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I.

Critique Proper
a. Introduction

In societies like ours where civilian authority is supreme, political leaders make
the key decisions that shape the use of the armed forces, leaving the actual execution
of the military and police function to the commanders. Sometimes, police and military
operations have to be carried out under delicate political circumstances. This imposes
extraordinary constraints on those assigned to conduct them (David, 2015).

Everything we do has consequences that we will pay at a cost sooner or later.


Since killings are now rampant in the Philippines, but it is morally right. We often
handle things in the right way through wrong doings. Patriotism, to die for ones
country, is the most honored way to die.

Wars can only be conceived if the peaceful means can no longer be implicated.
Revolutions in the Philippines are common thing. Since government official and its
people has no direct communication, rallies and rebels can be seen in the streets.

Peace is always achieved in what cost. Peace is a fragile thing that can be
broken by misuse, misunderstanding, misjudgment and many more. Through
communication with both parties in their calm demeanor can peace be gained.

b. Summary

Two state functions: the police functions governed by its own operational code
and the political functions involving the pursuit of a delicate government policy, collided
with one another at Mamasapano. The collision resulted a double fiasco for the
government.

The raid led by the Philippine National Police-Special Action Force (PNP-SAF)
triggered a clash with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels and other armed
groups in the areas. The soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines stationed near

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by joined the fray reducing its effects of the escalating gun battle. The restraint they
showed is now being portrayed as a refusal to respond to their uniformed comrades
urgent plea for help.

The extraction of Marwan and Usman, MILF leaders, led by the former
president, Benigno Aquino, almost led to a full-blown war.Many died, including those of
44 police officers, 18 MILF combatants, and a couple of civilians. The lack of
coordination between the chief and its commandos was the reason behind the failure of
the attack.

It suggests that he knew that fatal blunders had been committed, andif he was
being informed about what was happening on the ground, as he seemed to behe had
no desire to compound them. His foremost concern was to safely extricate the SAF
commandos who were trapped. And so, rather than deploy more troops into the area to
engage the rebels, he might have ordered the reinforcements to stand downin order
to save the peace process. This meant activating the ceasefire mechanism and asking
the MILF to restrain its men. Unfortunately, it took many hours before the MILF rebels
would stop firing. During those crucial moments, the horrible impression that was
conveyed was that the government had abandoned its men (David, 2015).

c. Article Review
Article reviewed:

David, R. (2015, February 8). Pursuing terrorists and pursuing peace. Retrieved
January 29, 2017, from http://opinion.inquirer.net/82382/pursuing-terrorists-and-
pursuiang-peace

The article by Randy David entitled Pursuing Terrorists and Pursuing Peace,
seeks to address how the Masasapano Clash might have been if the former president,
Aquino, was aware of the risks of sending the SAF commandos to Mindanao where the

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MILF rebels held the targets, Marwan and Usman. The research problem being
addressed is to weather the clear line between the states law enforcement duties from
its peacemaking initiatives in Mindanao can be intertwined and in its cost.

The composition doesnt match the level of formality required. Due to the fact that
the text will be published in a news article, it should have used simple English terms
instead of metaphors. The word lightning written on the first sentence of the third
paragraph means that
a swift, sudden military offense, usually by combined air and mobile land forces was
used (Farlex Inc., 2013). How would the reader unknown to military terms recognize its
meaning? Also, the pattern used by the author merely made the text longer and less
interesting to read. Some errors were also made, for example, the author mentioned the
full name of a government organization such as Philippine National Police-Special
Action Force, without stating its abbreviation inside a parenthesis. Due to this, the
following abbreviations seem meaningless and confusing. Contractions are also
noticeable. For instance, the word Jan. was used by the author that should have been
spelled out.

Overall this article isnt very straightforward and its not until the third paragraph
that you realize where the article is headed. In order to have more people be engaged
and read the whole article it needs a new, more concise introduction. Overall it is a
good, well-written article with an important message for the Philippines current political
officers and its people. The piece, when taken as a whole, is relevant and very
convincing in proving the authors opinion but starts slow and keeps on contradicting his
opinion with another.

II. References

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David, R. (2015, February 8). Pursuing terrorists and pursuing peace. Retrieved
January 29, 2017, from http://opinion.inquirer.net/82382/pursuing-terrorists-and-
pursuing-peace

III. Appendix

Pursuing terrorists and pursuing peace

By: Randy David

Two state functions were at play in the Jan. 25 Mamasapano incident: the pursuit
of terrorists and the pursuit of peace. The first is a strictly police function, governed by
its own operational code. The other is political, involving the pursuit of a delicate
government policy.

These two functions collided with one another at Mamasapano, resulting in a


double fiasco for the government.

The lightning raid led by the Philippine National Police-Special Action Force
triggered a clash with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front rebels and other armed groups
in the area, leading to the loss of many lives, including those of 44 police officers, 18
MILF combatants, and a couple of civilians. The gun battle, which ran for about 11
hours, could have escalated into a full-blown war had the soldiers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, who were stationed nearby, joined the fray. The restraint they showed
is now being portrayed as a refusal to respond to their uniformed comrades urgent plea
for help.

At once, we get an idea of what might have happened here. Since President
Aquino knew of the operation to get targets Marwan and Usman, we may assume that

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are not only of the risks to the SAF commandos, but also of the possible complications it
could pose to the peace process. In approving the operation, he must have laid down
the general parameters under which it was to be carried out.

Understandably, after authorizing the operation, the President would have left the
tactical details to the SAF commander and his men. He has since expressed his great
disappointment over the outcome. Ill carry this tragedy to the end of my days, he told
the nation the other night. The President alluded to three instances in which situational
changes on the ground could have prompted altering the original plan, or aborting it
altogether. How and why did it happen that there was no coordination? Why did the
mission continue, when it had deviated so far from the original plan, and our troops
were already in grave danger?

It is interesting to hear this from the President. It suggests that he knew that fatal
blunders had been committed, andif he was being informed about what was
happening on the ground, as he seemed to behe had no desire to compound them.
His foremost concern was to safely extricate the SAF commandos who were trapped.
And so, rather than deploy more troops into the area to engage the rebels, he might
have ordered the reinforcements to stand downin order to save the peace process.
This meant activating the ceasefire mechanism and asking the MILF to restrain its men.
Unfortunately, it took many hours before the MILF rebels would stop firing. During those
crucial moments, the horrible impression that was conveyed was that the government
had abandoned its men.

In societies like ours where civilian authority is supreme, political leaders make
the key decisions that shape the use of the armed forces, leaving the actual execution
of the military and police function to the commanders. Sometimes, police and military
operations have to be carried out under delicate political circumstances. This imposes
extraordinary constraints on those assigned to conduct them. The operation to get
Marwan and Usman is one example.

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It bears close similarities to the CIA-led Operation Neptune Spear that targeted
Osama bin Laden. In a lightning raid conducted on
May 2, 2011, inside a mountain resort in Pakistan, US Navy SEALs entered the
compound where Bin Laden was staying and killed him, carting off his corpse with them.
US President Barack Obama and members of his Cabinet monitored the operation by
remote video in real time. They were aware that US forces had entered the territory of
Pakistan, a sovereign nation, without permission. They had not coordinated with the
Pakistani military, suspecting that some of its leaders were coddling Bin Laden. In
authorizing the raid, Obama took a calculated risk. Had things gone wrong, the United
States would have found itself in an embarrassing diplomatic situation, and the Navy
SEALs would have been left on their own. Instead, it was Pakistan that found itself on
the defensive.

If Marwan and Usman had been captured or killed without further loss of lives,
the same celebratory mood would have greeted the returning SAF commandos. The
MILF would not have been able to complain about unannounced police intrusion into its
communities. The then suspended PNP chief, Alan Purisima, would have been hailed a
genius and a patriot, and quietly restored to his post. P-Noy would have been praised
for his wisdom and audacity. And, with this added boost, he would have been able to
smoothly steer the Bangsamoro Basic Law to its passage.

But, things went the other way. The Mamasapano operation was hemmed in by
so many political constraints that it would have been impossible to carry it out at all
without overstepping these conditions. Not the least of these was the fact that the
government was locked in an agreement to maintain the peace with the MILF rebels.
And so, when they got stuck in a rebel stronghold after carrying out their mission, the
SAF assault and blocking teams were basically on their own. The decision to use the
military to reinforce them would have required the approval of the countrys political
leaders, and this would have meant enlarging the scope of the operation.

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Those who think they can draw a clear line between the states law enforcement
duties from its peace making initiatives in Mindanao ignore the complex intertwining of
these two functions. The tragic outcome of the Jan. 25 SAF operation shows how costly
this could be.