..,.
;
What Psychology Knows About Energy
~~~----":::"-_~::::":::-_------:-----=---------7~
Paul C. Stern
Psychological research in the 1970s and early 1980s con-
tributed to understanding the determinants ofenergy use
and energy conservation. particularly in households. T.his
article reviews these contributions and sketches some Im-
plicationsfor research in the 1990s. Psychologic~/stud~es
show that information and money. two ofthe major polrcy
tools for conservation. are more complex and multidi-
mensional than standard technical economic policy anal-
ysis assumes and that money is not the only important
motive for conservation. These insights can be !,sed to
improl'e the implementation of energy conservation pro-
grams. but to have their insights applied. psycho/~gists
will need to communicate them in language famr!wr to
policymakcrs. I
EDergY..C9I1servation has.l:>c.eru:.<:tUrT1j-'!.g to \public con- behavior (Stern, 1986); Energy policy analySIS tYPlcally-?o~
sciousness) <lnd.b?Ji.ol1aL.RQlL~i\.LQebatG.TE'~en tl~oug\~H considers technology fIrst and thcn considers the actionsjf
trends since the late 1980s have been toward an_Q,LgLu:t..4 .
and price decreases (Wald, 1989), concern about conser-
vation has increased, mainly for environmental reasons
such as acid rain, urban air pollution, and the threat of
global climate change. A rekindled interest in conserva-
tion is starting to appear among psychologists. In the hope
that new psychological knowledge may build on the rast,
I review knowledge gained in the previous period of active
psychological research on energy,ponservation, which be-
gan more or less with the oil embargo of 1973 and waned
with the loss of federal policy initiative and research
funding in the early J 980s. I summarize the lessons of
past research and sketch some implicati.ons. for psycho-
logical contributions to energy conservatIOn In the 1990s
(for more detailed reviews, see Geller, WineH, & Everett,
1982', Katzev & Johnson, 1987; Stem & Oskamp, 1987).
Energy Use and Energy Users
Energy forms are not all alike in their environmental ef-
fects. For instance, nuclear energy differs from coal and
oil in that it creates radioactive waste and does not release
combustion products, such as the carbon, sulfur, and ni-
trogen oxides that contribute to global warming and acid
rain. Water and wind power and direct use of solar energy' thill-P~Qj)lcjnyeSLbec_au~~ .t I}~y'-have_hear.d-fmm.peop~et.
relea~ neither radioactivity nor combustion products.
Burning coal contributes more to as:id rain and urban air
pollution than burning natura! g~-(Nevert~eless, beca~se
the vast majority of energy use In the UnIted States In-
volves sources and technologies with major negative con-
sequences for the environment, a fairly safe generalization
is that reductions in energy use, wherever accomplished,
are environmentally beneficiaL;
1224
""'''----~------- ........'''''''''"'====~~-----------------.-_
~
.~
~l~~
Conservatlon'~
.
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences ,~
*
.""'(
and Education, National Research Council. e.. ;~
't~,
~\.
Washington, DC
~
Failures of Policy Analysis
U.S. energy poli~ies have often fOUl:dered on probJc~s.~
of implementatIOn. Carefully deSigned technologIes .
sometimes provoke widespread public opposition (e.~:;.:,;
nuclear power); incentives designed to motivate econom~,
ically rational decision makers often fail with ordinary~
citizens (e.g., fewer than one quarter of U.S. household,s~
claimed conservation tax credits, see Hirst, Clinton, -.
Geller, & Kro~er, ~ 986); an? many people disregard e~enJi
the best technical mformatJOn (e.g., home energy audIts,}.,;
see Hirst, Berry, & Soderstrom, 1981 )((i:olicies based on1;;~
careful technical and economical analysis have often been;lt
psychologically .nri"l.S9r politically u.nrea!istic~TI~e reasoQ:
for such policy failures lies inoverslmpllfled pollcy anal-~
ysis( that has serious blind spots in the area. 01 h~man::~
of the market and of government. In tl:e case of en:rgY'~I:
efficiency, it identifies equipment that IS now.or mlghti(;:
soon be available and that would perform deSIfecl tasks:.~~t
. . .~~
while using less energy than the technologies now In usql;"
It recommends research and development of such tech-"0
nologies and sometimes regulations, incentives, or infor-';i,:
mational programs to encourage their usc. The underlying::~t
behavioral assumption is that technologies that will, over~.
their useful life save their owners and operators money?~
will be adopted once the owners become aware of the,~,~
benefits.) .";~
. Psycl~ologist.s (ea.sily reco!!,nize that tl:is ass~mptJOn;~
IS far too slmphstlC'{l he tech,mcal e~onomlc style ?f anal-):.
ysis is indispensable for setting pollcy goals, but It lacks;;:
.t~c.onceptual tools for.analyz.ing how social systems can.~~
be changed to achieve those goals. It ignores what a N~- .~;.
tiona! Research Council study called "the human dl- ;~~:
mension . . . the rich mixture of cultural practices, social ,/:.t
inte.raction.s, ~n? human f~elings that innu~nc~ the ~:}Jk
havlOr of mdlvlduals, soc131 groups,. and I~Stlt~tlO~Stl
(Stern & Aronson, 1984, p. 2). BehaVIOral sClentIst.s, lfi-;
stead of assuming that people invest in energyemCle~cY >.
ifand only if they expect to j?y.un.on.t::Y, may hYPOlheslze~~~
they trustthaUhe investment will pay or because :thClf,;t
friends have already made investments and are satIsfied ,-
.~~.
!.b~.
;'~
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ',.r,
Correspondence concerning lhis anicle should be addressed to l'aU,1 Ci~~
Stern Commission on Behavioral pnd Social Sciences and Educa uon.;.
Natio'nal Research Council, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, DC,.-
2 0 4 1 8 . ' l
October 1992 American PsychologiSt,
Copyrip,t 1992 by.he Amaican ~ Associotioo. Inc. OOOJ-{)66X/'i't~~
. Vol. 47. No. 10. 111 '.
....
 th~c r(;:~l!I!s.(Stern & Aronson,. 1984).El!crgy policy:,".; labeling program was ineffective with consumers (few of
~rs tend to overlook such SOCial Pf?Ces5.es: B.ut~, whom read the labels), but it increased the average energy
iogicaJ researchers have also been slmp'l1tlc 10 ana- efficiency of four major appliances by 21 % ~<':"~J.!se it I1.:..
~Og energy use. They h~ve~~ooften)g[)9!t:.(t._~~~,_t~~_ c~ra~sd th.t;inpll_*Y_1O.f11<l.nge the product mix, s.c>. it.
",. ntiilljp~jgblLqGt~~l:!!1IS'l-Lec911.Q_m!~ anJ!!y~!~-that . was olTeringmainly,energy--efficient models, (Robinson,
"rove~YlS a.ke)')to energy conservatIOn and 1'989). ~ana~.r~~.l,!gg~:!.~~~:'{.Q_9~il1~:I:'~ye!.lOlogi,~~
P.2tt~s a critical moli~cJorc~lange. If psyc~ological should not o'{ersell the contribution made possible by
""ights are to be taken senously In energy pollcy, psy- changing behavior in households, and they should look
Il~logists must_broaden their. approach. We must begin for behaviors outside households that their methods might
'>'th a reasonable understand 109 of th 7e~_ergy sys~eE!. be ablCo<l.o<.infiuence.
f'. e actions.) Energy-using actions can be divided
';;ergy Users and Energy- Using Behavior ..r
into lnTee-iJroa categories. Direct energy-using actions {f J
.. . ~;sis,Q.Le!lergLancL~ha.:vj_ocsl:!.ol1ld_b:egi_n_":,,itQ_~ cause energy to flow through technology: driving a car,
"';Yquc.~ti?l.1.s~hich actors arc most important in terms turning on a light, operating a blast furnace, and so forth.
o(the energy they use or the energy savlllgs they can in- Although single everyday actions like these use little en-
_fl~~nce,,,~11ci,f9r each type of actor, which actions have a ergy on a national scale, aggregated across millions of
. IaJgc iml:>acl'(Stern & Gardner, 1981 b)? Psychological re- individuals and organizations and billions of occasions,
~rch should focus on' the largest energy users, the-aGtiQHS they constitute the total. Thus, factors that influence suf-
~th the greatest potential f~r changer-and the s\lpet of ficiently large numbers of individual actions have policy
iB't!Iose a~tlOns t~~~~l.p~tentlally changeable h~,mr~-,,::-,.. significance. -
~I~.J-Ultc.@n1lQfu:~'Ihls strategy n?ay seem sclf-c.vldent; 1 Energy users' technology choices indirectly aflcct en- (2)
~ut It was not followed by the earllest psychological re- ergy usc by selecting the buildings and equipment through
~~archers on energy conservation. U],slf.ad,..lh~yJQcueQ. __ which 'energy will flow. The choice of a residence sets a
In.:en.er.gYll.se. 5... lhat.are_higll1Y2i,sLl2Le,bu..l. tQ'!t _<l.9_noth_a.:Y~ rough minimum on a household's heating and cooling
~cry large .direct efkcts, such as riding busesandturning requiremenls and the amount of traveling household
- iolr lights ill u'no5'.~_upied,-rooms (see review by Stern & members must do; the choice ofa process for sleel making
,'Osk3lnp:-198'i). -Cognitive dissonance theory suggests that determines the minimum energy cost of a too of steel.
~haoging these behaviors may have large indirect eflccts The effects of such technology choices are powerful be-
, by;alteringpegple's attiludes aboutenergy_ use,J~ut.sllch cause each choice is multiplied by the intensity with which
, .dfectshaveilot been demonslrated.<,. "- buildings and equipmenl are used and by the life of the
:'fJir;Tlze actoLS-;~T~e major a~tors in energy use inclt.4.cJi' buildings and equipment.
,1sumers of gocl~s and servICes tn,qt u e energy!Zb~ --t Policy choices arc a third kind of action wi th even (3\

. ~ services;l;;ntem~diaries
. .c..,crs of those goods and
. bankers and engineers, whose decis\9ns constrain wha
,i\ ill be produced and consumed; and lpoli~\hakers. Each
. :qQhese actors influences energy use, but not equally.
",;..Jiguseholds in the United States directly consume ap-
:PJH"imatcly one third of all energy; the industrial and
',<;Ollllnercial sectors of the,economy account for the rest.
tiguseholdJ also alTect commercial and industrial activity
wg}rectly, for instance, by demanding more fuel-el11eient
~or~else more powerful automobiles; but their power is
~ 'wi ted because consumer ~overeignty is imperfect;. For
~i;lmple, builders, developers, and building owners usu-
: .1x:Sclect the appliances, furnaces, and insulation levels
1Q;J.lPW buildings. ManufacturerS decide which consumer
iJX<X1ucts to produce. Because these actors usually do not
p,ayfor the energy used in the equipment and buildings
:~1~y buy or the goods they manufacture, they have less
l!Uerest in energy efficiency than do the users of the
~yild~ngs or equipment. InshQr!L..h9~S~h()lc!;>ar\3 sigI1i(~ . CI1oices.This is the case not only for household energy
19lut actors in the U.S. energy picture, but not the pre-
cJS_Oli nan t ones. Mor.~_e.nergy savings can often be. achievcd.
..Yinfluencing business and industry than.bychanging.
.-J.~9ividual behavior directly. 'For example, more was ac-
f9!1lplished by forcing automobile manufacture!:.s to meet
,st.l!ldards for fuel economy than could have been done
~y, any \;onceivable elTort to change the behavior of au-
t.~nlObilc purchasers directly. The Canadian appliance-
~l;,~ :I
suc more indirect, and sometimes more widespread, eflecls.
Dy policies, 1 mean choices that create incentives, con-
straints, or opportunities alTecting energy consumers' ac-
tiuns. Decisions by manufacturers of automobiles, ap-
pliances, or industrial equipment about whether to pro-
duce highly energy-efficient prod ups are energy policies
in lhat they constrain consumers' technology choices, Tax
deduclions for rhortgage interest payments and federal
subsidies for highway construction are energy policies in
that they create incentives for households to own homes
and for homes and businesses to spring up outside cities,
thus increasing the demand for energy for travel, heating,
and cooling. Policy choices are typically made by a few
key decision makers, such as corporation presidents or
legislators, although they are sometimes influenced by
public opinion.
,:Direct energy-using behaviors matter when they are
aggregated, but they tend to matter less lhan technology
consumption (Stern & Gardner, 1981 b); it appears to be
a. more general principle. Actions that "prevent" envi- D -;" c' ;;,'
ronmenlal problems usually have a greater potenlial effect "
than actions that "cure" them (Stern & Gardner, 1981 a). -,';--
For example, both energy consumption and air pollution
can generally be decreased more effectively by purchasing
a fucl-elTlcient vehicle or furnace than by carefully op-
erating and maintaining an ineflicient one. The impor-'

American Psychologist 1225

y ,'i

" (I ) ~
tance 0 f preventJ.on IS underscored by two facts: Adopting Howevcr, psychological research has rarely addressed the
new technology is often perceived as an improvement in link from environmental attitudes to political behavior'
the Quality of life, whereas cutti~\ direct energy use is M..Jlli-12~chotQgical studies ofener~ use and conservatioq~
usually perceived as sacrifice; and(tmproved technologies ha"c acldre~sed househol? behavlOr-mos.tJrequently;~
arc inherently long-lived,whereas cb;:mge.s-i~J~verydjlY energy use In homes. ThiS research has Yielded usefuJit
-pehayi()f are caslly.reversed. When real energy prices fell knowledge; the next section summarizes it. :h~
in the 1980s, the first conservation gains to disappear E U' II q'rp,
were those from resetting home temperatures (U.S. De- ~ ncrgy sc In - a m e s . , ],! ,<'Il~
pariment of Energy, 1989). The prevention principle thus Psycholo.gists' ~fforts to u~lderstand household energy u~~
implies that themajoL targets ofopporiunity arc tech: began with ~e studies. Researchers found that, ~
nology choiccs and policies, not the daily behavior that with attitude-behavior research in other areas, COffJ~':;~
psychologists tend to look to flfSt. spondence depends.on.measuring attitudes and behavio;:S~
., Psycholo~i~ts have done little to .exploit the sig~ifi- at the same level of speciflcity (Heberlclll &. Black, 1976~
~ant opportUl1ltlCS ~o u~de:stand and Illfluence the hlgh- Weigel & Newman, 1976; Weigel, Vernon, & TOgnacei,~
Impact energy chOices III mdustry, commerce, and the 1974). For example, high levels of energy usc for housc~
policy process. Industrial and commercial decisions are ~ hold heating and cooling were correlated with beliefs tha'i .
affected by lcadership; by communication practices within' -home. temperature is important for personal health and~
and between firms; and by the form, quality, and credi- ~ 'comfort but not with belief in the urgency of the 1970s~
bili~y. of information available for corporate investment' "'''energy crisis" (Becker, Seligman, Fazio, & Darley, 198 I;"N
deCiSIOns. .:;, . Seligman ct aI., 1979). .)tj}i
Psychology can find a niche in the complex inter-_,> ' . ,)~:~~
relationships between organizational and individual be- \ ' A Psychological Model of Energy Use II~~
havior. A good example is the development of home en- Psychological rescarch on the determinants of energy usc~
ergy rating systems (HERS), which rate new or existing (e.g., Black, Stern, & Elworth, 1985; Heberlein & war.~~.
homes against a standard of energy-efficient construction riner, 1983; Macey & Brown, 1983; Verhallen & va~
with the goal of encouraging home buyers to demand that Raaij, 1981) generally supports a multistage causal model.\;
homes meet the standard. These programs require be- such as that illustrated in Table I (Stern & Oskamp~
havior change by program sponsors (usually utility com- 1987). Going from top to bottom in the model, each vari!.]t
panics), home contractors, home buyers, and sometimes ,. able acts as a possible influence on f those listed
f beloW:iP
l
mortgage lenders, who may offer preferential access to Two feedback rclaliooships flow in the reverse directiOli:~
financing of energy-efficient homes ~..u-se...-tlKy_.ba~.\2> f---ca.rI!illi; can occur when outcomes such asC,I!..cgy~~UI~
J~J ope.J.~ting costs, HERS have varied greatly in their and comfort levels affect specific attitudes and beliefs~
succ~ pcn~traG-;gmarkets(some programs have rcached about energy s~ving and, through that, ~n change sut}.~
2% of new homes per year, whereas others have reached sequent behaVIOr. Processes such as self-J usUficallon orJ,~
100%), mainly because of differential success in influ- dissonance reduction (Katzev & Johnson, 1983, 1984)':~
eneing the decision processes of consumers and contrac- also provide feedback, in this case, from behavior to gen::~
tors (Vine & Harris, 1988). ~-mQ~Lli.kc1y~h.c.!L eral attitudes and beliefs. It is worth noting that, following\
the.pf()gram....sponsor---advertises..it..~eU, offers.h.uild.eJs. dissonance theory, cJfonful action that produces Jitllc~J~
marketi ng assistance and advertising rnoncy, is credible saving may have the strongest effect on attitudes. ;Ji?
with local consumers, and cooperates with builders' as- The model in Table I has some important ill1pli-'.?,:!
sociations. Programs with those characteristics increase cations. It emphasizes, for example, that energy usc is!JB.
builders' confidence that a change in their routines will .JlQLil behavior but an outcome of behavior. Therefore,'J(~
sell more houses and in~rcase .consumers' confidence that interv~ntions that reliably change relat!vcly uni~portantM
they will benefit by bUYlnga hIghly rated home. The most behaVIOrs may save less energy than Il1terventlOns tbat:~
successful programs get that way by informal, applied occasionally change a few important behaviors. rhc::<~
psychology: TheydcYclQP_CLc..Q!ill2[clJcnsi.ve-apPJ=ecia1io~ model also helps explain the typical failure to find rcla;~
of the mar\(et, adaptto user needs, and invite user par- tionships between variables distant from cach other inl~~
, t;cipation in program operation. the model, such as general attitudes and energy usc, whcn:{~
_.'~. (:;.. Ano~her oPP?rtunityfor psychology to. contri?~te is, the intervening variables arc left unm~asured. .1!Jj .
III analy_zJQg pubhc pressu~_ol1~!H~rgy_POllCy_dcclslOns. The model shows why some fashIOnable policy aP-J~
which depends in part on political and environmental proaches fail in implementation. For example, the effcet!;~
:attit~des. 0-~sjgnificanLandgmwjng~iteralure_e.~i~ts:9IL o.f ~lIla~cial i~centives sucl~ as pric~ rebate.s or loao sUb-~i
pubhc_,,<ittltudes_on-energy-and.envu.onmental __ p.ohcy, Sidles IS mediated by the mtervenll1g vanables of con-'I'.
mainly in sociology and political science. Psychology can sumer attitudes and knowledge-and if knowledge is in~;.e
contribute, for instance, with stud~es_of how individual suJIicient (e.g., the consumer docs not know about the,. '
values affect environmental '!,ltitudes..and behavior (e:g., program) or attitudes inappropriate (e.g., the consumerj~
D. unlap, Grieneeks, & Rokeach, 1983) and ofsocia.l-ps~, is reluctant to assume new deb.t), such policies m.a. Y. bel;"'
ehological processes affecting support for, or willingness ineffective. Energy misinformation is quite common.,; >

to influence, policy (e.g., Stern, Dietz, & Black, 1986). !:!2..l!.seholders systematically mi?j.u-,1g~ the amoun~_o[eo-,:'

------------------------------.--------'
1226 October 1992 American Psychologist~
 = 9
presenting an investment in a water-heater wrap as a way
to avoid losing money rather than as a way to save it
increased consumers' willingness to make the investment.
The source of information, particularly its trust-
worthiness, can make a great difference in the effectiveness
of a message (McGuire, 1985). This fact probably helps
explain the strong influence of information from nonex-
pert friends on household energy decisions (e.g., Darley,
1978; Leonard-Barton, 1981). A classic example involved
a brochure on how to cut energy use in air-conditioned
New York City apartments (Craig & McCann, 1978). The
brochures were mailed out at random on the stationery
of the New York State Public Service Commission or on
the stationery of the local electric company, Consolidated
(Con) Edison. In the next month, the group of homes
receiving the brochures from the Public Service Com-
mission saved 7% on their electricity bills; the other group
saved nothing. Apparently the messages from Con Edison
were either ignored or mistrusted.
Source variables also affect householders' responses
to information aimed at influencing technology choices.
The Residential Conservation Service program, which
operated throughout the United States in the late 1970s,
offered free or low-cost home energy audits that delivered
expert recommend\ltlons about investment in energy-ef-
ficient equipment. -in Minnesota, some participating util-
ities conducted the audits themselves, some hired private
companies, and some employed community groups as
subcontractors. Utilities that used private firms spent half
as much per audit as companies using their own person-
nel, while maintaining the same quality and completing
more audits (6% vs. 4% ofeligibJe homes; Polich, 1984).
These findings are perfectly consistent with economic as-
sumptions, but the utilities that used community groups
got the best results. Their audits were of higher quality
as judged by state inspectors, cost one third as much per
audit as the use of a company's own employees, and
reached 15% of eligible homes. The local groups did better
because of a combination of greater credibility among
consumers; intensive, although apparently low-cost,
marketing efforts; and a concern with cutting people's
energy costs that the utilities did not share.
Another Minnesota study gives even more powerful
evidence of the importance of credibility. In 1984, the
Hennepin County government decided to initiate a
shared-savings program, in which a company insulated
homes at no cost to the households but earned money
by collecting a share of what its interventions saved the
household. The County contracted with a private com-
pany to do the energy audits and the insulating. As an
experiment, homes were solicited by a single random
mailing, either on the company's letterhead with no men-
tion of the County's involvement; on the same letterhead
with added mention of the County's role; or on County
letterhead, signed by the chairman of the County Board
of Commissioners. Requests for energy audits came from
6%, II 'Yo, and 31 %, respectively, of households receiving
the three types of :letters, and shared-savings contracts
were signed by 1.7%,2.7%, and 9.3% of the households,
1228
, "'" -" . """}
respectively. In short, a letter from the County, for no~'
':1
additional. cost, wa~ five times as effe~~ive as a I.etter ~ith:n
the same mformatlOn from the audltmg and msulatmg"l
company. The major energy savings that would result'~,
could be expected to last for the useful life of the bui1dings~:
involved (Miller & Ford, 1985), ';~!
In summary, energy information is multidimen.~~1
sional. From a policy standpoint, what matters is not so;~'
much the amount of information contained in a label:~)
advertisement, or other message but getting the aUdience~J
to pay attention aj\d take the m~ssage seriously)This de~~:
pends ?n the wa?~1 (he mes~g~ IS prese~Jed, the wPf) in~~
formatIOn users Interact With l~rormatlOn sources, theiii~
~rust in t~lOse sources, and thJ ~nfirming or c~nflicting~
informatIOn that comes from fflends and aSSOCiates, By~':1\'1
the early I980s, these insights were finding their way into!
an increasing number of conservation programs, ManY~1
programs, especially at the 10ca,1 level, i~ their efforts to~!
Inform energy users were relYing heavily on wordof.. ~
mouth communication through existing social networks~:
and on community organizations with local credibility!:
(e,g., Gaskell & Pike, 1983; Olsen & Cluett, 1979). '::"1
A1one)< Obviously, money profoundly innuences~'
energy choices. The prevalence oflarge cars in the United~
States clearly results in great degree from the low cost 0[',":
'-"rl
fuel compared with Western Europe or Japan, where gas~;&
oline costs three to four times as much and cars are:\' :.fm
smaller. But the effect of money docs not depend only ant
the amount: Money, like information, is mUltidimen-':~
sional. Economists compare different kinds of moneyy~
(e.g., fuel costs with capital costs) or evaluate dincrent~
kinds of incentives, such as rebates, price cuts, grants,~
and loan subsidies, by applying a standard "net presenti:.i
yalue" formula to them. But although costs or incentivedi
with the same net present value may be interchangeable ~';
for accou nting purposes, psychologists question the as;7~
sumption that they are equivalent for consumers, assum':-~
ing instead that costs or incentives that take difrcrenr~
forms may be perceived and responded to differently. Fo(~
instance, households respond more favorably to grants ;/
to defray the cost ofhome insulation than to Joan subsiclics,J
of equal net present value (Stern, Aronson, et aI., 1986); ::~
c
Behavioral psychologists have demonstrated the impof7 ,
tance ofsev~ral dimensions ofinffnti:~s: l:'dntingent v~r.'"
sus noncontll1S'1nt eonsequencd~ posItive versus aversive.;:;.
consequences:)continuous versus intermittent reinforce7f,
ment,r'~inmediacy of consequences, and so forth. They~'
have also used these concepts to design incentive programS';
for energy conservation (for a review, see Geller et al.;'_
1982), but there has been little translation in the literature'
between the psychological terms and the ones economists'
use (see Stern, 1986; Winkler & Winett, 1982).
Researchers have begun to explore the energy iIll:;.
plications of consumers' understanding of money. They;:
have found that householders often think of their utility'
bills in dollars per month rather than in units more rel7L
evant for energy conservation, such as therms per degrec-::
day (Kempton & Montgomery, 1982). Consequently,~
when energy prices are rising, peQple sometimes percei~
I .
October 1992
 .._.. _._.~_ ..-_-.-
. - -.. ,-,' -------_._._._-~_
;r:' ~

1~~~p~oximate Causal Model of Resource Use With Examples From Residential Energy Consumption
Type of variable Examples

8 Background factors Income, education, number of household

members. local temperature conditions
7 Structural factors Size of dwelling unit, appliance ownership
Institutional factors Owner/renter status. direct or indirect payment
for energy
6 Recent events Difficulty paying energy bills. experience with
shortages, fuel price increases
5 General attitudes Concern about national energy situation
General beliefs Belief households can help with national energy
problem
4 Specific attitudes Sense of personal obligation to use energy
efficiently
Specific beliefs Belief that using less heat threatens family
health
Specific knowledge KnOWledge that water heater is a major energy
user.
3 Behavioral commitment Commitment to cut household energy use 15%
Learning Behavior intention Intention to install a solar heating system
2 Resource-using behavior Length of time air conditioner is kept on
Resource-saving behavior Insulating attic. lowering winter thermostat
setting
1 Resource use Kilowatt-hours per month
o Observable effects Lower energy costs, elimination of drafts.
q:~~.:. family quarrels over t~ermostat
-.jj~.~

'-"~ie. From "Managing Scarce Environmental Resources" (p. 1063) by P. C. Slern and S. Oskamp. 1987. in D. Slokols and I. Altman. Handbook 01 Environmental
_ Psychology. New York: John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Copyright 1987 by John Wiley & Sons. Inc. Reprinted by permission of John Wiley & Sons. Inc.
-, ~7~~"

~~igy.~ed in.yarioushome activities, and these errors are
'~ 7iesistant to ordinary information campaigns (e.g., Becker,
Seligman, & Darley, 1979; Kempton, Harris, Keith, &.
Weihl, 1985). People typically overestimate energy use
'[or lights and appliances that are visible and that must
Q2'actuated for each use, and they underestimate energy
use for water heating and other less visible ends.
'~:;:ln,"'~
,:~c;hanging Household Energy Use
a:!.'ii2S\''''-""',. '.' . . of about 20% compared with deliy.erin~~.mej!1Jl>L::..
Most of the behavioral research on changing residential
"nergy use assesses two of the major classes of policy in-
't.r:uments: ~(in the form of price changes, loans,
r~bates, and the like) and iJlformatiQIl. Relatively little
,has addressed the other types of policy instruments:"'J2.cG.
.~'u,'asio.Jl--o..r--ex-hor.1atiol1, command or regulation, and
~technological research and development (for an analysis
bfthe psychological issues in those areas, see Stern et aI.,
.'!987). For both money and information, technical eco-
i1'omic analysis presumes that what matters is simply the
.amount. But research from the psychological perspective
shows that money and information are multidimensional
;;'~nd that money is not the only policy-relevant motive.
.lil' Information. With information, what matters is not
.only how much is made available, but how it is conveIT.d_
-Social psychologists and marketing professionals know
~h~t information is more likely to change behavior when
It IS s . v'vi<:l and ersonalized (Borgida & Nisbett,
p 977; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Taylor & Thompson, 1982).
fiany
-'<.
early energy information programs failed
_.'-
because
-:,-.-
they simply made information available, without serious
eflort to use psychological techniques to get the intended
audience to pay attention (Dennis. Soderstrom, Koncin-
ski, & Cavanaugh, 1990; Ester & Wi nett, 1982).
Better delivery of messages can lead to energy savings
of 10% to 200/0 through direct energy-saving actions. For
example, showing a closed-circuit .video program that
modeled energy-saving techniques yielded energy savings
mation in writing (Windt et aI., 1982). When social sci-
entists designed a package of information on time-oruse
electricity rates, consumers used 16% less energy than a
control group that received the same information in the
standard form, with the same financial incentive (He-
berlein &. Baumgartner, 1985). Energy-use feedback also
improves the quality of information. Householders who
received frequent (e.g., daily) reports based on meter
readings, with projected energy use or savings on a
monthly basis, cut their energy use about 10% to 15%
(for a review of the experiments, see Seligman, Becker, &
Darley, 1981). Feedback adds no information beyond
what is already on people's utility meters, but it provides
the information soon after any behavior change, and in
a vivid and easily understandable manner. Feedback also
provides highly credible information, compared with
supposedly expert advice.
Careful framing of energy information can also make
it more effective. Yates (1982), applying insights from
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), found that

American Psychologist 1227

 !ii;'~onservation efforJ'as ineffective because their bills
~rotfaII. This sort of thinking can be a significant bar-
":~to conservation. Psychologically informed researchers
~el: raised other questions about the perception of
'oney such as whether people are responsive to the same
egrec'to a price increase as to a decrease of the same
'ount (Stern, 1984) and whether it is more effective to
'f ribe the financial savings from energy-saving equip-
~rii'in terms of payback period (the length of time the
sIlVings would take to pay for the equipment), net present
'Wilue, or intern.al rate ,of return: . nology mirrors social group membership, with house-
. i'jNonjznancw! motives. Savmg money IS not the only
'otive that can be used to promote conservation. This
"int is especially important for the I 990s because energy
" nservation efforts may not be helped along by rising
'rices. At least four nonfinancia);,motives affect energy
uSe (Stern & Aronson, 1984). ('<..!onsumer preferences
i'atter: Most homeowners prefer to invest in storm win-
oaws than in wall insulation, even when the latter is a
~ttcr energy saver.,~{orm windows ar~ attractive and. r~
duce home upkeep:0roup membership mattcrs: ThIS IS
why friends' opinions and actions often have more influ-
ence over household energr: fhoices than expert advice
, at may be better informed.-}Jersonal values and attitudes
'i'atter: Although the attitude-behavior relationship is
""1:{trmally mediated by knowledge and constrained by
household technology, energy-related attitudes and belicfs
ere sometimes associated with changes in energy use
Black et a!., 1985; Heberlein & Warriner, 1983; Verhallen
\;an Raaij, 1981) and with participation in energy con-
-seFv'ation programs (Stern, Black, & Elworth, 1982). The
j'tlTccts of more general environmental attitudes on energy-
, '!sing behavior are probably mediated by energy-specific
attitudes or beliefs. Experimental application of minimal-
'iistification techniques from attitude change research has
le4)0 behavior changes that decrease househOld energy
use by about 10% (l3ccker, 1978; Katzev & Johnson, 1983,
'~?-4; Pallak, Cook, & S\itlivan, 1980). Finally, there is
h(:ubiquitous motive of problem avoidance, which ofte~
'eeps people from taking any action until there is a crisi
.a.~9}hen leads them to follow simple rules ofthumb rathe
than to make the calculations that would save the mas
"Rney.Simplification has been a key to success for energy
19.sentive programs. Programs that offer one-stop shop-
'l9:g:for energy information, incentives, and contractor
'J,v,ices arc more successful than those that keep those
,s~~ures separate (Stern, Black, & Elworth, 1981), and
~ancial incentives are more effective when there is a
~~ple procedure to collect the benefits (Stern, Aronson,
1:111., 1986).
S~lh'There is some evidence that the relative importance
gUhese motives varies situationally. For low-cost behav-
?r:>,such as minor investments and everyday behavioral
~9J!Jstments, personal norms and attitudes about energy
~~,can make more dif1erence than substantial dif1erenccs
~price (e,g., Heberlein & Warriner, 1983). However, for
xpensive and effortful technology-choice activities, such
,Investing in home insulation, major background factors
uch as home ownership are more important than either
-American Psychologist
attitudes and norms or energy costs (Black et al., 1985;
Stern, Black, & Elworth, ! 983).
Nonfinancial motives and technology choice. The
highest impact behaviors in the household sector are
adoptions of energy-saving household technol~s, SUCh'll
as home insulation and fuel-efficient vehicles, furnaces,
and major appliances. Because most of these technologies I
are expensive, policy analysts see money as the main bar-
rier to adoption. However, nonfinancial factors have con-
siderable influence. Diffusion of energy-efficient tech-
holders following the lead of friends and associates
(Darley, 1978; Darley & Beniger, 1981; Sawyer, 1982).
Concerns about problem avoidance arc important: To be
successful, programs to promote investment in home in-
sulation must simplify the shopping process and ensure
that installations are of high guality. And program ~
keting and iwplementa1i!m.can have a greater elTect than
a large financial incentive. Although stronger incentives
yield more investment in home energy efficiency, the
amount of household investment typically varies tenfold
between nominally identical incentive programs olfered
in the same geographic area. The reason seems to be that
financial incentives induce investment by those who have
made an initial commitment (e.g., by requesting a home
energy audit), but they do very little to overcome the big-
gest barrier-getting the households to contact the pro-
gram in the first place (Berry, 1990; Stern, Aronson, et
al., 1986). This situation produces a paradox of conser-
vation incentives: "The stronger the fmanciaI incentive,
the more the program's success depends on nonfinancial
factors" (Stern, 1986, p. 21 I). Weak incentives have little
etJect regardless of nonfin3ncial factors; strong incentives
have highly variable effects that depen(! on details of pro-
gram implementation. By improving niarketing ofenergy-
efficient technology, psychological research can hc:Ip make
the difference between success and failure in conservation
programs.
Psychology in Program Design and Evaluation
Although psychological insights can be practical for energy
policymakers, they have not always been welcomed. One
reason is that advice, such as to employ community
groups or to use simple language or bright displays to
attract attention, can be quite vague and can therefore
fail in the implementation. If psychologists are to make
a practical contribution, there is hard work to be done
on the details. Research from the 1970s and 1980s has
laid the conceptual groundwork, and the government ac-
countability movement has created an opening for eval-
uation research. Psychologists, because ofth~ir expertise
in research design, sometimes become involved in energy
program. e:,aluation (e.g., Archer, Pettigrew, f;,tronson,
1992, thiS Issue; Kushler, 1989). And because! psycholog-
ical and interpersonal processes are important to the suc-
cess of energy programs, psychologists can also play an
important role in designing programs.
I have already mentioned the critical role of under-
standing the market in the success of HERS. Understand-
1229
 ing the audience is equally critical to the success of other
residential conservation programs (Berry, 1990), a fact
best illustrated by the Hood River Conservation program
in Portland, Oregon, which planned carefully in advance
for community involvement and succeeded in installing
major energy-efficiency improvements in 85% of all eli-
gible homes between 1983 and 1985 (Hirst, 1987). Psy-
chologists can help by pointing out the importance of
audience input to program success, designing mecha-
nisms such as surveys and citizen advisory boards that
can provide needed input, and assessing the .reactions-.Of
participants and nonparticipants iIL1h~process_oLp(Q~
.gram eYaluatilln. The necessary approach is more art than
science, but it might draw on methods of.s~[vey_research,
formative evaluation resear.ch, ill1!lti~nQbUk.-Utilii~
analysis (e.g., von Winterfeldt & Edwards, 1986), social
marketing (e.g., Geller, 1989), and public involvement
(e.g., Dietz, 1987; Syme & Eaton, 1989).
Most evaluation studies of energy conservation pro-
grams have had the limited aim of providing summative
judgments of a program's success or cost-effectiveness.
This approach misses the opportunity to improve energy
programs by leaming from experience. Evaluation studies
need not only to qua~tify energy savings but also to un-
derstand the factors in a program and the environment
responsible for its overall performance. Thus, evaluation
studies should examine a range of behavioral, social, and
organizational variables in the program's design and im-
plementation, in addition to energy variables, and they
should be constructed so as to olfer specific advice on
how to modify programs to improve them. A few such
process evaluations of energy conservation programs have
appeared (e.g., Lerman & 13ronfman, 1984; Lerman,
Bronfman, & Tonn, 1983), and more work of this type,
informed by psychological concepts, would be valuable.
However, it can be diffIcult to get evaluation research ac-
cepted by those who can benefit from its fll1dings (Archer
et aI., 1992).
Psychological Research for the 1990s
The factors driving energy policy have changed somewhat
since the 1970s in ways that will affect the opportunities
for psychological research (Kempton, Darley, & Black,
1992, this issue). At least the following major changes in
the policy climate are relevant: Environmental concerns
have made new fossil energy supplies a less realistic policy
option, leaving the policy field more open for energy ef-
ficiency. Low energy prices, assuming they continue to
prevail, will force policy analysts to rely on their other
major tools to promote conservation: regulation, which
is usually unpopular among those who must comply, or
some combination of information, persuasion, and in-
centives. Psychologists have contributions to make with
respect to all of these. And electric utilities, under in-
creasing pressure from state regulatory agencies to pro-
mote conservation as an alternative to building power
plants, are pressed not only to institute conservation pro-
grams but also to develop quantitative forecasts of con-
sumers' responses to them.
1230
Psychology continues to have a special place in en_1
ergy conservation policy because of its emphasis on the';,
*
energy consumer's point of view. The policy situation Of~
the 1990s presents at least four major opportunities for~~
contributions from psychology. First, psychologists can'~
tap the potential to contribute to conservation in theft;
transportation, commercial, and industrial sectors ofthei.,l
economy by analyzing the barriers to conservation inl(
those sectors and how the major consumers respond to1~"
information and incentives. . d~,
Second, psychologists can do more work on tech:;,'
nology and policy choices. Even where there are clea~~
technological or policy fixes, social and psychological fae~~.
tors are usually critical. To enact policies, people must
be mobilized to provide political support. To make pol~'!.
icies successful, the target individuals or organi:z.ation~
must learn of them and comply without the need for ma~:;
jor enforcement efforts. I f new technologies are to be sue~'~
cessful, people must have the motivation and knowledge"' ,
necessary to adopt them. :ir
. -r:hird, t.he .1990~ present si?nificant opport~nities tolt
assist Il1 deslgmng, Implementing, and evaluatlng con-~l$
servation programs. Under a low-oil-price scenario, pol.~
icymakers are likely to reject the informational a~'
proaches of the 1970s in favor of tax instruments or other~:'
positive or negative monetary incentives that would in~:~...
crease the motive to conserve. They arc likely to turn to~
economists for help, but psychologists can make an es~t
scntial contribution. Behavioral research demonstrates}
that the cost-effectiveness of incentives depends critically'&i
on the form the incentive takes and on how it is marketed!"'"
and implemented (Berry, 1990; Stern, Aronson, et al:,?'~
1986; Vine & Harris, 1988). Psychologists can remind~
policymakers of those facts and show what they mean for}:"
particular conservation programs. They can also help by:
conducting the formative evaluation research that is crit-:~
ical for making incentive programs effective.
Nonfinancial strategies of behavior change will con-,.
tinue to be important for influencing behaviors where the:}.,
alternatives have roughly equal costs (Kempton et a!."
1992), for advertising conservation programs, for using~
persuasion to overcome the lack of motivation resulting, .
from low prices, and, in the event that energy prices in-,
crease, for designing the next generation of informational.'-
programs. These situations will allow psychologists to aP::';\
ply the knowledge they gained during previous price'
shocks. T.
Last, there is the tremendous opportunity and chal-?
lenge created by the need to forecast the energy savings
from conservation programs. When electric utilities arc.i
required to consider conservation programs as an alter~,
native to building power plants, they want projections of
energy savings for decades in the future that are as reliabl~.
as projections of energy production from power plan~:
Utility companies devote substantial resources to their.
demand projections, relying on engineers, who understand
the energy-saving potential of technologies that are ~
coming available, and economists, who have comple~
models of "rational" responses to prices. As we have seen
October 1992
 ,'t.
'~~els of behavior are limited, especially for ana-
IT. f r' . t ddt k ciologicallnquiry. 57. 5<HS9.
:wi'gthe el1c~ts 0 po .Icles III en e 0 rna e cons~mers
orC'responsl ve to pnces or other monetary consldera-
'c" 'Vtility analysts need help from psychology, but they
~~roceeding mostl~ without t~is hel~. They are de~el-
iIl''''g'their own behaVIOral theones, for Instance, by usmg
lf from information economics that lump variables
nccpts
'ell"as knowledge, bel.iefs, com~rehe.nsion o~ inforn: a -
on and trust under a smgle rubnc of informatIOn, whtch
~~alyzed as an economic activity that has costs (e.g.,
,- hleifer & Riley, 1979; Wilde, 1980). Without the sub-
er'analysis psych~logy can pr~~i~e, c~nser:ation fore-
-If-will be unreltable, and utilities Will reject conser-
don programs as risky investments.
','.-
'oCIusion
'Pl"9'90S will provide much to do in energy conservation
Jc
~'G~y; and society needs input from psychology. This
It'uf may not be readily accepted. The technical eco-
J', d t (II d . t r
I' d and electricity consumption in a time-ofuse experiment, Paper pre'
ic
0RJ.l:1 'ml? se s 1 omma es energy p? lC~ ana ySlS, ~n
P,;iy~~olog.tcal approac~es tend. to be dtsmlssed as naIve,
~ Jeffective, or Impractical to Implement (Geller, 1990;
-'':''mpton et aI., 1992). These criticisms need not apply,
~{kit is up to psychologists to demonstrate that they can
~ke practical contributions. To do this, psychologists
'1'ln"'e'ed to avoid past mistakes, build on the knowledge
00', 'insights developed in the past, propose activities rel-
evant to current policy concerns, and develop an under-
sG.'~ding and familiari ly with the languages, thought pro-
~ffiSes, and institutions that dominate energy policy set-
ti~:iS\sce Archer et aI., 1992).
';~"t,> I Hirst. E.. Berry. L., & Soderstrom, J. (1981). Review of utility home
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October 1992 American Psychol o .