Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
, 7 Phil 329,
January 23, 1907
FACTS:
Plaintiff was at work. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car
was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were
two immediately following one another but without side pieces or
guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to plaintiff, the
men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to
defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a
certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught
the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at
about the knee.
The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the breaking of the
tie, which was the immediate occasion of the accident to have
been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer
by the water of the bay raised by a recent typhoon.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Yes. The shinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails
produces the event for damages. The act of the plaintiff in walking
by the side of the car did not contribute, although it was an
element of the damage which came to himself. Had the crosspiece
been out of place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of
duty, the last would have been one of the determining causes of
the event or accident, for which he would have been responsible.
Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover.
Facts:
Sunga, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension
seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by
Verena and owned by Salva bumped the jeepney. As a result,
Sunga was injured and confined for about 2 weeks.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence
of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates
his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers.
Held:
2. No. the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case
are not the same. The issue in this case is whether petitioner
is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also
known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its
source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of
contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the
negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. In
breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries
to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence. This necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof. Thus, no basis for the contention
that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his
driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney,
should be binding on Sunga. In the case at bar, upon the
happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that
he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers.
3.
15. (Consolidated case)
Facts:
But the Supreme Court ruled that in the consolidated cases, that
PCIB and Citibank are not the only negligent parties. Ford is also
negligent for failing to examine its passbook in a timely manner
which could have avoided further loss. But this negligence is not
the proximate cause of the loss but is merely contributory.
Nevertheless, this mitigates the liability of PCIB and Citibank
16.
Facts:
Plaintiff was riding on his pony. Before he had gotten half way
across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in
an automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a
horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach.
He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave
two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on
horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.
The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance
away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite
near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to
the other side, the defendant quickly turned his car to the right to
escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it as then
standing; but in so doing the animal became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing.
As struck on the hock of the left hind leg and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a
result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required
medical attention for several days.
Issue:
Held:
Yes. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate
stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to
take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to
avoid the danger of collision. Instead the defendant ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse. When the defendant exposed
the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our opinion, negligent
in the eye of the law.
FACTS:
Manila Electric Company, is engaged in operating street cars,
Florenciano was in charge of car No. 74. After the car had stopped
at its appointed place for taking on and letting off passengers it
resumed its course at a moderate speed under the guidance of the
motorman. The car had proceeded only a short distance when Del
Prado ran across the street to catch the car, his approach being
made from the left. The plaintiff arrived at the front entrance of
the car at the moment when the car was passing. However, before
the plaintiff's position had become secure the motorman applied
the power giving the car a slight lurch forward. This sudden
impulse to the car caused the plaintiff's foot to slip and his hand
was jerked loose from the handpost. He fell to the ground, and his
right foot was caught and crushed by the moving car.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff his act of riding the moving car is the
proximate cause.
HELD:
No.
It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board
the moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury. The
direct and proximate cause of the injury was the act of appellant's
motorman in putting on the power prematurely. Again, the
situation before us is one where the negligent act of the
company's servant succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff,
and the negligence of the company must be considered the
proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems
to be analogous to, if not identical with that which is
sometimes referred to as the doctrine of "the last clear
chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if
it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of
reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The
negligence of the plaintiff was, however, contributory to
the accident and must be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages
HELD:
NO, Manila Electric cannot be held liable for damages in the
instant case.
David well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he
was amusing himself. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use
of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by
the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any
reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the
explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little
girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put
the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran
away.
19. PBC V CA ( 296 SCRA 711, March 14, 1997)
FACTS:
RMC has two accounts with PBC The RMC General Manager Lipana
entrusted to Irene Yabut RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for
the purpose of depositing it to RMCs account with PBC. However,
it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husbands
account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly
statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabuts
modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year.
ISSUE:
WON the banks negligence, through its teller in validating the
deposit slips, is the proximate cause of the loss
HELD:
YES. The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping
and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut,
despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank
with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or
duplicate.
ISSUE:
WON the accident was due to negligence on the part of the
defendant-appellant company
HELD:
FACTS:
A storm with strong rain hit Pangasinan. During the storm, the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of AEP were
blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire was
cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the
other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter
told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was
going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small
boy of 3 years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes,
whose house is just on the opposite side of the road, went to the
place where the broken line wire was and got in contact with it.
The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a
fortuitous event- storm;
HELD:
Decision affirmed. (1) A careful examination of the records
convinces the SC that a series of negligence on the part of
defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the
victim by electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of
the petitioner could have easily seen that even in case of
moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana
plants being blown down..
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner, PLDT, is liable in the present case
HELD:
No. The accident which befell private respondents was due to the
lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not
imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner, PLDT.
Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment and
evaluation of the evidence on record. The negligence of
respondent Antonio was not only contributory to his injuries and
those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of
the accident, as one of its determining factors, and precludes their
right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to,
hence appreciated and assumed by private respondents. By
exercising reasonable care and prudence, Antonio could have
avoided the injurious consequences of his act.
There was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the
part of PLDT. There was an absence of a police report of the
incident and non-submission of a medical report from the hospital
where respondents were allegedly treated have not even been
satisfactorily explained.
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner, NAPOCOR, was negligent and did not exercised
extraordinary care in the opening of the spillway gates of the
Angat Dam. Maintainers of the dam knew very well that it was far
safer to open them gradually. But the spillway gates were opened
only when typhoon Whelming was already at its height. It has
been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an
act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from
liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was
the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an
act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by which the loss or damage may have been
occasioned
27. LBC V. COURT OF APPEALS (241 SCRA 619, February 23,
1995)
FACTS:
Rogelio Monterola was traveling on board his motorcycle. At
about the same time, a cargo van driven by Tano was coming from
the opposite direction. When Tano Jr. was approaching the airport
entrance on his left, he saw two vehicles racing against each other
from the opposite direction. Thus, Tano stopped the van and
waited for the 2 vehicles to pass by. The dust made the visibility
extremely bad and instead of waiting, Tano started to make a
sharp left turn. Then when Tano Jr. was about to reach the center
of the right lane, the motorcycle driven by Monterola suddenly
emerged from the dust and smashed head-on against the LBC van
and this caused the death of Monterola.
A criminal case for homicide thru reckless imprudence was
filed against Tano Jr. and a civil case was instituted against Tano,
Fernando Yu as the manager and LBC for the recovery of damages.
The trial court dismissed the cases filed. On appeal, the Court
appeals reversed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the negligence of Monterola is the proximate cause
of the accident
HELD:
Yes. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of
Tano who, despite extremely poor visibility, hastily executed a left
turn (towards the Bislig airport road entrance) without first waiting
for the dust to settle. It was this negligent act of Tano, which had
placed his vehicle (LBC van) directly on the path of the motorcycle
coming from the opposite direction, that almost instantaneously
caused the collision to occur. Simple prudence required him not to
attempt to cross the other lane until after it would have been safe
from and clear of any oncoming vehicle. Petitioners poorly invoke
the doctrine of "last clear chance." In the instant case, the victim
was travelling along the lane where he was rightly supposed to be.
The incident occurred in an instant. No appreciable time had
elapsed that could have afforded the victim a last clear
opportunity to avoid the collision. However, the deceased had
contributed with his negligence since he is evidently speeding.The
Court held that the contributory negligence on the victim's part
that warrants a mitigation of petitioner's liability for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD:
Yes. The principle of res ipsa loquitur (the transaction speaks for
itself) which states: where the thing which caused injury, without
fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the
defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the
injury arose from defendants want of care. The gasoline station,
with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the
control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread
to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and
their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof
whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it.
However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of
proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence as the latter is
the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the
injury complained of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in applying the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor.
HELD:
NO. The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the
doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a
furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood
chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for
machinery may be found thereon. Even without applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the negligence or want of care on the
part of the petitioner or its employees was not merely presumed.
The failure on the part of the petitioner to construct a firewall in
accordance with city ordinances amounts to negligence on their
part.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Batiquin may be held liable.
HELD:
Yes.
Doctrine of Res ipsa loquitor is applicable in this case. First, the
entire proceedings of the cesarean section were under the
exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private
respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit
or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
respondent Villegas' body, which, needless to say, does not occur
unless through the intervention of negligence. Second, since aside
from the cesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent
no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of
rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could
only have been a by-product of the cesarean section performed by
Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the
presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently
leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas'
abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof.
HELD:
Yes. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of
the employee or in the supervision over him after such selection.
The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on
the part of the employer that it has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. PAL failed to overcome the
presumption.