Case Digest Conflict Final

SPSPS College of Law
Equitatus Legis
G.R. No. 149177 November 23,

2007
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,

LTD., Petitioners,
vs.
MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.
FACTS:
On March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese

firm, was contracted by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
to supervise the construction of the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April
1999, Nippon entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with
Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA was entered into
in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year (so until April 2000). In January
2000, DPWH awarded the Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon
subsequently assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in February 2000,
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon informed Kitamura that they
were pre-terminating his contract. Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but
Nippon refused to negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the contract was
entered in Japan; hence, applying the principle of lex loci celebracionis, cases
arising from the contract should be cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial
court denied the motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking

forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an inconvenient forum because the
parties are Japanese nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura,
on the other hand, invokes the trial courts ruling which states that matters
connected with the performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing
at the place of performance. Since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the
Philippines, courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Should the complaint against Nippon be dismissed?
HELD:
No.
The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of it.
In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific
performance and damages. Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such
cases are within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court.
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Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non

conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided for by the Rules
as a ground for dismissing a civil case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that Japanese laws
should apply is premature. In conflicts cases, there are three phases and each
next phase commences when one is settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have

jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties, the issues, the property,
and the res. Also considered, whether it is fair to cause a defendant to
travel to this state; choice of law asks further question whether the
application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case
is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law Which law will the court apply? Once a local court takes
cognizance, it does not mean that the local laws must automatically apply.
The court must determine which substantive law when applied to the
merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment Where can the resulting

judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the RTCs taking
cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately filed a motion to dismiss, which
was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then
he bypassed the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for certiorari.
The question of which law should be applied should have been settled in the trial
court had Hasegawa not improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his
motion for reconsideration.
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G. R. No. 120077 October 13, 2000
THE MANILA HOTEL CORP. AND MANILA HOTEL INTL. LTD. petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J.

DIOSANA AND MARCELO G. SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
In May 1988, Santos was hired as an overseas worker in Oman. In June,

he was recruited by Palace Hotel in China. While he was still in Oman, because it
offered higher pay and benefits, Santos accepted the offer and started working in
November. The employment between him and Palace Hotel was without the
intervention of POEA. In August 1989, Santos was informed he will be terminated
due to business reverses. Subsequently, he was terminated and paid all benefits
due to him, including plane fare back to the Philippines.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against

Manila Hotel Corp., (MHC), a government owned and controlled corporation and
Manila Hotel International, Ltd (MHIL), a Hong Kong Corp, 50% of which is
owned by MHL.
The LA decided the case against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the

NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. The
NLRC promulgated a resolution, stating that the appealed Decision be declared
null and void for want of jurisdiction.
Santos moved for reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He

argued that the case was not cognizable by the POEA as he was not an
overseas contract worker. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion and reversed
itself. The NLRC directed another LA to hear the case on the question of whether
private respondent was retrenched or dismissed. The LA found that Santos was
illegally dismissed from employment and recommended that he be paid actual
damages equivalent to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract. The
NLRC ruled in favour of private respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
No.
NLRC had not jurisdiction over the case. It is an inconvenient forum.

Though Santos is a Filipino, his contract was not entered into in the Philippines. It
was also entered into without the intervention of POEA.
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Although MHC owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs
of the Palace Hotel. MHC and MHIL are separate entities. Further, MHIL and the
Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are
not residents of the Philippines.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may
assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the
Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that
the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law
and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.
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G.R. No. 102223 August 22, 1996
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., ASPAC MULTI-TRADE,

INC., (formerly ASPAC-ITEC PHILIPPINES, INC.) and FRANCISCO S.
AGUIRRE, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ITEC INTERNATIONAL, INC., and ITEC,

INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI,

for brevity) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC, for brevity) are both
domestic corporations, while petitioner Francisco S. Aguirre is their President and
majority stockholder. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC,
INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC, for brevity) are corporations duly organized and
existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, United States of America. There
is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
On August 14, 1987, ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC
referred to as "Representative Agreement".
Through a "License Agreement" entered into by the same parties on

November 10, 1988, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name "ITEC" in
its own name. Thus, ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known
as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
By virtue of said contracts, ASPAC sold electronic products, exported by

ITEC, to their sole customer, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
(PLDT, for brevity).
To facilitate their transactions, ASPAC, dealing under its new appellation,

and PLDT executed a document entitled "PLDT-ASPAC/ITEC
PROTOCOL" which defined the project details for the supply of ITEC's Interface
Equipment in connection with the Fifth Expansion Program of PLDT.
One year into the second term of the parties' Representative Agreement,
ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly
violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements.
ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL

BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL, for brevity), the President of which is
likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITEC's
products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product
support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC's own, and offering them to
ITEC's former customer.
On January 31, 1991, the complaint in Civil Case No. 91-294, was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134.
In due time, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
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On February 8, 1991, the complaint was amended by virtue of which ITEC

INTERNATIONAL, INC. was substituted as plaintiff instead of ITEC, INC.
In their Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, defendants took note of the

amendment of the complaint and asked the court to consider in toto their motion
to dismiss and their supplemental motion as their answer to the amended
complaint.
After conducting hearings on the prayer for preliminary injunction, the

court a quo on February 22, 1991, issued its Order: (1) denying the motion to
dismiss for being devoid of legal merit with a rejection of both grounds relied
upon by the defendants in their motion to dismiss, and (2) directing the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction on the same day.
From the foregoing order, petitioners elevated the case to the respondent
Court of Appeals on a Petition forCertiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The respondent appellate court dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed corporation

doing business in the Philippines, and if it is, whether or not this fact bars it from
invoking the injunctive authority of our courts.
HELD:
Considering the above, it is necessary to state what is meant by "doing

business" in the Philippines. Section 133 of the Corporation Code, provides that
"No foreign corporation, transacting business in the Philippines without a license,
or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any
action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines;
but such corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine Courts
or administrative tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under
Philippine laws."
With the abovestated precedents in mind, we are persuaded to conclude

that private respondent had been "engaged in" or "doing business" in the
Philippines for some time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the
different contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with its various business
contacts in the country, particularly ASPAC and Telephone Equipment Sales and
Services, Inc. (TESSI, for brevity). The latter is a local electronics firm engaged
by ITEC to be its local technical representative, and to create a service center for
ITEC products sold locally. Its arrangements, with these entities indicate
convincingly ITEC's purpose to bring about the situation among its customers
and the general public that they are dealing directly with ITEC, and that ITEC is
actively engaging in business in the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in

Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business here against a
Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted with and benefited by said
corporation. To put it in another way, a party is estopped to challenge the
personality of a corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into
a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny corporate existence
applies to a foreign as well as to domestic corporations. One who has dealt with a
corporation of foreign origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its
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corporate existence and capacity: The principle will be applied to prevent a

person contracting with a foreign corporation from later taking advantage of its
noncompliance with the statutes chiefly in cases where such person has received
the benefits of the contract.
By entering into the "Representative Agreement" with ITEC, Petitioner is

charged with knowledge that ITEC was not licensed to engage in business
activities in the country, and is thus estopped from raising in defense such
incapacity of ITEC, having chosen to ignore or even presumptively take
advantage of the same.
In Top-Weld, we ruled that a foreign corporation may be exempted from

the license requirement in order to institute an action in our courts if its
representative in the country maintained an independent status during the
existence of the disputed contract. Petitioner is deemed to have acceded to such
independent character when it entered into the Representative Agreement with
ITEC, particularly, provision 6.2 (supra).
Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the

application, or non-application, of the private international law rule of forum non
conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the
Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance
or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue
before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has
already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the
original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to
question plaintiff's standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue
of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier.
Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based
on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on
the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse
to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the
court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that
the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the
parties may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court's
disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present
forum not being the "most convenient" as a ground for the suit's dismissal,
deserves scant consideration.
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G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
FACTS:
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with and was
granted by HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in the maximum amount
of Singapore dollars 200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime rate, payable
monthly, on amounts due under said overdraft facility.
In 1982, both private respondents and a certain Lowe, all of whom were
directors of the COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee
in favor of HSBC whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly
and severally, on demand all sums owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK
under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have jurisdiction over
all disputes arising under this guarantee.
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded

payment and inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, HSBC filed
a complaint for collection of a sum of money against private respondents
Sherman and Reloj before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter. The trial court denied the motion. They then
filed before the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order. The
IAC rendered a decision enjoining the Regional Trial Court Quezon City from
taking further cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the
proper court of Singapore which is the proper forum. Motion for Reconsideration
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit, vis-a-vis
the Guarantee stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
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HELD:
YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: A

State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for
exercising it, whether the proceedings are in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.
To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that
will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been
filed in Singapore is based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much
less prove, that the filing of the action here will cause them any unnecessary
trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.
In the case of Neville Y. Lamisl Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., where the
stipulation was [i]n case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of
Davao City. We held: Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the
venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing
of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4,
Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement
which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the
parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby
stipulate that only the courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has
jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in question operate to divest Philippine courts
of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a
State to exercise authority over persons and things within its boundaries subject
to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over travelling
sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and
foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the
permission of the latters authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the
concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within and throughout the domain of the
State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making
its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before
them.
The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:
In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized by
law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain the case
by applying the principle of forum non conveniens.
However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis

of the principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the
particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus,
the IAC should not have relied on such principle.
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Petition granted.
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G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997
PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPI-INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

LIMITED, and ATHONA HOLDINGS, N.V., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC,

VENTURA O. DUCAT, PRECIOSO R. PERLAS, and WILLIAM H. CRAIG,
respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from

petitioners Ayala International Finance Limited (AYALA) and Philsec Investment
Corporation (PHILSEC) in the sum of US$2,500,000.00, secured by shares of
stock owned by Ducat with a market value of P14,088,995.00. In order to
facilitate the payment of the loans, private respondent 1488, Inc., through its
president, private respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducat's obligation under an
Agreement.
1488, Inc. executed a warranty deed with vendors lien by which a parcel
of land in Harris County Texas, USA was sold to Petitioner ATHONA for
US$2,807,209.02 in order to assume Ducats obligation to AYALA and PHILSEC
for the payment of his loan, secured by shares of stock.
AYALA and PHILSEC extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of

US$2,500,000 as initial payment of the purchase price of the parcel of land the
balance was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by ATHONA in
favor of 1488, Inc. Subsequently, upon receipt of US$ 2,500,000 from 1488, Inc.,
PHILSEC and AYALA released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to
1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in their possession belonging to Ducat.
ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance and the entire amount
became due and demandable. Private respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners
PHILSEC, AYALA, and ATHONA in the United States for payment of the balance
of US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of contract and for fraud allegedly
perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the marketability of the shares of
stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
While Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a
complaint "For Sum of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment"
against private respondents in the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The complaint
reiterated the allegation of petitioners in their respective counterclaims in Civil
Action in the United States District Court of Southern Texas that private
respondents committed fraud by selling the property at a price 400 percent more
than its true value of US$800,000.00. Petitioners claimed that, as a result of
private respondents' fraudulent misrepresentations, ATHONA, PHILSEC, and
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AYALA were induced to enter into the Agreement and to purchase the Houston
property. On April 20, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment
against the real and personal properties of private respondents.
Private respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case No. 16563 on the
grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-avis Civil Action No. H-86-440 filed by 1488,
Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) failure of petitioners
PHILSEC and BPI-IFL to state a cause of action.
The trial court granted Ducat's motion to dismiss, stating that "the
evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the
forum of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international
law of forum non conveniens." The trial court also held itself without jurisdiction
over 1488, Inc. and Daic because they were nonresidents and the action was not
an action in rem or quasi in rem, so that extraterritorial service of summons was
ineffective. The trial court subsequently lifted the writ of attachment it had earlier
issued against the shares of stocks of 1488, Inc. and Daic.
A separate hearing was held with regard to 1488, Inc. and Daic's motion to
dismiss. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic
on the ground of litis pendentia.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court
erred in applying the principle of litis pendentia and forum non conveniens and in
ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the defendants. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUES:
1. Would the civil action filed be barred by the judgment of the U.S court?
2. Would the dismissal of the civil action be justified on the ground of forum
non conveniens?
3. Does the trial court have jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic.
RULINGS:
1. No. The foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata
without giving them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in
Rule 39, sec. 50 of the Rules of Court, to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." In the
case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res
judicata or conclusive of the rights of private respondents. The
proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial court nor the
appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S.
court or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper
determination of whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court
were exactly the issues raised in this case such that the judgment that
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might be rendered would constitute res judicata. As the trial court stated
in its disputed order dated March 9, 1988.
2. No. The trial courts refusal to take cognizance of the case is unjustified
under the principle of forum non conveniens. First, a motion to dismiss is
limited to the grounds under Rule 16, sec. 1, which does not include
forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this
principle requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly
considered a matter of defense. Second, while it is within the discretion of
the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it
should do so only after "vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances" require the court's desistance.
In this case, the trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely
on the basis of the pleadings filed by private respondents in connection
with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one of the plaintiffs
(PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura
Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt
which was the object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court
arbitrarily dismissed the case even after finding that Ducat was not a party
in the U.S. case.
3. It was error we think for the Court of Appeals and the trial court to hold
that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and Daic could not be obtained because
this is an action in personam and summons were served by extraterritorial
service. Rule 14, 17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of
summons on a nonresident defendant may be effected out of the
Philippines by leave of Court where, among others, "the property of the
defendant has been attached within the Philippines." 18 It is not disputed
that the properties, real and personal, of the private respondents had
been attached prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial
court dated April 20, 1987.
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G.R. Nos. 90306-07 July 30, 1990
K.K. SHELL SEKIYU OSAKA HATSUBAISHO and FU HING OIL CO., LTD.,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ATLANTIC VENUS CO., S.A., and

THE VESSEL M/V "ESTELLA", respondents
FACTS:
Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (Kumagai), a corporation formed and existing

under the laws of Japan, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money
with preliminary attachment against Atlantic Venus ("Atlantic"), a corporation
registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella and Crestamonte Shipping
Corporation ("Crestamonte"), a Philippine corporation. Atlantic is the owner of the
MV Estella.
The complaint filed with the Regional Trial Court, alleged that
Crestamonte, as bareboat charterer and operator of the MV Estella, appointed
N.S. Shipping Corporation ("NSS"), a Japanese corporation, as its general agent
in Japan. The appointment was formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in turn
appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai supplied the MV
Estella with supplies and servicesuntil it incurred barged expenses for the total
sum of US$ 152, 412.56 but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to
pay the amounts due.
NSS and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (Keihin) filed complaints-in-

intervention.
Petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (Fu Hing"), a corporation organized in

Hong Kong and not doing business in the Philippines, filed a motion for leave to
intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that Fu Hing
supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the MV Estella and incurred barge expenses for
the total sum of One Hundred Fifty-two Thousand Four Hundred Twelve Dollars
and Fifty-Six Cents (US$152,412.56) but such has remained unpaid despite
demand and that the claim constitutes a maritime lien. The issuance of a writ of
attachment was also prayed for.
Petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho (K.K. Shell), a corporation

organized in Japan and not doing business in the Philippines, likewise filed a
motion to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that upon
request of NSS, Crestamonte's general agent in Japan, K.K. Shell provided and
supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the M/V Estella at the ports of Tokyo and
Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous demands Crestamonte has failed to
pay the amounts of Sixteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars and
Ninety- Six Cents (US$16,996.96) and One Million Yen (Y1,000,000.00) and that
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K.K. Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella. The complaint-in-
intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.
The trial court allowed the intervention of Fu Hing and K.K. Shell
respectively. Writs of preliminary attachment were issued upon posting of the
appropriate bonds and thereafter discharged. Atlantic and the MV Estella moved
to dismiss the complaints-in- intervention filed by Fu Hing and K.K. Shell.
Atlantic and the M/V Estella filed a petition in the Court of Appeals against
the trial court judge, Kumagai, NSS and Keihin, which sought the annulment of
the orders of the trial court. Among others, the omnibus order denied the motion
to reconsider the order allowing Fu Hing's intervention and granted K.K. Shell's
motion to intervene. Again Fu Hing and K.K. Shell intervened.
The Court of Appeals annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it
to cease and desist from proceeding with the case.
According to the Court of Appeals, Fu Hing and K.K. Shell were not
suppliers but sub-agents of NSS, hence they were bound by the Agency
Agreement between Crestamonte and NSS, particularly, the choice of forum
clause, which provides:
12.0-That this Agreement shall be governed by the Laws of Japan. Any matters, disputes,
and/or differences arising between the parties hereto concerned regarding this Agreement shall
be subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the District Courts of Japan.
Thus, concluded the Court of Appeals, the trial court should have
disallowed their motions to intervene. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
Fu Hing and K.K. Shell but this was denied by the Court of Appeals.
However, Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the

courts will not find that K.K. Shell is expressly bound by the Agency Agreement,
and thus they fall back on the argument that even if this were so, the doctrine of
forum non conveniens would be a valid ground to cause the dismissal of K.K.
Shell's complaint-in-intervention.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid

ground to cause the dismissal of k.k. shell's complaint-in-intervention?
RULING:
FORUM NON CONVENIENS cannot be ruled as a valid ground to cause

the dismissal because there are still numerous material facts to be established in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to the true nature of the relationship between
Crestamonte and K.K. Shell and between NSS and K.K. Shell. The best recourse
would have been to allow the trial court to proceed with case and consider
whatever defenses may be raised by private respondents after they have filed
their answer and evidence to support their conflicting claims has been presented.
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The Supreme Court elucidated thus:
Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, as the exact nature of the relationship of the parties is still to be
established. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who is in the best
position, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances
require that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit. It was clearly reversible error
on the part of the Court of Appeals to annul the trial court's orders, insofar as K.K. Shell is
concerned, and order the trial court to cease and desist from proceeding.
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No.04-71843 DC. No. MDL-00840-MGR
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
IN RE: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Philippine National Bank, Petitioner,
vs.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII,

RESPONDENT, MAXIMO HILAO; ESTATE OF FERDINAND MARCOS; IMELDA
R. MARCOS; FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST.
FACTS:
There are two parties in this case which sought the estate of Marcos. One
is the Class Plaintiffs and the other is the Republic of the Philippines (RP).
The U.S. District Court (USDC) in Hawaii rendered judgment in favor of

the class of plaintiffs against the Marcos estate for Human Rights violations by
the Marcos Regime. The judgment included an injunction restraining the estate
from transferring any estates assets. On the other hand, the Republic of the
Philippines sought to forfeit the Marcos estates assets on the ground that they
were stolen by Marcos from the Phil. Government and its people.
There was an earlier case (Credit Suisse Case) wherein the Swiss Asset
of Marcos estate had been frozen by the Swiss Government at the request of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Class plaintiffs obtained injunction from USDC of
Hawaii to hold the assets for the benefit of the class Plaintiffs. The US CA issued
a writ of mandamus and held that the injunction violated the act of state doctrine,
which preclude American courts from declaring invalid a foreign sovereigns
official act, that is, the freeze order of the Swiss government.
Thereafter, the Swiss government released the funds frozen in

Switzerland for transfer to the Philippine National Bank in escrow pending a
determination of proper disposal by a competent court in the Philippines. The
Philippine National Bank deposited the funds in Singapore. The Philippine
Supreme Court subsequently held that the assets were forfeited to the Republic
of the Philippines.
The USDC of Hawaii then made a ruling that the Philippine SC had
violated due process by any standard and the latters judgment was entitled to
no deference. It ordered reinstatement of an earlier settlement agreement in the
District Court wherein the RP refused to approve and consent to it.
The District Court then issued an Order to Show Cause against the
Philippine National Bank, which was not a party to the litigation in the district
court, requiring the Bank to show why it should not be held in contempt for
violating the courts injunction against transfer of assets by the estate.
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The Philippine National Bank then filed the present petition for mandamus
in the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to restrain the District Court from
enforcing its Order to Show Cause and from pursuing discovery against the
Bank officer.
The Bank asserted that it had transferred nearly all of the funds in issue to
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the judgment of the Philippine
Supreme Court. It contended that the entire proceeding against it for its transfer
of funds to the Republic of the Philippines violated the act of state doctrine.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the USDC of Hawaii violated the act of state doctrine?
2. Whether or not the act of state doctrine do not apply to judicial
decisions?
3. Whether or not the act of state doctrine was inapplicable because the
judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court did not concern matters
within its own territory?
HELD:
1. Yes. Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of

every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another, done within its own
territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers
as between themselves. (Underhill v. Hernandez)
The District Courts orders in issue violated this principle. In

order to obtain assets from the Philippine National Bank, or to hold the
Bank in contempt for the transfer of those assets to the Republic of the
Philippines, the District court necessarily (and expressly) held invalid
the forfeiture judgment of the Philippine Supreme Court.
2. Although the act of state doctrine is normally inapplicable to court

judgments arising from private litigation, there is no inflexible rule
preventing a judgment sought by a foreign government from qualifying
as an act of state. (Liu v. Republic of China)
3. The USCA held that, generally, the act of state doctrine applies to
official acts of foreign sovereigns performed within their own
territory. The act of the Philippine Supreme Court was not wholly
external, however. Its judgment, which the district court declared
invalid, was issued in the Philippines and much of its force upon the
Philippine National Bank arose from the fact that the Bank is a
Philippine corporation.
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Because the RPs interest in the enforcement of its laws does not end at
its borders, the fact that the escrow funds were deposited in Singapore does not
preclude the application of the act of state doctrine.
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G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLES BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appelants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States
executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid, his distributable estate
should be divided among his heirs, viz: to his first wife - $240,000.00, to his three
(3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis Php 40,000.00 each and the remainder shall go to all his surviving seven
(7) children by his first and second wives.
Subsequently, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas,

U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid the
entire bequest therein.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor

submitted and filed its Executors Final Account, Report of Administration and
Project of Partition wherein it reported the satisfaction of the legacies therein
enumerated. It also stated therein the division of the residuary estate into seven
equal portions for the benefit of the testators seven legitimate children by his first
and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed
their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
The lower court issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving
the executors final account, report and administration and project of partition.
Subsequently, their respective motions for reconsiderations were denied. Hence,
they appealed to the Supreme Court on a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
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1. In determining the intrinsic validity of the will, what law must apply
Texas law or Philippine law?
HELD:
The national law of the decedent must be used.
The parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of
renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January
31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of
one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of
his death. So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that
the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not
result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas
law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the
Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is
therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
Article 16, par. 2 and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the

order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of

the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be

involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national
law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate arguing
from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
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Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate

Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to
those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said
national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,
the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
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G.R. No. 104235 November 18, 1993
SPOUSES CESAR & SUTHIRA ZALAMEA and LIANA ZALAMEA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSWORLD AIRLINES,

INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners-spouses Cesar C. Zalamea and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter,

Liana Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of
respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. for a flight to New York to Los Angeles on
June 6, 1984. The tickets of petitioners-spouses were purchased at a discount of
75% while that of their daughter was a full fare ticket. All three tickets
represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, petitioners received notice of the

reconfirmation of their reservations for said flight. On the appointed date,
however, petitioners checked in at 10:00 a.m., an hour earlier than the scheduled
flight at 11:00 a.m. but were placed on the wait-list because the number of
passengers who had checked in before them had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.
It was only Mr. Zalamea that was allowed to board the flight for it turned
out that he was holding the full fare ticket of his daughter. Unfortunately, Mrs.
Zalamea and her daughter were not allowed to board the airplane. Upon their
arrival in the Philippines, petitioners filed an action for damages based on breach
of contract of air carriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila,
Branch 145. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioners in its decision dated
January 9, 1989.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals held that moral damages are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. Since it is a matter of record that
overbooking of flights is a common and accepted practice of airlines in the United
States and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the
Civil Aeronautics Board, no fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on respondent
TransWorld Airlines.
Not satisfied with the decision, petitioners raised the case on petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is the Philippine Law applicable?
HELD:
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YES.
That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it
did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed
tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly authorizing
overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the
same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex
loci contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket was
issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are residents and
nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable
law in this case would be Philippine law.
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G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
FACTS:
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an

Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. A decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the
marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Grace J.

Garcia a Filipina married Rederick on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City.
In their application for marriage license, Rederick was declared as Single and
Filipino.
Starting October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declaration
secured in Australia.
On March 3, 1998, Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage in the trial court on the ground of bigamy Grace alleged she had no
knowledge of the prior marriage of Rederick until November 1997.
Rederick answered that Grace knew of his prior marriage as far back as
1993 and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989, thus he was legally capacitated to marry Grace in 1994.
Five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration
of nullity was pending respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a
family court in Sydney, Australia. He prayed in his Answer for the dismissal of the
complaint for no cause of action. The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent. The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that
the divorce was valid and recognized in the Philippines. The trial court held that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital
union to nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
Can the Australian divorce decree be admitted in evidence with no further

proof of its authenticity and due execution?
HELD:
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Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the

document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record
of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or

document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine Foreign Service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial

notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved.
Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to
know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be
exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.
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G.R. No. 110263 July 20, 2001
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION, respondents.
FACTS:
The petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation

organized under the laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine
National Construction Corporation is a corporation duly incorporated and existing
under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then

known as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before
the High Court of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had

put up in favor of private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda
Project and the non-payment of the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in

favor of the petitioner and against the private respondent.
Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from private

respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of
Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to

Dismiss, contending that the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya
should be denied recognition or enforcement since on its face, it is tainted with
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private respondent, collusion and/or fraud,
and there was a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was, however, denied by
the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon were not the proper
grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On May 22, 1989, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to
dismiss. In its reply, the petitioner contended that the High Court of Malaya
acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary
submission to the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel, Mr. Khay
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Chay Tee. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived any and all
objections to the High Courts jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
The trial court rendered its Decision dismissing petitioners complaint.

Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Would the Malaysian court did not acquire personal jurisdiction over
Philippine National Construction Corporation, notwithstanding that (a)
the foreign court had served summons on Philippine National
Construction Corporation at its Malaysia office, and (b) Philippine
National Construction Corporation itself appeared by counsel in the
case before that court?
2. Should the Philippine court should deny recognition and enforcement

of the judgment of the Malaysian court
RULING:
1. The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in

preventing enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment
primarily refer to matters of remedy and procedure taken by the
Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by
petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign
judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in
the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs
from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.
Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to
the service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the
authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the
formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the
internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the

judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the service of
court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by
it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of
fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be
pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an
official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof.
It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as
to what that Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the
assailed service of summons upon a financial officer of a corporation,
as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision
thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must stand.
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2. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound

to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal
of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under
certain conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign

tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly
shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular
proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws
under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the

country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum. Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was
decided by the trial court and respondent appellate court, a judgment,
against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction to
pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign
judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked
with the burden of overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the

existence of the money judgment of the High Court of Malaya by the
evidence it offered. Having thus proven, through the foregoing
evidence, the existence and authenticity of the foreign judgment, said
foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to
prove otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to

demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign judgment, being the
party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya.
But instead of doing so, private respondent merely argued, to which
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the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the
validity of the money judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would
render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign
judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first
establish its validity.
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G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, 1968
TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D.

TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left
among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a
corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins
estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock
certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator,
refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced
to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet
Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins shares.
Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are
not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust
Company of New York.
ISSUES:
1. What is the scope of power of the ancillary administrator?
2. Is it right to declare or consider the certificates lost when they are in the
possession of the domiciliary administrator?
3. Was there a failure on observing certain requirements provided in the by-

laws of the corporation in issuing new stock certificates?
4. Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper?
HELD:
1. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his

domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last
domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. An administrator
appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the Philippines. The
ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in
the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be
distributed among his heirs.
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It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require
that ancillary administrator's right certificates be respected is equally
beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full
allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its
shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune
from lawful court orders.
2. Yes. Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary

administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of stocks of Appellant
Corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable or arbitrary in considering
them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu
thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.
3. No, such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion
to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary
administrator did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover,
there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is
concerned, it is immaterial who is entitled to the possession of the stock
certificates. Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to
impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a
contrariety exists between the above by-law and the command of a court
decree, the latter is to be followed.
4. No, the appeal lacks merit.
Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and

possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines. It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary
administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus:
"It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.
When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his
domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both
countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last
domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the
latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have
any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an
administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the
[Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be
administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his
individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."
Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the

ancillary administrators right to the stock certificates when the actual situs
of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.
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It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require
that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the
33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet
Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For
appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to
the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot
therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
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G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in

behalf of his minor son MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine

Travel Bureau in Manila, three Visit the U.S.A. tickets from himself, his wife and
his minor son, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los
Angeles. All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines.
Having used the first coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport,
Aniceto changed their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was
issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: Check-in-
required. They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because the
flight was overbooked. The Court of Appeals ruled that private respondents
failure to comply with the check-in requirement will not defeat his claim as the
denied boarding rules were not complied with applying the laws of the USA,
relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on over-sales of the USA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA?
HELD:
No.
According to the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the law of the place
where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and
validity, obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the
rule even though the place where the contract was made is different from the
place where it is to be performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the
place where the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are residents
and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant
airline. Therefore, although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the
United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It
is true that the tickets were "rewritten" in D.C., however, such fact did not change
the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in
Manila.
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G.R. No. 104776 December 5, 1994
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA,

and the rest of 1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their Attorney-in-
fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONS

ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the

Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.

Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract
workers (OCWs) instituted a class suit by filing an "Amended Complaint" with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims
arising from their recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case No.
L-84-06-555). The claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is

engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a
service contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas
employment on behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired

portion of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and
secondarily, the payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and
Reserved Fund, interest on all the unpaid benefits; area wage and salary
differential pay; fringe benefits; refund of SSS and premium not remitted to the
SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license of AIBC and the
accreditation of BRII.
From the records, it appears that the complainants-appellants allege that

they were recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its accredited foreign
principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were all
deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries in
the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain,
as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the

Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas
employment contracts with AIBC before their departure from the Philippines
POEA Administrator rendered his decision which awarded the amount of
$824, 652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants submitted their
Appeal Memorandum for Partial Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC
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also filed its Motion for Reconsideration in addition to the Notice of Appeal filed
earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the decision of the POEA.

The resolution removed some of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants.
NLRC denied all the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, these petitions filed by
the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the foreign law should govern or the contract of the
parties.
2. Whether or not the Bahrain law on prescription of action or the

Philippine law on prescription shall be the governing law.
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
RULING:
NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised Rules on
Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour
Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
benefits than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the
claimants. It was of the belief that where the laws of the host country are more
favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall
form part of the overseas employment contract. It approved the observation of
the POEA Administrator that in labor proceedings, all doubts in the
implementation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and

BRII themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to
said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable than those
stipulated therein. However there was a part of the employment contract which
provides that the compensation of the employee may be adjusted downward so
that the total computation plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to
the compensation therein agree, another part of the same provision
categorically states that total remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of
the host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be

interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it.Article 1377 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall

not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
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Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where

there is already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment
contract and the employees merely take it or leave it. The presumption is that
there was an imposition by one party against the other and that the employees
signed the contracts out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power. We
read the overseas employment contracts in question as adopting the provisions
of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof. The parties to a
contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a system to regulate the relations of the parties,
including questions of their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to
be observed by them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting
the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree that specific
provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their contract
as a set of terms. By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the
contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law.
The said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms
deemed written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties. Such
party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties own choice of the
applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the
parties or their transaction. There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain law because the
services were rendered in that country.
Anent to the second issue, as general rule, a foreign procedural law will
not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of process,
joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by
the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign
substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the

sense that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on
the characterization given such a law. However, the characterization of a statute
into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the country of the
forum has a borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating
the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A borrowing statute directs
the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of borrowing
statutes, one form provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where
it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not
run against it. Section 48 of our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said
Section provides: If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action
arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippine Islands.
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be

enforced ex propio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of
Section 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.The courts of the forum will not
enforce any foreign claims obnoxious to the forums public policy. To enforce the
one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
As to the third issue, a class suit is proper where the subject matter of the
controversy is one of common or general interest to many and the parties are so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. When all the
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claims are for benefits granted under the Bahrain law many of the claimants
worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia
under different terms and condition of employment.
Inasmuch as the first requirement of a class suit is not present (common

or general interest based on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only
logical that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to rile their claims
in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of
the claims is the same (for employees benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of
the claimants never worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus,
each claimant is interested only in his own demand and not in the claims of the
other employees of defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting the
interests of the other claimants as shown by the fact, that hundreds of them have
abandoned their co-claimants and have entered into separate compromise
settlements of their respective claims. The claimants who worked in Bahrain
cannot be allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED
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Henry Hilton v. Bertin Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)

Nos. 130, 34
Argued April 10, 1894
Decided June 3, 1895
FACTS:
The case was an action at law, brought on December 18, 1885, in the
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by
Gustave Bertin Guyot, a Frenchman, as the official liquidator of the firm of
Charles Fortin & Co., against Henry Hilton and William Libbey, citizens of the
United States and of the State of New York and trading as co-partners in the
cities of New York and Paris and elsewhere under the firm name of A. T. Stewart
& Co.
The action was upon a judgment recovered in a French court at Paris, in

the Republic of France, by the firm of Charles Fortin & Co., all of whose
members were French citizens, against Hilton & Libbey, trading as co-partners,
and citizens of the United States and of the State of New York in whichthe French
court rendered judgment in favor of Guyot to recover the sum of $277,775.44
from Hilton.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a judgment of a foreign nations court entitled to full credit
and has a conclusive effect when sued to other nation.
HELD:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense --

including not only questions of right between nations, governed by what has
been appropriately called the "law of nations," but also questions arising
under what is usually called "private international law," or the "conflict of laws,"
and concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one
nation by reason of acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another
nation -- is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation between
man and man, duly submitted to their determination.
The most certain guide, no doubt, for the decision of such questions is a
treaty or a statute of this country. But when, as is the case here, there is no
written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial tribunals of
ascertaining and declaring what the law is, whenever it becomes necessary to do
so in order to determine the rights of parties to suits regularly brought before
them. In doing this, the courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial
decisions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the acts and
usages of civilized nations.
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the
sovereignty from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of
one nation, as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by
legislative act, or by judicial decree shall be allowed to operate within the
dominion of another nation depends upon the comity of nations.
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"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absoluteobligation, on

the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons under the protection of its laws.
The comity thus extended to other nations is no impeachment of

sovereignty. It is the voluntary act of the nation by which it is offered, and is
inadmissible when contrary to its policy, or prejudicial to its interests. But it
contributes so largely to promote justice between individuals, and to produce a
friendly intercourse between the sovereignties to which they belong, that courts
of justice have continually acted upon it as a part of the voluntary law of nations.
It is not the comity of the courts, but the comityof the nation, which is
administered and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same
reasoning, by which all other principles of municipal law are ascertained and
guided."
"All the effect which foreign laws can have in the territory of a state
depends absolutely on the express or tacit consent of that state. The express
consent of a state to the application of foreign laws within its territory is given by
acts passed by its legislative authority, or by treaties concluded with other states.
Its tacit consent is manifested by the decisions of its judicial and administrative
authorities, as well as by the writings of its publicists. There is no obligation
recognized by legislators, public authorities, and publicists to regard foreign laws;
but their application is admitted only from considerations of utility and the mutual
convenience of states, ex commitate, obreciprocamutilitatem."
"No sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to execute within his

dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another state, and if execution
be sought by suit upon the judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in which the suit is
brought, or from which execution is sought, is on principle at liberty to examine
into the merits of such judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found
just and equitable. The general comity, utility, and convenience of nations have,
however, established a usage among most civilized states by which the final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into
execution, under certain regulations and restrictions, which differ in different
countries."
Chancellor Kent says: "The effect to be given to foreign judgments is

altogether a matter of comity in cases where it is not regulated by treaty."
The court stated that comity was reciprocal. Since France did not
recognize final judgments of the U.S., and would try such judgments anew,
judgements given by France would be given the same treatment.Therefore, the
comity of the United States did not require the court to give conclusive effect to
the judgments of the courts of France.
A foreign judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit when sued
upon another nation, but is a prima facie evidence only of the claim.
Comity was not afforded to foreign judgments when the country did not
reciprocate comity.
Defendants could be granted a new trial.
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242 N.Y. 381 (1926)
JOHNSTON
vs.
COMPAGNIEGENERALETRANSATLANTIQUE
FACTS:
A steamship carrier, which is a foreign corporation organized under the

laws of the Republic of France wrongfully delivered goods in which the American
plaintiff Johnston first sought relief in the French Court. However, plaintiff failed to
win the cause of action. He decided, then, to bring a separate action before the
Americans courts in the State of New York. Defendant, Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique set up as a defense a judgement from a French court upon the
same cause of action. Lower courts refused to give effect to the French judgment
on the ground of the reciprocity requirement following by decision of the Supreme
Court in Hilton vs. Guyot wherein the case then went to the New York Court of
Appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the New York Court of Appeal were bound to apply the
reciprocity requirement following the decision the Hilton case
HELD:
No. Even though questions of international relations and comity are to be

determined by the Supreme Court of the United State - and therefore the Hilton's
decision is controlling such questions as a statement of law- the courts in New
York were not bound to follow the Hilton's ruling because the question is one of
private rather than public international law, of private right rather than public
relations and [American] courts will recognize private rights acquired under
foreign laws. The case was brought by an American before a foreign court and
the French judgment was sought to be used defensively. Nevertheless, the court
preferred to speak generally, and established a general principle by which
reciprocity is not a condition for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in the state of New York. The court went even further in disregarding
the Hilton's ruling. Given the fact that the French court heard and decided the
case judicially, honestly, and with full jurisdiction and with intension to arrive at
the right conclusion...the French judgment should be given full faith and credit.
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224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 July 12, 1918.
LOUCKS et al.
vs.
STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW YORK.
FACTS:
Loucks was killed when a negligent driver employed by Standard Oil

(Defendant) ran him down. The accident took place in Massachusetts, but he
was a resident of New York, and his administrator (Plaintiff) brought a suit for
wrongful death in New York. The suit was based on the Massachusetts wrongful
death statute, which provided a minimum recovery of $500 and a maximum
recovery of $10,000 with the amount of damages awarded to be based on the
degree of fault of the defendant. Standard Oil (Defendant) moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the Massachusetts Statute was penal in nature
and therefore unenforceable in New York.
ISSUE:
May a right created by statute in one state be enforceable in another state

if the enforcement of the right would not violate the public policy of the forum and
the underlying statute is not penal in nature?
HELD:
Yes.
One states penal laws are not enforceable in any other state. Whether a
statute is penal depends on the type of liability it creates. Where the penalty is
awarded to the state or a member of the public is suing in the interest of the
whole community to right a public wrong, the statute and/or recovery is penal.
While this statute is penal in the sense that damages are awarded on the basis of
the defendants conduct rather than the plaintiffs measure of damages, the right
to recover is private and therefore the statute is not penal in the international
sense. The public policy of New York is not violated by the enforcement of the
right, as New York recognizes the right of survivors to recover for wrongful death.
The fact that the Massachusetts Statute is different in the way it is enforced does
not make the Massachusetts Statute wrong. The forum may refuse to enforce a
right based on a foreign statute only where enforcement would violate an express
strong public policy of the forum. That is not the case here and since the Statute
is not penal in the international sense, there is no bar to its being enforced in
New York. Judgment reversed and order of the Special Term affirmed.
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L.R. 6 Q.B 139
GODARD
vs.
GRAY
FACTS:
Plaintiffs Godard are Frenchmen sued the defendants, who are

Englishmen, on a charter party made at Sunderland, which charter party
contained the following clause: "Penalty for non-performance of this agreement,
estimated amount of freight." The French Court below, having competent
jurisdiction, treating this clause as fixing the amount of liquidated damages, gave
judgment against the defendants for the amount of freight on two voyages. On
appeal, the superior court reduced the amount to the estimated freight of one
voyage, giving as their reason that the charter party itself and the tribunal
proceeds to observe that the amount thus decreed was after all more than
sufficient to cover all the plaintiffs' loss.
All parties in France seem to have taken the word for granted in the
charter party which is to be understood in their natural meaning,
However in English law is accurately expressed that passage been

brought to the notice of the French tribunal, it would have known that in an
English charter party, as is there stated, "Such a clause is not the absolute limit
of damages on either side; the party may, if he thinks fit, ground his action upon
the other clauses or covenants, and may, in such action, recover damages
beyond the amount of the penalty, if in justice they shall be found to exceed it. On
the other hand, if the party sues on such a penal clause, he cannot, in effect,
recover more than the damage actually sustained." But it was not brought to the
notice of the French tribunal that according to the interpretation put by the
English law on such a contract, a penal clause of this sort was in fact idle and
inoperative. If it had been, they would, probably, have interpreted the English
contract made in England according to the English construction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not this is a bar to the action brought in England to enforce

that judgment?
HELD:
It is not an admitted principle of the law of nations that a State is bound to

enforce within its territories the judgment of a foreign tribunal. Several of the
continental nations (including France) do not enforce the judgments of other
countries, unless where there is reciprocal treaties to that effect.
However in England and in those States which are governed by the

common law, such judgments are enforced, not by virtue of any treaty, nor by
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virtue of any statute, but upon a principle very well stated by Parke, B., in
Williams v. Jones (13 M. & W. 628; 14 L.J. Exch. 145):
"Where a Court of competent jurisdiction has adjudicated a certain sum to be due from
one person to another, a legal obligation arises to pay the sum, on which an action of debt to
enforce the judgment may be maintained. It is in this way that the judgments of foreign and
colonial Courts are supported and enforced."
A judgment in personam of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction cannot

be questioned by the parties on the merits when recognition or enforcement of
the judgment is sought in England, notwithstanding that it may have been wrong
either in fact or law. This derived from the mode of pleading an action on a
foreign judgment in debt, and not merely as evidence of the obligation to pay the
underlying liability.
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G.R. No. 137378 October 12, 2000
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC.,petitioner,
vs.
FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent.
FACTS:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (FASGI), a

corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship arrangement
with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI), a Philippine
corporation, and FratelliPedriniSarezzo S.P.A. (FPS), an Italian corporation. The
agreement provided for the purchase, importation and distributorship in the
United States of aluminum wheels manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then paid
PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later found the
shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with the contract.
On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS

for breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of
US$2,316,591.00 before the United States District Court for the Central District of
California. In the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI
kept on failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWIs persistent
default, FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California
the agreements for judgment against PAWI.
On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to

obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed a
complaint for enforcement of foreign judgment, before RTC Makati. The Makati
court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was tainted
with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled that
the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the
assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of the purchase amount,
no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth
containers of wheels. This situation amounted to an unjust enrichment on the
part of FASGI. Furthermore, the Regional Trial Court said, agreements which the
California court had based its judgment were a nullity for having been entered
into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the latters authorization.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign
judgment?
HELD:
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In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be

recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction; that
trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its counsel, Mr.
Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction, it is clear that an
attorney cannot, without a clients authorization, settle the action or subject
matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that such a settlement will
best serve his clients interest. However, PAWI failed to substantiate this
complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign judgment must be enforced.
Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US
Court based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment.
PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the
agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI
insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement within
this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts
not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is rendered, or that
which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would deprive the party against
whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the action to which he has a
meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which goes to
the very existence of the cause of action such as fraud in obtaining the consent
to a contract is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate
against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.
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G.R No. L-3693 July 29, 1950
MARGARET QUERUBIN relapsing-appellant,
vs.
SILVESTRE QUERUBIN turned-appealed.
FACTS:
In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret

Querubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. They had a daughter, Querubina.
Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a
countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's infidelity. In 1949, the Superior Court
of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child.
Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to reasonable visits by both
parties. Both parents were re-strained from taking Querubina out of California
without the permission of the Court.
On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an

interlocutory decree (although the child was still kept in the neutral home)
because at the time of the trial, Margaret was living with another man.
Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the

same year, went to the Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, with the
intent of protecting the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous conduct.
He wanted the child to be raised in a better environment.
Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she
had then married the man she was living with and had a stable home, the Court
granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the part of the father
and he was also ordered to pay for the support of the child $30 each month on
the first day thereof.
In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for

habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina under the interlocutory decree of the
California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los
Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody, must be complied within the
Philippines.
In the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, the
Respondent stated that he had brought his daughter to the Philippines because
he wanted to prevent her knowing about the misconduct and infidelity committed
by the mother. The appeal said that her daughter wanted to be bred in an
environment of high morals.
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ISSUE:
1. Is the interlocutory decree ordered in California court be in force in

Philippines?
2. Is Margaret entitled to the custody of Querubina?
RULING:
1. No. Because the interlocutory decree is not a final decision, it cannot

be asked for their fulfillment in the Philippines. Before such a judgment
rendered in one state is entitled to acceptance, in courts of another
state, as conclusive merits, it must be a final judgment and not merely
an interlocutory decree.
2. No. Firstly, under the divorce law the spouse who was declared guilty
of marital infidelity is not entitled to the custody of minor children.
Secondly, under the current legislation, morality and public order, the
child should be out of the care of the mother who has violated the oath
of fidelity to her husband. The judgment of foreign courts cannot be in
force in the Philippines if they are contrary to laws, customs and public
order. For the welfare of the child Querubina, which is what matters
most in this case, the custody of the father should be considered
preferential. The ruling is upheld on appeal. The appellant pay the
costs.
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G.R. No. 77085 April 26, 1989
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING CORPORATION (PISC), GEORGE

LIM, MARCOS BAUTISTA, CARLOS LAUDE, TAN SING LIM, ANTONIO LIU
LAO, ONG TEH, PHILIPPINE CONSORTIUM CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION, PACIFIC MILLS, INC., and UNIVERSAL STEEL SMELTING
CO., INC.,petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE C. DE GUZMAN, as Judge

presiding Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, INTERPOOL,
LTD. and SHERIFF NORBERTO V. DOBLADA JR., respondents.
FACTS:
In 1979 to 1981, Philippine International Shipping Corporation (PISC)

leased from Interpool Ltd. and its wholly owned subsidiary, the Container Trading
Corporation, several containers pursuant to the Membership Agreement and
Hiring Conditions and the Master Equipment Leasing Agreement both dated June
8, 1979. The other petitioners Philippine Construction Consortium Corporation,
Pacific Mills Inc. and Universal Steel Smelting Company, guaranteed to pay the
obligation due and any liability of the PISC arising out of the leasing or
purchasing of equipment.
In 1979 to 1981, PISC incurred outstanding and unpaid obligations with

Interpool representing unpaid per diems, drop-off charges, interest and other
agreed charges, resulting in a case before the US District Court, Southern
District of New York wherein a default judgment against petitioners was rendered
ordering the corp. to pay the liquidated damages, together with interest. To
enforce the default judgment of the US District Court, a complaint was instituted
against PISC and other guarantors before the QC RTC. PISC failed to answer
the complaint and they were declared in default. The RTC ruled in favor of
Interpool and which was affirmed by the CA.
In the first instance, petitioners contended that the U.S. District Court
never acquired jurisdiction over their persons as they had not been served with
summoned and a copy of the complaint. In the second instance, petitioners
contend that such jurisdictional infirmity effectively prevented the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City from taking cognizance of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-39927 and from enforcing the U.S. District Court's Default Judgment against
them. Petitioners contended, finally, that assuming the validity of the disputed
Default Judgment, the same may be enforced only against petitioner PISC the 9
petitioners not having been impleaded originally in the case filed in New York,
U.S.A.
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ISSUE:
Should the US District Court default judgment be enforced PISC and

against the 9 other petitioners?
HELD:
Yes.
The evidence of record clearly shows that the U.S. District Court had
validly acquired jurisdiction over PISC under the procedural law applicable in that
forum i.e., the U.S. Federal Rules on Civil Procedure. Copies of the Summons
and Complaint which were in fact attached to the Petition for Review filed with
the SC, were stamped "Received, 18 Jan 1983, PISC Manila." indicating that
service thereof had been made upon and acknowledged by the PISC office in
Manila on, 18 January 1983 That foreign judgment-which had become final and
executory, no appeal having been taken therefrom and perfected by petitioner
PISC-is thus "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title." The SC note, further that there has
been in this case no showing by petitioners that the Default Judgment rendered
by the U.S. District Court was vitiated by "want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. In other words, the Default Judgment
imposing upon petitioner PISC a liability of U.S. $94,456.28 in favor of
respondent Interpool, is valid and may be enforced in this jurisdiction.
The existence of liability on the part of petitioner PISC having been duly
established in the U.S. case, it was not improper for respondent Interpool, in
seeking enforcement in this jurisdiction of the foreign judgment imposing such
liability, to have included the other 9 petitioners herein (i.e., George Lim, Marcos
Bautista, Carlos Laude, Tan Sing Lim, Antonio Liu Lao, Ong Teh Philippine
Consortium Construction Corporation, Pacific Mills, Inc. and Universal Steel
Smelting Co., Inc.) as defendants in civil case, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City. The record shows that said 9 petitioners had executed continuing
guarantees" to secure performance by petitioner PISC of its contractual
obligations. As guarantors, they had held themselves out as liable. "Whether
jointly, severally, or in the alternative," to respondent Interpool under their
separate "continuing guarantees" executed in the Philippines. The New York
award of U.S. $94,456.28 is precisely premised upon a breach by PISC of its
own obligations under those Agreements. The SC considered the 9 other
petitioners as persons against whom [a] right to relief in respect to or arising out
of the same transaction or series of transactions [has been] alleged to exist" and,
consequently, properly impleaded as defendants. There was, in other words, no
need at all, in order that case would prosper, for respondent Interpool to have
first impleaded the 9 other petitioners in the New York case and obtained
judgment against all 10 petitioners.
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G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995
NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC. petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP & COMPANY INC., respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. (NORTHWEST), a corporation

organized under the laws of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A., sought to enforce in
the RTC- Manila, a judgment rendered in its favor by a Japanese court against
private respondent C.F. Sharp & Company, Inc., (SHARP), a corporation
incorporated under Philippine laws.
On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines and Sharp, through its Japan branch,
entered into an International Passenger Sales Agency Agreement, whereby the
former authorized the latter to sell its air transportation tickets. Unable to remit
the proceeds of the ticket sales made by defendant on behalf of the plaintiff
under the said agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980 sued defendant in Tokyo,
Japan, for collection of the unremitted proceeds of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages.
After the two attempts of service at its Office at the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd
floor, 132, Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma, Kanagawa Prefecture by the
36th Civil Department, Tokyo District Court of Japan, the judge of the Tokyo
District Court decided to have the complaint and the writs of summons served at
the head office of the defendant in Manila.
On July 11, 1980, the Director of the Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to serve the summons through diplomatic channels
upon the defendants head office in Manila and defendant received from Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit the writ of summons on August 28, 1980. Despite receipt
of the same, defendant failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Thus, the
Tokyo Court proceeded to hear the plaintiffs complaint and on [January 29,
1981], rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
83,158,195 Yen and damages for delay at the rate of 6% per annum from August
28, 1980 up to and until payment is completed. Defendant not having appealed
the judgment, the same became final and executory.
Plaintiff was unable to execute the decision in Japan, hence, on May 20,
1983, a suit for enforcement of the judgment was filed by plaintiff before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 54. Defendant filed its answer averring that
the judgment of the Japanese Court: (1) the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced is null and void for want of jurisdiction and (2) the said judgment is
contrary to Philippine law and public policy and rendered without due process of
law.
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In its decision, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court. It agreed with
the latter in its reliance upon Boudard vs. Tait wherein it was held that the
process of the court has no extraterritorial effect and no jurisdiction is acquired
over the person of the defendant by serving him beyond the boundaries of the
state. To support its position, the Court of Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such as the instant case, personal

service of summons within the forum is required for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the defendant (Magdalena Estate Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230).
To confer jurisdiction on the court, personal or substituted service of summons on
the defendant not extraterritorial service is necessary.
ISSUE:
Would the Japanese court have jurisdiction over C.F. Sharp & Company
Inc.?
HELD:
YES.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from

which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein. The judgment
may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court,
SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. It is settled
that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon a defendant are governed by the lexfori or the internal law of the
forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP. As to what this law is, it is a question of fact, not of law. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is
invalid. But, it did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of
the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese
court must stand.
Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law,

the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption
may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be
similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is
a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1)
on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if
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there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to

that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. Where the
corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official
designated by law, to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a
foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a
foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in
the case of other foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident

agent authorized to receive court processes in Japan.While it may be true that
service could have been made upon any of the officers or agents of SHARP at its
three other branches in Japan, the availability of such a recourse would not
preclude service upon the proper government official, as stated above.As found
by the respondent court, two attempts of service were made at SHARPs
Yokohama branch. Both were unsuccessful. Thus, the Tokyo District Court
requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons
and other legal documents to the Philippines.
Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons
together with the other legal documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy in Manila.
Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department)
of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in
Manila. This service is equivalent to service on the proper government official
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 128 of the
Corporation Code. Hence, SHARPs contention that such manner of service is
not valid under Philippine laws holds no water.
We find NORTHWESTs claim for attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and

exemplary damages to be without merit. We find no evidence that would justify
an award for attorneys fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Nor is an award for exemplary damages warranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED, and the

challenged decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it denied NORTHWESTs claims for
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and exemplary damages but REVERSED
insofar as in sustained the trial courts dismissal of NORTHWESTs complaint in
Civil Case No. 83-17637 of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
another in its stead is hereby rendered ORDERING private respondent C.F.
SHARP L COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST the amounts adjudged in the
foreign judgment subject of said case, with interest thereon at the legal rate from
the filing of the complaint therein until the said foreign judgment is fully satisfied.
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G.R. No. 139325 April 12, 2005
PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO,

SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and
on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States
District Court of Hawaii, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action
MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., respondents, April 12, 2005
FACTS:
Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered
human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their
favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly
$1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was
affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.
As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for

the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees
based on Rule 141, Sec. 7 (b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable
of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos, however, filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees.
Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the
subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment
rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money
allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such,
the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. In dismissing the
complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the
computation of the filing fee of over P472 Million.
ISSUES:
1. Is the amount paid by the petitioners the proper filing fee?
2. Is it necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign

judgment?
3. Is there a distinction between action one in personam and in rem?
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4. Would the actionable issues be generally restricted to a review of

jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion,
fraud, or mistake of fact or law?
HELD:
1. Yes, but on a different basisamount merely corresponds to the same

amount required for other actions not involving property. RTC Makati
erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of
the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The
Petitioners Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is
clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable
of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners
state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC,
MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under
the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33
of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject
matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money.
But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of
B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if
capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is
one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an
action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the
ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation
of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments
is Section 7(b)(3), involving other actions not involving property.
2. Yes. It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in

order to enforce a foreign judgment, even if such judgment has conclusive
effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing
the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy. Consequently, the
party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.
3. Yes. There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an

action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an
action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign
judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds
of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment
is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local
forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the
foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy.
4. Yes. As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
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personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations

on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all legal
systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Otherwise known
as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting
from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of
defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased by never-
ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote
what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all
law: rest and quietness. If every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her
original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation.
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G.R. No. L-28082 June 28, 1974

COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION and CAPTAIN DELFIN MACALINAO, CIS,
PC, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN GARCIA, respondent.
FACTS:
Teban Caoile, with his three brothers, arrived at the port of Manila on June
7, 1961. He applied for admission as a Philippine citizen under his
documentation issued for that purpose by the Philippine Consulate General at
Hongkong.
After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry rendered a decision dated

June 23, 1961, allowing his admission on the assumption that he was the son of
Antonio Caoile of Urdaneta, Pangasinan who was allegedly born on July 30,
1913 as the illegitimate child of Maria Caoile and a Chinaman.
On July 7, 1961 the Board of Commissioners of Immigration took the

following action on the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry: Commissioner
Emilio L. Galang voted for the exclusion of Teban Caoile and his brothers, while
Deputy Commissioners Francisco de la Rosa and Felix Talabis simply wrote the
word "noted" and, below that ambiguous word, the two affixed their signatures.
The significance of that equivocal action is a controverted point in this case.
On July 10, 1961 the Bureau of Immigration issued to Teban Caoile

Identification Certificate No. 15648 which stated inter alia that "Teban Caoile,
male, 28 years old, single, whose picture and fingerprint are affixed hereto, was
born in Amoy Fukien, China on November 4, 1932, ex CPA plane on June 7,
1961, was admitted as citizen of the Philippines as per decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry dated June 23, 1961, duly, affirmed by the majority of the
members of the Board of Commissioners, I. C. No. 61-1881-C" (sic).
Thereafter, Teban Caoile registered as a voter, obtained a Philippine

passport, paid residence and income taxes, worked in the Avenue Electrical
Supply Company (Avesco) and became a member of the Social Security System.
The Secretary directed the Board of Commissioners to review "all decisions of
the Board of Special Inquiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give
preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the ground that the
entrant is a citizen of the Philippines". The Commissioners concluded that Teban
Caoile and his three brothers had not satisfactorily established their Philippine
citizenship. Their return to the port whence they came or to the country of which
they are nationals was ordered. On that same date, June 23rd, the
Commissioner of Immigration issued a warrant of exclusion to implement the
decision. Pursuant to that warrant, Teban Caoile was arrested on March 10, 1964
by Captain Macalinao and detained at the Office of the Constabulary's Criminal
Investigation Service at Camp Crame.
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On March 12, 1964 Juan Garcia, a relative of TebanCaoile, filed a petition

for habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, on
the ground that Caoile, as a Filipino citizen, was illegally detained. The trial court
issued an order requiring the production in Court of Teban Caoile. On March 14,
1964 the Commissioner of Immigration, in his return, explained that Caoile was
detained by virtue of the warrant of exclusion implementing the decision of the
Board of Commissioners.
The case was submitted for decision on the basis of a stipulation of facts
and on the testimonies of Antonio Caoile and Immigration Commissioner Vivo.
Antonio Caoile, the supposed father of Teban Caoile, declared that he is a
Filipino citizen. He categorically affirmed "that he does not know Teban Caoile",
that "it was only in the hearing of the case that he saw Teban Caoile" and that he
(Antonio) was married only about five years prior to 1964.
On March 24, 1964 the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus. It found that Teban Caoile was legally detained. Juan
Garcia appealed to the Court of Appeals, where he renewed his motion for
Caoile's release on bail which had been denied by the trial court. The
Commissioner of Immigration opposed the motion. The Court of Appeals allowed
Caoile's release upon his posting bail in the sum of P5,000.
The Commissioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari and

prohibition, wherein he assailed the resolution allowing the release of Caoile on
bail. The petition was dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Teban Caoile is a Filipino Citizen?
HELD:
No.
The first Board of Commissioners did not meet collectively to discuss and
deliberate on the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. Its action was set aside
by Memorandum Order No. 9 of the Secretary of Justice. Individual action by the
members of the Board of Commissioners renders nugatory the purpose of its
constitution as a board. The later Board of Commissioners, headed by the
appellant, acted on the hypothesis that the documentation supporting Teban
Caoile's alleged Philippine citizenship was fraudulent and manufactured. That
conclusion was confirmed by the testimony of Antonio Caoile, who, at risk of
being indicted for perjury, denied any paternal relationship to Teban Caoile. His
testimony implied that a monstrous deception was practiced upon the
immigration authorities. The foundation of Teban Caoile's assertion of Philippine
citizenship is his representation that he is Antonio Caoile's son. That foundation
collapsed when Antonio Caoile revealed that he could not have been the father of
Teban Caoile. His revelation belied Teban Caoile's documentation of Philippine
citizenship and unmasked it as an imposition. "When a party resorts to falsehood
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or fraud in order to strengthen his evidence, it is presumed that he knows

perfectly well that his cause is groundless".
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G.R. No. L-25439 March 28, 1969
IN RE: PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH

OF THE MINOR, CHUA TAN CHUAN. CHUA TAN CHUAN, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
A verified petition was filed on April 28, 1965 by the petitioner Chua Tan
Chuan thru counsel Atty. Peregrino M. Andres for the purpose of changing the
nationality of his son Jacob Chua from Chinese to Filipino as could be found in
the birth certificate of Jacob Chua.
The petitioner in this case is a resident of Sta. Ana, Davao City, Philippines
and is a Chinese citizen, while the minor Jacob Chua is under the custody and
support of the petitioner as according to the decision of this Honorable Court ...;
that according to the birth certificate of the minor prepared by the attending
physician, he was born at the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital on October 24,
1965.
The nationality of the minor is indicated in the birth certificate as Chinese

instead of Filipino, and according to the decision of this Court ... of the complaint
filed by Leoncia Manglangit against the petitioner Chua Tan Chuan, it was found
that the petitioner and the plaintiff were not legally married but they live as
common-law husband and wife; that Jacob Chua is the illegitimate child of
Leoncia Manglangit; and according to Exhibit 'E' which is the birth certificate of
the minor, stated that the nationality of the child is Chinese and such entry was
explained by the petitioner that there was a mistake so that he has been asking
for correction of the certificate of birth of the minor.
The lower court, the Honorable Vicente P. Bullecer presiding, rendered its
decision ordering the correction of the birth certificate of the minor Jacob Chua
by changing his nationality from Chinese to Filipino.
ISSUE:
Can an alien national become a Filipino citizen by virtue of a petition for

correction of entry in the certificate of birth?
HELD:
No.
The lower court is apparently oblivious of a 1964 decision, the opinion

being penned by the then Chief Justice Bengzon about ten months before in
Reyes v. Republic, wherein this Court reiterated that doctrine that a change of
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citizenship cannot effected by a mere correction of an entry in the Civil Registry

because in effect, it requests the judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship. We
have clearly stated time and again, that declaratory relief is not available for the
purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of citizenship.
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G.R. No. L-32600 February 26, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio

and Benguet and ANITA PO alias VERONICA PAO, assisted by her mother
HELEN POA, respondents.
FACTS:
The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the herein
private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed
with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet a Petition for the
change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. For this purpose, she also
sought court permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's
name appearing as PO YU be corrected to PAO YU and her mother's name
recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the
litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was
assisted in the case by her mother.
The suit was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 642. The
petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is
Helen Chan and that the given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is
actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The petitioner also
asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously
written in her birth certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns
these alleged errors to the common misunderstanding of Chinese names.
The petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic
priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian
given name and the latter being the correct spelling of her surname; that since
her childhood up to the present, she had always been known and referred to as
Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.
In a Decision dated July 24, 1969, the trial court, with respondent Judge
Feliciano Belmonte presiding therein, ruled in favor of the petitioner. The
petitioner was allowed to change her name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao. The
court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents as prayed for in the
Petition in the registry of birth. The Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad Benguet
was ordered to implement the corresponding corrections. On behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General elevated the case
to this Court by way of the instant Petition.
ISSUES:
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Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in
the civil registry be joined in the same proceeding?
HELD:
No.
An examination of petitioners allegations reveal that her claim to the

supposed correct name of Veronica Pao is predicated on the assumption that the
correct name other father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as recited in her own birth
certificate.
The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name other father
in her birth certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, until the name of her father is shown to have been
registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is no justification for allowing
the petitioner to use the surname Pao. The corrections sought by the petitioner
involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections
should first be determined in a different proceeding more adversary in character
than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with the trial court. Aside from
the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil
registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary
proceeding. The summary procedure for correction of the civil register under
Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not to a material change
in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner. A clerical error must
be apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of being corrected
by reference to the record alone. The petitioner seeks more than just the
correction of a clerical error.
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of

an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to
the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the
trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party
to the proceeding. Said civil registrar being an indispensable party, a final
determination of the case cannot be made. The procedure recited in Rule 103
regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not
be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency to hold
otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the
change of one's name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all
the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 must be complied with.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of First

Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July
24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared to be without force or effect. The
entries in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguet pertaining to the
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petitioner Anita Po and her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were
before such Decision.
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G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
non-immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated
that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to
take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching
Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually
depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration
to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At the
hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except
for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-
in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Should Lau Yuen Yeung by ipso facto be Filipino citizen upon her marriage
to a Filipino citizen?
HELD:
Yes.
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An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully

naturalized ipso facto, provided that she does not possess all of the
disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to
undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a substitute
for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to
have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may
not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or
enter into a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos),
but such is no proof that the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage
or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is
that the situation obtains even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the
citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides

therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen of 25 January 1962.
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G.R. No. 99358 January 30, 1995
DJUMANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE BOARD OF

IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND
DEPORTATION, respondents.
FACTS:
Bernard Banez, husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a

contract worker. He then embraced and was converted to Islam.
He then, married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. Banez then

returned to the Philippines. Petitioner and her two children with Banez (Marina
and Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the guests of Banez. The latter made it
appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitability extended to him during his stay in Indonesia. Banez
executed an Affidavit of Guaranty and Support, for his guests. As guests,
petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez. Petitioner and her
children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary visitors. Marina Cabael
discovered the true relationship of her husband and petitioner.
She filed a complaint for concubinage, however, subsequently dismissed

for lack of merit. Immigration status of petitioner was changed from temporary
visitor to that of permanent resident. Petitioner was issued an alien certificate of
registration. Banez eldest son, Leonardo, filed a letter complaint subsequently
referred to Commissioners Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (CID).
Petitioner was detained at the CID detention cell. Petitioner moved for the
dismissal of the deportation case on the ground that she was validly married to a
Filipino citizen. CID disposed that the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. They revoked the visa previously granted to her. On September 20,
1994, Leonardo C. Banez manifested that his father died on August 14, 1994 and
that he and his mother were withdrawing their objection to the granting of a
permanent resident visa to petitioner. Further, petitioner claims that her marriage
to Banez was valid under the Muslim Code, which recognizes the practice of
polyandry by Muslim males.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Djumantans admission and change of immigration

status from temporary to permanent resident legal?
HELD:
We need not resolve the validity of petitioner's marriage to Banez, if under

the law the CID can validly deport petitioner as an "undesirable alien" regardless
of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. There was a obvious abuse of our
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immigration laws in effecting petitioner's entry into the country and the change of
her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent resident. All such
privileges were obtained through misinterpretation, since never did the petitioner
disclose his marriage to Banez to the immigration authorities. Had they known,
immigration authorities would be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who
claims to have entered into a marriage with a Filipino citizen, who is married to
another woman.
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose

presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified
as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country, their admission
into the territory is a matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which
creates no obligation on the part of the government to permit them to stay.
Further, there is no law guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right
to be admitted, much less to be given permanent residency, in the Philippines.
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from
the operation of the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of
aliens. Also, marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso
facto make her a Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to
depart from the country upon the expiration of her extended stay here as an
alien.
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G.R. No. L-33216 June 28, 1983
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TAN CHING TO BE ADMITTED A

CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES: TAN CHING, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor- appellant.
FACT:
Tan Ching, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization on

September 8, 1959with the now defunct Court of First Instance of Quezon. The
petition was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 74-G.
Hearings on the petition were held wherein an assistant provincial fiscal

represented the Solicitor General. In a decision dated December 20, 1960, the
court rendered the following judgment having complied with all the requirements
of the naturalization law of the Philippines and possessing all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications prescribed in the law, is hereby ADMITTED to
Philippine citizenship as a naturalized Filipino, subject to the conditions
prescribed in Republic Act No. 530, that his decision shall not become final and
effective until after the lapse of two years from the date of the promulgation of
this decision and after the Court shall have made the findings in that hearing,
with the attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, that during the
intervening period of two years, the applicant TAN CHING (1) has not left the
Philippines, (2) has continuously dedicated himself to a lawful calling or
profession as found in this decision, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to
the interest of the nation or contrary to any government announced policies. He
shall further sever forever all his affiliations with any and all associations and
organizations which are exclusive to Chinese citizens in the Philippines or
elsewhere.
On June 3, 1970, Tan Ching filed a verified "MOTION TO DECLARE

PETITIONER QUALIFIED TO TAKE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE."
The Motion was opposed by the Solicitor General on the ground that it
was "filed only in June 1970 or more than nine (9) years from the rendition of the
decision in December 20, 1960 granting the petition for naturalization and it is not
shown that the delay was excusable, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned his
petition."
On August 26, 1970, the Court issued an Order which reads as follows:
"The decision in this case dated December 20, 1960, admitting petitioner
Tan Ching to Philippine citizenship as a naturalized Filipino was promulgated on
January 6, 1961.
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On June 9, 1970, petitioner filed a pleading styled MOTION TO DECLARE

PETITIONER QUALIFIED TO TAKE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE. To this motion the
Solicitor General filed an opposition dated July 31, 1970, on the ground that as
more than nine years have elapsed from the date the decision was rendered and
it has not been shown that the delay is excusable, petitioner is deemed to have
abandoned his petition.
The Court Finding that petitioner Tan Ching has complied with all the
requirements provided for in Republic Act No. 530, the Court hereby confirms the
decision in this case dated December 20, 1960 and promulgated on January 6,
1961 and orders its registration in the civil registry of Catanauan, Quezon. After
petitioner shall have taken his oath of allegiance in the form and substance
prescribed by law, let the corresponding certificate if naturalization be issued to
him, after which let him be under the duties and enjoy and be entitled to all the
rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen."
On September 8, 1970, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Notice of

Appeal "to the Supreme Court the order rendered by this Court dated August 26,
1970, allowing the petitioner to take his oath of allegiance on the ground that it is
unsupported by law and the evidence."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in allowing the petitioner to take the
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen despite the fact that he has not complied
with all the requirements provided for in Republic Act No. 530 and does not
possess all the qualifications required by law for admission to Philippine
citizenship?
HELD:
It is now well-settled that a petition for naturalization is of a special nature

necessarily involving public interest. Accordingly, "in case of appeal, the entire
record of the case is opened for scrutiny whether an objection has been
submitted in the lower court or not. As a matter of fact, it may not only interpose
an appeal from the decision granting the petition, but the State is not even
precluded from objecting to petitioner's qualification during the hearing of the
latter's petition to take the oath." (Cheng vs. Republic of the Philippines, 121 Phil.
415)
R.A. No. 530 (1950) provides in Section 1 that no decision granting an

application for Philippine citizenship shall "become executory until after two years
from its promulgation and after the court, on proper hearing, with the attendance
of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during
the intervening time the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has
dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules, (4) or
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
government announced policies."
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Finding no merit in the appeal, the same was dismissed.
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G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
FACTS:
On March 8, 1995, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her

Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor, stating that she is 7-
months resident in the said district. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo
Roy Montejo, incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position,
filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), alleging that Imelda did not meet the constitutional one-
year residency requirement. Imelda thus amended her COC, changing seven
months to since childhood. The provincial election supervisor refused to admit
the amended COC for the reason that it was filed out of time. Imelda, thus, filed
her amended COC with COMELEC's head office in Manila.
On April 24, 1995, the COMELEC Second Division declared Imelda not
qualified to run and struck off the amended and the original COCs. The
COMELEC in division found that when Imelda chose to stay in Ilocos and later on
in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there
and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to
have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days,
as her place of domicile. The COMELEC en banc affirmed this ruling.
During the pendency of the disqualification case, Imelda won in the

election. But the COMELEC suspended her proclamation. Imelda thus appealed
to the Supreme Court. Imelda invoked Section 78 of B.P. 881 which provides
that a petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
must be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than 15 days before the
election. Since the COMELEC rendered the resolution on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election, COMELEC already lose jurisdiction over her case.
She contended that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House
of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First
District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
HELD:
For purposes of election laws, residence is synonymous with domicile.

Hence, petitioner was a resident of the First District of Leyte and therefore
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possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a

candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives for the following reasons:
Minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is

retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of
petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of
origin by operation of law. This domicile was established when her father
brought his family back to Leyte.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of

domicile, one must demonstrate:
1.) An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2.) A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3.) Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the
residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity
or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon
her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by

operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile. What
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law and quite
another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife, the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The
inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation
therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept
her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new
domicile after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after
her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin
(assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This choice was
unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when
petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in
Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's
house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her
letters to the PCGG Chairman.
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G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and

JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents
Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify
petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution,
should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
ISSUE:
Does the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for

congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution?
HELD:
In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of

the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice.
Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated

not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that
he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections.
At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the
same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of
his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile
of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of
candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident

in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract
maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City, it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones
original domicile.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to

Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of
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residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with
the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin
should be deemed to continue.
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G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, deceased. PHILIPPINE TRUST CO.,

executor-appellee,
vs.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and MARY LYDIA

BOHANAN, oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
The Court of First Instance admitted to probate the last will and testament
of C.O Bohanan. The lower court finds, according to the evidence of the
proponents that the testator C.O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen
of the United States and of the State of Nevada. It provides in his last will and
testament that out of the total estate (after deducting the administration
expenses) of P211, 639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90, 819.67
and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother
and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of only P6, 000
each, or a total of P12, 000.
` The wife Magdalena C. Bohanan question the validity of the testamentary

provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that
they have been deprived of the legitime that the laws of the form concede to
them.
The first question refers to the share that the wife of the testator,
Magdalena C. Bohanan, should be entitled to receive. The will has not given her
any share in the estate left by the testator. The court below refused to recognize
the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the
deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife of the testator and his children are entitled to their
legitime?
RULINGS:
As to his wife, the court below had found that the testator and Magdalena
C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to
him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married
Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of the
testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife
exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already found that
there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C.
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Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of the estate left
by the testator.
The most important issue is the claim of the testator's children, Edward
and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only,
and, therefore, have not been given their shares in the estate which, in
accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by
the testator.
The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator
died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are
to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.
As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of

testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator,
and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the
testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a
testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar,
the order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with
the testamentary provisions, must be, as it is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants.
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G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN,

DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased,

Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant
FACTS:
Edward E. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California,

where he resided and consequently was considered a California citizen. In 1913,
he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death.
However, during the entire period of his residence in this country he had always
considered himself a citizen of California. In his will executed on March 5, 1951,
he instituted Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir, but left a legacy of sum of
money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who was rendered to have been
declared acknowledged natural daughter. Counsel for appellant claims that
California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred
back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine law is ultimately
applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased in view of the
successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law. On the other
hand, counsel for the heir of Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear
that under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must
apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of California on the
matter; that under California law there are no compulsory heirs and consequently
a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in absolute dominion
and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to anything and his will
remain undisturbed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the

estate of Christensen?
HELD:
The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in

effect that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which
should apply to Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which
should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California. The California
conflict rule says: If there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed
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by the law of his domicile. Christensen being domiciled outside California, the
law of his domicile, the Philippines, ought to be followed.
G.R. No. L-35694 December 23, 1933
ALLISON G. GIBBS, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, oppositor-appellant.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE CITY OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
FACTS:
Allison D. Gibbs and his wife Eva Johnson Gibbs are both citizens
of California and domiciled therein since their marriage in July 1906. There was
no ante-nuptial marriage contract between the parties and during the existence of
their marriage the spouses acquired lands in the Philippine Islands, as conjugal
property. On November 28, 1929, Mrs. Gibbs died intestate in Palo, Alto
California and that in accordance with the law of California, the community
property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife
previous to that of the husband belongs absolutely to the surviving husband
without administration.
In an intestate proceeding, the Court of First Instance of Manilaon

September 22, 1930, entered a decree adjudicating the said Allison D. Gibbs to
be the sole and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil
Code of California. Gibbs presented this decree to the Register of Deeds of
Manila and demanded that the latter issue to him a "transfer certificate of title".
The Register of Deeds of Manila declined to accept as binding said

decree of court and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal
property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax
had not been paid pursuant to Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code
entitled: "Tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa"
provides in section 1536 that "Every transmission by virtue of inheritance ... of
real property ... shall be subject to the following tax.".
Thereupon, Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring
the said register of deeds "to issue the corresponding titles" to the
petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax.
The court reaffirmed the order of September 22, 1930 and entered the
order of March 10, 1931, which is under review on this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Eva Johnson Gibbs at the time of her death is the owner of
a descendible interest in the Philippine lands?
RULING:
Yes.
The second paragraph of Article 10 of the Civil Code provides:

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Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession

as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever
may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.
The second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the

deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the
jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands. In the case of Clarke vs. Clarke (178 U. S.,
186, 191; 44 Law ed., 1028, 1031), the court said: It is principle firmly
established that to the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look
for the rules which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect
and construction of wills and other conveyances.
This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of

our Civil Code as follows: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation
of the owner thereof; real property to the laws of the country in which it is
situated. In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei
sitae, the respective rights of husband and wife in such property, in the absence
of an ante-nuptial contract, are determined by the law of the place where the
property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or to the place
where the marriage was celebrated.
Under this broad principle, the nature and extent of the title which vested
in Mrs. Gibbs at the time of the acquisition of the community lands here in
question must be determined in accordance with the lex rei sitae. It is admitted
that the Philippine lands here in question were acquired as community property
of the conjugal partnership of the appellee and his wife.
It results that the wife of the appellee was, by the law of the Philippine
Islands, vested of a descendible interest, a title equal to that of her husband, in
the Philippine lands from the date of their acquisition to the date of her death.
The descendible interest of Eva Johnson Gibbs in the lands aforesaid was
transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance and this transmission plainly falls
within the language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code which levies a tax on inheritances. It is unnecessary in this
proceeding to determine the "order of succession" or the "extent of the
successional rights" (article 10, Civil Code, supra) which would be regulated by
section 1386 of the Civil Code of California which was in effect at the time of the
death of Mrs. Gibbs.
Petition dismissed.
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G.R. No. L-13114 November 25, 1960
ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
ESTHER PERALTA, defendant-appellee,
FACTS:
At the outbreak of the war in 1941, the defendant Esther Peralta

abandoned her studies as a student nurse at the Zamboanga General Hospital.
In June of 1942, she resided with her sister, Mrs. Pedro Pia, in Maco, Tagum,
Mabini Davao. Saturnino Silva, then an American citizen and an officer of the
United States Army and married to one Prescilla Isabel of Australia, had been
ordered to be sent to the Philippines during the enemy occupation to help unite
the guerillas in their fight for freedom. In 1944, he was the commanding officer of
the 130th Regiment, under the overall command of Colonel Claro Laureta of the
107th Division, with general headquarters at Magugpo, Tagum, Davao.
Sometime during the year 1944, Florence, a younger sister of the

defendant, was accused of having collaborated with the enemy, and for this she
was arrested, and accompanied by Esther, brought to Anibongan and later to the
general headquarters at Magugpo for investigation that Silva first met Esther
Florence was exonerated of the charges made against her and was ordered
released, but with the advice that she should not return to Maco for the time
being. Heeding such advice, Florence and her sister, appellee herein, went to live
with the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Camilo Doctolero at Tipas, Magugpo, Davao.
Silva started to frequent the house of the Doctoleros, and soon professed
love for Esther. Having been made to believe that he was single, she accepted
his marriage proposal, and the two were married on January 14, 1945 by one
Father Cote on the occasion of a house blessing. No documents of marriage
were prepared nor executed, allegedly because there were no available printed
forms for the purpose. Hence, the lovers lived together as husband and wife.
From the "marriage", a child, named Saturnino Silva, Jr., was born.
On May 8, 1945, Silva sustained serious wounds in the battle of Ising, for
which reason, he was transferred to Leyte, and later to the United States, he
divorced Precilla Isabel and later, on May 9, 1948, contracted marriage with
plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.
Upon his return to the Philippines, appellee Esther Peralta demanded

support for their child, and, his refusal, instituted a suit for support in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. Thereupon, the present action was filed against Esther,
and another suit against her was instituted in Cotabato.
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Except for the statement that a marriage actually took place between
Saturnino Silva and Esther Peralta, the evidence on record fully supports the
foregoing findings of fact the lower court. No evidence was offered, other than
the testimonies of the defendant herself and her counsel, Atty. Juan Quijano, to
prove any such alleged marriage, although there is convincing proof that the
defendant and Saturnino Silva, for a time, actually lived together as common-law
husband and wife. But the witness' asseverations regarding the marriage, taken
by themselves and considered with other circumstances appearing on the record,
reveal too much uncertainty and incoherence as to be convincing.
ISSUE:
Did the appellee misrepresented herself as Mrs. Silva?
RULING:
Yes.
In view of the non-existence of appellee's marriage with Saturnino Silva,

and the latter's actual marriage to plaintiff Ledesma, it is not proper for Esther to
continue representing herself as the wife of Saturnino. Article 370 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines authorizes a married woman to use the surname of her
husband; impliedly, it also excludes others from doing likewise.
In the face of the evidence, we cannot give value on the presumption of

the marriage under section 69 (bb) of the Rules of Court, especially because, at
the time of the alleged marriage on January 14, 1945, Saturnino Silva was still
married to one Priscilla Isabel, an Australian national.
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G.R. No. L-1780 August 31, 1948
PETITION FOR THE PRESUMPTION OF DEATH OF NICOLAI SZATRAW,

CONSUELO SORS, petitioner-appellant.
FACTS:
Pleading under oath that she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a Polish
citizen, to whom she was married in Manila on November, 1936, whom she bore
a child named Alexis Szatraw born on 8 September 1937, with whom she had
lived from the time they were married until February, 1940, when her husband,
on the pretext that he would call on some friends, departed from the conjugal
abode carrying the child along with him and never returned, about whose
whereabouts she made inquiries from among her husband's friends and
countrymen and learned that her husband and child had left for Shanghai, where,
according, however, to information obtained from Polish citizens who had arrived
from that place, he and the child had not been seen and could not be found; that
all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her husband and child were in vain;
and that, because of her husband's absence for more than seven years during
which she has not heard any news from him and about her child, she believes
that he is dead, Consuelo Sors prays that her husband be declared dead and
that her parental authority over her child, should the latter be alive and later on
appear, be preserved. Upon the foregoing evidence the trial court dismissed the
petition on the ground that it is not for the settlement of the estate of the
absentee, and because the rule of evidence establishing the presumption that a
person unheard from in seven years is dead, does not create a right upon which
a judicial pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The petitioner has
appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition is allowed?
HELD:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw,
because it does not appear that he possessed property brought to the marriage
and because he had acquired no property during his married life with the
petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits
the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had
been unheard from in seven years had been established. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be
the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. The
latter must decide finally the controversy between the parties, or determine finally
the right or status of a party or establish finally a particular fact, out of which
certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such controversy is
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decided by a final judgment, or such right or status determined, or such particular

fact established, by a final decree, then the judgment on the subject of the
controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the
existence of a particular fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral
attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by law. It is. therefore,
clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he
had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only,
subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final. Proof
of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person
presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in seven years, cannot
become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period
within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still disputable and
remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner.
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G.R. No. L-9268 November 28, 1959
VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS:
On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of petitioner, was

sleeping on board M/V Miss Leyte, when it caught fire. Awakened by the fire,
Pedro Icong jumped overboard. Since then he has not been heard of. The
employee was unmarried and his father, respondent Juan Icong was his partial
dependent. On April 30, 1954, Juan Icong filed with the Workmens
Compensation Commission a petition and a notice of claim for death
compensation. The Commission rendered an award in favour of respondent
Juan Icong.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court for the review of the award.
ISSUE:
Would the provisions of Article 391 of the old Civil Code on presumptive
death apply on this case?
HELD:
No.
Though petitioner argues that in the absence of proof of the death of

Pedro Icong, the person to be presumed dead must be unheard of for at least
four years; that inasmuch as Pedro Icong had been missing only for a few
months from the alleged accident, there is yet legal presumption that Pedro Icong
is alive.
The Supreme Court however, ruled that, in the case of Madrigal Shipping
Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del Rosario, et. al. G.R. No. L-13130, 10-31-1959, it
approves of the explanation of the respondent Commissioner therein that Article
391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of
persons aboard a vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to case wherein the
vessel cannot be located nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there
is no trace of its whereabouts, inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a
vessel must be given the same meaning as "missing" employed in connection
with an aeroplane, the persons taking both means of conveyance being the
object of the rule expressed in the same sentence. In the instant case, none of
the foregoing conditions appear to exist. The fate of petitioner's vessel is not
unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had been definitely
destroyed by fire and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that when
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petitioner's vessel caught fire, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had
not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not
apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact
of death. In the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc., supra, we said:
Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might
probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again,
though diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may be
drawn. (Brownlee, et al., vs. Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident Association, 29
Fed [2nd] 71).
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G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant,
vs.
GABRIEL FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
FACTS:
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yaez were
joined in a Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In
February of 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and
acquired real and personal property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza
Yaez came to Manila, where her husband was residing, and here lived with him
in conjugal relations until the month of April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month
and year they made an agreement, in a public document, by which they
"resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting to such separation, and by
virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside
in such place as the said lady pleases." In the same document, the husband
undertook to send his wife the sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support,
payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of June of the said year 1899. The
husband complied with this obligation until August, 1899, after which time he
ceased to make further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but
the husband had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the
same year. On the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce
proceedings against her husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery
committed by him in or about the year 1899 with a certain woman that she
named in the complaint and with whom he had lived and cohabited and by whom
he had had two children. She prayed that she be granted a decree of divorce;
that the court order the separation of the properties of the plaintiff and the
defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the conjugal society be
therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property had been
determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to the
amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant
be ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish
dollars, which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date
of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held
itself to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the
plaintiff and defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed
that the communal property be divided between the parties, with costs against
the defendant, and in event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was
to be effected by commissioners according to law.
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Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal,
the partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with.
These latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the
partition to the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both
parties appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance over the case and partition of
property as decided by the court should be affirmed.
HELD:
The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th
of September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed. The two judgments
appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special pronouncement of costs in
this instance.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not

comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because
the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does
not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the
courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political
law of the nation. The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to
procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are
generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to
demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain
nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunals of the
state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce
any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to
making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not
contribute to secure his rights because of the courts lack of means to enforce
them. Justice, says the same professor, is a principle superior to that of
nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into any account
whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their
relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing
justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within
the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their
sovereignty. Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing
in its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction,
refrain from administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave
the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the
nation? This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the
conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and domicile; it would be
equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of private persons.
The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within
the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish
subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in
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Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion
of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical
courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code,
could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal
statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial
courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. It is a
question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court.
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although
Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile
herein.
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G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990
TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch

20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy
Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus",
namely: CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents.
________________________________________
G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.
TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch

20, Cagayan de Oro City, CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS,
ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE, NENITA VARGAS-
CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of Vitalianas death on

August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. They alleged that she was forcible taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner,
Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court
then issued a writ of habeas corpus, but petitioner refused to surrender the
Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to
habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure
due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the
body should be delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy, but Eugenio assailed the
lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner claim custody of the deceased?
HELD:
Yes.
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The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried

man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294

of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages
where a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it
requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana.
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G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile

and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ
WIEGEL, respondents.
FACTS:
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel filed before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage with
herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of the latters previous existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion. Having been allegedly force to enter into a
marital union, she contends that the first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise
alleged that Karl was married to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void?
HELD:
Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law. There is no
need for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force because
assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable.
Therefore, such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to
her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is
no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry.
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G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
FACTS:
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil

ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, without the knowledge of
Castros parents (thus, a secret marriage). Defendant Cardenas personally
attended to the processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license (license
no.3196182). The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife,
but only did so when Castro got pregnant. However, they only lived together for 4
months and eventually parted ways. With the consent of Cardenas, their baby
was later adopted by Castros brother, and was brought to the US. Desiring to
follow her daughter, Castro consulted a lawyer regarding the possible annulment
of her marriage. They discovered that there was no marriage license issued to
Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage. A certification of due search
and inability to find was issued by the Civil Registry of Pasig to back this claim.
The trial court denied Castros petition for nullity of marriage, ruling that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage
license. Castro then appealed to the appellate court, which reversed the trial
courts decision and declared the marriage between the contracting parties null
and void. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, then filed for petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is the Certification of Due Search and Inability to Find the marriage

license a sufficient evidence to render the marriage void.
HELD:
Yes.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to

Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of due search and
inability to find sufficiently proved that the local civil registry office did not issue a
marriage license to the contracting parties. Since no marriage license was
issued, marriage is rendered void ab initio (under the Family Code, Art.4).
It is also worth noting that Castro failed to offer any other witness
regarding the celebration of her marriage. This is because of its peculiar
circumstance of being a secret marriage. Cardenas did not appear during the
annulment trial, so he is considered to be in default.
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Furthermore, the abovementioned certificate, accompanied by a written

statement that after a diligent search, no such entry exists in the records of an
office, duly signed by the official or deputy in custody of said office; is admissible
as evidence that said office contain no such record.
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A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
FACTS:
The municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed
an administrative case against the Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency
in office and ignorance of the law for solemnizing the weeding of Gaspar A.
Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely
separated from his first wife and for performing the marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Somaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seek exculpation

from his act of solemnizing the marriage of Mr. Tagadan, a married man
separated from his wife by stating that he merely relied on the affidavit issued by
the MTC judge of Basey confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his wife have
not seen each other for almost seven years and such affidavit is sufficient proof
of Ida Pearandas presumptive death. With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that he did not violate Art. 7 par. 1 of the Family Code when he
solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and del Rosario and points out article 8 and
its exceptions as the justification for having solemnize the marriage outside of
his courts jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Domagtoy acted with gross misconduct in these

instances.
RULING:
Article 41 of the Family Code Provides that For the purpose of contracting
the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present
must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In

fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into
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the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that
the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary

proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this
judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of
the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony

outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his
having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del
Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in

weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. The
respondent judge, in this case, was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the Municipality of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte. By citing Article 8 and
the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance

of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention
are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to

the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the
other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the
law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
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G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his
capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay-Pilapil, a Filipina and the

respondent to the case, and Erich Geiling, a German national, were married at
Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a
half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation,
support and separation of property before RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983
where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of
Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. Five months after the decree of divorce, private respondent filed
two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent,
petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in
1982 and 1983 respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents adultery charges against the

petitioner is still valid given the fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing
of charges?
HELD:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as
well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Now, the law specifically
provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the
action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is
a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as
a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the
complaint or petition.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
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according to their national law..Thus, pursuant to his national law, private

respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
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G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional

Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972, established residence in the Philippines and begot two
children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Petitioner remarried
to Theodore Van Dornalso in Nevada.
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in the RTC-Pasay

stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is a conjugal property of the
parties. It further asked that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that
business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action
is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no
community property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines, so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
ISSUE:
Is the foreign divorce of the parties binding to the Filipino citizen?
HELD:
Yes.
As embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are

covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which a divorce dissolves
the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioners husband who is entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
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over the alleged conjugal property. Alice Reyes Van Dorn should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Petition granted.
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G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CRASUS L. IYOY, Respondent.
FACTS:
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961. As a result of their union, they

had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos who are now
all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the
Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five
children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent
Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he
disregarded the said request.
Sometime in 1985, Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to

their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family,
staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to
talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and
the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times
more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the
brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons.
Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had
been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and
in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in
which she was named as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was
filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus,
and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Crasus alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and
dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable
and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June 1997.
She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and
was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued that her marriage to her
American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, the law of
her present nationality shall govern her status.
ISSUES:
1. Was Fely able to obtain a valid divorce from Crassus?
2. Is article 26, paragraph 2 of the family code of the Philippines applicable to

the case at bar?
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RULING:
1. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her
Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent
Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984, after which
she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she
filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already
living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and
recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have
validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
2. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar. According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code of the Philippines:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated

and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation

wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other
a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
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G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
FACTS:
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the

United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. On February
22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
"Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States
citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor
by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. He discovered
that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous
relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo returned to the United
States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by
counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November
27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San
Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce. On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in
Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they
resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or
cohabitation. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband
and wife. Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz
and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a
Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M.
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,
Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his
property to Alicia and their three children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will was valid?
HELD:
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen
long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia;
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily
governed by foreign law. The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
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"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife
and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to
frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family
rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity." Whether the will is
intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by
foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
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G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent
FACTS:
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one of them later
acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva
at the United Church of Christ of the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter.
In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree and then married an American citizen.
Cipriano thereafter file with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was file.
The court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Thereafter, it filed petition to the Supreme Court raising a pure question of law.
ISSUE:
Should the respondent be allowed to remarry under Article 26 of the

Family Code?
HELD:
Yes.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that

according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Thus, taking into consideration this legislative intent and applying this rule
of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
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and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import leads to mischievous results or contravenes the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding
as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino

citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating

him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
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G.R. No. L-8639 March 23, 1956
In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez Ernesto Vasquez,
Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK,
Petitioner-Appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.
FACTS:
Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition
seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and
Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz Vasquez. He claims that
they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage and he desires to
adopt them to promote their best interest and well-being. Since the hearing of
the petition, petitioner Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal a petition seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria
Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz
Vasquez. He claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of
marriage and he desires to adopt them to promote their best interest and well-
being.
Since at the hearing of the petition petitioner acknowledged that they are
his natural children, the Solicitor General opposed the petition on the plea that he
could not legally adopt them for the reason that Article 338 of the new Civil Code
which allows a natural child to be adopted by his natural father refers only to a
child who has not been acknowledged as natural child.
At first the court upheld the opposition but, on a motion for

reconsideration, the court reconsidered its decision and granted the petition.
Hence, this appeal.
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but their
marriage was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on December 12,
1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida, U.S.A. Thereafter, he
and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage and out of this relation four children were born who are the minors he is
now seeking to adopt. He claims that it is his intention to marry Paz Vasquez as
soon as he is granted Philippine citizenship for which he has already applied and
in the meantime he wants to adopt them in order that no one of his relatives
abroad could share in his inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his
former wife and acknowledged said minors as his natural children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Code allows for the adoption of acknowledged
natural children of the father or mother?
HELD:
Yes.
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Article 338 of the new Civil Code evidently intends to allow adoption of a
natural child whether the child be recognized or not. If the intention were to allow
adoption only to unrecognized children, then said article would be of no useful
purpose because such children could have been validly adopted even without it.
This is so because a natural child not recognized has no right whatever and
being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may be adopted under
Article 337. The same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural
child because, his filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot
be made under the general principles governing adoption. There is therefore
need of an express provision allowing the adoption of an acknowledged natural
child as an exception to the rule and that is what is contemplated in Article 338.
Furthermore, the prohibition against a person who has an acknowledged

natural child to adopt, provided in Article 335 of the new Civil Code, refers to the
adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child
and it does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has
acknowledged them as his natural children. It may be contended that the
adoption of an acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there already
exists between the father and the children the relation of paternity and filiation
which is precisely the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal
fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural
child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great
advantage of the latter if he be given, even though legal fiction, a legitimate trend
which considers adoption as an act not merely to establish the relation of
paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a legitimate status.
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G.R. No. L-6294 June 28, 1954
In the matter of the adoption of the minor MARCIAL ELEUTARIO RESABA. LUIS
SANTOS-YIGO and LIGIA MIGUEL DE SANTOS-YIGO, petitioners-
appellees,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
FACTS:
On June 24, 1952, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga by Luis Santos-Yigo and his wife for the adoption of a minor named
MarcialEleuterioResaba. It is alleged that the legitimate parents of said minor
have given their consent to the adoption in a document which was duly signed by
them on March 20, 1950, and that since then petitioners have reared and cared
for the minor as if he were their own. It is likewise alleged that petitioners are
financially and morally able to bring up and educate the minor.
By order of the court, copy of the petition was served on the Solicitor
General who, in due time, filed a written opposition on the ground that petitioners
have two legitimate children, a boy and a girl, who are still minors, and as such
they are disqualified to adopt under the provisions of the new Civil Code.
The court granted the petition holding that, while petitioners have two
legitimate children of their own, yet said children were born after the agreement
for adoption was executed by petitioners and the parents of the minor. The court
found that said agreement was executed before the new Civil Code went into
effect and while the petition may not be granted under this new Code, it may be
sanctioned under the old because it contains no provision which prohibits
adoption in the form and manner agreed upon by the parties. From this decision,
the Solicitor General took the present appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Has the lower court erred in granting the petition to adopt in violation of
the provisions of paragraph 1, article 335 of the new Civil Code?
2. Has the lower court erred in giving Exhibit "A", the agreement to adopt,
a binding effect?
RULING:
While the adoption agreement was executed at the time when the law
applicable to adoption is Rule 100 of the Rules of Court which does not prohibit
persons who have legitimate children from adopting, we cannot agree to the
proposition that such agreement has the effect of establishing the relation of
paternity and filiation by fiction of law without the sanction of court. The reason is
simple. Rule 100 has taken the place of Chapter XLI of the Code of Civil
Procedure (sections 765-772, inclusive), which in turn replaced the provisions of
the Spanish Civil Code on adoption. (Articles 173-180.) As was stated in one
case, said chapter of the Code of Civil Procedure "appears to be a complete
enactment on the subject of adoption, and may thus be regarded as the
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expression of the whole law thereof. So viewed, that chapter must be deemed to
have repealed the provisions of the Civil Code.
On the matter regarding the (In re adoption of Emiliano Guzman, 73 Phil.,

51.),Section 1 of said rule expressly provides that a person desiring to adopt a
minor shall present a petition to the court of first instance of the province where
he resides. This means that the only valid adoption in this jurisdiction is that one
made through court, or in pursuance of the procedure laid down by the rule,
which shows that the agreement under consideration cannot have the effect of
adoption as now pretended by petitioners.
`Notwithstanding the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure or the

adoption of the present Rules of Court concerning adoption, those provisions of
the Spanish Civil Code that are substantive in nature cannot be considered as
having been impliedly repealed, such as the one providing that a person who has
a legitimate child is prohibited to adopt (article 74).
The order appealed from is set aside, without pronouncement as to costs.
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G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994
vs.
HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the

Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and
SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents.
FACTS:
On February 21, 1990 Alvin Clouse, a natural born citizen of America and
his Wife, Evelyn A Clause, Filipino at birth who later became a natural citizen of
the United States petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala. On June 20, 1990 the
judge decree said Filipino minor be their child by adoption. Republic of the
Philippines, the petitioner here, appealed that the lower court erred in granting
the petition for adoption for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under the
Philippine Law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse being an

alien are disqualified to adopt under the Philippine law?
HELD:
Yes. The spouses are disqualified to adopt the Filipino child Solomon.
Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the
persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz:
An alien, except:
(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;
(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or
(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly the later.
Alvin Clause is not qualified being a natural born citizen of the United
States of America. On the other hand Evelyn Clouse may seem to be qualified on
Article 184, however adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone for the Family
Code requires that the husband and wife must jointly adopt as stated on Article
185.
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G.R. No. L-43955-56 July 30, 1979
RENATO LAZATIN alias RENATO STA. CLARA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., NORA L. DE LEON,

BERNARDO DE LEON, ARLENE DE LEON and IRMA L.
VELOSO, respondents.
FACTS:
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate in Pasay City, survived by his wife,
Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin daughters, respondent Nora L. de Leon
and respondent Irma Lazatin. One month after Marianos death, his widow,
Margarita de Asis, commenced an intestate proceeding.
Two months after, Margarita de Asis also died leaving a holographic

providing, among others, for a legacy of cash, jewelry, and stocks to respondent
Arlene de Leon, a granddaughter; a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son
of her late sister; and a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara, son of
petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara.
During her lifetime, Margarita de Asis kept a safety deposit box which
either she or respondent Nora L. de Leon could open. Five days after Margaritas
death, Respondent Nora, opened the safety deposit box and removed its
contents.
Days after having learned that respondent Nora L. de Leon had opened
this safety deposit box, petitioner's son, Ramon Sta. Clara, filed a motion in the
probate court, claiming that the deceased had executed a will subsequent to that
submitted for probate and demanding its production. He likewise prayed for the
opening of the safety deposit box. Respondent Nora L. de Leon admitted that
she opened the box but there was no will or any document resembling a will
therein.
Seven months after, the death of Margarita de Asis, petitioner intervened

for the first time in the proceedings to settle the estate of the late Dr. Mariano M.
Lazatin (Sp. Proc. No. 2326-P), as an admitted illegitimate (not natural) child.
On August 20, 1975, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta. Clara
filed a motion to intervene in the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child,
on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin Lazatin, brother of the
deceased Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, that petitioner was an "illegitimate son" of Dr.
Lazatin and was later adopted by him. This affidavit was later modified on August
19, 1975 to state that petitioner was adopted by both Mariano M. Lazatin and his
wife Margarita de Asis.
Respondent court heard petitioner's motion to intervene as an adopted

son in the estate of Margarita de Asis. When petitioner could not present
evidence on the issue of his alleged legal adoption, respondent court
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discontinued the hearing and gave the parties time to file memoranda on the
question of the admissibility of the evidence sought to be introduced by petitioner.
Respondent court, ruling on petitioners motion for definite resolution on

his previous motion to declare as established the fact of adoption, issued the
following order:
"As far as the case of Renato Sta. Clara is concerned and his Petition to
establish his status as an adopted child, the Court has ruled that he has failed to
establish such status. The Court denies any motion for reconsideration unless
based on some documentary proof."
ISSUE:
Whether or not Renato has established his status as an adopted child and
is allowed to intervene in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate?
RULING:
We find the ruling of the respondent court to be in conformity with law and
jurisprudence.
Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with the

procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this
jurisdiction. The absence of a record of adoption has been said to evolve a
presumption of its non-existence. Where, under the provisions of the statute, an
adoption is effected by a court order, the records of such court constitute the
evidence by which such adoption may be established.
The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided

by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with
a person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such
adoption. Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and
declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the
judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to
establish his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child which
status of an admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his petitioner for
intervention in the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of

adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the
former existence of the instrument. As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to
establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been
established that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is
indispensable. If adoption was really made, the records thereof should have
existed and the same presented at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a
reasonable explanation of loss or destruction thereof, if that be the case,
adduced.
As a necessary consequence, petitioner Renato Lazatin alias Renato Sta.

Clara cannot properly intervene in the settlement of the estate of Margarita de
Asis as an adopted child because of lack of proof thereof. For one to intervene in
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an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest in the estate, either

as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a claim against the
estate like a creditor. A child by adoption cannot inherit from the parent creditor
by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord with the
statue. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither the
supposed adopting parent nor adopted child could be bound thereby. The burden
of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.
He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in the jurisdiction
where the adoption occurred.
We hold that no grave abuse of discretion nor error of law as committed

by respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders of March 4, 1976, March
26, 1976 and June 3, 1976 denying petitioner's petition "to declare as established
in this proceeding the fact of adoption" and denying "any motion for
reconsideration unless based on some documentary proof." The Court finds no
basis to grant the affirmative relief sought in this proceeding by petitioner for a
rendition of judgment "declaring as established the fact of your petitioner's
adoption as a son of the deceased spouses entitling him to succeed in their
estates as such in accordance with the applicable law on succession as to his
inheritance."
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G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ZENAIDA C. BOBILES, respondents.
FACTS:
Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six
years old and who had been living with her family since he was four months old.
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
an order setting the petition for hearing and subsequently granted the petition for
adoption.
The petition was filed by private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on

February 2, 1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree No. 603, the
Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under the said code, a petition for adoption may
be filed by either of the spouses or by both of them. However, after the trial court
rendered its decision and while the case was pending on appeal in the Court of
Appeals, Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August 3,
1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.
On the foregoing consideration, petitioner contends that the petition for

adoption should be dismissed outright for it was filed solely by private respondent
without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which
requires joint adoption by the spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be
applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs. Bobiles, as the latter did not
acquire a vested right to adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition for
adoption.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's decision which
granted the petition to adopt Jason Condat in favor of spouses Bobiles?
HELD:
No.
Article 246 of the Family Code provides for retroactive effect of

appropriate relevant provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will
of the holder. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her
explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to
file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in
accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
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The error assigned by petitioner warrants a review of applicable local and

foreign jurisprudence. For that purpose, we start with the premise that Article 185
of the Family Code is remedial in nature. Procedural statutes are ordinarily
accorded a retrospective construction in the sense that they may be applied to
pending actions and proceedings, as well as to future actions. However, they will
not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps completed before their
enactment.
A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law

which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance and is in accordance with the law
in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it
until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action.
We see no reason why the following doctrines in American law should not apply
to this case and, for that matter, in our jurisdiction. It is a settled rule therein that
adoption statutes, as well as matters of procedure leading up to adoption, should
be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of the adoption
institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and privileges coming to it
as a result of the adoption.
In the case at bar, the rights concomitant to and conferred by the decree
of adoption will be for the best interests of the child. His adoption is with the
consent of his natural parents. The representative of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development unqualifiedly recommended the approval of the
petition for adoption and the trial court dispensed with the trial custody for several
commendatory reasons, especially since the child had been living with the
adopting parents since infancy. Further, the said petition was with the sworn
written consent of the children of the adopters.
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G.R. No. L-21951 November 27, 1964
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF THE MINOR CHARLES JOSEPH

BLANCAFLOR WEEKS. UGGI LINDAMAND THERKELSEN and ERLINDA G.
BLANCAFLOR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
The petitioners in the adoption proceeding are husband and wife married
on June 2, 1962. The minor sought to be adopted was born on February 16,
1960 and the natural child of petitioner wife who has been living with them ever
since the marriage of petitioners. Petitioner husband is a Danish subject, who
has been granted permanent residence in the Philippines and has treated the
minor as his son, and the latter calls him "Daddy." Although the possibility exists
that petitioners may yet have their own children, the adoption at this time, before
any such children are begotten, may strengthen, rather than disrupt, future
domestic relations.
The court a quo (Manila Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court) denied
the application for adoption of the minor Charles Joseph Blancaflor Weeks
because the same would not result in the loss of the minor's Filipino citizenship
and the acquisition by him of the citizenship of his adopter. It stated that, an alien
cannot adopt a Filipino unless the adoption would make the Filipino minor a
citizen of the alien's country. As petitioner husband in this case is a Danish
subject, it has to be held that he cannot legally adopt the minor Charles Joseph
Blancaflor Weeks, whose citizenship is of this country, following that of his natural
mother.
Thus, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Should adoption result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the

alien citizenship of the adopting parent?
RULING:
No.
The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for
the approval of the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by
the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no
support in the law. The judgment appealed from would operate to impose a
further prerequisite on adoptions by aliens beyond those required by law. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief, the present Civil Code in force
(Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a)
non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has
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broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two cases,
alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a
person under our law. Petitioners admittedly do not fall in either class.
The citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in

nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the
Civil Code. It is not within the province of our civil law to determine how or
when citizenship in a foreign state is to be acquired. The disapproval of the
adoption of an alien child in order to forestall circumvention of our exclusion laws
does not warrant, denial of the adoption of a Filipino minor by qualified alien
adopting parents, since it is not shown that our public policy would be thereby
subverted.
Petition granted.
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G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967
JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,

respondent-appellee.
FACTS:
Maria Garnier Garreau (Maria), then aged 85, filed an application for
adoption of Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida (Josefina), aged 55, a
Filipino citizen, at the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain, where both were
residing at that time.
On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the application for
adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes
final, to execute the corresponding adoption document "con arreglo al articulo
177 del Codigo Civil." The adoption document became necessary for the reason
that under Article 177 of the Civil Code of Spain, "[a]probada definitivamente la
adopcion por el Juez, se otorgara escritura, expresando en ella las condiciones
con que se haya hecho, y se inscribira en el Registro Civil correspondiente."
In compliance thereof, on November 29, 1958, the notarial document of

adoption which embodies the court order of adoption, was executed before
Notary Public Braulio Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria
instituted petitioner, amongst other conditions as here unica y universal
heredera de todos sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros.
In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was authenticated

by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who
issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.
The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. However, the registrar refused to
register that document upon the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can
only be had through judicial proceeding. And since the notarial document of
adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.
Petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on mandamus. As

adverted to earlier, the mandamus petition did not prosper. The lower court in its
decision of February 28, 1964, dismissed said petition.
ISSUE:
Should the order of adoption issued by the Court of First Instance of

Madrid be registered in the Philippines?
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RULING:
Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign

adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by the
law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in
another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when
created by its own law. It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once
created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except
where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and
demand the substitution of the lex fori.
At any rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State
and adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of
our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign
adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is
entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to
be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by
the laws of this country.
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G.R. No. L-5405 January 31, 1956
ERNESTO M GUVERA, Petitioner,
vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and PEDRO C. QUINTO, Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara (Victoriano), a resident of

Bayambang, Pangasinan, executed a will, distributing assorted movables and a
residential lot among his children. To his second wife, the testator bequeathed
among others a portion of 25 hectares to be taken out of a 259 odd hectare
parcel, plus another five (5) hectares in settlement of here widows usufruct. The
remainder of the 259 odd hectares were distributed to the desires of the testator
as follows:
100 hectares reserved for disposal during the testators lifetime and for
payment of his debts and family expenses;
108.0854 hectares to his legitimate son Ernesto Guevara (Ernesto),

including therein 43.2342 hectares by way of mejora; and
21.6171 hectares to mi hija natural reconocida Rosario Guevara

(Rosario).
On July 12, 1933, the same testator executed a deed of sale of the
southern half of the above mentioned 259-hectare lot in favor of Ernesto, who
was also appointed as executor without bond. He also expressly recognized
Ernesto as the owner of the northern half.
The whole lot had been previously registered by Victorino and Ernesto,
but in view of the sale, the decree for the whole tract was issued exclusively in
the name of Ernesto. A certificate of title was issued to this effect on October 12,
1933.
Upon Victorinos death on September 27, 1933, his will was not filed for
probate. About four years later, Rosario, claiming to be Victorinos recognized
natural child and assuming that he died intestate, brought a suit against Ernesto
to recover her legitime.
The case reached the Court of Appeals and was decided in favor of
Rosario but upon certiorari, the Supreme Court modified the judgment.
Claiming to act pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court, Rosario

commence on October 5, 1945, special proceeding in the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan for the probate of the will of Victorino Guevara.
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Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto,

counsel for Rosario in the former litigation, was allowed to intervene in view of his
duly recorded attorneys lien.
On January 31, 1946, Ernesto, through counsel, filed a motion to dismiss

the petition.
On December 9, 1946, Judge Sotero Rodas denied the motion but upon
reconsideration, Judge Maalac of the same court, on June 23, 1947,
reconsidered and set aside the previous resolution and ordered the petition
dismissed.
An amended petition for the probate of the will in toto and another petition
to reconsider the previous order were subsequently denied. Rosario and Atty.
Quinto thereupon brought the case on appeal. The Court of Appeals decided in
favor of Rosario and Quinto.
Ernesto filed a petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Is the petition for probate of a will barred by the Statute of Limitations?
HELD:
No.
The provision of Article 756 of the old Civil Code (1042 of the New) and of
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court, reiterating those of the old Code of Civil Procedure
(Act 190), point out that the presentation of a decedents will to the competent
court has always been deemed by our law as more of a duty than a right. The
neglect of such an obligation carries with it a corresponding penalty. It is
inconsistent with that policy for the court to refuse admission of wills to probate,
without inquiry into their validity. The authority given to testators to dispose freely
of a portion of their estate would be imperfectly safeguarded, unless adequate
measures were provided by the state to assure that the wishes of the deceased
would be carried out. Because the decedent may no longer act to have his
testamentary dispositions duly executed, the state authority must take over the
opposite vigilance and supervision, so that free testamentary disposition does not
remain a delusion and a dream.
Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will
with no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition
of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide
the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of
the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away
with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such
suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the
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probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof is given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will, may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be
done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may
have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate
among themselves to the exclusion of others.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to
the wills authenticity and due execution, none of the heirs may sue for the
partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its
allowance or probate by the court; first, because the law expressly provides that
no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in
the proper court; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a
proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other
proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy
designed to effectuate the testators right to dispose of his property by will in
accordance with law. This is for the protection of the rights of the heirs and
legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the
publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an
action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action
for revindicacion or partition.
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G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC,
Bulacan, respondent.
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became
American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New
York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship this means that in the
event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall
be presumed to have predeceased his wife. Later, the entire family perished in a
fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Joses will,
filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
Later, Salud Perez, Evelyns mother, filed a petition for reprobate in

Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New
York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York
law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers
and sisters were Joses heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate
proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and
that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could
present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already
issued an order, disallowing the wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was necessary to prove the foreign law.
HELD:
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have
been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of
the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in
the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to
probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court,
and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills. Except
for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed
evidence.
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the
probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them.
Petitioner must have perceived the omission of the fifth requirement above
as in fact she moved for more time to submit the pertinent procedural and
substantive New York laws but which request respondent Judge just glossed
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over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should
relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate.
Respondent Judge was ordered to give the petitioner a reasonable time

within which to submit evidence.
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G.R. No. L-42780 January 17, 1936
MANILA GAS CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
The plaintiff is a corporation that operates a gas plant in the City of Manila
and furnishes gas service to the people of the metropolis and surrounding
municipalities by virtue of a franchise granted to it by the Philippine Government.
Associated with the plaintiff are the Islands Gas and Electric Company domiciled
in New York, United States, and the General Finance Company domiciled in
Zurich, Switzerland. Neither of these last mentioned corporations resides in the
Philippines.
For the years 1930, 1931, and 1932, dividends in the sum of P1,
348,847.50 were paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric Company in
the capacity of stockholders upon which withholding income taxes were paid to
the defendant totaling P40, 460.03. For the same years interest on bonds in the
sum of P411,600 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands Gas and Electric
Company upon which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant
totaling P12,348. Finally for the stated time period, interest on other
indebtedness in the sum of P131, 644, 90 was paid by the plaintiff to the Islands
Gas and Electric Company and the General Finance Company respectively upon
which withholding income taxes were paid to the defendant totaling P3,949.34.
An action was brought by the Manila Gas Corporation against the

Collector of Internal Revenue for the recovery of P56, 757.37, which the plaintiff
was required by the defendant to deduct and withhold from the various sums
paid it to foreign corporations as dividends and interest on bonds and other
indebtedness and which the plaintiff paid under protest. On the trial court
dismissing the complaint, with costs, the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUES:
1. Did the trial court err in holding that the dividends paid by the plaintiff
corporation were subject to income tax in the hands of its stockholders?
2. Did the trial court err in not holding the interest on bonds and other
indebtedness of the plaintiff corporation, paid by it outside of the Philippine
Islands to corporations not residing therein, were not, on the part of the
recipients thereof, income from Philippine sources, and hence not subject
to Philippine income tax.
HELD:
1. Appellant first contends that the dividends paid by it to its stockholders,

the Islands Gas and Electric Company , were not subject to tax because
to impose a tax thereon would be to do so on the plaintiff corporation, in
violation of the terms of its franchise and would, moreover, be oppressive
and inequitable. This argument is predicated on the constitutional
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provision that no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted.

The particular portion of the franchise which is invoked provides:
The grantee shall annually on the fifth day of January of each year
pay to the City of Manila and the municipalities in the Province of
Rizal in which gas is sold, two and one half per centum of the gross
receipts within said city and municipalities, respectively, during the
preceding year. Said payment shall be in lieu of all taxes, Insular,
provincial and municipal, except taxes on the real estate, buildings,
plant, machinery, and other personal property belonging to the
grantee.
The trial judge was of the opinion that a corporation has a

personality distinct from that of its stockholders, enabling the taxing
power to reach the latter when they receive dividends from the
corporation. It must be considered as settled in this jurisdiction that
dividends of a domestic corporation, which are paid and delivered
in cash to foreign corporations as stockholders, are subject to the
payment in the income tax, the exemption clause in the charter of
the corporation notwithstanding.
For that reason, the decision of the trial court is sustain and
to overrule appellant's first assigned error.
2. The appellant contends that, as the Islands Gas and Electric Company
and the General Finance Company are domiciled in the United States and
Switzerland respectively, and as the interest on the bonds and other
indebtedness earned by said corporations has been paid in their
respective domiciles, this is not income from Philippine sources within the
meaning of the Philippine Income Tax Law.
Taking first under observation that last point, it is to be observed

that neither in the pleadings, the decision of the trial court, nor the
assignment of errors, was the question of the validity of Act No. 3761
raised. Under such circumstances, and no jurisdictional issue being
involved, we do not feel that it is the duty of the court to pass on the
constitutional question, and accordingly will refrain from doing so.
(Cadwaller-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario [1913], 26 Phil., 192;
Macondray and Co. vs. Benito and Ocampo, P. 137, ante; State vs. Burke
[1912], 175 Ala., 561.)
In the case at bar there is some uncertainty concerning the place of

payment, which under one view could be considered the Philippines and
under another view the United States and Switzerland, but which cannot
be definitely determined without the necessary documentary evidence
before, us.
The approved doctrine is that no state may tax anything not within
its jurisdiction without violating the due process clause of the constitution.
The taxing power of a state does not extend beyond its territorial limits, but
within such it may tax persons, property, income, or business. If an interest
in property is taxed, the situs of either the property or interest must be
found within the state. If an income is taxed, the recipient thereof must
have a domicile within the state or the property or business out of which
the income issues must be situated within the state so that the income
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may be said to have a situs therein. Personal property may be separated

from its owner, and he may be taxed on its account at the place where the
property is although it is not the place of his own domicile and even
though he is not a citizen or resident of the state which imposes the tax.
But debts owing by corporations are obligations of the debtors, and only
possess value in the hands of the creditors. These views concerning situs
for taxation purposes apply as well to an organized, unincorporated
territory or to a Commonwealth having the status of the Philippines.
Pushing to one side that portion of Act No. 3761 which permits
taxation of interest on bonds and other indebtedness paid without the
Philippine Islands, the question is if the income was derived from sources
within the Philippine Islands.
In the judgment of the majority of the court, the question should be

answered in the affirmative. The Manila Gas Corporation operates its
business entirely within the Philippines. Its earnings, therefore come from
local sources. The place of material delivery of the interest to the foreign
corporations paid out of the revenue of the domestic corporation is of no
particular moment. The place of payment even if conceded to be outside
of the country cannot alter the fact that the income was derived from the
Philippines. The word "source" conveys only one idea that of origin, and
the origin of the income was the Philippines.
Judgment affirmed.
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G.R. No. L-36402 March 16, 1987
FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS AND PUBLISHERS,
INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
BENJAMIN TAN, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant who is the owner of several musical compositions

among which are the songs entitled: "Dahil Sa Iyo", "Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin,"
"Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao Lamang" and "The Nearness Of You", filed a complaint
with the lower court for infringement of copyright against defendant-appellee for
allowing said song to be played in defendant-appellee's restaurant despite these
songs being copyrighted in the name of the former. Defendant-appellee,
countered that the complaint states no cause of action. While not denying the
playing of said copyrighted compositions in his establishment, appellee maintains
that the mere singing and playing of songs and popular tunes even if they are
copyrighted do not constitute an infringement under the provisions of Section 3 of
the Copyright Law.
ISSUE:
Does the playing and singing of copyrighted musical compositions inside

an establishment constitute a public performance for profit within the meaning
and contemplation of RA 3134 otherwise known as the Copyright Law of the
Philippines?
HELD:
NO.
It has been held that "the playing of music in dines and dance
establishment which was paid for by the public in purchases of food and drink
constitute performance for profit within a Copyright Law." Thus, it has been
explained that while it is possible in such establishments for the patrons to
purchase their food and drinks and at the same time dance to the music of the
orchestra, the music is furnished and used by the orchestra for the purpose of
inducing the public to patronize the establishment and pay for the entertainment
in the purchase of food and drinks. The defendant conducts his place of business
for profit, and it is public; and the music is performed for profit.
Nevertheless, appellee cannot be said to have infringed upon the

Copyright Law. Appellees allegation that the composers of the contested musical
compositions waived their right in favor of the general public when they allowed
their intellectual creations to become property of the public domain before
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applying for the corresponding copyrights for the same is correct. The Supreme
Court has ruled that pursuant to Paragraph 33 of Patent Office Administrative
Order No. 3(as amended, dated September 18, 1947) entitled 'Rules of Practice
in the Philippines Patent Office relating to the Registration of Copyright Claims
promulgated pursuant to Republic Act165, provides among other things that an
intellectual creation should be copyrighted thirty (30)days after its publication, if
made in Manila, or within the (60) days if made elsewhere, failure of which
renders such creation public property."
Indeed, if the general public has made use of the object sought to be
copyrighted for thirty (30) days prior to the copyright application, the law deems
the object to have been donated to the public domain and the same can no
longer be copyrighted. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the musical
compositions in question had long become public property, and are therefore
beyond the protection of the Copyright Law.
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G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS,

as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST

CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et
al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT
PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents.
FACTS:
The subject property in this case, the Roppongi is one of the four
properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine Government under the reparation
agreement entered into with the former. The properties and capital goods and
services procured from the Japanese Government for the national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their loses in life
and property and their suffering during world war II.
The Roppongi property consists of the land and building for chancery of
the Philippine embassy. As intended, it became the site of Philippine Embassy
until it was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed major
repairs. Due to the failure of the government to provide the necessary funds, the
Roppongi has remained undeveloped since that time.
Meanwhile, President Corazon Aquino issued EO No. 296 entitling non-

Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations capital goods and services in
the event of sale, lease or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by
various sectors, the Executive Branch of the government pushed for the sale of
reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been
set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while
the second was postponed and later restrained by the SC.
Petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property is classified as one of

public dominion, and not of private ownership under article 420 of the civil code.
He states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach
to it, not even by the State. The subject property cannot be appropriated, is
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outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be

alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying
that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of
Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is
used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and
devolution of the title to a property. The respondents add that even assuming for
the sake of argument that the Civil Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has
ceased to become property of public dominion. It has become patrimonial
property because it has not been used for public service or for diplomatic
purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and
because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert
it to private use has been manifested by overt acts.
ISSUES:
1. Can the Roppongi property can be alienated by the Philippine

Government?
2. Was there a conflict of law between the Japanese law on property (as the
real property is situated there) and Philippine law?
RULINGS:
1. No. Unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become

patrimonial, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion. As property
of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man.
Therefore, it cannot be alienated.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of

Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and
intended for some public service. The fact that the Roppongi site has not
been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private
appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such.
We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to

use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite
abandonment. This cannot be inferred from mere non-use alone
especially if the non-use was attributable, not to the government's own
deliberate and indubitable will, but to a lack of financial support to repair
and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166
SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based
on correct legal premises.
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2. No. We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no
conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when:
(1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such
that the capacity to take and transfer immovable, the formalities of
conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See
Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A
foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine
which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues
are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of
the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the
State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is
governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
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G.R. No. 2721 March 22, 1906
RAFAEL MOLINA Y SALVADOR, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO DE LA RIVA, Defendant-Appellant.
Gibbs & Gale, for Appellant.
Pillsbury &Sutro, for Appellee.
FACTS:
This is an action to recover a debt due upon a contract executed July 27,
1903, whereby plaintiff transferred to the defendant the abaca and copra
business carried on by him at various places in the Island of Catanduanes, with
all the property and right pertaining to the said business, or the sum of 134,636
pesos and 12 cents, payable in Mexican currency or its equivalent in local
currency. Defendant paid at the time of the execution of the contract, on account
of the purchase price, the sum of P33,659 pesos and 3 cents, promising to pay
the balance on three instalments P33,659 pesos and 3 cents each, with interest
at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from the date of the contract. The first
instalment became due July 27, 1904. It was for the recovery of this first
instalment that their action was brought to the Court of First Instance of the City
of Manila.
Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the subject of the action. The court overruled the demurrer and
defendant refused to and did not, as a matter of fact, answer plaintiffs complaint.
Judgment having been rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of 33,659
pesos and 3 cents, Mexican currency, equal to 30,052 pesos and 70 centavos,
Philippine currency, an interest thereon at the rate of 5 per cent per annum from
July 27, 1903 and costs, the defendant duly excepted.
ISSUES:
1. Does the court have jurisdiction over the subject of an act?

2. Did the court err in fixing in Philippine currency the sum which the
appellee should recover without hearing evidence?
3. Did the court err in rendering judgment regarding a sum larger than that
sought to be recovered?
HELD:
1. A personal action to recover a debt may be brought, under section 377 of

the Code of Civil procedure, either in the Court of First Instance of the
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province where the plaintiff resides or in that where the defendant may
reside, at the election of the plaintiff. The residence in such case should
be that which the parties had at the time of the commencement of the
action and not prior thereto.
The law does not authorize litigant-parties to submit themselves, by
express stipulation, to the jurisdiction of a particular court, to the exclusion
of the court duly vested with such jurisdiction. An express agreement
tending to deprive a court of the jurisdiction conferred on it by law is void
and of no legal effect.
2. Due to his failure to deny, dispute or controvert the facts of the complaint,
particularly regarding the value of the Mexican currency in Philippine peso,
the defendant has also admitted to the same. Therefore, it shall not be
necessary for the court to hear evidence upon this point. The proof
required by section 3 of Act No. 1045 is only necessary when the parties
disagree as to the actual value of either currency.
3. The relief granted to the plaintiff, if there be no answer, cannot exceed that
which he shall have demanded in his complaint. (Sec. 126, Code of Civil
Procedure).
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G.R. No. 61594 September 28, 1990
PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of Labor; HON. VICENTE

LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B.
FARRALES and MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, respondents.
FACTS:
On 2 December 1978, petitioner Pakistan International Airlines

Corporation (PIA), a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed in Manila two separate contracts of employment, one with
private respondent Farrales and the other with private respondent Mamasig. The
contracts, which became effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent
portion as follows:
5. DURATION OF EMPLOYMENT AND PENALTY
This agreement is for a period of 3 years, but can be extended by the mutual
consent of the parties.
xxxxxxxxx
6. TERMINATION
xxxxxxxxx
Notwithstanding anything to contrary as herein provided, PIA reserves the

right to terminate this agreement at any time by giving the EMPLOYEE notice in
writing in advance one month before the intended termination or in lieu thereof, by
paying the EMPLOYEE wages equivalent to one months salary.
xxxxxxxxx
10. APPLICABLE LAW:
This agreement shall be construed and governed under and by the laws of
Pakistan, and only the Courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall have the jurisdiction to
consider any matter arising out of or under this agreement.
After undergoing training Farrales and Mamasig (employees) were hired

as flight attendants with base station in Manila and flying assignments to different
parts of the Middle East and Europe. Roughly 1 year and 4 months prior to the
expiration of their contracts of employment, PIA through Mr. Oscar Benares,
counsel for an official of the local branch of PIA, sent separate letters, informing
them that they will be terminated effective September 1, 1980.
Farrales and Mamasig jointly instituted a complaint, for illegal dismissal

and non-payment of company benefits and bonuses, against PIA with the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
In its position paper, the PIA, without any evidence, claimed that both
private respondents were habitual absentees; that both were in the habit of
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bringing in from abroad sizeable quantities of personal effects; and that PIA
personnel at the Manila International Airport had been discreetly warned by
customs officials to advise private respondents to discontinue that practice. PIA
further claimed that the services of both private respondents were terminated
pursuant to the provisions of the employment contract.
A favorable decision was granted for the respondents. The order stated
that private respondents had attained the status of regular employees after
rendering more than a year of continued service; that the stipulation limiting the
period of the employment contract to 3 years was null and void as violative of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations on
regular and casual employment; and that the dismissal, having been carried out
without the requisite clearance from the MOLE, was illegal and entitled private
respondents to reinstatement with full back wages.
Decision sustained on appeal. Hence, this petition for certiorari
ISSUE:
Which law should govern over the case? Which court has jurisdiction?
HELD:
Philippine Law and Philippine Courts.
Petitioner PIA cannot take refuge in paragraph 10 of its employment

agreement which specifies, firstly, the law of Pakistan as the applicable law of the
agreement and, secondly, limits the venue for settlement of any dispute arising
out of or in connection with the agreement to only [in] courts of Karachi
Pakistan.
We have already pointed out that the relationship is much affected with
public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations
cannot be rendered illusory by the parties agreeing upon some other law to
govern their relationship. The contract was not only executed in the Philippines, it
was also performed here, at least partially.Private respondents are Philippine
citizens and respondents, while petitioner, although a foreign corporation, is
licensed to do business (and actually doing business) and hence is residing in
the Philippines. Lastly, private respondents were based in the Philippines in
between their assigned flights to the Middle East and Europe. All of the above
contacts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as the proper
forum for the resolution of contractual disputes between the parties.
Under these circumstances, paragraph 10 of the employment agreement

cannot be given effect so as to oust Philippine agencies and courts of the
jurisdiction vested upon them by Philippine law. Finally, and in any event, the
petitioner PIA did not undertake to plead and prove the contents of Pakistan law
on the matter; it must therefore be presumed that the applicable provisions of the
law of Pakistan are the same as the applicable provisions of Philippine law.
Petition denied.
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G.R. No. L-2935 March 23, 1909
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GEORGE I. FRANK, defendant-appellant,
FACTS:
In 1903, in the city of Chicago, Illinois, The Defendant Frank entered into a
contract for a period of 2 years with the Plaintiff, by which Frank was to receive a
salary as a stenographer in the service of the said Plaintiff, and in addition
thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in travelling from city of
Chicago to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
The contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms

on the part of the Defendant, he should become liable to the Plaintiff for the
amount expended by the Government by way of expenses incurred in travelling
from Chicago to Manila and the one-half salary paid during such period.
The Defendant entered upon the performance of his contract and was
paid half-salary from the date until the date of his arrival in the Philippine Islands.
Thereafter, Defendant left the service of the Plaintiff and refused to make
a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The Plaintiff commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila

to recover from the Defendant the sum of money, which the Plaintiff claimed had
been paid to the latter as expenses incurred in travelling from Chicago to Manila,
and as half-salary for the period consumed in travel.
It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No.
80 and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.
The Defendant filed a general denial and a special defense, alleging that:
(1) the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended Laws No. 80 and No.
224 and had thereby materially altered the said contract; and that (2) he was a
minor at the time the contract was entered into and was therefore not responsible
under the law. The lower court rendered a judgment against Defendant and in
favor of the Plaintiff for the sum of $265.90.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant can allege minority or infancy?
RULING:
No.
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It is not disputed upon the contrary the fact is admitted that at the
time and place of the making of the contract in question the Defendant had full
capacity to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters
bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of
performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit,
admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.
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G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON. RODOLFO A.

ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, respondents.
FACTS:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight

Attendant for its airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went

to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-
Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they
returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of
Thamer. When they were in te (sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after
he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as
an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA

officials interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to
go back to Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta,
SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with
the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members but did not
succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the
local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in
the local dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but
barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian

government, the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after
two weeks of detention. Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant
SAUDI (sic). In September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to
Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident
was already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy,
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station where the police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police
put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and
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Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and
allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a
few minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed
to board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the
case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to
appear before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to

Jeddah once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation.
Plaintiff did so after receiving assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager,
AslamSaleemi, that the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to
her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court
on June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one
hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane
was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her
to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary
of Mr. YahyaSaddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at
the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same
court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision,
translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to
286 lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together
with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention
of Islamic tradition.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against

SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager. On January
19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss which raised the following
grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia;
(2) that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or
demand set forth in the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case. On
February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss). Saudia
filed a reply thereto on March 3, 1994. On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an
Amended Complaint wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as party defendant. On
August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint.
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The trial court issued an Order dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion
to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia. On February 20, 1995, SAUDIA
filed its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary
Restraining Order dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge
from further conducting any proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant
Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October
13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of

Appeals rendered the Decision dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled
that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and
thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It further held
that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,
inasmuch as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an
adverse ruling, find recourse in an appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent appellate court erred in holding that the regional

trial court of Quezon City has jurisdiction to hear and try civil case no.
Q-93-18394 entitled "Milagros P. Morada v. Saudi Arabian airlines".
2. Whether respondent appellate court erred in ruling that in this case

Philippine law should govern.
HELD:
1. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the suit. Its authority to try and hear the case is provided
for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, otherwise known as the

"Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19.Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest,

damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses,
and cots or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-
mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxxxxxxxx
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And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court

the venue, Quezon City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxxxxxxxx
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it
best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance
of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she
no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary

difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be
upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons
of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with
the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the
jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several

motions praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended Complaint.
SAUDIA also filed an Answer in Ex AbundanteCautelam dated February
20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is that
SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner
SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying
for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction
over the case and that its exercise thereof, justified.
2. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort
complained of and the place "having the most interest in the problem", we
find, by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should
have paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal
issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which
could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable
petitioner's insistence that "since private respondent instituted this suit,
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she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on
the matter." As aptly said by private respondent, she has "no obligation to
plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause
of action is based on Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she
never alleged that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly
held by the respondent appellate court, "considering that it was the
petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia,
then the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the
law of Saudi Arabia is".
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court

in upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's (herein petitioner's)
motion to dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order and venue
properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand.
Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately concerned with the
ultimate outcome of the case below, not just for the benefit of all the
litigants, but also for the vindication of the country's system of law and
justice in a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial
court must proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of relevant
Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign element or elements
involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as
prejudging the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
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978 F.2d 493
116 A.L.R.Fed. 765, 61 USLW 2257
AGAPITA TRAJANO; ARCHIMEDES TRAJANO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,
vs.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, DEFENDANT, AND IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
FACTS:
After former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his daughter,

Imee Marcos-Manotoc, fled to Hawaii in 1986, they were sued in federal court by
Agapita Trajano, a citizen of the Philippines who then lived in Hawaii, for the
torture and wrongful death of Trajanos son, Archimedes, in the Philippines on
August 31, 1977. Marcos-Manotoc did not appear and a default judgment was
entered against her. In 1991, she moved to set aside entry of default on the
ground of insufficiency of service. The motion was denied and, after a hearing
for damages, judgment was entered based on the courts findings that
Archimedes was tortured and his death was caused by Marcos-Manotoc. The
court concluded that this violation of fundamental human rights constitutes a tort
in violation of the law of nations under 28 U.S. C. Sec. 1350, and awarded
damages of $4.16 million and attorneys fees pursuant to Philippine Law.
Manotoc filed an appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the US district court lack subject-matter jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1350?
HELD:
Yes.
The district court does not lack subject-matter jurisdiction of the case
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350.
Section 1350 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien or a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.
The Alien Tort Statute was enacted as part of the First Judiciary Act of
1789 but has seldom been invoked. The debates that led to the Acts passage
contain no reference to the Alien Tort Statute, and there is no direct evidence of
what the First Congress intended it to accomplish. The statute has, however, be
comprehensively analyzed by the Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
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F.2d 876, which recognized a cause of action and subject-matter jurisdiction

under Sec. 1350 in an action between Paraguayan citizens for acts of torture
committed in Paraguay, and by the District of Columbia Circuit in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, which affirmed dismissal for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction of an action by Israeli citizens against the Palestine Liberation
Organization for acts of terrorism in violation of international law.
The Alien Tort Statute requires a claim by an alien, and a violation of

international law. Trajanos complaint alleges that she and her son were citizens
of the Philippines, and that her claims for relief arise under wrongful death
statutes and various international declarations.
There is no doubt, as the district court found, that causing Trajano's death
was wrongful, and is a tort. Nor, in view of Marcos-Manotoc's default, is there
any dispute that Trajano's death was caused by torture. And, as we have recently
held, "it would be unthinkable to conclude other than that acts of official torture
violate customary international law." Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
965 F.2d 699
We believe, therefore, that Trajano's suit as an alien for the tort of wrongful
death, committed by military intelligence officials through torture prohibited by the
law of nations, is within the jurisdictional grant of Sec. 1350.
Marcos-Manotoc argues, however, that the district court erred in assuming

jurisdiction of a tort committed by a foreign state's agents against its nationals
outside of the United States, and having no nexus to this country. If Sec. 1350
were construed to confer jurisdiction under these circumstances, she asserts, it
would exceed the constitutional limits on federal court jurisdiction under Article III
of the Constitution. We disagree. We are rather constrained by what Sec. 1350
shows on its face: no limitations as to the citizenship of the defendant, or the
locus of the injury.
Marcos-Manotoc's argues that general principles of international law may

not provide a basis for federal court jurisdiction under 1350. Regardless of the
extent to which other principles may appropriately be relied upon, the prohibition
against official torture "carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm," which,"
'enjoy[s] the highest status within international law.' Siderman, 965 F.2d at 715,
717 (quoting Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 940 (D.C.Cir.1988)). As our survey of the scholarly and judicial opinion in
Siderman reflects, there is widespread agreement on this; "all states believe
[torture] is wrong, all that engage in torture deny it, and no state claims a
sovereign right to torture its own citizens. Under international law, any state that
engages in official torture violates jus cogens." Siderman at 717 (citations
omitted). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in founding
jurisdiction on a violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture.
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G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the

merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. The demurrer filed
by said appellee alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which
so held and dismissed the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime
committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters?
HELD:
Yes. The crime in the case at bar was committed in our internal waters
thus the Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction over the said offense. The
Court said that having the opium smoked within our territorial waters even though
aboard a foreign merchant ship is a breach of the public order because it causes
such drugs to produce pernicious effects within our territory. Therefore, the
demurrer is revoked and the Court ordered further proceedings.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection

with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the
courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the
English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States,
according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this
two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States (we were
still a US territory when this was decided in 1922).
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel
in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being
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about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public
order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign
merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because
it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It
seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute.
Remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with

law.
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G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
FACT:
Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and
internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went aboard the steamship Erroll to
inspect and search its cargo, and found two sacks containing opium. The
defendant stated freely and voluntarily that he had bought these sacks of opium
in Hong Kong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that as his hold had already been searched several times for opium he
ordered two other chinamen to keep the sack. All the evidence found properly
constitutes corpus delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that
it came from Hong Kong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports in
Manila and Cebu.
ISSUE:
Whether or not courts of local state can exercise its jurisdiction over
foreign vessels stationed in its port.
HELD:
Yes.
The Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter. The mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel
in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered
as an extension of its own nationality. However, the same rule does not apply
when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippines, in the present
case, a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime. Only the court established in the said place itself has
competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international
treaty.
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G.R. No. L-7991 May 21, 1956.
PAUL MACDONALD, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW YORK, Respondent.
FACTS:
Stasikinocey is a partnership formed by da Costa, Gorcey, Kusik and

Gavino. It was denied registration by the Security and Exchange Commission
due to a confusion between the partnership and Cardinal Rattan. Cardinal Rattan
is the business name or style used by Stasikinocey. Da Costa and Gorcey are
the general partners of Cardinal Rattan. Moreover, Da Costa is the managing
partner of Cardinal Rattan. Stasikinocey had an overdraft account with National
City Bank, which was later converted into an ordinary loan due the partnerships
failure in paying its obligation. The ordinary loan was secured by a chattel
mortgage over 3 vehicles. During the subsistence of the loan, the vehicles were
sold to MacDonald and later on, MacDonald sold 2 of the 3 vehicles to Gonzales.
The bank brought an action for recovery of its credit and foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage upon learning of these transactions.
ISSUE:
Should the partnership, Stasikinocey be estopped from asserting that it

does not have juridical personality since it is an unregistered commercial
partnership?
HELD:
Yes.
While an unregistered commercial partnership has no juridical personality,

nevertheless, where two or more persons attempt to create a partnership failing
to comply with all the legal formalities, the law considers them as partners and
the association is a partnership in so far as it is a favorable to third persons, by
reason of the equitable principle of estoppel. Where a partnership not duly
organized has been recognized as such in its dealings with certain persons, it
shall be considered as partnership by estoppel and the persons dealing with it
are estopped from denying its partnership existence.
Da Costa and Gorcey cannot deny that they are partners of the
partnership Stasikinocey, because in all their transactions with the National City
Bank they represented themselves as such. McDonald cannot disclaim
knowledge of the partnership Stasikinocey because he dealt with said entity in
purchasing two of the vehicles in question through Gorcey and Da Costa. The
sale of the vehicles to MacDonald being void, the sale to Gonzales is also void
since a buyer cannot have a better right than the seller. As was held in Behn
Meyer & Co. vs. Rosatzin, where a partnership not duly organized has been
recognized as such in its dealings with certain persons, it shall be considered as
partnership by estoppel and the persons dealing with it are estopped from
denying its partnership existence. If the law recognizes a defectively organized
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partnership as de facto as far as third persons are concerned, for purposes of its
de facto existence it should have such attribute of a partnership as domicile.
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G.R. No. 79986 September 14, 1990

GRANGER ASSOCIATES, petitioner,
vs.
MICROWAVE SYSTEMS, INC., LORETO F. STEWARD, MENARDO R.
JIMENEZ and JOHN PALMER, respondents.

FACTS:
The foreign corporation Granger Associates, the herein petitioner, which

was organized in the United States and has no license to do business in this
country sued the domestic corporation, Microwave Systems, Inc. (MSI), one of
the herein private respondents for recovery of a sum equivalent to
US$900,633.30 allegedly due from it to the petitioner.
The claim arose from a series of agreements concluded between the two
parties, principally the contract dated March 28, 1977, under which Granger
licensed MSI to manufacture and sell its products in the Philippines and extended
to the latter certain loans, equipment and parts; the contract dated May 17, 1979,
for the sale by Granger of its Model 7100/7200 Multiplex Equipment to MSI and
the Supplemental and Amendatory Agreement concluded in December 1979.
Payment of these contracts not having been made as agreed upon,

Granger filed a complaint against MSI and the other private respondents on June
29, 1984, in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 1982-P. In its answer, MSI alleged the affirmative defense that the
plaintiff had no capacity to sue, being an unlicensed foreign corporation, and
moved to dismiss.
The law invoked by the defendants was Section 133 of the Corporation
Code reading as follows:
No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a

license, or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene
in any action, suit or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the
Philippines; ...
The trial court, after considering the evidence of the parties in light of their
respective memoranda, sustained the defendants and granted the motion to
dismiss. On appeal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the respondent court
prompting the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In this petition, Granger seeks the reversal of the respondent court on the
ground that MSI has failed to prove its affirmative allegation that Granger was
transacting business in the Philippines. It insists that it has dealt only with MSI
and not the general public and contends that dealing with the public itself is an
indispensable ingredient of transacting business. It also argues that its
agreements with MSI covered only one isolated transaction for which it did not
have to secure a license to be able to file its complaint.
ISSUE:
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Is the petitioner doing business in the Philippines?
RULING:
According to Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 5455
...the phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, purchases, service
contracts, opening offices whether called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing
representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year
stay in the Philippines for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements and contemplates to that extent the performance
of acts or works, or the exercise of some of these functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization.
With the examination of the terms and conditions of the contracts and
agreements entered into between petitioner and private respondents, it indicates
that they established within our country a continuous business, and not merely
one of a temporary character. Such agreements did not constitute only one
isolated transaction, as the petitioner contends, but a succession of acts
signifying the intent of Granger to extend its operations in the Philippines.
In any event, it is now settled that even one single transaction may be
construed as transacting business in the Philippines under certain
circumstances, as we observed in Far East International Import and Export
Corporation v. Nankai Kogyo Co., Ltd., thus:
The rule stated in the preceding section that the doing of a single act does
not constitute business within the meaning of statutes prescribing the conditions
to be complied with by foreign corporations must be qualified to this extent, that a
single act may bring the corporation within the purview of the statute where it is
an act of the ordinary business of the corporation. In such a case, the single act
or transaction is not merely incidental or casual, but is of such character as
distinctly to indicate a purpose on the part of the foreign corporation to do other
business in the state, and to make the state a base of operations for the conduct
of a part of the corporations' ordinary business. (17 Fletchers Cyc. of
Corporations, sec. 8470, pp. 572, 573, and authorities cited therein.)
The petitioner stresses that whoever makes affirmative averments has the
obligation to prove such averments and points out that the private respondent
has not established its allegation that the petitioner is doing business in the
Philippines. On the other hand, it is also the rule that the factual findings of the
lower court are binding on this Court in the absence of any of those exceptional
circumstances we have enumerated in many cases that warrant a different
conclusion. Having assailed the finding of the respondent court that the petitioner
is doing business in the Philippines, the petitioner had the burden of showing that
such finding fell under the exception rather than the rule and so should be
reviewed and reversed. The petitioner has not done this.
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The purpose of the rule requiring foreign corporations to secure a license

to do business in the Philippines is to enable us to exercise jurisdiction over them
for the regulation of their activities in this country. If a foreign corporation
operates in the Philippines without submitting to our laws, it is only just that it not
be allowed to invoke them in our courts when it should need them later for its
own protection. While foreign investors are always welcome in this land to
collaborate with us for our mutual benefit, they must be prepared as an
indispensable condition to respect and be bound by Philippine law in proper
cases, as in the one at bar.
WHEREFORE the petition is DENIED, Granger is considered doing

business in the Philippines.
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G.R. No. L-3869 January 31, 1952
S. DAVIS WINSHIP, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Eastern Isles Import corporation and Eastern Isles, Inc., are corporations
organized under and are existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, all of the
capital stock of which are owned by American citizen, except, in Eastern Isles
Import, one share of the capital stock was owned by Antonia Sevilla and another
share was owned by Edmund Schwisinger and in Eastern Isles Inc., one share
was owned by F. Capistrano, who had a current account deposit with the
Philippine Trust Company amounting P51,410.00 and P34,827.74 respectively.
The Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines issued an order

requiring all deposit accounts of the hostile people to be transferred to the bank
of Taiwan, as the depositary of the Japanese Military Administration. The
Philippine Trust Company complied with the said order and transferred and paid
the credit balances of the current account deposits of the Eastern Isles Import
Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. to the Bank of Taiwan.
The pre-war current deposit accounts of the Eastern Isles Import

Corporation and of the Eastern Isles, Inc. were subsequently transferred to S.
Davis Winship, who presented to the Philippine Trust Company checks Nos. A-
79212 and H-579401 covering the aforesaid deposits. The Philippine Trust
Company, however, refused to pay said checks. S. Davis Winship instituted the
present action against the Philippine Trust Company in the Court of First Instance
of Manila, to recover upon the first cause of action the sum of P51,410.91 and
under the second cause of action the sum of P34,827.74.
In its answer, the defendant Philippine trust Company invoked the order of
the Japanese Military Administration by virtue of which it transferred the current
deposit accounts in question to the Bank of Taiwan. After trial, the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered a decision upholding the contention of the defendant
and accordingly dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Is the Philippine Trust Company correct in refusing not to pay the check
amounting to Php 51, 410.91 and Php 34, 827.74?
RULING:
In view of this pronouncement, we have to affirm the appealed judgment.

As it has been stipulated by the parties that the defendant transferred the
deposits in question to the Bank of Taiwan in compliance with the order of the
Japanese Military Administration, the defendant was released from any obligation
to the depositors or their transferee. Appellant's contention that there is no
positive showing that the transfer was made by the Philippine Trust Company in
compliance with the order of the Japanese Military Administration, and its logical
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effect is to make such act binding on said company. At any rate, the defendant
corporation has not impugned its validity.
The nationality of a private corporation is determined by the character or

citizenship of its controlling stockholders; and this pronouncement is of course
decisive as to the hostile character of the Eastern Isles, Inc., as far as the
Japanese Military Administration was concerned, it being conceded that the
controlling stockholders of said corporations were American citizens.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs against the

appellant. So ordered.
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G.R. No. L-41337 June 30, 1988
TAN BOON BEE & CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE HILARION U. JARENCIO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF

BRANCH XVIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, GRAPHIC PUBLISHING,
INC., and PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CAN DRUG COMPANY, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1972, Anchor Supply Co. (ASC), through Tan Boon Bee, entered into a
contract of sale with Graphic Publishing Inc. (GPI) whereby ASC shall deliver
paper products to GPI. GPI paid a down payment but defaulted in paying the rest
despite demand from ASC. ASC sued GPI and ASC won. To satisfy the
indebtedness, the trial court, presided by Judge Hilarion Jarencio, ordered that
one of the printing machines of GPI be auctioned. But before the auction can be
had, Philippine American Drug Company (PADCO) notified the sheriff that
PADCO is the actual owner of said printing machine. Notwithstanding, the sheriff
still went on with the auction sale where Tan Boon Bee was the highest bidder.
Later, PADCO filed with the same court a motion to nullify the sale on
execution. The trial court ruled in favor of PADCO and it nullified said auction
sale. Tan Boon Bee assailed the order of the trial court. Tan Boon Bee averred
that PADCO holds 50% of GPI; that the board of directors of PADCO and GPI is
the same; that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced based on the
premises. PADCO on the other hand asserts ownership over the said printing
machine; that it is merely leasing it to GPI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely exceeded, if not acted

without jurisdiction when he acted upon the motion of PADCO.
2. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when
he refused to pierce the PADCOs corporate identity.
HELD:
Petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely exceeded, if not, acted

without jurisdiction, in nullifying the sheriffs sale not only because Section 17,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court was not complied with, but more importantly
because PADCO could not have litigated its claim in the same case, but in an
independent civil proceeding. This contention is well-taken. Section 17 of Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, the rights of third-party claimants over certain
properties levied upon by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment should not be
decided in the action where the third-party claims have been presented, but in
the separate action instituted by the claimants. Otherwise stated, the court
issuing a writ of execution is supposed to enforce the authority only over
properties of the judgment debtor, and should a third party appeal- to claim the
property levied upon by the sheriff, the procedure laid down by the Rules is that
such claim should be the subject of a separate and independent action.
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However, the fact that petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court
during the initial hearing of the case but nevertheless actively participated in the
trial, bars it from questioning now the court's jurisdiction. A party who voluntarily
participated in the trial, like the herein petitioner, cannot later on raise the issue of
the court's lack of jurisdiction.
As to the second issue (the non-piercing of PADCO's corporate Identity),it

is true that a corporation, upon coming into being, is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as well as
from any other legal entity to which it may be related. As a matter of fact, the
doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the
members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and respected in all
cases which are within reason and the law. However, this separate and distinct
personality is merely a fiction created by law for convenience and to promote
justice. Accordingly, this separate personality of the corporation may be
disregarded, or the veil of corporate fiction pierced, in cases where it is used as a
cloak or cover for fraud or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to
achieve equity or when necessary for the protection of creditors. Corporations
are composed of natural persons and the legal fiction of a separate corporate
personality is not a shield for the commission of injustice and inequity. Likewise,
this is true when the corporation is merely an adjunct, business conduit or alter
ego of another corporation. In such case, the fiction of separate and distinct
corporation entities should be disregarded.
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G.R. No. L-40163 June 19, 1982
LEVITON INDUSTRIES, NENA DE LA CRUZ LIM, DOMINGO GO, and LIM KIAT
vs.
HON. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan

City, Branch XIV and LEVITON MANUFACTURING CO., INC.
FACTS:
Private respondent Leviton Manufacturing Co. Inc. filed a complaint for

unfair competition against petitioners Leviton Industries before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (RTC), presided by respondent Judge Serafin Salvador. The
complaint substantially alleges that plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) is a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York,
United States of America with office located at 236 Greenpoint Avenue, Brooklyn
City, State of New York, U.S.A. That defendant Leviton Industries is a partnership
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office at
382 10th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City; while defendants Nena de la Cruz
Lim, Domingo Go and Lim Kiat are the partners, with defendant Domingo Go
acting as General Manager of defendant Leviton Industries. That plaintiff,
founded in 1906 by Isidor Leviton, is the largest manufacturer of electrical wiring
devices in the United States under the trademark Leviton, which various
electrical wiring devices bearing the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton
Manufacturing Co., Inc. had been exported to the Philippines since 1954; that
due to the superior quality and widespread use of its products by the public, the
same are well known to Filipino consumers under the trade name Leviton
Manufacturing Co., Inc. and trademark Leviton; that long subsequent to the use
of plaintiffs trademark and trade name in the Philippines, defendants (Leviton
Industries) began manufacturing and selling electrical ballast, fuse and oval
buzzer under the trademark Leviton and trade name Leviton Industries Co.
That Domingo Go, partner and general manager of defendant partnership,

had registered with the Philippine Patent Office the trademarks Leviton Label and
Leviton with respect to ballast and fuse under Certificate of Registration Nos. SR-
1132 and 15517, respectively, which registration was contrary to paragraphs (d)
and (e) of Section 4 of RA 166, as amended, and violative of plaintiffs right over
the trademark Leviton; that defendants not only used the trademark Leviton but
likewise copied the design used by plaintiff in distinguishing its trademark; and
that the use thereof by defendants of its products would cause confusion in the
minds of the consumers and likely to deceive them as to the source of origin,
thereby enabling defendants to pass off their products as those of plaintiffs.
Invoking the provisions of Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, plaintiff prayed
for damages. It also sought the issuance of a writ of injunction to prohibit
defendants from using the trade name Leviton Industries, Co. and the trademark
Leviton.
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Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of

action, drawing attention to the plaintiffs failure to allege therein its capacity to
sue under Section 21-A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended. After the filing of
the plaintiffs opposition and the defendants reply, the respondent judge denied
the motion on the ground that the same did not appear to be indubitable.
The motion for reconsideration having likewise been denied, defendants

instituted the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, charging respondent
judge with grave abuse of discretion in denying their motion to dismiss.
ISSUE:
Did the plaintiff (Leviton Manufacturing) herein respondents, failed to

allege the essential facts bearing its capacity to sue before Philippine courts?
RULING:
Yes.
We agree with petitioners that respondent Leviton Marketing Co., Inc. had
failed to allege the essential facts bearing upon its capacity to sue before
Philippine courts. Private respondents action is squarely founded on Section 21-
A of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, which we quote:
Sec. 21-A. Any foreign corporation or juristic person to which a mark or

tradename has been registered or assigned under this Act may bring an action
hereunder for infringement, for unfair competition, or false designation of origin
and false description, whether or not it has been licensed to do business in the
Philippines under Act numbered Fourteen Hundred and Fifty-Nine, as amended,
otherwise known as the Corporation Law, at the time it brings the complaint;
Provided, That the country of which the said foreign corporation or juristic person
is a citizen, or in which it is domiciled, by treaty, convention or law, grants a
similar privilege to corporate or juristic persons of the Philippines. (As amended
by R.A. No. 638)
Undoubtedly, the foregoing section grants to a foreign corporation,

whether or not licensed to do business in the Philippines, the right to seek
redress for unfair competition before Philippine courts. But the said law is not
without qualifications. Its literal tenor indicates as a condition sine qua non the
registration of the trade mark of the suing foreign corporation with the Philippine
Patent Office or, in the least, that it be an assignee of such registered trademark.
The said section further requires that the country, of which the plaintiff foreign
corporation or juristic person is a citizen or domicilliary, grants to Filipino
corporations or juristic entities the same reciprocal treatment, either thru treaty,
convention or law,
All that is alleged in private respondents complaint is that it is a foreign

corporation. Such bare averment not only fails to comply with the requirements
imposed by the aforesaid Section 21-A but violates as well the directive of
Digested Cases
Conflict of Laws
160
Equitatus Legis
Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court that facts showing the capacity of a party
to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is
made a party, must be averred
In the case at bar, private respondent has chosen to anchor its action
under the Trademark Law of the Philippines, a law which, as pointed out,
explicitly sets down the conditions precedent for the successful prosecution
thereof. It is therefore incumbent upon private respondent to comply with these
requirements or aver its exemption therefrom, if such be the case. It may be that
private respondent has the right to sue before Philippine courts, but our rules on
pleadings require that the necessary qualifying circumstances which clothe it with
such right be affirmatively pleaded. And the reason therefor, as enunciated in
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., et al. versus Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. is that
these are matters peculiarly within the knowledge of appellants alone, and it
would be unfair to impose upon appellees the burden of asserting and proving
the contrary. It is enough that foreign corporations are allowed by law to seek
redress in our courts under certain conditions: the interpretation of the law should
not go so far as to include, in effect, an inference that those conditions had been
met from the mere fact that the party sued is a foreign corporation.
It was indeed in the light of this and other considerations that this Court
has seen fit to amend the former rule by requiring in the revised rules (Section 4,
Rule 8) that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the
authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal
existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be
averred.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby granted

and, accordingly, the order of the respondent judge dated September 27, 1974
denying petitioners motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Caloocan City), the court of origin, is hereby restrained from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. C-2891, except to dismiss the
same. No costs.
Digested Cases
Conflict of Laws
161

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SPSPS College of Law

G.R. No. 149177 November 23,

KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA and NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO.,

MINORU KITAMURA, Respondent.

On March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a Japanese

Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time invoking

Should the complaint against Nippon be dismissed?

Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non

1. Jurisdiction Where should litigation be initiated? Court must have

3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment Where can the resulting

G. R. No. 120077 October 13, 2000

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ARBITER CEFERINA J.

In May 1988, Santos was hired as an overseas worker in Oman. In June,

In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against

The LA decided the case against petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the

Santos moved for reconsideration of the afore-quoted resolution. He

Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case?

NLRC had not jurisdiction over the case. It is an inconvenient forum.

G.R. No. 102223 August 22, 1996

COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., ASPAC MULTI-TRADE,

THE COURT OF APPEALS, ITEC INTERNATIONAL, INC., and ITEC,

Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI,

Through a "License Agreement" entered into by the same parties on

By virtue of said contracts, ASPAC sold electronic products, exported by

To facilitate their transactions, ASPAC, dealing under its new appellation,

ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL

In due time, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.

On February 8, 1991, the complaint was amended by virtue of which ITEC

In their Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, defendants took note of the

After conducting hearings on the prayer for preliminary injunction, the

Whether or not private respondent ITEC is an unlicensed corporation

Considering the above, it is necessary to state what is meant by "doing

With the abovestated precedents in mind, we are persuaded to conclude

A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may sue in

corporate existence and capacity: The principle will be applied to prevent a

By entering into the "Representative Agreement" with ITEC, Petitioner is

In Top-Weld, we ruled that a foreign corporation may be exempted from

Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the

G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989

HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE

The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:

The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, HSBC demanded

Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: A

The respondent IAC likewise ruled that:

However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis

G.R. No. 103493 June 19, 1997

PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BPI-INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, 1488, INC., DRAGO DAIC,

Private respondent Ventura O. Ducat obtained separate loans from

AYALA and PHILSEC extended a loan to ATHONA in the amount of

G.R. Nos. 90306-07 July 30, 1990

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ATLANTIC VENUS CO., S.A., and

Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (Kumagai), a corporation formed and existing

NSS and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (Keihin) filed complaints-in-

Petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (Fu Hing"), a corporation organized in

Petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho (K.K. Shell), a corporation

However, Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the

Whether or not the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid

FORUM NON CONVENIENS cannot be ruled as a valid ground to cause

The Supreme Court elucidated thus:

No.04-71843 DC. No. MDL-00840-MGR

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.