Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Political Law = that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operations of governmental organs of the State and defines the relation of the S
tate with the inhabitants of its territory. (Cruz)
Macariola v. Asuncion 114 S 77 (1982)
F: judge associated himself a company in violation of Art 14 of Code of Commerce
H: judge did not violate provision since it partake the nature of a political la
w
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US, Art. 14 of this C
ode must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of soverei
gnty, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sov
ereign.
Constitutional Law = a term used to designate the law embodied in the constituti
on and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and application ma
de by courts of the provisions of the constitution in specific cases.
Constitution = a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its
powers and safeguarding the rights of the People (Taada and Fernando)
Types/ Kinds of Constitution:
1. Classification as when it is adopted
a. Written Constitution = the provisions have been reduced to writing and embodi
ed in one or more instruments at a particular time
(1) Democratic = sprung from the authority of the people
(2) Monarchical or octroved = granted by a monarch as an act of grace to his sub
ject
b. Unwritten Constitution = has not been committed to writing at any specific ti
me but is the accumulated product of gradual political and legal development
2. Classification according to amendment process:
a. Rigid = may not be amended except through a special process distinct from and
more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws
b. Flexible = it may be changed in the same manner and through the same body tha
t enacts ordinary legislation
Lawyers' League for a Better Philippines v. President Aquino (May 22, 1986)
F: The legitimacy of the government and President Aquino is questioned. It is clai
med that her government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to th
e 1973 Constitution.
H: Case is dimissed for the legitimacy of Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippin
es are the judge. And the people have made the judgment: they have accepted the g
overnment of Pres. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so
that it is not merely a de facto government but it is fact and law a de jure gove
rnment.
Kinds of Gov t:
1. De jure = gov t which is exercising control and authority, but without legal ti
tle
2. De facto = a gov t which has a legal title but no control or authority
a. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or by
the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself ag
ainst the will of the latter.
b. That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country
who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
c. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and oc
cupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated as a
government of paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines establi
shed by the Japanese belligerent.
? The Arroyo gov t is legitimate bec.
o Estrada is permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office
considering the his economic advisers have resigned, PNP and military have withd
rawn their support... (Estrada v Desierto, GR # 146710-15; Estrada v. Arroyo, GR
# 146738, 3/2/2001)
o Totality of Act Rule = considered the official actions that happened recogniti
on of int l community and both houses has passed resolution confirming GMA s assumpt
ion
Judicial Process
Administrative
CA
Law 473 Process
RA 9139:
Administrative Naturalization of 2000
Qualifications
1.) AGE: age of majority in the country (18 years old)
(ARC-PEN)
2.) RESIDENCE: 10 years, 5 years if:
a. born in the Phil
b. married to a Filipino woman (if husband is Filipino, alien wife only needs an
adm. proceeding)
c. held office in the Gov t
d. been engaged as a teaching in the Phil (in a public or private school not est
ablished for the exclusive instruction of persons of a particular nationality or
race) or in any of the branches of education or industry from a period of not l
ess that 2 years
e. made a useful invention or industry
3.) CHARACTER:
a. good moral character
b. believes in the principles underlying the Phil Const
c. must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Phil in his relation with the constituted
gov t as well as the community in which he is living
4.) PROPERTY: own real estate in the Phil worth not less than P5,000 or must hav
e some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation
5.) EDUCATION:
a. petitioner = speak and write Filipino or English and any Phil. dialect
b. children = study in Phil. schools, not solely for the foreigners and for the
grade schools must teach Phil. government and Constitution.
6.) Not otherwise disqualified by law
1. AGE: age of majority at the time of filing (18 yrs old)
2. RESIDENCE: born and residing here since birth
3. CHARACTER: good moral character
4. PROPERTY: have a known trade, business, profession or lawful occupation (this
shall not apply to applicants who are college degree holders but are unable to
practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of th
eir citizenship)
5. EDUCATION: received primary and secondary education here and his minor childr
en are enrolled in Phil schools
6. able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippi
nes; and
7. must have mingled with the Filipinos
composition of Spcl. Committee on Naturalization:
Chair: Sol-Gen
Members:
Sec. of Foreign Affairs or rep.
a)
Disqualifications
NatPersons
l Security
opposed
Adviser
to organized government or affiliated with any association of
group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governme
nts;
b) Persons defending or teaching the propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;
c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
d) Persons convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;
e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines have not
mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire t
o learn and embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United State and the Philippine
s are at war during the period of such war; and.
h) Citizens or subject of a foreign country other than the United States, whose
laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects
thereof
a. file a Declaration of Intention before the Sol-Gen at least one year before f
Procedure
iling the petition for naturalization
b. file the Petition for Naturalization before the RTC
c. the Petition and order of trial should be published 6 months prior to the act
ual hearing
d. actual residence in the Phil during the entire period
e. hearing of the petition
f. promulgation of the decision
g. hearing after 2 years. During the 2-year probationary period the applicant ha
s:
(a) not left the Philippines,
(b) has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or profession
,
(c) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government pro
mulgated rules,
(d) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or co
ntrary to any Government announced policies.
h. Oath of allegiance before the RTC and issuance of Certificate of Naturalizati
on
1.) File a petition before the Special Committee on Naturalization. Pay a proces
sing fee of P40,000
2.) The petition shall be published and posted for 3 consecutive weeks.
3.) copies will be furnished to DFA, Bureau of Immigration, civil registrar, NBI
and within 30 days submit to the committee whether or not the petitioner has an
y record
4.) 60 days after receipt of report from other agencies, committee shall intervi
ew applicant
5.) committee will approve or deny the petition
6.) Applicant must pay P100,000 within 30 days from approval
7.) Take an oath of allegiance and certificate of naturalization will be issued
8.) Bureau of Immigration shall forward a copy of the oath to the proper local c
ivil registrar and cancel petitioner s ACR
Sec 3, Art IV: Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner pr
ovided by law.
Loss of Citizenship
1. naturalization in a foreign country
2. express renunciation of citizenship or
3. taking an oath of allegiance to another country upon reaching the age of majo
rity
4. render service in the armed forces of another country unless there is a defen
sive or offensive pact
5. denaturalization
Cases on Losing Phil Citizenship through Naturalization in a Foreign Country:
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC (June 23, 1989)
F: During martial law, Frivaldo went to the US and was naturalized as US Citizen
. He subsequently came back and ran for governor. He pleaded that his naturaliza
tion was only forced upon him.
H: Frivaldo is not a Fil citizen
Frivaldo's feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result o
f his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected o
utright. There were many other Filipinos in the US similarly situated as Frivaldo
, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary
-- nor do they claim to have been coerced -- to abandon their cherished status
as Filipinos.
If petitioner really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacqui
re Philippine citizenship, he should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA 63, as amended, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direc
t act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation Frivaldo claims he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims t
hat by actively participating in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of US. Such laws do not concern us here. It should be o
bvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture
did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in
he Philippines that he had earlier renounced.
Frivaldo v. Comelec ( June 28, 1996)
F: Frivaldo s repatriation was completed one day after he won as governor
H: The repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his appl
ication.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are sett
led exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REM
EDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.
If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Com
mittee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any
substantial length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo having already renounced his American citizenship was, may be prejudice
d for causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the law making
body intended right and justice to prevail.
Republic v. De la Rosa ( June 6, 1994)
F: Frivaldo s naturalization proceeding was railroaded to be on time for the deadl
ine of filing certificate of candidacy
H: Frivaldo is not a Filipino citizen
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thr
u naturalization under the Revised Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow t
he procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an applicant to decide fo
r himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or m
erely of nuisance value. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who w
as formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen. It does not
provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by
former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Ph
ilippine citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien.
Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC (Aug. 1, 1989)
F: Labo married an Australian and was naturalized as Australian citizen. He won
as mayor and contended that he did not lost his Phil citizenship at most, he has
dual citizenship
H: Labo is NOT a Fil citizen
There is no claim of finding that petitioner automatically ceased to be a F
ilipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he w
as naturalized as such through a formal and positive process. He formally took the
oath of allegiance and/or the affirmation of allegiance to Australia
Even if it be assumed that petitioner's naturalization was annulled after f
inding that his marriage to such Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance
alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. That is a matter b
etween him and his adopted country.
Labo, Jr. vs. Comelec (July 3, 1992)
F: Labo elected Phil citizenship and contends that he is now a Fil. citizen
H: Labo remains not a Filipino citizen
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterat
e, he (Labo) was disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election do
es not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which
is an indispensable requirement for holding public office.
Cases on Losing Phil Citizenship through express Renunciation or Expatriation:
Yu vs. Defensor-Santiago (January 24, 1989)
F: Willie Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport but he was subsequently
naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Subsequent to his naturalization, he still
used his Portuguese passport in his business dealings
H: Yu expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known
distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner,
with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citiz
enship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his pri
or status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passp
ort and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had beco
me a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portugu
ese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citiz
enship.
Aznar vs. Comelec (May 25, 1990)
F: Lito Osmea has Filipino parents yet he holds an Alien Certificate of Registrat
ion as US citizen
H: No sufficient evidence to prove that Osmea s not a Filipino
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present
direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of
the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by natur
alization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws
of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osm
ea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinab
ove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizen
s and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an American under the l
aws of the United States does not concern Us here.
Reacquisition of Citizenship:
Modes of Reacquiring Citizenship:
1) Repatriation = the acquisition or restoration of one s original citizenship. Me
re taking the oath of allegiance and registration with the civil registry. Cover
age:
a) desertion of the armed forces;
b) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in WWII
c) service in the armed forces of the US at any other time;
d) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
e) political and economic necessity
2) Naturalization = an abbreviated process though since residency is reduced to
6 months and there is no need to file a Declaration of Intent (also refer to RA
9139: Adm Naturalization Law of 2000)
3) Direct Act of Congress
4) RA 9225: Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 = they will re
-acquire their Fil citizenship
a) Coverage: former natural-born Filipino who lost their citizenship through nat
uralization in the foreign country (whether it was lost before or after this Act
)
b) Procedure: take an oath of allegiance
c) derivative citizenship to minor unmarried child of applicant
Effect: of RA 9225:
They will enjoy full civil and political rights but with ff. conditions:
1. those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must comply with RA 9189
or The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and other laws
2. those seeking elective public office must make a sworn renunciation of all fo
reign citizenship
3. those appointed to any public office must renounce the oath of allegiance the
y took from another country
4. those intending to practice their profession must apply for license
5. the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office cannot be e
xercised by those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which
they are naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the arm
ed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens
? Bec. of RA 9225, the ruling on Frivaldo, Labo were already abrogated (do not c
onfuse this w/ RA 9255 which allowed illegitimate children to use the surname of
their fathers)
Bengson v. HRET (142840; 5/7/2001)
F: Bengson served US Marine Corps thus lost his citizenship. He re-acquired it t
hough repatriation
H: Repatriated Filipinos are also considered natural-born
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This m
eans that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to hi
s prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was o
riginally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he w
ill be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Dual Allegiance
Sec 5, Art IV: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law.
Dual allegiance, that's how the Constitution is phrased. But in the LGC
it refers to dual citizenship. Dual allegiance is what is prevented under the C
onstitution not dual citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano (135083; 5/26/1999)
F: Edu Manzano is a Filipino born in the US. Since Sec 40 of LGC prohibits candi
dates with dual citizenship, he could not seat as vice mayor
H: the phrase dual citizenship refers to dual allegiance
The following classes of citizens of the Philippines may posses dual cit
izenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which foll
ow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter s country the former are co
nsidered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renou
nced Philippine citizenship.
Dual allegiance refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, b
y some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is in
voluntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual s volition.
For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the fil
ing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to ter
minate their status as person with dual citizenship.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time for
swear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereb
y terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of vie
w of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively r
enounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, p
rivate respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his Ame
rican citizenship The filing of such COC sufficed to renounce his American citize
nship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen
. (the oath of allegiance contained therein is enough)
By declaring in his Certificate of Candidacy that he is a Filipino citiz
en; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith
and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively re
pudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.
Sovereignty
Sovereign Immunity(Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty)
Sec 3, Art XVI: The State may not be sued without its consent.
Basis:
1. There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on whic
h the right depends. However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether expres
s or implied
2. practicality: to allow suits against the state will lessen governmental effic
iency since it will divert the state s time and resources
Republic vs. Villasor (November 28, 1973)
F: RTC judge garnished AFP funds deposited with the Phil. Veterans Bank
H: it cannot be garnished since it is still considered public property
Public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even if th
e consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability adjudge
d.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
`only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' a
nd that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since govern
ment funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishm
ent to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public poli
cy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropria
tion as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due government
employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of
garnishment.
When is a Suit against the State
(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is su
ch that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
TEST: if it will require affirmative action on the part of the State in form of:
1. appropriating funds to satisfy the judgment; or
2. it would mean loss of government property.
Begosa vs. Chairman, Phil. Veterans Administration (April 30, 1970)
F: Bank refused to release a retired army s pension
H: this is not a suit against the state since the money was already appropriated
It is well settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences
on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of proper
ty, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal capac
ity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked.
It has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionar
y had to be instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by
statute appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (July 10, 1991)
F: Cojuangco asks the gov t the let him examine the books of San Miguel since his
shares have been sequestered by the PCGG
H: this is not a suit against the state bec. it does not require appropriation o
f money or loss of gov t property
No, the doctrine of state immunity cannot apply here.
For one thing, the petition filed by respondent Cojuangco, Jr., before t
he Sandiganbayan demanded no affirmative performance by the State in its politic
al capacity which would otherwise call for the application of immunity from suit
.
Suits against Government Agency:
1. Incorporated (GOCC w/ or without a special charter) = has a charter of its ow
n that invest it with a separate juridical personality (ex. SSS, UP, PNB, City o
f Manila, municipal corp)
a. test of suability: found in its charter; SUABLE if its charter says so, regar
dless of the function it is performing
2. Unincorporated (Not a GOCC) = no separate juridical personality but is merged
in the general machinery of the gov t (ex. DOJ, Gov t Printing Office)
a. no charter to consult; any suit filed against it is necessary an action again
st the Phil gov t
b. determine the nature of functions: SUABLE if proprietary; NOT SUABLE if gover
nmental
c. If the proprietary and non-governmental function is taken as an incident to i
ts governmental function, immunity is not lost
Suits against Public Officers:
1. Immunity applies if the official acted within the scope of his authority
2. Immunity does not apply on unauthorized acts of gov t officials
a. when the act was ultra vires, or showed bad faith, malice or gross ne
gligence
b. public official was sued in his personal capacity
M.H. Wylie vs. Rarang (May 28, 1992)
F: Wylie supervised the publication of the "Plan of theDay"(POD) which was publish
ed daily by the US Naval Base Station. It carried an article that Auring is corr
upt. Since there is only one Auring in the office, Rarang then sued Wylie for li
bel.
H: Wylie is liable. The general rule is that public officials can be held personal
ly liable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official dutie
s where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad faith.
Indeed, the imputation of theft in the POD dated Feb. 3, 1978 is a defam
ation against the character and reputation of private respondent. Petitioner Wyli
e himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended
the deletion of the name "Auring" if the article were published. The petitioners
, however, are negligent because under their direction they issued the publicatio
n without deleting the name. Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be p
art of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private responde
nt.
U.S. vs. Reyes (March 1, 1993)
F: Montoya married an American serviceman. After buying items at the US Navy Exc
hange, she was searched thoroughly at the parking place before being allowed to
leave. She was the only person searched thus she sued Bradford, an American and
the activity exchange manager at the said JUSMAG Headquarters.
H: The case falls within the exception to the doctrine of state immunity.
The rule is that, if the judgment against such officials will require the
state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appro
priation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, this must
be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally include
d.
Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unautho
rized acts of government officials or officers by one whose rights has been invade
d or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against
the State within the rule of immunity of State from suit.
It is apparent from the complaint that Bradford was sued in her private or p
ersonal capacity for acts allegedly done beyond the scope and even beyond her place
of official functions, that is, outside the NEX-JUSMAG.
Republic vs. Sandoval (March 19, 1993)
F: heirs of the deceased of the Mendiola Massacre sued the military officers and
personnel involved in the incident based on Pres. Aquino s pronouncement that the
victims should be compensated
H: This is not a suit against the State ; public officials have acted beyond the
scope of their authority
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability
does not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel
, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the inci
dent occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded th
eir authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack of justification
by the government forces in the use of firearms. Moreover, the members of the p
olice and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited act under B.P. B
lg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the marchers.
Vidad vs. Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental (October 18, 1993)
F: public school teachers held a strike. They were administratively charged by D
ECS. Teachers then went to court and filed a petition for injunction which was g
ranted by the RTC. Teachers asked for damages since DECS officials acted in bad
faith and malice when they refused to release their benefits.
H: RTC has no jurisdiction
Public officials are certainly not immune from damages in their personal
capacities arising from acts done in bad faith; in these and similar cases, the
public officials may not be said to have acted within the scope of their offici
al authority, and no longer are they protected by the mantle of immunity for off
icial actions.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogat
e unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which
is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
Court cannot and will not determine a controversy involving a question w
hich is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal; hence, in the ins
tant case, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pe
nding the final action in the administrative proceedings
Lansang v. CA (February 23, 2000)
F: Blind operated a kiosks at Rizal Park through a verbal agreement by the forme
r chair of the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). Iglesia signed a con
sent but now contend he was tricked into signing it
H: Lansang is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his persona
l capacity. However, there is no evidence of such abuse of authority. Thus, no n
eed to pay damages to GABI.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed aga
inst public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule
is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction o
f the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itse
lf to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to p
ay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his offi
cial capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of others.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his
official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of
may have been committed while he occupied a public position.
Calub v. CA (115634; 4/27/2000)
F: petitioners are DENR employees. They impounded the vehicles of private respon
dent for carrying lumber without a license. PR thus filed a replevin suit agains
t them contending the DENR failed to follow its procedure. RTC & CA sided with P
R.
H: seizure was lawful; this is a suit against the State
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its c
onsent.. And a suit against a public officer for his official acts is, in effect
, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State ultimately liable
. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally
applies only to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith an
d without willfulness, malice or corruption. In the present case, the acts for w
hich the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the d
ischarge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in
nature. In implementing and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code
through the seizure carried out, petitioners were performing their duties and fu
nctions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their authority
. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the pet
itioners who represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper w
ithout the State s consent.
Suits against Foreign State:
1. other states can claim immunity because of incorporation of generally accepte
d principles of international law into our Constitution
a. if the contract want entered in their proprietary capacity = foreign state ca
n be sued
2. diplomatic immunity = immune because of agreement (like the Vienna Convention
) NOT bec. he represents his state
a. Consular Officers = only immune as to their official acts
b. Ambassadors and Head of State = they are immune as to all acts; thus if they
commit murder, they cannot be charged here
c. only diplomats are immune, ordinary embassy employees are not
3. International Organizations = they are immune if:
a. it is provided for by their agreements
b. they are created for non-political purpose
Southeast Asian Fisheries Development (SEAFDEC) vs. Acosta (September 2, 1993)
F: SEAFDEC employees sued their employer for being wrongfully terminated. SEAFDE
C is an international inter-government organization, composed of various Southea
st Asian countries
H: SEAFDEC is immune bec. of the agreement
SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity. The pur
pose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheries developmen
t in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the member governments of the C
enter, hereinafter called the 'Members', and through collaboration with internat
ional organizations and governments external to the Center. (Agreement Establish
ing the SEAFDEC, Art. 1; . . .) Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC
including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom fro
m control of the state in whose territory its office is located.
How is Consent Given
1.) express = can only be given by a law enacted by Congress; thus, an executiv
e issuance is not enough
a. ACT 3038: the gov t consents to be sued for any money claim arising from contra
ct, express or implied IF the party first presents his claim to the COA. Jurisdi
ction is the RTC where the claimant resides. If the decision is adverse to the g
ov t, the decision shall be forwarded to the Pres. who will include it on the annu
al budget
b. CA 327, amended by PD 1415:
2.) implied = State can be sued even without its consent
a. when the State initiates the litigation
b. when the State enters into a business contract
c. if it is inequitable for the government to claim immunity (ex. is when the go
v t expropriates property but failed to pay the owner)
Republic vs. Purisima (Aug. 31, 1977)
F: Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc filed a civil case for breach of contract again
st Rice & Corn Administration
H: Rice & Corn Adm. is immune; the consent to be sued to be effective must come f
rom the state through a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Ri
ce & Corn Administration.
Court has no jurisdiction to pass onthe meritsof a claim against any offic
e or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless co
nsent be shown. What is more, the position of the Republic has been forfeited wi
th the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the Constitution: ' The Stat
e may not be sued without its consent.'
Apparently, respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract betwe
en the private respondent Yellow Ball Freight and defendant Rice & Corn Administra
tion which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract withi
n the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise.
The consent, to be effective though, must come from the State acting through
uly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice & Corn Administratio
n agreed to had no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the
scope of his authority.
Republic vs. Feliciano (March 12, 1987)
F: the land owned by Feliciano was included as part of the land expropriated by
gov t for settlement purposes. This was based on Pres. Magsaysay s proclamation.
H: State is till immune; consent of the Republic cannot be derived from a procla
mation which is not a legislative act.
The complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under settled j
urisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consente
d to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory la
nguage too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant c
ase. Worse, the complaint itself fails to allege the existence of such consent.
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read f
rom the Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation "subject to pri
vate rights, if any there be."
We do not agree. No such consent can be drawn from the language of the P
roclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights from the reservation estab
lished by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the immunity o
f the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, wi
ll not be inferred lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreove
r, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sue
d must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be ma
de by an act of the legislative body.
Veterans Manpower & Protective Services, Inc. vs. CA (Sept. 25, 1992)
F: VMPSI is a security agency whose license was not renewed by PADPAO bec. it wa
s guilty of cut-throat competition. Thus it sued PADPAO.
H: This is a suit against the state without its consent; the memorandum was not
a valid consent
The PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA being instrumentalities of the national gover
nment exercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization
and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said of
ficial and agency may not be sued without the Government's consent.
The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authorit
y, hence, from a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. In the instant ca
se, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and the PADPAO did n
ot constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued; it was intended to profess
ionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as
the current rates of security services, clearly a governmental function. The e
xecution of said agreement is incidental to the purpose of RA 5487, as amended, which
is to regulate the organization and operation of private detective watchmen or s
ecurity guard agencies. The correct test for the application of state immunity is n
ot the conclusion of the contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.
Department of Agriculture (DA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (N
ovember 11, 1993)
F: DA paid the Sultan Security Agency for the security guards it provided yet th
e security guards were not paid.
H: This is a suit against the state (a suit against unincorporated gov t agency)
Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of
its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed
in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its prop
rietary capacity.
In this case, DA has not assumed a capacity apart from its being a gover
nmental entity when it entered into the contract
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Constitutional Law 1 Review
Emily Zen Chua
Carolyn