On the tactical front, a national calls to arms, or perhaps even a localized call to
Militia Tactics: arms is an entirely different matter.
By Franke Schein—July 2010
What will be the indicators that will cause the militias to rise up in
angry defiance?
1.) Legislation that prohibits or restricts private firearms owner-
ship.
2.) Forced compliance with unconstitutional laws.
3.) The establishment of new legislation or laws that further erode
or dismantle civil liberties.
4.) The introduction of United Nations peacekeeping forces onto
American soil.
5.) Sweeping political arrests based upon quelling the voices of
dissent of grassroots political parties or activists.
Everybody has their limit. Everybody reaches a point when enough is enough. That goes without
saying, and holds true for nearly everything in our lives.
For members of a militia unit, and their commanders, it becomes imperative that everyone under-
stands that there are certain indicators that will create a call to action. Whether that call to action is
purely a political response, or an armed response, will be dictated by whatever action created the
call to arms itself. It also hinges upon the units preconceived ideas of what an attack represents to
their ideologies.
In a politically motivated response, the militia units take to the streets in a very public protest that
attracts worldwide attention. Such protest must be part of a national effort that is embraced by
every militia unit operating in the country. Images of camouflaged clothed and armed citizens on
the streets of America will certainly attract the attention of every news agency in the world. It would
be akin to the Hells Angels showing up at a bar mitzvah .
Imagine the surprise and shock of the average Joe Blow american awaking to news reports that all
across the United States, militia units have rallied in front of their respective state capitols to de-
nounce a new federal regulation. It’s never happened in this country, and that one single act would
send shockwaves across the country.
I’ve spent a great deal of time attempting to answer the question—what would
happen if all of the militia units arose (as one) against whatever threat caused
them to activate their alarm tree? [ For example, and of the indicators that I previ-
ously discussed. ]
On a local level we would probably see the activation of State National Guard
units that are augmented by law enforcement officers. States that have active
duty military bases would probably call on these resources as well. Since this ad-
ministration has shown time and time again that the Posse Comitatus Act is now
meaningless.
On a national level we could expect the same outcome, but definitely with active
duty military intervention. For the purposes of clarification-lets assume that any-
time that I use the word “Military”—it denotes United Nations peacekeeping
Forces..
That leaves the question on how these battles would go down.
It’s apparent from the onset that small militia units would be hard pressed to en-
gage in any head-to-head confrontation with organized military units. The out-
come would be pretty horrific—considering that the technology available to active
duty military/law enforcement, far exceeds what is available to militia units.
So, in essence, militia units would have to conduct hit and run type of battles,
much like what the insurgents in the Mideast are doing. Small unit penetrations,
ambush and counter ambush operations, convoy ambushes, tactical operations
that would generally be relegated to the role of guerilla warfare.
That doesn’t mean that all military units are unbeatable, in fact, it’s their technol-
ogy that makes them weak. The over reliance on all the fancy gizmos that can
blindside them.
The threats faced in this type of battle would include unmanned (drones) aircraft
that can be used both as an “eye in the sky” and as offensive weapons. We have
watched this technology reap havoc on the Taliban in Afghanistan time after time.
Special Operations units that operate outside of the military contstrains, and deep
inside of militia territory.
Armored cavalry units that sweep through an area, usually accompanied by air assets, and air-
borne weapons platforms. These are the key strategies that will be used against militia units.
If one takes the time to analyze and comprehend the counter-insurgency strategies used over-
seas, we can clearly see that the tactic of “Hammer & Anvil” is being used, time after time.
Counter ambush strategies dictate that a force upon force confrontation be met with equally dev- A small unit is sent into a village, and when it is taken under fire, a reaction force is
astating firepower, rapid movement out of the ambush zone, and massive multi-weapons fire that quickly sent to their aid.
breaks the ambusher’s continuity itself.
Once having broke through the ambush, the tables are then tuned against the ambusher’s-by
driving them back against a natural obstacle, such as a river, a forested tract of land, or a certain
landmark. That is the Hammer aspect of the counter ambush operations. The Anvil segment en-
tails that a ready action force takes up position along the proposed strategic area, (as described
above) and results in the ambusher’s being driven against a wall of withering gunfire while they
are being pushed into the area.
The Hammer & Anvil” strategy was used very successfully in Vietnam and Korea. The
Soviets also used it very effectively during the spring 1944 offensive against the Ar-
mies of Germany.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the H & A is being utilized with damned good results.
Air assets, when they are available, are brought into the fight, and all three elements
maneuver the ambusher’s backwards towards a selected landmark/location.
Another element is positioned at this landmark, with orders to hold the position, pre-
vent the enemy from effecting a breech through the area, and kill as many of the en-
emy as can be accomplished. As the original unit, along with the reaction forces, push
and drive the ambushers into the wall of weapons platforms among hastily prepared
positions.
The only way to counter this counter-ambush strategy, is to immediately disperse in
several directions. That mans even squad sized units must quickly disappear into the
crowds and become nearly invisible.
But rest assureds, that once he gunfire dies down, the enemy military units will seal
off the area in order to prevent any escape and evasion by the original ambushing
units.
This is also another common tactics being used today. It’s the most primitive form of
warfare in the streets—house to house, and room to room searches that round up
likely enemy fighters. Every male over 21 is interrogated, apprehended, and often
times placed into “protective custody” until his whereabouts can be determined.
A team of forensic analysts use Ultraviolet lights to determine if there is gunpowder
residue on the hands, face, or clothing of the suspect. Even K-( dogs are utilized to
sniff out weapons and explosives, as well as electronic “sniffing” of gun powder,
chemical, and explosives compounds.
During the initial engagement, the reaction force usually attempts to control not only
the immediate area/street that they are fired upon, but the streets adjacent to the am-
bush area as well.
This allows them better security and control of the immediate area, and if the tactical
situation allows it, to encircle the ambushing forces rather quickly. Usually squad or
platoon sized elements are used, as well as heavy weapons platforms such a crew
served weapons on vehicles. Deployment of units in this manner allows for a better
controlled battle areas, mutual force protection, and rapid response to changing bat-
tlefield conditions. The basis for military operations in urban environments. This strat-
egy dictates the control of at least 1-3 block continuous area around the maneuver
element engaged in the hardest fighting.
 the best course of action is to prepared operations that do not come face-to-face
with largely superior forces. Instead, militia unit should disperse among the popu-
lace and blend in with them until it’s time to strike—then hit hard, and evacuate to a
safe place out of the target area.

On a note: battles with UN forces must be fought on the streets, not in the woods.
Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) are mounted on gun ships, and some units
have hand held devices that can penetrate even the thickest foliage cover.

This will be the chapter for a later discussion.

Air assets can then be used to both identify and kill the enemy. Gun ships circle outside of the im-
mediate battle area in order to identify fleeing units, and to provide immediate fire support if any
of the friendly units are outnumbered or besieged. A tactic that is being used with good results
today in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan.

As stated earlier, engaging a vastly superior forces such as this is haphazard to say the least,
but it can have devastating effects if executed with critical planning in mind.

Hot hard, hit fast, and then disperse into nothing. That is the only way these types of battles can
be fought and won. Terrorist and guerilla fighters have been using this tactic for generations of Watchmen of America
war. Even the Roman legions were unable to counter a guerilla war action against their supply

Introduction
lines, and sometimes their base camps. The Gaul's became experts at these hit and run opera-
tions with devastating effects, in that it caused the Romans to provide additional security forces
to protected their caravans, thereby eliminating battle field resources at the front.

We see this happening today in wars all about the globe. Government forces that are being at- Video
tacked by small units, such as what occurred in Mumbai last year, and threw the entire country, if
not the whole world, into chaos.

In conclusion, I would suggest that given the current dispersing of all militia units, the lack of
network communications, and the simple fact that technology is not there at militia unit level—