+(,121/,1(

Citation: 8 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 51 1999

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline

Thu Jan 12 11:41:42 2017

-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance

of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License

-- The search text of this PDF is generated from

uncorrected OCR text.

-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope

of your HeinOnline license, please use:

Copyright Information

The Impact of the Crisis on Russian Politics
Pavel Kandel
bitter humor characterizes the Russian
A public's attitude toward NATO's military
operations in Yugoslavia. The saying, "We
didn't even notice that Bill Clinton and Madeleine
Albright had joined the Communist Party" became
very popular among those who considered themselves
democrats. America's and NATO's conduct in Kosovo
corroborated so precisely, if unintentionally, the
current propaganda slogans of Russia's national
communists that it would have been impossible to
make them a finer gift in the run-up to the parlia-
mentary and presidential elections. Not a single voice
in the country proved willing to defend the military
action. At the various conferences held in Russia since
the air strikes began, one conclusion was drawn:
"Thank God that Russia is not the only country being
run by idiots." Significantly, even the leaders of the
extremely pro-West party, Just Cause (Pravoe Delo),
headed by Yegor Gaidar, condemned NATO opera-
tions and actually hastened to dispatch a widely
publicized, if abortive, mediation mission to Belgrade
and several Western capitals. Gaidar's anti-NATO
posture accurately illustrates the prevailing mood in
Russia during the intervention, to which even the
supposed agents of Western influence were not
immune. The counterproductivity of NATO's rash
venture was so obvious that the laurels of the peace-
maker seemed like ripe fruit waiting to be plucked.
SUMMER 1999
Theinevitabilltv
ofa nauonalist
reaction
The wide consensus, here, needs stressing. The
Kremlin, Russian political elites of all stripes, and the
general public, regardless of political sympathies,
reacted with extreme hostility to NATO's military
operations. In Washington and Brussels, the violence of
the Russian response seems to have been as unexpected
as Milosevic's surprisingly long resistance to the
bombing. In both cases, NATO's prognosis was based
on shortsighted and mistaken assumptions, stemming
from an exaggerated belief in the West's untouchable
superiority and an imprudent itch to exploit the weak-
nesses of others. In the past, Milosevic had yielded at
the last moment to the dictates of force majeure. The
West's overconfident and poorly informed diplomats
and strategists falsely assumed that, after the first air
strikes, he would simply cave in, even though swift
capitulation would have spelled political suicide.
. Before the bombs began to fall, Russian diplo-
macy accepted the measures for putting pressure on
Belgrade laid out in UN Security Council resolu-
tions 1160, 1199, and 1203. Western power brokers
apparently assumed that Moscow's need for debt
relief would compel it to accept NATO's actions.
Most of them downplayed a possible negative reac-
tion from the Kremlin as something intended only
for domestic political consumption. And indeed, the
Russian authorities had neither the desire nor the
capacity to quarrel with their Western partners over
51
 Kosovo. They demonstrated a patent willingness to
work constructively for the settlement of the
Serbian-Albanian conflict. But no one in Russia was
prepared to accept the utter disregard of Russia's
opinions on the matter and the West's cynical abuse
of the country's humiliating financial dependence.
NATO's new strategic conception, as illustrated in
the bombing of Yugoslavia, suggested that nondefen-
sive military operations outside the territory of the
bloc, without UN Security Council sanction (and
that means, without consulting Russia), could
become a new norm in international affairs. Under
such conditions, Belgrade's resistance to NATO was
naturally interpreted in Moscow as an unavoidable
occasion for a last ditch defense of Russia's indepen-
dence and influence in foreign affairs.
The West still has not come to grips with the
effect of events in Yugoslavia on Russia's domestic
politics. Hostility to NATO by Boris Yeltsin's mori-
bund administration does not pose a serious problem;
but the alliance has been extremely foolish in underes-
timating the way its actions are bound to shape the
foreign-policy agenda of any Yeltsin successor.
Meanwhile, the course of Russian diplomacy during
the war confirmed the Kremlin's reluctance to
confront the West and, at the same time, revealed that
its capacity for compromise, too, was finally exhausted.
Boris Yeltsin's three "nos" (Russia would not be
drawn into war, would not supply arms to Yugoslavia,
and would not pursue seriously Yugoslavia's admit-
tance into the Russian-Belarusian alliance) clarified
one set of limits to the Russian stance. But during the
interv~ntion, the full range of Russia's possible responses
to the Western challenge remained obscure, depending
as it did on the situation in Yugoslavia and the domestic
maneuvers of "Czar Boris" and his entourage, as well as
on the more general political conditions in Russia. The
day after pronouncing his mollifying "nos;' Yeltsin
himself, seeking to derail the start of impeachment
proceedings in the Duma, spoke to Duma speaker
Gennady Seleznev about a possible retargeting of
Russian rockets at Western capitals and gave strong
verbal support to a triple alliance of Russia, Belarus, and
Yugoslavia, suggesting yet again that for him nothing
was inconceivable or impossible. And the fact is, in
Russia today, as in 1991 and 1993, anything is possible.
52
With an authoritarian regime, when a leader
departs from the scene, a deep political crisis ensues.
And in the present circumstances, one may anticipate,
in addition, catastrophic socioeconomic conditions, a
collapse of voter confidence, and discontent among
the elite, all of which testify to this regime's demise
even before the Yeltsin presidency formally expires.
Under these conditions, a foreign-policy humiliation
on a question of principle, affecting not illusory
Balkan interests but rather Russia's vestigial clout in
world politics, would be what is called an impermis-
sible luxury, for both the departing president and the
nation. If Western politicians could have foreseen the
distant consequences of their own actions, they might
have come to the surmise that the war against
Yugoslavia will end not with negotiations in Belgrade
but in the Russian presidential election in the year
2000. When trying to calculate the negative side
effects of the war, one cannot exclude an anti-Western
sea change in Russian public opinion and a drastic
turnabout in the Russian elite's way of thinking. Yet
West Europeans and Americans remain as numb to
such developments, now, as they were to Russia's
possible reaction when NATO began to drop bombs
on the Balkans.
Clinging to familiar myths about Russia-that
Russian society suffers from an empire complex, a
proclivity for Orthodoxy-Slav solidarity, and a phobia
of the West-some Western politicians, it is true,
anticipated an even more severe reaction from the
country than occurred; Such myths reflect the preju-
dices shared by Western commentators and Russia's
own so-called Westernizers. Empirical studies refute
this diagnosis and present a much more complex
picture. While dry statistics may be difficult to assimi-
late, recent opinion polls can help dispel some
common misconceptions.
Particularly telling is a poll conducted by the All-
Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion
(ACSPO), in February 1999, before the bombing
began. Of those polled, 38.7 percent supported
resolving the Kosovo conflict in concert with the
Western powers; 30. 7 percent supported a particular
policy of their own; and 30.6 percent found it difficult
to say. Only 4.1 percent responded very positively to
Russian participation in an international peacekeeping
EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITlITIONAL REVIEW
C
 force in Kosovo; 20.1 percent, somewhat positively; 26 here. The responses were particularly revealing, espe-
percent, somewhat negatively; 32.7 percent, extremely cially given the long-standing tradition of anti-
negatively; and 17 .1 percent found it difficult to say Semitism in Russia, the understandable reaction to
("Monitoring Public Opinion," Economic and Social terrorist acts and the seizure of hostages by Chechen
Chanxes 2 [1999], p. 76). Although these results most rebels, and, most recently, anger in Russia over the US
clearly testify to the public's lack of concern for the bombing of Yugoslavia. The information culled from
problem, they did not confirm the expectation that this survey spectacularly fails to support the prevailing
Russians generally long to become a superpower once stereorypes. The question was-How do you react to
again or to reassert their traditional imperial interests. members of the following groups:
Additional survey questions revealed that neither
Attitude
anti-Westernism nor an inclination toward ethnic
Toward: Jews Chechens Americans
nationalism nor a desire for an imperial foreign policy
is predominant in the popular imagination. At the same With likinx:
with interest 5.8% 2.1% 12.8%
time, Russians definitely distrust NATO and its brisk
expansion into post-Soviet space. The responses to a Calmly, I
I

question about the proposal to join an alliance of as toward I

any other: !
former Soviet republics were as follows: 3 percent of without 81.2% 47.6% I 75%
respondents felt absolutely positive about the prospect; particular
9.7 percent, somewhat positive; 27.2 percent, indif- Jeelinxs
ferent; 25 percent, somewhat negative; 17.2 percent,
With
absolutely negative; and 17.9 percent found it difficult irritation: I
9.8% 29% 6. 7%
to say. According to the poll, 9. 9 percent felt that with enmity I

Russia's interests would be best served by joining

NATO; 22.6 percent favored a modification of Russia's
collaboration with NATO; 19 percent supported the
creation of a defensive alliance distinct from NATO;
24. 7 percent preferred nonalignment with any military
alliance; and 23.8 percent found it difficult to say.
Furthermore, 17.2 percent considered the use of mili-
tary force to resolve foreign-policy problems
permissible; 68.3 percent, thought it impermissible;
and 14.6 percent found it difficult to say. The responses
to the question of whether it would be acceptable to
use military force against Chechnya is highly signifi-
cant: 11.4 percent of respondents answered
affirmatively; 64.6 percent, negatively; 11 percent
favored launching missile strikes on rebel bases only;
6. 7 percent supported conducting ground operations
with special divisions; and 6.3 percent found it difficult
to say.
An earlier poll conducted by ACSPO, in
November 1998, confirms this (to some Westerners)
surprising absence both of nationalist sentiment and of
anti-Americanism among ordinary Russians. Data on
attitudes toward various nationalities-for example,
Jews, Chechens, and Americans-are also worth citing
With I
mistrust: 3.2% 21.3% I 5.5%
withfear i
'
Source: "Monitoring Public Opinion." Economic and Social Changes I ( 1999), p. 89
Although it is not entirely appropriate to
compare feelings toward individuals with attitudes
toward a country, it is still worth stressing that Russians
are more kindly disposed toward Americans than
Americans are toward Russians. According to a Gallup
poll conducted from March to May, in 1999, 46
percent of Americans polled expressed a positive atti-
tude toward Russia; and 49 percent, a negative
attitude. There was no substantial difference of opin-
ions between Republicans and Democrats or liberals
and conservatives ("The Pulse of the Planet," America
[March 21, 1999], p. 5). Strikingly, even in Russia, the
results of polls on foreign-policy problems attest to
comparatively minor differences (rarely exceeding 10
percent) in the positions of those who voted for Yeltsin
and those who voted for Gennady Zuganov. Thus,
consensus on international political issues-customary
in the US and now increasingly common in Russia-
has deep roots in the popular consciousness.

SUMMER 1999 53
 "Pacifist isolationism" characterizes Russian
thinking far more than either "imperialist militarism"
or "great-power nationalism." Indeed, outrage at the
West's own imperialism is precisely what explains the
radical change in public opinion after the bombing of
Yugoslavia began. More than 80 percent of those
polled held a sharply negative view of NATO's activi-
ties. Ninety percent condemned the commencement
of bombing without the UN Security Council's
approval. But the numbers testify less to "war fever"
than to fear of war. Thus, 59 percent of the respon-
dents favored Russia's pursuit of an end to the conflict
by peaceful means; 26 percent, for providing humani-
tarian aid; and only 9 percent, for giving military
assistance to Yugoslavia (Itogi [April 6, 1999], pp. 24-
25) .. But the respondents did feel increasingly endan-
gered. Thus, the number of those supporting Russia's
union with other countries in a military-political bloc
grew to 50 percent, although only an insignificant 4
percent named Yugoslavia as a candidate for such a
union (Izvestiia [April 24, 1999], p. 1).
Data gathered by another sociological institute is
no less significant. Opinions on who the guilty parties
were in the crisis and the development of the Balkan
conflict broke down as follows: 46.3 percent blamed
NATO and the US; 16.7 percent, the Milosevic
regime; and 12.8 percent, the Kosovar Albanians. In
this survey, 7 4 percent favored assisting Yugoslavia,
while 16.8 percent were opposed. But 2.8 percent
favored entering the war on Yugoslavia's side; 7.3
percent thought Russia should be an outside observer;
26.2 percent believed it necessary to exert influence on
Milosevic to obtain a peace treaty; and 57.2 percent
thought it optimal to mold world public opinion,
using Russia's influence in the UN Security Council
and other international organizations (Kommersant
[March 31, 1999], p. 2).
Not surprisingly, Russians were of the opinion
that the actions taken by the US and NATO were just
as wrong as those of Russia itself in the extremely
painful Chechnya crisis, which displays some parallels
to events in Kosovo. The results of the survey
published in Kommersant are sensational and, at first
sight, paradoxical: the Russian public, precisely
because it has embraced democratic values, now firmly
rejects the anti- Yugoslavian military campaign waged
54
by the democratic West. Such a reaction could be
considered grounds for optimism about the future of
democracy in Russia. But Russia's failure to prevent
the bombing will lead many to conclude that a pacifist
foreign policy is doomed to failure, provoking a search
for other and perhaps more-aggressive solutions.
Russia's political elite reacted in a similar fashion
after the decision to expand NATO membership to
the east. For elites, the alliance's aggression against
Yugoslavia, which turned a local, ethnopolitical
conflict into an event of momentous global signifi-
cance, was the last straw. Russia's failure to prevent or
stop the war in the Balkans meant, in essence, a
"diplomatic default"-an admission that Russia's
foreign policy was utterly bankrupt, essentially a sham.
NATO's new strategic conception suggested that the
Yugoslavian affair was not just an exception but a new
precedent. NATO expounded its intention to
continue expansion, including expansion into post-
Soviet space, at its fiftieth-anniversary celebration, in
Washington, DC, stoking fears that future targets of
the alliance's "peacemaking" could be Russia's close
neighbors-and Russia itself. The West formulated its
expansionist intentions as a mere statement of the
naked facts of the new international system, in which
not the UN but NATO, led by the US, will force itself
upon others as the dominant international decision
maker and, at the same time, as the instrument of the
new European and world order. This new "world
government" will be defined by power, not by inter-
national law. In a monopolar world under American
leadership, and in a NATO-centric Europe prepared
to elbow its way into post-Soviet space, Russia is
apparently assigned the role of helpful assistant to the
alliance but denuded of any veto power. The Western
political class apparently sees a future that has no place
for Russia as an independent and significant actor in
international politics, and especially not as an immi-
nent threat or a direct challenge.
Of course, various political groups inside Russia
had their own reasons for condemning NATO's oper-
ations against Yugoslavia. Thus, for the national com-
munists, the air strikes were a vivid confirmation of
long-held anti-American and anti-Western concep-
tions. For the liberal free-market advocates, keeping
NATO's actions at arm's length was essential for polit-
EAST EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
ical survival. For the centrists, who profess both
foreign-policy realism and anti-NATO conviction,
opposition to all attempts to draw Russia into war
seemed an effective approach for reeling in supporters
from both the right and the left. But, in general,
Russia has witnessed a_serious upheaval of its political
landscape and a noticeable hardening of anti-Western
and anti-American sentiments.
Diverse political forces naturally coalesced around
different possible Russian responses to the Balkan crisis.
National communists urged that aid be provided to
Yugoslavia and argued for its immediate admittance
into the Russian-Belarusian alliance. Reformist demo-
cratic circles generally limited themselves to opposing,
as if from inertia, any attempt to lure Russia into the
conflict. The center was dominated by those vacillating
between the urge to exploit NATO's predicament and
weaken the alliance and the desire to find a political
solution to the crisis, making it possible for NATO to
save face, as it were. The latter tendency prevailed,
setting the Russian diplomatic course as well.
NATO's decision to "triumph at any price"
spelled out its willingness to pay the cost of an unco-
operative Russia. Without clearly realizing what it was
doing, the West made a strategic substitution in the
hills of Kosovo. Seeking to gain a piece of Yugoslavia,
it lost the whole of Russia. Russia will either
surrender to the national communists or be plunged
into a Weimar scenario, becoming a state hell-bent on
nationalistic regeneration, obsessed with revanchism.
What will be the face of post- Yeltsin Russian
foreign policy? Future foreign policy will presumably
react to the previous regime's foreign-policy short-
comings and humiliations and to the problems it left
unresolved. It is only logical to assume that Russia will
be forced to respond to the challenges and threats of a
new era. It is also obvious that Russian foreign policy
will be shaped by the character of its domestic political
SUMMER 1999
problems and by the current balance of forces within
the country. Finally, Russia's economic needs will play
a role. The first three factors-despite their differ-
ences-all point in the same direction: a foreign policy
based on opposition to the West. This is the inevitable,
and even rational, outcome. And there is no alterna-
tive. We can expect to see, therefore, a repudiation of
self-restraint in foreign policy, a proliferation in the
resort to the use of arms, and an open and ill-defined
game of destabilizing international relations. Russia's
economic needs will probably limit the scope of such
a foreign policy. Yet a situation in which meager and
ineffective economic assistance from the West is the
reward Russia receives for the loss of its independence
in foreign policy will do little to encourage restraint.
For the sake of analysis, it is important to distin-
guish three different processes, even though they all
point in the same direction: the collapse of Yeltsin's
regime and the inevitable resultant changes in Russian
foreign policy; the possible election of a national-
communist regime, with its obvious consequences for
domestic politics; and the rise of anti-Western senti-
ments in Russia's foreign policy as the only feasible
answer to the crudely anti-Russian policy of the
Western powers. In practice, the interweaving of each
of these processes mutually reinforces and accelerates
the others. The world and Russia will be very lucky if
responsible and reasonable political forces-capable of
segregating these tendencies and containing Russia's
responses to the West's incautious challenges within
sensible bounds-prevail. If moderation takes hold,
then, perhaps, we can speak of the next "Russian
miracle." But in the year 2000, when the debate on
who "lost Russia" and when is raging in America and
Europe, the answer will be at hand.
Pavel Kandel is the chairman ofthe Department of Ethnopolitical
Conflict Studies at the Institute ofEurope, Russian Academy of
Sciences. This article was written in May.
55