G.R. No.
187725 January 19, 2011 In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc, together with the
BENJAMIN JESALVA, Petitioner,
v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated
November 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben
Sabaw4 (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.
The Facts
On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a
criminal complaint5 for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days
thereafter, or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging
petitioner with the crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo6 (Leticia) died
on September 14, 1992.7 After conducting a hearing on the bail application of
petitioner, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December
18, 1992, granted him bail. 8 On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the
filing of Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the
records of the case to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon. 9
Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information 10 dated
January 26, 1993, which reads:
That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality of
Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, taking
advantage of superior strength, with treachery and evident premeditation with
the use of motor vehicle and during night time, did then and there [wilfully],
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, manhandle and use personal violence
upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal wounds
which directly caused her death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice
of her legal heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.11 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the
trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:
victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner), Elog Ubaldo, 12 Jo Montales
and Romy Paladin were at Nenas place playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas
and Atty. Alibanto were also there. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias group
left Nenas place and boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception
of Jo Montales, the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While
Gloria had softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest
consumed beer and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.
After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo who
flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel as it was
usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia Aldemo was seated
at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at his house first, followed by
Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away from Leticias house. While at Glorias
house, petitioner wanted to drink some more but Gloria told him to defer it until
the next day because the stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia
three (3) sticks of barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate.
After petitioner and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately
accelerated his car and went to the direction of 6th Street instead of towards
7th Street where Leticias house was situated.
At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1 Edgardo
Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol Section chanced
upon petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision in [Our Ladys Village]
OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team approached the vehicle and
SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the front portion of the vehicle to check
what was going on. There, SPO1 Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since
childhood seated in front of the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of
heeding his call, however, petitioner did not respond, immediately started the
engine and sped away toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite
his place of residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters
holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in OLV
Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a woman
naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the highway. Her jeans and
[panty] were beside her. Because it was raining, Olbes pitied her so he carried
her and her things to the shed some 10 meters away. As he was doing so, a
tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera focused its headlight in his direction.
De Vera called out, "What is that?" Because he received no response from Noel
Olbes, he decided to bring his passenger home first and just come back to
check the site later.
Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was
bleeding that he even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be
implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De Vera
came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the police
station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.
De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the area
but to no avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the morning,
they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no time in identifying
him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this point, Olbes admitted the
1
allegation but professed innocence. He admitted he left the woman in
Hazelwood where the police found her.
Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released until the
next day. However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as the last
person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He "surrendered"
at one (1) oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose Jayona, his first
cousin.13
The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia
disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told
petitioner that they should just remain as friends because she was already
married, and that she loved her handsome husband. 14 Moreover, the
prosecution asseverated that, at around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while
conducting patrol in St. Rafael Subdivision, 15 together with other police officers,
Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his
flashlight, saw petitioner on board his vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner
immediately started his vehicle and drove toward the town proper of Sorsogon,
which was directly opposite his residence in Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1
Mendozas calls.16Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m. of September 9, 1992, petitioner,
together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona (Fiscal Jayona), went to the
police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4 William Desder (SPO4
Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle.17 At about 1:20 p.m. of
September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police officers,
Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified as
the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat. 18
After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense
filed before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence, 19 which the RTC,
Branch 51, denied in its Order20 dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the
defense filed a Motion21for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and
Inhibition of Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any
further action in the case;22 hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch
52. Acting on the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch 52, denied the same and set the reception of
evidence of the defense.23
Version of the Defense
In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed
Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had
many reasons why he should not kill her. 24 The prosecution manifested that it
would not conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his
testimony was tantamount to pure denial.25 To prove that there was a broken
chain of circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de
Vera. The CA narrated:
12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about
12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang,
Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national road or highway,
he saw a man and a woman three meters from the edge of the road; he
stopped his tricycle and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards
the two; he saw the woman leaning on the left arm of the man while the
man was on a squatting position; he asked them "what is that?" and did
not get any response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little
blood on the clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a
polo shirt and pants; he decided to bring home his passenger home
(sic) first and then returned to the scene but found no one there; he
reported the matter to [SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied
him to the place; they searched for the man and woman but they could
not find them; they checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but
nobody had been brought there; then they proceeded back to the
junction and later to the Sorsogon town proper; upon reaching
Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia talking with a man, whom he (De
Vera) recognized as the man with the woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the
man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the police Sub-Station 1, he came
to know the name of the man Noel Olbes; he saw bloodstains on
Olbes arms, hands, face and nose; the police interrogated him about it
and he replied that he just helped the woman.
On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner] for a
longtime; and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his bondsman
in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms and because of
this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his gratitude to
[petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the case. 26
Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of SPO1
Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:
6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of
September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-
Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting position, and a
woman, who had blood on the upper right breast of her clothes,
lean[ing] against the man and that after De Vera brought his tricycle
passenger home, he returned to the site but he could not find the two
anymore; upon receiving the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with
SPO1 Sincua and De Vera, proceeded to the diversion road, at the
junction going to the hospital and Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to
investigate; they searched the place and went to the hospital but found
nothing; on their way back, at around 1:15 [a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes
talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos; De Vera pointed to Olbes as
the man he saw with the woman at the crossing so they brought him to
Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation; Olbes told them that he saw the
woman lying on the side of the road so he tried to lift her up but when
he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he became afraid as he might be
implicated in the crime so he brought her to Hazelwood, which is five
meters away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m. the patrol team found
Leticia Aldemo, whom they found naked from the waist down; at the
garage of Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim lying
beside her and noted that her panty was still on one of her knees; the
victims body appeared to have been laid down; they did not find any
blood in the garage except where the victims body was found outside
the garage, they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick
bloodstains; he (SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and
entrusted him to their investigator.
2
7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who are
holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that on
September 8, 1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely in
Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to
downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went
to Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast
Food and took a bottle of beer; upon the invitation of Lea, he went
inside Pena and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her
home at OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas house, he
walked and upon reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying on
her belly naked from the waist down; the woman was just uttering
guttural sound; her jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking
pity on the woman and since it was raining that night, he carried the
woman to a nearby shed in order that she would not be run over by
motor vehicles; he also took the panty and the jeans to the shed; he
noticed that a tricycle stopped for a while and focused its headlight on
them and proceeded on its way; when he laid down the woman in the
shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and he was stained with her
blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and left; he walked towards
the Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-five minutes, two
policem[e]n apprehended him and brought him to the police station for
investigation; while being investigated, he was not apprised of his
constitutional rights and made to sign the police blotter; he was
detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or 8
hours, he was released; and he executed a Sworn Statement and
affirmed its contents.27
Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.28 and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes)
testified on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her
death:
9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9,
1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose
state; she sustained the following injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion;
(2) 2.5 cm punctured wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound,
parietal left area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral
aspect deltoid left area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3rd upper left arm;
(6) contusion hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;] (8)
hematoma, 3rd left thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple
confluent abrasion right foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;]
(12) abrasion right elbow[;] (13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and
(14) skull-segmented fracture parietal bone with separation.
He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back
of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they recovered from said
area; the punctured wound on the parietal left area was caused by a
sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface;
the first three findings could also have been caused by the punch made
by the perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a
blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the sixth
findings could have been caused also by some of the above-mentioned
means; the eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing
on a hard object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or a fist blow while the tenth finding could have been caused
by a fall on a rough object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the
eleventh finding could have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the
twelfth finding could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by
fist blow and the thirteenth finding could also be caused by a fall or fist
blow.
He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed on
her.
xxxx
14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different kinds of
injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated that since there
were wounds sustained by the victim in the dorsum part of the foot and
sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of the back of the hand,
the victim could have been thrown off while unconscious. 29
The RTCs Ruling
On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence,
not of the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the
absence of any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was
not established, and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength
were not duly proven. Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Benjamin
Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code and considering
that there was no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attendant thereto
and taking into consideration the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum
of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for compensatory
damages plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).
SO ORDERED.30
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.31
The CAs Ruling
On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner
could not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the
former holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of
lifting her in order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any
misdeed or omission could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring
Leticia to a nearby hospital, because his fear of being implicated in the crime
clouded his better judgment. Thus:
3
All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to sustain the accused-
appellants conviction for homicide.
As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award of P10,000.00 by the trial
court meritorious, the records reveal that services of private prosecutor was
engaged.
Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by
reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion temporal is imposed in its
minimum period. Accordingly, accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should
suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
reclusion temporal as maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty.
Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.32
Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 33 which the CA,
however, denied in its Resolution34dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.
Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:
A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS CONVICTING
PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BASED ON PURELY
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN ACCORD WITH
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH
CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT
WITH THE HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND
B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT, SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY PETITIONER IN THE
POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD
THAT HE WOULD HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-
COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY. 35
Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and
where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was
responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if
he took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where
Leticias house is located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been
considered as a suspect in this case, considering that he was the last person
seen with Leticia when she was still alive. He avers that the statements he
made at the police station are not admissible in evidence, considering that he
was, technically, under custodial investigation, and that there was no waiver of
his right to remain silent. 36 Moreover, petitioner alleges that the fatal injuries
sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are consistent with a
fall, thereby suggesting petitioners innocence. Petitioner claims that the
evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place
where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than her
jumping out of the vehicle might have happened.37
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG,
argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we
accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially when
affirmed by the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs ruling, did
not err in convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because
the particular circumstances enumerated by both the RTC and the CA
satisfactorily meet the requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for
conviction. Moreover, the OSG claims that the statements made by petitioner
before SPO4 Desder, in the presence of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given
and were not elicited on custodial investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that
petitioner was not deprived of his rights since he was never held for questioning
by any police officer upon arriving at the police station and, besides, he was
accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona. 38
Our Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Custodial investigation refers to "any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or a confession from him. 39 The rule begins to operate at once, as
soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime,
and direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into
custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions which
tend to elicit incriminating statements. 40 The assailed statements herein were
spontaneously made by petitioner and were not at all elicited through
questioning. It was established that petitioner, together with his cousin Fiscal
Jayona, personally went to the police station and voluntarily made the
statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30 a.m. of
September 9, 1992.41 The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding that
the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.
Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be
convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity
in the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and
sufficient, and which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner
committed the said crime. Indeed, when considered in their totality, the
circumstances point to petitioner as the culprit.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are
4
instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the
commission of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or
accused as the perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the
person last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the
commission of the crime. This is the type of positive identification, which forms
part of circumstantial evidence. In the absence of direct evidence, the
prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its
burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under condition where
concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon under all
circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes in
secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove. 42
Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence
when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the
others, as the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these
essential requisites, viz.: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.43
We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the
RTC:
After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the
circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, when viewed in its entirety,
points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person responsible for
the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the following combination of the
circumstances which comprised such evidence forms an unbroken chain that
points to [petitioner] and no other, as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:
1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the victim
Leticia Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop as she was already
married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six other individuals left Nena
Ables house at 10 p.m. of September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong
thereat. They rode in [petitioners] red panel.
2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others
proceeded to Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with other two male
companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador, in addition to the three
bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group left the place.
3. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin Jesalva,
together with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring Gloria Haboc to her
home, which was only twenty meters away from Leticias residence.
4. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five minutes, and denied
another drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately accelerated his vehicle en
route to 6th Street instead of the shorter and direct route, the 7th
street, where Leticia Aldemos house is located;
5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband Efren
Aldemo;
6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling the
St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat and when they
approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw Benjamin Jesalva behind
the wheel, who suddenly drove away in the direction of Sorsogon town
proper, opposite to where he lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told
Benjamin Jesalva (whom he had known since his teen-age years) to stop
but the latter did not respond or heed his call;
7. At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of Leticia
Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction of OLV, Pangpang
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist down. He lifted her up and
brought the body at Hazelwood, which is about 10 meters away from
the highway.
8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around 2:15
a.m. of the same day, and brought her to the Sorsogon Provincial
Hospital in comatose condition.
9. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister, who in turn
informed the victims husband of the incident.
10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for Benjamin
Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was not able to find him.
11. At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin
Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose Jayona,
presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon headquarters, where
he voluntarily stated that the victim Leticia Aldemo was his passenger
in his vehicle at about 12:30 in the early morning of September 9, 1992
at St. Rafael Subdivision but upon reaching the crossing of OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital, she jumped
out of his vehicle. These declarations were recorded in the police blotter
by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon the instruction of SPO4 William Desder,
the PNP Sorsogon Chief Investigator.
12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with
[petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision
to conduct an ocular inspection. [Petitioner] pointed to the police the
place where he and the victim spent their time. The police
photographed what appear[ed] to be bloodstains just two meters away
from the place pointed by [petitioner].
13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the
occipital area was caused by a pebble which he recovered from said
area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was caused by a
sharp object and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface,
the cerebral contusion, the punctured wound in the occipital and in the
parietal area could also be caused by a punch by the perpetrator. As to
the multiple contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect of the deltoid
5
 left area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong grip;
the contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left elbow could as
well be similarly caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong
grip. As to the abrasion on the right knee, the same could have been
caused by a blunt instrument or a fist blow. The multiple confluent
abrasion[s] on the right foot could have been caused by a fall on a
rough object. The abrasions on the right elbow could have been caused
by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow. The same is true with
the contusion hematoma found on the victims right elbow. 44
Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly
establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the
positive declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an
accused. The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the
CA to be sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial was weak,
self-serving, speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence as to the
matters that occurred during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An
accused can only be exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of
proof required to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We
find that the prosecution has met this quantum of proof in this case. 45
All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would
warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision dated
October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal
Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 140740 April 12, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
v. JUANITO BALOLOY, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
At the waterfalls of Barangay Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, on the
evening of 3 August 1996, the dead body of an 11-year-old girl Genelyn
Camacho (hereafter GENELYN) was found. The one who caused its discovery
was accused-appellant Juanito Baloloy (hereafter JUANITO) himself, who claimed
that he had caught sight of it while he was catching frogs in a nearby creek.
However, based on his alleged extrajudicial confession, coupled with
circumstantial evidence, the girls unfortunate fate was pinned on him. Hence,
in this automatic review, he seeks that his alleged confession be disregarded for
having been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and that his
conviction on mere circumstantial evidence be set aside.
The information1 charging JUANITO with the crime of rape with homicide reads
as follows:
That on August 3, 1996 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, at
Barangay Inasagan, Municipality of Aurora, province of Zamboanga del
Sur, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with one Genelyn Camacho, a minor against the
latters will and on said occasion and by reason of the rape, the said
Genelyn Camacho died as a result of personal violence, inflicted upon
her by the accused.
Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R.A. No. 7659.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156.
6
Upon arraignment2 on 10 December 1996, JUANITO entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
Jose Camacho, father of GENELYN and resident of Inasagan, Purok Mabia,
Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that at about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996,
he asked GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog
whose house was about 200 meters away. GENELYN forthwith left, but never
returned. Thus, Jose went to the house of Wilfredo, who informed him that
GENELYN had already left with one ganta of rice. Jose then started to look for
GENELYN. Speculating that GENELYN might have taken shelter at the house of
their neighbor Olipio Juregue while it was raining, Jose proceeded to Olipios
house. Unfortunately, Jose did not find GENELYN there. Not losing hope, Jose
proceeded to the house of Ernesto Derio. On his way, he met Wilfredo, who
accompanied him to the house of Ernesto. GENELYN was not there either. They
continued their search for GENELYN, but when it proved to be in vain, the two
decided to go home.3
A few minutes after Jose reached his house, Ernesto and JUANITO arrived.
JUANITO informed Jose that he saw a dead body at the waterfalls, whose "foot
was showing." When asked whose body it was, JUANITO answered that it was
GENELYNs. Immediately, the three went to the waterfalls where JUANITO
pointed the spot where he saw GENELYNs body. With the aid of his flashlight,
Jose went to the spot, and there he saw the dead body floating face down in the
knee-high water. True enough, it was GENELYNs. Jose reported the incident to
Barangay Captain Luzviminda Ceniza. Upon Cenizas order, the Bantay
Bayan members and some policemen retrieved and brought GENELYNs dead
body to Joses house.4
Wilfredo Balogbog corroborated the testimony of Jose that GENELYN came to his
house in the afternoon of 3 August 1996 to borrow some rice. GENELYN had with
her an umbrella that afternoon, as it was raining. He learned that GENELYN
failed to reach her home when Jose came to look for her. 5
Ernesto Derio, JUANITOs uncle-in-law, testified that at about 6:30 p.m. of 3
August 1996, Jose, together with Wilfredo Balogbog, arrived at his house to look
for GENELYN, but they immediately left when they did not find her. At about
7:30 p.m., JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house, trembling and apparently weak.
JUANITO was then bringing a sack and a kerosene lamp. When Ernesto asked
JUANITO where he was going, the latter said that he would catch frogs; and then
he left. After thirty minutes, JUANITO returned and told Ernesto that he saw a
foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. With the disappearance of GENELYN in
mind, Ernesto lost no time to go the house of Jose. JUANITO followed him. There,
JUANITO told Jose that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls. When Jose
asked whether it was GENELYNs, JUANITO answered in the affirmative. The
three then proceeded to the waterfalls, where JUANITO pointed the place where
he saw the body of GENELYN. Jose immediately approached the body, and
having confirmed that it was GENELYNs, he brought it to a dry area. 6
Ernesto also testified that on 4 August 1996, he saw Antonio Camacho hand
over a black rope to Barangay Captain Ceniza. The latter asked those present as
to who owned the rope. When JUANITO admitted ownership of the rope, Ceniza
brought him away from the crowd to a secluded place and talked to him. 7
Finally, Ernesto testified that JUANITO previously attempted to molest his
(Ernestos) child, an incident that caused a fight between him (JUANITO) and his
(Ernestos) wife.8
Antonio Camacho, a cousin of Jose, testified that on 3 August 1996, he was
informed by Joses brother that GENELYN was "drowned." He and the Bantay
Bayan members proceeded to the place of the incident and retrieved the body
of GENELYN. At 8:00 a.m. of the following day he, together with Edgar
Sumalpong and Andres Dolero, went to the waterfalls to trace the path up to
where GENELYN was found. There, they found a black rope and an umbrella.
They gave the umbrella to Joses wife, and the black rope to Barangay Captain
Ceniza, who was then attending the wake of GENELYN. Ceniza asked those who
were at the wake whether anyone of them owned the rope. JUANITO answered
that he owned it. Thereafter Ceniza talked to JUANITO. 9
Andres Dolero corroborated the testimony of Antonio on the recovery of the
black rope and umbrella at the waterfalls where GENELYNs body was found. 10
Barangay Captain Ceniza of Inasagan, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, testified that
at about 8:30 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho, Ernesto Derio, Porferio
Camacho, and JUANITO arrived at her house to inform her that JUANITO found
GENELYNs dead body at the waterfalls. Ceniza forthwith ordered the members
of the Bantay Bayan to retrieve the body of GENELYN, and reported the incident
to the police headquarters of Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. She specifically
named JUANITO as her suspect. She then went home and proceeded to Joses
house for GENELYNs wake. She saw JUANITO at the wake and noticed that he
was very uneasy.11
Ceniza further revealed that on 4 August 1996, while she was on her way to
Joses house, Antonio gave her a black rope, which he reportedly found at the
spot where the dead body of GENELYN was retrieved. Ceniza then asked the
people at the wake about the rope. JUANITO, who was among those present,
claimed the rope as his. She brought JUANITO away from the others and asked
him why his rope was found at the place where GENELYNs body was
discovered. JUANITO answered: "I have to claim this as my rope because I can
commit sin to God if I will not claim this as mine because this is mine." Ceniza
further asked JUANITO to tell her everything. JUANITO told Ceniza that his
intention was only to frighten GENELYN, not to molest and kill her. When
GENELYN ran away, he chased her. As to how he raped her, JUANITO told Ceniza
that he first inserted his fingers into GENELYNs vagina and then raped her.
Thereafter, he threw her body into the ravine.12
After such confession, Ceniza examined his body and found a wound on his
right shoulder, as well as abrasions and scratches on other parts of his body.
Upon further inquiry, JUANITO told her that the wound on his shoulder was
caused by the bite of GENELYN. Ceniza then turned over JUANITO to a
policeman for his own protection, as the crowd became unruly when she
announced to them that JUANITO was the culprit. JUANITO was forthwith
brought to the police headquarters.13
Victor Mosqueda, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at
the Aurora Police Station, testified that at about 10:00 p.m. of 4 August 1996 he
was at Joses house. Ceniza informed him that JUANITO was the suspect in the
7
killing of GENELYN, and she turned over to him a black rope which belonged to
JUANITO. He wanted to interrogate JUANITO, but Ceniza cautioned him not to
proceed with his inquiry because the people around were getting unruly and
might hurt JUANITO. Mosqueda immediately brought JUANITO to the police
station, and on that same day, he took the affidavits of the witnesses. The
following day, a complaint was filed against JUANITO. 14
Dr. Arturo Lumacad, Municipal Health Officer of the Aurora Rural Health Clinic,
testified that he examined JUANITO so as to verify the information that JUANITO
sustained wounds in his body.15 His examination of JUANITO revealed the
following injuries:
1. fresh abrasions on the right portion of the cheek;
2. multiple abrasions on the right shoulder;
3. abrasion on the left shoulder; and
4. abrasions on the left forearm.16
Dr. Lumacad also testified that he examined the dead body of GENELYN on 4
August 1996 and found the following injuries:
1. 2.5-inch lacerated wound at her left neck, front of the head;
2. 1-inch wound at the right cheek just below the first wound;
3. multiple contusions on her chest;
4. contusion at the right hip; and
5. fresh lacerations on her vagina at 9 oclock and 3 oclock positions. 17
He opined that the fresh lacerations could have been caused by a large object
inserted into GENELYNs vagina, such as a male sex organ, a rod, or a piece of
wood or metal.18
Presiding Judge Celestino V. Dicon of the Municipal Trial Court of Aurora,
Zamboanga del Sur, testified that when he arrived in his office at around 8:30
a.m. of 4 August 1996 several people, including Barangay Captain Ceniza, were
already in his courtroom. He learned that they came to swear to their affidavits
before him. After reading the affidavit of Ceniza, he asked Ceniza whether her
statements were true. Ceniza answered in the affirmative and pointed to
JUANITO as the culprit. Judge Dicon turned to JUANITO and asked him whether
the charge against him was true. JUANITO replied in the dialect:
"[N]apanuwayan ko, sir" ("I was demonized"). While Judge Dicon realized that
he should not have asked JUANITO as to the truthfulness of the allegations
against him, he felt justified in doing so because the latter was not under
custodial investigation. Judge Dicon thus proceeded to ask JUANITO whether he
had a daughter as old as the victim and whether he was aware of what he had
done to GENELYN. Again, JUANITO responded that he was demonized, and he
spontaneously narrated that after he struck GENELYNs head with a stone he
dropped her body into the precipice.19
Lopecino Albano, process server in the court of Judge Dicon, corroborated the
testimony of the latter as to JUANITOs admission that he was demonized when
he raped and killed GENELYN.20
The sole witness for the defense was JUANITO, who invoked denial and alibi. He
testified that he was at his mothers house at around 6:30 p.m. of 3 August
1996. An hour later, he left for the creek to catch frogs; and while catching
frogs, he saw a foot. He forthwith headed for Ernesto Derios house to ask for
help. There, he told Ernesto and his wife of what he had seen. Ernestos wife
asked JUANITO whether the person was still alive, and JUANITO answered that
he was not sure. At this point, Ernesto informed him that Jose Camacho was
looking for GENELYN. JUANITO and Ernesto then proceeded to the house of Jose
to inform the latter of what he, JUANITO, had seen. The three forthwith went to
the creek. There, they found out that the foot was GENELYNs and that she was
already dead. Upon Joses request, JUANITO and Ernesto informed Joses brother
about the incident, and they proceeded to the house of Ceniza. Thereafter,
they, along with the members of the Bantay Bayan, went back to the creek to
retrieve the body of GENELYN.21
JUANITO further recalled that after the body of GENELYN was brought to her
parents house, he helped saw the lumber for her coffin. Thereafter, he went to
Ernestos house to get the sack containing the seventeen frogs he had caught
that night, which he earlier left at Ernestos house. He was shocked to find out
that the rope which he used to tie the sack, as well as all the frogs he caught,
was missing. As it was already dawn, JUANITO left his sack at his mothers
house; then he proceeded to the house of Jose to help make the coffin of
GENELYN. But, at around 8:00 a.m., policeman Banaag came looking for him. He
stopped working on GENELYNs coffin and identified himself. Banaag took him
away from the house of Jose and asked him whether he owned the rope.
JUANITO answered in the affirmative. At this point, policeman Mosqueda came
near them and escorted him and Banaag back to Joses house. At Joses house,
Mosqueda announced to the crowd that JUANITO was the suspect in GENELYNs
untimely demise. JUANITO was then detained and investigated at the police
station.22During his investigation by the police officers and by Judge Dicon, he
was never assisted by a lawyer. 23
In its challenged decision, 24 the trial court found JUANITO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide. On the challenge on the
admissibility of the admissions he made to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge
Dicon, it ruled that they are not the law enforcement authorities referred to in
the constitutional provisions on the conduct of custodial investigation. Hence,
JUANITOs confessions made to them are admissible in evidence. Moreover, no
ill-motive could be attributed to both Ceniza and Judge Dicon. It also found
unsubstantiated JUANITOs claim that he was threatened by his fellow inmates
to make the confession before Judge Dicon; and that, even assuming that he
was indeed threatened by them, the threat was not of the kind contemplated in
the Bill of Rights. The threat, violence or intimidation that invalidates confession
must come from the police authorities and not from a civilian. Finally, it ruled
8
that JUANITOs self-serving negative evidence cannot stand against the
prosecutions positive evidence.
The trial court, thus, convicted JUANITO of rape with homicide and imposed on
him the penalty of death. It also ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000 by way of civil indemnity. Hence, this automatic review.
In his Appellants Brief, JUANITO imputes to the trial court the following errors:
I Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED CONFESSION
OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO WITNESSES LUZVIMINDA CE[N]IZA AND JUDGE
CELESTINO DICON AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED.
II
ON ACCOUNT OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACCUSEDS ALLEGED
CONFESSION THE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Anent the first assigned error, JUANITO maintains that the trial court violated
Section 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution 25 when it admitted in evidence his
alleged extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon.
According to him, the two failed to inform him of his constitutional rights before
they took it upon themselves to elicit from him the incriminatory information. It
is of no moment that Ceniza and Dicon are not police investigators, for as public
officials it was incumbent upon them to observe the express mandate of the
Constitution. While these rights may be waived, the prosecution failed to show
that he effectively waived his rights through a written waiver executed in the
presence of counsel. He concludes that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence.
In his second assigned error, JUANITO asserts that the prosecution miserably
failed to establish with moral certainty his guilt. He points to the contradicting
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution concerning the retrieved rope
owned by him. Consequently, with the inadmissibility of his alleged extrajudicial
confession and the apparent contradiction surrounding the prosecutions
evidence against him, the trial court should have acquitted him.
In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) supports the
trial courts finding that JUANITO is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
as charged. His bare denial and alibi cannot overcome the positive assertions of
the witnesses for the prosecution. Moreover, he was unable to establish by
sufficient evidence that Barangay Captain Ceniza and Judge Dicon had an
ulterior motive to implicate him in the commission of the crime.
The OSG recommends that the civil indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial
court be increased to P75,000; and that in line with current jurisprudence, moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 be awarded to the heirs of GENELYN.
We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs extrajudicial
confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on custodial investigation does
not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to admissions or confessions
made by a suspect in the commission of a crime before he is placed under
investigation. What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of
incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.26
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the black rope and was
asked by Ceniza to tell her everything, JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza
that he raped GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the ravine. This
narration was a spontaneous answer, freely and voluntarily given in an ordinary
manner. It was given before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the offense.
It may be stressed further that Cenizas testimony on the facts disclosed to her
by JUANITO was confirmed by the findings of Dr. Lumacad. GENELYNs physical
resistance and biting of the right shoulder of JUANITO were proved by the
wound on JUANITOs right shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body.
His admission that he raped GENELYN was likewise corroborated by the fresh
lacerations found in GENELYNs vagina.
Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper or ulterior motive on
the part of Ceniza, which could have compelled her to testify falsely against
him. Where there is no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive
why a prosecution witness should testify against the accused or falsely
implicate him in a crime, the said testimony is trustworthy. 27
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his constitutional rights during
custodial investigation were violated by Judge Dicon when the latter
propounded to him incriminating questions without informing him of his
constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment the accused voluntarily
surrenders to, or is arrested by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. So, he could not thenceforth be asked about his
complicity in the offense without the assistance of counsel. 28 Judge Dicons
claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that neither was he conducting a
preliminary investigation deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at
that time JUANITO was already under the custody of the police authorities, who
had already taken the statement of the witnesses who were then before Judge
Dicon for the administration of their oaths on their statements.
While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but was rather brought
to the police headquarters on 4 August 1996 for his protection, the records
reveal that JUANITO was in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the
primordial concern of the police authorities, the need to detain and deprive him
of his freedom of action would not have been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a
person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
9
commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to
be arrested, or by his submission to the person making the arrest. 29
At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial confession before Judge
Dicon was made without the advice and assistance of counsel and hence
inadmissible in evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal admission of
the accused, which could be established through the testimonies of the persons
who heard it or who conducted the investigation of the accused. 30
JUANITOs defense of alibi is futile because of his own admission that he was at
the scene of the crime. Alibi is a defense that places an accused at the relevant
time of a crime in a place other than the scene involved and so removed
therefrom as to render it impossible for him to be the guilty party. 31 Likewise, a
denial that is unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is a negative
and self-serving evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 32
Anent the alleged inconsistencies in the details surrounding the recovery of the
black rope, the same are irrelevant and trite and do not impair the credibility of
the witnesses. Minor inconsistencies and honest lapses strengthen rather than
weaken the credibility of witnesses, as they erase doubts that such testimonies
have been coached or rehearsed. 33 What matters is that the testimonies of
witnesses agree on the essential fact that JUANITO was the owner of the black
rope and the perpetrator of the crime.
Even if JUANITOs confession or admission is disregarded, there is more than
enough evidence to support his conviction. The following circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain proving beyond reasonable doubt that it was
JUANITO who raped and killed GENELYN:
1. At about 5:00 p.m. of 3 August 1996, Jose Camacho bid his daughter
GENELYN to borrow some rice from their neighbor Wilfredo Balogbog.
GENELYN did so as told, but failed to return home.
2. About 7:30 p.m. of the same day, JUANITO arrived at Ernestos house
bringing a sack and kerosene lamp, trembling and apparently weak.
3. Thirty minutes thereafter, JUANITO returned to Ernestos house and
told Ernesto that he saw a foot of a dead child at the waterfalls, without
disclosing the identity of the deceased.
4. When JUANITO and Ernesto were at Joses house, the former told Jose
that it was GENELYNs foot he saw at the waterfalls.
5. GENELYN was found dead at the waterfalls with fresh lacerations on
her vaginal wall at 9 and 3 oclock positions.
6. At about 8:00 a.m. of 4 August 1996, Antonio Camacho, Andres
Dolero and Edgar Sumalpong recovered at the crime site a black rope,
which they turned over to Ceniza, who was then at GENELYNs wake.
7. When Ceniza asked the people around as to who owned the black
rope, JUANITO claimed it as his.
8. When Ceniza examined JUANITOs body, she saw a wound on his right
shoulder and scratches on different parts of his body.
9. Dr. Lumancads physical examination of JUANITO revealed abrasions,
which could have been caused by scratches.
Guilt may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the
following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
inferences are based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
the accused.34 All these requisites are present in the case at bar.
With JUANITOs guilt for rape with homicide proven beyond reasonable doubt,
we are constrained to affirm the death penalty ** imposed by the trial court.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659, pertinently provides: "When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
As to JUANITOs civil liability, prevailing judicial policy has authorized the
mandatory award of P100,00035 as civil indemnity ex delicto in cases of rape
with homicide (broken down as follows: P50,000 for the death and P50,000
upon the finding of the fact of rape). Thus, if homicide is committed by reason
or on occasion of rape, the indemnity in the amount of P100,000 is fully justified
and properly commensurate with the seriousness of the said special complex
crime. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000 may be additionally awarded to
the heirs of the victim without the need for pleading or proof of the basis
thereof; the fact that they suffered the trauma of mental, physical and
psychological sufferings, which constitutes the basis for moral damages under
the Civil Code, is too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial. 36
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Aurora,
Zamboanga Del Sur, in Criminal Case No. AZ-CC-96-156, finding accused-
appellant Juanito Baloloy guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is AFFIRMED with the modification
that he is ordered to pay the heirs of Genelyn Camacho P100,000 as indemnity
and P50,000 as moral damages.
In consonance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power. Costs de oficio.
10
 (Printed) F.
Ramos

At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager

in Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio
Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta
Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team."
Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in
writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989 made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the
proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame,"
v. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x
Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next
RAMOS, respondents. investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place,
"Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees
ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact
NARVASA, J.: afterwards did). 4 How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties
at all; but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent consummated.
Judge of the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against
himself" accorded by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos
any person "under investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right," granted by the same the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during
provision. The relevant facts are not disputed. that time, according to the indictment, 5 he (Ramos)

Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine
Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to
light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, 1 the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of
February 9, 1986. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's
Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement
signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. 2
On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his
superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO
SETTLE IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF
P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY
PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe
Ramos
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there
willfully ... defraud the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the
following manner, to wit: said accused ... having been entrusted with
and received in trust fare tickets of passengers for one-way trip and
round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express obligation
to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return
those unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying
with his obligation, with intent to defraud, did then and there ...
misappropriate, misapply and convert the value of the tickets in the
sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and
refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party .. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and
trial thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers
of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer
of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6which included "the (above mentioned)
statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his
"handwritten admission x x given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to,
which had been marked as Exhibit K.

11
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s
Evidence." 7 Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was
that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the
accused being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the
same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988, 8 the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits
"as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith
and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His
Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the
statement of accused Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio
City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the Branch Manager x x
since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same
and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel." He
also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by
accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason
stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused
was assisted by counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. 9 It was denied, by
Order dated September 14, 1988. 10 In justification of said Order, respondent
Judge invoked this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121
SCRA 538, People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219,
and People v. Decierdo, 149 SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in
custodial investigations the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall
not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel," and the explicit
precept in the present Constitution that the rights in custodial investigation
"cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He pointed
out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio Station was one
"for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets issued
to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional
provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the
investigation was administrative in character could not operate to except the
case "from the ambit of the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in
the petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private
prosecutors in the name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated
October 26, 1988, the Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to
comment on the petition, and directed issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents from proceeding further with the trial
and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R (People ... vs. Felipe Ramos),
including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment in the aforesaid case
or on any matter in relation to the same case, now pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also
subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The
comments of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all
been filed. The Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner
and prays "that the petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be
rendered setting aside respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit
Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby
removed whatever impropriety might have attended the institution of the
instant action in the name of the People of the Philippines by lawyers de
parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether
or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded
the People's Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, 11 to which respondent Judge has given a construction that is
disputed by the People. The section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights,
dealt with in the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself set out in the first
sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18, Article III of
the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth
Amendment of the American Constitution, 12 and
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of
every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the
individuality and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in
separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of a person in custodial
interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in
Section 12 of the same Article III. 13
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceeding. 14 The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 15 It prescribes
an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." 16 It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right
to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to
which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can
12
be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is
actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not
give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before
the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness
receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be
sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed
to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he may
refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not
impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or
investigation, any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against
self-incrimination. It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in
accordance with the well known axiom that every one is presumed to know the
law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature
of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in advance
the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter. 17
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the
protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time. 18
Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or
better said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation
for the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police
authorities; and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in
the first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated,
indiscriminately applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil,
criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an
offense was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 19 a decision described
as an "earthquake in the world of law enforcement." 20
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right, 21
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him; 22 and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence. 23
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid
down for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded
as the commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. 24
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain
silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded
him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and
agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and
waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained
as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without
full warnings of constitutional rights." 25
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or
"in-custody interrogation of accused persons." 26 And, as this Court has already
stated, by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 27 The situation
contemplated has also been more precisely described by this Court." 28
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there
questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as many
investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds
himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he
meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained
and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means
that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth, or
what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered
and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were,
the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such
an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of
Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is
within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial
interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the
statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to a
police precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared
that he was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was
threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a
statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
13
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1)
that against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply
to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a
crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary
investigation is not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the
police, if any there had been would already have been ended at the time of the
filing of the criminal case in court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with
respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court (or the public
prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak of his right while under
"custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and subsequent sentences of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious reason that he is
no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary
investigation before the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons,
possesses the right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of
Section 20 Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer
a specific incriminatory question at the time that it is put to him. 30
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the
matter of giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a
different tier of protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court,
in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 31 and 2) to testify as
witness in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-
examined as any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness
shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. 32
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a
witness against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or
produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the
accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process
or order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the
prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for himself. 33 In other words unlike
an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be compelled to testify
by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular
incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal
action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand,
be sworn, answer any question. 34 And, as the law categorically states, "his
neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used
against him." 35
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his
right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other
witness." He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct
examination, or connected therewith . 36 He may not on cross-examination
refuse to answer any question on the ground that the answer that he will give,
or the evidence he will produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for
the crime with which he is charged.
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be
asked a question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he
is charged, but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused,
he may decline to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right
against self-incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus,
assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his
behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the
ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline
to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and
distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently
charged with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of
his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor,
for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force,
violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected;
and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT 37
a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by
the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question
which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that
for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has
misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying
to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has
grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by
arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis was however so far
divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional and legal
principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him
tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His
14
Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as
they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in
any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no
relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily
answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be
recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the
criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious
that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on
February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his
part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda
rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because of a
violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the
general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may
not in justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be
accorded any evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the
Orders of the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9,
1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence
Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and
thereafter proceed with the trial and judgment thereof. The temporary
restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is now
declared of no further force and effect.

His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the
violation of the right of any person against self-incrimination when the
investigation is conducted by the complaining parties, complaining companies,
or complaining employers because being interested parties, unlike the police
agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to protect, they may in
their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless suspects,
whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral
coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention
to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary G.R. Nos. 138934-35 January 16, 2002
sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and
unless the employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded v. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL, accused-appellant.
adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the
making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the MENDOZA, J.:
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. These cases are before this Court for review from the decision, 1 dated February
But if he should opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it 26, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, finding accused-
would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the administrative appellant Anthony Escordial guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to
investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because death and to pay private complainant Michelle Darunday the amounts of
he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his P3,650.00 representing the amount taken by him, P50,000.00 as moral
"Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-
evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," In Criminal Case No. 97-18117, the information against accused-appellant
"answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted charged him with the crime of rape committed as follows:
and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability.
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the the herein accused armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, by means of
judge's expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
undue pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Michelle
investigation or for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another Darunday y Jintula, against the latter's will.
whom he has supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or
confession wrung from the person under interrogation would be inadmissible in
15
 All contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstance that the said
offense was committed in the dwelling of the said party during
nighttime while [she] was asleep inside her room.
Act contrary to law.2
In Criminal Case No. 97-18118, the information charged accused-appellant with
robbery with rape as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1996, in the City of
Bacolod, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon, a knife, with intent of
gain and by means of violence and intimidation on the person, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take from Michelle
Darunday y Jintula the sums of P3,650.00, belonging to said offended
party and [on] the occasion thereof have carnal knowledge with the
complainant Michelle Darunday y Jintula, against her will, and inside her
room wherein she was temporarily residing as a boarder.
All contrary to law and with aggravating circumstance that the said
offense was committed inside the dwelling of the offended party and
during nighttime the latter not having given provocation for the offense.
Act contrary to law.3
When arraigned on February 25, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to
the charges, whereupon the two cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely, Jason Joniega, Mark
Esmeralda, Erma Blanca,4 Dr. Joy Ann Jocson, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, Leo Asan,
Ma. Teresa Gellaver, and Michelle Darunday. Their testimonies are as follows:
Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda testified that at around 8 o'clock in the
evening of December 27, 1996, they and Mark Lucena were playing inside a
jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon 5 at No. 17
Margarita Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As
one of them hit his head on the rails of the jeepney, the boys were told by a
man sitting inside the jeepney to go home lest they would meet an accident.
The man was later identified by Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda as accused-
appellant.6
Living in a boarding house in front of which the jeepney was parked were
Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver. They stayed in a
bedroom on the ground floor. That same night, December 27, 1996, Teresa went
to sleep at around 9:30 p.m., while Michelle and Erma watched television for a
while before going to bed. They slept beside each other on two beds placed side
by side, with Teresa nearest the wall, Michelle in the middle, and Erma on the
other side.
While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man.
The man had his head covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and
carried a knife about four inches long. He warned Erma not to shout or he would
kill her. He then asked Erma where her money was, and the latter pointed to the
wall where she had hung the bag which contained her money. Michelle, who by
then was already awake, told Erma to give the man her money so he would
leave. Erma gave the man P300.00, but the latter said to give him all her
money. He told Erma that he would look for more money and, if he found more,
he would kill her. For this reason, Erma gave the rest of her money. Afterwards,
she was told to lie on her side facing the wall. The man then turned to Michelle
and Teresa. Michelle gave him her money, but Teresa said her money was in the
other room. However, she was not allowed to leave the bedroom. The man was
able to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle.
After getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa
and another to Michelle to blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and
then began touching her in different parts of her body. He ordered her to take
off her t-shirt, threatening to kill her if she did not do as he commanded. He
then went on top of Michelle and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. As he
had difficulty doing so, he instead inserted his two fingers. He tried once more
to insert his penis, but again failed. The man then rose from the bed and took
some soapy water, which he proceeded to insert into Michelle's vagina. He
finally succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle's vagina. Michelle felt great
pain and pleaded with the man to stop, but the man paid no heed, and only
stopped after satisfying his lust.
Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could
feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that
his chest was rough and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his
nape, she felt that it was also rough.
On the other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and
that she saw the man's face because of the light coming from the lamp post
outside the boarding house. Their bedroom window had panes through which
the light filtered in.
After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on the bed and talked to the
three women. He told Michelle that he used to make catcalls at her and called
her a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his place but Michelle had ignored
him. He told them that he was from Hinigaran, but later took back his statement
when Teresa told him that she was from Binalbagan, which was near Hinigaran.
Michelle then told him that she worked at the City Engineer's Office and
graduated from the Central Mindanao University. The man cussed when he
learned that Michelle was from Mindanao. As he spoke to Michelle, he leaned
over the bed and mashed the breasts of Erma and Teresa.
After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her again.
Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and
said it would be worse for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her.
He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then inserted his penis into her
anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and
returned to her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but
not before warning the women not to report the matter to anyone or he would
kill them.7
16
Mark Esmeralda testified that he was in his bedroom on the second floor of their
house, toying with a flashlight, when he saw from his bedroom window a man
wearing denim shorts coming out of the boarding house. It was around 12:30 in
the morning then. The man was nibbling something. Mark saw the man jump
over the fence. After 30 minutes, Mark went down from his room and told his
parents what he had seen. His parents then went out to check what had
happened. Mark identified accused-appellant as the man he saw that night. 8
Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that they were not able to ask for
help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo
Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called
up Allan Aguillon, the son of the owner of the boarding house, who in turn
reported the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived, they asked
Michelle to describe the assailant, but she told them that she could only identify
his voice and his eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for
the man around the Libertad area, but they did not find him. Michelle, Erma,
and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up 6 for investigation. But, at
Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had
been raped by their attacker.
Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her
aunt and told her about her ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police
headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to report the rape.
They were able to go home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6
o'clock in the evening.9
PO3 Nicolas Tancinco, one of the policemen who responded to the report shortly
after the commission of the crime, also testified for the prosecution. He said
that the assailant was described to him as wearing long hair and having a rough
projection on the back of his neck, small eyes, a slim body, and a brown
complexion. Later on, Michelle Darunday, accompanied by Allan Aguillon,
returned to the police station to report the rape committed against her.
Tancinco entered her complaint in the police blotter and referred Michelle to the
Women's Desk.
In the morning of December 28, 1996, Tancinco returned to the boarding house.
He found that the intruder was able to gain entry to the house through the
window of the bathroom. He noticed that the room beside those of the three
women had been ransacked, with the cabinets opened and the clothes in
disarray.
The following day, on December 29, 1996, Tancinco went around Margarita
Extension and learned about the children playing on the street around the time
the intruder entered the boarding house. He was told by Mark Esmeralda and
Jason Joniega that they saw a man inside the jeepney where they were playing
at the time of the incident. Tancinco was likewise informed by Esmeralda that
the person he saw inside the jeepney was the same person he saw coming out
of the boarding house later that night. According to Tancinco, the children said
that they could identify the man if he was shown to them. At around 8 o'clock
that evening, Tancinco questioned a certain Tiyo Anong and Ramie about the
identity of the suspect. Ramie said that the description of the suspect fitted that
of a worker at a caf called Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from
the boarding house.
Thus, on January 2, 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the
Coffee Break Corner and interviewed the security guard, who told them that a
certain Fidel Hinolan owned the caf. When interviewed by Tancinco and his
companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that accused-appellant was his helper and
that the latter had gone home on December 27, 1996 to Barangay Miranda,
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
Based on the information furnished by Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police
officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon went to
Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10 o'clock in the
morning of January 3, 1997 and asked the assistance of the police there to
locate accused-appellant. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at
the Pontevedra police to accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found
accused-appellant at the basketball court and "invited" him to go to the police
station for questioning.10
Michelle Darunday remained at the Pontevedra police station. When accused-
appellant was brought there, he saw Michelle and blushed. Michelle looked at
him and recognized him as the man who had robbed and raped her on
December 27, 1996. Accused-appellant was asked to take off his t-shirt.
Michelle said that she just kept quiet while accused-appellant tried to talk to
her. However, according to Tancinco, Michelle confirmed to him that accused-
appellant was the man who had attacked her, identifying him through a rough
projection, or a keloid, on the back of his neck and his voice. At the time of his
arrest, accused-appellant had a short haircut. He was transferred to the Bacolod
police station for further investigation.11 Allan Aguillon took a picture of
accused-appellant (Exh. F) at the Pontevedra police station. 12
At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega,
and Mark Esmeralda were asked whether accused-appellant was the same
person they saw on the night of the incident. They were taken one by one to the
jail cell and asked to point to the person that they had seen that night. They
picked accused-appellant out of four people who were inside the jail cell. 13
Michelle Darunday executed an affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, identifying
accused-appellant as the person who had robbed and raped her. 14 She testified
that she and her friends had gone to the Coffee Break Corner sometime in
September or October 1996. On the way home, she was approached by
accused-appellant. He asked Michelle what her name was, and she gave it to
him, albeit reluctantly. She usually passed by the said caf when going home
and accused-appellant would often whistle at her and call her a beautiful girl.
Michelle had simply ignored him and gone on her way. 15
Dr. Joy Ann C. Jocson, Medical Officer IV of the Bacolod City Health Department,
examined Michelle Darunday and made the following findings and remarks:
1. Abrasions noted on the right and left Labia Minora and on the
posterior fourchette.
2. New Lacerations noted on the hymenal ring on the following location
1 o'clock position, 3 o'clock position, and 9 o'clock position.
17
 3. Vaginal introitus admits 2 fingers but with pain.
4. Presently, patient with menstruation.
In my opinion, the patient would need a urinalysis (since she complains
of pain upon urination) and possible Medical treatment if necessary, for
about 7 to 10 days. And if necessary, psychiatric evaluation &
management is also recommended.16
Testifying in court, Dr. Jocson said there was penetration of the victim's vagina
as shown by the fact that the hymenal rim had lacerations at the 1, 3, and 9
o'clock positions. Since the edges of the lacerations were sharp, she concluded
that these lacerations were less than a week old at the time of the examination.
According to Dr. Jocson, these were caused by abrasions due to force or
pressure applied on the vaginal area. When asked during cross-examination
whether the victim had abrasions or contusions on her body at the time of her
examination, Dr. Jocson said that she could not remember. She could not
remember either whether there was sperm in the victim's vagina when she
examined the latter. She said that no sperm specimen had been taken from the
victim. She testified that it could not be determined how many times the victim
had previously engaged in sexual intercourse because this would depend on the
elasticity of the victim's hymen. She opined, however, that it would be less than
10 times in the case of the victim. Dr. Jocson stated it was possible the victim
agreed to have sexual intercourse voluntarily based on the lack of marks of
violence on the latter, although it was also possible that she was merely forced
to have sex because she was threatened. On re-direct examination, she stated
it was possible that seminal fluid was not found on the victim's private parts
because the victim was having her monthly period. She said the lacerations on
the victim's vagina would result whether the sexual intercourse was voluntary
or involuntary on the part of the victim.17
Leo Asan, an employee at the City Health Office in Bacolod, testified that the
medical certificate presented by the prosecution, which was undated, was a
faithful reproduction of what was written by Dr. Joy Ann Jocson on January 3,
1997 in the logbook.18
The defense presented as its witnesses Elias Sombito, Aaron Lavilla, PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino, Ricardo Villaspen, Nestor Dojillo, accused-appellant Anthony
Escordial, Jerome Jayme, and Lucila Jocame. These witnesses gave a different
account of the events that led to the arrest of accused-appellant. Their version
is as follows:
Accused-appellant testified that he was employed by Fidel Hinolan on January
21, 1996. He said he started on August 6, 1996 as a dishwasher and was later
made cashier. Accused-appellant said that he went home to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental on December 24, 1996, arriving there at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
Hinolan paid him P500.00, which he gave to his mother as his Christmas gift. He
dropped by the house of Aaron Lavilla. At 5:30 p.m., he returned to Coffee
Break Corner in Bacolod City.
In the evening of December 26, 1996, accused-appellant asked permission from
Hinolan to go home to Pontevedra to stay there until January 1997 as the
restaurant would be closed anyway during this period. Hinolan gave accused-
appellant his permission and paid the latter his salary of P600.00 as well as a
P200.00 bonus. Hence, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon of December 27, 1996,
accused-appellant took the bus home, arriving in Barangay Miranda,
Pontevedra, Negros Occidental an hour later. He went straight home to his
mother and gave her P600.00, telling her to use P400.00 for New Year's Day. 19
Accused-appellant also saw Elias20 Sombito, who told him to look for Aaron
Lavilla because a cockfight derby was being held that day in their barangay.
Accused-appellant, therefore, looked for Aaron Lavilla and found him at the
basketball court. Aaron's mother asked accused-appellant to help her bring to
the cockpit some cases of beer which she planned to sell there. Accused-
appellant obliged.
At the cockpit, Elias Sombito asked him to take care of his cocks. Accused-
appellant asked Aaron Lavilla to go with him to the cockpit, but the latter
continued playing basketball and only proceeded to the cockpit after the game
was finished. The derby ended at around 9 o'clock in the evening.
At about 10 o'clock that night, accused-appellant and Aaron Lavilla went to the
latter's house and slept there. The following day, December 28, 1996, accused-
appellant helped Aaron Lavilla's mother with the household chores, cutting the
grass and feeding the cocks. He stayed in Barangay Miranda until January 3,
1997.21 Accused-appellant's testimony as to his whereabouts from December
27, 1996 to January 3, 1997 was corroborated by Elias Sombito 22 and Aaron
Lavilla.23
As to the circumstances of accused-appellant's arrest, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino
and Ricardo Villaspen testified that at around 11 o'clock in the morning of
January 3, 1997, three members of the Bacolod police, led by PO3 Nicolas
Tancinco, went to the headquarters of the Pontevedra police to ask for help in
locating a person named Anthony Escordial, said to be a resident of Barangay
Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, who was wanted in connection with a
case for robbery with rape. Although Tancinco and his companions showed their
mission order to Gemarino, they did not show a warrant for accused-appellant's
arrest. Nonetheless, Gemarino told PO2 Gella of the Pontevedra police and
Ricardo Villaspen, the tanod commander of Barangay Miranda, to help the
Bacolod policemen look for accused-appellant. The group left the police station,
although Tancinco's other companions, Michelle Darunday and Pacita Aguillon,
stayed in the headquarters.24
The arresting party, composed of Tancinco, PO2 Gella, and Villaspen, proceeded
to the house of accused-appellant in Barangay Miranda, but the latter was not
there. They found accused-appellant at the basketball court watching a game.
After informing him that he was a suspect in a robbery case, the group invited
accused-appellant to go with them to the police headquarters.
Nestor Dojillo, the barangay captain of Barangay Miranda, was at the police
station. He testified that when accused-appellant, together with Tancinco and
his companions, arrived at the police station, he (Nestor Dojillo) followed them
to the investigating room. Inside the room were Michelle Darunday, three
members of the Bacolod police, Villaspen, and Gemarino. Gemarino asked
Michelle if she could identify accused-appellant as her attacker, but the latter
18
said that she could do so only if she could see a lump on his back. Gemarino
told accused-appellant to take off his t-shirt. When accused-appellant did as
Gemarino ordered, Michelle looked at his back for identifying marks, while Allan
Aguillon took his photograph. Gemarino then asked Michelle whether accused-
appellant was her attacker, but she replied that she was not sure because the
attacker was wearing a mask when she was raped. The Bacolod policemen
requested Gemarino to allow them to bring accused-appellant to Bacolod City
as they still had some witnesses who could identify the suspect there. Accused-
appellant was allowed to go with them after Dojillo and Gemarino asked the
Bacolod policemen not to harm him. 25 Dojillo's testimony was corroborated by
the testimonies of PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, 26 Ricardo Villaspen,27 and accused-
appellant.28
Accused-appellant further testified that on the way to Bacolod City, PO3
Tancinco began beating him and hitting him with the butt of a shotgun to force
him to admit liability for the crime. Because accused-appellant refused to do so,
he was taken by Tancinco and his companions to a lodging house where he was
subjected to torture. Accused-appellant was told to take off his clothes and to lie
down. PO3 Tancinco and his companions then proceeded to hit him with a belt.
Afterwards, they covered his mouth and took him to the bathroom. Tancinco put
a knife to his neck, telling him that he would be killed if he refused to admit that
he was the culprit. As he continued to deny liability for the crime, accused-
appellant was subjected to further torture. Later on, the driver entered the room
and brought with him a child, whose head was covered, who was instructed to
identify accused-appellant. The child, however, did not react upon seeing
accused-appellant, who was thus brought back to the headquarters where he
was again maltreated. Accused-appellant said that he was left alone in his cell
and tied to a chair. He also said that at around 8 o'clock that evening, two of the
complainants arrived and the police told them to identify accused-appellant as
their attacker. But these two complainants just kept looking at accused-
appellant and even asked the policemen if he was the suspect.
After the two women had left, PO3 Tancinco took accused-appellant to a house
so that he could be identified by another complainant. But this complainant
likewise said that he was not the assailant, as the latter had a heavier build and
longer hair. Accused-appellant was returned to the police headquarters.
At the headquarters, PO3 Tancinco talked to accused-appellant and told him
that he would help him if accused-appellant confessed to the crime. But
accused-appellant again refused because he said he had not done anything
wrong. The police then began beating him up again. PO3 Tancinco burnt
accused-appellant's lips and tongue with a lighted cigarette. 29
At around 12:00 noon of January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen,
together with accused-appellant's grandfather, a certain Inspector Tamayo, and
reporters from Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod police station to visit
accused-appellant. They found him tied to a chair. When they entered the cell,
accused-appellant, thinking that they were members of the Bacolod police, held
up his hands and asked for pity. The visitors assured accused-appellant that
they would not hurt him. Accused-appellant had a limp because his feet were
injured. For this reason, Dojillo and his companions asked the Bacolod police to
let them take accused-appellant to the hospital for treatment. Accused-
appellant was thus brought to the provincial hospital in Bacolod for x-ray and
medical treatment. He was taken back to the police station thereafter. 30
Lucila Jocame, Records Officer of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial
Regional Hospital (CLMMH), identified in court 31 the medical certificate (Exh. 12)
issued by the said hospital, showing the injuries sustained by accused-
appellant, to wit:
# 5 CM LINEAR ABRASION WITH CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT
SCAPULAR AREA.
# 1 CM LINEAR ABRASION RIGHT SCAPULAR AREA.
# 4 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA LEFT LATERAL CHEST LEVEL OF
T12.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT LEG ANTERIOR ASPECT.
# 2 x 4 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT KNEE LATERAL ASPECT.
# 3 x 3 CM SWELLING AND TENDER LEFT ANKLE.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA D/3 RIGHT LEG POSTERIOR ASPECT.
# 1 x 1 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA M/3 RIGHT THIGH POSTERIOR
ASPECT.
# 2 x 2 CM CONTUSION HEMATOMA RIGHT PERI AURICULAR AREA.
X-RAY # 280 dated January 6, 1997: SKULL APL: CHEST BUCKY RIGHT
THIGH: APL: RIGHT AND LEFT FOOT APO.
"No Radiographic evidence of fracture in this examination." 32
The last witness presented by the defense was Jerome 33 Jayme, General
Manager of Royal Express Transport, Inc., who testified that the last bus trip
from Kabankalan to Bacolod on December 27, 1996 left at 6 o'clock in the
evening. The trip from Kabankalan to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental would take one hour. On cross-examination, Jayme stated that the
said bus would reach Bacolod City by 7:40 to 8:00 p.m. if it left Kabankalan at
6:00 p.m. His company's buses were not allowed to pick up passengers along
the way to Bacolod City because of the incidence of highway robbery. Jayme
identified in court a certification (Exh. 12-a) he issued which stated that the last
bus trip of their company on December 27, 1996 was at 6:00 p.m. 34
On February 26, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, it is the well-considered view of this court, after a
thorough, painstaking and exhaustive review and examination of the
19
 evidence adduced in this case, that the accused ANTHONY ESCORDIAL
y GALES, is GUILTY, beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
with Rape, punished under Art. 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The commission of the crime was attended by three
aggravating circumstances of nighttime, that the crime was committed
in the dwelling of the offended party, and that craft, fraud and disguise
were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime under
paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code. There is
no mitigating circumstance. Applying Article 63, paragraph 1, the
accused is hereby sentenced to the maximum penalty of DEATH.
He is also condemned to pay private complainant the sum of P3,650.00,
representing the money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
SO ORDERED.35
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED TO THE EFFECT THAT ANTHONY ESCORDIAL CAN NEVER BE
THE ROBBER-RAPIST WHO RAVISHED MICHELLE DARUNDAY ON THAT
FATEFUL NIGHT OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, AS THE FORMER (ESCORDIAL)
DID NOT HAVE THE QUALITIES, CHARACTER AND EXPERTISE OF THE
LATTER (ROBBER-RAPIST).
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DESCRIPTION
OF THE ASSAILANT AS DESCRIBED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND HER
WITNESSES FIT WITH THAT OF HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRUTH OF THE
MATTER IS THAT THERE WAS NO DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSAILANT EVER
MADE BY ANYBODY PRIOR TO THE "WARRANTLESS ARREST" OF THE
ACCUSED. THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES
WERE IN FACT DRAFTED, EXECUTED AND SIGNED ONLY SEVERAL DAYS
AFTER THE ACCUSED WAS BROUGHT INTO THE CUSTODY OF THE
BACOLOD POLICE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE TESTIMONIES OF
WITNESSES PO2 RODOLFO GEMARINO (DEP. CHIEF OF POLICE OF
PONTEVEDRA), BRGY. CAPT. NESTOR DOJILLO (BRGY. CAPT. OF MIRANDA
AND THEN MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF PONTEVEDRA),
AND RICARDO VILLASPEN (THEN COMMANDER OF BARANGAY TANOD IN
PONTEVEDRA) TO THE EFFECT THAT MICHELLE DARUNDAY FAILED TO
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED DURING THEIR ENCOUNTER IN PONTEVEDRA
POLICE STATION.
4. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCES,
TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY, OBTAINED BY THE PROSECUTION
DURING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE
LATTER'S SUBJECTION TO CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION WITHOUT
LETTING HIM KNOW OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PARTICULARLY
HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE.
5. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PROSECUTION
WITNESSES WERE ABLE TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED IN A
POLICE LINE UP DESPITE THE FACT THAT OF THE PERSONS BEING LINED
UP ONLY THE ACCUSED WAS HANDCUFFED.
6. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY
WERE ABLE TO IDENTIFY THE ASSAILANT BY FACE THAT VERY EVENING
OF DECEMBER 27, 1996 AMIDST THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF DOING THE
SAME, GIVEN THE DISTANCE, THE INTENSITY OF LIGHT, AND THE
TERRIFYING SITUATION, WHICH ALL OBSCURE, IF NOT DESTROY, THE
CLARITY OF HUMAN MEMORY AND PERCEPTION.
7. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DEFENSE
FAILED TO SHOW THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED TO GO TO BACOLOD
THAT EVENING OF DECEMBER 27, 1996, DESPITE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED, BY SIMPLY RELYING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE
ACCUSED TAKING A CARGO TRUCK FROM PONTEVEDRA TO BACOLOD.
8. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED ANTHONY
ESCORDIAL HAD MOTIVE TO COMMIT THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON A
WRONG PREMISE THAT THE DEFENSE ALLEGEDLY DID NOT REFUTE THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINANT THAT ACCUSED ATTEMPTED TO BE
ACQUAINTED WITH THE COMPLAINANT AND WHISTLED AT THE LATTER
SEVERAL TIMES.36
The issues raised by accused-appellant concern (1) the alleged violations of his
constitutional rights and the consequent admissibility of the evidence against
him and (2) the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
I. Alleged Violations of Accused-appellant's Constitutional Rights
A. Accused-appellant questions the legality of his arrest without a warrant.
Indeed, PO3 Nicolas Tancinco admitted that he and his companions had arrested
accused-appellant without any warrant issued by a judge. 37Art. III, 2 of the
Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
To implement this provision, Rule 113, 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person only under the following circumstances:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
20
 (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
The cases at bar do not fall under paragraphs (a) or (c) of the aforequoted rule.
At the time of his arrest, accused-appellant was watching a game in a
basketball court in Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. He was
not committing or attempting to commit a crime when he was arrested by the
police on that day. Nor was he an escaped prisoner whose arrest could be
effected even without a warrant.
The question is whether these cases fall under paragraph (b) because the police
officers had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead
them to believe that accused-appellant had just committed a crime. The phrase
"personal knowledge" in paragraph (b) has been defined in this wise:
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section
5(b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means
"an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officer making the arrest. 38
In these cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996. But, accused-
appellant was arrested only on January 3, 1997, a week after the occurrence of
the crime. As the arresting officers were not present when the crime was
committed, they could not have "personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances of the commission of the crime" so as to be justified in the belief
that accused-appellant was guilty of the crime. The arresting officers had no
reason for not securing a warrant.
However, the records show that accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the
crimes charged against him during his arraignment on February 25, 1997
without questioning his warrantless arrest.39 He thus waived objection to the
legality of his arrest.40 As this Court has held in another case:
[The accused] waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of
their arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges
against them and participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest
must be deemed cured when they voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. Consequently, if
objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the arrest was
illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot
render subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to the culpability of
the accused.41
B. Accused-appellant invokes Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution which provides
that "[a]ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." He
contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being
informed of his right to remain silent and to have independent counsel
preferably of his choice. Hence, he contends, the trial court erred in not
excluding evidence obtained from him during such interrogation for violation of
accused-appellant's rights under this provision.1wphi1.nt
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the
police obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory -
which was used in evidence against him. The records do not show that he had
given one or that, in finding him guilty, the trial court relied on such statement.
In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when subjected to
physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with which he was
charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained from accused-
appellant which should have been excluded as evidence against him.
C. Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted
by counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from
the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his
continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although accused-appellant
made no statement during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it
affects the admissibility of the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant
by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma.
Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a police line-
up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial
inquest.42 However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-
appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after he had been
pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was
already under custodial investigation when these out-of-court identifications
were conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness
from a group of persons gathered for that purpose. 43 During custodial
investigation, these types of identification have been recognized as "critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the
presence of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-
21
trial proceedings "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself
to a mere formality."44 We have thus ruled that any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter,
after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as evidence against
him.45
Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle Darunda in a show-up on
January 3, 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having
been made when accused-appellant did not have the assistance of counsel,
these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these
identifications should have been held inadmissible for being "the direct result of
the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality.'" 46
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these
witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions
regarding this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, 36 of the
Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right
to object to the admissibility of these testimonies. 47
Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court identifications does not
render the in-court identification of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the
"fruits of the poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was what formed the
basis of the trial court's conviction of accused-appellant. As it was not derived
or drawn from the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a consequence
thereof,49 it is admissible as evidence against him. However, whether or not
such prosecution evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt is another matter altogether.
II. Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses
Accused-appellant contends that: (1) he does not possess the character,
qualities, and expertise of the assailant who robbed and raped Michelle
Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa Gellaver; (2) the records are bereft of
any description of the assailant made by these prosecution witnesses prior to
his arrest as the affidavits of Darunday, Blanca, Joniega, and Esmeralda were
executed only after his arrest; (3) the testimonies of the defense witnesses,
namely, PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, Barangay Captain Nestor Dojillo, and Ricardo
Villaspen, show that Michelle Darunday failed to identify accused-appellant
when the latter was presented to her at the Pontevedra police station; (4)
Tancinco's testimony that Michelle Darunday properly identified accused-
appellant at the Pontevedra police station could not be believed as the said
witness had motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant; (4) the
identification of accused-appellant at the Bacolod police station was tainted
because only accused-appellant was handcuffed among the persons presented
to the prosecution witnesses; and (5) it was highly improbable for the
prosecution witnesses to identify the assailant by face considering the distance,
the intensity of light, and the circumstances at the time of the commission of
the crime.
A. Jason Joniega50 and Mark Esmeralda51 pointed to accused-appellant as the
man they saw on the night of December 27, 1996 and the person they
identified inside a jail cell at the Bacolod police station. Erma Blanca, on the
other hand, testified that she saw through her blindfold accused-appellant
raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in court as their
assailant and as the man whom she saw inside the jail cell at the Bacolod police
station.52 Ma. Teresa Gellaver53 and Michelle Darunday54 identified accused-
appellant as the suspect brought before them at the Bacolod police station and
the Pontevedra police station, respectively.
The test is whether or not the prosecution was able to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon
observations of the suspect other than the line-up identification. 55 As held
in United States v. Wade:56
We think it follows that the proper test to be applied in these situations
is that quoted in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 US 471, 488, 9 L ed 2d
441, 455, 83 S Ct 407, "'[W]hether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Maguire,
Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)." See also Hoffa v United States, 385 US
293, 309, 17 L ed 2d 374, 386, 87 S Ct 408. Application of this test in
the present context requires consideration of various factors; for
example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any pre-line-up description and the defendant's actual
description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the
identification by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to
identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time
between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant
to consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel, are
disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.
We now consider whether the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses meet
the test as laid down in that case.
1. Michelle Darunday testified that her assailant's face was covered with cloth
when he entered the room and that she was blindfolded when she was
raped.57 She could thus only see the assailant's eyes, which Michelle described
as chinito (chinky),58 although she testified that she could also identify his
voice.59 Otherwise, Michelle did not see her attacker. Yet, she testified that she
immediately recognized accused-appellant as the assailant when she saw him
at the Pontevedra police station. Michelle stated:
PROS. CARDINAL:
Madam Witness, a few days thereafter, can you recall any
development of your case?
WITNESS:
That was in January 3, when somebody told us to identify a
suspect in the City Hall of Pontevedra.
22
PROS. CARDINAL:
Who was with you when you went to Pontevedra?
WITNESS:
My aunt and my uncle and the police investigators.
....
PROS. CARDINAL:
Upon arrival at Pontevedra, what happened?
WITNESS:
We waited for a while because they will find the suspect and I
was there in the room of the police sitting.
....
PROS. CARDINAL:
So, you stayed behind and the policemen pick up the suspect?
WITNESS:
I and my aunt waited in the police of the policemen, and then
later the suspect arrived.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that suspect arrived inside the room where you were, can
you tell us what was the reaction of the suspect?
WITNESS:
When the suspect arrived, at first, he was not able to see me
because I was behind the desk after the door, and then he was
so fresh saying that he was a good man, but when he saw me
he blushed and moving his head asking, "Ano ang sala ko sa
imo? (What did I do to you?), I did not do anything." But when I
looked at his eyes and heard his voice, I was sure that he was
the man.
PROS. CARDINAL:
When that person said, what did I do to you, I did not do
anything, what was [your] reaction?
WITNESS:
I just looked at him and he was so fresh that he has not done
anything, but the policeman said that his case is rape. Then, he
was asked to take off his t-shirt and I just looked at him and
then later, the policeman asked to borrow the man for
investigation and while the policeman was recording, that
suspect approached me and told me that, "You do not know
me.", and asked, "Do you know me?"
PROS. CARDINAL:
What was your reaction?
WITNESS:
I just [kept] quiet but my aunt reacted by saying, "You think you
cannot be identified because you covered yourself?"
PROS. CARDINAL:
And then what did he answer?
WITNESS:
He just stand outside while we went ahead to go back to our
home.60
A show-up, such as what was undertaken by the police in the identification of
accused-appellant by Michelle Darunday, has been held to be an underhanded
mode of identification for "being pointedly suggestive, generat[ing] confidence
where there was none, activat[ing] visual imagination, and, all told, subvert[ing]
their reliability as [an eyewitness]."61 In these cases, Michelle knew that she was
going to identify a suspect when she went to Pontevedra. Upon seeing accused-
appellant escorted by Tancinco and his colleagues in the Bacolod police, she
knew that he was the suspect she was supposed to identify. When accused-
appellant was thus shown to her, there could be no doubt as to what was
expected of her. Further aggravating the situation were the reply of the
policeman to accused-appellant's protestations of innocence that he was being
held for rape and Michelle's aunt's obvious assumption of his guilt. Michelle's
immediate conclusion, therefore, that accused-appellant was her attacker was
understandable. As has been explained:
Social psychological influences. Various social psychological factors also
increase the danger of suggestibility in a lineup confrontation.
Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a desire to be correct
and to avoid looking foolish. By arranging a lineup, the police have
evidenced their belief that they have caught the criminal; witnesses,
23
 realizing this, probably will feel foolish if they cannot identify anyone
and therefore may choose someone despite residual uncertainty.
Moreover, the need to reduce psychological discomfort often motivates
the victim of a crime to find a likely target for feelings of hostility.
Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave like those around
them. This desire to conform produces an increased need to identify
someone in order to show the police that they, too, feel that the
criminal is in the lineup, and makes the witnesses particularly
vulnerable to any clues conveyed by the police or other witnesses as to
whom they suspect of the crime. . .62
Coupled with the failure of Michelle to see the face of her assailant, the
apparent suggestiveness of the show-up places in doubt her credibility
concerning the identity of accused-appellant. The possibility that her
identification of accused-appellant was merely planted in her mind both by the
circumstances surrounding the show-up and her concomitant determination to
seek justice cannot be disregarded by this Court.
Michelle's identification of accused-appellant is further rendered dubious by the
disparity between her description of her attacker and the appearance of
accused-appellant. In her affidavit, dated January 4, 1997, Michelle described
her attacker as follows:
P - Sadtong tinion nga ginahimoslan ikaw sining suspetsado
nakita mo bala ang iya hitsura? (At the time that you were abused by
the suspect, did you see what he looked like?)
S - Wala, kay tungod nga may tabon ang akon mata, apang
matandaan ko guid ang iya tingog, mata, ang iya malaka nga biguti,
ang structure sang iya lawas, ang supat sang iya kamot, ang iya bibig,
ang madamo nga "kelloid" sa iya lawas kag ang iya baho. (No, because
I was blindfolded but I can remember his voice, his eyes, his thin
mustache, his body structure, the smoothness of his hands, his mouth,
and the numerous keloids on his body, and his smell.)63
Michelle's affidavit clearly indicated that she felt the keloids on the back of her
assailant when the latter was raping her. But, when she testified in court,
Michelle admitted that she did not see keloids on accused-appellant although
she said that his skin was rough. 64 This is corroborated by the testimony of PO2
Rodolfo Gemarino who said that he did not see any lump on the back of
accused-appellant when he tried to look for it. 65 In fact, it would appear that
accused-appellant had no such markings on his back but had only small
patches which could not even be readily seen.66
In dismissing the disparity between accused-appellant's appearance and
Michelle's description of her attacker, the trial court dwelt on the apparent
roughness of accused-appellant's skin and the probability that Michelle might
have felt only the arch of the spinal cord of her assailant. 67 However, mere
speculations and probabilities cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable
doubt required by law to be established by the prosecution. 68 Michelle Darunday
was a civil engineer in the City Engineer's Office in Bacolod City. Considering her
educational attainment and professional status, it is improbable that she was
mistaken as to what she felt on her attacker's back at the time she was raped. A
mere protrusion on the back of the neck of the assailant could not possibly have
been mistaken for keloids.
Another circumstance casting doubt on the credibility of Michelle's identification
is her lack of reaction upon seeing accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police
headquarters. Defense witnesses PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino, 69 Ricardo
Villaspen,70 and Nestor Dojillo71 testified that Michelle failed to see any
identifying marks on accused-appellant and that she showed hesitation in
pinpointing the latter as the culprit. With Gemarino being a policeman, Villaspen
a barangay tanod, and Dojillo a barangay captain, these witnesses were all, in
one form or another, connected with law enforcement. The prosecution having
failed to ascribe any ill motive on the part of these defense witnesses, who are
without doubt respectable members of the community, their testimonies that
Michelle showed no reaction in seeing accused-appellant at the show-up in
Pontevedra police station deserve greater credence than the testimony of
Tancinco that Michelle confirmed to him that accused-appellant was her
attacker. The defense evidence established that Tancinco was an abusive
policeman who had made up his mind as to accused-appellant's guilt and who
had no compunction in doing whatever means necessary, legal or illegal, to
ensure his conviction. We note further that the testimonies of these defense
witnesses coincide with Michelle's testimony that she kept quiet when she saw
accused-appellant at the Pontevedra police station on January 3, 1997. This
being so, her reaction to the show-up at the Pontevedra police station upon
seeing accused-appellant, the man who supposedly raped her twice in an
ignominious manner, is contrary to human nature.72 It may be that she was
filled with rage so that upon seeing accused-appellant she was unable to show
any emotion. But it is equally possible that, as defense witnesses Gemarino,
Villaspen, and Dojillo testified, Michelle did not immediately recognize accused-
appellant as her attacker and only pointed to him as her assailant upon
promptings by the police and her companions. "[W]here the circumstances
shown to exist yield two (2) or more inferences, one of which is consistent with
the presumption of innocence, while the other or others may be compatible
with the finding of guilt, the court must acquit the accused: for the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is insufficient to support a
judgment of conviction."73
For the foregoing reasons, we find both the out-of-court and in-court
identification of Michelle Darunday to be insufficient to establish accused-
appellant as the person who robbed and raped her and her companions on the
night of December 27, 1996.
2. Erma Blanca testified that she saw through her blindfold the assailant when
he was raping Michelle Darunday. She identified accused-appellant in open
court as the person whom she saw that night. 74 Certain circumstances in these
cases lead us to believe, however, that Erma Blanca did not really see the
assailant and that her testimony otherwise was a mere afterthought. These are:
First, the police blotter, dated December 28, 1996, 75 prepared by PO3 Nicolas
Tancinco, referred to an "unknown suspect" who allegedly entered the boarding
house of Pacita Aguillon and robbed Ma. Teresa Gellaver and Michelle Darunday.
This casts doubt on Erma's credibility because she testified that she had known
24
accused-appellant for a long time prior to December 27, 1996. During her The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to report to
testimony, Erma claimed that accused-appellant approached her and Michelle the Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt
sometime in September or October 1996 to ask for the name of the latter. In hereof.
addition, Erma said she had seen accused-appellant whenever he passed by
their boarding house or stayed in her Tiyo Anong's store nearby. 76 It would thus
seem that Erma was familiar with accused-appellant. But, if she had actually
seen him on that night of the robbery, why did she not report this to the police
immediately? Being a victim herself, Erma had every motive to reveal the
identity of the robber that same night the crime was committed. But she did not
do so. We are therefore left with the conclusion that the police blotter referred
to an unknown suspect because the identity of the assailant had not been
determined at the time the crime was reported to the police.

Second, Erma was not the one who accompanied the Bacolod police when the
latter sought accused-appellant in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. PO3 Tancinco
testified that he took Michelle Darunday along with his other companions when
they went to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental so that she could identify if the
suspect was the person who had raped her. But Michelle admitted that she did
not see the face of the assailant. Erma Blanca, who claimed she recognized
accused-appellant, was not taken along by the police to Pontevedra, Negros
Occidental. Why not? Why did they bring instead Michelle Darunday?

Third, the affidavit of Erma Blanca 77 was prepared on January 4, 1997, a day
after the arrest of accused-appellant. This delay belies Erma's claim that she
saw the assailant through her blindfold on the night of the incident. For the
normal reaction of one who actually witnessed a crime and recognized the
offender is to reveal it to the authorities at the earliest opportunity. 78 In these
cases, the crime took place on December 27, 1996, but Erma Blanca executed
her affidavit only on January 4, 1997, more than a week after the occurrence of
the crime. Delay in reporting the crime or identifying the perpetrator thereof will
not affect the credibility of the witness if it is sufficiently explained. 79 But here,
no explanation was given by the prosecution why Erma Blanca executed her
affidavit one week after the crime took place and one day after accused-
appellant's arrest. The most likely explanation for such lapse is that Erma
Blanca was used merely to corroborate what would otherwise have been a weak
claim on the part of Michelle Darunday. The same may be said of the
testimonies of Jason Joniega and Mark Esmeralda.

B. Accused-appellant's testimony that he was at the cockpit in Barangay

Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental on December 27, 1996 is corroborated
by Aaron Lavilla,80 Elias Sombito,81 and Nestor Dojillo.82 Considering the
improbabilities and uncertainties surrounding the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, the defense of alibi by accused-appellant deserves credence. 83

To summarize, we find that the prosecution failed to meet the degree of proof
beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases. The acquittal of accused- G.R. No. 141767 April 2, 2001
appellant is thus in order.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City, v. HILARION TEVES y CANTOR, accused-appellant.
finding accused-appellant guilty of robbery with rape and sentencing him to
death, is hereby REVERSED and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on the ground DE LEON, JR., J.:
of reasonable doubt. Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released unless
there are other legal grounds for his continued detention.1wphi1.nt
25
Before us on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of
Binan, Laguna, Branch 25, in Criminal Case No. 9620-B convicting the appellant,
Hilarion C. Teves, of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the
supreme penalty of death.1wphi1.nt
The lifeless body of Teresita Teves y Capuchino was found by a group of
barangay tanods in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna in the late
evening of August 25, 1996. The body of the victim bore strangulation marks
around the neck and a stab wound just below the left armpit. During the
investigation of the case, the husband of the victim, herein appellant, Hilarion
C. Teves, was identified as the driver of the passenger jeep that was allegedly
met by the barangay tanods shortly before they chanced upon the dead body of
the victim on that fateful evening of August 25, 1996. It was also gathered by
the police that the spouses purportedly had misunderstanding prior to the
incident.
On December 3, 1996, Hilarion Teves y Cantor was charged with the crime of
parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, Code, as
amended, in an Information2 that reads:
That on or about August 25, 1996, in the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Province of Laguna, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused HILARION TEVES y CANTOR, while
conveniently armed with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill his wife
TERESA CAPUCHINO y TEVES (sic) with whom he was united in lawful
wedlock, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab and
strangle the said TERESA CAPUCHINO TEVES with the aforesaid deadly
weapon, stabbing the latter on the left side of her chest causing her
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving
heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned on January 13, 1997, herein appellant, assisted by his
counsel, entered the plea of "Not guilty" to the charge as contained in the
Information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that on August 25,
1996 at around 10:30 o'clock in the evening four (4) barangay tanods, namely:
Milagros Tayawa, Jerry Pantilla, Angel Lapitan and Jose Bello, were patrolling on
board a barangay patrol vehicle in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna.
Milagros was behind the steering wheel. From the old national highway, they
entered the NIA road which was an isolated dirt road seldom used by
commuters due to its narrow width, There were no houses and streetlights
along the immediate vicinity as the road was bound by an irrigation canal on
one side and a stretch of rice field on the other. Subsequently, they met a
passenger jeep that was coming from the opposite direction. Milagros had to
maneuver backward to accommodate the other vehicle.3
As the patrol vehicle advanced, the barangay tanods saw a body of a woman
lying on the left side of the NIA road. The woman's white polo shirt was raised
above the chest exposing her right breast and a small wound just below her
armpit; while her black pants were lowered down to her knees. Upon
ascertaining that the woman was dead, Milagros and her companions
immediately informed their chief before proceeding to the Santa Rosa, Laguna
Police Station to report the incident.4 The police examined the cadaver, and
then took the sworn statement 5 of Milagros Tayawa on the same evening of
August 25, 1996.
Dr. Erwin Escal, medico-legal officer, conducted the autopsy on the body of
Teresa Teves upon the request of PO2 Tony Gangano. Dr, Escal identified in
court the Autopsy Report6 which shows the following findings:
Post Mortem Examination:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished female cadaver in rigor mortem with
post mortem lividity at the dependent portion of the body. Palpabral
conjunctive are pale. Lips and nail beds are cyanotic.
There are petechial hemorrhages on the face and neck and
subconjunctival hemorrhage on the left lateral conthal region.
Head, Neck, Trunk and Extremeties:
1. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. mid-pariento occipital area left.
2. Hematoma 0.5 x 0.5 cm. parieto occipital area right.
3. Contusion hematoma right lateral neck, measuring 6 cm; x
0.1 cm.
4. Punctured wound triangular in shape at the mid-axillary line,
left pectoralis region measuring 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm., non-
penetrating.
5. Contusion hematoma 12 x 4 cm. right lateral abdominal
region.
6. Abrasion 4 x 2 cm. right lumbar region.
7. Area of contusion hematoma with abrasion right buttocks
measuring 7 x 6 cm.
On opening up: The scalp was deflicted to expose the skull and was
sawing it off coronally. No skull fracture noted and the brain was grossly
normal.
Conclusion:
The cause of death is asphyxia by strangulation.
26
According to Dr. Escal, the victim could have been strangled ("binigti") with the
use of a constricting material which may be a wire, a rope or a nylon cord and
that the victim may have been dead for not less than thirty-six (36) hours when
it was brought to him for autopsy examination at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
on August 26, 1996.7
On August 29, 1996 Milagros was invited to the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police
Station by the PNP Provincial Director, Supt. Arthur Castillo, to identify a certain
person and a passenger jeep in connection with the incident on August 25,
1996. She remembered the person, who turned out to be the husband of the
victim, herein appellant Hilarion C. Teves, as the driver of the passenger jeep
that they met on the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa Rosa, Laguna
shortly before they chanced upon the body of a dead woman later identified as
Teresa C. Teves. She recognized the appellant when their respective vehicles
momentarily stopped facing each other with their headlights switched on. She
had also seen the appellant while the latter was sitting on a bench at the back
of " the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station when she came to verify the status of
the case on August 27, 1996.
Milagros likewise recognized the passenger jeep 8 as the same vehicle being
driven by the appellant when they met on the NIA road in the late evening of
August 25, 1996. Milagros explained that she instructed her fellow barangay
tanods to train their flashlight on its direction after the passenger jeep speed
away and she read partly the plate number at the back as "DJN 6" which she
wrote on a cigarette foil9 ("palara"). She also noted the distinguishing features
of the passenger jeep such as: a) the maroon paint on the bumper; b) the small
lights attached to the bumper; and c) the green reflectorized paints on the
bumper. After identifying the appellant and the passenger jeep, Milagros
executed another sworn statement10 before the police.
Upon his detention on the same date of August 29, 1996, the appellant
allegedly requested the aunt of the victim, Maria Alulod, who was present at the
Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station, to send his Tata Enteng (Vicente Alulod) to
the police station and to bring money for a certain barangay tanod of Barangay
Macabling so that his sentence for the commission of the crime would be
reduced.11 Vicente, turned down the request as he noted during the wake of
Teresa that Hilarion was not actually sorry for his wife's death although he
appeared worried ("balisa").12
It also appears that before her untimely demise, Teresa was able to confide with
an aunt, Paula Beato Dia, that she had a marital problem. Paula counseled her
that it was natural for any husband and wife to have occasional problems. She
even suggested to Teresa to seek the advice of her Tata Felix. 13
In July 1996 Teresa approached her uncle, Felix Padua, to seek the, latter's
advice concerning her marital problem. Apparently, her husband, herein
appellant Hilarion Teves, proposed that they live separately. He also wanted to
secure an arrangement regarding the custody of their children and his wife's
consent regarding the disposition of their house and lot. Teresa could not recall
any serious reason for her husband's behavior but she surmised that the
appellant resented her comment that his peers were all "dalaga" and "binata".
Since Felix was busy at that time, he advised Teresa to visit him on another
occasion so that they could discuss her problem thoroughly. 14
In the same month of July, Teresa and the appellant went to the house of Felix
Padua in Santa Rosa, Laguna. When asked about their problem, the appellant
disclosed that he could no longer put up with Teresa's jealousy that often
caused him embarrassment before his friends. Felix tried to explain that it was
common between any husband and wife to get jealous and that appellant
should realize that his wife simply loved him very much. However, the appellant
would not listen and even imputed that his wife had a bad character. 15
On July 20, 1996 Paula Beato Dia learned from Teresa that the couple had finally
decided to live separately after conferring with their Tata Felix. On July 30, 1996
Teresa informed Paula that the appellant became violent ("nagwala") over her
refusal to sell their properties. Paula then advised her niece to bring the matter
to the barangay officials.16
The evidence of the defense shows that the appellant stayed in their house
during the day on August 25, 1996. He helped his wife, Teresa, washed their
clothes. In the afternoon, he watched basketball game on the television and
also helped his children with their school assignments. He started to ply the
Binan-Cabuyao route with his passenger jeep at 6:30 o'clock in the evening, as
it was his usual schedule. Before leaving however, he told his wife that he would
spend the night in the house of his uncle Caloy in Barangay Tagapo, Santa Rosa,
Laguna.17 Itappears that the daughter of his uncle Caloy celebrated her debut
which the appellant and his children attended on August 24, 1996. When the
party ended, he was requested by the family to help in returning some of the
borrowed equipment on the following day.
Teresa also left the house at about 8:30 o'clock in the evening on the same day
allegedly to confer with somebody. She instructed her daughter, Leizel, not to
lock the door when they go to sleep. Leizel saw her mother board a tricycle
behind the driver, inasmuch as there were already two passengers in its
sidecar.18 Teresa was also seen by another tricycle driver, a certain
Edwin Carapatan, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening while she was on board
a tricycle behind the driver which was bound for the town proper. Both even
greeted each other.19
Meanwhile due to heavy traffic, the appellant managed to ply his route 2
times only after which he proceeded to the house of his Tiyo Caloy in Barangay
Tagapo, Santa Rosa, Laguna. Upon arrival at exactly 8:30 o'clock in the evening,
the appellant ate his supper. Thereafter, they arranged the things for him to
bring home on the following day. Before going to sleep, the appellant joined the
family in watching basketball game on the television until the game was over at
10:00 o'clock in the evening. 20
When the appellant arrived home in Barangay Sinalhan, Santa Rosa, Laguna on
August 26, 1996, he was informed by his youngest child that his wife was not
around. According to appellant, he thought that his wife left early on that day to
look for a job. He learned that his wife left the house at 8:30 o'clock in the
previous evening upon arrival of his second eldest daughter, Lalaine, from
school at 12:00 o'clock noon.21
The appellant and his neighbors searched for Teresita in the entire afternoon
but in vain. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard of talks that a body of a
dead woman was found in Barangay Balibago, Santa Rosa, Laguna. He went to
27
Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station together with a certain Lebong Dia and was
instructed by the police to proceed to Funeraria Lim after hearing his
description of his wife. At 11:30 in the evening, he saw the dead body of his "
wife at the funeral parlor which he brought home after midnight. 22
On August 27, 1996, the appellant went back to the police station in Santa
Rosa, Laguna where he was initially informed by a certain police officer Laurel
that his wife might be a victim of gang rape. However, he learned later that he
was a suspect in the killing of his wife when he was investigated by the police.
On August 29, 1996, he returned to the police station in Santa Rosa, Laguna
upon being informed that Supt. Arthur Castillo would investigate the case.
Three (3) barangay tanods, namely: Angel Lapitan, Milagros Tayawa and Gerry
Pantilla were present in the police station. Castillo requested them to identify
the appellant; however, none of the three (3) was able to recognize him. The
appellant was asked to sit behind the steering wheel of his passenger jeep and
was even ordered to wave his hand while pictures of him were being taken.
Subsequently, Castillo urged the three (3) barangay tanods to take a good look
at the appellant to refresh their memory after which he asked: "Ano sa tingin
niyo?" When no response from the tanods was forthcoming, Castillo again
asked: "Hindi pa ba ninyo nakikilala yan?" After putting his hand on the shoulder
of Barangay Tanod Milagros Tayawa, the latter remarked: "Parang kahawig
niya." Thereafter, Col. Castillo ordered the appellant's arrest. 23
On December 7, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, defined and
penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, restored in R. A.
No. 7659, Imposing Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, and there
being present the aggravating circumstances the herein accused killed
his wife (a) during nighttime; (b) in an uninhabited place; and (c) with
the use of a motor vehicle (jeepney), hereby imposes upon him the
DEATH PENALTY and orders him to indemnify the heirs of Teresa Teves
the sum of P100,000.00, as moral damages. .
The Provincial Jail Warden of Santa Rosa, Laguna is hereby ordered to transfer
accused Hilarion Teves y Cantor to the National Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prison,
Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved by the decision, Hilarion C. Teves appealed to this Court raising the
following assignment of errors:
I evidence, it is necessary that: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME OF PARRICIDE AS CHARGED IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 9620-B
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE MATERIAL
ALLEGATIONS IN THE INFORMATION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE INCOHERENCE, INCREDIBILITY AND
INADEQUACY IN WEIGHT AND VALUE OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE RELIED UPON.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON THE TESTIMONIES
OF MILAGROS TAYAWA AND MARIA ALULOD WHICH ARE INCREDIBLE
BASED ON COMMON OBSERVATION AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE EQUIVOCAL
TESTIMONY OF DR. EDWIN ESCAL IN FAVOR OF GUlLT AND AGAINST THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE PRESENCE OF
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
In his brief,24 the appellant contends, in essence, that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the perpetrator of the crime. Under the factual milieu of
the case, Milagros could not have recognized the vehicle and its driver which
she allegedly met on August 25, 1996. He also contends that the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Beato Dia to the effect that the
appellant and his wife had a misunderstanding were basically anchored on mere
suspicion. Moreover, the alleged implied admission by the appellant of his
alleged guilt before Maria Alulod, who is an aunt of the victim is incredible as it
contradicts common human experience. Lastly, the testimony of Dr. Edwin Escal
suggests that several malefactors may be responsible for the killing of the
victim.
The facts of this case clearly show that nobody had actually witnessed the
killing of the victim, Teresita Teves, in the evening of August 25, 1996. To prove
its case of parricide against the appellant, the prosecution relied on
circumstantial evidence. In order to convict an accused based on circumstantial
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.25 In other words, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
conviction where the multiple circumstances are proven and are consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with
28
the hypothesis that the accused is innocent as well as incompatible with every
rational hypothesis except that of guilt on the part of the accused. 26
In convicting the appellant of the crime of parricide based on circumstantial
evidence, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were credible and sufficient. It is well-settled rule that the trial judge's
assessment of the credibility of witnesses' testimonies is accorded great respect
on appeal.27 Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of
the trial courts since the latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts
have overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might
affect the result of the case.28
After thorough review, however, we find sufficient basis to warrant the reversal
of the assailed judgment of conviction. The trial court relied on the identification
made by Milagros Tayawa during the trial of this case in finding that the
appellant was the person driving the passenger jeep that was allegedly met by
the four (4) barangay tanods along the NIA road in Barangay Macabling, Santa
Rosa, Laguna in the late evening of August 25, 1996 shortly before they
accidentally found the dead body of Teresita Teves. We note, however, the
irregular manner by which the pre-trial identification of the appellant and his
passenger jeep during the custodial investigation on August 29, 1996 was made
by Milagros. At that time, the appellant, who was already a suspect in his wife's
murder, was alone inside the investigation room of the Santa Rosa, Laguna
Police Station and without his counsel. He was also ordered by Supt. Castillo to
board his passenger jeep, extend part of his body outside of the vehicle while
waving his hand, as if doing some kind of a re-enactment, to be observed by
Milagros and two (2) other barangay tanods namely: Jerry Pantilla and Angel
Lapitan.
We agree with the Solicitor General's observation that the pre-trial identification
in which the prosecution witness was made to identify the suspect (herein
appellant) in a one-on-one confrontation, was pointedly suggestive, generated
confidence where there was none, activated visual imagination and, all told,
subverted the identification of the appellant by the witness. This method of
identification is as tainted as an uncounseled confession and thus, falls within
the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. 29
Besides, there is reason to doubt the reliability of the said testimony of Milagros
Tayawa. Milagros allegedly recognized the appellant when their respective
vehicles momentarily stopped facing each other while their headlights were
switched on. In the ocular inspection conducted during the trial on July 2, 1997,
it was demonstrated that the two (2) vehicles were initially twenty and one-half
(20 1/2) feet apart when they stopped facing each other. When the barangay
patrol vehicle backed off to accommodate the passenger jeep, the two (2)
vehicles were thirty-six and one-half (36 1/2) feet apart, at which distance the
trial court made the observation that the man behind the steering wheel was
not cognizable in broad daylight.30
If the man on the driver's seat was not cognizable in broad daylight, this court is
not convinced that an accurate identification of the driver of the passenger
jeep, who was allegedly met by the barangay tanods at around 10:30 o'clock in
the evening on August 25, 1996, can be made even from a distance of twenty
and one-half (20 1/2) feet by the prosecution witness. It must be pointed out
that the two (2) vehicles were then passing along an isolated dirt road where
there were no houses and streetlights in the immediate vicinity. Under the
circumstances, clear visibility was practically improbable, if not impossible, from
a distance.
There is more reason to doubt the reliability of the testimony of Milagros Tayawa
upon consideration of the sworn statement 31 that she gave before the police
authorities during the investigation of this case. Her sworn statement contains a
narration of the circumstances leading to the discovery of Teresita's dead body.
Significantly, no mention was made therein that she had seen the driver of the
passenger jeep that they allegedly met in the late evening of August 25, 1996
on the NIA road, much less described his face or his other physical features.
It is absurd to believe that Milagros forgot or the police investigators had been
so negligent as to overlook this omission in her affidavit. In the first place, the
purpose of the investigation was to elicit basic information about the killing,
such as the identity of the perpetrator thereof. It was only during the custodial
investigation on August 29, 1996 that Milagros claimed in her subsequent
affidavit32 that she had seen the driver of the same passenger jeep after the
irregular one-on-one confrontation with the appellant and after unwarranted
suggestions had been made to the said witness by the police officer.
Notably, the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the other barangay
tanods who were likewise present during the incident on August 25, 1996 to
corroborate the testimony of Milagros. This is not difficult to understand
considering that the statements elicited from Angel Lapitan during the
investigation of the case run counter to the testimony that she gave during the
trial, to wit:
Tanong: Nakilala ba ninyo ang nagmamaneho at nakuha ba ninyo
ang plaka nito?
Sagot : Hindi namin nakilala ang driver dahil patay ang kanyang
ilaw sa loob at ng aming ilawan ang kanyang likuran ay walang plaka. 33
Due to the above statement of Angel Lapitan before the police investigator,
even the testimony of Milagros Tayawa that she recognized the passenger jeep
of the appellant as the same vehicle that they met along the NIA road shortly
before having accidentally discovered the dead body of the victim, was also
rendered doubtful. Besides, the passenger jeep of the appellant had been
impounded at the Santa Rosa, Laguna Police Station since August 27, 1996 or
two (2) days before the pre-trial identification of the said vehicle. 34
We also doubt the testimony of Maria Alulod for being contrary to common
human experience. It would be highly unlikely and contrary to common sense
for the appellant to admit his guilt before this witness, who is an aunt of the
victim, while vehemently denying to the police authorities any participation for
the death of his wife. It is well-settled rule that evidence, to be worthy of credit,
must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible
in itself.35
29
The motive that allegedly drove the appellant to kill his wife, as testified by
prosecution witnesses Felix Padua and Paula Dia, is not convincing. Both
prosecution witnesses simply stated in general terms that the appellant and his
wife were having a family problem out of the latter's jealous attitude and that
they decided to separate. These prosecution witnesses failed to furnish any
specific incident to the effect that Teresita had actually feared for her life or that
appellant had become so desperate as to will the death of his wife. At the most,
their testimonies simply manifest a suspicion of appellant's responsibility for the
crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not
sway judgment.36
On the other hand, the victim's daughter, Leizel Teves, testified that her family
was a normal and happy family. Leizel's testimony was corroborated by the
victim's cousin, Minerva Diaz, who testified that the Teves family was a
harmonious and happy family.37 Additionally, Rosita Barreto, a friend of the
Teves family and a neighbor for over seventeen (17) years, attested that the
relations of the appellant and his wife were generally smooth. 38
Even if we would assume that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
were true, it can not be reasonably inferred therefrom that the appellant is
responsible for killing his wife in the absence of any other circumstance that
could link him to the said killing. To be sure, motive is not sufficient to support a
conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be
adduced that the accused was the malefactor .39
In view of the foregoing, we cannot sustain the appealed judgment of the trial
court in the case at bar. The prosecution miserably failed to establish the
circumstantial evidence to prove its case against the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. Consequently, we need not pass upon the merits of his
defense of alibi.40 It is well-entrenched rule in criminal law that the conviction of
an accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and
not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense. 41
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision in Criminal Case
No. 9620-B is reversed and set aside. The appellant Hilarion Teves y Cantor is
acquitted of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless
convicted for any other crime or detained for some lawful reason, appellant
Hilarion Teves y Cantor is ordered released immediately.1wphi1.nt
G.R. No. 117202 February 13, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
v. DEORITO PORIO y RAPSING, accused-appellant.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Once again, we hark back to the principle that as long as constitutional
safeguards are adequately complied with, a confession constitutes evidence of
the highest order for it is supported by the strong presumption that no person
of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and his conscience.1
In an Information2 dated July 10, 1990 filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Olangapo City, accused Deorito Porio y Rapsing was charged with the
complex crime of rape with homicide, committed in the following manner:
"That on or about the twenty-fifth (25th) day of June, 1990, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Riza Cleodoro, 3 an 11 year old
girl, and by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the accused, with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and strangle
the said Riza Cleodoro, which caused her death shortly thereafter.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused entered a plea of "not guilty."4 During the hearing, the prosecution
presented Dr. Richard Patilano, Atty. Juanito Atienza, Pfc. Roosevelt Menor, Cpl.
Felipe Francia, and Pat. Marlon Agno as its witnesses. The defense, on the other
hand, offered the sole testimony of accused Deorito Porio.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that:
Shortly before midnight of June 25, 1990, the residents of New Cabalan found
the lifeless body of Riza Cleodoro Flores near a creek at Purok I, Libas, New
Cabalan, Olongapo City. She was 11 years old, and was survived by her mother
Trinidad Cleodoro.5
The Autopsy Report6 shows that the cause of Riza's death is strangulation. The
genital examination discloses "sexual intercourse with a man." The pertinent
portions of the said report issued by Dr. Richard Patilano, Medico-Legal Officer
of Olongapo City, read:
"Contusions: 4x1 cm over the left side of the neck; 2x1 cm over the
anterior aspect of the neck; 2x1.5 cm over the left side of the inguinal
area.
Breast: not yet developed.
Genital Examination:
No pubic hair, Labia majora-gaping, Labia Minora gaping. Feurchetelax with
fresh lacerations at the median line, Vestibular mucosa, cyanotic with
congestion. Hymen and vaginal walls with fresh lacerations at 1:00 oclock and
6:00 0clock positions. Hymenal orifice, originally annular admitted 2.5
cm in diameter bottle with marked resistance. Vaginal walls congested
with bloody materials, scanty.
30
Lungs: Voluminous, soggy, dark red in color. Petechial hemorrhages present at
the subepicardial and subpleural areas. x x x
Conclusion: Genital Findings are compatible with sexual intercourse
with a man on or about the alleged date of commission, with violence.
Cause of death: Neurogenic Shock and Asphyxia by Strangulation."
(Emphasis ours)
The day after Riza's exanimate body was found, Barangay Purok Leader
Francisco Montes informed Cpl. Felipe Francia of the Olangapo Police
Department that the accused attempted to rape Riza on three previous
occasions. Montes got this information, as a Purok Leader, from Trinidad, the
victim's mother, who confirmed its veracity.7
On January 26, 1990, Montes accompanied the accused to the Olongapo Police
Department. Immediately, Pat. Marlon Agno and Cpl. Francia conducted a
cursory examination of the accused.8 The latter readily admitted to them that
he raped and killed Riza and that he was bothered by his conscience. However,
Pat. Agno and Cpl. Francia did not reduce the accused's admission in writing. 9
On January 27, 1990, the accused, together with Montes, returned to the
Olongapo Police Station. Montes then informed Pfc. Roosevelt Menor that the
accused admitted having committed the crime. Thereupon, Pfc. Menor verified
from the accused the truth of such statement. The latter answered positively.
Communicating in the Tagalog language, Pfc. Menor informed the accused of his
constitutional rights, among which are his rights to remain silent and to have a
counsel of his own choice. Pfc. Menor also cautioned the accused that whatever
statement he will give can be used against him in court. Pfc. Menor repeatedly
explained these rights to the accused. He said he understood them. Since the
accused could not mention any lawyer of his own choice, Pfc. Menor requested
Atty. Juanito Atienza to assist him.10
Atty. Atienza conferred with the accused, informing him of all his constitutional
rights.11 Atty. Atienza also reminded him of the gravity of his crime and advised
him of its consequences.12 Notwithstanding these warnings, accused, assisted
by Atty. Atienza signed the Pagpapatunay13 that he was informed of his
constitutional rights which he understands; and that he is expressly waiving
them. Immediately, he made the following confession in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay:
"T: Ano ang masasabi mo sa nangyaring ito?
S: Nagawa ko po iyon dahil gusto ko po at ako ay nakainom.
T: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang mga pangyayari?
S: Pagkatapos ko pong ayusin ang aking trabaho ay umalis na ako, bandang
alas otso na po iyon at dumaan ako sa isang tindahan at bumili ng isang lapad
na ESQ, tapos tuloy na ako sa bahay namin ni Trining at Teresa.
T: Sino naman itong Trining?
S: Ina po ni Teresa, na kinakasama ko.
T: Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong salaysay?
S: Iyon po, pagdating ng bahay ay ininom namin ni Trining ang dala
kong alak na ESQ, tapos itong bata naman na si Teresa ay nagpaalam
sa kanyang ina na aakyat at magpapakilo ng plastic doon sa buyer,
tapos nang magtagal siya ay sinundan siya ng ina niya at sinundan ko
na rin at nakita ko si Teresa at nakita ko siya sa malapit sa puno ng
mangga at sinabi ko sa kanya na samahan niya ako sa manga at doon
ay nakatuwaan kong alisin ang kanyang short at hinawakan ko ang
puki niya (affiant is referring to Teresa Florez, 11 years old, the victim)
at hindi ako nakatiis ay inihiga ko siya sa damuhan.
T: Anong sabi niya nang ihiga mo, hindi ba siya natakot o sumigaw?
S: Ang sabi niya ay ano ang gagawin mo sa akin?
T: Ano naman ang sinabi mo sa kanya?
S: Sabi ko sa kanya, sige na, hindi ko na matiis.
T: Ipagpatuloy mo ang salaysay mo?
S: Nang maihiga ko siya ay ibinaba ko ang pantalon ko hanggang tuhod
tapos ipinasok ko ang ari ko sa kanyang pag-aari at kalahati lang ang
naipasok ko dahil nasasaktan siya at umiiyak, at nawalan siya nang
malay.
T: Nang mawalan na si Teresa ng malay, ano ang sumunod na ginawa mo?
S: Nabigla po ako at nahawakan ko ang leeg niya at nasakal ko na siya
hanggang mamatay na siya, at nang iwan ko siya ay talagang hindi na
humihinga at nagtuloy ako sa bahay na tinirhan namin ni Trining at
nagpalipas ng oras doon at nang magkagulo doon sa bahay ni Bruan ay
pumunta ako doon at nakita ko na nga itong si Teresa na kalong ng
kanyang ina at patay na.
T: Nang malaman mong nakamatay ka na nga, ano ang ginawa mo?
S: Wala po, nagbantay pa ako doon at ako pa ang nagbuhat ng bangkay ni
Teresa papuntang taas doon sa bahay ni SEVERO FLORES para maimbistigahan
at tuloy madala dito sa Funeraria Fernandez.
xxxxxx
T: Nakahiram ka ba ng pera kay Pineda pagkatapos ng insidenteng ito?
31
S: Opo, dalawang daan lang para sana ibigay ko sa nanay ng bata.
T: Naibigay mo naman?
S: Opo.
T: Nasaan na ngayon si Teresa?
S: Nandoon po siya nakaburol sa simbahan ng Purok 1.
T: May ipapakita akong isang short sa iyo, ano ang masasabi mo dito?
S: Iyan po ang suot na short ni Teresa na hinubad ko (Affiant is pointing
to a blue short pants allegedly wore by the victim during the incident)
T: Sa kasalukuyan ay wala na akong itatanong pa sa iyo, may nais ka
bang idagdag dito sa sinabi mo?
S: Wala na po, maliban sa kaya ako nagtapat ay nakokonsensya ako.
ASSISTED BY:
(Sgd) (Sgd)
ATTY. JUANITO C. ATIENZA DEORITO PORIO
Affiant"14
The prosecution failed to present Purok Leader Montes as a witness because he
died during the hearing of this case.15 Meanwhile, the subpoena upon the
victim's mother has remained unserved as she is no longer residing at her given
address.
The accused presented a different story during the trial.
He testified that in the evening of June 25, 1990, he went home after his day's
work in a junk shop. His common-law wife Trinidad and the victim were nowhere
to be found. He searched for them in the highway. Later on, he found Trinidad
holding the lifeless body of t he victim. They brought her to the barangay
authorities, but they were advised to go to the morgue.
The accused denied having raped and killed the victim.
With respect to the execution of his Sinumpaang Salaysay, the accused testified
that he did not read it. Although a certain Atty. Atienza was present during the
investigation, he did not know the said lawyer, nor did he request him to act as
his counsel. According to him, the police "let" him sign the document. 16
On July 20, 1994, the trial court, rendered a Decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds accused
Deorito Porio y Rapsing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of
rape with homicide and sentences him to RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify
the complainant Trinidad Cleodoro the amount of P50,000.00 as actual
damages; P100,000.00 as moral damages; P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."17
Feeling aggrieved, the accused, now appellant, comes to us ascribing to the
trial court the following errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN
VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE
COMPETENT AND INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PREFERABLY OF HIS
OWN CHOICE.
"II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION.
"III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT
AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND IN REJECTING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
DEFENSE.
"IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE."18
Appellant mainly contends that the taking of his Sinumpaang Salaysay was in
violation of his constitutional rights and is, therefore, inadmissible. He claims
that he was not assisted by an independent counsel and that he was
"intimidated or practically forced to execute or sign" the same. He likewise
maintains that the evidence against him is insufficient since all the prosecution
witnesses are mere "witnesses after the fact."
32
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitutional mandates on custodial
investigation were complied with, hence, appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay is
admissible. Also, appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt as
his Sinumpaang Salaysay was corroborated by the corpus delicti.
The primordial issue in this case is whether appellant's extra-judicial confession
(Sinumpaang Salaysay) was taken in violation of his constitutional rights.
Appellant's extra-judicial confession is not constitutionally infirmed.
This Court, with its constant tryst with retracting confessants, has drawn the
cardinal requirements for an extra-judicial confession to be admissible, to
wit: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the confession must be made with
the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the
confessant's choice; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession
must be in writing.19 Measured against this yardstick, we are convinced that
appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay is admissible.
I. The confession was made voluntarily.20
A confession is presumed to be voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and
untrue.21 Appellant was unable to discharge this burden. He failed to present
evidence that he was "intimidated or practically forced to execute or
sign"22 his Sinumpaang Salaysay.
Initially, it must be stressed that appellant was not arrested by the police
authorities. He voluntarily went to the Olongapo Police Station, accompanied by
Montes, a Purok Leader, to whom he previously mentioned having committed
the crime.23 There, before Cpl. Francia and Pat. Agno, he admitted that he raped
and killed Riza.24With such prior deliberate conduct, we are inclined to believe
that the subsequent execution of his Sinumpaang Salaysay before Pfc.
Menor was likewise voluntary on his part.
Significantly, this Court has held that where the appellant did not present
evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on his person; where he did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against his alleged intimidators
for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on his body;
and where he did not have himself examined by a reputable physician to
buttress his claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating
voluntariness of a confession.25
In the case at bar, no evidence whatsoever was offered by appellant to show
that he filed a complaint against the persons who allegedly intimidated or
forced him even if he had the opportunity to do so. Neither did he submit to the
trial court a medical report proving that his body was subjected to violence or
torture. He even willfully signed a Pagpapatunay that he gave the statements
freely, without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises, thus:
"PAGPAPATUNAY
Pagpapatunay po ito na naunawaan ko ang lahat ng nasasaad sa gawing itaas,
pinawalang halaga o bisa ko ang mga ito sa harapan ni Atty. JUANITO C.
ATIENZA. Kusa po akong nagbigay ng kusang salaysay at hindi ako
pinilit o tinakot o pinangakuan ng ano pa man, lahat ng aking
sasabihin ay buong katotohanan lamang.
(Sgd.)
DEORITO PORIO
May salaysay "26
On its face, the Sinumpaang Salaysay has no sign of suspicious circumstances
tending to cast doubt on its integrity. Like in other cases where this Court
upheld the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions, appellant's narration
reflects spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be
associated with a mind to which force and intimidation have been applied.
Appellant's response to each question contains details beyond what was being
asked, thus indicating a mind free from exraneous restraints. As can be gleaned
from the confession, the investigator did not propound questions answerable
only by yes or no. He gave appellant sufficient latitude to elaborate by simply
saying to him, "Ipagapatuloy mo ang iyong salaysay."
All the above facts indicate that appellant executed his Sinumpaang
Salaysay freely and voluntarily. To hold otherwise is to facilitate the retraction
by appellant of his solemnly made statements at the mere allegations of force,
intimidation, violence or torture, without any proof whatsoever. 27 Bare
assertions will certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption of
voluntariness.28
II. The confession was made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel.
Enshrined in Article III, Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution are the rights of
the accused during custodial investigation, thus:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."
The rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel
may be waived by the accused provided that the constitutional requirements
are complied with. It must appear clearly that the accused was beforehand
accorded his right to be informed of such rights. In addition, the waiver must be
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Appellant signed the Sinumpaang Salaysay which consists of two parts. The first
part shows that he was informed he has a right to remain silent and not to give
any statement; that he has a right to retain a counsel of his choice; and that
any statement he gives can be used against him in court. After being thus
informed, he said he was willing to give a statement and tell the truth. He even
33
signed a Pagpapatunay that contains an express waiver of his constitutional
rights in the presence of Atty. Atienza.
Notwithstanding such express waiver of his rights, Pfc. Menor still requested
Atty. Atienza to act as counsel for appellant during the investigation. He
interposed no objection to Atty. Atienza's assistance, thus:
COURT:
Q But you have no objection for Atty. Atienza to help you in that
investigation?
A No, sir.
Q In fact you would prefer that you were assisted by a lawyer while being
investigated in a very serious charge of rape with homicide?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the fact that Atty. Atienza was there to help you, you consented
to your having assisted while being investigated?
A Yes, sir.
Q You understand Tagalog very well?
A Yes, sir." (Emphasis supplied)29
It is now too late in the day for appellant to insist that he did not know Atty.
Atienza and that the latter was only "picked up" by Pfc. Menor outside the police
station. It must be emphasized that appellant did not object when Atty. Atienza,
suggested by the police, acted as his own counsel. We have consistently ruled
that while the initial choice of the lawyer, in cases where a person under
custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer, is naturally
lodged in the police investigator, the accused really has the final choice as he
may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer
provided by the investigator is deemed engaged by the accused where the
latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the
course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. 30We reiterate that
appellant did not interpose any opposition when Atty. Atienza assisted him.
We find that Atty. Atienza is a competent and independent counsel. To be
considered competent and independent for the purpose of assisting an accused
during a custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to be:
".willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as
distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individuals constitutional rights. In People v.
Basay (219 SCRA 404, 418) this Court stressed that an accused right to be
informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates the
transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."31
Atty. Atienza testified that he was present and assisted appellant during the
time that the latter waived his constitutional rights and gave his statement
admitting that he committed the crime charged. As a matter of fact, he asked
the investigator to give him an opportunity to talk to appellant alone. We quote
Atty. Atienza's testimony, thus:
"PROSECUTOR MACABANGUN:
Q I have here a document, it appears in that statement executed by the
accused Deorito Porio that your signature appears at the bottom of the
statement, and it is stated that you assisted the accused. Will you please look
at this document and tell the Court if you can recognize your signature?
A Yes, sir, I remember when my signature appears as said counsel during the
custodial investigation of a certain Porio.
Q Will you please tell the Court if at the time that certain Porio was investigated
in the police department and his statement was being taken x x x will you
please tell us whether you were present during the taking of this statement that
you just identified?
A I was present during the actual taking of the statement of this statement
you have shown me, sir.
Q All the time that the accused was giving this statement you were
always present during that investigation?
A Yes, sir, I was all the time present. As a matter of fact, before the
statement was taken by the police I requested for opportunity to talk
with the suspect alone, before that giving of the statement. I told him
the consequences of giving the statement; the gravity of the offense
and also informed him about all his right, which if allowed I will quote
the right I told him before giving his statement. I told him that he can
remain silent if he wish to.
I informed him that he can get the assistance of counsel of his own
choice. He told me that it is not necessary because I was called upon
by the police to assist in the investigation.
I told him that it is a very grave offense.1wphi1 Because of the
gravity of the offense I requested for interview of the suspect.
And I explained to him like the statement that he will give can be used
against him.
34
Q And after you interviewed the accused and informed him all about his rights
and consequences of his intended giving of voluntary statement to the
policemen, what did the accused tell you?
A He said he is giving the statement just the same he was then, I feel during
those date, he was in deep remorse because I understand that the victim is a
daughter of his live-in-partner.
Q Now, in this statement that was given by the accused wherein you assisted
the accused there was a signature over the typewritten name Atty. Juanito
Atienza, whose signature is that?
A This is my signature."32
III. The confession is explicit and categorical.
A confession is an acknowledgement in express words, by the accused in a
criminal case, of the truth of the main fact charged, or some essential parts
thereof.33 Owing to its very definition, there is no such thing as an implied
confession.34 It is always a direct and positive acknowledgement of guilt.
Considering that appellant is charged with the complex crime of rape with
homicide, his statements that he inserted his penis in the victim's vagina and
that he strangled her to death are express confessions or acknowledgement of
guilt.
IV. The confession is in writing.
Appellant's Sinumpaang Salayasay is not only in writing, it also written in the
language which appellant speaks and understands.
In fine, we hold that appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay adequately satisfies the
constitutional requirements on pre-interrogation advisories. Appellant can no
longer extricate himself from its necessary consequences. While the passage of
time could easily bring a change of mind to a retracting confessant, courts, on
the strength of settled principles, cannot undo for the confessant what he had
deliberately done in the name of truth. We can not overlook the fact that
appellant's Sinumpaang Salaysay is replete with details which only a
perpetrator of the crime could have supplied and which could not have been
concocted by someone who did not take part in its commission. Appellant's
statement that he raped the victim and then strangled her to death cannot be
taken lightly as it concurs with the findings of Dr. Patilano that the cause of
death is strangulation and that the victim's genitalia shows "sexual intercourse
with a manwith violence." This clearly signifies that appellant's Sinumpaang
Salaysay is corroborated by the corpus delicti.
In a criminal prosecution, in order to warrant a conviction, the State is required
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. An extra-judicial
confession made by an accused is a sufficient ground for conviction if
corroborated by the evidence of the corpus delicti.35 The existence of
the corpus delicti and the legality of appellant's extra-judicial confession having
been duly proven by the State, appellant's conviction is, therefore, in order. To
reiterate, a confession constitutes evidence of the highest order as long as
constitutional safeguards are adequately complied with, as in this case.
The trial court correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua inasmuch as the crime was committed in 1990 when the imposition of
the death sentence was suspended. However, the trial court erred in
awarding P50,000.00 as actual damages since there is no evidence to sustain
the same. Instead, the civil indemnity of P100,000.00 must be awarded, this
amount being properly commensurate with the seriousness of the complex
crime of rape with homicide.36 The amount of P100,000.00 for moral damages
awarded by the trial court must be reduced to P50,000.00 in keeping with
current jurisprudence.37 And, the award of exemplary damages must be deleted.
In criminal offenses, exemplary damages may be imposed only if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. 38 Here, the prosecution
failed to establish any aggravating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the trial court finding appellant guilty
of the crime of rape with homicide is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the
modification that the heirs of the victim, Riza Cleodoro Flores, shall be entitled
to the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages.
Footnotes
3
Her real name is Riza Cleodoro Flores, her mother's surname being
"Cleodoro." She is referred to as "Teresa" by accused Deorito Porio.
7
TSN, January 25, 1991, p. 10.
Trinidad Cleorodro also executed a sworn statement on June 27, 1990
before Pfc. Leo Batinga, pointing to Deorito Porio as her suspect. The
pertinent portion of which reads:
"T: Sino ang pinagsusutpetsahan mo na maaring pumatay sa iyong
anak?
S: Ang kinakasama ko pong si Deorito Porio.
T: Bakit mo nasabi ito?
S: Kasi po noong minsan hindi ko lang matandaan kung anong taon ay
may nagpatulong sa akin na manghingi ng gamot sa Landfield at
nagaatubili akong sumama dahil sa walang kasama ang anak kong si
Riza subalit pinilit akong pasamahin nitong si Deorito. Pagbalik ko
makaraan ang isang oras ay nakasara ang pintuan namin kaya
ito ay itinulak ko at nakita ko itong anak ko na nakahiga sa
pagitan ng dalawang hita ni Deorito na naka walker lang at ang
anak kong si Riza ay walang panty. Ang ginawa ko ay sinugod ko
itong si Deorito at sinabihan na "Gusto Mong Pagsamantalahan ang
Anak Ko Ano?" at sinabi niya na inaayos lang daw niya ito. Binantaan pa
35
po niya ako na kung magsusumbong ako sa pulis o sa barangay ay
papatayin niya ako.

T: Ilang beses mo siyang nahuli na gustong pagsamantalahan ang anak

mo?

S: Ang natatandaan ko po ay may tatlong beses na niyang ginawa ito.

(Records, pp. 150-151)

20
The term "voluntary," as used in the development of the law of
confessions, means that the accused speaks of his free will and accord,
without inducement of any kind, and with a full and complete
knowledge of the nature and consequences of the confession, and when
the speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the accused,
at the time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in
evidence against him. (Francisco, Evidence, Third Edition, 1996, p. 222
citing Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 631a)

31
People v. Espiritu, 302 SCRA 533 (1999) citing People v. Deniega, 251
SCRA 626 (1995).

"To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the

questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is
not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might
incriminate him, but rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The counsel, however, should never prevent an
accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth." People v. Gallardo,
323 SCRA 218 (2000).

36
 The autopsy conducted by Dr. Alberto Bondoc revealed that Marianne died of
"traumatic injuries" sustained as follows:
G.R. No. 116437 March 3, 1997
1. Abrasions:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 1.1 chest and abdomen, multiple, superficial, linear, generally
v. PABLITO ANDAN y HERNANDEZ @ BOBBY, accused-appellant. oblique from right to left.
2. Abrasions/contusions:
PER CURIAM: 2.1 temple, right.
2.2 cheek, right.
2.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
Accused-appellant Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was accused of the
2.4 breast, upper inner quadrant, right.
crime of rape with homicide committed as follows:
2.5 breast, upper outer quadrant, left.
2.6 abdomen, just above the umbilicus, rectangular,
That on or about the 19th day of February 1994, in the municipality of approximate 3 inches in width, from right MCL to left AAL.
Baliuag, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of 2.7 elbow joint, posterior, bilateral.
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by 3. Hematoma:
means of violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, 3.1 upper and lower eyelids, bilateral.
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Marianne 3.2 temple, lateral to the outer edge of eyebrow, right.
Guevarra y Reyes against her will and without her consent; and the 3.3 upper and lower jaws, right.
above-named accused in order to suppress evidence against him and 4. Lacerated wounds:
delay (sic) the identity of the victim, did then and there wilfully, 4.1 eyebrow, lateral border, right, 1/2 inch.
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill the said Marianne Guevarra 4.2 face, from right cheek below the zygoma to midline lower
y Reyes, attack, assault and hit said victim with concrete hollow blocks jaw, 4 inches.
in her face and in different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her 5. Fractures:
mortal wounds which directly caused her death. Contrary to Law. 1 5.1 maxillary bone, right.
5.2 mandible, multiple, complete, right, with avulsion of 1st and
The prosecution established that on February 19, 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in 2nd incisors.
Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne Guevarra, twenty years of 6. Cerebral contusions, inferior surface, temporal and frontal lobes,
age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home right.
for her school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her 7. External genitalia
final examinations on February 21, 1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and 7.1 minimal blood present.
faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her school 7.2 no signs of recent physical injuries noted on both labia,
uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash. introitus and exposed vaginal wall.
8. Laboratory examination of smear samples from the vaginal cavity
showed negative for spermatozoa (Bulacan Provincial Hospital, February
Marianne was walking along the subdivision when appellant invited her inside
22, 1994, by Dr. Wilfredo S. de Vera).
his house. He used the pretext that the blood pressure of his wife's
grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as
the old woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was
inside the house. Appellant then punched her in the abdomen, brought her to CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardiorespiratory Arrest due to Cerebral Contusions
the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, appellant dragged the unconscious due to Traumatic Injuries, Face. 3
girl to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night
came and appellant pulled Marianne, who was still unconscious, to their Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio
backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a six-foot high Trinidad of Baliuag to form a crack team of police officers to look for the
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Appellant stood on a bench criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found, the policemen
beside the pigpen and then lifted and draped the girl's body over the fence to recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be
transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head with a piece blood. They also found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were
of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After identified as Marianne's. 4
silence reigned, he pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it
towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it. 2
Appellant's nearby house was also searched by the police who found
bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They interviewed the
At 11:00 A.M. of the following day, February 20, 1994, the body of Marianne was occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of
discovered. She was naked from the chest down with her brassiere and T-shirt appellant's wife, that accused-appellant also lived there but that he, his wife
pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin. and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police several articles

37
consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish
brown stain, a towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were
found in the laundry hamper inside the house and allegedly belonged to
appellant. 5
The police tried to locate appellant and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team
led by Mayor Trinidad traced appellant in his parents' house. They took him
aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police headquarters where he
was interrogated. Initially, appellant denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.
However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's
clothes and the bloodstains found in the pigpen, appellant relented and said
that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed Marianne and that
he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid
the two bags of Marianne. 6 Immediately, the police took appellant to his house.
Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up earlier, were likewise brought there by
the police. Appellant went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned over
a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were
later identified as belonging to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of
appellant and the two other suspects holding the bags. 7
Appellant and the two suspects were brought back to the police headquarters.
The following day, February 25, a physical examination was conducted on the
suspects by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Orpha Patawaran. 8 Appellant was
found to sustain:
HEENT: with multiple scratches on the neck Rt side. Chest and back:
with abrasions (scratches at the back). Extremities: freshly-healed
wound along index finger 1.5 cm. in size Lt. 9
By this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the
police headquarters awaiting the results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad
arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor,
appellant approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The
mayor led appellant to the office of the Chief of Police and there, appellant
broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you the truth. I am the
one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the
public and media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked
for a lawyer to assist appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the
proceedings photographed and videotaped. 10 In the presence of the mayor, the
police, representatives of the media and appellant's own wife and son,
appellant confessed his guilt. He disclosed how he killed Marianne and
volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked for
forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it
because of ill-feelings against them. 11 He also said that the devil entered his
mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid he read almost
everyday. 12 After his confession, appellant hugged his wife and son and asked
the mayor to help
him. 13 His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media
nationwide. 14
Appellant was detained at the police headquarters. The next two days, February
26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television reporters came. Appellant was
again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted
the crime. 15
On arraignment, however, appellant entered a plea of "not guilty." He testified
that in the afternoon of February 19, 1994 he was at his parent's house in
Barangay Tangos attending the birthday party of his nephew. He, his wife and
son went home after 5:00 P.M. His wife cooked dinner while he watched their
one-year old son. They all slept at 8:00 P.M. and woke up the next day at 6:00 in
the morning. His wife went to Manila to collect some debts while he and his son
went to his parents' house where he helped his father cement the floor of the
house. His wife joined them in the afternoon and they stayed there until
February 24, 1994 when he was picked up by the police. 16
Appellant was brought by the police to a hotel at Bagong Nayon, Baliuag. In one
of the rooms, the policemen covered his face with a bedsheet and kicked him
repeatedly. They coerced him to confess that he raped and killed Marianne.
When he refused, they pushed his head into a toilet bowl and injected
something into his buttocks. Weakened, appellant confessed to the crime.
Thereafter, appellant was taken to his house where he saw two of his neighbors,
Larin and Dizon. He was ordered by the police to go to the old toilet at the back
of the house and get two bags from under the flower pot. Fearing for his life,
appellant did as he was told. 17
In a decision dated August 4, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant and
sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659. The trial court also
ordered appellant to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity,
P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Pablito Andan y
Hernandez alias "Bobby is found guilty by proof beyond a scintilla of
doubt of the crime charged in the Information (Rape with Homicide) and
penalized in accordance with R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) Sec.
11, Par. 8, classifying this offense as one of the heinous crimes and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to indemnify the
family of Marianne Guevarra the amount of P50,000. 00 for the death of
Marianne Guevarra and P71,000.00 as actual burial and incidental
expenses and P100,000.00 as moral damages. After automatic review
of this case and the decision becomes final and executory, the sentence
be carried out. SO ORDERED. 18
This case is before us on automatic review in accordance with Section 22 of
Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant contends that:
I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND USING AS BASIS OF
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS, REPORTERS AND THE MAYOR ON THE ALLEGED
ADMISSION OF THE ACCUSED DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION,
THE ACCUSED NOT BEING ASSISTED BY COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION;
38
 II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS RAPE WHEN
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY KIND TO SUPPORT IT;
III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING A FINDING OF CONVICTION
WHEN THE EVIDENCE IN ITS TOTALITY SHOWS THAT THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED. 19
The trial court based its decision convicting appellant on the testimonies of the
three policemen of the investigating team, the mayor of Baliuag and four news
reporters to whom appellant gave his extrajudicial oral confessions. It was also
based on photographs and video footages of appellant's confessions and
reenactments of the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant assails the admission of the testimonies of the policemen,
the mayor and the news reporters because they were made during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel. Section 12, paragraphs (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel. x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. x x x
Plainly, any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be
informed of such
rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. 20 Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. 21 The
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion physical
and psychological, is forcefully apparent. 22 The incommunicado
character of custodial interrogation or investigation also obscures a
later judicial determination of what really transpired. 23
It should be stressed that the rights under Section 12 are accorded to "[a]ny
person under investigation for the commission of an offense." An investigation
begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts
to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection
with an alleged offense. 24 As intended by the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
this covers "investigation conducted by police authorities which will include
investigations conducted by the municipal police, the PC and the NBI and such
other police agencies in our government." 25
When the police arrested appellant, they were no longer engaged in a general
inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, appellant was already a prime
suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. This is clear
from the testimony of SPO4 Danilo S. Bugay, the police chief investigator of the
crime, viz:
COURT How did you come about in concluding that it was accused who
did this act?
WITNESS: First, the place where Marianne was last found is at the
backyard of the house of the accused. Second, there were blood stains
at the pigpen, and third, when we asked Romano Calma who were his
other companions in the house, he said that, it was Pablito Andan who
cannot be found at that time and whose whereabouts were unknown,
sir.
Q: So you had a possible suspect?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You went looking for Pablito Andan?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And then, what else did you do?
A: We tried to find out where we can find him and from information we
learned that his parents live in Barangay Tangos in Baliuag. We went
there, found him there and investigated him and in fact during the
investigation he admitted that he was the culprit.26
Appellant was already under custodial investigation when he confessed
to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of
his constitutional rights when he was investigated and
interrogated. 27His confession is therefore inadmissible in evidence. So
too were the two bags recovered from appellant's house. SPO2 Cesar
Canoza, a member of the investigating team testified:
Atty. Valmores: You told the court that you were able to recover these
bags marked as Exhs. B and B-1 because accused pointed to them,
where did he point these bags?
A: At the police station, sir, he told us that he hid the two (2) bags
beneath the canal of the toilet.
Q: In other words, you were given the information where these two (2)
bags were located?
A: Yes, sir.
39
 Q: And upon being informed where the two (2) bags could be located
what did you do?
A: We proceeded to the place together with the accused so that we
would know where the two (2) bags were hidden, sir.
Q: And did you see actually those two (2) bags before the accused
pointed to the place where the bags were located?
A: After he removed the broken pots with which he covered the canal,
he really showed where the bags were hidden underneath the canal,
sir. 28
The victim's bags were the fruits of appellant's uncounselled confession to the
police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible. 29
The police detained appellant after his initial confession. The following day,
Mayor Trinidad visited the appellant. Appellant approached the mayor and
requested for a private talk. They went inside a room and appellant confessed
that he alone committed the crime. He pleaded for forgiveness. Mayor Trinidad
testified, viz:
Mayor Trinidad: . . . . During the investigation when there were already
many people from the media, Andan whispered something to me and
requested that he be able to talk to me alone, so what I did was that, I
brought him inside the office of the chief of police.
Private Prosecutor Principe: And so what happened inside the office of
the Chief of Police, mayor?
A: While inside the office of the headquarters he told me "Mayor
patawarin mo ako,! I will tell you the truth. I am the one who killed
Marianne." So when he was telling this to me, I told him to wait a while,
then I opened the door to allow the media to hear what he was going to
say and I asked him again whether he was the one who did it, he
admitted it, sir. This was even covered by a television camera. 30
xxx
Q: During that time that Pablito Andan whispered to you that he will tell
you something and then you responded by bringing him inside the
office of the Chief of Police and you stated that he admitted that he
killed Marianne . . .
Court: He said to you the following words . . .
Atty. Principe: He said to you the following words "Mayor, patawarin mo
ako! Ako ang pumatay kay Marianne," was that the only admission that
he told you?
A: The admission was made twice. The first one was, when we were
alone and the second one was before the media people, sir.
Q: What else did he tell you when you were inside the room of the Chief
of Police?
A: These were the only things that he told me, sir. I stopped him from
making further admissions because I wanted the media people to hear
what he was going to say, sir. 31
Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's
confession before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that
a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over the local
police 32 and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes
of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. However,
appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. 33 In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all.
No police authority ordered appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant
himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a
private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess
his guilt to him. When appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as
a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not violate his
constitutional rights. 34 Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures
on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited
through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. 35 What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 are guaranteed to preclude the
slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth. 36 Hence, we hold that appellant's confession to the mayor was correctly
admitted by the trial court.
Appellant's confessions to the media were likewise properly admitted. The
confessions were made in response to questions by news reporters, not by the
police or any other investigating officer. We have held that statements
spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview
are deemed voluntary an are admissible in evidence. 37
The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on
Channel 7, interviewed appellant on February 27, 1994. The interview was
recorded on video and showed that appellant made his confession willingly,
openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other
relatives. 38 Orlan Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also
interviewed appellant on February 25, 1994. He testified that:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned awhile ago that you were able to
reach the place where the body of Marianne was found, where
did you start your interview, in what particular place?
Mr. Mauricio: Actually, I started my newsgathering and interview
inside the police station of Baliuag and I identified myself to the
40
accused as I have mentioned earlier, sir. At first, I asked him
whether he was the one who raped and killed the victim and I
also learned from him that the victim was his cousin.
Q: And what was the response of Pablito Andan?
A: His response was he is a cousin of the victim and that he was
responsible for raping and killing the victim, sir. And then I
asked him whether his admission was voluntary or that there
was a threat, intimidation or violence that was committed on his
person because I knew that there were five other suspects in
this case and he said that he was admitting it voluntarily to the
policemen. I asked him whether he was under the influence of
drugs but he said no, and "nakainom lang," sir.
Q: You mentioned earlier that the uncle of the accused was
present, was the uncle beside him at the time that you asked
the question?
A: The uncle was there including the barangay captain whose
name I cannot recall anymore. A barangay captain of the place,
I don't know if it is the place of the crime scene or in the place
where Marianne Guevarra resides but . . . All throughout the
scene inside the office of the Station Commander, there was no
air of any force or any threatening nature of investigation that
was being done on the suspect, that is why, I was able to talk to
him freely and in a voluntary manner he admitted to me that he
was the one who raped and killed, so we went to the next stage
of accompanying me to the scene of the crime where the
reenactment and everything that transpired during the killing of
Marianne Guevarra.
Q: Before you started that interview, did you inform or ask
permission from the accused Pablito Andan that you were going
to interview him?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: You mentioned that after interviewing the accused at the
office of the Baliuag PNP, you also went to the scene of the
crime?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who accompanied you?
A: I was accompanied by some Baliuag policemen including
Mayor Trinidad and some of the relatives of the accused.
Q: At this time, did you see the wife of the accused, Pablito
Andan?
A: Yes, sir, I saw her at the place where the body of Guevarra
was recovered.
Q: How many relatives of accused Pablito Andan were present,
more or less?
A: There were many, sir, because there were many wailing,
weeping and crying at that time when he was already taken in
the patrol jeep of the Baliuag police, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Mauricio, upon reaching the scene of the crime in
Concepcion, Baliuag, Bulacan, what transpired?
A: I started my work as a reporter by trying to dig deeper on
how the crime was committed by the accused, so we started
inside the pigpen of that old house where I tried to accompany
the accused and asked him to narrate to me and show me how
he carried out the rape and killing of Marianne Guevarra, sir.
Q: Did he voluntarily comply?
A: Yes, sir, in fact, I have it on my videotape.
Q: It is clear, Mr. Mauricio, that from the start of your interview
at the PNP Baliuag up to the scene of the crime, all the stages
were videotaped by you?
A: Yes, sir. 39
Journalist Berteni Causing of "People's Journal Tonite" likewise covered
the proceedings for three successive days. 40 His testimony is as
follows:
Atty. Principe: You mentioned that you had your own inquiries?
A: We asked first permission from the mayor to interrupt their
own investigation so that we can have a direct interview with
the suspect.
Q: Were there people?
A: The people present before the crowd that included the
mayor, the deputy chief of police, several of the policemen, the
group of Inday Badiday and several other persons. I asked the
suspect after the mayor presented the suspect to us and after
the suspect admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. I
reiterated the question to the suspect. Are you aware that this
41
offense which is murder with . . . rape with murder is a capital
offense? And you could be sentenced to death of this? And he
said, Yes. So do you really admit that you were the one who did
it and he repeated it, I mean, say the affirmative answer.
Q: And that was in the presence of the crowd that you
mentioned a while ago?
A: Yes, yes, sir. And if I remember it right, as I took my camera
to take some pictures of the suspect, the mayor, the policemen
and several others, I heard the group of Inday Badiday asking
the same questions from the suspect and the suspect answered
the same.
Q: Also in the presence of so many people that you mentioned?
A: The same group of people who were there, sir.
Q: You mentioned that the answer was just the same as the
accused answered you affirmatively, what was the answer,
please be definite?
Court: Use the vernacular.
A: I asked him the question, after asking him the question," Ikaw
ba talaga and gumawa ng pagpatay at pag-rape sa kay
Marianne? Ang sagot nya, "Oo." Alam mo ba itong kasalanang
ito, kamatayan ang hatol, inaamin mo pa ba na ikaw and
gumawa sa pagpatay at pag-rape kay Marianne?" Sagot pa rin
siya ng "Oo."
xxx
Q: Did you ask him, why did you kill Marianne?
A: I asked him, your Honor and the reason he told me was
because a devil gripped his mind and because of that according
to him, your Honor, were the pornographic magazines,
pornographic tabloids which he, according to him, reads almost
everyday before the crime.
Atty. Principe: At the time of your interview, Mr. Reporter, will
you tell the court and the public what was the physical
condition of accused Pablito Andan?
A: As I observed him that time, there was no sign on his body
that he was really down physically and I think he was in good
condition.
Court: So he was not happy about the incident?
A: He even admitted it, your Honor.
Court: He was happy?
A: He admitted it. He was not happy after doing it.
Court: Was he crying?
A: As I observed, your Honor, the tears were only apparent but
there was no tear that fell on his face.
Court: Was he feeling remorseful?
A: As I observed it, it was only slightly, your Honor.
Another journalist, Rey Domingo, of "Bandera" interviewed appellant on
February 26, 1994. 42 He also testified that:
Atty. Principe: Now, Mr. Witness, did the accused Pablito Andan
give you the permission that you asked from him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when he allowed you to interview him, who were
present?
A: The first person that I saw there was Mayor Trinidad,
policemen from Baliuag, the chief investigator, SPO4 Bugay,
and since Katipunan, the chief of police was suspended, it was
the deputy who was there, sir.
Q: Were they the only persons who were present when you
interviewed the accused?
A: There were many people there, sir. The place was crowded
with people. There were people from the PNP and people from
Baliuag, sir.
Q: How about the other representatives from the media?
A: Roy Reyes, Orlan Mauricio arrived but he arrived late and
there were people from the radio and from TV Channel 9.
Q: How about Channel 7?
A: They came late. I was the one who got the scoop first, sir.
Q: You stated that the accused allowed you to interview him,
was his wife also present?
42
A: Yes, sir, and even the son was there but I am not very sure if
she was really the wife but they were hugging each other and
she was crying and from the questions that I asked from the
people there they told me that she is the wife, sir.
Q: How about the other members of the family of the accused,
were they around?
A: I do not know the others, sir. but there were many people
there, sir.
Q: Now, according to you, you made a news item about the
interview. May we know what question did you ask and the
answer.
A: My first question was, is he Pablito Andan and his answer was
"Yes."
Q: What was the next question?
A: I asked him how he did the crime and he said that, he saw
the victim aboard a tricycle. He called her up. She entered the
house and he boxed her on the stomach.
Q: What was the next question that you asked him?
A: He also said that he raped her and he said that the reason
why he killed the victim was because he was afraid that the
incident might be discovered, sir.
Q: Now, after the interview, are we correct to say that you made
a news item on that?
A: Yes, sir, based on what he told me. That's what I did.
Q: Were there other questions propounded by you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: "Ano iyon?"
A: He said that he threw the cadaver to the other side of the
fence, sir.
Q: Did he mention how he threw the cadaver of Marianne to the
other side of the fence?
A: I cannot remember the others, sir.
Q: But can you produce the news item based on that interview?
A: I have a xerox copy here, sir.
Clearly, appellant's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any
undue influence from the police authorities. The news reporters acted as news
reporters when they interviewed appellant. 44 They were not acting under the
direction and control of the police. They were there to check appellant's
confession to the mayor. They did not force appellant to grant them an
interview and reenact the commission of the crime. 45 In fact, they asked his
permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not
once did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his
guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the commission of the crime,
and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters
were witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive
atmosphere in the interview of appellant by the news reporters.
We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. 46 It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
They confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without need of any
governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights
that government has the duty to protect. 47Governmental power is not unlimited
and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the individual
against aggression and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. 48
In his second assigned error, appellant questions the sufficiency of the medical
evidence against him. Dr. Alberto Bondoc, a Medical Specialist with the
Provincial Health Office, conducted the first autopsy and found no spermatozoa
and no recent physical injuries in the hymen. 49 Allegedly,
the minimal blood found in her vagina could have been caused by her
menstruation. 50
We are unpersuaded. A second autopsy was conducted on March 1, 1994 by Dr.
Dominic L. Aguda, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation.
His findings affirmed the absence of spermatozoa but revealed that the victim's
hymen had lacerations, thus:
Hymen contracted, tall, thin with fresh lacerations with
clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions corresponding to the
walls of the
clock. 51
Dr. Aguda testified that the lacerations were fresh and that they may
have been caused by an object forcibly inserted into the vagina when
the victim was still alive, indicating the possibility of penetration. 52 His
testimony is as follows:
43
Witness: When I exposed the hymen, I found lacerations in this
3 o'clock and 6 o'clock position corresponding to the walls of the
clock. . . . .
Court: Include the descriptive word, fresh.
Witness: I put it in writing that this is fresh because within the
edges of the lacerations, I found blood clot, that is why I put it
into writing as fresh.
Atty. Valmonte: Now, Doctor, you told the Court that what you
did on the cadaver was merely a re-autopsy, that means, doctor
the body was autopsied first before you did you re-autopsy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Could it not be, doctor, that these injuries you found in the
vagina could have been sustained on account of the dilation of
the previous autopsy?
A: Well, we presumed that if the first doctor conducted the
autopsy on the victim which was already dead, no amount of
injury or no amount of lacerated wounds could produce blood
because there is no more circulation, the circulation had already
stopped. So, I presumed that when the doctor examined the
victim with the use of forceps or retractor, vaginal retractor,
then I assumed that the victim was already dead. So it is
impossible that the lacerated wounds on the hymen were
caused by those instruments because the victim was already
dead and usually in a dead person we do not produce any
bleeding.
Q: What you would like to tell the Court is this: that the
lacerations with clotted blood at 6 and 3 o'clock positions
corresponding to the walls of the clock could have been inflicted
or could have been sustained while the victim was alive?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This clotted blood, according to you, found at the edges of
the lacerated wounds, now will you kindly go over the sketch
you have just drawn and indicate the edges of the lacerated
wounds where you found the clotted blood?
A: This is the lacerated wound at 3 o'clock and this is the
lacerated wound at 6 o'clock. I found the blood clot at this
stage. The clotted blood are found on the edges of the lacerated
wounds, sir.
Q: What could have caused those lacerations?
A: Well, it could have been caused by an object that is forcibly
inserted into that small opening of the hymen causing
lacerations on the edges of the hymen, sir.
Q: If the victim had sexual intercourse, could she sustain those
lacerations?
A: It is possible, sir. 53
We have also ruled in the past that the absence of spermatozoa in the vagina
does not negate the commission of rape 54 nor does the lack of complete
penetration or rupture of the hymen. 55 What is essential is that there be
penetration of the female organ no matter how slight. 56 Dr. Aguda testified that
the fact of penetration is proved by the lacerations found in the victim's vagina.
The lacerations were fresh and could not have been caused by any injury in the
first autopsy.
Dr. Aguda's finding and the allegation that the victim was raped by appellant
are supported by other evidence, real and testimonial, obtained from an
investigation of the witnesses and the crime scene, viz:
(1) The victim, Marianne, was last seen walking along the subdivision road near
appellant's house; 57
(2) At that time, appellant's wife and her step brother and grandmother were
not in their house; 58
(3) A bloodstained concrete block was found over the fence of appellant's
house, a meter away from the wall. Bloodstains were also found on the grass
nearby and at the pigpen at the back of appellant's house; 59
(4) The victim sustained bruises and scars indicating that her body had been
dragged over a flat rough surface. 60 This supports the thesis that she was
thrown over the fence and dragged to where her body was found;
(5) Appellant's bloodstained clothes and towel were found in the laundry
hamper in his house;
(6) The reddish brown stains in the towel and T-shirt of appellant were found
positive for the presence of blood type "B," the probable blood type of the
victim. 61 Marianne 's exact blood type was not determined but her parents had
type "A" and type "AB." 62 The victim's pants had bloodstains which were found
to be type "O," appellant's blood type; 63
(7) Appellant had scratch marks and bruises in his body which he failed to
explain; 64
(8) For no reason, appellant and his wife left their residence after the incident
and were later found at his parents' house in Barangay Tangos, Baliuag,
Bulacan; 65
44
In fine, appellant's extrajudicial confessions together with the other
circumstantial evidence justify the conviction of appellant.
Appellants defense of alibi cannot overcome the prosecution evidence. His alibi
cannot even stand the test of physical improbability at the time of the
commission of the crime. Barangay Tangos is only a few kilometers away from
Concepcion Subdivision and can be traversed in less than half an hour. 66
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos,
Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 1109-M-94 is affirmed and accused-appellant
Pablito Andan y Hernandez is found guilty of the special complex crime of rape
with homicide under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2)
members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua. Accused-
appellant is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marianne
Guevarra, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and
P71,000.00 as actual damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise
of the pardoning power.
Footnotes
33 Leuschner v. State, 397 A. 2d 622 [1979]; Vines v. State, 394 A. 2d 809
[1978]; Cummings v. State, 341 A. 2d 294 [1975]; Howell v. State, 247 A. 2d
291 [1968]; Statements made by defendant while in custody of police officers
but not pursuant to any questioning by officers were properly admitted as
spontaneously volunteered statements State v. Matlock, 289 N.W. 2d 625
[1980]; State v. Red Feather, 289 N.W. 2d 768 [1980].
34 Baysinger v. State, 550 S.W. 2d 445, 447 [1977], where a defendant, not in
custody, in talking with the sheriff wanted the sheriff for a confidant instead of a
law enforcement officer, his admissions on an incriminating taped conversation
did not violate the 4th, 5th and 6th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and
are thus admissible.
37 People v. Vizcarra, 115 SCRA 743, 752 [1982], the accused, under custody,
gave spontaneous answers to a televised interview by several press reporters in
the office of the chief of the CIS.
44 Navallo v. Sandiganbayan, 234 SCRA 175, 183-184 [1994] We ruled that
an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer nor did he, in this case, act
as one.
45 cf. People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 513, 525-526 [1987] where several accused
were forced by the police to reenact the commission of the crime.
48 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 199, pp. 975-976; see also People v.
Marti, supra, at 67-68 where we ruled that the constitutional proscription
against unlawful searches and seizures cannot be extended to searches and
seizures done by private individuals without the intervention of police
authorities; People v. Maqueda, supra, at 59 where we held that extrajudicial
admissions of an accused to a private person and to a prosecutor in connection
with the accused's plea to be utilized as a state witness were deemed outside
the scope of the provision on custodial investigation.
45