IPTSTS 077 - The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic PDF

The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic
Islamic Philosophy, Theology

and Science
Texts and Studies
Edited by
H. Daiber
VOLUME LXXVII
The Works in Logic by Bosniac
Authors in Arabic
By
Amir Ljubovic
LEIDEN BOSTON
2008
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ljubovic, Amir, 1945-

The works in logic by Bosniac authors in Arabic / by Amir Ljubovic.
p. cm. -- (Islamic philosophy, theology and science ; v. 77)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-16856-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Logic--Bosnia and
Hercegovina--History. 2. Aristotle. I. Title.
BC39.5.B54L58 2008
160.949742--dc22
2008029639
ISSN: 0169-8729
ISBN: 978 90 04 16856 5
Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

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CONTENTS
Transcription Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

List of Abbreviations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter I. Development of Arabic Logic by the 16th Century . . . . . 9
Chapter II. Bosniac Authors and Their Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Kafs Compendium of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
A Commentary on the Kafs Compendium of Logic . . . . . . . 30
Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak al-Bosnaw as-Saray . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
A Commentary on The Sun Treatise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostar as-Say h Yuyo . . . . . . 36

A Commentary on Atrs Treatise in Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

A Useful Marginalia to Al-Fanars Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
The New Commentary on The Sun Treatise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
A Commentary on The Training in Logic and Apologetics 45
Muhammad
. b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw
(Cajni canin) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Other authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Ibrahm b. Ramad . an al-Bosnaw (Bosnjak) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Fadil
.
U z i
c awal
(U zicanin) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Muhammad
. b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw (Bosnjak). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Chapter III. Characteristics of Works in the Field of

LogicIssues in the Field of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Subject, Method and Objective of Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Teaching of Notion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Definition and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
On Judgment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Theory of Judgment and Judging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
Relations Among Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
On Concluding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
vi contents
General Notion and Issue of Concluding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Syllogism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Induction and Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Demonstration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Other Types of Argumentation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Sophistic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Scientific Questioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Terminological Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Chapter IV. Comparison: Bosniac Logicians and Logicians of

Western Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Chapter V. Logic in the Classical System of Islamic Sciences . . . . . . . 169
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Glossary of Logical Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Sources and Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Index of Personal Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Index of English Logical Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
Index of Arabic Logical Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
TRANSCRIPTION TABLE
I. Consonants
=" =z =q

=b =s =k
=t = s
=l
=t = s. =m

= g = d. =n
= h. U = t. =h
=h = z. =w

=d =# =y
=d = g = a (t)

=r =f = bb
II. Vowels
=a ! = a
" = u " = u
# = i # =
III. Diphthongs
$ = aw
$ = ay
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AHM Arhiv Hercegovine. Mostar

ANUBIH Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine.
Sarajevo.
Bratislava, UK Univerzitetna kniznica v Bratislave. Bratislava.
EI Encyclopaedia of Islam (Encyclopdie de lIslam).
Leiden. New edition. 1, 1960 . Suppl. 1980 .
GAL Geschichte der arabischen Litterature (Carl
Brockelmann).
GIVZ Glasnik Islamske vjerske zajednice. Sarajevo.
GHB Gazi Husrev-begova biblioteka. Sarajevo.
GVIS Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starjesinstva. Sarajevo.
HAZU Hrvatska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti. Zagreb.
OIS Orijentalni institut u Sarajevu. Sarajevo.
OZ HAZU Orijentalna zbirka Hrvatske akademije znanosti i
umjetnosti. Zagreb.
POF Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju (i istoriju jugosloven-
skih naroda pod turskom vladavinom). Sarajevo.
Prilozi Prilozi za izucavanje hrvatske filozofske bastine.
Zagreb.
TSMK AYK Topkap Saray Mzesi Ktphanesi Arapa
Yazmalar Katalogu
ZDMG Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlndischen
Gesellschaft. Weisbaden.
INTRODUCTION
In the distant year of 1910, Safvet-beg Basagic, the first Bosniac doctor
of philosophy, published his doctoral thesis Die Bosniaken und Hercegov-
cen auf dem Gebiete der islamischen Literatur, later translated into Bosnian
as Bosnjaci i Hercegovci u islamskoj knjizevnosti [Bosniacs and Herzegov-
inans in Islamic Literature], Sarajevo, 1912). His thesis points out the
general ignorance of Bosnian heritage in Oriental languages, and that
the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina have forgotten their glorious
forefathers whose names were celebrated in the Islamic world through
scholarly and poetic works. This Basagics paper lays the foundation
and sets the objectives for future research in the cultural heritage of
Bosniacs in Oriental languages.
Since that time a lot of eort has been invested into bringing round
this aspect of cultural life and mode of creativity, but this eort has
certainly not been sucient. Primarily, most of the research work com-
pleted and findings published so far are of bibliographical character,
which can be classified as primary research, collecting material, com-
piling records and processing data about individual authors and their
writings, first readings of the text, etc. However, modern researchers
are increasingly faced with the task of producing a study on individ-
ual cultural issues of the past, individual authors or areas of their cre-
ativity, all creating preconditions for a complete historical and cultural
evaluation of the heritage and give a precise portrayal of the profu-
sion and complexity of the cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Hence the determination to present previously unresearched thoughts
of our Predecessors who were active in the field of philosophy, or to
be more exact, logic that was influenced by the Arabic-Islamic spiritual
and cultural tradition in this region. These works deserve special atten-
tion and draw interest, even from the scientific circles outside Bosnia
and Herzegovina, as they oer reliable proof of presence and function
of Aristotelianism in this region in a certain period of time. Therefore,
we present this field of logic for its significance, its range and its role
within the specific concept of the world, science and philosophy, but
also within its own context that has always promoted rational thinking.
2 introduction
It was our desire that this book achieves the same task, to fill at least
one of the gaps in the obscure area of the cultural and scientific past of
Bosnia and Herzegovina.1
The so called Arabic period is relatively well known in the history
of logic. For the most part it is the period from the translation of Aris-
totles writings into Arabic, to the end of the 13th century, to the intro-
duction of the writings of Ibn Sna (Avicenna), al-Farab and Ibn Rusd
(Averroes), and the exposing of thus far unknown works by Aristotle
and the new logic, to European logicians and philosophers, can be
tracked accurately.The period between the late 13th and early 14th
century is often denoted as the final stage of evolution and the stage
of decay of Arabic logic.2 Such evaluations are the result of insu-
cient research on this issue, and lack of interest for this period among
researchers of the history of European logic. Their primary goal was to
retrace the path that logic took to reach the universities in Europe, and
attempt to revive Aristotle using the writings of Ibn Sna, al-Farab
and Ibn Rusd, who, among other things, wrote detailed commentaries
accompanying Aristotles works. On the other hand, the research in
Oriental literature from the early 19th century, presented in the cata-
logues of Oriental manuscripts by H.O. Fleischer (Dresden, 1831 and
Leipzig, 1838), Krat (Vienna, 1842), Rieu (London, 1888), Ahlwardt
(Berlin, 1889) and others, and in Brockelmanns Geschichte der arabischen
Litteratur (WeimarBerlin, 18981902), oer proof, though insuciently
organized and evaluated, on the continuous presence of works in the
field of logic in Arabic by the 19th century, and even later. As a part
of more comprehensive research topics, the researchers of Bosnian cul-
tural heritage in Oriental languages registered a number of authors
and their works in the field of logic. The most comprehensive data on
the overall heritage, including the field that this book deals with, was
1 This book is based on somewhat modified doctoral thesis defended at the Faculty
of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo in 1988. The author, members of the

Commission and the Archive of the Faculty keep copies of this paper and Annexes
to the paper, that contain photocopies of manuscripts that were object of the research.
Manuscripts, some of which handwritten by the authors, from the collection of the
Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, other sources and literature used for this work, were
definitely destroyed in the fire set to the Institute on May 17, 1992, together with some
of the authors notes and card-files. The Annexes are quoted by this book as one of the
sources, as the only testimony of the existence of these today inexisting manuscripts. It
is the authors intention to make these manuscripts available in digital on the Internet.
2 See e.g. Historija logike [History of Logic], edited by A.N. Prior, Naprijed, Za-
greb, 1970, p. 55.

introduction 3

oered by H. Sabanovi c in his book Knjizevnost Muslimana BiH na ori-
jentalnim jezicimaBiobibliografija [The Literature of Muslims in Bosnia
and Herzegovina in Oriental LanguagesBiobibliography] (Sarajevo,
1973) that outlines previous studies and results of the authors research
work. This is a collection of basic bibliographical data on individ-
ual authorstitles of their writings, and where the manuscript can be
found, under which reference number, depending on the accessibility of
the relevant information. As this paper has remained unfinished (pub-
lished posthumously), a part of bibliographical data remained uncon-
firmed and without necessary references. Understandably, conceived as
it is, such a complex bibliographical paper, not unlike the preceding
ones, due to the abundance and versatility of the material presented,
could not aord to exclude any attempt of appraisal or even a rough
note on the contents of the writings included. Nevertheless, we used
this paper as good research grounds and a basic source of informa-
tion.
The data that could be found in these sources, in the aforementioned
catalogues on writings in Oriental languages, in the works of Bosniac
researchers, in recent catalogues of Oriental manuscripts, inventory
books, and in the results of preliminary research, clearly show that
the current evaluations of the history of Arabic logic from the 14th
century on, can not stand. It was evident that logic survived in the
following ages even on a new terrain. It was in the 16th-century Balkans
that it met the Latin version of the Aristotelian logic through Croatian
Latinists, and it was there that it continued its life in two variants, until
the appearance of works in South Slavic languages. The data proves
that the way of writing commentaries on the works in the field of logic
was almost the same among the local authors: one within the Latin
framework of West-European culture and theological tradition, and the
other within the Arabic Islamic culture and tradition.
The chief objective of this book is to provide a historical and com-
parative study of logic in Arabic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as thor-
oughly as possible, from the first texts (16th century) to the end of
the 19th century, using authentic, completely unknown and unpub-
lished manuscripts in the field of logic in Arabic (over 1,000 pages in
manuscript) that has not yet been a subject of separate research, and
other sources, including general and specialized literature. While work-
ing on this topic, given the complexity of the topic and level of research
completed in the field, we planned a range of immediate objectives that
can be classified into four groups.
4 introduction
The first group includes the activities related to collecting, critical

evaluations, analysis and the systematization of two classes of material:
one, related to bibliographical data on the authors that were the sub-
ject of research (primary and secondary sources and literature), and
the other, consisted of texts in the field of logic written by Bosniac
authors (autographs or transcripts) and those to which Bosniac authors
wrote commentaries or marginalia. The objective of this part of the
research was historical identification of certain authors, and certify-
ing the authenticity and originality of the selected texts, and present-
ing their internal structure. As a necessary precondition of understand-
ing the form, contents, domain and importance of these writings, we
have tried to give a concise history of the development of Arabic logic
thinking and its transference through the Turks to Bosnia and oer
an understanding of the connection that Bosniac authors had with the
great names of Arabic philosophy and logic, and, through them, with
the writings of Aristotle. These remarks are based on the literature and
data available in the writings of local authors. The results of this part of
research are given in Chapters I and II of this book.
The second group consists of the very issues discussed in the writings
in the field of logic written by Bosniac authors. It is based on critical
reading, topical systematization of material from the selected texts,
analysis of the standpoints of significant authors on the crucial issues in
the field of logic and their interpretation. The only possible and right
way to represent this substantial matter divided into eleven selected
texts (without aecting the authenticity of the sources) was to let the
sources lead from one topic to another, respecting the dominating
structure of the works included in the research. This would mean
moving from the definition of the subject, methods and tasks of logic,
through teachings on notion and judgment, to acquiring conclusions.
There was also an attempt to present the crucial issues in the field
of logic, either through the text itself or in the annexes, in light of its
historical and philological role. We moved backwards, from the texts
that were the immediate concern of our attention, through direct and
indirect sources of these texts, to the final outcome. Hence, it was
necessary to point out the origin of Arabic vocabulary in the field of
logic and to link and compare the most important terms with their
Greek counterparts. This part of research is presented in Chapter III,
along with a dictionary of relevant Arabic vocabulary.
The third task comprises of a comparative study of the form and
contents of the works in the field of logic written in Arabic by Bosniacs
introduction 5
with the works in the same field originating from the same or somewhat
earlier period in the West (with special attention to Croatian Latinists),
observing them as works originating in a unique post-Hellenic philo-
sophical thinking, especially regarding the sense of unity of the overall
scholastic philosophy and logic. This part of research is presented in
Chapter IV.
And, finally, the fourth direct task was to shed light on the rela-
tions between logic and philosophy, between logic and language, and
between logic and theology, as these aspects are essential for better
understanding the place and the role that logic played in the Arabic
Islamic system of disciplines, as presented in Chapter V and partially
Chapter IV
The priority task of the book is to refute the thesis generally accepted
in former Yugoslavia and abroad that Bosnia and Herzegovina is some
sort of a black hole, emptiness in space and time, devoid of any kind
of creativity, especially in the field of philosophy. The book points
to a continuous and very stabile intellectual Aristotelian tradition in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and continuous warming up of Avicenna
and his fundamental pieces in logic, despite the fact that it all happens
in an antiphilosophical environment and antiphilosophical time.
Therefore, this book, especially when one has in mind the solidness
of the foundations laid by previous research activities, the lack of some
essential documents (especially those on reception) and the impossibility
to verify all of them, and more than modest variety of useful writings
on Arabic logic in general, especially topical or synthesized studies in
this area, it was inevitable for this work to be in part strictly linked
to primary and rudimentary research; the author is aware of these
self-evident weaknesses. For that reason the research direction is of a
purely historical and logical content, avoiding too liberal theoretical or
historical discourses and conclusions that could have been made.
Now that this research (predominantly of empirical nature) is com-
pleted and its results accepted, the future researchers have a new win-
dow open for their research: from critical publishing and integral trans-
lations of works, to subtle analysis of dierent logical issues, dierent
comparisons, and some new judgments.
Furthermore, here are some other deliberations.
This book includes neither those authors for whom the data that
would verify their identity could not be found, nor those works in the
field of logic whose authors could not be identified without certainty.
Inspite of our rather detailed insight in the collections of Oriental
6 introduction
manuscripts in the country and abroad, it is not impossible that ongo-

ing research of heritage, especially recent increasingly intensive work
on the categorization of manuscripts, discloses other Bosniac authors
or their writings in the field of logic that we have not yet recognized.
Inevitably, this would be a contribution to a more complete approach
of heritage in Oriental languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well
as completing bibliographical data on it. It is certain that the writings
that may be found would not, in sense of subject and contents, oer
anything that the ones presented in the book do not oer. The included
material is sucient for making the conclusions that weve made. This
is confirmed by dozens of manuscripts and printed issues in the field of
logic in Arabic that were reviewed.
And, eventually, before presenting the achieved results, it may be
useful to give a short explanation of the term Arabic logic as it is
frequently used in this book in dierent contexts.
The term Arabic in this book denotes the linguistic and not eth-
nical phenomenon. Although Arabs did play an important role in the
birth, development and spreading of this discipline, enormous contri-
butions were made by people of dierent ethnic backgrounds. On the
other hand, the Arabic language in the Oriental Islamic world played
a similar role to that played by Latin in the medieval Europe. Conse-
quently, almost all writings in traditional disciplines were composed in
Arabic as a rule. As for the writings in the field of logic, the exemptions
came even more seldom. In this sense, the most adequate term seems
to be the one used by Russian Orientalists: , or
Arab-language logic.
Note on transcription
The very nature of this book enforced the necessity of using a large
number of Arabic names, often repeatedly. Besides, the sources used for
this book give the names of a large number of Bosniac authors with
names of Arabic origin in their original Arabic form. As the consistent
use of scientific transcription carries a range of diculties, from those of
technical nature to the fact that non-Orientalists might find it dicult
to read, if not unintelligible, the author of this book uses a simplified
phonetic transcription. However, every Arabic name in those parts
of book that are accessory to the main text (in notes, bibliography,
literature, sources, in brackets in the very text, etc.) are also given in
introduction 7
the scientific transcription, DMG or ZDMG system (source: Deutsche

Morgenlndische GesellschaftGerman Oriental Association, i.e. the newsletter
of the Association, Zeitschrift). This system transcribes the titles of the
writings in Arabic, as well as the terminology.
chapter one
DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC
LOGIC BY THE 16TH CENTURY
Logic in Arabic, first mentioned in the writings of Bosniac authors in

the second half of the 16th century, is an outcome of several centuries
of development, the beginning of which is linked to a period of vividly
intense activity in the 8th century of collecting works from Greek
heritage and their translation into Arabic.
The most prominent results in the research of Arabic logic were
achieved by Nicholas Rescher, who published his findings in The Devel-
opment of Arabic Logic (Pittsburg, 1964), to be followed by the summary
of the findings in the 4th volume of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy1 and
the Soviet academician M.M. Hairulaev, who published a number of
significant papers on the history of Arabic logic.2 Besides these two
authors who dealt with a broader time span in their work, a range of
researchers, such as A. Badawi, D.M. Dunlop, B.G. Gafurov, A.M. Goi-
chon, I. Madkour, M. Meyerhof, E. Renan, A.K. Zakuev, R. Walzer,
A.I. Sabra, K. Gyekye, M. Marmura, D. Gutas, D.I. Black, J. Lameer
and others,3 focused their work on narrower topics and certain peri-
ods of history of Arabic logic, or on individual logicians, thus they
contribute significantly to its clarification. There are also writings of
the encyclopedic character that can be treated as sources, such as the
works by an-Nadm (10th century) and al-Qift. (13th century), especially
1 Eight-volume encyclopedia, New YorkLondon, 1967, Editor in Chief Paul Ed-

wards, vol. 4, pp. 169181 and 513571. The same text was published in translation in
Croatian in the book Historija logike [History of Logic], edited by A.N. Prior, Naprijed,
Zagreb, 1970, p. 254. Also see: N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic, Pittsburg,
1963.
2 Bibliography of works by M.M. Hairulaev (.. ) on the history of
Arabic logic is very profuse. He paid special attention to al-Farab (see: -

, compiled by S. D. Miliband in: - -
, , , , 1975, pp. 159181), and among
the books that give a good review of Arabic logic, special attention should be paid to:
, , 1967, p. 355,
and - , , 1981, p. 200.
3 For bibliography of individual authors see the last pages.
10 chapter one
the monumental work by C. Brockelmann Geschichte der arabischen Lit-

eratur that gives a survey of the most important bibliographical data
on a number of authors who wrote in Arabic, including some Bosniac
authors, whom most of the above mentioned researchers used as a
starting point for their work.
Besides these works, among the newer literature, exceptionally valu-
able is the bibliography by Prof. Hans Daiber, PhD, in two volumes
containing over 9,500 titles of primary and secondary sources on Is-
lamic philosophy originating from the period between 15th and 20th
century (vol. 1) and a very useful Index (vol. 2).4
These writings are good grounds to claim that history of Arabic logic
is relatively well known, especially from its beginning to the end of the
13th century, when European philosophers and logicians got to know
the works of Arabic authors and their commentaries on Aristotles writ-
ings. However, there are no primary sources that could better define
the earliest period.
This short review of the development of Arabic logic aims simply
to present the main flows, directions and names important for the
development of logic in the Arabic Islamic world based on the listed
literature. Focus is on primary sources (authors and their writings) that
Bosniac authors quote and on the presentation of the link that the
Bosniac authors had with the great names of Arabic logic, and, through
them, the writings of Aristotle.
The first stage of Arabic logic, or its first century, as named by

N. Rescher, is characteristic for intensive translation activities that were
of critical importance for the development, not only of logic, but also
of philosophy in general and other classical disciplines.5 It had a history
4 See: Hans Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy, Vol. 1 (Alphabetical List of

Publications); Vol. 2 (Index of names, terms and topics), Brill, LeidenBostonKln,
1999.
5 Regarding translation works, please note old sources: an-Nadm, Kitab al-fihrist,
Leipzig, 1881, (for works and translators); al-Qift., Tarh al- #ulama" bi ahbar al-h. ukma"
(Ahbar), Leipzig, 1903; as-Sahrist
and newer sources:
an, al-Milal wa an-nih. al, Ibrahim

Madkour, LOrganon dAristote dans le monde arabe, Paris, 1969, pp. 2547; N. Rescher, The
Development, pp. 1532; A. Badawi, La transmission, pp. 1431; Filip Hiti [Philip
K. Hitti], Istorija Arapaod najstarijih vremena do danas [History of Arabs from the Earliest
Times to the Present], Sarajevo, 1976, pp. 286292, A.I. Sabra, Naucni poduhvati,
Svijet islama, pp. 185196, and The appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of
Greek Science in Medieval Islam: a preliminary statement, History of Science, 25 (1987):
pp. 223243.
development of arabic logic by the 16th century 11
far more comprehensive than the scope we are interested in, especially
in Alexandria, Jundishapur and Harran, where members of Syriac-
Persian Christian church, Nestorians and Jacobites played an impor-
tant role in translations; and even later, during the rule of Harun ar-
Rasd (786803). Systematic activities in this field that had direct conse-
quences on the reception of Greek heritage, and especially of Aristotles
writings in the field of logic, took place at the beginning of the 19th
century. Organizing activities of a broader scope and greater inten-
sity started under the direct influence of caliph al-Ma"mun (813833)
through the establishment of a library-academy called Bayt al-hikma .
(House of Wisdom), whose objective was translation from Syriac, Per-
sian and Greek into the Arabic language.6
The appearance of the first translation of Aristotles writings and
Porphyrys Isagoge ( ), that already played an important role
in the approach to logic, were usually placed in the first half of the
9th century.7 However, based on a dierent set of sources, a number
of authors state that the famous Ibn al-Muqaa# (died in 757 or 759),
the translator of the famous Kalila and Dimna, was the first to translate
Aristotles Categories (al-Maqulat), On Interpretation (al-#Ibara) and Analytics
(al-Qiyas),8 while the others claim that those translations were done by
his son, Muhammad
. ibn Muqaa# (app. 750 app. 815).9
Besides these two translators, the sources and literature mention
other translators of Aristotles and other writings, such as: Yahy . a ibn al-
Bit.rq (app. 770 app. 830), al-Barmak (app. 780 app. 840), Theodor
(Tadhar, app. 790 app. 850), Ibn Na#ima (died app. 840), Ayyub
ibn al-Qasim ar-Raqq (app. 780 app. 840) and other, for the very
development of logic, less significant translators. However, neither the
number nor the value of the sources that historians have in their hands
today, nor the level of research completed are sucient to verify the
exact chronology of the appearance of individual translations.
6 For more details see: Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic
translation movement in Baghdad and early #Abbasid society (2nd4th/8th10th centuries), New
YorkRoutledge, 1998, 350 pp.
7 See e.g.: N. Rescher, The Development, pp. 2531 and: Historija logike, p. 49.
8 C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 158; al-Qift, Ahbar, p. 149. Also see Ibn al-Muqaf-
.

. ud al-man.tiq, Teheran, 1357, d. et introd. par M.T. Da-
fa#, Al-Man.tiqIbn Bihrz, Hud
nes-Pazuh, especially pages 6269.
9 See e.g.: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, pp. 3132.
12 chapter one
Both the sources and the literature show the special role of Hunayn
.
ibn Ish. aq (Joanitius, 809877)10 and his students, Hunayns school of
translation, in the history of Arabic logic. Hunayn . ibn Ishaq,
. as a
supervisor in the House of Wisdom, revolutionized, according to
N. Rescher, Arabic translation work introducing novelties such as: in-
sisting on translations from Greek and oering references of the origi-
nal text wherever possible, comparing dierent versions of manuscripts
in order to define reliable Greek or Syriac sources, proofreading texts
previously translated from Syriac to Arabic and comparison with Greek
originals, frequent translations of the sense of phrases instead of literal
translation, etc.11
After Hunayn,
. his son, Ish
. aq ibn Hunayn
. (app. 845910/911), Qust.a
ibn Luqa (app. 820912), Hubay
. s ibn al-Hasan
. (app. 830890), Tabit

ibn Qurra (834901), #Isa ibn Yahy . a (app. 850 app. 910) and Abu
#Utman ad-Dimasq (app. 860920) were influential.12 At the end of the

mass translation movement 23 translators were active (more than a half
of them worked with Greek) who translated or edited already translated
works by Aristotle, and gave about 88 versions for twenty of Aristotles
writings.13
In the midst of the translation activities, several scholars, who were
not only translators, but also teachers and commentators in the field
of logic, became active. Among the most important of them were Abu
Bisr Matta ibn Yunus (died 939/940) who translated Aristotles Posterior
Analytics and Poetics14 and Yahy . a ibn #Ad (893974), the archbishop,
a personal friend and a student of al-Farab, whose translation and
transcription activities were exceptional, and who was also an author
of the commentaries on Aristotles works.15
For more on his life and translation work, see: an-Nadm, Kitab al-fihrist, p. 294;
10
al-Qift., Tarh, p. 171; C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 224227 (205207); I. Madkour,

LOrganon dAristote, pp. 3233 (pay special attention to note nr. 6 that gives informa-
tion on this translator); N. Rescher, The Development, pp. 2731 and F. Hiti [Philip
K. Hitti], Istorija Arapa, pp. 288290.
11 N. Rescher, The Development, p. 28.
12 See footnote 10 on these translators.
13 I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, p. 40.
14 C. Brockelmann, GAL G I, pp. 228229 (207); N. Rescher, The Development,
pp. 31, 3435 and 38 and as well in: Historija logike, p. 50.
15 Ibid.
A unique monument of translation activities is the manuscript of the

translation into Arabic of the complete Organon that is today kept in the
National Library in Paris.16
Such impressive activities of Christian scholars in the field of logic
soon created conditions for the birth of one of the most prominent logi-
cians among Arabs. Historians of Arabic philosophy consider al-Kind
(796873) to be the first among Arabic logicians.17 It is well known
that al-Kind was a great promoter of Greek scientific and philosoph-
ical thinking. This is what al-Kind himself said about his relationship
with this tradition: We should not be ashamed to admit the truth and
accept it from whichever source it came, even if it is brought by the
preceding generations or foreign nations My principle is to register
all the details of what the classic authors said, and then to fill in all that
they have not said, in accordance to the rules of the Arabic language,
with the traditions of our time and our abilities.18
Unfortunately, among his works that have been preserved, or that
have been of interest to researchers, there are none of clearly logical
contents. In his evaluation of al-Kinds works, N. Rescher says that his
writings on logic were much more than merely a resume of someone
elses works on Aristotles writings.19 However, based on older sources,
we can be certain, as concluded also by A.I. Sabra, that he played
a critical role in the process of linguistic and intellectual adoption of
classical disciplines.20
The first great and one of the most important Arabic logicians was
certainly al-Farab (873950).21 In his comments on Aristotles Organon,
16 Manuscrit arabe, N 2346 (Anc. fond, 822).

17 Abu Yusuf Ya#qub ibn Ish. aq al-Kind. See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 230231
(200) and S I, 372374; N. Rescher, The Development, p. 24 and F. Hiti [Philip K. Hitti],
Istorija Arapa, p. 337.
18 A.I. Sabra, Nau cni poduhvati, in: Svijet islama [The World of Islam], Vjera-
Narodi-Kultura. Priredio: Bernard Lewis; Jugoslavenska revijaVuk Karadzic, Beo-
grad, 1979, p. 185.
19 N. Rescher, Arapska logika, in: Historija logike, p. 49.
20 A.I. Sabra, Nau cni poduhvati, p. 188.
21 Abu Nas.r ibn Muhammad
. al-Farab. For basic bibliographical data see: C. Brock-
elmann, GAL, G I, 232236 (210213), S I, 375377 and Nicholas Rescher, Al-Farab. An
annotated bibliography. Pittsburgh, 1962. The literature on al-Farab is very profuse, espe-
cially the Soviet (see footnote 2). Besides the already quoted writings, attention should
be paid to the Russian translation of al-Farabs writings in the field of logic, published
as -, , -, 1975, issue of his work Ih. s. a" al-
#ulum, al-Qahira, 1350 (1931), issues of a number of his works and translations to English
done by D.M. Dunlop in The Islamic quarterly (vol. II, 1955, 264282; vol. III, 1956, N 2;
14 chapter one
of which only a small part has been preserved, he pointed out the
importance of logic studies and awareness of its principles. Finding
foundations for his work in the abundant Antic heritage, especially in
the works of Aristotle, whom the Arabs consider their first teacher (al-
mu#allim al-awwal), al-Farab had great influence on the future devel-
opment of Arabic logic. In his Book on Logic (Kitab f al-mant.iq or Kitab
g am# al-kutub al-mant.iqiyya)22 al-Farab followed the contents and the
topics of Aristotle, and the framework was closely designed based on
Aristotles Organon which was believed to be authentic. The main dier-
ence was that after the general introduction he placed the Isagogue as a
special introduction (al-madhal), based on the Porphyrys Isagogue. Also,

as the last two volumes he added Retorics and Poetics treating them as
compound parts (kitab) of logic. Let us take a look at the structure of
this work, having in mind that it, along with a number of other works
that will be presented later, will have a crucial influence on the stan-
dardization of the structural form of the writings of Arabic logicians.
Following the Introduction (fol. 1b11a) topics are divided in nine
volumes (kitab):
ag u g (fol. 11a18b) Isagogue,
Kitab al-Is
Kitab al-qat.a g u riyas (fol. 19a44b) Categories,
Kitab al-#ibarat (Bar armniyas, 44b63b) Hermeneutics,
Kitab al-qiyas wa at-tahl . l (63b116a) Prior Analytics,
Kitab al-amkina al-maglit.a (116a136b) Sophistic,
Kitab al-burhan (136b187b) Posterior Analytics,
Kitab al-gadal (187b248b) Topics,
Kitab al-hit.a ba (248b271b) Rhetoric,
Kitab as-si#r (271b273b) Poetics.
vol. IV, 19571958, N 304; vol. V, 1959, N 12), and the following texts: I. Madkour, La
place dal Farb dans lcole philosophique musulmane, Paris, 1934; same author, al-Farab
in: Historija islamske filozofije [A History of Muslim Philosophy], ed. M.M. Sharif, t. I,
Zagreb, 1990, pp. 445471, N. Rescher, Al-Farabs Short Commentary on Aristotles Prior
Analytics, Pittsburgh, 1963 and F.W. Zimmermann, (trans.), Al-Farabs Commentary and
Short Treatise on Aristotles De Interpretatione (trans. and Introduction Notes), Oxford, 1991
(reprint). See: H. Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy, Vol. I, pp. 285299 and
Vol. II, pp. 124156.
22 This work by al-F arab, as the most complete work in the field of logic, has not
been yet published in the form conceived by the author. It was published in its original
form or in translation, partially or in combination with other works. Most of them were
published in Russian. The manuscript of this work, which was once part of the private
library of Safvet-beg Basagic, can now be found in the Library of the University of
Bratislava (inv. nr. TF 41). Description and contents of the manuscript are given in: Jozef
Blaskovic, and others., Arabische, trkische und persische Handschriften der Universittsbibliothek
in Bratislava, Bratislava, 1961 (further: Bratislava, UK), pp. 181188.
These and other writings in the field of logic by al-Farab served as

a great stimulus for further studying logic in the Arabic world. With
them al-Farab succeeded to clarify Aristotles logic and to explain
it in Arabic, what gave him the reputation as the second teacher
(al-mu#allim at-tan).23 His extraordinary interpretation of Aristotles

writings will have a deep impact on all Arabic logicians, including those
who were to oppose him later.
Among the points of great interest in al-Farabs comments are: (1)
strong emphasis on kthesis (notion definition) as a principle of reduc-
tion of syllogism, (2) increased focus on noncategorical types of syllo-
gism (e.g. hypothetical and disjunctive), (3) detailed processing of induc-
tive use of syllogic conclusion, and application of categorical syllogism
in reasoning by analogy, and (4) detailed explanation of future contin-
gency24
Another fact important for the history of Arabic logic is that al-
Farab was one of the representatives of so called Baghdad or West-
ern school of logic, whose core was made of Nestorian Christians, such
as Abu Bisr Matta b. Yunus, and his and al-Farabs student Yahy
. a ibn
#Ad. N. Rescher points out the three main achievements of this school:
(1) Completion of Arabic translations of Greek works in logic, (2)
proficient commentaries by al-Farab on Aristotles works in the field
of logic, and (3) comprehensive research of some non-Aristotelian con-
cepts done by Abu Bisr Matta and al-Farab e.g. the theory on the
conditional or hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, in a direction
used by Boeti, and syllogic reduction of inductive principles of conclu-
sions).25
Along with the mentioned contribution of the Baghdad school,
and especially al-Farabs, for the development of Arabic logic, this
school played a significant role in the definition of Arabic logical vocab-
ulary.
The 11th century in the history of Arabic logic, and not logic alone,
meant a new and confident step forward thanks to Ibn Sna (980
1037) an his works.26 His large opus with 276 compositions according
23 Esp. see: Joep Lameer, Al-Farab and Aristotelian SyllogisticsGreek Theory and Islamic
Pratcice, Brill, Leiden, New York, Kln, 1994, 216 pp.

24 N. Rescher, Arapska logika, in: Historija logike, p. 50.
25 Ibid, p. 51.
26 Ab u #Al Husayn
. ibn #Abdallah Ibn SnaAvicenna. For main bibliographical
data see: Jules Janssen, An Annotated Bibliography on Ibn Sna (19701989) including Arabic
16 chapter one
to G.C. Anawati27 had a great influence, not only on the Orient, but on
the West as well. He wrote several articles in logic, but it is interesting
that the works that had great importance for the development of this
discipline, and that were quoted and used by his followers, were the
introductions to his monumental books Kitab as-sifa" (Book of Healing),
Kitab an-nagat (Book of Safety) and, understandably, his masterpiece
according to the historians of Arabic philosophy, Kitab al-isarat wa at-
tanbhat (Book of Remarks and Admonitions). As presented in this book,
these works will also be used by Bosniac authors as basic sources. His
notebook titled Man.tiq al-masriqiyyn (Logic of the Easterners), of which
only a part of was preserved, was probably written as an introduction
to the lost work known in literature as al-Hikma . al-masriqiyya (Eastern
Philosophy). 28
Although Ibn Sna formally divided each of his works into dierent
chapters (maqalat), volumes (fus.u l), etc., all his works deal with issues in
the field of logic observing a strictly defined order that is elaborated on
in the text that he titled Tis# rasa"il f al-h. ikma wa a.t-.tab #iyyat (Nine Dis-
courses on Philosophy and Physics).29 The starting point here is the ele-
mentary structure of Organon that is accompanied by an introduction
a discussion based on Porphyrys Isagogue, and chapters eight and nine
are Rhetoric and Poetics. However, there are some significant dierences
among these works. In as-Sif a" logic is treated primarily as a commen-
tary on Aristotles Organon, and later as a compilation of certain def-
initions given in previous commentaries and his own analysis, and as
such it is strictly linked to Aristotles arguments.30 Therefore, if Aristotle
treats the same issue two or more times, as is done on the issue of def-
inition (Posterior Analytics, volume 2 and Topics, volume 4), the
same is done by Ibn Sna, while it does not happen in an-Nagat and
Kitab al-isarat The last two works could be results of a dierent orien-
tation of the author. Though it will be explained in more detail later, it
and Persian publications and Turkish and Russian References. Leuven, 1991 and An Annotated
Bibliography on Ibn Sna. First supplement (19901994), LouvainLa Neuve, 1999.; Hans
Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy. Vol. 1, 468485 and Vol. 2, pp. 263296; Dimitri
Gutas, Avicenna and The Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicennas Philosophical
Works. Brill, Leiden, 1998.
27 G.C. Anawati, Mu"allafat Ibn Sna (Essai de bibliographie avicennienne), al-Q ahira,
1950.
28 See: Ibn Sna, Livre des directives, Introduction (A.-M. Goichon), p. 4.
29 Ibn Sna, Tis # rasa"il f al-h. ikma wa a.t-.tab #iyyat, al-Qahira, 1908, pp. 116118. A
fragment was translated to French by I. Madkour in LOrganon dAristote, pp. 1011.
30 See: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, p. 21.
is worth saying that these last two works by Ibn Sna do not include the
discussion on categories.
Even though he was educated with, besides sources in Arabic, the
works of al-Farab and his commentaries on Aristotles works that were
a", after completion of his book Ibn Sna
largely used for writing as-Sif
became irately opposed to such an approach to logic (that he himself
had had before), in which the attention is directed to Aristotles texts
instead of to the very issue of logic. At the same time it was a require-
ment that a book on logic, respecting the generally accepted logical and
systematical order of the elementary subjects, should be either a dis-
course or a handbook dealing with the matters in its own self-sucient
way. His readiness to step o of the path paved by Aristotle is seen by
the new elements he introduced in his work, mainly originating from
Galenus and the Stoics, and his own work (discussed in more details in
the chapter The Issues of Logic), but not that much in the issues of
graver significance.31
He calls his work and approach to logic Eastern, contrasting it
with the Western (or Baghdad school) that he often severely criticizes,
sometimes without an apparent reason.32 This will lead to frequent con-
frontations between the two schools in the several following centuries,
and the diviside between the authorsfollowers of the two schools will
become rather evident.
It will be impossible to give even a short presentation of the range
of followers of the Baghdad school without mentioning a number
of authors whose works left a deep impact on history of Arabic, and
even European logic. This primarily includes Ibn Rusd (11261198).33
One segment of his work in the field of logic that is in accordance
with the tradition of this school includes the excellent commentaries on
31 See: N. Rescher, Arapska logika, in: Historija logike, pp. 5152.

32 For more on the disputes between the Eastern and the Western school, see:
S. Pines, La Philosophie orientale dAvicenne et sa polemique contre les Bagdadi-
ens, Archives dhistoire doctrinale et littraire du Moyen ge, vol. 19, 1952, pp. 537, and texts:
N. Rescher, The Development, pp. 52 and 6567 (same in: Arapska logika, in: His-
torija logike, pp. 5152 and 54) and Dmitri Gutas, Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition.
Introduction to reading Avicennas philosophical works. Leiden, New York, Kbenhavn, Kln,
1988.
33 Ab u al-Wald Muhammad
. ibn Ahmad
. ibn RusdAverroes. For main biblio-
graphical data, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 604606 (461462) and S I, 833836.
For a detailed data on works of Ibn Rusd, see: H. Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy
, Vol. 1, pp. 449468 and Vol. 2, pp. 231262; Majid Fakhry, Averroes (Ibn Rushd): His
Life, Work and Influence, Oxford. 2001.
18 chapter one
the works of Aristotle and al-Farab. From the numerous commentaries

recorded by his biographers, only a small portion is preserved in Ara-
bic, and a larger part in Latin and Hebrew. According to E. Renan, the
most important commentaries on Aristotles works were: G ami # (short
commentary, extract), Talhs (summary, medium length commentary)

h. (long commentary).
and Sar There is also a very popular commen-
tary on Aristotles Categories titled Talhs Kitab al-maqulat. One of the

most significant works among the ones translated into Latin is the
ten-volume work, containing the commentaries on The Organon, titled
Opera cum Averrois commentariis, published in Venice 15621574.34 And,
finally, it should be said that all logicians from Andalusia mentioned
by C. Brockelmann and N. Rescher were followers of the Western
school.
There are two logicians from this school whose works were often
used by Bosniac authors: Fahruddn ar-Raz (11491209)35 and Sirag ud-

dn al-Urmaw (11981283),36 and manuscripts of their works can still be
found in collections of Oriental manuscripts in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina.
The Eastern school also brought a range of important logicians
who had their role model in the works by Avicenna. One of them was
al (10581111)37 who, although not important as a logician, made
al-Gaz
a great contribution through his texts to the field of logic. His authority,
and especially his armative relations towards logic as propaedeutics,
which at a critical moment lead to the acceptance of logic first by edu-
cational institutions, then to its integration in the theological education
system,38 was devoted to logic. Ibn Haldun (13321406) in his Muqad-

dima states that in his age, as a result of support that was given to logic
al and Fahruddn ar-Raz, it was dicult to draw a clear line
by al-Gaz

between the works in logic and speculative theology.39
34 For more on publication of Ibn Rusds works in Latin, see: H. Daiber, op. cit.
35 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 666669 (506508) and S I, 920924.
37 Abu H al, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 535546 (420426) and
. amid al-Gaz
S I, 744756.
als relations towards logic in his works, see: Maqas. id al-falasifa,
38 For more on al-Gaz
al-Qahira, 1331 (1913), especially chapter 3 and Mi #yar al- #ilm, al-Qahira, 1927, especially
pages 2627. His work Mih. akk an-nazar, . al-Qahira, s.a.
39 Ibn Hald un, Muqaddima, Mis.r (Kairo), s.a., pp. 466467.

On relations between theology and logic, and importance of al-Gaz al and Fahrud-
dn ar-Raz in this context see: Ulrich Rudolph, Die Neubewertung der Logik durch
al, other members of this school who had great influ-

Besides al-Gaz
ence were: Kamaluddn ibn Yunus (11561242),40 and his students al-
Abhar (12001264)41 and Nas.ruddn at.-T . us (12011274),42 as well as
. uss students al-Qazwn al-Katib (app. 12201270 or 1292)43 and
at.-T
Qut.buddn as-S raz (12361311).44 Al-Abhar, at.-T . us and al-Qazwn
are the authors who, along with Ibn Sna and other above mentioned
logicians of the western school, left a deep impact on the works by
Bosniac logicians, who often mentioned their names in the introduc-
tions or in the margins of their manuscripts.45 The works by al-Abhar
and al-Qazwn also are often commented on by Bosniac authors.
Though the number of followers of the Eastern school could indi-
cate that it took over the dominant role, the texts originating from
this period show that disputes and polemics never ended until mid-
14th century, when at-Tustar (app. 1270 app. 1330) in his work al-
Muh. akama bayna Nas.ruddn wa ar-Raz (Dispute between Nas.ruddn and
ar-Raz)46 and his student Qut.buddn ar-Raz at-Taht . an (12901365) in
his work Kitab al-muh. akamat bayna al-Imam wa an-Nas.r (Book of Disputes
between the Imam (ar-Raz) and an-Nasir (at.-T . us))47 tried to play the
role of arbitraries between the two confronting schools and, according
to N. Rescher, succeeded in their task.48 In their works they use findings
and texts of both schools, and pass the positive experience on to their
students. Such orientation has become accepted since then all through
the period that is the subject of this book. The works of at-Taftazan
al in: Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalter.
al-Gaz
Ed. Dominik Perler, Ulrich Rudolph, Leiden, 2005, pp. 7397.
40 Kam aluddn Musa ibn Yunus, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, S I, 859.
41 Atruddn Mufaddal b. #Umar al-Abhar, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 608611
..
and S I, 839844
(464465)
42 Ab
u Ga#far . us, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 670676 (508
Nas.ruddn at.-T
512) and S I, 924933.
43 Na gmuddn al-Qazwn al-Katib, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 612614 (466
467) and S I, 845848.
44 Qutbuddn Mahm
. . ud ibn Mas#ud as-S raz, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, S I, 817,
824, 929; G II, 274275 (211) and S II, 296297.
45 The collection at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo holds dozens of manuscripts
or commentaries on these works. (The situation is similar in other collections in Bosnia

and Herzegovina: Gazi Husrev-beys Library, Archive of Herzegovina in Mostar, His-
torical Archive in Sarajevo, etc.) See inventory books of these institutions.
46 Muhammad b. Sa#d al-Yam
. an at-Tustar, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 454
(597), S I, 816.
47 Qutbuddn ar-R
. . an, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 271 (209210),
az at-Taht
S I, 816. and S II, 293294.
48 Arapska logika, in: Historija logike, p. 55.
20 chapter one
ga n (13401413),50 al-Fanar (13501431)51 and oth-

(13221390),49 Al-Gur
er authors written in accordance with this orientation definitely pro-
mote it, and the order of master-disciple (silsila) in the sense of former
confrontations loses its importance.52
The main feature of the large number of works in the field of logic
written after the reconciliation of the Eastern and the Western
school was the determination to discuss the complete issue of logic, as
seen, or as demanded by Ibn Sna. Nevertheless the tradition of writing
commentaries survived, becoming even more intensive than before.
However, these commentaries were not focused on Aristotles texts
(neither as a whole nor in parts), but on the texts of Arabic logicians,
mainly the one who treated the complete issue of logic. Positive and
negative consequences of such determination will be discussed later in
this book, as the texts of Bosniac authors are a good illustration of this
orientation.
Not even such a short review of the history of Arabic logic by the
end of the 16th century would be complete without pointing out the
fact that logical research, and logic in general, in Arabic, and later
in the Islamic world, were the subjects of dierent types of resistance,
from pure negation, to open assaults. This resistance came from dier-
ent sources, from general intolerance towards foreign science, to the
fear of damaging religious discipline through the application of log-
ical methods. In some periods of time, this intolerance grew to the
level to draw the line between logic and heresy, and logicians were
49 Sa#duddn Mas# ud at-Taftazan, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 278280 (215

216), S I, 514516, 531, 683 and S II, 301304.
ga n as-Sayyid as-Sar
50 Al-Gur f, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, on several places,
especially G II, 280281 (216217) and S II 305306.

51 Samsudd n ibn Hamza
. al-Fanar, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, 303304 (233234),
S I, 647 and S II, 328329.
52 This silsila at Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r (Hasan Kafija Pruscak) can be completely
reconstructed, both from the notes in his works, and based on the autobiographical
part of his work Niz . am al- #ulama" (see: Hasan Kafija Pruscak, Izabrani spisi, Niz
ucenjaka, pp. 125154) where he mentions his teachers and his teachers teachers. A
prominent logician whom he mentions as his teachers teacher is Ibn Kamal-pasa (see:
N. Rescher, The Development, p. 79 and C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 597602 (449
453); S II, 668673, and the sixth among the above mentioned, al-Fanar (see footnote
51). On the front page of his work Muntagab Mus.t.afa Yuyo b. Yusuf Ayyub-zade
al-Mostar (Mustafa Ejubovic) mentions the order of his teachers linking to al-Gur ga n
(see footnote 50), see manuscript Muntagab, GHB br. 3858, fol. 4a. It is possible to
define the chain of the most important logicians in the works of Muhammad . b.
Musa al-Bosnaw #Allamak (Muhamed Music) as well.
criticized: Man tamant.aqa tazandaqa (He who practices logic falls

into heresy).53 However, the broader circle of intellectuals with great
authority, such as al-Kind, al-Farab, Ibn Sna, and latereven more
importantlytheologians like al-Gaz al, Fahruddn ar-Raz and in the

far West Ibn Hazm. from Cordoba (9441064)54 continued to have a
growing interest and support for logic. Thanks to this, and to the very
nature of logic and the methodology it oered that is necessary to all
disciplines, it managed to find mainstream Islam and was accepted.
In the period when other nations within Ottoman Empire inherited
the classical Arabic culture and science, including logic and philoso-
phy, these sciences found themselves pressured by mainstream theol-
ogy on one side, and growing mysticism and agnosticism on the other.
This is especially the case at the beginning of the 16th century, when
the first Bosniac authors started writing. As an illustration we will cite
Taskprzade (14951533), a famous Ottoman encyclopaedist. Accord-
ing to him, the early 16th century was the beginning of a folding into
a single system of thought. This will result in a triumph of fanaticism
opposing the so called novelties (bid#a) that were the issue, directly or
indirectly, relevant to the entire Ottoman culture and society (though
they above all were related to religious theory and practice).55 This
became a strong obstacle in the development of science and resulted in
a mounting of scorn towards any independent thought that would pose
a threat to the mainstream theological thinking, so the very discussion
on dogmas itself signified great progress.
However, logic managed to maintain a place in the educational sys-
tem,56 which was of a great importance for its future and autonomy,
and for a number of scholars, it became a subject of special interest
53 See: N. Rescher, The Development, pp. 5963, especially page 61. For more on the
confrontations between the logicians and conservative theologians, see: I. Goldziher,
Stellung der alten islamischer Ortodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften in: Abhand-
lungen der Kniglichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische
Klasse, Jahrgang, 1915 (Berlin, 1916). This text is often quoted in literature when this
issue is discussed. Unfortunately the author of this book could not consult it. Also see:
I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, pp. 240241, and .. , -
, pp. 3435.
54 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL G I, 505506 (399400) and S I, 692697. For more
on his relation towards logic see: Roger Arnaldez, Grammaire et thologie chez Ibn Hazm.
de Cordoue, Paris, 1956, especially pages 101248; I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote,
pp. 255256 and 260 and A.I. Sabra, Naucni poduhvati, in: Svijet islama, p. 187.
55 See: H. Inaldzik, Osmansko Carstvo. Klasicno doba 13001600, Beograd, 1974, pp. 254
255.
56 Ibid, pp. 235245 and 246253.
22 chapter one
and study. The fact that its contents remained on the level of research
completed by the great figures of Arabic philosophy and logic, such
as al-Farab, Ibn Sna and their students, and that the only forms
of creation were textbooks, compilations, commentaries and margina-
lia, doesnt diminish its importance, neither does it suggest complete
death. That was the main characteristic not only of the history of Ara-
bic logic, but history of European logic, from the Middle Ages, the era
of humanism and renaissance, until modern logic. Domination of the
above-mentioned forms of writing (textbooks, compilations, commen-
taries and marginalia (glossariums)) that is characteristic throughout all
of the Middle Ages and later, especially of the Arabic Islamic world
and of the period that is the subject of this book, is a phenomenon by
far more complex than has been assumed until now. These forms of
expression are the result of a whole range of factors, primarily socio-
historical and other conditions from which they emerged, as did the
Oriental Islamic view of the human being and the surrounding world.
Conditions and limitations well portrayed by Taskprzade, and some
Bosniac authors, such as Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhammad
. b. Musa
al-Bosnaw #Allamak and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar57 lead
to the situation in which no form of philosophy, logic included, could
prevail without religious contents or direct links with religious contents.
These conditions, on the other hand, directed the authors towards the
mentioned forms of writing, especially towards commentaries, that, at
least at first sight, guaranteed to be in harmony with the tradition and
within it. As a consequence a number of works in dierent spiritual
disciplines remained on the level of endless futile repetitions and inde-
cisive argumentation over some insignificant or unimportant issues in
certain fields. However, the human instinct to learn, reflect and con-
template, knew how to render opinions, explanations, interpretations
and polemics, as this book later presents. Logic, not unlike other dis-
ciplines in the Ottoman Empire, could not creatively revitalize,
as pointed out by prof. Nedim Filipovic58because adequate scientific
57 A very interesting view of the conditions in the Ottoman Empire is given by
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r in his Temelji mudrosti o uredenju
svijeta [Foundations of Wisdom on
Organization of the World] (see: Hasan Kafija Pruscak, Izabrani spisi, pp. 91117), and
a similar standpoint on the situation in the early 17th century is given by Muhammad . b.
Musa al-Bosnaw in his introductions to certain writings (see: H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost
, pp. 134137).
58 Nedim Filipovi c, Uticaj islama na bosanskohercegovacko tlo, Radio-Sarajevo
treci program, nr. 9, (Sarajevo) 1975, p. 79.
institutions did not exist, but it was reduced to quite a narrow frame-
work of education. It is within these frameworks that it will be inter-
preted in Bosnia and Herzegovina until late 19th and early 20th cen-
tury.
chapter two
BOSNIAC AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS
Results of the research on Bosniac cultural heritage, especially in the

field of bibliography, served as a starting point for registrating, collect-
ing and processing data on authors and their works that will be the
subject of this book. But before presenting them, there are some short
remarks on creativity of the Bosniac in Arabic, since that is the lan-
guage in which the works in the field of logic were written. This is,
certainly, not purely formal dierentiation. It is well-known that Arabic
was kept in the Ottoman Empire as the second language, primarily
as the language of the Qur"an; then as the language of a whole range of
disciplines linked to the Qur"an and Islam in general; and, eventually,
as the language of almost all sciences, from natural and exact sciences
to social; and thus, the ones that entered the education system. That
is where the most significant features of creativity in Arabic in Bosnia
came from. The following are some of the most significant characteris-
tics:
Writings by Bosniacs in Arabic (in individual disciplines), directly
or indirectly leaned on the findings and achievement of classical
Arabic or Islamic science, culture and tradition, in a sometimes
changed, adapted or developed form;
these writings were usually composed to meet the requirements of
the education system (in its broadest sense), and they follow the
program and development of the Ottoman education and society
in general;
for this reason, these works are usually textbooks, compendia,
commentaries on some famous works or marginalia, and seldom
original and independent works;1
1 Such classification by form can be found in catalogues of oriental writings and
other textbooks, but it can be only conditionally taken into consideration. There were
some very dierent ways of commenting, and dierent forms of commentaries: from
those that comment only on some words (those are usually elementary notions or
terms), to those that are very comprehensive and detailed, that take certain standpoints
only as ideas for writing of very original works. For more details on this classification,
26 chapter two
although this heritage is mostly linked to the medieval ambiance,

based on the multitude of manuscripts (in general, and the num-
ber of preserved copies) and notes by authors on themselves and
their works, it can be said that they were present among various
classes of society, especially in urban population;
despite the fact that today there are very little data on the audi-
ences response to the works, it can be said that works in those
disciplines not bordering with religion and dogma reached their
readers very slowly, mainly because they were written in a for-
eign language and had a very dicult and complicated vocabu-
lary. Also, printing was adopted relatively late, in addition to the
fact that there were no developed institutions apart from educa-
tion that would help their faster and easier spreading and devel-
opment;
finally, most of these works were written by scholars, usually edu-
cated in all parts of the Empire, who were teachers or ocials of
the legal system.
Chronologically speaking, surveys and histories of literature and the
arts in the Oriental languages in Bosnia and Herzegovina first appeared
when the first Bosniacs converted to Islam. For some of them convert-
ing meant an opportunity to get higher education, which implied their
participation in the process, either directly, as teachers, or to contribute
in another way to the elaboration and development of the Arabic-
Islamic classical arts and culture inherited by the Ottoman society.
One of the first names recorded in the old Ottoman chronicles
and other sources, which was later described by Joseph von Ham-
mer in his History of the Ottoman Empire, is Mawla #Abdulkarm (died
in 1493),2 originating from the area inhabited by South Slavic peoples.
According to these sources, he was the author of a marginalia (glossar-
ium) accompanying a work very famous in the East, Sources of Light in
see: A. Ljubovic, Neke karakteristike proznog stvaralastva na orijentalnim jezicima

kod nas, POF, 40/1990, Sarajevo 1991, pp. 6378.
2 H
. ag g Halfa (Katib alab), Fezleke-i Tarih, Istanbul, 1286/87 (1869/70), I, 497;
C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 467; HammerPurgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches,
IX, Pesth, 18341836, see II, 586; S. Basagic, Bosnjaci i Hercegovci u islamskoj knjizevnosti
[Bosnians and Herzegovinians in Islamic Literature], Sarajevo, 1912, 19; H. Sabanovi c,
Knjizevnost Muslimana BiH na orijentalnim jezicima [Literature of the Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in the Oriental Languages], Sarajevo, 1973, pp. 4446.
bosniac authors and their works 27
Logic by Sirag udin al-Urmaw (died in 1283).3 Our researchverifying

the sources and literature, as well as surveys of major collections of
Oriental manuscripts in the country and abroad (directly or through
catalogues)have not oered us any new information that would dis-
close more on this marginalia. Therefore, this survey of authors and
their works starts with one of the most prominent writers coming from
the Oriental-Islamic component of the culture of Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, whose writing in the field of logic (manuscripts) has been preserved;
these works are of the Bosniac named Hasan. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r.
Hasan
. h. is. ar
Kaf al-Aq
As there are a lot of writings and resources available on Hasan . Kaf

al-Aq hi
. s.a r (Hasan Kafija Pruscak) and his life and opus,4 this book will
contain only the most important elements of his biography.
His full name, the one he used to sign his works, was: Hasan . Kaf
b. Turhan b. Dawud b. Ya#qub az-Zb al-Aqhi . s.a r al-Bosnaw. Kaf

is his artistic alias (mahlas.) that he first used in 1580 in his Kafs

Compendium of Logic, and the word az-Zb (Zblocality close to todays
Bugojno), al-Aq hi
h. is. ar (Aq- . s.a r = Biograd = Prusac) and al-Bosnaw
denote his regional origin, place of birth and nationality by which he
was recognized. The names of other Bosniac authors contain similar
information. He was born in 1544 in Prusac, a small town near Donji
Vakuf. As he says in his biography, he got his elementary education in
his hometown, and then he went to Istanbul, where he studied for nine
years. Among his teachers of that period were Qara Yilan and Mawla
Ahmad
. Ans.ar, and he also mentions the teachers of his teachers,
which helps trace his role-models he depended on for his work.
He spent most of the period between his return from Istanbul and his
first appointment as judge of the Prusac district (1583) in Prusac, where
he gathered students and started giving lectures. Besides Prusac, he
performed judicial duties in Srem County, then a place near to my
3 Sirag uddn al-Urmaw, Ma.tali # al-anwar f al-man.tiq, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, I,

467 (614).
4 Detailed list of sources and literature is given in Hasan Kafija Prusc ak, Izabrani
spisi. [Introduction, translation and notes: Amir Ljubovic and Fehim Nametak]. Vese-
lin Maslesa, Sarajevo, 1983, p. 189.
28 chapter two
Prusac, to be eventually reappointed judge (qad. ) of Prusac, a position

which he received as a life-time pension.5
There were some endowments that he left to his hometown, but
data on this are incomplete. In addition to performing his duties as
judge (according to some sources he became muftithe supreme court
judge later in his life), Hasan
. Kaf gave lectures at a school he founded
himself. He died on October 9, 1615, in his hometown of Prusac, where
he was buried.
According to the data discovered so far, Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r com-
posed seventeen works on various scientific and religious disciplines,
and the subjects of his particular interests were politics, philology, law,
speculative theology and logic.6
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r wrote two works in the field of logic. The
first one is Kafs Compendium of Logic (Muhtas.ar al-Kaf min al-mant.iq),

and the second is the commentary on it, titled A Commentary on Kafs
Compendium of Logic (Sar h. Muhtas.ar al-Kaf min al-mant.iq).

Kafs Compendium of Logic

One of the first works that Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r ever wrote was
Kafs Compendium of Logic, composed in 1580. The reasons for writing
this treatise were primarily practical. As I noticed, Pruscak says, that
todays students who are immersing themselves in logic are not getting
from it what they are looking for, due to an abundance of discrepancies
in the texts on logic and as it is hard to give exact interpretations
in sciences, I chose a clear compendium based on the books by old
authorities and their followers, and thus analyzed for those eager to
know more, and simplified for those who research, elaborating on the
basis of my modest understanding and aware of my limited capabilities
7
Today there are three preserved manuscript copies kept in public
libraries, i.e. the collections of Oriental manuscripts,8 and for this book
5Ibid., pp. 151153.

6Bibliography of the works by Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r with the data on manu-
scripts, printed editions and translations, is given in Hasan Kafija Pruscak, Izabrani spisi
, pp. 159179.
7 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Izabrani spisi, p. 61.
8 One manuscript copy is preserved at the Oriental collection of the Croatian
Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, N 173, fol. 1b20b, sized 12,5 17,5. This
copy, however, is incomplete, as the transcriber did not include most of the logical
the one kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo was used and quoted
from. It was also used for the translation to Bosnian in Izabrani spisi
9
As the quoted fragment shows, this work is a discourse on logic and
contains commentaries by al-Aq hi
. s.a rs predecessors with all essential
elements, collected and combined in the form of a textbook. Therefore,
its contents and form imply its nature of a textbook in this field, typ-
ical of the Oriental-Islamic world, giving very concise definitions and
answers to the most important logical issues. Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r
selected the issues that he wants to treat with the help of reference
material, and chose the composition and organization of the material,
which is rather original. The work is based on two, in his opinion, fun-
damental issues of logic: conceptions (tas.awwurat) and assertions (tas.dqat),
each having its origins and objectives.
Based on this division, and following the introductory part (fol. 1a
3b), all logical issues were divided into the following chapters:
1. On Words (f al-alfaz),. fol. 4a7b,
2. On Origins of ConceptionsFive Universal Terms (f mabadi" at-tas.aw-
wuratal-kulliyyat), fol. 7a12a,
3. On Goals of ConceptionsInterpretative Speech (f maqas.id at-tas.aw-
wuratal-qawl as-sa rih), . fol. 12a13a,
4. On Origins of AssertionsJudgments (f mabadi" at-tas.dqatal-qadiy-
.
ya), fol. 13a19a,
5. On Objectives of AssertionsSyllogism (f maqas.id at-tas.dqatal-qi-
yas), fol. 19a25a,
a) Apodictic (al-burhan), fol. 25a25b and 26b28b,
b) Dialectic (al-gadal), fol. 25b,
c) Rhetoric (al-hit.a ba), fol. 25b,

d) Poetic (as-si#r), fol. 25b26a,
e) Sophistic (al-muga lat.a), fol. 26a26b.
terms, chapter titles, and some other elements but instead left space to add them in red
ink, which was never done.
The second copy is kept at the Gazi Husrev-beys Library in Sarajevo (hereinafter:
GHB), R 3407; sized 19,5 13 cm.
The third copy is at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo (hereinafter OIS), R 591 (old
ref. MT 878). The description of this manuscript is given in Izabrani spisi, 27.
9 Pp. 6185.
The same translation was published by Dijalog (A. Ljubovic), 12, Sarajevo, 1985,
pp. 134168.
30 chapter two
In the context of the presented plan and distribution of material in

hi
this treatise of al-Aq . s.a r, it should be said that it has a very solid,
natural and logical composition that contains a variety of classifications.
They flow smoothly, springing out of each other, thus keeping their
functional value.
A Commentary on theKafs Compendium of Logic

hi
Al-Aq . s.a rs work A Commentary on Kafs Compendium of Logic is men-
tioned in reference books merely by title, and the data were used from
hi
al-Aq . s.a rs autobiography, where it is listed among his first works. Fol-
lowing this source, the trace lead to the University Library of Cam-
bridge.10
This work was composed in 1583 and it is a commentary on the pre-
vious writing, covering all material, according to al-Aq hi
. s.a r (Pruscak)
himself by the end of the chapter on conceptions,, i.e. to the end of
11
the third chapter of Kafs Compendium of Logic. Motives for creating this
work were the same as for the previous oneto help students under-
stand issues of logic. After an extensive Introduction (fol. 1b9a) the Com-
mentary was divided into three chapters, according to the source:
1. On Words (f al-alfaz),
. fol. 9a18a,
2. On Origins of ConceptionsFive Universal Terms (f mabadi" at-tas.aw-
wurat), fol. 7a12a, and
3. On Goals of ConceptionsInterpretative Speech (f maqas.id at-tas.aw-
. fol. 30b33b.
wuratal-qawl as-sa rih),
The structure of the Commentary was conditioned by the structure of
the original text, which was literally incorporated into the Commen-
tary. However, unlike the basic text, Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r often loses
compositional restraints in the Commentary, oering not only deeper
but also wider analysis of some of the issues in the Commentary. In this
way he anticipates some of the problems that exceed the framework of
the issues of relation, such as some issues in the theory on judgments,
syllogistic, direct conclusions, etc., that will not be discussed until later,
if at all in this work. In spite of this, the work represents a coherent and
harmonic unit, with excurses always in the explanatory function. Spe-
cial value lies on those in which Pruscak refers to texts and authors he
10 Ms. Or. 541 (8).

11 Hasan Kafija Puscak, Izabrani spisi, p. 151.
used to support his own positions, thereby indicating his own sources.
Those works include the texts by Ibn Sna Book of Healing (Kitab as-sifa")
and Book of Remarks and Admonitions (Kitab al-isa rat wa at-tanbhat),12 as
well as al-Fanar13 and al-Urmaw.14
Muh. ammad b. Musa #Allamak al-Bosnaw as-Saray
One of the most prominent writers of Bosniac origin who wrote in

Arabic was Muhammad. ibn Musa, in sources and older references
known as #Allamak (Know-it-all). More recent reference works often
use the patronymic, Music, as well as al-Bosnaw and as-Saray. Husein
Abdel Latif es-Sayyid wrote his doctoral dissertation on this author
and defended it at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo,
in 1965.15 The elementary subject of this dissertation was Musics opus
in the field of language. However, as the research has advanced signifi-
cantly since then, and as this dissertation has never been published, this
book will oer a more detailed biography of #Allamak, based on more
recent research and authentic documents.
Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak al-Bosnaw as-Saray was born in
1595 in Sarajevo, where he completed primary and secondary educa-
12 See, e.g. fol. 21b22a, 26a, 30b etc.

13
Samsudd n b. Hamza
. al-Fanar, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 303304 (233
234), S I, 647 and S II, 328329.
14 See footnote 3. Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r often mentions him as S . al-Mat.a li#, or
. ahib
al-Ma.tali # after his work, see fol. 17a.
15 Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, Muhamed Musa AllamekBosanac, arapski jezikoslovac
iz prve polovine XVII stoljeca [Muhamed Musa Allamekthe Bosnian, Arabic Linguist
of the Early 17th Century], doctoral dissertation defended at the Faculty of Philosophy
in Sarajevo, Sarajevo, 1965.
Besides this, other significant sources and literature for the studies of the opus and
life Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak are: Muhibb . , Hulas. at al-atar, Mis.r (Kairo), 1284
(1867/68), t. IV, 302; Dahab, A#lam an-nubala", t. VI, 246; al-Bagdad, Hadiyya al-
#arifn. Asma" al-mu"allifnwa atar al-mus. annifn, t. II, 278; C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 417
and 466, S I, 516, 534 and 740; S. Basagic, Bosnjaci, 7273; M. Handzic, Knjizevni rad
bosansko-hercegovackih muslimana, Sarajevo, 1934, 6, 14 and 6970; J. Blaskovic and others,
Arabische, trkische und persische Handschriften der Universittsbibliothek in Bratislava, Bratislava,
1961, 15, 4142 and 242; H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, pp. 131151; S. Grozdanic, Neke
opaske o knjizevnosti Muslimana Bosne i Hercegovine na arapskom jeziku [Some
Comments on the Literature of Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Arabic Lan-
guage] in: Knjizevnost Bosne i Hercegovine u svjetlu dosadasnjih istrazivanja [The Literature of
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Light of Contemporary Research], ANUBiH, Posebna
izdanja, knj. XXXV/5, Sarajevo, 1977, p. 71
32 chapter two
tion (Gazi Husrev-beys Madrasa). From 1611/12 he continued his edu-

cation in Istanbul at one of the highest-ranking educational institutions
in the Empire, Sahn-i seman,16 where he graduated no later than in
1616. Since then, the development of Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamaks
life and work can be divided into three directions: as a teacher at sev-
eral schools, as a judge, and as a writer. There are not precise data on
his life and work before 1626, the year he wrote a commentary on the
ar-Risala as-samsiyya, and soon after, in the summer of the same year,
marginalia (glossarium) in grammar. The work of his student, Ibrahm
b. Ramad . an al-Bosnaw, discussed later, shows that Muhammad . b.
Musa #Allamak had already been giving lectures in logic based on his
own work at some of the schools. In September 1627, after a period
of joblessness and relative poverty, he started working on a margina-
lia (glossarium) that would accompany a commentary on one chapter
of the Qur"an, which he used in the same year as habilitation for a
professorship at the Hasanbey-zades Madrasa in Instanbul. From May
1629 he taught at two schools, and in March 1633 he was appointed
to a professorship at one of the schools belonging to the Sahn-i seman.
The works he wrote over this period were mainly in the field of Ara-
bic language (syntax, stylistic and rhetoric), which indicates that Arabic
language was the main subject that Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak was
teaching. In 1634/35 he was appointed as supreme court judge (qad.
al-qud. at) in Aleppo (Syria) where he, in addition to his judicial duties,
took on a class in Arabic syntax. He spent the last days of his life in iso-
lation, in Rumela Hissar (a fortress in the vicinity of Istanbul), under the
. ar, who feared that #Allamak would report
order of Mus.t.afa-pasa Silahd
to the Port on the crime and violence he exercised in Aleppo and its
suburbs. It was there that in 1636 he found out that he was appointed
kadi of Istanbul, which was a sign of exceptional recognition. Several
days later, exhausted by severe rheumatism and arthritis, Muhammad .
b. Musa #Allamak died, most probably in Rumeli Hissar, where he was
buried.
All his works were written in Arabic. One of them, Marginalia (Glos-
sarium) to Mulla G ams Commentary on Arabic Grammar al-Kaf, was
printed in Istanbul in 1890, while the others are preserved only in
16 For more on the organization of the educational system in the Ottoman Empire,
and especially the place and the role of Sahn-i seman, see: H. Inaldzik, Osmansko Carstvo,
pp. 238239 and further.
manuscript copies.17 In addition to the mentioned fields, he wrote on

logic, law, exegesis of the Qur"an and dogmatics. Except for one trans-
lation from Arabic to Turkish, all his works are commentaries or super-
commentaries. They are specific for their independent approach to the
issues they treat and exceptionally bold criticism, either of the authors
of the main work, or other commentaries, regardless of the authority
and reputation they had at the time. His starting argument was that the
review of any of the scientific issues, including dogmatics, should not
imply indisputable acceptance of a solution only because it was oered
by an authority, whoever the authority may have been.18 Such explicit
methodical skepticism of Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak and the crit-
ical outlook on the heritage are the main values of his works which,
due to these aspects, are opposed to the greatest part of creativity in
the Ottoman Empire that were often burdened by traditionalism and
authority.
As for the work of Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak in the field of logic,
sources oer dierent data. Well-known Ottoman historians, Muhibb . 19
and Isma#l-pasa Bagdad wrote that #Allamak was the author of a
20
comprehensive Marginalia (Glossarium) Accompanying Qu.tbuddns Commen-

tary on as-Samsiyya,21
and Ussaq added that this work was known and
in use.22 One of the first Ottoman encyclopedists and a contemporary
of Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak, Katib alab (H. ag g Halfa), claimed

that Muhammad
. #Allamak wrote Commentary on as-Samsiyya, referring

to the famous work ar-Risala as-samsiyya by Nagmuddn al-Qazwn al-
Katib, and that it was combined (mamzug ).23
This research paper succeeded in recording four manuscripts of
Musa-zades work, always titled The Commentary on The Sun Treatise
h. ar-Risala as-samsiyya), in the collections of Topkapi Museum in
(Sar
17
See: H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, pp. 131151.
18 See quoted fragment from Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamaks H . asiya #ala Sar
h. al-
Mawaqif in: H. Sabanovi c, 19Muh. ibb, o.c., vol. IV, p. 302.Knjizevnost, pp. 149150.
19 Muhibb, o.c., vol. IV, p. 302.
.
20 Ba gdad, o.c., vol. II, p. 278.
21 The author of the basic work ar-Risala a
s-Samsiyya is Nagmuddn #Al b. #Umar
al-Qazwn al-Katib (died in 1293 or 1295, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 466 and
S I, 845). The Arabic title of the work that #Allamak allegedly wrote was supposed
to be H . asiya #ala Sar h. al-Qu.tb #ala as-Samsiyya,
i.e. the marginalia accompanying Sar h.
ar-Risala as-samsiyya by Qut.buddn Muhammad . ar-Raz at-Ta ht
. a n (died in 1365, see:
C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 466 and S and 845).

22 See: H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, p. 148.
23 H
. ag g Hal fa, II, 1064.

34 chapter two
Istanbul, Library of the National Museum in Algiers, in the collec-

tion of manuscripts of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences in
Zagreb and at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo.24
A careful reading of this work and its comparison with the basis
work by al-Qazwn and the previously mentioned commentary by
Qut.buddn ar-Raz revealed that this was actually not a marginalia
(glossarium), but a commentary on the original text. In this text as
well, Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak skillfully uses the commentaries by
Sa#duddn at-Taftazan,25 Nas.ruddn at.-T
ga n,27 and espe-
. us,26 al-Gur
cially Qut.buddn ar-Raz, whose names are often written in the mar-
gins (thence Katib alab calls this commentary combined). Most
probably the fact that the works of Qut.buddn ar-Raz are often quoted
prompted these biographers to say that this marginalia accompanies
Qut.buddns commentary, which cannot be accepted unless another
work by #Allamak is discovered.
24 The manuscript from Istanbul is kept at the Foundation of Emanet Hazinesi
kitaplg, N 1970. It has 223 sheets, sized 18,5 11,5 cm. It was copied in 1035 (1620).
See: Karatay, TSMK-AYK, C III, N 6845.
Xerox copy of the manuscript from Bibliothque dAlger (N 522) is kept at the
Oriental Institute in Sarajevo (copy nr. 1). The manuscript has 80 sheets (fol. 1b80b),
sized 13 19,5 cm, with 25 rows each. The copy was made based on the autograph on
May 27, 1626 by Must.afa b. Hidr al-Adirnaw (from Edrina).
The manuscript from theoriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and
Sciences in Zagreb holds number 1511; it has 124 sheets (fol. 4b127a), sized 13,5 21 cm.
The manuscript at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, R 698, is incomplete, it only
contains the first ten sheets (fol. 1b10a), sized 13,5 21 cm.
The collection of the oriental manuscripts of the National and University Library
Kliment Ohridski in Skopje, under number MSA II 209/2 holds the manuscript
h. dibaga ar-Risala as-samsiyya al-manqul min Sar
titled Sar h. Muh. ammad Musa al-Bosnaw. This
manuscript has seven sheets, sized 13,8 20 cm. After inspection of this manuscript
(microfilm was obtained for the needs of the Oriental Institute), and its comparison
with the Algiers manuscript, the author of this book concluded that it is the copy of the
commentary on the introductory part that the transcriber named at his own will.
According to some data, that unfortunately could not be verified, several copies of
this work by #Allamak are kept at the Sulaymaniyya Library in Istanbul (Fatih 3355,
Hamidiye 819, Laleli 2658 and 2661, and Sehid Ali Pasa 1791).
25 Sa#duddn Mas# ud at-Taftazan, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, pp. 278280
(215216), S I, pp. 514516, 531, 683 and S II, pp. 301304.
26 Ab
u Ga#far Nas.ruddn at.-T. us, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, pp. 670676
(508512) and S I, pp. 924933.
ga n as-Sayyid as-Sar
27 Al-Gur f, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, in a few places, and
especially G II, pp. 280281 (216217) and S II, pp. 305306.
A Commentary on The Sun Treatise

As said above, there are four manuscript copies of this work by Mu-
hammad
. b. Musa #Allamak. The copy kept at the Oriental Institute in
Sarajevo is incomplete, so this book uses the copy from Algiers, actually
its photocopy that is kept at the Oriental Institute28 which is, besides
the fact that most of the text does not contain diacritic signs, ortho-
graphically and grammatically very correct, and most importantly, the
transcriber did not omit a single word (as far as could be seen based
on comparisons with other copies). It was copied from the autograph,
immediately after the completion of the work, on May 27, 1626.29
According to a note at the end of the manuscript,30 the work was
completed on February 2, 1626, and it contains 160 dense manuscript
pages. Following the main text that it comments on, after the general
introduction (fol. 1b5a) this work is divided in the following way:
1. Introduction (al-muqaddima), fol. 6a13a, consists of two discussions
(bah. tan): (1) One the essence of logic and (2) On the subject of logic;

2. Article One (maqala): On Individual Terms, fol. 13a35a, with four
sections (fas.l): (1) On words, (2) On significations, (3) On the universal
and the particular and (4) On definitions;
3. Article Two, fol. 35a63b, with Introduction (On the definition of
judgment and its segments) and three sections: (1) On categorical
judgment, (2) On conditional judgment and (3) On the rules for judging
(immediate forms of reasoning);
4. Article Three, On syllogism, fol. 63b77a, with five sections: (1) Defini-
tion, its parts and figures, (2) On mixed syllogisms (modal), (3) On connected
syllogism, (4) On separate (separated) syllogism and (5) Supplements on syl-
logism;
5. Conclusion (hatima), fol. 77a80a, with two discussions: (1) On the

contents of syllogisms and (2) On segments of science.31
This work of Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak belongs to the class of
semi-extensive commentaries of The Sun Treatise, one of the most impor-
tant works in the field of logic in Arabic, written by al-Qazwn al-
Katib, a student of the great name of Arabic philosophy, Nasruddn
28 Photocopies, nr. 92.

29 h. ar-Risala as-samsiyya, fol. 80b.
Sar
30 Ibid.
31 For Arabic titles of certain chapters and sections, see in the chapter on The New
Commentary on The Sun Treatise by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar.

36 chapter two
. us. It is evident from the notes by #Allamaks student Ibrahm b.

at.-T
Ramad . an, from other manuscripts that are preserved in a relatively
large number considering the period they are from (it is interesting that
two of the preserved manuscripts were copied only several months after
the completion of the work), and from the style of presentation, that this
work was used as a textbook in logic. Unfortunately, there are no data
that would confirm the level of education for which #Allamak used this
work in his teaching, but the scope of the work and the included logi-
cal issues suggest that it could have been a higher-level religious school.
Besides all that has already been said on this work, it should be pointed
out that it was written in exceptionally clear language32 and there is a
sense of suciency in its interpretation.
h Yuyo
Mus. .tafa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostaras-Say

Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade (Ejubovic) al-Mostar was among the most promi-
nent writers in Bosnia and Herzegovina who wrote in Arabic. Thanks
to the biographies carefully assembled by his student Ibrahm Opiyac33
and Mus.t.afa Hurram, a poet from Mostar,34 it is now possible to

reconstruct the life of Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar and the devel-
opment of his work. The researchers were also helped by the notes,
which Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade added to his writings and some of the
manuscripts he copied with the dates of completion, as well as the bib-
liography of his writings that he left behind in several places.35
32 Overall Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamaks opus is specific for its lucid language
and style, which was pointed out by Kamel el-Buhi in Arapski radovi jugoslovenskih pisaca
[Arabic Works by Yugoslavian Writers], unpublished doctoral dissertation defended at
the University of Belgrade in 1963, p. 104, and Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid (o.c.,
pp. 176).
33 Ibrahm Opiyac, Risala fi manaqib as-Say h Yuyo ibn Yusuf al-Mostar, autograph:
GHB, nr. 3585. Edition: O. Music, Ibrahim Opijac Mostarac, POF, XXI/1960
1961, Sarajevo, 1961, pp. 3153. Translation to Bosnian: M. Mujic, Biografija Mustafe

Ejubovica (Sejh Juje), GVIS, VII/13 (Sarajevo), 1956, pp. 122.
ibn Hurram al-Mostar, Niz. am al- #ulama", manuscript:
34 Mustaf
. . a ibn al-h
. ag g Ahmad
.
Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences (OZ HAZU), N 86.
35 Besides the two quoted sources related to the life and work of Mustaf
. . a Ayyub-
zade, other relevant references are: C. Brockelmann, GAL, S I, 842 and S II, 317;
S. Basagic, Bosnjaci, pp. 118123; isti, Znameniti, p. 55; M. Handzic, Knjizevni rad
, pp. 9, 2224, 71, 74 and 105; M. Mujic, Sejh Jujo (16501707) u svjetlu knjizevno-
istorijskog materijala, Zora (pocasni broj), Mostar, 1968/69, pp. 291301; H. Saba-
novic, Knjizevnost, pp. 390410; S. Grozdanic, O knjizevnosti, pp. 541542 and
The full name of Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade, the one he used to sign

his work, and mentioned by others in quotations, in Arabic (here in
transcription) was: Mus.t.afa Yuyo (Yuy) b. Yusuf b. Murad Ayyub-
zade al-Mostar al-Bosnaw. He was born in 1651 in Mostar, where
his father Yusuf, son of Murad, worked as a lecturer at one of the
Mostar schools. He got his primary education in his home town, left
for Istanbul in 1677, where he spent four years at, most probably, Sahn-
i seman. After his studies and apprenticeship, he worked for a while
at a school in Istanbul. It is interesting to notice that his biographers
say that Say h Yuyo understood the weaknesses, narrow-mindedness

and weight of the old scholastic methods used by madrasas, so he tried
to have his lecturing methods and textbooks blaze new trails in the
methods of teaching.36 During his stay in Istanbul, he wrote a dozen
works, and in order to create a library for himself, he copied a number
of texts in almost all areas of spiritual creativity of that time. The
number of manuscripts preserved till today (most of which are kept at
the Oriental collection of the University Library in Bratislava) indicates
that he copied over 60 works. From 1692 on, Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade
performed the duty of the mufti (supreme court judge) in Mostar. The
last fifteen years of his life, that he spent in Mostar, are characterized by
his full engagement in education (lectures and writing textbooks) and in
some fields of science to which he was particularly drawn. He died in
Mostar on July 16, 1707.
Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostar wrote 27 short and
long discourses. Most of them were written in the field of logic and
disputation (13), laws (6), Arabic language, syntax and stylistics. In
addition to that, he wrote a paper on Persian lexicography and metrics,
two on dogmatics and compiled a collection of sermons (f al-wa#z). . As
previously stated, a number of these works are in form of textbooks
that he used in his teaching, and others are a result of certain personal
interests, such as works in logic and dialectics. So, in the foreword to
A Commentary on The Training in Logic and Apologetics (Sar h. Tahdb al-

mant.iq wa al-kalam), which was his last work, Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade
al-Mostar says:
I have long been involved in these two disciplines, and in these fields
I have written a number of useful, more or less extensive, papers. My
A. Ljubovic, Na marginama rukopisnih djela Mustafe Ejubovica (16511707), Herce-

govina, IV, Mostar, 1985, pp. 225238.

36 See: H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, p. 394.
38 chapter two
heart would often miss a beat when I thought of clarifying the writers
thoughts and of commenting on the part related to logic and the part
related to disputation.37
Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar was, therefore, particularly preoc-
cupied with issues in logic that were necessarily linked to dialectics, so
called science on terms, then to syntax, stylistics and rhetoric.
A Commentary on Atrs Treatise in Logic

The first work by Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostar in the
field of logic was A Commentary on Atrs Treatise in Logic (Sar h. ar-

Risala al-Atriyya f al-mant.iq) or, as it is sometimes titled, A commentary
ag u g ), which was completed in August 1682.
on Isagogue (Sar h. Is
Along with the autograph and a number of manuscript copies that
have been preserved till today,38 this work has a printed version, which
makes it unique among Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zades writings.39 This is a
commentary on a work in logic, very well known in the East, Isagogue
ag u g ) by Atruddn al-Abhar (died in 1256).40 It need be said that
(Is

this is not merely an adaptation of well-known Porphyrys Isagogue or its
commentary, as some of the works on al-Abhars compendium states,
but this is a work that took over Porphyrys title, and the basic elements
of his work form only part of the introduction to the reflections on
logical issues.41
37 Autographs: OIS, R 4668, fol. 1b. Also see: M. Mujic, Sejh Jujo (16501707) u
svjetlu, p. 298.
38 A large number of manuscript is preserved, and the autograph is kept at the
Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, R 2379. It is leather-bound with 27 sheets (fol. 1b27b) of

unusual size, 9 25 cm.
39 Istanbul, 1316 (1898/99), 78 pp.
40 Atruddn Mufaddal b. #Umar al-Abhar, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 608611
and S I, 839844. ..
(464465)
41 The main contents of Porphyrys Isagogue (Eisagog or An Introduction to Aristotles
Categories) is a discussion on five basic terms (quinque voces): genus, species, dierence,
property and accidence. This is the issue that will be the object of attention of only the
first chapter of al-Abharis Isagogue that kept the title. For more, see: A. Ljubovic, Da
li je al-Abharjevo djelo Is agug adaptacija Porfirijevog djela Eisagog? [Is Al-Abhars
Paper Is ag u g Adaptation of Porphyrys Eisagog?], POF, 38/1988, Sarajevo, 1989,
pp. 217223.
Also see: Kwame Gyekye, Arabic logic. Ibn al-Tayyibs Commentary on Porphyrys Eisagoge,
State University of New York Press, Albany, 1979.
The work by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, besides the Foreword

(pp. 26),42 has nine chapters (bab):
1. Isagogue, pp. 624, that includes short discussions on words, mean-
ings of words, relations between words and ideas, then on terms,
and, especially, on five universalia (species, genus, dierence, prop-
erty and accident),
2. On interpretative speech (al-qawl as-sa rih),
. pp. 2427, is on the rules of
definition and description forming,
3. On judgments (al-qad . aya), pp. 2749,
4. On syllogism (al-qiyas), pp. 4973,
5. Apodictic (al-burhan), pp. 7375,
6. Dialectic (al-gadal), p. 75,
7. Rhetoric (al-hit.a ba), pp. 7576,

8. Poetic (as-si#r), p. 76,
9. Sophistic (al-muga lat.a), pp. 7677.
The work has a structure that is essentially along the same line as the
one given in Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar. As the given structure

indicates, this piece of writings by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar,
which belongs to the group of semi-extensive commentaries, summa-
rizes the central logical issues treated by standard textbooks of that
time. And, finally, it should be said that Mus.t.afa b. Ayyub-zade often
ga n, and The Sources of Light on
used the works by ar-Raz and al-Gur
Logic and the related commentaries.
43
A Useful Marginalia to Al-Fanars Remarks

Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostar made another referral to
Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar ten years later, in 1692, when he noticed

that the commentary on Isagogue titled Al-Fanars Remarks (al-Fawa"id al-
Fanariyya) written by al-Fanar (13501431)44 is very useful for clarifying
a range of issues in logic, and that logic was used for a mans mind
to enjoy and for souls to connect in order to dierentiate the correct
from the incorrect, to measure the truth and to select indisputable
facts.45 The full title of this work is A Useful Marginalia on Al-Fanars
42 Quotations here correspond to the printed version compared with the autograph.
43 See footnote 3 in this chapter.

44 Samsudd n b. Hamza
. al-Fanar, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 303304 (233
234), S I, 647 and S II, 328329.

45 See: M. Zdralovi c, Prilog poznavanju, p. 128. Manuscript: Oriental collection
40 chapter two
Remarks on Atruddns Treatise on Logic (H . asiya mufda li al-Fawa"id al-

Fanariyya #ala ar-Risala f al-mant.iq), which contains 80 pages in
46
manuscript. It was completed on May 17, 1692.

As a h. asiya,47 this is a marginalia (glossarium) that had originally been
written in the form of margin notes, and were later edited by the author
and presented as an integral text. Given that this is a collection of indi-
vidual notes, clarifications, interpretations or commentaries on certain
words or statements, there is no evident internal structure and organi-
zation of material, as it is assumed that the reader reads the commented
text at the same time. However, Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar tried
to connect the margin notes and to give discrete indication on where
the issues treated in separate chapters of the original text begin and
where they end.48 Thus, the material is organized according to the
text that the notes referred to, Al-Fanars Remarks. Al-Fanars Remarks in
turn follow the basic text, al-Abhars Isagogue whose main structure can
be seen from the previously discussed work of Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zades
Commentary on Isagogue. The volume of the commentaries within certain
chapters depends on the extent of vague and unclear places that the
author found.
The New Commentary on The Sun Treatise

Besides Isagogue, one of the best known and most frequently commented
writings in the field of logic in Arabic from the later period is a work
titled The Sun Treatise (ar-Risala as-samsiyya) by Nagmuddn al-Qazvn
al-Katib (died in 1295).49 As this work was very concise, and contained
a number of unclear and incomplete parts, and since it was com-
mented on very often, the commentaries give interpretations that dier
greatly. In order to remove vagueness and obscurity, in 1690 Mus.t.afa
h. al-
Ayyub-zade wrote The New Commentary on The Sun Treatise (as-Sar
of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, N 198, fol. 2b.

46 The only known copy of this work is kept at the Oriental collection of the Croa-
tian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, N 198, fol. 2b42a, sized 14,5 19,5 cm
with 21 rows per page. The manuscript was bound in hard cardboard bindings with a
leather ridge, which was completed by linen bindings at a more recent date. A note in
the manuscript (fol. 2a) proves that this is the autograph on the endowment in Karadoz-
beys library in Mostar 1117 (1705).
47 The word hasiya comes from the verb ha
. . sayah. s, and means: seam, lining, hedge;
margin note; post scriptum, etc.
48 See, e.g: fol. 22a, 26b, 37b.
49 See footnote 21.
g add #ala as-Samsiyya

f al-mant.iq)50 refuting incorrect interpretation
of reputed authorities of the age. Ayyub-zade comments on this in a
typically oriental style:
The Sun Treatise written by a scientist and a great scholar, the Sun
of the nation and faith, al-Katib, is the most exalted and the most
excellent work that has ever been written in this field (logic, rem. A.L.),
since it contains the most illuminated statements and encompasses the
pearls of meaning. Although small in volume, it is very useful, and
although its necklace is very short, its beads are very precious rules.
Since the secrets of its truths are cloaked by conciseness, and the inno-
cence of its details, veiled by a curtain of briefness, many scholars have
tried to explain the unclear statements of The Sun Treatise and have
written commentaries and marginalia to make its usefulness accessi-
ble. However, disputes arose among them and contradictions among
their words. Therefore I have decided to write The New Commentary
on the Sun Treatise thus unveiling and uncloaking it and revealing its
secrets.51
This work by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar contains 286 pages,
and the main structure reflects the structure of the basic text: an Intro-
duction, three articles and a Conclusion. Ayyub-zade had the goal to
address not only the problems addressed in the basic text, but to
include as many problems as possible, almost encompassing the over-
all issue of logic that had ever been included in literature in Arabic at
that time, despite his modestly saying that he just wished to supplement
the short necklace. The abundance of material he collected is skill-
fully and logically added to the basic structure, opening new chapters,
new sections and new divisions. His exceptional pedantry, characteris-
tic of his opus in general, is present in its full extent in this work. This
was possible thanks to the very nature of logic. The work starts with a
Foreword (fol. 1b5a), followed by:
50 There are two manuscript copies of this work.

The autograph is kept at the Gazi Husrev-beys library in Sarajevo, nr. 793, fol. 1a
142b, it is sized 13 20 cm with 23 rows per page. The autograph was used for the needs
of this book, and the quotations given here are taken from it.
A manuscript copy is kept in the Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of
Arts and Sciences in Zagreb, N 1407/II, fol. 7b146a, sized 13 20 cm. It is a transcript
made in 1781, by Ahmad,
. son of Husain,
. from Ljubuski.
51 Authograph: GHB, br. 793, fol. 1b2a.
42 chapter two
Introduction (al-muqaddima), fol. 5a13a:

(1) Discussion on the essence of logic (bah. t f bayan mahiyyat al-mant.iq),

fol. 5a10b,
. u# li al-mant.iq), fol. 10b13a.
(2) Discussion on the subject of logic (f mawd
Article OneOn Particular Terms (al-maqala al-"ulaf al-mufradat), fol.
13b54b:
1. Section on words (al-fas.l f al-alfaz),
. fol. 14a25b,
2. Section on simple ideas (f al-ma#an al-mufrada), fol. 25a38b,
3. Section on expression of the universal and the particular (f mabahi . t al-kull
wa al-guz"), fol. 38b54b:

a. Research on the universal term (mabha . t f al-kull), fol. 38b39a,
b. Research on the nature of the universal term, fol. 39a40a,
c. Research on the opposition of terms, fol. 40a45a,
d. Research of particular terms, fol. 45a46b,
e. Research of universal terms, fol. 46b50b,
f. Section on definitions (al-fas.l f at-ta#rfat) fol. 50b54b).
. aya), fol. 54b106b:
Article TwoOn Judgments (f al-qad
Introduction, fol. 54b57b,
1. Section on categorical judgments (f al-hamliyya),
. fol. 57b80a:
a. Research on its parts and divisions (f agza"iha wa aqsamiha),
fol. 57b62b,
b. Research on determination of the quantity of judgments (f tahq
. q al-
mah. s.u rat), fol. 62b65a,
c. Research on determination of the scope of judgments (f al-#udul wa
at-tah. s.l), fol. 65a69a,
d. Research on modal judgments (f al-qad . aya al-muwagg aha), fol.
69b80a,
2. Research on the division of conditional judgments (f aqsam as-sart.iyya),
fol. 80a87b,
3. Section on direct reasoning (f ahk
. am al-qad. aya), fol. 87b106b:
a. Research on the opposition of judgments (contradictoriness and con-
trariness) (f at-tanaqud),. fol. 87b93a,
b. Research on conversionequipollence (f al-#aks al-mustawa), fol.
93a101a,
c. Research of contraposition (f #aks an-naqd),
. fol. 101a106a,
d. Research on conditional judgments (f lawazim as-sart.iyyat), fol.
106a106b.
Article ThreeOn Syllogism (f al-qiyas), fol. 106b137b:

1. Section on definition of syllogism and its parts (f ta#rf al-qiyas wa aqsa-
mihi), fol. 106b120a:
(a) First figure (as-sakl al-awwal), fol. 109a111a,
(b) Second figure, fol. 111a113a,
(c) Third figure, fol. 113a115b,
(d) Fourth figure, fol. 115b120a,
2. Section on conditions for reasoning in sense of modality in mixed syllogisms (f
sara"it. li al-intag bi hasb
. al-giha f al-muhtalit.a t) fol. 120a127b:

(a) First figure, fol. 120a122a,
(b) Second figure, fol. 122a124b,
(c) Third figure, fol. 124b125b,
(d) Fourth figure, fol. 125b127b,
3. Section on connected syllogism in conditional judgments (f al-iqtiraniyyat
al-ka"inat min as-sart.iyyat), fol. 127b131b:
(a) Conjunctive judgments (al-muttas.ilat), fol. 128a129a,
(b) Disjunctive judgments (al-munfas.ilat), fol. 129a129b,
(c) Categorical and conjunctive (al-hamliyya
. wa al-muttas.ila), fol.
129b130a,
(d) Categorical and disjunctive, fol. 130a131a,
(e) Conjunctive and disjunctive, fol. 131a131b,
4. Section on separated syllogism (f al-qiyas al-istitna"), fol. 131b134b,

5. Section on supplements to syllogism (f lawahiq . al-qiyas), fol. 134b137b:
a. Complex syllogism (al-qiyas al-murakkab), fol. 134b135a,
b. Syllogism of absurd (al-qiyas al-hulf), fol. 135a136b,

c. Induction (al-istiqra"), fol. 136b137a,
d. Analogy (at-tamtl), fol. 137a137b.

Conclusion, fol. 137b143a:
1. Research on the integral parts of syllogism (f mawadd al-aqyisa), fol.
137b142a,
(a) indisputably safe knowledge (yaqniyyat), fol. 137b139a,
initial knowledgeaxioms, fol. 138a,
experience based knowledge, fol. 138b,
experiment based knowledge, fol. 138b,
intuitive knowledge, fol. 138b139a,
transferred knowledge, fol. 139a,
syllogism based proposition, fol. 139a139b,
apodictic (burhan), fol. 139b140b,
44 chapter two
(b) unsafe knowledge (gayr yaqniyyat), fol. 140b142a,

dialectic (gadal), fol. 140b,
rhetoric (hit.a ba), fol. 140b141a,

poetic (si#r), fol. 141a141b,
sophistic (safsat.a), fol. 141b142a,
2. Research on segments of science (f agza" al-#ulum), fol. 142a143b,
(1) subjects of science (mawd . u#at al-#ulum), fol. 142a142b,
(2) principles of science (al-mabadi"), fol. 142b,
axioms (al-bayyina bi nafsiha),
postulates (gayr al-bayyina bi nafsiha),
hypotheses (al-wad#), .
(3) issue of sciencetheses (al-masa"il), fol. 142b143a.
Although the presentation of the structure of this work by Ayyub-zade
does not include the divisions within sections, research, etc., it shows
that the author had great mastery in the field of logic, and that he suc-
ceeded in noticing characteristics that helped him classify all the areas
he wanted to tackle, thus giving extraordinary insight into their very
nature. The foreword of this work (fol. 4b5a) gives the authors opinion
on the importance of good composition, and the work itself shows that
it is possible to turn very voluminous material into a logical and har-
monic unit, and that it is possible to apply the logical method of classi-
fication that he theoretically discusses. In the foreword Mus.t.afa Ayyub-
zade underlines that he used a number of texts by a great many reputed
Arabic logicians, pointing out primarily Ibn Sna and al-Farab, as well
as a dozen of other authors and their works. Thanks to the fact that
this work is preserved in autograph and that it contains numerous mar-
gin and interlinear notes, it can be said that Ayyub-zade took into
account almost all important and known works in logic in Arabic. He
mentions three works by Ibn Sna,52 and commentaries on Ibn Snas
The Book of Instructions by Fahruddn ar-Raz,53 Nas.ruddn at.-T
. us,54

52 Besides the two already mentioned works by Ibn Sn a, Kitab al-isarat wa at-tanbhat
and Kitab as-sifa", Mustafa Ayyub-zade mentions an-Nagat.
53 Fahruddn ar-R az (died 606/1209) wrote two commentaries on this work: Lubab
al-isarat, that had several editions later on (Cairo, 1882, 1907, 1916 and 1936) and Sar h.
al-isarat f at-tab #iyya.t. see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 454 and S I, 816.
54 Nasruddn at-T
. . . us (died in 672/1273) wrote a work that is actually a criticism
of ar-Razs commentary (see footnote 53) titled Hall . muskilat al-Isarat. see: C. Brockel-
mann, GAL, G I, 454 and S I, 816.
al-Isfahan55 and others, also independently written works by Afdalud-

.
dn al-Hunag (11941249), Kamaluddn ibn Yunus (11561242), Nag-

muddn al-Katib, al-Urmaw, Samsudd n as-Samarqand, at-Taftaza-
ga n, al-Fanar and others.56
n, al-Gur
And finally, when writing on the literature, presentation methods
and structures of his works, it need be said that Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade
very skillfully connected the basic text, the literature used, and his own
thoughts and views, combining them into a mosaic of terms, logical
issues and knowledge. This work by Ayyub-zade is not only his most
important work in logic, but also one of the most valuable, if not the
most valuable in this field in Bosnian heritage. However, based on the
number of preserved copies, it seems that A Commentary on Isagogue
was more popular.
A Commentary on The Training in Logic and Apologetics

The last work written by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar that was
completed on September 13, 1706, was also, in one part, devoted to
logic. That was A Commentary on The Training in Logic and Apologetics
h. #ala Tahdb al-mant.iq wa al-kalam).57 This is a commentary writ-
(Sar

ten by Sa#duddn at-Taftazan.58 The first 84 pages of the autograph
are dedicated to logic, and page 85 to 285 to apologetics, or, more pre-
cisely, the application of dialectical methods in theology.59 Explaining
. ud ibn #Abdurrahm
55 Mahm
. an al-Isfahan (14th century), see: C. Brockelmann,
GAL, G I, 418; G II, 47; S I, 537, 628, 742, 926 and S II, 137.
Ayyub-zades text does not give precise indication which work by al-Isfahan was
referred to here. It was most probably al-Muh. akama bayna Nasruddn wa ar-Raz, see:
A.-M. Goichon, Introduction to Ibn Sna (Avicenne), Livre des directives et remarques,
BeyrouthParis, 1951, p. 73.
56 For details on individual authors see: C. Brockelmann, GAL.
57 We have so far registered two manuscript copies of this work.
The autograph was kept at the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, N 4668 (fol. 1b242b),
sized 13,5 20,3 cm, with 23 per page. It is cardboard bound with leather ridge and
lining. Besides the authors notes, and the note on endowment and conditions for using
the book, the protective page contains the original Ayyub-zades seal. This book relies
on the autograph which was used for quotations.
The other copy is kept at the Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts
and Sciences, under nr. 412 (fol. 4b253b), sized 13 21,2 cm, with 23 o each page. It
was copied by Ahmad, . son of Husayn,
. from Mostar, Du al-qa#da 19, 1151 (April 1,
1739).
58 Sa#duddn Mas# ud b. #Umar at-Taftazan, died in. 791/1389. See: C. Brockel-
mann, GAL, G II, 278280 (215216), S I, 514516, 531, 683 and S II, 301304.
59 The arabic expression kalam means speech, word, discussion, but in the construc-
46 chapter two
his motivations for creation of the commentary on this work, Mus.t.afa

Ayyub-zade said in the Introduction:
Many works have been written in the domain of logic and apolo-
getics, whose importance is known to those who know things. Some of
those works are more concise, while others are more comprehensive.
However, Tahdb al-man.tiq wa al-kalam, written by the cream of scholars

and great names, the role model of the respected and learned, the mod-
ern scholar and the great capacity Sa#duddn at-Taftazan, is a highly
esteemed work, a row of pearls in brilliant words. Its greatness exceeded
all of the great. If I were to spend all my life praising and commending
it, my words would be inept for describing all the good sides of that
work. It is dicult to understand it due to its conciseness, not everyone
shooting hits the blank, only the strong ones can come to its water, and
what it wishes to say can be grasped only by the talented. I have never
seen a complete commentary on this piece of writing. All that I saw
were the comments by some esteemed scholars on the part related to
logic. Moreover, I have never heard of a complete commentary60
In the text of The Training in Logic and Apologetic, that Mustafa Ayyub-
zade comments on, the topics of logic are not as systematically or
neatly presented as was the case with the previously listed works. The
author of the original text, Sa#duddn at-Taftazan, chooses the divi-
sion based on two fundamental terms: conceptions (tas.awwurat) and asser-
tions (tas.dqat), i.e. two chapters, and an Introduction (muqaddima) and
Conclusion (hatima). A similar starting point was taken by Hasan . Kaf
hi
al-Aq s
. .
a r in his K
a f
s Compendium of Logic, but al- Aqhi s
. .
a r naturally
and logically built upon it. Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade develops at-Taftazans
division, trying to make it as neat as possible, giving the contents of the
work with chapter titles and page numbers on the first page of the auto-
graph,61 which was very rare at the time. After a general introduction
(fol. 1b5a), the part dedicated to logic is divided as follows:
tion kalam Allah, it often means Gods speech. Thence #Ilm al-kalam denotes a discipline
that will treat thinking about words said to men in the Qur"an. Ibn Haldun, in his

Muqaddima, defined kalam in the following words: This is a science that contains argu-
ments based on rational proofs for defending religious dogma against innovators that
step out of the principles of belief in comparison to their predecessors and traditional-
ists (followers of the tradition). (Muqaddima, Cairo, s.a., 458). Western literature usually
refers to this discipline as dialectical or speculative theology and scholastic philosophy.
Its relations towards logic will be the subject of the 5th chapter.
60 See: autograph, OIS, nr. 4668, fol. 1b2a. Translation: M. Muji
c, Sejh Jujo u
svjetlu, pp. 297298.
61 These two sheets were inserted into the code later (the handwriting is evidently
Introduction (muqaddima), fol. 5a,

. fol. 6b,
(1) On the meaning of words (dalala al-lafz):
(2) Comprehension (al-mafhum), fol. 8b.
Conceptions (tas.awwurat), fol. 10b,
(1) Five universal terms (al-kulliyyat al-hams), fol. 10b,

(2) On genii (al-agnas), fol. 12a,
(3) Predicament on the Thing (al-maqul #ala as-say"), fol. 13a,
(4) Factor for the higher is factor for the lower (al-muqawwim li al-#al
muqawwim as-safil), fol. 13b,
(5) Conclusion on research of the universal (hatima li mabahi . t al-kulliyyat),

fol. 14b,
(6) Section on the definers (mu#arrif as-say"), fol. 15a,
Assertionscategorical judgments (tas.dqat), fol. 16b,
(1) Conditional judgments (as-sart.iyyat), fol. 23b,
(2) On opposition (at-tanaqud), . fol. 26a,
(3) On conversion (al-#aks al-mustawa), fol. 28b,
(4) On contraposition (al-#aks al-munqid), . fol. 30b,
(5) On syllogism (al-qiyas), fol. 31b,
(6) On conditional connected syllogism (al-qiyas as-sart. al-iqtiran), fol. 36b,
(7) On separate (disconnected) syllogism (al-qiyas al-istitna"), fol. 37b,

(8) On induction (al-istiqra"), fol. 39a,
(9) Syllogism is either apodictic (al-qiyas imma burhan), fol. 39b,
Conclusionparts of science (hatima"agza" al-#ulum), fol. 40b42a.

Although relatively small by volume, this work by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade
attempts to include as many logical issues as possible. What remains is
the fact that it is not so systematical and well-organized as his previous
work, which is certainly a consequence of the lack of system of the
basic text. Ayyub-zade seems to have sensed this, as he repeatedly
directs the readers to his The New Commentary on The Sun Treatise.62
It is evident from the previously quoted fragment that his goal was
to comment on and establish links between the logical theory and
implementation of its methods in apologetics. Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-
Ayyub-zades) so they do not have the original numerical order of folios, and are placed
between the protective sheet and the first folio, also copied and inserted later. This is
evident because the type of paper that was used for the first four pages is dierent.
62 See e.g. fol. 12a13b.
48 chapter two
Mostar used numerous works in logic (mostly those already used in

The New Commentary) for his writings, and some notes show that he was
familiar with the works of Aristotle (fol. 42a), understandably indirectly,
through the works of classical Arabic authors.

Muh. ammad b. Mus. .tafa al-Caynaw

Reference books and other sources contain very little data on Muham- .

mad b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw (Muhamed, son of Mustafa, Cajni canin).63
It can all be summarized in just a few sentences. He was born in

Cajni ce in 1731. He acquired his primary education in Sarajevo, and
higher in Istanbul. From 1781 to 1783 he taught at D umisics Madrasa
in Sarajevo, and twice in 1783 and 1785, he was appointed as the mufti
(supreme court judge) of Sarajevo. He died in Sarajevo, on March 20,
1792.
The only still known work of his from the time he taught at the
madrasa, is the one in logic, called Revelation of Secrets in Commenting
ag u g ) that was preserved in
on Isagogue (Fath. al-asrar f sarh. al-Is
several manuscript copies. This is a semi-extensive commentary on
64
al-Abhars Isagogue written on about 120 pages. After the foreword

(fol. 1b11a), the text is divided into nine chapters:
63 Transcripts of these works were used in: Baseskija, Ljetopis, Sarajevo, 1968, pp. 247
and 391; S. Kemura, Sarajevske muftije, Sarajevo, 1916, pp. 1719; M. Handzic, Knjizevni
rad, pp. 105; Kamel el-Buhi, Arapski radovi, pp. 398399; H. Hasandedic, Djela i
kraci sastavi, Anali GHB, vol. 4, Sarajevo, 1976, pp. 117118; A. Bejtic, Jedno videnje

sarajevskih evlija i njihovih grobova kao kultnih mjesta, POF, XXXI/1981, Sarajevo,
1982, pp. 116.
64 There are five manuscript copies that were reviewed and collated for this purpose:
OIS, R 933; GHB, br. 219 and 3439; Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy
of Arts and Sciences, N 1243 (with about 10 sheets of manuscript missing) and the
manuscript from the Archives of Herzegovina in Mostar, nr. 138.
As the author of this book deemed the manuscript from the Archives of Herzegovina
very correct (with very few orthographical and other mistakes) and very intelligible, he
decided to use it as grounds for this book. This manuscript has 86 sheets (fol. 1b86b),
sized 17 11 cm, with 15 rows per page. It is bound in linen, and copied by a student at
Bentbasa Madrasa in Sarajevo, named Yusuf (see fol. 86). See: H. Hasandedic, Katalog
arapskih, turskih i perzijskih rukopisa, Mostar, 1977, p. 21.
By the time this book was completed, the author of this book got the information
from a colleague, Salih Trako, that the National and University Library Petar Kocic
in Banja Luka holds one more manuscript copy of this work (sign. III-5481), which is
probably the autograph. (See: S. Trako, Tragovi minulih stoljeca, Nedeljni Glas, Banja
Luka, September 20 and 21, 1986, 8).
1. Isagogue, fol. 11a37a,

2. . fol. 37a40b,
On interpretative speech (f al-qawl as-sa rih),
3. On judgment (f al-qad . a y
a ), fol. 40b62a,
4. On syllogism (f al-qiyas), fol. 62a82a,
5. Apodictic (al-burhan), fol. 82a84b,
6. Dialectic (al-gadal), fol. 84b85a,
7. Rhetoric (al-hit.a ba), fol. 85a85b,

8. Poetic (as-si#r), fol. 85b,
9. Sophistic (al-muga lat.a), 85b86a.
A comparison of this work with A Commentary on Isagogue by Mus.t.afa
Ayyub-zade al-Mostar shows that about three quarters of the com-
mentary by Muhammad .
al-Caynaw are exactly the same as the ones
of the work by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade, in other words, a large part of
his work was taken as it is. The attention to this fact is drawn by a
sentence in which Ayyub-zade, speaking about one way of conversion,
says:
The lines in our commentary added to the marginalia (glossari-
ums) on The Disputation by Mas#ud (Rum) verify this, and we have
explained it to a sucient extent.65 and indeed, Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade
commented on this work twice.66 Five years before A Commentary on Isa-
gogue was written, at the time when Ayyub-zade intensively worked
on disputation and dialectics, he completed an immensely comprehen-
sive collection of twelve, according to him, significant texts in this field,
which are today kept in the University Library in Bratislava.67
The same sentence was aopted by Muhammad .
al-Caynaw .68 As

the autograph of al-Caynaws work is still unavailable, it cannot be
confirmed whether he noted that he used Ayyub-zades A Commentary
on Isagogue, but the text itself proves that indisputably. The first part of
its title, Revelation of Secrets, is frequently used in the Orient in many
fields, and it indicates that the texts bearing it are additions or super-
commentaries.
Although it can be said that the overall heritage in Arabic in the field
of logic of a later date was in the spirit of idea and form of their great
65 Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar agug, p. 49.

h. Is
66 See: A. Ljubovic, Na marginama rukopisnih djela Mustafe Ejubovica (1651
1707), Hercegovina, br. 4, Mostar, 1985, pp. 231233.
67 J. Blaskovi c and others, Arabische, trkische und persische Handschriften der Universitts-
bibliothek in Bratislava, Bratislava, 1961, N 249260 and N 193202.
68 Muhammad b. Mustaf
.
. . a al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 61b.
50 chapter two
predecessors, the opus of Muhammad

.
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw clearly
has the character of an epigone.
Other authors
Besides these four authors whose biographies can be traced from reli-
able sources and literature, and whose work in the field of logic left
a visible mark, the research on the collections of oriental manuscripts
disclosed a number of authors, teachers and transcribers who worked
in the field of logic. However, there are no reliable sources that would
make the reconstruction of their biographies possible and verify their
identity. This book will address three more authors with comprehen-
sive works in logic, whose name contains at least some notes disclosing
either their place of birth or the place where they lived, and the works
contain at least the approximate time period when they worked.
Ibrahm b. Ramad. an al-Bosnaw (Bosnjak)

Mehmed Handzic was the first one to make note of this author in
his text Several Precious Manuscripts in Karadozbeys Library in
Mostar, when he came across the work titled Ta #lqat #ala Sar
69 h. as-
Samsiyya (Notes Accompanying The Commentary on the Sun Trea-
tise). M. Handzic drew attention to the introductory words that,
among other things, say:
Ibrahm b. Ramad hi
. an al-Bosnaw al-Aq . s.a r (Pruscak), al-Nawa-
badi says: These words that I have written are in connection with The
Commentary on The Sun Treatise by a distinguished scholar, a Bosniac,
from when I had the honor to study it under his guidance.70
Based on these words, he concluded that a distinguished scholar,
a Bosniac refers to Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, that Ibrahm b.
Ramad . an al-Bosnaw was his student, and that this work is a margina-
lia (glossarium) to accompany Mus.t.afas commentary.
69 M. Hand
zic, Nekoliko dragocjenih rukopisa u Karadozbegovoj biblioteci u Mos-
taru, GIVZ, II/12, 1934, pp. 633639.
70 Ibrahm b. Ramad. an al-Bosnaw, Ta #lqat, fol. 1b.
In his work, M. Handzic, quotes this sentence both in the original and in translation,
although he skips the words al-Aq hi
. s.a r al-Nawabad for no apparent reason.
In his doctoral dissertation, criticizing, in his opinion, this careless

conclusion, Kamel el-Buhi assumed that the reference was to Muham- .
mad b. Musa #Allamak and the margin notes accompanying his work,
and that Ibrahm was his student.71
All subsequent researchers of Bosnian heritage in Oriental languages
who wrote on this author and his opus, gave preference to one or the
other theory without studying the contents of the work. This was most
probably partly due to the fact that the paper by M. Handzic does
not give the number of the manuscript code or any other data on the
manuscript at the time he reviewed it.
Following the information that this manuscript was once kept at the

manuscript fund of the Karadozbeys Library, we found the manuscript
at Gazi Husrev-beys Library. Here are some conclusions on this
72
author and his work:

the full name of the author, given in transcription, is: Ibrahm b.
Ramad hi
. an al-Bosnaw al-Aq . s.a r an-Nawabad;73
there is no original title in the manuscript, but, having in mind the
formulation given by the author, the title as given by M. Handzic
can be accepted: Ta #lqat #ala Sar
h. as-Samsiyya
(Notes Accompany-
ing The Commentary on the Sun Treatise);74
detailed analysis shows that he made margin notes date in con-
tinuo, with the work by Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak The Com-
mentary on The Sun Treatise;
the work was not completed (unless another, complete, copy is
found), but commentary is present until the end of the first section
(fas.l) of the first article (maqala).75 In other words, it contains
marginalia accompanying:
71 Kamel el-Buhi, Arapski radovi jugoslovenskih pisaca, Beograd, 1963, pp. 394395. Buhi
made this conclusion based on the assumption that Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade was more
famous as al-Mostar, and that Ibrahm b. Ramad . an, if he had referred to him,
would have used this name, rather than al-Bosnaw. According to the quotation that
he adopted from Handzics work (with the mistake that Handzic made accidentally),
we can assume that Buhi did not have contact with the manuscript itself.
72 GHB, R 4043 (ref. nr. of Karadozbeys
Library, K 718). The manuscript has 55
sheets (fol. 1a55a), sized 19 12 cm, with 17 rows per page.
73 Fol. 1b.
74 See: M. Hand zic, Nekoliko, pp. 635.
75 The basic text and the text of Muhammad b. M
. usa #Allamaks commentary are
divided into: an Introduction (with two discourses), three articles and a Conclusion.
52 chapter two
1. Foreword,
2. Introduction,
a) Discussion on the essence of logic,
b) Discussion on the subject of logic,
3. On particular terms,
a) Section on words.76
Today it is very dicult to state who Ibrahm b. Ramad . an was. How-
ever, based on the scarce data found in the introduction to his work,
it can be stated that he lived in the mid-17th century, that he was a
student of Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak (therefore he wrote his work
before 1636), that he was originally from Prusac, i.e. that he is linked
to the location of Nawabad, a settlement close to Prusac, founded by
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r (Pruscak).77 Based on some indications such
as the name Ibrahm, the denotation al-Aq hi. s.a r (Pruscak), the time
period in which he was active, the field of his interests, etc. it is possible
that he is the same person as an author mentioned by G. Flgel in his
Catalogue. Flgel says that he is the author of a short text in the field of
logic (two pages) that deals with four syllogistic figures.78 However, the
data that would validate this assumption are scarce.
As for the Notes Accompanying The Commentary on the Sun Treatise, it
can be said that it is not only a collection of marginal notes (h . asiya)
to Muhammad
. b. M u sa #All
a maks work, but that its contents also
underline its nature of an epigone. In most of the notes (ta#lqat),
Ibrahm b. Ramad . an al-Bosnaw, only tried to clarify what #Allamak
already said, but in a shorter and simpler way, and very rarely refers to
additional literature in places where the original author did not, and,
when he does, primarily to the works by Ibn Sna.
76 For Arabic titles of chapters, see the part on The Commentary on The Sun Treatise
by Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak and The New Commentary on The Sun Treatise by
Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-zade al-Mostar.

77 See: H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, p. 176 and A. Handzic, O formiranju nekih
gradskih naselja u Bosni u XVI vijeku, POF, XXV/1975, Sarajevo, 1976, pp. 148
152.
78 The title of this short discourse is ar-Risala al-muta #alliqa bi al-a
skal al-arba #a (A
Treatise on the Four Figures), written (sic!, or copied?) in 1695/96 (1107), which is
kept today at the National Library in Vienna, Mixt. 1327,3 (fol. 122v123r). Compare:

H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, p. 663 and S. Trako, Ibrahim Munib Akhisari i njegov
#Pravni zbornik", POF, 2829/19781979, Sarajevo, 1980, pp. 215.
zicawal (Uzicanin)
Fad. il U
This author is not included in any of the major works of bibliographi-
cal character (either in the Ottoman chronicles, or in the works of more
recent times). Collecting Oriental manuscripts in Bosnia and Herze-
govina for the needs of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences
in Zagreb, Aleksej Olesnicki came across a manuscript in the field of
logic, written by a certain Fadil . U zicawal, filed it in the Oriental Col-
lection of the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, and catalogued
it for internal use. This catalogue note on Fadil . U zicawal and his work

is referred to by M. Zdralovic in one of the notes accompanying his
A Contribution to the Knowledge of the Work of Sejh Jujo (Mus.t.afa

Ayyub-zade al-Mostar). A detailed review of the manuscript copy of
79
the work titled Sar h. matn Is agug li Mawla al-Fad. il U zicawal (A Com-
mentary on Isagogue by Mawla al-Fadil
. Uzicawal), which is today
kept in the manuscript collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and
Sciences,80 lead to the following conclusions:
the authors name given is Mawla Fadil . U zicawal;
the text has the above given title, used by A. Olesnicki, and it
shows that it belongs to the group of semi-extensive commentaries
of Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar;

the contents are divided in accordance with the basic text, into:
1. Foreword, fol. 1b3a,

2. Isagogue (inclusive of a discourse on words and a discourse on the
five universal terms), fol. 3a9a,
3. On interpretative speech (rules of definition and description forming),
fol. 9a10b,
4. On judgments, fol. 10b20a,
5. On syllogism, fol. 20a26b,
6. Apodictic, fol. 26b28a,
7. Dialectic, fol. 28a28b,
c, Prilog poznavanju, Hercegovina, nr. 1, Mostar, 1981, p. 136, note

79 M. Zdralovi
nr. 33.
80 Oriental Collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, N 728. The
manuscript has 29 sheets (fol. 1a29a), sized 18 12 cm, with 25 rows per page. Leather
bound. Possibly autograph.
54 chapter two
8. Rhetoric, fol. 28b,

9. Poetic, fol. 28b i
10. Sophistic, fol. 28b29a.81
The work was completed in the summer (precisely between July 23
and August 2) of 1657.82 Based on the sources and literature that is
available today, it cannot be determined who Fadil . U zicawal was
even the denotation Fadil,
. that is accepted as his proper name, is
not necessarily his real name. Some Oriental manuscripts practiced
replacing the name of an author with the word fadil, . which means
excellent, exquisite; prominent; learned, etc.83
The work itself, by its internal structure and contents, is very sim-
ilar to The Commentary on Isagogue by Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf b. Ayyub-
zade al-Mostar and The Revelation of Secrets by Muhammad
. b. Mus.t.afa

al-Caynaw . The dierence in structure between this and previously
discussed works is that Fadil zicawal did not include any introduc-
. U
tion to his commentary, not even an invocation, but instead imme-
diately started commenting on the basic work, and that its first page
(fol. 1a) contains a short table of contents in Turkish. More signif-
icant dierences are that Fadil . U zicawal, in the chapter On Syllo-
gism (qiyas), pays special attention to the first syllogistic figure and its
modes, whereas for other figures he only gives the rules of deduc-
tion.84
Muh. ammad b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw (Bosnjak)

agug f
Just like the prvious work, the work titled Fath. al-asrar f sarh. Is
#ilm al-man.tiq (Revelation of Secrets in Commenting on Isagogue in
the Science of Logic), written by Muhammad
. b. Yusuf, al-Bosnaw,
was discovered and catalogued for the needs of the Yugoslav (Croatian)
81 For Arabic titles of chapters, see the chapter on A Commentary on Isagogue by

82 Fadil
. U zicawal, Sar
h. matn, fol. 29a.
83 A typical example of such use of this word was in the work by Ibr ahm b.
Ramad . an al-Bosnaw, who replaces the full name of Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak
with the words: al-fadil . an-nihr. r al-Bosnaw, which was, at the time and the place
where he lived, sucient to recognize who it was about.
84 See fol. 22b23a.
Academy of Arts and Sciences, by A. Olesnicki,85 and is later men-

tioned by M. Zdralovi c in one of his notes.86
This work, just like the others presented here, is a commentary on
Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar, and has the same structure:

1. Foreword, fol. 107b112b,
2. Isagogue, fol. 112a117b,
3. On interpretative speech, fol. 117b119a,
4. On judgments, fol. 119a125b,
5. On syllogism, fol. 125b130a,
6. Apodictic, fol. 130a131a,
7. Dialectic, fol. 131a131b,
8. Rhetoric, fol. 131b,
9. Poetic, fol. 131b i
10. Sophistic, fol. 131b132a.87
As the presented shows, this work belongs among shorter (s.agr) com-
mentaries, and by contents it is similar to the previously presented com-
mentaries on Isagogue. Similar to the work by Fadil . U zicawal, the chap-
ter On syllogism (F al-qiyas) gives a detailed analysis of the first syllogis-
tic figure, while the other three are presented only through the rules of
deduction and a number of modes per figure.88
This work originates from before 1841 (the date when it was copied),
approximately from late 18th century. Although reliable data isnt avail-
able, we can assume that the author of this work was the same per-
son as Muhammad
. b. Yusuf (died in 1770), the librarian of Osman

Sehdis Library in Sarajevo, and the mufti of Sarajevo (17581763).
This Muhammad
. b. Yusuf was mentioned by S. Kemura89 and H.
Sabanovic,90 and he wrote two works in Arabic syntax.91
85 Oriental collection of the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences, N 797/III.

The work has 26 sheets (fol. 107a132b), sized 11 16,8 cm, with 15 rows per page.
Lehter bound. Whole codex, this work included, was copied by a certain #Umer (Omer)
Pilav, son of S . in 1841 (1257).
. alih,

86 M. Zdralovi c, Prilog poznavanju, Hercegovina, br. 1, Mostar 1981, p. 130, note
nr. 34.
87 For Arabic titles of chapters, see the chapter on The Commentary on Isagogue by

88 Vidjeti: fol. 127a.
89 S. Kemura, Sarajevske muftije od 9261519. do 13341916, Sarajevo, 1916, 1415 and
1516.

90 H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, 490491.
91 The first, Tabb al-mubtadi #n, was completed in 1748 (1161), and it was written in

56 chapter two
This exhausts the list of authors who have one or more works in the
field of logic in their opuses. Still, there remains a number of names for
whom it was impossible to catch the threads that would lead to solid
facts on authors and classification of their work. Nevertheless, we can
say that this material mainly presents fragments of commentaries on
the Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar (usually syllogistic or presentations

of the four syllogistic figures) and various mnemotechnic compositions,
such as logical rules composed to verse, or charts of dierent division.
And, eventually, that material contains nothing new or significantly
dierent compared to the works presented here.
This summary of the contents of works by Bosniac writers in the field

of logic shows that, despite dierences in structure and types of works,
specifically the dierences in linking issues discussed in certain chapters,
volumes or folios (apart from the marginalia that are a special kind
of writing), they all exercise common general topics and have a clear
focus on the elementary issues. Another characteristic of these works
that they share with the rest of the heritage influenced by Ibn Sna,
is that all issues treated, regardless of dierent divisions, make up only
parts of the unique entity of the Arabic organon. Therefore, these are
not separate branches of logic that rest on their own canon, as logic
was seen in the first centuries of Arabic logic, instead its parts create a
complex but concrete entity. Its center lies in syllogism, and everything
else either precedes it as a necessary precondition for understanding,
or follows from it as its application. So, among the works by Bosniac
authors there is no division of books in logic (kitab) that existed in the
preceding period.
Turkish, on Arabic syntax (manuscript: OIS, R 1128). The other, al-Yaqn, is a com-
mentary on an Arabic grammar for beginners, also in Turkish (manuscript: OIS,
R 2584).
chapter three
CHARACTERISTICS OF WORKS IN THE FIELD

OF LOGICISSUES IN THE FIELD OF LOGIC
Besides the fact that writings in the field of logic, as evident from
the previous chapter, are classified dierently, that they treat dierent
issues in the field of logic dierently, and that they vary in what they
encompass, all these writings have unique general structure that springs
out of the elementary concept of logic as a whole, as seen by Arabic
Aristotelians. However, before the presentation of elementary issues in
the field of logic, and before pointing out the assumptions, teachings
and theories that logic is grounded in, it should be said that this text is
presented in the order of the texts that are used as references for this
book, and that this will be divided in four units, a division evident in
the referential texts. First, subject, method, and objective of logic (from
introduction and foreword), second, teaching of notions (assumptions
and objectives), third, teaching on judgment and fourth, teaching on
conclusion.
Subject, Method and Objective of Logic
One of the characteristics of valuable writings in the field of spiritual

creativity in Oriental languages, and writings in the field of logic as
well, is that the very beginning, besides the usual preambleinvocation
and procedure (sometimes written with artistic pretensions) gives a very
instructive and useful introduction or foreword. The length and quality
of an introduction is dierent for each piece of writing, and it is often in
proportion with the size of the work itself. The analysis of the writings
of Bosniac authors shows that the data given in introductions can be
classified into two groups:
information that help identify the author and the work (titles, in
the modern sense of word, are rarely found);
information that help the reader understand the presentation that
follows.
58 chapter three
Introductions from this second group often contain some very valu-
able information:
the area to which the work belongs,
the subject of logic and its definition,
the relation between logic and other disciplines, and in this con-
text, the relation of a human being with the world,
the definition of thinking and logical contents of thinking,
the definition of cognition and how it is acquired,
the definition of science, what is the truth and how it is reached,
the definition of the starting points of logic, where it comes from
and where it is going,
identification of sources and literature that the work lies upon, and
structure of the work, division to volumes, chapters, etc.
Such well-organized introductions help the readers reconstruct the an-
swers that the authors give to the elementary questions, such as:
What is logic?
What is its subject constituted of ?
What are its methods and what is its objective?
Arabic logicians also adopted polemics originating as early as the time
of stoics and the first Greek commentaries on Aristotles writings on the
place and role of logic and its definitions, which are usually presented
in the form of questions such as: is logic part of philosophy or not?, or
is it a discipline or a skill, i.e. an instrument of science? Some traces of
these polemics are also evident in the writings of Bosniac authors. But,
first it would be useful to point out its roots and its main features.
The classification of disciplines defined by Aristotle, especially defi-
nition of philosophy as begging for principal questions and its divi-
sion had great influence on Arabic philosophers, bcause of the author-
ity that the first teacher had in the minds of Arabic logicians. In
his Metaphysics1 Aristotle said that any spiritual activity is either theo-
retical, practical or poetical. The task of theoretical philosophy is to
study the problem of existence and being, practical philosophy studies
human actions, and poetical philosophy, in a narrow sense, is related
to technical and artistic actions. It was clear to the Arabic logicians, al-
Farab and the Ibn Sna, that logic (or analytics) does not fit into such
a division, as it is a necessary precondition for any form of thinking,
1 Aristotel, Metafizika [Metaphysics], Belgrade, 1960, VI, I, 1025b25.

characteristics of works in the field of logic 59
philosophical thinking included. In several places in his works, Ibn Sna

points out the essential character of logic,2 and two of his standpoints
are reflected in the works of almost all Bosniac authors, either as quo-
tations or as references. The first comes from his Book of Healing (Kitab
as-sifa") where he says:
If the term philosophy denotes only the science of beings, whether
real or unreal, logic is a part of it, and if the term philosophy applies
to all speculative research of whatever kind, logic, for sure is an integral
part that plays the role of an instrument in other disciplines.3
The other reference used by Bosniac authors to define logic is the
first sentence from Ibn Snas Book of Remarks and Admonitions (Kitab al-
isa rat wa at-tanbhat) saying:
Logic oers a kind of instrument, that, if well used, can protect the
human being from error in the process of thinking.4
In all writings that followed, regardless of whether logic is treated
as part of philosophy or not, it is at least at the entrance into philos-
ophy maintaining the feature of instrument (ala).5 So Hasan . Kaf

al-Aqhi . s.a r in his first work Kafs Compendium of Logic, avoiding more
detailed explanations, says that logic is a discipline, a science (#ilm), and
that it is an instrument that has the characteristics of laws that
prevent error of the mind (dihn) while thinking (fikr).6

In the Commentary on his own piece of writing (fol. 6a7a) he does
not divert from the polemic. First (fol. 6a), he defines logic as a science,
as it has its own subject of research and as its essence is in research
(kawnuhu bahi . t). Then, its important characteristic is that it is at the

same time a tool (ala) or instrument (wasit.a) of science, which has
the nature of law (al-qanuniyya). It is evident that the word ala
(tool) is a literary translation of the word organon, and that the
word qanuniyya clearly points out the peripatetic name for logic
canonic. There is also the fact that al-Aq hi
. s.a r in his Commentary
is critical of the above stated definitions, as its last part turns into a
2 See e.g.: Ibn Sna (Avicenne), Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab al-isa rat wa at-
tanbhat), traduction avec introduction et notes par A.-M. Goichon, BeyrouthParis,
1951, pp. 7981 and Kitab as-sifa", al-Qahira, 1952, pp. 1314 (fol. 4a, b).
3 Kitab a s-sifa", p. 13.
4 Livre des directives, p. 79.
5 The word ala, pl. alat literally means tools, device, instrument. That is where
the name for logic comes from #ilm alat, instrumental discipline. For more see: A.-
M. Goichon, Vocabulaires compars, p. 2.
6 Muhtasar al-Kaf min al-mantiq, OIS, R 591, fol. 29, also see: Izabrani spisi, p. 62.
. .
60 chapter three
description (Arabic: rasm), as it is defined in terms of the goal, and

as the goal of something is without itself, the definition becomes an
external description. However, as al-Aq hi
. s.a r later says, it was done to
provide a clear and comprehensive presentation of the most important
features of logic.7 He also adds that logic is called #ilm al-mzan.8 Here
the word that is usually used for chemistry stands figuratively, and
although it is not to be found in standard dictionaries of Arabic, it is
known in this meaning in the classical Arabic literature.
Other Bosniac authors approach these issues in the same way. One
of the authors who devoted most space and attention to this issue was
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in his New Commentary on The Sun Treatise.
Therefore, one of the chapters (bah. t) in the Introduction to his work is

titled Discourse on the Essence of Logic (fol. 5a10b). He gives a very
precise and well-organized list of works that he used while research-
ing this issue, pointing out primarily Ibn Snas Book of Healing, Book of
Remarks and Admonitions and Book of Safety, as well as Disclosure of Secrets
and Explanations (Kasf al-asrar wa al-bayan),9 Shine of Illumination (Mat.a li#
al-anwar),10 Glitter of the Hidden Thoughts (Lawami# al-asrar)11 and Gath-
ami# ad-daqa"iq).12 He then presents dierent views of
ered finesses (G
these issues, emphasizing al-Farab, who, according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade, saw logic as a tool and Ibn Sna, who treated it as sci-
ence (#ilm), and his followers who considered logic to be speculative
philosophy (al-hikma
. an-nazariyya).
. 13
Deducing his discussion on this
issue, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade reaches a conclusion similar to that of
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, that logic is science, but is also the instru-
7 h. Muhtas. ar al-Kaf min al-man.tiq, fol. 7a.

Sar
8 h. Muhtas. ar, fol. 7ab.
Sar
This name can be found in other writings of Bosniac authors, and it literally means:
the science of order, scales, balance. Besides this name for logic, other terms are
used, such as: mi #yar al- #ulum, which literally means: measure, criteria of science (See
e.g.: Muhammad
.
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 10a), then hadim al- #ulum,
literally: servant to science and ra"s al-h. ikma (al- #ulum), literally: the head, the elder
of wisdom (science). This use, according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar,

originates from Ibn Sna and al-Farab (See: as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 3b).
9 Author: Afdaluddn al-H
. unag (11941249), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 463.

10 Author: Sir
ag uddn al-Urmaw (died 1283), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 467;
S I 588.
11 This is the commentary on the previous work by Qutbuddn at-Taht
. . an ar-Raz,
died 1346, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 467; G II 209; S I 848 and S II, 293.
12 Author Na gmuddn al-Qazwn al-Katib, student of the aforementioned Nas.rud-
. (13th century), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 466467 and S I, 845848.
dn at.-Tus
13 As-sarh. al-gadd, fol. 1b3b, especially fol. 1a and notes on the margins.
ment of science. It is a part of philosophy, but is also an intro-

duction into philosophy. Muhammad . #Allamak treats this issue in the
same way, underlining that logic is more of a science than can be
assumed, and that the attributes of instrumentality and canonic
are general accident (#arad. #amm li al-mant.iq).14
The issue of logic is explained in detail in Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
zades work New Commentary on The Sun Treatise, similar to that of
Muhammad
. b. Musa al-Bosnaw #Allamak, and unlike al-Aq hi
. s.a rs

work Kafs Compendium of Logic, Ayyub-zades own work, Commentary on
the Isagogue and other works where logic is given in the contents of the
work.15 The second part of the Introduction is titled Discussion on the
Subject of Logic (Bah. t f mawd
. u# al-mant.iq).16 Considerable space is
devoted to this issue in Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zades Commentary on the
Training in Logic and Apologetics, but even there he directs the reader
to the New Commentary (if you want to learn more, go back to
our commentary on The Sun Treatise).17 Consequently, this paper will
search for answers on the subject of logic according to the logicians of
this circle in this Ayyub-zades piece of writing.
As we have seen, logic is defined, with minor variations, as teaching
the forms of correct and truthful thinking, but not all kinds of thinking,
rather thinking that is scientific or in harmony with the scientific. Its
goal is cognition (ma#lumat). Two basic elements with which to research
and reach (tah. s.l) the unknown are tas. awwurat and tas. dqat, and are, at
the same time, two basic elements of cognition.
The term tas. awwur (pl. tas. awwurat) denotes the elementary form
of thinking and cognition on an actual or imaginary object, or, in
Arabic vocabulary, cognition of the simplethe individual (idrak al-
mufrad), where cognition (idrak) means perceptioneither through the
senses (mahs . usat), or through mind (ma#qulat)and intuition. In the
conclusion, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade says: Perception (idrak) of a
14 h. ar-Risala as-samsiyya, fol. 10b.

Sar
15 Usually the contents of a discipline is presented in very short form, in two-three
sentences that present the contents of the work by chapters. So, for example, Hasan .
hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r says: Logic has two (main) areas: tas. awwurat and tas. dqat. Each of the
two has its objective and its goals. Its objectives tas. awwurat are the five universalia (the
five predicables), and the goal is definitions. Objectives tas. dqat are judgments, and goal
is syllogism and its forms. That makes four chapters, but I extended it to five, including
(a chapter on) words. (Muhtas. ar al-Kaf min al-man.tiq, fol. 2b3a, also: Izabrani spisi,
62).
16 As-sarh. al-gadd, fol. 10b11b.
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 6a6b.
17 Sar

62 chapter three
simple thing is called tas. awwur.18 This book will frequently translate the
word tas. awwur as conception. However, this term has a dierent meaning
in the common philosophical vocabulary, especially psychology.
The term tas. dq (pl. tas.dqat), according to Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade,
means cognition of relations (idrak an-nisba) between two notions,
through acceptance (tas.dq) of this relation, regardless of whether this
cognition is a result of thinking or merely spontaneous acceptance, or
whether this relation is truthful or not. It therefore stands for a kind of
judgment or assertion, so this book will often translate tas. dq as assertion.
Having in mind that the creation of conception can be subjected to
error, such as taking accidence for essence and other, and multiple error
in deduction of assertions, it is necessary to pose elementary rules that
the spirit (dihn)19 should act upon.

The perfect form of conception is the explicative discourse (qawl sa rih), .
that can be either definition (hadd). or description (rasm), and the perfect
assertion is reached through argument (hugg a), that can be either syllogism

(qiyas), induction (istiqra") or example, i.e. analogy, (tamtl). Therefore, the

main issue that logicians are interested in is starting from the known to
reach the unknown (maghulat), keeping in mind the laws of correct
thinking.20 Moreover, Arabic logicians feel that there is no thinking
without speech and vice versa, they define logic as a tool for correct
thinking and a precondition for truthful speech (qawl). They focus on
study of words, which they always place at the beginning of works in
the field of logic as a precondition of successful understanding of the
issues introduced later.
Such a definition of the elementary subject of logic resulted in the
elementary division of the problems treated by dierent works, includ-
ing those written in form of compendia, and those that present very
comprehensive discussions.
And, eventually, with the definition and the subject of logic, it is
necessary to present the theory of cognition, or to be more precise,
the theory of intelligence, not only because its main assumptions are
mentioned in the introductory parts of all works in the field of logic by
18 As-sarh. al-gadd, fol. 11ab.

19 Dihnspirit, mind, intellect. As a notion it denotes the part of spiritual life

manifested as thinking, i.e. mind or intellect. In the first translations of the Greek texts
and in their interpretations, it was used to describe the Greek terms, nous and pneuma.
See: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires compars, dihn.
20 As-sarh. al-gadd, fol. 11b.
Bosniac authors among all, but also because it is treated as integral and
inseparable part of logic.
Understandably, because of the time and the conditions in which
Bosniac authors lived, they tried to formulate the issue of cognition
in their works in a severe formal logical framework, dierent from
those in which these issues were discussed in the works that they used
as references. So Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a rs Kafs Compendium of Logic
presents only one assertion directed to the theory of cognition; it says:
The human cognition of abilities which accept the carving of the
pictures of all things accepted through the senses (sensible) and through
intellect (intelligible) is called the spirit, and that carving is called knowl-
edge.21
This assertion gives a mere hint that Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r thinks
from al-Farabs standpoint, according to which the cognition can be
compared with setting a seal, who, in the attempt to clarify the process
of cognition, uses Aristotelian tendency to link form to matter, the
power to the act, and in this sense, the Aristotelian notion of a seal
pressed in wax.22
Another important and distinguished element in al-Aq hi
. s.a rs con-
cept, that he will develop further in his Commentary (fol. 18b19a) is
his belief that the way to knowledge goes either through the senses
(mahs
. usat) or through intellect (ma#qulat), together leading to the par-
ticular or the universal. Later, in his (Compendium, fol. 17b and Commen-
tary, fol. 21b), Hasan
. Kaf will develop on the basic operations of the
intellect: abstraction (the creation of conception or ideas abstracted from
matter), forming definitions or descriptions, i.e. the operation of combina-
tion, and, eventually, the formation of judgment.
One of the works by Bosniac authors with the most comprehensive
study on cognition was Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zades New Commentary on
The Sun Treatise, and some very valuable notes were written in the
margins of the first seven pages of the autograph. The theory of cog-
nition is one of the most complex theories in Arabic philosophy, so its
detailed presentation, especially having in mind the sources, conditions,
genesis, etc. would go beyond the subject of this book.23 Therefore this
21 Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 7a and Izabrani spisi, 66.

22 See: C.
Veljacic, Filozofija istocnih naroda, vol. II, Zagreb, 1979, pp. 63 and 238
(selected texts).
23 Apart from the works that give over reviews of Arabic or Islamic philosophy and
their main contents, which are given in the list of literature used, attention should
64 chapter three
book will focus on the elements of this theory, as interpreted by Mus.t.afa

Yuyo Ayyub-zade, that are necessary for better understanding of cer-
tain problems of logic.
It need be said that the classical Arabic theory of cognition focuses
on the teachings of al-Farab and Ibn Sna, so the European literature
calls it al-farabianavicennian. The basic ideas and solutions to the
problem of intelligence was oered by al-Farab,24 and further devel-
oped by Ibn Sna.25 In the presentation these study elements, Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade starts with the teachings of al-Farab, connecting
them to his theory of the Ten Intelligences. He gives a brief descrip-
tion of the types of intelligence, from the first to the tenth that manages
sub-lunar world (tahta. falak al-qamar) and that is the source of human
souls (nafsnufus) and the four elements (#uns.ur#anas.ir, fol. 2b3a).
The tenth intelligence is called the active intellect (al-#aql al-fa##al). It cre-
ates the matter (hayula) that is necessary for the creation of the whole
sub-lunar world, and it is at the same time the giver of form (wahib as.-
s.uwar, Lat. dator formarum) and soul to the body when it is ready to
accept it. The human soul tends to move in the way opposite of ema-
nation, from the lowest level, upwards, to the ultimate, which starts its
spiritual journey towards the original source, through dierent levels.
The part of the human soul that it uses to know and think is called the
intellect (#aql).
be paid to the following texts: Filozofija istocnih naroda [Philosophy of Eastern Nations],
volume 2, especially page. 62100 and selected fragments from Ibn Snas (240256), al-
Farabs (238), Ibn Rusds (271273) and T . uss (276) works, and the texts by M.M. Sharif
translated in the Klasicna kultura islama, [Classical Culture of Islam] vol. 1, Zagreb, 1973:
on al-Farab (especially 348353), on Ibn Sna (375384) and Ibn Rusd (398407).
As for the texts in Arabic, especially valuable for the studies on this topic are Gam l
. ba, Ma#an al-#aql f al-falsafa al-#arabiyya, Magalla (Revue de lAcadmie Arabe
Sal
de Damas), vol. XXIX, N 4, pp. 496511, Dimasq (Damas), 1954.
24 As much as it is possible to find sources for the theory on Ten Intelligences within
the Greek philosophical tradition (Aristotelian definition of the movement of sphere,

Plotins theory of emanation, etc.) this theory, according to M.M. Sharif, completely
belongs to al-Farab. It was formulated based on his desire to show unity and his
methods of grouping and synthesis. See: M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy, t.
I, 460, or: Klasicna kultura islama, vol. 1, 350.
25 This issue was treated by Ibn Sn a in several of his works. It is very clearly
presented in his work Kitab al-h. udud, in chapters Hadd . al-#aql and Hadd
. an-nafs
(1116 and translated to French, pp. 1323). It is probable that Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
zade did in fact use this work either directly or indirectly. Ibn Sna directly quoted two
of Aristotles writings: Posterior Analytics (Kitab al-burhan) and On the Soul (Kitab an-nafs).
Further on, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, in accordance with the

teaching developed by Ibn Sna,26 points out the existence of the potential
intellect (al-#aql bi al-quwwa)27 that belongs to the human being, and
that can become actual only through the constantly active intellect (al-
#aql al-fa##al)28 which is, as we said, outside of it. It is evident that this
elementary division presented by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade has its
roots in the teachings of Aristotle on the flow of intellectual activity, and
the interpretations of Alexander of Aphrodisias on nus (nus poietiks i

nus dinamai or nus pathetiks, which will, in the time of the medieval

reception, acquire Latin names intellectus agens and intellectus possibilis).29
Not entering deeper into discussions on this very complex issue
that caused a lot of controversy, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade concisely
presents a sequence of human intellectual activities. The cognition
ability belongs to the human soul (nafs) that has four levels.
The first level, the material intellect (al-#aql al-hayulan, Lat. intellectus
materialis),30 is the ability that every individual human being possesses
from the day of birth. Given this fact, the first intellect, before anything
is accomplished in it, is an absolute potential.
The first phase of its realization, or the second level, is constituted by
the intellect with ability (al-#aql bi al-malaka, Lat. intellectus in habitu)31
that reaches axiomatic truth, primary intelligibilia (al-ma#qulat al-ula)
or, according to Ibn Sna, the soul is ready to accept secondary in-
telligibilia, either through reflection or through intellectual intuition.32
The third level, according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar,
is the intellect in eect or the actual intellect (al-#aql bi al-fi#l, Lat. intellec-
tus in eectu),33 the level on which the mind understands secondary
26 Ibn Sna (op. cit.), according to Aristotles On the Soul (III, 9) originally divides
the intellect into the speculative (nazar . ) and practical (#amal). The focal point is still the
speculative intellect.
27 Aristotle, On the Soul, III, 5.
29 Aristotles writings that describe the active intellect as the general and eternal
caused dierent interpretations, controversy and polemics among the philosophers on

the immortality of the active intellect.
31 Compare: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, II, 19 (Understanding of principles).
The Arabic word al-malaka literally means: property, feature, characteristic, ability,
etc. The meaning of this word is equal to the meaning of the Greek word hksis that
Aristotle uses to mark the intellect that is aware of the first principles.
sarat wa at-tanbhat, 325.
32 Kitab al-i
33 Compare: Aristotle, On the Soul, III 4.
66 chapter three
intelligibilia based on the primary intelligibilia and axioms (al-ma#qulat

at-taniya).

And, finally, there is the fourth level, the level of perfection, the
acquired intellect (al-#aql al-mustafad, Lat. intellectus acquisitus).34
Therefore, intellect is able to move gradually and to develop from
the material or potential to the acquired intellect, the level that can be
reached only by few of the chosen ones. However, this gradual rising
is not spontaneous; it is possible only through active intelligence that
is transcendent and that gives higher forms of knowledge to a sensible
and prepared human mind (isti#dad). Active intelligence is to the
potential intellect what the sun is to the eye, whose abilities remain
potential as long as we are in the dark.35
On the other hand, intelligibilia potentially exists in the senses, and
when abstracted from the senses, they actually exist in thinking. That
clarifies two elementary operations of thinking: perception and abstrac-
tion, through which the intelligibilia moves from the potential to the
actual, i.e. when the intellect transforms from the potential to the
actual, and, eventually, acquired intellect, when it is capable of under-
standing abstract forms without any connection to the material con-
tents. According to Ibn Sna, the highest level of this ability is excep-
tionally strong intuition, when a person can gain knowledge from with-
in.
Ibn Sna says: A proof for that is the evident fact that the intelli-
gibilia of the truth is gained when we find the middle member of the
syllogism If those dierences (possessing higher or lower number of
middle members and speed in which it can be found, remark A.L.)
are unlimited, and if they are always dierent in their level and their
strength, and if the lowest point is within people who lack intuition
whatsoever, then the highest point is within people who have intuition
for all or most problems, or people whose intuition appears within the
shortest timeframe. So, there could be a person whose soul is so thor-
oughly clean and so tightly linked with rational principles that it burns
from intuition, e.g. adaptability for inspiration coming from active intel-
ligence. In this way forms of all things consisted in the active intelli-
34 A.-M. Goichon in Vocabulaires compars (#aql mustaf ad) shows that this term can
be found in the commentary on Aristotles writings by Alexander of Aphrodisias: nus
epktetos. However, H. Corbin (Historija islamske filozofije, 179) underlines that, despite
its name, acquired intellect should not be confused with nus epktetos that Alexander of
Aprodisias defined, as it presents state between the potential and the actual intellect.
35 H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije, p. 179.
gence leave their imprint on that persons soul immediately, or almost

immediately, and are not accepted by authority, but are based on their
logical order that accepts all middle members.36
Even such a short presentation of the theory of intelligence as ex-
plained in short by Bosniac authorswhether given as quotations or
as definitions giving conclusionsmakes it possible to summarize and
conclude that cognition is observed as abstraction with dierent levels
depending on the power of abstraction.
Two operations of intellect are of importance for logic. In the first
case, notions (tas.awwur) are extracted from individual objects, and the
second establishes relations among the terms and connections among the ideas
(tas.dq). The first operation is perception and intuition, and the second
judgment.
Teaching of Notion
As pointed out earlier, notion and conclusion, definition and syllogism,

are the elementary subjects that Arabic logicians were interested in.
However, they treated teaching on notion with greater attention than
the first teacher in Organon. This broadly presented problem, and the
studying of notion, introduced a number of questions that entered the
field of linguistics, logic, psychology, and even metaphysics, giving a cer-
tain contribution to the beginning of the Arabic theory on meaning.37
Although this book has an entire chapter dedicated to the relations of
logic and philosophy and other disciplines, it should be pointed out
here that Arabic scholars paid special attention to the studies of lan-
guage in general, and logiciansas they follow the example of Aristotle
and build Arabic logic through the medium of language, believing that
the analysis of thinking as understanding of the objective reality can be
done only through the analysis of language,38 pay special attention to
this very subject.
As speech and thinking form a very intricate unity in which lan-
guage is especially complex and, from the aspect of multiplied mean-
ings, often unconfident and insecure, Arabic logicians understood that
36 Veljacic, Filozofija istocnih naroda, II, pp. 242243.

C.
37 See e.g.: A. ElamraniJamal, Logique Aristotlicienne et grammaire arabe, Paris, 1983.
sic, Aristotelov Organon (Foreword to the edition of Organon, Belgrade,
38 See B. Se
1965), XII.
68 chapter three
the preconditions of studying overall logical issues were analysis, clas-

sification and evaluation of meaning, both the constitutive elements of
language that show the rational form of meanings, and the ones that do
not show it. Therefore, Bosniac authors, in accordance with the widely
accepted tradition, began their writings in the field of logic with a so
called Study on Words.39 Hasan . Kaf al-Aq hi. s.a r says:
The final point of the conceptions (tas.awwurat) are the five univer-
salia (the five predicables) whose goal is the definition. The final points
of the assertions (tas.dqat) are judgments, and their goal is the syllogism
and its forms. That makes four chapters, that I have extended to five,
adding a chapter on words (f al-alfaz). . 40
It was expected that the chapter on words should contain at least
elementary theory on the meaning of words, the relation between terms
and ideas.
The meaning (dalala), is the existence of something in such a way
that the knowledge of it is a source of knowledge about something else.
The first is called the significator (dall) and sign (dall), and the other is the
significated (madlul).41
Although this definition that al-Aq hi. s.a r oered is short, it clearly
points out two elements. The first is that the meaning is the quality that
makes something be not only what it is, but something else as well, and
that in the process of semiosis an object is neither the nominator nor
the nominated in itself, but only in relation to other objects. And the
second is that he makes a very clear distinction between the significated,
the sign and the significator.
The meaning is further classified by two elementary principles: (1)
whether the sign is spoken (lafz.) or not (gayr lafz.), i.e. whether we in
the process of semiosis have a verbal or another sign, and (2) by the
nature of the sign. These two elementary principles give the following
classification:
39 Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf min al-man.tiq, fol. 4a7b, Sar h. Muhtas. ar al-
Kaf, fol. 9a18a; Muhammad b. Musa #Allamak, Sarh. ar-Risala as-samsiyya, fol. 13a

.
27b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar agug, page 6, as-Sar
h. Is h. al-gadd,
fol. 14a25b, Sar
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 6b8a; Muhammad . b. Mu s
. . a al-Caynaw
taf ,
Fadil U
Fath. al-asrar, fol. 11a; . zicawal, Sar h. matn, fol. 3a6a; Muhammad . b. Yusuf
al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 112a114a.
40 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 3a, translation into Bosnian: Iza-
brani spisi, p. 62.
41 See, fol. 3b, or: Izabrani spisi, p. 63.
1. Conventional meaning (wad#iyya) . 42

assigned by choice and agreement
with a meaning, that, according to the first principle, can be:
a) spoken (wad#iyya
. lafziyya)
. and
b) unspoken (wad#iyya.
g ayr laf ziyya).
.
2. Intellectual meaning (#aqliyya) with which the mind helps the inter-
preter understand the sign, that can also be:
a) spoken (#aqliyya lafziyya)
. and
b) unspoken (#aqliyya g ayr lafziyya).
.
3. Natural meaning (t.ab#iyya) with which the signs naturally, condi-
tionally, or by similarity, etc. suggest what they mean. It can also
be:
a) spoken (t.ab#iyya lafziyya)
. and

b) unspoken (t.ab#iyya gayr lafziyya)..
hi
Al-Aq . s.a r in his Compendium says:
It (meaning) is divided into three types: conventional, intellectual and
natural. Each of them can be either: (1) spoken, such as Zayd, mean-
ing someones name;43 the word heard behind the wall pointing out the
existence of its speaker;44 word ah indicating chest pain,45 or (2) unspo-
ken, such as symbols that point out the meaning that they are used in;46
or when the produced indicates the producer,47 the redness of the face
suggests shame, and paleness, fear.48,49
The focus of logic will remain on the conventional spoken sign. Feeling
that the term unspoken sign could remain unclear to the reader,
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade gives a somewhat broader explanation of
this term, giving examples for all three forms:
42 Word wad. # is derived from wad. #, literally meaning: putting; position; composition;
establishment; signing contracts; and, eventually, convention. Al-Aq hi. s.a r defines conven-
tion as the special definition of something by something, so that once the first one is
shown or comprehended, the other is understood therein (Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 3b,
translated to Bosnian in: Izabrani spisi, 63) and he also points out that the convention
is a special kind of agreement that guarantees acceptance of certain notions as means of
communication, which do not have a value on their own. Aristotle, in On Interpretation,
says: We have already said that a noun signifies this or that by convention. No sound is
by nature a noun: it becomes one, becoming a symbol. (On interpretation, 2).
43 Example for the conventional meaning of a spoken sign.
44 Example for the intellectual meaning of a spoken sign.
45 Example for the natural meaning of a spoken sign.
46 Example for the conventional meaning of an unspoken sign.
47 Example for the intellectual meaning of an unspoken sign.
48 Example for the natural meaning of an unspoken sign.
49 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 3b4a, translation to Bosnian:
Izabrani spisi, 63.
70 chapter three
If based on convention, unspoken meaning is conventional, for

example degrees, knots, symbols or signs have the meaning that they
were meant for. The intellectual (unspoken meaning) is the meaning
with which a clue points to the one who left it and the natural
(unspoken meaning) is, for example, change in the face of a lover when
he sees a loved one showing love.50
Further division focuses on the conventional spoken meaning. This is
the context in which the relation of terms and ideas is also discussed.
The first analysis shows that one word (term) can cover all meaning to
which it is applied, that it can cover a part of that meaning, or some
other meaning that springs out of its etymological meaning. Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade uses the word man to illustrate this division:
a) If the word man denotes reasonable animal, then it is harmonic
meaning (al-mut.a biqa),51
b) If the word man denotes only reasonable or only animal,
then it is partial meaning, (tadammun)
. 52
and
c) If the word man denotes capable to learn, then it is the
consequential meaning (iltizam).53
The rest of the presentation of our authors focuses on the meaning that
covers the contents of the word to the full (al-mut.a biqa), considering
the exactness required by logic.
50 Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar agug, 8.

h. Is
51 Mu.tabiqa (mu.tabaqa) based on .tabaqa = to harmonize, to agree with, to be in
accord with. Therefore, the adequate meaning or the meaning of complete harmony
(adequacy) is when one word directly means the essence of the subject in terms of
connecting and equalizing terms and objects.
52 Tadammun based on tadammana = to contain, to encompass, to consist. A more
. .
literal translation of this term would be included or implicit meaning. A. Soheil states
that Arabic philosophical terminology uses this word in the sense of implication (see:
Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian, Leiden, 1964, 28). However, the author of
this book insists that, besides being contained, the meaning expresses, above all, only
the part of the essence of the subject it stands for, whether expressing the genus or the
specific dierence. Therefore it will be translated as partial.
53 Iltizam = necessity, necessary causal connection.
For more on this classification, see: Hasan . Kaf al-Aq hi

. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf,
fol. 4ab (Izabrani spisi, 64) and Sar h. Muhtas. ar, fol. 10b14a; Muhammad b. Musa
.
#Allamak, Sar
h. ar-Risala as-samsiyya, fol. 13b17b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar,
agu g, page 810, as-Sar
h. Is
Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 14b18b, Sar h. Tahdb, fol. 6b7b; Mu-
hammad
.
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 13b17b.
Another division classifies meaning as simple (mufrad) and complex

(mu"allaf or murakkab).54 In this division, starting from the logical cri-
teria, the authors observe the word (lafz) . in a broader context, keeping
in mind whether a word has parts, at least phonetic units, and what are
the relations of those units to any meaning, and what is their relation
to the meaning that one wants to achieve. So, for example, the Arabic
question word a has no parts, and as such, has no meaning in itself,
while the same or other unit, e.g. letter k, has no parts either, but if in
function of a symbol or abbreviation it can have a meaning. The word
man has parts, but none of those parts in themselves have meaning,55
while the word #abdullah56 has parts and each of them has certain
meaning, but that meaning is not the meaning achieved in the case that
the word is functioning as a given name.
The complex word (murakkab) can be completely complex (tamm) or
incompletely complex (gayr tamm). The first group, interesting to logic, can
be judgments or phrases (a. command or prohibition, b. asking, c. plea, d.
diversion of attention, etc.).57 Although complex words will be discussed
in more detail in the chapter On Judgment, it needs to be pointed
out that Arabic logicians used the terms completely complex word or
discourse regarding a sentence as a contemplation or discourse unit,
and incompletely complex word as a group of syntactically connected
words.
Understandably, these classifications, linked to the elements of cat-
egorical proposition, judgment and categorical syllogism, make a dis-
tinction between names (ism), words that, based on the previous divi-
54 The Arabic logicians found source for this classification in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5
of Aristotles On interpretation.
55 Aristotle says: Let me explain. The word human has meaning, but does not
constitute a proposition, either positive or negative. It is only when other words are
added that the whole will form an armation or denial. But if we separate one syllable
of the word human from the other, it has no meaning; similarly in the word mouse,
the part ouse has no meaning in itself, but is merely a sound. In composite words,
indeed, the parts contribute to the meaning of the whole; yet, as has been pointed out,
they have not an independent meaning (On interpretation, 4).
Compare: Hasan Kafija Pruscak, Izabrani spisi, 64.
56 I.e. status constructus #abdullah (slave of God) can be in function of the literal
meaning or in function of the given name #Abdullah. Although, formally, this word is
complex, made of two words, from the aspect of meaning it is simple. Compare: Hasan
Kafija Pruscak, Izabrani spisi, 64.
hi
57 This classification is presented very systematically in al-Aq
. s.a rs Muhtas. ar al-Kaf
, fol. 4b7a (Izabrani spisi, 6466) and in his commentaries on his own works Sar h.
Muhtas. ar, fol. 13a17a.

72 chapter three
sions, have conventional spoken meaning but its parts do not have the
desired meaning, i.e. clear meaning, and that do not indicate to the
time,58 verbs (kalima)59 that have certain meaning, but at the same time
indicate the time and particles (ada)60 that have no meaning standing
alone, but when added to a name or a verb, they acquire it.61
All these considerations at the same time create preconditions for
better understanding the process opposite to denoting, the process of
understanding, interpreting and defining the precise meaning of terms,
words, symbols and expressions in general. Because, as pointed out by
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, in logic, as well as in scientific thinking in
general, the ambiguity and arbitrariness of words and terms should
be avoided at all cost.62 Arabic logicians based their solution for this
issue on Aristotles Organon, from its first chapter Categories, where
he discusses homonyms, synonyms and paronyms. However, they pay
more attention to this issue, discuss the details of it and, understandably,
base their research on the Arabic language, abundant in synonyms and
homonyms, as well as other specificities.
Considering the importance Bosniac logicians gave to this issue, and
the fact that it resulted in the development of a separate discipline
within philological research (#ilm al-wad#) . and contributed to the devel-
opment of exegesis (more to be discussed in a special chapter), this book
gives a summary of the elements of this teaching based on the texts of
Bosniac authors.
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, in his New Commentary on The
Sun Treatise (fol. 20a20b), points out that in language and thinking,
the relation between the terms and the notions they denote can be
expressed not only by one term denoting one notion, but that there are
relations such as one-many and many-one. The first and the clean-
58 Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, l.c.
Aristotle says: By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention, which has
no reference to time, and of which no part is significant apart from the rest. (On
interpretation, 2).
59 Kalima literally means: word, discourse, but in the logical terminology it means
verb.
Compare the meaning of Aristotles term hrema in On Interpretation, 3 and 4. Also see:
A.M. Goichon, Vocabulaires compars, 30.
60 Ada pl. adawat literally means tools, instruments, and in logical terminology it
means particles. Grammatical particles are usually described by h. arfh. uruf.

61 Hasan K
. af al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 5a (Izabrani spisi, 64). Also see:
h. al-Mu htasar, fol. 14b15b.
Hasan
. Kaf al- Aq . . r, Sar
hi sa
.
62 Hasan K
. af al-Aqhi. s.a r, listed works, fol. 12b (page 70) and 32b33a.
est relation is given name (ism), and then the univocal or the word
of the same meaning, i.e. harmonic word (mutawat.i"),63 meaning the
word that marks one idea, and is used for more units. Hasan . Kaf al-
hi
Aq s
. .
a r
gives the example of the word man that means reasonable
animal, but it at the same time denotes Zayd and #Amr and Bakr and
other units of the human kind. Monosemism, therefore, stands for the
unity of term and meaning in relation to the units, or, in al-Aq hi
. s.a rs
terminology, the unity of what is formed in the mind (dihniyya) and

what is outside which is objective (harigiyya).64 Accordingly, the words

that denote genus, species, characteristics and other universalia are
univocal.
Contrary to this, it is equivocal (musakkik)65 if it does not relate equally
to all units; it can provoke suspicion. Al-Aq hi
. s.a r adds that it does
not relate equally to units formed in ones mind and external units,
whether their realization (hu . s.u l) through some units is stronger than
their realization through the others, such as whiteness in relation to
snow and ivory, as it is stronger in snow than in ivory, or that their
realization is older (more primary) or more complete in some units than
in the other, such as existence in relation to necessary and possible
66
Another among the mentioned relations between words and their
meanings is the situation when a word has several meanings and it is
common (mustarak)67 to a number of dierent notions. And, eventually,
when talking about a number of terms, they can denote an equal
63 Mutawati" based on tawata"a = to harmonize, to agree with, to be in accord with; it

. .
means univocal, unambiguous. The Latin word that has the same meaning is univocus.
64 See: Hasan K
. af al-Aq hi . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 5a. (Izabrani spisi, 65).
Latin terminology, according to W. Occam, oers the following terms esse objective
(contents of the mind, internal reality) and esse formaliter or subjective (external reality).
See: W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije, t. I, 375.
65 Mu sakkik based on verb sakkaka = to provoke suspicion. Some texts use the form
mutasakkik for one that provokes suspicion.
Latin logical terminology has an adequate translation, aequivocus (of the same sound)
since such a word, despite it being grammatically and linguistically identical, provokes
suspicion in the sense of meaning, i.e. it can have dierent meanings, therefore
dierent logical and cognitive values.
66 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 5b (translation: Izabrani spisi,
65).
67 Mu starak = common, Latin nomen commune or according to Aristotle homonim:
Things are said to be named equivocally (in Greek:
", A.L.) when,
though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name diers
for each. (The Categories, I, chapter I, 5.)
74 chapter three
number of dierent notions in the sense of dierence (ihtilaf), i.e. the

terms may be dierent (muhtalif),68 or a number of dierent words

denoting the same notion, e.g. synonyms (mutaradif).69
Along with these elements on relations that words have with what
they mean or could mean, and the relations between terms and ideas,
some of the authors immaculately and systematically research he actual
. qa),,70 transferred (manqul) meaning (customary, terminologi-
meaning (haq
cal, etc.)71 and figurative meaning (maga z). Among the Bosniac authors it
is most evident in the works of Hasan. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r.
This is what in short the general starting points of the theory of
meaning studied by Arabic, and consequently Bosniac logicians, looked
like. The theory of meaning was not just put at the beginning of the
logical discussions, as a mere introduction to Porphyrys Introduction (Eis-
agog); it also had a great role in the development of Arabic philosophy,
the exegesis of The Qur"an, and exegesis in general.72 The interpreta-
tion of The Qur"an, and traditional codes (had . t)

that were strongly
supported by the theory of meaning, will have long-ranged eects on
the birth and development of a number of disciplines, from specu-
lative theology (kalam) to Islamic law (fiqh and sar#a). Therefore, a
large number of texts, including those written by Bosniac writers, clas-
sified according to their title, as theological, grammatical, syntactical,
or commentaries on poetry etc., would be very interesting to analyse
through the aspect of the theory of meaning and technique and the
methodology of interpretation. These elements of the theory of mean-
68 Some texts in the field of logic oer the term mutazayil with the same meaning.
69 Mutaradif, active participle of taradafa = to follow; to have the same meaning; to be
synonymous (words). Compare: Aristotle, The Categories, I, chapter I, 5.
70 The term haqqa (literally: truth; reality; fact; truthfulness; etc.) in Arabic philos-
.
ophy has several meanings. In logic it denotes logical essence, and the word that means
empirical truth and truthfulness is made based on the root word s. d. q (see: A.-M. Goi-
chon, Vocabulaires compars and C. Veljacic, Filozofija istocnih naroda, vol. II, 70). The
term that is used in the meaning opposite to h. aqq is usually ba.til, and opposite to s. idq is
kidb (kadib).

71 Hasan hi
Kaf al-Aq
. . s.a r, like many other authors, points out three types of trans-
ferred meaning (manqul):
Those are: habitual (#urf), if they are transferred by some general habit, like: four-
legged; transferred through Sheria (sar#), if transferred by religious code, words such as
fasting or prayer and terminologically transfered (is.t.ilah. ) if transferred through special
convention, such as al-fi#l (verb) in the terminology of linguists. (See: Muhtas. ar al-Kaf
, fol. 6a, translation: Izabrani spisi, 65.)
72 See: Mikls Marth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie, Leiden, New York,
Kln, 1994 and Die Eisagoge bei den Arabern in: Ziva antika (Antiquit vivant), XXV,
Skopje, 1975, pp. 457460.
ing, presented within texts in the field of logic, made good grounds for
the development of a separate discipline which had a lot of followers
among scholarsthe so-called science on notions (#ilm al-wad#). . 73
Among Bosniac authors who were active in the field of logic and
who rendered their services in the development of this discipline is
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, who wrote Marginalia on the
Commentary on the #Ad. ududdns Treatise on Notions by #Is. amuddn (H . asiya
#ala sarh. ar-Risala al-#Adudiyyaf
. al-wa d#
. li #I s
.
a mudd
n) in 1691.74
The
autograph of this marginalia has 184 pages. #Ad. ududdns Treatise, one
of the fundamental works by #Adududd . n al-I g75 and commentary
on this work by #Is.a muddn al-Isfara"in are at the very core of this
76
work. The goal that Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade had in mind while
writing his Marginalia was to make al-I gs work understandable and to
oppose some interpretations given in the commentaries on #Is.a muddns
writing. From the aspect of interpretation, also interesting and very
valuable are the commentaries by Muhammad . b. Musa al-Bosnaw
whose abilities, broad education, knowledge of Arabic, and immaculate
methodology, are emphasized by Husein Abdel Latif and Kamel el-
Buhi.77
The issue of generality, individuality and uniqueness of objects and
notions, and, linked to that, the issue of universaliageneral notions,
their definitions and dierent classification, take up a special place in
the writings by Bosniac authors. However, the history of Arabic logic
does not treat this issue the way it is treated in the West, meaning hav-
ing a clear division and disputes among realists, nominalists and con-
ceptualists.78 Therefore, it is not possible to find discussion treating this
73 On status and importance of this discipline, see: Bernard G. Weiss, #Ilm al-wad #:
.
An introductory account of a later Muslim philological science, ArabicaRevue dtudes
arabes, T. XXXIV, fasc. 3, Brill, Leiden, 1987, pp. 339356.
74 The autograph of this work is kept at the Gazi Husrev-beys Library in Sarajevo,
nr. 3957.
75 "Adududdn al-I
. g, died in 1355; see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 208 and S II,
287.
76 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 305; G II, 208 and S I, 533.
77 Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, Muhamed Musa Allamek, 176 and Kamel el-Buhi,
Arabic Writings by Yugoslavian Writers (doctoral thesis defended on the Faculty of Philology
of the University of Belgrade), Belgrade, 1963, 104.
78 See: Gyula Klima, The Medieval Problem of Universals, in: Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Internet: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/ (last visit

May 5, 2006)
76 chapter three
issue separately in the history of Arabic philosophy and creative work

in general.79 This, of course, does not mean that Arabic logicians did
not have dierent views on this issue. In order to get a clearer picture
of their views, and to be able to define them more precisely, this book
will use generally accepted Latin terminology. However, before the pre-
sentation of these views and classifications, here are some introductory
remarks.
Although Aristotle oers some elements on teaching of the universal,
especially in the 4th and the 5th chapter of Topics, early Arabic logi-
cians relied on Porphyrys Introduction to Aristotles categories, or popular
Isagogue, that became a part of the textbooks of Aristotles philosophy.
The subject of Porphyrys discussion was predicabiliamarks that can
be predicated, or five possible predicates (Latin: genus, species, dieren-
tia, proprium and accidens)research and understanding of which is,
according to Porphyry, necessary for interpreting Aristotles Categories,
forming definitions, understanding division (divisio) and deduction of
proofs.80 As Arabic logicians generally never worked on the categories
feeling that they did not belong to the field of logic,81 the analysis of
the general notions, as can be seen from the quoted fragment of al-
hi
Aq . s.a rs work,82 is taken as an assumption for the successful creation
of definition and description, and then the deduction of proofs. There-
fore, the works by Bosniac authors, as evident from their structures,
have discourses on universalia at the very beginning, either in the first
chapter, or in an introduction to the Discussion on Words, but always
before the text on definitions and descriptions, i.e. before the logical
procedure that defines the contents and the scope of a notion. There-
79 See, e.g. the very comprehensive work Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur by C.
Brockelmann.
80 Histoire de la Philosophie, t. l, Encyclopdie de la pleiade, d. Gallimard, 1969,
pp. 905908 and pp. 12671269. Also see: A.N. Prior, Historija logike, especially 5th
chapter, Srednjovjekovna logika, pp. 5777 by Ernest A. Moody.
The foundation of logical work in scholastics from the 12th century on, was so
called Corpus Logicum composed of Logica Vetus preceded by Boetys translation
of Porphyrys Eisagog, then Aristotles Categories and On Interpretation and, in the end,
Boetys commentary on Eisagog. Only so called Logica Nova gives Aristotles Topics,
both Analytics and On Sophistical Refutation.
81 Discussions on categories by these authors are marginal. If defined, they are
usually defined as the highest notions. See.: Hasan . Kaf al-Aq hi h. Muhtas. ar,
. s.a r, Sar
fol. 28b and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar agug, pp. 19.
h. Is
82 See footnote 15 in this chapter.
fore, this issue is often approached from the aspect of division of notions
and words.
The analyzed texts show that the objects, and notions that they are
expressed by, can be of dual nature: (1) particular (guz") or (2) universal
(kull),83 both in dierent degrees.
The particular notions can be those that mark (a) one person (per-
sonalsahs.);84 (b) the notions that mark one individual thing that is an

entity in itself, that does not exist in more than one unit; such notions
are called absolutely particular or true (guz" haq
. q); or (c) the notions that
are relatively particular (guz" id
. af) that can be either individual or gen-
eral, depending on the context.
It is sometimes said for each of the two (above mentioned notions.
A.L.) that they are relatively particular: Zayd in relation to man, and
man in relation to animal. It (man) is relatively individual, although
it is general if in relation to what precedes it. Each true individual
(notion) is relative, but each relative is not a true individual.85
Universal notion (kull) can be: either (1) essential (dat) or (2) accidental

(#arad. ).
The first group are: (a) genus (gins), (b) species (naw#) and (c) dierence
(fas.l), and the second (a) property (has.s.a) and (b) general accidence (#arad.

#amm) that can be either separable accidence (#arad. mufariq) or inseparable
accidence (#arad. lazim).86
It is clear that this division was based on relation towards what
something is (mahiyya),87 therefore towards the essence. The issue of
83 Compare: Aristotle, On Interpretation, II, chapter 7 and Posteior Analytics, I, chap-

ter 17.
84 Compare: Aristotle, Categories, 5th chapter.
85 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 7b8a (Izabrani spisi, 66). Also
see his commentary on the same work, fol. 23a24a.
86 The division of accidence to separable and inseparable is not used by the first
teacher, Aristotle. This distinction probably comes from Porphyry. See: I. Madkour,
LOrganon dAristote dans le monde arabe, Paris, 1969, p. 69 and pp. 232233.
As for the general notions, it should be mentioned that the community of scholars
Ihwan as.-s.afa in the Encyclopaedia (ar-Rasa"il), in the tenth treatise titled Risala f
ag u g , believed that person (sahs.) should be added as the sixth universalia to the five
Is
defined ones. Also see: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, 74.
87 Mahiyya is a neologism that some authors define as consisting of the relative
pronoun ma and the third person singular personal pronoun huwa. Other authors treat
it as a relative noun (nomen relativum) based on ma where hamza transformed into
h (see: al-Gur ga n, Ta #rfat, mahiyya).
This word marks the essence of things, and corresponds with Aristotles term t ti
n inai (what something is) or the scholastic term quidditas. See: A.-M. Goichon,
Vocabulaires compars, mahiyya.
78 chapter three
the universalia is usually linked with the issue of the relation of notions,
e.g. on relation of genus to the species, and the logical relativity of the
notion of genus is pointed out. Here is what Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r
wrote on this issue:
It is possible that a logical essencereality (haq . qa) has more than
one genuses, e.g. animal, is a genus for man, then there is the devel-
oping body, then absolute body, then substance. The genus that can
take in all participating notions is called genus proximum (gins qarb), e.g.
animal, takes in man and all the notions that participate in ani-
mal, while the notion that cannot take in all participating notions is
called distant genus (gins ba#d). If there are two groups of notions par-
ticipating in one genus, then it is distant by one level, as for example,
developing body, since it takes in both man and plant and other
animals. If there are three groups of notions, then it is distant by two
levels, as e.g. absolute body. Therefore, whenever genus is widened,
the distance is increased by one level, and the participating group of
notions has more primary properties.88 The highest genus is called sum-
mum genus (gins al-agnas), as is substance in the mentioned example,
and the genus minorlower (gins safil) is animal. The levels between the
lowest and the highest are called the middle genus (gins mutawassit.), and
in this case they are developing body and absolute body.89
In order to indicate the relativity of relations between genus and
species, a classification of three species is given (naw# #alhigher species;
naw# mutawassit.middle species; naw# safillower species and naw# al-
anwa#the species of species)90 and it is shown which of these species can
be genus and under which conditions.91 It is also shown that the highest
notions are categories and the lowest notions are notions of individual
88 This standpoint, together with the previous presentation, implies the relations
between the contents and the scope of notions that are in reversed proportion, i.e.
the notions that are in mutual relation of genus and speciesthe bigger the contents,
the smaller the scope, and vice versa.
89 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 9b10b (Izabrani spisi, 68). Also
see Komentar Kompendijuma, fol. 27b28b.
90 This classification, and especially examples given in the texts, show that it is a
reproduction of a pattern known as Porphyrys tree.

91 Porphiruss tree can be reconstructed based on all the works that are the subject
of this book, except for those written in form of marginalia (See, e.g.: Hasan . Kaf al-
hi
Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 9b11a, translation: Izabrani spisi, 86), these issues
are discussedin detail by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in his as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 30b
36a, and thus Ayyub-zade himself directs the readers to this work in his Sar h. Tahdb
al-man.tiq, fol. 12b13a.
objects.92 However, as pointed out above, Arabic logicians, especially

the ones from the later period, did not pay attention to categories in
their works, because, ever since the time of Avicenna, it was believed
that categories are a subject of metaphysics or ontology, and not of
logic. Bosniac authors, in the extreme cases, merely mention categories
and cite works where more can be found on the topic.
The discussion of the nature of the universalia has not been present
among Arabic logicians, especially in the later period, to the extent it
was in Medieval Europe. Although dierent views on this issue can be
found, from clear nominalism to extreme realism, Arabic philosophy
will be dominated by moderate nominalism or moderate conceptual-
ism, where individual objects are considered to exist realistically, that
they are the first, while notions and ideas are the second, created in the
reason as a result of abstracting the concrete.93
Hence, the universalia are based on objects on the one hand, and on
the other, they are the creation of reason.94 This point of view is explic-
itly or implicitly present in all the works by Bosniac authors, although
it was not reached through discussion but taken as is. The only author
who treats this issue in more detail is Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in his
New Commentary on The Sun Treatise 95 and Commentary on the Education in
Logic and Apologetic.96 The fact that the works of other Bosniac authors,
and most of the authors from the later period in general, do not oer
detailed discussions on this issue, can be understood as a consequence
of a dominant understanding of that time. Put simply, it was assumed
that a general notion exists, but the discussion of its nature or whether
92 See: Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 28a28b and Mus.t.afa Yuyo

Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sarh. Is
agug, 19.
93 See: Hasan K
. af al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 7b (translation: Izabrani spisi
, 66), Sar h. Muhtas. ar, fol. 22b23a; Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak, Sar
h. ar-Risala
as-samsiyya, fol. 21a21b and 27b28b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar h.
agug, page 1112, as-Sar
Is h. al-gadd, fol. 25b26b and 38b39a; Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq,
fol. 8b9a; Muhammad
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw
, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 19b23b; Muham-
. .
mad b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 114a; Fadil

. Uzicawal, Sarh. matn, fol. 5a

5b.
94 Moderate nominalism of Arabic logicians is directly linked to the realism of
cognition theory, which, as explained before, stands on the assumption that there is
the reality, that there is the outside world independent of the human consciousness and
that the human consciousness, in the process of cognition, seizes this reality as it is.
95 Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade devotes one whole chapter (fas.l) with five researches
(mabha . t) to the relations between the universal and the particular issues, see: as-Sar h.
al-gadd, fol. 38b50b.
96 Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 14b15a.

80 chapter three
it has an adequate correlant notion etc. was not considered an issue of

formal logic, as it is not limited to forms of thinking. The discussion on
the universalia in the West also became more fierce, and, according to
B. Bosnjak, the contemplative area started to be defined in sense of
ontological categories.97 Furthermore, there is the objective diculty
of the problem that required the author to be accutely aware of the
cognition methods and other assumptions that would enable to under-
stand a realistic link between the general and the individual, without
damaging the theological discipline and tradition.98
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, who evidently was under the
strong influence of Ibn Sna and the commentary writers who followed
him, besides the above mentioned divisions and standpoints, accepted
and passed on Avicennas theory on the nature of ideas99 that resulted
in a dissection of the general notions into three dimensions: natural
(t.ab#), intellectual (#aql) and logical (mant.iq), and then he placed focus
on their existence before the plurality or things (qabla katra, Latin: ante res),

in plurality (ma#a katra or f katra, Latin: in rebus) and after plurality (ba#da

katra, Latin: post res). Here is what Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade said on

this issue:
General (notion) is either (1) before things, and then that is the form100
of a being (that exists) in the first active principle before the existence
of individual thingsimilar to how the soul of a carpenter carries the
form of a bed before he makes the individual bedsor (2) it is with
things or within things, which is a general notion existing in the context
of its individual objects, without its actual existence or (3) it is after
things, and that is the one (general notion) that the soul abstracts from
the individual and separates it101 discarding the individual.102
97 See: B. Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela, 102, as well as: I. Madkour, LOrganon

dAristote, 137140.
98 Muhammad b. M
. usa #Allamak, for example, emphasizes that these fit better in
metaphysics and theology. See his work, fol. 28b.
99 See: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, 151 and 154, and text Teaching on Being
in: Klasicna kultura islama, pp. 363368.

100 Sura, literally means form, shape, in sense of external plastic shape. Mustaf
. . . a Yuyo
Ayyub-zade uses this word in the same meaning used by Ibn Sna, substantial form.
It covers the meaning of Platos notion archetype. See: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie
dAvicenne et son influence en Europe Medivale, Paris, 1979, pp. 6768.
101 Intaza #ayantazi #u literally means to be separated, removed from something, and
with prepositions #an it means to put aside, to separate something, to abstract some-
thing. Ibn Sna uses this word to denote abstraction; see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires
compars, naz#.
h. al-gadd, fol. 39.
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar
102 Mustaf
These standpoints that Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade passed on in the

shortened version from Ibn Snas Kitab as-sifa"the triple existence of
ideas and universalia (ante res, in rebus, post res, then genus naturale,
genus mentale and genus logicum)can also be found among the
Latinist philosophers from the early 12th century on. W. Windelband
shows that this formula was first taken over from Ibn Sna by Pierre
Ablard (10791142), to be later accepted by Thomas Aquinas and
Duns Scotus.103
Unlike other authors, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in his New Commen-
tary and Muhammad
. b. Musa al-Bosnaw #Allamak in the Commentary
on The Sun Treatise discuss the issue of relations between notions given
their contents and scope, in the context of general notions.104 Both these
authors divide this issue in two categories. The first category is the
notions that are mutually congruent (mutasawiyan), and the other are
incongruent or opposite (mutabayinan) notions.
Regarding congruent notions, both authors point out three elemen-
tary relations, although they do not oer specific terminology for each.
The first relation is those notions that are completely adequate to one
another, or have the same scope (equivalent); the second relation is the
one where one notion is more general (a#amm) and inclusive (sa mil)
at the same time, while the other is more special (ahas.s.) and in-
cluded (masmul), which can be interpreted as relations of subordina-
tion and super-ordination; and the third relation is the one of notions
that are partially overlapping, that partially share their scope or con-
tents (interfering).
It is evident that this classification, compared to modern textbooks
in formal logic, lacks the so-called relation of identity and the relation
of coordination. Actually, in the first case it is not really a relation of
two notions, but two wordssynonyms (mutaradif) that have the same
contents and the same scope, while in the second case it is a relation of
two notions of the same level of generality (#umum) that are subordinate
to the same notion, but are not even partially overlapping in their
scope, and thus cannot be considered congruent (mutasawiyan).
The remaining relations are compared by pairs and classified under
incongruent or opposite notions (mutabayinan), including the above men-
103 See: W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije, t. I, 344 and on, as well as I. Madkour,
LOrganon dAristote, 154.

104 Muhammad b. M
. usa al-Bosnaw #Allamak, Sar h. as-Samsiyya,
fol. 28b30b; Mus.-
h. al-gadd, fol. 40a45a.
t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, as-Sar
82 chapter three
tioned relation of coordination (manhorse), as well as the rela-

tion of contrariness (didd),
. contradiction (tanaqud)
. and complete dierence
(ihtilaf) when notions cannot be compared e.g. when they are in disparity

(muhtalifan).

Finally, it should be said that the part dealing with the relations
between notions, specifically the part where the issue of opposition of
notions is mentioned, is presented quite poorly in both works. It lacks
the system and organization that the rest of the work is characterized
with. Maybe that is a consequence of the nebulous parts in the refer-
enced basic texts, but comparing these works to the others, including
the works of Ibn Sna, we can conclude that this issue was not treated
on an adequate level. This is shown by the fact that most of the works in
the field of logic in Arabic do not even mention this issue, as is the case
with other Bosniac authors. Furthermore, Aristotle treats the issue of
the opposition of notions together with categories (Categories, volume 10
and 11), and this book has already given the views of Arabic logicians
towards categories. Bosniac authors too have presented the theory of
opposition in a clearer and a more systematic way in chapters on judg-
ment and opposition of judgments.
Definition and Description

The issue of definition and description is also one of the subjects to
which Arabic logicians devoted great attention and treated as one of
the fundamental issues of logic. The problem was defined and solved
by Ibn Sna. In his works on logic he treated issues of definition and
description systematically and in great detail.105 His solutions to the
given problems were adopted literally by other logicians. In his works
Ibn Sna based his explanations on three sources. For the definition
of definition he took Aristotles Posterior Analytics (especially volume 2,
chapter 13) and Topics (especially volume 1, chapter 5, and volume 6)
and for the definition of description, he used the works by Galenus.106
Works by Galenus aected the most significant elements of the view
of Arabic philosophers and logicians on description (rasm). Mikls
gat, pp. 120125, 129, 133134 and 137140; Kitab al-h. udud, introduc-
105 See, e.g: Na
tion, 110, especially pages 1011; Kitab al-isarat, pp. 103111.

106 Besides these writings, reference books mention the works by Socrates and Plato.
See more: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, 119120 and 133137; Ibn Sna, Kitab al-
h. udud, 6 (Introduction A.-M. Goichon), note 1.
Marth rightfully concludes that: Die Stoiker wandten dort eine Be-
schreibung (hypographe) an, wo die Peripatetiker difinierten, und eine
hypographe hat einen ganz anderen Aufbau als unser Beispiel. Die ber-
legung liegt nahe, da wir es hier nicht mit einer stoischen Ansicht
zu tun haben. Dies scheinen auch Galens Worte zu besttigen, der
behauptete: Es ist die Angewohnheit der Hellenen, ihre allgemeinglti-
gen Aussagen in Dreiecken order in der Form des Dreiecks auszu-
drcken. Im ersten Fall bezieht sich der Ausdruck auf alle Einzel-
wesen, im zweiten Fall auf den diese zusammenfassenden Artenbe-
gri. 107
In his works Aristotle mentions the two elementary types of defini-
tion: definition that explains the essence of things, and definition that
explains the meaning of words. Later Latin terminology oered the
terms definitions quid rei and definitiones quid nominis. Ibn Sna remained
primarily interested in the first type of definition, the actual definition (al-
hadd
. . q), while he felt that the other, nominal definition (al-hadd
al-haq .
al-lafz.), has no logical value, as it is based on the mere explanation of
one word by the other, and therefore cannot serve as a realistic pre-
miss.108
In the later period of the development of logic in Arabic this issue
takes up a chapter, usually titled al-Qawl as-sa rihInterpretative
.
discourse, or F at-ta#rfatOn Explications.109 This is also the case
among Bosniac authors, as shown by the quoted structures of the texts
in the field of logic. Most of these texts exclusively discuss realistic
definition in Ibn Snas meaning, while the texts by Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade New Commentary, and Muhammad . b. Musa al-Bosnaw
#Allamak Commentary on The Sun Treatise explain in short the nominal
definition as well (at-ta#rf al-lafz.).110
Bosniac authors often use the following completely identical defini-
tion of definition:
107 See: Mikls Marth, Ibn Sna und die peripatetische Aussagenlogik, E.J. Brill, Leiden,
New York, Kbenhavn, Kln, 1989, p. 82.

108 Ibid, note 105.
109 Although the syntagm qawl sarih and the word ta #rfat are used in the very broad
.
sense of the meaning, in texts in logic they denote the definition in a broader sense
(definition and description), or are used in the translation of Aristotles On Interpretation.
110 Mustaf h. al-gadd, fol. 53b; Muhammad
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, as-Sar . b.
Musa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 37b.
84 chapter three
Definition is the discourse that marks the essence of things (Al-hadd .

qawl dall #ala mahiyya as-say").111
It is clear that this is the literally translated definition of Aristotle
taken over by Bosniac authors from Kitab al-h. udud by Ibn Sna, where
he says: Definition, according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, A.L.) in
his Topics, is the discourse that marks the essence of things, i.e. the
perfection of their essential being.112
Further on, texts distinguish between the complete (al-hadd . at-tamm)
and incomplete definition (al-hadd
. an-naqis.). Hasan al-Aqhi
. s.ar says:
Firstly, the complete definition, and it is comprised of closer genus
(genus proximum) and closer dierence (dierentia specifica), such as
e.g. reasonable animal in the definition of man.113
Secondly, the incomplete definition, and it is comprised of distant genus
and closer dierence, such as reasonable developing body or reason-
able substance in its (of man, A.L.) definition.114
Therefore, the distinction is made on the basis of whether the defini-
tion uses the genus proximum (gins qarb) or the distant genus (gins ba#d) of
the defined notion.
In contrast to the definition which aims at defining the essence
of things (mahiyya as-say"), according to Ibn Sna, when a thing is
cognized following the description based on accidence and properties,
then that thing is cognized in accordance with its description (rasm).115
Analogously to the division of definitions into complete and incom-
plete, there is the division of description (rasm). This division will be illus-
trated by an example from al-Aq hi. s.a rs Compendium:
Thirdly, the complete description (ar-rasm at-tamm), is made of genus
proximum and properties, such as e.g. laughing animal in the defini-
tion of man.
Fourthly, the incomplete description (ar-rasm an-naqis.), is made of dis-
tant genus and properties, such as e.g. laughing body or laughing sub-
stance in its definition (of a man). It (the incomplete description) can
111 Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 12a12b; Sar h. Muhtas. ar, 31b;
Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak, Sarh. as-Samsiyya, fol. 33b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade

h. al-gadd, fol. 35; Sar
al-Mostar, as-Sar agug, 25 etc.
h. Is
112 Kitab al-hudud, 10 (1112).
.
Aristotle: Definition is a discourse that marks the essence of things. (Topics, I, V).
113 Compare: Aristotle, Topics, vol. V, IV.
114 See: Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 12a12b (Izabrani spisi, 69
70).
115 Ibn Sn a, Kitab al-isarat, p. 106.
consist of general accidence and properties: The laughing thing that is

here in description of man.116
Besides this classification, all works oer instructions and regulations
for creating a definition, with special emphasis on the following:
that a definition expresses the essence of the defined,
that a definition is applicable to all that it refers to and nothing
else,
that a definition is not circular,
that a definition is not expressed in negative terms if the defined is
positive and vice versa,
that a definition is not expressed in foreign and unclear words,
figures of speech, etc.117
And, it is important for the logic of judgments and emphasized by
authors, that a definition can serve as a premiss or a part of a premiss
in the conclusion process.
The theory of definition in Arabic philosophy and science in gen-
eral has a very important place. It should be pointed out that practical
application of the theory of definition in Arabic scholastic reached its
full in almost all classical Islamic disciplines, from speculative theol-
ogy118 to writing specialized dictionaries of philosophical, philological
and legal vocabulary.119 Some works from the later period (usually com-
ments on writings in law and philology) had an exclusive goal in the
analysis of the given works, focusing on how each author defines a term
and whether the regulations of definition were applied or not.
116 See: Hasan

. Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 12b (Izabrani spisi, 70). In

his Commentary al-Aqhi . s.a r presents some other possibilities for the creation of incmplete
description (see fol. 32a32b).
117 See, e.g.: Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 54a54b.
118 A typical example of the application of the theory of definition is a fragment from
Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi . s.a rs work Gardens of Eden on the Principles of Science of Kalam (Rawd . at
al-gannat f us.u l al-i#tiqadat min #ilm al-kalam) that has abundance of such examples:
As for the rational deduction of proofs, it is something that cannot exist if a part
of it does not exist. A man is a believer at all times, and neither deeds nor assertions
exist at all times. Believing, as well, has a definition, and it is defined and only when
all parts of the defined are present. If one part is missing, then it (the definition) cannot
be relevant to the rest. If believing were comprised of convictions, deeds and assertions,
then the committer of a severe, or even insignificant sin, is an infidel, since from the
inexistence of one part of it (definition) we could conclude that the entity as a whole
does not exist. Hasan . Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Izabrani spisi, 120121.
119 Bosnia and Herzegovina knew a number of dictionaries of that kind (see quoted
catalogues of Oriental manuscripts kept in Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the dictio-
86 chapter three
On Judgment
Theory of Judgment and Judging

Arabic logicians found elements of the theory on judgment and judging
in Aristotles On Interpretation (Peri Hermneias) in which Aristotle built

upon Platos teaching on simple armation and simple negation, to
reach the definition of judgment, classification of judgments, and the
theory of opposition.120 Aristotle saw judgment as a type of discourse
expressing existence or the attribution of something to something, or
the lack of attribution or inexistence of the subject of the judgment in
question. Following in Aristotles footsteps, Arabic logicians and their
Bosniac successors define judgment in the same way.121
Another point that should be raised before the presentation of the
elements of this theory is the fact that these works use four terms for
judgment: al-qawl al-gazim, al-habar, al-h. ukm and al-qad. iyya.

Al-qawl al-gazim is the literal translation of Aristotles term lgos apo-
fantiks,122 therefore, expresses the discourse that declares or judges
something.
nary that was used most often is the one composed by al-Gur ga n and titled Ta #rfat. It
contains linguistical, legal and philosophical terms.
120 The theory of conversion is presented in the Prior Analytics, vol. I, chapter II
and III, as well as in other chapters of the same work.

121 Aristotle: As there are in the mind thoughts which do not involve truth or falsity,
and also those which must be either true or false, so it is in speech. (On Interpretation,
IV) An armation is a positive assertion of something about something, and denial is
a negative assertion. (Ibid, VI.)
Compare: Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 13a13b (Izabrani spisi,
70) where he gives almost exactly the same definition of judgment and its structure.
Something similar is done in the works by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar h.
agug, page 2728 and Muhammad
Is .
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 40b
etc. The same issue is discussed in a bit more detail in the works by: Muhammad .
#Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 35a36a and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar,
h. al-gadd, fol. 54b55b, as well as Sar
as-Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 16b17a, also by
Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade, where the author oers references of his New Commentary on The
Sun Treatise (as-Sar h. al-gadd).
122 Greek lgos means discourse, the same as Arabic qawl, while apofino means I
declare, I claim, the same as gazama, especially with the preposition bi, that denotes
decisiveness of the declaration.
Compare: Aristotle, On Interpretation, (chapter V), that says that the: First type of
declarative discourse (lgos apofantiks) is armation
Al-habar means assertion, declaration, and taking into consideration

the original meaning of the Arabic root word hbr,123 it also carries the

elements of assertion. These two terms are rarely used by Bosniac
logicians, and when used, their purpose is to have a more precise
definition of more frequent al-h. ukm and al-qad. iyya.
Al-h. ukm denotes judgment and judging, while al-qad. iyya in addidtion
to meaning judgement, is also used as a proposition, which is not the
case with h. ukm.
The authors insist on a strict distinction between judgment of any
kind and any other assertion. This leads to the definition of the judg-
ment that says that it is the act of armation or negation so it can be
defined whether the one stating it is speaking the truth (s.a diq) or telling
lies (kadib).124

Therefore, in order for one statement, or in the words of Arabic
logicians, one complex word (lafz. murakkab), to be a judgment, it has
to state or deny something and it may be either true or untrue (truth:
untruths.idq: kidb).

Thus, truthfulness is the quality of a judgment, and, according to
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, truth is the correspondence
(mut.a baqa) of a judgments relation (an-nisba al-hukmiyya) . to reality,
and untruth is the lack of correspondence.125 This shows that Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade defines truth by accepting the theory of adequacy or
correspondence that originates from Aristotle, and according to which
the truthfulness of a judgment is based on the adequacy of thoughts
and things (Latin adaequatio intellectus et rei), or the adequacy of
judgment to its subject. Noticing that feature of truththat it is not
internal to a judgment but the quality that the judgment contains in
relation to realityArabic logicians, and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade as
well, speak of judgments relation (an-nisba al-hukmiyya).
.
This observation left its trace in the analysis of judgment structure
by Arabic logicians. Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, for example, states that
a judgment, in the logical sense of the word, is a four-part unit, that,
besides being the subject and predicate, it contains judgments rela-
tion and copula pointing out that relation.126 The very definition of
123 Basic meaning of habara is to be well informed, to know something well.

124
See note 121 and places in the listed works.
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq wa al-kalam, fol. 17a,
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar
125 Mustaf
first marginal note.

126 Muhtasar al-Kaf, fol. 13a and 14a. Also see: Muhammad b. M usa #Allamak, Sar
h.
.
.
88 chapter three
judgment shows that judging is not understood from the aspect of

speech, but that it is spoken armation or the denial of existence or
the inexistence of the entity that is the subject of the judgment, and
that there is an unbreakable link between thinking and speaking
Logical discussions pay special attention to analysis and classification
of judgments by relation, quality, quantity and modality. The following is a
short survey of the classification of judgments presented in the works by
Bosniac authors:127
I Regarding relation, judgments are classified in the following way:

a. Categorical or attributive judgments (al-qadiyya . al-hamliyya)
. 128
that
confirm or deny that a certain attribute belongs or does not be-
long to a subject, as e.g., man is a reasonable being, i.e. man is
not a reasonable being, and
b. Conditional judgment (al-qadiyya
. as-sart.iyya)129 which can be either:
1) Conjunctive (muttas.ila), as in the example: If the sun has risen,
the day has started or
ar-Risala as-samsiyya, fol. 37a37b and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, as-sarh. al-
gadd, fol. 57b58a.
127 See: Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 13b17a (Izabrani spisi, 71
74); Muhammad. b. Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 37a52a; Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar agug, str. 2837, as-Sar
h. Is h. al-gadd, fol. 57b87b, Sar h.
Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 17a26a; Muhammad .
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar,
fol. 4051a; Fadil. U zicawal, Sar
h. matn, fol. 11a15b; Muhammad . b. Yusuf al-Bos-
naw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 119a122b.

128 From the root hml that in a verb group (hamalayahmiluhaml) means to carry,
. . . .
to move, to transfer, etc. and its form with the preposition #ala = to attribute, to nomi-
nate, etc. Verb forms that were constructed for the needs of logic, in accordance with
the regulations of Arabic morphology, are h. aml = attribution in the sense of Aristotles
words: Every premiss states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute
of something else; of premisses of these three kinds some are armative, others nega-
tive, in respect of each of the three modes of attribution; again some armative and
negative premisses are universal, others particular, others indefinite. (Prior Analytics, I,
2). Further on, mah. mul = attribute and predicate, and h. amil as opposite to mah. mul meaning
subject and, evenutally, h. aml meaning attributive. (Compare translation by A.M. Goichon:
Ibn Sna-a, Kitab al-isarat (Livre des directives et remarques), 133 and A.-M. Goichon,
Vocabulaires compars where term mahm . ul is translated exclusively as attribute or
predicate.
The syntagm al-qad. iyya al-h. amliyya can be literally translated as attributive judgment,
however, there is also categorical considering the fact that this classification of judgment
completely covers those judgments that logic classifies as categorical, and the fact that
the literature on Arabic logic uses it more frequently.
129 sarataya
. sru.tusar.t (#ala, f) = to set as a condition, to condition. Al-qad. iyya as-
sar.tiyya, therefore conditional judgment.
2) Disjunctive (munfas.ila), as in the example: This number is

even or odd.130
Before we move on to further discourse, it is necessary to give some
details on this classification. In scientific literature there are dierences
in translating the Arabic terminology related to conditional judgments.
Latin scholastic, followed by modern logic, treats conditional-conjunc-
tive judgment as conditional or hypothetical, and conditional-disjunc-
tive judgment as disjunctive. This terminology aected researchers of
Arabic logic as well. However, it cannot be applied to the texts of Ara-
bic logicians and their followers. In terms of this classification, they
insist on two issues. Firstly, that categorical and conditional court are
dierent in the following way if the subject and the predicate of
a judgment stand alone, or if the words that are in the judgment
besides them belong to them, then it is categorical judgment and
if they do not stand alone, and if the words that are in the judg-
ment besides them do not belong to them, then it is conditional judg-
ment.131
A characteristic of conditional judgments is the fact thatbesides
the elements that each categorical judgment can containthey neces-
sarily contain one of hypothetical conjunctions, e.g. they are charac-
terized by a condition (sart.). That condition can be of dual character:
conjunctive (muttas.il), ifthen, or disjunctive (munfas.il), eitheror.
Conditional-disjunctive judgment, as we have seen, is comprised
of two predicates, two judgments. The relation between those two
predicates or judgments, according to Arabic logicians can be:
a) If one predicate is true, the other is necessarily untrue,
b) If one predicate is true, the other is untrue, but it is possible that
they are both untrue, and a third one should be added,
c) One predicate is necessarily true, but both may be true.
This classification can be clearer if a fragment from the work by Hasan
.
hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r is quoted:
Disjunctive judgment is either:
130 Both examples given for the conjunctive and the disjunctive judgment are typical
and can be found in almost all works by Bosniac authors. See note 127.
131 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 13b (Izabrani spisi, 71).

90 chapter three
. qiyya)if disjunction is in existence or inexistence:

a) actual (haq
The number is either even or odd, meaning that the two of them
(predicates) cannot be attributed or denied at the same time, or it
is
b) not inclusive (mani#a al-gam#)132if disjunction is only in existence,
for example: That thing is either stone or wood. It means that
the two of them (predicates) cannot be attributed at the same time,
but they can both be denied, or it is
c) denying inexistence (mani#a al-huluww)
. 133
if disjunction is in inexis-
tence: Zayd is either in the sea, or he hasnt drowned. It means
that the two of them do not exclude each other, but their connec-
tion is possible.134
Such classification of judgments by relation corresponds to Kants.
Kant classifies judgments by relation as: categorical (S is P), hypotheti-
cal (If P1 then P2) and disjunctive (S is either P1 or P2).135 However, one
significant dierence between this and other classifications is that Ara-
bic logicians dont divide judgments by relation directly, as is common,
but first they divide judgments into categorical and non-categorical or
conditional judgments, then they further divide them on. Such classifi-
cation seems more natural.
Relating to classification by relation, Bosniac authors analyze judg-
ment structure and point out the parts of a categorical judgment: sub-
ject (mawd. u#),136 predicate or attribute (mahm
. ul),137 relation between them
132 Compare: Ibn Sna, Kitab al-isarat, 130.

133 Ibidem.
134 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 16b17a (Izabrani spisi, 73).
sic, Osnovi logike, p. 220.
135 See: B. Se
136 Mawdu # literally means that which is positioned, placed, put, and in philosophical
.
terminology it may have more meanings (see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires compars,
pp. 2728).
Writings in the field of logic use this word in two dierent meanings: logical subject
(not grammatical), which is the literal translation of Aristotles hipokimenon (that which
lies here, subject) and object of a discipline (that will be discussed in more depth later).
The writings that this book is based on usually define subject as that on whom
(which) something is said by categorical judgement (al-mahk . um #alayhi). See, e.g:
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 13b and 14b (Izabrani spisi, 70 and
71); Muhammad b. Musa #All amak, Sar
h. as-Samsiyya,
fol. 37a; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
.
h. al-gadd, fol. 57b, Sar
zade, as-Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 17a and other.
137 Term mahmul meaning attribute or predicate is used exclusively in logic and never in
.
grammar. The expression that with which something is stated (al-mahk . um bihi) has
the same purpose. See notes 126 and 127.
(nisba) that is expressed by copula (rabit.a) and parts of conditional

judgments: antecedence (muqaddam), consequence (talin) and condition (sart.).
The issue of copula, with insight into Arabic language, is treated in
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zades New Commentary on The Sun Treatise.138 He
points out that in Arabic, given the dierent syntax from Greek (al-luga
al-yunaniyya), the copula is not necessary in a categorical judgment,
for example in Zayd a lim (Zayd (is) educated). Therefore this kind
of judgment can be called bipartite (tuna"iyya) rather than tripartite

(tulatiyya).139 When the copula is given explicitly, it is expressed either

by a pronoun, e.g. huwa (hi), when it, de facto, plays the role of
pronoun separating subject and predicate (dam . r al-fas.l wa al-#imad);
or it is expressed by some forms of he verb kana (to be) when it is the
time copula (ar-rabit.a az-zamaniyya). The negative copula is laysa (is
not).140 He points out that conditional conjunctive judgment in Arabic
has to be expressed by the copula. Also interestingly, Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade speaking on this issue compares Arabic with Persian.141
II Regarding quality, Bosniac authors classify judgments in the follow-

ing way:
1. armative (al-mug iba) and
2. negative (as-saliba).142
As stated before, categorical judgment confirms that an attribute be-
longs or does not belong to a subject; conditional conjunctive judgment
confirms or denies implications between antecedence and consequence,
e.g. If the sun is up, it is day and If the sun is not up, it is not day,
while conditional disjunctive judgment confirms either or denies both.
138 h. al-gadd, fol. 58a59b.

as-Sar
139 Noun clauses in Arabic indeed have no copula, as it is possible in Arabic syntax.
The name bipartite judgment (tuna"iyya) reflects the formal sense. Latin terminol-
ogy calls judgments without explicit copula, or when copula is not separated from
attributes, de secondo adjacente ((A) man stands), and judgments with an explicit subject,
predicate and copula de tertio adjacente.
140 See: a h. al-gadd, fol. 58a59b.
s-Sar
141 Ibid.
142 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, 13b14a (Izabrani spisi, 71); Muham- .
mad b. Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 37a38b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade,
agug, 2930, as-Sar
h. Is
Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 58a59b, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 23b
26a; Muhammad b. Mu st afa al-
Caynaw
, Fat h al-asr
a r,
fol. 43a44a; Fadil zicawal,
. .. . . U
Sarh. matn, 12a and Muhammad . b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 210a.
92 chapter three
Arabic logicians, and their Bosniac followers, recognize the expres-

sion that is al-ma #dul,143 a word that contains the negation la or
gayr, from the expression that uses the negative copula laysa. They
state that such a notion used in a judgment makes that judgment ar-
mative in form, but negative in essence. As its predicate is negative in
meaning, it is equivalent to a negative judgment.144
III There are a number of dierent classifications of judgment based

on quantity, but they can all be reduced to the general division, which is
most often done:145
1. individual (sahs.iyya) or proper (mahs.u s.a) judgments, such as: Zayd

is a clerk or Zayd is not a clerk and This man is good or
This man is not good,
2. Indefinite (muhmala)146 as, for example: A man is a clerk or A
man is not a clerk,
3. definite or quantified (al-mus.awwara or al-mah. s.u ra) that can be:
143 Ma #dul is passive participle of #adila that means to correct, to equalize, and with the
preposition bayna (between) it means not to dierentiate. Therefore, it is an expression

of the same value, equivalent. So judgments: Zayd is illiterate and Zayd is not literate
are equivalent. See e.g.: Hasan . Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 15a (Izabrani
spisi, 72); Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sarh. Is agug, p. 49 and other texts in the chapter.
144 A.-M. Goichon in the translation of Kitab al-i sarat (p. 121, note 3) rightfully
states that this expression should not be mixed with gayr muh. as. s. al (undefined noun) in
Aristotles meaning of noma ariston (see: On Interpretation, chapter X, 64, example
not man), as done by I. Madkour in LOrganon dAristote, pp. 169170.
145 See: Hasan K
. af al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 14b15a (Izabrani spisi,
str. 7172); Muhammad b. Musa #Allamak, h. as-samsiyya, fol. 38b42a; Mus.t.afa
Sar
.
Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar h. Is agug, str. 3033, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 59b
65a, Sar
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 18a; Muhammad .
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar

, fol. 44a47b; Fadil zicawal, Sar h. matn, fol. 12a13a; Muhammad
. U . b. Yusuf al-
Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 120a121a.
146 Although the division of definite and indefinite (and further to universal and particu-
lar) is given by Aristotle, his works, especially the first two chapters of Prior Analytics, give
the exact definition of indefinite proposition. In one of his classifications, Aristotle says:
I use the term /universal/ for attribution or non-attribution to a subject, that is taken
generally /universally/. The individual /particular/ is attribution or non-attribution to
a subject taken individually, and indefinite is attribution or non-attribution if individu-
ality or universality is not explicit. (Prior Analytics I, 1).
Among the indefinite propositions (muhmala), . Arabic logicians make the distinction
between definite (mah. s. ura based on h. as. ara = to encircle, to divide, to limit) or quantified
(musawwara, based on sawwara = to shape, to fence, to form), i.e. propositions that
contain quantifiers (sur), such as all or some, which will be foundation for further
division. See e.g. Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 15a (Izabrani spisi,
p. 72).
a) universal (kulliyya) as for example: All men are clerks and

No men are clerks, or
b) particular (al-guz"iyya) as for example: Some men are clerks
and Some men are not clerks.
Writings also give examples showing that conditional judgments can be
classified by quantity.
This classification is given following the example of Ibn Sna and
his Kitab al-isarat,147 and it must be commended for its consequential-
ity. Bosniac logicians point out the fact that an indefinite judgment is
equalized with the meaning of a corresponding particular judgment.148
As for singular judgments, they are discussed in the way determined
by the stoics, as mentioned by N. Rescher speaking about Ibn Sna,149
and given that these judgments refer to a number of subjects or sub-
ject as a whole, they are observed as a class of universal judgments.
Almost all Arabic logicians pay special attention to quantifiers as such;
they mention words that can be used in the function of quantifiers or
determiners in conditional and time judgments (if, when, whenever,
always, never, at a certain time, etc.). These judgements are also treated
as quantifiers (medieval logic will call these elements, including copula,
syncategorematic signs), thus they dont distinguish them terminologi-
cally.150
Ibn Sna implements the four-part division of judgments with re-
gards to quantity (individual, indefinite, universal and particular) on the
conditional (hypothetical) judgements as well. In his book Ibn Sna und
die peripatetische Aussagenlogik, Mikls Marth compared and analysed
in detail the work by Ibn Sna Kitab as-sifa", Boethiuss De syllogisme
hypotetico and other Greek sources and concluded that the views on this
problematic by Ibn Sna and Boethius dier significantly, even though
they might have used the same sources, and that these views resulted
in two diverging schools. The issue here is not just the number of
hypothetical links that can be deduced (twenty for Boethius or sixteen
armative and negative links for Ibn Sna), but above all the fact that
for Boethius the quantification means quantifying parts of a statement,
147Kitab al-isarat, pp. 118124.

148See e.g.: Hasan. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 15a (Izabrani spisi, 72)
and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 18b.
149 Arapska logika in: Historija logike, p. 52.
150 See, e.g.: Hasan K
. a f al-
Aq hi
. .s
a r
, Mu hta s ar af, fol. 17a (Izabrani spisi,
al-K
pp. 7374). .
94 chapter three
while for Ibn Sna quantifiers always, sometimes, never and

sometimes not denote quantification of a statements link, while the
words-quantifiers all, some etc. have no importance for quantifying
hypothetical statements.151
Eventually, regarding the division of judgments by quantity, it needs
to be said that some authors, such as Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-
Mostar, suggest the possibility of quantification of predicates in cat-
egorical judgments.152 It is known that Ibn Sna, in his Kitab as-sifa",
oers a detailed analysis of judgments with quantified predicates.153 The
same issue will be treated eight centuries later, by Sir William Hamil-
ton (17881856). Presenting consequent quantification of predicates, Ibn
Sna gives a list of eight such judgments (four armative and four
negative), that modern literature calls Hamiltons types (although
they are, according to P.L. Heath in History of Logics, far from being
his invention), which he does not consider important, but preten-
tious. This standpoint on quantified predicate judgments is understand-
able, having in mind that Ibn Sna adopts Aristotles theory on judg-
ment, i.e. the theory of subsumtion by volume, submission of subject vol-
ume to the predicate volume, so that the subject is always treated as
lower and narrower and the predicate as a higher and broader class.
The value will only be recognized by the syllogism of equality, includ-
ing so called mathematical judgments (A = B). The general evalua-
tion of the value of judgments with quantified predicates, given by
Ibn Sna, was taken over by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar,
who used the same name that Ibn Sna had used: crooked, abnormal
(munharifa).
.
151 Viel wichtiger ist der Umstand, da bei Boethius die Quantifizierung die Quan-
tifikation der Aussagenteile bedeutet, whrend bei Ibn Sna die am Anfang der Aussage
stehenden Worte immer, manchmal, nie, manchmal nicht die Quantifizierung der
Aussagenverknpfung bedeuten. Die in den Aussagen stehenden Worte alle, manche
usw. spielen fr die Quantifizierung der hypothetischen Aussage keine Rolle, sie sind
nur aus der Sicht des an sich als kategorische Aussage einstufbaren Aussagenteiles inter-
essant. Mikls Marth, Ibn Sna und die peripatetische Aussagenlogik, E.J. Brill, Leiden,
New York, Kbenhavn, Kln, 1989, especially: Operationen mit den hypothetischen
Aussagen. Der hypothetische Zweifel (Quantoren in den hypothetischen Aussagen),
p. 115.
152 See: a h. al-gadd, fol. 60b and 63b and Sar
s-Sar agug, p. 31.
h. Is
153 See: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote dans le monde arabe, pp. 189190.
IV The elementary division of judgments by modality154 is not done

directly, but the judgments are first divided into those in which some-
thing is simply or absolutely declared (mut.laqa)155 and which have no time
distinctionwhat would correspond to assertoric judgment as classified by
later Western scholarsand to modal judgments (dawat al-giha).156

Modal judgments are further divided to:
1. necessary (dar
. uriyya),157
2. possible (mumkina)158 that can be:
a) properly possible (al-qadiyya
. al-mumkina al-has.s.a) and

b) generally possible (al-mumkina al-#amma); and
3. impossible (al-qadiyya
. al-mumtani#a).
This classification, which is commonly found in the works in the field of
logic in Arabic, apparently misses contingency as one of modalities. Con-
tingency as coincidence, something that can but does not have to be,
154 See: Hasan K

. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 15b17a (Izabrani spisi, 72
73; Muhammad
. b. M u s
a #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 43a48a; Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 69a80a, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 20a23b.
h Is
agug, such as: Sar
Writings commenting on al-Abhars Is . agug by Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade al-Mostar; Fath. al-asrar by Muhammad .
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw h. matn
, Sar
by Fadil .
Uz i
c awal and Fat h
. al-asr ar by Mu hammad
. b. Y
u suf al-Bosnaw
, pay very
little attention to the classification of judgments by modality in context of conditional
judgments.
155 Mutlaq, literally: free, unlimited, unconditioned.
.
literally: direction; side; path or way in which something happens or exists.
156 Giha
It is evident that this word corresponds to the term modality. However, regarding
logic, modal judgment (which is the word usually used to translate this construction) in
European terminology includes assertoric judgment (S is P), which is considered as
one of the modal judgments or, in other words, each judgment belongs to one of the
modality types. On the other hand, Arabic logicians dierentiate between so called
absolute judgment (mut.laqa), and modality usually means: necessity, probability, impossibility
and, according to some authors, contingency.
157 Texts by the authors who are the subject of this book give a definition according to
which qad. iyya d. aruriyya (necessary judgment) is the one expressing the relation between
the subject and the predicate with total certainty, e.g. the unconditional relation. For
example, Hasan . Kaf says: The relation of a predicate to a subject, whether with
armation or with negation, in which it is impossible to separate (coincidence of the
subject-predicate link, A.L.), is called the necessary judgment. For example: Every men is
an animal in a necessary way. (Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 15b).
158 Texts by Bosniac authors define Qa diyya mumkina (possible judgment) as opposition
.
or negation of the necessary judgment. This leads to generally possible or properly possible
judgment.
See: Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi. s.a r, relevant piece of text, and compare with Aristotles, On
Interpretation, 13 and Prior Analytics, I, 13 and Ibn Sna, Kitab al-isarat, pp. 134142 and
148152.
96 chapter three
is omitted by Theofrastes, and among Arabic logicians its importance

was denied by Ibn Sna. It did not fit into his philosophy that polar-
ized around the relation of necessary and possible being.159 Contrary
to that, most of the authors that are the subject of this book, mention
contingency (ittifaq or imkan),160 partly including its meaning into possi-
ble judgments, so this division can be compared with quattuor modi of
Aristotles and scholastic logic.
Discussing modal judgments, Bosniac authors partly adopted Ibn

Snas temporal interpretation of judgments. Of course this is not an
already established time-related logic or the attempts to formulate its
axioms, which is a result of more recent research, but it is important
that there is at least a general understanding of judgments as time-
defined. There are notions that carry a certain definition of time, such
as all the time or permanently (da"ima)such a proposition is al-
qad. iyya ad-da"imait is opposed by time-defined proposition (al-qadiyya
. al-
waqtiyya) that is valid for the past, present and future time.161
Relations Among Judgments

The chapter that focused on judgments usually discussed the issues
of opposition and conversion of judgments,162 although these are forms
of direct conclusion, and so they could be classified in the following
chapter. Such topics remain formally linked to the classification of
judgments, since they discuss the relations among the judgments within
those divisions.
Although Arabic logicians and their Bosniac successors recognized
the notions of the opposition and the conversion of judgments, the issues
that this topic tackles in Latin scholastics, are discussed by Arabic
159 See: Ibn Sna, Kitab al-isarat, p. 138 and from Introduction, pp. 5354; I. Madk-
our, LOrganon dAristote, pp. 172175 and C. Veljacic, Filozofija istocnih naroda, p. 68.
160 The issue of contingent judgment (qadiyya ittif
. aqiyya) is discussed by e.g. Hasan. Kaf
al-Aq hi. s.a r. See: Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 16a16b (Izabrani spisi, p. 73).
161 Temporal interpretation is also discussed by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in his
as-Sarh. al-gadd, fol. 77a77b and Sar
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 20b and 22a, and
Muhammad b. Musa #Allamak in Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 46b47a.
.
162 Hasan K
. a f
al-
Aq hi
. . sa r
, Mu hta s
. ar al-Ka , fol. 18a19a (Izabrani spisi, 7475);
f
Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 52b63b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
zade al-Mostar, Sar agug, pp. 3749 (with chapter On Judgment), as-Sar
h. Is h. al-
gadd, fol. 87b106b, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 26a31b; Muhammad . b. Mus.t.afa

al-Caynaw
, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 51b62a; Fadil zicawal, Sar
h. matn, fol. 15b20b and
. U
Muhammad
. b. Jusuf, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 122b125b.
logicians within the discussions on two elementary notions: tanaqud. 163

and #aks.164
Other terms discussed along with tanaqud. , in a broader meaning,
are: contradiction (tanaqudin
. a narrow meaning), contrariness (tad
. add),165
judgments that are sub-contrary (dahilatani tahta. at-tad . add) and judg-
166

ments that are sub-altered (al-mutadahila).167

It should be said that most works by Bosniac authors point out
all four relations, sometimes without Arabic terms for sub-contrari-
ness and sub-alteration, but using very illustrative examples instead.
Sub-alteration is generally less present, and some texts omit it com-
pletely.168
Conclusions are immaculately made through conversion (#aks), which is
a kind of conclusion made based on one judgment, without significantly
changing its contents, but only transforming the judgment. Hasan . Kaf
hi
al-Aq . s.a r describes this issue as follows:
163 The basic meaning of the word tanaqud is incompatibility, incongruity, disharmony.
.
In logic it can also mean both contradiction and contrariness, although it is more frequently
used to signify contradiction. This can be concluded based on the texts by authors who
are the subject of this book, but also based on the texts by Ibn Sna (see: Kitab al-isarat
, p. 156 and note nr. 3). Therefore, the conclusion is that this term marks the same
thing which the Greek terminology defines as antithesis (antthesis), contrariness of two
notions or two judgments, that can be contrary or contradictory.
164 The basic meaning of the word #aks is rotation, turning, revolting. It, therefore,
completely corresponds to Aristotles antistrfon (see: Prior Analytics, vol. I, chapter 1 and
3), or to Latin conversion.
165 Derived from the verb tadadda (to oppose each another, to be contrary) are the
.
terms for relations between judgments that Latin terminology calls contrariness and sub-
contrariness. Examples that illustrate it (when talking about notions it is the relation
within coordinate notions, and concerning judgments it is the relation between the
universal-armative and universal-negative judgment) clearly show that it is exactly
contrariness.
Some texts in the field of logic, such as Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a rs Muhtas. ar al-Kaf,
fol. 18b, use the word ihtilaf (dierence, contrariness) to denote contrariness.
ahilatani tahta at-tadadd = two judgments that can be classified
166 Al-qadiyyatani ad-d
. illustrating. .
as sub-contrary. Examples relations between particularly-armative and
particularly-negative judgment, clearly points to the relation of sub-contrariness.
167 The researched texts present the relation between universal and particular judg-
ments of the same quality, i.e. the relation of subordination, or in Latin terminol-
ogy sub-alteration, strictly through examples, pointing out the fact that if a sub-altering
judgment is true, the judgment that is sub-altered under it is also true. There is no
terminological dierentiation in the texts, but literature uses the term al-qad. iyya al-
mutadahila.
e.g.: Hasan Kaf al-Aq hi
168 See
. . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, (Izabrani spisi, pp. 7185).

98 chapter three
Conversion of a judgment consists of changing the predicate or

predicative word into the subject, and the subject or subjective word
into predicate, keeping its armation or negation as well as truthfulness
or untruthfulness.
Universal-armative and particular are converted into particular-
armative. For example: when All men are animals is true, it implies
that Some animals are men is also true,169 and if Some animals
are men is true, it implies that Some men are animals is true as
well.170 The two of them (universal-armative and particular) cannot
be converted into universal judgment because it is possible that the
predicate is more general than the subject.171
This is the way, depending on whether the judgment changes its
quality or not, to deduce all types of complete or pure conversion,
and incomplete or impure conversion, to show the possibility of a
conversion, and to evaluate its cognitive theoretical and practical value.
Most works by Bosniac authors,172 besides two elementary types of
direct conclusion through opposition and conversion, deal with equipol-
lence (al-#aks al-mustawa)173 and contraposition (#aks an-naqd).
. 174 These
relations and th epossibility of direct deduction, all speak on conditional
judgments and the possibilities for opposition, conversion, equipollence
and contraposition.
At the end of this short presentation on judgment, there are several
general standpoints that Bosniac authors took on this issue that need to
be presented.
This is one of the topics for which the works by Ibn Sna were treated
as obligatory reading, whether they were used directly, or through
169 This is incomplete conversion (#aks naqis).

170 Complete conversion (#aks tamm).
171 See: Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 17b and on (Izabrani spisi,
p. 74).
172 See: Muhammad b. M
. usa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 55b60b and 60b
63b, and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 93a101a and
101a106a and Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 28b30b and 30b31b. Other works on this
issue treat conversion along with opposition.
173 Al- #aks al-mustawa, literally, equal reversion. Equipollent (of the same meaning) judg-
ments are those that state the same in dierent forms and in dierent ways.
174 #Aks al-naqd, literally: reversed contradiction. Contraposition, as a way to deduce a
.
new judgment from an existing one, actually is just that. Contraposition is opposing
and reversing of a judgment in which the subject and the predicate change places,
changing the predicate with a contradictory term (mortal immortal), and changing
the quality of the whole judgment (armative negative).
successful commentaries and compilations of his works, as well as the

writings by Raz175 and Taftazan.176 Consequently, works by Bosniac
authors preserved all values of this part of Ibn Snas logic, as well
as his contribution to the development of this discipline.177 Systematic
value of his writings is especially prominent in the Book of Remarks and
Admonitions (Kitab al-isa rat wa at-tanbhat) and successful commentaries
of this work are reflected in the works of Bosniac authors on judgment
and judging which were presented in a systematic way.
On Concluding
General Notion and Issue of Concluding

The structure of the works presented in this book shows that the ulti-
mate objective or goal (maqs.ad) of logic, which is evident from its def-
inition as well, is to achieve logically correct thinking which presumes
connecting (tarkb) judgments, in a way to reach a new judgment based
on the previous oneto reach a conclusion (natg a) and acquire new safe
knowledge. The elementary issue of concluding is to research the form
of such a conclusion, its shapes, deduction procedures and rules. As tra-
ditional logic considered syllogism as the only valid form of conclusion
(the two notionssyllogism and conclusionwere often mixed up), it
takes the central place in all the works of Bosniac authors, with a chap-
ter called On Syllogism (f al-qiyas).
As the title states, this chapter presents the elementary issue of syllo-
gistics, teachings on syllogistic or deductive procedures, its regulations,
forming, forms and application. This topic is usually followed by dis-
cussions of varying depth on the other two types of concluding: example
or analogy and induction.
Therefore, Arabic logic recognizes all three forms of concluding.
However, it sees the ideal type of concluding, i.e. deduction based
on the logical sequence called syllogism (qiyas) that leads to conviction
175 See footnote 35 in the first chapter.

176 See footnote 49 in the first chapter.
177 See more on Avicennas contribution to the development of logic: A.N. Prior,
Historija logike, pp. 5152 and 55.

100 chapter three
(yaqn), i.e. actual scientific and undisputable knowledge.178 The other

two forms of concluding, analogy (tamtl) and induction (istiqra"), lead to

opinion (zann)
. which has lesser value than conviction making it, more or
less, probable knowledge.179 This is in short the view on the evaluation
of dierent concluding forms.
As for the direct forms of concluding (concluding by opposition,
conversion, etc.), Arabic logicians traditionally felt that those forms are
but a transformation of a given judgment, with the only dierence
being in the form of expression; therefore these forms were closer to
the teachings on judgment than on concluding.
Syllogism
Following in the footsteps of Ibn Sna, reproducing the definition given
by Aristotle, Bosniac authors often used the following definition:
Syllogism (qiyas)180 is speech (qawl) made of a several judgments
(qad
. aya) which when posed (accepted) leads to another discourse dif-
ferent in essence.181
As this definition (identical in almost all works in the field of logic
that we had the chance to look at) is rather amniguous, in compre-
hensive works and works in the form of commentaries, such as those
by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade and Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak,
authors gave more detailed explanations of this definition and amend-
ments to it. Emphasis is on the following elements:
178 Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 19a19b (Izabrani spisi, pp. 75
76).
179 Ibid.
180 The term qiyas is masdar from the verb qasayaqsu that means to measure,
. . .
and with prepositions #ala and bi = to compare, to judge by. In logical terminology it
means syllogism (general literature often uses qiyas man.tiq = logical syllogism), and legal
terminology uses it to define a conclusion made based on analogy.
181 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 19b (Izabrani spisi, p. 76).
Almost the same definition, with minor variations, is oered in other works by
Bosniac authors: Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-Samsiyya,
fol. 64a64b;
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug, page 49, as-Sar
h. Is h. al-gadd, fol. 106b107a,
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 32a; Muhammad
Sar .
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar,

fol. 62a62b; Fadil zicawal, Sar h. matn, fol. 20b21a; Muhammad
. U . b. Yusuf al-
Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 125b126a.
Defining syllogism, Aristotle says: A syllogism is discourse in which, certain things
being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being
so. (Prior Analytics, I, 1).
That a syllogism is a combination (murakkab) of at least two

judgments that, given that they precede the conclusion (natg a),182
are called premisses (muqaddima);183
That a syllogism, if based on more than two premisses, can be
reduced to one based on two premisses and a conclusion;
That a syllogism can be deducted only if both premisses contain
one common element, called the middle term (al-hadd . al-awsat.),
that links the notions that are dierent (from dierent premisses)
that make the subject (mawd . u#) of the conclusion or minor term (al-
hadd
. al-as.g ar) and predicate (mahmul) of the conclusion or major
term (al-hadd
. al-akbar) and eventually,
In order to form a syllogism that will result in the inevitable or
possible conclusion, it is necessary to respect the rules or conditions
(sart.surut.) of forming a syllogism and pay attention to the con-
tents (madda) of premisses.184
A premiss can be called major (al-kubra) or minor (as.-s.ugra) depending
on whether the term it contains is major or minor.
This presentation points to the elements of Aristotles syllogism, its
structure and the most important features of the structure: the logical
function of the middle notion or term. The works that this paper dis-
cusses, treat its very role, position and relations with other two terms
separately. The principal issue raised by Arabic logicians is the classifi-
cation of syllogisms. This classification is somewhat dierent from the
one given in the works by Aristotle. Although this division is evidently
aected by Teofrastus and the stoics, Ibn Sna in his Book of Remarks
and Admonitions points out that it is his view of the classification.185 This
division is to be later taken over by Bosnian logicians.
According to this classification, syllogisms are divided into two ele-
mentary groups: connected (iqtiran) and separated or separate (istitna").

182 Natga, literally: result, consequence, fruit. A word also used in the meaning of
conclusion, although less frequently, is ma.tlub (literally: looked for, sought).

183 Muqaddima, literally: going before something, preceding. Logical terminology uses
this word to denote premiss, or judgment as a part of syllogism. Therefore, each

muqaddima is at the same time qad. iyya (the expression sometimes used is al-qadiyya . al-
muqaddima), and understandably not vice versa.
184 The issue of contents (m adda) of premisses, i.e. syllogism, will be dealt with in the
chapter on the fallacy of syllogistic conclusions or sophistic syllogisms.
185 Ibn Sn a says: According to our assumptions, syllogism is divided, see: Kitab
al-isarat, p. 194.
102 chapter three
This is a distinction between the two elementary types of syllogisms,

and between the two terms, literally translated, that are not common in
European logic. As these terms, dierently translated and interpreted,
caused polemics and discussions in literature, it is useful to explain their
meaning.
The term iqtiran is derived as a relative from the infinitive iqtiran
meaning: to link, to be connected, to interact, and the term istitna" is

derived in the same way from istatna meaning: to exclude, to separate,

to take out.
Speaking about the mechanism of syllogisms in Avicenna, I. Mad-
kour translates these terms as conjunctive (iqtiran) and hypothetical or
exceptive (istitna").186 In the translation of Ibn Snas Kitab al-isarat wa

at-tanbhat, A.-M. Goichon translates these terms as categorical and hypo-
thetical, stating that I. Madkours translation is wrong.187
The problem emerged from the fact that both authors (translators)
tried to fit one very original division into the scheme and the termi-
nology of the medieval scholastics. It is evident that I. Madkours dis-
tinction conjunctive: hypothetical, is not valid, as stated by A.-M. Goichon,
but, as proved by the following text, the distinction categorical: hypotheti-
cal is also dubious.188 Therefore this elementary classification keeps the
original terms, i.e. their literal translation.
Lets see now how and what this division performed by Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade, who refers to Ibn Snas texts and relevant com-
mentaries, was based on.
Connected syllogism (iqtiran) is the one that does not actually con-
tain (bi al-fi#l) the conclusion or its opposite, but it is potentially
contained (bi al-quwwa). Therefore, the conclusion is not explicitly
expressed, but it is contained implicitly in both premisses, and it
is called linked due to the link between the terms of the syllogism
minor, major and middle within itand it is said (to be called that,
A.L.) because the two premisses within are linked with a particle that
expresses the connection between the two premisses in realization, i.e.
linker particle wa189
186 Ibrahim Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, p. 203.

187 Ibn Sna, Kitab al-isarat, p. 194, esp. note nr. 6.
188 The inconsistency of such classification because traditional logic sees categorical
syllogism as exclusively categorical judgments for premiss, while in the classification

given by Arabic logicians, the iqtiran syllogism can be based on categorical judgments,
and also on a categorical and a hypothetical judgment, etc., as we will soon see.
189 A h. al-gadd, fol. 107b.
s-Sar
As the quoted fragment shows, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade points

out a logical-syntactical element of syllogism forming. Following one
of Ibn Snas commentators, he shows that the minor and the major
premiss, regardless of whether there are words or symbols used (A, B,
are inevitably linked either by a connective conjunction (harf
G), . al-#at.f)
or an exception or separation particle (harf
. al-istitna"), which is the case

in the second type of syllogisms. In this light Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
zade adds:
Separated syllogism is the one which actually quotes the conclusion
or its opposite, and it is called separated as it uses the exclusion
particle bat. For example:
If the sun is up, the day has started.
But the sun is up.
Conclusion: The day has started.
This shows190 that the issue here is that of linkage between two pre-
misses within one syllogism, and not a classification based on the rela-
tions of judgments (categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, etc.); therefore
the classification of syllogisms on these grounds is inappropriate.
Before the presentation of further division, it need be said that the
texts of Bosniac authors explain the so-called syllogism of equality (qiyas
al-musawat).191 However, according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, the
deduction of conclusions here is not a result of the essence of premisses,
or the link between the general and the specific, but of the principle of
the equation:
as in, for example:
A equals B.

B equals G.
therefore
A equals G.
However, this is not because of the essence of the two premisses, but
because of the premiss (axiom) that two things that are equal to the
third, are at the same time equal to each other.
Similar explanations can be found in other works that are included in this paper,
e.g.: Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 20a (Izabrani spisi, p. 76); Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar h. Is p. 52; Muhammad b. Mustafa al-Caynaw
agug, , Fath. al-
. ..
asrar, fol. 64a65a; Muhammad . b. M u s
a #All a mak,
Sarh. a
s-
s amsiyya, fol. 64b65a.
190 Mustaf h. al-gadd, fol. 107b.
191 Mustaf
.. a Y u y
o Ayyu b
-z
a de,
Sar agug, pp. 5051; as-Sar
h. Is h. al-gadd, fol. 107a;
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 32a.
Sar

104 chapter three
However, as Arabic logicians, following Aristotles example, paid

little attention to the logic of relation, this type of syllogism was left
without further studying.
Further division shows that connected syllogism can be made of exclu-
sively categorical judgments, when it is called categorical syllogism (al-qiyas
al-haml
. )192 or of conditional, or categorical and conditional, when it is
called non-categorical syllogism (gayr haml . ).193
Separated syllogism can be either conditional-disjunctive (qiyas sart.
infis.a l) or conditional-conjunctive (qiyas sart. ittis.a l).194
As for the first group, attention is paid to categorical syllogism. This
is an example of how Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade speaks about the
elements of syllogism and the forming of syllogistic figures (saklaskal):
The notion contained in both premisses is called the middle term
(hadd
. awsat.),195 as it acts as a mediator between two unknown elements
The subject of the conclusion is called the minor term (hadd . as.g ar),
as it is more specific, therefore poorer in volume and thus minor. The
predicate of the conclusion is called the major term (hadd . akbar), as it is
more general and more comprehensive.
The premiss containing the minor term is called the minor premiss
(s.ugra) as, containing the minor term, it has the features of the minor
term, and the premiss containing the major term is called the major
premiss (kubra), as, containing the major term, it has the features of the
major term, which is its meaning
The form derived from linking the major and the minor premiss is
called the figure (sakl) There are four figures.
If the middle term is the predicate of the minor and the subject of
the major premiss, it is called the first figure (as-sakl al-awwal).
For example:
192 The verb h. amala, which is the basis for this word, means: to carry, to transport, to
move, to show, etc. and with the preposition #ala it means: to attribute, to connect, to
award, etc. Therefore, h. aml means attribution, and mah. mul attribute or predicate (see
note nr. 128). As for the syllogism, the texts refer to categorical syllogism (v.: A. Wahrmund,
Handwrterbuch haml. ).
193 This division into categorical and non-categorical syllogisms (or attributive and non-
attributive) that are a form of iqtiran syllogisms, clearly shows that the translation iqtiran
= categorical, used by A.-M. Goichon, is not suitable.
194 See the chapter on judgments and division by relation.
195 The basic meaning of hadd (pl. hud
. . ud) is cutting edge, boundary, etc. It is used in
the meaning of definition. It can also mean a fixed word or term in syllogism. It would be
interesting to mention that Greek hros, Latin terminus and Arabic h. add originally meant
boundary, border.
All men are animals.

All animals are bodies.
Conclusion: All men are bodies.
If it is the other way around, i.e. if the middle term is the subject of the
minor and the predicate of the major premiss, it is called the fourth figure
(as-sakl ar-rabi#).
For example:
All reasonable beings are men.
Conclusion: Some animals are reasonable.
If the middle term is the subject of both premisses, it is called the third
figure (as-sakl at-talit).

For example:
All men are reasonable.
Conclusion: Some animals are reasonable.
If the middle term is the predicate of both premisses, it is called the
second figure (as-sakl at-tan).

For example:
Anything that is made of stone is not an animal.
Conclusion: No men are made of stone.
Before presenting the special forms of each of the figures, modes, here
is a short explanation of the structure of the given figures.196 The
connoisseurs of syllogistics will notice that the order of premisses that
leads to conclusions is the opposite to the one that prevails in traditional
west-European logic. It first gives the minor premiss, then the major
one. Although this order does not change anything significant in the
sense of the consequent deduction of all modes, it is characteristic
of Arabic logic, even in modern times. The texts that were used in
research for this book oer no explanation why the classical Arabic
authors, first al-Farab and Ibn Sna and then their followers, decided
to use this order,
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as well as other authors, further devel-
ops the issue of modes (darb,. pl. dur
. ub) of each of the above figures,
showing that each premiss in these figures, considering the division
196 Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug, p. 54.

h. Is
106 chapter three
presented in the chapter on judgments, can be universally-armative, or

universally-negative, or particularly-armative, or particularly-negative, thus, the
conclusion is defined according to the quality and quantity of pre-
misses. It also shows that it would be theoretically possible to deduce
each figure based on 16 modes.197 However, all theoretically deducible
modes are not necessarily possible in logic. Therefore, all works on this
topic point out the general rules of syllogisms that exclude some of the
combinations (e.g.: if both premisses are negative, conclusion is impos-
sible, etc.), and deduction rules before deducing any of the figures.
An example showing the way it is presented in is from Ayyub-zades
New Commentary on The Sun Treatise.
The Second figure Its condition, or the condition for its deduction,
regarding quality (kayfiyya), is the opposition of two premisses by quality,
i.e. one should be armative and the other negative, and regarding
quantity (kamiyya) that the major should be universal There are four
deducible modes, just like in the first figure, having in mind the two
conditions given
The first mode (ad-
. darb
. al-awwal)198 consists of two universal premisses,
where the major premiss is negative, i.e. of the universally-armative
minor premiss and universally-negative major premiss. The conclusion
is universally-negative.
For example:199
Every G is B.
No A is B.
Conclusion: No G is A.
The second mode (ad-. darb

. at-tan)200 consists of two universal premisses,

where the minor premiss is negative, i.e. of the universally-negative
minor premiss and universally-armative major premiss. The conclu-
sion is universally negative. For example.
No G is B.
Every A is B.
Conclusion: No G is A.
197 Ibid, pp. 6061.

198 This is the mode that scholastic terminology calls Cesare, but the quoted
examples have a reverse order of premisses.
199 Symbols used by Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as well as other Arabic logicians,
are Arabic letters alif, ba" and gim, the first three letters in the old Arabic alphabet, from
the so-called abgad system, that we translated to Latin symbols A, B and G.
200 Modus Camestres.
The third modus (ad- . darb

. at-talit) consists201

As the examples show, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, not unlike other
Bosniac authors following the path of the Arabic school of logic, aban-
doned Aristotles figure forming methods to some extent. Aristotles
principle of dierentiation among figures was the width or the vol-
ume of the middle term in comparison to the other two.202 On these
grounds it was possible to form only three figures.203 Accepting the prin-
ciple that the dierence among figures is made based on the position of
the middle term, Arabic logicians saw the opportunity for the analy-
sis and presentation of the fourth figure, whose introduction is often
attributed to Theophrastus and Galenus.204 However, remaining faith-
ful to the Aristotelian tradition, the first and the most significant Arabic
logicians, including al-Farab and Ibn Sna, discarded the fourth figure,
denying its importance.205 Later authors, including the Bosniac ones,
do however treat the fourth figure and its modes. Truthfully, there are
some dierences in the number of modes that can be formed and the
value of the fourth figure in general. So, for example, Hasan . Kaf al-

Aqhi. s.a r treats only four modes of the fourth figure, and qualifies it
206
201 Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 111a112b.

On forming syllogistic figures in the works of Bosniac authors, see: Hasan . Kaf
hi
al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 21a24a; Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-

samsiyya, fol. 65a73b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug, 5265; Sar
h. Is h. Tahdb
al-man.tiq, 32b37b; Muhammad
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 66a77b;
.
Fadil
.
U z ic awal ,
Sarh. matn, fol. 22b25a i Mu hammad
. b. Y u suf al-Bosnaw
, Fat h
. al-
asrar, fol. 127a128a.
202 Aristotle: Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is
contained in the middle as in a whole, and the middle is either contained in, or
excluded from, the first as in or from a whole etc. (Prior Analytics, I, 4).
203 As the middle term can be broader than one, and narrower than the other,
broader than both or narrower than both, there are three figures possible. For more
detail, see: M. Koen and E. Nejgel, Uvod u logiku i naucni metod [An Introduction to
Logic and The Scientific Method], Beograd, 1965, pp. 106107.
204 There are no reliable sources on the origin of the fourth figure. Its discovery is
often attributed to Galenus or Theophrastus, but some researchers deny the accuracy
of these claims. See: A.N. Prior, Historija logike, pp. 2930.
205 This left a trace on the works by Bosniac authors. For example, Mustaf
. . a Yuyo
Ayyub-zade, in his Commentary on Isagogue (Sar h. Is
agug), says: the fourth figure, among
these figures, is very unnatural, and it was not considered by either al-Farab or as-Say h
(Ibn Sna) (55). Similar evaluation was given by Hasan K af
al-
Aq hi s
a r
(Mu hta s
. . .
. al-
ar
Kaf, fol. 24a).
Compare: -, , pp. 267 and 270287 and Ibn
Sna, Kitab al-isarat, pp. 198199, as well as I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, pp.
206208.
206 Out of these four modes, the first, the second and the fourth correspond to the
108 chapter three
as very unnatural and we mention it only as an illustration for the

reasonable.207 Other authors deal with eight modes, and also point
out certain artificiality in comparison to the first figure. It is inter-
esting to note that Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in his New Commentary
on The Sun Treatise shows that the fourth figure can be observed as
the reversed first, which corresponds to the opinion of the major-
ity of modern logicians. He also shows, passing on the standpoints of
at-Taftazan, that eight modes of this figure can be observed in two
groups, as 5 + 3 modes, where the first five correspond with the classical
division into five modes.208
Additional three modes are:
(6) Some B are G.
Every A is B.
Conclusion: Some G are not A.
(7)
Every B is G.
Some A are not B.
(8)
No B is G.
Some A are B.
Forming the three last modes is a consequence of somewhat dierently

presented conditions (theorems) for deduction of this figure, as follows:
(1) that both premisses are armative, given that the minor is
particular, or (2) that they are dierent in quality (armation or nega-
tion) with one having universality.209
modes known in the Latin terminology as Bramantip (or Bamalip), Dimatis and Fesapo,
and the third is, the so-called, weakened mode.
207 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 23a24a (Izabrani spisi, pp. 80
81).
208 Modes that the scholastic calls: Bramantip (Bamalip), Calemes, Dimatis, Fesapo and
Fresison.
209 Mustaf h. al-gadd, fol. 125b127b, also: Hasan
. Kaf

al-Aqhi. s.ar, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 23b (Izabrani spisi, 80). A similar claim, that

the earlier authors (al-mutaqaddimun) treated five modes, and later (al-muta"ahhirun)
eight, is also presented by Fadil zicawal, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 127a.
. U
Logic textbooks, besides the general rules for deduction of the fourth figure, usually
present the following special rules: (1) if the major premiss is armative, the smaller
has to be universal, or (2) if one of the premisses is negative, the major has to be
universal. See: B. Petronijevic, Osnovi logike. Formalna logika i opca metodologija [Basics of
Logic. Formal Logic and the General Methodology], Beograd 1932, p. 108.
However, besides the fact that the fourth figure is treated with due
attention, Bosniac logicians saw the first as the most perfect and the
most natural or, according to Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, the first figure
is the one that became the measure of nature.210 Bosniac authors point
out the possibilities and rules of reduction (radd) of the second, third and
fourth figure into the first.211
The second subgroup of linked syllogism is made of non-categorical
syllogisms, which can be based on the judgments of dierent modality,
provided that the conclusion is not explicitly quoted in the premisses.212
Most works by Bosniac authors give the classification in the five follow-
ing combinations:213
1. Syllogism made of two conditional-conjunctive judgments (min mut-

tas.ilatayn):
If the sun is up, it is day.
If it is day, the land is in light.
Conclusion: If the sun is up, the land is in light.
2. Syllogism made of two conditional-disjunctive judgments (min mun-
fas.ilatayn):
Every number is either even or odd.
Every even number is either even of the even or
even of the odd number.
Conclusion: Every number is either odd or even of the even or even of
the odd number.
210 Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 24a (Izabrani spisi, p. 81).

211 = to return, to send back, to bring back to the original state. With preposi-
Radda
tion ila = to reduce to.
The regularity of deduction of other figures through the reduction of their modes
to the modes of the first figure was treated in details and proved first by Aristotle, (see:
Aristotle, Prior Analytics, chapter 44 and 45), and then by the scholastics. However, Ara-
bic logicians did not give great importance to this possibility. Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r
says: One with common sense and normal character has no need for reduction
(see previous note).
212 Teaching on modal syllogism among the Arabic logicians deserves special atten-
tion. See: Nicholas Rescher, The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Ara-
bic Philosophy in: Nicolas Rescher et al., Studies in Modality (American Philosophi-
cal Quarterly Monograph Series, 8), Oxford: Blackwell, 1974, pp. 1756. As for the
Bosniac authors, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade (as-Sar h. al-gadd) and Muhammad . b.
Musa #Allamak (Sar
h. as-Samsiyya)
pays special attention to modal syllogism.
213 Examples from: Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug, pp. 6670.
h. Is
110 chapter three
3. Syllogism made of categorical and conjunctive judgments:

If this is a man, this is an animal.
Every animal is a body.
Conclusion: If this is a man, this is a body.
4. Syllogism made of categorical and disjunctive judgment:
Every number is either even or odd.
Every even number is divisible in two equal parts.
Conclusion: Every number is either odd or divisible in two equal parts.
5. Syllogism made of conjunctive and disjunctive judgment:
If this is a man, this is an animal.
Every animal is either white or non-white.
Conclusion: If this is a man, he is either white or non-white.
These non-categorical syllogisms are said to have the same figures, with
a somewhat lower number of modes.
The second group of syllogisms are so-called separated or separate
syllogisms (al-qiyas al-istitna"), syllogisms in which the conclusion or

its opposite are actually (bi al-fi#l) mentioned,214 i.e. in which one of the
premisses oers the conclusion. The second premiss is a conditional
judgment, either conjunctive (first subgroup), or disjunctive (second
subgroup). The presentation of the rules of consequence and examples
illustratively shows what kind of syllogism this is about.215 This is how
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r presents it:
As for the conjunctive, it either:
(1) Consists of a necessarily conjunctive judgment where acceptance of

antecedence (muqaddim) and its armation, makes the conclusion
acceptance of consequence (talin), as in:
If this body is a man, it is an animal.
But it is a man.
Therefore: It is an animal.
214 See note nr. 189.

215 See: Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 24a25a; Muhammad . b.
Musa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 73b76a; h. Is
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug
, 6573, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 128a134b, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 37b39a; Mu-
77b82a; Fadil U
hammad
. b. Mu s
..taf
a al-
Caynaw
, Fat h
. al-asr
a r, fol. . zicawal, Sar h.
matn, fol. 25a26b; Muhammad . b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 128a130a.
(2) Or consists of these two premisses without a consequence and its

negation, the conclusion is non-acceptance of antecedence, as in the
previous example:
But it is not an animal.
Therefore: It is not a man.
As shown by these examples,216 these are two modes that Latin termi-
nology calls modus ponendo ponens and modus tollendo tollens, where conclu-
sion is categorical. Modes ponendo tollens and tollendo ponens are treated in
the same way, but with syllogisms made of conditional-disjunctive and
categorical judgment.217
Discussion on these issues generally covers the elements related di-
rectly to syllogistics. This is how it is in most works by Bosniac authors,
and especially those that referred to Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar.

This is the case with the works of Hasan . Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, commen-
hi
taries of Isagoge by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Muhammad
. b. Mus.t.afa

al-Caynaw , Fadil
.
Uz i
c awal
, Muhammad
. b. Yu suf al-Bosnaw , and
others. However, in the works by Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak Com-
mentary on The Sun Treatise and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade New Com-
mentary on The Sun Treatise the discussion on syllogistics does not end
there. That is partly the case because the author of the basic work,
al-Qazwn, in the chapter called Additions to Syllogism, emphasizes
some other questions that these two Bosniac authors aim to discuss and
therefore contribute to the readers more complete knowledge of deduc-
tion and syllogistics and their potentials. This opportunity is used by
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, who explains all the details of polysyllogism
and deductio ad absurdum, while Muhammad . b. Musa #Allamak
remains within the boundaries of the basic work.218
At the beginning of this chapter, commenting on one of the stand-
points of al-Qazwn, the author of The Sun Treatise, Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade emphasized that deduction of one conclusion is possible
within a syllogism consisting of more than two judgments, so-called
complex syllogism (al-qiyas al-murakkab) or polysyllogism. According to this
author, these complex syllogisms can be divided into two groups:
216 Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 24a24b (Izabrani spisi, p. 81).
218 Mustaf
.. a Yu yo Ayyu b
-zade, h. al-gadd, fol. 134b and Muhammad
as-Sar . b. Musa
#Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 76a.
112 chapter three
1. Complex syllogism with linked conclusions (maws.u l an-nata"ig), i.e. with

conclusions included in the syllogism. The syllogistic chain consists of
a number of syllogisms so that the conclusion of the first syllogism is
one of the premisses of the second, the conclusion of the second is one
of the premisses of the third, etc. Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade gives an
example of this type of syllogism:219
Every G is B.
Every B is V.
Conclusion: Every G is V.
Then: is V.
Every G
Every V is A.
Conclusion: is A.
Every G
Then: is A.
Every G
Every A is H.
Conclusion: is H.
Every G
2. Complex syllogism in which, dierently from the first type, the conclusions
of each individual syllogism are not mentioned (mafs.u l an-nata"ig),220 but are
understood, and polysyllogism is contracted. Latin terminology calls
such polysyllogism sorites. Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade,221 gives the fol-
lowing example:
Every G is B.
Every B is V.
Every V is A.
Every A is H.
Conclusion: Every G is H.
Another important issue discussed by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade and

Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak is conclusion based on the absurd,222 or, in
literal translation, the syllogism of contradiction (qiyas al-hulf).223 Taking

219 As-sarh. al-gadd, fol. 134b.

220 The terminological dierence between these two polysyllogisms is derived from
the opposite meaning of verbs was. ala and fas. ala = to link, to connect, and, on the other
hand: to separate, to disconnect.
221 Ibid, note nr. 220, fol. 134b135a.
As the example shows, the subject of the premiss is the subject of the conclusion,
and the predicate of the last premiss is the predicate of the conclusion. That is so called
Aristotles sorit.
222 Muhammad b. M
. usa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 76a76b and Mustafa
h. al-gadd, fol. 135a136b.
Ejubovic, as-Sar
223 Hulf = dierence, opposition. Some texts use the expression bi al-hulf.

over Avicennas standpoints from his Kitab al-isarat,224 Mus.t.afa Yuyo

Ayyub-zade says that the syllogism of contradiction is proving what you
want (the conclusion) by denying its opposite,225 and describes the way
in which this procedure can be performed.
Induction and Analogy

The followers of the traditional logic developed by Aristotle, including
Arabic logicians, considered deductive conclusions to be basic and
perfect, and syllogism to be the elementary, and sometimes, the only
form of deductive conclusions.226 That is the reason why most of the
works in the field of logic in Arabic mention induction and analogy only
marginally if at all.
These two forms of conclusion are treated by Muhammad . b. Musa
#Allamak and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, especially the later in his
chapter Additions to Syllogism in his New Commentary on The Sun
Treatise.227
Starting with the definition that induction (istiqra")228 is a conclusion
in general based on its existence in a number of individuals,229 Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade shows that there are two forms of induction: complete
induction (al-istiqra" at-tamm) and incomplete induction (al-istiqra" an-naqis.).
Reaching indisputable knowledge, which is the ideal of conclusion,
is only possible through complete induction, i.e. the complete list of all
individual cases. It is only then that induction can be one of the
scientific skills (say" min as.-s.ina#at al-#ilmiyya).
Incomplete induction, done through listing a number or a majority
of individual cases, still leads only to an opinion (az- . zann),
. 230
and not
224 See: Kitab al-isarat, pp. 221222.

225 Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 135a135b.
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 19a19b.
227 Muhammad b. M
. usa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 76b and Mus.t.afa Yuyo
h. al-gadd, fol. 136b.
Ayyub-zade, as-Sar
228 Istiqra", basic meaning of this word is following, research, study. This very meaning
suggests the procedures of induction: following the general in a number of individuals.

Besides this expression, to denote induction some texts use ta"diya (ta"adda = to bring)
that has exactly the same meaning as Aristotles epagog (leading, cognitive inductive
procedure that leads the thinking from the individual and special to the general), see:
Aristotle, Topics, vol. I, chapter XII and Prior Analytics, II, 13.
230 Strict and very clear distinction between opinion (zann) and certain knowledge
.
(yaqniyyat), i.e. science, that can be found in all the works by Bosniac authors, has its
grounds in the 33rd chapter of volume I of Posterior Analytics where Aristotle says:
114 chapter three
to a safe conclusion in general, as opposing experience is possible

(muhalif, Latin: instantia negativa). He warns us about mistakes possible

when induction is done not treating all cases: as if we were to
say: All animals move their lower jaw when chewing, based on the
fact that the same is done by human beings, quadrupeds, birds and
other animals we have seen. It (the incomplete induction) does not
result in knowledge, as it is possible that all of those do not satisfy the
condition, as, for example, the crocodile, which moves its upper jaw
when chewing.231
Those logicians who pay somewhat more attention to induction,
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade among them, claim that complete induc-
tion is but a type of syllogism, namely so called divided syllogism (qiyas
muqassam). An example proving it is an inductive conclusion that has
one premiss quoting, treating and classifying all objects of a certain type
or group (usually the notion of genus and all subordinate notions of the
kind), and then, using two or more premisses with all mentioned indi-
vidual items for subjects, deducting a general conclusion on that class
and group of items.
The following is a scheme of the examples used by Arabic logicians
to illustrate complete induction, i.e. divided syllogism:
Scientific knowledge and its object dier from opinion and the object of opinion
in that scientific knowledge is commensurately universal and proceeds by necessary
connexions, and that which is necessary cannot be otherwise. So though there are
things which are true and real and yet can be otherwise, scientific knowledge clearly
does not concern them: if it did, things which can be otherwise would be incapable of
being otherwise. Nor are they any concern of rational intuition-by rational intuition I
mean an originative source of scientific knowledge-nor of indemonstrable knowledge,
which is the grasping of the immediate premiss. Since then rational intuition, science,
and opinion, and what is revealed by these terms, are the only things that can be true,
it follows that it is opinion that is concerned with that which may be true or false, and
can be otherwise: opinion in fact is the grasp of a premiss which is immediate but not
necessary.
This view also fits the observed facts, for opinion is unstable, and so is the kind of
being we have described as its object
Knowledge is the apprehension of, e.g. the attribute animal as incapable of being
otherwise, opinion the apprehension of animal as capable of being otherwisee.g. the
apprehension that animal is an element in the essential nature of man is knowledge; the
apprehension of animal as predicable of man but not as an element in mans essential
nature is opinion: man is the subject in both judgements, but the mode of inherence
diers.
Bosniac authors used almost the same way to dier between knowledge and opinion
and between their methods (more about this in the next chapter, Argumentation).
h. al-gadd, fol. 137.
231 Mustaf
The same example is used by Ibn Sna in his Kitab al-isarat, p. 192.
Every S is S1 or S2 or S3 or Sn.
(I.e.: S1, S2, S3 Sn all make S)
S1 is P.
S2 is P.
S3 is P.

Sn is P.
Every S is P.
S1, S2, S3 Sn, by their interpretation, are nothing but the middle term
divided into more premisses. This interpretation brings the complete
induction down to the first mode of the syllogistic figure (Barbara).
On the other hand, the incomplete induction, both in the way it is
performed (without a key premiss) and in the degree of certainty of
the conclusion, is seen by logicians of this circle as opposing (f al-
muqabala) syllogism.
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade defines the example or analogy in the fol-
lowing way:
Example (tamtl)232 is adduction of a judgment on the individual as it

exists in the other individual, based on the features they share.233
This definition, as well as the examples given by Mustafa Ejubovic,
show that Arabic logicians do not stray much from the path set by Aris-
totle,234 not even in the use of terminology for this type of conclusion
(Ar. tamtl = Gr. pardeigma), nor in its evaluation.

Writing on analogy, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade describes the falla-
cies that can happen, emphasizing the fallacy that results in the deduc-
tion of proofs going in circles (ad-dawran, Latin: circulus vitiosus) or with
the thesis being proved occurring as an argument used for the con-
clusion, placing it in the context of an analogical conclusion based on
232 The word tamtl is the infinitive form (mas.dar) of the second type of verbs and
means to give examples, to compare, to bring down to, to equalize, etc. Several terms
that are used to denote analogy in texts in the field of logic are derived from the same
root (mtl). The most frequently used terms are mital (sample, pattern) and mumatala
equality, same value).
(similarity,
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, o.c., fol. 137a.
233 Mustaf
234 Aristotle: We have an example (pardeigma) when the major term is proved to
belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. It ought to be
known both that the middle belongs to the third term, and that the first belongs to that
which resembles the third Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning
from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from
part to part, when both particulars are subordinate to the same term, and one of them
is known. (Prior Analytics, II, 24.)
116 chapter three
causality (#illiyya). In the context of causality, he also mentions the mis-

take that occurs when one disjunctive premiss (A is B, or G, or V),
through the absurd (bi al-hulf) of the two causes, leads to the necessary

acceptance of the third, which is unconvincing.
It is evident that the fallacy here occurs in the reasoning process
(circulus vitiosus and fallacia disjunctionisincomplete disjunction fallacy)
which is later discussed in more detail by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade.
However, the fact that fallacy, especially the fallacy of unfounded rea-
son, is discussed within the discourse on induction and analogy, points
out certain scepticism to these two types of reasoning.
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade states that legislators (fuqaha") call anal-
ogy qiyas, what, in logical terminology, exclusively denotes syllogism,
and some theologians, istidlal, which denotes adducing proofs and con-
clusion in general.
Argumentation
As a reasonable conclusion of the argument in the field of logic where
the elementary aim of all previous logical research needs to be realized:
the scientific method of reasoning and indisputable knowledge, the last
chapter is on argumentation (hu . gg a). It is dedicated to adducing proofs
and classifying the premisses that the safety of the procedure is based
on.
According to Arabic logicians, human knowledge, as conviction with
objective grounds in the truthfulness of a conclusion based on syllogism,
depends not only on respecting the rules of the deduction of syllogism
and its form (s.u ra), but also on its contents (madda),235 i.e. on the truth-
fulness of judgments forming the syllogism, or, as they say, the way
in which they provoke conviction (tas.dq). Such observationa led to
the so-called quintal division of syllogistics into five skills (as.-s.ina#at al-
hams), dierent by the degree of likelihood of the premisses within a
syllogism. Such views on syllogism by Arabic logicians were grounded

in the assertions of the first teacher, among which the most quoted is
the statement from the Prior Analytic, that says:
We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syl-
logisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures, but also rhetorical
235 See: Mustaf h. al-gadd, fol. 137b and Muhammad

. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar . b.
Musa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 77a.
syllogisms and in general any form of persuasion, however it may be

presented.236
Those five skills, as seen in the previously presented discussion struc-
tures, are: apodictic or demonstration (al-burhan), dialectics or, as it is some-
times calledafter Aristotles work, which shows that each issue can
result in probable, but not scientific conclusionstopics (al-gadal), then
rhetoric (al-hit.a ba), poetics (as-si#r) and sophistic (safsat.a or muga lat.a).237

Demonstration
Apodictic or demonstration (burhan)238 as a skill, or a scientific method,
according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade the path to theoretical and
practical truth239 is a subject of a number of discussions.
A precondition for defining apodictic, in the definition of scientific
knowledge as dierentia specifica is that knowledge is acquired in a scien-
tific way, deduced from true causes, by method of syllogistic deduction.
To knowas Aristotle saidmeans to know through evidence,
to know through scientific syllogism.240
Following this and similar standpoints that Aristotle suggested in his
Posterior Analytics, Bosniac logicians defined apodictic in the following
way:241
Apodictic is a syllogism consisting of absolutely safe premisses that
result in indisputable knowledge.242
236 Aristotle, Prior Analytics, III, 23.

237 See chapter Bosniac Authors and their Works.
238 Burhan literally means proof, clear sign, argument. As it can be seen, especially in
the texts in the field of logic, this word is adequate to Aristotles apodeiksis. It, therefore,
signifies the scientific, the premisses of demonstrated knowledge must be true,
primary, immediate, better known than and prior to the conclusion, which is further
related to them as eect to cause (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2). It encompasses
the same contents covered by demonstration in Latin terminology.
Moreover, texts in Arabic in the field of logic use al-Burhan or Kitab al-burhan to
denote Aristotles Posterior Analytics that presents teaching on scientific reasoning (see,
e.g.: al-Farabi, Maqalat f ma #an al- #aql, item 3, 47 and Ibn Sna, Kitab al-h. udud, p. 12).
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 42a.
239 Sar
240 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I, 2.
241 See: Hasan K
. af al-Aq hi . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 25a25b; Muhammad
. b.
Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 77b; Mustafa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar h. Is
agug,
..
73, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 137b, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 39b; Muhammad. b. Mus.t.afa

al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 82a; Fadil . U zicawal, Sar
h. matn, fol. 26b; Muhammad
.
b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 13a.
242 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 25b.
The dierences in interpretation given by other Bosniac authors are minor. These
118 chapter three
The first question that authors face after this is: which premisses can
be considered absolutely safe?
Although the works that are the subject of this paper give clear re-
views of all indisputable knowledge (yaqniyyat) in the same order,243
they will be presented according to the review given by Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade in his New Commentary on The Sun Treatise, as he included
some additional explanations.244
1. As apodictic is presented as a foundation of scientific knowledge, the
question that is inevitable is whether the search for indisputably true
premisses can last in infinitum or are there some elementary premisses of
scientific knowledge?
That is why the first place is reserved for first knowledge or axioms
(al-awwaliyyat)245 which are, according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
zade, judgments that the very perception of the two parties (subject
and predicate) is sucient for a conclusion on the relation between the
two, i.e. the judgment that you need common sense (al-#aql as-sarh) . to
perceive its parts, without any admonitions from outside.246
As an example of such knowledge, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade gives
Euclids eighth axiom: The whole is bigger than its part.247
2. The second group is perception-based knowledge (al-musa hadat),248 i.e.
the indisputable knowledge acquired either through:
definitions can be compared with the following statements of Aristotle: By demonstration

(apdeiksis, A.L.) I mean a syllogism which produces scientific knowledge, in other
words one which enables us to know by the mere fact that we grasp it. (Posterior
Analytics, I, 2) Reasoning is demonstration (apdeiksis, A.L.) when it proceeds from
premises which are true and primary or of such a kind that we have derived our
original knowledge of them through premises which are primary and true. (Topics,
I, 1).
244 A h. al-gadd, fol. 137b and on.
s-Sar
245 Awwaliyyat from awwal = first, earlier, preceding. Compare Aristotles arhi (archi;
Posterior Analytics, vol. I, chapter 12 and 13).

246 A h. al-gadd, fol. 138a.
s-Sar
Aristotle says: Things are true and primary which are believed on the strength
not of anything else but of themselves. (Topics, I, 1.)
247 A h. al-gadd, fol. 138a.
s-Sar
248 Mu sahadat from musahada = observation, watching, seeing.
Aristotle: Therefore we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not such as to
rank higher in accuracy than these developed states. And this at least is an obvious
characteristic of all animals, for they possess a congenital discriminative capacity which
is called sense-perception. But though sense-perception is innate in all animals, in some
(higher animals) the sense-impression comes to persist, in others (lower animals) it does
not. (Posterior Analytics, vol. II, chapter 19.)
(a) external senses (al-haw

. ass az-. z
. ahira) concerning the outside world,
also called sense-based knowledge (al-mahs. usat), as, for example,
the judgment that the sun shines,249 or
(b) through internal senses (al-haw
. ass al-bat.ina) concerning internal
feelings, also called emotional perception (al-wigdaniyyat), as, for
example, the judgment that we are afraid or angry.250
As this short presentation by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade shows, knowl-
edge here is acquired based on direct perception through the senses,
which in part corresponds to the notion of intuition.251 Arabic logicians
clearly dierentiate sensual intuition and intellectual intuition; more detail is
given in chapter 4.
3. Experiment-based knowledge (mugarrabat),252 and those are judg-
ments achieved based on comprehensive observation useful for convic-
tion as for example the judgment that the use of scammonia causes
purgation.253
249 Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 138b.

250 Ibid.
251 Philosophical terminology presents the meaning of intuition in several variations:
direct perception of a complex situation whose elements or aspects can be perceived by

senses; direct perception of an object or an event by one experience; direct perception
of essences that are principally inapproachable (untouchable, ungraspable) and sense-
perception and rational thinking. Compare: intuition (from intuor = I look at)musahada
(from sa hada = to look, to see).
252 Mu garrabat from garraba = to test, to try; to experience. This expression points out
two elements of its meaning: it is based on experience in the broadest sense of the word,
and this experience is repeated (which is clear from the context and the meaning of this
term because 2nd class verbs, such as this one, express intensity and frequency among
else).
From the quote that follows, as well as the examples given in texts in logic, we
can notice that this term concerns observation of certain consciously provoked events,
and disclosure of their causal connection. Therefore, the adequate word here would
be experiment (tagrb), although we are aware that, if we were to follow the sources, we
would reach a term more adequately translated as experience, experience-based
knowledge or judgment (see e.g.: Ibn Sna, Kitab al-isarat, pp. 176177).
This kind of knowledge is described by Aristotle at the end of his Posterior Analytics:
and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once
arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a
power of systematizing them and those which do not. So out of sense-perception comes
to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing
develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience. (II, 19)
253 Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 138b. Compare: Hasan
. Kaf
hi
al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 27a (Izabrani spisi, p. 84).

120 chapter three
4. Intuition-based knowledge (or knowledge acquired based on intuition)

(hadsiyy
. at),254 and those are judgments made based on very strong
intuition (hads
. qawiyy) as the judgment that the light of the moon
is borrowed from the sun And intuition is the quick shift from
elementary notions to conclusions.255
This very quick shift, or identification of the middle term, and
the example given, shows that the ability described here is equivalent to
Aristotles quick wit.256
5. The fifth group is so called transferred knowledge (mutawatirat),257
or propositions based on several identical testimonies by persons of
authority in certain areas, whose, according Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r,
consent in lies is discarded by reason.258
6. And, eventually, syllogism based propositions (qad
. aya qiyasatuha ma-
#aha),259 is the one in which the judgment is based on mediator that is
founded in reason, where the notion of its final terms (t.arfan) alone is
sucient such as the judgment that four is an even number, because
it is divisible into two equal parts.260
In this case its necessary to observe the final terms, and, this time,
to reveal the mediator that is syllogism. In this example the mediator
is the divisibility into two equal parts without a remainder, and reason
instantly connects that number four is divisible into two equal parts.
254 Hadsiyyat from hads = opinion, guessing, premonition; quick understanding. Intu-
. .
ition, intuitive cognition etc. are derived from this basic meaning, as well as the meaning
attributed to this term by I. Madkour hypotheses bien fondes (LOrganon dAristote,
p. 224).
255 Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 138a139b.
256 Quick wit is a faculty of hitting upon the middle term instantaneously. It would
be exemplified by a man who saw that the moon has her bright side always turned
towards the sun, and quickly grasped the cause of this, namely that she borrows her
light from him In all these instances he has seen the major and minor terms and
then grasped the causes, the middle terms. (Posterior Analytics, I, chapter 34.)
257 Mutawatirat from tawatara, literally: to be repeated, to arrive constantly.
258 Hasan K
. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 27a27b (Izabrani spisi, p. 85).
This type of proposition is also grounded in Aristotles writings. Regarding the rules
for selection of proposition, he says: thus one may first take in hand the opinions
held by all or by most men or by the philosophers, i.e. by all, or most, or the most
notable of them for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted
authority. (Topics, I, 14.)
Transferred or traded knowledge as indisputable truth will have its place in the hadis
(tradition corpse), i.e. in authentication and unbroken chain of transmitters.
259 Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade adds that propositions of this kind are also called
qad. aya fitriyya f al-qiyas, see: as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 139a.
260 Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 139a139b.
Everything divisible in this way is even, therefore four is an even

number.261
Therefore, these four types of proposition can form apodictic or
demonstrative syllogism. However, such a demonstration (in the sense
of al-burhan for Arabic logiciansproof through syllogism with indis-
putably safe premisses) means to prove, i.e. to claim that something is a
reason for certain statement.
According to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade (Muhammad
. b. Musa #Al-
lamak has a similar approach to the same issue, if somewhat more
brief),262 the middle term (al-hadd
. al-awsat.) of such syllogism can point
out the causality (#illa) between the minor and the major term (al-as.g ar
al-akbar). That is where the dierentiation between the two types of
demonstration comes from, or, in this case, argumentation (al-burhan).
The first type of demonstration consists of causal argumentation (burhan
limi(yy)) or argumentation why, and that is the one with the
middle term as the cause of the relation of the major towards the
minor term, in reason and reality, and the second consists of conditional
argumentation (burhan ini(yy)),263 and that is the one with the middle
term as the cause of relation only in reason.264
Based on this, and also on the explanations and examples that follow,
we can see that there are two kinds of argumentations: the first one,
in which syllogism is deducted so that the middle term is the cause,
both logical, as it implies a conclusion, and actual, as it is in practice
the cause of a consequence; and second, where causality is purely
logical.
Terms used as distinction: lima and in very clearly show that these
are the two kinds of Aristotelian argumentation that are in Latin termi-
nology similarly called argumentation quia and argumentation si. Lima
261 Vidjeti: Hasan

. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 27b (Izabrani spisi, p. 85).
262 Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 139b and Sar
h. Tahdb al-man.tiq
, fol. 40a and Muhammad b. Musa al-Bosnaw #Allamak, Sarh. as-samsiyya,
fol.
.
77b.
263 Terms burhan limiyy (or limayy) and burhan iniyy are formed on an unusual but
regular way. The word burhan is clear (see note nr. 239), but the second part of
the first compound word consists of the interrogative particle lima (why) and sux
iyy for relative noun formation (ism mansubnomen relativum), and the second part
of the second term of the conditional particle in (if) and the same sux. That is why
it is translated as conditional argumentation. Also see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires
compars, pp. 12.
122 chapter three
(why) corresponds to the Aristotelian term diti (why), and in (inna) to

hti 265 which Aristotle sees as knowledge of facts and causes.266
Other Types of Argumentation

Unlike demonstration, other skills are treated in far less detail. Most
works just give definitions, explained by several examples. The exclu-
sions here were dialectics (gadal), which had a special place and role in
the development of kalamaspeculative and dialectical theologyand
sophistic (safsat.a or muga lit.a).
1. Arabic logicians, following Aristotles views, believed that dialectics
(gadal)267 has far lesser importance for science than demonstration. For
the needs of their writings in the field of logic, they significantly reduced
the very comprehensive study of dialectics, presented in the fifth part of
Organon, Topics.
They found justification for that in Aristotles findings that dialectic
syllogism (that is the very subject here), as it derives not from true
principles and absolutely safe premisses but from probable ones which
265 Hti in Greek: 1. introduces subject and object clauses and 2. cause; as, because,
since.
It is interesting to note that the Arabic particle, which is the subject here, when
written without vowels (as in practice) can be inna (anna) which also introduces subject
clauses and in when it is conditional conjunction. These alternatives in reading and
understanding caused Arabic researchers dilemma (see: Ibn Sna, Kitab al-isarat, 231
and on, especially note nr. 2). We found it easier to read the text using Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zades vocalization.
266 Aristotle says: Knowledge of the fact /hti/ diers from knowledge of the
reasoned fact /diti/. To begin with, they dier within the same science and in two
ways: (1) when the premisses of the syllogism are not immediate (for then the proximate
cause is not contained in them-a necessary condition of knowledge of the reasoned
fact): (2) when the premisses are immediate, but instead of the cause the better known
of the two reciprocals is taken as the middle; for of two reciprocally predicable terms
the one which is not the cause may quite easily be the better known and so become the
middle term of the demonstration (Posterior Analytics, I, 13.)

267 Gadal, literally means dispute, row; discussion skill. This word is the Arabic
equivalent for Greek dialectic (dialektik thne) in its meaning used by Aristotle in
Metaphysics, G, 2 and Topics. This word is used to derive qiyas gadal (dialectic syllogism)
as the equivalent for Greek sillogisms dialektiks. The word gadal is also used as the

translation for the title of Aristotles book Topics that shows how probable (non-scientific)
conclusions can be deducted (see: A.N. Prior, Historija logike, p. 49), even though some
older texts give the original title in Arabic transcription T . ubqa (see: Ibn Sna, Kitab
al-h. udud, pp. 7, 18 etc.). And, finally, the expression gadal (gadaliyyun) also means
dialectician, and it is used to denote mu #tazila (followers of a school of speculative
theological thinking, see: H. Corbin, Historija, pp. 121128).
can result only in probable conclusion, belongs to the field of probable

thinking and not scientific knowledge. Thus, the definition of dialectics
given by Bosniac logicians springs out of these standpoints. Hasan
. Kaf
hi
al-Aq s
. .
a r
very shortly says:
Dialectics (gadal) is syllogism that consists of premisses known or
accepted.268
The same definition, with minor dierences can be found in the
works of other Bosniac logicians.269 With his well-known pedantry and
liking of systematization and classification, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade
speaks about six kinds of non-absolutely safe judgments (gayr yaq-
niyyat), in parallel to the presented six absolutely safe judgements.270
The first two out of these non-absolutely safe kinds of judgments,
that are such the least, belong to dialectics, and the others to rhetoric
and poetics. Those are:
a) Well-known judgments (mashurat), premisses known to all, to the
majority, or to a group, but of educated people.271 The gap
between them and the first truths is still large. Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade points out that judgments of this kind are true in
most cases and lead to true conclusions. However, this is not
always true, as there are premisses very well-known, yet untrue.
An example that those judgments cannot participate in formation
of apodictic or scientific syllogisms is the relativity of judgment on
the sacrifice of animals for religious purposes, which is a bad deed
for Hindus. He especially points out that all these judgments are
used in the field of laws, moral, education and tradition, and that
they are relative.272
b) Accepted judgments (musallamat), premisses accepted from oppo-
nents, and used (regardless of whether they are true or false) to
build discussion refuting their arguments.273
268 Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 25b (Izabrani spisi, p. 82).

269 Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 78a; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
h. Is
zade, Sar agug, 75, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 140b, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 40a;
adil U
Muhammad
. b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 84a; F
. zicawal, Sar
h. matn
, fol. 131a and Muhammad . b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 28a.
270 See: Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 140b.
Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak treats this issue in a similar way but in less detail.
(see: l.c.).
271 Ibid.

272 Mustaf h. al-gadd, fol. 140a.
273 Ibid, fol. 140a140b.
124 chapter three
In conclusion on the meaning of dialectics, and in accordance with

Aristotles evaluation,274 it is emphasized that it is useful for practice
and discussion, and disciplines such as law, ethics, speculative theology,
education, etc.
At the beginning of the dialectics presentation, it was said that Ara-
bic logicians, especially later ones, minimized this issue in comparison
to Aristotles Topics in their writings that deal with logic in a narrow
sense. However, it need be pointed out that, in the circle of Arabic-
Islamic culture and science, a special discipline developed, dedicated to
the research and definition of rules for debating skills, called #ilm adab
al-bah. t wa al-munazara.
.
275

Special stimulus for the development of this discipline was given by
as-Samarqand276 with his work Ad ab al-bah. t. Disputation, as an idea

and in practice, was familiar to the Arabs even before they learnt
about Aristotles Topics and before as-Samarqand,277 however, unlike
earlier authors, in certain fields limited to disputation exclusively, as-
Samarqand presented the first treatise applicable to any subject area
and thus the first attempt at a universal theory of disputation, referred
to by his successors as simply the adab al-bah. t.278
This work was, even in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period treated
here, very popular, often copied and commented on. This indicates the
need to pay special attention to the research on this matter within the
studies of the cultural history of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade himself wrote nine texts on this issue. As those
works are directly linked to the topic that is the subject of this paper,
they will not be treated specifically, but we shall instead give a short
274 Compare l.c. and vol. I, chapter 2 of Aristotles Topics.

275 Titles of works in this field bear dierent alternatives of this title, such as: #ilm
al-bah. t, #ilm al-bah. t wa al-munazara,
. adab al-bah. t wa al-munazara
. etc., but it is always men-
tioned that it is aseparate discipline on dialogue and debating skills (bah. t wa munazara).
.
There is a number of works in this field written in the 13th century and later both in
West Europe and the Orient, almost at the same time. See: Histoire de la philosophie, Enc.
de la Pliade, t. I, pp. 14571462.

276 Samsudd n Muhammad
. as-Samarqand, 15th century, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL,
G II, 194.
277 See: George Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and Christian West: With
Special Reference to Scholasticism, Edinburgh 1990, especially: Part five, Chapter II, Mud-
hakara and Chapter III, Munazara, pp. 208212, and E. Wagner, Munazara, . in:
Encyclopaedia of Islam, CD-ROM Edition, Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
278 L.B. Miller, Al-Samarkand, Shams al-dn, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam
.
presentation of the works by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade who contributed

enormously in this field.
He wrote nine texts in this field, mostly commentaries and super-
commentaries on well-known works. One of them is very short, only
two pages, and it is called The Essence of Disputation (Hulas.at al-adab),

and it is mentioned as the Treatise on Disputation (Risala f a dab al-
bah. t).279 It gives a brief outline of the issues in the field of disputation.

Later, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade commented on this text on two occa-
sions: firstly, in the form of a short compendium called Brief Commentary
h. al-muhtas.ar #ala Hulas.at al-adab)
on The Essence of Disputation (as-Sar

and secondly, in detail in the work called Comprehensive Commentary on
The Essence of Disputation (as-Sar h. al-mut.awwal #ala Hulas.at al-adab).

However, manuscripts of these two commentaries have yet to be found,
and they are known only on the basis of the notes left by the author
and his biographers.
The object of attention of Ayyub-zades other commentaries was
the first significant piece of writing in this area, the above mentioned
Samarqands work, for its popularity called Samarqands Treatise (ar-
Risala as-Samarqandiyya).280
The first among Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zades commentaries on this work
was written in Istanbul, no later than 1677 or 1678. It is called Com-
h. #ala ar-Risala as-Sa-
mentary on Samarqands Treatise on Disputation (Sar
marqandiyya). In his Introduction, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade says:
281
The highest and the most glorious aspiration and the most impor-
tant and the most sublime desire is to decorate ones self with various
sciences and knowledges, and to comprehend what is witty and shrewd
in them. One of those sciences is disputation that possesses the winning
tools and contains the rules for progress, and its goal is to preserve us
from fallacy in debate and ambiguity in discussion. There are a lot of
papers written on this issue and a lot of treatises completed. The best
among them is a treatise, popular among scholars, written by the most
excellent among later scholars and the most perfect among the edu-
cated ones, the sun of the people and faith, Samarqand, it contains
shrewd rules and brings benefit. I parted not from it for a long time, I
devoted myself to reading, and my heart often led me to comment on
279 Manuscript: OIS, R 4726/II; GHB, br. 1766; OZ HAZU, No 1525/II; Bratislava
UK, TC 8, cat. nr. 269.

280 See note nr: 277.
281 Manuscript: Bratislava UK, TF 119, cat. nr. 261.
126 chapter three
it with a commentary that would surmount all its elusions, take the veil
o the face of its pearls, encompass its unsolved secrets and explain the
finesses under the shroud. I studied, reading the books written in the
science of disputation, especially the commentary on assumption and
truth criterion in this field282
In the following two cases, Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade used a number of
commentaries, especially the commentaries by Kamaluddn Mas#ud as-
an (died 1355)283 and accompanying marginalia, completing super-
Sirw
commentaries or new marginalia. That is how the two works were
written: Commentary on the Marginalia on the Commentary on Mas #uds dis-
putation (Sar h. #ala H . asiya sarh. al-adab al-Mas#ud li al-Mostar)284
and Marginalia on Marginalia on the Commentary on Disputation (Haw . as #ala
haw
. as sarh. al-adab). 285
In both these works, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade shows comprehen-

sive knowledge of the issue and the literature in the field. That is
confirmed by two more worksmarginalia on another very famous
work, Disputation (Ad ab al-bah. t), written by #Adududd . g (died in
n al-I

1355), and commentary on it and accompanying marginalia written
286
by Muhammad. at-Tibrz al-Hanaf

. (died in 1494).287 The first work
was written in April 1684 titled Useful Marginalia (H . asiya mufda)288
and it contains about 150 pages, while the second was written in Febru-
ary 1691, and titled Marginalia Accompanying al-Hanaf . s Work by al-Mostar
. asiya #ala al-Hanafiyya
(H . li al-Mostar).289
Besides these works, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade wrote another, very
short commentary called Commentary on the Writings of as-Sar gan
f al-Gur
on Disputation (Sarh. #ala ma katabahu as-Sarf f al-adab).
290
282 This fragment in original and in translation in Bosnian can be found in: S. Basa-
gic, Bosnjaci, pp. 122123.
283 Kam aluddn Mas#ud as-Sirw an ar-Rum, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G, I, 468
and S, I, 849.
284 Autograph: GHB, br. 3974.
285 Autograph: GHB, br. 3855.
286 #Adududdn al-I
. g, see.: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G, II, 208 and S, II, 287.
287 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G, II, 208 i S, II, 289.
288 The title is given in short form. There are several titles of this paper (see: H.
Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, p. 407 and M. Zdralovi

c, Prilog poznavanju djela Sejha Juje,
Hercegovina, br. 1, Mostar, 1981, pp. 121124), and we give here the beginning of the title
in autograph.
Autograph: GHB, br. 3987.
289 Manuscripts: GHB, br. 3915/I and OIS, R 3529.
290 There have been no known manuscript copies of this work found to date.
Although some of these works focus on rules adapted to legal issues,

all of them have the characteristic presentation of rules applicable in all
disciplines. All the issues could be roughly divided in three groups:
a. Definition and closed identification of the elementary issues of
this discipline, such as: debate (munazara),
. proof, premiss, cause,
consequences, vicious circle (ad-dawr), contradiction, accidence,
etc.,
b. Definition of dialogue and instruction on how to lead a dialogue,
to set and to refute a thesis, and
c. Application of this knowledge in theology, philosophy and juris-
prudence.
Lastly, lets remember that there are a number of discourses and trea-
tises written on this topic in Western Europe from the 13th century on,
with almost the same goal, that were titled De disputatione.291
2. The following two disciplines or skills: rhetoric (al-hit.a ba) and

poetics (as-si#r), are treated with even lesser attention in the writings in
the field of logic,292 which is understandable, given the cognitive value
of syllogisms of this kind.293
Reasoning based on rhetoric and poetic syllogisms is treated by some
of Arabic logicians as a type of conclusion through dialectic syllogism,
but with a less severe premisses selection on rhetoric, and the least
severe on poetic conclusion.
The definition of rhetorical syllogism (al-qiyas al-hit.a b)294 is very close

to the definition of dialectic syllogism. It is defined as a syllogism con-

292 See: Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 25b26a; Muhammad . b.
Musa #Allamak, Sar h. as-samsiyya, fol. 78a78b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar h. Is
a-
gug, 7576, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 140b141b, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 40a; Muham- .

mad b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 85a85b; Fadil zicawal, Sar
h. matn,
. U
fol. 28b and Muhammad . b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 131b.
Dierently from these authors and most other logicians of this school, even Ibn
Sna, al-Farab speaks on rhetoric and poetics in more detail and bases his argument
on other works, not only Organon. See: al-Farab, Logiceskie traktati, pp. 439555.
293 See more: Deborah L. Black, Logic and Aristotles Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic
Philosophy, Brill, Leiden, 1990.

294 The word hitaba means rhetoric, speaking skills; preaching, speech. It is a trans-
.
lation of Greek rhetorik, as well as the translation of the title of Aristotles Rhetoric,
although in older texts, similar to Topics, the original title in Arabic transcription
Ra.turqa can be found (see note nr. 268).
The expression qiyas hi.tab = rhetorical syllogism, found in some of the works, derives
from the same base word.
128 chapter three
sisting of acceptable (maqbulat)295 premisses, the ones that are taken

over from those who are convinced about them, or probable (al-mazn . u-
nat)296 premisses, and those are premisses that judge on something
based on assumption as in: Someone wanders around at night, and
he is a thief . The usage (of this syllogism) is to entice the listener
to something that can be useful to them in education and religious
issues.297
Poetics (si#r)298 was not treated as a separate discipline in a consider-
able number of works by Arabic logicians, but as a kind of rhetoric,
or a versified rhetorical conclusion. However, the practice to treat it as
the fourth skill was evidently introduced long before Bosniac authors
became active,299 as they treated it as separate one, pointing out its main
characteristics.
According to these texts it can be concluded that poetic syllogism
characteristically consists of suggestive premisses (muhayyilat)300 which,

295 Maqbul, passive participle of qabila = to accept, to take in; to believe; to take over;
to give consent.
A dierence should be made between accepted premisses (musallamat) mentioned in
dialectics, which are accepted in a debate with an opponent (regardless of whether
they are true or false) and an argument to refute his thesis, and these are translated as
acceptable premisses.
296 Maznun, passive participle from zanna = to think, to believe; to assume, to antici-
. .
pate.
297 Mustaf
. . a Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. al-gadd, fol. 140b. Almost the same defini-
tion was given by other Bosniac authors (see: Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf
, fol. 25b (Izabrani spisi, 83).
Aristotle in Organon says: We must now state that not only dialectical and demon-
strative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures, but also rhetorical syl-
logisms and in general any form of persuasion, however it may be presented Again,
the persuasion exerted by rhetorical arguments is in principle the same, since they use
either example, a kind of induction, or enthymeme, a form of syllogism. (Prior Analytics,
II, 23 and Posterior Analytics, I, 1.)
#r = poem; verse; poetry; poetics; feeling, etc. Translators and writers of com-
298 Si
mentaries on the works of Aristotle, as well as Arabic logicians, use this word to trans-
late Aristotles term poietik (see: On Interpretation, chapter 4). Another term that is also
used is qiyas si #r = poetic syllogism.
On poetics by Bosniac authors see: Hasan . Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf,
fol. 26a; Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak, Sarh. as-samsiyya, fol. 78a78b; Mus.t.afa Yuyo

Ayyub-zade, Sar h. Is agug , fol. 40a; Muhammad . b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-
asrar, fol. 85b; Fadil .
U z i
c awal ,
Sarh. matn, fol. 28b and Mu hammad
. b. Yusuf al-
Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar, fol. 131b.
299 See: A.N. Prior, Historija logike, p. 49.
300 Muhayyil, active participle of hayyala that has a very wide scope of meanings, with

the preposition ila it means to convince; to awaken feelings. The context clearly shows
that these are premisses that provoke certain feelings.
when told to a person, aect that person with an unusually strong

impression of either confinement (qabd), . 301 or openness (bast.)302 as when
they say: Wine is a liquid ruby, the man opens and wants to drink it
303
In commentaries that are somewhat more comprehensive, such as
New Commentary on The Sun Treatise, besides these elementary remarks,
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade points out the basic values of poetics as well
as its deficiencies, and that it can be used as a tool for practicing, in the
same way as dialectics and rhetoric.
Sophistic
Arabic logicians did not pay the same level of attention to sophistic, or
to be more accurate, the refuting of sophistic proofs, as Aristotle did
in his eighth book Topics and in his book On Sophistic Refutation. More
importantly, their place and importance among Arabs is much lesser
than the one it had in the medieval scholastics. A more detailed and
comprehensive explanation is given by al-Farab304 and Ibn Sna,305 the
forefathers of Arabic logic, while later logicians generally reduce this
issue down to a reference of the basic types of sophistic argumentation.
On the other hand, a number of issues related to sophistics, as well
as the ones related to dialectics, were included in #ilm adab al-bah. t, the

discipline whose goal is to develop dialogue and debating skills, which
means avoiding sophisms. However, the tradition to treat sophistics
as one of the reasoning skills was maintained by all Bosniac authors,
although in some cases very minimally and only within its elementary
The same base word is used to derive the psychological term tahayyul (imagination),
hayal (imaginative) and others (see: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires, /hyl/ and Psychologie
dIbn Sna (Avicenne) daprs son oeuvre as-Sif
a", d. Jan Bakos, Prague, 1959).
301 Qabd = confinement; contraction, tightening; repulsion, repugnance.
.
302 Bast = spreading; dissemination; exhilaration, joy.
.
By this statement, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade wishes to say that poetic syllogism,
consisting of suggestive premisses, gives a conclusion that is also suggestive, and that
can provoke a feeling of repulsion (qabd) . or, opposite, the feeling of full joy for the
recipient. Compare: Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 26a.
fol. 241a.
h. al-gadd,
303 Mustaf
304 See: -, [see: Kit ab al-amkina al-maglit.a],
- , 1975, pp. 361438. Translation into Russian was composed directly from the
manuscript in the Bratislava collection. See in this book, Chapter I, footnote 22.
305 Ibn Sn a, an-Nagat, al-Qahira, 1321 (1903), 141148 and Kitab al-isarat, p. 214.
130 chapter three
framework.306 Two basic issues in this field are the definition of sophism
and classification of sophisms.
Leading into delusion or sophistic argumentation (al-muga lat.a)307 is defined
as syllogism consisting of untrue premisses (kadiba), or of apparently true

(sabha bi al-haqq)
. premisses, or of apparently known (sabha bi al-mashu-
ra)308 ones.
If a syllogism is formed and used in a way that apparently true pre-
misses express the necessity of conclusion, it is called sophism (safsat.a),309
and when it uses an apparently known premiss it is called dispute (musa -
g aba) or in Aristotles terminology, eristic proof.310 Sophism stands op-
posed to apodictic, i.e. knowledge, and dispute, i.e. eristic, opposed to
dialectic.
As for the classification of sophism, before Ibn Sna wrote Kitab al-
isarat wa at-tanbhat, and even in his Nagat, it was formed in analogy to
306 As the analysis of the structure of works in the field of logic by Bosniac authors
(2nd chapter) shows, those works that used al-Abhars Isagogue as the paradigm of
structure or directly depended on this piece of writing (in form of commentary or
super-commentary), payed, lets say, symbolic attention to the skills in general, giving
only a definition followed by one example, while other texts treat them in more detail.
Notable exception is the apodictic which is the source of scientific knowledge.
For more on sophistic see: Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 26b
(Izabrani spisi, 83); Muhammad b. Musa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 78b; Mus.t.a-
.
fa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug, pp. 7677, as-Sar
h. Is h. al-gadd, fol. 141a141b, Sar h.
Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 40; Muhammad .
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar, fol. 85b
86a: Fadil
. U zicawal, Sar
h. matn, fol. 28b and Muhammad . b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath.
al-asrar, fol. 131.
307 Mugalata from galata = to lead to delusion; to lead to fallacy; to cause error; to
. .
cheat, to delude, to befool. These meanings, and the following text show that term
mugala.ta denotes any invalid conclusion (logical fallacy in narrow and broad sense),
intentional logical fallacy (sophism) and unintentional (paralogism).
309 Safsata (sophism) is the Arabic form of the Greek sofisms, and it denotes both
.
sophism (cunning thought, apparent evident and delusion aimed conclusion) and sophistic
(skill to abuse language expression abilities and logical forms).
Besides this expression, there is qiyas sufis.ta" = sophistic syllogism.
310 Mu sagaba, infinitive (mas.dar) of sagaba, means rebellion, riots; intrigue; raw,
dispute, argument. This type of syllogism corresponds to eristic proof in Aristotles
classification:
So, then, any merely apparent reasoning about these things is a contentious argu-
ment, and any reasoning that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand, even
though it be genuine reasoning, is a contentious argument: for it is merely apparent
in its conformity to the subject-matter, so that it is deceptive and plays foul Hence
everybody, including even amateurs, makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of
examining: for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who profess to know
things (On Sophistic Refutation, 11.)
the classification given by Aristotle,311 i.e. it was divided into speech-

based (Latin: in dictum) with six types of fallacy, and those out of speech
(Latin: extra dictionem) with seven types of fallacy.312 In Kitab al-isarat
Ibn Sna gave another classification taken over by later logicians,
including Bosniac ones, as a whole.313 This classification is based on the
place where fallacy occurs:
(1) Fallacy in syllogism form (min g iha as.-s.u ra),
(2) Material fallacy in contents (min g iha al-madda) and
(3) Fallacy in both contents and form (min g ihatihima g am#an).
The first group are fallacies of formal nature that are a result of,
according to Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, the disrespect of the fig-
ure forming conditions, disrespect of the quantity condition (kamiyya),
quality condition (kayfiyya) or modality condition (giha).
The second group consists of those fallacies that can occur in rea-
soning despite meeting all syllogism forming conditions. Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade mentions so called petitio principii (principle anticipation)
and says:
If one premiss and the conclusion are one (the same) thing, then the
fallacy is called mus. adara #ala al-ma.tlub,314 or when a conclusion that
is yet to be proved is taken as grounds for reasoning.
311 See: Aristotle, On Sophistic Refutation, chapter 1 and 5.

312 See e.g.: -, (Kitab al-amkina al-maglit.a),
pp. 361438, especially 366 and 379.
For classification by Ibn Sna see: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, pp. 237239.
313 Ibn Sna, Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab al-isa rat wa al-tanbhat), pp. 239
245.
Among the authors in the field of logic who are the object of this book this
classification is completely taken over in the following works: Muhammad . b. Musa
#Allamak, Sar
h. as-Samsiyya,
fol. 78a; Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, Sar agug, pp. 76
h. Is
77, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 141b142a; Muhammad.
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw , Fath. al-asrar
, fol. 85b86a.
314 Musadara #ala al-matlub = begging for principal questions, petitio principii. See:
. .
Y. Karam, al-Mu #gam al-falsaf, p. 159 and D. Reig, Dictionnaire ArabeFranais,
3066/III, as well as I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, pp. 238239.
As an example of such fallacy (petitio principii), Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade (o.c.,
fol. 141b) uses syllogism based on synonyms:
Every basar (man) is insan (man).
Every basar (man) can laugh.
Conclusion: Every insan (man) can laugh.
The very same type of seeking principles or begging original question was described
by Aristotle in his Topics, VIII, chapter 13: People appear to beg their original
question in five ways: the first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point
132 chapter three
Then there are other sophisms classified in those originating from

the aspect of words (min g iha al-lafz)
. and those originating from the aspect
of meaning (min g iha al-ma#na). This type of classification includes those
fallacies that occurred based on synonymy, homonymy, amphiboly,
word order, when one does not pay attention to the predicate,
when the accidental is taken for the essential, when genus is attri-
buted with the attributes of class, when the abstract is mistaken for
the concrete and the other way round etc.315
The third group consists of sophisms and material fallacy in the very
premisses.
However new and original for the time this classification of sophism
appeared, when we observe more comprehensive works in the field of
logic that form all, or at least most of sophisms (especially commen-
taries on Ibn Snas works), it appears that they do not mention then
unknown types of sophisms.
Scientific Questioning
Sophistic is usually the issue that ends treatises in the field of logic.
However, a number of logiciansapparently under the strong, direct
or indirect influence of Ibn Snas workdeal with the relation between
demonstration and science, its contents, principles and questions. Hav-
ing in mind that Arabic logicians see demonstration as equal to deduc-
tive conclusion, or that syllogisms (provided that their premisses are
true and that they are formed in the right way) are the only form
in which reasoning reaches conclusions, which are the highest form
of theoretically available truth as coordination between reasoning and
being, and how scientific knowledge is reached, it was necessary to give
answers to some methodological questions that, based on the definition
of scientific knowledge and syllogism, Aristotle asked himself. Primarily,
the question is which and what kind of the initial assumptions human
cognition starts with, if its only reliable method is pure deduction, and
requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words; but it is more
apt to escape detection in the case of dierent terms, or a term and an expression, that
means the same thing. (Also see: Prior Analytics, vol. II, chapter 16, Begging Original
Question).
whether the search for those premisses can infinitely suggest syllogisms
and elementary premisses of scientific knowledge.
As we know, Aristotle gave most of the answers to these questions
in the volume 1 of his Posterior Analytics, and Arabic logicians
gave partial answers along with the chapter on the demonstration
of apodictic. Among the authors whose works are the object of this
study, the ones who treated this issue separately following the example
of Ibn Sna, are Muhammad. b. Musa #Allamakvery shortly, and

Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, somewhat more comprehensively, in his
New Commentary on The Sun Treatise and Commentary on The Training in
Logic and Apologetic. Both these authors do it at the end of their books,
in the Conclusion.316 Here is a presentation how extensively Aristotles
solutions were taken as paradigm for writings of this kind.
This matter is catalogued around three elementary questions: subject
. u#), principles of the discipline (mabda"mabadi") and
of the discipline (mawd
questionsissues of the discipline (mas"alamasa"il).
The subject of the discipline (mawd . u#, pl. mawd. u#at)317 can consist
of one or more questions that define the respective discipline, whose
phenomena (giha) are researched. In order to be able to prove and use
principles within a discipline that has more than one subject, the sub-
jects have to be of the same kind. On the other hand, one subject can
be treated by more than one discipline. Therefore there are dierent
relations between dierent disciplines: equal relation in which two or
more disciplines treat the same issue, but from dierent angles; relation
in which one discipline is a part of another, and the third relationthe
relation of subordination.
Identification of the subject of the discipline and definition of these
relations are necessary to define the exact role of dierent principles,
those that are generally valid and those applicable only within one
discipline, because, according to Aristotle, Of the basic truths used
in the demonstrative sciences some are peculiar to each science, and
some are common, but common only in the sense of analogous, being
of use only in so far as they fall within the genus constituting the
province of the science in question.318
316 Muhammad b. M
. usa #Allamak, Sar
h. as-samsiyya, fol. 79a80a; Mus.t.afa Yuyo
h. al-gadd, fol. 142a143b and Sar
Ayyub-zade, as-Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq, fol. 40b42a.
317 Logic uses the word mawdu # in the meaning of subject. However, here it is used in
.
the meaning of objective, problem or contents of science.
134 chapter three
The term mabadi" is used by Arabic logicians to denote those very

principles, the principles of science in its broadest sense, its standards and
starting points. Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade and Muhammad
. b. Musa
#Allamak,319 following in the footsteps of Ibn Snas Kitab as-sifa" quoted
by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade,320 divided the principles into two main
groups:
1. Before stating, proving or concluding, it is necessary to define the

exact contents of the terms that will be used, to define their definition
(hadd)
. originating from conception (tas.awwurat). And that is the first type
of principle.
2. The assertions (tas.dqat) are used to form premisses (muqaddimat) that

can have the function of principles, and that appear in two forms:
a) The ones clear as such (al-bayyina bi nafsiha) also called generally
accepted knowledge (#ulum muta#arifa), as in: Sizes equal to a size are
equal to one another.321
Therefore, this is about axioms, the truths that cannot be proved but are
so evident that they need not be proved and it is impossible even to
imagine something opposite to them.
b) The ones unclear as such (gayr al-bayyina bi (f) nafsiha) also
called postulates (mus.a darat), according to Euclid: If there is a line
intersecting two other lines, and if the two internal corners on the
(smaller) side are more acute than two right angles, (those) two
lines, if continued to that side, will intersect with each other. 322
Postulates, therefore, are not immediately evident truths as axioms are,
but we accept them because we can prove some other truths using
them.
The very definition of principles and their division, show that those
solutions are literally taken over from Aristotle. Aristotle noticed that
the beginning and the foundation of cognition, as well as the origin
of proof, are some principal judgments (archi) which can be: definitions
(horisms) that cannot be proved as they simply define or identify

320 h. al-gadd, fol. 142b.
Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, as-Sar
h. al-gadd, fol. 142b.
321 Mustaf
Here he uses the first Euclids axiom.

322 Ibid. Example given is the fifth Euclids postulate.
contents of a term, or, according to Aristotle, existence and meaning

(definition) of those issues are assumed immediately without proof ;
axioms that are evident as such and necessarily exist as such and should
be necessarily believed in; or postulates (itema) that are assumed

without proof and used.323
The term masa"il means scientific questioning and issues that yet need
to be provedtheses. The issue emphasized here is that the solving of
certain problems should be done within the discipline that questioned
them, as, besides the fact that there are questions answered by the first
principles (awwaliyyat) as the elementary truth of all disciplines, the
final and the medium terms in one definition need to belong to the
same contents.324
Terminological Characteristics
As the previous presentations show, as well as the notes accompanying

the text, Arabic logical terminology used in the texts of Bosniac authors
is characteristic for its stability and causality in use, and the way it is
formed and its etymology show certain specificities. It can be said that
Arabic logical terminology was formed over two and a half centuries;
from the first translations of Aristotles writings (directly from Greek
or indirectly from Syrian) into Arabic; to the works of al-Farab and
his contemporaries, in whose works it was already developed; to the
texts of Ibn Sna where it was fixed and more or less stabile. Truthfully,
there were some later attempts to innovate, the most significant eorts
were the ones of al-Gaz al in his Mih. akk al-nazar.325 However, those
.
attempts to change some of the terms into new ones, despite having
been accepted by some of the logicians, had no significant success, and
in the texts by Bosniac authors they can only be found in the function
of explaining some terms. They caused confusion and severe criticisms,
323 See: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, chapter 10 (dierent principles).

324 Aristotle: If a syllogistic question is equivalent to a proposition embodying one
of the two sides of a contradiction, and if each science has its peculiar propositions from
which its peculiar conclusion is developed, then there is such a thing as a distinctively
scientific question, and it is the interrogative form of the premisses from which the
appropriate conclusion of each science is developed There is a limit, then, to the
questions which we may put to each man of science; nor is each man of science bound
to answer all inquiries on each several subject, but only such as fall within the defined
field of his own science. (Posterior Analytics, I, 12.)
325 Ab u H al, Mih. akk an-nazar, al-Qahira, s.a., especially p. 30.
. amid al-Gaz .
136 chapter three
such as the ones by Ibn Haldun.326 Therefore, logical terminology was

completely stabile by the time Bosniac authors started being active,
until the end of the 19th century.
As for the specificities in its forming, it should be said that the
Arabic language, from the time of the first written documents to the
translation of Greek texts, was primarily the language of poetry as
the only creative activity of human beings worth attention, then the
language of The Qur"an, and eventually, the language of a very modest
corpus of prose.327 That is why the specific Arabic logical terminology
was created, since the overall Arabic dictionary from the mentioned
corpus of written language, along with what the spoken language had
to oer, could not satisfy the new needs or cover the new meanings
that some philosophical terms carried, especially the ones that entered
Arabic as an already finalized result of the Antic philosophical thought.
The later development of Arabic philosophical thinking resulted in
the development of the new terminology springing out of the very
philosophical thought.
On the other hand, Arabic, as one of the Semitic languages or as
the type of language that has root inflexion, with its structure and pos-
sibilities to use consonant groups and form new words, was an inex-
haustible source.328 That is why Arabic terminology has always drawn
the greatest attention, almost from the time when it was formed (which
is evident in Ibn Snas Kitab al-h. udud) until today. It is certain that it is
impossible to shed light on such a complex process as the formulation
of terminology that is comprised of the most versatile influences, espe-
cially the formulation of philosophical and logical terminology. This is
why we shall use the original texts of Bosniac authors in Arabic, as well
as their resources and literatureto point out the elementary ways and
characteristics of forming Arabic logic terminology.
326 See previously quoted fragment, Ibn Haldun, Muqaddima, p. 489.

327 ci [Jewelers with words], in: Svijet islama
Also see: Charles Pellat, Draguljari rije
, pp. 145146 and F. Hiti [P. Hitti], Istorija Arapa, especially pp. 97102.
328 Theoretically the number of consonants could form over 20,000 tri-consonant
roots that would further be used to derive noun and verb forms. Understandably, it
would not be possible to apply all out of this number of theoretical roots due to some
acoustic and physiological reasons, but it is still true that the todays Arabic has only one
third realized. See more: Teufik Muftic, Infinitivi trilitera u arapskom jeziku [Infinitives of
Triliteral Roots in Arabic], Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, Special Edition V, Sarajevo,
1966, especially pp. 1216.
A. Before starting with the pure Arabic terminology, it must be men-

tioned that in the early period of Arabic logic, philosophical termi-
nology was penetrated by a certain number of Greek terms in Arabic
transcription.329 And if their later development is followed, they can be
classified as follows:
1. Greek terms in Arabic transcription, which as early as al-Farabs

texts, had their Arabic equivalent, continued existing concurrently with
them, and then extinguished. Among these terms that can be found
in al-Farabs works, there is an example of qa.taguriyas with its Ara-
bic equivalent al-maqulat, and silugismus with the Arabic equivalent, al-
qiyas.330
Most of these terms, after their Arabic equivalent had been estab-
lished, could not survive in Arabic language, also because those words
did not easily fit in Arabic morphology and orthography (there was
a possibility of dierent and wrong reading and pronunciation due to
unmarked short vowels, etc.).
2. A limited number of Greek terms, besides their Arabic equivalent,

survived in the texts in the field of logic, as for example: us.tuqs: #uns. ur
(element); hayula: madda (matter); falsafa: h. ikma (philosophy); sufs.tiqa (or
safsa.ta): mugala.ta (sophistic) etc.
These terms, in contrast to those of the first group, can be found in
derivative forms, such as: sufs.ta" (sophistical, sophist), hayulan (material)
and others.
B. The main source for forming Arabic logic terminology was in the
Arabic language itself, in the abundance of the existing consonant
(mainly tri-consonant) roots that carried certain ideas, and in the exist-
ing vocabulary. Arabic logic, and other philosophical terminology,
shows several main methods of their formation:
329 There are very few original texts from that period that could be used to identify
the terms and their number. This lack is especially evident in the case of al-Kinds
texts that could be very illustrative. It can be followed in later texts, especially the ones
by al-Farab, though the number of terms is significantly lower in them as well. See:
-, , especially: , pp. 603620, and:
.. , - in: -
, , , , 1975, pp. 8390.
330 Ibid.
138 chapter three
1. Terms formed out of the existing word fund (from dierent sources)
whose meaning was adequate (mut.a biqa) to the meaning of these
terms. Such words are: zaman (time), nafs (soulanima), s. ura (form), s. idq
(truth), kidb (untruth, lie), and even fine distinctions such as: s. idq = truth

(and other therein derived forms) in sense of accuracy and correctness
vs. h. aqqa = truth in sense of the essence of things.331
Most of these words can be found in The Qur"an, where they have
quite a precise meaning, and then found in the disciplines that devel-
oped concurrently and a bit before logic, such as grammar and specu-
lative theology.
2. Terms formed by the literal translation of Greek terms, for exam-

ple the name of logic as a discipline: man.tiq derived from n.tq that bears
the idea of articulated speech and reason. The terms literally trans-
lated from Greek include those that had previously existed with a con-
crete meaning in Arabic, but were given a new meaning and function
(semantic switch).
There is a whole range of these terms, for example h. add whose basic
meaning is boundary, border, limit, and in logic it means definition and
term within a premiss (medium, minor or major) and the corresponding
Greek term hros (or horisms) that has the same basic and terminolog-
ical meaning. The situation is the same with sur which literally means
fence, wall, and in logic it means quantifier; muqaddima which literally
means the front part, forerunner, and in logic it means premiss etc. Notes
accompanying previous chapters give examples for such formation.
3. Arabic roots, whose main meaning was used to derive new words
for the needs of logical and philosophical terminology, oered many
opportunities. The most frequent, so called, morphological-syntactical
formation went in two directions. Firstly, (a) through the use of ex-
panded verbal form, which resulted in new meanings, and secondly
(b), their transformation into nouns, adjectives and participles.
a) Analyzing philosophical terms and their forms in the texts by
Ibn Sna and comparing them with forms used in literature, A.-
M. Goichon found that most of the philosophical terms belonged
to the second and the fifth verbal form with fa##ala and tafa ##ala,
or that they were derived from them. Fewer verbs belonged to
331 See note nr. 70 in the 3rd chapter.

the fourth, seventh and tenth form, and it is very rare situation
that the term belongs to the sixth verbal form. There are no
terms registered in the eighth group, while the absence of terms
from the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth group is understandable,
considering their very small scope in general.332
An example of this process is the transformation of the root s. wr which
bears the idea of form, in s. awwara (2nd form) when it means to give
form to something and tas. awwara (5th form) when it means to give form
to something within.
b) Another direction the morphological-syntactical formation took
was forming noun forms from verb forms or verb themes using
known paradigms, and then axation (adding suxes) to noun
forms. That is how the following terms were formed from the
above given example: tas. wr, tas. awwur, tas. awwurat, mutas. awwir.
Adding suxes to noun forms or already made terms resulted in the
creation of new forms. The most frequently used sux was iyy(un) for
formation of the relative word, which resulted in the formation of the
following terms kull(yyun), guz"(yyun), sar.t(yyun), etc.
In order to form some of the abstract notions (according to the
known Arabic word formation procedure), the characteristic female
t (in transcription a, or iyya(tun)) was added to the words created in
the above described way. That is how terms such as #aqliyya, naw#iyya,
insaniyya and others were formed, as well as the unusual ones, such
as kammiyya, kayfiyya, huwiyya, laysiyya, derived from the interrogative
pronouns kam and kayfa, the personal pronoun huwa, auxiliary verb
laysa, etc.
Although as a rule, in the formation of new words, Arabic does not
accept so called lexical-syntactical formation, where the new word is
formed by joining two words, philosophical and logical terminology
still have several terms formed in this way. Besides the frequently used
mahiyya (essence) whose structure and origin was a cause of numerous
332 And indeed, when we take a look at a dictionary of logical terms, we can see
that most of the logical terms belong to the second and the fifth verb group. A.-
M. Goichon feels that this comes out of their meaning, and above all, their causality,
and on the other hand, their reflexivity that has certain elements of passivity, so called
reflexive-passive verbs, which opened the opportunity for formation of a number of
philosophical terms. See: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie dAvicenne, pp. 7375.
140 chapter three
discourses,333 logic has several compound words for terms such as la-
wugud, la-kawn and la-nihaya, and in the context of discussion on nega-
tive form, terms as la-insan etc.
In the context of logical terminology and its specificities, there is
another language phenomenon that should be addressed, even if it has
already been mentioned in brief.
As a rule, the Arabic noun phrase does not have a copula. Juxtapo-
sition of a defined subject and a non-defined predicate is sucient to
express desired predication. However, when it was necessary to point
out the copula in e.g. judgment analysis, logicians used a personal pro-
noun corresponding by gender and number to the subject, e.g.: Zayd
huwa #alim (Zayd he (is a) scholar); or they used some of the forms of
kana (to be), but also keeping the subject at the beginning of the sen-
tence, followed by the verb to be and then by the predicate: Zayd ka"in
#alim (Zayd is educated). The function of negative copula is played by
the antipode of verb kanalaysa (is not, not to be) in the same way.
And, eventually, more as a curiosity than as a serious attempt to
translate Arabic terms to Bosnian, it should be said that some of the
manuscripts and prints that were kept at the Oriental Institute in
Sarajevo, held marginal or inter-linear notes attempting to translate
or paraphrase certain definitions to Bosnian, using Arabic alphabet.334
We say attempting as those eorts stopped at the translation of
words from everyday spoken language, while relevant terms, among
all, remained in Arabic. These notes could date back to the late 19th
and early 20th century.
To conclude this presentation, in which I have attempted to analyze

the elementary logical issues in writings by Bosniac authors, observing
it from the aspect of its development and history, and from the language
standpoint, it is necessary to present certain observations and, in a way,
to anticipate the conclusion in order to give the clearest possible picture
of this matter.
Primarily, a joint characteristic of all works in the field of logic that
were included in this study is that all of them (except the two marginalia
333 See: Ibn Sna (Avicenne), Livre des directives et remarques, p. 307 (see note A.-
M. Goichon that starts on page 304, and ends on page 307).
334 Here we should point out the codices, catalogued in the library of printed editions
of the Oriental Institute under number III 2094.

There is a large corpus of texts in Bosnian from Ottoman period, that were written
using Arabic alphabet (the so-called Alhamiado literature).
mentioned earlier), besides evident dierences in the scope, depth and

understanding of logical matter, were written in an attempt to encom-
pass the elementary teachings in the field of logic as seen by Arabic
logicians succeeding Ibn Sna. In the Arabic system of philosophy and
sciences, logic had the task to define the method of acquiring com-
pletely safe and indisputable, i.e. scientific knowledge. Taking not only
this objective of logic from Aristotle, but also his elements of the logical
system regarding topics and contents (the theory of meaning and the
understanding of truth, the teaching of logical forms of thinking, the
teaching of scientific thinking methods, of scientific and non-scientific
reasoning, and other), the earliest Arabic logicians, especially al-Farab
and Ibn Sna, played a very important role in establishing research in
the field of logic within Arabic philosophy and in the later development
of Islamic scholastics. Therefore, the history of logic, in its, so called,
Arabic period (including the Ottoman period as well) can be right-
fully seen as its post-Hellenistic development. As the presented material
shows, it survived in its basic elements and continued its life in Bosnia,
which is evident from the works such as Commentary on The Sun Treatise
by Muhammad
. b. Musa al-Bosnaw #Allamak and New Commentary on
The Sun Treatise by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, having all those posi-
tive features that decorated Arabic logic in the period which ended the
dispute between, so called, Western or Baghdad school and Eastern
school, from the period that synthesizes the achievements of the most
important Arabic logicians: al-Farab and his followers, and Ibn Sna
and his students.335
This resulted in a situation where, at the time when Bosniac logicians
were active, there were no texts formally linked to those by Aristotle (in
the sense of commentaries or marginalia), which is a consequence of
Ibn Snas influence, however Aristotelian they remained in the sense of
their contents. All these writings focus on the teaching of syllogism,
a form of deductive concluding that oers a reliable method in
reaching scientific, safe and indisputable knowledge. All other logical
matters treated in these works, are given either as a precondition for
better understanding syllogism, its structure, absoluteness, necessity and
generality, or as its application in apodictic, opposed to other forms
of reasoning and knowledge that is more or less probable, apparent,
wrong or false. Certain extra-Aristotelian topics that were treated in
335 See more in chapter 1.

142 chapter three
more or less detailthe treatment of singular judgments as used by

the stoics, the development of conditional (conjunctive and disjunctive)
judgments, the development of the fourth figure, the syllogistic theory
of inductive reasoning, attempts of temporal interpretation of modal
judgments, teaching on future contingency, the presentation of some
laws of judgment logic, predicate qualification, and others (some of
which were initiated by the philosophers of Megara and stoic school)
are only a confirmation of continuity.
Arabic logicians from the later period, who are later followed by
Bosniac logicians, firmly believed in the firmness and perfection of
thus formed logical system and its strength as an ecient instrument
for acquiring the truth. They felt that its development can only be
achieved by interpreting already defined discoveries (either through
interpretation of works by classical authors, or through the production
of textbooks and guidebooks based on those works), through eorts to
systematize issues and develope dierent classification systems.
The analysis of the researched works and presented data leads us to
the conclusion that Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade, especially in his New
Commentary on The Sun Treatise, followed by Muhammad. b. Musa al-
Bosnaw #Allamak, who used the same piece of writing for his com-
mentary, were the most successful in their eort. As for the textbooks
and other smaller works, Kafs Compendium of Logic by Hasan
. Kaf al-

Aqhi. s.a r, which goes beyond most of the works of that nature, even
outside its time and space, is especially prominent.
Having in mind that logic in medieval Europe developed within the
same framework, with consideration of the specificities of place and
role of logic in philosophy and the system of disciplines, the follow-
ing chapter presents Bosnian logic in the context of that of medieval
Europe, and a comparison between Bosniac and European logicians of
that time.
chapter four
COMPARISON: BOSNIAC LOGICIANS

AND LOGICIANS OF WESTERN EUROPE
Shifts in thinking, an important characteristic of history of philosophy,

is one of the salient features of logic. Like other disciplines, logic has
its own contents and relative independence. However, on the other
hand, it has always been immediately linked to the concrete historic
conditions and levels of social development, and the development of
other philosophical disciplines and to science and culture in general.
Permanence in thinking shifts springs out of the dynamism of social
action, and progress in certain solutions means having an adequate
grasp on the objectively existing and acting. In thinking, this process
is expressed through the principles of formal logic, as they show the
essence of the continuous flow, which is its own definition. As soon as it
is indeed expressed it becomes something else within the possible and
so on to infinity. Therefore, everlasting changes and dierences, basis
and process are a unity, that find their reasons and sense exactly in the
dialectic expression.1
However, the history of logic, regardless of how the relation between
philosophy and theory of logic is defined, has its specificities, so the
standard periodization does not apply completely. The nucleus of the
theory of logic and its history, the element that lasted and was identical,
was within Aristotles logic, and the process was made of the infinite
eorts to reach a better and more complete interpretation, method-
ological perfecting, and the adequate and fruitful application of logic
that will, eventually result in the development of modern symbolist
logic and logistic. Twenty centuries after Aristotle, Leibniz will discover
new possibilities for interpretation and directions of further develop-
ment, pointing out that Aristotle was actually the first to write mathe-
matically outside of mathematics.2
1Branko Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela do renesanse, 3rd edition, Zagreb, 1982, p. 7.

2Ivo Thomas, Pretece suvremene logike, in: Historija logike, edited by A.N. Prior,
Zagreb, 1970, p. 90.
144 chapter four
That is why this comparison is based on the period that is usually

called medieval logic. This term refers to those teachings that were
interpreted and developed at the universities and schools between the
11th and 15th century, and that were home to scholastic systems. It
also includes the period in cultural history called humanism and renais-
sance. This period in the history of logic was interregnum, until mod-
ern logic came onto the scene. In European logical tradition this period
was dominated by Aristotles formal logic, which was the basic and
majority content of writings in the field of logic. Since the earliest times,
logic established in this way was the object of dierent, and even radical
criticisms, especially regarding syllogisms (whose weaknesses, according
to some historians, were something that Aristotle himself was aware
of). Nevertheless, the contents of the majority of books on logic in this
period followed the standard structure of Aristotles Organon, and they
took over the elements and the order taught in schools around Europe.3
In comparison between the writings of Bosniac authors in the field of
logic, and the writings of the same character originating from Western
Europe, this chapter will focus on the elements that could be identical
but also dierent in the context of their relation towards Aristotles
Organon.
As the last representative of antic culture in Roman society and the

mediator between the antic times and the Middle Ages, according to
history of philosophy, A.M. Boethius (470 or 480525)4 left the heritage
of his works in the field of logic. Besides his own writings (two works
on categorical and two on hypothetical syllogisms and short writings
on division and dierent places in rhetoric), his comments and trans-
lation of Aristotles Categories and On Interpretation (De interpretatione),
3 Moris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, Uvod u logiku i naucni metod [An Introduction to
Logic and Scientific Method], Beograd, 1965, p. 28.
4 Among the works of general character, this study used the following: Historija
logike [History of logic], edited by A.N. Prior, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1970; Histoire de
la Philosophie 1, Encyclopdie de la pliade, (Paris) 1969; Branko Bosnjak, Filozofija od
Aristotela do renesanse (and selected texts by philosophers), 3rd edition, Zagreb, 1982;
Vladimir Filipovic, Filozofija renesanse, 3rd edition, Zagreb, 1982; I.M. Bochenski, Formale
Logik, FreiburgMnchen, 1956. and W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije, vol. I, Zagreb,
1956. Bibliographical data are given according to this list of works.
For more on Anicius Manlius Boethius see: Historija logike, p. 58; Histoire de la
Philosophie, pp. 12261231; B. Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela, pp. 8286 and selected
texts, pp. 202207. Especially Mikls Marth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie,
E.J. Brill, London, New York, Kln, 1994, 274 p.
bosniac logicians and logicians of western europe 145
as well as Porphyrys Eisagog (Introduction of Categories) were very

significant for the development of logic. However, it will take six cen-
turies for his heritage to reach fertile grounds with the first significant
medieval logician, Pierre Ablard (10791142).5 Working almost exclu-
sively on Boethius works in the field of logic, and using some results
of the stoic logical syntax taken over from Priscians (5th6th cen-
tury)6 Institutiones Gramaticae, Ablard gave a critical reconstruction of
Boethius heritage in which the linguistic approach is characteristic of
the stoic-megara extention of Aristotles logic over metaphysical inter-
pretations that originate from Porphyry and neo-Platonic tradition.7
There is also the fact that the issue on the nature of universal terms
(Roscelin, Anselm and others) was also very prominent in the age of
early scholastics, as, according to W. Windelband, formal logical edu-
cation of the nations entering the scientific movement at the beginning
of the Middle Ages was developed upon the issue of the logical and
the metaphysical meaning of notions (universalia).8 Logical discussions
between the followers of nominalism and realism spread into the field
of ontology, giving it a special dimension.9
However, in the history of European logic, the overall reception of
Aristotles work in the field of logic, can be discussed only for the time
when the remaining volumes of Aristotles Organon were available in
translation from Greek and Arabic, in addition to translation of works
by Arabic philosophers and logiciansprimarily, al-Farab, Ibn Sna
and Ibn Rusdand their commentaries on Aristotles writings.10 An
especially significant fact for the issue we speak of here is that Ibn
Snas writings in logic (al-Man.tiq and Kitab as-sifa") were translated
relatively early (between 1130 and 1150) by translators identified as
Dominicus Gundissalinus (Gondisalvi) and Johannes Hispalensis, and
5 See: Historija logike, pp. 5960; Histoire de la Philosophie, pp. 12951308 and
B. Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela, pp. 100103, and selected texts, pp. 222228.
6 Besides the above mentioned references, see: Milka Ivi c, Pravci u lingvistici, Ljubl-
jana, 1978, p. 20.
7 Ernest A. Moody, Srednjovjekovna logika [Medieval Logics], in: Historija logike
, p. 59.
8 W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije, knj. I, Zagreb, 1956, p. 334.
9 Vidjeti: B. Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela, pp. 97103.
10 On translations to Latin, see more: Hans Daiber, Lateinische bersetzungen
arabischer Texte zur Philosophie und ihre Bedeutung fr die Scholastik des Mittelal-
ters. Stand und Aufgaben der Forschung. In: Recontres de cultures dans la philosophie mdi-
vale. Traductions et traducteure de lantiquit tardive au XIVe sicle. Louvain-la-NeuveCassino,
1990, pp. 203250.
146 chapter four
were followed by translations by Grard de Crmon (from Cremona,

died in 1187) of other relevant texts by al-Farab and Ibn Rusd.11 This
is how the larger part of Organon was accepted as Logica nova (Ars
NovaThe New Logic), dierently from the previously known part
called Logica vetus (Ars VetusThe Old Logic). In his Lehrbuch der
Geschichte der Philosophie W. Windelband accentuates the importance of
the encounter of the Orient with philosophy as the Parisian educated
circles got to know not only the complete works by Aristotle, but all
actual parts of his system.
It was through the new logic , says W. Windelband, that dialec-
tics, numbed within, came to life again, and as the objective of ratio-
nal elucidation on the religious outlook was undertaken with a new
momentum and a developed technique of thinking, concurrently an
almost infinite matter of knowledge was included into the metaphysical-
religious cluster Reception of Aristotle belonging to the period
from 1150 to 1250. It started with, the previously unknown, more valu-
able part of Organon (Logica vetus: Logica nova) and advanced towards
the writings in metaphysics, physics and ethics, usually accompanied by
an introduction by the Arabic commentators12
The strong influence of Arabic philosophers, Islamic philosophi-
cal reflextion in general and Arabic interpretation of Aristotles logic
in particular, will become a general feature of scholastics, based on
the works by Albertus Magnus, (12061280) who himself paid great
attention to studying Arabic-Islamic and Hebrew philosophy, Thomas
Aquinas (12251274), Petrus Hispanus (about 12461277) about whom
Jean Jolivet in his La philosophie mdivale en Occident specifically
says that he was under the influence of augustinism and avicennism,
Duns Scotus (12661308) and others.13
Special emphasis should be placed on Summulae logicales by Petrus
Hispanus, which was one of the most frequently used textbooks in logic
in the 16th century and later, and had great influence on a number of
logicians of European Latinism.
There were also eorts to get to know the works by Arabic philoso-
phers in the Renaissance. G. Pico della Mirandola (14631494) says:
11 See chapter Les traductions in: Histoire de la Philosophie 1, pp. 13511367; F. Hiti
[Hitti], Istorija Arapa, pp. 530531; Carl Prantl, Gescichte der Logik im Abendlande, Bd. I
IV, Leipzig, 18551870 (reprint: Hildesheim, 1997), see especially: Bd. II, Einflus der
Araber pp. 297496 and Bd. III, pp. 1178.
12 W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije, pp. 360361.
13 In: Histoire de la Philosophie 1, p. 1462.
Among the Arabians, there is in Averros something solid and

unshaken, in Avempace, as in Al-Farabi, something serious and deeply
meditated; in Avicenna, something divine and platonic What should
have been our plight had only the philosophical thought of the Latin
authors, that is, Albert, Thomas, Scotus, Egidius, Francis and Henry,
been discussed, while that of the Greeks and the Arabs was passed over
14
A follower of these and similar ideas of Mirandola was Juraj Dragisic
(1448 or 14501520), a prominent Croatian scholar, a refugee from
Bogomil Bosnia, who was also familiar with the writings, and who
quoted them in his teachings on intelligence and the cognition of future
contingencies.15
In the midst of the Renaissance, besides severe disagreements, de-
nials of the main Aristotelian trends and criticisms of Aristotles logic
by the Church, the works by Arabic philosophers, and above all Ibn
Sna and Ibn Rusd, will get their full validation at important univer-
sities and schools, among philosophers and scientists, as well as terms
avicennism and averroesism,16 that will be put on the same level
with Platonism, Aristotelianism and, to an extent, Augustinism,
and Thomasism and Scotusism.
Writing on the life and works of Marko Marulic (14501524), person-
alities that were either formants or ferments of Marulics spiritual world,
Tomislav Ladan mentions Averroes (Ibn Rusd), emphasizing that for a
long time, Padova was a center of Averroist Aristotelianism, and that
about one hundred editions of his writings, actually commentaries
on the works by Aristotle, were published between 1480 and 1580 in
Latin.17
14 From: De dignitate hominis (Oration on the Dignity of Man), tr. by A.R. Caponigri,
Chicago, 1956, p. 45 and 47. Retrieved from: http://www. cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/
Mirandola on April 14th, 2008.
15 Literature on the life and work of Juraj Dragisi c is abundant. Relevant here
are: J. Jelinic, Kultura bosanskih franjevaca [Culture of Bosnian Franciscans], Sarajevo,
1912, and texts by Kruno Krstic in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije [Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia]
(second edition), vol. III, pp. 543544; Z. Sojat,
Dragisiceva teorija o volji [Dragisics
Theory of Will], Prilozi za izucavanje hrvatske filozofske bastine (hereinafter Prilozi), Za-
greb, 1976, issue 34, pp. 2966, and: Cesare Vasoli, Profezia e ragione, Napoli, 1974.
16 See, e.g.: Laverrosme latin au XIIIe sicle, Laverrosme au XIVe sicle and
Les averostes in: Histoire de la Philosophie 1, pp. 14421447, 15241529 and 1540
1541, as well as A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie dAvicenne et son influence en Europe mdivale,
Paris, 1979.
17 Tomislav Ladan, Maruli cev Syllabus, Prilozi, Zagreb, 1975, nr. 12, p. 206.
The influence of Averroes on the Padova peripatetic school is explained in Marija
148 chapter four
Ibn Snas and Ibn Rusds influence on Croatian Latinists, their

way of elaboration and understanding of certain philosophical and
especially logical issues, is evident in almost all Croatian authors who
were educated in the West (as we will show later when discussing the
problematics of logic). The most significant among them were Benko
Benkovic (oko 14601523)18 who promoted the philosophy of Duns
Scotus and wrote a textbook in scholastic philosophy (and the stand-
point of Duns Scotus with regards to the writings of Ibn Sna is well-
known);19 then Antun Medo from Dubrovnik (15301600),20 who wrote
a very interesting paper titled Quaedam animadversiones in Praedicabilia
Porphyrii (Some observations on Porphyrys praedicabilia); Andrija
KacicMiosic (17041760), primarily a poet, but in his Elementa peri-
pathetica iuxta mentem Joannis Duns Scoti,21 printed in 17511752, he proves
to be a loyal follower of Scotus; and, eventually, Nikola Gucetic (1549
1610), also from Dubrovnik, whose works Commentaria in sermanem Aver-
rois de substantia orbis (Commentary on Averroess Work on the Sub-
stance of Consciousness) and De immortalitate intellectus possibilis writ-
ten in the spirit of Averroess Aristotelianism. His contemporary Cvi-
jeta (Flora) Zuzoric says that he studied Averroes with special atten-
tion.22
Bridas text Spor Jurja Dubrovcanina i Cesara Cremoninija o formama elemenata

[Dispute of Juraj of Dubrovnik and Cesar of Cremona on the Forms of Elements],
Prilozi, Zagreb, 1978, nr. 78, pp. 3983, and Damir Barbaric, Znacaj sveucilista u
Padovi za obrazovanje nasih humanista [Importance of the University of Padova for
Education of Croatian Humanists], Prilozi, Zagreb, 1983, nr. 12 (1718), pp. 151160.
18 See: Marija Brida, Benedikt Benkovic, Zagreb, 1967.
19 See, e.g.: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie dAvicenne, pp. 2425, 117 and 122126
and . Gilson, Avicenne et le point de dpart de Duns Scot, pp. 100117.

20 See: Erna Pajni c, Antun Medo (Antonius Medus Calossiua). Neki rezultati istra-
z ivanja z ivota i rada dubrovackog filozofa XVI stoljeca [Some results of the research
on life and work of Antonius Medus Calossiua, a 16th century philosopher from
Dubrovnik], Prilozi, Zagreb, 1976, nr. 34, pp. 6785.
21 On Ka cic as a logician, a folower of Duns Scotus, and some influences of
Avicennas philosophy, logic and psychology, see: Albert Bazala, Kaciceva Elementa
peripathetica , Prilozi, Zagreb, 1976, nr. 34, pp. 191220.
22 See inauguration speech by Prof. Franjo Markovi c, PhD, rector of Zagreb Uni-
versity, 1881/82, called Filozofijske struke pisci s onkraj Velebita u stoljecih XV. do
XVIII [Writers in the field of philosophy originating from the foothills of Mt. Velebit,
15th to 18th century], published in: Prilozi, Zagreb, 1975, nr. 12, p. 269.
This presentation contains some bibliographical data esentially valid for the history
of Croatian philosophical heritage, as well as some data on Croatian logicians in Latin
language.
European logic, therefore, started its historical movements as a devel-

oped philosophical discipline, with Aristotle in Ancient Greece, through
its Arabic period and European logic, to modern contemporary logic.
Analyzing the nature of formal and general logic, and explaining its
essence, Kant points out that That logic has advanced in this sure
course, even from the earliest times, is apparent from the fact that,
since Aristotle, it has been unable to advance a step and, thus, to all
appearance has reached its completion. For, if some of the moderns
have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discus-
sions on the mental faculties, such as imagination and wit, metaphysical
discussions on the origin of knowledge and the dierent kinds of certi-
tude, according to the dierence of the objects (idealism, scepticism,
and so on), or anthropological discussions on prejudices, their causes
and remedies: this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows
their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science.23
The statement that Kant presents as a characteristic of the history
of European formal logic, brings to our minds that logic cannot be
expected to have abundant and original development before the math-
ematical logic and authors that were modern in spirit, as even those
authors, who were estimated as the most original, considered their work
as an attempt to reconstruct the original Aristotle and the attempt of
successful interpretation of his writings.
This introduction is a reminder of some generally known data from
the history of European logic that should give at least a rough guideline
to the historical and philosophical framework for observing the relation
of Bosniac authors and authors of somewhat earlier or the same period
from West-European logical tradition, and to the origin of influences,
interrelations and potentials for a comparative approach. More atten-
tion will be paid to Croatian Latinists, if for no other reason, then
because they acted at the same time and in the same space as Bosniac
Arabists.
The best examples for observing this relation are the results of logical
studies at the University of Paris dating mid 13th century, textbooks
originating from the vicinity of the Oxford University, then Padova that
was closely linked with the universities of north-eastern Italy, such as
Bologna, Ferrara and Venice, and, eventually, the works written under
the influence of Vienna and Budim universities.
23 Immanuel Kant, Kritika cistog uma [Critique of Pure Reason], Kultura, Belgrade,
1958, p. 63.
150 chapter four
Besides the above mentioned work by Peter of Spain (Petrus His-

panus), Summulae Logicales, which was popular as a standard textbook,
among summulae, i.e. comprehensive courses in logic, based on
syllabi of the universities, manuscripts and libraries, biographies and
research with results published in reference books that we used, evi-
dently significant were Summa totius logicae by William Ockham (or of
Ockham, app. 12851349), Perutilis Logica (or Summa Logicae) by his fol-
lower Albert of Sachs (Albert von Sachen, app. 13161390), then Sum-
mulae Logicales by Jean Buridan (14th century),24 De Puritate Artis Logicae
by Walter Burleigh (or Burley, 14th century), works by Jean Mair (died
app. 1531) and his students, Commentaria in universam Aristotelis logicam by
Francisco of Toledo (15321596), which was, according to the syllabus
of 1598, the main textbook in Aristotles logic in Rome.25 Besides the
writings listed here, there is a whole range of works written in the form
of compendia of similar or the same contents, usually called logica
parva or minor, as well as numerous disputations in organon Aris-
totelis, interpretations cum passibus or iuxta mentem The
later texts usually use interpretations by Duns Scotus (iuxta mentem
Joannis Duns Scoti).26 There is also a significant number of works
that deal in some of the logical issues or some parts of Aristotles
Organon, usually written in the form of treatises.
As a conclusion on the form of writings in the field of logic, we can
say that the ones written in the Orient and the ones by Bosniac authors
are identical to the works written in the West.
Those are primarily, so called, independent works, dierent in size,
but similar in contents, as they include all traditional issues, whether
in form of compendium: muhtas. ar; summa (summula): gami # or simply logica

(ars logica): man.tiq (#ilm al-mant.iq), then commentarius: sarh. ; glosse (nota
seu glossa marginalis): h. asiya and, eventually, tractatus: risala, whether it
relates to narrowly defined logical issues or general logic, but usually
shorter in form.
24 Among his works in the field of logic are also Summulae de Dialectica, Consequentiae
and Sophismata. See: Ernest A. Moody, Srednjovjekovna logika, pp. 5777 and
adequate literature.
25 Besides the literature listed above, a very comprehensive bibliography of medieval
editions in the field of logic with selection of original texts from dierent periods is
given by I.M. Bochenski, in Formale Logik, FreiburgMnchen, 1956. (In English, History
of Formal Logic, Notre Dame, Ind., 1961.)
26 A typical work of this type is the one by Andrija KacicMiosic (see footnote 20).
As a result of comprehensive insight into the overall creative work in

the field of logic in Arabic springing out of a broad geographic area,
and over a long period in timebased on direct or indirect analysis of
important pieces of oriental manuscripts in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and abroad, or through works of bibliographical character included
in the list of sources and literaturethere is an interesting feature in
Arabic logic.
Dierent from the inventory of the logical heritage in the West,
proportionate to the complete number of works in logic, this signifi-
cantly smaller number of treatises is related to any specific logical issue,
such as discussions on universal terms, or categories, separate texts on
so called syllogistic skills, on places (loci communes), and texts in
rhetoric, poetic and sophisticsomewhat excluding dialectics.27
Based on the knowledge of trends in the history of Arabic logic,
it could be concluded that this phenomenon is a consequence of two
main events.
Firstly, the acceptance of Ibn Snas orientation and his recommen-
dation that the book written for the needs of logic should be a self-
sucient discussion or handbook,28 i.e. the one that would include
all logical issues. Anticipating possible negative consequences that such
orientation could bring to logic, Ibn Haldun saw the fault of his con-

temporary logicians in observing logic in this way, and in discarding
books and methods of old authors as if they were never there, and
they are full of results and useful remarks.29
Secondly, there is the historical fact that the Ottoman Empire ac-
cepted printing later than the West (18th century) and the main issue
was supplying for the demand of textbooks and adequate commen-
taries, since schools were the main front where logic was studied. This
issue can be more clear through the comparison of data from Summulae
Logicales by Peter of Spain who had more than 150 editions only in the
15th and 16th century,30 while A Commentary on Isagogue by Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade al-Mostar (Mustafa Ejubovic) was printed more than 200
years after it was written, in 1898 in Istanbul. Or an even better illus-
tration is the work by al-Abhar, Is agug, with its translation into Latin
27 See chapter 3.
28 Nicholas Rescher, Arapska logika, in: Historija logike, p. 51.
29 Ibn Haldun, Muqaddima, pp. 491492.
30 logike, p. 62.
Historija
152 chapter four
printed in 1625,31 while its Arabic original was printed more than two
centuries later, and more than six centuries after it was originally writ-
ten. Understandably, a large number of manuscripts in logic were used
as textbooks in many schools, and a smaller number of still preserved
writings, such as The New Commentary on the Sun Treatise by Mus.t.afa Yuyo
Ayyub-zade, oer a subtle analysis of logical issues and open a range
of interesting and important issues.
As for the internal structure of works written in the West, it varies
in dierent types of works, and there are certain dierences among
works of the same type, even those that treat the whole issue of logic
in the form of a textbook. Truly, deviations from the standard order
are usually a result of the commitment of authors to treat one issue
while anticipating the other, and giving more details on it than in
the place where it logically belongs (e.g. universalia or predicabilia),
to treat it once more by separate disputatio or dissertatio after having
treated all other issues. However, most of these works have the uniform
organization of issues treated.
Works dating from an earlier period, such as Introductiones in Logicam
by William Sherwood (13th century), are usually divided into six chap-
ters: On predicabilia, On judgment, On syllogism, On dialecti-
cal topics, On logical fallacy and On features of terms.32
Summulae Logicales by Peter of Spain has almost the same contents
as Sherwoods work, it only includes an additional chapter On cate-
gories, and the last chapter, On features of terms, is given separately,
as an item also consisting of six chapters.33
In the period that follows it becomes common practice to divide
works of logic into three parts (liber, caput, pars) after the introduc-
tion (incipit, praeludium, prologus) that discusses the issue of the nature
of logic (De natura Logices), and answers the following questions: Num
Logica sit scientia: practicaspeculativa; Quodnam sit Logices obiec-
tum; and other issues relevant for the definition of logic. Depending on
the answers to given questions, the division principle is derived from the
threefold way in which the intellect works (de triplici mentis opera-
tione). So the first book On terms (De terminis) is related to all those log-
31 The Latin title of this work is Isagoga i.e. breve introductorium arab. in scientiam logices,
cum vers. lat. ed. R.P. Fr. Thomas Novariensis (Roma, 1625).
The data found in literature could not be checked. See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I,
608611 (464465) and S I, 839844.
32 See: Historija logike, p. 62.
33 Ibid.
ical issues linked to perception of the intellect, the second On judging (De
iudicio), to judging and the third On rationing (De ratiocinio or De rati-
ocinatio) when the intellect moves from the known to the unknown,
when it rations.
Besides this, more comprehensive works, especially those written in
the 18th century and later, include an addition titled Methodologia (or
Logica est Methodologia).
This elementary division into sections (sectio, disertatio), the number
of which depended on the authors vision of how far systematization
should go for specific needs, treats the comprehensive issue of formal
logic.
An illustrative example of division can be found among works of
Croatian Latinists: Kacics Elementa peripathetica and Traditiones in univer-
sam AristotelicoScoticam philosophiam by Filip Lastric (17001783) from
Ocevlje near Breza, whose manuscript was preserved in the Francis-
can Library of Kraljeva Sutjeska.34 In his work on logic, Lastric said
about the first book: Quid et quotuplex sit terminus seu prima men-
tis operatio, on the second: De hist quae ad secundum operationem
intellectus specant and on the third: De his quae ad tertiam mentis
specant. In further discussion, Lastric, with evident sensibility to logic
and systematization simply dissolves the logical problems he encoun-
ters.
This is one of the problems that we can use as an example. The
first part that consists of ten disputations (disputatio), the seventh is
devoted to species (De specie, secundo praedicabili), and divided into
four sections:
(1) An species bene definiatur a Porphirio,
(2) Per quodnam constituatur species in esse universalis,
(3) An individuum bene definiatur a Porphirio et
(4) An ab omnibus individuis possit abstrahi aliqua ratio communis.35
34 Ms. 12B. See: Serafin Hrka c, Filozofijski rukopisi na latinskom jeziku Franjevacke
biblioteke u Kraljevoj Sutjesci, Prilozi, Zagreb, 1978, nr. 78, pp. 257288. Also see:
Andrija Zirdum, Lastricev rukopis Universa aristotelico-scotica Philosophia , Jukic,
III, Sarajevo, 1973, pp. 8798. This collection holds other texts interesting for related
studies.
Also see S. Hrkacs text titled Fojnicki filozofski rukopisi na latinskom jeziku
(Philosophical manuscripts in Latin from Fojnica), Prilozi, Zagreb, 1982, nr. 15
16, pp. 125166, and especially Tractatus logicae totiusque philosophiae cursus (Ms. xxx),
manuscript by Friar Andrija Kotorvarosanin (Kotoranin).
35 S. Hrkac, Filozofijski rukopisi, p. 265.
154 chapter four
After a careful insight into these works, it can be seen that the sub-
ject of the first book is the contents of Porphyrys Eisagog and Aristotles
Categories, while the second book treats Aristotles On Interpretation. The
two volumes together make so called Logica vetus, and the third volume
is Logica nova, Aristotles Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics and On Sophis-
tic Refutations.
When the form and contents of these works are compared with
works such as New Commentary by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade i and
Commentary on The Sun Treatise by Muhammad . b. Musa al-Bosnaw
#Allamak (Muhamed Music), especially comparing their tables of con-
tents, it can be said that the construction of logical works, organiza-
tion, sequence, and, mostly, comprehensiveness of the issues treated, is
very similar among the authors whose works are treated here, and that
some of the works are almost identical with the ones written in the
corresponding period in Western Europe. The logical material organi-
zation principle that is the axes of the logical system, the system that
has its foundations, its internal order linking dierent issues, and its
goal, was one of the main factors that made the logical body of writ-
ings keep its firmness and coherence, and to keep Aristotles logic as
the main logical system of human knowledge36 and to preserve its
scientific and practical value, regardless of the new, non-Aristotelian
systems of logic.
Defining the logic and identification of its place in philosophy and
system of disciplines was significantly aected by the definition of phi-
losophy and the philosophical system. As the systems dier from one
anotherand the system of philosophy is the generality of disciplines
and disciplines are specificities and individualities of the system37
there are dierences in understanding individual disciplines. Depen-
dence on the definition of logic on the definition of philosophy, as
seen by Arabic-Islamic philosophers, was very precisely explained by
Ibn Sna in the fragment we quoted before.38 It is evident that Ara-
bic logicians define logic as, above all, an instrument (ala), canonic (al-
qanuniyya), a measurement of science (mi#yar al-#ulumword kanun primar-
ily means a straight cane that can be used to measure everything else),39
sic, Aristotelov Organon (foreword to: Aristotel, Organon, Kultura, Bel-

36 B. Se
grade, 1965), XVII.

37 Branko Bosnjak, Sistematika filozofije, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1977, p. 12.
38 See chapter 3.
39 Kanon (Greek: ), originally, reed, cane, or any device used for measuring
as universal propaedeutics, but they do not deny that it is a part of

philosophy.
Thus, the solution to this issue, that was a subject of century long
discussions, is used by logicians of the Arabic school as a foundation
for a form of syncretism that unites the teaching and division of philos-
ophy in Platos Academy and Aristotles systematization, views of sto-
ics and peripateticians. This syncretism is not based on non-critically
linking the definitions of logic from two dierent systems but on the
eorts to reserve space for logic in any kind of classification of disci-
plines, even those classifications that implied limitations and promoted
disdain towards disciplines, such as logic, that through their origin or
instruments belonged to so-called foreign disciplines.
The lack of unity in the definition of place in the system of disciplines
and the systematization of philosophy will be one of the features in the
history of European logic, from early scholastics and one of the first
attempts to systematize philosophy done by Hugo of St. Victor (1096
1141),40 until modern philosophy. Most of the modern interpretations
of Aristotle define the relation between philosophy and logic as the
relation of tools to the material on which the tools are used, regardless
of the fact that they are the very tools derived from the definition of the
thing that is the object of thinking.41 The period treated here is specific
for defining logic as a part of philosophy, whether it was clasified within
philosophy as theoretical, practical or instrumental,42 while another
important characteristic is that logic was considered conditio sine qua
non of philosophy and science in general.
This presentation shows that the subjects that logic is concerned with
are conception and judging and that its final goal is rationing. So the very
essence of logic is the term that caused disputes, especially evident
in scholastics that influenced the further development of logic and
philosophy in general, such as the dispute on the nature of universal
terms, and the issues whether general terms really exist, in themselves
and before reality, or are they subjective constructions that exist only
in words and thoughts. This temptation resulted in the development
of realism (the extreme, that sees the general as existing before and
in general; later, rule, law, norm. Enciklopedija leksikografskog zavoda FNRJ [Encyclopae-
dia of the Lexicographic institute of Yugoslavia], Vol. 4, p. 106.
40 See: B. Bosnjak, Sistematika, pp. 5557.
41 Ibid, p. 72.
42 Ibid, 43.
156 chapter four
independent of the individual things, and the moderate, which sees it

existing in things) and nominalism, that states that only the individual
exists, while the general is given only in terms (moderate nominalism
or conceptualism) or that it is but a wordempty sound (flatus vocis
extreme conceptualism).
Although these disputes among Arabic logicians did not reach the
momentum and extent that they had in the West, Arabic logicians and
interpreters of Aristotles works, especially Ibn Sna, with his moderate
realism, being not far away from moderate nominalism,43 made great
influence on a number of philosophers, among them the ones very
important for the future development of this issue, Thomas Aquinas
and Duns Scotus, as well as Pierre Ablard and William Occam.44
A. Bazala gave very illustrative examples of the influence of Arabic
logicians and Arabic psychology leaning towards the empiric on Duns
Scotus, that was passed on to other philosophers and logicians from
the later period, especially onto Andrija Kacic.45 The importance of
this influence is more evident when we know that the Franciscans,
and not only them, used the works of Duns Scotus, whom they called
doctor subtilis, as a model. This influence can be seen through the
presentation of Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade, who paid a lot of attention to this
issue, and who was (similar to other Bosniac authors) under a great
influence of Ibn Sna.
As it is evident from the third chapter, he first posed the issue of
terms and things, and the question of their relation and existence, and
based his answers on Ibn Snas theory of ideas. Ideas have their pre-
empirical existence in active intelligence, the potential existence in
individual objects, and the psychological existence in spirit. As long as it
exists in active intelligence, the idea is neither universal nor individual,
as both are accidents that happen. The relation of ideas to individual
objects is defined by their extension (applicability) that is defined by
genus (gins), conditioning forming ideas in our minds. This leads to the
conclusion that the general term (genusgins) can be: natural (t.ab#),
intellectual or psychological (#aql) and logical (mant.iq). The first exists before

43 Cedomil Veljacic, Filozofija istocnih naroda [Philosophy of Eastern peoples], II, Za-
greb, 1979, p. 67.
44 See: B. Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela do renesanse [Philosophy from Aristotle to the
Renaissance], pp. 107111 and 114115, and: W. Windelband, Povijest filozofije [History of
philosophy], I, pp. 334347, 351, 374375, 390392.
45 A. Bazala, Ka ciceva Elementa periphatetica , Prilozi, Zagreb, 1976, br. 34,
pp. 191220.
things (qabla), the second within things (f or ma#a) and the third after
things (ba#da). Things, parallel to this, also exist in three ways: actual
existence, spiritual or intentional existence (primary or secondary) and existence
in words.
In the interpretation of this issue given by Duns Scotus and followed
by a number of Croatian Latinists, there is the general term ante rem
(before things), in re (within things) and post rem (after things), and the
existence of things can be threefold: essendi, intelligendi (primae intentio-
nis et secundae intentionisterms established by Ibn Sna) and signifi-
candi.
Albert Bazala shows the extent to which Andrija Kacic follows Sco-
tuss solutions in his work, and giving a summary of Kacics presenta-
tion, says:
The universal, therefore, is not non entia, but it is, on the one hand,
based on things, and on the other, a creation of mind: Intellectus facit
universalitatem in re, ergo est illa in re non in intellectu. They are therefore
eective ab intelectu, but materialiter, originaliter or occasionaliter a proprietate
rei, and never figmenta.
Further on, A. Bazala shows that the presentation of this issue and its
solution was based on the theory of cognition in which D. Scotus was
also under the influence of Arabic thinkers.46
The similarity of these teachings, understood in the context of mod-
erate realism, is best seen from the fact that the basic dierence in
solving this issue is in terminology: the Arabic and the Latin one, as
can be seen from the examples given above.
Similarity (or identicalness) continues in the part that discusses the
dierent divisions of terms and words, from elementary division (by
Arabic logicians to spoken and unspoken words, and by Latinists
to vocal wordsverbum vocale and those that flow in thoughts
verbum mentale); division into simple and complex, general and special;
division into univocal, equivoque and analogous, to division into verbs
and nouns, and other divisions.
In the context of these divisions, it should be said that Bosniac
logicians who wrote in Arabic, write about words that can stand
within judgments as subjects and predicates, and those that cannot,
not making terminological dierence between so called categorematic and
46 Ibid, pp. 195196.

Also see: B. Bosnjak, Filozofija od Aristotela, p. 114.
158 chapter four
syncategorematic signs, while this issue is not discussed so elaborately as it

is done in the West.
Along with this discussion, and linked to the teaching on meaning
(significatio), the West developed the theory of the supposition of terms.
Analyzing texts of Bosniac authors in Arabic and paying attention
to those standpoints that could be related to the supposition of terms
along with the established teaching on meaning (dalala), we paid special
attention to those standpoints that are related to the use of terms on
dierent semantic levels, and the necessity to dierentiate among them.
In logical terminology it means that a term (having in mind the division
of categorematic terms to terms of the first and the second intention)
of the first intention can be used as the subject on one judgment
whose predicate is the term of the second intention. Examples of these
judgements are: man is genus and man is a reasonable being, that
use predicate in logical meaning (logical supposition) in the first, and in
actual meaning (real supposition) in the second case. Bosniac authors
often point out the type of sophistic syllogism that is made by using
premisses of dierent forms or suppositions.47
Along with a number of statements related to this issue, and pre-
sented in the context of discussions on judgments or rationing (on the
quantification of subject and predicate, tense interpretation, etc.), this
would be an element given by Bosniac logicians in the teaching on sup-
position of terms. Evidently, this is not systematized, and this issue was
not treated with the same attention as in Europe and as by Croatian
Latinists. This is understandable, as this was a theory established in
mid-18th century, in the teachings of Peter of Spain and his followers,
whose results Arabic logicians were not aware of. This confirms the
correctness of N. Reschers statement that many of famous novelties
of medieval Latin logic, are, actually, borrowed or are a development
of borrowed Arabic ideas (e.g. the dierentiation of dierent modes of
suppositio and the dierentiation of modalities de dicto and de re).48
Directly linked to the teaching on terms that are used to state some-
thing in a judgment, and on general terms, is the teaching on the most
general marks of beings or categories. As the structure of works in the
field of logic in Arabic by Bosniac authors shows (we already empha-
sized that in the third chapter), they, as well as other later logicians

. hi
af al-Aq . s.a r, Izabrani spisi, p. 83. and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyu-
agug, p. 77.
h. Is
b-zade, Sar
48 Nicholas Rescher, Arapska logika in: Historija logike, p. 55.
of this school pay little attention to discussion on categories. This was

influenced by Ibn Snas attitudes, whose Kitab as-sifa" presents a short
but interesting thesis (several centuries before Hamilton and Zeller
as pointed out by I. Madkour),49 that the subject of Aristotles Cate-
gories is essentially of metaphysical character, that Aristotle discusses
it under the influence of the metaphysical term of being and its fea-
tures, and that categories as such belong primarily to Metaphysics with
which they make a unity, in the way that Porphyrys Isagogue makes a
unity with Organon. This certainly does not mean that logicians should
study categories, but that their place is not in the books of logic as,
in order to fully comprehend this issue, it is necessary to research it by
an inductive method within metaphysics.50
In his second work, Kitab al-isarat, that had great influence on
Bosniac authors as well, Ibn Sna supports his thesis from as-sifa", and
does not work with categories. Therefore, the whole theory on cate-
gories as interpreted by Bosniac authors, in somewhat more compre-
hensive works and commentaries, gives only the definition of categories
that is the same in the works of all the authors (that categories are the
highest termsgenus with no higher genus, that cannot be defined in
accordance with the definition, and that there are ten of them)51 in the
context of discussion on general terms: genus and species. However, even
the small amount that was said shows two dependent spots and connec-
tion between logic and metaphysics (ontology), and logic and language,
which will be the subject of the next chapter.
The treatment of categories as a logical issue is significantly dierent
in the West in the period that interests us. Although there were dis-
putes on whether categories should be treated by logic or metaphysics,
i.e. ontology, and although a number of authorities, from the 13th cen-
tury logicians, such as W. Sherwood,52 to modern logicians, denied the
need for their existence as a direct subject of logical research (even their
authenticity was denied), the generally prevailing determination was to
treat categories as a part of logic. These texts, as well, regardless of
the dierent number and types of categories that certain authors pre-
sented or decided upon, criticisms of certain categories, whether justi-
49 I. Madkour, LOrganon, p. 79.

50 Kitab as-sifa" Some interesting chapters from this work in French translation
were taken over by I. Madkour in: LOrganon, pp. 7981.
51 See chapter 3, footnote nr. 78.
52 Ernest A. Moody, Srednjovjekovna logika [Medieval logic], in: Historija logike,
p. 62, especially bibliography accompanying this text on page 192.

160 chapter four
fied or unjustified, Aristotles teaching on the elementary determinants

of reasoning and being, his lingual-logical-metaphysical approach to the
issue, will remain an important feature of logic, from his direct follow-
ers, through Arabic logicians, to modern researches.
According to the logicians of the Arabic school, the most important
part and the objective of the part of logic linked to the research of
terms, was the theory of definition, which was the starting point of the
theory of science and the method of cognition. The previous chapter
showed how to define definition and description, and how Bosniac logi-
cians classified definition and description, and the kinds of definition
that are treated specially (given its capabilities in scientific research and
reasoning). An important feature of this theory, in relation to the theory
of definition and division in the West, is that Arabic logicians were fully
consistent followers of Aristotles teaching on definition, adding to it
Galenuss definition of description, a procedure that can be used in the
case when it is impossible to construct a definition in accordance with
the rules. Aristotles research of definition (horisms) was based on the
criticism of Socrates induction and Platos division53 and the analysis of
the ways in which a predicate can be connected with a subject. Bosnian
logicians literally took over Aristotles definition of definition and gave it
utmost importance because it can be used as a premiss or as a part of a
premiss in reasoning. Therefore, the definition is given more space than
division in contrast to those from other texts written in Europe in the
corresponding period. More accurately, the works of Bosniac authors in
Arabic, as well as the works of other authors of the same school, do not
contain chapters devoted to division as a logical procedure and its pos-
sibilities, but the elements of division can be seen in chapters analyzing
universal terms, such as genus, species and dierence.
The previous chapter on the elements of teaching on judgment by
Bosniac logicians shows the most important similarities and dierences
between the teachings of the Arabic school and the teaching developed
in Europe in the Middle Ages and later. This chapter will disclose only
some of the issues that attracted attention in the later development of
logic in the West and played an important role in establishing devel-
oped logic of judgments and mathematical logic (logistics).
One of the issues that form the backbone of logic is the issue of
implication, or the combination of two judgments in one hypotheti-
53 See: Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, vol. II, especially chapters 5 and 6.

cal judgment, where the truthfulness of one implies the truthfulness of

the other. The works of Bosniac authors do not contain chapters that
would systematically discuss this complete issue, so we cannot speak of
a developed theory of implication, or separate discussions that compre-
hensively treat this issue, as the ones led in the West that were usually
titled De Consequentiis.54 However, the main conditions of truthfulness or
the rules of consequence, influenced by Ibn Snas texts are formu-
lated in chapters related to disputes on judgment and syllogism.
Following Ibn Snas example, in the part treating non-categorical
syllogisms, i.e. syllogisms where at least one premiss is a conditional
judgment (depending on the conjunction in the sentence: disjunctive or
conjunctive), special attention is paid to implication, conjunction and
disjunction. The texts by Ibn Sna are based on some statements (sev-
eral of them) presented by Aristotle,55 as well as on some statements
by his students, Theophrastes and Eudemus,56 and on some developed
definitions from the logic of judgments in the teachings of Megaric
and Stoic schools whose results, according to A.-M. Goichon, he used
through the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias.57 Detailed dis-
cussion on non-categorical judgments by some Bosniac authors, espe-
cially in the New Commentary by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade i,58 prove
that, despite the strong and indisputable influence of the first teacher,
they were aware of the significance of complex judgments and they paid
evident attention to the logic of judgments.
This should be accompanied by other teachings that logic of judg-
ments directly depends on, such as the logic of modalities (as well as the
modalities of judgments and the modalities of syllogisms), whose development
in the West, Ernest A. Moody claims, was a consequence of the fact
that 13th century philosophers and theologians had special interest in
modal arguments, partly because those arguments were often used by
Avicenna and Averroes.59 We should also mention teachings on the
54 Ernest A. Moody, Srednjovjekovna logika, p. 72.

55 The most frequent quotation in this context is:
When two events are interrelated so that if one is true, the other is necessarily
true, if the other does not exist, the first does not exist either. (Aristotle, Organon,
Introduction, p. XXII.)
56 Compare: Czeslav Lejewski, Anti cka logika, in: Historija logike, pp. 2425.
57 Ibn Sn
a, Livre des directives et remarques (Kitab al-isa rat wa al-tanbhat), trad. A.-
M. Goichon, BeyrouthParis, 1951, pp. 215217, esp. page 251, footnote 4.
58 See chapter 2.
59 Ernest A. Moody, Srednjovjekovna logika, p. 73.
162 chapter four
negative term (ma#dul) and its function in armative and negative judg-
ment, quantification of predicates of categorical judgments, etc.
The third chapter shows that the logicians whose texts are the focus
of this paper, leaning on the Arabic tradition, point out three types of
indirect reasoning: deduction, induction and analogy. Understandably,
they used the term deduction to denote syllogism that is, for them as
well as for Aristotle, the ideal form of reasoning. This chapter also
discloses basic similarities and dierences in the interpretation of this
matter, guided only by the issue itself. The presentation shows how
much trust in the force of syllogism and faith in its perfection logicians
of this school had. What they were able to do themselves in the field
of syllogistics were certain simplifications, by accepting the practice to
illustrate syllogisms not only through examples but through schemes
and attempts to express them as naturally as possible. This was the
main characteristic of the eorts in the field of syllogistics in the West.
In comparison to the teachings in the West, a prominent feature of
the later Arabic schools logicians was that the fourth figure was legit-
imized and that almost all texts treat it in the full, with all modes,
although most of them point out its unnaturalness, and even its
needlessness. The fact that Ibn Snas works, including the most fre-
quently quoted one, Kitab al-isarat, did not recognize the validity of
the fourth figure, and did not mention it, even if Ibn Sna was aware
of its possibilities. As a starting point of dierentiation among figures,
Aristotle used the volume of the middle term in comparison to the
other two, that resulted in the three figures with the middle term that
can be: (1) broader than one and narrower than the other, (2) broader
than both terms, and (3) narrower than both terms.60 However, if the
dierence between the figures is made on the basis of the position of
the middle term in the premisses, which is accepted as a starting point
by Ibn Sna and other logicians of the Arabic school,61 consequently
four figures may be formed: 1. the middle term as the subject of the
60 By middle term I mean that which both is contained in another and contains
another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by the extremes (a)
that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained. Prior
Analytics, I, 4 and further. Also see: M. Cohen and E. Nagel, Uvod u logiku i naucni metod,
p. 107.
61 See: Ibn Sn a, Livre des directives, p. 197.
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r (Hasan Kafija Pruscak) says: The form that is created by
combination of two premisses is called a figure, and there are four of them. If the middle
term is the predicate of the minor premiss, and subject of the major, then it is the first
figure, and if etc.. See: Hasan Kafija Pruscak, Izabrani spisi, p. 77.
major premiss and the predicate of the minor, 2. the predicate in both
premisses, 3. the subject of both premisses, and 4. the predicate of the
major and subject of the minor premiss.
By defining the ways of figure formation this way, Arabic logicians
were completely consistent. It was impossible to identify the exact
moment when the fourth figure became the object of special interest
of Arabic logicians and when it started to be discussed in their texts,
but it was certainly so since the second half of the 13th century, when

al-Qazwns work as-Samsiyya that had strong and evident influence on
all later logicians, Bosniacs included, was published.
In contrast to such a consistent relation, one of the characteristics of
the history of logic in the West, especially in the period between the
medieval scholastic logic and modern logic, according to I. Thomas,
is the well-spread incompetence for classification by figures, which
was a consequence of dierent definitions of terms (middle, major and
minor) and dierent starting points in the dierentiation of figures.62
As for the fourth figure the situation was similar in terms of evalua-
tion and place in the texts in the field of logic. The only dierence
was that its definite acceptance and full presentation was carried out
more slowly.63 The authors who treated fourth figure syllogisms regu-
larly characterized them as badly sequenced, imperfect and unnatural,
which was the name of fourth figure syllogisms first used by Averroes,
and supported by Giacomo Zabaralla (15331589).64 And, finally, in
the context of this issue, it should be said that the studies in the com-
pared period in the West led to a number of attemptsmore or less
successfulof criticisms of Aristotles syllogism,65 while there is almost
no criticism among the followers of the Arabic schools, except some
individual attempts, not of constructive criticism of syllogism as such,
but of criticism of rational cognition and logic in general.66
The chapter that focuses on syllogism, the third chapter, where,
according to medieval western logicians, the mind works de argumen-
tatione, gives analysis of syllogisms and premisses that participate in
its formation, taking into account the certainty of the premisses, and,
62 Ivo Thomas, Interregnum, in: Historija logike, pp. 7886, esp. pages 8384.
63 Ibid, p. 84. Also see: A. Bazala, Kaciceva Elementa peripathetica, p. 210.
64 I. Thomas, Interregnum, p. 84.
65 See previously quoted texts by Ernest A. Moody and Ivo Thomas.
66 Especially severe criticism is given in Ar-radd #ala al-mantiqiyyn (Refutation of
.
Logicians) by Ibn Taymiya (died 1328), see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, pp. 125127
and S II, pp. 119126.
164 chapter four
therefore, their conclusion. In the case of Arabic logicians, this resulted

in a fivefold division of syllogistics into the five skills (as.-s.ina#at al-
hams): apodictic or demonstration (al-burhan), dialectic (al-gadal), rhetoric (al-
hit.a ba), poetic (as-si#r) and sophistic (safsat.amuga lat.a). The texts in the

field of logic that were the object of our analysis pay less attention to
syllogistic skills, except, understandably, to apodictic (they mostly give
only definitions, main characteristics and examples), as Arabic school
logicians see them as skills that do not necessarily lead to scientific
knowledge, but only probable knowledge, opinion, or completely wrong
ideas. Therefore, apodictic belongs to logic, philosophy and science,
while dialectic, rhetoric and poetic do notthey are, in terms of sci-
ence, inferior in comparison to demonstration, and can be in function
of theology, laws, morals, or as tools for practicing adducing proofs
or disputation.67
West-European philosophical and logical tradition has a similar way
of evaluating apodictic proof (demonstration) in comparison to the
dialectic one in its original Aristotelian meaning. It must be men-
tioned that European tradition, under the influence of scholastic tra-
dition, understood dialectic as formal logic.68 Therefore, this relation
(of apodictic and dialectic) can be observed within textbooks on logic,
especially in those parts that treat the proof by the evident and in
those that treat the probable, dialectic proofs. Such parts are usually
called Topics according to Aristotles work (or teaching on loci com-
munes), and according to works in rhetoric as a separate discipline.
Apodictic syllogism which certainly expresses some irreplaceable link,
usually has the same status as in the works by Arabic logicians, while
there were some dierent standpoints regarding dialectic, rhetoric and
poetic syllogism, their potentials and rhetoric in general and its philo-
sophical legitimacy.
Scholastic was dominated by the standpoint that is almost the same
as the standpoint of Arabic logicians on validation, while in the mid-
15th century, in the writings by Lorenzo Valle (14071457), P.S. Me-
lanchton (14971560) and, especially, Pierre de la Rame (Peter Ramus,
15151572), the tendency of the third particle of trivium, rhetoric, to
take over some of the functions of logic and generally dierent vali-
dation of philosophical function or rhetorical thinking and speech was
67 See chapter 3.
68 See: B. Bosnjak, Sistematika filozofije, p. 57 and further.
more present.69 These tendencies that were a part of general humanis-

tic trends, led to the development of rhetoric in the direction initiated
by Cicero and Quintilian. However, criticisms of these standpoints on
pure logic and syllogistics became evident at the same time, so that
their contemporaries brought rhetorical thinking and speech back in
the area of opinion, while its task is limited to conviction. Based on such
interpretation of the function of rhetoric, the new age of thinking, such
as German idealism and English philosophy, following the example of
Descartes, will exclude rhetoric from the field of philosophy.70 This will
additionally strengthen the standpoint that rhetoric belongs to the field
of conviction and opinion, and that it can be used as tools to accept
facts rationally proved and based in demonstration.
In the context of syllogistic skills, it should be said that Arabic
school logicians were not particularly attracted to sophistic, in contrast
to the medieval logicians, some of whom were practically obsessed
with what Aristotles De Sophisticis elenchis oered as a part of the
new logic. All that the Arabic school logicians believed should be
said on this topic was presented in their writings in the field of logic,
especially in the more comprehensive works, such as New Commentary
by Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade (Mustafa Ejubovic), and in the writings
on disputation skills (#ilm a dab al-bah. t wa al-munazara).
. As a result

there is almost no separate discussion in sophistic, apart from the
preserved fragments from more comprehensive works.
And, eventually, another issue that all texts in the field of logic treat
(at least by one sentence in short texts), which is interesting to compare,
is the issue directly linked to syllogism as a scientific method, i.e. the
result of that method, scientific knowledge.
The third chapter shows how, in accordance with Ibn Snas texts,
logicians defined scientific knowledge and solved problems such as:
how to always find adequate syllogism, i.e. the middle term, whether
there are elementary premisses of scientific knowledge or not, etc. We
could also see that those solutions are but summarized statements from
Aristotles works in the field of logic and other fields in which the first
teacher established the basic general principle, to be the one (unity
69 See: I. Thomas, o.c., as well as Ernesto Grassi, Filozofija i retorika. Pripada li
Frane Petric specificnoj humanistickoj tradiciji, Prilozi, Zagreb, 1983, nr. 12 (17
18), pp. 3961, esp. 46. Also see: Damir Barbaric, Znacenje Sveucilista u Padovi za
obrazovanje nasih humanista, Prilozi, Zagreb, 1983, nr. 12 (1718), pp. 151160,
esp. 152.
70 E. Grassi, Filozofija i retorika, p. 56.
166 chapter four
of plurality), i.e. the principle of identity when it is said that there has
to be unique and identical in plurality.71 Therefore, according to
Aristotle, in order to deduct a syllogism, or in order to acquire scientific
knowledge, it is necessary to have the unity or identity of the plurality
of things. Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r (Hasan Kafija Pruscak), for example,
at the very beginning of his text in logic says: Each discipline has the
unity that defines the aspect of plurality72 Similar attitude is evident
in the writings of other authors as well.
This understanding of science, logic and its laws, or bivalent logic
as theory of scientific thinkingdespite the fact that Aristotle him-
self revealed a dierent perspective (in relation to possibility) that
was also present in the Arabic school of logicremained the foun-
dations of West-European logical thinking until the year 1920, when
Jan Lukasiewicz discovered the principles of trivalent logic.73 Therefore,
it is easy to understand why the European logical tradition had the
same approach, whether the subject is treated within some texts in the
field of logic (usually in separate chapters called De modo sciendi or
something similar) or it is treated in some writings of general character.
The fact that authors from Bosnia, both the ones who wrote in Arabic
and those who were educated at the universities of Western Europe,
dealt with the same problems, and that their answers to these ques-
tions were similar, can be illustrated by extracts from writings by Juraj
of Dubrovnik Peripateticae disputationes and New Commentary by Mus.t.afa
Yuyo Ayyub-zade.
In the first disputation, Juraj of Dubrovnik treats the issue of defin-
ing the term subjectum scientiae (in Ejubovics work, mawd. u # al- #ilm has
the same meaning). Juraj of Dubrovnik pointed out that the subject of
science should be defined as one, otherwise science would not draw
its uniqueness from it, and that it should be univocal. The sub-
ject of science should denote that it is and what it is; it has to exist
in the nature of things, or at least there should be no opposition that
it would eventually exist (the issue here is de naturalis philosophiae
subjecto, A.L.). Eventually, a science should, through its subject, dif-
ferentiate from other sciences. He concludes: The subject of science
is the primary intention of science; its causes, action and types are dis-

72 Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf, fol. 2a (Izabrani spisi, p. 61).
73 sic, Osnovi logike, 4th
Bogdan Se edition, Belgrade, 1974, p. 370.
cussed by the science and it is where the science gets its uniqueness and
distinction.74
As shown in the previous chapter, Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade in
his New Commentary treats the subject of science in a similar way.
A science should be defined, and that means that its subject should
be defined precisely, e.g. dierent from others by a specific dier-
ence (fas.l al-qarbdierentia specifica), and that it should be defined
uniquely (amr wahid).
. The example taken here is the science of nature
(#ilm tab#) where the subject is absolutely unique, and that it is, accord-

ing to Ibn Snas definition, a changeable body (gism qabil li at-tagyr).75
Juraj of Dubrovnik treats the science of nature in the same way, and
among res sensibiles (sensible things), ens mobile (changeable being) and
corpus mobile (changeable body), chooses changeable body as the adequate
subject of science of nature. According to M. Brida, this idea was taken
over from the teachings of Avicenna and al-Gaz . al, through Albertus
Magnus, Aegidius, and others.76
This chapter presented some general views on the important issues

that can help us asses relations, similarities and dierences among
the works by Bosniac authors and the ones by writers that belong
to Aristotelian tradition in Western Europe. Examples similar to, or
even more typical than the ones given here, especially the definitions
of certain logical issues, classifications, and other, are numerous, and
would go beyond the framework of this paper. The examples given
here, together with the previous chapter, are sucient to conclude
that, besides some dierences, such as the dierent level of readiness
to leave Aristotles footsteps, the history of logic is unique and it goes
in two dierent paths, two languages and two cultural and civilization
circles, but in the same direction. The path that follows the traditions
of West European thinking is mainly written in Latin; only later did
they begin writing in local languages, and to a much lesser extent. The
other, based on Arabic-Islamic cultural and historical heritage, even
despite the exceptional results oered by the great names of Arabic
philosophy and logic, such as al-Farab, Ibn Rusd, especially Ibn Sna
and others, of good predispositions such as the clarity of thought and
74 Marija Brida, Problemi djela Peripateticae disputationes Jurja Dalmatinca, Prilozi,
Zagreb, 1975, nr. 12, pp. 154155.

h. al-gadd, fol. 142 b.
75 Mustaf
76 M. Brida, Problemi djela, p. 155.
168 chapter four
expression evident in the works by authors of indisputable speculative

and researching talent, such as Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade, still remained
strictly within the framework of a completed and perfect logical
system.
The history of logic in Bosnia, observed from that aspect, the aspect
of the same (the subjects treated and solutions oered) and the dierent
(mediation, language, etc.) is an exceptional indicator of uniqueness of
the science of this region. It is unique in Europe by the specificities
of its development, the diversity of sources and experiences, the direct
meeting of political, social, philosophical and theological doctrines and
tradition and their coexistence.
chapter five
LOGIC IN THE CLASSICAL

SYSTEM OF ISLAMIC SCIENCES
On several occasions this paper, especially its first and fourth chapter,
indirectly pointed to the place and significance that logic had within
Arabic-Islamic system of disciplines, and to its possible relations with
and influence on other disciplines, as well as the influence that these
disciplines made on logic itself. However, the specific subject of logic, a
clear definition of its objectives and main concepts, that had to have an
impact on other branches of philosophy, and then on other disciplines,
deserves a more detailed treatment.1 It is certain that a book of this
volume cannot take into account all aspects of this issue, so the author
decided to give a brief presentation showing some possible ways for its
interpretation and chose to present it from two dierent angles: firstly,
by identifying the place that logic has in the system of disciplines and
education system with reference to the most important classifications,
and secondly, by defining logic and its articulation as a system and
general methodology in relation to other disciplines and sciences.
1. From philosophy as a universal discipline and a unified understand-

ing of world in which philosophy and science were mixed, dierent
disciplines with specific subjects gradually separated, at first classified
according to their cosmological or anthropological concerns in Ancient
Greece, as the consequence of a special encounter of man with the
world and his understanding of totality and its parts. Through this dif-
ferentiation and specification, philosophy itself developed. At the time
of the development of the sciences in the Arabic world, when most
of the Hellenic heritage was available in the Arabic language, Ara-
bic scholars faced the issue of the classification of disciplines. Under-
standably, this issue was not only of a formal character, although it
was sometimes approached from a purely formalist standpoint. As seen
by Arabic philosophers and scholars, who were inspired by Hellenic
1 See a very instructive work: Mikls Marth, Die Araber und die antike Wissenschafts-
theorie, E.J. Brill, London, New York, Kln, 1994, 274 p.

170 chapter five
heritage and faced with ready-made solutions oered especially in the

Aristotelian system, which was supposed to be adapted and developed
to satisfy the needs of a significantly dierent social and scientific situ-
ation, this issue was even more complex. On the one hand there was
the issue of integrating Aristotle within a system that emerged from the
conflict between Muslim scholars and Aristotles teachings, and on the
other, there was the issue of integrating certain elements of Platonism
into Aristoteliansm.2
Troughout the history of Islam, and especially in Arab history, a lot
of attention was paid to the classification of disciplines. This was the
topic of numerous studies done by Orientalists and apparently the best
results were achieved by G.C. Anawati in his Introduction la thologie
musulmane.3 These classifications were done on the basis of very dierent
criteria, such as: domesticforeign; theoreticalpractical; religious
nonreligious; traditionalrational; appreciativedamaging, etc. This
work deals only with those classifications that were present by the
mid-16th century, left the deepest impact, and were present in various
writings preceding the works by Bosniac logicians, and only with those
parts of classifications that point out the place, role and relation that
logic had to other disciplines, as observed from within the system itself.
The first significantly comprehensive classifications in the Arabic sys-
tem were done by al-Farab. Several of his works reveal his standpoint
in this context.4 We are interested in two of his classifications. The
first one, presented in Kitab at-tanbh #ala sabl as-sa #ada (The Book of
Advice on the Way to Happiness),5 divides philosophy into theoreti-
cal philosophyincluding mathematics, physics and metaphysics, and
practical philosophyincluding ethics and politics. As these basic ele-
ments show, al-Farab, according to Aristotles vision, did not include
logic, but gave it the place of a discipline that is a prerequisite for
2 See: A.-M. Goichon, La philosophie dAvicenne, pp. 753 and: C. Veljacic, Filozofija
istocnih naroda, p. 56 and further.
For a more detailed study of this issue, see works by Abdelhamid I. Sabre, professor
emeritus of the history of Arabic science, Department of the History of Science,
Harvard University, given in the bibliography.
3 Also see: G.C. Anawati, Classification des sciences et structure des Summae chez
les auteurs Musulmans, Revue des tudes islamiques, XLIV, (Paris) 1976, pp. 6170.
4 See: .. , , especially
[On topics and classification of sciences], pp. 215239.

5 Haydar
. abad, 1345/19261927.
Another classification that is presented in Risala f tah. s.l as-sa #ada, Haydarabad,
I 1345/19261927.
logic in the classical system of islamic sciences 171
approaching philosophy. In his Ih. sa" al- #ulum (Discussion on Sciences)6

al-Farab gives another, very comprehensive classification of sciences,
dividing them into five categories: 1. the science of language (with seven
disciplines), 2. logic, 3. mathematics (with seven independent disci-
plines), 4. natural sciences or physics (with eight disciplines) and divine
science, or metaphysics (with three disciplines) and 5. science of man-
aging towns (politics), jurisprudence and speculative theology (kalam).
It is interesting to mention that al-Farab sees the science of language
and logic as pedagogical sciences, suggesting the links between them
and, in the context of the relationship between logic and other disci-
plines, says that logical skills (fann) are necessary for all other spheres
of knowledge, especially those requiring punctuality, clarity, consistency
and reasoned thinking.7
Ibn Snas Risala f taqsm al- #ulum al- #aqliyya (Treatise on the Division
of the Rational Sciences),8 besides elaborating previous classifications
(Aristotles, al-Kinds and al-Farabs), gives a very intriguing classifi-
cation of rational sciences (intellectual), i.e. without religious disci-
plines,9 where he divides h. ikma (term denoting wisdom, knowledge and
philosophy) according to the classical division into theoretical or specu-
lative, where the objective is the truth, and practical, where the objec-
tive is well-being.
The theoretical group includes physics, mathematics and, as the
third discipline, metaphysics and the science of the divine, while the
practical is divided depending on whether it addresses the individual,
his way of living and his behavior (in terms of morals) or his family (in
terms of family morals) or it addresses the position of the individual in
a society and the management of state in terms of politics. Clearly it
is grounded in Aristotles division of philosophy presented in his Meta-
physics that lacks only poetical philosophy (poietik). From these grounds
Ibn Sna derives the architecture of his system, defining the relations
between the main and sub-altered sciences. For example, he classifies
6 Ih. sa" al- #ulum, al-Qahira, 1367/1948.

7 See: . . , , p. 238, and: S.H. Nasr, Sciences
et savoir en Islam, Paris, 1979, pp. 5961.
8 Treatise published within Tis # rasa"il f al-hikma wa at-tab #iyyat, al-Q
ahira, in 1326
.
(1908), pp. 104118.
9 Some literature states that Ibn Sn a did not treat religious disciplines because his
approach to theology was defined by problems, and not by areas (See e.g., N. Smailagic,
Klasicna kultura islama [Classical Culture of Islam], Zagreb, 1973, p. 113). However, its a
fact that the term al- #ulum al- #aqliyya (rational sciences) at that time was opposed to
al- #ulum an-naqliyya (traditional sciences) which included religious disciplines.
172 chapter five
physics into eight elementary disciplines with sub-disciplines. Mathe-

matics has four: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music, geome-
try is further divided into seven sub-disciplines (topography, mechan-
ics, optics, hydraulics, etc.) and so on. Again logic is not included in
the division, as Ibn Sna saw it as a prerequisite both to truth and to
well-being, i.e. it belongs both to theoretical and practical philosophy,
although some of his texts treat it as a part of theoretical philosophy
since its ultimate goal is truth.10
Ibn Snas classification can be seen later in various texts with minor
adjustments, and most frequently his order of rational sciences (al-#ulum
al-#aqliyya) is faced with the order of traditional sciences (al-#ulum an-
naqliyya): jurisprudence, speculative theology, grammar, skill in writ-
ing, poetics and prosody, and history. Such classification was usually
treated as a part of the main division to religious and non-religious
disciplines, although poetics and history were treated dierently by dif-
ferent authors.
One of the older classifications that should be mentioned here is Ibn
Halduns, which gives logic a dierent place. As the main starting point,

Ibn Haldun took the intellectual and traditional sciences. The intel-

lectual or philosophical disciplines included logic, physics or natural
science (medicine and agriculture), metaphysics and science on mea-
sures (geometry and its disciplines, arithmetic, music and astronomy),
while traditional included The Qur"an and its interpretations, tradition
. t),
(had jurisprudence (fiqh) and religious laws (sar#a), theology, sufism

and language sciences (grammar, lexicography and literature).11
In the context of the period that is the subject of this book, along
with the classifications given here, it is interesting to note the obser-
vations of Taskpr-zade (14951553), an Ottoman encyclopaedist,12 as
they reflect the systematization of disciplines in the Ottoman Empire in
the early 16th century. It is interesting that this classification is accom-
panied by a very realistic picture of the state of disciplines, and that it
does not reflect the authors own view of an ideal classification (he saw
the classification of disciplines as a discipline in itself)13 but the actual
situation and the prevailing standpoint.

11 S.H. Nasr, Sciences et savoir, pp. 6263. Also see: Ibn Haldun, Muqaddima, Sara-
jevo, 1982, selection, translation and afterword by Hasan Susic, pp. 112113 and 115117.
12 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 425426 (559562) and S II, 633634.
13 Ahmed Taskpr-z ade, Mawd. u #at al- #ulum (translated to Turkish by Kamaluddn
Muhammad),
. t. I and II, (Istanbul) 1313/18951896. Taskpr-zade saw the division of
The essence of this very extensive classification can be reduced into

the following division: (1) calligraphic science, comprised of: the alpha-
bet, orthography, writing styles, etc.; (2) oral science which includes
about thirty disciplines, including Arabic language, phonetics, lexicog-
raphy, etymology, grammar and syntax, rhetoric, prosody, poetry, stylis-
tics, history, literature, etc.; (3) rational science, such as, primarily logic
(pedagogy), disputation and dialectics, and, finally, (4) spiritual sciences
which include by far the largest number of disciplines, divided into
four subgroups: (a) theoreticalrational disciplines (metaphysics, math-
ematics and natural sciences); (b) practicalrational disciplines (ethics
and political sciences); (c) theoreticalreligious disciplines (studying
and exegesis of The Qur"an and traditional laws, speculative theology,
jurisprudence, etc.) and (d) practicalreligious disciplines.
This classification, especially the text of Mawd. u #at al- #ulum (Subjects
of Disciplines), discloses some traces of the previous classifications, but
it also shows that the number of disciplines, especially natural sciences,
was considerably lower in the Ottoman Empire, therefore their impor-
tance was also reduced. On the other hand, the status of sciences was
given to some disciplines that the previous classifications did not con-
sider scientific, such as dierent forms of fortune-telling and predicting
the future. It is also evident that the axis is pointed in two directions: on
the one hand towards theological disciplines, and on the other, towards
language studies.
As philosophy had already seen certain branches separated and es-
tablished as individual disciplines (such as physics), it could only keep
logic, methodology and general instructions or orientation of thinking,
i.e. its criticism.14
Such a situation lead to the transformation of philosophy into ancilla
theologiae, similarly as it happened in the West in the Middle Ages, and
the use of its results, reasoning and proving in function of speculative
theology, and language studies and interpretation, primarily of the
exegesis of The Qur"an, and then interpretation skills in general.
Another issue important for a better understanding of relations be-
tween logic and other disciplines is the issue of place and the role of
disciplines as a separate discipline and therefore devoted a whole separate chapter to it,
t. I, 348.
For more on this classification, see: H. Inaldzik, Osmansko Carstvo, pp. 235236.
c, Jezik i filozofija, Radio-Sarajevotreci program, XIV, (Sarajevo) 1986,
14 M. Filipovi
nr. 51, p. 33.

174 chapter five
logic in the educational system. It has already been said that logic as an
instrumental science had the role of a regular educational subject and
was a precondition for studying of any other science as early as 9th and
10th century.15 Even then the practice was to view logic, together with
the Arabic language, mathematics and some disciplines of The Qur"an,
as an elementary educational subject of propaedeutical character. In
the period dealt with here, from the 16th century on, logic was taught
in elementary religious schools as ibtida-i harig together with basic
Arabic grammar, speculative or scholastic theology (kalam), astronomy,
geometry and rhetoric.16
One of the most frequently used elementary textbooks was Isagogue
ag u g ) by al-Abhar. Alternatively, some other piece of writing was
(Is
used, for example Kafs Compendium of Logic by Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r
that he prepared for his students, as well as some short commen-
taries. Secondary schools (dahil-madresa, tatimma, etc.),17 treated logic
as a compulsory subject, and it was taught using more comprehensive
works, such as al-Katibs The Sun Treatise (ar-Risala as-samsiyya) and
some of the commentaries on this work. The highest level of education
(sahn madrasas) did not treat logic as an independent subject, but it
was studied as a part of speculative theologyapologetic.18
An especially interesting and important issue is the use of logic for
the methodology of learning, as well as inquiring into the role of logic
in the educational system, although it indeed has kept the status of
an unavoidable subject on the curriculum, and its results could have
been oered to the educational system.
This issue was treated by numerous authors, among them especially
Carl Prantl, Adam Mez, G.E. Von Grunebaum, Josef Van Ess, Hans
Daiber, C.H.M. Versteegh, Dmitri Gutas, Oliver Leaman and others,
who have conveyed and interpreted dierent historical testimonies. The
most frequently quoted sources on this matter are the works of George
Makdisi, especially The Rise of Humanism in Classical Islam and Christian
West: With Special Reference to Scholasticism.
To summarize the interesting and important results for the needs of
this paper, it can be said that . teachingtadrs, in the didactical context,
15 S.H. Nasr, Sciences et savoir, pp. 7073.

16 See: H. Inaldzik, Osmansko Carstvo, pp. 239240, and A. Ljubovic, Neke karak-
teristike proznog stvaralastva na orijentalnim jezicima [Some characteristic of the
prose literature in Oriental languages], POF, (Sarajevo), 40/1990, pp. 6378.
17 See: ibid, pp. 240245, and I.H. Uzunarsl, Osmanl tarihi, t. II, pp. 583588.
18 Ibid.
leaned upon memory. Memory, Makdisi says, played a crucial role

in the process of learning. It was a tool in the service of humanism, as
well as in that of scholasticism. Memorization involved great quantities
of materials, their understanding, and their retention through frequent
repetition at close intervals of time. When limited to mere transmission,
memorization was simply the attribute of the common man among the
men of learning, e.g. the hadith scholars, the lexicographers. Above this
rudimentary level, the humanist, like the scholastic, aimed at the higher
level of emulation. The road to creativity called for progression from
authoritative reception and transmission, riwaya, to understanding the
materials transmitted, diraya, and finally, with personal eort pushed to
its limit, itjtihad, to creating ones personal ideas, in ones own words
and, in an elegant style, expressed with eloquence.
The Arabic sources used by G. Makdisi and quoted literature give
detailed deliberations on the role of memory and learning by heart
(talqn or h. ifz)
. when studying The Qur#an and hadith and in legal stud-
ies. However, as G. Makdisi rightfully concludes, the sources say that
this method, since the time before the flourishing of the madrasa,
was recommended and used in other fields of creative thinking, from
poetry to dierent traditional religious disciplines and fields of science.
In his Muqaddima, Ibn Haldun criticizes the insistance on memoriz-

ing and giving it priority over disputation, which was the practice back
then. He says: Lentra nement convenable le plus simple, cest sans
doute lexercice de la parole dans les conversations et les dbats sci-
entifiques. Cest ainsi quon se rapproche du but et quon parvient
latteindre. Il y a des tudiants qui passent leur vie suivre des runions
savantes, mais qui se tiennent cois et ne prennent aucune part active
aux discusions. Leure aaire, cest dapprendre par curbeaucoup plus
quil est nccessaire. Mais ainsi, ils nont aucune pratique scientifique
ou pdagogique. Aprs leure tudes, ils sont incapables de converser, de
controverser et denseigner, faut de formation pdagogique convenable.
Ils peuvent bien en savoir plus long que dautre, force de sen remet-
tre leure mmoire, mais lentra nement scientifique est tout autre
chose.19
Nonetheless, such practices in teaching have remainedeven in the
Ottoman Empire and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the period treated
19 Ibn Khaldun, Discours sur lhistoire universelleAl-Muqaddima. Traduction nouvelle,
prface et notes par Vincent Monteil. Seconde dition revue. Paris (1978), tome 2,
p. 892.
176 chapter five
herelate 16th through late 19th century. This is illustrated by the

fact that lower level education used compendia (Ar. muhtas. ar) as text-

books. Numerous handwritten copies of compendia kept in archives
and libraries today are a direct result of dictations (Ar. imla #), for exam-
ple Isagogue by Atruddn al-Abhar and short commentaries of this work
h. al-Is
agug by Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf Ayyub-
(e.g. in Bosniac tradition Sar
zade al-Mostar or compendia such as Muhtas. ar al-Kaf min al-man.tiq by
hi
Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq . s.a r and others. Higher levels of education often
used the same elementary textbooks, with the addition of subtle com-
mentaries (Sar h. "ala), super-commentaries (Sar h. "ala Sar
h)
. or glos-
saries (H. asiya "ala). These commentaries and glossaries were in line
with the levels of education and anticipated the students abilities to
have disputations (Ar. munazara). . In the context of logic, the concrete
example of such work in the Bosniac tradition is the aforementioned
. asiya mufda li al-Fawa"id al-Fanaryya "ala ar-Risala f al-man.tiq the work
H
glossarizing al-Fanars commentary to al-Abhars Isagogue.
One proof of the fact that memorization played an important role in
studying certain matters in the Islamic education (which was also the
case in pre-modern education in general) are numerous manuscripts,
documents and authentic testimonies, some of which the author of
this text witnessed. Numerous works intended for education, especially
textbooks, were often written in rhymed prose or verse. In order to
make memorizing more successful, various mnemo-technical tools were
designed, such as charts of chapters and paragraphs and dierent (often
artificial and unnatural) divisions within chapters. Oftentimes in
manuscripts we can find ideally symmetrical divisions that make little
logical and scientific sensethe symmetry here was intended for the
sole purpose of easy memorization.
When we speak about logic, it is interesting to mention that in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, judging by the number of copies preserved
in the collections of manuscripts and libraries, a very popular work was
al-Sullam by "Abdurrahm . an al-Ah. dar. ,20 a 16th century author, active in
the far east of Islam, Maghrib. It is interesting to notice that this work
has only 143 verses and that it was written in ragaz, a meter considered
simple and easy to remember.
20 For example: Ms. Archive of Herzegovina in Mostar (Arhiv Hercegovine u Mos-
taru), No 14/2. Cf.: Abderrahman el-Akhdhari (sic!), Le Soullam. Trati de logique. Traduit
de larabe par J.-D. Luciani, Alger, 1921., 78 p.
When the texts belonging to the tradition of Bosnia and Herzegov-

ina written in oriental languages (biographies, memoirs, etc.) describe
prominent features of significant scholars, special focus is put on their
ability to remember and to dictate. For example, Hasan . hi-
Kaf al-Aq .
. am al "ulama # ila hatam al-anbiya" (Row of scholars to the last
s.a r in his Niz
prophet), on one of his masters masters, a well-known Hanafi jurist,
al-Sarahs Muhammad. b. Ahmad .
b. Abu Bakr Sams al-A"imma, says:

Without looking at a book or note, he dictated by heart (bolded by A.L.)
Al-Mabsu.t, a work of fifteen volumes.21
Also Ibrahm Opiyac, a student of Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf Ayyub-zade
al-Mostar, writing about his master, points out one of his especially
valuable qualities, saying he had such a good remembrance, that his
honorable memory never lost a thing he heard thirty or more years
ago from a teacher or read from a book, so he could quote it when
necessary and give the precise place where that quote could be found.
The scholars would say: You need to learn knowledge from the living
word (bolded by A.L.), because a man can best remember what he
heard and best say what he remembers. 22
Capable teachers (sing. mudarris), who will be remembered in the
tradition and whose names will be put on dierent diplomas (sing.
igaza), indicating the qualifications of the students and permitting them
to teach in a certain field, will be those who memorized an enormous
quantity of dierent information and, in addition, were able to research
and interpret fine details of certain disciplines, especially Islamic laws.
Besides this, the diplomas contained the name of the book that was
written on dictation and that the candidate masteredsometimes the
diploma would be written on the book itself.
What an individual class (dars, pl. durus) looked like can be recon-
structed based on the sources and literature.23
After compulsory innovation (Ar. basmala and h. amdala) and roll call, it
contained lecturesdictation (Ar. imla #), complemented by the teachers
deliberations on the exegesis of the text and emphasis on the issues that
21 Hasan Kafija Prusc ak, Izabrani spisi, page. 141 or Niz . am al "ulama #, manuscript,
, fol. 76 b.
22 Muhamed Muji c, Biografija Mustafe Ejubovica (Sejh Juje) [Biography of Mus-

tafa Ejubovic (Sejh Jujo)], Glasnik Vrhovnog islamskog starjesinstva [Gazette of High Islamic
Committee], Sarajevo, JanuaryMarch 1956, p. 13.
23 Esp. see: G. Makdisi, The Rise of Humanism, Chapter IV Tools of the humanist
and Chapter V The method of dictation, pp. 213216, as well as Madrasa and
Tadrs in: Encyclopaedia of Islam
178 chapter five
can and should be discussed, followed by the memorization (Ar. talqn

or h. ifz)
. process, dependent on the students abilities. The complete pro-
cess ended with disputation (Ar. munazara).
. Depending on the education
level, from elementary to advanced, the focus shifted towards disputa-
tion. The classes of the advanced level focused on disputation, giving
the teacher an opportunity to discuss fine details of the studies with his
students (it was especially so in the field of the Islamic laws) and verify
their understanding of the matter and problem-solving skills.
Logic was an important methodological tool for disputation, argu-
mentation and deducing a conclusion, together with a specially devel-
oped discipline among Arabic-Islamic sciences, named disputation
skillsadab al-bah. t (wa al-munazara).
.
24
Logic, in the sense of master-

ing the elementary principles of logical thinking and conclusion, and
the disputation skills, in the sense of mastering disputation principles
described here.25
A detailed analysis of a number of works, especially commentaries
and glossaries in dierent fields (from dogmatics, through various dis-
ciplines of the laws, to natural sciences and mathematics), concerning
the aspect of using the principles of logic and rules of disputation, could
oer a realistic picture on how much influence these disciplines had in
education and scientific disputations. This research (limited for objec-
tive reasons) suggests only these interesting phenomena and problems
of the educational system in the Ottoman Empire, and especially the
issues related to the methodology of teaching, the role of logic, and dia-
logue and disputation skills (adab al-bah. t wa al-munazara)
. in the teaching

process and the academic dialogue in general. The researchers can eas-
ily recognize the form of these texts and disputations by distinctive Fa
in qala qa#il wa qulna (naqulu, wa qultu), but seldom enter the
very analysis of interpretation and comments: phonological, morpho-
logical, syntactical, geographical, hagiographical, historical, semantic,
etc. analysis of what follows after wa naqul (wa aqulu) and eval-
uation of the methodology of interpretation, ways of giving comments
and having dialogues, regardless of the topic treated in the respective
work. This issue, especially as we speak of the Arabic-Islamic tradition
24 See more: G. Makdisi in Chapter IIV.

25 Besides quoted work by G. Makdisi, also see: Logic in classical Islamic culture, Edited
by G.E. von Grunebaum, Otto HarrassowitzWiesbaden, 1970, especially Robert
Brunschvig, Logic and Law in Classical Islam and Josef van Ess, The logical
structure of Islamic theology in: pp. 2250.
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, remains open for further research. Special

attention should be paid to the abundance of so far unused historical
sources and manuscripts.
Consequences of such treatment of logic and its stabile place in the
educational system are seen in a considerable percentage that writings
on logic have in the overall heritage of oriental manuscripts. For exam-
ple, the collection of manuscripts of the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo
contains 5,263 codices26 out of which 307 manuscripts are in the field
of logic. As seen in catalogues, the situation is similar with other collec-
tions of Oriental manuscripts.
2. All Arabic interpretations of Aristotle, especially the definitions of

logic, explain the relation between logical theory and philosophy (later
other disciplines that developed within) as the relation between tools
and the object that tools are applied on. Therefore, logic had an
instrumental, propaedeutical and preparatory character. On the other
hand, philosophy, or science in general, oered its experiences and
results for logic to build upon.
As the main task of logic (analytics), according to Aristotle, was to
perform analysis of thought as knowledge of objective reality through
analysis of language,27 and reach the scientific method of cognition,
relations between logic and philosophy or other disciplines can be
observed through two significant points: language and the demonstra-
tive method (deduction); language, because logical research of funda-
mental issues such as term, category, standpoint, judgment, conclusion,
etc. is based upon analysis of language; demonstrative method, primar-
ily because it puts syllogism in the place of the only form in which
thinking reaches scientific knowledge that has features of necessity and
absoluteness, as well as harmony between thinking and being.
Accepting Aristotles logic, which is a logic of syntax in its method-
ological approach, a logic of thinking in its contents, forms and laws,
and an ontologically grounded logic in its foundation,28 Arabic philoso-
phers and logicians had to accept a range of consequences originating
from Aristotles approach, contents and foundations, as well as relations
between logic and other disciplines in the two points given above. That
26 5,263 codices contain about 8,000 titles. Data from December 1991.
27 sic, Aristotelov OrganonForeword: Aristotel, Organon, Beograd, 1965,
B. Se
p. XII.
28 Ibid.
180 chapter five
is how some of the significant features of the Greek spirit in general

are recognizable in Arabic philosophy. For example, Aristotles defini-
tion of man as living being that has reason and speech (zoon logon ehon)
points out the important role of speech and its relation to reason. Sens-
ing this link between reason and speech, and their identicalness with
the essence of man, Arabic philosophers accepted this definition and
translated these essential terms as na.tiq (al-insan hayaw
. an nat.iq). The
immediate link between words and beings or things, which is specific
and clearly defined in Aristotles On Categories, especially in the def-
initions of categories, had its influence in Arabic logic, and expressed a
strong link between philosophy and logic.
An important feature to be underlined here is that Aristotles works
and their transfer to the Arabic world build a strong relationship within
the languagethoughtobject of thought complex, while the examination of
language forms and logical forms has always been a feature of both
Arabic and European logic.
The issue of language was primarily a philosophical issue, however,
it had great importance for logic and linguistics, especially the issue of
relationship between speech and thought. This aspect was the object of
attention of Arabic logicians, who, according to Aristotelian tradition,
defined it as an unbreakable connection, where language is a picture
of objects, notions and terms, a presentation in which thinking and
speaking are concurrent actions. Although this relation was already
described in the works by al-Farab and Ibn Sna,29 together with the
elements of logical concepts and concepts of philosophy and science in
general, it can be said that it wasnt until later that the issue of language
in the context of logic was discussed to its full extent, especially in
ga n,30 an author of the later period with great
the writings by al-Gur
influence on Bosniac logicians, especially on Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-
ga n as one of his teachers.31 His influence
zade, who considered al-Gur
was evident in the works by Bosniac authors.
The definition of language here implies that speech does not exist
without thinking, and vice versa, that the language complies to the
same rules as nature and life, and that each word and each sentence
29 See: - , ..
, , 1981, pp. 127128; and .. ,

, , 1965, p. 50 and on.
30 See: -, especially chapter: -
, pp. 127191.
31 See footnote 49, 1st chapter.
must be defined according to their meaning, their form, and the place
they have. This answered a number of questions and presented a num-
ber of problems, to philosophers and logicians, and Arabic grammari-
ans, especially at the Basra Grammar School, which accepted such an
elementary conception of language,32 and to philosophers inspired by
Hellenic traditions.
As for the Arabic logicians, especially those from a later period,
succeeding Ibn Sna, they saw this issue and its clear solution as a
necessary preposition for approaching logic in general. As much as
logic was a preparation for approaching any other discipline, Essay on
Words, as an introduction to logic, had the same role in the approach
to logical theory. Therefore, it is not possible to find a single piece of
writing on logic (unless it is a fragment of another text) that does not
have this chapter as an introduction.33
How much attention was paid to this issue is shown by the fact that
the 14th century was the time of the development of a special discipline
called #ilm al-wad. # (science on terms) that aimed at defining the rela-
tion between form and language signs, especially general terms (species,
genus, etc.) and their concrete syntactical functions.34 Even balaga (elo-
quence), as a philological discipline in the Oriental-Islamic concept,
had sub-discipline ma #an whose main task was to grant logicalness of
speech.35
The Essay on Words implied these fundamental conceptual as-
sumptions, some of which were implicated and others explicated. Here
are some of them:
1. Language is a system of signs which has not only a communicative
function, but as it is the picture of reality which plays an active role
in forming of our cognition of this reality, it also has a cognitive
function.
2. Language and thought form unbreakable unity, therefore log-
ical research can be based solely on the analysis of language
that is a manifestation of thinking. Thinking is defined as unex-
pressed speech, speech that flows within mental words (alfaz.
32 Compare: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije, p. 159 and on.

33 Compare the contents of writings in the field of logic by Bosniac authors pre-
sented in the 2nd chapter.
34 See: W. Ahlwardt, Verzeichniss der arabischen, Bd. IV, pp. 534538 and Taskpr-
zade, Mawd. u #at al- #ulum, t. I, p. 169.

35 See: M. Kaya Bilgegil, Edebiyat bilgi ve teorileri, 1 Belgat, Ankara, 1980, p. 42.
182 chapter five
mutahayyila or g ayr lafz.verbum mentale), and speech, as ex-

pressed thought that flows within spoken, vocal words (lafz.
verbum vocale).36
3. Moreover, there is a resilient link between words and beings,
which is seen from the approach to the issue of categories and its
solution, that is linguistical-logical-ontological (the utmost expres-
sions on being, each word taken without link with other words
means either substance or).37
4. This generally presented relation of the resilient link between the
object of thinking, thought and language (that sees the object of
thinking and thought universal, and language (speech) as concrete,
separate, therefore dierent), led Arabic logicians, as well as Aris-
totle and his Greek followers, to the issue of meaning and the
sense of words and sentences, leading to the following:
a) Meaning is fixed to the word (in broader sense), organically
connected as a sign and a bearer of meaning.
b) In order for a word to be a sign, it has to be a sign of
something, in other words there is no sign without meaning.
c) A sign does not have to be an articulated voice, as man
can speak in symbols or gestures and understand the signs
of nature and the signs understood by the intellect, but
the main subject of logical research that should result in a
scientific method is only the conventional spoken meaning
and the sign that belongs to it, i.e. conventional verbal sign.
d) Having in mind all the deficiencies of language expressed
above all in the manifold of relations between meaning and
sense as the necessary assumption for research and expres-
sion of logical operations and science in general, there is the
need to define the precise meaning of words and, especially,
terms, which is the immediate task of the discipline #ilm al-
wad#.
.
e) Every term of judgment is expressed by a word or a complex
wordsentence (lafz. murakkab), but not every word or sen-
tence has to express a term or judgment. Logic studies those
words and sentences that express terms and judgments.
36 See: -, especially chapter -
, pp. 178191.
37 Aristotle, Categories, 4.
f) Truthfulness and falseness are characteristics of speech and

thought, therefore the truthfulness of judgments and other
logical forms can be confirmed by equalizing it with mate-
rial reality, in existence or nonexistence of things of certain
features.
Yet another issue that should be mentioned in this context38 is the
relation of Aristotelian logic and Arabic grammar and their mutual
influences.
Modern-age literature oers solutions to this problem that can be
reduced into two theories.
Firstly, leaning on the thesis that there are two mentalities, two
cultures, two concepts of the world, and, eventually, two languages:
Arabicthe language of The Qur"an, primarily linked to theology, and
then to poetry, and Greekthe language of philosophy and logic, there
was the theory that Greek logic and Arabic grammar are incompatible,
and therefore could not possibly influence one another. A. Elamrani-
Jamal oers an exceptional analysis of this issue, quoting E. Renan
and his theory in Histoire gnrale et systme compar des langues smitiques
and Averros et laverrosme39 as a typical representative of the dogmatic
standpoint, that a priori discards the possibility of Greek influence. The
negation of all influence whatsoever is also present in the writings of
Arabic researchers, but they are, according to A. ElamraniJamal,
based on the false definition of the problem or the confusion of the
epistemological level of the problem with ideological and other levels.40
The other theory is based on the general standpoint that Greek sci-
ence not only made great influence on the development of all disci-
plines in Arabic culture, but that Arabic philosophy consisted of noth-
ing but the further development of Greek thought, and that, based on
the lexical equivalence of Greek and Arabic grammar, that the first
Arabic grammarians were indisputably influenced by Greek texts in
logic and grammar. One of the supporters of this theory was A. Merx,
38 Literature that treats this issue, given in bibliography: I. Madkour (LOrganon

dAristote, and Man.tiq Aris.tu wa an-nah. w); E. Renan (both texts); A. Merx, al-Ibras
. anis; A. Waf; R. Arnaldez (Grammaire) and, especially, A. ElamraniJamal,
at.-Taw
Logique aristotlicienne et grammaire arabe, besides oering an exceptional analysis of this
issue and review of literature, it gives a number of related classical Arabic texts. Also
interesting is the unpublished doctoral thesis by Husein Abdel Latif es-Seyyid, Muhamed
Music Allamek, especially pp. 923.
39 See: A. ElamraniJamal, Logique, p. 9.
40 Ibid.
184 chapter five
the author of Lorigine de la grammaire arabe and Historia artis grammaticae

arabe apud Syros.41 Some authors developed this hypothesis further, to
a degree which denied any aspect of originality and independence to
Arabic grammar.
Worth mentioning in this context is an interesting text by C.H.M.
Versteegh titled Greek elements in Arabic linguistic thinking,42 where the au-
thor outlines a very precise historical boundaries, dividing the matter
into two categories: calques and adaptations resulting from earlier pre-
Aristotelian contact with the living tradition of Greek grammar
and rhetoric and to calques and adaptations derived directly from the
translations of the Aristotles works.
A detailed analysis of this problem, or a dialogue with certain au-
thors and their works, is not the intention here as it, and especially
its scientific elaboration, goes beyond the topic set here. However, it
is surprising how much this matter is aected by ideological bias or
prejudice of any other nature (even in late 20th century literature).
These texts may lead to a conclusion that a science, to be worthy
the attention, has to necessarily be purely Arab or purely Islamic.
Otherwise, if they are a product of acculturation, they are of no or very
little value. J. Wansbrough, in the review of C.H.M. Versteeghs book
rightfully says: Why any one of these (referring to: fiqh, tafsr, falsafa,
and kalam, A.L.) must manifest a purely Arab science is, in the light
of the social and intellectual history of the early Islamic community,
quite beyond me, as is, indeed, the view that borrowing must be a
symptom of cultural inferiority..43
In the end, it has to be noted that the standpoints of grammar
schools of Basra and Kufa are often given among the arguments oered
in the treatment of this matter, as standpoints that reflect two dierent
outlooks and two opposing philosophical and linguistic concepts.
Although the dierences between them are often exceedingly accen-
tuated, those interpretations rightfully point out that the Basra school
defines the language as a mirror that gives faithful reflection of objects,
41 Ibid.
42 See: C.H.M. Versteegh, Greek elements in Arabic linguistic thinking, Leiden, 1977,
XI + 243 pp.
43 Cf.: J. Wansbrough, C.H.M. Versteegh: Greek elements in Arabic linguistic thinking.
(Studies in Semitic Languages and Lingustics, VII) xi, 243 pp. + errata slip. Leiden,
1977, in: Buletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 41, No 2 (1978), pp. 372
373.
events and terms.44 Proving the direct link between language and intel-
lect, strengthened by antagonism to the Kufa School, grammarians in
Basra tried to induct all the laws of language, and to bring them down
to rational and logical categories and laws, and prove that there were
no anomalies in language, but only rationally motivated aberrations.45
With these principals in mind, the grammarians of this school some-
times went to the extreme on some issues, such as searching for base
words (as.l) and defining severe paradigms for deduction. They labored
to discard those forms from the spoken language that would not fit
their structures. The question of consequences of this extreme severity,
as it is not in the nature of language to remain closed within previ-
ously defined frames and paradigms, but to be eternally revitalized and
refreshed as a part of life in general, remains open.
Such an outlook on language was formed very early, even before
the texts in logic by Arabic authors, so it is dicult to speak about
the direct influence of these texts on Arabic grammarians. However,
the influence of Aristotles On Interpretation (Peri Hermenias, or, in

Arabic, al-#Ibara) on the creation of Arabic grammatical system, at
least as inspiration for the first Arabic grammarians, is indisputable,
especially its first four chapters.46 The importance of the roles played by
Ibn al-Muqaa# (died 757 or 759), a famous grammarian and convert
from Zoroastrianism (Mazdaism), Hall (died 791),47 and his student

Sibawayh (died 786),48 in whose works Arabic grammar was given a
form of completed system, is indisputable.
The influence of logic on grammar became even more clear and evi-
dent in the later period. There was close cooperation between al-Farab
and Ibn as-Sarrag , a grammarian.49 However, it does not mean that
Arabic logicians did not comprehend the dierences between logic and
grammar. Al-Farab said: Logic has a lot in common with grammar.
However, they are dierent at the same time, as grammar gives the
44 H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije, p. 160.

45 Ibid.
46 I. Madkour Bayyumi in his Mantiq Aristu wa an-nahw al- #arab gave an excellent
. .
analysis of this problem through a historical-comparative method and arguments prov-
ing the undeniable influence of Aristotles logic on Arabic grammar.
48 See: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 99100 (101) and S I, 160, 495.
49 See: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije, pp. 163164. and C. Brockelmann,
GAL, G I, 114 (112) and S I, 174.

186 chapter five
rules of language expressions specific of one nation, while logic presents

rules of expression in all languages.50
Very vivid and developed language research activities in the first and
the second century of Islam were brought on by immediate and prac-
tical motives linked to the studying the language of The Qur"an and
its interpretation, therefore studying the language that was not only a
communication instrument but an instrument of comprehension for the
Book and addressing God. In other words, it was necessary to approach
interpreting The Qur"an, to discover its true sense. Although inter-
pretation of The Qur"an was at first seen as a dangerous activity one
should avoid, objective ideological and political circumstances influ-
enced the development of tafsr (exegesis of The Qur"an) whose devel-
opment and dierent lines of interpretation can be closely monitored.51
The development from the so called mythological tafsr, whose object
of attention were meaning and contents of stories and legends, often
added on by interpreters imagination, through interpretation based in
the so called competent knowledge source went through the lines of
competent re-tellers, achieving developed philological method, as one
of the most important methods of interpretation of The Qur"an.
Ibn al-#Abbas (died app. 686)52 is often seen as one of the founders of
the philological method in tafsr (exegesis of The Qur"an). He saw and
used his knowledge of language and poetic skills, especially that of pre-
Islamic Arabic poets, as very important elements of exegesis. However,
this method reaches its full armation in at.-Tabar
. s (838923) Tafsr al-
Qur"an (Commentary of The Qur"an).53 His philological research, along
with other methods used, oered not only exceptional grammatical dis-
cussions and invaluable lexical research sources, but also the develop-
ment of a critical method, helped solve the phenomenon of understand-
ing applicable in interpreting and comprehending texts in general.
50 Quoted from al-Farabs Ih. sa" al- #ulum, p. 18; also see: .. , -
, p. 281 and: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije, p. 164.
51 See: I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung, Leiden, 1952, pp. 155
289. Parts of this book relating to the development of exegesis and dierent interpreta-
tions are given in translation to Bosnian in: N. Smailagic, Uvod u Kur"an, Zagreb, 1975,
pp. 135183.
52 #Abdullah b. al-#Abbas, see: Encyclopaedia of Islam, and I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen
, p. 160 and on.
53 Muhammad b. Gar
. r at.-Tabar
. , see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 142, 184, 189
and S I, 789, as well as: I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen, in: N. Smailagic, Uvod u Kur"an
, pp. 141143.
In a later stage of development, along with two developed methods:

one based on the traditional chain of re-tellers leading to the earliest
reliable sources (people), and the other, philological (that included pho-
netic, grammatical-morphological, syntactical-lexical, as well as seman-
tic analysis), interpreting and commenting on The Qur"an would be
done with auxiliary disciplines. One of such disciplines was logic, as a
number of texts required fulfilling the condition of reasonableness.
This would result in a flood of commentaries (sarh), . super-commentaries and
marginalia (h . asiya). Muhammad
. b. Musa al-Bosnaw #Allamak was one
of the Bosniac authors active in writing commentaries and the applica-
tion of philological method.54
Having in mind the facts presented, especially the chronological
dimension of this issue, it could be said that grammar had more influ-
ence on theology than philosophy, or even logic, have had, in terms of
its corpus and its research.
Another point that can help us comprehend the relations between
the logical concept and philosophy and other disciplines, is deduc-
tivism. Philosophy and other disciplines benefited from logics demon-
strative method grounded in two significant facts: position of premisses
and deduction of conclusions, and clear formal conditions that granted
demonstrative and scientific cognition. Applying this general cognitive
methodological theory in the Arabic world relatively quickly led to reli-
gious doctrinaire disciplines, such as speculative theology (kalam), whose
main task was to defend the Islamic beliefs from negations, proving
dogmas through rational argumentation, and jurisprudence (fiqh), which
systematized the principles of religious, moral and social life, its founda-
tion (us.u l al-fiqh) and legal practice (furu# al-fiqh). Understandably, their
development was conditioned and accelerated by political disputes that
were often manifested in religious expressions. This historical context
is very important for comprehending basic standpoints and theses of
both disciplines. However, here we shall discuss only methodological
characteristics of these disciplines, leaving out the historical contexts.55
54 A large part of the opus of Muhammad b. M

. usa al-Bosnaw #Allamak was devoted
to exegesis of The Qur"an. He wrote six longer and shorter texts, commentaries, super-
commentaries and marginalia, and used his exceptional methodology in the field of
syntax, rhetoric, speculative theology and logic. See: Husein Abdel Latif es-Sayyid,
Muhamed Music Allamek, and footnote nr. 15 in the 2nd chapter.
55 For more on socio-historical conditions and theoretical grounds of kalam see:
L. Gardet et G.C. Anawati, Introduction la thologie musulmane. Essai de thologie compare.

188 chapter five
As early as the beginning of the 10th century, the works by Abu

Hasan
. al-As#ar56 presented kalam in a form of systems and methods that
caused a breach between the simple credo and its scientific grounds. This
does not mean that acceptance of this new discipline, and especially its
method originating from a dispute with a similar method Mu #tazilites,57
went by without arguments with old opinions, and later rigid conser-
vativism. Clashes and heated discussions would be more or less promi-
nent, but always present, in the whole history of this discipline. How-
ever, religious pragmatism and ocial theological dogmas found more
support in the discipline that used dialectical methods, however for-
eign they might be, than theological liberalism or theological view-
points or irrationalistic schools. In addition to this, al-As#ar, showing
understanding for principles supported by the schools established at
that time, succeeded to, according to L. Gardet and G.C. Anawati,
preserve some form of autonomy in relation to the various contempo-
rary legal schools in order to make all of those schools believe that he
actually belonged to them.58
As al-As#ar is considered the father of the method of speculative the-
ology, and as his work al-Ibana #an us. ul ad-diyana (Unraveling the Founda-
tions of Religion)59 presented foundations for all succeeding discussions
in this discipline, including those written by Bosniac authors, we shall
briefly discuss methodological characteristics of this work.
Al-As#ar built his argument in the way which later became one of
the scholastic methods, oering his opponents (above all Mu#tazilites)
a chance to ask him questions in order to get a position of legitimate
defense (it should be kept in mind that kalam is primarily apologetic in
character). Then, he briefly presented the viewpoints of his opponents
on certain issues, eventually, to refute them and present his own proofs,
using dierent argumentation procedures (division, classification, def-
inition, syllogism, referring to religious authoritiesargumentum ad
IIme d., Paris, 1970, especially pp. 2178. Translated into Bosnian in: N. Smailagic,
Klasicna kultura, pp. 134176.
56 Ibid, pp. 155161.
57 Followers of the school of speculative theology Mu #tazila who were the first to deal
with speculative issues and connected the dogma of Islam with dialectical methods.
For more see footnote nr. 48, pp. 150155, and: H. Corbin, Historija islamske filozofije,
pp. 121128.
58 Ibid, p. 157.
59 Al-As#ar (Ab
u al-Hasan), al-Ibana #an us. ul ad-diyana, al-Qahira (Mas.r), 1348/1929
.
1930.
verecundiam etc.). His apologetics are characterized by a very success-

ful analysis of words and their meanings and the frequent presentation
of a large number of proofs (up to ten) for some of the theses. Interest-
ingly, he introduced the expression: If it is said, then we say (fa
in qla, qultu (qulna)), which later became a form through which
Islamic scholastic diused and refuted all possible consequences of pre-
viously posed questions and their answers.
Josef van Ess identified this method as originally Greek, as well as
the term kalam. In his previously quoted text, The Logical Structure
of Islamic Theology, he says: Muslim theology; as a matter of fact,
those stereotype phrases mentioned above as common to nearly all
kalam literature, have been retraced to Greek origin as the word
kalam itself indubitably is derived from the Greek " by the
Church Fathers.60
Later theologians, especially al-Gaz al and ar-Raz, further devel-

oped this technique. Al-Gazal is considered the greatest dialectician of
the overall Arabic tradition,61 while ar-Razs theological writings con-
tain multiple arguments introduced by al-As#ar.62 The writings by these
two and some of the later authors, taking over previous positive expe-
riences, increased the number of proofs reached by methods of logic
and other disciplines, and a number of logical terms, and even some
logical laws, became their inseparable part. Ibn Haldun (13321406) in

his Muqaddima stated that at that time it was sometimes dicult to sep-
arate writings in speculative theology from those in logic, and to decide
which field they belonged to.63 These are important features of the writ-
ings in this field and were burning issues at the time when the authors
who are the subject of this paper were active, and when works, such as
g and Tahdb al-man.tiq wa al-kalam by
al-Mawaqif f #ilm al-kalam by al-I

at-Taftazan were being written.64
Logic did not have strong influence only on Ash#arite theological
schools, but on others as well. Its influence is evident in the teachings of
Mu#tazilites, although their method focused more on grammatical anal-
ysis, while dialectics, especially during the 8th and early 9th century,
60 In: Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, Edited by G.E. von Grunebaum, Otto Harras-
sowitz, Wiesbaden, 1970, p. 24.

61 See: I. Madkour, LOrganon dAristote, p. 254 and pp. 262263.
62 Ibid, pp. 254255. Also see: ar-R az (Fahruddn), Muh. as. s. al afkar al-mutaqaddimn wa
al-muta"ahhirn min al-falasifa wa al-mutakallamn, al-Qahira, 1323/1905.
63 Ibn Haldun, Muqaddima, Misr (Kairo), s.a., pp. 466467.
zik, Osmansko Carstvo, .
64 H. Inald p. 240.
190 chapter five
had more oratorical and rhetorical character.65 In his texts of religious

polemical character, Ibn Hazm . (9941064), a poly-historian, theologian
and lawyer of Cordoba, regularly used already formulated logical rules
that he accepted as an exceptional dialectical method.66
Law (fiqh) was another field under the indisputable influence of logic.
Truthfully, theology and law were so deeply interwoven in Islam that
they were not treated as separate disciplines. However, the dynamic
development of the Arabic society necessitated the faster development
of law: both in terms of theory and judicial practice. It is hard even
to list all purely logical elements (from the theory of the universal to
the use of syllogism and other forms of indirect and direct reasoning)
applied in legal theory and practice.67 This can be illustrated by two
al: Mih. akk an-nazar (Stone of Temptation for Spec-
treatises by al-Gaz .
ulation) and Mi #yar al- #ilm (The Measurement of Science), where he,
presenting the rules of logic, gave examples in laws and tried to present
to what degree it was possible to apply logic in laws.68 This is why
the introduction of his work in law, al-Mustas. fa (Selection) has a com-
pendium of logic as a foreword.
Eventually, it should be pointed out that later works in law focused
on the syllogistic method (qiyas)in its short form, lawyers saw syllo-
gism as analogyand searching and finding the cause (#illa).
Logic oered its results to other disciplines as well, but those disci-
plines that were not closely linked to the elementary goals and interests
of the society, especially in the period we have focused on here, the time
when the Ottoman Empire was threatened militarily, politicaly and ide-
ologicaly, thus falling into a severe crisis.69 These disciplines were being
neglected, and the scholars focused more on the didactical needs that
required collecting, processing and commenting on resources, than on
research in new directions. This was further contributed to by the edu-
65 See footnote nr. 50.

66 See: R. Arnaldez, Grammaire et thologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue, especially
.
chapter poglavlje La logique, pp. 105194 and La dialectique, pp. 195216.
67 See: J. Schacht, Fikh, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam
.
69 The crisis that the Ottoman Empire was under was the subject of the writings
of some Bosniac authors, especially Hasan . hi

Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, who wrote on stagnation
of science and technology (see: Hasan. Ka f al-
Aq . .a r, Izabrani spisi, pp. 4143 and
hi s
91112). This was also pointed out by Muhammad . b. Musa al-Bosnaw "Allamak (see:

H. Sabanovi c, Knjizevnost, pp. 136137) and Mus.t.afa Yuyo Ayyub-zade (see: Ibrahim
Opijac, Risala f manaqib, (based on the edition by O. Music)), pp. 4243.
cational system that was focused explicitly on interpreting and teaching

readymade truths, which reflected in petrifying of a range of dis-
ciplines in education, the only institution where science found some
modest space.
CONCLUSION
From its beginning to the era of modern logic, the history of logic has
always been the best indicator of the eternal scientific value and signif-
icance of Aristotles Organon, a tool without which today it is impos-
sible to imagine the further development of philosophy, science and
civilization in general. On the other hand, it is also an indicator of how
firm the foundations of Organon are, despite its evident deficiencies that
Aristotle himself was aware of. In spite of all the criticism by the new
non-Aristotelian system of logic, Aristotles analytic has not lost its
basic practical and scientific value. The reception of Aristotles Organon
among Arabs was an impetus for the development of philosophy and
science, but, as Windelband says, this meant that the Greek culture
came out from its national closure and stepped into the great collective
movement by which the peoples of the Old Age, inhabiting the coasts
of the Mediterranean Sea, exchanging and uniforming their ideas, was
transformed into a reciprocal spiritual life.
The history of logic acknowledges the main timeframe of its so called
Arabic period from the first translations of Aristotles works into Ara-
bic to when European philosophers and logicians (11501250) became
familiar with the works of al-Farab, Ibn-Sna (Avicenna) and Ibn-Rusd
(Averros) and with, until then, unknown to Aristotles worksLogica
nova (The New Logic). The contribution and the importance of Ara-
bic logic is great, not only for its part in keeping from sinking into
oblivion and its role as a transmitter, but also for its thought pro-
voking commentaries and interpretations of Aristotles works and the
works of other thinkers, as well as elaborating, completing and incor-
porating into the logical opus a number of extra-Aristotelian topics, the
creation of logical terminology, etc., which left a deep and lasting trace
in the medieval Western European, Renaissance, and even later philos-
ophy. On top of that, there are the works of the most important Ara-
bic philosophers and logicians inspired by Hellenism, characterized by
strong rationalistic tendencies in a broader sense. Their psychology was
characterized by an inclination for the empiric (rational empiricism), in
which the experiment, as one of the basic methods of research, plays
194 conclusion
a special part. All that inspired R. Bacon (12141294), an admirer of

empiricism, to say in his review of the history of philosophy (Opus Majus)
that Avicenna was dux et princeps philosophiae;1 and the strong nat-
uralistic and rationalistic traits inspired Engels to point out while
among the Latins a cheerful spirit of free thought, taken over from the
Arabs and nourished by the newly-discovered Greek philosophy, took
root more and more and prepared the way for the materialism of the
eighteenth century2 in his Dialectics of Nature, seeing the 18th century
as the greatest progressive movement experienced by the mankind by
then.
The period beginning from the late 13th or early 14th century is
often seen by historians of Arabic philosophy as a period of decadence,
when philosophy in general lost its value and the continuity of philo-
sophical thinking began to weaken.
In scientific literature, this evaluation of the state of philosophy is
commonly referred to logic as well, which was allegedly in its final
phase at that time, a phase of decay in which it faded away as a dis-
cipline. However, in spite of the fact that the Arabic Aristotelianism,
whose naturalistic consequences at the beginning seemed to try to
strengthen the rationalistic spirit to a victorious unruliness,3 did not
fulfill its expectations, it came up with a form of survival within the
realm of thought, within the science of shapes and the laws of reason-
ing and the method of scientific cognition. In addition to that, although
belonging to the circle of so called foreign sciences which were seen
as outside the scope of the Islamic sciences by their origin, subjects
and methods and disciplines which were exposed to attacks from con-
servative circles that feared for the religious discipline, logic managed
to keep its place within the system of oriental sciences and preserved
its autonomy. Even at the time when the creativeness of the classical
Arabic period was inherited by the nations of Ottoman Empire and
on new territory, logic was in a similar situation. The beginning of
the 16th century, when the first Bosniac authors came onto the scene,
was a very dicult period, but the logicians still persisted in their atti-
tude that it was a discipline which explained the skill of reasoning and
1 The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon, Vol. III: Fratris Rogeri Bacon, Ordinis mino-
romOpus Majus. Pars primaCapitulum VI, p. 14, Oxford, 1900. (Reprint: Elibon
Cllasic)
2 Fridrih Engels, Dialectics of Nature. Introduction [Friedrich Engels, Dialektik der Na-
tur. Einleitung], ProsvetaBIGZ, Beograd, 1978, p. 10.

3 Wilhelm Windelband, Povijest filozofije, I, p. 360.
conclusion 195
research and provided techniques of scientific thinking to other fields

of science and even theology, thus, was a tool of any scientific work
and scientific thought in general. And this was the fact that awarded
logic with a place as a universal educational subject. For a number of
scholars, especially those who were inclined to rationalism, it became
a subject of special interest and studies and almost the only area of
activity.
The period from the beginning of the 16th century, when the activity
of the Bosniacs started in various spheres of spiritual creativity, till the
end of the 19th century, was abundant in authors who left behind a
vast number of texts in logic, with a variety of subjects and forms.
This proves that logic was not a marginal discipline, and that it was,
by no means, in the phase of decay and fading away, and demands
an explanation of its existence, contents and sources.
After having collected the general resources, such as the bibliograph-
ical data and the texts, as well as the works in logic that Bosniac authors
had written commentaries and marginalia on, the first objective of the
author of this book was to verify and select authors, followed by the
historical identification of authors, authentication of selected texts and
proving the connection that linked those logicians to the great names of
the Arabic philosophy and logic, and through them, to Aristotle.
The primary criteria for the selection of authors were reliable re-
sources and literature for a complete historical identification of the
authors and the authentication of the works. On the other hand, the
selected authors should have left behind works with visible traces in
textbooks or commentaries, available in more than one copy.
This selection singled out four authors: Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.ar (Ha-
san Kafija Pruscak, 15441615), the author of the extremely successful
Kafs Compendium of Logic (Muhtas.ar al-Kaf min al-mant.iq) and A Com-
h. Muht.as.ar al-Kaf min al-
mentary on Kafs Compendium of Logic (Sar

mant.iq); Muhammad
. ibn Musa #Allamak al-Bosnaw (Muhamed son of
Musa Bosnjak), in sources and literature known as #Allamak and the
patronymic Music (15951636), the author of A Commentary on The Sun
h. ar-Risala as-samsiyya); Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar
Treatise (Sar
(Mustafa Ejubovic, 16511707), known as Say h Yuyo in his hometown,

Mostar, the author of four works in logic: widely popular Commentary
h. ar-Risala al-Atriyya f al-mant.iqsarh. Is
on Isagogue (Sar ag u g ), The

Useful Marginalia to Al-Fanars Remarks (H . asiya mufda li al-Fawa"id al-
Fanariyya #ala ar-Risala f al-mant.iq), the exceptional New Commentary
h. al-gadd #ala as-samsiyya f al-mant.iq) and
on The Sun Treatise (as-Sar
196 conclusion
A Commentary on The Training in Logic and Apologetic (Sar h. #ala Tahdb

al-mant.iq wa al-kalam), and his later epigone, Muhammad . al-Caynaw
(Muhamed from Cajni
ce, Cajnicanin, 17311792), the author of Reve-
lation of the Secrets for Commenting on Isagogue (Fath. al-asrar f sarh. al-
ag u g ).
Is
All these works can be found in manuscriptssome in autographs,
and some in several copies. However, only one of them (A Commentary on
Isagogue) was printed, as late as two hundred years after it was written.
Researching the collections of Oriental manuscripts kept in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and abroad, the author of this book discovered a
number of authors of shorter papers, excerpts from individual works,
mnemonic aids, etc., and a number of names of teachers and tran-
scribers of numerous papers in the field of logic. Although it was impos-
sible to find reliable information on most of them, in order to show to
what extent these and other texts in logic were clearly profiled in both
contents and form, three of them are included in this work: Ibrah. m
b. Ramad . an al-Bosnaw (Ibrahim Bosnjak, son of Ramadan, 17th cen-
tury), Fadil . Uzicawal (Fadil from Uzice, Uzicanin, 17th century) and
Muhammad
. b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw (Muhamed Bosnjak, son of Jusuf,
early 19th century).
The examined material shows that the works of the authors wor-
thy of our attention were written according to the tradition dating
from early 14th century. The main characteristic of the papers from
that tradition is that in them controversy was surmounted and the dis-
agreement between the Western or the Baghdad school of logic, of
al-Farab and his followers, and the Eastern, Ibn Snas and his stu-
dents, and the results from both the sources were freely used. In other
words, this meant accepting Ibn Snas demand to stop the practice
of commenting on Aristotles texts and to draw attention to the very
subject of logic, which was supposed to eventually result in a work in
logic that encompasses the whole material of logic and that is as such
self-sucient. However, the tradition of commenting and interpreting
cherished by the Baghdad school, continued to thrive, one would say
even more intensely than before. The axis of those commentaries were
no longer Aristotles texts (neither in parts nor as a whole), and the
practice of writing texts dealing with the individual areas of logic or
commenting on only one or only several of the key issues was aban-
doned. Consequently, various parts of logic were not viewed as separate
entities that are based on their own canons, but as parts that constituted
a complex but a concrete unity within the architectonics of logic.
conclusion 197
Reconstructing the main link of direct and indirect relations teacher

student was possible on the basis of data found in the biographies and
autobiographies of some authors, as well as on the data found in
their works in logic. This link connected the first Bosniac logicians
to the most creative and the most authoritative Arabic logicians: al-
ga n (13401431), ar-Raz (11491209), Ibn
Fanar (13501431), al-Gur
Sna (9801037) and al-Farab (870950).
The form of the works in logic was that of textbooks, compendia,
commentaries and marginalia, which were characteristic not only of
Arabic but also of European logic throughout all the Middle Ages and
even later. Such an orientation was conditioned by a range of factors,
from the very characteristics of logic itself to the practical needs of
educational nature. Besides, in comparison with the Western tradition,
the belief of the Arabic authors in the solidness and the perfection
of the logical system was by far deeper. Therefore, the logic texts
in Arabic, especially those from later times, contain no attempts of
serious criticism of Aristotelian logic, except for a few that are generally
negative concerning logic itself and its validity. The textbooks and
compendia were a result of the endeavors to present the basic material
of logic in a coherent, methodical and acceptable way, both to students
and for the needs of the author himself. The success was reflected just
in the realization of such needs. On the other hand, the commentaries
and marginalia aimed to improve the system through more successful
interpretations of defined discoveries, the endeavor to systematize and
classify the material.
Besides the evident dierences in comprehensiveness of their studies,
both in width and depth, the texts in logic written by Bosniac authors
(except for two marginalia (glossariums) which are of a so-called con-
textual type and a specific character), had a common characteristic
they were written with the aim to include the main theories of logic
or all parts of the logical organon, as observed by the classical Ara-
bic Aristotelianism. In this tradition, Bosniac authors defined logic as
an instrument, canonic, criterion of science and as a universal
propedeutics, but they did not deny that it was a part of philosophy.
Uniting the teachings and classification of philosophy oered by Platos
Academy with Aristotelian systems and views of the Stoics and Peri-
patetic, the logicians of the Arabic school created a kind of syncretism
that is not a result of a non-critical linking of definite logic from various
systems, but instead of the eorts to grant logic a place in any classifi-
cation of disciplines. According to this classification, logic is, therefore,
198 conclusion
a precondition of any kind of thinking, and its direct task is to give

an analysis of the knowledge of objective reality through the analysis of
language, achieving a scientific method of knowledge that will be fully
reliable and irrefutable. Such an aim, whose continuity in the history of
logic can be traced back to its founder, Aristotle, to the contemporary
logicians, contradicted the growing gnoseological mysticism, nihilism
and relativism.
The research proved not only the acceptance of the basic aim of
logic from the time of Aristotle till today, but also the acceptance of
the elements of his system, his way of elaboration and his answers to
the main logical issues (theory of basic subjective and reflective decrees,
theories of meaning and understanding of the truth, the teaching of log-
ical forms of thinking, the theory of the scientific method of thinking
syllogistics, of the scientific and nonscientific proving, etc.).
It is dicult to present these works with a unique structure in the
sense of composition, as these writings are of dierent types. Never-
theless, it is evident that there is a unique, general subject matter and
aim towards the solution of the elementary issues of logic. After an
introduction, the issues are usually classified according to the following
traditional logical questions:
1. On wordsterms,
2. On the universal,
3. On definition and description,
4. On judgment and immediate forms of reasoning,
5. On syllogism (its figures and modes) and other forms of indirect
reasoning (analogy and induction):
a) apodictical syllogism,
b) dialectical syllogism,
c) rhetorical syllogism,
d) poetical syllogism,
e) sophistical syllogism.
Therefore, the center of research is the theory of syllogism, a form
of deductive reasoning, the only one of its kind that gives a reliable
method in search for scientific, trustworthy and indisputable knowl-
edge. All other issues studied in these papers are treated either as pre-
conditions of a better understanding of a syllogism, its structure, abso-
luteness, unavoidability and generality, or as its application in apodic-
tic that is opposed to other forms of thinking and knowledge that are,
more or less, probable, illusory, wrong or false.
conclusion 199
The study also showed that, in light of most issues treated here,
most of the logicians are in agreement to a certain extent, although
there were some initial dierences in understanding and explanations
of some logical issues in the very beginning of the development of logic
in Arabs. Certain extra-Aristotelian topics, treated in a narrower or
broader way, such as the elaboration of singular judgments in the man-
ner of stoics, the development of conditional (conjunctive and disjunc-
tive) judgments, the elaboration of the 4th syllogistic figure, the indica-
tion of a possibility of predicate quantification, the presentation of some
laws of judgment, etc. Some of these, indicated by the Megara and stoic
school philosophers, are only a confirmation of that continuity. All of
this shows clearly that history of logic in its Arab period (including
also the Ottoman period) or more exactly logic of the Arabic idiom,
can righteously be regarded as its post-Hellenistic period.
Although the presentation of some of the material in this book antic-
ipates some of the conclusions regarding validating the texts by Bosniac
authors, it need be said that, according to the analysis and compari-
son of the vast number of texts included in this study, that the work
of Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.ar is the most prominent among the works of
the textbook character. This is especially so in the case of Kafs Com-
pendium of Logic, a typical textbook by form and contents, where inter-
pretations, answers to the most important questions and basic defini-
tions are given in a very condense, but logical and systematical way.
There is also the textbook titled Commentary on Isagogue by Mus.t.afa
Ayyub-zade al-Mostar. Among the commentaries, The New Commen-
tary on The Sun Treatise by Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade al-Mostar is specific
for its comprehensiveness, its systems, its excellent linking of the basic
text and literature with the authors own opinions and views. However,
as logic was reduced to the narrow frame of educational needs and, on
the other hand, as philosophy itself was put within a narrow space
except for a few cases when some philosophers, although of limited
capacities, turned themselves to actual social, economical, intellectual
and moral problems, having thus a connection with a real social and
political lifethose texts in logic were similarly far from the milieu in
which they appeared, from its problems which needed solving. Foreign
vocabulary and terminology contributed even more to the discipline
being understood only by highly educated individuals, and inaccessible
to a broader public.
This book also tries to show the evidence of influences that logic
had on theology and laws, as well as on grammar and vice versa.
200 conclusion
Because these influences were founded in an early period, the period of

codification and creation of those disciplines, they cannot be considered
new in the context of the period treated here.
The analysis and comparison of those texts with the texts in logic
written in Western Europe from the reception of the whole Aristotles
Organon (11501250) till the occurrence of modern logic, or more pre-
cisely, that part of the European tradition in logic which was dominated
by Aristotles formal logic and was a basic and dominating contents of
the books of logic, realizing identity or similarity (of the problems dealt
with and the solutions given) and dierences (interventions, vocabu-
lary, etc.) among them undoubtedly showed that it was a matter of a
unique history of logic in two parallel courses or two idioms, two cul-
tural and civilization circles. One was created in Arabic and within the
Arabic Islamic spiritual and cultural tradition and the other, written
mostly in Latin (later in national languages) and within the circles of
the West European philosophical tradition. Both those languages, Latin
and Arabic, were regarded as universal to their civilization circle for
the scientific thinking of that period.
To illustrate the above, there are writings of two Croat Latinists,
Andrija Kacic Miosics (17041760) Elementa Peripathetica Iuxta Mentem
Joannis Duns Scotii and Filip Lastrics (17001783from Ocevlje near
Breza) Traditiones in Universum Aristotelico-Scoticam Philosophiam who lived
and worked at the same time and on the same territory as the Bosniac
authors discussed here. The construction of these works in logic, their
organization, sequence and the scope of problems in those texts are
very similar, and sometimes almost identical to the works by Bosniac
authors. The passages in which the authors give definitions or answers
to some crucial questions are incredibly similar, one in Arabic in Gazi
Husrev-beys Medresa in Sarajevo, and the other, in Latin, in the Fran-
ciscan Monastery in Kraljeva Sutjeska. Some essential dierences in
the development of those two schools began to take place only in
the later phase. The one in Arabic, even besides the excellent results
oered by the great Arabic philosophers and logicians, good predis-
positions such as clear thinking and expression and, finally, talents
with undoubted speculative-research abilities which, from time to time
appeared, such as Hasan . hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r and Mus.t.afa Ayyub-zade
al-Mostar, forever stayed within the framework of a completed and
perfect system of logic. In the West, logic, as well as the entire philos-
ophy, helped by events such as Humanism and Renaissance, succeeded
in getting out of the domain of religious pragmatism, and with the final
conclusion 201
armation of nominalism and empiricism, the threshold that Arabic

logicians had reached long ago, improving formal logic and methodol-
ogy, found new ways of development of sciences.
And finally, with an outlook of the goal of this book, which is to
present the works by Bosniacs in the field of logic in Arabic, it is
important to say that the history of logic is a perfect indicator of the
quality and greatness of the contribution of Bosniacs in spreading and
developing philosophical thinking. It also shows how much the territory
of this country is unique in Europe for its development, are the diversity
of sources and experiences. Therefore it is a point of meeting and
coexistence of dierent social, philosophical and theological doctrines
and traditions.
GLOSSARY OF LOGICAL TERMINOLOGY
The glossary of Arabic terminology in the field of logic given here

includes all the terms encountered in the works by Bosniac authors
and texts used as sources. As most of these terms are focused on in
this book (in sense of their etymology, context, their exact place in
manuscripts, etc., especially in Chapter 3), this glossary contains only
their basic meanings. A significant number of included terms have dif-
ferent meanings, either in everyday speech, or in other disciplines, or
even in other parts of philosophy. As the goal here was precise informa-
tion and possible practical use, the glossary gives only their meanings
related to the subject of the book, avoiding (wherever possible) the pre-
sentation of an array of dierent meanings, and the confusion that it
may cause.
The main objective of this dictionary is to oer translations of the
logical vocabulary to Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian for future re-
searchers and readers from the South-Slavic region. Translation of
some of the words into the English language was aggravated by the
fact that the numerous sources, especially from Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, oers dierent (sometimes contradictory) translations of the same
terms, and try to squeeze them in the European scheme of terminol-
ogy. Therefore, certain terms are translated literally, for the readers to
interpret and understand them in the given context.
The order in which they are listed is based on the principle of
etymology and semantics (although the glossary itself is not), i.e. sorting
Arabic base words in alphabetical order, to be further divided in several
terms according to the level of their derivation. The terms that are of
Greek origin are also placed alphabetically. This principle shows the
base word and basic idea each term emerged from, especially when
there are several terms based on the same idea.
Besides the source texts, this glossary is based on dictionaries listed
in the bibliography, and especially: A.-M. Goichon, Vocabulaires compars
dAristote et dIbn Sna; the dictionary by a group of authors Al-Mu #gam al-
ga n, Ta #rfat
falsaf; Ibn Sna, Kitab al-h. udud (Book of Definitions); al-Gur
(Definitions) and for the Bosnian version, Filozofski rjecnik (Dictionary of
204 glossary of logical terminology
Philosophical Terminology) by a group of authors edited by Vladimir

Filipovic. Of course, some of the books and papers quoted in the
bibliography oer useful and instructive glossaries of terminology.1
"
"dw ada(t), pl. adawat, particle.

"dy ta"diya, induction. Often: istiqra" (see).
"hr muta"ahhirun, (1) subsequent scholars. The word that Ibn Sna uses
to denote Alexander of Aphrodisias (fadil al-muta"ahhirn) ad their
. logicians who
contemporaries. (2) In later texts this term denotes the

were active after Ibn Sna (afdal. al-muta"ah hir
n).
us.tuquss, element (Greek term in Arabic transcription). Often: #unsur (see).
.
"s.l as. l, principle; base; beginning (see mabda").
"lf mu"allaf, complex. Alfaz. mu"allafat, complex words (see murakkab).
"n in, if (conditional). Burhan iniyy (or burhan al-in), conditional argumen-
tation.
"wl ala, tools, instrument, organ. #Ilm al-ala (or #ilm al), instrumental
discipline, another name of logic (see man.tiq).
awwaliyyat, primary knowledge; first principles; axioms.
agug, (1) introduction; (2) Isagogue (Porphyrys).

Is
"yn ayna, where?; place (category, also: makan, see).
bah. t, research; discussion. #Ilm adab al-bah. t wa al-munazara,

bh. t . science on

the rules of research and discussion.
bd" mabda", pl. mabadi", principle; axiom; starting point.

brhn burhan, proof, demonstration, argumentation; apodictic, scientific
proof. Burhan iniyy (burhan al-in) conditional argumentation; burhan
limiyy (burhan al-lima), causal argumentation (in literature and
sources often as inniyy and limmiyy).
burh an, demonstrative; apodictic.

bs t
. bas .t , simple. Opposite: murakkab and mu"allaf (see), complex.
bt.l ib.tal, annulment, abrogation. In theology: reductio ad absurdum
(reduction leading to absurd), in logic: qiyas al-hulf (see).
b#d. ba#d. , part, several.
ba#d., partial, particular. Often: guz" (see).

byn mutabayin, dierent; opposite.
mutabayinan, two unconformable, opposite (terms).
1 See here Sources and Literature.

glossary of logical terminology 205
tly tal(in), consequence. Opposite: muqaddam (see), antecedence.

tufqa, Topics (Aristotles work).
t

tbt itbat, armation. Often: gab (see).
tlt at, triple, tripartite. Qadiyya tulatiyya, tripartite judgment (with
tul
subject,
.
predicate and copula), see qad. iyya.
tny tuna", dual, bipartite. Qad. iyya tuna"iyya, bipartite judgment, see
qadiyya.
.
istitna", exclusion, separation, partition.
istitna": Qiyas istitna", separated syllogism, see qiyas.

g
g dl gadal, (1) dialectics; (2) Topics (Aristotles work).
gadal, dialectical; qiyas gadal, rhetorical syllogism.

g rb mugarrabat, experience based knowledge; experiment based
conviction (type yaqniyyat, see).
g rd tagrd, abstraction (action).
mugarrad, abstract (result of abstraction); abstract (not concrete);
notion.
g z" guz", part, component.
guz", particular; individual. Qad. iyya guz"iyya, particular judgment
(proposition); qad. iyya guz"iyya mugiba (saliba), particular armative
(negative) judgment (proposition), see qad. iyya.
g zm gazim, decisive, final. Qawl gazim, statement; judgment, proposition.
g sm gism, body, corpus.
g ns al-agnas, summum genus; gins safil, genus minor; gins
gins, genus. Gins
t.ab #, gender (genus naturale); gins #aql, intellectual, psychological
genus (genus mentale); gins #al, genus major (higher); gins qarb, closer
genus (genus proximum); gins man.tiq, logical genus; gins mutawassi.t,
medium (middle) genus.
gins, of genus.
g hl maghul, unknown; the unknown.
g wz magaz, metaphorical, figurative (term, meaning); metaphor.

magaz, metaphorical.
g whr gawhar, substance. Al-gawhar al-awwal, primary substance; al-gawhar
at-tan, secondary substance.

h.
h
. gg h. ugga, proof, argument; proving, argumentation.
hdd
. h. add, (1) definition. Hadd . h. aqq, actual definition (definitio quid rei);
h. add tamm, complete definition (seldom h. add kamil, complete, perfect
definition); h. add lafz . , nominal definition; h. add naqis. , incomplete
definition. See qawl sarih. and ta#rf. (2) Term, notion (of syllogism).
Hadd
. as. gar, minor term; h. add mustarak, common (medium) term; h. add
akbar, major term; h. add awsa.t, middle term. (3) Limit.
hds
. h. ads, intuition (meaning intellectual perception, fast revelation of the
medium term, wit, contrary to musahada (see), immediate perception
through senses).
h. adsiyyat, intuition based knowledge (cognitio intuitiva), intuitive (see
h. ads).
hrf
. h. arf, particle (in logic often as: adat, see); letter.
hss
. h. assa, pl. h. awass, sense. Haw. ass ba.tina, internal sense; h. awass z
. ahira,
external sense.
h. iss, sense, feeling; perception. Also: ih. sas. Hiss . ba.tin, internal sense;
h. iss z. ahir, external sense.
mah. sus, sensible.
mah. susat, sense based knowledge (conviction) (type of yaqniyyat, see).
ih. sas, sense, feeling; perception. Also: h. iss.
h. s.r h. as. r, limitation, determination of quantity; restriction.
mah. s. ura, defined, quantified proposition.
Opposite: muhmala (see).
h. s.l muh. as. s. al, negative term (ism) which implies negation, although in
form it is positive, e.g. blind (implies the negation of seeing, though it
is grammatically positive). Opposite: gayr muh. as. s. al, see ma#dul.
muh. as. s. ala, proposition whose predicate is muh. as. s. al (see).

hqq
. h. aqqa, truth; logical essence, reality.
h. aqq, actual, real; true. Dalala h. aqqiyya, actual meaning (significa-
tion), see dalala.
hkm
. h. ukm, judgment.
mah. kum bihi, used to state something, predicate. See mah. mul.
mah. kum #alayhi, on which something is stated, subject. See mawd. u #.
h. ikma, philosophy. Al-h. ikma an-nazariyya, . speculative philosophy;
al-h. ikma al- #amaliyya, practical philosophy.
hll
. tah. ll, (1) analysis. (2) Analytics (Aristotles work)
hml
. h. aml, attribution; predication.
h. amil, subject (as opposite to mah. mul). Often: mawd. u # (see).
h. aml, predicative, attributive; categorical. Qiyas h. aml, categorical
syllogism; qiyas gayr h. aml, non-categorical syllogism. Qad. iyya h. amliyya,
categorical judgment.
mah. mul, predicate; attribute.

hwl
. h. al, state, position (category).
h

hbr
g
habar, statement, declaration.
harig, extern; exterior.
hr
harig, external; objective. Opposite: dihn, (see).
hassa, property; proper (proprium).
hs.s.
has. s. , special, particular (as synonym for more often used guz", see).
has. s., same as hass (see).
ma.h. sus, individual,
. . personal. Qadiyya mahsusa, special, particular
. . . . .
judgment (premiss). See sahs. iyya.
ht.b hi.taba (hat.a ba), (1) rhetoric(n.), oratory. (2) Rhetoric (Aristotles
work).
hitab, rhetoric (adj.). Qiyas hi.tab, rhetoric syllogism.
mu. htalit, mixed, combined (syllogism).
hl
.
t .
dierence,
See qiyas.
hlf hulf, opposition; absurd. Qiyas al-hulf, syllogism of
contradiction, syllogism per impossible, absurd (deductio ad
absurdum). Seldom: al-qiyas bi al-hulf.
ihtilaf, dierence, inequality (meaning close to hulf, see).
muhtalif, dierent, inequal. Muhtalifan, two disparate (terms).
hyl
hayal, thinking; vision; image; imagination.
hayyala, to inspire feelings; to convince.
muhayyilat, suggestive (imaginativa), which inspire visions.

d
drk idrak, cognition (perception and intuition). Idrak al-mufrad, cognition

of the individual (same as tas. awwur, see); idrak an-nisba, cognition of
relations between two particular terms (same as tas. dq, see).
mudrak, percept (object of perception).

dll dalala, meaning, signification. Dalala wad. #iyya, conventional sig-
nification; dalala wad. #iyya (gayr) lafziyya,
. conventional (un)spoken
signification; dalala #aqliyya (lafziyya
. gayr lafziyya),
. intellectual signi-
fication (spokenunspoken); dalala .tab#iyya (lafziyya. gayr lafziyya),
.
natural signification (spokenunspoken); dalala manqula, figurative
signification; dalala bi al-mu.tabaqa, signification by harmony; dalala bi
at-tad. ammun, signification by content (partial signification); dalala bi
al-iltizam, signification by order, consequential.
dall, significator.
dall, sign; proof; demonstration.
madlul, significated.
dwr dawr, circle; vicious circle (circulus vitiosus). See qiyas ad-dawr.
dawran, revolution, revolving; also: qiyas ad-dawr (see).
d

dhn dihn, spirit; mind, intellect; understanding.
dihn, spiritual; mental. Opposite: harig (see).
dwy dat, essence. Qadaya dawat al-giha, modal
judgment, see qadaya and
giha. .
dat, essential.

r

rbt. rabi.ta, copula.
rdd radd, reduction. Radd al-qiyas, reduction of syllogism.
rdf muradif, synonym. Often: mutaradif (see).
mutaradif, synonym.
rsm rasm, description. Rasm tamm, complete description; rasm naqis. ,
incomplete description.
rkb tarkb, synthesis.
murakkab, complex (word, syllogism); synthetic. Murakkab tamm,
completely complex; murakkab gayr tamm, incompletely complex.
r.turqa, rhetoric; see hi.taba. Aristotles work Rhetoric.

z
zmn zaman, time; time (category), also: mata (see).
s"l mas"ala, pl. masa"il, issue of science; thesis.

safsa.ta, sophism, sophistic; Aristotles work On Sophistical Refutation.
sufis.ta", sophistical; Qiyas sufis.ta", sophistical syllogism.

slb salb, negation. Seldom: nafy (see).
salib, negative. Qad. iyya saliba, negative judgment.

slsl tasalsul, argumentation into infinity (argumentum ad infinitum);
succession.
slm musallamat, accepted propositions (opponents proposition accepted
in a debate regardless of their truthfulness); presuppositions.
smw ism, name; noun. Ism muh. as. s. al, see muh. as. s. al; ism mustarak, equivoque;
homonym (see mustarak); ism musakkik, equivocal (see musakkik); ism
mutaradif (muradif ), synonym.
swr sur, quantifier.
musawwara, quantified, determined judgment. Also: mah. s. ura (see).
sufis.tqa, sophistic. Also: safsa.ta (see).
swy musaw, equal. Qiyas al-musawat (or al-qiyas al-musaw), syllogism of

equality (mathematical syllogism: A = B; B = G; A = G).

mutasawiyan, two concurring (corresponding) terms; congruent.
sbh tasbh, analogy. Often: tamtl (see).

shs. sahs. , person.

sahs. , singular, individual.
srh. sar h. , interpretation, explanation; explication.
sarih. , explicative. Qawl sarih. , explicative speech (speech that describes
a term or a unit so that it decomposes it; in terminology it includes
both definition (see h. add) and description (see rasm)).
srt. sar.t, condition.
sar.t, conditional. Qad. iyya sar.tiyya, conditional judgment (premiss). See
qad. iyya.
srk istirak, equivocation; homonymy.
mustarak, common, equivoque; homonym. Also: ism mustarak (see).
sg b musagaba, confusion, dispute; sophistic (knowledge).
s#r si#r, poem; poetry, poetics.
si#r, poetical. Qiyas si#r, poetical syllogism.

skk musakkik, equivocal. Also: ism musakkik (see).
skl sakl, form, figure (of syllogism).
shd musahada, intuition (immediate cognition of a unit a complex
situation through senses, as opposed to h. ads (see), intuition closer
to intellectual perception, fast revelation of the medium term).
musahadat, perception, intuition based cognition, see musahada;
sensibilia.
shr mashurat, generally known judgments, statements; celebrata.
syh sayh, old man; leader; teacher, etc. The title that the texts in logic
(and philosophy) use to refer to Ibn Sna.
s.
s.dr mus. adara, request, postulate. Mus. adara #ala al-ma.tlub, petitio principii
(logical error in argumentation; lack of, and need for argumentation
grounds), petition of principle.
s.dq s. idq, truth, veracity. Opposite: kidb (see).
tas. dq, assent, assessment; judgement. See idrak.
s.g r s. ugra, minor premise (of syllogism). See muqaddima.

as. gar, minor term (of syllogism). See h. add (2).
s.lh. is. .tilah. , pl. is. .tilah. at, convention; term, terminology.
is. .tilah., conventional; terminological.
s.n# s. ina #a, skill; art. As. -s. ina #at al-hams, five logical skills (apodictic,
dialectic, rhetoric, poetic and sophistic), scientia quinquenalis.

s.wr s. ura, form. S. urat al-qiyas, syllogism form. Opposite: maddat al-qiyas
(see), contents of syllogism.
tas. awwur, pl. tas. awwurat, notion, concept, image; idea. See idrak.
d.
ddd
. d. idd, contrary; contrast; contrariness.
tad. add, mutual opposition, contrariness. (Sometimes this term
denotes the subcontrariness relations, but it is often described as:
al-qad. iyyatan ad-dahilatan tah. ta at-tad. add, two subcontrary judgments).
drb d. arb, mode, modus (of syllogism). Darb muntig, productive, conclusive
. . .
modus; d. arb #aqm, unproductive modus (that does not lead to
conclusion). Seldom: qarna (see).
drr
. d. arur, necessary. Qad. iyya d. aruriyya, necessary judgment (premiss). See
wagib.
dmn
. tad. ammana, to contain, to include, to be consisted of.
tad. ammun, contents; implication. Dalala bi at-tad. ammun, meaning by
contents, see dalala.
dyf
. id. afa, relation (category, also: mud. af, see); gr. genitive relation.
id. af, relative, conditioned (in relation to something).
mud. af, relation (category, also: id. afa); gr. noun defined by another in
genitive.
tad. ayuf, relativity; correlation.
mutad. ayif, correlative; correlate.
t.
t.b# .tab#, nature. Also: .tab #a (see).

.tab #a, nature.
.tab#, natural. Dalala .tab#iyya, natural signification (meaning), see
dalala.
t.bq mu.tabaqa (mu.tabiqa), adequacy, concordance, harmony, congruity.
Dalala bi al-mu.tabaqa, signification by harmony (in sense of connect-
ing and equalization of its subject). See dalala.
mu.tabiq, adequate, corresponding.
t.rf .tarf (or .taraf ), extreme. Tarf
. an, extreme terms of syllogism (minor
and major). See h. add.
t.lb ma.tlab, question. Ma.tlab hal, question whether (an est); ma.tlab ma,
question what (quid est); ma.tlab lima, question why, what for (propter
quid); ma.tlab ayyu, question who, which (quia est).
ma.tlub, (1) that is researched, issue; (2) conclusion (as a result of
research).
t.lq mu.tlaq, absolute; free, unlimited; unconditioned.
z.
znn
. zann,
. opinion, thinking, believing, seeming, feeling.
mazn
. nat, judgments (premisses) based on thinking, believing;
u
presumptions (type gayr yaqniyyat, see).
#br #ibara, interpretation, explanation; Hermeneutics (Aristotles work).

#dl ma#dul, derivative. (Negative term which implies negation, although
in form it is positive, e.g. blind (implies the negation of seeing,
though it is grammatically positive). See muh. as. s. al.
ma#dula, derivative; equivalent to negative proposition (negation by
meaning, although in form it is positive, with predicate ma#dul, see).
#rd. #arad. , accident (oposite: substance). #Arad. #amm, general (common)
accident; #arad. lazim, inseparable accident; #arad. mufariq, separable
accident. Bi al- #arad. , per accidence (per accidens).
#arad., accidental.
#rf ma#rifa, cognition, knowledge.
ta#rf, pl. ta#rfat, explanation, explication (also: qawl sarih. , v.);
definition (in broader sense includes both h. add, see, and rasm, see).
mu#arrif, explanatory, explicative.

#ql #aql, intellect; intelligence. #Aql fa##al, active intellect (intellectus
agens), #aql bi al-fi #l, actual intellect (intellectus in efectu); #aql bi al-
quwwa, potential intellect; #aql mustafad, acquired intellect (intellectus
acquisitus); al- #aql bi al-malaka, intellects with potential (intellectus
in habitu); #aql hayulan, material intellect (intellectus materialis); #aql
#amal, practical intellect; #aql nazar. , speculative intellect; #aql z . ahir,
expressed intellect.
#aql, related to intellect, intelligence; rational. Dalala #aqliyya
(lafziyya
. gayr lafziyya),
. intellectual signification (spokenunspoken).
See dalala.
ma#qul, pl. ma#qulat, intelligible, reachable only by intellect (opposite:
mah. susat, (see), sensibilia). Al-ma#qulat al-ula, primary intelligibilia;
al-ma#qulat at-taniya, secondary intelligibilia.
#ks revolution. #Aks bast, simple conversion; al- #aks
#aks, conversion, .
al-mustawa, equipollence; #aks an-naqd. , contraposition (see naqd. ).
mun #akis, that can be revolved; convertible (definition).

#ll #illa, cause.
#illiyya, causality.
#lm #ilm, knowledge, cognition; science.
ma#lumat, knowledge; facts, cognition.

#ml #amal, action, practice. Opposite: nazar . (see).
#amal, practical. Opposite: nazar . (see). See: #aql, h. ikma.

#mm #amm, general; universal (often: kull, see).
#umum, generality.
#ns.r #uns. ur, pl. #anas. ir, element. See us. tuqs.
#ny ma#na, pl. ma#an(in), idea (in broader sense); sense; meaning;
signification.
#yr mi #yar, measure, norm. Mi #yar al- #ulum, logic (measure of science).
g lt. mugala.ta (mugali.ta), fallacy, sophism; sophistic knowledge; Sophistic

(Aristotles work On Sophistical Refutation).
mugali.t, sophistical. Qiyas mugali.t, sophistical syllogism.
frd mufrad, simple (word). Opposite: murakkab. See lafz. .
mufradat, individual terms.

frd. fard. , hypothesis. Often: wad. # (see).
fs.l fas. l, dierence. Fas. l dat, essential dierence; fas. l qarb, next dierence
(dierentia specifica); fasl ba#d, further dierence.
.
infis. al, disjunction, separation.
infis. al, disjunctive. Also: munfas. il (see).
munfas. il, disjunctive. See qiyas.
f#l fi #l, (1) verb (in logic often: kalima, see): (2) action, act, doing (category,
also: yaf#al, see).
bi al-fi #l, actual. Opposite: bi al-quwwa.
yaf#al, acting, act, doing (category, see fi #l).
fa##al, very (constantly) active. See #aql fa##al.
infi #al (or yanfa#il), passive (category); passivity.

fkr fikr, thought, thinking, reflection (in sense of discursive thinking
as successive logical process from one logical element towards the
other, from parts towards the unit).
fikra, notion, idea.

fhm mafhum, understood, understandable; understanding, comprehen-
sion.
fyd mustafad, acquired. See #aql mustafad.
qbl maqbul, applicable, acceptable; maqbulat, acceptable premisses, given.

taqabul, opposition. (This term denotes contrariness and contradic-
tion, as subtypes, but, dierently from the related term tanaqud. (see),
often contrariness).
mutaqabil(an), opposite, opposed; two opposed, contradictors, and
often contrary terms.
qdm muqaddam, antecedence. Opposite: tal(in) (see).
muqaddima, premiss, assumption. Muqaddima s. ugra, minor premiss;
muqaddima kubra, major premiss. See qadiyya.
qr" istiqra", induction; istiqra" tamm, complete induction; istiqra" naqis. ,
incomplete induction.
qsm qisma, division.
qdy
. qad. iyya, judgment, proposition, premiss. Qad. iyya bas.ta, simple
judgment (proposition); qad. iyya ba#d. iyya, particular judgment (often:
guz"iyya, see); qad. iyya guz"iyya (mugibasaliba), particular judgment
(armativenegative); qad. iyya mah. s. ura, determined (quantified)

judgment (opposite: muhmala, see); qad. iyya tulatiyya, tripartite
judgment (that has subject, predicate andcopula); qad. iyya tuna"iyya,
bipartite judgment (without copula); qad. iyya h. amliyya, categorical
judgment; qad. iyya gayr h. amliyya, noncategorical judgment; qad. iyya
mah. s. us. a, individual (singular) judgment; qad. iyya saliba, negative
judgment; qad. iyya musawwara, quantified (determined) judgment (see
sur), also: qad. iyya mah. s. ura (see); qad. iyya sahs. iyya, individual judgment;

qad. iyya sar.tiyya (muttas. ilamunfas. ila), conditional (conjunctive
disjunctive) judgment; qad. iyya s. ugra, minor judgment, premiss (see
muqaddima); qad. iyya d. aruriyya, necessary judgment; qad. iyya kubra,
major premiss (see muqaddima); qad. iyya kulliyya (mugibasaliba),
universal (armativenegative) judgment; qad. iyya lazima, necessary
judgment (see d. aruriyya); qad. iyya mugiba, armative judgment; qad. iyya
mumtani #a, impossible judgment; qad. iyya mumkina, possible judgment;
qad. iyyatan mutaqabilatan bi at-tanaqud, two (mutually) opposed
(contradictory) judgments; qad. iyyatan mutaqabilatan, two (mutually)
opposed judgments; al-qad. iyyatan ad-dahilatan tah. ta at-tad. add, two
subcontrary judgments; qad. aya dawat al- giha (or muwaggaha), modal

judgments; al-qad. aya qiyasatuha ma#aha, judgments based on syllogisms
(implied by some previous syllogisms); al-qad. iyyatan al-mutad. addatan,
two (mutually) contrary judgments.
qwl qawl, speech, statement (dictum). Qawl sarih. , interpretative,
explicative speech (see sarih. ); gawl gazim, speech that claims
something; judgment.
maqul, stating; stated, speech; predicament.
maqulat, categories.
qwy quwwa, strength, power, force; ability, potential. Bi al-quwwa,
potential. Opposite: bi al-fi #l (see), actual.
qys qiyas, (1) syllogism. Qiyas iniyy (qiyas al-in), see burhan; qiyas burhan,
demonstrative syllogism; qiyas istitna", separate (separated) syllogism;
qiyas gadal, dialectical syllogism; qiyas hi.tab, rhetorical syllogism; qiyas
al-hulf, syllogism per impossible, absurd (deductio ad absurdum);

qiyas ad-dawr, circular syllogism (circulus in probandocircle in
argumentation); qiyas al-musawat, syllogism in equality (mathematical
syllogism); qiyas muqassam, divided syllogism; qiyas murakkab, complex
syllogism, polysyllogism; qiyas sufis.ta", sophistical syllogism; qiyas
d. amr, shortened syllogism (entimem); qiyas mugali.t, sophistical
syllogism (also: sufis.ta"); qiyas iqtiran, connected syllogism; qiyas kamil,
perfect syllogism; qiyas gayr kamil, imperfect syllogism; qiyas man.tiq,
logical, deductive syllogism; syllogistics; qiyas sar.t, conditional
syllogism. (2) Qiyas, title for Aristotles Analytics (analysis through
syllogism).
kubra, major premiss, see muqaddima.

kbr
akbar, major term (of syllogism). See h. add.

ktr katra, multiplicity, plurality; many; individual things. Qabla al-katra,

before things, before many (ante res); f (ma#a) al-katra, in things, in
many (in rebus); ba#da al-katra, after things, after many (post res).

kdb kidb, lie, untruth. Opposite: s. idq (see).
kll unity, wholeness. Opposite: guz", (see).
kull,
kull, universal, general. Qad. iyya kulliyya mugiba (saliba), universal
armative (negative) judgment (proposition).
kulliyyat, universalia; al-kulliyyat al-hams, five universal terms (genus,

species, dierence, property and accidence).
klm kalima, verb; word.

km kam, how much?
kml k
amil, complete, perfect. See qiyas.
kmm kamm (kammiyya), quantity (of judgment); quantity (category).
kwn makan, place; place (category), also: ayna (see).
kyf kayfa, how?; quality (category).
kayfiyya, quality (of judgment); quality (category).
lzm lazim, necessary; inseparable; inherent.

luzum, necessary consequence, necessity.
iltizam, necessity; necessary causal link (meaning close to luzum (see)).
Dalala bi al-iltizam, consequential meaning (signification). See dalala.
lfz. lafz,
. word; expression. Lafz. mufrad, individual, simple word (consisted
of one word); lafz. murakkab (mu"allaf), complex word.
lafz
. , spoken, phonetic. Gayr lafz . , unspoken.
lm limiyy; burhan limiyy (burhan al-lima), causal argumentation (see burhan).
m
mahiyya,
essence; essential quality of something (quidditas); quiddity.
mty mata, when?; tense (category), also: zaman (see).
mtl mital, example.
tl, analogy, analogy based conclusion, reasoning by analogy.
tam
atala, similarity, equality, analogy, also tamtl (see).
mum
mutam atil(un), mutually similar, analogue.
mdd
madda, matter. Opposite: s. ura (see), contents (of syllogism).
madd, material.
mkn imkan, possibility.
mumkin, possible; gayr mumkin, impossible. Qad. iyya mumkina has. s. a,
specially possible judgment (premiss); qad. iyya mumkina #amma,
generally possible judgment.
mlk milk, property; possession(category); having.
malaka, property, faculty; permanent ability (habitus). See #aql bi

al-malaka.
mn# imtina #, impossibility.
mumtani #, impossible. Qad. iyya mumtani #a, impossible judgment.
ntg antaga, to conclude; to give conclusion to syllogism.

intag, concluding, making conclusions; deduction (seldom).
natga, conclusion.
muntig, which gives (oers) conclusion (judgment or syllogism).

nz# intiza #, abstraction (meaning action or activity abstracting something
from something else, dierent from (mugarrad, see) abstractionthe
result of that action). Also: tagrd (see).
nsb nisba, relation; relation between subject and predicate. Also: nisba
h. ukmiyya, judgmental relation.
nt.q man.tiq, logic.
man.tiq, logician; logical.
na.tiq, reasonable, reasoning; able to speak.
nzr
. nazar,
. speculation (theoretical way of thinking).
. , speculative, theoretical; #ilm nazar
nazar . , speculative science; h. ikma
nazariyya,
. speculative philosophy.
munazara,
. discussion, debate. See bah. t.

nfs nafs, soul (Lat. anima).
nfy nafy, negation. Often: salb (see).
nqd. naqd. , opposition, contradiction (also tanaqud. , see); contradictory
(notion, judgment). #Aks an-naqd. , contraposition.
tanaqud. , mutual contrariness, opposition; antithesis. (Close to
taqabul (see); denotes both contradiction and contrariness, however,
dierently from taqabul, it is used primarily for contradiction.)
nql manqul, taken; transferred (e.g. meaning, dalala, see).
nhy nihaya, end; extreme; extreme or final limit.
la nihaya, endlessness; infinity.
nw# naw #, species. Naw # safil, lower species; naw # #al, higher species; naw #
al-anwa #, species of the species; naw # mutawassi.t, middle species.
hml muhmal, indefinite (by quantity); qad. iyya muhmala, indefinite (unquan-
tified) judgment (proposition, premiss). Opposite: qad. iyya mah. s. ura,
(see).
hayula, matter; first matter; hyle. See madda.
hayulan, material. #Aql hayulan, material intellect.
wtr mutawatirat, transferred, inherited knowledge (knowledge based on

evidence of others).
wgb gab, armation. Opposite: salb (see), negation.
- mugib, (1) armative. Qad. iyya mugiba, armative judgment (propo-
sition, premiss). Opposite saliba (see). (2) necessary (also: d. arur, v.).
Opposite: mumkin (see), possible and gayr mumkin (see), impossible.
wgd wigdaniyyat, emotional perceptions, feelings.
wgh giha, modality; modus. Qad. aya dawat al-giha, modal judgment
(proposition, premiss).
muwaggah, modal. Qad. iyya muwaggaha, modal judgment.
wzn mzan, scales, balance. #Ilm al-mzan, logic; chemistry.
wst. awsa.t, middle term (of syllogism). See h. add (2).
ws.f s. ifa, attribute.
ws.l ittis. al, connection, conjunction.
muttas. il, conjunctive. See qad. iyya.
wd#
. wad. #, (1) situation, position; position (category); (2) thesis, postulate;
hypothesis (expressed in sense of postulate); (3) convention.
wad. #, conventional; dalala wad. #iyya, conventional meaning. See dalala.
mawd. u #, (1) subject; (2) object of science.
wt" mutawa.ti", monosemic, univocal; univoque.
wfq ittifaq, case, accidence; contingency.
ittifaq, accidental, contingent. Qad. iyya ittifaqiyya, contingent
judgment.
yqn yaqn, conviction; strong belief; persuasion; certitude.

yaqniyyat, indisputable (non-refutable) truth, knowledge. Opposite:
gayr yaqniyyat.
SOURCES AND LITERATURE
Sources
Manuscripts
Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq hi
. s.a r, Muhtas. ar al-Kaf min al-man.tiq, manuscripts: Orijentalni
institut u Sarajevu (OIS), R 591/1; Orijentalna zbirka HAZU u Zagrebu
(OZ HAZU), N 173 and Gazi Husrev-begova biblioteka u Sarajevu (GHB),
3407.
h. Muhtas. ar al-Kaf min al-man.tiq, manuscript: University Library Cam-
Isti, Sar
bridgeEngland, Ms. Or. 541. (8).
Ibrahm b. Ramad . an, Ta#lqat #ala Sar h. as-Samsiyya,
manuscript: GHB, R
4043.
Muhammad
. b. Musa #Allamak, Sar h. ar-Risala as-samsiyya, manuscripts: Bib-
liothque dAlger, N 522; OZ HAZU, N 1511; Emanet Hazinesi Kitaplg,

Istanbul, N 1970; OIS, R 698 (incomplete); Kliment Ohridski, Skopje,
MSAII 209/2 (incomplete).
Muhammad
.
b. Mus.t.afa al-Caynaw agug, manuscripts:
, Fath. al-asrar f sarh. Is
Arhiv Hercegovine u Mostaru, R 138; OIS, R 933; GHB, R 219 and 3439
and OZ HAZU, N 1243.
Muhammad
. b. Yusuf al-Bosnaw, Fath. al-asrar f sarh. Is agug f #ilm al-man.tiq,
manuscript: OZ HAZU, N 797/III.
Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf Ayyub-zade al-Mostar, Sar h. Is h #ala ar-Risala al-
agug, (Sar
Atriyya f al-man.tiq); autograph: OIS, R 2379; edition: Istanbul, . 1316/1898

1899.
, as-Sar h. al-gadd #ala as-Samsiyya
f al-man.tiq, autograph: GHB, R 793;
manuscript: OZ HAZU, N 1407/II.
, H . asiya mufda li al-Fawa"id al-Fanaryya #ala ar-Risala f al-man.tiq, auto-
graph: OZ HAZU, N 198.
, Sar h. Tahdb al-man.tiq wa al-kalam, autograph: OIS, R 4668; manuscript:
OZ HAZU, N 412.
Uzicawal, Fadil, h. matn Is
. Sar agug, manuscript: OZ HAZU, N 728.
Detailed description of this manuscript is given in chapter II.
Sources of Biographical and Bibliographical Nature

#At.a " (#At.a "ullah), Naw#-zade, Had
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, Kasf az- . un #an asam al-kutub wa al-funun, (Istanbul), 19411943. Same
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primut edidit, G. Flgel, IVII, LeipzigLondon, 18351858.
hi
Hasan
. Kaf al-Aq . am al-#ulama" ila hatam al-anbiya", manuscripts: OIS,
. s.a r, Niz
R 252/V, R 898; GHB, R 3673 etc. Bosnian translation: Hasan Kafija
Pruscak, Izabrani spisi, pp. 125154.
Hurram, see Mus.t.afa ibn Hurram al-Mostar.
Hallikan, Ahmad ibn Mu
Ibn hammad, Wafayat al-a#yan, Bulaq (Cairo), 1299/
. .
18811882. Translation: Ibn Khallikans Bibliographical Dictionary, 4 vol; d. de
Slane, Paris, 18421871.
Ibrahm Opiyac, Risala f manaqib as-Say h Yuyo ibn Yusuf al-Mostar, autograph:
GHB, R 3858. Edition: O. Music, Ibrahim Opijac Mostarac, POF, X
XI/19601961, Sarajevo, 1961, pp. 3153. Translation: M. Mujic, Biogra-
fija Mustafe Ejubovica (Sejh Juje), GVIS, VII/13, Sarajevo, 1965, pp. 1
22.
Kah. h . ala, #U.R., Mu#gam al-mu"allifn, 15. vol. Damask, 13761380/19571961.
. , Hulas. at al-atar, Mis.r (Cairo), 1284/18671868.
Muhibb
Mus.t.afa ibn Hurram al-Mostar, Nizam al- #ulama", manuscript: OZ HAZU,
.
N 86.
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Nag , Esam, Istanbul, 1308/18901891.

Na#ma, Tarh-i Na#ma, Vol. IVI, Istanbul, 1293/18751876.

aluddn, Ahbar al- #ulama" bi ahbar al-h. ukama". Ed. G. Lippert, Leip-
al-Qift., Gam
zig, 1903.
Sreyya (Turayya), Mehmed, Sigill-i #utman, 4 vol., Istanbul, 13081315/1890
1898.
Taskprzade, #Isamuddn Ahmad, . As-saqa"iq an-nu #maniyya f #ulama" ad-dawla
al- #utmaniyya (printed as marginalia to: Ibn Hallikan, Wafayat al-a#yan), Bulaq
(Kairo), 1299/18811882.
, Es-Saqa"iq en-No#maniyya von Taskprzade. Translation: O. Rescher, 2 vol.,

Istanbul, 19271934.
Yaqut, Sih abuddn, Mu#gam al-udaba". Ed. Margoliouth, 7 vol., Leiden, 1907
1926.
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INDEX OF PERSONAL NAMES
#Abdulkarm, Mawla, 26 112n221, 113, 113n228, 113n230,

Ablard, Pierre, 81, 145, 156 115, 115n234, 117, 117n236,
al-Abhar, Atruddn, 19, 19n41, 38, 117n238, 117n240, 118n242,
38n40, 38n41, 39, 40, 48, 53, 55, 118n245, 118n246, 118n248,
56, 95n154, 111, 130n306, 151, 174, 119n252, 120, 120n258, 122,
176 122n266, 122n267, 124, 124n274,
Abu Bisr Matta ibn Yunus, 12, 15 127n294, 128n297, 128n298,
Abu #Utman ad-Dimasq, 12 129, 130, 130n310, 131, 131n311,
Aegidius, 167 131n314, 132, 133, 133n318, 134,
. (el-Akhdhari), #Abdurrah-
al-Ah. dar . 135, 135n323, 135n324, 141, 143
man, 176, 176n20 147, 149, 150, 154156, 159, 160,
Ahlwardt, W., 2, 181n34 160n53, 161, 161n55, 162166,
Ahmad
. b. Husayn,
. from Ljubuski, 166n71, 167, 170, 171, 179, 180,
41n50 182, 182n37, 184, 185, 185n46,
Ahmad
. b. Husayn,
. from Mostar, 193, 195, 196, 198, 200, 205208,
45n57 211213
Albert von Sachsen, 150 Arnaldez, Roger, 21n54, 183n38,
Albertus Magnus, 146, 147, 167 190n66
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 65, al-As#ar, Abu al-Hasan,
. 188,
66n34, 161, 204 188n59, 189
Anawati, Georges C., 16, 16n27, 170,
170n3, 187n55, 188 Bacon, Roger, 194, 194n1
Andrija Kotorvarosanin (Kotoranin), Badawi, Abdurrahman, 9, 10n5
153n34 Bagdad, Isma#l-basa , 31n15, 33,
Ans.a r, Mawla Ahmad,
. 27 33n20
Anselm, 145 Bakos, Jan, 129n300
Antun Medo (Antonius Medus), 148, Barbaric, Damir, 148n17, 165n69
148n20 al-Barmak, 11
Aristoteles (Aristotle), 2, 4, 1018, Basagic, Safvet-beg, 1, 14n22, 26n2,
20, 48, 58, 58n1, 64n25, 65, 31n15, 36n35
65n26, 65n27, 65n28, 65n29, Baseskija, Mula Mustafa, 48n63
65n30, 65n31, 65n33, 66n34, 67, Bazala, Albert, 148n21, 156, 156n45,
69n42, 71n54, 71n55, 72, 72n58, 157, 163n63
72n59, 73n67, 74n69, 76, 76n80, Bejtic, Alija, 48n63
77n83, 77n84, 77n86, 77n87, 82, Benkovic, Benko, 148
83, 83n109, 84, 84n112, 84n113, Bilgegil, Kaya M., 181n35
86, 86n121, 86n122, 87, 88n128, Black, Deborah L., 127n293
90n136, 92n144, 92n146, 94, Blaskovic, Jozef, 14n22, 31n15, 49n67
95n158, 96, 97n164, 100, 100n181, Bochenski, I.M., 144n4, 150n25
101, 104, 107, 107n202, 109n211, Boethius, 93, 94n151, 144, 144n4, 145
230 index of personal names
Boltaev, M.N., 180n29

Ejubovic, Mustafa Sejh Jujo, see
Bosnjak, Branko, 80, 80n97, Mus.t.afa b. Yusuf Ayyub-zade
143n1, 144n4, 145n5, 145n9, al-Mostar
154n37, 155n40, 156n44, 157n46, Elamrani-Jamal, A., 67n37, 138n38,
164n68 183, 183n39
Brida, Marija, 148n17, 148n18, 167, Engels, Friedrich, 194, 194n2
167n74, 167n76 Ess, Josef van, 174, 178n25, 189
Brockelmann, Carl, 2, 10, 11n8, Euclid, 118, 134, 134n321, 134n322
12n10, 12n14, 13n17, 13n21, Eudemus, 161
17n33, 18, 18n35, 18n36, 18n37,
19n40, 19n41, 19n42, 19n43, Fakhry, Majid, 17n33
19n44, 19n46, 19n47, 20n49,
al-Fanar, Samsudd n ibn Hamza,
.
20n50, 20n51, 20n52, 21n54, 20, 20n51, 20n52, 31, 31n13, 39,
26n2, 27n3, 31n13, 31n15, 33n21, 39n44, 45, 176, 197
34n25, 34n26, 34n27, 36n35, al-Farab, 2, 9n2, 12, 13, 13n21,
38n40, 39n44, 44n53, 44n54, 14, 14n21, 14n22, 15, 17, 18, 21,
45n55, 45n56, 45n58, 60n9, 22, 44, 58, 60, 60n8, 63, 64,
60n10, 60n11, 60n12, 75n75, 64n23, 64n24, 105, 107, 107n205,
75n76, 76n79, 124n276, 126n283, 127n292, 129, 135, 137, 137n329,
126n286, 126n287, 152n31, 141, 145147, 167, 170, 171, 180,
163n66, 172n12, 185n47, 185n48, 185, 186n50, 193, 196, 197
185n49, 186n53 Filipovic, Muhamed, 173n14
Brunschvig, Robert, 178n25 Filipovic, Nedim, 22, 22n58, 144n4
el-Buhi, Kamel, 36n32, 48n63, 51, Filipovic, Vladimir, 203
51n71, 75, 75n77 Fleischer, H.O., 2
Buridan, Jean, 150 Flgel, Gustav, 52
Burleigh, Walter, 150 Francisco of Toledo, 150
Caponigri, A.R., 147n14 Gafurov, B.G., 9

Cicero, 165 Galen (Galenus), 17, 82, 83, 107,
Corbin, Henry, 66n34, 66n35, 107n204, 160
122n267, 181n32, 185n44, 185n49, am, Mawla, 32
G
186n50, 188n57 Gardet, Louis, 187n55, 188
al, 18, 18n37, 18n38, 18n39,
al-Gaz
Daiber, Hans, 10, 10n4, 14n21, 19, 19n39, 21, 135, 135n325, 189,
16n26, 17n33, 18n34, 145n10, 174 190
Danes-Pazuh, M.T., 11n8 Gerard de Crmon, 146
Descartes, Ren, 165 Gilson, tienne, 148n19
Dominicus Gundissalinus (Gondis- Goichon, A.-M., 9, 16n28, 45n55,
alvi), 145 59n2, 59n5, 62n19, 66n34, 72n59,
Dragisic, Juraj, 147, 147n15 74n70, 77n87, 80n100, 80n101,
Dunlop, D.M., 9, 13n21 82n106, 88n128, 90n136, 92n144,
Duns Scotus, 81, 146148, 148n19, 102, 104n193, 121n263, 129n300,
148n21, 150, 156, 157 138, 139n332, 140n333, 147n16,
148n19, 161, 161n57, 170n2, 203
Edwards, 9n1 Goldziher, I., 21n53, 186n51, 186n52,
Egidius, 147 186n53
index of personal names 231
Grassi, Ernesto, 165n69, 165n70 158n47, 162n61, 166, 166n72, 174,

Grozdanic, Sulejman, 31n15, 36n35 176, 190n69, 195, 200
Grunebaum, G.E. Von, 174, 178n25, Hasan Kafija Pruscak, see Hasan .
189n60 hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r
Gucetic, Nikola, 148 Hasandedic, Hivzija, 48n63, 48n64
f, 20,
ga n, as-Sayyid as-Sar
al-Gur Heath, P.L., 94
20n50, 20n52, 34, 34n27, 39, 45, Hiti, Filip (Hitti, Philip), 10n5,
77n87, 86n119, 180, 197 12n10, 13n17, 136n327, 146n11
Gutas, Dimitri, 9, 11n6, 16n26, Hrkac, Serafin, 153n34, 153n35
17n32, 174 Hubay
. s ibn al-Hasan,
. 12
Gyekye, Kwame, 9, 38n41 Hugo of St. Victor, 155
al-Hunag, Afdaludd
. n, 45, 60n9

. gg Halifa,
Ha Mus.t.afa (Katib
), 26n2, 33,
Hunayn
. ibn Ish. aq (Joanitius), 12
alab 33n23 Hurram, Mus.t.afa b. al-h . ag g b.
, .., 9, 9n2, 170n4,
Hurram al-Mostar, 36, 36n34
186n50 Abdel Latif es-Sayyid, 31,
Husein
Hall, 185 31n15, 36n32, 75, 75n77, 183n38,

Hamilton, William, 94, 159 187n54
Hammer, Joseph von, 26, 26n2
al-Hanaf
. , Muhammad
. at-Tibrz, Ibn al-#Abbas, #Abdullah, 186,
126 186n52
Handzic, Mehmed, 31n15, 36n35, Ibn Haldun, 18, 18n39, 46n59, 136,
48n63, 50, 50n69, 50n70, 51,
136n326, 151, 151n29, 172, 175,
51n71, 51n74, 52n77 189, 189n63
Harun ar-Rasd, 11 Ibn Hazm,
. 21, 190
Hasan
. hi
Kaf al-Aq . s.a r, 20n52, Ibn al-Muqaa#, 11, 185, 186n105
22, 22n57, 27, 28, 28n6, 28n7, Ibn al-Qasim ar-Raqq, 11
29, 30, 31n14, 46, 50, 52, 59, Ibn Bihrz, 11n8
60, 61, 61n15, 63, 68, 68n39, Ibn Na#ima, 11
68n40, 69, 69n42, 69n49, 70n53, Ibn Rusd (Averroes), 2, 17, 17n33,
71n57, 72, 72n58, 72n61, 72n62, 18n34, 64n23, 145147, 147n17,
73, 73n64, 73n66, 74, 74n71, 148, 161, 163, 167, 193
76, 76n81, 77n85, 78, 78n89, Ibn Sna (Avicenna), 2, 5, 15, 15n26,
78n91, 79n92, 79n93, 84, 84n111, 16, 16n28, 16n29, 1722, 31, 44,
84n114, 85n116, 85n118, 86n121, 44n52, 45n55, 52, 56, 58, 59,
87, 88n127, 89, 89n131, 90n134, 59n2, 60, 60n8, 64, 64n23, 64n25,
90n136, 91n142, 92n143, 92n145, 65, 65n26, 66, 79, 80, 80n100,
92n146, 93n148, 93n150, 95n154, 80n101, 81, 82, 82n106, 83, 84,
95n158, 96n160, 96n162, 97, 84n115, 88n128, 90n132, 93,
97n165, 97n168, 98n171, 100n178, 94, 94n151, 95n158, 96, 96n159,
100n181, 103n189, 107, 107n201, 97n163, 98, 99, 99n177, 100,
107n205, 108n207, 108n209, 101, 101n185, 102, 102n187, 103,
109, 109n211, 110, 110n215, 105, 107, 107n205, 113, 114n231,
111, 111n216, 113n226, 117n241, 117n238, 119n252, 122n265,
117n242, 119n253, 120, 120n258, 122n267, 127n292, 129, 129n305,
121n261, 123, 127n292, 128n297, 130, 131, 131n312, 131n313, 132
128n298, 129n302, 130n306, 142, 136, 138, 140n333, 141, 145, 147,
148, 148n21, 151, 154, 156, 157, Lejewski, Czeslav, 161n56

159, 161, 161n57, 162, 162n61, 165, Ljubovic, Amir, 26n1, 27n4, 29n9,
167, 171, 171n9, 172, 180, 181, 193, 37n35, 38n41, 49n66, 174n16
194, 196, 197 Lukasiewicz, Jan, 166
Ibrahm b. Ramad . an, 32, 36, 50,
50n70, 51, 51n71, 52, 54n83, 196, al-Ma"mun, 11
203, 204, 209 Madkour, Ibrahim, 9, 10n5, 11n9,
al-Ibras, 183n38 12n10, 12n13, 14n21, 16n29,
g, Adududd
al-I . n #Abdurrahm. an, 16n30, 21n53, 21n54, 77n86,
75, 75n75, 126, 126n286, 189 80n97, 80n99, 81n103, 82n106,
Inaldzik, Halil, 21n55, 32n16, 92n144, 94n153, 96n159, 102,
173n13, 174n16, 189n64 102n186, 107n205, 120n254,
#Isa ibn Yahy. a, 12, 15 131n312, 131n314, 159, 159n49,
al-Isfahan, Mahm . ud ibn #Abdur- 159n50, 172n10, 183n38, 185n46,
rahman, 45n55 189n61, 190n68
al-Isfara"in, #Is.a muddn, 75 Makdisi, George, 124n277, 174, 175,
Ish
. aq ibn Hunayn,
. 12 177n23, 178n24, 178n25
Ivic, Milka, 145n6 Markovic, Franjo, 148n22
Marmura, Michael E., 9
Jelinic, Julijan, 147n15 Marth, Mikls, 74n72, 83, 89n107,
Johannes Hispalensis, 145 93, 94n151, 144n4, 169n1
Jolivet, Jean, 146 Marulic, Marko, 147
Juraj Dubrovcanin (from Dubrov- Melanchton, Phillip Schwarzeret,
nik), 148n17, 166, 167 164
Merx, A., 183, 183n38
Kacic Miosic, Andrija, 148, 148n21, Meyerhof, M., 9
150n26, 153, 156, 157, 200 Mez, Adam, 174
Kamaluddn b. Yunus, 19, 19n40, Miliband, S.D., 9n2
45 Moody, Ernest A., 76n80, 145n7,
Kant, Immanuel, 90, 149, 149n23 150n24, 159n52, 161, 161n54,
Karam, Yusuf, 131n314 161n59, 163n65
Karatay, Fehmi Edhem, 34n24 Muftic, Teufik, 136n328
al-Katib, Nagmuddn al-Qazwn, Muhammad
. ibn Musa #Allamak,
19, 19n43, 33, 33n21, 34, 35, 40, 20n52, 22, 31, 31n15, 32, 33,
41, 45, 60n12, 111, 163, 174 33n18, 33n21, 34, 34n24, 35,
Kemura, Sejfudin, 48n63, 55, 36, 36n32, 51, 51n75, 52, 52n76,
55n89 54n83, 61, 68n39, 70n53, 79n93,
al-Kind, 13, 13n17, 21, 137n329, 171 80n98, 81, 81n104, 83, 83n110,
Klima, Gyula, 75n78 84n111, 86n121, 87n126, 88n127,
Krat, A., 2 90n136, 91n142, 92n145, 95n154,
Krstic, Kruno, 147n15 96n161, 96n162, 98n172, 100,
100n181, 103n189, 107n201,
Ladan, Tomislav, 147, 147n17 109n212, 110n215, 111, 111n218,
Lameer, Joep, 9, 15n23 112, 112n222, 113, 113n227,
Lastric, Filip, 153, 200 116n235, 117n241, 121, 121n262,
Leaman, O.N.H., 174 123n269, 123n270, 127n292,
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 143 128n298, 130n306, 131n313, 133,
133n316, 134, 141, 142, 154, 187, 120n259, 120n260, 121n262,

187n54, 190n69, 195 121n264, 122n265, 123, 123n269,
Muhammad
. ibn Mus.t.afa al- 123n270, 123n272, 124126,

Caynaw , 48, 49, 49n68, 50, 127n292, 128n297, 128n298,
54, 60n8, 68n39, 70n53, 75, 129, 129n302, 129n303, 131,
79n93, 86n121, 88n127, 91n142, 131n313, 131n314, 133, 133n316,
92n145, 95n154, 96n162, 100n181, 134, 134n320, 134n321, 141,
103n189, 107n201, 110n215, 111, 142, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158n47,
117n241, 123n269, 127n292, 161, 165167, 167n75, 168, 176,
128n298, 130n306, 131n313, 196 177, 180, 190n69, 195, 199,
Muhammad
. ibn Yusuf al-Bosnaw, 200
50, 51n71, 54, 68n39, 79n93, Music, Omer, 36n33, 190n69
88n127, 91n142, 92n145, 95n154,
100n181, 107n201, 110n215, 111, (Ibn) an-Nadim, 9, 10n5, 12n10
117n241, 123n269, 127n292, Nametak, Fehim, 27n4
128n298, 130n306, 196 Nasr, Seyyed Hosein, 171n7, 172n11,
. , 31n15, 33, 33n18, 33n19
Muhibb 174n15
Mujic, Muhamed, 36n33, 36n35,
38n37, 46n60, 177n22 Ockham (Occam), William, 73n64,
Music, Muhamed Allamek, see 150, 156
Muhammad . ibn Musa #Allamak Olesnicki, Aleksej, 53, 55
. ar, 32
Mus.t.a fa-pasa Silahd
Mus.t.afa b. Hidr . al-Adirnaw, 34n24 Pajnic, Erna, 148n20
Mus.t.afa b. Y usuf Ayyub-zade al- Pellat, Charles, 136n327
Mostar, 20n52, 22, 35n31, 36, Perler, Dominik, 19n39
36n35, 3741, 44, 44n52, 45, Petronijevic, Branislav, 108n209
45n55, 45n57, 46, 47, 47n61, 48, Petrus Hispanus, 146, 150, 152
49, 49n65, 50, 51n71, 52n76, Picco della Mirandola, G., 146, 147
53, 54, 54n81, 55n87, 60, 60n8, Pierre de la Rame (Petar Ramus),
6164, 64n25, 65, 68n39, 69, 164
70, 70n50, 70n53, 72, 75, 76n81, Pilav, Omer, sin Saliha, 55n85
78n91, 79, 79n92, 79n93, 79n95, Pines, S., 17n32
80, 80n100, 80n102, 81, 81n104, Plato, 80n100, 82n106, 86, 145, 147,
83, 83n110, 84n111, 85n117, 155, 160, 170, 197
86n121, 87, 87n125, 88n126, Plotin, 64n24
88n127, 90n136, 91, 91n142, Porphyry, 11, 14, 16, 38, 38n41, 74,
92n143, 92n145, 93n148, 94, 76, 76n80, 77n86, 78n90, 145,
95n154, 96n161, 96n162, 98n172, 148, 154, 159
100, 100n181, 102, 103, 103n189, Prantl, Carl, 146n11, 174
103n190, 103n191, 104, 105, Prior, A.N., 2n2, 9n1, 76n80, 99n177,
105n196, 106n199, 107, 107n201, 107n204, 122n267, 128n299,
107n205, 108, 108n209, 109n213, 143n2, 144n4
110n215, 111, 111n218, 112, 113, Priscian, 145
113n225, 113n227, 113n229,
114n231, 115, 115n233, 116, Qara Yilan, 27
116n235, 117, 117n241, 118, 119, aluddn, 9, 10n5, 11n8,
al-Qift., Gam
119n249, 119n253, 120n255, 12n10
Quintilian, 165 at.-Tabar

. , Muhammad
. r,
b. Gar
Qust.a ibn Luqa, 12 186, 186n53
Tabit ibn Qurra, 12
ar-Raz, Fahruddn, 18, 18n39, 21, at.-Taw
. anis, 183n38

39, 44, 44n53, 44n54, 189n62, 197 Theodor (Tadhar), 11
. an, 19,
ar-Raz, Qut.buddn at-Taht Theophrastus, 107, 107n204
19n47, 33n21, 34, 60n11 Thomas Aquinas, 81, 146, 156
Reig, Daniel, 131n314 Thomas, Ivo, 143n2, 163, 163n62,
Renan, E., 9, 18, 183, 183n38 163n64, 163n65, 165n69
Rescher, Nicholas, 9, 9n1, 10, 10n5, Trako, Salih, 48n64, 52n78
11n7, 12, 12n10, 12n11, 12n14, at-Taftazan, Sa#duddn Mas#ud, 19,
13, 13n17, 13n19, 13n21, 14n21, 20n49, 34, 34n25, 108, 189
15, 15n24, 17n31, 17n32, 18, . us, Nas.ruddn, 19, 19n42, 34,
at.-T
19, 20n52, 21n53, 93, 109n212, 34n26, 36, 44, 44n54
151n28, 158, 158n48 at-Tustar, Sa#id al-Yaman, 19,
Rieu, Ch., 2 19n46
Roscelin, 145
Rudolph, Urlich, 19n39 Urmaw, Sirag uddn, 18, 27, 27n3,
an, 126,
ar-Rum, Mas#ud as-Sirw 31, 45, 60n10
126n283 Ussaq (Ussaq-zade), 33
. 53, 54, 54n82, 55,
Uzicawal, Fadil,
Sabra, A.I., 9, 10n5, 13, 13n18, 68n39, 79n93, 88n127, 91n142,
13n20, 21n54 92n145, 95n154, 96n162, 100n181,
. ba, Gam
Sal l, 64n23 107n201, 108n209, 110n215,
as-Samarqand, Samsudd n, 45, 124, 111, 117n241, 123n269, 127n292,
124n276, 125 128n298, 130n306, 196
al-Sarahs, Muhammad b. Ahmad
b. Ab u Bakr .Sams

.
al-A#imma, 177 Valla, Lorenzo (Lorenzo della Valle),
Schacht, J., 190n67 164
Sharif, M.M., 14n21, 64n23, 64n24 Vasoli, Cesare, 147n15
Sherwood, William, 152, 159
Veljacic, Cedomil, 63n22, 67n36,
Smailagic, Nerkez, 171n9, 186n51, 74n70, 96n159, 156n43, 170n2
186n53, 188n55 Versteegh, C.H.M., 174, 184,
Socrates, 82n106, 160 184n42, 184n43
Soheil, A., 70n52
Susic, Hasan, 172n11 Wahrmund, Adolf, 104n192
Sabanovi c, Hazim, 3, 22n57, 26n2, Walzer, R., 9

31n15, 33n17, 33n18, 33n22, Wansbrough, J., 184, 184n43
36n35, 37n36, 52n77, 52n78, 55, Weiss, Bernard G., 75n73
55n90, 126n288, 190n69 Windelband, Wilhelm, 73n64, 81,
sic, Bogdan, 67n38, 90n135,
Se 81n103, 144n4, 145, 145n8, 146,
154n36, 166n73, 179n27 146n12, 156n44, 193, 194n3
as-S raz, Qut.buddn, 19, 19n44
Sojat, Z., 147n15 . a ibn #Ad, 12

Yahy
. a ibn al-Bit.rq, 11
Yahy
Taskpr-zade, Ahmad,
. 172, 172n13, Yusuf b. Murad, 37
181n34
Zabaralla, Giacomo, 163 Zuzoric, Flora (Cvijeta), 148

Zakuev, A.K., 9, 21n53
Zdralovic, Muhamed, 39n45, 53,
Zeller, Eduard, 159 53n79, 55, 55n86, 126n288
Zimmermann, F.W., 14n21
INDEX OF ENGLISH LOGICAL TERMS
Absolute (judgment), 95, 95n156, 115n232, 116, 162, 190, 198, 209,
117, 118, 122, 123 214
Absolutely particular, 77 Ante res, 80, 81, 214
Abstract, 66, 80n101, 132, 139, 205 Antecedence, 91, 110, 111, 205, 212
Abstraction, 63, 66, 67, 79, 80, Antistrfon, 97n164
80n101, 205, 215 Ant thesis, 97n163, 215
Acceptable premisses, 128, 128n295, Apodictic (apodeictic syllogisms), 29,
212 39, 43, 47, 49, 53, 55, 117, 118, 121,
Accepted judgments, 100, 123, 128, 123, 130, 130n306, 133, 141, 164,
128n295, 208 198, 204, 209
Accidence, 38n41, 62, 77, 77n86, 84, Apparently known premiss, 130
85, 127, 211, 214, 216 Apparently true premiss, 130
Accident, 39, 61, 211 Archetype, 80n100
Accidental, 77, 132, 211, 216 Argument, 16, 33, 46n59, 62, 115,
Acquired intellect, 66, 66n34, 211, 116, 117n238, 123, 127n292,
212 128n295, 128n297, 130n310, 161,
Active intellect, 64, 65, 65n29, 66, 184, 185n46, 188, 189, 206, 208
211 Argumentation, 114n231, 116, 121,
Active intelligence, 66, 156 121n263, 122, 129, 130, 163, 178,
Actual (disjunctive judgment), 90 187, 188, 204, 206, 208, 209, 213,
Actual definition, 83, 206 214
Actual existence, 80, 157 Ars Nova, 146
Actual intellect, 65, 66n34, 211 Ars Vetus, 146
Actual meaning (signification), 74, Assent (assessment), 209
158, 206 Assertions, 29, 46, 47, 62, 63, 68,
Actually, 66, 102, 110 85n118, 86n121, 87, 116, 134
Adaequatio intellectus et rei, 87 Assertoric (judgment), 95, 95n156
Adequacy, 70, 87, 210 Attribute, 88, 88n128
Aequivocus, 73n65 Attribution, 86, 88n128, 92n146,
Armation, 71n55, 8688, 95n157, 104n192, 208
98, 108, 110, 205, 216 Attributive (judgment), 88, 88n128,
Armative (judgment), 88n128, 91 104n193, 206
94, 97n165, 97n166, 98, 98n174, Axiom, 43, 44, 66, 98, 103, 118, 124,
106, 108, 108n209, 162, 205, 213, 124n321, 135, 204
214, 216
After plurality (Lat. Post res), 80 Barbara (modus), 115
Amphiboly, 132 Before the plurality (things, Lat.
Analogous, 133, 157 Ante res), 80, 166, 214
Analogy (reasoning by analogy), 15, Bipartite (judgment), 91, 91n139,
43, 62, 99, 100, 100n180, 113, 115, 205, 213
238 index of english logical terms
Bramantip (modus), 108n206, Conception, 29, 30, 46, 47, 62, 63,
108n209 68, 134, 155, 181
Conceptualism, 79, 156
Calemes (modus), 108n208 Concluding, 99, 100, 134, 141, 215
Camestres (modus), 106n200 Conclusion, 4, 15, 30, 35, 41, 43, 46,
Categorematic (sign), 93, 157, 158 47, 51, 53, 57, 85, 96106, 108
Categorical (judgment, proposition, 118, 120124, 127133, 135n324,
premiss), 35, 42, 43, 47, 71, 8891, 140, 142, 150, 156, 164, 178, 179,
94, 102104, 110, 111, 161, 162, 187, 210, 214, 215
208, 213 Conclusion based on the absurd,
Categorical (syllogism), 15, 43, 71, 111, 112, 207, 219
102, 102n188, 104, 104n192, Condition, 15, 43, 78, 88n129, 89,
104n193, 109, 206 91, 106, 108, 114, 131, 209
Categories, 11, 14, 17, 18, 38n41, 72, Conditional (judgment, proposition,
73n67, 74n69, 7682, 145, 151, premiss), 15, 35, 42, 43, 47, 8891,
152, 154, 158, 159, 171, 180, 182, 93, 95n154, 98, 101, 104, 110, 142,
182n37, 184, 185, 213, 220 161, 204, 209
Causal argumentation, 119n252, 121, Conditional (syllogism), 47, 121, 204,
204, 214 209, 213
Causality, 116, 121, 135, 135n332, Conditional argumentation, 121,
211 121n263, 204
Cause, 66, 116122, 127, 130n307, Conditional-conjunctive (judgment,
133, 134, 139, 149, 166, 190, 211 proposition, premiss), 15, 89,
Cesare (modus), 106n198, 147n15 91, 104, 109, 122n265, 142, 199,
Changeable being, 167 213
Changeable body, 167 Conditional-disjunctive (judgment,
Circle, 92n116, 115, 127, 207, 213 proposition, premiss), 15, 89, 91,
Circulus vitiosus, 115, 116, 207 104, 109, 111, 142, 199, 213
Closer dierence, see: Dierentia Congruent, 81, 208
specifica Connected (syllogism), 35, 43, 47,
Closer genus, see: Genus proximum 101, 102, 104, 213
Cognition, 58, 6165, 67, 79, 79n94, Consequence, 91, 101n182, 108, 110,
80, 120n254, 132, 134, 147, 157, 111, 127, 161, 205, 214
160, 163, 179, 181, 187, 194, 207, Consequential meaning (significa-
209, 211 tion), 70, 207, 214
Common, 73, 73n67, 101, 118, 206, Content (of premiss, syllogism), 35,
209, 211 101, 101n184, 116, 130n210, 131,
Complete definition, 84, 206 134, 135, 209, 210, 214
Complete description, 84, 208 Contingency, 15, 95, 95n156, 96, 142,
Complete induction, 113, 114, 115, 216
212 Contradiction, 82, 97, 97n163,
Complex (syllogism), 43, 111, 112, 98n174, 112, 113, 127, 135n324,
119n251, 161, 208, 213 207, 212, 215
Complex (word), 71, 71n56, 87, 182, Contradictoriness (judgments,
204, 208, 214 propositions, premiss), 42
Comprehension, 47, 186, 212 Contraposition, 42, 47, 98, 98n174,
Concept, 209 211, 215
index of english logical terms 239
Contrariness (judgment, proposition, Demonstrative syllogism, 116, 121,

premiss), 42, 82, 97, 97n163, 128n297, 179, 204, 213
97n165, 97n166, 210, 212, 215 Denominated, 207
Contrary (Contrariness), 73, 96, 97, Denominator, 207
97n163, 97n165, 97n166, 206, 210, Denying inexistence (judgment,
212, 213 proposition), 90, 107, 113
Convention, 70, 72n58, 74n71, 209, Description, 39, 53, 60, 62, 63, 76,
216 82, 83n109, 84, 85, 85n116, 160,
Conventional (signification, 198, 208, 209
meaning), 69, 69n42, 69n43, Dialectic (dialectical syllogism), 29,
69n46, 70, 72, 182, 207, 209, 216 39, 44, 49, 53, 55, 116, 117, 122,
Conversion, 42, 47, 49, 86n120, 122n267, 123, 124, 127130, 151,
96100, 211 152, 164, 198, 205, 209, 213
Conviction, 85n118, 99, 100, 116, Dialektik thne, 122n267
119, 165, 205, 206, 216 Dierence, 38n41, 39, 70n52, 74, 77,
Conjunction, 89, 103, 122n265, 161, 82, 84, 97n165, 112n223, 167, 207,
216 212, 214
Conjunctive (judgment, proposition, Dierent, 74, 76, 101, 204, 207, 212
premiss), 43, 88, 89, 89n130, 91, Dierentia specifica, 70n52, 84, 117,
102, 104, 109, 110, 142, 161, 199, 167, 212
213, 216 Dimatis (modus), 108n206, 108n208
Coordination, 81, 82, 132 Direct reasoning, 42, 162, 190, 196
Copula, 87, 91, 91n139, 92, 93, 140, Disjunction, 90, 116, 161, 212
205, 208, 213 Disjunctive (proposition, premiss;
Corpus mobile, 167 judgment, syllogism), 15, 43, 89,
Correspondence, 87 89n130, 90, 91, 103, 104, 109111,
116, 142, 161, 199, 212, 213
De dicto, 158 Disparity (disparate), 82, 207
De re, 158 Dispute, 122, 130, 130n310, 209
Deductio ad apsurdum, 111, 207, 213 Distant genus, 78, 84
Deduction, 54, 55, 62, 76, 85n118, Divide syllogism, 114, 213
98, 99, 103, 105, 106, 108, Division, 76, 212
108n209, 109n211, 111, 115117,
132, 162, 179, 185, 187, 215 kthesis (notion definition), 15
Deductive conclusion, 113, 132, 141, Element, 64, 137, 204, 211
198 Emanation, 64, 64n24
Deductivism, 187 Emotional perceptions, 119, 216
Definite (judgment), 92, 92n146, 215 Empiricism, 193, 194, 201
Definition, 35, 39, 42, 53, 60, Ens mobile, 167
61n15, 62, 63, 67, 68, 76, 82 Epagog, 113n228
85, 104n195, 134, 135, 138, 160, Equipollence, 42, 98, 211
188, 198, 206, 209, 211 Equivalent, 81, 92, 92n143, 211
Definitiones quid nominis, 83 Equivocal, 73, 73n67, 208, 209
Definitiones quid rei, 83, 206 Eristic proof, 130, 130n310
Demonstration, 117, 117n238, Esse formaliter, 73n64
118n242, 121, 122, 122n266, Esse objective, 73n64
132, 133, 164, 165, 204, 207 Essence, 74n70, 77, 77n87, 78, 83, 84,
84n112, 85, 92, 100, 119n251, 138, Harmonic (congruent), 81, 208
139, 149, 155, 208, 214 Harmonic (word), 73
Essential, 77, 208, 212, 214 Harmonic meaning (signification),
Example, 62, 99, 115, 115n232, 70
115n234, 214 Hermeneutics (al-#Ibara, Bar
Exceptive (judgment), 102 armniyas), 14, 211
Existence in words, 157 Higher species, 78, 215
Experience based knowledge, 43, Homonym, 72, 73n67, 132, 208, 209
119, 119n252, 205 Homonymy, 132, 209
Experiment based knowledge, 43, Horisms, 134, 138, 160
119, 205 Hros, 104n195, 138
Explicative discourse (speech), 62, Hti, 122, 122n265, 122n266
209, 213 Hypographe, 83
External senses, 119, 206, 207 Hypothesis, 184, 212, 216
Hypothetical (judgment), 89, 90, 93,
Fallacia disjunctionis, 116 94
Fesapo (modus), 108n206, 108n208 Hypothetical (syllogism), 15, 102,
Figurative (meaning, signification), 102n188, 103, 144, 182
74, 205, 207 Hypothetical conjunction, 89
Figure (figures of syllogism), 35, 43,
52, 52n78, 54, 56, 85, 104110, Idea, 39, 42, 49, 63, 67, 68, 70, 73,
115, 116, 128n297, 131, 142, 162, 74, 7981, 156, 209, 211, 212
162n61, 163, 198, 199, 209 Identity, 81, 166
First knowledge, 118 Implication, 70n52, 91, 160, 161,
Five skills, 116, 117, 164 210
Five universal terms, 29, 30, 39, 47, Impossible (judgment), 95, 95n157,
53, 61n15, 68, 214 106, 207, 213216
Form, 45, 58, 64, 80, 80n100, In plurality (Lat. In rebus), 80
92n146, 116, 131, 138, 139, 209 In rebus, 80, 81, 214
Fresison (modus), 108n208 Incomplete conversion, 98, 98n169
Incomplete definition, 84, 206
General accident (accidence), 61 Incomplete description, 84, 208
General notion(s), 75, 76, 77n86, Incomplete disjunction, 116
7981, 99 Incomplete induction, 113115, 212
Generally accepted knowledge, 134 Incompletely complex, 71
Generally known judgments, 209 Indefinite (judgment), 88n128, 92,
Generally possible (judgment), 29, 92n146, 93, 215
95n158, 214 Indisputable (safe knowledge), 43,
Genus, 38n41, 39, 70n52, 73, 76 113, 113n230, 116118, 120n258,
78, 78n88, 81, 84, 114, 132, 156, 141, 198, 216
158160, 181, 205, 214 Individual, 35, 61, 77, 78, 80, 92,
Genus logicum, 81 92n146, 93, 112, 113n228, 115, 156,
Genus mentale, 81, 205 205, 207, 209, 213, 214
Genus minor (lower), 78, 205 Induction, 43, 47, 62, 99, 100, 113,
Genus naturale, 81, 205 113n228, 114116, 128n297, 160,
Genus proximum, 78, 84, 205 162, 196, 204, 212
Given name, 71, 71n56, 73 Inductive, 15, 113n228, 114, 142, 159
Inseparable accidence, 77, 77n86, Logic of judgments, 85, 160, 161

211, 214 Logica nova, 76n80, 146, 154, 193
Instantia negativa, 114 Logica vetus, 76n80, 146, 154
Intellect (intellectus), 62n19, 6367, Logical fallacy, 130n307, 152
69, 69n44, 69n47, 70, 87, 119, Logical supposition, 158
148, 153, 156, 157, 171, 208, 211, Lgos apofantiks, 88, 88n122
215 Lower species, 78, 215
Intellect in eect, 65
Intellectual (signification, meaning), Major premiss, 101106, 108n209,
80, 205209, 211 162n61, 163, 212214
Intellectus acquisitus, 66, 211 Major term, 101, 104, 115n234,
Intellectus agens, 211 120n256, 121, 138, 163, 205, 206,
Intellectus in eectu, 65 210, 214
Intellectus in habitu, 65, 211 Material intellect, 65, 211, 215
Intellectus materialis, 65, 211 Mathematical (judgment, syllogism),
Intellectus possibilis, 65, 148 94, 208, 213
Intelligence, 62, 64, 64n24, 66, 67, Mathematical logic, 149, 160
147, 156, 211 Matter, 63, 64, 130n210, 137, 214, 215
Intelligibilia, 65, 66, 211 Meaning (signification), 39, 47, 67
Intelligible, 63, 211 74, 83, 138, 141, 158, 182, 198,
Intentional existence, 128n307, 157 206, 207, 210, 211, 214126
Interfering, 81 Meaning (signification) by harmony
Internal (senses), 87, 119, 206 (congruity), 207
Interpretative speech, 29, 30, 39, 49, Middle genus, 78, 205
53, 55, 83, 213 Middle species, 78, 215
Intuition, 61, 6567, 114n230, 119, Middle term, 101, 104, 105, 107,
119n251, 120, 120n254, 206, 207, 107n208, 115, 120, 120n256, 121,
209 122n266, 162, 162n60, 162n61,
Intuitive knowledge (Intuition based 165, 206, 216
knowledge), 43, 120, 206, 209 Mind, 59, 61, 62, 62n19, 65, 66,
66n121, 69, 73, 73n64, 156158,
Judgment (Judging), 4, 5, 29, 30, 35, 185, 188, 205
39, 42, 43, 47, 53, 55, 57, 61n15, Minor premiss, 104106, 162n61,
62, 67, 68, 71, 82, 85104, 106, 163, 212
109111, 115, 116, 118120, 123, Minor term, 101, 104, 120n256, 121,
134, 140, 142, 152, 153, 155, 157, 206, 209
158, 160162, 176, 179, 182, 183, Mixed (syllogism), 35, 43, 92n144,
198, 199, 205210, 212216 99, 207
Judgments relation, 87 Modal (judgment, proposition), 35,
42, 95, 95n156, 96, 109n212, 142,
Knowledge, 4345, 53, 63, 66, 68, 161, 208, 213, 216
75, 99, 100, 111, 113, 113n230, Modality, 43, 88, 95, 95n154,
114, 116120, 122, 122n266, 123, 95n156, 109, 131, 216
125127, 130134, 141, 146, 149, Mode, 54, 58, 105111, 115, 158, 198,
151, 154, 164166, 171, 177, 179, 210
188, 193, 198, 204206, 209, 211, Modus ponendo ponens, 111
212, 216 Modus ponendo tollens, 111
Modus tollendo ponens, 111 Particle, 72, 72n60, 102, 103,

Modus tollendo tollens, 111 121n263, 122n265, 204, 208
Particular (judgment, proposition,
Name, 7173, 208 premiss), 63, 88n128, 92n146, 93,
Natural (signification, meaning), 69, 97n166, 97n167, 98, 106, 108, 146,
69n45, 69n48, 70, 80, 207, 210 204, 205, 207, 212
Natural, 81, 156, 205 Particular (notion, term), 35, 42, 77,
Necessary (judgment), 95, 95n157, 204, 205, 207
95n158, 210, 213 Particular-armative (judgment,
Necessary, 70, 70n53, 73, 96, premiss), 97n166, 106, 205, 213
113n230, 116, 122, 122n266, Particular-negative (judgment,
210, 214, 216 premiss), 97n166, 106, 205, 213
Necessity, 70n53, 95n156, 100n181, Perception, 61, 66, 67, 118119, 153,
130, 214 206, 207, 209, 216
Negation, 86, 87, 92, 95n157, Perception based knowledge, 118
95n158, 98, 108, 111, 206, 208, Personal, 77, 77n87, 207
211, 215, 216 Petitio principii, 131, 131n314, 209
Negative (judgment), 86n121, Phrase, 71
88n128, 91, 92, 94, 97n165, Polysyllogism, 111, 112, 112n220, 213
97n166, 98n174, 106, 108n209, Possible, 73, 95, 95n158, 96, 106, 213,
162, 205, 208, 211, 213, 214 214, 216
Negative term, 51n55, 85, 140, 162, Post res, 80, 81, 214
206, 211 Postulate, 44, 134, 134n322, 135, 209,
Nominal definition, 83, 206 216
Nominalism, 79, 79n94, 145, 156, Potential intellect, 65, 66, 66n34,
201 211, 213
Nominated, 68 Potentially, 66, 102
Nominator (significant), 68, 207 Practical truth, 117
Non-categorical, 90, 104, 104n193, Predicabilia, 76, 152
109, 110, 161, 206 Predicate, 76, 8792, 94, 95n157,
Not inclusive (judgment, proposi- 98, 98n174, 101, 104, 104n192,
tion), 90 105, 112n221, 118, 132, 140,
Notion, 4, 25n1, 57, 67, 72, 7482, 142, 157, 158, 160, 162, 162n61,
84, 101, 104, 114, 145, 180, 205, 163, 199, 205, 206, 211, 213,
206, 209, 212, 215 215
Premiss, 83, 85, 88n128, 101106,
Opposite, 81, 113, 204, 212 108112, 114118, 121123, 127
Opposition ( of judgments, 135, 138, 158, 160163, 165, 187,
propositions), 42, 47, 82, 86, 207, 209, 210, 212216
95n158, 96, 98, 98n172, 100, 106, Principle, 44, 46n59, 65n31, 69, 80,
112, 207, 210, 212, 215 122, 131, 133135, 204, 209
Opposition (terms, notions), 42, 82 Principle anticipation, 131
Principle of identity, 166
Pardeigma, 118, 118n234 Principle of reduction, 15
Paronym, 72 Probable premisses, 128
Partial meaning (signification), 70, Proof, 46n59, 66, 76, 85n118, 115,
70n52, 204, 207 116, 117n238, 121, 127, 129, 130,
130n310, 134, 135, 164, 176, 188, Scientific knowledge, 114n230, 117,
189, 204, 206, 207 118, 118n242, 123, 130n306, 132,
Proper (judgment), 92 133, 141, 164166
Properly possible (judgment), 95, Second intention, 158
95n158 Sense, 61, 63, 66, 118n248, 119n251,
Property (proper), 38n41, 39, 65n31, 119n252, 206, 211
77, 207, 214, 215 Sense based knowledge, 119, 206
Proposition, 43, 71, 71n55, 87, Sensible, 63, 167, 206
92n146, 96, 120, 120n258, Sensible things, 167
120n259, 121, 135n324, 205, Separable accidence, 77, 77n86, 211
206, 208, 211, 212, 214 Separate (separated, disconnected
216 syllogism), 35, 43, 47, 101, 103,
Proprium, 76, 207 104, 110, 205, 213
Si (argumentation), 121
Quality (of judgment, proposition), Sign, 6870, 93, 158, 181, 182, 207
87, 88, 91, 97n167, 98, 98n174, Significated, 68, 207
106, 108, 115n232, 131, 207, 208, Signification (meaning), 35, 206,
213, 214 207, 210, 211, 214
Quantification of predicate, 93, 94, Significator, 68, 207
158, 162, 199 Simple (idea, word, judgment),
Quantified (judgment), 92, 92n145, 42, 61, 71, 71n56, 157, 204, 212,
208, 213, 215 214
Quantifier, 92n146, 93, 94, 138, Singular (judgment), 93, 142, 199,
208 209, 213
Quantity (of judgment, proposition), Sophism, 129, 130, 130n307,
42, 88, 9294, 106, 131, 177, 206, 130n309, 132, 208, 212
214, 215 Sophistic (sophistical syllogism), 14,
Quattuor modi, 96 29, 39, 44, 49, 54, 55, 101n184,
Quia (argumentation; quia est), 121, 117, 122, 129, 130, 130n306,
210 130n309, 132, 137, 151, 158, 164,
Quick wit, 120, 120n256 165, 198, 208, 209, 212, 213
Quidditas, 77n87, 214 Sorites, 112
Quinque voces, 38n41, 209 Soul, 6467, 80, 138, 215
Species, 38n41, 39, 73, 7678, 153,
Rational thinking, 1, 119n254 159, 160, 181, 214, 215
Rationing, 153, 155, 158 Specific dierence, 70n52, 84, 117,
Real supposition, 158 167, 212
Realism, 79, 145, 155157 Spirit, 49, 62, 62n19, 63, 156, 208
Reality, 67, 73n64, 74n76, 78, Spiritual existence, 157
79n94, 87, 121, 179, 181, 183, Spoken (sign, signification,
208 meaning), 69, 69n43, 69n44,
Reduction, 109, 109n211, 204, 208 69n45, 70, 72, 157, 182, 207, 211,
Reduction of syllogism, 15, 109n211, 214
208 Sub-altered (judgment), 97, 97n167
Reflection, 85, 184, 212 Sub-alternation, 97, 97n166
Relation, 8790, 9698, 103, Sub-contrariness, 97, 97n166
104n194, 133, 210, 215 Sub-contrary (judgment), 97, 97n166
Subject, 70n51, 8795, 98, 98n174, The first principles, 65n31, 69, 135,
101, 104, 105, 112n221, 118, 204
122n265, 140, 157, 158, 162, Theoretical truth, 117
162n61, 163, 205, 206, 210, 213, Thinking, 1, 4, 5, 13, 21, 58, 59, 61,
215, 216 62, 62n19, 66, 67, 72, 80, 88, 99,
Subordination, 81, 97n167, 133 113n228, 119n251, 123, 136, 141,
Substantial form, 80n100 143, 146, 155, 164166, 171, 173,
Subsumtion by volume, 94 175, 178182, 194, 195, 198, 200,
Suggestive premisses, 128, 129n302, 201, 207, 210, 212, 215
207 Time, 72, 72n58, 90, 91, 93, 95, 96,
Summum genus, 78, 205 103, 120, 138, 208
Super-ordination, 81 Time-defined proposition, 96
Supposition of terms, 158, 208 Transferred (meaning, signification),
Syllogism, 15, 29, 35, 39, 43, 47, 74, 74n71, 215
5356, 61n15, 62, 6668, 71, 94, Transferred knowledge, 43, 120,
99104, 106, 109123, 127133, 120n258, 216
141, 144, 158, 161166, 179, 188, Tripartite (judgment), 91, 205, 213
190, 198, 205210, 212216 Truth, 13, 39, 41, 58, 65, 66, 74n70,
Syllogism based proposition 87, 98, 117, 120n258, 123, 126,
(Proposition based on syllogisms), 132135, 138, 141, 142, 171, 172,
43, 120 183, 191, 198, 206, 209, 214,
Syllogism of absurd (per impossibile; 216
deductio ad absurdum), 43, 207,
213 Universal (judgment, premiss),
Syllogism of contradiction, 112, 113, 88n128, 92n145, 93, 97n165,
207 97n167, 98, 106, 108, 108n209,
Syllogism of equality, 94, 103, 208 114n230, 211, 213, 214
Syllogistic (figure, conclusion), 30, Universal (term, notion; universalia),
52, 5456, 99, 101n184, 104, 29, 30, 35, 39, 42, 47, 53, 61n15,
105, 107n201, 111, 112, 115117, 63, 69, 73, 7581, 92n146, 145,
135n324, 142, 151, 162, 164, 165, 151153, 155157, 160, 198, 211,
190, 198, 199, 213 214
Syncategorematic, 93, 158 Universal-armative (judgment,
Synonym, 72, 74, 74n69, 81, premiss), 97n165, 98, 98n174, 106,
131n314, 207, 208 162, 205, 213, 214
Synonymy, 132 Universal-negative (judgment,
premiss), 97n165, 98n174, 106
Temporal interpretation of modal Univocal (univocus), 73, 73n63, 157,
judgments, 96, 96n161, 142 166, 216
Term, 25n1, 29, 30, 35, 38, 38n41, Unsafe (non-absolutely safe;
39, 42, 45, 47, 52, 53, 68, 7274, judgment, knowledge), 44, 123,
85, 101, 104, 105, 107, 107n208, 213
115, 115n234, 120, 120n256, 121, Unspoken (sign, signification,
138, 151, 156163, 165, 179181, meaning), 69, 69n46, 69n47,
184, 198, 204212, 214, 216 69n48, 70, 157, 207, 211, 214
Terminus, 104n195, 153 Untrue premisses, 87, 123, 130
The first intention, 158 Untruth, 87, 98, 138, 214
Verb, 40n47, 72, 72n59, 74n71, 157, Word, 29, 30, 35, 39, 42, 47, 52,
212, 214 53, 61n15, 62, 6874, 76, 77, 81,
Verbum mentale, 157, 182 83, 85, 87, 89, 9294, 98, 103,
Verbum vocale, 157, 182 104n195, 132, 155157, 181, 182,
Vicious circle, 127, 207 189, 198, 204, 208, 212, 214
INDEX OF ARABIC LOGICAL TERMS
Terms that are mentioned only in the Glossary of Logical Terms, are marked
with an asterisk (*).
ada(t), pl. adawat, 72, 72n60 awwaliyyat, 118, 118n245, 135

akbar, 101, 104, 121 ayna*
#aks, 42, 97, 97n164, 98, 98n169
#aks bast.* ba#d*
.
al-#aks al-mustawa, 42, 47, 98, ba#da al-katra, 80, 157
98n173 ba#d. *
#aks naqis, 98n169 bah. t, 35, 42, 60, 61, 124, 124n275,
#aks tamm, 98n170 165, 178
125,
#aks an-naqd, . 98, 98n174 Bar armniyas, 14
a la, 59, 59n5, 154 bast.*
alfaz. mu"allafat, 71 bi al-#arad*.
#amal* bi al-fi#l, 65, 102, 110
#amal, 65n26 bi al-hulf, 112n223, 116
#amm, 81, 95
bi al-quwwa, 65, 102
antaga* burhan, 14, 29, 39, 43, 47, 49, 117,
#aql, 64, 64n23, 64n25, 65, 66, 117n228, 121, 164
66n24, 118 burhan iniyy (burhan al-in), 121,
#aql #amal, 65n26, 110 121n263
#aql bi al-fi#l, 65, 102, 110, 116 burhan limiyy (burhan al-lima), 121,
#aql bi al-malaka, 65 121n263
#aql bi al-quwwa, 65, 102, 162 burhan, 47
#aql fa##al, 64, 65
#aql hayulan, 65 dalala, 47, 68, 158
#aql mustafad, 66, 66n34 . qiyya*
dalala haq
#aql nazar . * dalala t.ab#iyya g ayr lafziyya*
.
#aql sarh, . 118 dalala t.ab#iyya lafziyya*
.
#aql z . ahir* dalala #aqliyya g ayr lafziyya*
.
#aql (#aqliyya), 69, 80, 156, 171, dalala #aqliyya lafziyya*
.
171n9, 172 dalala #aqliyya*
#arad, . 77 dalala bi al-iltizam*
#arad. #amm, 61, 77 dalala bi al-mut.a baqa*
#arad. lazim, 77 dalala bi at-tadammun*
.
#arad. mufariq, 77 dalala manqula*
#arad. , 77 dalala wad#iyya*
.
as.g ar, 101, 104, 121 dalala wad#iyya
. g ayr lafziyya*
.
as.l, 185, 185 dalala wad#iyya
. lafziyya*
.
awsat., 101, 104, 121 dall, 68
248 index of arabic logical terms
dall, 68, 84 g uz"*

darb,
. 105107 g uz", 42, 77, 93, 139
darb
. #aq m*
darb
. munt.ig* hayula, 64, 137
. ur, 95
dar hayulan, 137
dawr, 127 h
. al*
dawran, 115 . amil, 88n128
h
didd,
. 82 hadd,
. 62, 84, 104n195, 134,
dat, pl. dawat, 95 138
at, 77
d hadd as.g ar, 101, 104
.
dihn, 59, 62, 62n19 hadd
. akbar, 101, 104
(dihniyya), 73
dihn hadd awsat., 101, 104, 121
.
hadd
. . q, 83
haq
fa##al* hadd
. kamil*
fas.l, 35, 42, 51, 77, 78n95, 91 hadd
. lafz., 83
fas.l ba#d* hadd
. mustarak*
fas.l dat* hadd
. naqis., 84
b, 167
fas.l qar hadd tamm, 84
.
f (ma#a) al-katra, 157 hads,
. 120, 120n254
fikr, 59 hadsiyy at, 120, 120n254
.
fi#l, 74n71 haml,
. 88n128, 104n192
haml
. , 42, 88n128, 104n192
g ayr haml
. , 104 hamliyya
. (hamliyy
. at), 42, 43, 80, 88
g ayr lafz., 68, 69, 182 . q, 77, 90
haq
g ayr muha . s.s.al, 92n144 . qa, 74, 74n70, 78, 138
haq
g ayr mumkin* harf,
. 72n60, 103
g ayr tamm, 71 h
. assa, pl. haw . ass*
g ayr yaqniyyat, 44, 123 haw
. ass z . ahira, 119
g adal, 24, 29, 39, 44, 49, 117, 122, . ass bat.ina, 119
haw
122n267, 123, 164 hikma,
. 16, 16n29, 60n8, 137, 171
g adal, 122n267 hikma
. #amaliyya*
g a zim* hikma
. nazariyya,
. 60
g awhar* hiss*
.
al-gawhar at-tan* hiss
. bat.in*
hiss
al-gawhar al-awwal* . z . ahir*
g iha, 43, 95, 95n156, 131133 . gg a, 62, 116, 206
hu
g ins, 77, 78, 84, 156 hukm,
. 86, 87
g ins al-agnas* habar, 86, 87
g ins #al* arig*
h
g ins #aql* arig (harigiyya), 73
h
g ins mant.iq* ass*
h
g ins mutawassit., 78 as.s.a, 77, 119
h
g ins qarb, 78, 84 as.s.*
h
g ins safil, 78 ..
hayyala, 128n300
g ins t.ab#* ta ba (hata ba), 24, 29, 39, 44, 49,
hi
g ins* . 117, 127, . 127n294, 164
g ism, 167 hulf, 112n223, 116

index of arabic logical terms 249
#Ibara (al), 11, 14, 185 ittifaq*

ibt.a l, 204 itbat*
idrak, 61
idrak al-mufrad, 61 kalima, 72, 72n59
idrak an-nisba, 62 kam, 139
id
. afa* kamm*
. af, 77
id kammiyya, 106, 131, 139
g a b* katra*
ihs 139
kayfa,
. as*
ihtilaf, 74, 82, 97n165 kayfiyya, 106, 131, 139
121, 190
#illa, kidb, 74n70, 87, 138
#illiyya, 116 a, 101, 104
kubr
#ilm, 59, 60, 72, 74, 75n73, 113, 166, kull*
167, 181 kull, 42, 77, 93, 139
#ilm a dab al-bah. t wa al-munazara, . kulliyyat, 29, 47
124, 124n275, 129, 165 al-kulliyyat al-hams, 47
#ilm al-ala*
#ilm al-mant.iq, 150 la nihaya, 140
#ilm al-mzan, 60 . 29, 30, 42, 47, 72, 132,
lafz. (pl. alfaz),
#ilm nazar . * 181
#ilm al-wad#, . 72, 75, 181, 182 lafz. mufrad*
iltizam, 70, 70n53 lafz. murakkab (mu"allaf), 87, 182
imkan, 96 lafz. (lafziyya),
. 68, 69, 182
imtina#* lazim*
in, 121, 121n263, 122, 122n265, 204 limiyy, 121
infis.a l* luzum, pl. lawazim, 42
infis.a l, 104
infi#al* mabda" (pl. mabadi"), 29, 30, 44, 133,
inniyy, 121, 121n263 134
intag , 43 madda, 101, 116, 131, 137
intiza#* madd*
ag u g , 151, 174, 176, 195, 196
Is maddat al-qiyas, 101, 101n84
ism, 72, 73 ma#dul, 92, 92n143, 162
ism muha . s.s.al* ma#dula*
ism musakkik* maga z, 74
ism mustarak* maga z*
ism mutaradif* maghul, 62
is.t.ilah,
. pl. is.t.ilah
. at* mafhum, 47
is.t.ilah. , 74n71 mahiyya (pl. mahiyyat), 42, 77,
istitna", 103 77n87, 84, 139
istitna", 43, 101, 102 . um #alayhi, 90n136
mahk
a", 43, 47, 62, 100, 113, 113n228
istiqr . um bihi, 90n137
mahk
istiqra" naqis., 113 . ul, 88n128, 90, 90n137, 101,
mahm
istiqra" tamm, 113 104n192
istirak* mah. s.u ra, 42, 92, 92n146
ittis.a l* mahs
. us*
ittifaq, 96 . usat, 61, 63, 119
mahs
mahs.u s., 92 muhtalif, 74

makan*
muhtalif an, 82
malaka, 65n31 t, 43
muhtali
ma#lumat, 61 .
mulk*
ma#na, pl. ma#an(in), 42, 64n23, 132, mumatala, 115n232
181 mumkin*
mant.iq, 11n8, 37, 38, 4042, 45, 46, mumkina, 95, 95n158
54, 59n6, 61, 61n17, 68n39, 78n91, mumtani#*
86n121, 87n125, 138, 150 mumtani#a, 95
mant.iq, 80, 156 mun#akis*
ma#qul (pl. ma#qulat), 11, 47, 61, 63, munazara,
. 124, 124n275, 127, 176,
137 178
al-ma#qulat at-taniya, 66 munfas.il, 43, 89, 109
u la, 65
al-ma#qulat al- muntig*
ma#rifa* muqaddam, 91
mas"ala, pl. masa"il, 44, 133, 135 muqaddima, 35, 42, 46, 46n59, 47,
mashurat, 123 101, 101n183, 134
mata* muqaddima kubra, 101, 104
mat.lab* muqaddima s.ugra, 101, 105
mat.lab ayyu* muradif*
mat.lab hal* murakkab, 43, 71, 87, 101, 111,
mat.lab lima* 182
mat.lab ma* murakkab g ayr tamm, 71
mat.lub, 101n182, 131 murakkab tamm, 71
mawd . u# (pl. mawd . u#at), 42, 44, 61, musallamat, 123, 128n295
90, 90n136, 101, 133 musawwara, 92n146
. unat, 128, 128n296
mazn musaw*
mital, 115n232 mustafad, 66, 66n34
ar al-#ulum, 60n8, 154, 190
mi#y mustawa, 42, 47, 98, 98n173
mi#yar, 18n38 mus.a dara*
mu"allaf, 72 mus.a dara #ala al-mat.lub, 131,
mu#arrif, 47 131n314
mud. af* musa g aba, 130, 130n310
mudrak* musa hada, 119n251
mufrad, 42, 61, 71 musa hadat, 118, 118n248
mufradat, 42 mustarak, 73, 73n67
muga lat.a (maglit.a), 14, 29, 39, 49, mut.a baqa (mut.a biqa), 70, 70n54, 87,
117, 122, 130, 130n307, 137, 164 138
muga lit.* mut.a biq*
mugarrad* mut.laq (mut.laqa), 95, 95n155
mugarrabat, 119, 119n252 muta"ahhirun, 108n209, 189n62
mug ib (mugiba), 91 mutabayin*
muhayyilat, 128, 128n300 mutabayinan, 81

muhmal* mutadahila, 97, 97n167
muhmala, 92, 92n146 mutad
. ayif*
muha. s.s.al, 189n62 mutamatil(un)*
an)*
muha. s.s.ala* mutaqabil(
index of arabic logical terms 251
mutaradif, 74, 74n69, 81 qadiyya

. muhmala, 92
mutasawiyan, 81 qadiyya
. mumkina, 95, 95n158
mutawassit., 78 qadiyya
. mumkina #amma, 95
mutawat.i", 73, 73n63 qadiyya
. mumkina has.s.a, 95
mutawatirat, 120, 120n257 qadiyya
. mumtani#a, 95
muttas.il, 43, 88, 89, 109 qadiyya
. mutadahila, 97n167
muwagg ah* qadiyya musawwara, 92n146
.
muwagg aha, 42 qadiyya
. muwagg aha, 42
qadiyya
. saliba, 91
nafs, 64, 65, 138 qadiyya
. s.ugra, 101, 104
naqd,. 42, 98, 98n174 qadiyya
. sahs.iyya, 92
natg a, 99, 101, 101n182 qadiyya
. sart.iyya, 88, 88n129
nat.iq, 180 qadiyya
. sart.iyya munfas.ila, 43, 89,
naw#, 77 109
naw# al-anwa#, 78 qadiyya
. sart.iyya muttas.ila, 43, 88,
naw# #al, 78 89, 109
naw# safil, 78 qadiyya
. tuna"iyya*
atiyya*
. 190
nazar, qadiyya
. tul

. , 65n26
nazar qadiyya
. waqtiyya, 96
nihaya* al-qadiyyat
. an ad-dahilatan tahta .

nisba, 62, 91 at-tad . add, 97n166
nisba hukmiyya,
. 87 al-qadiyyat
. an al-mutad . addatan*
qadiyyat
. an mutaqabilatan*
qabla al-katra, 80, 157 qadiyyat
. an mutaqabilatan bi at-ta-

. aya qiyasatuha ma#aha, 120
al-qad naqud*
qad
. aya dawat al-giha (muwagg aha), qawl, 62, 84, 100
42 qawl g a zim, 86
qadiyya,
. 29, 39, 42, 48, 86, 87, 100, qawl sa rih, . 29, 30, 39, 49, 62, 83,
101n183 83n109
qadiyya
. ba#diyya*
. qisma*
qadiyya
. bast.a* qiyas, 11, 14, 29, 39, 43, 47, 49, 54,
qadiyya
. da"ima, 96 55, 62, 99, 100, 100n180, 103, 116,
qadiyya
. . uriyya, 95, 95n157
dar 137, 190
qadiyya
. g ayr hamliyya*
. al-qiyas bi al-hulf, 112n223
qadiyya
. g uz"iyya, 93 qiyas burhan, 47
qadiyya
. g uz"iyya mug iba, 91 qiyas ad-dawr*
qadiyya
. g uz"iyya saliba, 91 . r*
qiyas dam
qadiyya
. hamliyya,
. 88, 88n128 qiyas g ayr haml . , 104
qadiyya
. ittifaqiyya, 96n160 qiyas g ayr kamil*
qadiyya
. kubra, 101, 104 qiyas g adal, 44, 49, 117, 122,
qadiyya
. kulliyya, 93 122n267, 123, 164
qadiyya
. kulliyya mug iba, 91 qiyas haml
. , 88n120, 104, 104n192
qadiyya
. kulliyya saliba, 91 qiyas hit.a b, 127, 127n294
qadiyya lazima* hulf, 43, 112
qiyas al-
. (qiyas al-in), 121
qadiyya
. ma h. s.u ra* qiyas iniyy
qadiyya
. mah. s.u s.a* qiyas iqt.iran, 47
qadiyya
. mug iba* qiyas istitna", 43, 47, 110

qiyas kamil* tad. add, 97

qiyas mant.iq, 100n180 ta"diya, 113n228
qiyas muga lit., see: muga lat.a tagrd*
qiyas muqassam, 114 tahl. l, 14
qiyas murakkab, 43, 101, 111 tal(in), 91, 110
qiyas al-musawat (al-musaw), 103 tamtl, 43, 62, 100, 115, 115n232
qiyas sufist.a ", 130n309 tanaqud, . 42, 47, 82, 97, 97n163
qiyas sart., 104 taqabul*
qiyas si#r, 128n298 t.arfan, 120
quwwa, 65, 102 ta#rf, pl. ta#rfat, 42, 43, 77n87, 83,
83n109, 86n119
rabit.a, 91 tarkb, 99
radd, 109, 109n211, 163n66 tasalsul*
radd al-qiyas* tas.awwur, pl. tas.awwurat, 29, 30,
rasm, 60, 62, 82, 84 46, 47, 61, 61n15, 62, 67, 68, 134,
Rt.u rqa, 127n294 139
tas.dq, pl. tas.dqat, 29, 46, 61, 61n15,
safsat.a, 44, 117, 122, 130, 130n309, 62, 67, 68, 116, 134
137, 164 tasbh*
salb* Tufqa*
salib (saliba), 91 t.ab#*
sur, 92n146, 138 t.ab# (t.ab#iyya), 69
sufist.a ", 137 t.ab#a*
Sufist.qa (safsat.a), 137 t.arf (t.araf), 120
s.idq, 74n70, 87, 138 tulat, 91
s.ifa* tuna", 91, 91n139
as.-s.ina#at al-hams, 116, 164
s.ugra, 101, 104 #umum, 81
s.u ra, 80n100, 116, 131, 138 #uns.ur, 64, 137
s.u ra al-qiyas* ust.uquss, 137
sabha bi al-haqq, . 130
sabha bi al-mashura, 130 . 44, 69n42, 72, 74, 75, 75n73,
wad#,
sahs., 77n86 181, 182
sah s., 77 wad#. , 69n42
sah s.iyya, 92 wigdaniyyat, 119
sakl, 43, 104, 105
sart., pl. sara"it, 43, 88n129, 89, 91, yaf#al*
101 yanfa#il*
sart., 42, 43, 139 yaqn, 56n91, 100
si#r, 14, 29, 39, 44, 49, 117, 127, 128, yaqniyyat, 43, 44, 113n230, 118, 123
128n298, 164
si#r, 128n298 zaman, 138
zamaniyya, 91
tadammana,
. 70, 70n52 zann,
. 100, 113, 113n230
tadammun,
. 70, 70n52
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The Works in Logic by Bosniac Authors in Arabic

Islamic Philosophy, Theology

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ljubovic, Amir, 1945-

Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

printed in the netherlands

Transcription Table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Chapter I. Development of Arabic Logic by the 16th Century . . . . . 9

Chapter II. Bosniac Authors and Their Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Chapter III. Characteristics of Works in the Field of

General Notion and Issue of Concluding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Chapter IV. Comparison: Bosniac Logicians and Logicians of

Chapter V. Logic in the Classical System of Islamic Sciences . . . . . . . 169

Glossary of Logical Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Sources and Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217

Index of Personal Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

=" =z =q

AHM Arhiv Hercegovine. Mostar

of Philosophy of the University of Sarajevo in 1988. The author, members of the

greb, 1970, p. 55.

The first group includes the activities related to collecting, critical

manuscripts in the country and abroad, it is not impossible that ongo-

the scientific transcription, DMG or ZDMG system (source: Deutsche

Logic in Arabic, first mentioned in the writings of Bosniac authors in

1 Eight-volume encyclopedia, New YorkLondon, 1967, Editor in Chief Paul Ed-

Arabic logic is very profuse. He paid special attention to al-Farab (see: -

the monumental work by C. Brockelmann Geschichte der arabischen Lit-

The first stage of Arabic logic, or its first century, as named by

4 See: Hans Daiber, Bibliography of Islamic philosophy, Vol. 1 (Alphabetical List of

al-Qift., Tarh, p. 171; C. Brockelmann, GAL, G I, 224227 (205207); I. Madkour,

A unique monument of translation activities is the manuscript of the

16 Manuscrit arabe, N 2346 (Anc. fond, 822).

These and other writings in the field of logic by al-Farab served as

Pratcice, Brill, Leiden, New York, Kln, 1994, 216 pp.

31 See: N. Rescher, Arapska logika, in: Historija logike, pp. 5152.

the works of Aristotle and al-Farab. From the numerous commentaries

al, other members of this school who had great influ-

or commentaries on these works. (The situation is similar in other collections in Bosnia

ga n (13401413),50 al-Fanar (13501431)51 and oth-

49 Sa#duddn Mas# ud at-Taftazan, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, G II, 278280 (215

criticized: Man tamant.aqa tazandaqa (He who practices logic falls

57 A very interesting view of the conditions in the Ottoman Empire is given by

BOSNIAC AUTHORS AND THEIR WORKS

Results of the research on Bosniac cultural heritage, especially in the

1 Such classification by form can be found in catalogues of oriental writings and

although this heritage is mostly linked to the medieval ambiance,

see: A. Ljubovic, Neke karakteristike proznog stvaralastva na orijentalnim jezicima

Logic by Sirag udin al-Urmaw (died in 1283).3 Our researchverifying

As there are a lot of writings and resources available on Hasan . Kaf

3 Sirag uddn al-Urmaw, Ma.tali # al-anwar f al-man.tiq, see: C. Brockelmann, GAL, I,

Prusac, to be eventually reappointed judge (qad. ) of Prusac, a position

Kafs Compendium of Logic

5Ibid., pp. 151153.

In the context of the presented plan and distribution of material in

A Commentary on theKafs Compendium of Logic

10 Ms. Or. 541 (8).

Muh. ammad b. Musa #Allamak al-Bosnaw as-Saray

One of the most prominent writers of Bosniac origin who wrote in

12 See, e.g. fol. 21b22a, 26a, 30b etc.

tion (Gazi Husrev-beys Madrasa). From 1611/12 he continued his edu-

manuscript copies.17 In addition to the mentioned fields, he wrote on

comprehensive Marginalia (Glossarium) Accompanying Qu.tbuddns Commen-

Istanbul, Library of the National Museum in Algiers, in the collec-