exemplary damages.
Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class
seat and consequently
Whether or not he was entitled to the damages
awarded.
Held:
Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger
and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued is
desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand
how a reputable firm like Air France could have the
indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor
at all. It received the corresponding amount in
payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is
more in keeping with the ordinary course of business
that the company should know whether or not the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not."
Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection
on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case, it could have
been easy for Air France to present its manager to
testify at the trial or secure his deposition but
defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to
whether or not a prior reservation was made by the
white man.
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from
enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he imposed
his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat,
made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to
tourist class just to give way to another passenger
whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad
7
faith.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal is conduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuse from such employees. Any
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards
a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier.
Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of
ejectment fits into the condition for exemplary
damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill
will or for ulterior purpose
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO
SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS,
FACTS: A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which
caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the
second-floor premises of the Philippine School of
Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents
of the deceased to file suit in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge Regina
Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA
and its corporate officers. At the time of his death,
Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce
course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school's academic
community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and several
school authorities, including the chief of security and
his assistant chief.
The private respondents sought to adjudge them liable
for their sons death due to the their negligence,
reckless and lack of security precautions, means and
methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim.
The petitioners alleged that the complaint against
them has no cause of action given that PSBA is an
academic institution. And academic institution is
beyond the ambit of rule as provided by Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents and on
appeal, the appellate court ruled the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the liability of the school and
the authorities is based on quasi-delict.
RULING: NO. The liability is based on the students and
the schools contractual relations.
Contractual Relations of students and the school
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between
them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the
school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him
with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or
"built-in" obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its
primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,
no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or
higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts
and other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades
exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb.
Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate
steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince
a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising
from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-
contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented
this Court from determining the existence of a tort
even when there obtains a contract.
Non-applicability of Article 2180 and 2176
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis.
Article 2180 plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of
the educational institution sought to be held liable for
the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody.
However, this material situation does not exist in the
present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of
Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts
the school could be made liable.
8
In comparison with Air France vs Carrascoso
In Air France vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private
respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted
expulsion from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner
airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to
the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort,
not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect,
Air France is authority for the view that liability from
tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act
that breaks the contract may be also a tort.
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as
early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind.
In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice
Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation
is much broader than that of
contractual obligation, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of juridical
human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that
is to say, the mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does not
relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor
may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract
would have constituted the source of
an extra-contractual obligation had no
contract existed between the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21,
which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or
public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage. (emphasis
supplied).
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline
which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly
oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a
white man who allegedly "had a better right to the
seat."
Breach of Contract not yet proven in the present case
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached
thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a
breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of
Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not
be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence
becomes material only because of the contractual
relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a
contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot
exist independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties
posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned,
for conceptually a school, like a common carrier,
cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks.
This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila
where there have been reported several incidents
ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism.
It would not be equitable to expect of schools to
anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures
installed, the same may still fail against an individual
or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed
inside school premises and environs. Should this be the
case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that
the breach of its contractual obligation to the students
was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined
to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is
required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time
and place.
PETITION DENIED. The case is reverted back to the trial
court for further proceedings.
MANILA RAILROAD CO. VS. COMPANIA
TRANSATLANTICA
FACTS:
SS/Alicante, belonging to Compania Transatlantica
de Barcelona was transporting two locomotive boilers
for the Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of
the ship for discharging the heavy cargo was not
strong enough to handle the boilers. Compania
Transatlantica contracted the services of Atlantic gulf
and Pacific Co., which had the best equipment to lift
the boilers out of the ships hold. When Alicante
arrived in Manila, Atlantic company sent out its floating
crane under the charge of one Leyden.
When the first boiler was being hoisted out of the
ships hold, the boiler could not be brought out
because the sling was not properly placed and the
9
head of the boiler was caught under the edge of the
hatch. The weight on the crane was increased by a
strain estimated at 15 tons with the result that the
cable of the sling broke and the boiler fell to the
bottom of the ships hold. The sling was again
adjusted and the boiler was again lifted but as it was
being brought up the bolt at the end of the derrick
broke and the boiler fell again.
The boiler was so badly damaged that it had to be
shipped back to England to be rebuilt. The damages
suffered by Manila Railroad amounted to P23,343.29.
Manila Railroad then filed an action against the
Streamship Company to recover said damages. The
Steamship Company caused Atlantic Company to be
brought as co-defendant arguing that Atlantic
Company as an independent contractor, who had
undertaken to discharge the boilers had become
responsible for the damage.
The Court of First Instance decided in favor of
Manila Railroad, the plaintiff, against Atlantic Company
and absolved the Steamship Company. Manila Railroad
appealed from the decision because the Steamship
Company was not held liable also. Atlantic Company
also appealed from the judgment against it.
ISSUES:
1. Was the Steamship Company liable to Manila
Railroad for delivering the boiler in a damaged
condition?
2. Was Atlantic Company liable to the Steamship
Company for the amount it may be required to pay the
plaintiff?
1. Was Atlantic Company directly liable to
plaintiff as held by the trial court?
RULING:
There was a contractual relation between the
Steamship Company and Manila Railroad. There was
also a contractual relation between the Steamship
Company and Atlantic. But there was no contractual
relation between the Railroad Company and Atlantic
Company.
There was no question that the Steamship
Company was liable to Manila Railroad as it had the
obligation to transport the boiler in a proper manner
safe and securely under the circumstances required by
law and customs. The Steamship Company cannot
escape liability simply because it employed a
competent independent contractor to discharge the
boiler.
Atlantic Company claimed that it was not liable,
because it had employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family and proper care in the selection of
Leyden. Said argument was not tenable, because said
defense was not applicable to negligence arising in the
course of the performance of a contractual obligation.
The same can be said with respect to the liability of
Atlantic Company upon its contract with the Steamship
Company. There was a distinction between negligence
in the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa
contractual) and negligence considered as an
independent source of obligation (culpa aquiliana).
Atlantic Company wasis liable to the Steamship
Company for the damage brought upon the latter by
the failure of Atlantic Company to use due care in
discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that the
damage was caused by the negligence of an employee
who was qualified for the work, duly chose with due
care.
Since there was no contract between the Railroad
Company and Atlantic Company, Railroad Company
can had no right of action to recover damages from
Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which
constituted the violation of the contract. The rights of
Manila Railroad can only be made effective through the
Steamship Company with whom the contract of
affreightment was made.
Light Rail Transit Authority vs Navidad
FACTS:
October 14, 1993, 7:30 p.m. : Drunk Nicanor
Navidad (Nicanor) entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a token.
o While Nicanor was standing at the
platform near the LRT tracks, the guard
Junelito Escartin approached him.
o Due to misunderstanding, they had a
fist fight
Nicanor fell on the tracks and
killed instantaneously upon
being hit by a moving train
operated by Rodolfo Roman
December 8, 1994: The widow of Nicanor,
along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Escartin, Roman, LRTA, Metro
Transit Org. Inc. and Prudent (agency of
security guards) for the death of her husband.
o LRTA and Roman filed a counter-claim
against Nicanor and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent
Prudent: denied liability
averred that it had exercised
due diligence in the selection
10
 and surpervision of its security
guards
LRTA and Roman: presented
evidence
Prudent and Escartin: demurrer
contending that Navidad had
failed to prove that Escartin
was negligent in his assigned
task
RTC: In favour of widow and against Prudent
and Escartin, complaint against LRT and Roman
were dismissed for lack of merit
CA: reversed by exonerating Prudent and held
LRTA and Roman liable
ISSUE: W/N LRTA and Roman should be liable
according to the contract of carriage
HELD: NO. Affirmed with Modification: (a) nominal
damages is DELETED (CANNOT co-exist w/
compensatory damages) (b) Roman is absolved.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business
and for reasons of public policy, is burdened
with the duty off exercising utmost diligence in
ensuring the safety of passengers
Civil Code:
o Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances
o Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries
to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755
o Art. 1759. Common carriers are liable
for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or
wilful acts of the formers employees,
although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers
This liability of the common carriers does NOT
cease upon proof that they
Exercised all the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees
o Art. 1763. A common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a
passenger on account of the wilful acts
or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carriers
employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission.
Carriers presumed to be at fault or been
negligent and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieaved of the duty to still
establish the fault or negligence of the carrier
or of its employees and the burden shifts upon
the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure
Where it hires its own employees or avail itself
of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task, the
common carrier is NOT relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage
GR: Prudent can be liable only for tort under
Art. 2176 and related provisions in conjunction
with Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (Tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort [quasi-delict
liability] is that which breaches the contract)
o EX: if employers liability is negligence
or fault on the part of the employee,
employer can be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum
that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its
employees.
o EX to the EX: Upon showing due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee
Factual finding of the CA: NO link bet. Prudent
and the death of Nicanor for the reason that
the negligence of Escartin was NOT proven
NO showing that Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be
absolved from liability
o Contractual tie bet. LRT and Nicanor is
NOT itself a juridical relation bet.
Nicanor and Roman
Roman can be liable only for
his own fault or negligence
11
 BARREDO VS GARCIA AND ALMARIO
FACTS: On May 3, 1936, there was a head-on collision
between a taxi of the Malate taxicab driven by
Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Dimapilis. The
carretela was over-turned, and a passenger, a 16-year
old boy, Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla, and he was
convicted.
The court in the criminal case granted the petition to
reserve the civil action. Garcia and Almario, parents of
the deceased, on March 7, 1939, filed a civil action
against Barredo, the proprietor of the Malate Taxicab
and employer of Fontanilla, making him primarily and
directly responsible under culpa acquiliana of Article
2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
It is undisputed that Fontanillas negligence was the
cause of the accident, as he was driving on the wrong
side of the road at high speed, and there was no
showing that Barredo exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family, a defense to Article 2180 of the said
Code. Barredos theory of defense is that Fontanillas
negligence being punished by the Revised Penal Code,
his liability as employer is only subsidiary, but
Fontanilla, was not sued for civil liability. Hence,
Barredo claims that he cannot be held liable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily
liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903
which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil
action and this is more expeditious because by the
time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already serving
his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple
traffic infractions already before he hired him
something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had
Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily
liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages
arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but
rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee
(Article 1903).
Quasi-delict or culpa acquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code of the Philippines is
entirely distinct and independent from a delict or crime
under the Revised Penal Code. In this jurisdiction, the
same negligent act causing damage may produce civil
liability (subsidiary) arising from a crime under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines; or
create an action for quasi-delicto or culpa aquiliana
under Articles 2179 and 2180 of the Civil Code and the
parties are free to choose which course to take.
And in the instant case, the negligent act of Fontanilla
produces two (2) liabilities of Barredo: First, a
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of Fontanilla
arising from the latters criminal negligence under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, and second,
Barredos primary and direct responsibility arising from
his presumed negligence as an employer under Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Since the plaintiffs are free to
choose what remedy to take, they preferred the
second, which is within their rights. This is the more
expedious and effective method of relief because
Fontanilla was either in prison or just been released or
had no property. Barredo was held liable for damages.
ELCANO VS HILL
FACTS: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of
Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case
against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack
of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil
action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for
damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill
argued that the civil action is barred by his sons
acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil
liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact
that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason
of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly
liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal
case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A
separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only
to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of
Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however,
12
also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation
by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the
childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer
his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.
Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the
SC however ruled since at the time of the decision,
Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be
subsidiary only as a matter of equity.
EQUITABLE LEASING CORP VS SUYOM
Facts:
On July 17, 1994, a Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul
Tutor rammed into the house cum store of Myrna
Tamayo in Tondo, Manila. A portion of the house was
destroyed which caused death and injury. Tutor was
charged with and later convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple
physical injuries.
Upon verification with the Land Transportation Office, it
was known that the registered owner of the tractor was
Equitable Leasing Corporation/leased to Edwin Lim. On
April 15, 1995, respondents filed against Raul Tutor,
Ecatine Corporation (Ecatine) and Equitable Leasing
Corporation (Equitable) a Complaint for damages.
The petitioner alleged that the vehicle had already
been sold to Ecatine and that the former was no longer
in possession and control thereof at the time of the
incident. It also claimed that Tutor was an employee,
not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was liable for damages
based on quasi delict for the negligent acts.
Held:
The Lease Agreement between petitioner and Edwin
Lim stipulated that it is the intention of the parties to
enter into a finance lease agreement. Ownership of the
subject tractor was to be registered in the name of
petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully
paid by Edwin Lim.
Lim completed the payments to cover the full price of
the tractor. Thus, a Deed of Sale over the tractor was
executed by petitioner in favor of Ecatine represented
by Edwin Lim. However, the Deed was not registered
with the LTO.
Petitioner is liable for the deaths and the injuries
complained of, because it was the registered owner of
the tractor at the time of the accident.The Court has
consistently ruled that, regardless of sales made of a
motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful
operator insofar as the public and third persons are
concerned.
Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the
tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the
deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of
the driver.
LIM VS PING
Principle: A single act or omission that cause damage
to an offended party may gave rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1)civil
liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the
criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil
liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability
may be based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as felony. It may also
be based on an act or omission that may constitute
felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from
the criminal action by specific provision of the Article
33 of the Civil Code.
FACTS: FR Cement Corporation issued several
withdrawal authorities for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement and Tiger bilt. Each
withdrawal authority contained provision that it is valid
for six months from its date of issuance, unless
revoked by FRCC Marketing Department .Filcement and
Tigerbilt sold their withdrawal authorities to Co. On
February Co then sold these withdrawal authorities to
Lim. Using the withdrawal authorities Lim withdrew
cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to
withdraw the remaining bags covered by the
withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co
and administrative manager of Fil-Cement, who
explained that the plant implemented a price increase
and would only release the goods once Lim pays the
price difference or agrees to receive lesser quantity of
cement. Lim filed case of Estafa through
Misappropriation or Conversion against Co. The
Regional Trial Court acquitted Co. After the trial on the
civil aspect of the criminal case the court also found Co
not civilly liable. Lim sought a reconsideration which
the regional trial Court denied. On March 14, 2005 Lim
filed her notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the
criminal case. On April 19, 2005 Lim filed a complaint
for specific performance and damages before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is no forum shopping for
a private complainant to pursue a civil complaint for
specific performance and damages while appealing the
judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case for
estafa?
HELD: A single act or omission that cause damage to
an offended party may gave rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender (1)civil liability ex
delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal
offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
and (2) independent civil liability, that is civil liability
that may be pursued independently of the criminal
proceedings. The independent civil liability may be
based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as felony. It may also be
13
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony
but, nevertheless, treated independently from the
criminal action by specific provision of the Article 33 of
the Civil Code. Because of the distinct and independent
nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence
holds that the offended party may pursue two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without
offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia
or res judicata. The criminal cases of estafa are based
on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual. The first action is
clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been
instituted together with criminal action. On the other
hand, the second action, judging by the allegations
contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from
contractual obligation and fortuitous conduct. The Civil
Case involves only the obligation arising from contract
and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case
involves only the civil obligations of Co arising from the
offense charged.
PICART VS SMITH
FACTS: On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had
gotten half way across, Smith approached from the
opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew
his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued
his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not observing
the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the
novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going
to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that
he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over
to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith
guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of
the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant
assumed that the horseman would move to the other
side.
Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet
some distance away or slowing down, continued to
approach directly toward the horse without diminution
of speed.
When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the
right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the
animal that it became frightened and turned its body
across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with
some violenceAs a result of its injuries the horse died.
The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith
from liability Picart has appealed.
ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as
gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done
HELD: the judgment of the lower court must be
reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the
Picart recover of Smith damages
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a
given situation must of course be always determined in
the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these
terms, the proper criterion for determining the
existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct
is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in
the present case we think that negligence is clearly
established. A prudent man, placed in the position of
the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized
that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to
the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under these circumstances the law
imposed on the Smith the duty to guard against the
threatened harm.
It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not
free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent
negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly
responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of
the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence
of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the
14
last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
PRECIOLITA V. CORLISS vs. THE MANILA
RAILROAD COMPANY
FACTS: Ralph Corliss Jr. was an air police of the Clark
Air Force Base. The jeep he was driving while
accompanied with a P.C. soldier, collided with a
locomotive of Manila Railroad Company (MRC) close to
midnight at the railroad crossing in Balibago, Angeles,
Pampanga, in front of the Clark Air Force Base. Corliss
Jr. died of serious burns at the hospital the next day,
while the soldier sustained serious physical injuries and
burns.
In the decision appealed from, the lower court, after
summarizing the evidence, concluded that the
deceased in his eagerness to beat, so to speak, the
oncoming locomotive, took the risk and attempted to
reach the other side, but unfortunately he became the
victim of his own miscalculation.
The negligence imputed to MRC was thus ruled out by
the lower court, satisfactory proof to that effect, in its
opinion, being lacking. Hence this appeal direct to us,
the amount sought in the concept of damages reaching
the sum of P282,065.40.
ISSUE: WON the lower courts decision is erroneous
HELD: The decision of the lower court dismissing the
complaint, is affirmed.
The lower court judgment has in its favor the
presumption of correctness. It is entitled to great
respect. In the absence of compelling reasons, [the
factual] determination is best left to the trial judge why
had the advantage of hearing the parties testify and
observing their demeanor on the witness stand.
But more importantly, this action is predicated on
negligence, the Civil Code making clear that whoever
by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being negligence, is under obligation to pay for the
damage done. Unless it could be satisfactorily shown,
therefore, that MRC was guilty of negligence then it
could not be held liable. The crucial question,
therefore, is the existence of negligence.
Negligence was defined by us in two 1912 decisions,
United States v. Juanillo and United States v. Barias.
Cooley formulation was quoted with approval in both
the Juanillo and Barias decisions. Thus: Judge Cooley
in his work on Torts (3d ed.), Sec. 1324, defines
negligence to be:
The failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly
demand whereby such other person suffers injury.
There was likewise a reliance on Ahern v. Oregon
Telephone Co. Thus:
Negligence is want of the care required by the
circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
absolute term and its application depends upon the
situation of the parties and the degree of care and
vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.
To repeat, by such a test, no negligence could be
imputed to MRC and the action of Corliss must
necessarily fail. The facts being what they are, compel
the conclusion that the liability sought to be fastened
on MRC had not arisen.
Finally, each and every case on questions of negligence
is to be decided in accordance with the peculiar
circumstances that present themselves. There can be
no hard and fast rule. There must be that observance
of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the situation demands.
Norman Gaid vs People of the Philippines
(Simple Negligence)
FACTS: Norman Gaid was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide driving a passenger
jeep and running over and killing MichaelDayata.
Gaid was driving his jeep along a 2-lane road near
theLaguindingan National HS, and students were
coming out of it. Dayata was siting near a store on the
left side of the road, and hailed Gaids jeep. Neither the
driver nor the conductor see anybody hail the jeep.
Next thing the witness saw, Dayatas feet were pinned
to the rear wheel of the jeep, lying down on the
ground. The first hospital where he wasrushed was
closed; the second pronounced him dead on arrival.
ISSUE: W/N Gaid is liable
HELD:
NOT LIABLE. The prosecution was not able to establish
that the proximate cause of the victims death was
petitioners alleged negligence. In this case, the courts
below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop
the jeepney when he felt the bouncing of his vehicle, a
circumstance which the appellate court equates with
negligence. Petitioner contends that he did not
immediately stop because he did not see anybody go
near his vehicle at the time of the incident. In an
American case,
Hernandez v. Lukas, a motorist traveling within thes
peed limit and did all was possible to avoid striking a
child who was then six years old only. The place of the
incident was a neighborhood where children were
playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The court
ruled that it must be still proven that the driver did not
exercise due care. The evidence showed that the driver
was proceeding in lawful manner within the speed limit
when the child ran into the street and
15
was struck by the drivers vehicle. Clearly, this was an
emergency situation thrust upon the driver too
suddenly to avoid.
If at all again, petitioners failure to render assistance
to the victim would constitute abandonment of ones
victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised
Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by
the information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally
liable under the provision would be tantamount to a
denial of due process simple negligence.
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.
The elements of simple negligence:(1) that there is
lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and(2)
that the damage impending to be caused is not
immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The
standard test in determining whether a person is
negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this:
could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the
person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course actually pursued?
If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain
from that course or to take precautions to guard
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can
be held to exist.
PACIS v MORALES
Topic: Owners and managers of establishments and
enterprises
DOCTRINE: A higher degree of care is required of
someone who has in his possession or under his control
an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character,
such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such
person in possession or control of dangerous
instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby.
Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which
involve little or no risk, a business dealing with
dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher
degree of care.
FACTS: Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil
case for damages against Jerome Jovanne Morales.
Spouses Paceis are the parents of Alfred, 17 y.o. who
died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms
and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City.
Morales is the owner.
Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which
he sustained while he was at gunstore. The bullet
which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a
customer of the gun store for repair. The gun, was left
by Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun
store.
Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee
Armando Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of
the gun store was also not around. Jarnague entrusted
to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys which
included the key to the drawer where the gun was
kept. It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later
brought out the gun from the drawer and palced it in
top of the table. Attacted by it, Alfred got hold of it.
Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. Alfred followed
but it went off the bullet hitting Alfred.
The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death
of Alftred under A2180 in relation to A2176, ruling that
the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his
death was partyl due to the negligence of Morales
emplyee Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was
no employee-employer relationship because Matibag
was not under the control of Morales with respect to
the means and methods in the performance of his
worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if Matibag
was an employee, Morales still cannot be held civilly
liable because there is no negligence can be attributed
to Morales because he kept the gun.
ISSUE: WON Morales is civilly liable?
RULING: YES. Respondent was clearly negligent when
he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the
drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. For
failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales
himself was negligent.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on
Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person
who is in the business of purchasing and selling
of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic
security and safety requirements of a gun dealer,
otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be
suspended or canceled.
As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have
known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to
avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others.
Morales has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his
store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored
unloaded and separate from ammunition when the
firearms are not needed for ready access defensive
use.
In the first place, the defective gun should have been
stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun
for repair, Morales should have made sure that it was
not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed,
Morales should never accept a firearm from another
person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely
unloaded
Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care
and diligence required of a good father of a family,
much less the The bullet which killed Alfred was fired
from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store
for repair.
16
This case for damages arose out of the accidental
shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the
Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for
damages based on the civil liability arising from the
crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to
file an independent civil action for damages under the
Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim
for damages in the homicide case filed against
Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil
action for damages against respondent whom they
alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based
their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under
Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or
any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons
own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by
the provisions of this Chapter.
Choice of claim of petitioners
This case for damages arouse out of the accidental
shoting of Alfred. Under A1161 of the Civil Code
petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based
on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article
100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent
civil action for damages under the Civil Code.
In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for
damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag,
petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was
Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil
Code.
DISPOSITIVE: Morales is civilly liable to petitioners
because he was negligent.
Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of
Appeals
FACTS: Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen,
was Honorary Consul General of Israel in the
Philippines. He went to Manila International Airport to
meet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing,
he and his companions went to the viewing deck to
watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke
slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his
back, breaking his thigh bone in the process. He
underwent a 3-hour operation and after recovery he
filed a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA), which was the government entity
in charge of the airport.
ISSUE: Whether or not CAA was negligent
HELD:
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a
legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was
never intended to trip down people and injure them. It
was there for no other purpose but to drain water on
the floor area of the terrace."
But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was
found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA
776, the CAA is charged with the duty of planning,
designing, constructing, equipping, expanding,
maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport.
Responsibility of CAA
The SC held that pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or
negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the person, of the time, and of the place." Here, the
obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck,
a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure
the safety of the viewers using it. As these people
come to look to where the planes and the incoming
passengers are and not to look down on the floor or
pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should have
thus made sure that no dangerous obstructions or
elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any
undue harm to the public.
Contributory Negligence
Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates
a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff,
which although not the proximate cause of his injury,
CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,
considering the following test formulated in the early
case of Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918):
The test by which to determine the existence of
negligence in a particular case may be stated as
follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution
which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of
the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of the negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers
what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in
17
the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct
of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be
always determined in the light of human experience
and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value
but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men-
overn their conduct by the circumstances which are
before them or known to them. They are not, and are
not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence
they can be expected to take care only when there is
something before them to suggest or warn of danger.
Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration,
foresee harm as a result of the course actually
pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary
before negligence can be held to exist.... [Picart v.
Smith, supra, p. 813]
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the
case before the lower court, could not have reasonably
foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering
the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the
private respondent had been looking where he was
going, the step in question could not easily be noticed
because of its construction.
"WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition
for review on certiorari is DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51172-R is
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED."
MAKATI SHANGRI-LA VS HARPER
FACTS: In the first week of November 1999, Christian
Harper (Harper) came to Manila on a business trip. He
checked in at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel and was
billeted at Room 1428. He was due to check out on
November 6, 1999. In the early morning of that date,
however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by
still unidentified malefactors.
Thus, the heirs of Christian Harper sued the hotel for
damages. Col. Rodrigo de Guzman, the hotels Security
Manager, testified that the management practice prior
to the murder of Harper had been to deploy only one
security or roving guard for every three or four floors of
the building; that such ratio had not been enough
considering the L-shape configuration of the hotel that
rendered the hallways not visible from one or the other
end; and that he had recommended to management to
post a guard for each floor, but his recommendation
had been disapproved because the hotel "was not
doing well" at that particular time.
And to prove heirship of the plaintiffs-appellees, they
presented several documents which were all kept in
Norway. The documents had been authenticated by the
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also
bore the official seal of the Ministry and signature of
one, Tanja Sorlie. The documents were also
accompanied by an Authentication by the Consul,
Embassy of the Republic of the Philippines in
Stockholm, Sweden to the effect that, Tanja Sorlie was
duly authorized to legalize official documents for the
Ministry.
The RTC ruled in favor of Christian Harpers heirs and
found the hotel negligent. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Makati Shangri-La Hotel is liable to pay
damages?
Held: Petitioner was liable due to its own negligence.
Makati Shangri-La Hotel, to stress, is a five-star hotel.
The "reasonable care" that it must exercise for the
safety and comfort of its guests should be
commensurate with the grade and quality of the
accommodation it offers. If there is such a thing as
"five-star hotel security", the guests at Makati Shangri-
La surely deserves just that.
When one registers (as) a guest of a hotel, he makes
the establishment the guardian of his life and his
personal belongings during his stay. It is a standard
procedure of the management of the hotel to screen
visitors who call on their guests at their rooms. The
murder of Harper could have been avoided had the
security guards of the Shangri-La Hotel in Makati
dutifully observed this standard procedure."
It could be gleaned from findings of the trial court that
its conclusion of negligence on the part of defendant-
appellant is grounded mainly on the latter's inadequate
hotel security, more particularly on the failure to
deploy sufficient security personnel or roving guards at
the time the ghastly incident happened.
A review of the testimony of Col. De Guzman reveals
that on direct examination he testified that at the time
he assumed his position as Chief Security Officer of
defendant-appellant, during the early part of 1999 to
the early part of 2000, he noticed that some of the
floors of the hotel were being guarded by a few guards,
for instance, 3 or 4 floors by one guard only on a roving
manner. He then made a recommendation that the
ideal-set up for an effective security should be one
guard for every floor, considering that the hotel is L-
shaped and the ends of the hallways cannot be seen.
At the time he made the recommendation, the same
was denied, but it was later on considered and
approved on December 1999 because of the
Centennial Celebration.
It could be inferred from the foregoing declarations of
the former Chief Security Officer of defendant-
appellant that the latter was negligent in providing
18
adequate security due its guests. With confidence, it
was repeatedly claimed by defendant-appellant that it
is a five-star hotel. Unfortunately, the record failed to
show that at the time of the death of Christian Harper,
it was exercising reasonable care to protect its guests
from harm and danger by providing sufficient security
commensurate to it being one of the finest hotels in
the country. In so concluding, WE are reminded of the
Supreme Court's enunciation that the hotel business
like the common carrier's business is imbued with
public interest. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are
bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests but
also security to their persons and belongings. The twin
duty constitutes the essence of the business.
DY TEBAN TRADING, INC., v. JOSE CHING
FACTS: A Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban
Trading, Inc. was traversing along the National Highway
in Butuan City, going to Surigao City. A Joana Paula
passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane
towards the van.
In between the two vehicles was a parked
prime mover with a trailer, owned by private
respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. The parked prime mover
suffered a tire blowout the night before, so its driver
parked the vehicle askew occupying a substantial
portion of the national highway. However, the parked
prime mover was not equipped with triangular,
collapsible reflectorized plates as required by the law,
instead a banana trunk was placed as substitute.
To avoid hitting the parked prime mover
occupying its lane, the incoming bus swerved to the
right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van.
When the Nissan van driver saw this, he swerved to the
left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van instead hit
the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger
bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents prime mover
owner and driver.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the prime mover is liable for
the damages suffered by the Nissan van YES
a. Whether or not prime mover driver was
negligent in parking the vehicle YES
b. Whether or not his negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van YES
HELD:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that
whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict.
Requisites to claim based on quasi-delict:
(a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence
of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by plaintiff.
a. Prime mover driver was negligent in parking
the prime mover on the national highway; he
failed to prevent or minimize the risk to
oncoming motorists.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. The test by which to determine
the existence or negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinary person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he
is guilty of negligence.
We find that the prime mover driver was negligent in
parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the
national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial
portion of the national road on the lane of the
passenger bus. It is common sense that the skewed
parking of the prime mover on the national road posed
a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent
upon the driver to take some measures to prevent that
risk, or at least minimize it.
b. The skewed parking of the prime mover was
the proximate cause of the collision.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. More
comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
effecting the injury as natural and probable result of
the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.
Plaintiff must, establish a sufficient link
between the act or omission and the damage or injury.
That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise,
no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a
natural and probable result of the act or omission.
Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga
are liable for all damages that resulted from the
skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability
includes those damages resulting from precautionary
measures taken by other motorist in trying to avoid
collision with the parked prime mover. The skewed
parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the
Nissan van.
19
 ASSOCIATED BANK (Now WESTMONT BANK) vs
TAN
FACTS: Respondent Tan is a businessman and a
regular depositor-creditor of the petitioner, Associated
Bank. Sometime in September 1990, he deposited a
postdated check with the petitioner in the amount of
P101,000 issued to him by a certain Willy Cheng from
Tarlac.
The check was duly entered in his bank record.
Allegedly, upon advice and instruction of petitioner
that theP101,000 check was already cleared and
backed up by sufficient funds, respondent, on the same
date, withdrew the sum of P240,000 from his account
leaving a balance of P57,793.45. A day after, TAN
deposited the amount of P50,000 making his existing
balance in the amount of P107,793.45, because
he has issued several checks to his business
partners. However, his suppliers and business
partners went back to him alleging that the
checks he issued bounced for insuffi ciency of
funds.
Thereafter, respondent informed petitioner to
take positive steps regarding the matter for he
has adequate and suffi cient funds to pay the
amount of the subject checks. Nonetheless,
petitioner did not bother nor offer any apology
regarding the incident. Respondent Tan fi led a
Complaint for Damages on December 19, 1990,
with the RTC against petitioner. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of respondent and ordered
petitioner to pay damages and attorneys fees.
Appellate court affi rmed the lower courts
decision. CA ruled that the bank should not
have authorized the withdrawal of the value of
the deposited check prior to its clearing.
Petitioner fi led a Petition for Review before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner has the right to debit the amount of the
dishonored check from the account of respondent on
the ground that the check was withdrawn by
respondent prior to its clearing
HELD:
The Petition has no merit.
The real issue here is not so much the right of
petitioner to debit respondents account but,
rather, the manner in which it exercised such
right. Banks are granted by law the right to
debit the value of a dishonored check from a
depositors account but they must do so with the
highest degree of care, so as not to prejudice the
depositor unduly. The degree of diligence required of
banks is more than that of a good father of a family
where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with
their depositors is concerned. In this case, petitioner
did not treat respondents account with the highest
degree of care. Respondent withdrew his money upon
the advice of petitioner that his money was already
cleared. It is petitioners premature authorization
of the withdrawal that caused the respondents
account balance
The degree of diligence required of banks is more than
that of a good father of the family where the fiduciary
nature of their relationship with their depositors is
concerned.
Did petitioner treat respondents account with the
highest degree of care? From all indications, it did not.
It is undisputed nay, even admitted that purportedly
as an act of accommodation to a valued client, the
petitioner allowed the withdrawal of the face value of
the deposited check prior to its clearing. That act
certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the
banking system. Such a practice is unusual, because a
check is not legal tender or money; and its value can
properly be transferred to depositors account only
after the check has been cleared by the drawee bank.
FRANCISCO VS CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS
FACTS:
Francisco bought diesel fuel from a certain
Bacsa who allegedly was the agent of Chemical
Bulk Carriers. Deliveries were then made. Later on,
Chemical Bulk Carriers wrote a demand letter to
Francisco demanding the latter payment for the
diesel fuels it delivered. Francisco refused to pay
alleging that it already paid to Bacsa as e v i d e n c e d
by the invoice issued by CBCI and a
r e c e i p t w i t h n o l e t t e r h e a d whatsoever
issued by Bacsa to him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CBCI gave Bacsa the authority
to sell its fuel thus precluding the former from
denying the transactions made by the latter.
HELD:
The owner of the goods who has been unlawfully
deprived of it may recover it even from a purchaser
in good faith. Thus, the purchaser of property
which has been s t o l e n f r o m t h e o w n e r h a s
been held to acquire no title to it even
t h o u g h h e purchased for value and in good faith. In
this case, it is clear that Bacsa was not the owner of
the diesel fuel. Francisco was aware of this but he
claimed that Bacsa was authorized by CBCI to
sell the diesel fuel. However, Franciscos claim that
Bacsa was authorized is not supported by any evidence
except his self-serving testimony.
First, Francisco did not even confirm with CBCI if it
was indeed selling its diesel fuel since it is not
one of the oil companies known in the market to be
selling petroleum products. This fact alone should have
put Francisco on guard.
Second, it does not appear that CBCI, by some direct
and equivocal act, has clothed Bacsa with the indicia of
ownership or apparent authority to sell CBCIs diesel
fuel. Francisco did not state if the identification card
presented by Bacsa indicated that he was CBCIs agent
or a mere employee.
Third, the receipt issued by Bacsa was typewritten on
a half sheet of plain bond paper. !here was no
letterhead or any indication that it came from
CBCI. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
this was a personal receipt issued by Bacsa and not an
official receipt i s s u e d b y C B C I .
20

Consequently, CBCI is not
precluded by its conduct from
denying Bacsas authority to sell. CBCI did not
hold out Bacsa or allow Bacsa to appear as the
owner or one with apparent authority to dispose of the
diesel fuel.
PHIL HAWK CORP V. VIVIAN TAN LEE
FACTS: On March 15, 2005, respondent Vivian Tan Lee
filed a case for Damages based on QD arising from
vehicular accident between a motorcycle and bus of
Phil Hawk. The accident resulted in the death of
respondents husband, Silvino Tan, and caused
respondent physical injuries. Before the answer,
respondent filed an amended complaint, adding
additional damages and reliefs.
The trial court held petitioner bus company
liable for failing to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of
Avila, having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him
discipline and correct behavior on the road.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with modification in the
award of damages.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not negligence may be attributed to
petitioners driver, and whether negligence on his part
was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in
the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to
respondent;
(2) Whether or not petitioner is liable to respondent for
damages; and
(3) Whether or not the damages awarded by
respondent Court of Appeals are proper.
HELD: In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on
the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle
on the left side of the road before the collision.
However, he did not take the necessary precaution to
slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle,
and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of
the road, showing that the bus was negligent in
veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle
and the passenger jeep.
Whenever an employees negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption that the employer failed to exercise the
due diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee,
an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care
and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
The Court upholds the finding of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to
respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having
failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and
correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioners tests
were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical
fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had
been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased is provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil
Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for
loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn
money.As a rule, documentary evidence should be
presented to substantiate the claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages
for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite
the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the
deceased is self-employed and earning less than the
minimum wage under current labor laws, in which
case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in
the deceased's line of work no documentary evidence
is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily
wage worker earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws.
In this case, the records show that
respondents husband was leasing and operating a
Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon.
Respondent testified that her husband earned an
annual income of one million pesos. Respondent
presented in evidence a Certificate of Creditable
Income Tax Withheld at Source for the Year 1990, which
showed that respondents husband earned a gross
income of P950,988.43 in 1990. It is reasonable to use
the Certificate and respondents testimony as bases for
fixing the gross annual income of the deceased at one
million pesos before respondents husband died on
March 17, 1999. However, no documentary evidence
was presented regarding the income derived from their
copra business; hence, the testimony of respondent as
regards such income cannot be considered.
In the computation of loss of earning capacity,
only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be
considered; that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings
or income, less living and other incidental expenses. In
the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable
to peg necessary expenses for the lease and operation
of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross
income, and peg living expenses at 50 percent of the
net income (gross income less necessary expenses).
In fine, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded
civil indemnity for the death of respondents husband,
temperate damages, and moral damages for the
physical injuries sustained by respondent in addition to
the damages granted by the trial court to respondent.
The trial court overlooked awarding the additional
damages, which were prayed for by respondent in her
Amended Complaint. The appellate court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even if they
are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision of the case.
21
DR. RUBI LI v. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA
SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of deceased Angelica
Soliman
FACTS: On July 7, 1993, respondents 11-year
old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of
the mass located in her lower extremity at the St.
Lukes Medical Center (SLMC).Results showed that
Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma ,osteoblastic
type,a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the
bone which usually afflicts teenage children. Following
this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelicas
right leg was amputated by Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order
to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to
eliminate any remaining cancer cells, and hence
minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the
disease from spreading to other parts of the patients
body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr.
Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another
doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical
oncologist.
On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC.
However, she died on September 1, 1993, just eleven
(11) days after the (intravenous) administration of the
first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because
SLMC refused to release a death certificate without full
payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the
cadaver of Angelica to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-
mortem examination. The Medico-Legal Report issued
by said institution indicated the cause of death as
"Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ
hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation."
On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit
against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma,
a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged
them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas
safety, health and welfare by their careless
administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure
to observe the essential precautions in detecting early
the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and
stopping early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding
led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas
untimely demise.
On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the
physicians duty to inform and explain to the patient or
his relatives every known side effect of the procedure
or therapeutic agents to be administered, before
securing the consent of the patient or his relatives to
such procedure or therapy. The physician thus bases
his assurance to the patient on his personal
assessment of the patients condition and his
knowledge of the general effects of the agents or
procedure that will be allowed on the patient.Dr.
Balmaceda stressed that the patient or relatives must
be informed of all known side effects based on studies
and observations, even if such will aggravate the
patients condition.
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that
petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed
the best known procedures and employed her highest
skill and knowledge in the administration of
chemotherapy drugs on Angelica but despite all efforts
said patient died.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can be held liable for
failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the
parents of the child patient who died while undergoing
chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that
petitioner was negligent in administering the said
treatment
HELD: No. There are four essential elements a plaintiff
must prove in a malpractice action based upon the
doctrine of informed consent: "(1) the physician had a
duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose
or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct
and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise would
not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by
the proposed treatment." The gravamen in an informed
consent case requires the plaintiff to "point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the
treatment which would have altered her decision to
undergo it.
Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there
was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in
the chemotherapy procedure performed with the
consent of Angelicas parents. Respondents could not
have been unaware in the course of initial treatment
and amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her
immune system was already weak on account of the
malignant tumor in her knee.
When petitioner informed the respondents
beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which
includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells,
decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart
damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable
expectation on the part of the doctor that the
respondents understood very well that the severity of
these side effects will not be the same for all patients
undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the
nature of the disease itself, each patients reaction to
the chemical agents even with pre-treatment
laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the
physician.
That death can possibly result from
complications of the treatment or the underlying
cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the
administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that
cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical
procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably
drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy
already disclosed.
As a physician, petitioner can reasonably
expect the respondents to have considered the
variables in the recommended treatment for their
daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness. On the
other hand, it is difficult to give credence to
respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95%
chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely
for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave
conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured
22
patients of chemotherapys success rate. Besides,
informed consent laws in other countries generally
require only a reasonable explanation of potential
harms, so specific disclosures such as statistical data,
may not be legally necessary.
The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in
the proposed medical treatment cannot thus be
reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all
instances. Further, in a medical malpractice action
based on lack of informed consent, "the plaintiff must
prove both the duty and the breach of that duty
through expert testimony. Such expert testimony must
show the customary standard of care of physicians in
the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.
PETITION DENIED.
CALVO vs. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO.,INC.
FACTS:
Petitioner Virgines Calvo is the owner of
Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc.
(TCTSI), a sole proprietorship customs broker.
Petitioner entered into a contract with San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the transfer of
114 reels of semi-chemical fluting paper and
124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area
in Manila to SMC's warehouse at the Tabacalera
Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila. The
cargo was insured by respondent UCPB General
Insurance Co., Inc.
The shipment arrived in Manila on board "M/V
Hayakawa Maru" and, after 24 hours, were
unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the
arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc.
From July 23 to July 25, 1990, petitioner
withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator
and delivered it to SMC's warehouse in Ermita,
Manila. On July 25, 1990, the goods were
inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who
found that 15 reels of the semi-chemical fluting
paper were "wet/stained/torn" and 3 reels of
kraft liner board were likewise torn. The
damage was placed at P93,112.00.
SMC collected payment from respondent UCPB
under its insurance contract. In turn,
respondent, as subrogee of SMC, brought suit
against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that she is not a common
carrier but a private carrier because, as a
customs broker and warehouseman, she does
not indiscriminately hold her services out to
the public but only offers the same to select
parties with whom she may contract in the
conduct of her business.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Calvo is a common carrier.
2) Whether or not Calvo is liable.
HELD & RATIO:
1) YES.
Applicable Provision:
Article 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in
the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or
air for compensation, offering their services to
the public.
The abovementioned provision did not make
any distinction:
o between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of persons or
goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity.
o between a person or enterprise offering
transportation service on aregular or
scheduled basis and one offering such
service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis.
o between a carrier offering its services
to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who
offers services or solicits business only
from a narrowsegment of the general
population. We think that Article 1732
deliberately refrained from making
such distinctions.
The concept of "common carrier" under Article
1732 may be seen to coincide neatly with the
notion of "public service," under the Public
Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1416, as
amended) which at least partially supplements
the law on common carriers set forth in the
Civil Code.
There is greater reason for holding petitioner to
be a common carrier because the
transportation of goods is an integral part of
her business. To uphold petitioner's contention
would be to deprive those with whom she
contracts the protection which the law affords
them notwithstanding the fact that the
obligation to carry goods for her customers, as
already noted, is part and parcel of petitioner's
business.
2) YES.
Applicable Provision:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods and
for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of
each case. . . .
Petitioners Contention: She denies liability
for the damage to the cargo and claims that
the "spoilage or wettage" took place while the
goods were in the custody of either the
carrying vessel "M/V Hayakawa Maru," which
transported the cargo to Manila, or the arrastre
operator, to whom the goods were unloaded
and who allegedly kept them in open air for
nine days from July 14 to July 23, 1998
notwithstanding the fact that some of the
23
 containers were deformed, cracked, or
otherwise damaged.
To prove the exercise of extraordinary
diligence, petitioner must do more than merely
show the possibility that some other party
could be responsible for the damage. It must
prove that it used "all reasonable means to
ascertain the nature and characteristic of
goods tendered for [transport] and that [it]
exercise[d] due care in the handling [thereof]."
Petitioner failed to do this.
Another contention: She denies liability by
invoking Art. 1734 (4) which provides that:
Common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of the goods,
unless the same is due to any of the following
causes only: . . . .
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the
packing or in the containers.
For this provision to apply, the rule is that if the
improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s
in the container, is/are known to the carrier or
his employees or apparent upon ordinary
observation, but he nevertheless accepts the
same without protest or exception
notwithstanding such condition, he is not
relieved of liability for damage resulting
therefrom. In this case, petitioner accepted the
cargo without exception despite the apparent
defects in some of the container vans. Hence,
for failure of petitioner to prove that she
exercised extraordinary diligence in the
carriage of goods in this case or that she is
exempt from liability, the presumption of
negligence as provided under Art. 1735 holds.
24