I.

PHILIPPINE LAND LAWS: HISTORY AND APPLICATION

A. The General Rules
The bedrock of all Philippine land laws is the Regalian Doctrine, which
is contained in Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It provides that all
lands of the public domain, except agricultural lands, belong to the State and
cannot be alienated. The doctrine, which was first enacted in the 1935 Constitu
tion, was adopted to preserve the State s natural resources and land in favor of F
ilipinos.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS

160 SCRA 228 (1988)
Facts: Jose dela Rosa sought to register a parcel of land. The land was divide
d into 9 lots. Lots 1-5 were purchased from Balbalio while Lots 6-9 were purcha
sed from Alberto. Both Balbalio and Alberto claim to have acquired the lots by
virtue of prescription.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Ato
k Big Wedge Corp. and the Bureau of Forestry Development. Benguet and Atok oppo
sed on the ground of valid mining claims, while the Bureau of Forestry objected
because the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera F
orest Reserve, hence, not subject to alienation.
The trial court denied the application. The CA reversed TC, affirming th
e surface rights of dela Rosa over the land while reserving the sub-surface righ
ts of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.
Held: Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property by virtue of their
respective mining claims.
Ratio:. While it is true that the property was considered forest land, they were
removed from the public domain and had become private properties from the perfe
ction of the mining claims of Benguet and Atok.
The evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submit
ted by dela Rosa was insufficient to support claim of ownership. Even if it be
assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of dela Rosa had really been in posses
sion of the property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mi
ning claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not.
The theory of the CA that the land is classified as mineral underneath an
d agricultural on the surface is erroneous. It is a well-known principle that t
he owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to every
thing underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height (Art. 437,
NCC). The rights over the land are indivisible and the land itself cannot be ha
lf agricultural and half mineral. The rule is, once minerals are discovered in
the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use ma
y be discontinued by the State (the Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land) to enable it to extr
act the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land
is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private property,
including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede t
he mining operations to be undertaken therein.
SUNBEAM CONVENIENCE FOODS, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
181 SCRA 443 (1990)
Facts. Director of Lands issued sales patent over two parcels of land in favor
of Sunbeam. After registration, the Register of Deeds issued OCT. Subsequently,
OCT was cancelled and TCTs were issued in favor of Coral Beach Dev t Corp. The R
epublic instituted before the CFI a civil action for reversion as the land was c
lassified as forest land.
Trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that since the titles s
ought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the Bureau of Land
s Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the disposition of
the land. CA set aside the Order of Dismissal and ordered presiding judge to r
eceive the answers of Sunbeam and Coral Beach in the action for reversion.
Ratio: The Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber and mineral land
s to the dominion of the State. Thus, before any land may be declassified from
the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultura
l or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rul
es on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the lan
d classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effe
ct so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public d
omain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not c
onfer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or patent
is part of the public forest.

Police Power
MINER S ASSOCIATION VS FACTORAN
240 SCRA 100 (1995)
FACTS: The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of tw
o Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders p
romulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers.
Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XI
I, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development
and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the Stat
e are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint ventur
e; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-
owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issu
ed on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned
"Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 27
9 where all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the ef
fectivity of the 1987 Constitution except small scale mining leases and those p
ertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20
) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within
one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines.
On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No.
82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Miner
al Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation." requiring the perso
ns or entities to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrati
ve Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed p
eriod shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims
ISSUE: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Phi
lippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Adm
inistrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Sectio
n 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administra
tive orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner con
tends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Ar
ticle III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative
Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining leases and other mining .
HELD: Well settled is the rule that regardless of the reservation clause, mining
leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Ex
ecutive Order No. 211 referred to in this petition, are subject to alterations t
hrough a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. The State, in the
exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the consti
tutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and
amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 4
63, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police power, being coexten
sive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest, extend
s to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which su
perseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to
carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

OPOSA VS FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792 (1993)
FACTS: The complaint was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit (minors and par
ents) and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the P
hilippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of th
e natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests. C
onsequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered ordering defendant, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country; (2) Cease and desist from re
ceiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreeme
nts."
HELD: All timber licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is only a license or privilege, which can be vali
dly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed."
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, th
e instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring th
e cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impai
rment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law
has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same can
not still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is be
cause by its very nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the r
ight of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health a
nd enhancing the general welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of
non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the pol
ice power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and gene
ral welfare. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for g
overnment cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detrim
ent of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equal
ly fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in th
e common interest.'" In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the polic
e power of the state

Social Justice
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. FUNTILAR (142 SCRA 57)
FACTS: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar and the Heirs of Felipe Rosete applied for the
registration of land in Mulanay, Quezon. Such parcel originally belonged to on
e Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession began sometime during her lif
etime and extended until she died in 1936. Sometime in 1940, the land was forfe
ited in favor of the Gov t for failure to pay real estate taxes but the same was r
edeemed in 1942 by one of the three children of Candida. The land now in disput
e was adjudicated to petitioners-respondents, as heirs of Fernandez. The Direct
or Lands and Dir. of Forest Dev t filed an opposition alleging that neither applic
ants nor their predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the land,
not having acquired the same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under th
e Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894; that neither have they been in open, continuos,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least 30 y
ears immediately filing the application; and that the land is a portion of the p
ublic domain belonging to the Republic.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the applicants. On appe
al, the Intermediate appellate Court affirmed the lower court s decision. Hence, t
his petition.
Issue: WON applicants-respondents have met the requirements of possession for a
t least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of their application in 1972 a
s to entitle them to registration
Held: Yes. The Court is satisfied from the evidence that long before her deat
h in 1936, Candid Fernandez already possessed the disputed property. This posse
ssion must be tacked to the possession of her heirs, through the administrator a
nd later, to the applicants-respondents who are her grandchildren. It would als
o be absurd under the circumstances that the government would order the forfeitu
re of the property if the property were a forestland.
As to petitioner s allegation that the land was unclassified public forest
until Sept. 15, 1953 when it was declared alienable and disposable, the Court sa
id that the Regalian doctrine must be applied together with the constitutional p
rovisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as
to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. A strict application of the Heirs o
f Amunategui vs. Dir. Of Forestry (applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public d
omain) is warranted whenever a part of the public domain is in danger of ruthles
s exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when a
n application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of act 49
6, as amended or the land Reg. Act and CA 141 or the Public Land Act, then their
provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their on implementation. T
he attempts of humble people to have disposable lands they have been tilling for
generations titled in their names should not only be viewed with understanding
but should, as a matter of policy, be encouraged.

REPUBLIC VS. CA (201 SCRA 3)

Private respondents, the Parans, are applicants for registration of a pa
rcel of land in La Trinidad, Benguet which they claim to have acquired from thei
r father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession th
ereof since time immemorial.. The Dir. of lands filed an opposition, alleging a
mong others, that the land is part of the public domain. The Office of the Prov
incial Fiscal likewise opposed the registration, stating that the land is within
the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated Feb
. 16, 1929. The trial court found in favor of the applicants. The Court of App
eals dismissed the appeal filed by the Sol Gen. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON land is part of the Cordillera Forest Reserve and hence not subject
to registration.
Ratio: The applicants are members of the Ibaloi tribe whose application for reg
istration should be considered as falling under Section 48 (c) of CA 141, said s
ubsection having been added by RA 3872 on June 18, 1964. Under the said section
, members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to la
nds of public domain, whether disposable or not. They may therefore apply for p
ublic lands although such are legally forest lands or mineral lands, so long as
such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. However, PD 1073 effective J
anuary 25, 1977 amended Section 48 (c), making the said provision applicable onl
y to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
It is important to note that the application of the Parans was filed in 1
970 and the land registration court affirmed their long-continued possession of
the lands in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48 (c) was in legal eff
ect. Private respondents imperfect title was perfected or vested by the required
period of possession prior to the issuance of PD 1073 thus, their right in resp
ect of the land they had possessed for 30 years could not be divested by said PD
. The Court stressed its pronouncement in Dir. of Lands vs. Funtilar that the R
egalian doctrine must be applied together with constitutional provisions on soci
al justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest
unfairness and injustice. The Declarations of Real Property submitted by appli
cants likewise indicated that the land had become suitable to agriculture. Clea
rly, the requirements of Section 48 (c) were satisfied.

Time Immemorial Possession

Time immemorial possession is deemed to be part of the general rule and
not an exception to the Regalian Doctrine. Land held under a concept of ownersh
ip since immemorial is deemed to have been private and therefore never to have c
ome within the ambit of the Regalian Doctrine.
CARINO VS. INSULAR GOV T
(41 PHIL 935)
FACTS: Plaintiff, an Igorot from Benguet, filed application to Phil. Court of l
and registration. For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris in 1899, th
e plaintiff and his ancestors had held the land as owners. They had been recogn
ized as owners by the Igorots. No document of title, however, was issued from t
he Spanish crown. The application was granted on 1904. On appeal to the CFI, on
behalf of the Gov t of the Phils. and also of the US, the application was dismiss
ed. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON plaintiff owns the land
Held: Yes. Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that never was brought under the
civil or military government of the Spanish crown. It seems probable, if not ce
rtain, that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone that province
the registration to which the plaintiff was entitled by Spanish laws, and which
would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been the tec
hnical position of Spain, it foes not follow that, in the view of the United Sta
tes, he had lost all the rights and was a mere trespasser when the present gover
nment seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial
of native titles throughout an important part of Luzon, at least, for the want o
f ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power
to enforce.
It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back
as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a clai
m of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way fr
om before the Spanish conquest and never to have been public land. If there is
doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefi
t of the doubt.
The older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for plaintiff indicate c
learly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of an
y royal grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native i
nhabitants of the Phils. Into trespassers or even into tenants at will.

ANKRON VS. GOV T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS (40 PHIL 10)

FACTS: Petitioner sought to register a parcel of land which he brought from the
Moros, which the latter formerly occupied, cultivated and planted under claim o
f ownership for more than 44 years. The only oppositor was the Director of Land
s, alleging that the land was property of the US under the control and administr
ation of the Gov t of the Phil. Islands. No proof whatsoever was offered by the o
ppositor. The lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel be registered in
Ankron s name subject however to the right of the government to open a road there
on. From that decree, the Dir. appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON applicant proved his possession and occupation in accordance with th
e provisions of section 54 (6) of act 926
Held: Yes. Under the said paragraph, the important requisites for registration
are: (1) that the land shall be agricultural public land as defined by the Act o
f Congress of July 1, 1902; and (2) that the petitioner, by himself or his prede
cessors-in-interest, shall have been in the open, continuos possession and occup
ation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years
next preceding the taking effect of the said Act.
In the present case the applicant proved and there was no effort to dispu
te said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and h
is predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a
period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action.
No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the rig
ht of the Moros to acquire absolute ownership and dominion of the land which the
y have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period
of years.
Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry or mineral is a qu
estion
to be settled in each particular case. The mere fact that land is a manglar (ma
ngrove swamp) is not sufficient in itself to show that it is agricultural, fores
try or mineral. It may belong to one or the other class. Considering that it i
s a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the public lands in the Phils.
are agricultural lands, the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of e
vidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands.
ABAOAG VS. DIR. OF LANDS
(45 PHIL. 518)
FACTS: Petitioners are among those Igorots who, in 1884, were given by the gobe
rnadorcillo and principalia of Sison, Pangasinan, a tract of land in order that
they may cultivate the same and increase the population of the said municipality
. At the time of delivery, said land was unoccupied and unimproved public land.
Said Bagos or Igorots entered upon said land, took possession of it and have con
tinued to live upon the same and have cultivated it since that date. In 1919, p
etitioner, et al. presented a petition for registration with the CFI of Pangasin
an. Oppositors filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that petitioners had n
ot presented proof sufficient to show that they are entitled to the registration
of the land. Said motion was granted. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON dismissal of the case was proper.
Held: No. No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia
of the town of Alava, now Sision, were not authorized in 1884, as representativ
es of the then existing Gov t, to give and to deliver the land in question to the
petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which the land was so given
. Neither was it denied that it was agricultural land. No pretension is made t
hat the land might not be registered under the Torrens system had the petitioner
s invoked the benefits of the public land law. No contention is made on the par
t of petitioners that they were ever given a title to the land. Their contentio
n is simply that they were given the land; that they accepted the same; that the
y lived upon the land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to th
e exclusion of all others for a period of about 39 years and that therefore they
are entitled to have the same registered under the Torrens system; that they ha
ve occupied and cultivated the same for a period sufficient to give them title a
nd to have the same registered. This is like the case of Carino vs. Insular Gov
ernment.
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754: Where such possessors shall not
be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that a
ncient possession as a valid title by prescription. To this, the Court added tha
t every presumption of ownership under the public land laws is in favor of the o
ne actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which
seeks to deprive him of it.
MANARPAAC VS. CABANATAN
(21 SCRA 743)
FACTS: Plaintiffs filed complaint against defendants, alleging that they have b
een, since time immemorial, in possession of two parcels of land, which were fra
udulently included in the free patent application of defendant. Cabanatan filed
a motion to dismiss. Such was granted by the lower court holding that the free
patent having been issued on November 3, 1959 and the first complaint was filed
on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree, was therefore filed mo
re than one year after the issuance of the patent. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: WON dismissal was proper
Held: No. From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears tha
t plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the dis
puted land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them
and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud and irregularity
, defendant succeeded in securing a certificate of title. The foregoing recital
of facts are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemoria
l, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domai
n, or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. Whe
ther this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately
determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opp
ortunity to adduce, their respective evidence.
The complaint likewise states a sufficient cause for action for recovery
of possession of the land. Settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowne
r whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another s name i
s, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring
an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the p
roperty has passed into the hands of innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

B. Exceptions
Mining Claims
REAVIS V. FIANZA
40 PHIL 1017 (1909)
The Philippine Act of 1902 provides, That where such a person or associati
on, they and their grantors have held and worked their claims for a period equal
to the time prescribed by the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands,
evidence of such possession and working of the claims for such period shall be
sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto under this Act, in the absen
ce of any adverse claim The period of prescription is ten years.
Fianza and his Igorot ancestors had been in possession of the land and ha
d been working their mining claims for more than 10 years but this was before th
e enactment of the Phil. Act of 1902. Reavis, an American, applied for a mining
patent over the same land during the effectivity of this law.
Reavis argued that first, ownership of the land surface does not automatically v
est ownership over the mining rights. Second, mines can only be acquired in acc
ordance with government-prescribed regulations. Therefore, Fianza had no legal
rights to the mines since there was no compliance with the procedural requiremen
ts laid down in the Phil. Act. of 1902. Furthermore, Fianza held no patent.
The Supreme Court did not deal squarely with the first argument. However
, the issue was somewhat more resolved in its disposition of the second argument
. It was held that Fianza and his ancestors have, through their possession of m
ore than 10 years under Spanish Law and their working of the mining claims withi
n such period, acquired ownership rights over the questioned land and the mining
claims. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent was held or applied fo
r by Fianza under the provisions of the Phil. Act of 1902 since the right to hav
e a patent that will confer title is also a right to have the thing.

MCDANIEL V. APACIBLE AND CUISIA

42 PHIL 749
On June 17, 1916, in accordance with the Phil. Act of 1902, McDaniel loc
ated 3 petroleum placer mineral claims in Tayabas. Notices of their location we
re recorded in the office of the mining recorder. Furthermore, there was contin
uous possession and annual assessment work over the said claims.
Act No. 2932 which was approved on August 31, 1920 provided that all publ
ic lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils and gas, on which no patent,
at the date this Act takes effect, has been issued, are hereby withdrawn from s
ale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and lease On Jun
e 18, 1921, in accordance with Act No. 2932, Cuisia applied with the Secretary o
f Agriculture and Natural Resources for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land th
at included McDaniel s 3 claims.
However, Actd No. 2932 further provided that parties having heretofore fi
led claims for any mineral lands containing said minerals, shall be given prefer
ence to lease their respective claims, provided they file a petition to that eff
ect within 6 months from the date of the approval of this Act. Therefore, all pa
rties having mineral claims prior to the approval of Act No. 2932 had until Feb.
28, 1921 to file a petition with the Government to lease the corresponding publ
ic lands. Otherwise, their preference over other applicants shall be forfeited.
McDaniel sought to prohibit the Government from granting Cuisia s lease ap
plication mainly on the argument that Act No. 2932 is unconstitutional since it
deprives him of his property without due process of law.
The Supreme Court sustained McDaniel s argument. It held that a perfected
, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tr
act from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remain
s valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. Su
ch perfected, valid and subsisting appropriation shall be deemed to have taken p
lace when all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral
placer claims have been complied with and the claims were never abandoned or for
feited. This is notwithstanding the fact that no patent has been issued since t
he right to a patent vests full equitable title with all the benefits, immunitie
s, and burdens of ownership. Furthermore, the claim and the location is perfect
ed not only against 3rd persons but also against the Government.
GOLD CREEK MINING CORP. V. RODRIGUEZ
(66 PHIL 259)
On Jan. 1, 1929, Gold Creek Mining Corp. located a mining claim in Bengu
et. Notice of the location was recorded in the office of the mining recorder.
Furthermore, there was continuous possession and annual assessment work over the
said claim. Before Nov. 15, 1935, the date of effectivity of the 1935 Const.,
Gold Creek Mining applied with the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce for a p
atent.
However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of t
he Bureau of Mines refused to approve the application on the ground that the iss
uance of the patent amounted to an alienation of natural resources which is proh
ibited under the Constitution.
The Supreme Court held that the patent must be issued. It is clear that
the 1935 Constitution prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the e
xception of public agricultural land. However, natural resources only includes mi
neral lands of the public domain and not mineral lands already withdrawn from th
e public domain prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Perfected, v
alid and subsisting mining claims prior to the 1935 Const., whether or not a pat
ent has been issued therefor, are included in the latter category. They are no
longer part of the public domain and therefore, are beyond the constitutional pr
ohibition on the alienation of natural resources.
STANDARD MINERAL PRODUCTS, INC. V. CA
Deeunhong was a registered owner of 120 hectares of land in Antipolo und
er a transfer certificate of title. Standard Mineral Products, Inc. undertook t
he prospecting and locating of a mining claim in the said land without first sec
uring written permission from Deeunhong. After locating a claim, SMPI applied
for a mining lease with the Bureau of Mines over a portion of the land, which wa
s opposed by the registerd owner.
In a separate civil case for reversion of the land to the State, it was
found that the land was essentially agricultural and not mineral land.
The Supreme Court held that SMPI is not entitled to the surface rights d
ue to its non-compliance with the Mining Act provision which requires written pe
rmission from the landowner prior to the prospecting and locating of mineral cla
ims. Such written permission must also accompany the application of a mining le
ase with the Bureau of Mines.

Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect Titles

SUSI V. RAZON AND DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 48 PHIL 427 (1925)
Susi and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, adve
rse and public possession since time immemorial in the concept of owner and for
value of a certain parcel of unregistered land in Pampanga. On the other hand,
Razon was able to purchase the same parcel of land from the Government for which
an original certificate of title was issued.
The Supreme Court held that Susi was the absolute owner and that the sal
e to Razon and the corresponding certificate of title issued in her name is null
and void. Reiterating the doctrine laid down in Carino v. Insular Govt., the S
upreme Court held that that there is a presumption juris et du jure that all the
necessary requirements have been complied with when there had been actual and p
hysical possession, personally or through predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively, and publicly since July
26, 1894 with a right to a certificate of title to said land. Therefore, by ope
ration of law, Susi had already acquired not only a right to a grant but a grant
from the Government much prior to the application of Razon. The questioned lan
d was already private and was not part of the public domain anymore . Therefore
, the Director of Lands no longer had any control or jurisdiction over Razon s app
lication.
MERALCO V. CASTRO-BARTOLOME
114 SCRA 799 (1982)
A certain parcel of land was possessed by Ramos since 1941. In 1947, Ra
mos sold the land to the Piguing spouses. IN 1976, the Piguing spouses sold the
land to MERALCO, a domestic corporation. Subsequently, MERALCO applied for the
registration of the parcel of land which was opposed by the Republic of the Phi
lippines.
The trial court dismissed MERALCO S application on the ground that it is n
ot qualified to apply for registration since the Public Land Act allows only Fil
ipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of their im
perfect titles to public land.
MERALCO argued that first, the questioned land was no longer public but
was now private land since its predecessors-in-interest had possessed such land
in the concept of owner for more than 30 years. Furthermore, it argued that it
invoked the provision of the Public Land Act in behalf of the Piguing spouses wh
o, as Filipino citizens, could secure judicial confirmation of their imperfect t
itle to the land.
The Supreme Scourt affirmed the dismissal of MERALCO s application. It he
ld that the questioned land was still public land and shall remain so until a ce
rtificate of title is issued to a Filipino citizen. Consequently, MERALCO, bein
g a juridical person, is therefore disqualified to apply for registration of suc
h public land.
The doctrine enunciated in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands that an op
en, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain sin
ce time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecesso
rs confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be p
ublic, cannot be properly invoked by MERALCO since its predecessors-in-interest h
ad not been in possession since time immemorial or beyond the reach of memory, i
.e. before 1880.
Citing Oh Cho, the Supreme Court held that the immediate predecessors-in
-interest must apply for registration of the land in order to secure a grant und
er the Public Land Act. Without such registration, the immediate predecessor-in
-interest did not have any vested right amounting to title which was transmissib
le.
NOTE: This ruling was subsequently overturned in the case of Director of Lan
ds v. IAC (Acme case).
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. IAC & ACME
146 SCRA 509 (1986)
In the case, the Supreme Court held that the ruling in the case of Meral
co v. Castro-Bartolome is no longer deemed to be binding. Notwithstanding the p
rohibition in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions against private corporations holdi
ng lands of the public domain except by lease not exceeding 1000 hectares, still
a private corporation may institute confirmation proceedings under Sec. 48(b) o
f the Public Land Act if, at the time of institution of the registration proceed
ings, the land was already private land. On the other hand, if the land was sti
ll part of the public domain, then a private corporation cannot institute such p
roceedings.
The correct rule is that alienable public land held by a possessor, pers
onally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusi
vely for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as
amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of sa
id period, ipso jure.
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS & PARAN
(AUGUST 21, 1991)
There is no question that a positive act (e.g., an official proclamation)
of the Executive Department of the Government is needed to declassify land whic
h had been classified as forestal and to convert it into alienable or disposable
lands for agricultural or other purposes. In the case of Director of Lands vs.
Funtilar, the Court considered the reports of the District Forester and the Dist
rict Land Officer as adequate proof that the land applied for was no longer clas
sified as forestal.
We consider and so hold that once a parcel of land Is shown to have been
included within a Forest Reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation
, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues
to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequen
t withdrawal therefrom or declassification is shown. A simple, unsworn statement
of a minor functionary of the Bureau of a minor functionary of the Bureau of Fo
rest Development is not, by itself, such evidence.

OH CHO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

75 PHIL 890 (1946)
The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act. No. 496) or should
it not be applicable to the case, then he would apply for the benefits of the P
ublic Land Act (C.A. 141)
The applicant failed to show that he has title that may be confirmed und
er the LRA. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purc
hase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be
time immemorial possession, which would justify the presumption that the land h
ad never been public land. The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in
1880.
As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is w
hether he is entitled to a decree of registration thereof under the provisions o
f the Public Land Act (C.A. 141). Under the provisions of the Act invoked by the
applicant, he is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot because he
is an alien.
The benefits provided in the Public Land constitute a grant or concessio
n by the State. Before they could acquire any right, the applicant s immediate pre
decessor in interest should comply with the condition precedent, which is to app
ly for the registration of the land of which they had been in possession at leas
t since July 26, 1894. This is the applicant s immediate predecessors in interest
failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the lot amounting to title w
hich was transmissible to the applicant. The only right is their possession of t
he lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be availed o
f by a qualified person buy not by the applicant, since he is disqualified.
Indigenous Peoples' Rights
PD 705
Forestry Reform Code
SECTION 52. Census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other
occupants and residents in forest lands. Henceforth, no person shall enter into
forest lands and cultivate the same without lease or permit.
A complete census of kaingineros, squatters, cultural minorities and other occup
ants and residents in forest lands with or without authority or permits from the
government, showing the extent of their respective occupation and resulting dam
age, or impairment of forest resources, shall be conducted.
The Bureau may call upon other agencies of the government and holders of license
agreement, license, lease and permits over forest lands to participate in the c
ensus.

RA 6657
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
SECTION 9. Ancestral Lands. For purposes of this Act, ancestral lands of ea
ch indigenous cultural community shall include, but not be limited to, lands in
the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and i
ts members: Provided, That the Torrens Systems shall be respected.
The right of these communities to their ancestral lands shall be protected to en
sure their economic, social and cultural well-being. In line with the principles
of self-determination and autonomy, the systems of land ownership, land use, an
d the modes of settling land disputes of all these communities must be recognize
d and respected.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the PARC may suspend the i
mplementation of this Act with respect to ancestral lands for the purpose of ide
ntifying and delineating such lands: Provided, That in the autonomous regions, t
he respective legislatures may enact their own laws on ancestral domain subject
to the provisions of the Constitution and the principles enunciated in this Act
and other national laws.
RA 6734
Organic Act for Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
SECTION 2. The Autonomous Region is a corporate entity with jurisdiction in
all matters devolved to it by the Constitution and this Organic Act as herein e
numerated:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family and property relations;
(5) Regional, urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
(9) Powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by the depart
ments of the National Government except:
(a) Foreign affairs;
(b) National defense and security;
(c) Postal service;
(d) Coinage, and fiscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration of justice;
(f) Quarantine;
(g) Customs and tariff;
(h) Citizenship;
(i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation;
(j) General auditing, civil service and elections;
(k) Foreign trade;
(l) Maritime, land and air transportation and communications that affect are
as outside the Autonomous Region; and
(m) Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the Region.

ARTICLE XI
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN, ANCESTRAL LANDS AND AGRARIAN REFORM
SECTION 1. Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional
Government shall undertake measures to protect the ancestral domain and the ance
stral lands of indigenous cultural communities.
All lands and natural resources in the Autonomous Region that have been possesse
d or occupied by indigenous cultural communities since time immemorial, except w
hen prevented by war, force majeure, or other forms of forcible usurpation, shal
l form part of the ancestral domain. Such ancestral domain shall include pasture
lands, worship areas, burial grounds, forests and fields, mineral resources, ex
cept: strategic minerals such as uranium, coal, petroleum, and other fossil fuel
s, mineral oils, and all sources of potential energy; lakes, rivers and lagoons;
and national reserves and marine parks, as well as forest and watershed reserva
tions.
Lands in the actual, open, notorious, and uninterrupted possession and occupatio
n by an indigenous cultural community for at least thirty (30) years are ancestr
al lands.
SECTION 2. The constructive or traditional possession of lands and resource
s by an indigenous cultural community may also be recognized subject to judicial
affirmation, the petition for which shall be instituted within a period of ten
(10) years from the effectivity of this Act. The procedure for judicial affirmat
ion of imperfect titles under existing laws shall, as far as practicable, apply
to the judicial affirmation of titles to ancestral lands.
The foregoing provisions notwithstanding, titles secured under the Torrens syste
m, and rights already vested under the provisions of existing laws shall be resp
ected.
SECTION 3. As used in this Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community"
refers to Filipino citizens residing in the Autonomous Region who are:
(1) Tribal peoples whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguis
h them from other sectors of the national community and whose status is regulate
d wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or r
egulations; and
(2) Bangsa Moro people regarded as indigenous on account of their descent fr
om the populations that inhabited the country or a distinct geographical area at
the time of conquest or colonization and who, irrespective of their legal statu
s, retain some or all of their own socioeconomic, cultural and political institu
tions.
SECTION 4. The customary laws, traditions, and practices of indigenous cult
ural communities on land claims and ownership and settlement of land disputes sh
all be implemented and enforced among the members of such community.
SECTION 5. The Regional Government shall require corporations, companies an
d other entities within the ancestral domain of the indigenous cultural communit
ies whose operations adversely affect the ecological balance to take the necessa
ry preventive measures and safeguards in order to maintain such a balance.
SECTION 6. Unless authorized by the Regional Assembly, lands of the ancestr
al domain titled to or owned by an indigenous cultural community shall not be di
sposed of to nonmembers.
SECTION 7. No portion of the ancestral domain shall be open to resettlement
by nonmembers of the indigenous cultural communities.
SECTION 8. Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional
Assembly shall enact an Agrarian Reform Law suitable to the special circumstance
s prevailing in the Autonomous Region.
ARTICLE XIII
ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
SECTION 1. Consistent with the Constitution and national policies, the Regi
onal Government may enact regional laws pertaining to the national economy and p
atrimony applicable and responsive to the needs of the Region. However, nothing
herein shall be construed as to authorize the Regional Government to require les
ser standards respecting the protection, conservation and enhancement of the nat
ural resources than those required by the National Government.
SECTION 2. Except for strategic minerals such as uranium, coal, petroleum,
and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy, as well a
s national reserves and aquatic parks, forest and watershed reservations as may
be delimited by national law, the control and supervision over the exploration,
utilization and development of the natural resources of the Autonomous Region is
hereby delegated to the Regional Government in accordance with the Constitution
and national laws.
The Regional Assembly shall have the authority to grant franchises and concessio
ns but the Regional Governor may, by regional law, be authorized to grant leases
, permits and licenses: Provided, That, any lease, permit, franchise or concessi
on shall cover an area not exceeding the limits allowed by the Constitution and
shall subsist for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years; Provided, furth
er, That existing leases, permits, licenses, franchises and concessions shall be
respected until their expiration unless legally terminated as provided by law;
and Provided, finally, That when the natural resources are located within the an
cestral domain, the permit, license, franchise or concession, shall be approved
by the Regional Assembly after consultation with the cultural community concerne
d.
SECTION 3. The exploration, development and utilization of natural resource
s, except those enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 2 hereof, shall be
allowed to all Filipinos and to private enterprises, including corporations, ass
ociations, cooperatives, and such other similar collective organizations with at
least sixty percent (60%) of their capital investment or capital stocks directl
y controlled or owned by Filipinos who are preferably residents of the Region.

SECTION 4. Small-scale mining shall receive support from and be regulated b

y the Regional Government, considering ecological balance, the safety and health
and the interest of the communities and the miners where such operations are co
nducted.
SECTION 5. The Regional Government may, in the interest of regional welfare
and security, establish and operate pioneering utilities. Upon payment of just
compensation, it may transfer the ownership of such utilities to cooperatives or
other collective organizations.
SECTION 6. The Regional Government may, in times of regional emergency decl
ared by the President, when the public interest so requires and under reasonable
terms and safeguards prescribed by the Regional Assembly, temporarily take over
 or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affec
ted with public interest.
SECTION 7. The Regional Assembly shall enact laws for the just compensation
, rehabilitation, relocation, and other similar measures of inhabitants adversel
y affected in the harnessing of natural and mineral resources in the Region.
The Regional Assembly shall likewise provide for the rehabilitation of the areas
affected by said harnessing of natural and mineral resources in the Region.
SECTION 8. The Regional Government shall actively and immediately pursue re
forestation measures to ensure that at least fifty (50%) of the land surface of
the Autonomous Region shall be covered with trees, giving priority to land strip
s along eighteen percent (18%) in slope or over by providing infrastructure, fin
ancial and technical support to upland communities especially the Lumads or trib
al peoples.
SECTION 9. The Regional Government shall prohibit the use, importation, dep
osit, disposal and dumping of toxic or hazardous substances within the Autonomou
s Region.
SECTION 10. The Regional Government shall adopt policies to promote profit s
haring and broaden the base of ownership of business enterprises.
SECTION 11. The Regional Government shall provide incentives, including tax
holidays, for investors in businesses that will contribute to the development of
the Region.
It shall provide the same incentives to all companies doing business in the Regi
on which reinvest at least fifty percent (50%) of their net profits therein, and
to all cooperatives which reinvest at least ten percent (10%) of their surplus
into socially-oriented projects in the Region.
SECTION 12. The Regional Government shall give priority to the establishment
of transportation and communication facilities for the economic development of
the region.
SECTION 13. In the delivery of power services, priority shall be given to pr
ovinces in the area of autonomy which do not have direct access to such services
.
SECTION 14. The Regional Government is hereby empowered to create pioneering
firms and other business entities needed to boost economic development in the R
egion.
Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquatic Resources
SECTION 15. The Regional Government shall recognize, promote and protect the
rights and welfare of farmers, farmworkers, fishermen and fishworkers, as well
as farmers, and fishworkers' cooperatives and associations.
SECTION 16. The Regional Government shall encourage agricultural productivit
y and promote a diversified and organic farming system.
SECTION 17. The Regional Government shall give top priority to the conservat
ion, protection, utilization and development of soil and water resources for agr
icultural purposes.
SECTION 18. The Regional Assembly shall enact on Aquatic and Fisheries Code
which shall enhance, develop, conserve and protect marine and aquatic resources,
and shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use o
f communal marine and fishing resources, including seaweeds. This protection sha
ll extend to offshore fishing grounds, up to and including all waters twelve (12
) nautical miles from the coastline of the Autonomous Region but within the terr
itorial waters of the Philippines, regardless of depth, the seabed and the subso
il that are included between two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general co
astline from points where the boundary lines of the Autonomous Region touch the
sea at low tide and a third line parallel to the general coastline.
Further, it shall provide support to subsistence fishermen through appropriate t
echnology and research, adequate financial, production and marketing assistance
and other services.
Fishworkers shall also receive a just share from their labor in the utilization
of marine and fishing resources.
Science, technology and other disciplines shall be developed and employed to pro
tect and maintain aquatic and marine ecology.
SECTION 19. The Regional Assembly may, by law, create a Bureau of Agricultur
e and Fisheries and define its composition, powers and functions.
Trade and Industry
SECTION 20. The Regional Government recognizes the private sector as the pri
me mover of trade, commerce and industry. It shall encourage and support entrepr
eneurial capability in the Region and shall recognize, promote and protect coope
ratives.
SECTION 21. The Regional Government shall promote and protect small and medi
um-scale cottage industries by providing assistance such as marketing opportunit
ies, financial support, tax incentives, appropriate and alternative technology a
nd technical training to produce semi-finished and finished products.
SECTION 22. The Regional Government shall give support and encouragement to
the establishment of banks in accordance with the principles of the Islamic bank
ing system, subject to the supervision by the central monetary authority of the
National Government.
SECTION 23. Subject to national policies, the Regional Government shall regu
late traditional barter trade and countertrade with neighboring countries.
SECTION 24. The Regional Government shall encourage, promote, undertake and
support the establishment of economic zones, industrial centers and ports in str
ategic areas and growth centers of the Region to attract local and foreign inves
tments and business enterprises.
SECTION 25. The Regional Government shall undertake measures to promote cons
umer education and to ensure that the rights, interests and welfare of the consu
mers are protected.
SECTION 26. The Regional Government shall promote the preferential use of la
bor and locally produced goods and materials by adopting measures to increase th
eir competitiveness.
SECTION 27. Subject to the Constitution and national policies, the Regional
Government shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within
its jurisdiction in accordance with its goals and priorities.
Tourism Development
SECTION 28. The Regional Government shall, with the assistance of the Nation
al Government and the participation of the private sector, develop tourism as a
positive instrument toward accelerated regional development. Tourism development
shall promote greater pride in and commitment to the nation: Provided, That the
diverse cultural heritage, and moral and spiritual values of the people in the
Autonomous Region shall be primarily considered and respected.
SECTION 29. The Regional Assembly may, by law, create a Tourism office, and
shall define its composition, powers and functions.
RA 7076
People's Small-Scale Mining Act
SECTION 7. Ancestral Lands. No ancestral land may be declared as a people's
small-scale mining area without the prior consent of the cultural communities c
oncerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as people's small-scal
e mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be given p
riority in the awarding of small-scale mining contracts.

RA 7586
National Integrated Protected Areas System
Sec 4
d. "Indigenous cultural community" refers to a group of people sharing common bo
nds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, and
who have, since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized a territory;
SECTION 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights Over Them. Ancestral lands and custom
ary rights and interest arising shall be accorded due recognition. The DENR shal
l prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral lands within protected are
as: Provided, That the DENR shall have no power to evict indigenous communities
from their present occupancy nor resettle them to another area without their con
sent: Provided, however, That all rules and regulations, whether adversely affec
ting said communities or not, shall be subjected to notice and hearing to be par
ticipated in by members of concerned indigenous community.
RA 7611
Palawan Strategic Environmental Plan
SECTION 11. Tribal Ancestral Lands. These areas, traditionally occupied by c
ultural minorities, comprise both land and sea areas. These shall be treated in
the same graded system of control and prohibition as in the others abovementione
d except for stronger emphasis in cultural considerations. The SEP, therefore, s
hall define a special kind of zonation to fulfill the material and cultural need
s of the tribes using consultative processes and cultural mapping of the ancestr
al lands.
RA 7942
Mining Act of 1995
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. As used in and for purposes of this Act, th
e following terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean:
(a) "Ancestral lands" refers to all lands exclusively and actually possessed
, occupied, or utilized by indigenous cultural communities by themselves or thro
ugh their ancestors in accordance with their customs and traditions since time i
mmemorial, and as may be defined and delineated by law.
SECTION 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. Mineral resources are owned by t
he State and the exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof s
hall be under its full control and supervision. The State may directly undertak
e such activities or it may enter into mineral agreements with contractors.
SECTION 16. Opening of Ancestral Lands for Mining Operations. No ancestral l
and shall be opened for mining operations without the prior consent of the indig
enous cultural community concerned.
SECTION 17. Royalty Payments for Indigenous Cultural Communities. In the eve
nt of an agreement with an indigenous cultural community pursuant to the precedi
ng section, the royalty payment, upon utilization of the minerals shall be agree
d upon by the parties. The said royalty shall form part of a trust fund for the
socioeconomic well-being of the indigenous cultural community.
SECTION 18. Areas Open to Mining Operations. Subject to any existing rights
or reservations and prior agreements of all parties, all mineral resources in pu
blic or private lands, including timber or forestlands as defined in existing la
ws, shall be open to mineral agreements or financial or technical assistance agr
eement applications. Any conflict that may arise under this provision shall be
heard and resolved by the panel of arbitrators.
SECTION 19. Areas Closed to Mining Applications. Mineral agreement or financ
ial or technical assistance agreement applications shall not be allowed:
(a) In military and other government reservations, except upon prior written
clearance by the government agency concerned;
(b) Near or under public or private buildings, cemeteries, archeological and
historic sites, bridges, highways, waterways, railroads, reservoirs, dams or ot
her infrastructure projects, public or private works including plantations or va
luable crops, except upon written consent of the government agency or private en
tity concerned;
(c) In areas covered by valid and existing mining rights;
(d) In areas expressly prohibited by law;
(e) In areas covered by small-scale miners as defined by law unless with pri
or consent of the small-scale miners, in which case a royalty payment upon the u
tilization of minerals shall be agreed upon by the parties, said royalty forming
a trust fund for the socioeconomic development of the community concerned; and
(f) Old growth or virgin forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves, wild
erness areas, mangrove forests, mossy forests, national parks, provincial/munici
pal forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird sanctuaries as defined by l
aw and in areas expressly prohibited under the National Integrated Protected Are
as System (NIPAS) under Republic Act No. 7586, Department Administrative Order N
o. 25, series of 1992 and other laws.
RA 8425
Social Reform Agenda
SECTION 4. Adoption and Integration of Social Reform Agenda (SRA) in the Na
tional Anti-Poverty Action Agenda. The National Anti-Poverty Action Agenda shall
principally include the core principles and programs of the Social Reform Agend
a (SRA). The SRA shall have a multi-dimensional approach to poverty consisting o
f the following reforms:
(1) Social dimension access to quality basic services. These are reforms whi
ch refer to equitable control and access to social services and facilities such
as education, health, housing, and other basic services which enable the citizen
s to meet their basic human needs and to live decent lives;
(2) Economic dimension asset reform and access to economic opportunities. Re
forms which address the existing inequities in the ownership, distribution, mana
gement and control over natural and man-made resources from which they earn a li
ving or increase the fruits of their labor;
(3) Ecological dimension sustainable development of productive resources. Re
forms which ensure the effective and sustainable utilization of the natural and
ecological resource base, thus assuring greater social acceptability and increas
ed participation of the basic sectors in environmental and natural resources con
servation, management and development;
(4) Governance dimension democratizing the decision-making and management pr
ocesses. Reforms which enable the basic sectors to effectively participate in de
cision-making and management processes that affect their rights, interests and w
elfare.
The SRA shall focus on the following sector-specific flagship programs:
(1) For farmers and landless rural workers agricultural development;
(2) For the fisherfolk fisheries and aquatic resources conservation, managem
ent and development;
(3) For the indigenous peoples and indigenous communities respect, protectio
n and management of the ancestral domains;
(4) For workers in the informal sector workers' welfare and protection;
(5) For the urban poor socialized housing; and
(6) For members of other disadvantaged groups such as the women, children, y
outh, persons with disabilities, the elderly, and victims of natural and man-mad
e calamities the Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS).
Additionally, to support the sectoral flagship programs, the following cross-sec
toral flagships shall likewise be instituted:
(1) Institution-building and effective participation in governance;
(2) Livelihood programs;
(3) Expansion of micro-credit/microfinance services and capability building;
and
(4) Infrastructure buildup and development.

ON LEGAL MYTHS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: RE-EXAMINING CARINO VS. INSULAR GOVERNMEN
T
(MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN)
Concept of Ownership
There is nothing necessary or natural in ownership, as it is understood
now under our Phil. Legal System. The concept of property and ownership arise a
nd take shape not because of any physical or material attribute of the thing bei
ng owned. Rather, these concepts are reflections of human associations in relat
ion to things. In other words, specific cultures create their own set of proper
ty relationships. Under the Civil Code, one is said to own a piece of land when
he exercise, to the exclusion of all others, the right to use, enjoy its fruits
and alienate or dispose of it in any manner not prohibited by law. Among the i
ndigenous, unwesternized or unHispanized Phil. Population, there is no such conc
ept of individual and exclusive ownership of land. Ownership more accurately ap
plies to the tribal right to use the land or territorial control. Ownership is
tantamount to work. At best, people consider themselves as 'secondary owners'
or stewards of the land, since beings of the spirit world are considered as the
true and primary or reciprocal owners of the land. There is also the concept of
trusteeship since not only the present generation but also the future ones poss
ess the right to the land.
The Relevance of Legal Issues: Carino Revisited
In a paper written by the Cordillera Studies Program, they point out tha
t the Ibaloi, where Carino belonged, had no concept of exclusive or alienable ow
nership. Ownership, as we understand it, was only a relatively new development
and which by custom applied only to pasture land. The court focused only on the
issue whether plaintiff owned the land, without focusing on the kind of propert
y tenure Carino had with respect to the land. The law, which the judge was impl
ementing, was simply not equipped to assist him discover this important point.
 The ruling in Carino is so broad that when used indiscriminately as the
sole ground to recognize and protect ancestral domains it will work a contradict
ion. At the same time that it provides an avenue to protect native titles, it ope
ns floodgates for enterprising lowlanders to take advantage of the uplander s lega
l ignorance. Their land become as alienable as any other property as conceived
by the national legal system.
The Attempt to entrench Carino as a statutory doctrine
The subsequent attempt at statutory articulation like the Public Land Ac
t, Sec. 48 (c) of CA 141 and RA 3872 only worsened the situation. They seem to
build up on the Carino doctrine. The truth is that its concept is totally diffe
rent. First, unlike Carino, the provisions do not require possession by individ
uals under a claim of private ownership for as far back as testimony or memory go
es. A mere thirty years possession is sufficient. Second, Carino establishes th
e precedent that the native tittle is presumed never to have been public. Sec. 48
of CA 141 starts from the presumption that the land is initially part of the pu
blic domain. Like Carino however, the concept of ownership remains. The prevai
ling rule is that the lapse of 30 years adverse possession is enough to vest tit
le ipso facto. Judicial confirmation is only a formality.
These rights however, can work against indigenous peoples. First, the r
ecognition of his native title has served to make his land alienable in every sens
e provided by the national legal system. Its disposition is not confined only t
o members of his kin or of his village. Ironically, while reiterating native righ
t to ancestral land, the decisions make it possible for a private corporation to
acquire the land from the indigenous holder just what happened in the case of A
cme. Second, the awareness of the rights provided by the outsider s laws will def
initely be a tempting opportunity for a member of a community to treat land, not
as something that sustains life that should be revered, but as a commodity that
could be sold for profit.
The Bias against indigenous concept of ownership
Other laws applicable to indigenous cultural communities reveal a simila
r bias against indigenous concept of ownership the constitution notwithstanding.
The concept of private right as defined in the Revised Forestry Code excludes
orchards and forests since they are plantations of forest and trees of economic v
alue. The Kalinga, however, would own the residential area, the sacred shrine, the
burial grounds and possibly the rice terraces. Likewise, a large part of the a
ncestral domain is expressly excluded by the provision which reads: No land of th
e public domain 18% in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and dispos
able It is obvious that in Gran Cordillera, which is so mountainous, virtually al
l populated areas under this provision are inalienable and indisposable, such th
at the land cannot be owned by the inhabitants thereof.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (MARVIC LEONEN)
On October 29, 1997, the President signed into law Republic Act No. 8371
, otherwise known as the Indigenous People s Rights Act of 1997. Formally, the la
w is the legislature s interpretation of some key provisions of the Constitution d
irectly relating to indigenous peoples particularly Sec. 22, Article II and Sec.
5, Article XII. IPRA implements these provisions in the following ways:
Civil and Political Rights
Foremost in the law is its recognition of the right to on-discrimination
of indigenous peoples (IPs). Discrimination against the cultural minority, as sh
own in the cases of People vs. Cayat and Rubi vs. Provincial Board are not only
archaic but also outlawed. IPs are entitled to the same rights and privileges a
s citizens and should not be discriminated against in a any form of employment a
nd should receive more appropriate forms of basic services. The new law even go
es further to ensure the rights of women, children and civilians in situations o
f armed conflict. There is also recognition of IPs right to self-governance. L
ikewise, the new law defines more precisely the concept of customary law, which
will be used not only to arrive at an amicable settlement but also to process it
in an acceptable manner that is, the offended party may opt to use the customar
y processes rather than have the offender prosecuted in the courts of law.
Social and Cultural Rights
IPRA requires that the educational system should become relevant to the
needs of children and young people as well as provide them with cultural opportu
nities. Cultural diversity is recognized. The rights to religion as well as to
cultural sites and ceremonies are guaranteed. It is now unlawful to excavate a
rchaeological sites in order to obtain materials of cultural value as well as de
face or destroy artifacts.
Recognizing Right and Tenure
to Natural Resources
IPRA supplements the private vested rights recognized by the Constitutio
n by the operation of Carnino, through rights acquired under the Public Land Act
and other similar laws. It also creates by law other sources as well as a diff
erent concept of ownership. By legislative fiat, ancestral domains and ancestra
l lands are now legitimate ways of acquiring ownership. Unlike emphasis on indi
vidual and corporate holders in the Civil Code, IPRA emphasizes private but commu
nity property nature of ancestral domains. Aside from not being a proper subject
of sale or any other mode of disposition, ancestral domain holders may claim ow
nership over the resources within their territory, develop the land and natural
resources, stay in the territory, have the rights against involuntary displaceme
nt, regulate the entry of migrants, have rights to safe and clean air and water,
claim parts of reservations and use customary law to resolve their conflicts.
These rights however need to be qualified by the ff. provisions: 1) Sec. 56: Exi
sting Property Rights Regimes; 2) Sec. 57: Granting only priority rights to memb
ers of indigenous cultural communities; and 3) Sec. 58: Allows the use of ancest
ral domains as critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness,
protected areas when deemed appropriate and with the full participation of the
ICCs/IPs concerned.
Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
This will act as a mechanism to coordinate implementation of the law as
well as a final authority that has jurisdiction to issue Certificates of Ancestr
al Domains/Land Titles.
THE POLICY CONTEXT
This includes the direct action taken by the communities themselves to w
ard off encroachments into their territory and threatening their existence, as a
ssisted/organized by various POs and NGOs. There are also various responses fro
m post EDSA governments which reveal the extent of advocacy for indigenous peopl
es rights. Lastly, there is the pressure from international funding institution
s like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Funding for projects had
a lot to do with the changing attitude of the government relinquishing control o
ver large portions of the public domain and recognizing rights of upland migrant
s.
THE DANGERS
IPRA is not the solution to the various problems of IPs. Being a nation
al law, it is too general to address the diversity of the indigenous communities
. The premise of national law is that it can meet local problems with generaliz
ed solutions. The premise of cultural diversity is able to find creative and un
ique approaches to the issues as they define them. The law can also be diversio
nary. It can involve peoples and communities into concerns and activities which
may far be removed from those which might better address their concerns bureauc
ratisation. Lastly, the present language and the new concept of IPRA encourage
litigation. Even those situations where the law prescribes customary law will r
equire some form of litigation to determine for instance whether a particular fo
rm is customary, to whom it will apply, etc. Normally, it is the party that has
the most resources that has the greater possibility of getting a better judgmen
t. Bsid4es, courts of law provide a culture that is radically different from th
at of the indigenous community.
THE POTENTIALS
Our own experience has shown that the laws even when they find their way
to hegemony, is not a monolith that could not be challenged. It adjusts to pol
itical advocacy. They also provide for the condition for change. The use of la
w in many situations of IPs therefore should be marginal. Important but margina
l nonetheless. Advocates need to be more strategic to understand the long term
needs and aspirations of the community as the latter defines them. The challeng
e for advocates is to know when to use the law, not so much to maintain the stat
us quo, but to gain leverage for a more just and fundamental change. Its potent
ial lies not in what it really contains, but in how we decide and when to use it
.
How is IPRA different from Carino?
(1) Carino does not distinguish between ancestral land and ancestral domain. IP
RA does, however.
(2) Carino refers only to land. IPRA refers to land as well as the natural reso
urces above and below it.
(3) IPRA is applicable only to indigenous peoples. Carino applies to all person
s who can prove that their predecessors-in-interest occupied lands since time im
memorial.

II. LAND CLASSIFICATION

Lands of the public domain are classified into 4 categories:
(1) Agricultural land
(2) Forest or timber land
(3) Mineral land
(4) National parks

THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE XII
National Economy and Patrimony
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, for
est or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the publ
ic domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may
be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultura
l lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five yea
rs, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousan
d hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hun
dred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, hom
estead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and develo
pment, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall de
termine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, d
eveloped, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Section 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the sp
ecific limits of forest lands and national parks, marking clearly their boundari
es on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall be cons
erved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall
provide, for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in e
ndangered forests and watershed areas.

A. Classes of Lands
Public Agricultural Lands
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141*
AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture a
nd Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain int
o
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to a
nother, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alien-able or
disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession under this Act.
SEC. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timb
er nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for comm
ercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, and is
open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the pro-visions o
f this chapter and not otherwise.
SEC. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as fol
lows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filing, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or ba
nks of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

MONTANO V. INSULAR GOVERNMENT

12 PHIL. 572
Lands under the ebb and flow of the tide, being reserved for public uses
of navigation and fishery and subject to Congressional regulation, are not under
stood as included in the term "public lands" when used in general laws authorizi
ng private appropriation thereof as homesteads or otherwise. Swamps and marshes
not available for the purpose of navigation or public uses may be subjected to p
rivate appropriation although covered by the tides.
Of this character are the manglar or mangrove swamps of the Philippine Is
lands in which grow aquatic trees cultivated and in common use for domestic or c
ommercial purposes. Such manglares when converted by man into fisheries and used
as such for the statutory period are the subject of private ownership.
JOCSON V. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY
39 PHIL. 560
That manglares are not forestry lands, within the meaning of the words "t
imber lands" in the Act of Congress, has been definitely decided by this court i
n the case of Montano vs. Insular Government. Whatever may have been the meanin
g of the term "forestry" under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress of July 1st,
1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral
or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands
are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps
, manglares [mangroves], fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
ANKRON V. GOVERNMENT
40 PHIL. 10 (1919)
The Torrens system does not provide for registration of public forestry a
nd mineral lands. Under certain conditions, public agricultural lands may be reg
istered. (Sec. 54, Act No. 926.)
Considering that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of th
e lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, the courts have a righ
t to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the
lands are agricultural lands. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon
it or has mineral wealth within it, is not in itself sufficient to declare that
one is forestry land and the other mineral land. There must be some proof of th
e extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the mineral. The pro
of must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the minerals which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes.
Whether the particular land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a que
stion to be settled in each particular case, unless the Bureau of Forestry has,
under the authority conferred upon it, prior to the intervention of private inte
rests, set
aside for forestry or mineral purposes the particular land in question.
HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI V. DIRECTOR
126 SCRA 69
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not l
ose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it
of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of
the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other tr
ess growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain
, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
Possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private o
wnership. A positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is cla
ssified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricu
ltural or other purposes.
REPUBLIC V. DE PORKAN
151 SCRA 88
It is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Govern
ment to classify public lands. The classification is descriptive of its legal n
ature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually lo
oks like. Since the disputed tract of public land is neither timber nor mineral
lands, the same is alienable or open to disposition as public agricultural land
s, under Section 11, C.A. 141 thru homestead settlement or free patent.
Where the possession of a public land dates back to the time of the Spanish
colonial period, such possession of the said tract of public land has attained
the character and duration prescribed by law as the equivalent of an express gra
nt from the Government. The mandate of the law itself is that the possessors "sh
all be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title" and by legal
fiction, the land ceases to be public and thus becomes private land. Title over
the land has vested on the possessor so as to segregate the land from the mass o
f the public domain. It is not necessary that a certificate of title should be i
ssued in order that said grant may be sustained by the courts, an application th
erefor being sufficient.
When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which ent
itle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested
interest therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof, and onc
e the right to a patent has become vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is
equivalent to a patent actually issued. From that point the land ceases to be p
art of the public domain and becomes private. The Director of Lands is divested
of control and possession when homestead applications are approved and recorded
.
Forest Lands
May 19, 1975
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 705
FORESTRY REFORM CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Sec. 15. Topography. - No land of the public domain eighteen per cent (18
%) in slope or over shall be classified as alienable and disposable, nor any for
est land fifty per cent (50%) in slope or over, as grazing land.
Lands eighteen per cent (18%) in slope or over which have already been de
clared as alienable and disposable shall be reverted to the classification of fo
rest lands by the Department Head, to form part of the forest reserves, unless t
hey are already covered by existing titles or approved public land application,
or actually occupied openly, continuously, adversely and publicly for a period o
f not less than thirty (30) years as of the effectivity of this Code, where the
occupant is qualified for a free patent under the Public Land Act: Provided, Tha
t said lands, which are not yet part of a well-established communities, shall be
kept in a vegetative condition sufficient to prevent erosion and adverse effect
s on the lowlands and streams: Provided, further, That when public interest so r
equires, steps shall be taken to expropriate, cancel defective titles, reject pu
blic land application, or eject occupants thereof.
Sec. 16. Areas needed for forest purposes. - The following lands, even if
they are below eighteen per cent (18%) in slope, are needed for forest purposes
, and may not, therefore, be classified as alienable and disposable land, to wit
:
1) Areas less than 250 hectares which are far from, or are not contiguous w
ith, any certified alienable and disposable land;
2) Isolated patches of forest of at least five (5) hectares with rocky terr
ain, or which protect a spring for communal use;
3) Areas which have already been reforested;
4) Areas within forest concessions which are timbered or have good residual
stocking to support an existing, or approved to be established, wood processing
plant;
5) Ridge tops and plateaus regardless of size found within, or surrounded w
holly or partly by, forest lands where headwaters emanate;
6) Appropriately located road-rights-or-way;
7) Twenty-meter strips of land along the edge of the normal high waterline
of rivers and streams with channels of at least five (5) meters wide;
8) Strips of mangrove or swamplands at least twenty (20) meters wide, along
shorelines facing oceans, lakes, and other bodies of water, and strips of land
at least twenty (20) meters wide facing lakes;
9) Areas needed for other purposes, such as national parks, national histor
ical sites, game refuges and wildlife sanctuaries, forest station sites, and oth
ers of public interest; and
10) Areas previously proclaimed by the President as forest reserves, nationa
l parks, game refuge, bird sanctuaries, national shrines, national historic site
s:
Provided, That in case an area falling under any of the foregoing categories sha
ll have been titled in favor of any person, steps shall be taken, if public inte
rest so requires, to have said title cancelled or amended, or the titled area ex
propriated.

Mineral Lands
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7942
Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in and for purposes of this Act, the foll
owing terms, whether in singular or plural, shall mean:
(aa) "Minerals" refers to all naturally occurring inorganic substance in soli
d, gas, liquid, or any intermediate state excluding energy materials such as coa
l, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials, and geothermal energy.
(ab) "Mineral agreement" means a contract between the government and a contra
ctor, involving mineral production-sharing agreement, co-production agreement, o
r joint-venture agreement.
(ac) "Mineral land" means any area where mineral resources are found.
(ad) "Mineral resource" means any concentration of minerals/rocks with potent
ial economic value.
(ae) "Mining area" means a portion of the contract area identified by the con
tractor for purposes of development, mining, utilization, and its sites for supp
ort facilities or in the immediate vicinity of the mining operations.
(af) "Mining operation" means mining activities involving exploration, feasib
ility, development, utilization, and processing.

National Parks
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7586
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
Sec. 4. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms sha
ll be defined as follows:
(b) "Protected area" refers to identified portions of land and water set asi
de by reason of their unique physical and biological significance, managed to en
hance biological diversity and protected against destructive human exploitation;

(c) "Buffer zones" are identified areas outside the boundaries of and immedi
ately adjacent to designated protected areas pursuant to Section 8 that need spe
cial development control in order to avoid or minimize harm to the protected are
a;
(e) "National park" refers to a forest reservation essentially of natural wi
lderness character which has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy or any fo
rm of exploitation except in conformity with approved management plan and set as
ide as such exclusively to conserve the area or preserve the scenery, the natura
l and historic objects, wild animals and plants therein and to provide enjoyment
of these features in such areas;
(f) "Natural monument" is a relatively small area focused on protection of s
mall features to protect or preserve nationally significant natural features on
account of their special interest or unique characteristics;
(g) "Natural biotic area" is an area set aside to allow the way of life of s
ocieties living in harmony with the environment to adopt to modern technology at
their pace;
(h) "Natural park" is a relatively large area not materially altered by huma
n activity where extractive resources uses are not allowed and maintained to pro
tect outstanding natural and scenic areas of national or international significa
nce for scientific, educational and recreational use;
(i) "Protected landscapes/seascapes" are areas of national significance whic
h are characterized by the harmonious interaction of man and land while providin
g opportunities for public enjoyment through recreation and tourism within the n
ormal lifestyle and economic activity of these areas;
(j) "Resources reserve" is an extensive and relatively isolated and uninhabi
ted are normally with difficult access designated as such to protect natural res
ources of the area for future use and prevent or contain development activities
that could affect the resource pending the establishment of objectives which are
based upon appropriate knowledge and planning;
(k) "Strict nature reserve" is an area possessing some outstanding ecosystem
, features and/or species of flora and fauna of national scientific importance m
aintained to protect nature and maintain processes in an undisturbed state in or
der to have ecologically representative examples of the natural environment avai
lable for scientific study, environmental monitoring, education, and for the mai
ntenance of genetic resources in a dynamic and evolutionary state;
(l) "Tenured migrant communities" are communities within protected areas whi
ch have actually and continuously occupied such areas for five (5) years before
the designation of the same as protected areas in accordance with this Act and a
re solely dependent therein for subsistence; and
(m) "Wildlife sanctuary" comprises an area which assures the natural conditi
ons necessary to protect nationally significant species, groups of species, biot
ic communities or physical features of the environment where these may require s
pecific human manipulation for their perpetuation.
Sec. 5. Establishment and Extent of the System. - The establishment and operatio
nalization of the System shall involve the following:
(a) All areas or islands in the Philippine proclaimed, designated or set asi
de, pursuant to a law, presidential decree, presidential proclamation or executi
ve order as national park, game refuge, bird and wildlife sanctuary, wilderness
are, strict nature reserve, watershed, mangrove reserve, fish sanctuary, natural
and historical landmark, protected and managed landscape/seascapes as well as i
dentified virgin forests before the effectivity of this Act are hereby designate
d as initial components of the System. The initial components of the System shal
l be governed by existing laws, rules and regulations, not inconsistent with thi
s Act;
(b) Within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall sub
mit to the Senate and the House of Representatives a map and legal description o
r natural boundaries of each protected area initially comprising the System. Suc
h maps and legal descriptions shall, by virtue of this Act, constitute the offic
ial documentary representation of the entire System, subject to such changes as
Congress deems necessary;
(c) All DENR records pertaining to said protected areas, including maps and
legal descriptions or natural boundaries, copies of rules and regulations govern
ing them, copies of public notices of, and reports submitted to Congress regardi
ng pending additions, eliminations, or modifications shall be made available to
the public. These legal documents pertaining to protected areas shall also be av
ailable to the public in the respective DENR Regional Offices, Provincial Enviro
nment and Natural Resources Offices (PENROs) and Community Environment and Natur
al Resources Offices (CENROs) where NIPAS areas are located;
(d) Within three (3) years from the effectivity of this Act, the DENR shall
study and review each area tentatively composing the System as to its suitabilit
y or nonsuitability for preservation as protected area and inclusion in the Syst
em according to the categories established in Section 3 hereof and report its fi
ndings to the President as soon as each study is completed. The study must inclu
de in each area:
(1) A forest occupants survey;
(2) An ethnographic study;
(3) A protected area resource profile;
(4) Land use plans done in coordination with the respective Regional Develop
ment Councils; and
(5) Such other background studies as will be sufficient bases for selection.

The DENR shall:

(i) Notify the public of the proposed action through publication in a newspa
per of general circulation, and such other means as the System deems necessary i
n the area or areas in the vicinity of the affected land thirty (30) days prior
to the public hearing.
(ii) Conduct public hearing at the locations nearest to the area affected;
(iii) At the least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing advise all lo
cal government units (LGUs) in the affected areas, national agencies concerned,
people's organizations and nongovernment organizations and invite such officials
to submit their views on the proposed action at the hearing not later than thir
ty (30) days following the date of the hearing; and
(iv) Give due consideration to the recommendations at the public hearing; and
provide sufficient explanation for his recommendations contrary to the general
sentiments expressed in the public hearing;
(e) Upon receipt of the recommendations of the DENR the President shall issu
e a presidential proclamation designating the recommended areas as protected are
as and providing for measures for their protection until such time when Congress
shall have enacted a law finally declaring such recommended areas as part of th
e integrated protected area system; and
(f) Thereafter, the President shall send to the Senate and the House of Repr
esentatives his recommendations with respect to the designations as protected ar
eas or reclassification of each area on which review has been completed, togethe
r with maps and legal description of boundaries. The President, in his recommend
ation, may propose the alteration of existing boundaries of any or all proclaime
d protected areas, additional of any contiguous area of public land of predomina
nt physical and biological value. Nothing contained herein shall limit the Presi
dent to propose. as part of this recommendation to Congress, additional areas wh
ich have not been designated, proclaimed or set aside by law, presidential decre
e, proclamation or executive order as protected area/s.
Sec. 6. Additional Areas to be Integrated to the System. - Notwithstanding the e
stablishment of the initial component of the System, the Secretary shall propose
the inclusion in the System of additional areas with outstanding physical featu
res, anthropological significance and biological diversity in accordance with th
e provisions of Section 5(d).
Sec. 7. Disestablishment as Protected Area. - When in the opinion of the DENR a
certain protected area should be withdrawn or disestablished, or its boundaries
modified as warranted by a study and sanctioned by the majority of the members o
f the respective boards for the protected area as herein established in Section
11, it shall, in turn, advice Congress. Disestablishment of a protected area und
er the System or modification of its boundary shall take effect pursuant to an a
ct of Congress. Thereafter, said area shall revert to the category of public for
est unless otherwise classified by Congress: Provided, however, That after dises
tablishment by Congress, the Secretary may recommend the transfer of such disest
ablished area to other government agencies to serve other priority programs of n
ational interest.

B. The Power to Classify Lands

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
Title XIV - ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department shall:
(10) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to:
(a) Accelerate cadastral and emancipation patent surveys, land use planning and
public land titling:
(13) Assume responsibility for the assessment, development, protection, licen
sing and regulation as provided for by law, where applicable, of all energy and
natural resources; the regulation and monitoring of service contractors, license
es, lessees, and permit for the extraction, exploration, development and use of
natural resources products; the implementation of programs and measures with the
end in view of promoting close collaboration between the government and the pri
vate sector; the effective and efficient classification and subclassification of
lands of the public domain; and the enforcement of natural resources and enviro
nmental laws, rules and regulations;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all
lands of the public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classif
ication, sub-classification, surveying and titling of lands in consultation with
appropriate agencies;
Chapter 4 - THE DEPARTMENT FIELD OFFICES
Sec. 22. Provincial and Community Offices. - The Natural resources provin
cial and community offices shall each be headed by a provincial natural resource
officer and community natural resource officer, respectively. They shall take o
ver the functions of the district offices of the former Bureau of Forest Develop
ment, Bureau of Lands, and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.
Title III - JUSTICE
Chapter I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 4. Organizational Structure. - The Department shall consist of the followin
g constituent units:
(1) Department proper;
(2) Office of the Government Corporate Counsel;
(3) National Bureau of Investigation;
(4) Public Attorney's Office;
(5) Board of Pardons and Parole;
(6) Parole and Probation Administration;
(7) Bureau of Corrections;
(8) Land Registration Authority;
(9) Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems.
Chapter 9 - LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Sec. 28. The Land Registration Authority. - The Land Registration Authori
ty, hereinafter referred to as the Authority shall continue to exercise its powe
rs and functions under existing law on the Land Titles and Deeds Registration Au
thority and those which may hereafter be provided by law.
Sec. 29. Organizational Structure. - The Authority shall be headed by an
Administrator who shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Administrators, all of who
m shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.
Sec. 30. Reorganization of Registry Offices in the National Capital Regio
n. - The Registries of Deeds in the National Capital Region is hereby reorganize
d as follows:
(1) The Registries of Deeds in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloo
can shall be maintained;
(2) There is hereby created Registries of Deeds in the Municipalities of Nav
otas, Malabon, Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Marikina, Las Pinas and Parana
que with jurisdiction over their respective municipalities;
(3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasig shall be maintained with jurisdiction ove
r the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig and Pateros; and
(4) The Registry of Deeds of Makati shall have jurisdiction over the municipalit
ies of Makati and Muntinlupa.

C. The Power to Reclassify

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160
Local Government Code
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, thr
ough an ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for
the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide fo
r the manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) whe
n the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purpose
s as determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall hav
e substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industria
l purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such recla
ssification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultur
al land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
(1) For highly urbanized and independent component cities, fifteen percent (15%)
;
(2) For component cities and first to the third class municipalities, ten pe
rcent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, f
urther, That agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pur
suant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657). ot
herwise known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law", shall not be affected
by the said reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purpose
s shall be governed by Section 65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and upon recommendat
ion of the National Economic and Development Authority, authorize a city or muni
cipality to reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next preceding p
aragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with existing laws, cont
inue to prepare their respective comprehensive land use plans enacted through zo
ning ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases for the future use
of land resources: Provided. That the requirements for food production, human s
ettlements, and industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the pr
eparation of such plans.
(d) Where approval by a national agency is required for reclassification, su
ch approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Failure to act on a proper and c
omplete application for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of
the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or mo
difying in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.

III. THE TORRENS SYSTEM

A. General Themes
Modes of Acquiring Land Titles
(1) Public Grant
The conveyance of public land by the government to a private individual.
(i.e. Spanish distribution of Public Lands by issuance of royal grants and conc
essions) No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, ex
press or implied from government.
(2) Adverse Possession / Prescription
A possessor of land who may not be the owner, after the lapse of a certa
in period prescribed by law, may assert ownership thereof as against anyone exce
pt the true owner or one with a better title based on an earlier possession whic
h he had not abandoned. Occupancy must be actual or physical, adverse, open and
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted, coupled with the fact that i
t must be under claim of ownership. It does not run against private lands brough
t under the operation of the Torrens system, nor against public lands except whe
re the law expressly so provides. It is different from laches.

(3) Accretion
 When soil and earth, weeds and other deposits are washed away from other
places and gradually settle down and attach themselves to one s land that used to
border on a stream or local body of water, the owner of the land becomes the ow
ner of the additional areas thus formed. (Art. 457 NCC) It can not be invoked fo
r areas fronting the seashore as alluvial formations become part of the public d
omain. Does not apply also to lands adjoining a pond or lagoon with respect to l
and left dry by the natural decrease of water. If the accretion is formed with t
he intervention of man, becomes part of the public domain. Lands acquired by acc
retion must still be registered to confirm and protect the title of the owner. (
also Art 461 NCC re: shifting course of riverbeds)
(4) Reclamation
Filling of submerged land by deliberate act and reclaiming title thereto
. In the Philippines, it is only the government that can assert title to reclaim
ed land.
(5) Private Grant or Voluntary Transfer
It is the usual means by which title to land is transferred by the owner
himself or his duly authorized representative. Consent of the grantor is an ess
ential element. This transfer is given effect by the voluntary execution of a de
ed of conveyance in certain prescribed form, completed by recording or registrat
ion thereof in a public office. The legal title to the land does not pass until
the conveyance shall have been registered or made of public record.
(6) Involuntary Alienation
Transfers that do not require the consent or cooperation of the owner of
the land. (i.e. expropriation, condemnation, eminent domain, escheats, forfeitu
re, foreclosure, ) Under this mode of acquiring land, the purchasers are generally
subject to the rule of caveat emptor.
(7) Descent or Device
May be acquired by virtue of hereditary succession to the estate of a de
ceased owner, or by devise if appropriate dispositions were made in the testator
s will.
(8) Emancipation Patent or Grant
Land Reform:
- P.D. 27 / P.D. 266 making tenant farmers owners of the lands they till upon th
e fulfillment of certain conditions.
- R.A. 6657 The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (Note, however, that acc
ording to Prof. Gatmaytan, CARP falls under the mode of involuntary alienation.)

Purpose
The purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet title
to land: to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title, e
xcept as to claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certifica
te or which might arise subsequent thereto. (Umali v. CA, Cruz v. CA)
The Torrens system facilitates transactions involving real estate by givi
ng the public the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens Certificate of Title,
and to dispense of the need of inquiring further, except when the party concern
ed had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonabl
y cautious man to make such further inquiry. (Pino v. CA)
Every registered owner and purchaser holds title to the property free fro
m all encumbrances not noted in the deed.
In cases where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when
the land is sold, in the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, the
vendee has the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title and is
under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of
the vendor appearing on the face of the certificate. (Pino v. CA)
It must be stressed that the Torrens system does NOT create or vest titl
e, and has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership.

ALBA V. DE LA CRUZ
17 PHIL 49 (1910)
FACTS: Agricultural land in Bulacan was registered in the names of the petition
ers Grey y Alba on Feb. 12 1908 by TC decree. Their parents had obtained the lan
d by purchase in 1864 as evidenced by a public document. On June 16, 1908 de la
Cruz asked for a revision of the case on the grounds that he is the absolute ow
ner of two of the lands in question, alleging that the degree of registration ov
er those lands was obtained maliciously and fraudulently. He claimed that he had
inherited the lands from his father who had obtained them via state grant in 18
95 as inscribed in the old register of property in Bulacan. TC reopened the case
, noting that the petitioners neglected to mention de la Cruz s occupancy of the l
and, it modified its earlier decree by excluding the two parcels of land.
ISSUE: WON the TC could reopen the case after its decree of registration had al
ready been entered earlier.
RULING: No. By express provisions of law all parties are deemed served notice b
y publication to all whom it may concern . The decree of registration must be held
to be conclusive against all persons whether his name is mentioned in the applic
ation, notice, or citation. Such decree could only have been opened on the groun
d that it had been obtained by fraud. Proof of constructive fraud is not suffici
ent, there must be actual or positive fraud to reopen a case. This is not so in
this situation, the petitioners honestly believed that the appellee was occupyin
g the lands as their tenant.
REPUBLIC V. UMALI
171 SCRA 647 (1989)
FACTS: The original sale from the government was tainted with fraud because it
was based on a forgery. However the original OCT was canceled and valid a TCT wa
s issued. The properties were subsequently transferred to purchasers in good fai
th and for value.
ISSUE: WON the land could revert back to the state.
RULING: No. A certificate of title fraudulently secured is not null and void ab
initio, it was only voidable and the land remained private as long as title the
reto had not been voided. There is no allegation in the complaint filed by the p
etitioner that any one of the defendants was privy to the fraud or that they had
acquired the subject land in bad faith. Their status as innocent transferees fo
r value was never questioned nor disproved. That status now accords to them the
protection of the torrens system and renders the titles obtained by them indefea
sible and conclusive despite the flaw in the TCT.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of land registration is to quiet t
itle to land: to put a stop forever to any question of the legality of the title
except claims which were noted at the time of registration in the certificate o
r which may arise subsequent thereto.
PINO V. CA
198 SCRA 434 (1991)
FACTS: Subject lot was originally owned by spouses Juan and Rafaela. When Juan
died ownership was transferred to Rafaela and her two sons: Raymundo and Cicero.
The lot was then sold to Rafaela who acquired title thereto. She first sold a p
ortion of the lot in 1967, then sold the other portion later. Ownership was even
tually sold to Pino who registered the sale in 1970. In 1980 Cicero died and his
heirs instituted suit for nullity and reconveyance against Pino.
ISSUE: WON Pino is an innocent purchaser for value.
RULING: Yes. Where the certificate of title is in the hands of the vendor when
the land is sold, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on
the certificate of title. In the absence of anything to excite or arouse suspic
ion, the vendee is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and invest
igate the title of the vendor.
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of
title to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving t
he public the right to rely upon the face of the TCT and dispense with the need
for inquiring further except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of fa
cts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably cautious man to make such f
urther inquiry.
The action had already prescribed because it was filed 15 years after the
sale and issuance of TCT in 1967. The remedy for the petitioner is to bring act
ion for damages against those who caused the fraud.

CRUZ V. CA (NOV. 6, 1997)

When the sale was executed, nothing was annotated in the certificate. The
re can be no reconveyance because the property had already been acquired by an i
nnocent purchaser for value. The real purpose of the Torrens system of land regi
stration is to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title except claims which have been recorded in the certific
ate of title. Every registered owner and purchaser holds the title to the proper
ty free from all encumbrances not noted in the deed.

DELOS REYES V. CA
285 SCRA 81 (1998)
FACTS: In 1942 de los Reyes sold only 10,000 sqm to Penas who in 1943 registere
d all 13,405sqm. After 4 subsequent sales the land was eventually acquired by Ca
inas. In 1978 the heirs of de los Reyes filed action for reconveyance.
ISSUE: WON an action for reconveyance filed after more than 30 years may prospe
r against the holder for value.
RULING: NO. When respondents Cainas as fourth transferee in ownership dealt wi
th the land in question they were not required to go beyond what appeared in the
TCT in the name of their transferor. They were innocent purchasers for value ha
ving acquired the property in due course and in good faith under a clean title i
.e. there were no annotations of encumbrances or notices of lis pendens at the b
ack. They had no reason to doubt the validity of the title to the property. It w
ould be the height of injustice if a valid transaction transferring property to
them would be set aside just to accommodate parties who heedlessly slept on thei
r rights for more then a third of a century- having brought action to recover th
e land only after 36 years from the accrual of their cause of action.

HEIRS OF DELA CRUZ, CA

FACTS: Petitioners were in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of
the land since 1959, when their predecessor in interest allegedly bought it from
the Madrids. Petitioners only had a photocopy of the deed of sale. The Madrid b
rothers allegedly sold the land to Marquez in 1976. The Madrids and Marques obta
ined TCTs in 1986, the petitioners then filed this action for reconveyance and d
amages in the same year.
RULING: The fact that the Madrids and Marquez were able to secure their respect
ive TCTs did not operate to vest
upon them ownership of the property. The Torrens system does not create or vest
title. It has never been recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership especially
considering the fact that both the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respecti
ve TCTs only in 1986 27 long years after petitioners first took possessions of t
he land. If the Madrids and the Marquezes wished to assert their ownership they
should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not merely to
have the land registered under their respective names. The Madrids long inactio
n or passivity in asserting their rights will preclude them from recovering the
same. Marquez is also not an innocent purchaser for value as he must have been f
ully aware of another person s possession of the lot he purchased. One who buys wi
thout checking the vendor s title takes all the risks and losses consequent to suc
h failure.

Nature of proceedings
A land registration proceeding is in rem, and therefore, the decree of r
egistration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons, including the Go
vernment and its branches. This is irrespective of whether or not they were per
sonally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have appea
red and filed an answer to said application since all persons are considered as
notified by the publication required by law. (Cacho v. CA) Note however, that in
instances where the property sought to be registered is occupied by persons oth
er than the registrant, mere notice by publication is not sufficient: they must
be given actual and personal notice. Moreover, an allegation of occupancy by s
uch persons must be stated in the petition for registration. Failure to comply
with these requirements will render the issued decree susceptible to a petition
for reopening or review of the decree of registration. See
subsequent discussion under Part IV. F. (4).
A decree of registration acquires finality and thereby becomes indefeasi
ble upon the lapse of one year from entry thereof. Once such decree becomes fin
al, it is deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and det
ermined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the land
registration proceedings. (Cacho v. CA)

SAJONAS V. CA
FACTS: Uychocde spouses sold the land to spouses Sajonas in 1984 who had their
adverse claim duly registered. Upon full payment, the sale was registered in Aug
. 28, 1985. However the land was also subject to a notice of levy and execution
in Feb 12, 1985 for debts owed by the Uychocde s to Pilares. The notice of levy an
d execution was carried over to the new title. Sajonas filed a complaint to have
the notice removed from the new title. Noting their earlier claim, the TC agree
d. Their decision was reversed by the CA on the grounds that PD1529 limits the v
alidity of adverse claims to 30 days..
ISSUE: WON the earlier adverse claim was invalid.
RULING: No. Sec. 70 of PD 1529 does not the limit the effectivity of adverse cl
aims to 30 days. To interpret the effectivity period as absolutely limited to 30
days defeats the purpose why the law provides for the remedy of inscription of
adverse claim. Annotation is a measure designated to protect the interest of a p
erson over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest or r
ight is not otherwise provided for by Act 496, now PD 1529. It serves as warning
to third parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an int
erest on the same or a better right then registered owner. Under the Torrens Sys
tem registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered land is not requi
red to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property. He is
only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the f
ace of the register or certificate of title.
CACHO V. CA
In the case of Cacho v. US decided in 1912, the court reserved making a f
inal decision on the registration of two parcels of land bought by decedent Cach
o. Registration decrees were allegedly subsequently issued in 1915. In 1978 heir
Cacho filed a petition for reconstitution of title. After first going up to th
e SC, reconstitution was granted by the TC over RP and National Steel as well as
the city of Iligan opposition. CA reversed, requiring petitioner to first fulfi
ll the conditions set forth in the Cacho v. US decision. .
A land registration proceeding is in rem and therefore the decree of regist
ration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the Governme
nt and its branches irrespective whether or not they were personally notified of
the filing of the application for registration or have appeared and filed an an
swer to said application because all persons are considered as notified by publi
cation required by law. Further more, a decree of registration that has become f
inal shall be deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and
determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the
land registration proceedings with the certification duly issued by the then Lan
d Registration Commission (now National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin
istration) there is no doubt that decrees of registration have in fact been issu
ed in the case at the bench. Also, such decrees attained finality upon the lapse
of one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be sub
ject to the conditions set forth in Cacho v. US would be tantamount to setting a
side the decrees which cannot be reopened after the lapse of

one year from the entry thereof. Such action would definitely run counter to the
very purpose of the Torrens System.

SPOUSES LEBURADA V. LRA

287 SCRA 333 (1998)
FACTS: TC ordered LRA to issue a degree of registration in favor of the spouses
Leburada. LRA refused on the grounds that its immediate issuance would result i
n the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land. LRA found that the tit
le issued for the lot could not be found because the TCT covering them was incom
plete/ unreadable. It was waiting for better copies from the Pasig register of d
eeds before proceeding further.
ISSUE: WON LRA can be compelled by mandamus to issue the decree.
RULING: NO. A judgment of registration does not become executory until after th
e expiration of one year after the entry of the final decree of registration. Tr
ue, land registration is an in rem proceeding and is binding upon and conclusive
against all persons including the government, however a court has no jurisdicti
on to order the registration of a land already decreed in an earlier land regist
ration case. The LRA is mandated to refer to the TC any doubt it may have in reg
ard to the preparation and issuance of a decree of registration. As the issuance
of the decree is a judicial act and not merely ministerial, it may not be comp
elled through mandamus. Given the above, that LRA hesitates to issue a decree of
registration is understandable. (But to avoid multiplicity of suits, SC ordered
LRA to submit its report to the TC within 60 days)

B. The Land Registration Administration

B. THE LAND REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529
AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR OTH
ER PURPOSES
SECTION 9. Qualifications of Registers of Deeds and Deputy Registers of Dee
ds. No person shall be appointed Register of Deeds unless he has been admitted t
o the practice of law in the Philippines and shall have been actually engaged in
such practice for at least three years or has been employed for a like period i
n any branch of government the functions of which include the registration of pr
operty.
The Deputy Register of Deeds shall be a member of the Philippine Bar. Pro
vided, however, that no Register of Deeds or Deputy Register of Deeds holding of
fice as such upon the passage of this Decree shall by reason hereof, be removed
from office or be demoted to a lower category or scale of salary except for caus
e and upon compliance with due process as provided for by law.
SECTION 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. The office of the Regis
ter of Deeds constitutes a public repository of records of instruments affecting
registered or unregistered lands and chattel mortgages in the province or city
wherein such office is situated.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal property whi
ch complies with all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that sa
id instrument bears the proper documentary and science stamps and that the same
are properly cancelled. If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith
deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in writing, s
tating the ground or reason therefor, and advising him of his right to appeal by
 consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree.
SECTION 11. Discharge of duties of Register of Deeds in case of vacancy, etc
.
(1) Until a regular Register of Deeds shall have been appointed for a provin
ce or city, or in case of vacancy in the office, or upon the occasion of the abs
ence, illness, suspension, or inability of the Register of Deeds to discharge hi
s duties, said duties shall be performed by the following officials, in the orde
r in which they are mentioned below, unless the Secretary of Justice designates
another official to act temporarily in his place:
(a) For the province or city where there is a Deputy Register of Deeds, by s
aid Deputy Register of Deeds, or by the second Deputy Register of Deeds, should
there be one;
(b) For the province or city where there is no Deputy or second Deputy Regis
ter of Deeds, by the Provincial or City Fiscal, or any Assistant Fiscal designat
ed by the Provincial or City Fiscal;
(2) In case of absence, disability or suspension of the Register of Deeds wi
thout pay, or in case of vacancy in the position, the Secretary of Justice may,
in his discretion, authorize the payment of an additional compensation to the of
ficial acting as Register of Deeds, such additional compensation together with h
is actual salary not to exceed the salary authorized for the position thus fille
d by him.
(3) In case of a newly-created province or city and pending establishment of
a Registry of Deeds and the appointment of a regular Register of Deeds for the
new province or city, the Register of Deeds of the mother province or city shall
be the ex-officio Register of Deeds for said new province or city.
SECTION 12. Owner's Index; reports. There shall be prepared in every Registr
y an index system which shall contain the names of all registered owners alphabe
tically arranged. For this purpose, an index card which shall be prepared in the
name of each registered owner which shall contain a list of all lands registere
d in his name.
The Register of Deeds shall submit to the Land Registration Commission wi
thin ten days after the month to which they pertain his monthly reports on colle
ctions and accomplishments. He shall also submit to the Commission at the end of
December of each year, an annual inventory of all titles and instruments in his
Registry.
SECTION 13. Chief Geodetic Engineer. There shall be a Chief Geodetic Enginee
r in the Land Registration Commission who shall be the technical adviser of the
Commission on all matters involving surveys and shall be responsible to him for
all plats, plans and works requiring the services of a geodetic engineer in said
office. He shall perform such other functions as may, from time to time, be ass
igned to him by the Commissioner.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987
BOOK IV, TITLE III
CHAPTER 9 LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
SECTION 28. The Land Registration Authority. The Land Registration Authority
, hereinafter referred to as the Authority shall continue to exercise its powers
and functions under existing law on the Land Titles and Deeds Registration Auth
ority and those which may hereafter be provided by law.
SECTION 29. Organizational Structure. The Authority shall be headed by an Ad
ministrator who shall be assisted by two (2) Deputy Administrators, all of whom
shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary.
SECTION 30. Reorganization of Registry Offices in the National Capital Regio
n. The Registries of Deeds in the National Capital Region is hereby reorganized
as follows:
(1) The Registries of Deeds in the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay and Caloo
can shall be maintained;
(2) There is hereby created Registries of Deeds in the Municipalities of Nav
otas, Malabon, Valenzuela, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Marikina, Las Pias and Paraaque
with jurisdiction over their respective municipalities;
(3) The Registry of Deeds of Pasig shall be maintained with jurisdiction ove
r the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig and Pateros; and
(4) The Registry of Deeds of Makati shall have jurisdiction over the municipalit
ies of Makati and Muntinlupa.

C. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129
AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER P
URPOSES
SECTION 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or l
and registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition
, or contested lots the value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos, su
ch value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of t
he respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding ta
x declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appe
alable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
CIRCULAR NO. 38-97
SUBJECT: Clarification of the Extent of Delegated Jurisdiction under Administra
tive Circular No. 6-93-A of METCs, MTCCs, MTCs and MCTCs to Hear and Determine C
adastral and Land Registration Cases
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 6-93-A is that only
original cadastral or land registration cases are covered. The jurisdiction of
the First Level Courts, being merely delegated, should be limited to what is exp
ressly mentioned in the delegation.
1. There are limits to the delegation, i.e., either the subject matter is a
n uncontested lot or if contested the value of the lot should not exceed One Hun
dred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos. There will be difficulty in the determination
of these limits if and when the First Level Courts are required to exercise del
egated jurisdiction over petitions subsequent to original registration.
2. A First Level Court should not be placed in a situation where, in dispos
ing of a matter subsequent to registration, it will have to consult the records
of another Court which granted the original registration.
3. To require First Level Courts to handle petitions after original registr
ation would unduly increase their dockets already loaded with cases covered by R
A 7691, the law on their expanded jurisdiction.
Therefore, matters subsequent to the original registration determined by Second
Level Courts, including petitions for reconstitution of lost titles, should not
be unloaded to the First Level Courts. The Second Level Courts are hereby direct
ed to take cognizance of and exercise jurisdiction over such matters.
MOSCOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioner applied for land registration of a 1,147 square meters residen
tial lot, claiming that she inherited the same from her father. The written oppo
sition however substantially allege that the oppositors acquired ownership of th
e same through a deed of donation.
The trial court rendered a decision directing that the title over the lan
d should be registered in the name of the co-ownership of: (1) Andrea M. Moscoso
for 13/14 share; and (2) Maximina L. Moron for 1/14 share, subject to the reser
vation of a road right-of-way in favor of the government of the Philippines. Max
imina s share was based on a power of attorney executed in her favor which was tre
ated as a recognition of her status as a natural child.
ISSUE: WON the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, has
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of whether the oppositor is the acknowledge
d natural child of Pascual Monge
HELD: untenable
RULING: Firstly, the otherwise rigid rule that the jurisdiction of the Land Regi
stration Court, being special and limited in character and proceedings thereon s
ummary in nature, does not extend to cases involving issues properly litigable i
n other independent suits or ordinary civil actions. Such is based the following
premises: (1) Mutual consent of the parties or their acquiescence in submitting
the aforesaid issues for the determination by the court in the registration pro
ceedings; (2) Full opportunity given to the parties in the presentation of their
respective sides of the issues and of the evidence in support thereto; (3) Cons
ideration by the court that the evidence already of record is sufficient and ade
quate for rendering a decision upon these issues.
In addition, considerations of speedy justice and avoidance of multiplici
ty of suits impel Us to hold and rule that under the facts of the case at bar, t
he trial court, acting as a land registration court, may adjudicate the land sou
ght to be registered to either or both of the applicant and oppositor, in whole
or in part, based on evidence submitted to the court showing that the party has
proper title for registration. (Section 37, Act 496.)
In any event, as the Supreme Court said in Nicanor T. Santos vs. Rosa Gan
ayo, L-31854, Sept. 9, 1972, 116 SCRA 431, "Whether a particular matter should b
e resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdi
ction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (Probate, Land Registrat
ion, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a proce
dural question involving a mode of practice which may be waived."
OBITER: The proceedings for the registration of title to land under the Torrens
system is an action in rem, not in personam, hence, personal notice to all claim
ants of the res is not necessary to give the court jurisdiction to deal with and
dispose of the res, and neither may lack of such personal notice vitiate or inv
alidate the decree or title issued in a registration proceeding, for the State,
as sovereign over the land situated within it, may provide for the adjudication
of title in a proceeding in rem or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which s
hall be binding upon all persons, known or unknown.

AVERIA JR. VS. CAGUIOA

146 SCRA 459 (1986)
FACTS: The petitioner-oppositor refused to participate in the hearing of the reg
istration proceedings below, claiming the respondent court, acting as a cadastra
l court, had no competence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act 49
6, because of the absence of unanimity among the parties as required under Secti
on 112 of the Land Registration Act. The respondent court then held the hearing
ex parte and later rendered a decision ordering the registration prayed for on t
he basis of the evidence presented by the private respondent herein.
ISSUE: whether or not the court has jurisdiction to order the registration of a
deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an antecedent contract to sell.
HELD: Yes. Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 has eliminated the distinction between t
he general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited juris
diction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral co
urt. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified registra
tion proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the authority to a
ct not only on applications for "original registration" but also "over all petit
ions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determin
e all questions arising upon such applications or petitions."
Under the amended law, the court is now authorized to hear and decide not
only such non-controversial cases but even the contentious and substantial issu
es, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.

HEIRS OF GONZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Eugenio, claiming title under (TCT) No. 17519, sold two lots to Gonzaga.f
or which TCT No. 81338 was issued on November 29, 1960. In 1981, Gonzaga sold th
e two lots to petitioner Mascarias and TCT No. 48078 was issued in the latter s fav
or.
However, another subsisting Torrens title covers the same two lots, TCT N
o. C-26086, in the name of private respondent Sevilla issued on August 2, 1979 a
nd is a transfer from (OCT) No. 994 which was registered on April 19, 1917. Both
conflicting TCTs were derived from one common OCT, viz., OCT No. 994. However,
while both the court a quo and the respondent appellate court found that OCT No.
994 was registered on May 3, 1917, we find that on the one hand, petitioners' t
itles indicate original registration to have been made on May 3, 1917, but on th
e other hand, private respondents' title indicates original registration to have
been made on April 19, 1917.
The court a quo resolved the conflicting claims in favor of private respo
ndents.
ISSUE: Between petitioners and private respondents, who have the legal and vali
d title to the two lots. (OVERLAPPING TITLES)
HELD: Private respondents. Although petitioner's title was issued in 1940, it w
ill be noted that petitioner's title over Lots 2693 and 2695 both with an area o
f 599 square meters was based on the Cadastral Survey of Kaloocan City, Cadastra
l Case No. 34, while private respondents' title was derived from OCT No. 994 iss
ued on April 19, 1917. In the case of Pamintuan vs. San Agustin, this Court rule
d that where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the e
arlier in date prevails. . . . In successive registrations, where more than one
certificate is issued in respect of a particular

estate or interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is e
ntitled to the estate or interest; and the person is deemed to hold under the pr
ior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is derived directly or indi
rectly from the person who was the holder of the earliest certificate issued in
respect thereof. Hence, in point of priority of issuance, private respondents' t
itle prevails over that of petitioner MWSS.
Lastly, a certificate is not conclusive evidence of title if it is shown
that the same land had already been registered and an earlier certificate for th
e same is in existence. Since the land in question has already been registered u
nder OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, the subsequent registration of the same l
and on May 3, 1917 is null and void."
Though petitioner Mascarias may be a purchaser for value and in good faith
, but whose title, which is only a derivative of the void OCT No. 994 dated May
3, 1917, his title could not possibly be of force and effect more than its paren
t title.

TAGAYTAY-TAAL TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS (273 SCRA 182
; 1997)
FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of four (4) parcels of land covered b
y TCT Nos. T-9816, T-9817, T-9818 and T-9819. The properties were mortgaged on J
une 7, 1976 to Filipinas Manufacturers Bank and Trust Company by Benjamin Osias,
representing himself as President and Chairman of the Board of petitioner.
Because of a dispute regarding the true set of officers of the petitioner
, the parcels of land allegedly became delinquent in the payment of real estate
taxes resulting in the sale of the said properties in a public auction. Responde
nt City itself was the successful bidder.
On July 14, 1989, respondent City filed for the entry of new certificates
of title over the lots in its name. Said petition was opposed by herein petitio
ner, alleging that the tax delinquency sale was null and void for lack of valid
and proper notice to petitioner.
On December 5, 1989, the trial court dismissed on the ground of laches. C
A affirms.
On July 19, 1991, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cavit
e, sitting as a regular court, a petition assailing the authority of respondent
City to levy real estate tax on the ground that said properties are located in t
he Province of Batangas. RTC rules in favor of petioner. No appeal was filed.
ISSUES (a) whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, sitting as a land
registration or cadastral court, had jurisdiction to hear and decide respondent
City's petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-9816 and TCT No. T-9817 in the
name of petitioner and the issuance of new ones in the name of respondent City
despite serious opposition by petitioner
HELD: negative.
RULING: Here, petitioner had the right to avail of its legal and equitable remed
ies to nullify the delinquency sale because, firstly, there was lack of notice t
o it; secondly, the properties in question became subject of serious controversy
before RTC -Cavite and the SEC; and thirdly, respondent City had no authority t
o impose realty tax on petitioner as the properties are actually located in Tali
say, Batangas.
Given such facts, The issues raised before the RTC sitting as a land regi
stration or cadastral court, without question, involved substantial or controver
sial matters and, consequently, beyond said court's jurisdiction. The issues may
be resolved only by a court of general jurisdiction.
It is clear that petitions under Section 75 and Section 108 of P.D. 1529
(formerly Sec. 78 and Sec. 112 of Act 496) can be taken cognizance of by the RTC
sitting as a land registration or cadastral court. Relief under said sections c
an only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no
adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwi
se, the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary cas
e or in the case where the incident properly belongs. 15
Also, RTC-Cavite, sitting as a land registration or cadastral court, coul
d not have ordered the issuance of new certificates of title over the properties
in the name of respondent City if the delinquency sale was invalid because said
properties are actually located in the municipality of Talisay, Batangas, not i
n Tagaytay City.
ESTATE OF JACOB VS. COURT OF APPEALS (283 SCRA 474; 1998)
FACTS: Jacob left for the United States, but before she did, she asked her son-i
n-law Quinto Jr., to pay the real estate taxes on her property. However, Luciano
Jr. was not allowed to pay by the City Treasurer's Office as he had no written
authorization from her. In 1984 respondent City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a
notice to Mercedes Jacob that her real estate taxes on the property were delinqu
ent and that the land was already sold at public auction on 24 August 1983 to pr
ivate respondent Virginia Tugbang for P6,800.00. Jacob came to know of the sale
on 6 September 1983 when she received from respondent City Treasurer a Notice of
Sale of Real Property addressed to her husband. They tried to redeem the proper
ty from Tugbang but she evaded them until the Final Bill of Sale was issued. On
3 March 1989 TCT No. 81860 was issued in the name of Tugbang.
On 17 May 1993 petitioners filed a complaint for annulment or cancellatio
n of the auction sale, the final bill of sale, TCT No. 81860, and for redemption
of the property plus damages. However, the trial court dismissed the petition p
urportedly for lack of jurisdiction as the petition was deemed to be a petition
to annul and set aside the Decision canceling Jacob's TCT No. 39178. The appella
te court dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: the nature of the petitioners action
HELD: It is an action for reconveyance. The complaint alleges that respondent Tu
gbang procured a transfer certificate of title upon her fraudulent representatio
n in her petition for cancellation of title. This way of acquiring title creates
what is called "constructive trust" in favor of the defrauded party and grants
to the latter a right to the reconveyance of the property.
As the petition makes out a case for reconveyance and not a mere annulmen
t of an RTC judgment as viewed under par. (2), Sec. 9, BP Blg. 129, jurisdiction
over the case is clearly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City as p
rovided in par. (2), Sec. 19, BP Blg. 129.
Moreover, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition as
it may be considered only as a continuation of the original proceeding for cance
llation of title which in view of its non-litigious character is summary in natu
re. Furthermore, under Sec. 2 of PD 1529, a Regional Trial Court, like the RTC o
f Quezon City which issued a new title to respondent Virginia Tugbang in lieu of
the old one, has the authority to act not only on applications for original reg
istration but also over all petitions filed after original registration of title
, with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications
or petitions.
As to whether such an action should be granted requires further evidence
culled from a full-blown trial.
G.R. No. 120974 (substantially the same facts)
Under Sec. 55 of the Land Registration Act, as amended by Sec. 53 of PD N
o. 1529, 14 an original owner of registered land may seek the annulment of the t
ransfer thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance. Ho
wever, such remedy is without prejudice to the rights of an innocent purchaser f
or value holding a certificate of title.

The other controversy lies in the failure of petitioner City Treasurer to

notify effectively the delinquent taxpayer (Valencia), under the wrong premise
that the property was still owned by the former registered owner, Alberto Sta. M
aria.
In ascertaining the identity of the delinquent taxpayer, for purposes of
notifying him of his tax delinquency and the prospect of a distraint and auction
of his delinquent property, petitioner City Treasurer should not have simply re
lied on the tax declaration.

IV. ORIGINAL REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

A. Who May Apply
PD 1529, Sec. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the p
roper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have b
een in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of al
ienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of own
ership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river be
ds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided f
or by law.
Where the land is owned in common: all the co-owners shall file the application
jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro: the vendor a retro may file a
n application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that
should the period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration
proceedings and ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, t
he latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceeding
s.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any
land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trus
t.
Sec. 16. Non-resident applicant. - If the applicant is not a resident of
the Philippines, he shall file with his application an instrument in due form ap
pointing an agent or representative residing in the Philippines, giving his full
name and postal address, and shall therein agree that the service of any legal
process in the proceedings under or growing out of the application made upon his
agent or representative shall be of the same legal effect as if made upon the a
pplicant within the Philippines. If the agent or representative dies, or leaves
the Philippines, the applicant shall forthwith make another appointment for the
substitute, and, if he fails to do so the court may dismiss the application.
CA 141, Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occ
upying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an intere
st therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to
the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confir
mation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, unde
r the Land Registration Act , to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the prior U
nited States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant o
f lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and
have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have
with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received t
itle therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and
cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have b
een in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of a
gricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition o
r ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the a
pplication for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeu
re. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions es
sential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title un
der the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and not
orious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agric
ulture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at l
east 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.

DAIS V. CFI
51 PHIL. 396 (1928)
The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment
of his death; in other words, the heirs immediately succeed to the dominion, own
ership and possession of the property of their predecessor. The fact that the la
w provides for the appointment of a legal administrator for the liquidation of t
he deceased's property, and the partition among his heirs, does not deprive the
heirs of the right to intervene in the administration of said property for the p
rotection of their interests. Heirs have the right to intervene in a cadastral p
roceeding for the purpose of objecting to the striking out of an answer filed by
the judicial administrator of the intestacy of the petitioners' predecessor in
interest, claiming several parcels of land as the property of said estate, even
when the aforementioned administrator consents to its being stricken out
SANTIAGO V. CRUZ
19 PHIL. 145 (1911)
Because applicants own merely an undivided share, less than fee simple, i
n the
land described in the application, the application should be dismissed, without
prejudice to the right of the various owners of the undivided interests in the l
and, jointly to present a new application for registration.
Citizenship
As a general rule, only individuals, corporations or associations qualifie
d to acquire or hold lands of the public domain are qualified to be transferees
of private lands, i.e. Filipino citizens. (Sec. 12, Art. XII, 1987 Const.) How
ever, this is subject to the ff. exceptions:
(1) Aliens can acquire private lands, but only through hereditary (not testamen
tary) succession (Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez, 111 SCRA 704)
(2) Natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Phil. citizenship may be t
ransferees of private lands of up to a maximum of 5,000 sq. m. of urban land and
3 hectares of rural land for residential, business or other purposes. (BP 185,
 as amended by RA 8179)
There are 3 remedies by which private land may be recovered from disqualifi
ed aliens:
(1) Escheat proceedings (see Rule 91 of the Rules of Court);
(2) Actions for reversion under the Public Land Act; and
(3) Actions for recovery filed by the former (Filipino) owner. Note that the in
pari delicto doctrine was abandoned in the case of Phil. Banking v. Lui She.

Natural Persons
Const. Art. XII., Sec. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into a
gricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural l
ands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limite
d to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to ex
ceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not mo
re than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof
by purchase, homestead, or grant..
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development,
and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine
, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, develope
d, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national d
evelopment policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultura
l communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cul
tural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing prope
rty rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral do
main.
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transf
erred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-b
orn citizen of the Philippines who has lost its Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

CA 141
SEC. 12. Any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, o
r the head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land
in the Philippines or has not had the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of mor
e than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of the Philippines by t
he United States, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twenty-four hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain.
SEC. 22. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any such citiz
en not of lawful age who is a head of a family, and any corporation or associati
on of which at least sixty per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in
said capital stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, and which is
organized and constituted under the laws of Philippines, and corporate bodies or
ganized in the Philippines authorized under their charters to do so; may purchas
e any tract of public agricultural land disposable under this Act, not to exceed
one hundred and forty-four hectares in the case of an individual and one thousa
nd and twenty-four hectares in that of a corporation or association, by proceedi
ng as prescribed in this chapter: Provided, That partnerships shall be entitled
to purchase not to exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares for each member th
ereof. but the total area so purchased shall in no case exceed the one thousand
and twenty-four hectares authorized in this section for associations and corpora
tions.
SEC. 23. No person, corporation, association, or partnership other than t
hose mentioned in the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural pub
lic land or land of any other denomination or classification, which is at the ti
me or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any perm
anent improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement: Provi
ded, however, That persons, corporations, associations or partnerships which, at
the date upon which the Philippine Constitution took effect, held agricultural
public lands or land of any other denomination, that belonged originally, really
or presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands
, or a real right upon such lands and Constitution took improvements, having acq
uired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acqui
sition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same
as if such persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified u
nder the last preceding section; but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienat
e the same to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships not included
in section twenty-two of this Act, except by reason of hereditary succession, du
ly legalized and acknowledged by competent courts.
SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner
of more than twenty-four hectares and who since July fourth, nineteen hundred a
nd twenty-six or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either
by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricu
ltural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real esta
te tax thereon while same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled,
under the provisions of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for s
uch tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and c
ultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or
tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled
to the right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That
at the time he files his free patent application he is not the owner of any rea
l property secured or disposable under this provision of the Public Land Law
Sec. 48, supra.
KRIVENKO V. REGISTER OF DEEDS
79 PHIL. 461 (1947)
There is absolutely no difference in nature, character, value or importan
ce to the nation between a residential land of the public domain and a residenti
al land of private ownership, and, therefore, both should equally be considered
as agricultural lands to be protected as part of the national patrimony. Special
ly is this so where the prohibition as to the alienation of public residential l
ots may become superfluous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to pri
vate residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands w
ill eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the co
nstant disposition of public lands in favor private individuals, almost all, if
not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private re
sidential lands.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not includin
g residential lots or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that
aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for t
hemselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities, and that they may
validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, facto
ries, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation res
orts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses an
d purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural. That this
is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question.
SAN JUAN V. INTESTATE ESTATE OF SPOUSES SOCCHI, GR L-19467 (1966)
An alien who validly owns agricultural land in the Philippines, which land is so
ld at public auction for tax delinquency, may avail of the right to repurchase t
he same within one year pursuant to Section 38 of the Assessment Law. Such right
is but an incident of the right of ownership and its exercise by the owner, who
happens to be an alien, does not fall within the purview of the terms "shall be
transferred or assigned" used in Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution, o
r of the terms "encumbered, alienated or transferred" used in the implementing p
rovision of Section 122, Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as Public Lan
d Act. Moreover, the sale at public auction by reason of tax delinquency under t
he Assessment Law does not immediately divest the rights of the owner to the pro
perty sold. Indeed it is provided in section 39 of said law that after the sale
and before repurchase or before the expiration of the term of one year fixed for
such repurchase, the real property shall remain in the possession of the delinq
uent taxpayer who shall have the right to the usufruct thereof. It is only after
failure to redeem within that period and after the final bill of sale is issued
to the purchaser by the Provincial Treasurer that the rights of the owner are d
efinitely divested.
PHIL. BANKING V. LUI SHE
21 SCRA 52 (1967)
If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a pi
ece of land by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispo
se of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the ar
rangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself i
n stages not only of the right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi jus utendi, jus
t fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it (jus disponen
di) rights the sum total of which make up ownership. If this can be done, then t
he Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the Philippines, as announced
in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, is indeed in grave peril. The contract givi
ng the above rights to the alien is therefore void.
RAMIREZ V. VDA. DE RAMIREZ
111 SCRA 704
The usufruct in favor of an alien is upheld, because the same, albeit a r
eal right, does not vest title to land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting
of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
CHEESMAN V. IAC
193 SCRA 93
The fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Sec
tion 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of he
reditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
the public domain."
Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was charged with knowledge of this prohibition. Thus,
assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him
and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously
and clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him w
as null and void. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to que
stion the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in
so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of con
jugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of
the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, th
is would accord to the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over
land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition.
This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.

RELLOSA V. GAW CHEE HUN

93 PHIL. 827
Sale to alien by Filipino vendor during Japanese occupation null and void
, for being contrary to the Constitution. But vendor can no longer recover the
land, because of doctrine of pari delicto. (Note however that the pari delicto
doctrine was subsequently abandoned in the case of Phil. Banking v. Lui She, 21
SCRA 52.)

Corporations
REGISTER OF DEEDS V. UNG SUI SI TEMPLE, 97 PHIL. 58 (1955)
A deed of donation of a parcel of land executed by a Filipino citizen in
favor of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are
non-Filipinos, can not be admitted for registration.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF DAVAO V. LRC, 102 PHIL. 596 (1957)

A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated wi
th clergy, designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership of
the church which was regarded as the property owner. It consists of one person o
nly, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular,
who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal advantages particul
arly that of perpetuity which in their natural persons they could not have. Thro
ugh this legal fiction, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corpora
tion sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not to his personal heirs bu
t to his successor in office. A corporation sole, therefore, is created not only
to administer the temporalities of the church or religious society where he bel
ongs, but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office. Al
though a branch of the Universal Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Ca
tholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfull
y incorporated in accordance with laws of the country where it is located, is co
nsidered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such
artificial being under laws of that country, separate and distinct from the pers
onality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious
relations with the latter which are governed by the Common Law or their rules a
nd regulations.
Even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the R
epublic of the Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered
had by express provision of law (Corporation Law, Public Act. 1459) the necessar
y power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the t
erritory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was cr
eated, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single numbe
r and head, the bishop of the diocese. The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in th
e Philippines has no nationality and that the frames of the Constitution did not
have in mind the religious corporation sole when they provided that 60 per cent
um of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens. Thus, if this constitut
ional provision were not intended for corporation sole, it is obvious that this
could not be regulated or restricted by said provision.
A corporation sole or "ordinary" is not the owner of the properties that
he may acquire but merely the administrator thereof and holds the same in trust
for the church to which the corporation is an organized and constituents part. B
eing mere administrator of the temporalities or properties titled in his name, t
he constitutional provision requiring 60 per centum Filipino ownership is not ap
plicable. The said constitutional provision is limited by it terms to ownership
alone and does not extend to control unless the control over the property affect
ed has been devised to circumvent the real purpose of the constitution. In deter
mining, therefore, whether the constitutional provision requiring 60 per centum
Filipino capital is applicable to corporations sole, the nationality of the cons
tituents of the diocese, and not the nationality of the actual incumbent of the
parish, must be taken into consideration. In the present case, even if the quest
ion of nationality be considered, the aforesaid constitutional requirement is fu
lly met and satisfied, considering that the corporation sole in question is comp
osed of an overwhelming majority of Filipinos.
REGISTER OF DEEDS V. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, 4 SCRA 1146 (1964)
The prohibition in the Constitution against the acquisition of lands by a
liens is absolute in its terms. It cannot be limited to the permanent acquisiti
on of real estate by aliens, whether natural or juridical persons. A deed of tra
nsfer in favor of an alien bank, even if it was subject to the obligation that th
e bank dispose of the property within five years from the date of acquisition, i
s unregisterable.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & ACME,

146 SCRA 509 (1986)
Supra.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title i
n their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public
Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to acquire the land
at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might
be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in
public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "in
complete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corpora
tions could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,
024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings w
ere brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations
from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested befo
re that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid an
d proper, This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Cons
titution cannot impair vested rights.
B. Where to File
PD 1529
Sec. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. - Ju
dicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shal
l be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying t
he Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all appli
cations for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and
interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of t
itle, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applicati
ons or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Re
gistration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orde
rs, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registra
tion, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing
or issuance thereof.
Sec. 17. What and where to file. - The application for land registration
shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province or city where th
e land is situated. The applicant shall file together with the application all o
riginal muniments of titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land appr
oved by the Bureau of Lands.
The clerk of court shall not accept any application unless it is shown th
at the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the applicat
ion and all annexes.
Sec. 18. Application covering two or more parcels. - An application may i
nclude two or more parcels of land belonging to the applicant/s provided they ar
e situated within the same province or city. The court may at any time order an
application to be amended by striking out one or more of the parcels or by a sev
erance of the application.
Sec. 19. Amendments. - Amendments to the application including joinder, s
ubstitution, or discontinuance as to parties may be allowed by the court at any
stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms.
Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries
or an increase in area of the land applied for or which involve the inclusion of
an additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and
notice as in an original application.
Sec. 20. When land applied for borders on road. - If the application desc
ribes the land as bounded by a public or private way or road, it shall state whe
ther or not the applicant claims any and what portion of the land within the lim
its of the way or road, and whether the applicant desires to have the line of th
e way or road determined.
Sec. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. -
The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to thos
e prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filin
g of any additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessar
y.
Sec. 22. Dealings with land pending original registration. After the fil
ing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of registration, th
e land therein described may still be the subject of dealings in whole or in par
t, in which case the interested party shall present to the court the pertinent i
nstruments together with a subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in
case of transfer of portions thereof and the court, after notice to the parties
, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance or encumbrance crea
ted by said instruments, or order that the decree of registration be issued in t
he name of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments
.

AGUILAR V. CAOGDAN, 105 PHIL. 661

The court that should take cognizance of a registration case is that which has t
erritorial jurisdiction over the property.
The Pangasinan court of first instance dismissed the registration case wh
en it found that the portions of the land covered by it were actually situated w
ithin the municipality of San Clement, province of Tarlac, and the dismissal was
without prejudice. This dismissal has the effect or relinquishing the jurisdict
ion originally acquired by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and of tran
sferring it to the court of Tarlac was filed sometime before the dismissal of th
e Pangasinan case can have no legal adverse consequence. On the contrary, it was
a rectification of an error committed as to venue for indeed the court that sho
uld take cognizance of this registration case is that which has territorial juri
sdiction over the property. This court is the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.

MANILA V. LACK, 19 PHIL. 234

Before the creation of the Court of Land Registration, jurisdiction to de
termine the nature, quality, and extent of land titles, the rival claims of part
ies contending therefor, of their registration (in its former sense), and the l
egality and effect thereof was vested in the Courts of First Instance of the Isl
ands. They had complete and exclusive jurisdiction thereover. By the passage of
Act No. 496 these courts were deprived under certain conditions of the power of
determining some of these questions and of adjudicating in relation to certain a
spects of others. By that Act, two things occurred. First, a court of limited j
urisdiction, with special subject matter, and with only one purpose, was created
. Second, by reason thereof courts, theretofore of general, original, and exclus
ive jurisdiction, were shorn of some of their attributes and deprived of certain
of their power.
However, the purpose of the Court of Land Registration is not to create o
r vest title, but merely to confirm title already created and vested. The Court
of Land Registration has no authority or jurisdiction to adjudicate rights in l
ands not registered. Therefore, a judgment of the Court of Land Registration, af
ter trial, declaring that a parcel of land, excluded from the petition and from
registration, was owned by the respondent and that such ownership was the reason
for the exclusion of said parcel from registration, is not res adjudicata in an
action of ejectment in the Court of First Instance, between the same parties, f
or the recovery of said parcel. Such judgment has no force or effect as evidence
of title in such action.

Form and Contents of Application

PD 1529, sec. 15. Form and contents. - The application for land registrati
on shall be in writing, signed by the application or the person duly authorized
in his behalf, and sworn to before any officer authorized to administer oaths fo
r the province or city where the application was actually signed. If there is mo
re than one applicant, the application shall be signed and sworn to by and in be
half of each. The application shall contain a description of the land and shall
state the citizenship and civil status of the applicant, whether single or marri
ed, and, if married, the name of the wife or husband, and, if the marriage has b
een legally dissolved, when and how the marriage relation terminated. It shall a
lso state the full names and addresses of all occupants of the land and those of
the adjoining owners, if known, and, if not known, it shall state the extent of
 the search made to find them.

REPUBLIC V. ALON, 199 SCRA 396

The following are the essential requisites for original registration proceed
ings in accordance with the Land Registration Act:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private surveyor.
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant.
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court.
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of the initial hearing together w
ith all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of Court
to the Land Registration Commission.
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place o
f hearing in the Official Gazette.
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known to have i
nterests in the property by the sheriff.
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the notice
or not.
8. Hearing of the case by the Court.

Amendments to Application
PD 1529, Sec. 19. Amendments. - Amendments to the application including jo
inder, substitution, or discontinuance as to parties may be allowed by the court
at any stage of the proceedings upon just and reasonable terms.
Amendments which shall consist in a substantial change in the boundaries
or an increase in area of the land applied for or which involve the inclusion of
an additional land shall be subject to the same requirements of publication and
notice as in an original application.
Sec. 21. Requirement of additional facts and papers; ocular inspection. -
The court may require facts to be stated in the application in addition to thos
e prescribed by this Decree not inconsistent therewith and may require the filin
g of any additional paper. It may also conduct an ocular inspection, if necessar
y.

ORTIZ V. ORTIZ, 26 PHIL. 250

While an application for the registration of various parcel real was pend
ing in the Court of Land Registration, the petitioner sold the property under pa
cto de retro to a corporation with juridical personality, and owing to the lapse
of redemption period, ownership became consolidated by operation of law and the
vendor lost all his rights in the properties. Therefore the new and lawful owne
r in entitled to be subrogate in place of the petitioner, the previous owner, pe
nding registration, and he may continue the proceedings in the case and finally
obtain title as owner. (Sec. 29, Act No. 496, and arts. 1507 and 1508, Civil Cod
e).
ESCUETA V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
16 PHIL. 482
It is not permissible to make amendments or alterations in the description of th
e land after its publication in the newspapers and after the registration of the
property has been decreed, without the publication of new notifications and adv
ertisements making known to everyone the said alterations and amendments. Otherw
ise, the law would be infringed with respect to the publicity which characterize
s the procedure, and third parties who have not had an opportunity to present th
eir claims, might be seriously affected in their rights, through failure of oppo
rtune notice.
The agreement of the owners, merely designated in an amendment of the des
cription of the land, is not sufficient, because there may be other persons who
might be injured by the alteration of the description and of the plan of the lan
d, and a third party who did not appear at the trial, in view of the previous pu
blication of the description of the property before its alteration and amendment
might afterwards be damaged by the subsequent decree of the court based on the
altered or amended description of which he was not opportunely informed, or beca
use he had no knowledge of the amendment which was not published.
The real property to be inscribed in the registry by virtue of the decree of the
court must be identical in its description with that which was the subject of t
he application of its owner and of the proceedings had in the court.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA
276 SCRA 279 (1997)
Absent publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land regist
ration court cannot validly confirm and register title. Note, though, that the
court already acquires jurisdiction upon mere publication in OG. Due process, h
owever, mandates publication, mailing and posting. The in rem nature of land re
gistration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole wo
rld, and the objective of dissemination of the notice in as wide a manner as pos
sible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, maili
ng and posting.

Dealings Pending Original Registration

See Sec. 22 of PD 1529.

C. Notice of Application, Opposition and Default

Application
OMANDAM VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
(1954)
Facts. Omandam applied for registration, under the Land Registration Act, a par
cel of land subject to a mortgage in favor of PNB for the sum of P600. On the d
ate of hearing, representatives of the Bureau of Lands, PNB and other opponents
appeared. Representatives of Bureau of Lands and PNB were given 15 days to file
written opposition to the application. Except as to those who had made their a
ppearance a general default was entered. After hearing, court decreed registrati
on in favor of Omandam.
Director of Lands filed an opposition and ten days later, a motion for re
consideration was filed by him predicated upon newly discovered evidence and lac
k of notice of the hearing. This was denied by the Court. Director of Lands file
d a motion for relief from judgment on the ground of excusable neglect. Also den
ied by the Court.
Held. Order appealed from is affirmed.
Ratio. Appellant points to the lack of hearing on the petition for relief, as p
rovided for in sections 4 and 6, Rule 38. According to the rule the Court is to
require "those against whom the petition is filed to answer the same within fift
een days from the receipt thereof" "if the petition is sufficient in form and su
bstance to justify such process."
Granting that the means of communication between Occidental Misamis and M
anila was faulty as alleged by the appellant, still there is no justification fo
r the delay in filing his opposition to the application. The fact that he did no
t file his opposition within the period granted or within a reasonable time ther
eafter led the Court to believe that he abandoned his opposition to the applicat
ion.
The motion for relief, apart from failing to show excusable neglect, does
not have an affidavit of merits. Hence, being an insufficient petition not only
in form but also in substance to justify the Court to require those against who
m it is filed to answer within fifteen days from the receipt thereof, as provide
d for in section 4, Rule 38, the hearing provided for in section 6 of the rule w
as not available to the party seeking the relief.

Opposition
See Sec. 25 of PD 1529.

NICOLAS VS. PRE, ET AL.

97 PHIL 766 (1955)
Facts. Nicolas filed for registration a vast tract of land. Pre, et al., oppos
ed the application with respect to a portion of the entire land claiming to be t
he owners thereof. During the hearing, on which date Nicolas was able to submit
his evidence, the parties agreed to come to an amicable settlement. The court
gave them 5 days. Instead of submitting the proposed settlement, Nicolas moved t
o dismiss the registration proceeding, which was favorably acted upon. Pre move
d to reconsider the order to give them an opportunity to present their evidence.
Pre s motion was granted. However, Nicolas failed to appear for the reception of
evidence. The court declared Pre as owners of the portion of land claimed by t
hem as owners. No appeal was taken.
4 years later, Nicolas sought to declare the order null and void for lack
of jurisdiction and for violation of Sec. 37 of Act 496. TC sustained motion t
o dismiss filed by Pre. CA affirmed TC.
Held. CA decision affirmed. With the enactment of Act No. 3621, the oppositor
may now not only allege in his answer his objections to the application but also
to ask for any affirmative relief he may desire (e.g., ask for the land to be r
egistered in his name in the same proceeding). But the adverse claimant to whom
a portion of the land applied for has been awarded has to pay to the applicant
such part of said expenses as may be in proportion to the area awarded. And ina
smuch as the applicant (Nicolas) had asked for the dismissal of his application,
the oppositors (Pre, et al.) ipso facto acquired the role of applicants on the
portion they claim without any opposition whatsoever.

ROXAS, ET AL., VS. CUEVAS, ET AL.

8 PHIL. 469 (1907)
Facts. An application for registration of Hacienda Calauang in Laguna was filed
. The government and several residents in the adjoining towns, cities and munici
palities opposed the application. Some oppositors maintained that the land is th
e property of the government and a portion thereof is occupied by them.
The lands in question were originally Crown lands conveyed to Salgado by
a royal grant. Upon his death, it was sold at auction to Benito Machado as agen
t of Domingo Roxas. The applicants herein acquired the property by succession.
The lower court found that active possession was exercised by Salgado and
his successors for a period of 130 years while oppositors possession was precari
ous and doubtful. Court of Land Registration thus overruled the oppositions of
private respondents.
The Court adjudged the land to the applicants except for a portion of the
land held to be public forest.
Held. Judgment of lower court affirmed. If the land as claimed by the opposito
rs belongs to the government, it follows that the oppositors cannot have interes
t in the land as they are not the government but mere citizens. Since the land
belongs to the State, and since the lower court has not so held it in its judgme
nt, the aggrieved party would be the State and not a mere citizen, and it is the
State that would have been entitled to appeal from the judgment and not any pri
vate individual. But the Insular Government did not appeal.
In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership i
n the Court of Land Registration may be object to, the opposition must be based
on the right of dominion or some other real right opposed to the adjudication or
recognition of the ownership of the petitioner, whether it be limited or absolu
te.

Order of Default
The court may, upon motion of the applicant, order a default to be recorde
d if no person appears and answers within the time allowed, and there appears to
be no reason to the contrary. The court shall then require the applicant to pr
esent evidence.
Partial defaults are allowed in land registration proceedings. (Sec. 26,
PD 1529)
YABUT LEE VS. PUNZALAN
99 SCRA 567 (1980)
Facts. Spouses Yabut Lee filed an application for registration 2 parcels of lan
d. No opposition having been interposed despite due publication, TC issued an O
rder of General Default. Due to the transfer of the presiding judge, however, ap
plication was not acted upon.
Subsequently, Punzalan filed a petition for reopening and/or review. He
claimed that the applicants committed fraud in not disclosing that he is the own
er of a house standing on the lots applied for and that he has usufructuary righ
ts over said properties. TC denied reopening.
Held. Order of General Default set aside. No judgment has yet been rendered by
the lower court, much less a decree of registration issued. Petition for reopen
ing is thus premature. In the absence of any decision and/or decree, there is n
othing to be reviewed or reopened. But in the interest
of substantial justice and the speedy determination of the controversy, the TC s
hould have lifted the Order of General Default to allow the Punzalan to file an
Opposition to the Application and present his evidence.
An Order of General Default is interlocutory in character and may be modi
fied or amended at any time prior to the rendition of the final judgment.
MANDIAN VS. LEONG
103 PHIL 431 (1958)
Facts. Dionisio Leong was sued by Mandian, widow and second wife Dionisio s late
father, for usurpation. In answering the complaint, Dionisio pleaded that he pos
sessed and administered the property as part of the estate of his late father by
agreement with Mandian. Celestino, brother of Dionisio, filed an answer in inte
rvention pleading that the lot was acquired during his second marriage to Mandia
n but title was placed in her name because the husband was not a Filipino citize
n. Celestino filed cross-claim against Dionisio for his failure to give his co-
heirs any share in the estate s fruits.
No answer having been filed by Dionisio notwithstanding the lapse of 26 d
ays after he was served a copy of the cross-claim, court declared him in default
. Dionisio sought reconsideration on the ground that the period to answer must b
e counted not from the time he was served a copy but from the time the court adm
itted it. Lower court denied reconsideration.
Held. Appeal dismissed and trial court ordered to proceed with the hearing of t
he case.
Ratio. The order declaring Dionisio in default is interlocutory and preliminary
to the hearing of the case, and remains under the control of the court, and may
be modified or rescinded by it on sufficient ground at any time before final ju
dgment. Thus, appeal is premature and improper.
A prerequisite to defendant s right to appeal is that he file a motion unde
r Rule 38 asking that the order of default entered against him be set aside. On
ce such motion is filed, the defendant, even if his motion is denied, becomes en
titled to all further proceedings including final judgment and may duly appeal t
herefrom.
MALAGUM AND ORNOPIA VS. PABLO
46 PHIL 19 (1924)
Facts. Andrin and Anacleta Lopez were the applicants for registration of a parc
el of land while Malagum and Ornopia appeared as opponents (petitioners in this
case). Lower court granted opponents 24 hours to file written opposition. Oppo
sitors presented a written opposition which was not verified under oath. When th
e case was again called for hearing, the opponents presented an amended oppositi
on in exactly the same language as the previous opposition but verified in the p
roper form. Applicants opposed. Judge denied admission of said amendment and d
eclared opponents in default. Motion for reconsideration was filed. On the same
date, court decreed the land in favor of applicants.
Petitioners pray that a writ of mandamus issue ordering the respondent ju
dge to reinstate the opposition.
Held. Demurrer sustained. Petition suffers from defects not curable by amendmen
t.
Ratio. Mandamus will not lie when there is another plain, speedy and adequate r
emedy. Petitioners should have taken an exception to the order rejecting their a
mended opposition or answer and after the denial of their motion for reconsidera
tion, could have taken their appeal to the Supreme Court. The order excluding t
heir answer was not a minor order within the meaning of Sec. 141 of the Civil Pr
ocedure to which no exception could be taken. It was in effect a final determin
ation of their rights and may be appealed as soon as the decision ordering the i
ssuance of the decree in favor of the adverse party was rendered.
D. Hearing, Judgment and Decree of Registration
PD 1529
Sec. 27. Speedy hearing; reference to a referee. - The trial court shall
see to it that all registration-proceedings are disposed or within ninety days f
rom the date the case is submitted for decision.
The Court, if it deems necessary, may refer the case or any part thereof
to a referee who shall hear the parties and their evidence, and the referee shal
l submit his report thereon to the Court within fifteen days after the terminati
on of such hearing. Hearing before a referee may be held at any convenient place
within the province or city as may be fixed by him and after reasonable notice
thereof shall have been served the parties concerned. The court may render judgm
ent in accordance with the report as though the facts have been found by the jud
ge himself: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion accept the r
eport, or set it aside in whole or in part, or order the case to be recommitted
for further proceedings:
Sec. 28. Partial judgment. - In a case where only a portion of the land s
ubject of registration is contested, the court may render partial judgment provi
ded that a subdivision plan showing the contested and uncontested portions appro
ved by the Director of Lands is previously submitted to said court.
Sec. 29. Judgment confirming title. - All conflicting claims of ownership
and interest in the land subject of the application shall be determined by the
court. If the court, after considering the evidence and the reports of the Commi
ssioner of Land Registration and the Director of Lands, finds that the applicant
or the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration, judgment shall b
e rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land
or portions thereof.
Sec. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. -
The judgment rendered in a land registration proceedings becomes final upon the
expiration of thirty days to be counted from the data of receipt of notice of t
he judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinar
y civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the
court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree t
o the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corres
ponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registr
ation.
Sec. 31. Decree of registration. - Every decree of registration issued by
the Commissioner shall bear the date, hour and minute of its entry, and shall b
e signed by him. It shall state whether the owner is married or unmarried, and i
f married, the name of the husband or wife: Provided, however, that if the land
adjudicated by the court is conjugal property, the decree shall be issued in the
name of both spouses. If the owner is under disability, it shall state the natu
re of disability, and if a minor, his age. It shall contain a description of the
land as finally determined by the court, and shall set forth the estate of the
owner, and also, in such manner as to show their relative priorities, all partic
ular estates, mortgages, easements, liens, attachments, and other encumbrances,
including rights of tenant-farmers, if any, to which the land or owner's estate
is subject, as well as any other matters properly to be determined in pursuance
of this Decree.
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, s
ubject only to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be c
onclusive upon and against all persons, including the National Government and al
l branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the
same being included in the general description "To all whom it may concern".
Sec. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value.
- The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absen
ce, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby, nor
by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however, to the
right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof, deprive
d of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmat
ion of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Inst
ance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later
than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registrati
on, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an inno
cent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest therein, whose rig
hts may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value" or an
equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innoce
nt lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registratio
n and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by ac
tion for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for the
fraud.
Sec. 33. Appeal from judgment, etc. - The judgment and orders of the cour
t hearing the land registration case are appealable to the Court of Appeals or t
o the Supreme Court in the same manner as in ordinary actions:
Sec. 34. Rules of procedure. - The Rules of Court shall, insofar as not i
nconsistent with the provision of this Decree, be applicable to land registratio
n and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever pract
icable and convenient. cdasia
BP 129
Sec. 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases.
- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Tria
l Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or
land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or oppositi
on, or contested lot the value of which does not exceed twenty thousand pesos, s
uch value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of
the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding t
ax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be app
ealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
Rule 143, Rules of Court
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein pro
vided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicab
le and convenient.

BALTAZAR VS. LIMPIN

49 PHIL. 39
Facts: M. Baltazar and J. Limpin filed an application for registration. Opposit
ion was filed by B. Limpin and the Dir of Lands. David was named as referee and
he made a report favorable to the applicants. No exception was made to the ref
eree s report so the judge handed down a decision in which he concurred in part an
d dissented in part with the referee s report. Decision was unfavorable to applica
nts. Applicants appealed and filed a petition to order stenographer to transcri
be the notes of the testimony of the referee. TC denied pet bec. referee s report
 has become unassailable.
Issue: WON petition to order stenographer should be granted.
Held: Yes. GENERAL RULE: If a party fails to make timely and specific exception
s to the report of a referee and the report is confirmed by the trial judge, he
is bound by the findings and cannot be heard to dispute their truthfulness or es
cape the legal consequences flowing therefrom. BUT by virtue of sec 140 of the C
ode of Civil Procedure and sec 36 of the Land Registration Law, the trial judge
retains a discretion to accept the report of the referee in part and set it asid
e in part or reverse it entirely even where no exceptions to the referee's repor
t are taken (see sec 27 of PD 1529). When the trial judge accepts the referee s r
eport in part, the general rule does not apply such that the referee s report does
not become unassailable. Petition granted.
DURAN VS. OLIVA
113 PHIL 144
Facts: Duran and Vda. De Duran filed an application for registration of land an
d Oliva et al filed their opposition and MTD on the ground of lack of jurisdicti
on because the lands were already registered. TC granted MTD. P claims there i
n no such thing as MTDs in land registration cases.
Issue: WON MTDs are allowed in land registration cases.
Held: Yes. By express provision of Rule 132 (now R143) of the Rules of Court, th
e rules contained therein apply to land registration and cadastral cases in a su
ppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. The Land Registratio
n Act does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to di
smiss. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for the expeditious termination of la
nd registration cases, said motion contained in the Rules of Court can be availe
d of by the parties. Petition denied.

Evidence Necessary to Prove Title

RODRIGUEZ VS. DIR OF LANDS
31 PHIL 272
Facts: Rodriguez filed an application for registration of land and the Dir of L
ands and several homesteaders filed their opposition. TC denied the application
because the area and boundaries of the land applied for is too uncertain.
Issue: WON the P are entitled to a new trial.
Held: Yes. Only under exceptional circumstances should an application for regist
ry in the Court of Land Registration be dismissed. Applicants should be grante
d a new trial, upon such terms as the court may deem just and reasonable and to
submit additional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are stro
ng or reasonable grounds to believe that he is the owner of all or of any part o
f the land described in his application. This especially when the only ground fo
r the dismissal of the application, as is in the CAB, is the lack of formal or
perhaps even substantial proof as to the chain of title upon which applicant rel
ies, or as to the precise location of the land, which there is reasonable ground
to believe can be supplied by the applicant upon his being advised as to the na
ture of the defects or omissions in the evidence offered by him, such defects or
omissions having been the result of oversight or excusable error on his part in
submitting his evidence in support of his claim of title to the land described
in his application.
REPUBLIC VS. LEE
Facts: Lee filed an application for registration of land on the bare statement
that the land applied for has been in the possession of her predecessor-in-inter
est for more than 20 years. Director of Lands opposed. TC granted the applicat
ion.
Issue: WON Lee s bare statement constitutes the well-nigh incontrovertible and concl
usive evidence required in land registration cases.
Held: No. The most basic rule in land registration cases is that "no person is
entitled to have land registered under the Cadastral or Torrens system unless he
is the owner in fee simple of the same, even though there is no opposition pres
ented against such registration by third persons . . In order that the petition
er for the registration of his land shall be permitted to have the same register
ed, and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title, finally iss
ued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in f
ee simple." Lee must prove the alleged 20 year or more possession of his predece
ssors-in-interest by means of factual support and substantiation. Lee failed to
discharge this burden to the satisfaction of the Court. That the representing f
iscal did not cross-examine her on this point does not help her cause because th
e burden is upon her. Petition granted.
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORP. VS. CA, CORREA, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF BULACAN (198 SCRA 734
)
Facts: Republic Cement Corp (RCC) filed an application for registration of land
. Rayo, Mangahas and Legaspi opposed as to a portion of the land applied for ba
sed on ownership. Oppositors were later substituted by the purchaser Correa. T
C denied application based on new SC ruling that a juridical person, is disqualif
ied to apply for its registration under Section 48 (b) of she Public Land Law and
when its predecessors-in-interest did not apply for land registration, they did
not have any vested right or title which was transmissible to the juridical per
son. Correa filed an action for recovery. RCC filed a MTD on the ground that t
he land registration case is on appeal. TC granted MTD. The CA, as regards the
land registration case on appeal, ruled that the SC ruling used by TC was alrea
dy overturned, such that juridical persons like RCC can now apply for registrati
on. CA ordered registration in favor of RCC but excluding certain portions in f
avor of Correa. RCC appeals CA decision.
Issue: WON CA was correct in giving a portion to Correa.
Held. Yes. Petitioner raises questions of fact which are not within the province
of the present recourse. Settled is the rule that findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are final and binding upon the Supreme Court if borne out by the evi
dence on record. A review of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals is no
t a function ordinarily undertaken by the Supreme Court, the rule admitting of o
nly a few exceptions recognized under decisional law, which exceptions are not o
btaining in the case at bar.
After the death of RCC s predecessor-in-interest Felix Mangahas, one-half
(1/2) of said land was adjudicated and partitioned among his five (5) daughters
in a deed of extrajudicial partition. Later, RCC boought the land form the daugh
ters. Based on said transfers, petitioner is now seeking the registration of the
whole of Lot No. 2880 in its name. This we cannot allow. The deeds of sale reli
ed upon by petitioner do not constitute sufficient legal justification for petit
ioner's claim over all of Lot No. 2880. Petitioner's title over said lot, as the
successor in interest of said heirs, is limited only to whatever rights the lat
ter may have had therein. It is elementary that a grantor can convey no greater
estate than what he has or in which he has an alienable title or interest.
Petitioner's claim over the excess area is premised on the survey alleged
ly made by surveyor Villaruz, but the resultant areas depicted in said survey do
not tally with, but supposedly consist of expanded areas very much larger than,
those indicated for the lots involved in their respective tax declarations. Th
ese facts are expressly stated by the foregoing parties in the deeds of sale the
y executed in favor of petitioner over the lots covered by the aforestated tax d
eclarations. We do not find satisfactory the stilted explanation advanced to jus
tify the glaringly excessive disparity of areas resulting after the supposed sur
vey.
It does not appear from our scrutiny of the records, despite petitioner's
representations in its written offer of evidence filed in the court a quo, that
the purported survey plans of the lots involved were actually submitted in evid
ence therein. Neither was it alleged and proved that they were approved by the D
irector of Lands. It has long been held that unless a survey plan is duly approv
ed by the Director of Lands, the same is of dubious value and is not acceptable
as evidence. Indubitably, therefore, the reputed survey and its alleged results
are not entitled to credit and should be rejected. An applicant for registration
of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove no
t only the genuineness of said title but also the identity of the land therein r
eferred to. If he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he mus
t clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that ti
tle.

Spanish Titles
PD 1529, Sec. 3. Status of other pre-existing land registration system. - The
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is hereby discontinued an
d all lands recorded under said system which are not yet covered by Torrens titl
e shall be considered as unregistered lands.
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under t
he Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 113 of this Decree, until
the land shall have been brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
The books of registration for unregistered lands provided under Section
194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344, shall contin
ue to remain in force; provided, that all instruments dealing with unregistered
lands shall henceforth be registered under Section 113 of this Decree.

REPUBLIC VS. FELICIANO

148 SCRA 424 (1987)
Facts: Feliciano filed a complaint with the CFI of Camarines Sur against the Re
public of the Philippines for recovery of ownership of a parcel of land. Felici
ano alleges that he bought the property from Victor Cardiola who in turn acquire
d the property from a Francisco Abrazado. Abrazado s claim to ownership is by vir
tue of an informacion posesoria. Feliciano took actual possession of the land a
nd introduced improvements. Government claimed ownership by virtue of Proclamat
ion 90 which reserved for settlement purposes a tract of land which includes Fel
iciano s land. Feliciano filed an action praying that he be declared rightful and
true owner by virtue of the informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interes
ts.
Issue: WON ownership is vested by virtue of the informacion posesoria.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. The inscription in the property registry of an inf
ormacion posesoria under the Spanish Mortgage law was a means provided by the la
w then in force in the Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spa
in to US, to record a claimant s actual possession of a piece of land, established
through an ex parte proceeding. Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, pr
ima facie evidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the cla
imant was in possession of the land under a claim of right. The possessory info
rmation could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20 years upon
the fulfillment of the requisites. There is no showing in the case at bar that
the informacion posesoria held by the respondent had been converted into a recor
d of ownership. Such possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere p
rima facie evidence of possession.

Tax Declarations
Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registrati
on cases.
PALOMO VS. CA
JANUARY 21, 1997
Facts: Gov General Forbes issued EO 40 w/c reserved for provincial park purposes
an area of land. Subsequently the CFI of Albay ordered registratiion of 15 par
cels of land covered by EO40 in the name of Diego Palomo. In 1954, President Ma
gsaysay issued Proc. 47 converting the area of EO40 into the Tiwi Hot Spring Nati
onal Park .
The Palomos continued in adverse possession, paying real estate taxes the
reon, and making improvements. In 1974, the Govt of the Phils. Filed a case for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels.
Jundgment was rendered in favor of the Republic.
Issue: WON the certificate of titles to the 15 parcels are valid and binding.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: NO. The tax receipts which were presented in evidence d
o not prove ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority
is that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registra
tion cases.

Possession
SOUTH CITY HOMES VS REPUBLIC
185 SCRA 693 (1990)
Facts: Lot No. 5005 is a strip of land between 2 lots owned by the petitioner.
Registration of the strip was issued in the name of the petitioner, but the orde
r was reversed by special division of the respondent court. Petitioner argues t
hat the reversal is erroneous.
The 2 adjacent lots are Lot 2381 and 2386. Both are now registered with t
he petitioner. He submits 2 theories as to why lot 5005 should also be register
ed in his name. First, the strip of land formed part of the 2 lots but was ommit
ted therefrom only because of the inaccuracies of the old system of cadastral su
rveys. Second, it had acquired the property by prescription through uninterrupt
ed possession in the concept of owner.
Issue: WON petitioner has acquired ownership over lot 5005 through prescription.

Ratio: NO. It is obvious that the technical descriptions of the two lots do no
t include the strip of land between them. Furthermore, the testimony and the evi
dence presented falls short of establishing the manner and length of possession
required by law to vest prescriptive title in the petitioner to lot No. 5005. F
or one thing, as the SolGen points out in his comment, the claim of adverse owne
rship to the strip of land between their respective lots was not exclusive but s
hared by the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioner. The petitioner merely o
ccupied the disputed strip believing it to be included in the 2 lots. However,
even if it can be conceded that the previous owners of the lots possessed the st
rip, the possession cannot be tacked to the possession of the petitioner. Posse
ssion cannot be transferred.

Prescription
PARCOTILO VS PARCOTILO
120 PHIL. 1231
Facts: The plaintiffs alleged that Pablo owned two parcels of land during his l
ifetime in Misamis Occidental. In 1918, Pablo and his wife died of cholera, lea
ving no ascendant or descendant. So it was claimed by the plaintiffs herein tha
t they are co-owners of the land with the defendants involved. On January 1956,
plaintiffs filed a complaint for partition, claiming that in 1936, defendant De
metrio swore to an affidavit that he was the only son and heir of Pablo and in s
o doing, procured the transfer to his name of the tax declarations of Pablo s land
s. Demetrio then sold a portion of the property to a third party, Crispin Priet
o. The defendants raised various defenses: claiming that it was donated to them
since 1917 and took possession thereof in 1918 in the concept of an owner, intr
oducing improvements to it; the third party claims innocent purchaser for value.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding defendant s assertion that it
was donated mortis causa through a testament (without requisite of law) exh 1 c
onveying it to defendant. And it was also found that defendant possessed the la
nd without any protesting his occupation thereof, and only recently did plaintif
fs raise this claim. The TC ruled that exh 1 has no probative value but it serv
es as a good ground to base acquisitive prescription. Hence, this appeal.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the TC. Eve
n if exh 1 was not executed with all the requisites of a valid will or of a vali
d donation mortis causa, the said document supplied the basis for the claim for
the defendant. This claim of ownership by Demetrio coupled with his open, conti
nuous and adverse possession for a period of 38 years had ripened into a title b
y prescription.
And where the lands involved are unregistered and the rights thereto by prescrip
tion accrued before the New Civil Code went into effect, the law applicable is S
ec 41 of Act 190 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure (10 year- period and concept
of actual, open, ... possession). Even the Art 1137 of the New Civil Code, nev
ertheless, upholds the claim of defendant since he held on the property through
uninterrupted adverse possession for more than 30 years.
SEMINARY OF SAN CARLOS VS THE MUNICIPALITY OF CEBU (19 PHIL 32)
Facts: The Seminary of San Carlos asks for the registration of two pieces of lan
d located in Cebu, alleging as its source of title a royal cession from the King
of Spain. The City of Cebu denies the title of the petitioner and alleges in i
tself ownership of the land in question, stating that its title is based upon po
ssession thereof required by law to effect title by prescription.
The land in question as claimed by the seminary, includes a portion of one of th
e public squares of that city. So aside from the question of ownership, the two
related matters resolved by the court involved the quantity of the land and its
precise location.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: After looking at the exhibits to ascertain the exact plan
of the land, the Court found that the land described in petitioner s exhibits far
exceeds the land it was allowed to claim. It was shown that indeed, there appe
ars to be a large difference between the amount of land as described in one of t
he petitioner s exhibits and that included in the plan. But still, there are enou
gh documents to show that it owns part of the land. Under the evidence, therefo
re, the Court concluded that a portion of the land now occupied by the City of C
ebu as a public plaza is a land described in the petitioner s exhibits and so much
said land is contained in petitioner s plan, and to that land, no documentary rec
ord or title appears except that of petitioner s paper title which the City fails
to contradict. The City s contention is based solely on long years of actual occu
pation (prescription). It then signifies no source from which comes any right o
r interest and asserts no ability to disclose any. In fact, exh k was even pres
ented by petitioner to show that the City s occupation was permissive and not adve
rse, was under license and not under claim of right, and could not therefore be
made the basis of a prescriptive title. Any express or implied acknowledgment wh
ich the possessor makes with regard to the dominant rights of the true owner int
errupts the possession held for prescriptive purposes and defeats the operation
of the law granting such rights.
Also, the spanish grant (a written instrument acknowledging the superior title o
f the Seminary and limited the purpose of the City s possession of the land) given
by the governor-general then, recognizing the Seminary s right was binding upon t
he City and conclusive as to the character thereof. But the Seminary is likewis
e bound to honor the purposes for which the City can occupy the land (so long as
the paseo exists).
RAMOS VS CA (FEB. 3, 1999)
Facts: supra
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Under the law, an action for reconveyance of real propert
y resulting from fraud prescribes in four years from the discovery of fraud. Di
scovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place when Lucia Bautista was
issued OCT Nos. 17811 and 17812 because registration of real property is conside
red constructive notice to all persons and it chall be counted from the time of
such registering, filing, or entering. An action based on implied or constructi
ve trust prescribes in 10 years. This means that petitioners should have enforc
ed the trust within 10 years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged f
raudulent registration of property. But as it is, petitioners failed to avail o
f any of the aforementioned remedies within the prescribed periods. With NO reme
dy in view, their claims should forever be foreclosed.
Likewise, the Court reiterated on the protection afforded by the Torrens System
(once its title is registered, owner may rest secure.. so no abandonment can wor
k against the private respondents.

E. Hearing, Judgment and Decree

Hearing and Notice
GOV T OF THE PHIL, VASQUEZ, GAYARES VS ABURAL (39 PHIL 996)
Facts: Cadastral proceedings were commenced in Negros Occidental upon an applica
tion of the Director of Lands in 1916. Notices were issued. Vasquez and Gayare
s, although residing in the same municipality and participated in other cadastra
l cases, did NOT enter any opposition. Hearing then issued, and the lower court
issued a final decree ordering the Chief of the General Land Registration Offi
ce to issue the decrees corresponding to the lots adjudged in the decision. Eig
ht months later, but before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the
so-called technical decree, Vasquez and Gayares came into the case for the first
time, claiming complete ignorance of the proceedings. The lower court however,
denied their motion for new trial, saying that there was already a decree rende
red by the Court and there being no allegation of fraud, the Court has no jurisd
iction to consider this case. Hence, this appeal.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: The main question is : When does the registration of tit
le, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially under the differen
t Philippine laws, establishing the Cadastral System, become final, conclusive a
nd indisputable? As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral sy
stem is final, conclusive and indisputable after the passage of the 30 day perio
d allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the j
udgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken t
o perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgme
nt as a matter of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by th
e Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
providing for fraud.
In this case, the Court explained that there are 3 actions taken after tr
ial in a cadastral case. First, adjudicates ownership in favor of claimants. Se
cond, declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the is
suance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office
(such order is made within 30 days from date of receipt of a copy of the decisi
on, there being no appeal made). Third, devolves upon the General Land Registra
tion Office to prepare the final decrees in all adjudicated cases. Indeed, the
judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judi
cial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the basis of the c
ertificate of title. The issuance of a decree by the LRO is ministerial act. T
he date on which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the
running of the time for the interposition of a motion for new trial or appeal.
Herein, the claim after 8 months will not be allowed by the Court.
MAGBANUA, PINEDA VS DIZON, DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND FORESTRY (73 PHIL. 622)
Facts: Petitioners applied in the CFI of Iloilo for the registration of a parcel
of land. This was opposed by the DOL and DOF claiming that the applicants have
no sufficient title to the land, and that a portion thereof formed part of the
provincial road. Hearing ensued, and in there, an agreement was reached wherein
the applicants ceded to the government the land claimed by it (excluding it in t
heir application). As such, the Court rendered a decision bestowing parcels A a
nd C to applicants and ceding parcel B to the government. The decision was silen
t however to one parcel of land (parcel D). In the decision, the applicants wer
e ordered to submit an amended plan duly approved by the BOL corresponding to th
e technical description as agreed upon.
The DOL however filed a motion for reconsideration based on the Court s fai
lure to include parcel D in its claim. Petitioners opposed the MFR, saying that
the judge no longer has jurisdiction because the decision had become final.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: DOL can file MFR because decision is NOT yet final. In v
iew of the necessity for the applicants to present a new plan as a result of the
ir agreement whereby it was agreed that parcels B and D were to be excluded in f
avor of the government. The decision could not acquire finality until the amend
ed plan was presented. Indeed, such decisions which leave something yet to be d
one by the parties and the court before it can be enforced, has in various cases
been declared by the Court as interlocutory and not appealable.
ALINSUNURIN VS. DIR OF LANDS
(68 SCRA 177)
FACTS: On Feb. 24, 1964, Alipinoi Alinsunurin filed an application for registra
tion under Act No. 496 of a vast tract of land in nueva Ecija. The director of
lands opposed the application, claiming that the applicant was not in open, cont
inuous possession of the land for at least 30 years, and that part of the land w
as a military reservation, therefore inalienable land.
On Nov. 19, 1966, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the app
licants, ordering the registration of the land in the names of: (Paranaque Inves
tment and Devt. Corp. (PIDC/ successor-in-interest of Alinsunurin); and (2) Roma
n Tamayo as to 1/3 portion of the land.
The DOL filed a notice of appeal with the SC. PIDC was furnished a copy
of the notice, but no copy was sent to Roman Tamayo. Pending approval of the re
cords of appeal, PIDC and RT filed a motion for the issuance of a decree of regi
stration pending appeal. The DOL opposed.
The lower court on March 11, 1967 ordered the issuance of a decree of registrati
on of the entire land, 1/3 pro indiviso in favor of RT, and 2/3 in favor of PIDC
the latter subject to the final outcome of the appeal, while the former absolut
e since RT was not furnished a Notice of Appeal.
OCT No. 0-311 was isued by the register of deeds on March 14, 1967. The D
OL filed a petition to nullify the LC s order dated march 11, 1967, the decree of
reg issued pursuant thereto, and the OCT No. 0-311 issued by the ROD.
ISSUE: WON the OCT No. 0-3151 may be nullified.
HELD: Yes. Under the circumstances of the case, the failure of the appellants t
o serve a copy of their Notice of Appeal to RT is not fatal to the appeal becaus
e, admittedly, he was served with a copy of the original, as well as the Amended
record on appeal in both of which the Notice3 of Appeal is embodied. Hence, su
ch failure cannot impair the right of appeal.
What is more, the appeal taken by the gov't was from the entire decision,
which was not severable. Thus, the appeal affects the whole decision.
In any event, We rule that execution pending appeal is NOT applicable in
land registration proceedings. It is fraught with dangerous consequences. Inn
ocent purchasers may be misled into purchasing real properties upon reliance on
a judgment which may be reversed on appeal.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment that is not final is a
nullity, as it is violative of the express provision of the LRA w/c requires tha
t a decree shall be issued only after the decision adjudicating the title become
s final and executory, and it is on the basis of said decree that the ROD concer
ned issues the corresponding certificate of title.
Consequently, the LC acted w/o jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction
in ordering the issuances of a decree of reg. Despite the appeal taken from the
entire decision a quo.
DE LOS REYES VS. DE VILLA
(48 PHIL 227)
FACTS: Delos Reyes filed an application for the registration of 2 parcels of lan
d situated in the municipality of Mariaya, Tayabas. The CFI rendered a decision
in favor of delos Reyes, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and
OCT as soon as the decision becomes final. The court issued an order directing
the Land Reg Office to prepare a final decree of registration. Such was issued
on Nov 22, 1923.
Braulio de Villa filed a petition for review of the decree under Sec 38 o
f the LRA, alleging that the registration of land was obtained by fraud. The pe
tition was opposed by delos Reyes on the ground that it had been presented after
the expiration of the time allowed under sec 38. DLR maintains that the decree
of March 31, 1923 was the reckoning point of the 1-year period under Sec. 38, h
ence the petition was presented out of time.
Appelant de Villa contends that the 1-yr period commenced on Nov. 22, 192
3 when the final decree of registration was issued by the GLRO; therefore, the p
etition was presented well within the one year period provided for in Sec. 38.
ISSUE: When does the one-year period for the petition for review commence?
RATIO: Upon the issuance of the final decree of registration, as described under
 Section 40, by the chief of the general Land Reg. Office. De Villa s petition wa
s timely presented.
The petition for review under Sec. 38 of the LRA must be presented within
one year after the entry of the decree of registration described and defined in
Sec. 40 of the same act.
The LRA expressly recognizes 2 classes of decrees in land registration pr
oceedings, namely, decrees of confirmation and registration dealt with in sectio
ns 30-41 of the Act, and the decrees dismissing the application. It will be not
ed that Sec. 38 speaks of the former class. Sec. 40 defines and describes th
e form and contents of such decrees. The decision of the trial court in a land
registration case, ordering the issuance of a decree of registration within the
meaning of Sec. 38 of the LRA.
In preparing and signing the final decree of registration, the chief of t
he GLRO acts in his capacity as Chief Clerk of the CFI in land registration matt
ers, and not as an administrative one. It is the last word of the court to the
registration and is the basis for the issuance of the certificate of title.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the date noted on the final d
ecree of registration, as the date of its issuance and entry, must be regarded a
s the true date of such entry, and the year within which a petition for review m
ust be presented begins to run from that date.

YUSON VS. DIAZ (42 PHIL. 22)

Facts: Yuson purchased a parcel of land from Lopez, to whom OCT no. 999 was issu
ed by the CFI (Lopez was the applicant for registration). When Yuson took posse
ssion of the land, they found the respondents in possession of the part of the l
and. The latter were asked to leave the land, but they refused. The respondent
s claim that they purchased the land in good faith from one Graciano Garcia.
The Land Reg. Court issued a writ of possession in favor of Lopez, by vir
tue of which Lopez was placed in possession of the land. In the case at bar, Yu
son filed petition/motion to issue a writ of possession to compel the respondent
s to surrender the land to Yuson.
The respondents maintain that, in view of the right of possession which t
hey claim to have acquired over the parcel of land, they cannot be dispossessed
thereof by means of a simple motion.
Yuson claims that it is entitled to a writ of possession, relying on Sec.
39 of the LRA. It is claimed that Sec. 39 guarantees that the purchaser of reg
istered land for value shall hold the same free and clear from any and all prior
claims and encumbrances, except those set forth in the decree of registration a
nd those expressly mentioned in the Act as having been reserved against it.
The CFI Judge refused to issue the writ of possession. Hence, this petit
ion.
Issue: WON the successors-in-interest of the applicants can acquire possession o
f said parcel of land actually occupied by the respondents by means of a petitio
n asking for a writ of possession?
Held: No. An independent action for reconveyance or unlawful detainer is necessa
ry.
Under the facts stated in the decision, it is improper to issue the perem
ptory writ of mandamus against a judge to compel him to issue a writ of possessi
on in favor of the owner of the registered land occupied by a third person who h
as not been defeated after trial.
Sec. 39 of the LRA w/c states that an OCT issued by virtue of a decree of
reg. And every subsequent purchaser for value receives a certificate and those
mentioned in Sec. 39. The meaning of the words free from all encumbrances does no
t include adverse possession of a third person who subsequent to the decree ente
red and occupied the said land.
By virtue of Sec. 17 of the LRA, the Land Registration Court may, in case
s falling within its jurisdiction, enforce its orders, judgments or decrees in t
he same manner as the CFI, including a writ of possession. But when OTHER person
s have subsequently entered the property, claiming right of possession, the owne
r of the registered property or his successors in interest CANNOT dispossess suc
h persons by merely asking for a writ of possession.
He who believes himself entitled to deprive another of the possession of
real property must come to the courts of justice, instituting, as the case may b
e, and action for unlawful entry or detainer, or the reinvindicatory action auth
orized under the Civil Code.

BLAS, SIMEON VS. DELA CRUZ

(37 PHIL. 1)
Facts: Dela Cruz filed an application for registration of a parcel of land under
the Torrens system. Blas presented an opposition, claiming that he was the own
er of a portion of land described in the petition. Lower court ruled in favor o
f Blas, but the SC ruled otherwise. The SC ordered that the portion w/c was cla
imed by Blas be registered in the name of V. dela Cruz.
Blas filed this present petition to obtain an injunction against dela Cr
uz to prevent him from destroying the buildings and improvements over the subjec
t land. Blas claims that these byuildings fall under exceptional encumbrances pro
vided for under Sec. 39 of Act 496. Therefore, despite the absence of any notat
ion in the certificate of title as to these buildings, these encumbrances must b
e recognized by dela Cruz.
Issue: 1. Does the decree ordering the registration of land under the Torrens sy
stem include the buildings and improvements thereon, when they have not been exp
ressly excluded in said decree? Ans: YES
2. May Blas claim said buildings as his property and remove the same or
prevent the owner of the land under said decree from removing or destroying the
same, even if he had not made any claim to said improvements during the proceedi
ngs for registration? Ans: No.
Held: The general purpose of the Torrens System is to forever foreclose litigati
on concerning the title to land. Every decree of registration shall bind the la
nd, and quiet title thereto, subject only to the exceptions stated by law. If t
he objector (Blas) may, during the pendency of the case, remain silent as to cer
tain rights, interests or claims existing in or upon the land, and then later, b
y a separate action, have such interest litigated, then the purpose of the Torre
ns System will be defeated.

IN RE MANILA BUILDINGS AND LOANS ASSOCIATION (13 PHIL 575)

Facts: MBLA leased a parcel of land owned by Benito Legarda, and erected a build
ing of strong materials thereon. On Jan. 14, 1908, MBLA applied to the Court of
Land reg. For the registration of a building of strong materials erected on gro
und belonging to another. The application was denied by the CLR.
MBLA filed an amended application alleging that the land was registered i
n the name of Legarda; and that the lease contract between MBLA and Legarda was
registered/indorsed on the title deed of the latter.
On April 14, 1908, the CLR ruled that an annotation that the building the
reon belongs to the lessee (MBLA) is sufficient registration. MBLA appealed to
the SC, claiming that Sec. 2 of the LRA allows the registration of title to land
or buildings or interest therein
Held: The use of the phrase land or buildings or an interest therein, instead of t
he single word land , is no reason for construing the law as authorizing the regist
ration of buildings erected on land belonging to another separately and independ
ently from the registration of the land. The natural and logical interpretation
of such language of the LRA being natural and logical interpretation of such la
nguage of the LRA being that it authorizes the owner of the land to register tog
ether with the land all the improvements. But under NO circumstances can regist
ration be applied for separately and independently by the owner of the land and
by the owner of the buildings; that is to say that the land of one person and th
e building of another erected thereon can have no separate legal existence in th
e registry as property independent in themselves.
At the expiration of the lease, the owner of the land has the right, not
merely a contingent one but a definite right under the law, to cause the buildin
g erected on his estate to be taken down without incurring any obligation whatso
ever, enforcing against
the lessee the obligation imposed by article 1561 (Civil Code), to return the es
tate in the same condition in w/c he received it.
D. Remedies
An aggrieved party may take any of the following remedies to challenge the j
udgment in a land registration case or the validity of title issued pursuant the
reto:

(1) Motion for New Trial

(2) Petition for Relief from Judgment
(3) Appeal
(4) Petition for Review of Decree of
Registration
(5) Action for Reconveyance
(6) Action for Damages
(7) Action for Compensation from the Assurance Fund
(8) Cancellation Suit
(9) Quieting of Title
(1) New Trial
Within the 15-day reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, the aggrieve
d party may file a motion for new trial under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for
one or more of the following causes:
(a) Fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence co
uld not have guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has pro
bably been impaired in his rights; or
(b) Newly-discovered evidence which he could not, with reasonable diligence, h
ave discovered and produced at the trial, and which if presented would probably
alter the result.

(2) Relief from Judgment

A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court can
be resorted to in instances where the judgment was entered through fraud, accide
nt, mistake, or excusable negligence (FAME for short).
This petition must be verified and filed within 60 days after the petitioner
learns of the judgment to be set aside, but not more than 6 months after such j
udgment was entered. It must be accompanied by affidavits showing the FAME reli
ed upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause
of action or defense.
 This remedy can be availed of only when the judgment has become final and th
e remedies of new trial or appeal are no longer available.

(3) Appeal
The judgment and orders of the court hearing the land registration case are
appealable to the Court of Appeals in the same manner as in ordinary actions.

(4) Petition for Review of Decree of Registration

A petition for reopening and review of decree of registration under Sec. 32 o
f PD 1529 may be resorted to provided that the ff. requisites are present:
(1) the petitioner has a real and dominical right;
(2) that he has been deprived thereof;
(3) through fraud;
(4) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree;
and
(5) the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser for va
lue
Once the 1-year period lapses, the decree of registration and the certificate
of title issued become incontrovertible, and the person aggrieved loses his rec
ourse to this remedy.
However, even if a petition is filed within 1 year from the entry of the decr
ee, the courts cannot entertain such petition if the rights of an innocent purch
aser for value may be prejudiced.
MERCEDES ANICETA GARCIA, ET AL VS. DOMINADOR G. MENDOZA
14 SCRA 691 (1965)
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedes A. Garcia claims that she and her husband, Cirilo Men
doza, had purchased Lot No. 32080 located in San Carlos City, Pangasinan on Apri
l 24, 1938. They subsequently sold it under a Pacto de Retro sale to co-petition
ers Sps. Dulcesimo Rosario and Violeta Reyes and Erlinda O. Rosario (Petitioners
), who then took possession of said lot.
On February 23, 1988, the cadastral court issued a decision adjudicating
Lot No. 32080 in favor of Dominador G. Mendoza (hereafter, Mendoza), their son.
Petitioner Garcia claims that there was actual fraud because Mendoza fals
ely claimed that his father, Cirilo Mendoza, inherited the property from Hermene
gildo Mendoza (Cirilo's alleged father); that Mendoza made it appear that Lot 32
080 was an exclusive property of Cirilo Mendoza, who had been in possession of t
he lot since October 15, 1987, and subsequently, donated the same to his son, Me
ndoza.
On September 2, 1988, the petitioners filed with the court a petition for
review of judgment. This was denied in an Order dated December 6, 1988. Mendoz
a countered that a petition for relief from judgment under Sec. 38, Act No. 496,
does not apply to a cadastral proceeding. Moreover, Mendoza alleged that he had
filed his claim over Lot No. 32080
ISSUE: WON the remedy of petition for review of judgment exists or is warranted
by Act No. 2259 (Cadastral Act):
HELD: Sec. 11, Act 2259 clearly states that except as otherwise provided by the
Cadastral Act, all the provisions of the Land Registration Act are applicable t
o cadastral proceedings as well as to the decree and certificates of title grant
ed and issued under the Cadastral Act.
SOLEDAD DE G. CRISOLO, IN HER BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN OF NOEL CRISOLO VS. COURT O
F APPEALS,
68 SCRA 435 (1975)
FACTS: Within a year from the issuance of a decree of registration in a land reg
istration case, respondent-ward, represented by his guardian, filed a petition f
or review of the decree under Section 38 of Act 496 on the ground of fraud which
allegedly consisted in petitioner's taking advantage of the insanity of respond
ent-ward to secure the execution of a deed of exchange of properties by and betw
een the petitioner and said respondent-ward, and in petitioner's instituting the
land registration proceedings while said ward was confined at the National Psyc
hopathic Hospital. The trial court dismissed the petition and held that Section
38 of Act 496 was not applicable because respondent had opportunity to oppose th
e registration proceedings but abandoned his opposition.
Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and when petitioner moved to
have the appeal certified to the Supreme Court because it involved purely quest
ions of law, the Court of Appeals denied the motion and instead sustained the al
legation of fraud. It rendered a decision reversing that of the trial court and
remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings. Hence, this petit
ion for certiorari on the grounds that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction
since only questions of law are involved and private respondent is not entitled
to the re-opening of the land registration proceedings because he was not denied
fraudulently of his day in court but merely abandoned his opposition thereto de
spite the opportunity given to him to oppose the registration.
ISSUE: whether or not an oppositor, after abandoning his opposition in a land re
gistration case and after a decision had been rendered and a decree of registrat
ion issued thereunder, is entitled to a reopening of the proceedings by means of
a petition for review based on fraud under Section 38 of Act 496
HELD: The record shows that private respondent had been duly afforded the opport
unity to object to, the registration and substantiate the same. The person(s) c
ontemplated under Section 38 of Act 496, to be entitled to a review of a decree
of registration, are those who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity t
o be heard in the original registration case. Such is not the situation of the p
rivate respondents here. They were not denied their day in court by fraud, which
the law provides as the sole ground for reopening of the decree of registration
. In fact they opposed the registration but failed to substantiate their opposit
ion.
Mere allegation of fraud is not enough. Specific, intentional acts to dec
eive and deprive another of his right, or in some manner injure him, must be all
eged and proved. There must be actual or positive fraud as distinguished from co
nstructive fraud to entitle one to the reopening of a decree of registration. An
d it must be extrinsic and not intrinsic fraud. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, supra
, 17 Phil. 49, 57).

SPOUSES RODOLFO YABUT LEE AND LYDIA LISCANO, VS. FLORENCIO P. PUNZALAN, 99 SCRA
567 (1980)
FACTS: On May 14, 1968, applicants-appellees had filed before the CFI an applica
tion for the registration of two parcels of land (Land Reg. Case No. N-345, LRC
Record No. 34956). No opposition having
been interposed despite due publication, the trial Court issued an Order of Gene
ral Default. In due time, the applicants presented their evidence before the Cle
rk of Court who was duly commissioned to receive the same. The latter submitted
his Report to the Court for proper action but due to the transfer of then Presid
ing Judge Julian E. Lustre to another district, the Application was unacted upon
.
On November 26, 1968, appellant Florencio Punzalan filed a "Petition for
Reopening and/or Review" on the claim that applicants had committed fraud in not
disclosing in their Application that he is the owner of a house standing on the
lots applied for, that he has usufructuary rights over said properties, and pra
yed that the Petition be admitted, the case reopened and a new trial ordered so
that he could have his day in Court.
The trial Court, presided by Judge Jose C. de Guzman, rendered an Order d
enying reopening and/or review "for not having been well taken and for lack of m
erit since "there is nothing to reopen and/or review at the moment."
ISSUE: WON the CFI was correct in denying reopening/review of the case
HELD: The petition for review contemplated in the law clearly envisages the issu
ance of a decree of registration. It presupposes the rendition of a Court's deci
sion. In fact, it has even been held that a petition for review under the law "m
ay be filed at any time after the rendition of the Court's Decision and before t
he expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration".
In the case at bar, no judgment has as yet been rendered by the lower Court, an
d much less has any decree of registration been issued. The filing of a Petition
for Reopening and/or Review by appellant, therefore, is decidedly premature. In
deed, in the absence of any decision and/or decree, there is nothing to be revie
wed or reopened.

Innocent Purchaser for Value

One is considered an "innocent purchaser for value" only if, relying on t
he certificate of title, he bought the property from the registered owner, "with
out notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property
and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or be
fore he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the propert
y." (Realty Sales Enterprise, Inc. v. IAC, 154 SCRA 328) He is not required to
explore farther than what the Torrens title indicates upon its face. (Fule v.
De Legare, 117 Phil 367)
The phrase "innocent purchaser for value" is deemed to include an innocen
t lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (Sec. 32, PD 1529)

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISE, INC. AND MACONDRAY FARMS, INC. VS. IAC,
154 SCRA 328 (1987)
FACTS: Morris Carpo filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal
, Branch XXIII, presided over by Judge Rizalina Bonifacio Vera thereafter referr
ed to as Vera Court, for declaration of nullity of Decree No. N-63394 and TCT No
. 20408 issued in the name of Realty Sale. It was alleged that the court (Reyes
court) that adjudicated title in favor of Realty had no jurisdiction as a land r
egistration court. It was further alleged that the original records of LRC Case
No. 657, GLRO Record No. 29882 which was the basis for the issuance of said orde
r of May 21, 1958, were lost and/or destroyed during World War II and were still
pending reconstitution; hence, the Reyes Court had no authority to order the is
suance of a certificate of title. The court of first instance decided in favor o
f Carpo. Realty appealed. CA affirmed CFI. The Court of Appeals further held tha
t Morris G. Carpo is a purchaser in good faith and for value.
ISSUE: 1. WON the court that adjudicated title in favor of Realty had jurisdicti
on
 2. WON Carpo is an innocent purchaser for value was never raised as
an issue in the trial court.
HELD: 1. The parties thereto did not have to commence a new action but only had
to go back to the preceding stage where records are available. The land registra
tion case itself remained pending and the Court of First Instance of Rizal conti
nued to have jurisdiction over it.
The records were destroyed at that stage of the case when all that remain
ed to be done was the ministerial duty of the Land Registration Office to issue
a decree of registration (which would be the basis for the issuance of an Origin
al Certificate of Title) to implement a judgment which had become final There a
re however authentic copies of the decisions of the CFI and the Court of Appeals
adjudicating Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Plan Psu-47035 to Estanislao Mayuga. Moreover,
there is an official report of the decision of this Court affirming both the CFI
and the CA decisions. A final order of adjudication forms the basis for the iss
uance of a decree of registration.
Considering that the Reyes court was actually in the exercise of its juri
sdiction as a land registration court when it issued the order directing the iss
uance of a decree of registration, "substituting therein as registered owner Dom
inador Mayuga, in lieu of the original adjudicates, Estanislao Mayuga, based on
the affidavit of self-adjudication, subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 74
of the Rules of Court," which order is in consonance with the ruling of this Co
urt in the Guico decision, and the decisions of the CFI-Rizal and the CA dated A
ugust 19, 1935 and November 17, 1939, respectively, We uphold the validity of sa
id order and rule that Judge Vera was without jurisdiction to set it aside.
2. A perusal of the records of the case reveals that no factual basis exists to
support such a conclusion. Even Carpo himself cites no factual proof of his bein
g an innocent purchaser for value. He merely relies on the presumption of good f
aith under Article 527 of the Civil Code.
It is settled that one is considered an innocent purchaser for value only
if, relying on the certificate of title, he bought the property from the regist
ered owner, "without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest i
n, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of suc
h purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other perso
ns in the property." (Cui v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606 [1928], Fule v. De Legare, 117
Phil. 367 [1963], 7 SCRA 351.) He is not required to explore farther than what
the Torrens title upon its face indicates. (Fule v. De Legare, supra.) At the ti
me of sale there was as yet no Torrens title which Carpo could have relied upon
so that he may qualify as an innocent purchaser for value. Not being a purchaser
for value and in good faith, he is in no better position than his predecessors-
in-interest.

HILDA WALSTROM VS. FERNANDO MAPA, 181 SCRA 431 (1990)

FACTS: Petitioner alleges that her predecessor in interest (Dianson) filed a fre
e patent application. On April 10, 1933 free patent was issued in Dianson s name.
On the other hand, Mapa, predecessor in interest of private respondents filed Mi
scellaneous Sales Application. On May 12, 1934, the Director of Lands awarded Jo
sefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. Dianson filed a protest against the constructi
on made by Mapa on the said land. The Director of the Director of Lands awarded
Josefa Abaya Mapa a tract of land. The Director of Lands decided in favor of Map
a. Nearly two years later, on July 8, 1966, Gabriela Walstrom filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Director of Lands of the decision dated August 12, 196
4 of the regional land officer, claiming that she had acquired the rights and in
terests of Cacao Dianson to the subject parcel of land by virtue of a transfer o
f said rights and interests. by Dianson to one Agripino Farol who, in turn, tran
sferred the same rights and interests to Gabriela Walstrom. The Director set asi
de the previous order, Mapa appealed to DANR Secretary. DANR restated the decis
ion of the reional land officer in favor of Mapa. Petitioner Hilda Walstrom fil
ed a civil complaint against the respondents praying for the nullification of th
e Mapas' sales patent and certificates of title issued by the register of deeds
of Benguet Province 11 under Section 38 of Act 496 or the Land Registration Ac
t. Court dismissed petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: WON the court was correct in dismissing Walstrom s petition
HELD: It is the teaching of the foregoing provisions that a decree of registrati
on may be reopened or renewed by the proper Regional Trial Court upon the concur
rence of five essential requisites, to wit: (a) that the petitioner has a real a
nd a dominical right; (b) that he has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud;
(d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree;
and (e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchas
er for value.
An examination of the records of the case shows non-concurrence of the es
sential elements enumerated above.
The first element is patently not present because the petitioner can not
allege that she has already a real and dominical right to the piece of property
in controversy. The latest order of the DANR Secretary, dated June 13, 1968, was
to give full force and effect to the regional land officer's decision, dated Au
gust 12, 1964. 13 The regional land officer held that the petitioner's Free Pa
tent Application No. 3-74 shall exclude the disputed portion "A" of Lot No. 1, w
hich, instead, shall be included in the Mapas' Miscellaneous Sales Application.
The second element is also absent since corollary to the aforecited rulin
g of the DANR Secretary, the petitioner can not aver that she was deprived of pr
operty because she did not have a real right over portion "A".
Apropos the third element, the records are bereft of any indication that
there was fraud in the issuance of the certificates of title. As matters stand,
the prerequisites have not been complied with. The petitioner's recourse to Sect
ion 38 would not have prospered; accordingly, the respondent court's dismissal o
f petitioner's complaint was proper.
Instead of invoking Section 38, the petitioner should have pressed for th
e speedy resolution of her petition with the DANR. The petitioner avers that sin
ce the one-year prescriptive period for seeking judicial relief provided for in
Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Act was about to lapse, she was compelled to fi
le the action to nullify said patent. 15 The petitioner's submission is not co
rrect. Her fear of the futility, or even only inefficacy, of exhausting the admi
nistrative remedies granted her by law is clearly unfounded.

Actual or extrinsic fraud

For fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment, it must be extrinsic to
the litigation. Extrinsic fraud (also known as collateral fraud) refers to any
fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outsi
de the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or w
itnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fai
rly his side of the case. Or more simply, a deprivation of a party of his day i
n court. Examples of extrinsic fraud include the following:
* failure and intentional omission on the part of respondents to disclose the fa
ct of actual physical possession of the premises by petitioner (Nicolas v. Direc
tor of Lands, 9 SCRA 934)
* deliberate failure to notify a party entitled to notice (Stilianopulos v. City
of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523)
On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation
during the trial which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prev
ent a fair and just determination of the case. Examples of such acts are the us
e of forged instruments or perjured testimony.
It has also been said that if the fraud alleged in the petition is involved i
n the same proceedings in which the party seeking relief had ample opportunity t
o assert his right, to attack the document presented by the applicant for regist
ration, and to cross-examine the witnesses who testified thereto, then the fraud
relied upon is intrinsic. (Frias v. Esquivel, 5 SCRA 770)

STERLING INVESTMENT CORPORATION, ET AL VS. HONORABLE V. M. RUIZ, 30 SCRA 318 (19

69)
FACTS: Alejandro Cabasbas filed a complaint to recover land registered in his na
me. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties. A decision was rende
red based thereon. Later on Cabasbas filed an amended complaint asking for the a
nnulment of the compromise based on fraud. He alleged that it was obtained throu
gh fraud as it was made to appear before the court of first instance that the co
nveyance of title was made on February, 1946 when in fact it took place on Septe
mber 14, 1944, in violation of the Homestead Law. The RTC dismissed the complain
t.
HELD: Fraud relied upon is intrinsic. It suffices to refer to the leading case
of De Almeda v. Cruz, 8 a 1949 decision. As Justice Tuason speaking for the Cour
t made clear: "Fraud to be ground for nullity of a judgment must be extrinsic to
the litigation. Were not this the rule there would be no end to litigations, pe
rjury being of such common occurrence in trials. In fact, under the opposite rul
e, the losing party could attack the judgment at any time by attributing imagina
ry falsehood to his adversary's proofs. But the settled law is that judicial det
ermination however erroneous of matters brought within the court's jurisdiction
cannot be invalidated in another proceeding. It is the business of a party to me
et and repel his opponent's perjured evidence."
The latest case in point, decided in 1968, this time in an opinion penned
by Justice Zaldivar, reiterates the above doctrine. 10 Thus: "Not every kind of
fraud, however, is sufficient ground to set aside a judgment. This Court has he
ld that only extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished from intrinsic, fraud is
a ground for annulling a judgment. Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the successful party in a litigation which is committed outside the trial of
a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereb
y said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of
the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a liti
gation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments on perjured testi
mony, which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case."

ALFREDO FRIAS, ET AL., VS. SANTIAGO ESQUIVEL, ET AL.

FACTS: Appellee spouses Alfredo N. Frias and Belen Lustre filed in the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija an application to register a residential lot. Resp
ondents Esquivels opposed the application claiming ownership of a portion of 1,3
57 square meters of the land sought to be registered, having inherited the same
from their parents, Victoriano Esquivel and Catalina Villamanca. They also sough
t the postponement of the proceedings pending final determination of Civil Case
No. 998 of the same court between themselves as plaintiffs and the applicants as
defendants, involving the ownership and possession of the land subject of their
opposition.
In the civil case mentioned above, the plaintiffs alleged that they, toge
ther with their youngest sister, Anastacia Esquivel de Yambao (who refused to be
joined as a party in the action), inherited pro-indiviso from their parents, Vi
ctoriano Esquivel and Catalina Villamanca, a parcel of land with improvements th
ereon situated at Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing an area of about 1,357 square me
ters; that while said property was still owned in common, on or about July 16, 1
951, without their knowledge and consent, Anastacia Esquivel de Yambao sold the
whole of it to the defendants, the Frias spouses, who knew, at the time of the s
ale, that their vendor owned only a part thereof; that the defendants had taken
possession of the land and had refused to reconvey it to them despite repeated d
emands therefor.
The Court issued an order postponing the hearing on the application until
after final adjudication of Civil Case No. 998, but on March 24, 1953 issued an
order of general default except as against the oppositors and the Director of L
ands. On April 20, 1956 we rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 998 (G.R. No. 882
5) declaring the deed of sale executed by Anastacia Esquivel valid insofar as Sa
ntiago, Felisa, Ceferina and Anastacia, all surnamed Esquivel, were concerned, b
ut invalid with respect to the minor heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel.
It appears that, subsequent to our decision, that is, on February 15, 195
7, the children of the deceased Alvaro Esquivel who had attained the age of majo
rity, with the exception of Alvaro and Reynaldo and their mother, Perpetua Pada
de Zaragosa (remarried to Eduardo Zaragosa), as natural guardian of the two mino
rs, executed a deed of sale conveying their one-seventh participation in the lan
d to the Frias spouses. (Exhibit I)
On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid registration proceedings, after due
notice and hearing, the Court rendered judgment adjudicating the land described
in the plan Exhibit A in favor of the applicants and ordering its registration i
n their name. After the same had become final and executory, the Court ordered t
he issuance of the Decree of Registration, and on December 11, 1957 the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in
favor of the Frias spouses.
On December 8, 1958, Rosario Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed gua
rdian of the minors Reynaldo and Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to
reopen the decree of registration on the ground of fraud becauseIt appears that,
subsequent to our decision, that is, on February 15, 1957, the children of the
deceased Alvaro Esquivel who had attained the age of majority, with the exceptio
n of Alvaro and Reynaldo and their mother, Perpetua Pada de Zaragosa (remarried
to Eduardo Zaragosa), as natural guardian of the two minors, executed a deed of
sale conveying their one-seventh participation in the land to the Frias spouses.
(Exhibit I)
On October 2, 1957, in the aforesaid registration proceedings, after due
notice and hearing, the Court rendered judgment adjudicating the land described
in the plan Exhibit A in favor of the applicants and ordering its registration i
n their name. After the same had become final and executory, the Court ordered t
he issuance of the Decree of Registration, and on December 11, 1957 the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office issued Decree of Registration No. 60798 in
favor of the Frias spouses.
On December 8, 1958, Rosario Esquivel-Gonzales, as the duly appointed gua
rdian of the minors Reynaldo and Ricardo Esquivel, filed a verified petition to
reopen the decree of registration on the ground of fraud that applicants committ
ed fraud in obtaining said decree of registration, and such fraud consists of th
e following: the herein applicants had falsely represented to this Honorable Cou
rt during the hearing of their application that they were the owners of the enti
re residential lot included in their plan marked as Exhibit "A" and now covered
by the decree of registration, when at that time they knew fully well they were
not the owners thereof in its entirety; that they were aware of such fraudulent
representation when they made it because they were parties in Civil Case No. 998
of this Court involving precisely the validity of their title to the aforementi
oned lot; they also knew that on appeal the case became G.R. No. L-8825 of the S
upreme Court which, in a decision promulgated on April 20, 1956, held that the t
itle (a deed of sale) to that residential lot claimed by the herein applicants i
s invalid with regard to the minor heirs of the late Alvaro Esquivel', one of th
em being Reynaldo Esquivel, your petitioner's ward, in whose behalf this petitio
n is being presented.
ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud
HELD: To justify the setting aside or review of a decree of registration under S
ection 38 of Act No. 496, the party seeking relief must allege and prove, inter
alia, that the registration was procured through fraud actual and extrinsic. It
has been held in this connection that if the fraud alleged in the petition to se
t aside the decree is involved in the same proceedings in which the party seekin
g relief had ample opportunity to assert his right, to attack the document prese
nted by the applicant for registration, and to cross- examine the witnesses who
testified relative thereto, then the fraud relied upon is intrinsic. The fraud i
s extrinsic if it was employed to deprive a party of his day in court, thus prev
enting him from asserting his right to the property registered in the name of th
e applicant (Bagoyboy vs. Director of Lands, 37 Off. Gaz., 1956)
Upon consideration of the facts relied upon by appellants to justify a re
view of the decree in question, we find that the same do not constitute the extr
insic fraud required as justification for the granting of the relief sought by t
hem.
ALBINO NICOLAS, ET AL. VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
9 SCRA 934 (1963)
FACTS: Albino Nicolas, filed an application to register under the Torrens System
two parcels of land. On December 19, 1951, Eusebio Coloma, also applied for reg
istration in favor, under the system, the ssame parcels. Before the initial hear
ings of the two applications, Guillermo Camungao (petitioner herein), presented
with the Registration Court, a written appearance, opposing the registration of
Lots 2, of both PSUS, alleging that said lots belonged to him, having been award
ed to him in Sales Application No. 2091 (E-3989). The Provincial Fiscal, represe
nting the Director of Lands, filed an opposition to the applications for registr
ation, alleging that the lots, are public lands and covered by Sales Application
No. 2091 (E-3989) of Guillermo Camungao. On August 22, 1952, the lower court is
sued an Order of General Default in both cases, except as to the Director of Lan
ds. A hearing was subsequently held, with notice thereof, sent only to the Provi
ncial Fiscal, as representative of the Director of Lands. No notice to Guillermo
Camungao, was given, in spite of his written appearance and opposition to the r
egistration. Judgment was rendered on September 20, 1955, adjudicating the lands
applied for, in favor of the applicants. The judgment having become final and e
xecutory the court a quo issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registr
ation. On January 21, 1956, an Order of eviction was directed against appellant,
and it was the first time he came to know that a decision and decree had been r
endered and issued in the registration cases. Camungao filed a petition to set a
side the decision. The court dismissed the petition for review.
ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud
HELD: It is contended that, in cases of the nature of the one at bar, the only b
asis for the re-opening of the case, is actual fraud. There was allegation of ac
tual fraud in the petition, such as the failure and intentional omission on the
part of the respondents to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of th
e premises by petitioner herein. It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact
, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person (Estiva vs.
Alvero, 37 Phil. 498). In short, the series of allegations contained in the peti
tion, portions of which are quoted heretofore, describe fraudulent acts, actual
and otherwise. Perhaps, the trial judge had reasons to doubt the veracity of the
supposed fraudulent acts, attributed to respondents. This doubt, however, shoul
d not have been made the basis of dismissal, because if a court doubts the verac
ity of the allegations in the petition, the best thing it could do, would have b
een to deny the motion to dismiss and proceed with the hearing on the merits, of
the petition (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 50 O.G., p. 3064). This i
s specially true in the instant case, where the ground for the motion to dismiss
the petition for review, is lack of cause of action, which is not indubitable.
The written appearance with opposition presented by petitioner herein, on
November 7, 1951 (R.A.) was a valid one, and sufficient to give him a legal sta
nding in court and would entitle him to notice, as a matter of right. The lower
court erred in having chosen to ignore the written appearance with opposition, w
hich was a substantial compliance with the law, that requires a formal answer.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. TEODOCIA LOZADA,

90 SCRA 503 (1979)
FACTS: In her application for the registration of the lots in question, applican
t did not disclose the vital facts that her husband's previous application for a
revocable permit and to purchase the lands in question from the Bureau of Lands
had been rejected, because the lands were already reserved as a site for schoo
l purposes. She concealed the fact that the lands were part of the public domai
n and stated the deliberate falsehood that the lands were allegedly inherited b
y her from her parents, which allegation misled the Bureau of Lands into not fil
ing an opposition to her application and thus effectively deprived the Republic
of its day in court. Applicant succeeded on ex parte evidence in securing regis
tration of the property.
Within one year from entry of decree, the Solicitor General filed a petit
ion for review of the decision and decree of registration on the ground of actua
l fraud. The Court of First Instance gave due course to the petition and after
hearing ordered the cancellation of the certificate of title in favor of applica
nt-appellant. Applicant-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals which certif
ied the appeal to the Supreme Court as involving only questions of law.
ISSUE: WON there was actual fraud
HELD: The fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud which connotes any fraudu
lent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant outside of the trial of a case aga
inst the defeated party, of his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said def
eated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.
But even assuming that such fraud could be technically considered as "int
rinsic fraud [which] takes the form of 'acts of a party in a litigation during t
he trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did
not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determ
ination of the case,'" it would not alter the result, because the mistake and er
ror into which the officials of the Bureau of Lands were misled by such a delibe
rately false application, suppressing the facts known to the applicant that the
lands sought to be registered were lands of the public domain (and not private p
roperty) and having been reserved for a school site were not susceptible of priv
ate registration (as in fact her husband's application to purchase the same had
been rejected) cannot operate to bar the Republic's timely petition to review an
d set aside the decree, since the State cannot be estopped by the mistake or err
or of its officials and agents.
Besides, the registration decree was properly voided by the lower court s
ince it had no jurisdiction over the lands of the public domain subject matter o
f the proceedings which were portions of the bed or foreshore of the Las Pias riv
er and were not open to registration proceedings.

Other Grounds
Other grounds for a petition for review or reopening of a decree of registra
tion include want of due process as a result of machinations of the clerk of cou
rt (Tiongco v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89) and the fact that the land sought to be
registered is part of the public domain and incapable of registration, as when
it is part of a military reservation (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648)
.

(5) Action for Reconveyance

Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in th
e name of another person, he can still be compelled under the law to reconvey th
e subject property to the rightful owner. In an action for reconveyance, the dec
ree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is
the transfer of the property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously register
ed in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, or to one with a b
etter right. (Walstrom v. Mapa, Jr., 181 SCRA 431) The property registered is
deemed to held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is reg
istered.
In filing an action for reconveyance, it is not necessary that the 1-year pe
riod lapse first. Such an action can be filed anytime after the entry of decree
of registration provided that is within the prescriptive period.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescri
bes in 10 years.
However, an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust for co-heirs i
s imprescriptible.
An action for reconveyance on the ground of fraud must be filed within 4 yea
rs from discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place
from the issuance of an original certificate of title.
An action for reconveyance which in effect seeks to quiet title to property
in one's possession is imprescriptible. (Almarza v. Arguelles, 156 SCRA 718)

MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS V. COURT OF APPEALS (MARCH 31, 1987)

Facts: Respondent Norma Leuenberger inherited Lot No. 140 (27.246 has.) from he
r grandmother Simeona Vda. De Ditching. In 1952, she donated a portion (3 has.)
of the property to the Municipality of Victorias for the ground of a high schoo
l. The 4 hectares of the land was converted into a subdivision. Later, she dis
covered that part of the remaning portion was being used by the Municipality as
a cemetery from 1934. She wrote the Mayor demanding payment of rentals and deli
very of the area. The Mayor, however, showed her documents showing that the Mun
icipality purchased the land. Respondents then filed a complaint for recovery o
f possession. Municipality s defense is that of ownership claiming that the land
was purchased by it from Simeona Vda. De Ditching. TC decided in favor of Munic
ipality. CA reversed.
HELD: It is undisputed that petitioner had been in open, public, adverse and co
ntinuous possession of the land for more than 30 years. Evidence established wi
thout debate that the property was originally registered in 1916. When Gonzalo
Ditching died, Simeona became the administratrix of the property and it was whil
e she was serving as such that she executed the document of sale in favor of the
municipality. Unfortunately, the Municipality failed to register the Deed of S
ale. Thus, respondent was able to register the property under the Torrens Syste
m. However, since she inherited the same from her grandmother only after the la
tter had already sold the portion to the petitioner, she had no legal right whic
h may serve as basis for her to register the land.
While an inherently defective Torrens title may not ordinarily be cancelled even
after proof of its defect, the law nevertheless safeguards the rightful party s i
nterest in the titled land from fraud and improper use of technicalities by allo
wing such party to judicially seek reconveyance to him of whatever he has been d
eprived of as long as the land has not been transferred to a purchaser in good f
aith. (Pascua v. Capuyoc). As the land in dispute is held in trust by private r
espondent in favor of the Municipality, the latter cannot be deprived of its pos
session nor can it be made to pay past rentals. Private respondent is in equity
bound to reconvey the property to the cestui que trust, the Municipality.

ESCONDE V. BARLONGAY,
152 SCRA 603 (1987)
Facts: Private respondent Delfin applied for registration of title of the land
subject of the present petition. His application was granted in 1969 and an OCT
was issued in his favor in 1971 by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. In Feb of
1978, he filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession against the s
pouses Esconde. The spouses opposition to the motion was denied. Subsequently
in Oct 1978, petitioner, Basilisa Esconde filed an action for reconveyance again
st Delfin. Judge Sammy Barlongay dismissed the action for reconveyance on the g
rounds of res judicata. Hence, this petition.
HELD: Petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner and her husband s failure to appea
r before the land registration proceedings despite notice of the scheduled surve
y of the land and notice of the publication and posting by the sheriff of the no
tice of hearing to oppose the defendant s application, bars the petitioner from fi
ling this action. Section 38 of Act 496 provides that a decree of registration
once issued, binds the land and quiets title thereto. It is conclusive against
all persons one year from the date of entry. However, it is a settled doctrine
that when a decree of registration was obtained by fraud, the party defrauded ha
s only one year from date of entry to file a petition for review thereof.
An action for reconveyance, on the other hand, is a legal and equitable r
emedy granted to the rightful owner of land w/c has been wrongfully or erroneous
ly registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to
transfer of reconvey the land to him. This action may be filed even after one
year from the issuance of the decree. Its aim is not to re-open the registratio
n proceedings but to show that the person who secured the registration of the qu
estioned property is not its real owner. In the case at bar, reconveyance is no
t the proper remedy as there was no proof of irregularity in the issuance of the
title nor in the proceedings incident thereto. It was also not established tha
t fraud had intervened in the issuance of the title and the period of one year w
ithin w/c intrinsic fraud could be claimed had long expired. Furthermore, the p
etitioner s action had also prescribed as an action for reconveyance must be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.

ALZONA V. CAPUNITAN,
4 SCRA 450 (1962)
Facts: Plaintiffs instituted an action for the recovery of two registered parce
ls of land and for the cancellation of the corresponding certificates of title i
n the names of the defendants and the issuance of the proper certificates in the
ir names. The TC dismissed the complaint on the grounds of estoppel and prescri
ption of action. On appeal, the CA found that the subject land was the conjugal
property of Arcadio Alomia and Ildefonsa Almeda. Said land was bought by Arcad
io from the Friar Lands Administration and a Patent Title was issued in his favo
r. However before completing payment of the installments, Arcadiio died. Upon
Arcadio s death, Ildefonsa executed an affidavit that she was the sole heir of Arc
adio. She was made the assignee thereof and after completion of the installment
payments, a Certificate of Title was issued in her favor. Defendant Capunitan
was a niece of Ildefonsa who bought the property from the latter. The CA also
found that plaintiffs, nieces and nephews of Arcadio, are entitled to the other
half of the disputed property and that Ildefonsa exercised a legal fraud when sh
e executed said affidavit. She, therefore, held in trust the other half of the
property in favor of the plaintiffs. The case, however, was remanded to the TC.
TC later held that although the plaintiffs have the right to ask for reconveya
nce, their cause of action has already prescribed.
HELD: The case involves an implied or constructive trust upon the defendants-ap
pellees. The CA declared that Ildefonsa held in trust the of the property legal
ly belonging to the plaintiffs, of which the defendants had full knowledge. The
sale in favor of defendants, however, is not void or inexistent, action on whic
h is imprescripltible. It is voidable, at most, and as such valid until revoked
within the time prescribed by law for its revocation.. An action for reconveya
nce based on an implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years. The plaintiffs caus
e of action accrued in 1928 when the defendants bought the land and took possess
ion thereof from Ildefonsa. However, plaintiffs-appellants only filed the prese
nt action for reconveyance on November of 1949 or 13 years after the COA accrued
. Thus, the action had long prescribed.

VDA DE JACINTO V VDA DE JACINTO,

5 SCRA 371 (1962)
Facts: The land in question originally belonged to the now deceased spouses Jac
into, both of whom died intestate survived by their children named Melchor and P
edro. Melchor also died intestate before the estate of their parents could be p
artitioned. After the partition, Pedro, besides receiving his share, continued
administering the properties which corresponded to the heirs of his deceased bro
ther. Pedro applied for the registration and succeeded in having the properties
registered in his name
When the widow of his deceased brother decided to sell the parcel of land
, she realized for the first time, that the parcel delivered to her by Pedro had
a smaller area than that which rightfully belonged to her and her son.
HELD: In view of these facts, it would be against reason and good conscience no
t to hold that Pedro committed a breach of trust which entitled him to secure re
gistration of the land in question to the prejudice of his coheirs. In an actio
n like the present, he may be ordered to make reconveyance of the property to th
e person rightfully entitled to it. In fact, it has been held that even in the
absence of fraud in obtaining registration, or even after the lapse of one year
after the issuance of a decree of registration, a co-owner of land who applied f
or and secured its adjudication and registration in his name knowing that it had
not been allotted to him in the partition, may be compelled to convey the same
to whoever received it in the apportionment, so long as no innocent third party
had acquired rights therein, in the meantime, for a valuable consideration.
An action to enforce a trust is imprescriptible. Consequently, a coheir
who, through fraud, succeeds in obtaining a certificate of title in his name to
the prejudice of his coheirs, is deemed to hold the land in trust for the latter
, and the action by them to recover the property does not prescribe.

ALMARZA V ARGUELLES,
156 SCRA 718 (1987)
Facts: Lot No. 5815 originally belonged to private respondents predecessor-in-in
terest, Grana. The latter sold a portion thereof to petitioner. Said portion w
as physically segregated from the whole lot and was taken possession of by petit
ioner.
In a cadastral case, the court declared private respondents owner of undivided s
hare of Lot No. 5815 and a certain Pancrudo (deceased) as owner of the other . O
CT was issued in the name of said adjudicatees.
Private respondents instituted a complaint for recovery against the petit
ioner. The latter interposed a counterclaim for reconveyance of the disputed po
rtion of Lot No. 5815.
The LC ordered petitioner to vacate and dismissed the counterclaim of the
petitioner fo the reason that although a constructive or implied trust was cons
tituted in favor of petitioner when the disputed portion was included in the OCT
issued to private respondents, petitioner s action for reconveyance had prescribe
d, more than ten years having elapsed from the issuance of said certificate of t
itle.
HELD: SC reverses. The remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfull
y or erroneously registered in the name of another is, after one year from the d
ate of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as inc
ontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the o
rdinary court of justice for reconveyance or if the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. Petitioner availed hers
elf of this remedy seasonably.
Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance which is in
effect an action to quiet title, against the plaintiff therein who is in possess
ion of the land in question. The reason is that as lawful possessor and owner o
f the disputed portion, her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, s
eeks to quiet title to property in one s possession, is imprescriptible. The peti
tioner s undisturbed possession over a period of 48 years gave her a continuing ri
ght to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claim of a third party and the effect on her title.
If ever prescription may be invoked, it may be said to have commenced to
run only from the time the possessor was made aware of a claim adverse to his ow
n. In the case at bar, petitioner was made aware of such adverse claim only upo
n service on her of the summons in the civil case. As her action for reconveyan
ce, or to quiet title was contained in her counterclaim, the same cannot be said
to have already prescribed.

TAMAYO V CALLEJO,
46 SCRA 27 (1972)
Facts: A parcel of land was previously owned by spouses Vicente Tamayo and Ciri
la Tamayo. They sold the northern portion of said land to Fernendo Domantay, wh
o took possession thereof. Vicente died and Cirila waived her rights to the rem
aining portion of their original property to their children, Marcos and Mariano.
These brothers were declared the sole heirs of the deceased. The brothers app
lied in a cadastral proceeding for the registration of the land. The applicatio
n was granted and OCT was issued in favor of the brothers.
Domantay sold his property in favor of Callejo who took possession thereo
f. Marcos sold his undivided share to Mariano.
Callejo filed a complaint for reconveyance and damages against Mariano. CFI dis
missed the complaint on the ground that the land purchased by Domantay from the
parents of Mariano is not included in said titles of Mariano. The CA reversed a
nd overruled the plea of prescription set up by Mariano upon the theory that th
e title to said portion of land now claimed by Callejo is held in trust by the T
amayos and that the action to enforce said trust does not prescribe.
HELD: CA affirmed with modification. CA did not err in overruling the plea of p
rescription. Prescription of action for reconveyance is reckoned from the date
of creation of the express trust. Although the trust created by the application
for registration filed by Mariano and Marcos in 1913, and the inclusion in the
OCT issued in their names of the tract of land previously sold to Domantay and l
ater conveyed to Callejo may have had a constructive or implied nature, its stat
us was substantially affected in 1918 by the following facts, namely: On the da
te last mentioned, Domantay and Mariano the latter acting on his own behalf and
on that of his brother Marcos executed a public instrument whereby Mariano EXPLI
CITLY acknowledged that his deceased parents had sold to Domantay the parcel of
land then held by the latter, and stipulating that Domantay is the absolute owne
r of said land, free from any lien or encumbrance thereon.
This express recognition by Mariano on his behalf and that of his brother
Marcos of the previous sale made by their parents to Domantay, had the effect o
f imparting to the aforementioned trust the nature of an express trust it having
been created by the will of the parties, no particular words being required for th
e creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly inte
nded . This express trust is a continuing and subsisting trust, not subject to the
statute of limitations, at least, until repudiated, in which event the period of
prescription begins to run only from the time of the repudiation. The latter d
id not take place in the case at bar, until early in June, 1952, when Mariano re
jected Callejo s demand that the now disputed portion be excluded from the TCT in
the former s name. But then, the case at bar was filed weeks later when the perio
d of prescription had barely begun to run.
The CA declared that the land in question is declared reconveyed to Callejo
. Such reconveyance cannot, however, be deemed made without a survey defining w
ith precision the metes and bounds of the area to be segregated for Callejo. Ac
cordingly, the case was remanded to the court of origin for the preparation of t
he subdivision plan of the portion to be segregated and the judicial approval of
said plan, and only after such approval has become final and executory may the
reconveyance be either made or deemed effected.

JOAQUIN V COJUANGCO,
20 SCRA 769 (1967)
Facts: The OCT of the first parcel of land involved in this case was issued as
early as 1921. Said parcel was transferred in favor of the defendants who obtain
ed a TCT in their own names in 1928. With respect to the second parcel, OCT was
acquired in 1925 and the land was subsequently transferred to defendants also i
n 1925. TCT was issued to the transferees in 1936.
HELD: The action in this case is one for reconveyance, on the theory that the o
riginal registered owners were the administrators of those lands, and hence held
them in a fiduciary capacity. Even assuming that this was true, the disabiliti
es imposed by such relationship did not extend to the transferees of said admini
strators, who acquired the land for value and claimed adverse title in themselve
s. The action for reconveyance on the theory of trust might prosper, if at all,
as against the trustees and provided they still hold the properties, but not as
against third persons who do not occupy the same fiduciary position.

(6) Action for Damages

PINO V. COURT OF APPEALS,
198 SCRA 434 (1991)
FACTS: Rafaela Donato, Raymund Gaffud and Cicero Gaffud were co-owners
of a lot. The title of the lot was only in the name of Rafaela Donato. Donato
sold to Pino the lot. A TCT was issued in the name of Pino. The Gaffuds filed
a complaint for nullity of sale and reconveyance against Pino.
HELD: The Supreme Court said that the complaint for nullity of sale and reconve
yance must fail. Pino is a purchaser in good faith. Where the certificate of t
itle is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold, the vendee for value ha
s the right to rely on what appears on the certificate of title. In the absence
of anything to excite or arouse suspicion, said vendee is under no obligation t
o look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing
on the face of said certificate.
If an action for reconveyance based on constructive trust cannot reach an
innocent purchaser for value, the remedy of the defrauded party is to bring an
action for damages against those who caused the fraud or well instrumental in de
priving him of the property. And it is now well-settled that such action prescr
ibes in 10 years from the issuance of the Torrens Title over the property.

DE LOS REYES V. COURT OF APPEALS, 285 SCRA 81 (1998)

FACTS: De los Reyes sold to Pena property which had an area of 10,000 square me
ters. However, Pena s title did not cover only the 10,000 square meters but also
an additional 3,405 which De los Reyes did not sell. The property passed to fiv
e owners successively in a span of more than twenty years. De los Reyes filed a
n action for reconveyance of the 3,405 square meter property.
HELD The Supreme Court said that the complaint for reconveyance must fail. The
property passed to four owners successively in a span of more than twenty years
before it reached the current owners. Surely, the rights of innocent purchasers
of real property must be protected. In Avecilla v. Yatco, the Supreme Court r
uled that the only remedy of an owner who was fraudulently deprived of his land,
which was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser for value, is to file an a
ction for damages against the person who perpetrated the fraud within 4 years af
ter the discovery of the deception.

(7) Assurance Fund

Sec. 93. Contribution to the Assurance Fund
* Imposed upon the entry of a certificate of title in the name of the registered
owner (also applies to registration of building and other improvements on the l
and covered by the certificate)
* Amount imposed is .25% of the assessed value of the real estate. The assessed
value shall be based on the last assessment for tax purposes. If there has be
no previous assessment, then the assessment shall be determined by the sworn dec
laration of 2 disinterested persons. However, in any event, if the value of the
property is too small, then the court can always increase the valuation of the
property.
Sec. 94. Custody and Investment of the Fund
* All contributions to the assurance fund which are received by the Register of
Deeds shall be turned over to the National Treasurer. The National Treasurer ca
n invest the money as may be provided for by law.
Sec. 95. Action for Compensation from Fund
* Only the following persons can recover from the assurance fund:
1. Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions:
a) that there was no negligence on his part; and
b) that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfea
sance of the court personnel, or the Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other emp
loyees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties under the p
rovisions of the Property Registration Decree; or
2. Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the fo
llowing conditions:
a) that there was no negligence on his part;
b) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest
 therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the reg
istration by any other person as owner of such land, or by mistake, omission or
misdescription in any certificate of owner s duplicate, or in any entry or memoran
dum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation; and
c) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the rec
overy of such land or interest or claim upon the same.
Sec. 96. Against whom Action Filed.
* Against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land is situat
ed and the National Treasurer if it is brought to recover for loss or damage o
r for deprivation of land or any estate or interest therein arising wholly throu
gh fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeasance of the court personnel, R
egister of Deeds, his deputy or other employees of the Registry in the performan
ce of their respective duties, the action shall be brought
* Against the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land is situat
ed and the National Treasurer, and other person or persons as co-defendants if i
t is brought to recover for loss or damage or for deprivation of land or of any
interest therein arising through fraud, negligence, omission, mistake or misfeas
ance of a person OTHER THAN court personnel, the Registry of Deeds, his deputy o
r other employees of the Registry
* The Solicitor General must defend all such suits.
* Nothing in this law shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any right o
f action which he may have against any person for such loss, or damage or depriv
ation without joining the National Treasurer as party defendant.
* All actions against the Assurance Fund must be reported to the Commissioner of
Land Registration.
Sec. 97. Judgment, how satisfied.
* If there are other defendants besides, the National Treasurer and Register of
Deeds, execution shall first issue on the other defendants. If the judgment can
not be satisfied by the other defendants in whole or in part, then the assurance
fund will answer for that part unsatisfied.
* The plaintiff cannot recover more than the fair market value of the land at th
e time he suffered the loss, damage or deprivation.
Sec. 98. General Fund when liable.
* The General Fund is liable if there are not enough funds to satisfy the judgme
nt from the Assurance Fund. Take note however that those funds from the general
fund must not have been otherwise appropriated for other purposes.
Sec. 99. Subrogation of government to plaintiff s rights
* The government shall be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff against othe
r persons if payment has been made by the National Treasurer. The amount recove
red shall be paid to the Assurance Fund.
Sec. 100. Register of Deeds as party in interest.
* If it appears that the Assurance Fund is liable due to the unlawful or erroneo
us issuance of a title, the Register of Deeds shall be deemed a party in interes
t, who shall upon the authority of the Commissioner of Land Registration, file t
he necessary action in court to annul or amend the title. The court may order t
he Register of Deeds to amend or cancel a title or to do any other acts which ar
e just and equitable.
Sec. 101. Losses not recoverable.
* The Assurance Fund is not liable for any loss, damage or deprivation caused or
occasioned by
1. breach of trust (express, implied or constructive) or
2. by any mistake in the resurvey of registered land resulting in the expansion
of area in the title.
Sec. 102. Limitation of Action.
* Action against the Assurance Fund must be instituted within 6 years from the t
ime the right to bring such action first occurred.
* The right to bring action shall be transmitted to the legal representatives of
the person sustaining loss or damage unless the same is barred in his lifetime.
* Notwithstanding the expiration of the 6 year period, if at the time the right
of action first accrued the person entitled to bring such action was incapacitat
ed to do so, such person or any person claiming from, by or under him may bring
the proper action at any time within 2 years after the incapacity has been remov
ed.

TORRES V. COURT OF APPEALS,

186 SCRA 672 (1990)
FACTS: Mariano Torres was the owner of a lot and building. Fernandez, Torres b
rother-in-law, filed a petition with the CFI of Manila where he misrepresented t
o be Torres attorney-in-fact. He alleged that the owner s duplicate of copy of the
title to the lot and building was lost. Fernandez succeeded in obtaining a cour
t order for the issuance of another copy of the certificate. Fernandez forged a
simulated deed of sale in his favor. Thus, the TCT in the name of Torres was c
ancelled in favor of Fernandez. Fernandez mortgaged the property to Mota.
Torres found out about Fernandez s TCT. Torres brought an action to annul
Fernandez s TCT. Fernandez was unable to pay his loan obligations. Mota was the
highest bidder in the public auction of the property mortgaged.
ISSUE: Who has a better right to the property Torres or Mota
HELD: Torres has a better right over the property. As between two persons both
of whom are in good faith and both innocent of negligence, the law must protect
and prefer the lawful holder of registered property over the transfer of a vend
or bereft of any transmissible rights. In view of the foregoing, to hold, for t
he purpose of enforcing the mortgage, that Mota was an innocent mortgagee would
be futile because as above shown, no certificate of title covering the subject r
ealties in derogation of Torres certificate of tile may validly be issued.
The only possible remedies of Mota would be to go against Fernandez or th
e Assurance Fund. However, Mota cannot go after the Assurance Fund since Mota w
as negligent in protecting her interest. Mota as a creditor and mortgagee shoul
d have inquired as to all the related facts and circumstances regarding the rent
als and tenants. Mota should have looked at the payment of taxes on the propert
y. It was not enough that Mota should have merely relied on the title. Thus, M
ota s only remedy is to go after Fernandez.

FRANCISCO V. NATIONAL TREASURER, (AUGUST 3, 2000)

FACTS: The spouses Milambiling were the owners of a parcel of land. It appears
that a couple impersonated themselves as the spouses Milambiling. The imposters
were able to somehow acquire a duplicate TCT over the land. The imposters sold
the land to De Guzman. Milambiling filed an action against De Guzman for decla
ration of nullity of sale. Milambiling won the suit. De Guzman thus filed an a
ction for damages against the Assurance Fund.
HELD De Guzman cannot recover from the Assurance Fund. Only the following pers
ons can recover from the assurance fund:
(3) Any person who sustains loss or damage under the following conditions
:
d) that there was no negligence on his part; and
e) that the loss or damage sustained was through any omission, mistake or malfea
sance of the court personnel, or the Register of Deeds, his deputy, or other emp
loyees of the Registry in the performance of their respective duties under the p
rovisions of the Property Registration Decree; or
Any person who has been deprived of any land or interest therein under the follo
wing conditions:
f) that there was no negligence on his part;
g) that he was deprived as a consequence of the bringing of his land or interest
therein under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree; or by the reg
istration by any other person as owner of such land, or by mistake, omission or
misdescription in any certificate of owner s duplicate, or in any entry or memoran
dum in the register or other official book or by any cancellation; and
h) that he is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action for the rec
overy of such land or interest or claim upon the same.
De Guzman does not fall under any of these two cases. The loss or damage
was not due to the omission, mistake or malfeasance of the court personnel or R
egister of Deeds, his deputy or other employees. Furthermore, they were not dep
rived of their land as a consequence of bringing of the land or interest therein
under the provisions of the Property Registration Decree. Neither was there dep
rivation due to the registration by any other person as owner of such land or by
mistake, omission or misdescription in any certificate or owner s duplicate or in
any entry or memorandum in the register or other official book or by any cancel
lation.
The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve innocent persons from the hars
hness of the doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence of an indefeasib
le title to land. De Guzman did not suffer any injury because of the operation
of this doctrine. De Guzman sought to avail of the benefits of the Torrens Syst
em by registering the property in his name. That De Guzman eventually lost the
property to Milambiling does not entitle him to compensation under the Assurance
Fund. De Guzman s recourse is against the persons who duped him.

(8) Others
Cancellation suit involving double title
PAJOMAYO V. MANIPON,
39 SCRA 676 (1971)
FACTS: Both parties claims that they are the exclusive owners of the land in di
spute. Pajomayos had with them OCT No. 1089 issued by the register of deeds on N
ovember 27, 1931 in virtue of the homestead patent. The Manipons on the other ha
nd had OCT No. 14043 issued on April 1, 1957, in connection with the cadastral p
roceedings.
ISSUE : Which of the two OCTs should prevail?
HELD : OCT No. 1089 should prevail. The decree of registration issued in th
e cadastral proceedings does not have the effect of annulling the title that had
previously been issued in accordance with the provisions of the Land Registrati
on Law (Act 496).
The law requires that the homestead patent must be registered in the Offi
ce of the Register of Deeds of the province where the land covered by the patent
lies (sec. 122 of Act 496 Land Registration Law).
Thus once a homestead patent granted in accordance with the Public Land A
ct is registered pursuant to sec. 122 of Act 496, the certificate of title issue
d in virtue of said patent has the force and effect of a Torrens under the Land
Registration Act.
Where two certificates of title are issued to different persons covering
the same land in whole or in part, the earlier in date must prevail as between t
he original parties, and in case of successive registration where more than one
certificate is issued over the land the person holding under the prior certifica
te is entitled to the land as against the person who relies on the second certif
icate.

Cancellation suit involving non-registrable property (reversion suit)

REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS,
99 SCRA 743 (1980)
FACTS : A motion to reopen cadastral case was filed by Alpuerto. After trial the
court rendered its decision adjudicating to him the subject lot and ordered the
issuance of a decree of registration over the said lot. Hence, Land Registratio
n Commission issued a decree. This was the basis of the issuance of the OCT. Por
tions of the lot were subsequently transferred to various persons.
Later the provincial fiscal of Quezon filed a MFR on the ground that the
said decision was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation and deciet. The Dire
ctor of Land joined the fiscal, on the ground that the same was issued on the wr
ong premise that i.e. that the decision of the court had already become final an
d executory when in fact it had not.
Later the SolGen filed for the government a complaint for annulment, canc
ellation of titles and for reversion on the ground that the decision of the lowe
r court adjudicating the lot to Alpuerto, its order for the issuance of the decr
ee of registration as well as the OCT and all the TCTs derived therefrom are all
null and void and w/o legal effect because the court had no jurisdiction to all
ocate the subject land, which is inalienable.
RATIO : CA 141 explicitly states that timber and mineral lands shall be governed
by special laws. And the Forestry Law now vests in the Director of Forestry the
jurisdiction and authority over forest or timberland.
In one case the SC held that if the land covered by the homestead applica
tion of petitioner was still within the forest zone or under the jurisdiction of
the Bu. of Forestry, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction to dispose of sa
id land under the provisions of the Public Land Law and the applicant acquired n
o right to the land.
Also, if a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act w/c includes,
by oversight, lands w/c cannot be registered under the Torrens System, or when
the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is a pu
blic forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of the said certificate of title al
one, become the owner of the land illegally included.
The patent of title thus issued is void at law, since the officer who iss
ued it had no authority to do so.
Under this circumstances, the certificate of title may be ordered cancell
ed and the cancellation may be pursued through an ordinary action therefor.
The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate against the State. It is a well-se
ttled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic or its government is usually no
t estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.
The state may still seek the cancellation of the title issued to Alpuerto
pursuant to Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act. Such title has not become indefeas
ible, for prescription cannot be invoked against the State.

(9) Quieting of Title

Art. 476, Civil Code. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or a
ny interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact in
valid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said t
itle, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon ti
tle to real property or any interest therein.
Sec. 1, Rule 63, Rules of Court. An action for the reformation of an instrument
, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate
ownership under Art. 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule.

REALTY SALES ENTERPRISES V. IAC,

154 SCRA 328 (1987)
Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, stri
ctly speaking, in personam, but being against the person in respect of the res,
these proceedings are characterized as quasi in rem. The judgment in such procee
dings is conclusive only between the parties.
MAMADSUL V. MOSON,
190 SCRA 82 (1990)
An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in poss
ession of the property. The right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quiet
ed, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not b
arred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the lan
d, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the
owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse
claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity in his favor t
o ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title,
or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his possession
is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right
. But the role that the statute of limitations is not available as a defense to
an action to remove a cloud from title can only be invoked by a complainant when
he is in possession. One who claims property which is in the possession of anot
her must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the statutory period.
Petitioners may wait until their possession is disturbed or their title is
attacked before they may take steps to vindicate their right. The statute of lim
itation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title
over property in possession of the petitioners.
It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the regis
tered owner of the property in question. "Title" to property does not necessari
ly mean the original transfer certificate of title. It can connote acquisitive p
rescription by possession in the concept of an owner thereof. One who has an
equitable right or interest in the property may also file an action to quiet tit
le under the law.
TAN V. VALDEHUEZA,
66 SCRA 61 (1975)
Relying on Section 3 of Rule 17 of the Rules of Court which pertinently p
rovides that a dismissal for failure to prosecute "shall have the effect of an a
djudication upon the merits," the Valdehuezas submit that the dismissal of civil
case 2002 operated, upon the principle of res judicata, as a bar to the first c
ause of action in civil case 2574. This contention is untenable as the causes of
action in the two cases are not identical. Case 2002 was for injunction against
the entry into and the gathering of nuts from the land, while case 2574 seeks t
o "remove any doubt or cloud of the plaintiff's ownership . . ." with a prayer
for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession.
Applying the test of absence of inconsistency between prior and subsequen
t judgments the failure of Tan, in case 2002, to secure an injunction against th
e Valdehuezas to prevent them from entering the land and gathering nuts is not i
nconsistent with her being adjudged, in Case 2574, as owner of the land with rig
ht to recover possession thereof. Case 2002 involved only the possession of the
land and the fruits thereof, while case 2574 involves ownership of the land, wit
h possession as a mere attribute of ownership. The judgment in the first case co
uld not and did not encompass the judgment in the second, although the second ju
dgment would encompass the first. Moreover, the new Civil Code provides that sui
tors in actions to quiet title "need not be in possession of said property."
FAJA V. COURT OF APPEALS,
75 SCRA 441 (1977)
An action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is impre
scriptible. One who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be
owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is attacke
d before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, tha
t his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek aid of a court
of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
party and its effect on his own title, which right can be claimed only by one w
ho is in possession. The right to quiet title to the property, to seek its recon
veyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrues only from the ti
me the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is
only then that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against su
ch possessor.

Decree of Registration
See Sec. 31, 32, 39 of PD 1529.
GOMEZ V. CA
168 SCRA 503 (1988)
FACTS: Petitioners applied for the registration of their land. After notice and
publication, there being no opposition to the application, the trial court issue
d an order of general default. Later the court issued an order stating that the
decision had become final and directed the Land Registration Office to issue the
corresponding decrees of registration over the lots adjudicated in the decision
.
Later it was reported to the court a quo that some of the lots subject of the re
gistration were already covered by homestead patents, issued in 1928 & 29 and reg
istered under the Land Registration Act. Hence the decision was recommended to b
e set aside. Lower court set aside the decision.
ISSUE : WON respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the decision sett
ing aside the its earlier decision?
HELD : YES. It is not disputed that the first decision had become final
and executory. However unlike ordinary civil actions the adjudication of land i
n a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sens
e of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the en
try of the final decree of registration.
As long as the final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the deci
sion in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registratoin offi
cials to issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense
that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they
have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point i
n relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to re
fer the matter to the court. They are in this respect as officials of the court
and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They
are in specifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and c
adastral land registration proceedings .

RAMOS V. RODRIGUEZ,
244 SCRA 418 (1995)
Ramos applied for the registration of a parcel of land. After issuing an
order of general default judge rendered decision adjudicating said lot to the pe
titioners; ordered issuance of decree and directed NLTDRA to prepare the decree
and certificate of registration.
NLTDRA however recommended that the order be set aside because the said s
ubject lot is already covered by a TCT. The court opined that it cannot set asid
e its decision on the basis of the report after the finality of its decision. It
added that the proper remedy of the government was an action for annulment of j
udgment. Later however the court set aside its order and denied petitioner s appli
cation for registration. The court noted that the subject lot is already covered
by an existing TCT and that no final decree has yet been issued by the LRA.
Petitioner assailed this decision on the principle of finality of judgmen
ts.
RATIO: This issue has already been settled in a similar case where the court
declared that: However unlike ordinary civil actions the adjudication of land in
a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense
of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one (1) year after the ent
ry of the final decree of registration.
As long as the final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration
Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from the
date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the deci
sion in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and sound
discretion of the court rendering it.
They also raised the issue of the function of LRA as only ministerial. In
Gomez the SC squarely met this issue:
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registratoin officials to

issue the decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they
act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the
decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no d
iscretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relatio
n to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the m
atter to the court. They are in this respect as officials of the court and not a
s administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are in s
pecifically called upon to extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral
land registration proceedings .
In the case at bar, the LRA is not legally obligated to follow the court s
order because the subject land sought to be registered was found to be already
decreed and titled under the Payatas Estate.
 The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 of PD 1529 within which a petition
to reopen and review the decree of registration is described in Sec. 31 of the
said PD which decree is prepared and issued by the Commissioner of Land Registra
tion.

E. Certificate of Title
PONCE DE LEON VS. REHABILITATION FINANCE CORP.,
36 SCRA 289 (1976)
Facts: Ponce procured an industrial loan from RFC in 1951. As security, Ponce mo
rtgaged a parcel of land in Paranaque which was registered in the name of Franci
sco Soriano (FS) OCT No. 8094 married to Tomas Rodriguez. At the time of signin
g of the mortgage deed, Tomasa was already dead leaving her heirs, her children.
None of Tomasa s children signed the mortgage deed.
Ponce failed to pay the amortizations due. RFC took steps to extra-judi
cially foreclose the mortgaged properties. Upon foreclosure, RFC purchased the
Paranaque lot.
Prior to the expiration of the one-year period redemption period, FS off
ered to repurchase the PQUE lot for P14,000, but the bank (RFC) rejected the off
er. RFC scheduled the public sale of the lot.
In 1956, Ponce filed the present action questioning the validity of the
sheriff s foreclosure sale, and requesting a writ of P.I. to restrain RFC from ca
rrying out its schedule sale.
The Sorianos filed a 3rd party complaint contending that the mortgage wa
s void insofar as FS is concerned for lack of consideration; and that the PQUE l
ot belonged to the conjugal property, and that Tomasa was already dead at the ti
me and the heirs who have inherited it have not signed the mortgage contract.
The TC dismissed Ponce s complaint, and declared the mortgage of 1/2 of th
e PQUE lot of void because it belongs to the heirs of Tomasa. All the three par
ties appealed.
Issues: WON the TC erred in voiding the sale to the RFC of the PQUE lot, upon th
e ground that the same formed part of the conjugal partnership of the Soriano sp
ouses.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : The TC erred in applying the said presumption. The sal
e to RFC is valid.
It appears that the property was registered in the name of Francisco Soria
no married to Tomasa Rodriguez, and that based on this fact alone, the TC presume
d that it belongs to the conjugal partnership. The TC erred in applying the sai
d presumption.
We should not overlook the fact that the title to said property was not a
transfer certificate of title, but an original one, issued in accordance with a
decree which, pursuant to law, merely confirms a pre-existing title. Said OCT
does not establish, therefore, the time of acquisition of the PQUE property by t
he registered owner thereof.
REYES VS. REYES,
17 SCRA 1099 (1966)
Facts: Mateo, Juan and Francisco Reyes are the registered owners of several parc
els of land covered by OCT No.s 22161 and 8066. In 1962, Mateo and Juan filed a
motion for the issuance of writs of possession over all the lots against Raval.
Raval adnmitted that he was in possession of 22161 but not of 8066, although h
e is entitled to the possession of both, having acquired by way of absolute sale
from Francisco the latter s undivided 1/3 interest to these discputed lots.
The CFI issued the writes of possession. Raval did not appeal. Subseque
ntly, petuitioners filed an action to recover the products of the disputed land
against Raval. Raval filed a counter-claim for partition of the said lots, alle
ging that he is the co-owner of the properties.
Issues: Who between the petitioners or respondent has a better right to the poss
ession or custody of the disputed owners duplicate of certificates of title?
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Petitioners are entitled to the possession.
While we agree that the disputed lots are subjects of litigation, we see
no valid reason to justify, on this ground, the withholding from the registered
owners, such as the petitioners herein, the custody and possession of the owners
duplicates of certificates of title.
In a decided case, this court has already held that the owner of the lan
d in whose favor and in whose name said land is registered and inscribed in the
certificate of title has more preferential right to the possession of the owners
duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and has yet to
establish his right to the possession thereto.
It being undisputed that respondent had already availed of an independen
t civil action to recover his alleged co-owner s share in the disputed lots by fil
ing a counterclaim for partition, his rights appear to be amply protected; and c
onsidering that he may also avail of the provision on notice of lis pendens for
the purpose of recording the fact that the lots covered by titles in question ar
e litigated in the said Civil case, we again see no justifiable reason for reaso
n for respondent to retain the custody of the owner s duplicates of certificates o
f title.

NATIONAL GRAINS AUTHORITY VS. IAC, 157 SCRA 380 (1991)

Facts: In 1971, spouses Vivas executed a deed of sale with a right of repurchase
in favor of spouses Magcamit, with a condition that the balance of P40,000 was
to be paid the moment the certificate of title is issued and delivered to the ve
ndees. The Magcamits have remained in peaceful possession of the property since
then.
In 1975, the OCT covering the subject property was issued in the names o
f spouses Vivas w/o the knowledge of the Magcamits. Vivas mortgaged the propert
y to the petitioner.
NGA foreclosed the property, and was able to purchase the same during th
e auction. TCT No. T-75171 was issued in the name of NGA. Upon learning this, S
pouses Magcamit offered to pay P40,000 to Vivas but the latter refused. NGA cla
ims it is now the owner of the property in question. NGA filed an ejectment sui
t against Magcamit.
Issues: WON violation of the terms of agreement between the Vivas and the Mgcami
ts to deliver the certificate of title to the vendees upon its issuance, constit
utes a breach of trust sufficient to defeat the title and right acquired by NGA,
an innocent purchaser for value.
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : No. NGA won. It is axiomatic that while the registrati
on of the conditional sale with right of repurchase may be binding on third pers
ons, it is by provision of law understood to be without prejudice to a 3rd party
who has a better right . In this case, it will be noted that the 3rd party NGA is
a registered owner under the Torrens System and has obviously a better right th
an private respondents, and that the deed of sale with the suspensive condition
is not registered and is necessarily binding only on the spouses Vivas and Magca
mits.
Registration of title to land under the Torrens System is an action in r
em, not in personam. Hence personal notice to all is not necessary..
Where there is nothing on the certificate of title to indicate a
ny cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon, t
he purchaser need not explore further than what the torrens title upon its face
indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right.

Indefeasibility
HEIRS OF VENCILAO VS. CA,
(APRIL 1, 1998)
Facts: In 1990, Vencilao filed an action for quieting of title against the spous
es Gepalago. Complaint was amended to include an action for reconveyance and ca
ncellation of title.
LV claims to have purchased the land from PNB; and that they are the reg
istered owners of the land.
The TC appointed a commissioner to survey the property. The commissione
r reported that out of the 22,400 sq. m. property claimed by the Vencilaos, Gepa
lagos were the registered owners. TC ruled in favor of the Vencilaos, since they
have been in possession for more than 30 years. CA reversed.
Issues: Who is entitled to the land?
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Gepalagos are entitled to the land. As a general rule,
where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is so
ld, the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of th
e title. He is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate of title. Ex
ception is when there is anything in the certificate w/c indicates any cloud or
vice in the ownership of the property.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING COMPANY V DUMYUNG, ROD OF BAGUIO & CFI OF BAGUIO,
89 SCRA 532
Facts: Republic of the Phil filed a case for annulment of 3 free patents on the
ground of misrepresentation and false dates and informations furnished by defen
dants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan. The Rod was made
a formal party defendant. Leopant filed motions for intervention, alleging that
a portion of the titled lands in question is within the intervenor s ordinary tim
ber license, and the other portion being embraced in its mineral claims.
Before the hearing on the 3 civil claims, Republic filed 3 criminal cases
for falsification of public documents, for allegedly making untrue statements i
n their applications for free patents. The civil cases were then suspended.
The trial court then dismissed the criminal case for insufficiency of evi
dence. As a result, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the 3 civil cases
saying that: (1) the dismissal of the criminal cases also resulted in the dismis
sal of these civil cases; (2) the court has no jurisdiction over the case becaus
e the certificates of title can no longer be assailed; (3) Leopanto has no legal
interest in the matter.
The CFI then DISMISSED the civil cases ruling that the free patents duly
registered were indefeasible, as in the Torrens system. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON the original certificates of title held by respondents were indefeas
ible
WON the respondents are entitled to the benefits of RA 3872
WON the acquittal of the respondents in the criminal cases also meant ex
tinction of civil cases
Held/ Ratio Decidendi : Case REMANDED to TC for reception of evidence.
(1) and (2) No. Under CA 141. timber and mineral lands are NOT alienable or dis
posable. The principal factual issue raised by the Republic and the intervenor
is that the lands covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber an
d mineral lands and, therefore, inalienable. Without receiving evidence, the TC
dismissed the 3 civil cases on the ground that the free patents were duly regis
tered in the ROD and as such, enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the to
rrens title. And even in its dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideration, it use
d RA 3872, liberalizing the free patent provisions of the Public Land Act in fav
or of the national cultural minorities. The SC emphasized that the trial court s
assumption that the respondents are protected by RA 3872 is WITHOUT any factual
basis. There is no evidence that respondents are members of the national cultur
al minorities, that they have continuously and cultivated the lands and that the
y are not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the Public Land Act.
These QUALIFICATIONS must first be established. Thus, it was premature for the
trial court to render that decision. It is well-settled that a certificate of
title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest or t
imber and mineral lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the ha
nds of innocent purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.
(3) No. The acquittal of the respondents in the criminal cases for falsificatio
n is NOT a bar to the civil cases. The criminal cases dealt with falsification
using evidence to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Herein, the factual
issues are WON lands in question are timber or mineral lands and WON respondents
are entitled to the benefits of RA 3872.
FLORENTINO REYES, ET AL V COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTA, PAULA, PETRA REYES, 258 SCR
A 651 (1996)
Facts: On July 29, 1970, a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Settlement was a
llegedly entered into between petitioner Florentino and his sisters (Jacinta, Pa
ula and Petra). The subject of the alleged partition was a parcel of land locat
ed in Makati, originally registered in the name of their father, Bernardino Reye
s. The Deed stipulated that the sisters waived their rights, interests and parti
cipation in favor of Florentino. In the deed, a share of 50 m2 was given to Pa
ula. Petitioner then regisitered the deed and obtained a TCT in his name, leavi
ng the 50 m2 in the name of Paula.
May 1985, respondents discovered the registration of said deed and denied
having any knowledge of its execution and disclaimed having signed the deed and
having waived their rights. Paula likewise denied any participation and reiter
ated that it was fraudulently prepared by petitioner and that their signatures w
ere forged. It was also asserted that the Notary Public who signed was not list
ed as accredited Notary Public.
Petitioner, however, even executed a Deed of Absolute Sale and sold some
portion to his children. Later on, there was allegedly another Deed of Partitio
n dividing the property (participated by Florentino, his children and Paula).
As a result, private respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale
and Damages with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/ Restraining Order. The Lower
Court enjoined the ROD from issuing and delivering the TCTs and subsequently ru
led that Florentino forged and simulated the controversial documents, thereafter
ordering that the documents involved are null and void. CA affirmed this decisi
on. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON the lower court erred in ruling that the deed was forged
WON the petitioner acquired the land by prescription, despite the forger
y
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: PETITION DISMISSED.
(1) No. Petitioners failed to convincingly overturn the factual findings of the
lower court -- (a) the signatures were done by one person; (b) the acknowledgme
nt was signed by a notary public who was never commissioned as such and no recor
d of the deed was ever done; (c) the word Pasay, Rizal was superimposed on the
word Makati; (d) the residence certificates were obtained in Pasay City instead
of Makati; (e) the group picture shown could have been taken on another occasion
and not necessarily before signing the deed. Clearly, the question to be resol
ved here is a question of fact beyond the SC s power to decide. (Question of Law:
when doubt or difference arises as to what the law is pertaining to the case vs
Question of Facts: when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged f
acts) As cited in Chua Tiong Tay, the SC can only review factual findings on 10
occasions. Thus, this being a purely question of fact and not covered in the e
xceptions, the SC cannot take cognizance of this case. What further strengthens
the case of forgery is the fact that CA affirmed the findings. As to the claim
that there was no allegation of deception, the SC held that forgery and simulat
ion was precisely arrant deception. And as regards the allegation that a docume
nt duly notarized cannot be impugned, the SC deemed it baseless, saying that the
re was a finding of fact that it was notarized by an unaccredited Notary Public
and was not recorded accordingly.
(2) No. The provisions on acquisitive prescription (Arts 1117 and 1134) will no
t apply in this case. Petitioners cannot justify their ownership and possession
of the land since they did not meet an essential requisite, cited in Art 526 --
that of GOOD FAITH. The forgery and simulation cannot be the basis for issuing
a just title. Likewise, there can be no acquisitive prescription considering t
hat the parcel of land in dispute is titled property -- in the name of their fat
her Bernardino, which Florentino does not deny. As such, their title cannot def
eat the real rights of the respondents through their father. In fact, there was
not even any adverse possession since respondents continued to reside in the pr
operty.
Prescription
Art. 47 of PD 1529 explicitly provides that title to registered land canno
t be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. This is to be contrasted
from unregistered lands and/or public agricultural lands which can be acquired t
hrough adverse, notorious continuous possession under a claim of ownership for t
he period fixed by the Public Land Act (CA 141).
SULPICIA JIMENEZ AND TORIBIO MATIAS V VICENTE FERNANDEZ AND TEDORA GRADO,
184 SCRA 190 (1990)
Facts : The land in question is the eastern portion of a 436 m2 residential land
located in Pangasinan, covered by a TCT under the name of Suplicia Jimenez. Th
e entire land was originally owned by Fermin Jimenez who had two sons (Fortunato
and Carlos). Fortunato predeceased his father and had only one child (Sulpicia)
. After Fermin s death, the entire land was registered in the name of Carlos and
Sulpicia in equal shares pro-indiviso. Later on, Carlos died and passed possess
ion of the eastern part to his illegitimate daughter (Melecia) who later sold it
to Cagampan then to Grado. Sulpicia, on the other hand, executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos
upon manifestation that she is the only legal heir of Carlos. Consequently, TCT
was issued in Sulpicia s name alone. Sulpicia then filed a case to recover posse
ssion of said land from Melecia. The lower court dimissed Sulpicia s claim, which
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON Melecia Jimenez has a right over the parcel of land
WON the lower court erred in declaring Grado as the absolute owner citi
ng Arcuico case (prescription) and laches
Held: Petition GRANTED.
(1) Melecia has no right. Melecia is an illegitimate daughter of Carlos and co
uld not have validly acquired the land nor legally effect any transfer of it. O
nly a legitimate, legitimated, adopted or acknowledged natural child has success
ional rights. This was embodied in the law then in force (1889 Civil Code).
(2) The court erred in relying on the Arcuino case, concluding that respondents
acquired the property under litigation by prescription. This cannot be applied
in this case because herein, Suplicia was a title holder since 1933 while in the
Arcuino case plaintiffs were not registered owners. As such, Sulpicia s title ov
er the property remained good and continued to be good when she segregated into
a new title. Sulpicia s title being covered by the Torrens System could never be
defeated by Melecia s possession no matter how long. The right of Sulpicia, there
fore, is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. Laches is
an equity case, whose application depends on a case-to-case basis and depends o
n the court s discretion. In the case at bar, the doctrine is NOT applicable. A
fter all, the professed objective of Act 496 (LRA, Torrens System) is to establi
sh the stability of the landholding system in the Philippines (maintaining the c
onfidence of the people in their titles). And to this end, the Court ruled that
the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its
Torrens title is imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches.

URBANO JAVIER, LEONILA ALBIELA V HON. CONCEPCION, HON. A REYES, HON. L REYES, LI
M CHUA, TAN TIAN ON,TAN SIOK TAN, 94 SCRA 212 (1979)
Facts: On October 17, 1959, respondents as plaintiffs (Chua, Tan Tian On, Tan Si
ok Tan) filed against herein petitioners with the CFI of Quezon, for reconveyanc
e of a parcel of land with improvements thereon known as Lot 12 and an accountin
g and recovery of the produce of the land possessed by herein petitioners since
1945. Lot 12 is allegedly part of Lot 6 covered by TCT 16817. In Expediente Nos
. 1509 and 1679, said Lot 12 was ordered excluded for the reason that respondent
s then were deemed owners of said land.
Defendants then, now petitioners, denied the material averments of the co
mplaint and pointed out that Lot 12 could never be a part of Lot 6 because betwe
en the two lots there exists a big river. It was also alleged that Lot 6 was sit
uated within the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon while Lot 12 was situated withi
n the jurisdiction of Candelaria, Quezon. As special defenses, defendants-petiti
oners alleged that they acquired Lot 12 partly by purchase and partly by inherit
ance; that they have title granted by the Spanish government; that the lot was a
djudicated to them by CFI of Tayabas; that they have declared the land for tax p
urposes; that they have cleared, cultivated and planted on these lands; that pla
intiffs were never the owners of this land, and even if a portion thereof was in
cluded in their title, it was done thru fraud and deceit by making it appear in
the application and in the notices that said Lot 6 belonged to them and is withi
n the jurisdiction of Dolores, Quezon.
The Lower Court found that Lot 12 is part of Lot 6 and was accordingly ad
judicated to plaintiffs. This is confirmed by the Commissioner s Report as maifes
ted by the Chief Surveyor. Also, it was pointed out that defendant knew that th
e land is within Lot 6 and covered by a title in favor of palintiffs since 1924
-- so, when he filed his opposition, he did not act in good faith and did not oc
cupy the land for 30 years(so no prescription). Indeed, no title to registered
land may be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The CA affirmed thi
s finding. Hence, this petition.
Issues: WON there was fraud or misrepresentation in the procurement of the TCT
WON the case is barred by statute of limitations or by laches
Held/ Ratio Decidendi: Decision affirmed, with modification
(1) No. The existence of actual or positive fraud is a question of fact, and re
spondent court having ruled out the same, the SC has no basis to sustain the def
endants-petitioners contention. Lot 12 was clearly found to be part and parcel o
f Lot 6, for which TCT was issued to plaintiffs-respondents and registered in 19
41. Likewise, the decree of registration has long become final, absent a showin
g that the same was questioned within one year after thereof was made. Under Se
c 38, a person allegedly defrauded has a year to file a case. Thus, even assumi
ng arguendo that there was actual or positive fraud in securing the title, the d
efendants-petitioners are now barred from questioning the same.
(2) No. As the land in registration was covered by the Torrens System and duly
registered, the decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground o
f fraud, error or lack of notice, AFTER the lapse of one year.
Indeed, it is an established rule that one cannot acquire title to a regi
stered land by prescription or adverse title when covered by a Torrens tile. Ad
verse, notorious, continuous possession under claim of ownership fo rthe period
fixed by the law is ineffective against a torrens title and it is likewise settl
ed that the right to secure possession under a decree of registration does not p
rescribe (Tuason Case)
As regards equitable doctrine of laches, it will NOT apply as against the
registered owners. The reliance on Mejia de Lucas Case was misplaced becaus eth
e circumstance attendant in that case was not present in this case. The 37 year
possession in the case cited and intervening rights of third persons who may be
prejudiced due to series of transfers effected allows the application of laches
. But this was not the case herein.
* Petitioners, however did not act in bad faith in occupying the land in questio
n (finding of fact), and possession in bad faith only started in 1959 when judic
ial summons were served. As such, in the interest of justice, petitioners are e
ntitled to accounting and reimbursement of necessary and useful expenses during
its occupation of the land in good faith.
Collateral Attack
A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack. It can
not be altered, modified or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance
with law. (Sec. 48, PD 1529)

HALILI VS. CIR,

257 SCRA 174
FACTS: The original controversy arose when the Halili Bus Drivers and Conductor
s Union (PTGWO) filed claims for unpaid overtime pay for 897 Union members again
st Fortunato Halili. The latter died, thus the claims were made against his est
ate. The Union and the administratrix of the estate reached an amicable agreeme
nt whereby the Administratrix would transfer to the employees title to a tract o
f land covered by TCT36389 in Caloocan + additional amount of P25,000. The admi
nistratrix executed a Deed of Conveyance of Real Property, transferring it to th
e Union. The Union requested from the Minister of Labor the authority to sell an
d dispose of the property. Granted. Atty. Pineda, representing the Union, filed
a motion with MOLE praying for authority to sell the land to Manila Memorial Pa
rk Cemetary (MMPCI). Granted by labor arbiter Valenzuela. Title was transferred
in the name of MMPCI. In a resolution, the SC set aside the orders of labor ar
biter Valenzuela saying it was issued w/o due process of law. Union filed a com
plaint with NLRC to compel MMPCI to reconvey the property. NLRC refused to take
cognizance of the case (outside of jurisdiction). Petitioners thus filed the
instant petition seeking reconveyance.
ISSUE: 1. WON there was jurisdiction --- no, there was none.
2. WON validity of MMPCI s title can be attacked. no!
RATIO: The petition should definitely be dismissed because the property was reg
istered under the Torrens System of registration in the name of MMPCI. The best
proof of ownership is the Certificate of Title.
Sec 48 of PD 1529 (Prop Reg Decree) provides that a certificate of title s
hall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or can
celed except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The Certificate of title, in the absence of fraud, is the evidence of tit
le and shows the real interest of its owner. The petition of the Union seeks fo
r reconveyance, thus in effect seeking the nullification of MMPCI s title aba di pw
ede yan! This is a collateral attack w/c is not permitted under the principle of
indefeasibility of a Torrens Title.
* additional: 1. The portions of the land have already been sold out to individu
al lot buyers (innocent purchasers for value).

H. Cadastral Proceedings
A cadastral proceeding, as distinguished from a land registration proceeding,
is one where the petition for registration is filed by the government and not b
y the persons claiming ownership of the lands subject thereof.
However, as in land registration proceedings, the objective in cadastral
proceedings is the adjudication of title to lands involved in said proceeding.
Cadastral proceedings are in rem, and judgments therein are binding on the who
le world.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS BENITEZ, 16 SCRA 557 (1960)

FACTS: In cadastral proceedings by the Director of Lands before the CFI, Spouses
Benitez and Brillo were declared owners of a parcel of land in tacloban. Decis
ion was rendered on Dec 29, 1932. 26 years after, they filed a petition before
the same cadastral court for reopening of the proceedings. They claim that thro
ugh inadvertence, they failed to include a portion (1,805sq m) thus it should be
adjudicated to them pursuant to RA 931. Court admitted the petition and set th
e petition for hearing. It ordered copies of the petition be furnished to the So
lgen, provincial fiscal of Leyte and Tacloban.
Cadastral Court granted the petition. It declared the couple as owners of the ad
ditional portion. Spouses moved for writ of execution. Occupants of the additi
onal portion opposed, disputing the validity of the decision. They were 62 occu
pants by virtue of permits granted by the Dir. of Lands. Solgen also opposed cit
ing lack of jurisdiction for the reopening of the proceedings because there was
no requisite publication. Both were denied. MFR. Denied. Present petition.
ISSUE: was there Jurisdiction?
RATIO: The petition to reopen cadastral proceedings is a matter of right granted
by RA 931 as long as it is filed within due time. RA 931, parties are given
a period of 10 years to file a petition for reopening the proceedings in case th
ere was failure to file a claim in the first proceedings. However, the petition
must be filed in the same cadastral proceedings, with the same procedures. Thu
s, it is necessary that notice be given to those persons who claim an adverse in
terest in the land sought to be registered, as well as to the general public, by
publishing such notice in 2 successive issues of the OG, and posting it in a co
nspicuous place in the land to be surveyed, as well as in the municipal building
.
Publication is one of the essential bases of the court s jurisdiction.
VALISNO VS PLAN
FACTS: In 1964, petitioner-spouses Flordeliza and Valisno purchased 2 parcels of
land from the legal heirs of Agapito Blanco. They declared the two parcels in
their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession thereof in t
he concept of owners by installing a caretaker (Fermin Lozano). In 1968, priva
te respondent Cayaba ousted Lozano from the land. He claims ownership by virtue
of a deed of sale in his favor. He then erected a 6-door apartment on the land
. Petitioner filed complaint for recovery of possession. Resolved in favor of
petitioners. CA reversed the decision and dismissed complaint, ruling that the
land occupied by Cayaba has not been successfully identified with the land descr
ibed in the complaint. CA also ruled that being the actual possessor of the pro
perty, Cayaba possesses it with a just title. CA gives more weight to Cayaba s ev
idence.
In 1979. Cayaba applied for registration in his name. Petitioners filed opposit
ion. MTD (ground: prior judgment). Granted. Opposition was dismissed. Instant
petition.
ISSUE: WON dismissal was proper. YES.
RATIO: It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer
with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be consider
ed a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. Th
e original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then
answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismi
ss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although su
ch situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregulari
ty that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a mot
ion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized.
There was, in fact, res judicata. With respect to the subject matter, there can
be no question that the land sought to be recovered by petitioners are the very
same parcels of land being sought to be registered in Cayaba's and Noriega's nam
es. While the complaint in the first action is captioned for recovery of possess
ion, the allegations and the prayer for relief therein raise the issue of owners
hip, In effect, it is in the nature of an action reinvidicatoria. The second cas
e is for registration of title. Consequently, between the two cases there is ide
ntity of causes of action because in action reinvidicatoria, possession is sough
t on the basis of ownership and the same is true in registration cases. Registra
tion of title in one's name is based on ownership. In both cases, the plaintiff
and the applicant seek to exclude other persons from ownership of the land in qu
estion. The only difference is that in the former case, the exclusion is directe
d against particular persons, while in the latter proceedings, the exclusion is
directed against the whole world. Nonetheless, the cause of action remains the s
ame.
* Abellera vs. Farol ruled that "while in a cadastral case, res judicata is avai
lable to a claimant in order to defeat the alleged rights of another claimant, n
evertheless, prior judgment can not be set up in a motion to dismiss." This rul
ing is now abandoned; reversed by this case.
DURAN VS. OLIVA,
3 SCRA 154 (1961)
Facts: (SUPRA)
Held: By express provision of Rule 132 of the ROC, the rules contained therein a
pply to land registration and cadastral cases in suppletory character and whenev
er practicable and convenient. The LRA does not provide for a pleading similar
or corresponding to a motion to dismis. As a motion to dismiss is necessary for
the expeditious termination of land registration cases, said motion can be avai
led of by the parties.
The primary and fundamental purpose of the Torrens System of registratio
n is to finally settle the titles to land and put to stop any question of legali
ty of title thereto. Pursuant to this purpose, a homestead patent once register
ed under the LRA cannot be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, and any
title issued thereon is null and void.

Hearing, judgment and Decree (Sec. 38)

WIDOWS AND ORPHANS ASSOCIATION INC., (WIDORA) VS. CA, ORTIGAS & CO., 201 SCRA 16
5 (1991)
Facts: Widora filed an application for registration of a land they acquired fro
m the heirs of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. Molina and Oritgas & Co. separa
tely opposed claiming ownership. Ortigas filed a motion to dismiss alleging tha
t the court had no jurisdiction, the land being applied for having been already
registered under the Torrens System (TS). MTD denied and the case was set for
hearing. TC believes Ortigas TCTs were derived form OCT 337, 19, 336, 334 (as it
appears on its face) pursuant to Decree 1425, NOT OCT 351 as claimed by Ortigas
. If it were really derived from OCT 351 then why didn t Ortigas have the same co
rrected? And besides, Decree 1425 covers land which is 4 km. away from the land
being applied for. So if there was no valid decree of registration, Ortigas TCTs
cannot be valid.
Ortigas brought the case to the CA on certiorari, prohibition and mandamu
s and the CA reversed the TC decision and dismissed the case. The CA believed O
rtigas TCTs are actually derived from OCT 351, the latter being issued pursuant t
o Decree 1425 and that since OCT 351 is a copy of Decree 1425, even though a cop
y of Decree 1425 cannot be presented in court does not mean Decree 1425 was not
issued and OCT 351 would suffice to show that a decree of registration was made
. So according to the CA, as far as Lots 7 and 8 are concerned Ortigas TCTs refer
to OCT 351 and the CA ordered that the mistake in the TCTs be corrected.
Issue: WON Ortigas TCTs are valid despite the absence of a supporting decree of
registration.
Held: No. CA judgment set aside.
Ratio: The evidence presented by Ortigas to prove the existence of a decree of
registration is merely secondary (i.e. the plan, testimony of surveyor and OCT 3
51). Ortigas must satisfy requisites to justify admission of secondary eviden
ce (1. Execution 2. Lost or destroyed or possession of adverse party). Ortigas e
vidence should not have been admitted in the first place.
A ground for dismissal based on disputed facts (WON the TCT s of Ortigas w
as supported by a decree of registration specifically by Decree 1425) is not a g
round for dismissal. The resolution of this controversy calls for a full-blown
trial to afford the parties a day in court.
An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory thus not pr
oper for the an extraordinary writ of prohibition. Interlocutory orders cannot
be reviewed by the CA until the LC shall have decided the merit of the case.
The mistakes that appear in Ortigas TCTs cannot be corrected except by or
der of the court in a petition filed for the purpose and entitled in the origina
l case in which the decree of registration was entered. The court is not author
ized to alter or correct a certificate of title if it would mean the reopening
of the decreed of registration beyond the period allowed by law. Respondent cour
t committed a procedural lapse.
The rule that a land registration court has no jurisdiction over parcels
of land already covered by certificate of Title applies only where there exists
no serious controversy as to the certificate s authenticity vis-a-vis the land co
vered therein.

GABRIEL VS. CA, PETRITA PASCUAL, RUDYARDO SANTIAGO,

159 SCRA 461 (1988)
Facts: A survey was made for Santiago Quimson. Land was registered under his n
ame and an OCT was issued by the Registry of Deeds. Subsequently a cadastral su
rvey (Orani survey) was conducted which resulted in an increase in the land. The
Cadastral court confirmed Quimson s title. The lot was subdivided and subsequent
ly acquired by Eligio Naval. Potenciano Gabriel had a parcel of land surveyed (
2,792,712 sq m designated as Psu 9742) and later it was amended to exclude porti
ons of land owned by Quimson. OCT 1264 with a reduced area (2,436,280 sq m) was
issued to Gabriel. Another cadastral survey was conducted (Hermosa survey) and
Gabriel s lot covered by Psu-9742 became Lot No. 557 with a further reduced area (
2,096,433 sq m) but no new certificate of title was issued such that the OCT 126
4 continued to subsist with an area of 2,436,280 sq m. Gabriel passed away and
his heirs (petitioners) divided the land according to Psu 9742 under OCT 1264 (i
ncludes land owned by Naval). Petitioners filed a complaint against Pascual and
Santiago (administrators of Naval estate) claiming that respondents usurped the
land and that the land was merely loaned to the respondents for dike and water
control purposes of the latter s fishpond. The TC dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the land was in the possession of Naval in the concept of an owner
and the petitioner s claim that the land was loaned to Naval was not supported by
sufficient evidence. Further the TC found that the right of petitioners was los
t by prescription and that they were guilty of laches. TC ORDERED THE NECESSARY
CORRECTION OF THE TECHINICAL DESCRIPTION TO MAKE IT CONFORM TO THE CORRECT AREA
. CA affirmed.
Issue: WON the courts have the authority to order the necessary corrections of
an erroneous techinical description and make it conform to the correct area.
Held: Yes. Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.
Ratio: In cadastral cases, jurisdiction of the court over lands already registe
red is limited to the necessary correction of technical errors in the descriptio
n of lands, provided such corrections do not impair the substantial rights of t
he registered owner, and that such jurisdiction cannot operate to deprive a regi
stered owner of his title. The court also has the power to determine the priori
ty of overlapping or over-laying registered title. This power is necessary for
a complete settlement of the title to the land, which is the express purpose of
cadastral proceedings. Furthermore, in the case at bar, it was not as if the co
urt reopened or set aside a final decree. Therefore the action of the lower cou
rt in correcting the error in the technical description appearing in Psu 9742 is
well within its jurisdiction.
The fact that Gabriel did not own the land is shown by the Hermose and O
rani Cadastre, and by the behavior of Gabriel himself (even after discovering oc
cupation he allowed Naval to use and occupy the land). The claim that the land
was loaned was supported by mere oral evidence which the SC believes to be insuf
ficient to defeat title and possession of registered owners.
For failure to prosecute their claims for 20 years, petitioners have los
t by laches their right to recover their property.

REPUBLIC AND DIR. OF LANDS VS. JUDGE ESTENZO

158 SCRA 282 (1988)
Facts: Oct. 31, 1940 Cadastral Court declared Lot No. 8423 of the Ormoc Cadastr
al as public land. 32 years later (Jan 12, 1972) spouses Adolfo filed a petition
to re-open the Oct. 31, 1940 decision. Spouses claimed ownership by virtue of h
aving purchased it and as evidenced by a deed of quitclaim and confirmation date
d August 28, 1969, likewise alleging that due to accident, mistake, and excusabl
e neglect of the previous claimant, the land was declared public. Director of La
nds appeared as oppositor. Judge adjudicated Lot No. 8423 in favor of spouses.
Rep. and Dir. appeals by certiorari. Petitoner claims spouses petition is barr
ed by the expiration of the period for reopening of cadastral proceedings under
RA 931 (Dec. 31, 1968).
Issue: WON spouses are barred.
Held: Yes. Decision set aside.
Ratio: Spouses filed their petition more than 3 years after the lapse of the re
glementary period required by the law. The period having expired, respondent ju
dge was without jurisdiction when he entertained spouses petition to re-open the
decision of the cadastral court.
Spouses claim that assuming the LC has no jurisdiction to re-open the ca
dastral proceedings their petition may be taken as one for confirmation of imper
fect title considering the allegation contained in the complaint. But looking i
nto their petition, the spouses cause of action is premised on RA 931 because it
conforms with the conditions to be met before one can avail of the provisions of
RA 931 therefore the petition filed by the spouses cannot be one for confirmati
on of imperfect title. If it were a confirmation of imperfect title, spouses ca
n take advantage of the extension of period granted by RA 6236 (Dec. 31, 1976) b
ut that law does not apply to re-opening of cadastral cases.
Requirements of the rules relative to perfection of appeal in an ordinar
y case apply in the same manner to appeals from a decision of a court of first i
nstance in registration and cadastral proceedings. Hence, from Aug. 28, 1972 wh
en the assailed decision was received by herein petitioners until Sept. 15, 1972
when the petition was filed, the 30 period had not yet elapsed.

I. Lost or Destroyed Certificates

Lost or Destroyed Certificates (Sec.109, PD 1529)
- In case of loss or theft of an owner s duplicate certificate of title
-Due notice under oath is required to be sent to Reg. of Deeds where land is sit
uated as soon as loss or theft is discovered
-Petition to be filed by registered owner or other person in interest
-Notice and hearing required

Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original Copies of Certificate of Title

-Denotes restoration of the instrument which is supposed to have been lost or de
stroyed in its original form and condition
-Purpose is to have the same reproduced, after proper proceedings, in the same f
orm they were when the loss or destruction occurred.
OCAMPO V. GARCIA,
105 PHIL. 533
FACTS: Appellees ask for the issuance of another duplicate certificate TCT whic
h was lost in the liberation of Manila. They ask as well that the two encumbranc
es (re appointment of special administrator and sum due to a judgment creditor)
thereon because such encumbrances no longer exist or have been satisfied.
HELD: There is no question that under the foregoing quoted provisions of Act N
o. 496, the court of first instance, acting as land registration court, may, upo
n petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, after notice and
hearing, and upon satisfactory proof, direct the issuance of a new duplicate ce
rtificate of title in lieu of a lost or destroyed one, and the cancellation of e
ncumbrances on a certificate of title which have terminated or ceased. Having sh
own to the satisfaction of the Court that the owner's duplicate of transfer cert
ificate of title No. 28709 had been lost or destroyed during the battle for libe
ration of Manila, the appellees are entitled to the issuance of another owner's
duplicate TCT. Having also shown to the Court's satisfaction that Mariano Ocampo
y Zamora, who had been appointed by the probate court to administer the estate
of the late Manuel Rivera y Angeles, died in 1938, and the record of that fact o
n the back of the certificate of title would serve no useful purpose, the appell
ees may ask for the cancellation thereof and the Court commits no error in direc
ting the cancellation of the annotation on the certificate of title of the admin
istrator's appointment by the probate court.
SERRA V. CA,
195 SCRA 482
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; PURPOSE. The purpose of the reconstitution of any docum
ent, book or record is to have the same reproduced, after observing the procedur
e prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occu
rred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made, as just stated
, in the same form and exactly as they were at the time they were lost or destro
yed. A person who seeks a reconstitution of a certificate of title over a proper
ty he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a w
rit of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants of p
ossession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be threshe
d out in a separate proceeding
RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE; ACTUAL AND PERSONAL NOTICE TO ACTUAL POSSESSORS, INDISP
ENSABLE. Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the
order granting reconstitution because the reconstitution proceedings was heard a
fter notices were sent to alleged boundary owners and the petition was published
in the Official Gazette. However, the petitioner who were in actual possession
of the properties were not notified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as
regards actual possessors of the property. In the case of Alabang Development v.
Valenzuela, No. 54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held that in petitions
for reconstitution of titles, actual owners and possessors of the lands involve
d must be duly served with actual and personal notice of the petition.
RECONSTITUTED TITLE A NULLITY WHERE NO ORIGINAL TITLE EXISTS. If no such origina
l title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the order for i
ts reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering the order ha
s not acquired jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule appli
es if in fact there is an earlier valid certificate of title in the name and in
the possession of another person/s.
REPUBLIC V CA AND YUPANGCO,
OCTOBER 26, 1999
Issue: The question for decision in this case is whether in a proceeding for th
e issuance of an owner s duplicate certificate of title, the Solicitor General is
required to be notified, such that failure to give such notice would render the
proceedings void.
Held: Nothing in the law requires that the Office of the Solicitor General be
notified and heard in proceeding for the issuance of an owner s duplicate certific
ate of title. In contrast, 23 of the same law(PD 1529), involving original regist
ration proceedings, specifically mentions the Solicitor General as among those w
ho must be notified of the petition. Similarly, 36 provides that the petition for
registration in cadastral proceedings must be filed by the Solicitor General, i
n behalf of the Director of Lands.
It is only now that the Solicitor General is claiming the right to be not
ified of proceedings for the issuance of the owner s duplicate certificate of titl
e. Indeed, the only basis for such claim is that the Office of the Solicitor Gen
eral represents the government in land registration and related proceedings. Eve
n so, however, the request for representation should have come from the Registra
r of Deeds of Makati who was the proper party to the case.
Considering that the law does not impose such notice requirement in proce
edings for the issuance of a new owner s duplicate certificate of title, the lack
of notice to the Solicitor General, as counsel for the Registrar of Deeds, was a
t most only a formal and not a jurisdictional defect. M

J. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Certificates

What is the purpose of reconstitution?
The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to hav
e the same reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the sa
me form they were when the loss or destruction occurred. The reconstitution of
certificates of title should be made in the same form and exactly as they were a
t the time they were lost or destroyed. (Serra Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482)
How is reconstitution done?
Reconstitution may be done either judicially or administratively / extrajudi
cially, depending on the source document which is the basis for the reconstituti
on. (See Sec. 5 of RA 26, as amended by RA 6732, as well as Sec. 10-12 of RA 26
.)
What is the force and effect of a reconstituted title?
A reconstituted certificate of title has the same validity and legal effect
as the original thereof. (Sec. 6, RA 26) This is without prejudice to any part
y whose right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original at the
time it was lost or destroyed, but entry or notation of which was not made on an
extrajudicially reconstituted certificate of title.

Judicial Reconstitution
Judicial reconstitution partakes of a land registration proceeding and is p
erforce a proceeding in rem.
The procedure for judicial reconstitution is laid down in Sec. 12 (contents
of the petition) and 13 (publication, posting, and sending by mail of the petit
ion) of RA 26. These requirements are mandatory and jurisdictional, and non-co
mpliance therewith voids the reconstitution proceedings.
What are the sources for judicial reconstitution of title?
I) For Original Certificate of Title (C.T)
In the following order:
a) Owner s duplicate of the CT
b) Co-owner s mortgagee s or lessee s duplicate of said C.T.
(Note that reconstitution based on (a) and (b) can be done administratively. Ho
wever, Sec. 10 of RA 26 allows a petitioner to file directly with the RTC. More
over, such certificates of title reconstituted under Sec. 10 are not subject to
the encumbrance provided under Sec. 7 of RA 26.)
c) Certified copy of such certificate, previously issued by the Reg. Of deeds or
by legal custodian thereof
d) Authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, which was the bas
is of the certificate of title
e) Deed of mortgage, lease or encumbrance containing description of prop covered
by the CT and on file with Reg. of Deeds, or an authenticated copy thereof indi
cating that its original had been registered
f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is a sufficient and p
roper basis for reconstitution.
II) For Transfer Certificate of Title
In the following order:
a) The same as sources a, b and c for reconstitution of original CT
b) Deed of transfer or other document covered by TCT and on file with the Reg. o
f Deeds, or an authenticated copy thereof indicating that its original had been
registered and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed CT was issued
c) The same as sources (e) and (f) for reconstitution of original CT
Can liens and encumbrances be reconstituted?
YES. The sources for such reconstitution are provided under Sec. 4 of RA 26
. Also see Sec. 8-9 of the same law.
Who may file a petition for reconstitution?
A petition for reconstitution may be filed with the Register of Deeds by:
(1) the registered owner;
(2) his assigns; or
(3) any other person having an interest in the property (Sec. 5, RA 26)
Can the Register of Deeds reconstitute a certificate of title motu proprio?
NO. Sec. 6 of RA 26, which gave the Register of Deeds such power, has been
expressly repealed by RA 6732.
When does the order of reconstitution become final?
Upon 15 days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Administrator
of the Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment withou
t any appeal having been filed by any of such officials. (Sec. 110, PD 1529, as
 amended by RA 6732)
What is the force and effect of a fraudulently reconstituted title?
It is void ab initio as against the party obtaining the same and all person
s having knowledge thereof. (Sec. 11, RA 6732)
What is the remedy of an aggrieved party to a fraudulently reconstituted title?
Sec. 10 of RA 6732 provides that any interested party who by fraud, accident, mi
stake or excusable negligence (FAME; note, these are the same grounds for a mot
ion for new trial as well as a petition for relief from judgment) has been unju
stly deprived or prevented from taking part in the proceedings may file a petiti
on in the proper court to set aside the decision and to reopen the proceedings.
The petition must be verified and filed within 60 days after the petition
er learns of the decision but not more than 6 months from the promulgation there
of. (This is the same as a petition for relief from judgment.)
Can a writ of possession issue in reconstitution cases?
NO. Reconstitution does not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the prope
rty covered by the reconstituted title, unlike in original land registration pro
ceedings. Thus, a person who seeks a reconstitution of a CT over a property he
does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession (which, it must be noted, is summary in nature) deprive the actual o
ccupants of possession thereof. (Serra Serra v. CA, 195 SCRA 482)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND ISABEL LASTIMADO, 94 SCRA
865
FACTS:
1. September 11, 1967 - Lastimado filed in the CFI a Petition for the reopening
of cadastral proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastr
e.
2. In the absence of any opposition, whether from the Government or from privat
e individuals, Lastimado was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte.
3. October 14, 1967- the trial Court granted the Petition and adjudicated the l
and in favor of Lastimado.
4. The trial Court issued an order for the issuance of a decree of registration
on November 20, 1967, and on November 21, 1967, the Land Registration Commissio
n issued Decree No. N-117573 in favor of private respondent. Eventually, OCT No.
N-144 was also issued in her favor.
5. Lastimado thereafter subdivided the land into ten lots, and the correspondin
g titles, TCT Nos. 18905 to 18914 inclusive, were issued by the Register of Deed
s.
6. June 3, 1968 - or within one year from the entry of the decree of registrati
on, RP filed a Petition for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the grou
nd of fraud alleging that during the period of alleged adverse possession by pri
vate respondent, said parcel of land was part of the U.S. Military Reservation i
n Bataan, which was formally turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only
on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of Marivele
s, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Pu
blic Land Law.
7. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Solicitor Gene
ral had failed to file opposition to the original. Petition for reopening the ca
dastral proceedings, and was therefore estopped from questioning the decree of r
egistration. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal.
8. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as
the order of the trial court, and held that the trial court should have afforded
petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support of the facts alleged t
o constitute actual and extrinsic fraud committed by private respondent. Moreove
r, the inaction of the Solicitor General cannot operate to bar the action of the
State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its official or agent
s.
Case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
HELD: The essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a
decree are: (1) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right; (2) that he
has been deprived thereof; (c) through fraud; (d) that the petition is filed wi
thin one year from the issuance of the decree; and (e) that the property has not
as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
For fraud to justify the review of a degree, it must be extrinsic or collateral
and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in t
he case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The fraud is one
that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the Court.
It is error for the lower court to deny the petition for review of a decr
ee of registration filed within one year from the entry of the decree, without h
earing the evidence in support of the allegation and claim that actual and extri
nsic fraud has been committed by the applicants. The lower court should afford t
he petitioner an opportunity to prove it.
If the allegation of the government that the land in question was inside
the military reservation at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be
the object of any cadastral proceeding nor can it be the object of reopening und
er Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed, forms part
of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it
into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau o
f Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral Court to regis
ter under the Torrens System.
The inaction or neglect of government agencies cannot operate to bar the
action by the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its offi
cials or agents. The State as a persona in law is the juridical entity, which is
the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under basic Constitutiona
l precepts, and is charged with the conversation of such patrimony.

THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MALABON VS. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MALABON
, 181 SCRA 788
1. March 17, 1988 - a Deed of Absolute Sale of a property covered by TCT No. R-
3899 in the name of Salome Castillo in favor of Jose M. Castillo, was presented
to the Register of Deeds in Caloocan City for registration. It could not be give
n due course because the original of said TCT in the Registry of Deeds was missi
ng.
2. As the missing title covered a parcel of land in Malabon, Atty. Gaudencio Cen
a, the Register of Deeds for Malabon, filed on April 12, 1988 in the Regional Tr
ial Court of Malabon, a verified petition for reconstitution of the original of
TCT No. R-3899 under Rep. Act No. 26, which was given due course on April 22, 19
88. The court s order setting it for hearing on August 17, 1988 was ordered to be
published in two (2) consecutive issues of the Official Gazette as provided in S
ection 9 of Republic Act No. 26.
3. At the hearing for the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional requiremen
t of publication of the notice of the hearing of the petition, the petitioner su
bmitted the following exhibits:
a) a certification dated August 10, 1988, of the Director of the National P
rinting Office certifying that the order dated April 22, 1988 was included in Vo
lume 84, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the Official Gazette;
b) the sheriffs certificate of posting; and
c) the registry return receipts for the copies of the notices which were se
nt to the Director of Lands, the Office of the Solicitor General, the National L
and Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA), Salome Castillo, and
Jose Castillo.
4. November 3, 1988 - the petitioner caused to be marked as Exhibit G the certi
ficate of publication issued by the Director of the National Printing Office sta
ting that the order of the court dated April 22, 1988 was published in Volume 84
, Nos. 21 and 22, May 23 and May 30, 1988 issues of the Official Gazette and tha
t the May 30, 1988 issue was released for circulation on October 3, 1988. The Ma
y 23 and May 30 issues of the Official Gazette were also marked as Exhibits B-1
and B-2, respectively.
5. The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City testified that the original TCT No. R
-3899 had been missing from the files of his office since 1981; that the Deed of
Sale of the property of Salome Castillo in favor of Jose Castillo was presented
for registration but it could not be registered because the original of TCT No.
R-3899 could not be found; and that he was authorized by the administrator of t
he NLTDRA to file a petition for reconstitution of the lost original copy of TCT
No. R-3899.
6. The Regional Trial Court in Malabon dismissed the petition for lack of juris
diction because the notice of the petition was not published in the Official Gaz
ette "at least thirty (30) days prior to the date of hearing" (Sec. 9, R.A. No.
26) which had been set on August 17, 1988. The May 23 and May 30 issues of the O
fficial Gazette were actually released for circulation on October 3, 1988, or fo
rty-seven (47) days after the scheduled hearing of the petition.
7. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 26 provides:
"Sec. 9. A registered owner desiring to have his reconstituted certificate of t
itle freed from the encumbrance mentioned in section seven of this Act, may file
a petition to that end with the proper Court of First Instance, giving his reas
on or reasons therefor. A similar petition may, likewise, be filed by a mortgage
e, lessee or other lien holder whose interest is annotated in the reconstituted
certificate of title. Thereupon, the court shall cause a notice of the petition
to be published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of
the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the main entrance of the provincial b
uilding and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in which the l
and lies, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing, and after hearing,
shall determine the petition and render such judgment as justice and equity may
require. The notice shall specify, among other things, the number of the certifi
cate of title, the name of the registered owner, the names of the interested par
ties appearing in the reconstituted certificate of title, the location of the pr
operty, and the date on which all persons having an interest in the property mus
t appear and file such claim as they may have. The petitioner shall, at the hear
ing, submit proof of the publication and posting of the notice."
ISSUE: Whether the actual publication of the notice of the petition in the Off
icial Gazette forty-seven (47) days after the hearing, instead of "at least thir
ty (30) days prior to the date of hearing" was sufficient to vest jurisdiction i
n the court to hear and determine the petition.
HELD: Evidently, it did not. The purpose of the publication of the notice of t
he petition for reconstitution in the Official Gazette is to apprise the whole w
orld that such a petition has been filed and that whoever is minded to oppose it
for good cause may do so within thirty (30) days before the date set by the cou
rt for hearing the petition. It is the publication of such notice that brings in
the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to
hear and decide it.
In Director of Lands vs. The Court of Appeals and Demetria Sta. Maria de
Bernal, Greenfield Development Corporation, Alabang Development Corporation and
Ramon Bagatsing (102 SCRA 370), this Court ruled that "in all cases where the au
thority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner o
f obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the
proceedings will be utterly void."
Where there is a defect in the publication of the petition, such defect deprives
the court of jurisdiction (Po vs. Republic, 40 SCRA 37). And when the court a q
uo lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, it lacks authority over the
whole case and all its aspects (Pinza vs. Aldovino, 25 SCRA 220, 224).
Apart from the defective publication of the petition, another reason for its dis
missal is that the Register of Deeds for Malabon is not the proper party to file
the petition for reconstitution. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 26, which allowe
d the Register of Deeds to motu proprio reconstitute a lost or destroyed certifi
cate of title from its corresponding owner's duplicate certificate, was expressl
y repealed or declared to be "inoperative" by Section 6 of Republic Act 6732, ap
proved on July 17, 1989. A petition for reconstitution may now be filed only by
"the registered owner, his assigns, or any person who has an interest in the pro
perty" (Section 12, Republic Act No. 26). In other respects, the special procedu
re provided in Republic Act No. 26 remains unchanged and therefore still applies
(Zuiga vs. Vicencio, 153 SCRA 720).
JOSE MANUEL STILIANOPULOS VS. THE CITY OF LEGASPI
[G.R. NO. 133913. OCTOBER 12, 1999.]
FACTS:
1. September 26, 1962 - Legaspi City filed a petition for the judicial reconstit
ution of its titles to twenty parcels of land, including Lot 1, the certificates
of which had allegedly been lost or destroyed during World War II.
2. September 16, 1964 -, the trial court ordered the Register of Deeds to recons
titute the OCTs over these lots including OCT No. 665 in favor of the City.
3. August 4, 1970 - the City filed a Complaint for quieting of title over Lot 1
against Carlos V. Stilianopulos alias Chas V. Stilianopulos, Ana Estela Stilian
opulos, and the American Oxygen and Acetylene Company. While this case was pendi
ng, Carlos V. Stilianopulos died. As a consequence, TCT No. T-1427 which was reg
istered under his name was cancelled, and TCT No. 13448 was issued in the name o
f his son, petitioner herein, on July 12, 1974.
4. February 29, 1984 - the trial court rendered its Decision, which upheld the
validity of TCT No. 13448 and its superiority to OCT No. 665. Thus, Stilianopulo
s was declared the lawful owner of the disputed property, Lot 1, Psd-3261.
5. The CA reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the City. Stilianopulo
s recourse to this Court was dismissed in a Minute Resolution promulgated on Augu
st 17, 1988, 12 on the ground that the issue raised was factual in nature.
6. Stilianopulos filed an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 665, which the
trial court subsequently dismissed on August 15, 1989 on the ground of res judic
ata. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court, reasoning that petitioner s actio
n was "an action for annulment of the order" of the reconstitution of OCT No. 66
5 and was therefore not cognizable by the trial court.
7. June 13, 1994 - Stilianopulos again filed before the CA a new action for annu
lment of the September 16, 1964 Order based on three grounds: "(1) that the Resp
ondent City of Legaspi procured OCT No. 665 fraudulently; (2) that the original
certificate of title which was judicially reconstituted was non-existent: and (3
) that the court which ordered the reconstitution lacked jurisdiction."
8. The Court of Appeals ruled that "the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud
has lapsed [and] the petitioner is likewise guilty of laches in the filing of t
his case for annulment."
Res judicata had also set in against petitioner, as there was an identity of par
ties and causes of action ownership and possession of the lot covered by OCT No.
665 between the earlier case for quieting of title and his Petition for Annulme
nt. Further, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction in the e
arlier case; thus, he was guilty of laches.
ISSUES: (1) WON the prescriptive period for extrinsic fraud has [not] lapsed" a
nd
(2) WON the reconstitution court had no jurisdiction and "petitioner
is [not] guilty of laches." In addition, the Court will pass upon the CA holdin
g that this case is also barred by res judicata.
HELD: The Petition has no merit.
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extri
nsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue inv
olved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or co
uld have been litigated. It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits a
cts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real contest, or f
rom presenting all of his case such that there is no fair submission of the cont
roversy. Our examination of the facts shows that, indeed, respondent failed (1)
to state in its Petition for Reconstitution that Lot 1 was occupied and possesse
d by petitioner s predecessor-in-interest and (2) to give him notice of such proce
edings. Deliberately failing to notify a party entitled to notice constitutes ex
trinsic fraud.
Although the CA and the respondent impliedly admitted the presence of ext
rinsic fraud, both contend, however, that the prescriptive period for filing an
action based thereon had already run out on the petitioner. The appellate court
said: "If the ground for the annulment is extrinsic fraud, the action has to be
filed within four (4) years from the time the fraud is discovered pursuant to th
e provisions of Article 1891 of the Civil Code. . .
Petitioner s arguments are untenable. He could and should have raised the i
ssue of extrinsic fraud in the action for quieting of title. It was then that he
became aware of the reconstituted title in the name of respondent. A simple che
ck on the records of the reconstitution proceedings would have revealed that it
was conducted without notice to the petitioner s father.
Thus, we find no sufficient explanation why March 24, 1988 should be reck
oned as the date when the prescriptive period should begin. Simply unacceptable
is the contention that petitioner s counsel discovered the extrinsic fraud "shortl
y after March 24, 1988" only. Granting arguendo that the prescriptive period sho
uld begin when petitioner s counsel read the Land Registration Commission Report,
the "discovery" should have been made earlier, because the Report had been made
available to the said counsel when it was attached to the respondent s Appeal Brie
f on April 5, 1986, or at the latest, when the CA Decision was promulgated on Oc
tober 16, 1987. There was absolutely no excuse why petitioner had to wait until
the finality of the Decision in the case for quieting of title, before raising t
he issue of extrinsic fraud in order to annul the Decision in the reconstitution
proceedings. Clearly, the facts constituting the fraud should have been known t
o petitioner s predecessor-in-interest, when the Petition to quiet the title was f
iled in 1970.
It appears that the trial court had no jurisdiction. First, under Section
13 of RA 26, the sending of notice to the occupant of the land covered by the t
itle sought to be reconstituted is mandatory and jurisdictional. If no notice of
the date of hearing of a reconstitution case is served on the possessor or anyo
ne else having interest in the property involved, the order of reconstitution is
null and void. Second, reconstitution of title is simply the reissuance of a n
ew duplicate certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original fo
rm and condition. Thus, it arises from the loss or destruction of the owner s copy
of the certificate. In the case at bar, the title to Lot 1 was not lost or dest
royed. It remained in the possession of the petitioner s father and was eventually
passed on to him. If a certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in
the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title is void and the
court that rendered the Decision had no jurisdiction.
However, the CA ruled that the delay of more than twenty years since peti
tioner learned of the reconstituted title was unreasonable, giving rise to the p
resumption that he had abandoned the idea of seeking annulment of the proceeding
s on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and that he had opted to take other act
ions instead. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable or unexplai
ned length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier, warranting the presumption that the right holder has ab
andoned that right or declined to assert it. This inaction or neglect to assert
a right converts a valid claim into a stale demand. Laches prevents a litigant f
rom raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction. True, petitioner filed the annulm
ent Complaint right after the dismissal of the cancellation-of-title case, but i
t is equally true that it was filed only after the quieting-of-title case had be
en decided in favor of the respondent. By participating in the quieting-of-title
case and arguing therein his defenses against the legality of the title of the
respondent in order to establish his rights over the disputed property, petition
er is deemed to have chosen this action over the annulment of the reconstitution
proceedings. Annulment of the reconstitution proceedings was belatedly resorte
d to only after the CA had reversed the trial court and upheld the reconstituted
title of respondent. Laches bars a party from invoking lack of jurisdiction for
the first time on appeal for the purpose of annulling everything done, with his
active participation, in the case below. It cannot be said either that the appl
ication of laches would work an injustice against petitioner, because he was giv
en a fair chance in the quieting-of-title case to prove his ownership of the dis
puted lot.
Furthermore, by seeking the reexamination of the ownership of the dispute
d lot, petitioner accepted the jurisdiction of the court which heard the action
for quieting of title. A litigant cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to s
ecure affirmative relief and, after failing to obtain such relief, to repudiate
or question that same jurisdiction. Clearly, laches has attached and barred the
petitioner s right to file an action for annulment.
We are convinced that indeed res judicata has already set in. This conclu
sion is the most persuasive argument raised by the appellate court. The principl
e applies when the following elements are present (1) a judgment has became fina
l; (2) such judgment was rendered on the merits; (3) the court that rendered it
had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there was iden
tity of parties, subject matter and causes of action between the previous and th
e subsequent action. There is identity of cause of action between a case for ann
ulment of title and one for annulment of judgment. Causes of action are identica
l when there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two
actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions. If the same fact
s or evidence can sustain either, the two actions are considered the same so tha
t the judgment in one is a bar to the other. The underlying objectives or relief
s sought in both the quieting-of-title and the annulment-of-title cases are esse
ntially the same adjudication of the ownership of the disputed lot and nullifica
tion of one of the two certificates of title. Thus, it becomes readily apparent
that the same evidence or set of facts as those considered in the quieting-of-ti
tle case would also be used in this Petition.
The difference in form and nature of the two actions is immaterial and is not a
reason to exempt petitioner from the effects of res judicata. The philosophy beh
ind this rule prohibits the parties from litigating the same issue more than onc
e. When a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of c
ompetent jurisdiction or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgm
ent of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon th
e parties and those in privity with them. Verily, there should be an end to liti
gation by the same parties and their privies over a subject, once it is fully an
d fairly adjudicated.

Administrative Reconstitution
Administrative reconstitution is the putting together again/ restoration
of the original copies of Original and Transfer Certificates of Title that were
lost or destroyed due to fire, flood or other natural calamities without necessi
ty of court proceeding.
It may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of l
and titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure where the number of certifi
cates of titles lost or damaged, is at least 10% of the total number in the cust
ody of the Register of Deeds, but in no case shall the number of the lost or dam
aged titles be less than 500 as determined by the Administrator of the Land Regi
stration Authority.
What are the source documents on which administrative reconstitution may be base
d?
(1) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title; (Sec. 2a, RA 26)
(2) The co-owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of titl
e; (Sec. 2b, RA 26)
(3) For liens and other encumbrances affecting the destroyed or lost CT, the ann
otations or memoranda appearing on the owner's co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee'
s duplicate. (Sec. 4a, RA 26)
What are the requirements for administrative reconstitution?
1. Owner s duplicate copy of the OCT or TCT and 3 clear xerox copies. If the owne
r s duplicate is lost or unavailable, then the co-owner s duplicate of title and 3 c
lear/legible xerox copies may be submitted;
2. Real estate tax receipt representing full payment for the last 2 years prior
to the application/petition;
3. Tax declaration or real property; and
4. Others (e.g. power of attorney).
What is the procedure for administrative reconstitution?
(1) The registered owner, his assigns, or other persons having an interest in th
e property files a petition with the Register of Deeds, complying with the requi
rements imposed by Sec. 5 of RA 26.
(2) If the Register of Deeds has no valid reason to deny the petition, he/she sh
all reconstitute the certificate of title accordingly.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND ANTONINA GUIDO, 204 SC
RA 160
FACTS:
1. August 22, 1979 The RP, represented by the SolGen, filed a complaint for decl
aration of nullity of Decreto No. 6146, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 23
37 and all titles derived from said decree; and the declaration of the parcel of
land covered by the decree as belonging to the state, except so much thereof as
had been validly disposed of to third persons. The complaint alleged inter alia
, that:
"15. The alleged Decree No. 6146 issued on September 10, 1911 and the alleged
owner's copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23377 issued on May 12, 1933,
both in the name of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido, and which supposed owner's
duplicate was made the basis of the administrative reconstitution of TCT No. (23
377) RT-M-0002 on March 29, 1976, or about 43 years later, are false, spurious a
nd fabricated and were never issued by virtue of judicial proceedings for regist
ration of land, either under Act No. 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Lan
d Registration Act, or any other law, . . ."
2. The defendants denied that Decreto No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were false and
spurious. They consistently claimed (from the trial court up to this Court) tha
t the parcel of land covered by the questioned document is a portion of the vast
Hacienda de Angono owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Don Buenaventura Gui
do y Sta. Ana; that Don Buenaventura Guido left a portion of the hacienda (porci
on del plano 11-627) to his heirs, Francisco and Hermogenes Guido; that the subj
ect matter of the petition is only a portion of plano 11-827, and covered by Dec
reto No. 6145, issued on September 1, 1911 in the name of the heirs of Buenavent
ura Guido y Sta. Ana (Francisco and Hermogenes Guido); that on June 12, 1912, OC
T No. 633 was issued on the basis of Decreto No. 6145; that the original title w
as subsequently cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 23377 was issued on May 1
2, 1933; that the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes Guido adjudicated among them
selves the estate left by their predecessors and transferred one-half portion th
ereof to Jose Rojas sometime in 1942, as contained in an Extra-judicial Settleme
nt of Estate with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973.
3. The parties, however, admit that on August 20, 1974, the heirs of Buenaventu
ra Guido, requested the then Land Registration Commission (now Land Registration
Authority) to issue the corresponding original certificate of title based on De
creto 6145, which was denied on January 8, 1976.
4. March 29, 1976 - Alfredo Guido, representing the other heirs, filed a petitio
n for reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 with the Registry of Deeds of Morong. The
petition alleged that the original could not be located in the files of the Regi
stry of Deeds of Rizal after he and his co-heirs sought the registration of thei
r Extra-judicial Settlement with Quitclaim dated December 17, 1973. The petition
was supported by the owner's duplicate copy of the title.
5. The petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 23377 was granted
and a reconstituted certificate of title [TCT (23377) RT-M-0002] was issued date
d March 29, 1976.
6. After the reconstitution, the heirs presented before the Registry of Deeds o
f Morong the Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate with Quitclaim which they execu
ted on December 17, 1973 in favor of Jose Rojas and which they had earlier prese
nted for registration.
7. Subsequently, the entire parcel of land covered by the decree was subdivided
into twenty-one (21) lots and twenty-one (21) different certificates of titles
were issued in lieu of the reconstituted TCT No. 23377. On August 25, 1978, four
teen (14) of these twenty-one (21) lots were exchanged with shares of stocks of
Interport Resources Corporation. On April 21, 1980, all the named heirs renounce
d their rights over the property in favor of their co-heir Alfredo Guido, Sr. in
exchange for monetary considerations.
8. The court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the complaint and declaring Dec
ree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377, genuine and authentic.
9. The decision of the trial court was appealed by the Solicitor General to the
Court of Appeals which affirmed said decision on July 12, 1988.
ISSUES: It is the contention of petitioner that respondent Court of Appeals com
mitted serious errors in the assessment of the evidence on record and acted with
grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the Republic failed to satisfy the
requirements of preponderant proof in support of its theory.
HELD:
1. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. The general rule in civil cases is that a party
having the burden of proof of an essential fact must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon. By preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which i
s of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition
to it. The term 'preponderance of evidence' means the weight, credit and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonym
ous with the terms 'greater weight of evidence' or 'greater weight of the credib
le evidence.'
2. The matter of determining which party had the preponderant evidence is withi
n the province of the trial court before whom the evidence of both parties are p
resented. The decision of who to believe and who not to believe goes to the cred
ibility of a witness which, likewise, is within the province of the trial court.
3. We have carefully gone through the records of this case and there is no reas
on for this Court to reverse the decisions of both the court a quo and the appel
late court. Both courts were one in concluding that the preponderance of evidenc
e is in favor of the theory presented by the private respondents, i.e., the auth
enticity of the questioned documents.
4. The fact alone that the petition for reconstitution was approved on the same
day that it was filed did not render the approval suspect. In administrative re
constitution of a certificate of title supported by the owner's duplicate copy o
f the title, no other requisite was required under Section 6 of Republic Act 26
unlike in judicial reconstitution under Section 12 of the same law. The Register
of Deeds correctly granted the reconstitution on the basis of private responden
ts owners' duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377.
5. We find no legal basis for the declaration of the questioned documents as val
id only with respect to such portions of the property not possessed and owned by
bonafide occupants with indefeasible registered titles of ownership or with len
gths of possession which had ripened to ownership. Having been found valid and g
enuine, Decreto No. 6145 therefore, possessed all the attributes of a decree of
registration. Section 31 of the Property Registration Decree (P.D. 1529), second
paragraph provides:.
The decree of registration shall bind the land and quiet title thereto, subject o
nly to such exceptions or liens as may be provided by law. It shall be conclusiv
e upon and against all persons, including the National Government and all branch
es thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, the same bei
ng included in the general description "To all whom it may concern."
6. Likewise, TCT No. 23377, having been found true and authentic also possessed
all the attributes of a torrens certificate of title. By express provision of S
ection 47 of P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation to that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. To de
clare that the decree and its derivative titles is valid but only with respect t
o the extent of the area described in the decree not possessed by occupants with
indefeasible registered titles or to possessors with such lengths of possession
which had ripened to ownership is to undermine the people's faith in the torren
s title being conclusive as to all matters contained therein. The certificate se
rves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person
whose names appear therein. After the expiration of the one year period from th
e issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is based, it becomes inco
ntrovertible, unless subsequent to the issuance of the decree a third party may
be able to show that he acquired title thereto by any of the means recognized by
law.

V. SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
The act of registration is the operative act to convey or affect the land i
nsofar as third persons are concerned. Thus, the mere execution of deeds of sal
e, mortgages, leases or other voluntary documents serves only as (1) a contract
between the parties, and (2) as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds t
o register such documents. They do NOT, in themselves, effect a conveyance or e
ncumbrance on the land. The exception to this rule is if the instrument is a wi
ll.
The act of registration creates a constructive notice to the whole world of
such voluntary or involuntary instrument or court writ or process.

CAMPILLO VS CA
129 SCRA 513 (1984)
The De Vera spouses sold 2 parcels of land to Santos. Sale was not registered. A
bout a year later, Campillo obtained a judgment for a sum of money against De Ve
ra. The parcels, still in the De Veras name, were levied upon on execution and Ca
mpillo was able to purchase them at a public auction. TCT was issued to Campillo
. Santos sought to annul sale at public auction, claiming to be the owner.
HELD: Registration of the sale shall be the operative act to convey or affect th
e land insofar as third persons are concerned. The properties were still in the
name of the De Veras. Campillo was not required to look behind the register to d
etermine the condition of the property. He is only charged with notice of the bu
rdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certifi
cate of title. To require him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects
of the Torrens system.
RATIO: A bona fide purchaser for value of such property at an auction sale acqui
res good title as against a prior transferee of same property if such prior tran
sfer was unrecorded at the time of the auction sale.

HEIRS OF MARASIGAN VS IAC

152 SCRA 253 (1987)
Who has a better right to the property in question, the party (Marasigan) who bo
ught it with a notice of lis pendens annotated at the back of her title or the p
arty (Marron) in whose favor the notice of lis pendens was made? The appellate c
ourt answered this question in favor of the party who had the notice annotated a
nd who won the litigation over the property.
Marron s cause of action had not prescribed. While Marasigan acquired the property
in 1974, it was only in 1977 that the sale was registered. It is the act of reg
istration which creates constructive notice to the whole world. (Sec 52, PD 1529
)
Also when Marasigan was issued her TCT the notice of lis pendens in her predeces
sors title was carried over to her title. In case of subsequent sales or transfer
s, the Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to carry over the notice of lis pendens
on all titles to be issued. Otherwise, if he cancels any notice of lis pendens i
n violation of his duty, he may be held civilly and even criminally liable for a
ny prejudice caused to innocent third persons.
A notice of lis pendens means that a certain property is involved in a litigatio
n and serves as notice to the whole world that one who buys the same does it at
his own risk. It was also a clear notice to Marasigan that there was a court cas
e affecting her rights to the property she had purchased. Consequently, Marasiga
n was bound by the outcome of the litigation against her vendors or transferors.

GARCIA VS CA
95 SCRA 380 (1980)
In this case two sets of certificates of title were issued to different people f
or the same lots. The 1st set was issued sometime in 1920 to Lapus who had bough
t the parcels in 1918. However, despite this registered sale, the OCT was not ca
ncelled and the sale to Lapus was not annotated thereon. The 2nd set of titles w
as issued in 1963 when heirs of the original owner, relying on the clean OCT, we
re able to succeed in having TCTs issued to them. Eventually, both sets of owners
entered into transactions with other people who in turn secured TCTs in their fa
vor. Whose successors in interest would have a better right?
HELD: Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land, the ea
rlier in date prevails. And the rule that in case of double registration the own
er of the earlier certificate is the owner of the land applies to the successive
vendees of the owners of such certificates. The vendee of the earlier certifica
te would be the owner as against the vendee of the owner of the later certificat
e.
There can be no doubt that Lapus was an innocent purchaser for value. He validly
transmitted to his successors-in-interest his indefeasible title or ownership o
ver the disputed lots or parcels of land. That title could not be nullified or d
efeated by the issuance forty-three years later to other persons of another titl
e over the same lots due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel the t
itle preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so considering that Lapus
and his successors-in-interest remained in possession of the disputed lots and
the rival claimants never possessed the same.

MINGOA VS LAND REG COM

200 SCRA 782 (1991)
A deed of donation of several parcels of land was executed by petitioner in favo
r of his children on July 15, 1987. The deed was forwarded to the Register of De
eds for registration by registered mail on September 9, 1988. It was entered in
the primary entry book of the Register of Deeds on September 20, 1988 under Entr
y No. 181. Said Register of Deeds suspended registration of the donation until t
he petitioner has secured the proper clearances from the Department of Agrarian
Reform on the ground that under Section 6 of Republic Act 6657 any disposition o
f private agricultural lands made prior to June 15, 1988, when the Act took effe
ct, must be registered within three (3) months from said date or on before Septe
mber 13, 1988 to be valid.
HELD: Sec. 56 of PD 1529 requires the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the ent
ry fees, to enter in the primary book of entry, in the order of reception, all i
nstruments including copies of writs and processes filed with him relative to re
gistered land the date, hour and minute shall be noted in said book which shall
be regarded as the date of registration of the instrument and the memorandum of
each instrument on the certificate title shall bear the same date. Sec. 34 of PD
1529 makes the Rules of Court suppletorily applicable to land registration and c
adastral cases.
Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 13 of the ROC, in case of filing by registered mail, it
is the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt w/c shall be co
nsidered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. In the pres
ent case, September 9 should be considered the date of filing and thus the deed
of donation was filed within the three-month statutory period.
A. Voluntary Registration
Conveyances and other Dealings by Registered Owner
Voluntary dealings with land refer to deeds, instruments or documents which a
re the results of the free and voluntary acts of the parties thereto. These inc
lude:
* Sales, conveyances or transfers of ownership over the titled property;
* Mortgages and leases;
* Powers of attorney;
* Trusts
In voluntary registration, when does an innocent purchaser for value become the
holder of a certificate of title?
He becomes the holder of a CT at the moment he presents and files a duly no
tarized and valid deed of sale, and the same is entered in the day book (primary
entry book) AND at the same time he surrenders or presents the owner's duplicat
e certificate of title covering the land sold, and pays the registration fees.
(Garcia v. CA, 95 SCRA 380. Contrast this from involuntary registration, which
will be discussed in the following section.)
It must be noted that an executed document or transfer of registered land p
laced by the registered owner thereof in the hands of another operates as a repr
esentation to a third party that the holder of the document of transfer is autho
rized to deal with the land.

PD 1529, Sec. 51. Conveyances and other dealings by registered owner- An owner
of registered land may convey, mortgage, transfer, lease, charge, or otherwise d
eal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of de
eds, mortgages, leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law.
But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will pur
porting to convey or affect registered land; shall take effect as conveyance or
bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as e
vidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
 The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the l
and insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree,
the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land lies.
Sec. 52. Constructive notice upon registration- every conveyance, mortgage, le
ase, lien attachment, order, judgement, instrument or entry affecting registered
land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of De
eds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies be construc
tive notice to all persons from the time of such registering, filing, or enterin
g.

VILLALUZ V. NEME
7 SCRA 27 (1963)
Facts: Maria Rocabo died intestate, leaving three daughters( Maria, Patricia, a
nd Sinforosa)and grandchildren (from her other children who predeceased her), th
e plaintiffs in this case. She left a parcel of land granted her under homestea
d patent and with original certificate of title. After approval of her applicat
ion but before the granting of patent, Maria donated the southern portion of the
land to her daughter, also named Maria, and donated the northern part to Patric
ia in two notarial deeds of donation giving them the right to present the deeds
of donation to the Bureau of Lands. The daughters forgot to present the deeds
of donation and patent was granted in the name of their mother, Maria Rocabo. A
fter their mother s death, the daughters, Sinforosa included, executed a deed of e
xtrajudicial partition among themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs. They la
ter declared the land for tax purposes and sold it to Pajarillo, who thereafter
sold it to Neme.
Plaintiffs came to know that the lands were in the possession of Neme.
They filed a complaint for partition of land and recovery of their share. It al
so appeared that the deeds of sale of the land were not registered in favor of
defendant Neme and not recorded in compliance with the Public Land Act and the
Land Registration Law; the vendees even failed to have their deed of sale annota
ted on the said TCT or have the title transferred in their names.
HELD: A deed of extra-judicial partition executed without including some of th
e heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same is fraudulent and vicio
us, and sale of the land subject of the partition did not prejudice and affect t
he interest and participation of the heirs excluded.
Moreover, the acquisition of the land in question is governed by the Pub
lic Land Act and the Land Registration Law. Considering that the deed of sale h
ad not been registered in accordance with the same laws, the same did not const
itute a conveyance which would bind or affect the land because the registration
of a voluntary sale of land is the operative act that transmits or transfers tit
le (Tuason vs. Raymundo, 28 Phil 635).

ALARCON V. BIDIN
120 SCRA 390 (1983)
FACTS: Roberto Alarcon leased Sargas a parcel of land he co-owned with
a certain Trinidad. In 1926, Alarcon sold a portion of his undivided share to
Sergas. The date of the instrument of sale was entered on the title as January
5, 1926 and the date of inscription as May 3, 1963, with the name of the vendor
in the text of the Escritura de Venta as Roberto Alarcon while the typewritten n
ame at its bottom read Alberto Alarcon with a thumbmark above it. Alarcon sold
another portion of his share to Alvarez in 1928. Alvarez sold it to Francisco,
one of the private respondents.
The heirs of Alarcon filed a suit for recovery and questioned the genuin
eness if the Escrituras de Venta , that the thumbmark is not Roberto s, nor is he Al
berto Alarcon,and that the documents in favor if Alvarez was not signed by Rober
to. The lower court dismissed on the ground of laches.
HELD: Decision sustained. The heirs allegation that their father never
sold the disputed land is belied by the Escrituras de Venta he executed, one in
favor of Sergas, another in favor of Alvarez. Furthermore, Sergas and Alvarez
had taken adverse possession of the property under the claim of ownership from t
he time the property was sold to them. More than 50 years had elapsed since the
execution of the deed of sale in 1926 and 1928 when the heirs instituted their
cause of action in 1978.
Land registered under the Torrens system may not be acquired by prescrip
tion or adverse possession. The presumption given by law is in favor of regist
ered owners. Although title to property is still in the name of Roberto Alarcon
, it has been subjected to registration in 1963 if the sale made by him to Serga
s. Technically, Sergas became the owner in 1963 of the portion sold to him.

PNB V. CA
98 SCRA 207 (1980)
FACTS: Spouses Inigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver owned a parcel of land. The husband
died before the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title. He was survived
by his wife and children. The wife mortgaged the entire property to PNB. The
mortgage document was registered in the day book of the Register of Deeds if Ilo
cos Norte but was not annotated in the Register of Deeds when the OCT was issu
ed.
The wife defaulted on her obligations to Manila Trading Company. The co
mpany levied upon the property and was able to buy the same in a public auction
. It thereafter sold its rights over the property to Sambrano who secured annot
ation of the said sale.
She also failed to settle her obligation to PNB, who sold the land at pu
blic auction with the PNB as the highest bidder. The period for redemption expi
red and PNB consolidated title over it, but the document of consolidation was no
t annotated in the owner s duplicate certificate of title since the wife failed to
surrender the same. Upon PNB s petition, a owner s duplicate certificate was issu
ed in its favor. It later sold the land to Reyes.
The heirs of Bitanga filed a complaint against PNB for reconveyance of
real property and damages and sought to enjoin PNB and Reyes from consummating
the sale of the property in question and prohibiting the Register of Deeds from
registering the sale.
HELD: The land was conjugal property, hence, only belongs to the wife and it w
as only this half which was acquired by PNB.
The conjugal character of the land was not changed even if the tax decla
ration on the lot was in the name of the wife only. Declaration of ownership fo
r purpose of taxation is not sufficient evidence of title.
The lien by reason or on account of the mortgage executed by Rosa Ver o
ver the entire parcel of land which was not annotated on the original certificat
e of title could not have attached to the land. Otherwise stated, the failure
of the interested party to appear during the registration proceedings and to cla
im such interest in the land barred him from having such interest on the certifi
cate of title.

Double Sale
 In cases of double sale, the property belongs to the purchaser who first re
gisters the transaction in his name in the registry of property.
Forged Documents
Although forged documents are generally null and void, they can legally be
the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value intervenes.
Mortgages and Leases
Sec. 60, PD 1529 requires deeds of mortgage or lease and all instruments wh
ich assign, extend, discharge or otherwise deal with the mortgage or lease to be
registered, and such deeds shall take effect upon the title only upon registrat
ion. Unless recorded, such deeds are not binding on third persons even though t
hey are binding between the parties.

Powers of Attorneys; Trusts

Sec. 64, PD 1529 provides that any person may convey or otherwise deal with r
egistered land through a power of attorney. The instrument granting or revoking
the power of attorney must be registered with the Register of Deeds of the prov
ince or city where the land lies.
Note the special provisions in the Civil Code dealing with the requirements f
or powers of attorney in transactions involving land, particularly Art. 1874, Ar
t. 1879, and Art. 1878.

B. Involuntary Dealings
Involuntary dealings refer to writs, orders or processes issued by a court of
record affecting registered land which by law should be registered to be effect
ive. They likewise refer to instruments which are not the wilful acts of the re
gistered owner and which may have been executed even without his knowledge or ag
ainst his consent. These dealings include:
* Writs of attachment, injunction or mandamus;
* Sales on Execution of judgment;
* Sales for taxes;
* Adverse claims;
* Notices of lis pendens
In contrast to voluntary registration, a mere entry in the day book (prima
ry entry book) of the Registry of Deeds in cases of involuntary registration is
a sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner's duplicate CT is not prese
nted to the Register of Deeds. (Because the proceedings were involuntary, the o
wner's CT may not be available because the owner did not freely enter into the t
ransaction involved.)

What is annotation? What is the purpose of annotating adverse claims?

Annotation is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person over a
piece of real property where the registration of such interest or right is not
otherwise provided for by Act 496, now PD 1529. It serves as a warning to third
parties dealing with the said property that someone is claiming an interest on
the same or a better right than the registered owner.

What are the requisites for a valid adverse claim?

(1) The claimant's right or interest in registered land must be adverse to the r
egistered owner;
(2) Such right or interest must have arisen subsequent to the date of original r
egistration; and
(3) No other provision is made in the Decree for the registration of such right
or claim. (Sec. 70, PD 1529; Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279)
Note that a mere money claim CANNOT be registered as an adverse claim.

When is notice of lis pendens proper?

A notice of lis pendens is proper in actions:
(1) to recover possession of real estate;
(2) to quiet title thereto;
(3) to remove clouds upon the title thereof;
(4) for partition; and
(5) any other proceeding of any kind in court directly affecting the title to th
e land or the use or occupation thereof or the building thereon. (Sec. 76, PD 1
529, Sec. 14, Rule 13, Rules of Court)
What is the nature and purpose of a notice of lis pendens?
The notice of lis pendens, i.e. that real property is involved in an action
, is intended to constructively advise or warn all people who deal with the prop
erty that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may a
cquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results o
f the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be fin
ally determined and laid down therein.
Such notice is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court wh
ere the action is pending, as it is but an extrajudicial incident of the pending
action which does not affect the merits thereof.
It must be noted that a notice of lis pendens can subsist concurrently wit
h an adverse claim.

MAGDALENA HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION VS CA,

184 SCRA 3 (1990)
Facts: A part of Lot 15 of Magdalena Rolling Hills Subdivision, had initially b
een set aside as the subdivision's "open space," i.e., reserved for use as a par
k, playground or recreational zone.However, an amendment of the plan of the subd
ivision substituting the area earlier designated as open space, was approved by
the City Council of Quezon City. The Council also authorized the subdivision for
disposition to the public of the former open space. Subsequently, the CFI of Qu
ezon City also approved the same amended subdivision plan.
The entire Lot 15, including that part thereof originally designated as
open space was subsequently conveyed to the Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) by way of dacion en pago and to third parties who thereafter constructed h
ouses thereon.
 The purchasers of the other subdivision lots, who had organized themselv
es into a non-stock corporation known as the Magdalena Homeowners Association, I
nc., believed that the act of the Quezon City Government of authorizing the rele
ase of said Lot 15 as open space, after it had been so declared and earlier dedi
cated as such and its substitution by another portion of the subdivision was bey
ond the City Government's authority. They therefore brought suit against the Mag
dalena Estate, Inc. (MEI) in the court of First Instance at Quezon city for the
recovery of said Lot 15 as "open space" for public use of the residents of the s
ubdivision.
While the case was pending, notices of lis pendens were, at the plaintif
fs' instance, inscribed by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on the Torrens t
itles of all the lots. The Trial Court then dismissed the case. The petitioners
went up to the Court of Appeals. While the case was pending adjudgment, the subd
ivision owner and DBP filed separate motions with the Court of Appeals praying f
or cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. These motions were granted by reso
lution. Reconsideration was sought and denied by. Hence, the petition at bar.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of and grant
the motion to cancel notice of lis pendens although no such motion had ever bee
n filed in the lower court.
Held: YES. The notice of lis pendens i.e., that real property is involved in a
n action is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the
action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial
one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to
constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they
so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the
property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action,
and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determine
d and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is ther
efore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having
jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal like the c
ontinuance or removal of a preliminary attachment or injunction is not contingen
t on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effe
ct on the merits thereof.
In the CAB, the case had properly come within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals in virtue of the perfection of the plaintiffs' appeal. I
t therefore had power to deal with and resolve any incident in connection with t
he action subject of the appeal, even before final judgment. The rule that no qu
estions may be raised for the first time on appeal have reference only to those
affecting the merits of the action, and not to mere incidents thereof, e.g., can
cellation of notices of lis pendens, or, to repeat, the grant or dissolution of
provisional remedies.
Now, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon order of the court, "a
fter proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse
party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused
it to be recorded."
The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the case had dragged on and had
been unnecessarily prolonged by repeated amendments of the complaints by the pl
aintiffs, and that the circumstances on record justified the conclusion that the
annotation of the notice of lis pendens was intended to molest and harass the d
efendants.
SEVESES VS CA,
OCTOBER 13, 1999
Facts: Rexcon Philippines, through its president, Reynaldo Reyes entered into a
contract of sale on installments of a parcel of land, with private respondent Ca
rreon. He then learned that 3 days later, a mortgage in favor of Makati Leasing
and Finance Corporation was annotated on the title. This was later cancelled. Bu
t a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Reyes and another mortgage in favor of Aya
la Investment and Dev't Corp. were subsequently annotated. Carreon then demanded
that title to the land be restored in the name of Rexcon.
Due to Carreon's failure to pay the other installments, Reyes considered
the sale rescinded and instituted an action for rescission before the RTC. Mean
while, Carreon caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on Reyes' title. T
he RTC affirmed Reyes' extra-judicial foreclosure.
Seveses then acquired the land from Reyes. Although the notice of lis pe
ndens was carried over to Seveses' title, Reyes informed him that the pending ca
se had been terminated inasmuch as no appeal was filed by Carreon. He then obtai
ned a Certificate of Finality from the court. Thus the notice of lis pendens was
cancelled.
However, because he was served a notice of eviction, Seveses learned tha
t Carreon indeed appealed the decision of the RTC to the CA, wherein he obtained
a favorable judgment. This CA decision became final.
Issue: WON a Certification of Finality will suffice to have a notice of lis pend
ens cancelled (and save the day for Seveses).
Held: NO. The rules dictate that cancellation of the notice of lis pendens shou
ld be done with judicial authority. Thus, by virtue of the notice of lis pendens
, Seveses is bound by the outcome of the litigation subject of the lis pendens.
As a transferee pendente lite, he stands exactly in the shoes of the transferor
and must respect any judgment or decree which may be rendered for or against the
transferor. His interest is subject to the incidents or results of the pending
suit, and his Certificate of Title will, in that respect, afford him no special
protection.

YARED VS TONGCO,
AUGUST 1, 2000
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint alleging that private respondent succeeded i
n having the subject properties registered in his name, to the prejudice of the
other surviving heirs of the previous owners, petitioner among them. Petitioner
caused the annotation of notices of lis pendens on the titles of respondent. The
trial court dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. Petitioner filed
a notice of appeal while Tongco then sought to cancel the notices of lis pendens
which was denied. After 3 Motions for Recon, Tongco succeeded. When petitioner
then sought to reconsider the cancellation, the judge reversed himself. But when
Tonco filed another MR, he was sustained (Leche! Make up your mind, judge!). He
nce, this certiorari to the SC.
Held: Eto raw ang importante sa case nito as per Dan Gat: All petitioner has to
do is to assert a claim of possession or title over the subject property to put
it under the coverage of the rule on lis pendens. It is not necessary for her t
o prove ownership or interest over the property sought to be affected by lis pen
dens. (But the petition was dismissed by the SC for violating the doctrine of
judicial heirarchy. Puede naman kasing dumaan muna sa CA eh dumiretso agad sa SC
.)

VI. REGISTRATION OF PATENTS

Sec. 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. - Whenever public lan
d is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same sh
all be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree.
It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation, grant
, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument to b
e filed with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies,
and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certific
ate of title shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner
's duplicate issued to the grantee.
The deed, grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the g
rantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate
only as a contract between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of aut
hority to the Register of Deeds to make registration.
It is the act of registration that shall be the operative act to affect and conv
ey the land, and in all cases under this Decree, registration shall be made in t
he office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies.
The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration a
nd issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be registe
red land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.

ORTIGAS V. HIDALGO,
198 SCRA 635 (1991)
FACTS: Estate of Villa claims ownership of subject land. It appears that a certa
in Teresio Villa applied for the land. However, land was not registered nor decr
eed to anybody. No attempt was made to have judicial or administrative confirmat
ion of title over the land.
Estate of Villa filed criminal charges against settlers in the land, peti
tioners herein. Petitioners were convicted of squatting. Order of demolition was
issued.
Petitioners, meanwhile asked OP to give the land to them. OP ordered Dire
ctor of Lands to look into the issue. Director of Lands dismissed claim of Estat
e of Villa and gave due course to application of petitioners.
Petitioners went to SC on certiorari with prayer for TRO.
HELD: It is clear, therefore, that private respondent (estate of Villa) is not t
he registered owner of the disputed parcel of land. Assuming arguendo that respo
ndent had been granted a patent to the land in question, the same has never been
registered with the Registry of Deeds of the province where the property is loc
ated. Indeed, respondent could offer no proof to show that the same was register
ed. All patents that may be granted must be registered since the conveyance of t
he land covered thereby is effective only upon such registration which shall be
the operative act to convey and affect the land (CA 141, Sec. 107). Registration
is mandatory under the law to affect third parties.
Absent the fact of registration of a patent, title to the land covered th
ereby, whether it be by sales or homestead, may not be said to have been perfect
ed and, therefore, not indefeasible. A patent becomes indefeasible as a Torrens
Title only when said patent is registered with the Register of Deeds pursuant to
the provisions of the Land Registration Act.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. CA,

17 SCRA 71
Sales application was filed. The land was advertised to highest bidder an
d was awarded to applicant (1928). Having complied with the requirements, Direct
or of Lands signed sales patent in favor of applicant Tolentino (1950). Later, T
olentino learned that portion of land awarded to him was covered by homestead ap
plication of Braulio Cosme and that homestead patent and OCT was issued to him (
1949).
Director of Lands verified that homestead patent embraced land covered by
 sales patent to Tolentino. Director filed action for cancellation of homestead
patent and OCT. An intervenor came out and asked that he be declared a buyer in
good faith and be recognized owner of the property. RTC cancelled homestead pate
nt and OCT and ordered reversion of land.
CA upheld RTC but upon MR reconsidered its decision and reversed RTC.
HELD: The present action is for the cancellation of the patent and certificate o
f title of the defendant on the ground that they are an absolute nullity, becaus
e the Bureau of Lands had no jurisdiction to issue them at all.
The Government is the proper party to bring an action to cancel a patent and a c
ertificate of title issued in accordance therewith.
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of the nat
ure of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding as long as the land of the
domain (Lucas vs. Durian, supra).
A certificate of title issued pursuant to a decree of registration and a certifi
cate of title issued in conformity therewith are on a higher level than a certif
icate of title based upon a patent issued by the Director of Lands.
Prior to the issuance of a patent and its registration, the Government retains t
he title to the land. The award thereof, however, confers on the awardee the rig
ht to take possession of the land so that he can comply with the requirements pr
escribed by the law before said patent can be issued in his favor. Being protect
ed by law, under which it cannot be taken away without due process said right ha
s the effect of withdrawing the land of the public domain that is "disposable" b
y the Director of Lands under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

DAVID V. MALAY,
NOVEMBER 19, 1999
FACTS: Andres Adona applied for homestead patent over parcel of land. Applicatio
n was perfected before he died. However, OCT was issued in the name of his mistr
ess after his death. His children by his mistress partitioned the land among the
mselves. One of them bought the interests of the others.
Andres Adona s children, private respondents herein, by his legal wife soug
ht to annul this sale. The action was treated as action for reconveyance. RTC di
smissed case on the ground of lack of cause of action and prescription. CA rever
sed RTC. CA said property belongs to estate of Andres Adona, whose incontestable
right is derived from perfected homestead application before his death.
HELD: Estate of Andres Adona is entitled to the property. OCT in the name of the
mistress to be cancelled, property to be reconveyed to the private respondents.
Section 32 of PD 1529 is also applicable to patents. The date of issuance
of the patent corresponds to the issuance of decree in regular cases.
OCT would have become indefeasible a year after it was issued had not its
issuance been attended by fraud. Fraud created implied trust. Fraud gave privat
e respondents right of action. Prescription of this right of action reckoned fro
m the time right is disturbed.

FONTANILLA V. CA,
NOVEMBER 29, 1999
FACTS: Crisanto and Felician Duanan are homestead grantees. Their son Luis Duana
n inherited 4 has of the land. Luis Duanan gave two of his children 2 has of his
inheritance. Luis children mortgaged the land. Later, Luis children sold the land
 to Eduardo Fontanilla and Ellen Fontanilla.
Luis wanted to repurchase the land from the Fontanillas. The latter refus
ed on the ground that Luis, not being the vendor, cannot exercise the right of r
edemption. Also, the right to redeem has prescribed since over 5 years has lapse
d from the time Luis conveyed the property to his two children.
HELD: Section 119 of the PD 1529 does not say that the applicant/legal heir must
be the vendor before he can exercise the right of redemption. It only says that
the applicant/legal heir may repurchase the land.
The prescriptive period is reckoned from the time the homestead was conve
yed to someone outside the family of the grantee. Thus, the reckoning period is
from the time land was sold to the Fontanillas. The conveyance to Luis son is not
the conveyance contemplated in Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Luis conveyan
ce to his son did not violate the policy that the homestead be kept within the f
amily.

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1

1
Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Reviewer in Land Titles and Deeds

Prof. Dan Gatmaytan

________________________________________________________________________________
______
This reviewer is a product of the joint efforts of the members of the LTD Class
of 2nd sem, AY 2000-2001, particularly the graduating class of 2001 (Jun-Jun Bau
tista, Cheryl Pena, Mona Katigbak, Harvey Braceros, Ato Pagdanganan, Aimee Villa
flor, Cherell de Castro, Ian Castillo, Jerome Bonsol, Donna Dideles, Pat Cortes,
Tel Recinto, Jem Camania), 2002-C (Elvin Cruz, Weng Lardizabal, Tina Bayhon, Ri
chie Raymundo), 2002-A (Toni Aguilar, Kit Belmonte), 2004-E (Pam Abalos, Jary Ag
bon, Mae Reyes, Chizper de Guzman). As compiled, edited and annotated by Tanya L
at (2001-E).