March 17 PF

Resolved: The United States should no longer pressure Israel
to work toward a two-state solution.
March 2017 PF Brief*
*
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Contents
1 VBI 2017 11
2 Topic Analysis by Abraham Fraifeld 14

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Definitions and Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.1 A kind of longwinded discussion on ground parsing . . . . . . . 16
2.2.2 Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.3 Two Tricky Framework/Overview Options . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Taking Advantage of Vagueness in the Mandate . . . . . . . . . . 21
The Long View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.1 Pressure for a one-state solution achieves the two state solution
better . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.2 The two state solution is impossible or undesirable . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Negative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.1 Alternatives Are Not Viable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.2 Pressure prevents heel-digging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins 31

3.0.1 Overview of Two State Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.0.2 Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pressure . . . . . . 32
3.0.3 Responses to Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pres-
sure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.0.4 Defense of Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pressure 46
3.1 Argument Guide 2: Whether or not the two state solution is beneficial . 50
3.1.1 Two state solution is the best solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.1.2 Responses to Two state solution is the best solution . . . . . . . 55
3.1.3 Defense of Two state state solution is the best solution . . . . . 58
Contents
4 Definitions 61
4.0.1 The two-state solution is a way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5 Pro Cards 62
5.1 Israeli negotiations with Palestine could be a sign of weakness . . . . . . 62
5.1.1 A nuclear Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.1.2 Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1.3 Pressure encourages heavy lobbying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2 US relationship with Israel becoming worse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.1 The US seems to be asking too much from Israel . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.2.2 Pressure in the form of criticism and military aid keeps Ne-
tanyahu popular . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
5.2.3 Pressure through UN resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.3 Two state solution cannot be stable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3.1 Palestinian government unclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3.2 Borders unclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
5.3.3 Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
5.3.4 Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.4 Israel should not just work towards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.4.1 The words to work towards have been used to stall peace in the
past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.5 Pressure on Israel in the form of military aid will hurt our relationship
with the Islamic World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.5.1 Military aid is ineffective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
5.5.2 Surrounding countries perceive threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
5.5.3 Other Harms of Military Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.6 The alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.6.1 One state solution - Palestinians and Israelis live in the same state 94
5.7 AT: Empowers BDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.7.1 The BDS has been demonstrably ineffective . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.7.2 A two-state solution would render BDS even more ineffective . . 95
5.8 AT: Benefits Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.8.1 The prospect of a two-state solution is used to justify Israeli ex-
pansion and settlement building in Palestinian territory . . . . . 96
Contents
5.9 AT: Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

5.9.1 Minority of Israelis and Palestinian Arabs support US-brokered
two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.9.2 Public pressure for a peace-deal is declining and Netanyahus
governing coalition generally rejects a two-state solution . . . . . 97
5.10 AT: US Pressure Prevents One-State Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.10.1 Two-state solution will remain the dominant normative paradigm
independent of whether US supports it- both Israel and the PLO
have interests in keeping it alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.11 AT: Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.11.1 Security assistance provisions have historically not been used to
acquire leverage in two-state solution talks- Israel continues to
build settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.12 AT: Undermines UN Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.12.1 International community backs UNs support of a two-state solution102
5.12.2 International community views the two-state solution as the most
appropriate response to the Israel-Palestine conflict . . . . . . . . 102
5.13 AT: Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.13.1 The reconciliation of cultural differences are a prerequisite to a
two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.13.2 Netanyahu has a political strategy to resist a two-state solution . 103
5.13.3 Internal divisions, trust issues, and timing make a two-state solu-
tion functionally impossible to achieve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.13.4 Empirical evidence suggests that a two-state solution is impossible 105
5.13.5 Sustained Israeli rejection of two-state solution crushes all possi-
bility of its implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.13.6 US pressure has functionally been lip service . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.13.7 Ambassador to Israel says Trump administration will not pres-
sure Israel to support two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.14 AT: Partitions Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.14.1 Partitions empirically do not reduce the probability of war recur-
rence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.14.2 Partition doesnt consolidate durable, legitimate peace . . . . . . 108
5.15 AT: US Support Advances the Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.15.1 US hides behind the two-state solution to skirt legitimate con-
frontation of the Israeli-Palestine conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Contents
5.15.2 Ending support for a two-state solution opens up further foreign

policy avenues to keep Israel accountable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.15.3 US impact is negligible- 70 different nations attended a conference
in Paris to pursue a two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.15.4 Insincere adherence and commitment to a two-state solution un-
dermines the peace process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.15.5 Israeli lobbying is a prerequisite to achieving a two-state solution
and advancingthe peace process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.15.6 Two-state solution focus crowds out other alternative solutions . 112
5.15.7 Only the Israeli public can sufficiently pressure the government
to make progress on a two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6 Con Cards 114

6.0.1 A two-state solution has several elements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.1 Alternatives Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1.1 All other alternatives are unacceptable or unsustainable. . . . . . 116
6.1.2 The regional solution makes no sense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
6.1.3 Maintaining the status quo is a terrible idea. . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.1.4 Failure to achieve a two-state solution means escalating violence. 117
6.1.5 Reabsorption of Palestine into other territories is similarly
unworkable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.1.6 Even if the two state solution is bad, the alternatives are worse. . 118
6.1.7 None of the current alternatives can supplant the two state
paradigm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.1.8 Existing alternatives cannot bring about a peaceful solution. . . . 119
6.1.9 Failure to pursue a peaceful solution now will make it impossible
to do so in the future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.1.10 A two-state solution is necessary because there are no acceptable
alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.2 Botton-up Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2.1 Trump could pursue a bottom-up strategy to negotiate peace. . . 122
6.3 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.3.1 The one-state solution means that Israel must choose between be-
ing Jewish or democratic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.3.2 A two-state solution is crucial for maintaining stability and a
democratic Jewish state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Contents
6.3.3 The two-state solution is crucial to US interests in the Middle East. 125
6.3.4 The two-state solution is imperative to reducing tensions. . . . . 125
6.3.5 Trumps administration must attempt to foster peace and cooper-
ation on the two-state solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
6.3.6 The US needs to put more pressure on Israel to stay at the negoti-
ating table. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.7 Despite current trends, the two-state solution is the best hope for
enduring peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.3.8 The Quartet report outlines several steps to achieve a negotiated
peace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.4 Harms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.4.1 Israel and Palestine are paying for the stalled peace process with
their lives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.5 Jerusalem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
6.5.1 Its possible for a sacred space like Jerusalem to be shared. . . . . 130
6.5.2 There is support for a shared arrangement for Jerusalem. . . . . . 130
6.6 Optimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.6.1 We should be optimistic about the potential for peace today com-
pared to forty years ago. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.7 International Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.7.1 The Paris peace conference reaffirms the possibility of a two-state
solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.7.2 There is great international support for a peaceful two-state solu-
tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.7.3 China and other developing countries support the establishment
of a Palestinian state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.7.4 The UK is devoting more funds to coeexistence projects between
Israel and Palestine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.7.5 Proposed UK legislation will devote far more funding to resolving
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
6.8 Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
6.8.1 The two state solution is the only way to insure peace. . . . . . . 136
6.9 Trump Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.9.1 Mattis is pressing for a two-state solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.9.2 Its in the Trump Administrations interests to keep pushing for a
two-state solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
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6.9.3 Mattis is now in a position to push for the two-state solution. . . 139
6.10 Two-State Solution Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.10.1 The two-state solution offers clear and substantial benefits to
Americans, Palestinians, and Israelis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.10.2 The two-state solution is infinitely preferable to the status quo or
other alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
6.11 US Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.11.1 US support has been too unconditionalmeans that Israel has no
incentive to change its policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.11.2 The US needs to apply more pressure to Israel on achieving a two-
state solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.11.3 The United States should start using sticks, not carrots on Israel. 143
6.12 Water Talks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.12.1 Recent Israeli-Palestinian water talks lend hope to the two state
solution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.12.2 The UN is optimistic about the two state solution after the water
talks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
6.12.3 Israel and Palestine have agreed to start a joint water committee. 146
6.12.4 Water talks prove viability for cooperation on substantive issues
in the future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.13 AT One State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.13.1 A one-state solution would lead inevitably to oppression. . . . . 148
6.13.2 Mutual distrust means the two state solution is the only viable
alternative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
6.13.3 Israel would never grant voting rights to Palestinians. . . . . . . 149
6.13.4 The push for a one-state solution actually makes the two-state so-
lution more likely. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
6.13.5 A one-state solution would create a dystopia. . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.13.6 The one-state solution would spell doom. . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6.13.7 A one-state solution is a formula for continuing and escalating the
conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
6.13.8 Absent the two-state policy, Israel has no answer for what to do
with the four million Palestinians residing in the OPTs. . . . . . . 151
6.13.9 The non-Jewish citizens of Israel mean it is impossible for Israel
to be both Jewish and democratic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Contents
6.13.10 Absorbing the West Bank into Israel would make the Palestinians
second-class citizens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.13.11 Israel risks becoming an apartheid state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.13.12 The alternatives are a two-state solution or apartheid. . . . . . . . 154
6.14 AT Multinational State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.14.1 Power sharing would be disastrous. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.14.2 The bi-national idea is particularly problematic in the case of Israel
and Palestine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.15 AT Two-State Solution Dead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.15.1 Just because leaders oppose a truce now does not mean they will
continue to. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.15.2 The status quo is quickly becoming costlier. . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.15.3 The costs of the status quo makes both sides more likely to coop-
erate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.16 AT: Iranian Nuclearization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.16.1 Iran is conciliatory towards a two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.16.2 Iranian president supports two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
6.16.3 No credible evidence suggests a risk of an Iranian attack on Israel 161
6.17 AT: Angers Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
6.18 AT: Trump Rejects Two-State Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.18.1 Trump administration is committed to pursuing a two-state solution163
6.18.2 Two-state solution can still be achieved in future administrations-
even if Trump didnt support it, the idea doesnt die . . . . . . . 163
6.18.3 Trump election has energized activism and support for a two-
state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.18.4 Appointment of Friedman doesnt weaken administrations com-
mitment to two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
6.19 AT: Palestinian Government is the Obstacle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.19.1 Israeli settlement-building is the real obstacle to progress on the
two-state solution front . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.19.2 Third party actors like the US has the potential to reconcile Pales-
tine to a two-state solution if Israel initiates the plan . . . . . . . . 167
6.20 AT: Borders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.20.1 Borders can be fairly drawn to conform with international legiti-
macy primarily based on the 1967 armistice lines . . . . . . . . . 168
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6.20.2 Well-developed and high-tech border security systems can ensure

an effective two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.21 AT: AIPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.21.1 AIPAC has come out in support of the two-state solution . . . . . 170
6.21.2 There are a considerable amount of American Jewish groups that
act as a counterweight to the AIPAC, like J Street . . . . . . . . . 170
6.21.3 AIPAC influence is declining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.22 AT: Israel Wont Cave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.22.1 Historically, major US pressure has forced concessions from Ne-
tanyahu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
6.23 AT: Alternatives Solve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.23.1 Natural paradigm shift will occur to a one-state solution absent
pressure for a two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
6.23.2 One-state solution is comparatively worse than a two-state solution173
6.23.3 A one-state solution would be a diplomatic nightmare . . . . . . 174
6.23.4 One-state solution is undesirable for both Israel and Palestine . . 175
6.23.5 A one-state solution is naive and would never work effectively . 175
6.23.6 Majority of literature/studies suggest that two-state solution is
the best solution for both parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.23.7 Two-state solution is the best for US interests compared to a one-
state solution or a binational state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
6.24 AT: Security Assistance Bad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.24.1 The US should increase security assistance to fully realize the po-
tential of the two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
6.24.2 Security assistance guarantees enhance US-Israel relations and al-
low US to gain leverage in two-state solution talks . . . . . . . . . 178
6.25 AT: US Support Meaningless . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.25.1 Trump administration has successfully pressured Israel to post-
pone vote regarding annexation of West Bank settlements- proves
US pressure is effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.25.2 Israel justifies settlement building and destruction of two-state so-
lution due to inconsistent pressure from the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . 180
6.25.3 Increases in US pressure applied to Israel can achieve meaningful
changes in their behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6.25.4 Increased US pressure can force Netanyahu to accept a two-state
solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
Contents
6.26 AT: Economic Harms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

6.26.1 A two-state solution is the best economic solution out of five al-
ternative trajectories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.26.2 US economic support needed to actualize the benefits of a two-
state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6.27 AT: Harms Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.27.1 Long-term security architecture stands to improve as a function
of a two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.28 AT: Increases Antagonism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.28.1 No evidence indicates that extended, systematic violence would
continue under a two-state solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
6.29 AT: Status Quo Ineffective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.29.1 The status quo is affirmative ground- the US has not been consis-
tently pressuring Israel, but instead using carrot measures rather
than stick measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
6.29.2 Theres a lot more the US could do to pressure Israel . . . . . . . 187
6.30 AT: Two-State Solution Infeasible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.30.1 The reason as to why prospects for a two-state solution are dimin-
ishing is because of an administration that will not apply pressure
to Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
10
1 VBI 2017
Since 2001, thousands of students have attended the Victory Briefs Institute, and col-
lectively our students have gone on to reach levels of success that no other summer
institute can match. VBI alumni have won over 45 national championships in mul-
tiple debate events over the past 15 years across the Tournament of Champions, the
National Speech and Debate Association, the National Catholic Forensic League, and
the National Debate Coaches Association. They have won hundreds of major invita-
tionals, round robins, and state tournaments across the country. Beyond high school
debate, they have won the American Parliamentary Debate Association National Cham-
pionship, the World Universities Debating Championship, moot court competitions at
top law schools, multiple Rhodes and Marshall Scholarships, and even been named
among Forbes 30 Under 30.
Thats why VBI is trusted by coaches, parents, and debaters across the country to pro-
vide the very best in debate education. In 2016 alone, nearly 600 students from 252
schools in 36 states attended VBI. With a 4-to-1 student-to-instructor ratio, a designated
faculty mentor for each student, and coaches who specialize in every different facet of
debate, VBI ensures that every student receives the personalized instruction and indi-
vidual attention they need to achieve their goals.
We inaugurated the Public Forum division of VBI in the summer of 2015, and already,
our alumni have reached late out-rounds of Nationals and invitationals and state tour-
naments around the country. Most recently, VBI PF alumni have won Minneapple, Bel-
laire, University of Houston, UT Austin, Hockaday, the International Public Policy Fo-
rum, and Grapevine. And over 25 percent of the students who attended our first-ever
PF institute have since qualified to the Tournament of Champions. The results are a
testament to our debate education philosophy, which holds that effective PF instructors
need to stay up to date with its constantly changing styles. This summer, VBIs PF staff
will feature some of the most innovative minds in the event: some who have been re-
sponsible for setting the events stylistic tone and others who have coached against the
trend-setters. We recognize Public Forums dynamism, so in selecting our faculty, we
11
1 VBI 2017
have placed great importance on recent competitive and coaching success all over the
country. Mentorship, critical thinking activities, and a dash of fun make VBI a uniquely
enriching experience.
Along with our diverse faculty and emphasis on one-on-one instruction, what differen-
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our students, so well conclude with words from some of our 2016 PF alumni:
The quality of instruction at VBI is unparalleled. More than just an invalu-

able learning experience, VBI also provides an incredibly welcoming and
friendly atmosphere in which long lasting friendships with people from all
over the nation are formed. Brian Ho
VBI is a perfect mix of enjoyment and helpfulness, and Im really thankful

for it. Yatha Limbachiya
VBI has definitely been an enlightening experience. Out of my three years

of doing PF, I feel like Ive learned more here than I have ever learned before.
The expertise and close connections of the staff have definitely made this
experience worthwhile. Aaron Tanaka
Not only was VBI one of the most helpful and informative experiences of
my life, it was the most fun thing I did all summer and it has positively
impacted how I will view debate for the rest of my life. Hannah Levine
We now invite you to join the VBI family. This year, as part of our mission to provide
access to high-quality debate instruction to as many students as possible, VBI is offering
three Public Forum sessions (including a pioneering three-week PF curriculum):
VBI Philadelphia (Swarthmore College) July 1st through July 14th
VBI Los Angeles: Session I (Loyola Marymount University, Flagship Three-Week

Session) July 16th through August 5th
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through August 19th
Last year, VBI reached capacity more quickly than ever; over 50 students were wait-
listed. And students have already begun signing up for VBI 2017 at a record pace, with
many more students registered than at this point in any previous year. So sign up soon
to reserve your spot.
12
1 VBI 2017
To sign up for or learn more about VBI 2017, visit VBIdebate.com. If you have any ques-
tions about our workshops, please dont hesitate to email us at help@victorybriefs.com.
We hope to see you there!
With best wishes,
Jake Nebel and Chris Theis, Executive Directors
Abraham Fraifeld, Public Forum Director
13
2 Topic Analysis by Abraham Fraifeld
Abraham Fraifeld is the VBI Director of Public Forum Debate. Over the past
four years, he has coached Trinity Prep and Walt Whitmans Public Forum
teams. Abrahams students won Yale, the New York City Round Robin, the
New York City Invitational, Glenbrooks, the Florida Novice State tourna-
ment, and closed out the Tournament of Champions. In 2016 and 2017, Abra-
hams students were in semi-finals of the NDCA National Tournament, fin-
ished 7th at the NSDA National Tournament, and reached quarterfinals or
later at Emory, Grapevine, Yale, Blue Key, and Minneapple. In high school,
Abraham reached six final rounds and accumulated twelve bids to the Tour-
nament of Champions. Abraham is a student of International Politics and
Computer Science at Georgetown University. He will graduate this spring.
2.1 Introduction
This months resolution is Resolved: The United States should no longer pressure
Israel to work towards a two state solution. The resolutions announcement comes
on the heels of President Trumps strong contradictory statements on Israeli settlement
building. On the campaign trail, he claimed that he was staunchly pro-Israel but had
to remain neutral in negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leaders. In particular
he said, A lot of people say an agreement cant be made, which is OK, sometimes
agreements cant be made [and they are] not good. I will give it one hell of a shot. I
would say if you can do that deal, you can do any deal. He sees the challenge as
follows, You have one side in particular growing up and learning that these are the
worst people, these are the worst peopleI was with a very prominent Israeli the other
day and he said its impossible because the other side has been trained from the time
theyre children to hate Jewish people. Im going to give it a shot.1
1
Mark Hensch [staff writer at The Hill], Trump: Ill be neutral on Israel and Palestine, The Hill. Febru-
ary 16 2016. Available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/269806-trump-ill-
14
So despite his purported neutrality, the President will likely approach the two-state
solution with a very strong preconceived notion about Palestinians. More recently, Sean
Spicer offered what the Atlantic called the gentlest of critiques of settlements. Given
the statement, its clear that the White House is interested in a two-state solution. But
itll be up to debaters to determine whether or not this counts as pressure, or if it is
evidence that pressure may ramp up in the near future.
Emboldened by Trumps recent signaling toward Israel, which has included

a pledge to move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and the appointment of
David Friedmana pro-settlement real-estate lawyerto serve as his am-
bassador to the country, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continued to
test the boundaries of this new dynamic. On Wednesday, the Israeli govern-
ment announced plans for the construction of 3,000 new housing units in the
West Bank and, on Thursday, Netanyahu declared that a new West Bank
settlement would be established, the first since the early 1990s. This time
the White House did speak out. In an official statement delivered by White
House spokesman Sean Spicer on Thursday, the administration offered the
gentlest of critiques. While we dont believe the existence of settlements is
an impediment to peace, he said, the construction of new settlements or
the expansion of existing settlements beyond their current borders may not
be helpful in achieving that goal. Spicer added that the president has not
taken an official position on settlement activity and will seek to discuss it
with Netanyahu when the two meet later this month.2
Its clear that President Trump wants to strike a deal. Its unclear whether that deal will
look anything like currently conceived frameworks for a two-state solution. Its also
unclear if President Trump will pressure Israel to achieve his goals.
be-neutral-on-israel-and-palestine
2
Adam Chandler [staff writer, The Atlantic], Trumps Non-Policy on Israeli Settlements, The Atlantic.
February 3 2017. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/trump-
israel-settlements/515571/
15
2.2 Definitions and Framing
2.2.1 A kind of longwinded discussion on ground parsing
Full disclosure: at first, this topic confused me. Its unclear what policy towards Israel
would look like under the Trump administration, which makes it unclear which side
gets to advocate the status quo. Lets look at an analogy:
Resolution: I no longer want to eat meat.
1. If I eat meat and affirm, I adopt a different diet.
2. If I eat meat and I negate, the advocacy sentence (I no longer dont want to eat
meat) makes no sense because at the time of the resolution, I was not doing the
thing I no longer want to do. Nevertheless, we can interpret this as diet continua-
tion because it certainly a diet shift.
3. If Im a vegetarian and I affirm, I just keep doing what Im doing but the sentence
is a little wonky.
4. If Im a vegetarian and I negate, I adopt a different diet.
If I am an omnivore, negating means I continue with the status quo. By contrast, if Im

a vegetarian and I negate, I change course.
So, the first thing that needs to be established is whether the US is a pressure Israel
omnivore or vegetarian.
Resolution: US should no longer pressure Israel
1. If under Trump, the US is pressuring Israel to work towards a two state solution
and we affirm, the US stops doing so.
2. If under Trump, the US is pressuring Israel to work towards a two state solution,
and we negate, the advocacy sentence (The US should no longer not pressure Is-
rael) obviously makes no sense because it is impossible to stop doing something
we are not doing. But as with the example above, no longer not pressuring Israel
obviously does not mean not pressuring Israel. So this can be interpreted as a
change of continuation of the status quo.
3. If under Trump, the US is not pressuring Israel to work towards a two state solu-
tion and we affirm, the US continues not pressuring Israel
16
4. If under Trump, the US is not pressuring Israel to work towards a two state so-
lution and we negate, the resulting advocacy is analogous to the fourth advocacy
above. The US should no longer not pressure Israel.
This is how ground should be divided: If the Trump administration will pressure Israel
to work towards a two state solution, the negative advocates the status quo. But if the
Trump administration will not pressure Israel to work towards a two state solution, the
affirmative advocates the status quo.
Wait a sec, but the introduction spent hundreds of words demonstrating that Trumps
position on this is not just unclear, its unknown!! With this in mind you should beware
of evidence about the current state of affairs that does not make explicit reference to US
pressure. Its really unclear who that evidence belongs to.
17
2.2.2 Pressure
Whats pressure? Generally, pressure in diplomatic negotiations is anything that re-

duces or threatens a countrys bargaining position. It usually breaks down into the
following categories:
1. Criticism: A key party claims that a position held by one of the other negotiating
parties is a non-starter. Alternatively, the key part calls out another negotiating
partys behavior, claiming that it is impeding progress in negotiations. This un-
dermines the criticized partys bargaining position by altering electoral incentives
at home. Usually criticism hardens the criticized countrys positions but increases
support for the other party around the world. Countries that do not eventually re-
act positively to criticism may face isolation. If the criticism is not received well by
countries around the world, the criticized party may actually benefit. For example,
Islamaphobic comments by American officials cause countries to unite against US
efforts against Muslims.
2. Praise of the other party or expressed empathy towards that party: This increases
global support for the praised party at home and around the world. It is this sort
of tactic that most significantly contributed to recent peace efforts. Though the
FARC was regarded in a lot of Colombia as a brutal communist insurgency, non-
Colombian negotiators praised the FARC for their diplomatic maturity and their
willingness to be peaceful. This played a major role in bolstering global support
for the FARC-Colombia peace agreement, which was eventually ratified.
3. Carrot-and-Stick pressure: One party creates leverage and dangles it to achieve

diplomatic goals. Examples can include conditional aid, holding political prison-
ers, the threat of criticism or praise, and others.
There is a suite of things the US does that could count as US pressuring Israel. The
con could easily argue that the pro must do away with all of pressures that currently
look like they will be employed. Below is a (non-exhaustive) list of tools the US uses to
pressure Israel to work towards a two state solution.
1. Speeches and Statements
While the Spicer statement documented above probably cant be seen as real pressure,
the United States has historically done its fair share of criticism and praise through
speeches and statements. Of note is Secretary Kerrys recent speech arguing that Israel
18
faces a tri-lemma. They cannot be a Jewish state, a democratic state, and accept Palestini-
ans as first-order citizens. President Trumps White House has also issued statements
setting up Israel for criticism. The Jerusalem Post reported,
The White House warned Israel on Thursday in a surprising statement

to cease settlement announcements that are unilateral and undermin-
ing of President Donald Trumps effort to forge Middle East peace, a senior
administration official told The Jerusalem Post. The official said the White
House was not consulted on Israels announcement of 5,500 new settlement
housing units. He added: As President Trump has made clear, he is very
interested in reaching a deal that would end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and is currently exploring the best means of making progress toward that
goal. With that in mind, we urge all parties to refrain from taking unilateral
actions that could undermine our ability to make progress, including settle-
ment announcements. The administration needs to have the chance to fully
consult with all parties on the way forward.3
2. Diplomatic Holdouts
For decades, symbolically and to create pressure. The United States has kept its embassy
in Tel Aviv. This is probably the most talked-about focal point of the debate. A Daily
Wire article documents the timeline of reports regarding President Trumps position on
the embassy.
As president-elect, Trump was asked by Israel Hayom, the Hebrew-

language daily, at the Chairmans Global Dinner in Washington, DC on
January 17 if you have not forgotten your promise concerning the embassy
in Jerusalem. Trump responded, Of course I remember what I said about
Jerusalem. You know that I am not a person who breaks promises. Six
days later, MSNBCs Morning Joe host Joe Scarborough reported that the
Trump administration would not be moving the U.S. embassy to Israel to
Jerusalem until Israel completed negotiations with various Arab countries.4
This is mounting pressureat least for the next six days.

3
Michael Wilner [staff writer, Jerusalem Post], Trump Warns Israel: Stop Announcing New Settlements,
Jerusalem Post. February 2 2017. Available at: http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-
Diplomacy/Trump-warns-Israel-Stop-announcing-new-settlements-480446
4
Hank Berrian [staff writer, Daily Wire], Trump to Netanyahu: Cease Settlement Announcement, Daily
Wire. February 2 2017. Available at: http://www.dailywire.com/news/13108/trump-netanyahu-
cease-settlement-announcements-hank-berrien
19
3. UN Statements Resolution Action
The United States recently, for the first time, abstained from a UNSC resolution decrying
Israeli settlements as illegal under international law. This would count as pressure, as
would threats to continue action like this in the UN. This behavior is likely to change
with the new administration.
4. Military Aid
This is likely the form of pressure most relevant to the Trump administration, but there
is only scant evidence the aid will become conditional, and no evidence that it will be-
come conditional on Israeli efforts for peace. The most President Trump has said on
this is . On the other hand, the US just signed a $38 Billion military aid deal that did not
include two-state solution related conditions. In my mind, unless a lot changes, military
aid is off the discussion table.
20
2.2.3 Two Tricky Framework/Overview Options
Taking Advantage of Vagueness in the Mandate
Pro says: The resolution asks the US stop pressuring Israel to work towards a two state
solution. Our interpretation is that the negative, which calls for pressuring Israel to
work towards a two state solution leaves itself too open to interpretation to be useful.
In fact Israeli leaders have repeatedly argued that the denial of Jewish settlements and
perceived Israeli insecurity are obstacles to peace and therefore a two state solution.
David Keyes, Netanyahus spokesman told the Associated Press,
Jews have been in Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria for thousands of years and
their presence there is not an obstacle to peace, Keyes said in a statement,
using the biblical names for the West BankThe obstacle to peace is the
unending attempt to deny the Jewish Peoples connection to parts of their
historic land.5
Netanyahu himself said in 2013,
[P]eace is premised on mutual recognition, of two states for two peoples,

of the Palestinian state for the Palestinian people mirrored by the Jewish
state for the Jewish people. I think thats fundamental for any peace, but
equally it must be a peace that, as President Obama has said, a peace that
Israel can defend by itself, for itself, against any conceivable threat.
In Netanyahus eyes, any work towards Israeli complete security is work towards mu-
tual recognition, which in turn is work towards a two state solution.
If, to Israeli leaders, working towards a two state solution means entrenching their
bargaining position until they are comfortable, any attempt to rescue the two state so-
lution by negating the resolution will fail.
The Long View
Since the resolution specifies no stopping point, the con could argue that affirming the
resolution stops pressuring Israel in perpetuity.
5
IAN DEITCH [reporter, Associated Press], Israel says UN envoys set-
tlement remarks distort history, AP. August 30 2016. Available at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a1dacc2ef0c7487f814c01d51876b8d3/israel-lashes-back-after-un-
envoy-comments-settlements
21
Then, the Con can take advantage of the Pro arguments that say that pressure entrenches
the Israeli right and reduces the likelihood of Israeli-Palestinian peace by arguing that
Trumps much more conciliatory approach mutes the disadvantages and will achieve
mutual good-will.
The key intuition here is that most of the literature thats pessimistic about the two state
solution is pessimistic because of the acrimonious relationship between Bibi and Obama.
But good-will can mend the US-Israel relationship, and if it ever does, there will be
opportunities for a two state solution that the AFF will never have access to.
Its certainly much harder to argue that the US should no longer pressure Israel to
work towards a solution than to argue that a solution seems extremely improbable and
Obama-era pressure only hurt the cause. The con should not let the pro get away with
saying the latter statement and the resolution are synonymous.
22
2.3 Affirmative Arguments
2.3.1 Pressure for a one-state solution achieves the two state solution better
This is an argument mostly from an article in Foreign Affairs.6 Foreign Affairs,

July/August 2016 Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2015-
06-16/death-and-life-two-state-solution.]
According to Grant Rumley and Amir Tibon, the most likely, yet paradoxical route to a
two state solution works as follows:
First, there is evidence that Israeli-Palestinian relations are on course for a one-state
reality that deserve international pressure.
In the 2015 election, the Israeli left tried to convince voters that Israel faced
a grave threat in the international arena, from economic sanctions to for-
mal condemnations to official recognitions of a Palestinian state. But voters
didnt buy it, because their fear of territorial concessions in the West Bank
overcame their fear of any new anti-settlement measures drafted in Brussels.
In the absence of progress toward a two-state solution, however, the interna-
tional debate over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could start sliding toward a
one-state reality, and the world will likely begin demanding that Israel give
Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem equal rights. At that point,
Israelis would find the international threat more frightening than the cost of
a Palestinian state.
A shift toward a one-state outcome would create a tough dilemma for Israel,
since officials would not be able to argue against it by appealing to secu-
rity. During his six years in office, Netanyahu has rejected moves toward a
Palestinian state by arguing that any land that Israeli forces evacuated and
handed over to the PA would immediately be taken over by Hamas, the
self-proclaimed Islamic State, or Hezbollah. Abbas has spent his entire time
in office trying (and failing) to convince the Israelis that his security forces
could quell the more violent elements in the West Bank and Gaza. But since
6
Grant Rumley [research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies] and Amir Tibon [Wash-
ington DC Haaretz Correspondent], The Death and Life of the Two-State Solution
23
the 2007 civil war, his rhetoric has not been able to overcome Fatahs hu-
miliating defeat at the hands of Hamas and the subsequent expulsion of the
entire Fatah leadership from Gaza. So Netanyahu has had an easy time sug-
gesting that a Palestinian state might be a threat to Israel. Yet it would be far
harder for him or any future Israeli prime minister to say no to a new gener-
ation of Palestinians who called for Israeli citizenship and voting rights but
no change to the existing security structure.
And this could lead to a two state solution,
Granting Israeli voting rights to the Palestinians living under Israeli control
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem would mean the end of the Jewish state,
and there is no chance the Israelis would agree to it. A one-state campaign
could, however, inflict massive damage on Israel, far greater than what anti-
Israeli or pro-Palestinian campaigns have. Kerry gave Israel a taste of the
umbrage it might face openly when he warned in private last year that with-
out a peace deal, Israel could become an apartheid state. Although his
words angered officials in Jerusalem and members of the organized Jewish
community in the United States, even Netanyahus former defense minister
and close confidant, Ehud Barak, has sounded a similar warning.
For the Palestinians, in other words, the increasingly likeliest way to achieve
an independent state is, paradoxically, to give up on trying to get one. Only
when the Palestinians make the Israelis recognize that the status quo can-
not persist indefinitely and reach for something the Israelis hold even more
dear than the West Bankcontrol over Israel itself as a Jewish statewill
the Israelis begin to see a two-state solution as their least-bad option. But
if things eventually reach this crossroads, the state the Palestinians will be
granted wont be the one they have demanded for the last two decades. In-
stead of following the 1967 borders, its outline will be based on Israels secu-
rity and demographic concerns. In the last round of peace talks, Netanyahu
was willing to discuss a Palestinian state in approximately 90 percent of the
West Bank, with limited land swaps. If Israel decides one day to support a
Palestinian state in order to kill a binational state, the result is more likely to
be Netanyahus abridged version of it.
The argument is complicated but a pretty interesting take on the topic. Stop pressuring
24
Israel to achieve a two state solution and instead pressure Israel to accept Palestinian
rights and Israel may opt for a two state solution on its own. An alternative take would
be that the more Israel succumbs to pressure to work towards a solution, the more
Israelis will show up to the negotiating table but not achieve anything. Optically, this
works. The international community wont dole out extremely harsh criticism of Israel
so long as Israelis look like they are making goodfaith efforts to come to the negotiating
table. Some would argue that this could be construed as a negative argument because
this type of pressure could be interpreted as working towards a two state solution. Id
argue a few things against this:
1. Effects dont define topicality. The resolution says that the AFF has to defend not
pressuring Israel towards a two state solution. NOT pressuring Israel to work
towards a two state solution, and allowing a natural trajectory that leads to a
two state solution is clearly not Con ground because it explicitly involves NO
LONGER PRESSURING ISRAEL TO WORK TOWARDS A TWO STATE SOLU-
TION. It involves pressuring Israel to do something else, namely accept Pales-
tinian rights in a single state.
2. By analogy. Lets say I ask should I go to school to learn? Suppose that not
going to school leads to me participating in debate, which means I learn. Nobody
would say that the alternate path to learning is a reason to go to school to learn.
I am still going somewhere, much like the US is still pressuring Israel. I am not
going to school, much like the US would not be pressuring Israel to work towards
a two state solution.
25
2.3.2 The two state solution is impossible or undesirable
Some argue that Israeli settlements are too politically sensitive for compassion towards
Palestinian desire for a state to ever make its way into the political majority. Sharif
Nashashibi writes for al-Jazeera
Those who continue to portray a two-state solution as a possibility are - in-

advertently or otherwise - providing Israel with cover to continue wiping
Palestine off the map, because the point of no return seems to forever be on
the horizon, and as long as that is the case, Israel can avoid blame for passing
the point of no return. In reality, we passed it long ago. There was national
upheaval in Israel about evacuating several thousand settlers from the Gaza
Strip. This renders impossible the prospect of evacuating several hundred
thousand from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, even if there was the po-
litical will to do so, which there has never been.7
Others argue that even if the two state solution is possible, pressure entrenches the both
the Israeli and Palestinian anti-reconciliation positions.
Pro-Israel advocates argue that US criticism of Israel has made illegitimate positions
mainstream.
Barack Obama could not have found a more apt way to seal his lamentable
legacy than by demonstrating one last time his dismal judgment on foreign
policy. In singling out the Israeli settlements as the major obstacle to peace,
Obama denies the greatest obstacle of all, the failure of the Palestinian lead-
ership to renounce terror, to recognise Israel and to commit genuinely to bi-
lateral negotiations. Obama has fuelled and legitimised global antisemitism,
the boycott, divestment, sanctions movement, and contempt for the Jewish
state. The tragedy for Israelis and Palestinians alike is that Obama has made
a two-state solution even more of a pipe dream than it already was.
Israeli-left advocates argue that US criticism of Israel handed Netanyahu electoral vic-
tory.
Frida Ghitis of CNN argues,
7
Sharif Nashashibi [reporter, al-Jazeera], Israel-Palestine: The delusion of a two-state solution, al-
Jazeera March 2016. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/03/israel-
palestine-delusion-state-solution-160324132044351.html
26
You may have heard that Israeli politics is extremely complex. But one of the
most important forces at play there is actually rather straightforward: When
Israelis feel safe and strong they tend to support moderate parties. When
they feel vulnerable they move to the right. Understand that, and you will
understand Israel and why President Barack Obama may have inadver-
tently given Benjamin Netanyahu a helping hand. Israelis know they need
American support to survive in a hostile, increasingly unstable and radical-
ized neighborhood, but they dont believe they can trust Obama to help keep
them safe. And the president, despite taking numerous measures to support
the Jewish state, has done a dismal job of persuading Israelis that he has their
back. This reality helps explain how Netanyahu and his rightist Likud party
pulled off an upset victory this week, despite opinion polls showing them
trailing the main opposition Zionist Union heading into Tuesdays election.8
Others believe that Palestinians do not want a two state solution because already-in-
place Palestinian leadership is no good.
The impulse among that younger demographic is realistic. At a recent meet-

ing of about a dozen young Israeli and Palestinian journalists convened by
a pro-peace organization, participants were asked whether they supported
the two-state solution. All the Israelis were for it, although some, reflecting
the fears of many Israeli Jews, thought it was too dangerous to pursue at the
moment. On the Palestinian side, only one participant supported the two-
state solution. The rest, a group of young, moderate, worldly Palestinians,
said they would prefer to get Israeli citizenship. You guys can just get into
your car, drive to the airport, and catch a flight to Paris, one of the Pales-
tinians told the Israelis. I have to file a request months ahead, go through
checkpoints, and get special permissions from Israeli intelligence agencies.
Israel will never give us a state, but it can give us our rights. I want to be like
you. For young Palestinians who have grown up under the PA, the demise
of that corrupt and authoritarian pseudo-state and the incorporation of the
West Bank into Israeli institutions would be no great loss.9
Still others hold that the two state solution only turns national conflict into international
conflict. Nominal agreements about statehood may not change the conflict dynamic.
8
Frida Ghitis [opinion contributor, CNN], How Obama Handed Netanyahu Victory, CNN, March 18
2015. Available at: http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/18/opinions/ghitis-obama-israel-relations/
9
Rumley and Tibon, The Death and Life of the Two-State Solution
27
2.4 Negative Arguments
2.4.1 Alternatives Are Not Viable
The most commonly cited alternatives, maintaining the status quo and the one state
solution wont happen. Other alternatives are discussed in the cited article.
Maintaining the status quo is not viable.
Many Israelis, and some Americans, believe that managing the status quo
(meaning the continued absence of a formal settlement) is the most viable
and feasible alternative to the two-state solution. [But] Lack of justice for
Palestinians; does not resolve regional issues for Israel. Status quo is not
actually static, but dynamic and trending in negative directions (e.g. con-
tinued settlement activity, growing radicalization on both sides, arming of
militant groups in Gaza etc). Periods of calm are often broken by outbreaks
of violence.10
The one state solution is impossible.
Many left-wing Palestinian academics and activists, and some far-left-wing

Israelis, view a onestate solution with equal rights for all inhabitants as the
only just solution to the conflict. [But] Given the prevailing demographics,
one-state alternatives are considered a political non-starter for Israel. The
vast majority of Israelis view one-state solutions as an existential threat to
their desire for a Jewish and democratic state. The international community
would likely reject a one-state solution with limited or no political rights for
Palestinians.11
2.4.2 Pressure prevents heel-digging
Pressure works, particularly when civil society is targeted.
10
Jane Farrington, Richard Hinman, Daniel Joyce, Uri Sadot, Jesse Singal, Ross van der Linde, Carl
Westphal [Students at Princeton WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNA-
TIONAL AFFAIRS], Daniel Kurtzer [Faculty Advisor and Former Ambassador to Egypt], Ex-
ploring Alternatives to the Two-State Solution In the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, WOODROW
WILSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, December 2012. Avail-
able at: https://wws.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/content/other/591d-Workshop-FinalReport-
Israel-Main.pdf
11
Farrington et. al, Exploring Alternatives
28
To be clear, the civil society track is an and rather than an or. It but-
tresses other strategies and enables their successes, rather than stands alone.
While it is not sufficient, it is necessary for any initiative to be successful.
Unlike settlements and incitement, which are driven far more by Israeli and
Palestinian domestic considerations than international policy, engagement
with the Israeli and Palestinian publics is one area where the U.S. negotiating
team could have played a positive and effective role. Had Secretary Kerry re-
alized in 2012 the importance of encouraging the public to push their leaders
to stay at the negotiating table, he would have likely invested more time and
money in supporting the efforts of civil society groups dedicated to preserv-
ing the two-state solution. Instead, the State Department largely ignored
civil society, remaining laser-focused on the top leaders.12
Experts recognize that pressure is key to keeping parties at the negotiating table
Tony Karon of Time Magazine argued,
Solana called for a U.N. Security Council resolution outlining in detail the
parameters of a two-state solution, fixing borders, prescribing arrangements
for sharing Jerusalem, security and the fate of refugees. Of course, Obama
is saying nothing of the sort, still hoping to drag the two sides, however
reluctantly, to the negotiating table to hash out an agreement. But Solana
who has been involved in trying to do just that for a decade longer than
Obama has may simply have recognized that the U.S. pressure that has
been required to get both sides simply to make confidence-building gestures
is nothing compared with what will be required to get them to accept a final
peace agreement.13
President Obama concluded that absent pressure Israeli and Palestinian leaders were
unwilling to compromise at all.
Karon continues,
President Barack Obama has concluded that Israel and the Palestinians are
unlikely to achieve peace unless theyre under external pressure to make
12
Joel Braunold and Sarah Yerkes, [Brookings Fellows], Is a peace deal possible if Israelis and Palestinians
simply dont trust each other? Brookings, 3 January 2017.
13
Tony Karon [Time Magazine Reporter], Despite Jewish Concerns Obama Keeps
up Pressure on Israel, Time Magazine. Tuesday July 14 2009. Available at:
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1910376-1,00.html
29
the requisite compromises. Believing that a two-state solution is in the best

interests of both parties and that time is running out for such a solution,
the President is stepping up the pressure on both sides. That was Obamas
message at a White House meeting on July 13 with representatives of lead-
ing Jewish-American organizations, some of whom have lately complained
that the President is unfairly pressuring Israel to make concessions on West
Bank settlements, while going easy on the Palestinians. According to var-
ious accounts of the White House meeting, Obama was gentle but firm in
rejecting requests to refrain from publicly expressing his differences with Is-
raels leaders. When it was suggested by one participant in the meeting that
the past eight years had demonstrated that the best chance for peace came
when there was no daylight between the U.S. and Israeli positions, Obama
pushed back, noting that the close ties between the Bush Administration and
the governments of Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert had in fact produced no
significant progress toward peace.14
2.5 Conclusion
I wish you the very best of luck at state tournaments, state qualifiers, national qualifiers,
and whatever other tournaments you may have this month. I look forward to seeing you
all on the circuit.
14
Karon, Despite Jewish Concerns Obama Keeps Up Pressure on Israel
30
3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins
Austin debated for four years at Trinity Prep (FL). Austin served as team
captain his senior year. During his debate career, he reached the octafinals
at Tournament of Champions, broke at several bid qualifying tournaments,
and qualified to NSDA nationals and CFL nationals.
This argument guide is going to be slightly different than most of them. The basic levels
of the debate are the link level and the impact level, and the main arguments will revolve
around a two state solution (obviously). The pro side will likely argue that a two state
solution is bad, and the U.S. should take pressure off Israel since pressure will make a
two state solution more likely. The con side will likely argue that a two state solution is
good, and the U.S. should maintain pressure to cause it to enact. However, an unusual
pro argument could be that the two state solution is good, yet U.S. pressure undermines
the likelihood. Similarly, a con team could argue that the two state solution is bad, but
the U.S. should keep pressuring Israel, thereby preventing it.
Therefore, this argument guide will be separated into the link level (an analysis of U.S.
pressure) and the impact level (effect of a two state solution).
3.0.1 Overview of Two State Solution
The solution is meant to address the conflict between Israel and Palestine [Max Fisher,
The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York
Times, December 29, 2016]
It helps to start with the problem the solution is meant to address: the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. At its most basic level, the conflict is about how or
whether to divide territory between two peoples.The territory question is
also wrapped up in other overlapping but distinct issues: whether the Pales-
tinian territories can become an independent state and how to resolve years
31
of violence that include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the partial
Israeli blockade of Gaza and Palestinian violence against Israelis.
The proposed two state solution would give each side its own territory [Max Fisher,
The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York
Times, December 29, 2016]
The two-state solution would establish an independent Palestinian state

alongside Israel two states for two peoples. In theory, this would win
Israel security and allow it to retain a Jewish demographic majority (letting
the country remain Jewish and democratic) while granting the Palestinians
a state. Most governments and world bodies have set achievement of the
two-state solution as official policy, including the United States, the United
Nations, the Palestinian Authority and Israel. This goal has been the basis
of peace talks for decades.
3.0.2 Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pressure
U.S. needs to facilitate talks in order for two state solution to happen [Yair Lapid, Op-
Ed: Time for a regional solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Jewish Telegraphic
Agency, June 8, 2015]
Im going to argue that the only way to achieve the two-state solution is
to give up on direct talks and manage the negotiations through a regional
conference supported by the United States.
U.S. is best facilitator [Mitchell Plitnick is the Program Director at the Foundation for
Middle East Peace, Toward A New Two -State Solution, Foundation for Middle East
Peace, February 4, 2015]
Every time such a bump was encountered, each side predictably blamed
it on the bad faith of the other. Sometimes there was merit to those argu-
ments, sometimes less so. Either way, the blame game illustrated the need
for an honest broker to mediate the talks between the parties. It needed to
be a party that could be fair to both sides, but also strong enough to hold
both sides feet to the fire in order to keep the process moving forward. The
United States seemed to be the only party that could possibly fulfill both of
those needs, and so we slid into the role of broker. But it turned out that
32
we were ill-suited for the part. Although the U.S. was probably correctly
seen as the only force that could deliver both the Israelis and Palestinians, its
special relationship with Israel and the negative view of the Palestinians
among most Americans made it impossible to keep domestic U.S. politics
out of the peacemaking arena. When that was added to the real U.S. interest
in Israels security, a much greater interest than it has in the rights and free-
doms of Palestinians, the United States became more a part of the problem
than of the solution.
U.S. has to apply pressure to settlement problem [Mitchell Plitnick is the Program Di-
rector at the Foundation for Middle East Peace, Toward A New Two -State Solution,
Foundation for Middle East Peace, February 4, 2015]
This was taken by Israel as tacit American approval of Israels intention to

keep the three largest settlement blocs in the West Bank, a view neither the
Bush nor Obama administrations have disputed. While Bush was correct
that this was an integral part of prior negotiations, his statement here ended
such negotiations, leaving the Palestinians with little leverage to ensure that
they would be fairly compensated for sacrificing those pieces of the West
Bank. The President didnt stop there. He also stated, It seems clear that
an agreed, just, fair, and realistic framework for a solution to the Palestinian
refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found
through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Pales-
tinian refugees there, rather than in Israel. Again, this was likely going to
be the case, but by laying this out as an American position, Bush curtailed
Palestinian leverage in negotiating the terms of settling the refugee issue.
Essentially, the Bush administration unilaterally pre-determined the dispo-
sition of two key final status issues in favor of Israel. Palestinian faith in the
U.S.s willingness or ability to act as a fair broker has never recovered. One
cannot have reasonably expected Sharon, or any Israeli leader, to refuse such
gifts from an American President. But these and other developments over
the years altered the playing field. By the time talks between Israel and the
Palestinians fell apart last year, many analysts, this one included, doubted
that the Palestinian people would accept the deal the Palestinian Authority
was still trying to win.
Israel needs to be motivated to pursue two state solution [Matthew Duss, How to Pres-
sure Israel to Make Peace, Slate Magazine, March 24, 2015]
33
In the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus declaration that

a Palestinian state would not be created on his watch, the Obama administra-
tion has signaled that it is considering a reassessment of its options with
regard to the two-state solution.We cannot simply pretend that those com-
ments were never made, or that they dont raise questions about the prime
ministers commitment to achieving peace through direct negotiations, said
Denis McDonough, the presidents chief of staff, in remarks at a conference
held Monday by the pro-Israel, pro-peace lobby J StreetIn a Sunday inter-
view with Israeli radio, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro confirmed
that a shift is under way. While Shapiro was careful to make clear that no
decision had been reached regarding future U.S. action, he did point out
that Washingtons defense of Israel at the United Nations was predicated
on Jerusalems commitment to the two-state solution.
Israel will string along U.S. and international community without pressure [Matthew
Duss, How to Pressure Israel to Make Peace, Slate Magazine, March 24, 2015]
For years, Netanyahu has strung the United States and the international com-
munity along with a kind of Two-State Hamlet act, providing just enough
reasons, little hints here, a trail of breadcrumbs there, to sustain the hope that
yes, under the correct circumstances, and offered the appropriate truckload
of carrots, he could be the Man to Make a Deal. But, as Netanyahu himself
once said, The question is not of hope, the question is of actual results.
And the results are now in on Netanyahu
If U.S. doesnt put pressure on Israel, they may undermine efforts [David Sanger, Kerry
Rebukes Israel, Calling Settlements a Threat to Peace, New York Times, December 28,
2016]
With only 23 days left in his four-year turn as secretary of state, during which
he made the search for peace in the Middle East one of his driving missions,
Mr. Kerry said the Israeli government was undermining any hope of a two-
state solution to its decades-long conflict with the Palestinians.The American
vote last week in the United Nations allowing the condemnation of Israel for
settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, he added, was driven by
a desire to save Israel from the most extreme elements in its own govern-
ment.The status quo is leading toward one state and perpetual occupation,
Mr. Kerry said, his voice animated.
34
Need pressure instead of unconditional support to get Israel to change policies

[Matthew Duss, How to Pressure Israel to Make Peace, Slate Magazine, March 24,
2015]
Obviously the idea that Obama is nicer to Iran than Israel is ridiculous on its
face. Iran is under the most comprehensive sanctions regime in the world,
which the Obama administration has led in constructing. Israel, on the other
hand, has continued to enjoy billions of dollars in U.S. aid, and protection
from any international legal consequences for breaking the law and building
new settlements. Indeed, its precisely because U.S. support has been so
unconditional that successive Israeli governments have seen no reason to
change their provocative policies, and Israeli voters have seen no reason to
seriously challenge their governments to do so. At long last, it seems that
this equation is about to change
Pressure is important agent for change [David Sanger, Kerry Rebukes Israel, Calling
Settlements a Threat to Peace, New York Times, December 28, 2016]
Mr. Kerry argued that Israel, with a growing Arab population, could
not survive as both a Jewish state and a democratic state unless it em-
braced the two-state approach that a succession of American presidents
have endorsed.Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, responded to
Mr. Kerrys speech by calling on Israel to freeze housing construction in
order to restart negotiations. The minute the Israeli government agrees
to cease all settlement activities, including in and around occupied East
Jerusalem, and agree to implement the signed agreements on the basis of
mutual reciprocity, the Palestinian leadership stands ready to resume per-
manent status negotiations, he said.Mr. Netanyahu has said he is willing
to meet Mr. Abbas anytime for talks as long as there are no preconditions.It
was notable that it was Mr. Kerry who delivered the speech rather than
President Obama, who has long kept a distance from Middle East peace
negotiations, a pursuit he has always doubted would succeed. After talks
at Camp David collapsed in 2000, it was President Bill Clinton himself who
gave a speech laying out the parameters of an ultimate deal, about 10 days
before leaving office in 2001.
Many avenues for U.S. to put pressure on Israel [Matthew Duss, How to Pressure Israel
to Make Peace, Slate Magazine, March 24, 2015]
35
This isnt to suggest that the United States will suddenly throw its support
behind Palestinian U.N. initiatives, but there are a number of other options
for applying pressure on Israel. They could include crafting a U.N. Security
Council resolution laying out clear terms of reference for future negotiations,
something the Palestinians have long sought, and which Obama himself ar-
ticulated, to Netanyahus dismay, in his May 2011 speech at the State De-
partment. The United States could go further, setting out a specific set of
parameters laying out the official U.S. view of a final disposition of the key
final status issuesborders, security, refugees, and Jerusalem. The United
States could simply choose to abstain from a new U.N. Security Council res-
olution declaring Israeli settlements illegal (which remains the official posi-
tion of the U.S. government, though illegitimate has been the term used
since the 1980s) rather than vetoing, as it did in February 2011. While a settle-
ments resolution might seem less drastic at first glance than one laying out
a broader set of parameters, it could actually be a more potent tool of pres-
sure on the Israelis. A fresh U.N. Security Council resolution could serve
as Exhibit A in the Palestinians case against settlements at the International
Criminal Court.
36
3.0.3 Responses to Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pressure
Several difficulties that may be impossible for U.S. pressure to overcome
Fundamentally, it is impossible to decide what the dividing line is, which is essential
to the solution [Max Fisher, The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt
Happened, The New York Times, December 29, 2016]
1. Borders: There is no consensus about precisely where to draw the line.

Generally, most believe the border would follow the lines before the
Arab-Israeli war of 1967, but with Israel keeping some of the land where
it has built settlements and in exchange providing other land to the
Palestinians to compensate. Israel has constructed barriers along and
within the West Bank that many analysts worry create a de facto border,
and it has built settlements in the West Bank that will make it difficult
to establish that land as part of an independent Palestine. As time goes
on, settlements grow, theoretically making any future Palestinian state
smaller and possibly breaking it up into noncontiguous pieces.
The city of Jerusalem is a holy city desired by both sides [Max Fisher, The Two-State
Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, December
29, 2016]
2. Jerusalem: Both sides claim Jerusalem as their capital and consider it

a center of religious worship and cultural heritage. The two-state solu-
tion typically calls for dividing it into an Israeli West and a Palestinian
East, but it is not easy to draw the line Jewish, Muslim and Christian
holy sites are on top of one another. Israel has declared Jerusalem its
undivided capital, effectively annexing its eastern half, and has built
up construction that entrenches Israeli control of the city.
Decisions over what would happen to refugees are a roadblock [Max Fisher, The Two-
State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, Decem-
ber 29, 2016]
3. Refugees: Large numbers of Palestinians fled or were expelled from

their homes in what is now Israel, primarily during the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war that came after Israels creation. They and their descendants
now number five million and believe they deserve the right to return.
37
This is a nonstarter for Israel: Too many returnees would end Jews de-
mographic majority and therefore Israels status as both a Jewish and a
democratic state.
Israel has concerns about its safety after formation of another state [Max Fisher, The
Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times,
December 29, 2016]
4. Security: For Palestinians, security means an end to foreign military

occupation. For Israelis, this means avoiding a takeover of the West
Bank by a group like Hamas that would threaten Israelis (as happened
in Gaza after Israels 2005 withdrawal). It also means keeping Israel
defensible against foreign armies, which often means requiring a con-
tinued Israeli military presence in parts of the West Bank.
Settlements prevent two state solution [Time Running Out For A Two-State Solution?,
CBS News, January 23, 2009]
Its known as the two-state solution. But, while negotiations have been
going on for 15 years, hundreds of thousands of Jewish settlers have moved
in to occupy the West Bank. Palestinians say they cant have a state with Is-
raeli settlers all over it, which the settlers say is precisely the idea. Daniella
Weiss moved from Israel to the West Bank 33 years ago. She has been the
mayor of a large settlement.I think that settlements prevent the establish-
ment of a Palestinian state in the land of Israel. This is the goal. And this
is the reality, Weiss told 60 Minutes correspondent Bob Simon.Though set-
tlers and Palestinians dont agree on anything, most do agree now that a
peace deal has been overtaken by events.While my heart still wants to be-
lieve that the two-state solution is possible, my brain keeps telling me the
opposite because of what I see in terms of the building of settlements. So,
these settlers are destroying the potential peace for both people that would
have been created if we had a two-state solution, Dr. Mustafa Barghouti,
once a former candidate for Palestinian president, told Simon.
Settlements make it impossible [Yousef Munayyer, Thinking Outside the Two State
Box, The New Yorker, September 20, 2013]
A National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the U.S. intelligence commu-

nity said the following: If Israel continues to occupy conquered territory
38
for an extended period, say two to three years, it will find it increasingly
difficult to relinquish control. Domestic pressures to establish paramilitary
settlements in occupied areas would grow, and it would be harder to turn
back to the Arabs land which contained such settlements. One might, as
Ive written before, think that that is a very grim prognosis and that by 2016
the two-state solution will surely be impossible. But that N.I.E. was written
in 1968, only a year after Israel occupied the West Bank and when barely a
couple thousand settlers lived beyond the Green Line. Now, some six hun-
dred fifty thousand Israelis are there, with well over a hundred colonies,
turning maps of the West Bank into Swiss cheese. It is farcical to talk about
the impending death of the two-state solutionits been long dead and de-
composing before our eyes, yet few have had the common decency to bury
it.
[Saeb Erekat, As long as Israel continues its settlements, a two-state solution is impos-
sible, Washington Post, October 24, 2016]
A two-state solution is impossible with the presence of Israeli settlements.

A sovereign state must have control over its territory and natural resources,
something impossible with more than 200 illegal foreign settlements. To-
day, there are more than 600,000 illegal Israeli settlers in the occupied state
of Palestine. This includes East Jerusalem, our capital and an integral part
of the state of Palestine. Our demand for full sovereignty in our territory is
not directed against the Jewish people, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahus office has cynically portrayed, but against the illegality of a
foreign colonial enterprise. Neyanyahu, the prime minister of a country re-
sponsible for the destruction of hundreds of Palestinian Christian and Mus-
lim villages and the ongoing process of forcible displacement in occupied
territory, has accused us of ethnic cleansing for advocating to respect U.N.
resolutions and international law that call upon Israel to withdraw to the
1967 border.
All parties are making it more difficult [Max Fisher, The Two-State Solution: What It
Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, December 29, 2016]
There is plenty of blame to go around. The Palestinian leadership is divided

between two governments that cannot come to terms. The leadership in
the West Bank lacks the political legitimacy to make far-reaching but neces-
39
sary concessions, and the leadership in Gaza does not even recognize Israel,
whose citizens it frequently attacks. The United States, which has brokered
talks for years, has taken more than a few missteps.
Palestinian and Israeli confidence in two state solution is low [Christa Case Bryant, Few
Israelis, Palestinians see two-state solution as feasible. Whats the alternative?, Chris-
tian Science Monitor, January 22, 2014]
Jerusalem Secretary of State John Kerry may take comfort in the fact that
roughly half of Israelis and Palestinians are confident that their side is in-
terested in a two-state solution and about 40 percent are willing to let him
work at it. But only about 1 in 3 believe that such a solution is feasible, a new
Zogby poll reveals.Its not hard to see why. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords,
the population of Israeli settlements in the West Bank has tripled, making
dismantlement or evacuation of many of them much more difficult, if not
impossible. On the Palestinian side, a deep rift exists between the Hamas-
run Gaza Strip and the Fatah-dominated West Bank. In addition, political
upheavals in the Arab world since 2011 have turned Arab leaders attention
inwards and away from the Palestinian cause.Amid these changing dynam-
ics, alternative visions for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are under discus-
sion by scholars, politicians, and activists. Some would not be palatable to
political elites on either or both sides of the divide. But neither is the current
impasse, according to the polling data.
Israel does not support it [Max Fisher, The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It
Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, December 29, 2016]
Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister since 2009, endorsed the
two-state solution in a speech that year. But he continued to expand West
Bank settlements and, in 2015, said there would be no withdrawals and
no concessions.Mr. Netanyahu appears personally skeptical of Palestinian
independence. His fragile governing coalition also relies on right-wing par-
ties that are skeptical of or outright oppose the two-state solution.
Israeli support for it is declining [Max Fisher, The Two-State Solution: What It Is and
Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, December 29, 2016]
Israeli public pressure for a peace deal has declined. The reasons are com-
plex: demographic changes, an increasingly powerful settler movement,
40
outrage at Palestinian attacks such as a recent spate of stabbings, and bitter

memories of the Second Intifada in the early 2000s, which saw frequent
bus and cafe bombings.And the status quo has, for most Israelis, become
relatively peaceful and bearable. Many see little incentive for adopting a
risky and uncertain two-state solution, leaving Mr. Netanyahu with scant
reason to risk his political career on one.
Pressure causes disadvantages Two state solution focus will lead to instability and hor-
rible outcomes [Ian S. Lustick is a professor of political science at the University of Penn-
sylvania, Two-State Illusion, New York Times, September 13, 2013]
THE assumptions necessary to preserve the two-state slogan have blinded

us to more likely scenarios. With a status but no role, what remains of the
Palestinian Authority will disappear. Israel will face the stark challenge of
controlling economic and political activity and all land and water resources
from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. The stage will be set for
ruthless oppression, mass mobilization, riots, brutality, terror, Jewish and
Arab emigration and rising tides of international condemnation of Israel.
And faced with growing outrage, America will no longer be able to offer
unconditional support for Israel. Once the illusion of a neat and palatable
solution to the conflict disappears, Israeli leaders may then begin to see, as
South Africas white leaders saw in the late 1980s, that their behavior is pro-
ducing isolation, emigration and hopelessness.
Continued push for two state solution takes better options off the negotiating table [Ian
S. Lustick is a professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, Two-State
Illusion, New York Times, September 13, 2013]
Fresh thinking could then begin about Israels place in a rapidly changing re-
gion. There could be generous compensation for lost property. Negotiating
with Arabs and Palestinians based on satisfying their key political require-
ments, rather than on maximizing Israeli prerogatives, might yield more se-
curity and legitimacy. Perhaps publicly acknowledging Israeli mistakes and
responsibility for the suffering of Palestinians would enable the Arab side to
accept less than what it imagines as full justice. And perhaps Israels potent
but essentially unusable nuclear weapons arsenal could be sacrificed for a
verified and strictly enforced W.M.D.-free zone in the Middle East.
Deemphasizing the two state solution might cause political alignment that could create
41
progress. [Ian S. Lustick is a professor of political science at the University of Pennsyl-

vania, Two-State Illusion, New York Times, September 13, 2013]
In such a radically new environment, secular Palestinians in Israel and

the West Bank could ally with Tel Avivs post-Zionists, non-Jewish
Russian-speaking immigrants, foreign workers and global-village Israeli
entrepreneurs. Anti-nationalist ultra-Orthodox Jews might find common
cause with Muslim traditionalists. Untethered to statist Zionism in a rapidly
changing Middle East, Israelis whose families came from Arab countries
might find new reasons to think of themselves not as Eastern, but as
Arab. Masses of downtrodden and exploited Muslim and Arab refugees,
in Gaza, the West Bank and in Israel itself could see democracy, not Islam,
as the solution for translating what they have (numbers) into what they
want (rights and resources). Israeli Jews committed above all to settling
throughout the greater Land of Israel may find arrangements based on a
confederation, or a regional formula more attractive than narrow Israeli
nationalism.
U.S. pressure may backfire [Christa Case Bryant, Why UN resolution against Israeli
settlements could backfire, Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 2016]
The United Nations Security Councils resolution Friday condemning

Israeli settlements as a flagrant violation under international law, and
the United States decision not to block it, has been broadly welcomed by
anti-settlement advocates.But it could end up having exactly the opposite
effect from the one desired.Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has long
carried on a delicate balancing act between the right wings pressure to
support settlement expansion and the lefts push for peace with the Pales-
tinians. The UNs move may compel him to choose between those forces,
and it appears the momentum is on the side of the settlers.At the time of
the last such Security Council resolution on settlements, in 1980, there were
fewer than 23,000 Israelis living in the West Bank. Today their numbers are
around 400,000 and they have far more influence in Israeli government and
society including within Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus cabinet
and the officer ranks of the Israeli Defense Forces, which would be respon-
sible for evacuating settlements in case of dismantlement.Since Fridays
announcement, the Jerusalem municipality has already announced plans
to step up Israeli building in areas of East Jerusalem. And Netanyahu has
42
retaliated diplomatically against countries that supported the resolution

even calling in the US ambassador for a talking-to.
U.S. pressure worsens problem - increases settlements [Christa Case Bryant, Why UN
resolution against Israeli settlements could backfire, Christian Science Monitor, De-
cember 27, 2016]
From 2013 to 2015, as the war in Syria worsened and at times came nearly
to Israelis doorsteps, the percentage of Israeli Jews who believe settlements
help Israels security jumped from 31 percent to 42 percent, according to
a Pew survey. And the Israel Democracy Institute, as part of its monthly
Peace Index, found last month that 44 percent of Israeli Jews support annex-
ing the West Bank.Given that political context, and perhaps emboldened by
a global tailwind of right-wing populism and fears of radical Islam, some
in Netanyahus government see a ripe opportunity for capitalizing on those
sentiments.The way of the left has failed, now it is time to try our solution,
sovereignty taking the maximum territory with minimum Palestinians,
said Education Minister Naftali Bennett of the Jewish Home party, which
is to the right of Netanyahus Likud.For a number of years, Mr. Bennett
the former head of the Yesha Council, an umbrella group representing set-
tlers has advocated extending Israels sovereignty to the portions of the
West Bank known collectively as Area C. It accounts for about 60 percent
of the West Bank and includes all Israeli settlements.In the wake of the UN
vote, Bennett is now pushing for the Israeli parliament to start by extending
sovereignty to Maale Adumim, a settlement of more than 40,000 residents
just to the east of Jerusalem. A poll earlier this year found 78 percent of
Israelis in favor of annexing the settlement.
U.S. pressure may have emboldened extremism - making solution more difficult to
come by [Felicia Schwartz, Critics Say Kerrys Israel Speech Could Backfire on Obama
Administration, Wall Street Journal, December 29, 2016]
WASHINGTONJohn Kerrys speech on the Mideast peace process has

drawn an exceptionally sharp reaction in Washington, with lawmakers in
both parties warning it could further inflame the fraught state of the re-
lations between Israel and the Palestinians that the secretary of state de-
scribed.Some top Democrats including incoming Senate Minority Leader
Chuck Schumer (D., N.Y.) said the speech, which attempted to defend and
43
preserve President Barack Obamas approach to resolving the conflict, could

yield the opposite effect, leading to an unraveling of the long-held push for a
two-state solution.While he may not have intended it, I fear Secretary Kerry,
in his speech and action at the United Nations, has emboldened extremists
on both sides, Mr. Schumer said in a statement late Wednesday.
Bipartisan U.S. agreement it made two state solution less likely [Felicia Schwartz, Crit-
ics Say Kerrys Israel Speech Could Backfire on Obama Administration, Wall Street
Journal, December 29, 2016]
Aaron David Miller, a former adviser to Republican and Democratic secre-

taries of state, said Mr. Kerrys speech was a fitting end to an eight-year
soap opera between Obama and Netanyahu. This is a migraine headache
for just about everybody, said Mr. Miller. The Obama administration is
going to produce the opposite of what they intended, he said, including
spurring more settlement building and driving the peace process to the in-
ternational arena, where things are going to be said and done that wont be
helpful for realities on the ground. Sen. Ben Cardin (D., Md.), ranking mem-
ber of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he shared Mr. Kerrys
concerns about the lack of progress on a two-state solution but said he was
still concerned about the Obama administrations abstention last week on
the U.N. resolution critical of Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories. Re-
publicans, who have been regular critics of the Obama administrations poli-
cies in the region, also criticized Mr. Kerrys speech and suggested it could
move the parties away from a two-state solution. Sen. John McCain said the
speech was at best a pointless tirade in the waning days of an outgoing ad-
ministration. At worst, it was another dangerous outburst that will further
Israels diplomatic isolation and embolden its enemies. The speech and
the U.N. resolution are also a guarantee that Netanyahu will press Trump
to move the embassy, and the Trump administration will be inclined to re-
spond, Mr. Miller said.
Allies can apply pressure as well - U.S. doesnt have to [Herb Keinon and Rina Bassist,
Paris conference ends with endorsement of two-state solution, JPost, January 15, 2017]
The much-discussed Paris Middle East Conference ended Sunday with a

rather bland statement reaffirming support for a two-state solution, and a
call to stop violence and ongoing settlement activity. Some 70 countries
44
and international organizations, including the foreign ministers of more

than 30 states, attended the conference, which included neither Israeli nor
Palestinian participants. Israel adamantly opposed the conference, with
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeating on Sunday that he felt it was
futile and a relic of an approach to the Middle East that will end on Friday
with the inauguration of US President-elect Donald Trump. The conference
represents the final palpitations of yesterdays world. Tomorrow will look
a lot different, and tomorrow is very close, he said at the weekly cabinet
meeting. The final statement did, however, adopt the anti-settlement UN
Security Resolution 2334, as well as the six principles that US Secretary of
State John Kerry laid out in his December 28 speech. Kerry, who attended
the parley, called Netanyahu from Paris and said the United States will
oppose any efforts to codify the Paris declaration into another Security
Council resolution. Israeli sources said Kerry called Netanyahu from the
conference to brief him on the efforts the US was taking there to soften the
language of the final statement. According to the sources, Netanyahu told
Kerry that damage had already been done to Israel by the anti-settlement
resolution that the US allowed to pass in the Security Council last month,
and that no more harm should be allowed to be caused from the Paris
summit.
45
3.0.4 Defense of Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pressure
Ignoring Israel increases Israeli-Palestinian tensions [Felicia Schwartz, Critics Say

Kerrys Israel Speech Could Backfire on Obama Administration, Wall Street Journal,
December 29, 2016]
Dennis Ross, a longtime diplomat who has served in Republican and Demo-
cratic administrations and was Mr. Obamas top adviser on the Mideast dur-
ing his first term, said Mr. Kerrys speech likely had limited effect because
of its timing, and because it came from the secretary of state rather than the
president. He said tensions between Israelis and Palestinians generally in-
crease when the U.S. stays out of the conflict, and much would depend in the
future on how interested Mr. Trump is in engaging. Any American presi-
dent who washes his hands of it isnt doing Israel a favor, he said. Kerry
made an intensive effort in 2013 and the spring of 2014. He didnt do much
since and look whats happened. He added: One of my concerns is that
you adopt an approach thats all or nothing, and when you cant produce
all, you yield nothing.
Obstacles are overstated, can be overcome [David Wearing, A two-state solution is the
most practical route for Israel and Palestine, The Guardian, November 2, 2012]
Obstacles to the decolonisation of the Palestinian territories are certainly real,

but should not be overstated. The settlements themselves take up very lit-
tle space. It is the settlement blocs which dissect Palestinian territory, seize
key natural resources and render unviable an independent state on the land
that remains. Palestinian negotiators have produced detailed maps showing
how, with those obstacles largely removed, an exchange of land equivalent
to 1.9% of the West Bank could leave 63% of Israeli colonists in situ, and
the Palestinians with a contiguous, viable state (black areas to be annexed to
Israel; orange areas to the future Palestinian state Source: Palestine papers)
May be possible to gain support [David Wearing, A two-state solution is the most
practical route for Israel and Palestine, The Guardian, November 2, 2012]
The offer is a generous one, given that Israels colonisation of the territories
is illegal, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in 2004. Ten
years ago, the Arab League offered Israel full recognition in exchange for its
46
withdrawing to its legal borders and agreeing a just solution for the Pales-
tinian refugees, a formula agreed by the Palestinian leadership but rejected
by Israel. While formally opposed to such a settlement, even Hamas has indi-
cated that it would accept it if ratified by the Palestinian people who, though
despairing of their situation, continue to favour a two-state settlement. The
problem is less the two-state solution than Israels rejectionist stance, which
benefits from crucial backing, or acquiescence, from its patron in Washing-
ton, as well as the EU states. Vigorous and well-targeted public pressure on
Israel and its western allies is required so as to change the strategic calculus
for Israel, and render it in its own interests to withdraw to its legal borders.
Any alternative would remove all pressure from Israel [David Wearing, A two-state
solution is the most practical route for Israel and Palestine, The Guardian, November
2, 2012]
For advocates of the Palestinian cause, the alternative to pressing for the
two-state settlement, a difficult objective which still retains a decent amount
of support, is to pursue a far more difficult objective that enjoys consider-
ably less support. The result would be to reduce effective pressure on Israel,
which in turn would allow it, as Chomsky stated in response to questions
I put to him via email, to continue with its current policies: tak[ing] what
is valuable in the West Bank, perhaps 40-50%, including very few Palestini-
ans, while consigning the rest to unviable cantons with the option to rot,
or leave.There would thus be no demographic problem setting the scene
for an anti-apartheid struggle. Meanwhile, Gaza will remain a prison, sep-
arated from what remains of West Bank Palestine in violation of the Oslo
accords. In short, without effective pro-Palestinian advocacy based on a re-
alistic appraisal of the situation, Israel will be free to maintain the status quo
indefinitely. Conversely, the most practical route to a bi-national state may
lie in securing a modicum of justice and peace as soon as possible through
a two-state settlement, thus establishing the conditions most likely to lead,
through dialogue and consensus-building over the longer term, to a more
enduring bi-national state.
Lack of pressure emboldens settlements [Lawsuits loom for new Israeli law calledlast
nail in the coffin of the two-state solution, CBS News, February 7, 2017]
JERUSALEM A new Israeli law legalizing dozens of unlawfully built
47
West Bank settlement outposts came under heavy criticism on Tuesday from
some of Israels closest allies, as local rights groups prepared to ask the
Supreme Court to overturn the measure.Amid the uproar, the Trump ad-
ministration remained quiet about the law - paving the way for further pos-
sible action by emboldened Israeli hard-liners ahead of a trip to the White
House by Israels prime minister next week.The law was a first step in a
series of measures that we must take in order to make our presence in Judea
and Samaria present for years, for decades, for ages, Israeli Cabinet Minis-
ter Yariv Levin said, using the biblical name for the West Bank. I do believe
that our right over our fatherland is something that cannot be denied.
Can use alliance to advance two state goal [Times of Israel Staff, Kerry: US, Israel can
make progress on two-state solution in coming months, Times of Israel, September 24,
2016]
US Secretary of State John Kerry said Friday that Israel and the US could still
make progress toward the two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian con-
flict in the coming months and that Israel could work with Mideast allies
to achieve more stability in the region. Speaking at a joint press conference
before a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in New
York, Kerry said the US and Israel could use their friendship to advance
(peace efforts), what we believe is not only in the highest priority for Israel
to provide for its long-term security. Kerry said that there were things we
believe we could achieve in the next months, and there are serious concerns
that we all have about the security of the region, the need for stability, the
need to protect the two-state solution. The top US diplomat added that
the US-Israel alliance could also help create a new relationship within the
region that can be powerful in reinforcing that long-term security interest.
Kerry and Netanyahu met a day after the Israeli PM gave his annual address
to the UN General Assembly in which he hailed developments on regional
ties, called on the Palestinian leadership to restart talks and invited Pales-
tinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to speak at the Knesset. This
came a day after Netanyahu met with Obama to thank him for last weeks
signing of a $38 billion military aid deal to Israel the largest single pledge
to any country. Kerry on Friday praised the deal, known as the Memoran-
dum of Understanding, which he said provides for a long-term commit-
ment of security between the United States and Israel and is a remarkable
48
statement about the relationship between our countries.
Allies cannot solve without us [Uri Savir, EU to push forward with two-state confer-
ence, with or without Washington, Al-Monitor, July 7, 2016]
European capitals are busy with the organization of an international confer-

ence on the two-state solution, which would elaborate on the French Mid-
dle East Peace Initiative. Israel and the Palestinians were not invited to the
preparative conference in Paris June 3. European leaders, including more
Israel-leaning countries, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, agree
that the next phase would include both. According to a senior European
Union official who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity, all EU
foreign ministers decided to support the French initiative in order to chal-
lenge the parties and bolster the position of Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas. EU officials believe that not much can come out of such a conference
without the United States playing an active role. Therefore, if the United
States remains passive, the conference can be only of preliminary nature, to
set a policy platform for future negotiations. And so if the conference even-
tually takes place before a new US president is sworn in (with a lame-duck
administration in Washington) with the United States effectively playing
a passive role Brussels will probably take the lead, to avoid a diplomatic
vacuum.
49
3.1 Argument Guide 2: Whether or not the two state solution is

beneficial
3.1.1 Two state solution is the best solution
Status quo is unsustainable [Dan Kurtzer, Nothing beats the two-state solution for Is-
rael and the Palestinians, Brookings Institute, January 29, 2016]
Maintaining the status quo is a non-starter, because status quos are never
staticas the events of recent years prove, they tend to get worse. How
many Intifadas or stabbings will it take for the people of Israel to believe
their own security chiefs, who recognize that these actions are born of frus-
tration over the occupation and related grievances? Why should Israelis be-
lieve that the majority of Palestinians are interested in peace when Hamas
opposed to Israels very existencestill rules Gaza and commands signifi-
cant popular support, and while the Palestinian Authority is crumbling and
hardly represents anyone anymore? And how long will it take Palestinian
supporters of armed and violent resistance to recognize that their abortive
efforts to destroy Israel and indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians are
repugnant: targeting civilians is a morally unacceptable tactic for any resis-
tance movement. Thus, the idea of conflict management or even conflict
mitigationstaple products of those who support maintaining the status
quo until somehow things changeis pernicious, for it rests on an assump-
tion that the rest of us simply dont understand the conflict.
Benefits to United States [Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Israel and Pales-
tine: Two States for Two PeoplesIf Not Now, When?, Harvard Belfer Center, March
2010]
For Americans, a two-state solution would eliminate one of the grievances

that feeds radical extremism throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. It
would fulfill pledges that U.S. President Barack Obama made during his
historic June 2009 Cairo speech to the Muslim world, and it would enhance
the U.S. position throughout the region and around the globe. An end to
the conflict would also help fulfill Americas long-standing commitment to
Israels survival and its commitment to Palestinian self-determination.
Benefits to Israelis and Palestinians [Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Israel
50
and Palestine: Two States for Two PeoplesIf Not Now, When?, Harvard Belfer Cen-
ter, March 2010]
For Palestinians, obtaining their own state means an end to more than four
decades of occupation, acknowledgment of their past suffering, the fulfill-
ment of their national aspirations and an opportunity to shape their own des-
tiny at last. For Israelis, a two-state solution ends the demographic challenge
to Israels character as a Jewish-majority state, removes the stigma of being
an occupying power, enables a lasting peace with the entire Arab world and
eliminates a critical barrier to full international acceptance.
Quantified economic benefits [C. Ross Anthony, Daniel Egel, Charles P. Ries, Craig
Bond, Andrew Liepman, Jeffrey Martini, Steven Simon, Shira Efron, Bradley D. Stein,
Lynsay Ayer, Mary E. Vaiana, Israelis Stand to Gain $120 Billion, Palestinians $50 Bil-
lion in Two-State Solution Over Next Decade, RAND Corporation, June 8, 2015]
The Israeli economy stands to gain more than $120 billion over the next
decade in a two-state solution, a possible resolution of the long-standing
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in which the Palestinians gain in-
dependence and relations between the Israelis and their neighbors normal-
ize, according to a new RAND Corporation study. Palestinians would gain
$50 billion, with average per-capita income rising by about 36 percent.A re-
turn to violence, by contrast, would have profoundly negative economic con-
sequences for both Palestinians and Israelis over the next decade, with the
Israeli economy losing some $250 billion in foregone economic opportuni-
ties. The Palestinians could see their per-capita gross domestic product fall
by as much as 46 percent under this scenario.The estimates are part of a sys-
tematic effort to quantify the likely economic and security costs and benefits
of five alternative futures for the conflict relative to present trends. RAND
researchers also estimate the costs likely to be borne by the international
community and consider intangible dimensions, such as perceived security
risk and sovereignty aspirations, suggesting how such factors might affect
the course of the conflict and efforts to resolve it.
Important to resolve conflict for U.S. national securitys sake [Brent Scowcroft and
Thomas R. Pickering, Speaking truth to our ally Israel, Washington Post, December
31, 2016]
Even in a region so destabilized, flare-ups on the Israeli-Palestinian front
51
strike a particularly radicalizing cord. If a two-state peace accord is per-

manently off the agenda, and a protracted and increasingly violent conflict
develops in the occupied Palestinian territories, the ramifications for U.S.
national security interests would be disturbing, particularly given our com-
mitment to Israels security. When U.S. presidents assert their opposition to
settlements and reaffirm their support for two states, they are doing what
their oath of office requires serving U.S. national security interests. Our
commitment to Israel is right and unshakable, but it cannot extend to com-
mitting ourselves to erroneous policies that undermine U.S. interests, well-
being and security.
Settlements need to be rebuked for peace [Brent Scowcroft and Thomas R. Pickering,
Speaking truth to our ally Israel, Washington Post, December 31, 2016]
In recent days, the Obama administration has undertaken two significant

actions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian issue. It refrained from vetoing a
resolution at the U.N. Security Council that, among other things, detailed
the devastating impact that Israeli settlement expansion is having on the
prospects for a two-state peace agreement. And in a landmark speech, Sec-
retary of State John F. Kerry warned that the trend toward a one-state re-
ality is becoming increasingly entrenched, and he set out principles for a
lasting peace based on a two-state solution. He rightly pointed out that the
demise of the two-state option is to nobodys benefit Israeli, Palestinian
or American. We share Kerrys concerns and applaud the Obama adminis-
tration for having set out the conclusions of its peace efforts in a transparent
and compelling manner. Over decades in and out of government, we have
shared with great conviction the United States commitment to Israel and its
security. We have also followed with increasing concern the inability to se-
cure the kind of peace that Israelis and Palestinians alike so deserve and that
would best advance U.S. goals in the region and beyond. No side is blame-
less for the absence of peace, but the relentless confiscation of Palestinian
land and expansion of Israels presence in the territories occupied since 1967
have created facts on the ground that are the proximate cause of fear that a
two-state deal might soon be impossible to attain.
Two state solution is only viable way to solve for instability [General Assembly,
Two-State Solution Only Viable Way to Resolve Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Secretary-
General Tells International Meeting as It Opens in Moscow, United Nations, July 1,
52
2015]
The two-day meeting, convened under the theme The two-State solution:
a key prerequisite for achieving peace and stability in the Middle East by
the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People, aimed to mobilize support for a just and comprehensive solution to
the question of Palestine. It will explore ways to foster the conditions needed
for a successful political process and review international efforts to achieve
the two-State solution including those within the framework of the Arab
Peace Initiative, the Quartet, the League of Arab States, the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and other multilateral organizations as well
as in the context of the United Nations. Israels nearly half century-long
occupation must end and failure to do so could further destabilize the region,
Mr. Ban warned. Despite setbacks over the years, most people on both sides
still supported the idea of two States Israel and Palestine living side by
side. It is their voices we must listen to, and their efforts we must support,
he said.
[General Assembly, Two-State Solution Only Viable Way to Resolve Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict, Secretary-General Tells International Meeting as It Opens in Moscow, United
Nations, July 1, 2015]
Amid such formidable obstacles, he said, the Palestinian people were deter-
mined to achieve their inalienable rights, live in freedom and dignity, and
take their rightful place among the worlds free nations. It was time for the
world to recognize the State of Palestine, hold Israel accountable for its of-
fenses and set up an international mechanism to monitor both sides com-
pliance with a final peace agreement. It is either a two-State solution on
the 1967 borders or an apartheid reality the world cannot tolerate, he said,
adding that for those who call on us to be patient and continue to reject
international intervention, in violation of their own obligations under inter-
national law, we say: if they are waiting for the right time to intervene, our
freedom and independence are long overdue. The State of Palestine was
charting a new peace offensive, he went on. Granted observer State status
in the United Nations in November 2012, and recognized by the Vatican last
week, it was now seeking the recognition of more States. It also was pushing
for a new framework for peace and the establishment of clear terms of refer-
ence, a timetable for a final status agreement and an international monitoring
53
mechanism to ensure accountability. He welcomed Frances initiative for a

Council resolution calling for those parameters. Impunity was a tremen-
dous obstacle to peace. The State of Palestine had chosen justice rather than
vengeance, and, as such, it was also seeking accountability through the Inter-
national Criminal Court, the Human Rights Council and the Conference of
the High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions. He also implored
European Union members to uphold the commitments they had made in
1999, following the signing of the Oslo peace agreements, when they af-
firmed their intention to recognize the State of Palestine in due time. How
then, 15 years later, had a majority of European Union member States, in-
cluding all those that adopted the Berlin Declaration, with the important
exception of Sweden, decided not to recognize State of Palestine? he asked.
If they are conditioning recognition on the results of negotiations, we assure
them that our right to self-determination and freedom is not negotiable and
that support for a sovereign State of Palestine on the 1967 borders is the best
antidote to settlement activities.
54
3.1.2 Responses to Two state solution is the best solution
Palestine and Israel could form a confederation with Jordan, would have many benefits:
Improving exports and the economy for all groups [William M. Evan, professor emeri-
tus of sociology and management at the University of Pennsylvania, The New Gener-
ation Palestine - Israel Journal, Vol 2 No. 6, 1999]
Developing Ports of Commerce. Each of the three states has ports that are
presently underdeveloped. Expanding and modernizing them would have
a catalytic effect on exports and imports from around the world. Large in-
frastructure projects, such as ports, have to enjoy a certain minimum level
of usage for economies of scale to kick in. If each country insists on build-
ing and operating individual ports, none of these facilities would achieve
the threshold of usage necessary for cost savings to materialize. Such large
infrastructure projects as ports are ideally suited for joint ventures to avoid
duplication of facilities. For example, the port project in Aqaba, Jordan, if
it were undertaken jointly with Israel, would greatly expand commerce for
both countries.
Improving water resources [William M. Evan, professor emeritus of sociology and man-
agement at the University of Pennsylvania, The New Generation Palestine - Israel
Journal, Vol 2 No. 6, 1999]
A confederation would highlight the need for exploring joint efforts to

develop new sources of water, instituting a program of conservation and
achieving a more equitable allocation of water among the three states. Ad-
mittedly, because of its much higher level of economic development than
either Palestine or Jordan, Israel requires more water resources. For this
reason, Israel is presently negotiating with Turkey to deliver several million
cubic meters of water per year to Israel by pipe or tanker or medusa bag.
While this strategy might solve some of Israels water problems, it would
leave the serious water conflicts with Palestine and Jordan unresolved. On
the other hand, a confederation would, in principle, enable the three states
to cooperate in planning for the development of new water supplies, e.g.,
by investing in a program of desalination a project that would very likely
elicit financial support from the World Bank. It is noteworthy that Israel is
now considering helping fund the development of three multimillion-dollar
desalination plants in Egypt to meet the needs of both countries.10
55
Solves for refugees [William M. Evan, professor emeritus of sociology and management
at the University of Pennsylvania, The New Generation Palestine - Israel Journal, Vol
2 No. 6, 1999]
Problem of Refugees. Another highly contentious problem is the plight of

the millions of Palestinian refugees dispersed in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the
West Bank and Gaza since the war in 1948. Palestinians argue that they, like
the Jews, are entitled to a right of return to their homeland. The establish-
ment of a Palestinian state would enable the new state to absorb a portion of
the estimated 3.5 million refugees. A confederation would seek to address
the problem of the Palestinian Diaspora by exploring the feasibility of reset-
tlement as well as a program of compensation and reparations.
Solves for problem of Jerusalem [William M. Evan, professor emeritus of sociology and
management at the University of Pennsylvania, The New Generation Palestine - Israel
Journal, Vol 2 No. 6, 1999]
Status of Jerusalem. Such a confederal arrangement could provide the

framework for solving the much-contested and highly emotional problem
of Jerusalem. Jewish fundamentalists, dedicated to the building of the Third
Temple, are as fervently devoted to the eventual coming of the Messiah as
are Christian fundamentalists to the Second Coming of Jesus, and Muslim
fundamentalists to the coming of the Mahdi, the Muslim Messiah.12 Instead
of dividing this historic city, a Solomonic solution would be to preserve
it as a united city for all three monotheistic religions, but not necessarily
under the exclusive control of Israel. It could become simultaneously the
capital of Israel, the capital of the new Palestine state, as well as the capital
of the confederation. Finally, the principal holy places the Temple
Mount, the Western Wall, the Dome of the Rock, Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Holy
Sepulcher, etc. could come under the joint rule of the three states forming
the confederation.
One state solution [Christa Case Bryant, Few Israelis, Palestinians see two-state solu-
tion as feasible. Whats the alternative?, Christian Science Monitor, January 22, 2014]
One binational state: Historic Palestine, including Israel, the West Bank, and
potentially the Gaza Strip, becomes a binational state with equal rights for all.
This is increasingly popular among Palestinians, who would likely become
the majority within a few decades as a results of higher average birth rates.
56
But it would challenge Israels identity as Jewish and democratic, because

one of those criteria would have to be sacrificed to maintain the other, given
the demographic trend.
Slow but steady progress [Christa Case Bryant, Few Israelis, Palestinians see two-state
solution as feasible. Whats the alternative?, Christian Science Monitor, January 22,
2014]
Baby steps: Israel loosens its restrictions on Palestinian freedom of move-

ment, many of which were put in place after the intifada. This allows Is-
raelis and Palestinians to gradually get to know each other again. Palestini-
ans would be allowed to visit the beach, while Israelis would be free to shop
in Palestinian cities like Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Nablus. Peace would be
built from the ground up through people-to-people interactions, rather than
decided by negotiators.
Israel willing to support Arab Peace Initiative [Ori Lewis, Netanyahu says willing to
discuss Arab initiative for peace with Palestinians, Reuters, March 31, 2016]
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held out the prospect on Mon-
day of reviving a 2002 Arab peace initiative that offers Israel diplomatic
recognition from Arab countries in return for a statehood deal with the
Palestinians. Netanyahus comments were a formal response to a speech
last week by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who promised Israel
warmer ties if it accepted efforts to resume peace talks. The Arab peace
initiative includes positive elements that can help revive constructive
negotiations with the Palestinians, Netanyahu said, echoing comments he
made a year ago to Israeli reporters.
57
3.1.3 Defense of Two state state solution is the best solution
Regional solution is unworkable
Israel hasnt accepted Arab Peace Initiative, so unlikely to go along with negotiations
[Dan Kurtzer, Nothing beats the two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians,
Brookings Institute, January 29, 2016]
First, Israel has not accepted the Arab Peace Initiative (API) of 2002, the clos-
est the Arab world has come to accepting Israel within the borders of the
1949 armistice line and agreeing to normalize relations with Israel once peace
has been achieved. But no Israeli government has liked its terms, especially
the paragraph on Palestinian refugees, the notion of a Palestinian capital
in Jerusalem, and the APIs insistence on full Israeli withdrawal. Thus, the
question to those who propose a regional solution today is whether there is
a coalition in Israel ready to use the API as the basis for negotiating a com-
prehensive peace. I think not.
Even if they did, practical concerns would ruin any arrangement [Dan Kurtzer, Noth-
ing beats the two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians, Brookings Institute, Jan-
uary 29, 2016] Second, the Arab world is in no position to deliver on what the API
promises. The Arabs have never followed up the API by engaging Israel. And the
premise of the API has been that the Arabs will recognize Israel and agree to normalize
only after peace is concluded with the Palestinians (and the Syrians and Lebanese) not
a very attractive incentive for Israelis to enter a risky peace process.
Stability has only decreased since it was proposed - if it didnt happen then, it wont hap-
pen now [Dan Kurtzer, Nothing beats the two-state solution for Israel and the Pales-
tinians, Brookings Institute, January 29, 2016]
And third, the Arab world of 2002, however dysfunctional, was far more
stable than the Arab world of 2016. The opponents of the two-state solution
in Israel point to this when describing the security dangers that Israel would
face were it to concede anything now to the Palestinians. Even if a compre-
hensive solution were to rest on the shoulders of Egypt and Jordan, Israels
peace treaty partners, would Israeli skeptics truly be assuaged that these
countries could assure Israels security in the face of continued instability
(Egypt) or the impact of refugees and economic distress (Jordan)? Indeed,
58
the idea of a regional or comprehensive solution based on Arab stability to-

day is chimerical.
Confederations are not a good alternative
Confederations are not an alternative at all - would likely require Palestinian state to
form before they were implemented [Uri Savir, Could Jordan-Palestine confederation
be in the cards?, Al-Monitor, May 10, 2015]
Thus, Palestinians are looking for creative ideas to revive international inter-
est in the resolution of the conflict while actively engaging Arab countries.
One senior Palestinian official told Al-Monitor of a deus ex machina concept
he had in mind that could salvage the Palestinian predicament. The offi-
cial, who entertains good contacts within the Jordanian court, would like to
rekindle the idea of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, an issue he has
apparently raised lately with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and
with the entourage of the Jordanian king.The characteristics of the confeder-
ation, according to the senior source, would be outlined in an agreement be-
tween two independent states each headed by an independent executive,
two capitals (one in Amman and one in East Jerusalem), two parliaments, a
joint parliamentary institution dealing with confederative issues, a joint eco-
nomic area of free trade, joint economic ventures (including enterprises in
the Dead Sea region) and joint water and energy mechanisms. There would
also be joint security and anti-terror measures and arrangements, mainly
along the Jordan River.The confederation, according to this source, would
come about only after the establishment of the Palestinian state. Yet, an un-
derstanding in principle could be achieved prior to that, so as to give Jordan
a central role in the negotiations on statehood. Jordanian involvement in
the negotiation is considered by many of its officials as essential in several
aspects.
Confederation wont work - neither Jordan nor Egypt would accept Palestine [Dan
Kurtzer, Nothing beats the two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians, Brook-
ings Institute, January 29, 2016]
The alternatives to the regional idea are equally unrealistic. The idea of con-
federation rests on the agreement of Jordan (and potentially Egypt) to join
a political entity with the Palestinians. However, neither state has indicated
any interest in doing so.
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Israel wont accept terms of Arab Peace Initiative [Barak Ravid, Netanyahu: Israel Will
Never Accept Arab Peace Initiative as Basis for Talks With Palestinians, Haaertz, June
13, 2016]
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Likud ministers Monday that he

will never accept the original Arab Peace Initiative as a basis for negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians, according to two sources at the meeting.
If the Arab nations grasp the fact that they need to revise the Arab League
proposal according to the changes Israel demands, then we can talk, Ne-
tanyahu said. But if they bring the proposal from 2002 and define it as take
it or leave it well choose to leave it. The positive part of the plan, he told
the ministers, was the willingness of the Arab nations to achieve peace and
normalization with Israel. On the other hand, its negative elements include
the demand that Israel retreat to the 1967 borders in the West Bank with ter-
ritorial adjustments, and leave the Golan Heights, as well as the return of
the Palestinian refugees.
Single state wont happen [David Wearing, A two-state solution is the most practical
route for Israel and Palestine, The Guardian, November 2, 2012]
The case for a single, bi-national state is now reasonably familiar. Israels
illegal settlements are so entrenched that uprooting them to make way for
a viable Palestinian state has become impossible. We should therefore call
instead for a single, democratic state in the whole of the former British Man-
date for Palestine.But the logic is incomplete. Declaring the two-state solu-
tion unrealistic does not, by itself, make self-evident the greater feasibility of
one bi-national state. The latter would entail the end of Israel, and of Zion-
ism, as we understand those terms today. Is this really a more likely scenario
than the colonial infrastructure in the occupied territories being dismantled?
Recent polls showing alarming levels of racism in Israeli public opinion, re-
flected in the new hard-right alliance between Likud and Yisrael Beitenu,
suggest a polity that is not currently minded to dissolve itself under any
amount of political pressure.
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4 Definitions
4.0.1 The two-state solution is a way to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict.
Max Fisher, [Columnist, NYT], The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt
Happened, New York Times, 29 December 2016.
It helps to start with the problem the solution is meant to address: the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. At its most basic level, the conflict is about how or whether to divide territory
between two peoples. The territory question is also wrapped up in other overlapping
but distinct issues: whether the Palestinian territories can become an independent state
and how to resolve years of violence that include the Israeli occupation of the West Bank,
the partial Israeli blockade of Gaza and Palestinian violence against Israelis. Continue
reading the main story RELATED COVERAGE Opinion Editorial Is Israel Abandon-
ing a Two-State Solution? DEC. 28, 2016 NEWS ANALYSIS In John Kerrys Mideast
Speech, a Clash of Policies and Personalities DEC. 28, 2016 Israel Wonders How Long
Netanyahu Can Back Settlements and Two-State Solution DEC. 25, 2016 David Fried-
man, Choice for Envoy to Israel, Is Hostile to Two-State Efforts DEC. 16, 2016 The two-
state solution would establish an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel two
states for two peoples. In theory, this would win Israel security and allow it to retain a
Jewish demographic majority (letting the country remain Jewish and democratic) while
granting the Palestinians a state. Most governments and world bodies have set achieve-
ment of the two-state solution as official policy, including the United States, the United
Nations, the Palestinian Authority and Israel. This goal has been the basis of peace talks
for decades.
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5.1 Israeli negotiations with Palestine could be a sign of

weakness
5.1.1 A nuclear Iran
Threat of military force by Israel is what stops Iran from making the bomb
Jeremy Diamond [White House Reporter], Could military force still be used against
Iran?, CNN, 04/02/15, http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/02/politics/iran-nuclear-
deal-military-attack/
Israel, which isnt at the negotiating table, has vowed to act alone if necessary to prevent
Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. And an Israeli military intervention could set
back Irans program several years likely two to three, according to several military
experts.
Continued pressure is necessary, even with the nuclear deal
The diplomatic progress lessens the likelihood of a strike, but it doesnt completely
rule it out. Critics such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might still decide
the deal is so bad that force will be necessary to stop an Iranian nuclear weapon. And
American and European distrust of Iran and a decision by Tehran to violate the deal
and rush toward weaponization could bring the West to the same point.
US pressure on Israel to work towards two state solution is a signal to Iran that Israeli
power is waning
Mark Silverberg [Foreign Policy Analyst at the Ariel Center For Policy Research], Ne-
gotiating in the Middle East How The Other Side Sees It, Gatestone Institute, 09/27/10,
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1563/negotiating-middle-east
Our adversaries Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah seenegotiations and our
desire for dialogue as opportunities to best others, to demonstrate power, and to
make certain that we know who is in control. Under such circumstances, goodwill
and confidence-building measures by the West are interpreted as a lack of strength or
resolve. Israel should not have been surprised when, in return for withdrawing from
southern Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, it received terror in the form of increased
suicide bombings and missile attacks on its civilian population. Nor, for that matter,
should President Obama have been surprised when his many overtures to our enemies
were seen as symptomatic of American weakness, vulnerability, lack of resolve and an
opportunity for conquest in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere - which is why American
foreign policy in the Middle East is in shambles. As Rhode writes, such regimes are
prepared to negotiate only after they have defeated their enemies and established
their superiority - at which point they need only dictate terms rather than negotiate
them. Contrary to the view of Western diplomats, signaling a desire to talk before
being victorious is [interpreted as] a sign of weakness or lack of will to win, and, in
the view of our enemies, can only lead to an escalation of violence against them and
invite demands for further concessions from them.
Iran could make a rapid push for the bomb even with the nuclear deal
James Fallows [Atlantic Correspondent], Why the Iran Deals Critics Will Probably
Lose, The Atlantic, 08/04/15, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/08/more-
signs-that-the-iran-deal-is-going-through/400508/
The themes in Netanyahus opening presentation will be familiar to anyone following

this topic. To wit: The deal doesnt block Irans path to the bomb but paves the path;
it will fuel and fund Irans international destructiveness; it will provoke a nuclear arms
race in the region (which now has only one nuclear power); and it ignores Irans anti-
Semitic commitment to Israels destruction, which obliges Netanyahu as Israels prime
minister to consider this an existential threat. Also, Iran can have its yellowcake and
eat it too.
The Irani government has a deep hatred for the state of Israel
Josh Levs [Broadcast Journalist], Iran leaders call to annihilate Israel sparks fury as
nuclear deadline looms, CNN, 11/10/14, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/10/world/meast/iran-
annihilate-israel/
A new document by Irans supreme leader calling for the elimination of Israel shows
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that world powers must not rush into a deal on the countrys nuclear program despite
an upcoming deadline, Israels Prime Minister said Monday.There is no moderation
in Iran. It is unrepentant, unreformed, it calls for Israels eradication, it promotes inter-
national terrorism, Benjamin Netanyahu said in a statement.
An Irani nuclear bomb would have severe economic implications
Charles Robb [Expert], Dennis Ross [Distinguished fellow at the Washington In-
stitute for Near East Policy], and Michael Makovsky [Expert], The Economic
Cost of a Nuclear Iran, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 12/17/12,
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-economic-cost-of-a-
nuclear-iran
Energy markets respond both to actual supply disruptions and to expected changes in
supply and demand. A nuclear Iran would raise the likelihood of instability, nuclear
proliferation, terrorism and war and could thus drive oil prices up without disrupting
the flow of oil. To quantify this price impact, we identified five scenarios that an Iran
with nuclear weapons would make more likely: domestic instability in Saudi Arabia,
the destruction of Saudi energy facilities, an Iran-Saudi nuclear exchange, an Iran-Israel
nuclear exchange, and the lapse of sanctions against Iran. To isolate the worst-case sce-
nario for the oil market a Saudi-Iran nuclear exchange we assessed that the probabil-
ity of such an event would change from zero today (when neither country has nuclear
weapons) to 5% within a year. This could lead to the disruption of 12 million barrels
per day, or 13% of current global supply, due to the cessation of exports through those
two countries for one year and a partial cessation from their neighbors. Accounting for
this scenario and the others, we calculated the total additional risk premium that an
informed oil market might reflect after Iran has crossed the nuclear threshold that is,
the amount added onto the price of oil due to the possibility of supply disruption. We
concluded that even if none of the above scenarios actually came to pass, the collective
risk that they could occur would cause significant economic harm: Oil prices could rise
by 10% to 25% in the first year (or $11 to $27 more per barrel). As instability and tensions
remain high, so will prices, even rising as much as 30% to 50% ($30 to $55 per barrel)
within three years. Consequently, gasoline prices could jump 10% to 20% in the first
year. Within three years, the cost of gas could rise more than 30% (or more than $1.40
per gallon). Such sustained price increases would have a pronounced negative impact
on the U.S. economy. U.S. gross domestic product could fall by about 0.6% in the first
year costing the economy some $90 billion and by up to 2.5% (or $360 billion) by the
third year. This is enough, at current growth rates, to send the country into recession.
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The unemployment rate could also rise by 0.3 percentage points in the first year and
by nearly 1% two years later, resulting in some 1.5 million more Americans becoming
jobless.
An Irani nuclear bomb could lead to catastrophic consequences
Ray Takeyh [Senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations] and James Lindsay [Se-
nior Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations], After Iran Gets the Bomb,
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2010, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-
gulf/2010-02-22/after-iran-gets-bomb
The dangers of Irans entry into the nuclear club are well known: emboldened by this
development, Tehran might multiply its attempts at subverting its neighbors and en-
couraging terrorism against the United States and Israel; the risk of both conventional
and nuclear war in the Middle East would escalate; more states in the region might also
want to become nuclear powers; the geopolitical balance in the Middle East would be
reordered; and broader efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons would be under-
mined. The advent of a nuclear Iran even one that is satisfied with having only the
materials and infrastructure necessary to assemble a bomb on short notice rather than
a nuclear arsenal would be seen as a major diplomatic defeat for the United States.
If Iran attains a nuclear weapon, the US relationship with the rest of the world would
be in great peril
Friends and foes would openly question the U.S. governments power and resolve to
shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from
Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively.
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5.1.2 Terrorism
Groups like Hamas and Hezbollah will attack as soon as negotiations begin
Mark Silverberg [Foreign Policy Analyst at the Ariel Center For Policy Research], Ne-
gotiating in the Middle East How The Other Side Sees It, Gatestone Institute, 09/27/10,
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1563/negotiating-middle-east
Our adversaries Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah seenegotiations and our
desire for dialogue as opportunities to best others, to demonstrate power, and to
make certain that we know who is in control. Under such circumstances, goodwill
and confidence-building measures by the West are interpreted as a lack of strength or
resolve.
Negotiations difficult because of terror groups (particularly Hamas)
Daniel L. Byman [Senior fellow for the Brookings Institution], How to Handle Hamas,
Brookings Institution, August 25th, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-
to-handle-hamas/
Some prominent Israelis, such as Efraim Halevy, the former director of Mossad, the Is-
raeli secret service, and Giora Eiland, a former head of Israels National Security Coun-
cil, have called for negotiating with Hamas. Other Israelis, who fear that the group will
never abandon its goal of destroying Israel, think the Israeli military should retake Gaza
before Hamas gets any stronger; they argue that postponing the day of reckoning will
cost Israel dearly in the future. But with neither option being palatable at this time, Is-
rael continues to rely on economic pressure and military operations to preempt terrorist
attacks from Gaza, kill the people there who launch rockets into Israel, and retaliate for
Hamas provocations. Although shunning Hamas may seem morally appropriate and
politically safe, that policy will undermine Israels peace talks with Abbas and other
Palestinian moderates. An alternative approach is necessary. Hamas could, perhaps,
be convinced not to undermine progress on a peace deal. To accomplish this, Israel and
the international community would have to exploit Hamas vulnerabilities, particularly
its performance in governing Gaza, with a mix of coercion and concessions, including
a further easing of the siege of Gaza. At the same time, they should support the state-
building efforts of Fayyad and restart the peace process with Abbas in order to reduce
the risk that Hamas will win the struggle for power among the Palestinians. Moreover,
because the effort to transform Hamas into a responsible government could fail, the
international community must be prepared to support a more aggressive military re-
sponse by Israel if Hamas does not change.
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5.1.3 Pressure encourages heavy lobbying
Lobbyists will believe that US is putting onus on Israel, but not Palestine because
thats what Israeli politicians say
John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, The Israel Lobby, London Review of Books,
03/26/2006, https://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult Israeli officials, to make sure
that their actions advance Israeli goals. As one activist from a major Jewish organisation
wrote, it is routine for us to say: This is our policy on a certain issue, but we must
check what the Israelis think. We as a community do it all the time. There is a strong
prejudice against criticising Israeli policy, and putting pressure on Israel is considered
out of order.
AIPAC and the pro-Israel political movement garner tons of support
John Mearsheimer [Professor at the University of Chicago] and Stephen Walt [Profes-
sor at Harvard University], The Israel Lobby, London Review of Books, 03/26/2006,
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby
Edgar Bronfman Sr, the president of the World Jewish Congress, was accused of per-
fidy when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid-2003 urging him to persuade Israel
to curb construction of its controversial security fence. His critics said that it would
be obscene at any time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the pres-
ident of the United States to resist policies being promoted by the government of Israel.
Similarly, when the president of the Israel Policy Forum, Seymour Reich, advised Con-
doleezza Rice in November 2005 to ask Israel to reopen a critical border crossing in the
Gaza Strip, his action was denounced as irresponsible: There is, his critics said, ab-
solutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing against the security-
related policies of Israel. Recoiling from these attacks, Reich announced that the
word pressure is not in my vocabulary when it comes to Israel. Jewish Americans
have set up an impressive array of organisations to influence American foreign pol-
icy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and best known. In 1997, Fortune magazine
asked members of Congress and their staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Wash-
ington. AIPAC was ranked second behind the American Association of Retired People,
but ahead of the AFL-CIO and the National Rifle Association. A National Journal study
in March 2005 reached a similar conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with
AARP) in the Washington muscle rankings.
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Lobbying could lead to increased support for right wing movements
Connie Bruck [New Yorker Journalist and Reporter], Friends of Israel, The New
Yorker, 09/01/14, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/01/friends-
israel
On July 23rd, officials of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee-the powerful lob-
bying group known as AIPAC-gathered in a conference room at the Capitol for a closed
meeting with a dozen Democratic senators. The agenda of the meeting, which was
attended by other Jewish leaders as well, was the war in the Gaza Strip. In the century-
long conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the previous two weeks had been
particularly harrowing. In Israeli towns and cities, families heard sirens warning of in-
coming rockets and raced to shelters. In Gaza, there were scenes of utter devastation,
with hundreds of Palestinian children dead from bombing and mortar fire. The Israeli
government claimed that it had taken extraordinary measures to minimize civilian casu-
alties, but the United Nations was launching an inquiry into possible war crimes. Even
before the fighting escalated, the United States, Israels closest ally, had made little secret
of its frustration with the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. How
will it have peace if it is unwilling to delineate a border, end the occupation, and allow
for Palestinian sovereignty, security, and dignity? Philip Gordon, the White House
cordinator for the Middle East, said in early July. It cannot maintain military control
of another people indefinitely. Doing so is not only wrong but a recipe for resentment
and recurring instability. Although the Administration repeatedly reaffirmed its sup-
port for Israel, it was clearly uncomfortable with the scale of Israels aggression. AIPAC
did not share this unease; it endorsed a Senate resolution in support of Israels right to
defend its citizens, which had seventy-nine co-sponsors and passed without a word of
dissent.
Heavy lobbying will destroy possibilities of strengthened Israeli-Palestinian rela-

tionship
Connie Bruck [New Yorker Journalist and Reporter], Friends of Israel, The New
Yorker, 09/01/14, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/01/friends-
israel
AIPAC is prideful about its influence. Its promotional literature points out that a re-
ception during its annual policy conference, in Washington, will be attended by more
members of Congress than almost any other event, except for a joint session of Congress
or a State of the Union address. A former AIPAC executive, Steven Rosen, was fond of
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telling people that he could take out a napkin at any Senate hangout and get signatures
of support for one issue or another from scores of senators. AIPAC has more than a
hundred thousand members, a network of seventeen regional offices, and a vast pool
of donors. The lobby does not raise funds directly. Its members do, and the amount
of money they channel to political candidates is difficult to track. But everybody in
Congress recognizes its influence in elections, and the effect is evident. In 2011, when
the Palestinians announced that they would petition the U.N. for statehood, AIPAC
helped persuade four hundred and forty-six members of Congress to co-sponsor reso-
lutions opposing the idea.
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5.2 US relationship with Israel becoming worse
5.2.1 The US seems to be asking too much from Israel
Israel is beginning to think that Israel is a less important ally in the region
David Rothkopf [CEO and Editor of the FP Group], The Amazing Decline of Americas
Special Relationships, Foreign Policy, 05/08/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/08/decline-
of-special-relationships-uk-election-obama-netanyahu/
Similarly, whereas a generation ago Israel was seen as central to U.S. Mideast policy,
today, while it is still Americas most important and best-supported ally in the region,
events have undercut its importance in practical terms. Once it was key to the U.S.
Cold War strategy in the region, but the Cold War ended. Once the Middle East was
more important to the United States as a source of energy, but that is clearly less true
today than at any time since the Second World War. Once the Israel-Palestine conflict
was seen as central to all the problems and geopolitical issues of the region; now that
is far from being the case. Indeed, that issue, once number one among U.S. regional
priorities, might have a hard time making the top ten today. (Coming in after: Iraq,
Syria, Afghanistan, containing Iran, the Iranian nuclear deal, the spread of extremism,
the current crisis in Yemen, the looming crisis in Libya, Egyptian stability, maintaining
eroding support among our traditional Arab allies, and a host of other such issues.)
Further, both special relationships are fading in the minds and hearts of Americans as
a new generation starts assuming power, one that has few memories of the historical
reasons for the founding of Israel or of Britains vital partnership with the United States
in two world wars.
The Israeli and US governments have been damaging their relationship with each
other
David Rothkopf [CEO and Editor of the FP Group], The Amazing Decline of Americas
Special Relationships, Foreign Policy, 05/08/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/08/decline-
of-special-relationships-uk-election-obama-netanyahu/
Part of the deterioration in these two relationships has to do with policy decisions made
by the governments that have just won second terms in power. The U.S.-Israel relation-
ship sure doesnt feel that special when the prime minister of Israel tries to politically
body-slam the U.S. president. It is devalued when the prime minister of Israel appears
to choose sides in the U.S. political debate, seeming to be willing to save his specialness
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for his Republican friends. And it is certainly deeply damaged when Israel wages a
brutal and unjustifiable campaign against the people of Gaza that violates international
norms and offends the sensibilities of all with a hint of conscience, as the Netanyahu
government did last year.
Israel believes that the US seems to be siding more with Palestine than Israel on
international issues
Vijay Prashad [Professor at Trinity College], Americas Israel problem: The U.S.
government chooses sides while taxpayers foot the bill, Salon Magazine, 09/18/16,
http://www.salon.com/2016/09/18/americas-israel-problem-the-u-s-government-is-
choosing-sides-and-taxpayers-are-footing-the-bill_partner/
Over the ten months that the United States, the Israelis and the arms industry worked
on this deal, Netanyahu has shown nothing but contempt for Obama and for the tepid
concerns of the United States over Israels illegal settlement program in the West Bank
and East Jerusalem. Netanyahus animosity to Obama goes back to the first term of the
President, and was underscored by his embarrassingly partisan speech to a joint session
of Congress before Obamas 2012 re-election. The public posturing against the Iran deal
and the disdain for the U.S. statements over the illegal settlement policy are part of a
long-standing lack of concern by Netanyahu and the Israeli leadership for American
policy.
Israel has been trying to push for two state solution but negotiations too difficult
because of political factionalism on both sides
Alon Ben-Meir [Professor], Why Have Past Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations Failed?,

Huffington Post, 11/18/16, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alon-benmeir/why-
have-past-israeli-pal_b_8590960.html
Whereas a majority of Israelis and Palestinians (based on many polls conducted over
the years) have steadily supported a solution to the conflict based on two states, political
factionalism within both communities makes it extremely difficult to concede on this or
any other issue. Major opposition from political opponents who have different agendas,
though they represent a smaller part of the overall population, have consistently scut-
tled the peace talks. The settlement movement in Israel and extremist jihadist groups
among the Palestinians wield far greater political influence than their numbers warrant,
and thus far have succeeded to dash any prospect for peace, justifying their refusal to
accommodate the other.
Continued US pressure angers Israeli government
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Somini Sengupta [New York Times Correspondent] and Rick Gladstone [New York
Times Reporter], Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over Settlements, The New
York Times, 12/23/16, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world/middleeast/israel-
settlements-un-vote.html
Defying extraordinary pressure from President-elect Donald J. Trump and furious lob-
bying by Israel, the Obama administration on Friday allowed the United Nations Secu-
rity Council to adopt a resolution that condemned Israeli settlement construction. The
administrations decision not to veto the measure reflected its accumulated frustration
over Israeli settlements. The American abstention on the vote also broke a longstand-
ing policy of shielding Israel from action at the United Nations that described the set-
tlements as illegal. While the resolution is not expected to have any practical impact on
the ground, it is regarded as a major rebuff to Israel, one that could increase its isolation
over the paralyzed peace process with Israels Palestinian neighbors, who have sought
to establish their own state on territory held by Israel.
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5.2.2 Pressure in the form of criticism and military aid keeps Netanyahu
popular
Netanyahu popular with Israelis because of strong stance on Palestine
Steven Klein [Professor], Why Israelis Really Reelected Netanyahu, Israeli Newspaper
Haaretz , 03/25/15, http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.648709
After Netanyahus victory, commentators scrambled for explanations, saying he offered

a vision with no hope and the frightened public rushed into his arms. This conclusion
patronizes and discounts right-wing voters. The truth is, we all voted for hope, right
and left alike, but we are divided on what we hope for. The left puts its hopes for Israels
future in diplomatic agreements that will transform her relationship with her neighbors.
The right puts its hopes in a strong, self-reliant Israel that is willing to go it alone in the
face of eternally hostile neighbors.
Israelis opposed to US recent actions
Peter Beaumont [Guardian Correspondent], Israel rejects shameful UN resolution

amid criticism of Netanyahu, The Guardian, 12/24/16, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec
rejects-shameful-un-resolution-amid-criticism-of-netanyahu
Israel has responded furiously to a UN security council resolution condemning Israeli

settlements in the occupied territories, recalling two of its ambassadors to countries
that voted for the motion and threatening to cut aid. The security council adopted the
landmark resolution demanding Israel halt all settlement building and expansion in the
occupied territories after Barack Obamas administration refused to veto the resolution
on Friday. A White House official said Obama had taken the decision to abstain in the
absence of any meaningful peace process. The resolution, which passed by a 14-0 vote,
was met with loud applause in the packed chamber after the US ambassador, Samantha
Power, abstained. The move was immediately condemned as shameful by the office
of the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu.
Right wing movements will become even more popular. Israelis support Ne-
tanyahus administration because of the USs unwillingness to help Israel in foreign
affairs. Netanyahus administration is the most right wing party in Israels history
Joel Gehrke [Reporter], Kerry: Netanyahu coalition most right wing in Israeli history,
Washington Examiner, 12/28/16, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/kerry-
netanyahu-coalition-most-right-wing-in-israeli-history/article/2610473
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Secretary of State John Kerry accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of
presiding over the mostright wing coalition is Israeli history, leading to policies that
would destroy the two-state coalition the United States supports. The Israeli prime
minister publicly supports a two-state solution, but his current coalition is the most
right wing in Israeli history, with an agenda driven by the most extreme elements,
Kerry said. The result is that policies of this government, which the prime minister
himself just described as more committed to settlements than any in Israels history, are
leading in the opposite direction. Theyre leading towards one state.
** Netanyahu often dismisses important issues and panders to fear**
Netanyahu Is Exposing His Nationalist Face to the Public, Israeli Newspaper Haaretz,
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/1.625981
Netanyahus modus operandi is always the same: He does everything in his power to
torpedo any possible agreement with the Palestinians, and then exploits the frustration
created by his rejectionism to inflame the atmosphere. He sets absurd preconditions
for beginning negotiations (like recognizing Israel as the Jews nation state), and then,
after the Palestinian frustration has become tangible in the streets, invites everyone
who demonstrates against Israel and in favor of the Palestinian state to move there; we
wont put any obstacles in your path.
More settlements
Judi Rodoren [New York Times Jerusalem Bureau Chief] and Jeremy Ashkenas, Ne-
tanyahu and the Settlements, The New York Times, 03/12/15, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/20
west-bank-settlements-israel-election.html
AS MR. NETANYAHU SEEKS a fourth term, his record on settlements is a central ele-
ment of his troubled relationship with Washington, alongside the divergence on how to
deal with Irans nuclear program. Construction in the West Bank is also at the heart of
mounting European criticism of Israel. In the campaign, Mr. Netanyahu is navigating
between his center-left challenger, Isaac Herzog, who promised to freeze construction
beyond the so-called settlement blocks near Israels pre-1967 lines, and rightists who say
the prime minister has not built nearly enough. An analysis of planning, construction,
population and spending data over the past two decades shows that Mr. Netanyahu was
an aggressive builder during his first premiership in the 1990s, when the West Bank set-
tler population rose at roughly three times the total Israeli rate. But since returning to
Israels helm in 2009, Mr. Netanyahu has logged a record similar to the less-conservative
leaders sandwiched between, with those settlements swelling about twice as fast as Is-
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rael overall. In those recent years, however, Mr. Netanyahu has taken several steps that
make drawing a two-state map particularly problematic, and has declared: I do not
intend to evacuate any settlements. He has taken more heat over settlements than his
predecessors, analysts said, in part because of his broader intransigence on the Pales-
tinian issue and the use of construction as a retaliatory tool. But Mr. Netanyahu is also
a focus of international ire because of the cumulative effect of decades of settlement
growth. With negotiations stalled between the Palestinians and Israelis, the number
of settlers in the West Bank now exceeds 350,000 - including about 80,000 living in iso-
lated settlements like Eli and Ofra that are hard to imagine remaining in place under
any deal.
Settlements displace hundreds of thousands of Palestinians
Patrick Strickland [Producer at Al Jazeera], Israeli demolitions displace dozens of Pales-
tinians, Al Jazeera, 07/13/16, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/israeli-
demolitions-displace-dozens-palestinians-160713124336539.html
Mona Sabella, a legal researcher and advocacy coordinator at the Al-Haq human rights
group, said the demolitions in Jabal al-Mukabercome at a time when Israel is increas-
ing settlement construction in East Jerusalem and poverty is at an all-time high among
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. People are finding it more and more difficult to
afford living in Jerusalem as a result of Israeli policies and practices towards forcible
transfer, both direct and indirect, she told Al Jazeera. During the first three months of
2016, Israeli forces demolished an average of 165 homes a month, according to the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Settlements house thousands of Jews at the expense of the displacement of Palestini-
ans
Patrick Strickland [Producer at Al Jazeera], Israeli demolitions displace dozens of Pales-
tinians, Al Jazeera, 07/13/16, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/07/israeli-
demolitions-displace-dozens-palestinians-160713124336539.html
The Israeli rights groups BTselem estimates that 530,000 Israelis live in Jewish-only set-
tlements - considered illegal under international law - across the West Bank, including
East Jerusalem. Couches and personal belongings sit in the wreckage of the demolished
homes in Anatas Bedouin community.
Settlements strain Israeli-Palestinian relationship, ruining the chance for peace
UN Security Council, Accelerated Settlement Activity Casts Doubt on Israels Commit-
ment to Two-State Solution, Secretary-General Tells Security Council, United Nations,
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04/18/16, https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12327.doc.htm
The demolition of Palestinian homes and businesses in the West Bank was continuing
at an alarming rate and plans for more illegal Jewish settlements in the area cast doubt
on Israels commitment to a two-State solution, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said
this morning at the start of a day-long Security Council open debate on the Middle East.
The creation of new facts on the ground through demolitions and settlement-building
raises questions about whether Israels ultimate goal is in fact to drive Palestinians out
of certain parts of the West Bank, thereby undermining any prospect of transition to a
viable Palestinian State, said Mr. Ban, pointing out that 20-year-old Palestinians living
under occupation had seen no political progress at all during their lifetime. By early
April, the number of Palestinian structures demolished had exceeded the entire total
of those destroyed in 2015, displacing 840 people, he said. Meanwhile, plans to build
more settlements and retroactively legalize construction in almost untraceable steps, to-
gether with the declaration of State land in March - the first in more than 18 months
- signalled that Israels strategic settlement enterprise continued to expand on land in-
tended for a future Palestinian State.
Palestinian terror in response to Israeli settlements
Ibrahim Hewitt [Senior editor], Everything Israel does is part of a plan, not a forced re-
sponse to terrorism, Middle East Monitor, 05/15/16, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20160515-
everything-israel-does-is-part-of-a-plan-not-a-forced-response-to-terrorism/
Scrutiny of how Israels offensives have been launched against the people of Gaza over
the past few years demonstrates that the Zionist state is the prime cause of the violence
through its vicious occupation policies in the occupied West Bank and the blockade of
the Gaza Strip; indeed, its polices before, during and since the Nakba. Rockets fired
from the territory and other acts of resistance have to be viewed within that context if
there is to be a genuine attempt to decipher the reality of the situation. The same is true
of the three major Palestinian uprisings in 1987-1991, 2000-2005 and 2015-present. All
were in response to Israeli oppression and occupation, rather than the over-simplistic
violence against Israelis that some claim.
Terror strains Israeli-Palestinian relationship
Shlomi Eldar [Columnist], Without Hamas, Israelis and Palestinians can find peace,
Al-Monitor, 04/16/14, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/08/hamas-
gaza-peace-oslo-accords-terror-palestinians.html#ixzz4Y85bWmke
It was terrorist attacks by Hamas from the 1990s until today that ruined any chance
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of reconciliation with Israel. Thus, only when the Palestinian people come out against
Hamas will it be possible to talk about peace.
Israeli right wing party worsens relationship with Iran. Iran is coming to the negoti-
ating table
BBC, Israel PM calls Iran leader wolf in sheeps clothing, BBC News, 10/02/13,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24354160
In a speech to the UN General Assembly, he described President Hassan Rouhani as

awolf in sheeps clothing. He said Israel would not allow Iran to develop nuclear
weapons, even if it had to stand alone on the issue. Iran replied that it had no inten-
tion of developing nuclear weapons, and called Mr Netanyahus commentsextremely
inflammatory.
An angry Iran could retaliate with a nuclear weapon
The diplomatic progress lessens the likelihood of a strike, but it doesnt completely
rule it out. Critics such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might still decide
the deal is so bad that force will be necessary to stop an Iranian nuclear weapon. And
American and European distrust of Iran and a decision by Tehran to violate the deal
and rush toward weaponization could bring the West to the same point.
Possibility of a nuclear arms race
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5.2.3 Pressure through UN resolutions
Israelis angry with US involvement in the UN
Stephen Collinson [Senior enterprise reporter], David Wright [Writer and editor], and
Elise Labott [CNN Correspondent], US abstains as UN demands end to Israeli set-
tlements, CNN, 12/24/16, http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/23/politics/israel-official-
rips-obama-un-settlements/
The United States on Friday allowed a UN Security Council resolution condemning Is-
raeli settlement construction to be adopted, defying extraordinary pressure from Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahus government in alliance with President-elect Donald
Trump. The Security Council approved the resolution with 14 votes, with the US ab-
staining. There was applause in the chamber following the vote, which represented
perhaps the final bitte r chapter in the years of antagonism between President Barack
Obamas administration and Netanyahus government. In an intense flurry of diplo-
macy that unfolded in the two days before the vote, a senior Israeli official had accused
the United States of abandoning the Jewish state with its refusal to block the resolution
with a veto.
UN legitimacy, in the eyes of Israel and its allies, undermined as US continues to

push for two state solution
AFP, Israel cuts $6 million in UN funding over anti-settlement vote, Times of Israel,
01/06/17, http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-cuts-6-million-in-un-funding-over-
anti-settlement-vote/
Israel on Friday suspended about $6 million in funding to the United Nations to protest
a Security Council resolution demanding an end to settlements in the West Bank. The
council adopted the resolution last month after the United States refrained from using
a veto to block the measure in a break from its usual practice of shielding its Middle
East ally. The cut to Israels $40 million annual contribution to the United Nations rep-
resented the portion of the UN budget allocated to four committees on Palestinian is-
sues, the Israeli mission said. It is unreasonable for Israel to fund bodies that operate
against us at the UN, Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon said in a statement. We seek
to stop the practice where the UN is used solely as a forum for unending attacks against
Israel.
UN resolutions, particularly when it comes to settlements, are never followed be-

cause of Israels distrust with the UN and Israel considers settlements important to
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its security
J.J. Goldberg [Editor-at-large], That Shameful UN Resolution Actually Blasts the Set-
tlements - Not Israel, Forward Magazine, 12/23/16, http://forward.com/opinion/358273/that-
shameful-un-resolution-actually-blasts-the-settlements-not-israel/
The claim that Israels West Bank settlements violate international law has been taken
up by the Security Council repeatedly since 1979. At times Washington has blocked the
resolutions with a veto, as the Obama administration did in 2011. On other occasions
Washington has abstained and allowed the resolution to pass, as it did this week.
Decreased trust in UNs ability to operate decreases worldwide soft power
Nile Gardiner [Director in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, Davis Institute
for National Security and Foreign Policy, Expert on National Security], The Decline
and Fall of the United Nations: Why the U.N. Has Failed and How It Can Be Reformed,
Heritage Foundation, 10/13/06, http://www.heritage.org/report/the-decline-and-
fall-the-united-nations-why-the-un-has-failed-and-how-it-can-be-reformed
At the same time, however, there remains a con_sensus in the United States, whether
on Capitol Hill or in Kansas City, that the U.N. still has an impor_tant role to play-for
now at least-in both interna_tional security matters and humanitarian efforts. While
disenchantment with the U.N. is rising sig_nificantly, there is at this time no significant
chorus of calls for the U.S. to immediately walk away from the U.N. Both Congress and
the executive branch have focused heavily in the past year on advancing the reform
of the United Nations rather than desert_ing the institution altogether. Washington
has looked to the U.N. Security Council to play a role in the Iranian and North Korean
nuclear issues, as well as the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping to help prevent further
mass killing in the Sudan. The U.N. may not be loved, but it is still seen as a valuable
forum and tool for advancing U.S. interests on the international stage.
Soft power is important for solving international conflicts
Joseph S. Nye [Professor at Harvard University], The Decline of Americas Soft Power,
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004, http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/rdenever/PPA-730-
27/Nye.pdf
Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of

obtaining outcomes the United States wants. When Washington discounts the impor-
tance of its attractiveness abroad, it pays a steep price. When the United States becomes
so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries domestic
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politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions (witness the
defiance of Chile, Mexico, and Turkey in March 2003). And when U.S. policies lose their
legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international
affairs.
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5.3 Two state solution cannot be stable
5.3.1 Palestinian government unclear
Palestine is divided between too many territories and too many governments
Max Fisher [New York Times Editor and Writer], The Two-State Solution: What It Is
and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, 12/29/16, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/
palestinians-two-state-solution.html
There is plenty of blame to go around. The Palestinian leadership is divided between

two governments that cannot come to terms. The leadership in the West Bank lacks the
political legitimacy to make far-reaching but necessary concessions, and the leadership
in Gaza does not even recognize Israel, whose citizens it frequently attacks. The United
States, which has brokered talks for years, has taken more than a few missteps.
Difficult to negotiate with Hamas
Adam Davidson [Journalist], Hamas: Government or Terrorist Organization?,

NPR, 12/06/16, http://www.npr.org/2006/12/06/6583080/hamas-government-or-
terrorist-organization
Perhaps what is most striking about this debate is that there was virtually no disagree-
ment on the facts. Three panelists argued that Hamas is a terrorist organization. Three
others responded that Hamas now leads a legitimate, democratically elected govern-
ment and is not a terrorist group. But almost all agreed on the basic details: Hamas has
targeted and killed many civilians, and Israels occupation has contributed to a violent
political environment. In short, this was not a debate about facts; it was a debate about
how to frame those facts.
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5.3.2 Borders unclear
Israel has been attempting to negotiate, but Palestine threatens Israeli security with
the demands it is making
Barak Ravid [Diplomatic Correspondent for Haaretz], Netanyahu: Israel Will Enter
Peace Talks Honestly, Wont Give Up Security Demands, 07/21/13, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.537004
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that he intended to embark on nego-
tiations with the Palestinians honestly, but assured ministers at the weekly cabinet meet-
ing in Jerusalem that he would stand his ground on Israels security needs throughout
the talks.I am committed to two objectives that must guide the result if there will be
a result. And if there will be a result, it will be put to a national referendum, he said
at the start of the cabinet meeting, two days after U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry an-
nounced that direct Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations were due to begin next week
in Washington. Negotiations with the Palestinians will not be easy but we are enter-
ing them with integrity, honesty and hope.Our negotiating partners will have to make
concessions that enable us to preserve out security and crucial national interests, Ne-
tanyahu said, adding that the negotiations would be conducted in a responsible, serious
and businesslike fashion and that at least in the early stages they will also be carried
out discreetly.
Border disputes have been going on for a long time
Zach Beauchamp [Vox Correspondent], Everything you need to know about Israel-
Palestine, Vox, 05/19/15, http://www.vox.com/cards/israel-palestine/intro
Though both Jews and Arab Muslims date their claims to the land back a couple thou-
sand years, the current political conflict began in the early 20th century. Jews fleeing per-
secution in Europe wanted to establish a national homeland in what was then an Arab-
and Muslim-majority territory in the Ottoman and later British Empire. The Arabs re-
sisted, seeing the land as rightfully theirs. An early United Nations plan to give each
group part of the land failed, and Israel and the surrounding Arab nations fought sev-
eral wars over the territory. Todays lines largely reflect the outcomes of two of these
wars, one waged in 1948 and another in 1967.
Israel wants settlements and wont stop because they are unwilling to negotiate un-
less US pressures Palestine to make concessions. Pressuring Israel on settlements
hasnt been working
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Max Fisher [Editor and Writer for the New York Times], The Two-State Solu-
tion: What It Is and Why It Hasnt Happened, The New York Times, 12/29/16,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-two-
state-solution.html
1. Borders: There is no consensus about precisely where to draw the line. Generally,
most believe the border would follow the lines before the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, but
with Israel keeping some of the land where it has built settlements and in exchange
providing other land to the Palestinians to compensate. Israel has constructed barriers
along and within the West Bank that many analysts worry create a de facto border, and
it has built settlements in the West Bank that will make it difficult to establish that land
as part of an independent Palestine. As time goes on, settlements grow, theoretically
making any future Palestinian state smaller and possibly breaking it up into noncon-
tiguous pieces.
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5.3.3 Refugees
Lots of Palestinian refugees
United Nations Relief and Work Agency, Palestine Refugees, https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-

refugees
Nearly one-third of the registered Palestine refugees, more than 1.5 million individuals,
live in 58 recognized Palestine refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Re-
public, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. A Palestine refugee
camp is defined as a plot of land placed at the disposal of UNRWA by the host govern-
ment to accommodate Palestine refugees and set up facilities to cater to their needs. Ar-
eas not designated as such and are not recognized as camps. However, UNRWA also
maintains schools, health centres and distribution centres in areas outside the recog-
nized camps where Palestine refugees are concentrated, such as Yarmouk, near Dam-
ascus. The plots of land on which the recognized camps were set up are either state
land or, in most cases, land leased by the host government from local landowners. This
means that the refugees in camps do not own the land on which their shelters were
built, but have the right to use the land for a residence. Socioeconomic conditions in
the camps are generally poor, with high population density, cramped living conditions
and inadequate basic infrastructure such as roads and sewers.
Similar to what happened with Syrian refugees, Israel would be unwilling to accept
refugees
Ben White [Author of Israeli Apartheid: A Beginners Guide and Palestinians in

Israel: Segregation, Discrimination and Democracy], Israel keeps making, not taking
refugees, Middle East Eye, 09/13/15, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/israel-
s-ethnocracy-closes-door-syrian-refugees-408109104
Long before Syrian refugees found their way to Europe, the war-torn countrys neigh-
bours have been hosting a staggering number of displaced persons - with one notable ex-
ception. Syria has five neighbours: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Israel (with the
latter occupying the Golan Heights since 1967). According to recent figures, Turkey cur-
rently hosts 1.8 million Syrian refugees, Lebanon a further 1.17 million, Jordan around
630,000, and Iraq some 250,000. Israel, however, with a GDP per capita almost double
that of Turkey and five times as much as Jordan, has not accepted a single one. This
is unlikely to change any time soon. On 6 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu rejected the idea of accepting any Syrian refugees, stating: Israel is a very
small state. It has no geographic depth or demographic depth. The day before, former
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finance minister and Yesh Atid chair Yair Lapid expressed similar sentiments, arguing
that Israel cannot afford to get into the matter of the refugee crisis since to do so, he
added instructively, could open a back door to discussing the right of return for Pales-
tinians.
Influx of refugees will infringe on Israels sovereignty to be only Jewish state
state-solution.html
3. Refugees: Large numbers of Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes
in what is now Israel, primarily during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war that came after
Israels creation. They and their descendants now number five million and be-
lieve they deserve the right to return. This is a nonstarter for Israel: Too many
returnees would end Jews demographic majority and therefore Israels status as
both a Jewish and a democratic state.
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5.3.4 Jerusalem
Extremely disputed territory makes it virtually impossible to negotiate a deal
state-solution.html
2. Jerusalem: Both sides claim Jerusalem as their capital and consider it a center of
religious worship and cultural heritage. The two-state solution typically calls for divid-
ing it into an Israeli West and a Palestinian East, but it is not easy to draw the line -
Jewish, Muslim and Christian holy sites are on top of one another. Israel has declared
Jerusalem its undivided capital, effectively annexing its eastern half, and has built up
construction that entrenches Israeli control of the city.
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5.4 Israel should not just work towards
5.4.1 The words to work towards have been used to stall peace in the past
Israel continues to say that allowing Jews back into the West Bank are Pro-Israel
moves for security reasons (which is working towards peace)
Greg Myre [Journalist] and Larry Kaplow [Editor], 7 Things To Know About Israeli Set-
tlements, NPR, 12/29/16, http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/12/29/507377617/seven-
things-to-know-about-israeli-settlements
When Israel captured the West Bank in the 1967 Six-Day War, no Israeli citizens had
lived in the territory for nearly two decades, since an earlier war. But in 1968, a small
group of religious Jews rented rooms at the Park Hotel in Hebron for Passover, saying
they wanted to be near the Tomb of the Patriarchs, one of the holiest sites in Judaism
(as well as Islam and Christianity). The Israeli government reluctantly allowed them
to staytemporarily. From that beginning, hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews now
reside in the West Bank, citing religion, history and Israels security among their reasons
for being there.
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5.5 Pressure on Israel in the form of military aid will hurt our
relationship with the Islamic World
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5.5.1 Military aid is ineffective
Military aid has a poor track record
Patricia L. Sullivan [Associate Professor at UNC Chapel Hill], Brock F. Tessman [As-
sistant Professor at the University of Georgia], and Xiaojun Li [Assistant Professor at
the University of British Colombia], US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,
Foreign Policy Analysis, 2011, http://plsullivan.web.unc.edu/files/2011/09/Sullivan_FPA_Military-
Aid-Cooperation.pdf
Despite its limitations, our study offers a novel approach to the foreign aid and in-
fluence puzzle. And our results uncover interesting relationships that deserve greater
theoretical and empirical attention in future research. Clearly, the relationship between
US military aid and recipient state cooperation is far from straightforward. The bulk
of our evidence pens a cautionary tale for policymakers; although military assistance
may achieve the specific goals for which it was allocated, it appears to generate less
cooperative behavior from recipient states overall. US military aid levels may be more
indicative of American dependence on recipient states than of US influence over client
states. Contrary to the vast majority of the existing literature on foreign aid, our results
suggest military aid is neither a carrot nor a stick; US assistance is given to countries that
the United States depends on for some foreign policy goodand the United States will
continue to provide such aid as long as thatgood is valued in Washington. With this
knowledge, recipient state behavior is actually likely to be increasingly uncooperative
as levels of American dependency (and subsequent aid packages) increase.
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5.5.2 Surrounding countries perceive threat
US offering military aid to Israel will threaten the people in the areas around Israel
and increase anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment
David Wallechinsky [Historian], Why Do They Hate Us?, Huffington Post,

11/12/11, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-wallechinsky/why-do-they-hate-
us_2_b_957277.html
If the names Sabra and Chatila do not ring a bell, please reread the first sentence of
reason #1 before going on. From an emotional point of view, Sabra and Chatila are
the Pearl Harbor of the movement for Palestinian independence. In September 1982, Is-
raeli troops surrounded the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Chatila in southern
Lebanon and stood by while Christian militiamen, over a three-day period, massacred
at least 800 people, including women, children and the elderly. Foreign journalists, in-
cluding Americans, who entered the camps as soon as the killing was finished, were
sickened by what they saw. Unfortunately, the Israeli defense minister who approved
the action was none other than Ariel Sharon, who is now the prime minister of Israel.
One might wonder why an act committed by Lebanese and overseen by Israelis would
arouse hatred against the United States, particularly as the US government officially
condemned the massacres. The reason is simple. The United States provides $3 billion
in aid a year to Israel. As the rest of the world well knows, Israel could not survive with-
out US aid. Those Muslims who hate us do so not just because of Sabra and Chatila, but
because they blame us for every outrage and brutal act committed by the Israeli govern-
ment.
Threats could escalate into potential further conflict
Michelle Maiese [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Emmanuel College], Destruc-

tive Escalation, Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base Project at the University of Col-
orado, September 2003, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/escalation
Some conflict escalation is driven by incompatible goals. Many note that destructive
social and inter-personal conflicts always begin with the emergence of contentious goals
of two adversaries. If the parties do not see a possibility of finding a mutually beneficial
solution, and one believes that it has the power to substantially alter the aspirations of
the other, it may try to bully the other side into submission.[7] As the adversaries begin
to pursue their incompatible goals, they may issue threats or otherwise attempt to co-
erce the opposing side into giving them what they want.[8] Each side typically believes
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that the other is driven by power and will increase its coercive behavior unless it is pre-
vented from doing so by greater coercion.[9] But if one party is harmed or threatened by
another, it is more likely to respond with hostility. The greater number of issues in con-
tention and the more intense the sense of grievance, the more fuel there is to encourage
escalation.[10]
Arms race could turn nuclear in the Middle East if Iran decides to go nuclear from
perceived threats from Israel
If Iran attains a nuclear weapon, the US relationship with the rest of the world would
be in great peril
Friends and foes would openly question the U.S. governments power and resolve to
shape events in the Middle East. Friends would respond by distancing themselves from
Washington; foes would challenge U.S. policies more aggressively.
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5.5.3 Other Harms of Military Aid
Anti-American terror in response to military aid
Eric Neumayer [Professor at the London School of Economics] and Thomas Plmper
[Professor at the Vienna University of Economics], Foreign terror on Americans, Jour-
nal of Peace Research, 2011, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/30794/1/__Libfile_repository_Content_Neumayer,%
Turning to our variables of main interest, we find evidence in favor of our hypothesis.
In particular, the three military support variables exert a positive impact on the num-
ber of US victims. All three show a significant and positive relation to the number of
American terror victims, as per our theory. The three variables also exert a substantively
important influence on the dependent variable. A one standard deviation increase in
the measure of military aid, arms exports and military personnel raises the expected
count of anti-American terrorism by 135, 109 and 24%, respectively.
US military assistance prolongs conflict
Navin A. Bapat [Professor at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill], Transna-
tional Terrorism, U.S. Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent, University of
North Carolina - Chapel Hill, 08/03/10, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Navin_Bapat/publication
If we use the instrumental variable model to compare the mean duration until a group
collapses, we see that when the instrument is equal to .39, signifying no military aid, the
predicted duration until a group collapses is 4.69 years. However, when the instrument
is increased to its mean of .61, indicating that the U.S. is providing military assistance,
the predicted duration increases to 7.82 years, which is a 67% increase. We therefore
see that consistent with Hypothesis 1, U.S. military aid seems to prolong the existence
of terrorists, which can be explained by the lucrative nature of having an active terrorist
campaign in the post 9/11 era.
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5.6 The alternative
5.6.1 One state solution - Palestinians and Israelis live in the same state
Palestinians are starting to look at a one state solution as the resolution to the conflict
Joshua Mitnick [Reporter], With the two-state solution a distant dream, Palestini-
ans ask if its time to push for a one-state solution, Los Angeles Times, 12/29/16,
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-palestinian-one-state-2016-story.html
For nearly three decades, governments around the world have insisted that the best
way to end the most intractable conflict in the Middle East is to trade land for peace,
creating an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. But these days, as Palestinians see prospects for the so-called two-state solution
disintegrating, a growing number are mulling over a provocative alternative: a single
binational state from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean.
Israels options with a one state solution
Joshua Mitnick [Reporter], With the two-state solution a distant dream, Palestini-
ans ask if its time to push for a one-state solution, Los Angeles Times, 12/29/16,
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-palestinian-one-state-2016-story.html
The notion is the equivalent of a demographic Trojan horse, forcing Israel either to give
Arab residents full voting rights - and jeopardize the Jewish identity upon which Israel
was created in 1948 - or risk becoming an apartheid state under permanent sanction by
the rest of the world.
The benefits of a one state solution
Musa al-Gharbi [Senior fellow with the Southwest Initiative for the Study of
Middle East Conflicts], Israel and Palestinians need a one-state solution, Al
Jazeera America, 01/06/15, http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/israel-
palestineunitedstatesunitednationsonestatesolution.html
If Abbas really wants radical change for the Palestinians plight, he should dissolve the
Palestinian Authority and hand control of the West Bank to Israel - as he has repeat-
edly threatened to do - and then encourage Palestinians to demand annexation with all
rights, protections and benefits granted to other Israelis. Given the one-state reality on
the ground, removing the illusion of sovereign Arab institutions would render Israel
responsible for the population it has subjugated for the last 70 years. A failure to rise to
this challenge would expose it as an apartheid state.
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5.7 AT: Empowers BDS
5.7.1 The BDS has been demonstrably ineffective
Urback, Robyn. Robyn Urback: The Proper Response To The BDS Movement Is Not
Censure, But Facts. National Post. 23 Feb. 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
First off, lets get one thing out of the way: the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)
campaign against Israel is a demonstrably ineffective, hopelessly tired, morally disin-
genuous preoccupation that has achieved basically nothing in terms of territorial con-
cessions, unless you count the occasional yield of meeting spaces on North American
university campuses. Activists have tried for the last decade to put an economic stran-
glehold on Israel as well as on companies that do business with Israel while remain-
ing blissfully blind to the innumerable products, technological advances and medical
breakthroughs from Israel that touch our everyday lives.
5.7.2 A two-state solution would render BDS even more ineffective
Lazaroff, Tovah. EU Ambassador To Israel: A Two-State Solution Is The Best Antidote

To BDS. The Jerusalem Post. 28 Mar. 2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz charged that the BDS movement was trying to un-
dermine Israel and that many of its members had relations with those who were hostile
to Israel. Its important to know who your enemies are, he said. Shapiro agreed that
hatred of Israel is certainly part of the issue. There are those who have a truly anti-
Israel agenda independent of the conflict, but there are those who are persuadable, and
there are significant numbers of such people, he said. Lars Faaborg-Andersen agreed
that the most effective antidote to the BDS movement is to solve the Israeli- Palestinian
conflict, he said. BDS would quickly become ineffective if there were a two-state solu-
tion and the movement was not piggy-backing on Israels continued conflict with the
Palestinians, he said. We do not expect Israel to solve the issue on its own. It takes
two to tango, he said. What is important is that Israel is not seen as working at cross
purposes by undermining the possibility of a two-state solution, Faaborg-Andersen
said.
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5.8 AT: Benefits Palestine
5.8.1 The prospect of a two-state solution is used to justify Israeli expansion

and settlement building in Palestinian territory
Nashashibi, Sharif. Israel-Palestine: The Delusion Of A Two-State Solution. Al

Jazeera. 24 Mar. 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Those who continue to portray a two-state solution as a possibility are - inadvertently

or otherwise - providing Israel with cover to continue wiping Palestine off the map, be-
cause the point of no return seems to forever be on the horizon, and as long as that is
the case, Israel can avoid blame for passing the point of no return. In reality, we passed
it long ago. There was national upheaval in Israel about evacuating several thousand
settlers from the Gaza Strip. This renders impossible the prospect of evacuating sev-
eral hundred thousand from the West Bank and East Jerusalem, even if there was the
political will to do so, which there has never been. There needs to be a paradigm shift
in the way people view the conflict and ways to solve it. That involves acknowledging
that Israel has created a one-state reality, and finding ways to make that state equitable
rather than a vehicle for the apartheid system that exists today. This is actually easier
than with two states, because issues of separation - borders, settlements, East Jerusalem,
resources - no longer become the insurmountable obstacles they currently are. Never-
theless, the debate over the desirability of one state for both peoples is moot given that
the two-state solution is no longer feasible. The only choice to be faced is whether to
continue turning a blind eye to the facts on the ground.
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5.9 AT: Public Support
5.9.1 Minority of Israelis and Palestinian Arabs support US-brokered

two-state solution
Dvorin, Tova. Poll: PA, Israel Care Less About US Pressure. Israel National News.
13 Dec. 2013. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
The US may be in a bit of a political snafu, a new poll reveals. The Truman Institute
revealed statistics Tuesday showing that both Israelis and Palestinian Arabs want a two-
state solution - but without US involvement. Just 41% of Israelis surveyed believed that
Israel is obligated to accept a two-state solution brokered through the US, down from
52% at the beginning of President Barack Obamas term. 43% believe that Israel must
reject a two-state solution even if there is pressure from the United States to accept a
deal. Among Palestinian Arabs, the decrease is more dramatic: only 36% are ready
to accept a two-state solution under US pressure, down from 47% at the beginning of
Obamas term. The objection is only to US involvement, however; both sides support
the two-state solution itself, the poll reveals. The percentage who support a two-state
solution remains stable and high on both sides - 63% of Israelis and 53% of Palestinians.
The survey also found that in light of the ongoing American involvement in talks, 39%
of Israelis think that this involvement will succeed and 29% of Israelis think that US
involvement will fail. At the beginning of Obamas term, the numbers held at 42% and
30%, respectively.
5.9.2 Public pressure for a peace-deal is declining and Netanyahus

governing coalition generally rejects a two-state solution
Fisher, Max. The Two-State Solution: What It Is And Why It HasnT Happened. New
York Times. 29 Dec. 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli prime minister since 2009, endorsed the two-state so-
lution in a speech that year. But he continued to expand West Bank settlements and,
in 2015, said there would be no withdrawals and no concessions. Mr. Netanyahu
appears personally skeptical of Palestinian independence. His fragile governing coali-
tion also relies on right-wing parties that are skeptical of or outright oppose the two-
state solution. Israeli public pressure for a peace deal has declined. The reasons are
complex: demographic changes, an increasingly powerful settler movement, outrage at
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Palestinian attacks such as a recent spate of stabbings, and bitter memories of the Second
Intifada in the early 2000s, which saw frequent bus and cafe bombings. And the status
quo has, for most Israelis, become relatively peaceful and bearable. Many see little in-
centive for adopting a risky and uncertain two-state solution, leaving Mr. Netanyahu
with scant reason to risk his political career on one.
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5.10 AT: US Pressure Prevents One-State Solution
5.10.1 Two-state solution will remain the dominant normative paradigm

independent of whether US supports it- both Israel and the PLO have
interests in keeping it alive
Beck, Martin. Quo Vadis Palestine?. (2015): 8.
According to the present analysis, a two-state solution (Scenario 1) is likely to remain the
dominant normative paradigm not only because it is favoured by major international
actors, but also because both Israel and the PLO have a strong interest in keeping it
alive. For instance, Israel promotes the two-state solution because it would struggle to
justify its repressive and undemocratic practice of occupation as an official form of gov-
ernment, whereas the PA owes its very existence to the bilateral Oslo process. However,
a sustainable two-state solution will only become likely if the power gap between Israel
and the PLO significantly narrows. There is no indication that this could happen in the
foreseeable future in either economic or military terms. However, should Western per-
ceptions of Israels occupation of Palestine as a tolerable form of government begin to
change, it could lead the West to push for multilateral negotiations on a Palestinian state.
Although such a development would help the Palestinians to partially compensate for
their lack of power vis- -vis Israel, Israel has always been able to rely on unwavering
support from the United States and Germany. As a result, continued occupation is the
most likely scenario for the foreseeable future
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5.11 AT: Security Assistance
5.11.1 Security assistance provisions have historically not been used to

acquire leverage in two-state solution talks- Israel continues to build
settlements
Beinart, Peter. Why Doesnt Obama Use Military Aid Package To Israel As Leverage?.
Peter Beinart. 8 Sep. 2016 Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Over roughly the same period, the Obama administration has negotiated the terms of
a military aid package to Israel to replace the one that expires next October. Given that
U.S. military aid accounts for twenty percent of Israels defense budget, Israel needs
such a deal badly. At one point, Netanyahu seemed inclined to wait to finalize one un-
til Obama left office. But given the real, albeit small, possibility that Americans could
elect Donald Trump, an unpredictable candidate who exudes hostility to foreign aid, Is-
raeli officials now appear eager to conclude the agreement this year. The tradeoff seems
obvious. America gives Israel the aid it desires. Israel does something to preserve the
two state solution. But there is no tradeoff. Instead, the Obama administration appears
close to agreeing to a ten-year deal that boosts military aid to Israel to between $3.5
and $3.7 billion per year. The administration has reportedly insisted that Israel spend
the money on American, rather than Israeli-made, arms. But on the question of settle-
ments and a Palestinian state, America has asked nothing. To the contrary, Obama is
reportedly waiting until after the deal is signed to unveil an Israeli-Palestinian peace
initiative at the United Nations. Only once he has proved his commitment to Israeli
security, the logic goes, will Obama have the credibility to ask Israel to make conces-
sions for peace. This isnt logic. Its lunacy. Theres zero reason to believe that giving
Israel a new military aid package will make Netanyahu curtail settlement growth or
negotiate seriously toward a Palestinian state. Obama has already given Israel more
military aid than any president in history. Hes dramatically boosted funding for Is-
raeli missile defense, adding hundreds of millions of dollars per year to $3.1 billion
that Congress allocates annually. Ehud Barak has already called Obamas support for
Israeli security unprecedented. Yet despite this, Netanyahu has boosted settlement
construction, retroactively legalized settlements that were illegal under Israeli law and
publicly rejected the principle that the Palestinians should have a state near the 1967
lines, the principle that has undergirded every serious two state negotiation in the past.
Netanyahu has also constructed a governing coalition dominated by ministers who op-
pose any Palestinian state at all. This is what seven and half years of unprecedented
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U.S. security assistance has brought.
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5.12 AT: Undermines UN Legitimacy
5.12.1 International community backs UNs support of a two-state solution
Baskin, Gershon. ENCOUNTERING PEACE: The United Nations And IsraelS Legiti-
macy. The Jerusalem Post. 8 May 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Despite some of the very harsh words from almost all of the official representatives of
governments here against Israels policies and actions, there is an underlying founda-
tion on which these international meetings are built, which is in full support of Israels
right to exist, backed by international law and legitimacy. The fundamental agreement
in the international community and especially in the UN is support for the two-state
solution. The statements made by all in these meetings call for the establishment of a
Palestinian state on the basis of the 1967 lines and as a result of a negotiated Israeli-
Palestinian agreement. This is, of course, based on UN Resolution 181 from November
29, 1947 calling for two states to be established a Jewish state and an Arab state on the
land between the River and the Sea. As long as the international community remains
loyal to these principles, Israel retains international support for its legitimate right to
exist. This is not only the official position of the international community and the UN,
but is also the official position of the government of the state of Palestine, which is rec-
ognized by the international community and the UN, yet is still waiting to be formally
established through a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian agreement.
5.12.2 International community views the two-state solution as the most

appropriate response to the Israel-Palestine conflict
The interest in the two-state solution is likely to be driven also by the fact that the in-
ternational community supports it and views it as the most appropriate solution to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Palestinians will need to rely on that support in the day
after if they are to be able to wage an effective diplomatic warfare against Israel and to
find means to continue to deliver basic services to the public. Having invested about 20
billion dollars in the way to reaching that solution, the international community might
not be willing to invest in yet another untested approach to ending that conflict.
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5.13 AT: Feasibility
5.13.1 The reconciliation of cultural differences are a prerequisite to a

two-state solution
Alvarez, Joshua. Why The Israel-Palestine Two-State Solution Wont Happen -

IVN.Us. IVN. 30 Jul. 2014. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Israel is partly (not fully) responsible for the Islamists appeal: by hollowing out any
possibility for true Palestinian self-government and subjecting them to the indignities
of living under military occupation, groups like Hamas capitalize on the anger, resent-
ment, and helplessness by offering services and community support that the Palestinian
Authority cannot or is prevented from creating. Yet, these same groups that promise
Palestinians something like control over their own destinies are fundamentally opposed
to any co-existence with Jews and Israel. At the same time, to speak of Israel as one,
unified country is hugely misleading. Americans who bemoan political polarization in
their country would be horrified by the state of politics in Israel. There is a vast cultural-
political canyon that divides Israelis, and in a region where land is everything, the two
sides are best represented by the cities in which they live: Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. The
two cities are separated by less than 50 miles, but they may as well be in two different
countries in two different continents.
5.13.2 Netanyahu has a political strategy to resist a two-state solution
The Jerusalem source admitted the prime ministers office clearly has a plan to delay
the two-state solution. The strategy consists of several elements. First, the right-wing
HaBayit HaYehudi (Jewish Home) party of Naftali Bennett needs to be kept within the
coalition. Netanyahu has made this clear to Zionist Camp leader Isaac Herzog in back-
channel talks on a possible national unity government. The prime minister considers
Israeli settlers his main political base for his next election campaign. This constituency
must be convinced that Netanyahu is their best guarantee against a Palestinian state,
as he knows how to outmaneuver the international community. Second, settlements
need to be expanded, which would render establishing a Palestinian state impossible.
This is especially true in the case of the Jerusalem-area settlements and those outside
the settlement blocs that disrupt the contiguity of a future Palestinian state. Agricul-
ture Minister Uri Ariel said in a Dec. 18 interview with the daily Israel Hayom that by
2019, the government plans to increase the number of settlers by 50% to 600,000
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in the West Bank (not counting East Jerusalem). Then there is the element of resisting
US pressure. Netanyahu responded with a resounding No to US Secretary of State
John Kerry during Kerrys last visit on Nov. 24 regarding any meaningful confidence-
building measures, such as the release of Palestinian prisoners. Netanyahu excels in re-
sisting US pressure and pointing the finger at Abbas. During the Kerry peace initiative
of 2013-14, the prime minister agreed to certain concessions on a border based on 1967
lines, but conditioned them on Palestinians recognizing Israel as a Jewish state, some-
thing he knew the Americans would accept but Abbas would reject. A fourth strategic
component of Netanyahus plan is cooperation with neighboring countries. Part of his
well-orchestrated, anti-two-state strategy is to use Israels close security cooperation
with Egypt and Jordan to defuse their pressure on the Palestinian issue. The same is
true for Israel potentially exporting natural gas to Turkey. In addition, Netanyahus of-
fice views IS as a major propaganda asset in making the case against a Palestinian state.
The prime minister and his representatives equate random Palestinian terror attacks
by individuals to IS terror, and warn that the West Bank risks turning into an IS base
should Israel withdraw. This approach works well with most Israelis and with some in
the international community who are mesmerized by the IS threat. This strategy also
shapes the content of Netanyahus policy dialogue with both the United States and the
EU. This indicates that those who claim that Netanyahu has no foreign policy or does
not achieve his strategic goals are wrong. The strategies, the diplomacy and the rhetoric
all serve one central purpose: to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Israel
is shaping a new reality, from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River a binational
apartheid state in the making.
5.13.3 Internal divisions, trust issues, and timing make a two-state solution
functionally impossible to achieve
Tagliabue, Sofia Maria. THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION: IS IT STILL FEASIBLE?. Eu-

ropean Scientific Journal (2014).
Many scholars and politicians have been advocating the end of the two-state solution,
given major obstacles like the right of return for the refugees, the settlements, the weak-
ness of the Palestinian state, security and borders. However, this paper argues that the
everlasting stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process is not necessarily caused
by problems concerning the two-state solution per se, but it is rather the result of psy-
chological factors such as internal divisions, conflicting stances, lack of trust, and bad
timing. Among all these obstacles to peace, the most influential impediment has been
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Israels behavior and unwillingness to compromise during the negotiations. In fact, the
Israeli stance and rhetoric, and especially its continuous appropriation of land, have
been very problematic, as they have not left space for genuine negotiations and real
compromise. In this light, the two-state solution, as well as any other solution to end
the stalemate, is not currently feasible, and it will never be unless there is a real change
in the Israeli position.
5.13.4 Empirical evidence suggests that a two-state solution is impossible
Tilley, Virginia. From Jewish state and Arab state to Israel and Palestine? Inter-
national norms, ethnocracy, and the two-state solution. The Arab World Geographer
8.3 (2005): 140-6.
At this writing, the international community is confronting both political and moral co-
nundrums regarding the conflict in Israel/Palestine. The political conundrum is glaring
and urgent. Although the United Nations has formally endorsed a two-state solution
by affirming that the states of Israel and Palestine should exist side by side, empirical
and political realities seem to indicate that the two-state solution is, at best, a diplomatic
fiction. The present course of Israeli policy is instead generating for Palestinians an un-
viable Bantustan-like system of enclaves likely only to foster more Palestinian despera-
tion and violence. Yet neither the Israeli government nor the Palestinian Authority has
formally declared the two-state plan moribund, and the U.S. administration will brook
no open diplomatic intervention by foreign governments. Formal diplomatic space for
considering alternatives, therefore, remains closed.
5.13.5 Sustained Israeli rejection of two-state solution crushes all possibility

of its implementation
Abunimah, Ali. Kerry Gives Eulogy For Two-State Solution. The Electronic Intifada.
28 Dec. 2016. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
In any case, the US vision of two states is dead and the Obama administration helped
bury it. As Kerry confessed, the outgoing administration has done everything in its
power to provide Israel with unconditional support and to frustrate any initiative to
hold it accountable. We have strongly opposed boycotts, divestment campaigns and
sanctions targeting Israel in international fora, Kerry boasted, adding that the Obama
administration recently signed a $38 billion arms giveaway to Israel that exceeds any
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military assistance package the US has provided to any country, at any time. Things
are not about to get any brighter for those who still believe in the two-state fantasy.
Unsurprisingly, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ministers have an-
grily rejected Kerrys speech. Even before the Secretary of State spoke, President-elect
Donald Trump tweeted that We cannot continue to let Israel be treated with such to-
tal disdain and disrespect as the Obama administration supposedly has. Stay strong
Israel, January 20th is fast approaching, Trump urged. The reality is this: Israel can-
not be sweet-talked into ending its brutal regime of occupation, apartheid and settler-
colonialism.
5.13.6 US pressure has functionally been lip service
Ashrawi, Hanan. US Support For Two-State Solution Must Be More Than Lip Ser-
vice . The Hill. 13 Sep. 2013. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
For decades, every U.S. Secretary of State has told the Palestinians that negotiations are
the only way to end Israels occupation and relentless expansion of settlements. Yet,
in practice, negotiations have served the cause of expanding Israels settlement project,
not ending it. During the 1990s, while the Oslo Accords were being negotiated, Israel
nearly doubled the number of settlers in the West Bank, destroying Palestinian faith in
the peace process and our hopes for an independent state and freedom from decades
of Israeli military occupation. Today, there are more than half a million Jewish settlers
in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The huge network of infrastructure that Israel
has built to serve the settlements, including Israeli-only highways that dissect the West
Bank, which, along with the settlements themselves, isolate Palestinian population cen-
ters from each other and the outside world, are expressions of Israeli extraterritoriality
and essentially make the settlement enterprise permanent. Israel has already annexed
East Jerusalem in a move regarded as illegal by the international community, including
the U.S., and has de facto extended Israeli sovereignty over large areas of the West Bank.
5.13.7 Ambassador to Israel says Trump administration will not pressure

Israel to support two-state solution
Varkiani, Adrienne. Trumps Pick For U.S. Ambassador To Israel Is Frightening.

ThinkProgress. 16 Dec. 2016. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Friedman doesnt believe Israeli settlements on
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Palestinian landwhich are considered illegal under international laware an obsta-

cle to peace. In fact, he is president of the American Friends of Bet El; the Bet El settle-
ment was build on private Palestinian land without approval, but Friedmans group has
sent it millions of dollars over the past few years. (Trumps son-in-law Jared Kushner
has donated at least $20,000 to the organization.) A Trump administration will never
pressure Israel into a two-state solution or any other solution that is against the wishes
of the Israeli people, Friedman told a rally of Trump supporters in Jerusalem in Octo-
ber. Even conservative Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pretended to be
committed to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the two-state solution. After an-
nouncing that there would be no Palestinian state under his leadership while campaign-
ing last year, Netanyahu was met with a barage of criticism and reversed his disavowal
two days later.
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5.14 AT: Partitions Effective
5.14.1 Partitions empirically do not reduce the probability of war recurrence
Sambanis, Nicholas. Partition as a solution to ethnic war: An empirical critique of the

theoretical literature. World politics 52.04 (2000): 437-483.
Population movements to partition states during or after civil war are coerced, painful,
and costly, and they may sow the seeds of future conflict. It is therefore imperative that
international policy toward partition [End Page 478] be informed by rigorous, empir-
ically verified arguments, rather than by untested theory. In this paper, I have pro-
vided a host of empirical tests, starting with an empirical inquiry into the determi-
nants of war-related partition. I have found that partitions are more likely after costly
ethnic/religious wars, after rebel victory or truce, and in countries with better-than-
average socioeconomic conditions. Partitions are more likely where ethnic groups are
large; they are less likely to occur as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity increases. My
analysis has also shown that the differences between ethnic and nonethnic wars with
respect to war termination and partition are small. The relationship between the degree
of ethnic heterogeneity and the need for partition is not as straightforward as partition
theorists assume. 84 The finding that partition does not significantly prevent war re-
currence suggests, at the very least, that separating ethnic groups does not resolve the
problem of violent ethnic antagonism.
5.14.2 Partition doesnt consolidate durable, legitimate peace
Alford, Conner. Partition, Power Sharing, and the Legitimacy of Post-Conflict Ar-
rangements. The Eagle Feather Undergraduate Research Journal (2011)
Scholars have produced an impressive compendium of literature pertaining to power

sharing and partition as methods of consolidating peace durability. Empirical tests
primarily focus on which method is associated with durable peace, however, and
stop short of how the method achieves durable peace or why it fails to do so. My
research seeks to advance the existing literature by theorizing that any arrangement
for the consolidation of durable peace must meet two basic requisiteslegitimacy
and enforceabilityand by exploring the impact partition and power sharing have
on the legitimacy of post-conflict arrangements. Using riots and anti-government
demonstrations as a proxy for legitimacy, I run a logistic regression analysis to test my
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hypotheses. I found that, ultimately, while power sharing is significant in increasing

the legitimacy of post-conflict arrangements following an ideological conflict, under
no circumstances tested is partition significantly associated with legitimacy.
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5.15 AT: US Support Advances the Peace Process
5.15.1 US hides behind the two-state solution to skirt legitimate

confrontation of the Israeli-Palestine conflict
Hammond, Jeremy. John KerryS Big Lie And The USS Opposition To The Two-State
Solution. Foreign Policy Journal. 17 Jan. 2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
With an understanding of the true origins of the state of Israel and the meaning of Reso-
lution 242, it is possible to correctly interpret the six principles John Kerry outlined in
his speech.Most of Kerrys speech was intended to preface the heart of it, which was the
Obama administrations six principles ostensibly intended to preserve the two-state
solution. It was necessary to place the policy outlined in the context of the Zionist
mythology underlying the peace process. The purpose was two-fold: one, to sus-
tain the public illusion that US policy is not rejectionist, but supportive of the two-state
solution; and, two, to make one final attempt to clearly communicate to the Israeli gov-
ernment (and dense members of Congress) that it will no longer be politically feasible
for the US to continue to support its crimes against the Palestinians if Israel doesnt
moderate its behavior.
5.15.2 Ending support for a two-state solution opens up further foreign

policy avenues to keep Israel accountable
Bernstein, Dennis. How Trump Kills The Two-State Solution Consortiumnews.

Consortium News. 22 Dec. 2016. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
But to tell you the truth, Dennis, thats really where we already are in practice. If you
look at the reality of where we are, the Israelis have been building settlements, effec-
tively annexing the West Bank with total impunity. And not just impunity, with the full
support of every U.S. administration, and not least the Obama administration, which
in September signed off on an unconditional 10 year, $38 billion minimum, guaranteed,
military aid package. I mean $38 billion is the minimum. Its not the total package, be-
cause they can still come back for more. That greatly increases the current U.S. aid to
Israel. So, part of me is saying, well this is simply a more honest labeling of what the
U.S. policy already is. There was not going to be a two-state solution, even if Hillary
was elected. There was not going to be any real consequences for Israeli settlements.
So, I think this is another horrible sign of where our country is on so many issues. But I
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think its an opportunity, also, for us to say to people, Well, you cant pretend theres a
peace process anymore, so why arent you signing up to BDSboycott, divestment and
sanctionsand other campaigns and tactics that are independent of what the govern-
ment does? The real people power to begin to hold Israel accountable and change its
situation. I think thats both the challenge and opportunity thats put in front of us.
5.15.3 US impact is negligible- 70 different nations attended a conference in

Paris to pursue a two-state solution
Dwyer, Colin. Paris Summit Urges Two-State Solution To Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

NPR. 15 Jan. 2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Foreign ministers and other diplomats from some 70 different countries descended on
Paris on Sunday, with the intent to renew peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians.
The summit, which was held without leaders from either side of the conflict, pushed for
the establishment of a Palestinian state. We are here to reiterate strongly that the two-
state solution is the only one possible, said French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault,
in his opening remarks to top envoys at the conference. A joint statement issued after
the one-day conference also warned against any parties taking unilateral action on the
conflict.
5.15.4 Insincere adherence and commitment to a two-state solution

undermines the peace process
Opinion: The Two-State Solution Is Just Empty Talk. DW. 1 Jun. 2017. Web. 7 Feb.
2017.
In the West, where many countries continue to cooperate closely with Israel on arms and
security, one should really ask the question why one still calls on Jerusalem to realize the
two-state solution while assisting Israel directly or indirectly with its military buildup.
This behavior and the waiving of effective sanctions only serve to strengthen the ultra-
right in Israel as well as Palestinian extremists and undermine the peace process on both
sides. Adherence to the idea of a two-state solution is nothing but empty rhetoric, and
that has not gone unnoticed in Israel. It allows the Israeli right to triumph and drives the
Israeli left to despair just like the moderate Palestinians, who, as it looks, cannot expect
anything positive from Washington under the future Trump administration. Europe,
therefore, will need to take a tougher stance against Jerusalem.
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5.15.5 Israeli lobbying is a prerequisite to achieving a two-state solution and

advancingthe peace process
Mearshimer, John. Two Views: Is A Two-State Solution Still Possible?. WRMEA. July
2010. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Some advocates of a two-state solution believe the Obama administration can compel
Israel to accept a two-state outcome. The United States, after all, is the most powerful
country in the world and should have great leverage over Israel, because it gives the
Jewish state so much diplomatic and material support. But no American president can
pressure Israel to change its policies toward the Palestinians. The main reason is the
Israel lobby, a powerful coalition of American Jews and Christian evangelicals that has
a profound influence on U.S. Middle East policy. Alan Dershowitz was spot on when
he said, My generation of Jewsbecame part of what is perhaps the most effective
lobbying and fund-raising effort in the history of democracy.
5.15.6 Two-state solution focus crowds out other alternative solutions
Eiland, Gioria. Trump Era Must Not Be Wasted On Two-State Solution. Ynetnews.
15 Nov. 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Among the other solutions, we can talk about a regional solution with land swaps
between four playersEgypt, Jordan, Israel and Palestineor about the creation of a
federation between Jordan and the West Bank, or about a functional and not necessarily
territorial division between us and the Palestinians. And yes, even Bayit Yehudi leader
Naftali Bennetts plan to annex C Area and establish Palestinian autonomy in the rest
of the area. We should remember that until 1992, both the Likud and the Labor Party
completely ruled out the two-state idea. In the past 24 years, a different plan could not
even be considered, as three American presidents and six American secretaries of state
rushed to declare shortly after taking office that they were committed to the two-state
solution. US President-elect Donald Trump will likely not make such a declaration, and
neither will the person he selects as his secretary of state. The Israeli government has
two options: It can either determine that there is no solution to the conflict and that it
should therefore continue managing it, or it could launch a dialogue with the new
administration which would examine the entire range of possibilities, without being
committed to the four aforementioned assumptions. In the short run, the first approach
may have an advantage, as the Trump administration wont pressure Israel to reach an
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agreement and will likely be more lenient regarding the settlements. In the long run,
this approach could be revealed as a mistake. First of all, if and when the Palestinian
side realizes that there is no diplomatic hope of any kind, it will strengthen both Hamas
in the West Bank and other radical elements. From there, the road to a third intifada
could be short. Second, and more importantly, the Trump administration could actually
be attentive to other and better solutions. If we waste the next four years, we may regret
it in the future.
5.15.7 Only the Israeli public can sufficiently pressure the government to
make progress on a two-state solution
Lovatt, Hugh. Europes Time To Save The Two State Solution. European Council on
Foreign Relations. Nov. 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
However, while acknowledgement of Palestinian statehood can help keep the idea of
a two state solution alive, it will not alone translate into on-the-ground Palestinian
sovereignty. In isolation, such a move could even benefit Israel since its settlement
expansion and de-facto annexation of West Bank territory depends to a large extent on
the international communitys continued perception that the occupation is temporary
and that the two state solution remains viable but just out of reach. By providing sym-
bolic but not actual support for Palestinian statehood, recognition could reinforce
this status quo and provide cover for Israel to continue its settlement project. Ultimately
it is only the Israeli public that can put sufficient pressure on their government to end
the occupation. And recognition by itself will do little to change the cost/benefit calcu-
lations that underpin the Israeli publics support or indifference towards the status
quo, which has resulted in significant benefits for Israeli citizens and almost zero costs
to their international relations.
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6.0.1 A two-state solution has several elements.
Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Israel and Palestine: Two States for Two
PeoplesIf Not Now, When? Policy Statement of the Boston Study Group on Middle
East Peace, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, March 2010.
The elements of a two-state solution that have emerged from decades of negotiations
and proposals can be summarized as follows: Israel would withdraw from nearly all of
the West Bank and end its blockade of Gaza. The new Palestinian state would be ter-
ritorially contiguous on the West Bank, with equitable access to water resources and a
secure land connection between the West Bank and Gaza. If Israel retains small agreed-
upon portions of the West Bank, the Palestinian state would be compensated with land
of equal size and value from Israel. The two sides would agree to security provisions
designed to protect them from attack. These arrangements might include early warn-
ing stations, buffer zones, limitations on armaments and/or deployments and the sta-
tioning of international peacekeeping forces on the territory of Palestine, Israel or both.
Jerusalem would be a shared, open city. Jewish neighborhoods would be under Israeli
sovereignty and Palestinian neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty. The western
portion would become the internationally recognized capital of Israel. East Jerusalem
would become the capital of the Palestinian state. This solution recognizes that al-
though Jerusalems borders and status have shifted markedly over many centuries, the
city remains a powerful source of meaning and identity for Jews, Muslims and Chris-
tians alike. The holy sites in Jerusalem (Western Wall, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount,
Church of the Holy Sepulcher) would be administered under mutually acceptable terms
of sovereignty over these areas. For example, the Clinton parameters talk about Pales-
tinian sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Israeli sovereignty
over the Western Wall. Other arrangements may emerge that are acceptable to all the
parties. The issue of Palestinian refugees would be resolved in a manner that satisfies
the Palestinian concern for justice and historical recognition but would not jeopardize
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Israels character as a Jewish-majority state. Such a resolution would include compen-

sation; resettlement, whether in the states where they currently reside, other states, the
new Palestinian state or Israel, with its agreement; and citizenship, whether in the state
where they will permanently reside or in the new Palestinian state. A peace agreement
between the Palestinians and Israelis would constitute the end of all their claims and end
their conflict. As envisioned in the Arab League peace initiative of 2002 (reaffirmed in
2007), the 22 states in the Arab League would formally recognize the State of Israel and
establish normal relations with it. The initiative calls for agreements leading to Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories including the Golan Heights, resolution of the
Palestinian refugee problem and the formation of an independent Palestinian state.
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6.1 Alternatives Bad
6.1.1 All other alternatives are unacceptable or unsustainable.
Max Fisher, [Columnist, NYT], The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasnt
Happened, New York Times, 29 December 2016.
There are, but they involve such drastic costs that the United States and many other
governments consider all but the two-state solution unacceptable. There are multiple
versions of the so-called one-state solution, which would join all territories as one nation.
One version would grant equal rights to all in a state that would be neither Jewish nor
Palestinian in character, because neither group would have a clear majority. Skeptics
fear this would risk internal instability or even a return to war. Another, advocated
by some on the Israeli far right, would establish one state but preserve Israels Jewish
character by denying full rights to Palestinians. Under this version, Israel would no
longer be a democratic state. With few viable or popular alternatives, the most likely
choice may be to simply maintain the status quo though few believe that is possible
in the long term.
6.1.2 The regional solution makes no sense.
Daniel Kurtzer, [Professor in Middle Eastern Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School],
Nothing beats the two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians, Brookings, 29
January 2016.
In the absence of progress toward two states, are there better alternatives than throw-
ing in the towel and looking at annexation as Plan B? The search for alternative Plan
Bs is a fools errand. Some of those ideas are creative, but none of them will be ac-
cepted by both sides. For example, one Plan B variant du jour rests on the premise of a
regional solutionthat is, having Israel and the Arab world reach a comprehensive
peace agreement that includes a resolution of the Palestinian issue. Sounds good, ex-
cept it makes no sense. First, Israel has not accepted the Arab Peace Initiative (API) of
2002, the closest the Arab world has come to accepting Israel within the borders of the
1949 armistice line and agreeing to normalize relations with Israel once peace has been
achieved. But no Israeli government has liked its terms, especially the paragraph on
Palestinian refugees, the notion of a Palestinian capital in Jerusalem, and the APIs in-
sistence on full Israeli withdrawal. Thus, the question to those who propose a regional
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solution today is whether there is a coalition in Israel ready to use the API as the basis
for negotiating a comprehensive peace. I think not.
6.1.3 Maintaining the status quo is a terrible idea.
Daniel Kurtzer, [Professor in Middle Eastern Policy Studies, Woodrow Wilson School],
Nothing beats the two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians, Brookings, 29
January 2016.
STATUS QUO? The alternatives to the regional idea are equally unrealistic. The idea
of confederation rests on the agreement of Jordan (and potentially Egypt) to join a po-
litical entity with the Palestinians. However, neither state has indicated any interest in
doing so. Maintaining the status quo is a non-starter, because status quos are never
staticas the events of recent years prove, they tend to get worse. How many Intifadas
or stabbings will it take for the people of Israel to believe their own security chiefs,
who recognize that these actions are born of frustration over the occupation and related
grievances? Why should Israelis believe that the majority of Palestinians are interested
in peace when Hamasopposed to Israels very existencestill rules Gaza and com-
mands significant popular support, and while the Palestinian Authority is crumbling
and hardly represents anyone anymore? And how long will it take Palestinian support-
ers of armed and violent resistance to recognize that their abortive efforts to destroy
Israel and indiscriminate attacks on Israeli civilians are repugnant: targeting civilians
is a morally unacceptable tactic for any resistance movement. Thus, the idea of con-
flict management or even conflict mitigationstaple products of those who support
maintaining the status quo until somehow things changeis pernicious, for it rests on
an assumption that the rest of us simply dont understand the conflict.
6.1.4 Failure to achieve a two-state solution means escalating violence.
The failure to achieve a peace agreement could well mean continuing military occupa-
tion of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in its present form, thereby assuring ongoing
humiliation as well as economic, political and social hardship for the Palestinians. For
Israel, not only would the threat of violence remain and likely grow, but other risks
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would also arise. Increasingly the over 40-year occupationnow involving about one-
half million settlers (including the West Bank and East Jerusalem)would be charac-
terized as a de facto annexation. Thus, the vital question of whether Israel can remain
a Jewish-majority state and democratic becomes ever more urgent. 4 The predicted de-
mographic trend, stemming from the higher birth rate of Palestinians than that of Jews,
would change the population in the near future from rough equality to a majority of
Palestinians in the territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. In
such circumstances, a Jewish voting public could continue to elect Israels government
only by continuing to deny the vote to Palestinians outside the Green Line (the 1949
armistice boundaries established at the end of the initial war between Israel and its Arab
neighbors).
6.1.5 Reabsorption of Palestine into other territories is similarly

unworkable.
Lastly, some commentators have suggested the reabsorption of Gaza into Egypt and the
return of portions of the West Bank to Jordan. This proposal ignores the fact that Jordan
formally renounced this option in 1988 and Egypt relinquished its claims to Gaza when
it signed the Camp David accords in 1978, which set Egypts border as the internation-
ally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine. Both Egypt and Jordan
reject this option, and there is little prospect that either will alter its position. Moreover,
this solution denies the Palestinians right to self-determination in the territory from
which Palestinian nationalism emerged.
6.1.6 Even if the two state solution is bad, the alternatives are worse.
Nathan Thrall, [Middle East and North Africa Program, International Crisis Group,
Brussels], The Two-State Solution: Toward a Long-Term Israeli-Palestinian Truce,
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 21, 2016.
There is growing consensus among Israelis and Palestinians that the paradigm of pursu-
ing a two-state solution through bilateral talks has reached a dead end. Yet the widely
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discussed alternatives to this supposedly expired model have not posed a credible chal-
lenge to it. Instead they have been confined largely to academic discussions among
activists who enjoy little support in their societies; the proposals are more a reflection
of widespread desperation than a serious movement to bring change. In the absence of
a negotiated settlement to the conflict, one possibility, though currently remote, is that
Israel and a future Palestinian state will establish a long-term truce that settles some
disputes, such as over territory, while leaving other issues unresolved.
6.1.7 None of the current alternatives can supplant the two state paradigm.
Among Israelis, the alternatives include enfranchisement of Palestinians in the West
Bank and Jerusalem (but not in Gaza) in a single state that would retain its Jewish char-
acter; and annexation of Jerusalem and parts of the West Bank, leaving the remainder
of the territory under Palestinian or Jordanian control. Among Palestinians, the alterna-
tives include a single state with equal rights for all its citizens; a long-term truce between
Israel and a future Palestinian state; and unilateral steps designed to increase Pales-
tinian leverage, thereby inducing greater Israeli concessions or further Israeli territorial
withdrawals. Despite the despair, none of these alternatives yet threatens to supplant
the negotiated two-state paradigm. European and American diplomats still cling to a
negotiated two-state solution, even as they have been temporarily disheartened at the
prospect of achieving one under the current Israeli and Palestinian leaderships. Neither
Israeli nor Palestinian society has reached anything approaching a consensus on which
alternative to pursue, if any. The default Israeli position is to seek Arab partners who,
Israeli leaders hope, could compel Palestinians to make concessions that they have so
far been unwilling to make. The default position of Palestinian leaders has been to take
small, halting steps to increase pressure on Israel, while quietly seeking a resumption
of negotiations on terms that would not open them to intolerable levels of domestic
criticism.
6.1.8 Existing alternatives cannot bring about a peaceful solution.
Martin S. Indyk, [Executive Vice President, Brookings Institution], President Trumps

options for Israeli-Palestinian dealmaking, Brookings, 1 December 2016.
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The second reality is a politically and physically divided Palestinian polity in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip between the Hamas and Fatah political parties, in which Hamas re-
mains dedicated to the destruction of Israel and is consolidating its grip on Gaza while
building its influence in the West Bank. Meanwhile, Fatah is going through a succession
process which has left its leadership preoccupied and, for the time being, unable to en-
gage in any kind of peace initiative. In other words, there are two powerful forcesthe
Israeli settler movement and the Hamas Islamist movementthat are driving toward
one-state solutions of their own design. However momentarily attractive these alterna-
tives may look to people on either side of the conflict, they cannot produce a peaceful
solution brought about by a negotiated deal between the two sides. Indeed, such a ne-
gotiated peace deal is anathema to both of them. Little wonder they have done all they
canthe one through settlement activity, the other through violence and terrorismto
thwart the negotiations that have taken place. Their solutions do not solve the conflict
between the two peoples that inhabit the same land. On the contrary, they are bound
to perpetuate it.
6.1.9 Failure to pursue a peaceful solution now will make it impossible to

do so in the future.

This situation generates an acute policy dilemma: current circumstances do not permit
the achievement of a negotiated resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and yet
failure to pursue that resolution now will make it even less possible to achieve it in the
future. In attempting to address this dilemma, President-elect Trump and his would-
be special envoy would do well to heed the lesson of the last attempt by Secretary of
State John Kerry (in which I served as his special envoy to the negotiations): American
willpower alone, no matter how artful, cannot substitute for the will and ability of the
parties themselves to make the politically costly and emotionally fraught compromises
necessary to achieve the deal. And yet another failed effort will not only make matters
worse, potentially sparking a new round of conflict, but also tarnish the credibility of
the new president, making him look like a loser.
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6.1.10 A two-state solution is necessary because there are no acceptable

alternatives.
Herbert C. Kelman, [Richard Clarke Cabot Professor of Social Ethics at Harvard Univer-
sity]], A One-Country/Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle
East Policy, Spring 2011.
Despite the weakness of the leaderships and the faltering negotiation process, I believe
that a negotiated two-state solution is still possible and that we cannot give up the effort
to achieve it. My starting point is the lack of an acceptable alternative. The failure so
far to reach a negotiated agreement, along with the changing realities on the ground
the growth of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the building of separate roads, the
confiscation of land, the construction of the security barrier, the proliferation of check-
points, the development of Jewish housing in East Jerusalem have led increasing
numbers of Palestinians to the conclusion that a two-state solution is no longer possible.
They propose, instead, to work for a one-state solution, whether in the form of a unitary
state (based on the principle of one-person/one-vote) or a binational state. The calls for
a one-state solution come primarily from the Palestinian diaspora, not from the West
Bank and Gaza. Moreover, some of the people who now argue that a two-state solution
has become impossible have never accepted a two-state solution in the first place or
have accepted it only reluctantly. There is no question that Israeli facts on the ground
have made the establishment of a viable Palestinian state increasingly difficult; to a cer-
tain extent, they were indeed designed to do so. The settlement process has created
increasing opposition within Israeli society to a two-state solution that would require
abandoning the settlement project and sharing Jerusalem. But opposition to a one-state
formula within Israel would be much stronger and virtually unanimous, since it would
mean abandonment of the essence of the Zionist project, which is the establishment of
a Jewish-majority state. The preservation of Israel as a Jewish-majority state is an exis-
tential concern for an overwhelming majority of Israeli Jews. I might add here that the
majority of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza prefer a solution that would allow
them to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, in which they can
exercise their right to national self-determination and give expression to their national
identity.
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6.2 Botton-up Negotiations
6.2.1 Trump could pursue a bottom-up strategy to negotiate peace.

President Trump could instead choose a more conventional effort that attempts to use
time to shape a more favorable negotiating environment, laying the groundwork for a
negotiated solution later in his presidency. In his first two years, he would instead fo-
cus on arresting the negative dynamics on the ground in the West Bank and work with
Egypt and Jordan to promote a united Palestinian leadership with a mandate to negoti-
ate peace with Israel. Under this option, he would need to insist at the outset that Israel
stop all construction east of the security barrier that it has built that runs more or less
parallel to the 1967 lines inside the West Bank and incorporates the major Israeli settle-
ment blocs as well as east Jerusalem. The right-wing Israeli defense minister, Avigdor
Lieberman, has already offered a similar deal to President-elect Trump. Construction
in the blocs west of the barrier could continue without American objection. Construc-
tion in east Jerusalem could also continue but on a 1:1 basis for building in Arab as well
as Jewish suburbs. There could be no construction in E1 or other sensitive areas such
as Givat Hamatos which would block east Jerusalems connection with the West Bank
in the south. Israel also would have to agree to handing over significant territory in
Area C, contiguous to the Palestinian-controlled Areas A and B, to allow for Palestinian
construction and development. If the Netanyahu government prefers to continue set-
tlement construction in Area C beyond the barrier, President Trump should make clear
that he is willing to have the United States abstain on a settlements resolution in the
UN Security Council that would declare settlement activity illegal. Prime Minister Ne-
tanyahu cannot say so, but he needs this threat to constrain the settlers in his governing
coalition. Trumps insistence on this approach might precipitate a change in Prime Min-
ister Netanyahus coalition, since it would be unacceptable to Naftali Bennetts Jewish
Home Party but it has been one of the preconditions for Isaac (Buji) Herzog to bring
the Labor Party into the coalition. With Jewish Home out and Labor in, Netanyahu
would be more capable of entering into meaningful negotiations. Meanwhile, Presi-
dent Trump would need to work with President Sissi and King Abdullah on generating
a change in Palestinian leadership and reconciling Hamas and Fatah on grounds that
would enable a unified leadership to enter peace negotiations with Israel. In return,
the building of state institutions and the development of the Palestinian economy in
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the West Bank and Gaza initiated by former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad should be
boosted by a new injection of funds from the United States, the Arab states, and the
international community. As these processes on both sides began to take hold, Presi-
dent Trumps special envoy could begin to talk to both sides about terms of reference
for resuming final status negotiations in the last two years of the presidents term. If
the Palestinians refused to enter negotiations based on these Israeli constraints on set-
tlement construction, or demanded additional preconditions such as prisoner releases,
President Trump could make clear that he would no longer be willing to constrain Is-
raeli settlement activity anywhere.
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6.3 General
6.3.1 The one-state solution means that Israel must choose between being
Jewish or democratic.
Gabby Morrongiello [Reporter], Kerry rips Israel in speech advocating two-state solu-
tion, Washington Examiner, 18 December 2016.
Secretary of State John Kerry demanded mutual respect from Israel in a marathon
speech on Wednesday, forcefully criticizing the key U.S. allys continuing settlement ex-
pansion and the current governments pursuit of a unitary Jewish state. If the choice is
one state Israel can either be Jewish or democratic. It cannot be both, and it wont ever
really be at peace, he said. In what is likely to be his last major speech as the nations
top diplomat, Kerry slammed the Israeli government for displacing Palestinian fami-
lies and depriving them of basic freedom and dignity. He expressed serious concern
about its opposition to a two-state solution, claiming the settler agenda has become
increasingly extreme under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus leadership. Lets
be clear, settlement expansion has nothing to do with Israels security, Kerry charged,
adding that leaders of the movement are motivated by ideological imperatives that
entirely ignore legitimate Palestinian aspirations.
6.3.2 A two-state solution is crucial for maintaining stability and a

democratic Jewish state.
Gabby Morrongiello [Reporter], Kerry rips Israel in speech advocating two-state solu-
tion, Washington Examiner, 18 December 2016.
With all the external threats Israel is dealing with today does it really want an in-
tensifying conflict in the West Bank? Kerry said, referring to the area where Israeli
leaders have sought to increase settlement construction. How does that help Israels
security? How does that help stability in the region? The answer is, it doesnt. Instead,
he urged Israel to embrace a two-state solution, suggesting such an agreement would en-
sure peace in the region and advance the prospect of a democratic Jewish state. Kerrys
speech comes amid heightened tension between the U.S. and its top Mideast ally after
Israeli officials accused the Obama administration of abandoning its ally last week by
declining to veto a United Nations Security Council resolution that demanded Israel
halt its settlement program. The vote in the U.N. was about preserving the two-state
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solution thats what we were standing up for, he said, describing the decision not to
veto the resolution as one that was made in accordance with our values just as previous
administrations have done at the Security Council before us.
6.3.3 The two-state solution is crucial to US interests in the Middle East.
The combination of Israels occupation of Palestinian lands and unstinting U.S. support
for Israel continues to generate anger and resentment in the Arab and Muslim worlds.
These attitudes help extremists rally support for their positions and aid terrorist recruit-
ing, threatening both the United States and many of its allies. They also make Arab
rulers wary of meeting U.S. policy requests, for fear of fueling domestic opposition. Ac-
cordingly, a final resolution of the conflict would help counter the terrorist threat and fa-
cilitate U.S. diplomacy throughout the region. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict provides
an effective wedge for Iran in the Arab world. Irans support for Hamas and Hezbollah
and its efforts to delegitimize Israel appeal to a frustrated Arab public. A continuing
Palestinian-Israeli conflict has led to the strengthening of extremist jihadist groups that
are less pragmatic than Hamas in the occupied territories and has the potential to again
spark major and deadly Palestinian-Israeli violence.
6.3.4 The two-state solution is imperative to reducing tensions.
Omar M. Dasani, [University of the Pacifics McGeorge School of Law], Divorce With-
out Separation? Reimagining the Two-State Solution, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 15, 2016.
In a 2011 interview, Israeli politician Tzipi Livni explained why she considers a
two-state solution imperative: lamenting that Jews and Arabs cannot live happily
together between the Jordan and the Mediterranean, because we would lose the
sovereignty of the Jewish state as such, she concluded that it was necessary to divide
the land, adding, This is the way we live together, in a nice divorce (Goldberg, 2011
Goldberg, J. (2011, August 5). Tzipi Livni praises Obama for pressuring Netanyahu,
suggests U.S. should keep up the heat. Atlantic [online]. Retrieved September 10, 2015,
from http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/tzipi-livni-praises-
obama-for-pressuring-netanyahu-suggests-us-should-keep-up-the-heat/243098/ ).
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Livni may not have been the first to use the metaphor, but it is echoed often by Israeli
officials and commentators. What they appear to mean by divorce is separationor
hafrada in Hebrew. By delimiting and enforcing a border, the argument goes, Israel
could both preserve its Jewish majority and relinquish its responsibility for governing
the lives of millions of hostile Palestinians. By separating from each other, Jews and
Arabs would be better able to get along.
6.3.5 Trumps administration must attempt to foster peace and cooperation

on the two-state solution.
Joel Braunold and Sarah Yerkes, [Brookings], Is a peace deal possible if Israelis and
Palestinians simply dont trust each other? Brookings, 3 January 2017.
The next administration, whose dedication to the two-state solution is questionable,
might look for some out-of-the-box ideas to try and unstick the parties and move the
situation to a more stable setting. If we have any advice for them it is this, it starts with
hope and change. It might seem odd that the Obama slogan needs to the be organizing
philosophy for their approach to the Israeli Palestinian conflict, but without hope, the
parties will never move beyond their retrenchment. The key to hope is change, that the
status quo can be different, that people do have agency. To help each society recognize
this potential, all the tools in the foreign policy toolkit must be used, including working
with civil society groups. Thats essential for delivering that message and demonstrat-
ing to skeptical people that we are in a new era with new opportunities. This should
include: Senior level advisors, including the new advisor for International Negotiations
Jason Greenblatt, meeting with not just the parties, but civil society groups privately as
well publically; Inclusion of the USAID people-to-people reconciliation grant program
into the federal budget; and Leveraging U.S. dollars off those of the rest of the interna-
tional community in the creation of an International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace,
which currently enjoys bipartisan support, that can provide the necessary bandwidth
and budget for a systemic approach to the trust deficit. We are glad Secretary Kerry un-
derstands how important it is to establish trust and confidence among the leaders in or-
der to preserving the two-state solution. And we are glad he made a strong case for why
the Israeli and Palestinian people must push their leaders to take political risks. With
the Paris peace conference on the horizon, a new U.S. administration being sworn in,
and the parties jockeying for position in the new environment, we hope that the lessons
that took four years for Secretary Kerry to learn can be remembered and reflected on as
seriously as the principles that he presented.
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6.3.6 The US needs to put more pressure on Israel to stay at the negotiating
table.
Joel Braunold and Sarah Yerkes, [Brookings], Is a peace deal possible if Israelis and
Palestinians simply dont trust each other? Brookings, 3 January 2017.
To be clear, the civil society track is an and rather than an or. It buttresses other
strategies and enables their successes, rather than stands alone. While it is not sufficient,
it is necessary for any initiative to be successful. Unlike settlements and incitement,
which are driven far more by Israeli and Palestinian domestic considerations than inter-
national policy, engagement with the Israeli and Palestinian publics is one area where
the U.S. negotiating team could have played a positive and effective role. Had Secretary
Kerry realized in 2012 the importance of encouraging the public to push their leaders to
stay at the negotiating table, he would have likely invested more time and money in sup-
porting the efforts of civil society groups dedicated to preserving the two-state solution.
Instead, the State Department largely ignored civil society, remaining laser-focused on
the top leaders.
6.3.7 Despite current trends, the two-state solution is the best hope for
enduring peace.
Akshan de Alwis, [UN Correspondent], UN and World Leaders Committed to Israeli-

Palestinian Two-State Solution, Diplomatic Courier, 2 February 2017.
The Quartet has worked on the report since February 2016. In its initial meeting in
Munich it reiterated its concern that current trends are imperiling the viability of the
two-state solution. Underlining its commitment to supporting a comprehensive, just,
and lasting resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Quartet agreed to prepare a
report on the situation on the ground. According to the Quartet, a negotiated two-state
outcome is the only way to achieve an enduring peace that meets Israeli security needs
and Palestinian aspirations for statehood and sovereignty, ends the occupation that be-
gan in 1967, and resolves all permanent status issues. A two-state solution implies the
existence of the State of Israel and State of Palestine within pre-1967 borders, with East
Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital.
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6.3.8 The Quartet report outlines several steps to achieve a negotiated peace.

The report provides recommendations to what it has identified as the major threats to
achieving a negotiated peace: continued violence, terrorist attacks against civilians and
incitement to violence; settlement construction and expansion; and the Palestinian Au-
thoritys lack of control in Gaza. The Diplomatic Quartets main recommendations as
articulated by the Quartet are: Both sides should work to de-escalate tensions by ex-
ercising restraint and refraining from provocative actions and rhetoric. The Palestinian
Authority should act decisively and take all steps within its capacity to cease incitement
to violence and strengthen ongoing efforts to combat terrorism, including by clearly
condemning all acts of terrorism. Israel should cease the policy of settlement construc-
tion and expansion, designating land for exclusive Israeli use, and denying Palestinian
development. Israel should implement positive and significant policy shifts, includ-
ing transferring powers and responsibilities in Area C, consistent with the transition to
greater Palestinian civil authority contemplated by prior agreements. Progress in the
areas of housing, water, energy, communications, agriculture, and natural resources,
along with significantly easing Palestinian movement restrictions, can be made while
respecting Israels legitimate security needs.
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6.4 Harms
6.4.1 Israel and Palestine are paying for the stalled peace process with their
lives.
Issam Aruri, [GEneral Director of the Jersusalem Legal Aid Center], Palestinians and
Israelis are paying for the stalled peace process with their lives, The Guardian, January
2017.
The world cannot afford to stand still and let both Israeli and Palestinian societies feel
a threat to their existence. A new reportentitled No Place Like Home (pdf), by an al-
liance of Catholic aid agencies (Cidse) of which the UK aid agency Cafod is a mem-
ber, draws attention to the fact that displacement remains a protracted, consistent
and central issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and exacerbates the fragmentation,
de-development and isolation of the communities. The report notes that forced dis-
placement has led to even deeper poverty among Palestinians. About 80% of Gazas
population relies on humanitarian aid for survival and both communities, Israeli and
Palestinian, will be condemned to more years of misery, despair and violence because
of it.
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6.5 Jerusalem
6.5.1 Its possible for a sacred space like Jerusalem to be shared.
Harvey Cox, [Professor of Divinity, Harvard University], Jerusalem, in the Policy

Statement of the Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center, March 2010.
Sacred spaces can be shared. All three faiths honor the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron.
Muslims and Christian pilgrims visit the milk cave outside Jerusalem where Joseph
and Mary are believed to have stopped with the infant Jesus on their way as refugees
to Egypt. Holy cities can also be shared. If Jerusalem is a key issue to finding peace,
it will be necessary to take both political and religious factors into consideration. Over
the past decades, several peace plans have been advanced (described in other parts of
this report). Each contains within it proposals for Jerusalem. These include the 1993
Oslo accords, the July 2000 Camp David summit and the so-called Clinton parame-
ters of December 2000, which were expanded at the 2001 Taba talks. The Arab League
peace initiative of 2002 was endorsed again in 2007 by all 22 of the leagues members.
The unofficial Geneva accords of 2003 called for a shared status for Jerusalem. Still,
very little progress has been made, and the final status of the city remains highly con-
tested. An agreement will require sensitive negotiations, including how the Haram al-
Sharif/Temple Mount can be shared. Then, if this highly charged symbolic issue can be
resolved, sharing of the rest of the Old Citywhich already has its separate quarters
seems more likely.
6.5.2 There is support for a shared arrangement for Jerusalem.
Harvey Cox, [Professor of Divinity, Harvard University], Jerusalem, in the Policy

Statement of the Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Harvard Kennedy School
Belfer Center, March 2010.
Following the guidelines of the Clinton parameters of 2000 and some other proposals,
the rest of the city, outside the old-walled portion, could be divided into eastern and
western sections (borders to be negotiated), with the western part recognized by the in-
ternational community as an integral part of Israel and the eastern section as part of a
Palestinian state. The international community would recognize both as the capitals of
their respective states, and governing councils should be established both for the two
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sides and for the city as a whole. These could be constituted by neighborhood councils.
Today, unfortunately, the Israeli wall or security barrier snakes through Jerusalem,
dividing neighborhoods and fragmenting the city. A future border between the two sec-
tions should be as porous as possible, and supervised by either joint Israeli-Palestinian
teams and/or international units. A number of recent polls suggest that a majority of
Jerusalemites (both Israeli and Palestinian) would welcome such an arrangement. An
accord on Jerusalem could contribute significantly toward generating some of the trust
and goodwill between both sides that is needed today in order to move ahead on other
issues. If that happens, the appropriate biblical passage for the holy city might not be
the doleful one quoted above from Lamentations but these words from the prophet Isa-
iah: Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people, Says your God. Speak tenderly to Jerusalem,
and cry to her that her warfare is ended.
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6.6 Optimism
6.6.1 We should be optimistic about the potential for peace today compared
to forty years ago.
A major source of my optimism, or sense of possibility if you will, is awareness of how

much has changed in the past 40 years. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is, indeed, a very
longstanding and intractable conflict, and there is good reason to feel discouraged by
the obstacles to a peaceful resolution that arise whenever there seems to be a sign of
progress. It is important to remember, however, that in the 1970s, the idea of negotia-
tions between the Israeli government and the PLO toward establishment of a Palestinian
state in the occupied territories was barely on the horizon. Even within the Israeli peace
movement, only a minority endorsed this idea. On the Palestinian side, acceptance of
a state alongside Israel in 22 percent of mandatory Palestine was unthinkable as re-
flected in a 1978 article in Foreign Affairs by Walid Khalidi, embracing this formula,
which was entitled Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State. Today,
the two-state solution is widely accepted among Israelis and Palestinians and around
the world. Even elements of the Israeli right are now resigned to the establishment of a
Palestinian state, although their conception of the nature of that state is not acceptable
to Palestinians. On the Palestinian side, even elements of the Hamas leadership have
hinted that they would go along with a two-state solution if negotiated by Fatah leaders
and endorsed by the public, as long as they did not have to renounce their ideological
principles
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6.7 International Pressure
6.7.1 The Paris peace conference reaffirms the possibility of a two-state

solution.
BBC/Reuters, Paris peace talks: Two-state solution reaffirmed for Israeli-Palestinian

Conflict, RadioNZ.co, 16 January 2017.
The final communique of a peace conference in Paris shied away from explicitly criticis-
ing plans by US President-elect Donald Trump to move the US embassy to Jerusalem,
although diplomats said the wording sent a subliminal message. The one-day in-
ternational conference was held to try to kick-start peace talks between Israel and the
Palestinians. Mr Trump has pledged to pursue more pro-Israeli policies and to move
the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, all but enshrining the city as Israels capital,
despite international objections. Countries including key European and Arab states, as
well as the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, were in Paris
for the conference. Neither the Israelis nor the Palestinians were represented - Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected the conference as futile. Just five days
before Mr Trump is sworn in, the meeting was seen as a platform for countries to send a
strong signal to the incoming American president that a two-state solution to the conflict
could not be compromised.
6.7.2 There is great international support for a peaceful two-state solution.

The Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, Nickolay Mladenov, said it
is now time for both the Israelis and the Palestinians to rise to the challenge in a brief
to the UN Security Council a few days before the report released. The importance of
the Quartets report is underlined by statements from China and Russia in stressing the
primacy of the Middle East Quartet in assisting efforts towards a peaceful resolution
of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told UN Secretary-
General Ban that Beijing is willing to work closely with the UN to solve the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Wang stated that China firmly supports the peace process in the Middle
East, the two-state solution as the basis of the Palestinian question, the resumption of
peace talks, and the role of the Middle East Quartet. The Chinese statements were made
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in June 2016, at an international conference which was hosted by France, and was joined
by representatives of the UN, Arab League, members of the Middle East Quartet and
foreign ministers from around 20 countries. It aimed at finding ways to revive the peace
process between two sides. South African Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane
and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry were among those who participated. Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, who is also Russian President Vladimir
Putins special envoy for the Middle East, warned that we are fast approaching the
point of no return. The pause in the political dialogue between the parties is far too
long. The two-state solution is jeopardized. Although it has not been removed from the
agenda, the prospects of a just settlement on the internationally recognized legal basis
are virtually fading away before our very eyes, Bogdanov said.
6.7.3 China and other developing countries support the establishment of a

Palestinian state.

In January 2016, In Egypt, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for the establishment of
a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, adding that the Palestinian prob-
lem should not be marginalised and he stated further: China supports the peaceful
process in the Middle East [and] the establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital
being eastern Jerusalem. The Chinese view is shared by other BRICS countries that
include Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa. They too have backed the two-state so-
lution for the conflict at international forums including the UN. In an age of rebalancing
power, this validation has important geopolitical implications.
6.7.4 The UK is devoting more funds to coeexistence projects between Israel

and Palestine.
Daniel Sugarman [reporter], Israeli-Palestinian Co-Existence Funding Bill Introduced

to Parliament, 18 January 2017, The Jewish Chronicle.
A bill introduced to Parliament today, calling for Britain to promote a fund to support co-
existence projects between Israelis and Palestinians, has achieved cross-party support.
Joan Ryan, parliamentary chair for Labour Friends of Israel, tabled a 10-minute rule bill,
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which allows backbench MPs to introduce legislation. With the title of Promotion of Is-
raeli Palestinian Peace, the Bills supporters include Sir Eric Pickles, parliamentary chair
of Conservative Friends of Israel, as well as other MPs from the Labour, Conservative
and Liberal Democrat parties, Speaking in the House of Commons, Ms Ryan stressed
the importance of co-existence projects that bring together Israelis and Palestinians to
advance the cause of mutual understanding, reconciliation and trust.
6.7.5 Proposed UK legislation will devote far more funding to resolving the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Daniel Sugarman [reporter], Israeli-Palestinian Co-Existence Funding Bill Introduced

to Parliament, 18 January 2017, The Jewish Chronicle.
However, she said, the world has invested only around 37m a year in people-to-
people projects for Israel and Palestine: less than 4 for each Israeli and Palestinian
person each year. Britain exemplifies this problem. From spending a pitiful 150,000
on coexistence projects in 2015-16, the government despite repeated warm words to
the contrary appears to have cut this funding altogether in the current financial year.
The Bill, Ms Ryan said, requires the government to promote the establishment of the
proposed International Fund for Israeli-Palestinian Peace, aiming to leverage and in-
crease public and private contributions worldwide. It is envisaged that the $200m per-
year-fund four times the current level of international support for people-to-people
work in Israel-Palestine would receive contributions of approximately 25 percent each
from the US; Europe; the rest of the international community (including the Arab world);
and the private sector, she said.
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6.8 Peace
6.8.1 The two state solution is the only way to insure peace.
AP, Paris summit attendees: The two-state solution is the only way to Israeli-
Palestinian Peace, Salon, 13 January 2017.
Dozens of countries gathering at a Paris summit are expected to send a strong message
to Israel and the incoming Trump administration, reiterating their opposition to Israeli
settlements and calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state as the only way to
ensure peace. France is hosting more than 70 countries at a Mideast peace summit this
weekend. According to a draft statement obtained by The Associated Press on Friday,
the conference will urge Israel and the Palestinians to officially restate their commit-
ment to the two-state solution. Israel has settled some 600,000 of its citizens in the West
Bank and east Jerusalem occupied territories claimed by the Palestinians for a future
independent state. Neither Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas nor Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are attending the conference.
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6.9 Trump Administration
6.9.1 Mattis is pressing for a two-state solution.
Leon Hadar, [senior analyst with Wikistrat], Can Trump Find an Israel-Palestine Solu-
tion? National Interest, 4 February 2017.
Trumps defense secretary, retired U.S. Marine Gen. James Mattis, who was in charge
of U.S. forces in the Middle East when he was chief of U.S. Central Command, made
that argument during a 2013 speech at the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. He said
America needed to work with a sense of urgency to achieve a two-state solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because resentment of U.S. support for Israel had hurt Amer-
ica militarily throughout the region. I paid a military-security price every day as the
commander of CENTCOM because the Americans were seen as biased in support of Is-
rael, Mattis insisted, warning that the current situation was unsustainable. He called
on Washington to act with a sense of urgency toward finding a two-state solution be-
cause the chances were starting to ebb because of the settlements and where theyre at.
Its likely that the new Pentagon chiefs advice to his boss in the White House will reflect
those concerns. He will probably call for maintaining the current U.S. policy of support-
ing a two-state solution along the 1967 cease-fire lines and oppose changes in the status
quo in the West Bank in the form of new Jewish settlements. New Israeli-Palestinian
violence may force Trump to take that advice seriously.
6.9.2 Its in the Trump Administrations interests to keep pushing for a

two-state solution.
Leon Hadar, [senior analyst with Wikistrat], Can Trump Find an Israel-Palestine Solu-
tion? National Interest, 4 February 2017.
The conventional wisdom is that Trump and some of his aides, who perceive the Pales-
tinians as part of the radical Islamist terrorist bloc, would treat the building of new Jew-
ish settlements with benign neglect and place more emphasis on strengthening strategic
ties with Israel. After all, Trump has reiterated his commitment to relocate the U.S. em-
bassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and has nominated a pro-settlement Jewish
activist as his ambassador to Israel. But again, personal sentiments and fiery rhetoric
dont necessarily make for a coherent policy. To fight ISIS and contain Iran, Washington
would still need to rely on the support and cooperation of leading Arab and Muslim
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states. Israels ability to play a major role in U.S. strategy in the Middle East will de-
pend to a large extent on progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front, while an explosion of
new Israeli-Palestinian violence will play into the hands of Iran and radical Sunni Arab
groups and place constraints on pursuing U.S. interests in the region.
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6.9.3 Mattis is now in a position to push for the two-state solution.
Shai Feldman, [Brandeis Universitys Crown Center for Middle East Studies], Mattis
Could Resolve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, The National Interest, 30 January 2017.
The second reason why Mattis is uniquely positioned to address the Palestinian-Israeli
problem is this: he is now in charge of the most important realm that has paralyzed the
Israeli side of the required peacemaking effortthe security realm. Security was not
and is not the most difficult issue dividing Israelis and Palestinians, but for Israelis it
is the most important one. Why? Most Israelis who are at the center and center-left of
their countrys political map do not push their government to resolve the conflict be-
cause they are terrified. Why? Because implicitly, if not explicitly, even theylet alone
those on the right and center-right of the mapaccept the assertion that all concessions
that Israel has made in the past two decades have placed them in greater jeopardy. They
see the 1993 Oslo Accords as having resulted in the murderous 20002005 second Pales-
tinian Intifada. They see the May 2000 withdrawal from South Lebanon as having led
to the 2006 Second Lebanon War. Additionally, they see the summer 2005 withdrawal
from Gaza as having already led to three military confrontations with Hamas. More-
over, most Israelis accept the proposition that to enable the creation of a Palestinian
state, Israel would have to withdraw from the West Bank. If the withdrawal results in
consequences similar to Israels previous withdrawals from South Lebanon and Gaza,
then the ramifications of such a withdrawal would be far worse for Israels safety and se-
curity. Why? Because in contrast to South Lebanon and Gaza, the West Bank is adjacent
to Israels center core, which is where 80 percent of its population resides. The majority
percentage of Israels GDP is also produced in that area. Mattis is now in a position to
initiate a security dialogue with his counterpart in Israel and to preside over a parallel
dialogue between the Joint Chiefs of Staffas well as the Israel Defense Forces general
staffon how to secure Israel under conditions that would allow the implementation
of a two-state solution to the conflict. In the history of the increasingly intimate U.S.-
Israeli defense relationship, this important issue never became part of the conversation.
Indeed, during the last attempt to resolve the conflict (the negotiations launched by for-
mer Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013) the IDF was blocked from engaging retired
Gen. John Allen, then senior advisor to the secretary of defense.
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6.10 Two-State Solution Benefits
6.10.1 The two-state solution offers clear and substantial benefits to

Americans, Palestinians, and Israelis.
A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is of compelling interest to the

United States. It offers the only realistic prospect for lasting peace and attainable justice
for Israelis and Palestinians. It offers clear and substantial benefits to Americans, Pales-
tinians and Israelis, as well as to most of the other states in the region. For Americans, a
two-state solution would eliminate one of the grievances that feeds radical extremism
throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds. It would fulfill pledges that U.S. President
Barack Obama made during his historic June 2009 Cairo speech to the Muslim world,
and it would enhance the U.S. position throughout the region and around the globe.
An end to the conflict would also help fulfill Americas long-standing commitment to
Israels survival and its commitment to Palestinian self-determination. For Palestinians,
obtaining their own state means an end to more than four decades of occupation, ac-
knowledgment of their past suffering, the fulfillment of their national aspirations and
an opportunity to shape their own destiny at last. For Israelis, a two-state solution ends
the demographic challenge to Israels character as a Jewish-majority state, removes the
stigma of being an occupying power, enables a lasting peace with the entire Arab world
and eliminates a critical barrier to full international acceptance.
6.10.2 The two-state solution is infinitely preferable to the status quo or

other alternatives.
The benefits of a two-state solution are incontestable, and genuine progress must be
achieved quickly. Continuing the status quofruitless negotiations, Palestinian divi-
sions and the steady expansion of Israeli settlementsmay soon make it impossible
to create two states for two peoples. The result would be the latest in a long line of
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tragedies: extremists on both sides would be vindicated; Americas image would suf-
fer, complicating foreign policy in a crucial region; Israel would cease to be a democratic
and Jewish-majority state and be condemned as an apartheid society; and the Palestini-
ans would continue to suffer in poverty and powerlessness.
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6.11 US Pressure
6.11.1 US support has been too unconditionalmeans that Israel has no

incentive to change its policies.
Matthew Duss, [president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace], How to Pressure
Israel to Make peace, Slate, 24 March 2015.
In the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus declaration that a Pales-
tinian state would not be created on his watch, the Obama administration has signaled
that it is considering a reassessment of its options with regard to the two-state solution.
We cannot simply pretend that those comments were never made, or that they dont
raise questions about the prime ministers commitment to achieving peace through di-
rect negotiations, said Denis McDonough, the presidents chief of staff, in remarks at
a conference held Monday by the pro-Israel, pro-peace lobby J Street In a Sunday inter-
view with Israeli radio, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Dan Shapiro confirmed that a shift is
under way. While Shapiro was careful to make clear that no decision had been reached
regarding future U.S. action, he did point out that Washingtons defense of Israel at the
United Nations was predicated on Jerusalems commitment to the two-state solution.
For years, Netanyahu has strung the United States and the international community
along with a kind of Two-State Hamlet act, providing just enough reasons, little hints
here, a trail of breadcrumbs there, to sustain the hope that yes, under the correct circum-
stances, and offered the appropriate truckload of carrots, he could be the Man to Make
a Deal. But, as Netanyahu himself once said, The question is not of hope, the question
is of actual results. And the results are now in on Netanyahu.
6.11.2 The US needs to apply more pressure to Israel on achieving a

two-state solution.
The United States and its allies remain convinced that the only way to resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is through direct negotiations. Indeed, even the Palestinian leader-
ship, while they may see international efforts at the United Nations and the Interna-
tional Criminal Court as useful in creating leverage against Israel, understands that the
only way a two state-solution ultimately gets done is by Israelis and Palestinians sit-
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ting around a table and signing a bilateral agreement between their two states, Israel
and Palestine. But the administration is signaling that, at least under Netanyahu, the
bilateral path is now shut. Which means its time to look at other options for advancing
toward the two-state goal, such as diplomatic pressure at the United Nations. When
Netanyahu spoke of the need for results, not hope, he was referring to the need for pres-
sure on Iran. Indeed, Netanyahu has been the loudest advocate of pressure on Iran to
change its policies and engage seriously in talks about its nuclear program. And the very
same logic now applies to Netanyahu and a two-state solution, particularly with regard
to the ongoing construction and growth of illegal Israeli settlements on occupied terri-
tory in the West Bank and Jerusalem, which many believe will eventually make such a
solution impossible. While there are obvious differences between the Iranian nuclear
program and the Israeli settlement enterprise, there are some remarkable similarities.
Both are couched in broad nationalistic terms. Both are based in a highly tendentious
interpretation of treaty commitments (though, to be fair, Irans assertion of its right to
enrich uranium under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a bit more plausible than Israels
assertion that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not prohibit the transfer of its popu-
lation into occupied territory). Both involve the creation of facts on the groundjust
continue to build and expand and eventually the world will have to accept it.
6.11.3 The United States should start using sticks, not carrots on Israel.
This isnt to suggest that the United States will suddenly throw its support behind Pales-
tinian U.N. initiatives, but there are a number of other options for applying pressure
on Israel. They could include crafting a U.N. Security Council resolution laying out
clear terms of reference for future negotiations, something the Palestinians have long
sought, and which Obama himself articulated, to Netanyahus dismay, in his May 2011
speech at the State Department. The United States could go further, setting out a spe-
cific set of parameters laying out the official U.S. view of a final disposition of the key
final status issuesborders, security, refugees, and Jerusalem. The United States could
simply choose to abstain from a new U.N. Security Council resolution declaring Israeli
settlements illegal (which remains the official position of the U.S. government, though
illegitimate has been the term used since the 1980s) rather than vetoing, as it did in
February 2011. While a settlements resolution might seem less drastic at first glance
than one laying out a broader set of parameters, it could actually be a more potent tool
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of pressure on the Israelis. A fresh U.N. Security Council resolution could serve as Ex-
hibit A in the Palestinians case against settlements at the International Criminal Court.
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6.12 Water Talks
6.12.1 Recent Israeli-Palestinian water talks lend hope to the two state
solution.
Tovah Lazaroff, [Reporter], UN Official: Israeli-Palestinian Water Talks Important for

Two-State Solution, The Jerusalem Post, 16 January 2017.
Palestinians and Israelis agreed Sunday to renew activities of the Joint Water Committee
after a six-year freeze that has made it difficult to advance projects to benefit Palestini-
ans and Israelis living in the West Bank and contributed to acute water shortages in
the summer months. On Sunday, while the international community met in Paris to
discuss the stymied peace process, Israeli and Palestinian officials held a regional meet-
ing on critical meeting on water. Major General Yoav Mordechai sat with Palestinian
Authority Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh at a table adorned with small Israeli
and Palestinian flags. They were joined by Moshe Garazi and Mazen Jenim, the Israeli
and Palestinian heads of the respective water authorities. Signing the water agreement
proves that you can reach agreements and understandings when you discuss matters
in a substantive, bilateral manner that is clean of foreign considerations when it con-
cerns matters of natural resources and other infrastructural issues that affect the entire
population, said Mordechai.
6.12.2 The UN is optimistic about the two state solution after the water talks.
Tovah Lazaroff, [Reporter], UN Official: Israeli-Palestinian Water Talks Important for

Two-State Solution, The Jerusalem Post, 16 January 2017.
A UN Official on Monday lauded the renewed cooperation between Israelis and Pales-
tinians on water issues in the West Bank as an important move to the creation of a two-
state solution. I welcome the signature of an agreement to renew the activity of the
Israeli Palestinian Joint Water Committee to improve the water infrastructure and
supply in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle
East Peace Process Nikolay Mladenov said. This, along with previous joint agreements
on electricity, water, mail and 3G cellular coverage, is in line with the Middle East Quar-
tets recommendations, Mladenov said If fully implemented, this agreement would
be an important step toward preserving the two-state solution. I encourage further co-
operation between the two sides which is critical to the viability of a future Palestinian
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state, Mladenov said.
6.12.3 Israel and Palestine have agreed to start a joint water committee.
Sputnik International, Israel, Palestine Authority Agree to Restart Joint Water Com-
mittee, January 2017.
The agreement, signed January 15, was lauded by UN Special Coordinator for the Mid-
dle East Peace Process Nikolay Mladenov as an important step toward preserving the
two-state solution. Part of the Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim, east of Jerusalem in
the occupied West Bank I welcome the signature of an agreement to renew the activity
of the Israeli Palestinian Joint Water Committee to improve the water infrastructure
and supply in the occupied West Bank and Gaza, he said, noting that the agreement is
in line with Middle East Quartets recommendations. If fully implemented, this agree-
ment would be an important step toward preserving the two-state solution. I encourage
further cooperation between the two sides which is critical to the viability of a future
Palestinian state. When the committee reconvenes, it will discuss ways to bring more
water to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the latter of which has been gripped by an
acute water crisis for years. It will be tasked with improving the outdated water infras-
tructure of the West Bank, including laying new water pipes, Israeli media report.
6.12.4 Water talks prove viability for cooperation on substantive issues in

the future.
Sputnik International, Israel, Palestine Authority Agree to Restart Joint Water Com-
mittee, January 2017.
The sides will also discuss accessing water sources; environmental, irrigation and
sewage issues; and in the nearest future will work to coordinate joint reservoir usage
ahead of the hot summer months. A Turkish flag hangs in the Gaza port as fishermen
in their boats pass off the shore of Gaza City, Tuesday, Sept. 13, 2011 The parties
also announced that they had approved a joint strategic planning process to create
a 23-year strategic water plan for the region until 2040, taking into account expected
population growth. Head of the COGAT General Yoav Mordechai said at the signing
with Palestinian Authority Civil Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, Signing the
water agreement proves that you can reach agreements and understandings when you
discuss matters in a substantive, bilateral manner that is clean of foreign considerations
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when it concerns matters of natural resources and other infrastructural issues that
affect the entire population, the Jerusalem Post reports.
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6.13 AT One State
6.13.1 A one-state solution would lead inevitably to oppression.
Benjamin Miller, [School of Political Science, University of Haifa], Israel-Palestine: One

State or Two: Why a Two-State Solution is Desirable, Necessary, and Feasible, Ethnop-
olitics, Vol. 15, August 2016.
A fourth solution is the dominance of one ethno-national group over the other(s). The
dominant group suppresses by coercive means the ethno-national claims and aspira-
tions of the competing groups and thus creates a semblance of stability. However, in
the age of democratization and human rights, coercion by strongmen or oppressive
groups is going eventually to lose legitimacy and effectiveness, especially in deeply di-
vided societies. This is unsustainable especially for a state such as Israel, which desires
to be a democracy and to have good relations with the West. Moreover, democracy is a
strategic necessity for Israel, not only an idealist aspiration, as Israel is so much depen-
dent on the West in every respect. In other words, there are no good solutions to the
state-to-nation imbalance. Oppression is too costlyunless maybe if it is a powerful
great power, but it is also illegitimate and ineffective in the long-run. There is usually
not enough time to build a civic nation. Neither is the West likely to commit enough
troops and money to prop up a power sharing arrangement for the next several decades.
Further, there are also no regional powers which are likely to exercise moderating pres-
sures in the foreseeable future.
6.13.2 Mutual distrust means the two state solution is the only viable
alternative.

Mutual distrust, for its part, increases the need for a partition. In the IsraeliPalestinian
case the parties always needed third-party mediation for addressing their disputes so
how could they cooperate in jointly managing a bi-national state? This would be fraught
with numerous obstacles, especially with regard to who will provide security and who
will be ultimately responsible for this crucial issue. Thus, it is quite reasonable to expect
that power-sharing will lead to more violence and bloodshed, especially if we take into
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account also the following factor: Demographic changes will challenge power-sharing
arrangements. More specifically, differences in the levels of birth-rate, higher among
Arabs than it is among Jews, will de-stabilize any agreed-upon arrangement of power-
sharing based on demographic criteria.
6.13.3 Israel would never grant voting rights to Palestinians.
Grant Rumley [Research Analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies] and
Amir Tibon [Diplomatic Correspondent for Walla], The Death and Life of the Two-
State Solution, Foreign Affairs, 2015.
Granting Israeli voting rights to the Palestinians living under Israeli control in the West
Bank and East Jerusalem would mean the end of the Jewish state, and there is no chance
the Israelis would agree to it. A one-state campaign could, however, inflict massive
damage on Israel, far greater than what anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian campaigns have.
Kerry gave Israel a taste of the umbrage it might face openly when he warned in private
last year that without a peace deal, Israel could become an apartheid state. Although
his words angered officials in Jerusalem and members of the organized Jewish commu-
nity in the United States, Netanyahus closest confidant, former Israeli Prime Minister
Ehud Barak, regularly sounds a similar warning.
6.13.4 The push for a one-state solution actually makes the two-state
solution more likely.
Grant Rumley [Research Analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies] and
Amir Tibon [Diplomatic Correspondent for Walla], The Death and Life of the Two-
State Solution, Foreign Affairs, 2015.
All of this suggests that the most likely result of an impending onestate outcome is the
implementation of the two-state solution. That would be the obvious way for Israel
to silence its critics and kill any demands for Palestinian civil rights. An Israeli stance
that refused to grant citizenship or voting rights to the Palestinians but held out the
prospect of granting them clear title to most of the West Bank would meet with much
acclaim. For the Palestinians, in other words, the increasingly likeliest way to achieve
an independent state is, paradoxically, to give up on trying to get one. Only when the
Palestinians make the Israelis recognize that the status quo cannot persist indefinitely
and reach for something the Israelis hold even more dear than the West Bank-control
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over Israel itself as a Jewish state-will the Israelis begin to see a two-state solution as
their least-bad option. But if things eventually reach this crossroads, the state the Pales-
tinians will be granted wont be the one they have demanded for the last two decades.
Instead of following the 1967 borders, its outline will be based on Israels security and
demographic concerns. In the last round of peace talks, Netanyahu was willing to dis-
cuss a Palestinian state in approximately 90 percent of the West Bank, with limited land
swaps. If Israel decides one day to support a Palestinian state in order to kill a binational
state, the result is more likely to be Netanyahus abridged version of it.
6.13.5 A one-state solution would create a dystopia.
Jeffrey Goldberg, [editor in chief of The Atlantic], The Two-State Solution is the Best,
and Only, Solution, The Atlantic, 28 February 2012.
Some of the most persuasive arguments against one-statism, in fact, come from the left.
Jeremy Ben-Ami, the founder of J Street, the liberal pro-Israel lobby group in Washing-
ton, told me that the one-state solution is a one-state nightmare. Gershom Gorenberg,
in his new book, The Unmaking of Israel, a jeremiad directed at the Jewish settlement
movement, writes at length about the absurdity at the heart of the proposal. Pales-
tinians will demand the return of property lost in 1948 and perhaps the rebuilding of
destroyed villages. Except for the drawing of borders, virtually every question that
bedevils Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations will become a domestic problem setting
the new political entity aflame. Gorenberg predicts that Israelis of means would flee
this new state, leaving it economically crippled. Financing development in majority-
Palestinian areas and bringing Palestinians into Israels social welfare network would
require Jews to pay higher taxes or receive fewer services. But the engine of the Israeli
economy is high-tech, an entirely portable industry. Both individuals and companies
will leave. In the best case, this new dystopia by the sea would be paralyzed by end-
less argument: Two nationalities who have desperately sought a political frame for
cultural and social independence would wrestle over control of language, art, street
names, and schools. In the worst case, Gorenberg writes, political tensions would
ignite as violence.
6.13.6 The one-state solution would spell doom.
AFP Report, UN chief: One-state solution for Israeli-Palestinian conflict would spell
doom, 20 September 2016, The Times of Israel.
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Speaking at the 71st session of the UN General Assembly in New York for the final
time as UN chief, Ban gave a wide-ranging address focused largely on the Syrian civil
war, which has claimed the lives of over 300,000 people since March 2011. On stalled
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, Ban said that prospects for the creation of a Palestinian
state alongside Israel are being lowered by the day. It pains me that this past decade
has been lost to peace. Ten years lost to illegal settlement expansion. Ten years lost to
intra-Palestinian divide, growing polarization and hopelessness, he said, adding that
West Bank settlements were obstacles to progress. This is madness. Replacing a
two-state solution with a one-state construct would spell doom: denying Palestinians
their freedom and rightful future, and pushing Israel further from its vision of a Jewish
democracy towards greater global isolation, said Ban.
6.13.7 A one-state solution is a formula for continuing and escalating the

conflict.
Attractive though a one-state solution may be (and I write as someone who favored a
binational state in the 1940s, before the establishment of Israel), pursuit of that option
at this historical juncture is a formula for continuing and escalating the conflict, with
predictably destructive consequences for both sides. The choice, in my view, is between
a two-state solution and a one-state non-solution. I therefore see no alternative to the
vigorous pursuit of a two-state solution. Despite the setbacks and frustrations of the last
few years and the limited progress in the negotiating process, and despite the realities
on the ground that are creating obstacles to the establishment of a Palestinian state, I
believe there is room for what I call strategic optimism: an optimism that is anchored
in a realistic assessment of the situation, but actively seeks out all the possibilities for
movement toward peace and vigorously pursues them.
6.13.8 Absent the two-state policy, Israel has no answer for what to do with
the four million Palestinians residing in the OPTs.
Nick Whitney, [Senior Policy fellow, ECFR], Europe and the Vanishing Two-State So-
lution, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2013.
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And here, of course, lies the fatal flaw in current Israeli policy it fails to provide any
remotely plausible answer to the question of what is to be done with the four million
Palestinian residents of the OPTs. It is perhaps understandable that, having pulled out
of Gaza, Israelis should take it for granted that they will one day be able to divest them-
selves definitively of the Gazans. It may be natural to suppose that, over time, the prob-
lem can be wished on the Egyptians, even if the latter have shown themselves both alert,
and allergic, to such a development. Alternatively, the current status quo in Gaza might
simply continue indefinitely much as the situation of the almost five million refugees
in UNRWA camps surrounding Israel has turned out to be sustainable for decades. But
it is much harder to envisage a manageable solution for the two and a half million Pales-
tinians of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in the absence of a Palestinian state. Any
idea that these people can somehow be transferred across Jordan, either through a con-
federation with the Hashemite Kingdom or through a complete redrawing of the post-
colonial map of the Mashriq, is simply wishful thinking. Absent another Nakba, the
West Bankers will stay and in all probability sustain a birth rate consistently higher
than that of Israelis. Indeed, global experience suggests that the greater the degree of
dispossession and marginalisation, the higher the rate of fertility.
6.13.9 The non-Jewish citizens of Israel mean it is impossible for Israel to be

both Jewish and democratic.
This non-Jewish cuckoo in the nest is what makes the mindset of managing the con-
flict with the Palestinians rather than resolving it so self-deluding. And it is what makes
the vision of an Israel that comes to embrace Judaea and Samaria and yet remains both
Jewish and democratic simply unattainable. The Israel of the future can be any two
out of the three of Jewish, democratic, and enlarged to the banks of the Jordan but it
cannot, without large-scale ethnic cleansing, be all three. Obama made this point deftly
to his audience in Jerusalem, recalling words of their former prime minister: As Ariel
Sharon said Im quoting him It is impossible to have a Jewish, democratic state and
at the same time to control all of Eretz Israel. If we insist on fulfilling the dream in
its entirety, we are liable to lose it all.31 For, as Prime Minister Netanyahu recently
reaffirmed, the idea of a democratic Jewish state requires a solid Jewish majority.32
Even with such a solid majority, the task of reconciling democratic rights for all with
a strong ethnic identity is not easy as the position of the Palestinian minority who
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hold Israeli citizenship attests. Alongside their colleagues reports on Area C and East
Jerusalem, the EU ambassadors in Tel Aviv contributed their own depressing perspec-
tive on current developments with their 2011 report on the relative impoverishment
and marginalisation of this 20 percent of the Israeli population.33 Average earnings in
the Israeli Arab community are 61 percent of those of Jewish households; Israeli Arabs
occupy only 7 percent of government jobs, and own a mere 3 percent of the land. Fewer
than 10 percent of them live in mixed Jewish-Arab towns.
6.13.10 Absorbing the West Bank into Israel would make the Palestinians
second-class citizens.
Even more concerning, however, is what the report tells us about the degree of antipathy
between the Jewish majority and Palestinian minority. More than half of Israeli Jews
tell pollsters that the government should encourage Arabs to emigrate. Over a third
would like to see Israeli Arabs lose their vote. For their part, almost two thirds of Israeli
Arabs believe Jews to be a foreign imprint in the Middle East, and believe Israel has
no right to exist as a Jewish state. Thus the fallacy of the notion that absorption of the
West Bank into Israel (whether by continuation of the current settlement process or by
the simple annexation of Area C as advocated by cabinet minister Naftali Bennett) is
a viable way forward. The Jewishness of an enlarged Israel could be preserved only
by treating a large and expanding Palestinian minority as second-class citizens, and in
an increasingly undemocratic manner. (The EU report cited above has more details on
recent illiberal legislation, both proposed and enacted.) Combine this prospect with the
necessity to maintain tough control over the minoritys residence and movements, and
the geographical fragmentation of those areas in which the minority will be allowed a
degree of autonomy, and the parallels with apartheid South Africa become impossible
to ignore.
6.13.11 Israel risks becoming an apartheid state.
Josh Rogin, [former senior correspondent for national security and politics for the Daily
Beast], Exclusive: Kerry Warns Israel Could Become An Apartheid State, Daily
Beast, 27 April 2014.
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The secretary of state said that if Israel doesnt make peace soon, it could become an
apartheid state, like the old South Africa. Jewish leaders are fuming over the compar-
ison. If theres no two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict soon, Israel risks
becoming an apartheid state, Secretary of State John Kerry told a room of influential
world leaders in a closed-door meeting Friday. Senior American officials have rarely,
if ever, used the term apartheid in reference to Israel, and President Obama has pre-
viously rejected the idea that the word should apply to the Jewish state. Kerrys use
of the loaded term is already rankling Jewish leaders in Americaand it could attract
unwanted attention in Israel, as well. It wasnt the only controversial comment on the
Middle East that Kerry made during his remarks to the Trilateral Commission, a record-
ing of which was obtained by The Daily Beast. Kerry also repeated his warning that a
failure of Middle East peace talks could lead to a resumption of Palestinian violence
against Israeli citizens. He suggested that a change in either the Israeli or Palestinian
leadership could make achieving a peace deal more feasible. He lashed out against Is-
raeli settlement-building. And Kerry said that both Israeli and Palestinian leaders share
the blame for the current impasse in the talks. Kerry also said that at some point, he
might unveil his own peace deal and tell both sides to take it or leave it.
6.13.12 The alternatives are a two-state solution or apartheid.
Josh Rogin, [former senior correspondent for national security and politics for the Daily
Beast], Exclusive: Kerry Warns Israel Could Become An Apartheid State, Daily
Beast, 27 April 2014.
A two-state solution will be clearly underscored as the only real alternative. Because
a unitary state winds up either being an apartheid state with second-class citizensor
it ends up being a state that destroys the capacity of Israel to be a Jewish state, Kerry
told the group of senior officials and experts from the U.S., Western Europe, Russia,
and Japan. Once you put that frame in your mind, that reality, which is the bottom
line, you understand how imperative it is to get to the two-state solution, which both
leaders, even yesterday, said they remain deeply committed to. According to the 1998
Rome Statute, the crime of apartheid is defined as inhumane acts committed in the
context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one
racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention
of maintaining that regime. The term is most often used in reference to the system of
racial segregation and oppression that governed South Africa from 1948 until 1994. For-
mer president Jimmy Carter came under fire in 2007 for titling his book on Middle East
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peace Palestine: Peace or Apartheid. Carter has said publicly that his views on Israeli
treatment of the Palestinians are a main cause of his poor relationship with President
Obama and his lack of current communication with the White House. But Carter ex-
plained after publishing the book that he was referring to apartheid-type policies in the
West Bank, not Israel proper, and he was not accusing Israel of institutionalized racism.
Apartheid is a word that is an accurate description of what has been going on in the
West Bank, and its based on the desire or avarice of a minority of Israelis for Palestinian
land, Carter said.
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6.14 AT Multinational State
6.14.1 Power sharing would be disastrous.

Another solution is the bi/multi-national state, which involves two nations (or more)
sharing power in one state. This solution was tried recently in Iraq, but the high level
of mistrust, petty politics (enhanced by ethnically based elections), and the weakness
and/or partisan nature of state institutions virtually dooms many of these system to
failure. Indeed, power-sharing statessuch as Lebanon, Yugoslavia or Cyprus, for
exampleare prone to civil wars. Even Belgium faces challenges to its power-sharing
arrangements between the Flemings and Walloons. Recent power-sharing agreements
which seem to work (or at least not lead to violence) are those that are underwritten
by a strong international presence but also by at least some sorts of a de facto partition,
such as in Bosnia. It cannot be assumed that the West will supply peace builders, so
this solution is unlikely to be much help in the Middle East. Israel also prefers self-
reliance rather than relying on foreign forces and the effectiveness of UN forces in the
Middle East has not been very high. Still, even if only on the margins, if the parties
are in a basic agreement, the presence of a multi-national force might help to avert mis-
communication and an inadvertent escalation. Another recent way to reach an effective
power-sharing is when two collaborative motherlands exert moderating pressures on
their respective brethren such as the United Kingdom and Ireland on the Protestant
and Catholic communities, respectively in the case of the Good Friday Agreement in
Northern Ireland. However, this template is not applicable to the Middle East, where
regional powers are mostly antagonistic to each other rather than acting as moderating
forces.
6.14.2 The bi-national idea is particularly problematic in the case of Israel

and Palestine.

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In the IsraeliPalestinian case the bi-national idea, supported at least partly by OLeary
(2015 OLeary, B. (2015). Power-sharing and partition amid IsraelPalestine. Unpub-
lished paper. ), is a recipe for a continuous struggle and instability, including a sustained
(low-level) civil war. Demographic changes can seriously undermine power-sharing ar-
rangements. Moreover, the mere expectation for such changes can reinforce the lack of
trust and mutual fears which at any rate pre-exist very strongly in both communities.
A key controversial question is who will control the security of this state. The idea of
the one state by itself, moreover, is not going to resolve outstanding controversial is-
sues such as the right of return to Palestinian refugees and the future of the Jewish
settlements in the West Bank.
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6.15 AT Two-State Solution Dead
6.15.1 Just because leaders oppose a truce now does not mean they will
continue to.
The fact that both Israeli and Palestinian leaders now oppose a long-term truce does not
mean they will do so indefinitely. But it does mean that in the absence of political up-
heaval in either society a change in position will come only if the costs of the status quo
become significantly greater for Palestinian and Israeli leaders alike. This could come
about in several ways, including through heightened violence, a collapse of the Pales-
tinian Authority (PA), the withdrawal of aid to the PA, the establishment of a popular
movement that would rival or supplant the PLO, or, in the not too immediate future,
sanctions against Israel. Yet so long as such possibilities, particularly the last, seem
remote, the incentive for the parties to take action to avoid them will remain low.
6.15.2 The status quo is quickly becoming costlier.
Still, policies toward the IsraeliPalestinian conflict are slowly changing, and some of
these changes may eventually make the status quo more costly. It is possible to imagine
future initiatives from the United Nations (UN), international institutions and European
parliaments that encourage the enforcement of existing legal obligations of UN member
states not to recognize, assist in or give legal effect to Israeli and Palestinian violations of
international law: Israels occupation of, and land confiscations within, the West Bank;
the blockade of Gaza; the construction and maintenance of settlements in violation of
the Geneva Conventions; and Palestinian Authority violations of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, such as facilitating the transfer of Palestinian detainees to prisons outside
the occupied territory. UN member states could one day begin to reject not just products
from settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem but also companies, institutions
and government ministries that operate inside them.
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6.15.3 The costs of the status quo makes both sides more likely to cooperate.
Many of these measures currently seem distant or improbable. Yet even in their ab-
sence the costs of the status quo have been slowly rising: threats of increased isolation
and economic boycott of Israel are growing, albeit at a scale that has not made a dent
in steadily rising IsraeliEuropean trade; violence has been increasing in the West Bank
and Jerusalem; and a new war in Gaza looms. Most costly of all would be a collapse of
the increasingly fragile Palestinian Authority, forcing the Israeli army to re-enter West
Bank city centres and more directly suppress Hamas. The legitimacy of the Palestinian
leadership is at a nadir. The absence of challenges to it stems primarily from its ability,
not always consistent, to pay salaries, and from the dependency of so many families
in the West Bank on the PAs continued existence. It is no coincidence that the Pales-
tinians who are making the greatest efforts to raise the costs of Israels occupation are
those where the Palestinian Authoritys control is weakest: protesting Jerusalemites,
hunger-striking prisoners, militants in Gaza, demonstrators against settlements and the
separation barrier in parts of the West Bank outside PA jurisdiction, activists and indi-
vidual attackers in Hebron, and the boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS) movement,
which is driven largely by the Palestinian diaspora. The success of these groups raises
the costs of the status quo not just for Israel but for a PLO that is increasingly dismissed
as ineffectual, inactive and irrelevant.
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6.16 AT: Iranian Nuclearization
6.16.1 Iran is conciliatory towards a two-state solution
Dinmore, Guy. Iran Accepts Two-State Answer In Mideast. Financial Times. 4 Sep.
2006. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Mohammad Khatami, Irans former president, says Iran would accept a Palestinian state
ready to live alongside Israel if the elected Hamas government freely adopted such an
outcome.In an interview with the Financial Times, Mr Khatami, a reformist, distanced
himself from the hardline statements expressed by Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, his fun-
damentalist successor, who has called the Holocaust a myth and said Israel should be
removed from the map by the Palestinians.Mr Khatami, a cleric and the most senior Ira-
nian politician to visit the US since the 1979 Islamic revolution, is on a 12-day, private
speaking tour. At the weekend he addressed the annual convention of the Islamic So-
ciety of North America near Chicago, where 13,000 mostly American Muslims greeted
him with a standing ovation. Criticising the Bush administrations approach to the war
on terror, Mr Khatami said the US was fanning conflicts and inflaming sentiments. On
the nuclear issue, he reiterated Irans rejection of US demands for Iran to suspend ura-
nium enrichment as a precondition for talks. But asked if Iran could accept a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Mr Khatami appeared more conciliatory. Al-
though now a private citizen, he stressed his words represented Irans policy. I think
Hamas itself, which has come to power today in a democratic process, is ready to live
alongside Israel if its rights are met and it is dealt with like a democratic state and as the
Palestinian government, and pressures are removed from Hamas, he said. Of course
whatever Palestinians think is respected by us, he said.
6.16.2 Iranian president supports two-state solution
Spillius, Alex. Irans President Would Support Two-State Solution For Israel. The
Telegraph. 26 Apr. 2009. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Asked if he would support an agreement between the Palestinians and Tehrans arch
enemy, he said: Whatever decision they take is fine with us. We are not going to
determine anything. Whatever decision they take, we will support that.We think that
is the right of the Palestinian people, however we fully expect other states to do so
as well. Given his frequently stated hostility to Israels existence - calling more than
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once for its annihilation - and his habit of capriciously offering threat and promises
of friendship within the space of a few days, Mr Ahmadinejads words will not treated
by Western diplomats as a permanent shift in policy. He has previously declared that
Israel should be wiped off the map and a week ago accused the Israelis of running
the the most cruel and repressive racist regime. But his comments are now in the
open and cannot be taken back. They will provide the Obama administration and its
European partners significant encouragement that he is prepared to move beyond the
mutual hostility of the Bush era and negotiate on Irans nuclear programme, which the
West is convinced is designed to produced nuclear weapons as soon as possible.
6.16.3 No credible evidence suggests a risk of an Iranian attack on Israel
Weiss, Leonard. Israels future and Irans nuclear program. Middle East Policy 16.3
(2009): 79.
The tacit assumption behind the apocalyptic pronouncements is that Iran will not only
make nuclear weapons, but will use them to destroy Israel shortly thereafter. This
amounts to assuming that Irans leaders are insane. That is, Israels deterrent notwith-
standing, the Iranian clerics hatred of Israel is so intense that in order to destroy it they
would launch a nuclear attack that would kill not only Jews but also up to 1.5 million
Muslims living in Israel, as well as triggering an Israeli nuclear counterattack. An Is-
raeli nuclear counterattack, which Iran could not prevent, would turn back the clock on
Irans development for many decades and reduce its leaders to radioactive dust. There
is no evidence to suggest that the ruling clerics are so disposed.4 Some have specu-
lated that Iran might make nuclear weapons and transfer some of them to third parties,
e.g. terrorist organizations, for use against Israel.4 But no country that provides nuclear
weapons to a third party can be sure that the transfer will be perfectly secure from dis-
covery or that the weapons will be used as intended. A nuclear attack on Israel using
a weapon originating in Iran would undoubtedly be treated as if it came from Tehran,
again resulting in Irans utter destruction.
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6.17 AT: Angers Israel
Rasgon, Adam. Poll Indicates Majority Supports Two-States, But Not On Previous
Negotiations. The Jerusalem Post. 22. Aug 2017. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
A majority of Palestinians and Israelis the two-state solution, a new poll found. Fifty-one
percent of Palestinians and 59% of Israelis back the twostate solution, despite the recent
stagnation in the peace process, according to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center
for Polling and Survey Research (PCPSR) and the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI). How-
ever, when the pollsters presented respondents with a hypothetical peace agreement
based on previous negotiations, only 39% of Palestinians and 46% of Israelis supported
it. The hypothetical deal included mutual recognition, a demilitarized Palestinian state
based on 1967 borders with land swaps, the establishment of a Palestinian capital in east
Jerusalem and an Israeli capital in West Jerusalem, and the return of 100,000 refugees to
Israel based on family reunification. Among Israeli Jews, 10% of the Right, 59% of the
center, and 88% of the Left supported the proposed deal, while 56% of seculars and 10%
of religious backed it. Interestingly, 90% of Arab-Israelis supported the proposed deal.
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6.18 AT: Trump Rejects Two-State Solution
6.18.1 Trump administration is committed to pursuing a two-state solution
Savitsky, Shane. Trump Supports Two-State Solution, Rejects Settlements. Axios. 2

Feb 2017. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
The Jerusalem Post reported today that senior Trump administration officials have
confirmed that President Trump is committed to a two-state solution for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict a shift from his prior harsh rhetoric on the topic. No to
settlements: We urge all parties from taking unilateral actions that could undermine
our ability to make progress, including settlement announcements, Trump officials
told the paper. This comes after Israel authorized 5,500 new settlement units in the
West Bank during Trumps first two weeks in office. Still up in the air: Trump had
previously pledged to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,
which would be a major stumbling block for the peace process. Update: After the story
broke, the White House put out a clarifying statement: While we dont believe the
existence of settlements is an impediment to peace, the construction of new settlements
or the expansion of existing settlements beyond their current borders may not be
helpful in achieving that goal The Trump administration has not taken an official
position on settlement activity and looks forward to continuing discussions, including
with Prime Minister Netanyahu when he visits with President Trump later this month.
6.18.2 Two-state solution can still be achieved in future administrations-

even if Trump didnt support it, the idea doesnt die
Ziri, Danielle. Can The Two-State Solution Survive In The Age Of Trump?. The
Jerusalem Post. 26 Jan. 2017. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Jewish American organizations that have been advocating for the two-state solution are
confident the idea will live on despite the installation of Donald Trump as US president.
The two-state solution wasnt achieved in the last administration or the one before that,
and it may not be achieved in this one either, but it doesnt mean that the idea dies,
because it remains the only actual functioning, viable solution that anyone has put for-
ward, Alan Elsner, special adviser to the president of J Street, told The Jerusalem Post
on Monday. Elsner said out that while the Trump administrations policy regarding
the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has not yet been clearly formulated, some of the new
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presidents moves, such as nominating David Friedman, a supporter of settlements, as

ambassador to Israel, are worrying. I think everyone thinks in a kind of short-term
way, especially now when a tweet has kind of a half-life of a few seconds, he explained.
But there are ideas that are powerful and true and just. They happen when the time
comes and when the leaders are there who are willing to have the courage to implement
them. Over the last eight years, Elsner said, the Obama administration worked hard for
a two-state solution and didnt achieve much progress because of Israeli and Palestinian
leaders who were unwilling to tackle some of the core issues. However, because public
opinion polls show that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians and American Jews sup-
port a two-state solution, Elsner said the idea is bigger than any political phase. We are
advocating for an idea which is a powerful one, he told the Post. Its based on justice
and its based on the values that we were brought up to believe in, and we are not about
to abandon it and neither are the millions of Israelis, Palestinians and others around
the world who believe in it, just because one individual has been elected for a term of
four years or because another individual might sit in the embassy wherever it is that he
chooses to sit. If the policy of the administration were to come out and say blatantly
We are forsaking the two-state solution, I think we would then have to grapple with
what comes in its place, he added. David Halperin of the Israel Policy Forum agreed
that it is premature to respond to any potential Trump policy on the Middle East before
a statement has been made or action taken, though he said the absence of the two-state
solution from Trumps statements so far and from the Republican Partys platform is
worrisome. It is, in general, concerning that Israel has become such an increasingly
blatantly partisan issue, Halperin said. The concept of a two-state solution, I think,
has been caught up in that partisanship, but I think its really too early to tell. We have
to see how policy will be advanced under Trump. Halpern and his colleagues at the
Israel Policy Forum were in Israel this week to develop and advance their new strategy,
adapted to the new dynamics in Washington. As an organization, weve come to a
conclusion that a resumption or a call for a resumption of negotiations at this time sim-
ply is not wise, given the deep distrust of the leadership on both sides, he explained.
Instead, we should be looking at what sort of things Israel can do in the near term to
improve its security and preserve the opportunity for a negotiated two-state solution in
the near future.
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6.18.3 Trump election has energized activism and support for a two-state
solution
Ziri, Danielle. Can The Two-State Solution Survive In The Age Of Trump?. The
Jerusalem Post. 26 Jan. 2017. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Halpern said he is confident two states will remain on the agenda, because he does not
believe there is a viable alternative that either people is not only willing to accept but
is interested in genuinely entertaining or that is workable. Regarding Friedman, both J
Street and the Israel Policy Forum pointed out that the ambassador will not be creating
policy, but rather carrying out Washingtons vision, which is still undetermined. Al-
though it may not be achieved anytime soon, Halperin said the two-state concept can be
preserved until the climate becomes favorable again for negotiations. The focus is less
on creating a two-state solution and more on creating a two-state reality, a two-state dy-
namic that ensures that Israels security can be maintained, Halperin explained. We
all recognize that its not in the cards in the near term, its really about preservation.
To achieve this, Halperin believes the Israel Policy Forum will need to project ideas
that have strong and credible Israeli support. We think that its really important that
if we want to keep the two-state goal on the agenda in the [US] Jewish community and
in Washington, we demonstrate that there are credible and serious security- minded Is-
raelis who are with us and who are fighting for that in Israel, he said. The Israel Policy
Forum, along with its partner Commanders for Israels Security, is expected to reveal
its new set of proposals for the region, titled Advancing Two- State Security in the
Age of Trump, at an event in New York City on February 13. Meanwhile, Elsner said
the new climate in Washington, seemingly unfavorable to the organizations core goals,
may actually present a great opportunity. Sometimes being in the opposition is what
energizes people, because they now see what is at stake and what is liable to be lost,
he said. The response of our members to the election of Trump and other people who
are not our members who are joining J Street has been electrifying, he continued. The
election was not a good election in terms of Hillary Clinton, but it wasnt a bad election
for J Street. Since November 8, he explained, its endorsements in the US Senate rose to
19 from 13, while December was a record- breaking month for J Streets general growth.
We no longer need to defend the actions of any particular administration or individual,
and we are liberated to speak our minds, to organize and to grow our influence and our
movement, and thats what we are going to do, he said. Its already started and its
already happening.
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6.18.4 Appointment of Friedman doesnt weaken administrations

commitment to two-state solution
Trump Aide: Israeli Envoy Pick Is Not A Rejection Of Two-State Solution. The Times
of Israel. 19 Dec. 2016. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Donald Trumps chief of staff said on Sunday that the president-elects pick of lawyer
David Friedman as the ambassador to Israel was not an indication that he rejects the
notion of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Theres going to be
things that individually people may believe in their hearts or in their mind, Priebus
said Sunday of Trumps nominees to top posts. But ultimately, its their job to repre-
sent the president-elect of the United States and his foreign policy. Over the course of
the presidential campaign, Friedman was outspoken on his belief that West Bank settle-
ment activity is not an obstacle to peace and that Israel does not face a demographic
threat to its Jewish character if it fails to separate from the Palestinians. The 57-year-
old bankruptcy attorney, a Hebrew-speaker, served along with Jason Dov Greenblatt
on Trumps Israel advisory committee during the campaign, becoming one of his main
representatives to the Jewish community and Jewish media.
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6.19 AT: Palestinian Government is the Obstacle
6.19.1 Israeli settlement-building is the real obstacle to progress on the

two-state solution front
A two-state solution is impossible with the presence of Israeli settlements. A sovereign

state must have control over its territory and natural resources, something impossible
with more than 200 illegal foreign settlements. Today, there are more than 600,000 ille-
gal Israeli settlers in the occupied state of Palestine. This includes East Jerusalem, our
capital and an integral part of the state of Palestine. Our demand for full sovereignty
in our territory is not directed against the Jewish people, as Israeli Prime Minister Ben-
jamin Netanyahus office has cynically portrayed, but against the illegality of a foreign
colonial enterprise. Neyanyahu, the prime minister of a country responsible for the de-
struction of hundreds of Palestinian Christian and Muslim villages and the ongoing pro-
cess of forcible displacement in occupied territory, has accused us of ethnic cleansing
for advocating to respect U.N. resolutions and international law that call upon Israel to
withdraw to the 1967 border.
6.19.2 Third party actors like the US has the potential to reconcile Palestine
to a two-state solution if Israel initiates the plan
Greene, Toby. Two-State Solution 2.0: New Israeli Thinking On The Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict. Fathom. N.p., 2016. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Third parties, including European governments, should engage constructively with any
proposal that offers the prospect of advancing towards a two-state reality, as long as it
is consistent with the possibility of a future permanent status agreement. In the case of
an Israeli unilateral separation move, enormous international support would be needed
to help ensure the Israeli public felt the benefits. A critical element in Ariel Sharon gar-
nering domestic support for the disengagement with Gaza was securing from President
Bush a letter which in effect recognised that the major settlement blocs would remain
part of Israel in a future agreement. This helped Sharon face down domestic critics
and show that Israel was not giving something for nothing. In a situation where the
Palestinians are unwilling or unable to reciprocate an Israeli move towards a two-state
reality, third parties, in particular the US and European states, have the potential to fill
that gap.
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6.20 AT: Borders
6.20.1 Borders can be fairly drawn to conform with international legitimacy

primarily based on the 1967 armistice lines
Kelman, Herbert C. A OneCountry/TwoState Solution To the IsraeliPalestinian

Conflict. Middle East Policy 18.1 (2011): 27-41.
Second, while details of the final agreement that reflects this historic compromise re-
main to be negotiated, the statement would affirm certain basic principles, dictated by
the logic of the historic compromise. These principles must be followed in resolving the
core issues, which engage each peoples national narrative, in order to enable each peo-
ple to maintain its national existence and express its national identity in its own state.
In particular, the statement might address the issues of borders, Jerusalem, settlements
and refugees along the following lines: The borders between the two states would be
drawn in a way that conforms with international legitimacy (as expressed in appropri-
ate UN resolutions) and establishes a Palestinian state (consisting of the West Bank and
Gaza) that meets the criteria of independence, viability, governability and contiguity
within the West Bank. To this end, the borders would follow the 1967 armistice lines,
with minor, mutually agreed-upon adjustments, based on an exchange of West Bank
territories that contain most of the Israeli settlers for Israeli territories of equal size and
value, and with a secure link between the West Bank and Gaza.
6.20.2 Well-developed and high-tech border security systems can ensure an

effective two-state solution
Goldenberg, Ilan, et al. A Security System for the Two-State Solution. (2016).
The border security system would include: Crossing points between Jordan and the
new Palestinian state that would be staffed by the PASF (on the Palestinian side) and
Jordanian security forces (JSF) (on the Jordanian side of a crossing) but would include
American monitors on the Palestinian side who are qualified to reinspect people or
cargo if Israel demands it. During the transition years, Israel would remain respon-
sible for overall security at the crossing points, though with only a low-visibility Israeli
presence that over time would transition to nonvisible and, if technology allows, even-
tually to electronic monitoring. A state-of-the-art traveler database shared by Israelis,
Palestinians, and Jordanians that would include watch lists, biometric data for positive
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identification, and other relevant information. A multilayered border trace security

system between Jordan and the new Palestinian state that would include aerostat-borne
monitoring systems; redundant physical barriers, sensors, and monitoring systems on
the border itself; and patrols conducted by Palestinian and American forces. Data
from the crossing points for personnel, baggage, and cargo, and data from the bor-
der trace security system. This data would feed into a joint border control center that
would have representatives from all relevant parties and into individual headquarters
elements in each relevant country. Many similar concepts that could also be applied
to the Egyptian border with Gaza, but these would have to be specifically designed and
tailored in the future once Gaza and the West Bank come under unified governance
that adheres to the Quartet conditions. Completion of the barrier along the agreed
lines of final borders between Israel and the new Palestinian state. Exceptional secu-
rity zones in sensitive areas, which would require additional zoning and/or monitoring
by security forces and limitations on construction to prevent possible attacks (e.g., on
the pathway into Ben Gurion International Airport). These zones would be combined
with anti-tunneling technology in order to prevent infiltration near the border. A 2-
kilometer security zone between Route 90 and the Jordan River, similar to the one that
exists now on the Jordanian side of the Jordan Valley, that would be symmetrically en-
forced on the Palestinian side.
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6.21 AT: AIPAC
6.21.1 AIPAC has come out in support of the two-state solution
AIPAC also officially supports the two-state solution. It does so because AIPAC bases its
argument for why America should support Israel on Israeli democracy. While groups
on the religious right, like Christians United for Israel, invoke biblical rationales for
backing the Jewish state, AIPAC knows that religious language would alienate many
Democrats, including many of AIPACs Democratic Jewish members. So it instead
claims that commitment to democracy, the rule of law, freedom of religion and speech
and human rights are all core values shared between the United States and Israel. That
becomes less convincing if Israel permanently controls millions of West Bank Palestini-
ans who lack citizenship, the right to vote, and free movement while living under mili-
tary law. So AIPAC insists that Israeli control of the West Bank is a temporary, regret-
table reality forced upon democracy-minded Israeli governments by Palestinian intran-
sigence.
6.21.2 There are a considerable amount of American Jewish groups that act
as a counterweight to the AIPAC, like J Street
Meyerson, Harold. Americas Growing Resolve For A Palestinian State. Washington

Post. 17 Jun. 2009. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
These numbers reflect changes in American Jewish life and thought that have been build-
ing for decades. At a broad level, the intense identification of American Jews with Is-
rael has been waning for many years. More narrowly, the past couple of decades have
brought the rise of American Jewish groups that try to pressure the U.S. government to
push for a two-state solution a clear counterweight to more established organizations
such as AIPAC that generally try to pressure the U.S. government to do whatever the Is-
raeli government would like it to do. The J Street PAC, an organization thats just three
years old, raises funds for members of Congress who back policies leading to a two-state
solution, much as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) encourages
its backers to donate to candidates who toe a more hawkish line.
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6.21.3 AIPAC influence is declining
Rosenberg, MJ. New Poll: AIPAC Influence Waning. The Huffington Post. 10 May
2014. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Ever since the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) lost its battle to pre-
vent negotiations with Iran by imposing new sanctions on Tehran, the media has been
reporting that the lobby is not the powerhouse in Washington that it once was. Now
a poll conducted by Zogby Analytics for Avaaz, a group that promotes democratic ac-
tivism world wide, provides the data that demonstrates that AIPACs decline is real
although it remains strong. The poll conducted Feb. 25-28, surveyed 165 Capitol Hill
staffers, journalists and other Washington officials, asking them about AIPACs influ-
ence and its reputation in general.The findings are not startling except when contrasted
to perceptions of AIPACs image prior to the past year. Here are a few of them: More in-
siders thought AIPACs influence is falling than rising. 40 percent think AIPAC is more
an ally of the Republican party in contrast to 18% who believe it is closer to Democrats.
(AIPAC itself says it is strictly nonpartisan.) 74 percent have seen Members of Congress
take a position on an issue that was not in the public interest as a result in full or in part,
because of AIPACs influence? More than 50 percent of those agreed with the statement:
AIPAC is the National Rifle Association (NRA) of U.S. Middle East Policy.
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6.22 AT: Israel Wont Cave
6.22.1 Historically, major US pressure has forced concessions from

Netanyahu
Knell, Yolande. Reconsidering The Two-State Solution - BBC News. BBC News. 21
Mar. 2013. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
Meanwhile, the construction of Israels barrier in and around the West Bank and the
expansion of settlements on occupied land make a Palestinian state less possible. On
Israels left and far right in particular, as well as among Palestinian activists, there is
renewed talk of a one-state solution. The Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas has
never officially dropped its claim to a single state in all of historic Palestine. Some
hawkish Israelis, meanwhile, also discuss another alternative: a three-state solution.
Under heavy US pressure, Israels Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a speech
in 2009, in which he first committed to a demilitarised Palestinian state. A year later,
peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians were revived but then quickly derailed
with the end of a partial freeze on Jewish settlement building. In recent months, Mr
Netanyahus government has announced plans to construct thousands of new settler
homes, including in the sensitive E1 area that would separate East Jerusalem from
the West Bank. If these go ahead, even the UN has said they would represent an al-
most fatal blow to the chance of a two-state solution.
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6.23 AT: Alternatives Solve
6.23.1 Natural paradigm shift will occur to a one-state solution absent

pressure for a two-state solution
Al-Dajani, Rafat. As Two-State Solution Dies, One-State Alternative Is Born. Na-

tional Catholic Reporter. 24 Jan. 2017. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
John Kerry, secretary of state for the Obama administration, has spoken hard truths to
Israel on this. Referring to the current Netanyahu government coalition as the most
right-wing in Israels history, Kerry warned that recent events are cementing a one-
state reality that most people do not actually want. Kerry added that if the one-state
reality becomes the default paradigm following the demise of the two-state solution,
Israel can either be Jewish or democratic, it cannot be both, and it wont ever really be
at peace. Kerry is right and his view has been echoed by Dennis Ross of the Washington
Institute For Near East Policy and Stuart Eizenstat, former ambassador to the European
Union, both hardly shrinking violets when it comes to their support for Israel. In a
Washington Post opinion they write that doing nothing is a prescription for drifting
toward a one-state outcome, a result that, due to demographics, would mean Israel over
time would become a binational state and no longer majority-Jewish and democratic.
6.23.2 One-state solution is comparatively worse than a two-state solution
Al-Dajani, Rafat. As Two-State Solution Dies, One-State Alternative Is Born. Na-

tional Catholic Reporter. 24 Jan. 2017. Web. 6 Feb. 2017.
The seemingly inevitable demise of the two-state solution paradigm will certainly not
lead to John Boltons fantasy of a modified Allon Plan, which is based on complete ig-
norance of the region and its dynamics. What it will lead to is what Kerry, Ross and
Eizenstat have warned will come. It will see Israels Jewish population become an even-
tual minority and would sharpen comparisons between the Israeli occupation and South
African apartheid. Calls for boycotts and divestment from Israel will increase and in-
tensify in the West, particularly Europe, as will Israels political isolation on the world
stage.
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6.23.3 A one-state solution would be a diplomatic nightmare
Gorenberg, Gershom. Israels Future: The Three Steps That Will Save It From Endless
Conflict And International Ostracism.. Slate. 9 Nov. 2011. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
[A] one-state arrangement would solve little and make many things worse. Imagine
that tomorrow Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip were reconstituted as the East-
ern Mediterranean Republic, and elections were held. With the current population, the
parliament would be split almost evenly between Jews and Palestinians. One of the
first issues that the parliament and judiciary would face is the settlements that Israel
built on privately owned Palestinian property, whether it was requisitioned, stolen, or
declared state land over Palestinian objections. Palestinian claimants would demand
return of their property. The problem of evacuating settlers wouldnt vanish. Rather,
it would divide the new state on communal lines. Likewise for refugees. Palestinian
legislators would demand that Israels Law of Return be extended to cover Palestini-
ans returning to their homeland. Jewish politicians would oppose the move, which
would reduce their community to a threatened minority. Palestinians would demand
the return of property lost in 1948 and perhaps the rebuilding of destroyed villages. Ex-
cept for the drawing of borders, virtually every question that bedevils Israeli-Palestinian
peace negotiations would become a domestic problem, setting the new political entity
aflame. Issues not at the center of todays diplomacy would also set the two commu-
nities at odds. Israel has a post-industrial Western economy; The West Bank and Gaza
are underdeveloped. Financing development in majority-Palestinian areas and bring-
ing Palestinians into Israels social-welfare network would require Jews to pay higher
taxes or receive fewer services. But the engine of the Israeli economy is high-tech, an
entirely portable industry. Both individuals and companies would leave, crippling the
new shared economy. Meanwhile, two nationalities who have desperately sought a
political frame for cultural and social independence would wrestle over control of lan-
guage, art, street names, and schools. Psychologically, it would be a country with two
resentful minorities and no majority. Even in the best case, the outcome would be the
continued existence of separate Jewish and Palestinian political parties. And even the
more liberal-leaning parties of each community would be hard-pressed to bridge the
divide to form stable coalitions. Israel would become a second Belgium, perpetually
incapable of forming a stable government. In the more likely case, the political tensions
would ignite as violence. The transition to a single state would mark a new stage in
the conflict. It would be a nightmare: another of the places marked on the globe as a
country, in which two or more communities do battle while the most educated or well-
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connected members of each look for refuge elsewhere.
6.23.4 One-state solution is undesirable for both Israel and Palestine
Friedlander, Libby. Is It Time To Move On To The One-State Solution?. +972 Maga-

zine. 13 Feb. 2011. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Although the one-state approach proposes a united entity between the Jordan and the
sea, in fact it represents King Solomons original proposal to cut the baby in half. In
reality, one state means that Israelis and Palestinians each receive a mutilated and un-
sustainable version of its national dream. The Palestinians will never get the national
self-determination they seek in a Jewish-dominated single state. Jews will achieve nei-
ther the democracy and inner harmony they seek (or ought to), nor legitimacy from
the world, as long as they obstruct Palestinian rights to national self-expression in their
single state even before Jews become a minority. Finally, this conflict is tragically
likely to ignite again over some damn foolish thing in the settlements (with apologies
to Bismark). A one-state solution not only fails to prevent settlements from ripping
into Palestinian land and courting violence, it legitimizes expansion since there is no
border.
6.23.5 A one-state solution is naive and would never work effectively
Halevi, Yossi. Only The Naive Or The Malicious Would Urge A Binational Israel. LA
Times. 10 Oct. 2003. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Think Yugoslavia, only worse. Thats what proponents of a binational, Arab-Jewish

state are really offering in their utopian vision of the Middle East. The notion that Pales-
tinians and Jews, who cant even negotiate a two-state solution, could coexist in one
happy state is so ludicrous that only the naive or the malicious would fall for it. But de-
spite this, the idea which periodically surfaced in the 20th century is again grow-
ing fashionable The refusal by Palestinian leaders to accept Israel in any borders is
the real reason for the ongoing conflict. Western proponents of a one-state solution
only justify and reinforce Arab intransigence and territorial greed. Those advocates of
Israels demise should ask themselves why Jewish nationhood, alone among all forms
of nationhood, is so problematic and distasteful. Is Israeli democracy, however flawed,
a greater moral blight to humanity than the more perfect autocracies that surround it?
Not that a binational state isnt a lovely dream. But if were already dreaming, then lets
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imagine a world without states. I would be happy to live in such a world. And thats
about as realistic a hope as imagining that Arafat will create a binational democratic
state in Palestine.
6.23.6 Majority of literature/studies suggest that two-state solution is the

best solution for both parties
Anthony, C. Ross, et al. The Costs of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Rand Corporation,
2015.
Other Important Noneconomic Factors- Multiple studies (including our own) have
demonstrated that the two-state solution is clearly the best solution for both parties,
and violence the worst. So why has the Israeli-Palestinian impasse endured? Either
the parties do not properly recognize the economic benefits of an agreement, or the
economic benefits of an agreement have not been and may not be high enough to out-
weigh the imputed costs of other factors associated with the present trends, including
the perceived costs of such intangible factors as distrust and fear of relinquishing some
degree of security.
6.23.7 Two-state solution is the best for US interests compared to a one-state

solution or a binational state
Stine, Scott F. The three possible solutions to the Israel-Palestinian conflict and their
impact on the achievement of US interests. Diss. Monterey, California. Naval Postgrad-
uate School, 2002.
The current political drift indicates that Israel and the Palestinians are heading toward
the unintended consequences of either a one-state solution or a bi-national state. Both
solutions would prohibit Israel from realizing its dream of normalization and prohibit
the achievement of a sustainable level of security. For the Palestinians, either solution
spells their further subjugation or expulsion from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Right
or wrong, the United States suffers guilt by association with Israel due to its strong
economic and military support for Israel. Thus, it is imperative to the achievement
of US interests in the Middle East that the United States takes the lead in building an
international coalition capable of imposing an immediate resolution to the problem. The
only solution capable of satisfying the best interests of all parties concerned is a two-state
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solution. The previous step-by-step approaches to peace have failed and the immediate
recognition of the state of Palestine is imperative to future stability in the region.
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6.24 AT: Security Assistance Bad
6.24.1 The US should increase security assistance to fully realize the

potential of the two-state solution
Casey, Keith A. Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Department of Defense Role in a Two-State

Solution. ARMY WAR COLLEGE CARLISLE BARRACKS PA, 2013.
Only after a final peace agreement is reached between Israel and a new Palestinian
State, can DoD establish an enduring ODC with a permanent training assistance compo-
nent. Or when the internal or external security threat to a partner nation is excessive, or
when the need exists for extensive and continual security cooperation, DoD can estab-
lish a more robust, permanent presence in the form of an Office of Military Cooperation
(OMC). An OMC for a Palestine state need not be as large as the 800-man U.S. Military
Training Mission Saudi Arabia or an OMC in 23 Kuwait.85 Nonetheless, DoD must be
prepared to maintain a sizeable security assistance presence in Palestine comparable to
the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. In conclusion, the Palestinian government and
society have a tremendously difficult journey ahead as they strive for full statehood.
Without a credible Palestinian Israeli peace process, Palestinians will be stuck in their
long and tenuous attempt to build a state while still under occupation.86 To stay the
course, they will require partners who are dedicated to providing the required assis-
tance needed. Only the U.S. has the means to organize and sustain the international
effort that will be required. Likewise, only DoD has the resources and expertise to en-
sure the permanence of the security assistance effort. However, the current effort will
not carry us through to a Two-State Solution. The opportunity exists now to set the
conditions for these future requirements and ensure that the U.S. is ready to respond
when needed.
6.24.2 Security assistance guarantees enhance US-Israel relations and allow

US to gain leverage in two-state solution talks
Kerry: US, Israel Can Make Progress On Two-State Solution In Coming Months. The
Times of Israel. 24 Sep. 2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Secretary of State John Kerry said Friday that Israel and the US could still make progress
toward the two-state solution to the Israeli Palestinian conflict in the coming months and
that Israel could work with Mideast allies to achieve more stability in the region. Speak-
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ing at a joint press conference before a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu in New York, Kerry said the US and Israel could use their friendship to ad-
vance (peace efforts), what we believe is not only in the highest priority for Israel to pro-
vide for its long-term security. Kerry said that there were things we believe we could
achieve in the next months, and there are serious concerns that we all have about the
security of the region, the need for stability, the need to protect the two-state solution.
The top US diplomat added that the US-Israel alliance could also help create a new re-
lationship within the region that can be powerful in reinforcing that long-term security
interest. Kerry and Netanyahu met a day after the Israeli PM gave his annual address
to the UN General Assembly in which he hailed developments on regional ties, called
on the Palestinian leadership to restart talks and invited Palestinian Authority President
Mahmoud Abbas to speak at the Knesset. This came a day after Netanyahu met with
Obama to thank him for last weeks signing of a $38 billion military aid deal to Israel
the largest single pledge to any country. Kerry on Friday praised the deal, known as the
Memorandum of Understanding, which he said provides for a long-term commitment
of security between the United States and Israel and is a remarkable statement about
the relationship between our countries.
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6.25 AT: US Support Meaningless
6.25.1 Trump administration has successfully pressured Israel to postpone

vote regarding annexation of West Bank settlements- proves US
pressure is effective
Israel Postpones Vote On Settlement Annexation Bill After Pressure From Trump.
Maan News Agency. 22 Jan. 2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
According to reports from Israeli media, a vote on a bill seeking to annex the occupied
West Bank settlement of Maale Adumim that was set to be voted on Sunday was post-
poned at the request of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, following pressure
from the administration of US President Donald Trump. Israels ultra-right Education
Minister Naftali Bennett has been keen to introduce the bill, with its introduction hav-
ing reportedly been delayed until Trumps inauguration, as the new American head of
state has come out as a vocal supporter of illegal Israeli settlements. However, Israeli
daily Haaretz reported Sunday morning that Netanyahu called Bennett on Friday and
asked him to postpone the bill after Trump advisers said that no unilateral steps should
be taken by Israel until a meeting is held between Netanyahu and Trump. While the
Maale Adumim bill was still expected to be discussed before Israels Ministerial Com-
mittee for Legislation on Sunday, Israeli news outlet Haaretz reported that the commit-
tee had decided not to vote on the bill on Sunday. The legislation reportedly would
be further discussed in Netanyahus weekly security cabinet meeting later Sunday af-
ternoon, when Netanyahu is also expected to present Israeli policy regarding the new
Trump administration.
6.25.2 Israel justifies settlement building and destruction of two-state

solution due to inconsistent pressure from the U.S.
Foreign Ministry: Israel Uses Absence Of U.S. Position To Destroy Two-State Solution.
Palestinian News & Info Agency. 29 Jan. 2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement on Monday that Israel is using the
absence of a U.S. position to continue settlement construction and destroy the two-state
solution. The ministry said as the U.S. President Donald Trump assumed office, the
Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu rushed to reveal the position of its ruling
extremist right wing towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while arrogantly express-
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ing Israels positions towards [the conflict] without any confusion or deception. It is
as if Israel is saying that it no longer needs its previous masks to hide its anti-peace po-
sitions; that reject the existence of a viable and sovereign Palestinian state living side by
side with the State of Israel based on the two-state solution, said the statement. The
Israeli positions undermine any international efforts to revive a serious and meaning-
ful negotiations, read the statement. The pillars of the ruling right wing in Israel and
the government of Israel with all of its institutions and departments embody this fact,
not only through declared statements and positions, but also through escalating occu-
pational and field aggression against the Palestinian existence.
6.25.3 Increases in US pressure applied to Israel can achieve meaningful

changes in their behavior
Walt, Stephen. Can The United States Put Pressure On Israel?: A Users Guide. For-
eign Policy. 10 Apr. 2009. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
The key point to grasp is that using U.S. leverage on both sidesand not just oneis not
an anti-Israel policy, if that is what it will take to make the two-state solution a reality.
It is in fact the best thing we could do for ourselves and for Israel itself. In effect, the
United States would be giving Israel a choice: it can end its self-defeating occupation
of Palestinian lands, actively work for a two-state solution, and thereby remain a cher-
ished American ally. Or it can continue to expand the occupation and face a progressive
loss of American support as well as the costly and corrupting burden of ruling millions
of Palestinians by force. Indeed, that is why manythough of course not allIsraelis
would probably welcome a more active and evenhanded U.S. role. It was former Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert who said if the two-state solution collapses, Israel will face a
South-Africa style struggle for political rights. And once that happens, he warned,
the state of Israel is finished. The editor of Haaretz, David Landau, conveyed much
the same sentiment last September when he told former Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice that the United States should rape Israel in order to force a solution. Landaus
phrase was shocking and offensive, but it underscored the sense of urgency felt within
some segments of the Israeli body politic. Indeed, I suspect it would not take much U.S.
pressure to produce the necessary shift in Israels attitudes. As the recent bipartisan
statement notes, most Israelis understand and appreciate that, at the end of the day,
what really matters most for Israels security is a relationship of trust, confidence, and
friendship with the U.S. If the United States believes that a two-state solution is the
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best option, then it will have to convey that this trust, confidence, and friendship can
be retained if Israel changes course, but cannot be taken for granted.
6.25.4 Increased US pressure can force Netanyahu to accept a two-state

solution
Abu Toameh, Khaled. ANALYSIS: WHY WAS PA REACTION TO NETANYAHUs

SPEECH SO HARSH?. Stand With Us. 16 Jun. 2009. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
The harsh response of the PA is the direct result of high hopes that its leaders have
pinned on the administration of US President Barack Obama. Reports about a loom-
ing crisis between the administration and Netanyahu over the future of the Middle
East peace process, combined with Obamas conciliatory approach toward the Arab
and Muslim worlds, created the impression in Ramallah that the Israeli government
had no choice but to accept all the Palestinian demands. Briefing reporters on the eve
of Netanyahus speech, some of PA President Mahmoud Abbass top aides predicted
that, in the wake of increased US pressure, Netanyahu would be forced to give in, freez-
ing settlement construction and accepting the two-state solution. Thats why most of
these aides expressed surprise when they heard the prime ministers uncompromising
position on most of the sticking issues. By completely rejecting Netanyahus offer of a
demilitarized state and his demand to recognize Israel as the homeland of the Jewish
people, the PA leadership has climbed a high tree from which it will find it difficult to
climb down.
6.26 AT: Economic Harms
6.26.1 A two-state solution is the best economic solution out of five

alternative trajectories
2015.
This study estimates the net costs and benefits over the next ten years of five alternative
trajectories a two-state solution, coordinated unilateral withdrawal, uncoordinated
unilateral withdrawal, nonviolent resistance, and violent uprising compared with
the costs and benefits of a continuing impasse that evolves in accordance with present
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trends. The analysis focuses on economic costs related to the conflict, including the eco-
nomic costs of security. In addition, intangible costs are briefly examined, and the costs
of each scenario to the international community have been calculated. The studys focus
emerged from an extensive scoping exercise designed to identify how RANDs objective,
fact-based approach might promote fruitful policy discussion. The overarching goal is
to give all parties comprehensive, reliable information about available choices and their
expected costs and consequences. Seven key findings were identified: A two-state so-
lution provides by far the best economic outcomes for both Israelis and Palestinians.
Israelis would gain over two times more than the Palestinians in absolute terms $123
billion versus $50 billion over ten years. But the Palestinians would gain more propor-
tionately, with average per capita income increasing by approximately 36 percent over
what it would have been in 2024, versus 5 percent for the average Israeli. A return to
violence would have profoundly negative economic consequences for both Palestinians
and Israelis; per capita gross domestic product would fall by 46 percent in the West Bank
and Gaza and by 10 percent in Israel by 2024. In most scenarios, the value of economic
opportunities gained or lost by both parties is much larger than expected changes in
direct costs. Unilateral withdrawal by Israel from the West Bank would impose large
economic costs on Israelis unless the international community shoulders a substantial
portion of the costs of relocating settlers. Intangible factors, such as each partys security
and sovereignty aspirations, are critical considerations in understanding and resolving
the impasse. Taking advantage of the economic opportunities of a two-state solution
would require substantial investments from the public and private sectors of the inter-
national community and from both parties.
6.26.2 US economic support needed to actualize the benefits of a two-state

solution
2015.
Realizing these benefits of a two-state solution will require significant support from
the international community, and the United States in particular. For Israel, the pri-
mary support from the international community will be the financing of the relocation
of 100,000 settlers, which is estimated to cost $30 billion. The international community
will also provide additional technology and funding to implement the variety of requi-
site warning systems discussed earlier and any agreed-to security guarantees. Though
the price tag for this cost is unknown, it could easily run into the billions of dollars.
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For Palestine, the greatest support required will be significant inflows of public and
private investment to realize the economic potential associated with the two-state solu-
tion. In addition to these new economic opportunities, we also assume that the return
of refugees would not reduce the per capita GDP of the Palestinian economy. Thus, the
10-percent expansion in the population (600,000 refugees) will be accompanied by a 10-
percent expansion in the size of the entire economy, or roughly $2.7 billion. Realizing
all these opportunities would yield a potential $9.7 billion increase in GDP, equivalent
to a 49-percent increase over present trends in 2024 GDP. The $6.4 billion in oppor-
tunity costs for this scenario, following a general rule, would require an approximate
152-percent increase in the size of the present trends 2024 capital stock.19 As the capital
stock under present trends would reach $39 billion in 2024, this implies that roughly
$58 billion in additional public and private investment will be required to achieve this
expansion of the economy.
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6.27 AT: Harms Security
6.27.1 Long-term security architecture stands to improve as a function of a

two-state solution
2015.
Even as many key elements of Israeli security would be degraded in the short to medium
term, others would be enhanced in a two-state solution scenario. Liaison relationships
with the Palestinian state would certainly improve, as would those with European mil-
itaries. Liaison relationships with Jordan and Egypt are already sound but could be
further improved if the issue of Palestinian independence were not a barrier to public
tolerance for cooperation with Israel, although public opinion in these countries will
likely remain fairly negative toward Israel. Relations with the United States would cer-
tainly be enhanced in ways that benefited Israels security needs, in addition to ensuring
continued U.S. diplomatic support for Israel in a wide variety of settings. Relations with
Europe and the Arab world would improve, increasing trade between countries.
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6.28 AT: Increases Antagonism
6.28.1 No evidence indicates that extended, systematic violence would

continue under a two-state solution
Taterov, Eva, and Samuel Antwi Darkwah. Is Israeli-Palestinian Conflict a Clash

of Civilization? Samuel P. Huntingtons Theory Challenged. REXTER: Politicko-
Sociolick Casopis 12.2 (2014).
The core of the dispute is the problem of dividing the territory of historic Palestine be-
tween the Jews and the Arabs. If the two-state solution prevails in the end, there is no
empirical evidence forecasting that the war between these two states would continue
since they belong to different civilizations. Israels relations with Egypt and Jordan also
had their ups and down in the second half of the 20th century but after the peace agree-
ments were reached, there seems to be enduring peace between these countries. These
prevailing relations can sometimes be characterized as relatively cold, but certainly not
very hostile. This is not the only historical example in this world as France and Germany
experienced the same situation in the period from the late 19th century to the first half
of 20th century. The situation improved after the Second World War when both coun-
tries became members of the European Economic Community presently the European
Union. In this sense, there is a hope that a similar process could also work for Israel and
the Palestinians.
186
6 Con Cards
6.29 AT: Status Quo Ineffective
6.29.1 The status quo is affirmative ground- the US has not been
consistently pressuring Israel, but instead using carrot measures
rather than stick measures
Duss, Matthew. How To Pressure Israel To Make Peace. Slate Magazine. 24 Mar.
2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
This isnt to suggest that the United States will suddenly throw its support behind Pales-
tinian U.N. initiatives, but there are a number of other options for applying pressure
on Israel. They could include crafting a U.N. Security Council resolution laying out
clear terms of reference for future negotiations, something the Palestinians have long
sought, and which Obama himself articulated, to Netanyahus dismay, in his May 2011
speech at the State Department. The United States could go further, setting out a spe-
cific set of parameters laying out the official U.S. view of a final disposition of the key
final status issuesborders, security, refugees, and Jerusalem. The United States could
simply choose to abstain from a new U.N. Security Council resolution declaring Israeli
settlements illegal (which remains the official position of the U.S. government, though
illegitimate has been the term used since the 1980s) rather than vetoing, as it did in
February 2011. While a settlements resolution might seem less drastic at first glance
than one laying out a broader set of parameters, it could actually be a more potent tool
of pressure on the Israelis. A fresh U.N. Security Council resolution could serve as Ex-
hibit A in the Palestinians case against settlements at the International Criminal Court.
Again, none of these measures alone would resolve the issue. But they would represent
the United States playing a more active and genuine role as facilitator in addressing the
radical power disparities between the two negotiating parties, and the recognition that,
as in any negotiation, incentives to change course must be coupled with disincentives
for not doing so. Carrots alone dont work. You need some sticks. And up until now,
its basically been all carrots for Israel. I know what America is, Netanyahu said in
the 2001 video. America is a thing you can move very easily. This is what hes still
banking on, because up until this point, he has been correct. Lets hope hes wrong now.
6.29.2 Theres a lot more the US could do to pressure Israel
Walt, Stephen. Can The United States Put Pressure On Israel?: A Users Guide. For-
eign Policy. 10 Apr. 2009. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
187
6 Con Cards
But what about pressure on Israel? The United States has only rarely put (mild) pressure
on Israel in recent decades (and never for very long), even when the Israeli government
was engaged in actions (such as building settlements) that the U.S. government opposed.
The question is: if the Netanyahu/Lieberman government remains intransigent, what
should Obama do? Are there usable sources of leverage that the United States could
employ to nudge Israel away from the vision of Greater Israel and towards a genuine
two-state solution? Here are a few ideas. 1. Cut the aid package? If you add it all up,
Israel gets over $3 billion in U.S. economic and military aid each year, which works out
to about $500 per Israeli citizen. Theres a lot of potential leverage here, but its probably
not the best stick to use, at least not at first. Trying to trim or cut the aid package will
trigger an open and undoubtedly ugly confrontation in Congress (where the influence
of AIPAC and other hard-line groups in the Israel lobby is greatest). So thats not where
Id start. Instead, Id consider a few other options, such as: 2. Change the Rhetoric. The
Obama administration could begin by using different language to describe certain Is-
raeli policies. While reaffirming Americas commitment to Israels existence as a Jewish-
majority state, it could stop referring to settlement construction as unhelpful, a word
that makes U.S. diplomats sound timid and mealy-mouthed. Instead, we could start
describing the settlements as illegal or as violations of international law. The UN
Charter forbids acquisition of territory by force and the Fourth Geneva Convention bars
states from transfering their populations (even if voluntarily) to areas under belligerent
occupation. This is why earlier U.S. administrations described the settlements as illegal,
and why the rest of the world has long regarded them in the same way. U.S. officials
could even describe Israels occupation as contrary to democracy, unwise, cruel,
or unjust. Altering the rhetoric would send a clear signal to the Israeli government
and its citizens that their governments opposition to a two-state solution was jeopardiz-
ing the special relationship. 3. Support a U.N. Resolution Condemning the Occupation.
Since 1972, the United States has vetoed forty-three U.N. Security Council resolutions
that were critical of Israel (a number greater than the sum of all vetoes cast by the other
permanent members). If the Obama administration wanted to send a clear signal that
it was unhappy with Israels actions, it could sponsor a resolution condemning the oc-
cupation and calling for a two-state solution. Taking an active role in drafting such
a measure would also ensure that it said exactly what we wanted, and avoided criti-
cisms that we didnt want included. 4. Downgrade existing arrangements for strate-
gic cooperation. There are now a number of institutionalized arrangements for secu-
rity cooperation between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces and between U.S.
and Israeli intelligence. The Obama administration could postpone or suspend some
188
6 Con Cards
of these meetings, or start sending lower-grade representatives to them. There is in

fact a precedent for this step: after negotiating the original agreements for a strategic
partnership, the Reagan administration suspended them following Israels invasion of
Lebanon in 1982. Today, such a step would surely get the attention of Israels security
establishment. 5. Reduce U.S. purchases of Israeli military equipment. In addition to
providing Israel with military assistance (some of which is then used to purchase U.S.
arms), the Pentagon also buys millions of dollars of weaponry and other services from
Israels own defense industry. Obama could instruct Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
to slow or decrease these purchases, which would send an unmistakable signal that it
was no longer business-as-usual. Given the battering Israels economy has taken in
the current global recession, this step would get noticed too. 6. Get tough with private
organizations that support settlement activity. As David Ignatius recently noted in the
Washington Post, many private donations to charitable organizations operating in Is-
rael are tax-deductible in the United States, including private donations that support
settlement activity. This makes no sense: it means the American taxpayer is indirectly
subsidizing activities that are contrary to stated U.S. policy and that actually threaten Is-
raels long-term future. Just as the United States has gone after charitable contributions
flowing to terrorist organizations, the U.S. Treasury could crack down on charitable or-
ganizations (including those of some prominent Christian Zionists) that are supporting
these illegal activities. 7. Place more limits on U.S. loan guarantees. The United States
has provided billions of dollars of loan guarantees to Israel on several occasions, which
enabled Israel to borrow money from commercial banks at lower interest rates. Back in
1992, the first Bush administration held up nearly $10 billion in guarantees until Israel
agreed to halt settlement construction and attend the Madrid peace conference, and the
dispute helped undermine the hard-line Likud government of Yitzhak Shamir and bring
Yitzhak Rabin to power, which in turn made the historic Oslo Agreement possible. 8.
Encourage other U.S. allies to use their influence too. In the past, the United States has
often pressed other states to upgrade their own ties with Israel. If pressure is needed,
however, the United States could try a different tack. For example, we could quietly
encourage the EU not to upgrade its relations with Israel until it had agreed to end the
occupation.
189
6 Con Cards
6.30 AT: Two-State Solution Infeasible
6.30.1 The reason as to why prospects for a two-state solution are

diminishing is because of an administration that will not apply
pressure to Israel
Duss, Matthew. This Is How The Two-State Solution Dies. New Republic. 22 Dec.
2017. Web. 7 Feb. 2017.
Liberal groups J Street and Americans for Peace Now have come out against Friedman,
while right-wing organizations like the Zionist Organization of America and the Re-
publican Jewish Coalition have praised him. But two of the largest and most influen-
tial groups on Israel, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the
Anti-Defamation League (ADL), have respectively remained silent or aggressively neu-
tral. While this can be partially explained by their desire to maintain access to a Trump
White House, one doubts either group would be so reticent if a president had nominated
an ambassador who rejected Israels right to exist, as Friedman does Palestines. Thus,
in nominating Friedman, Trump has done again what he did throughout the election
on a range of issues: laid bare a set of views just below the surface of American politics.
AIPAC and the ADLs non-response on Friedman demonstrates that a considerable por-
tion of the pro-Israel establishment doesnt really prioritize a two-state solution; they
see it mainly as a tool to deflect any political pressure on Israel, the argument being that
such pressure could undermine negotiations. But when you have no negotiations, and
an incoming administration that has no intention of applying pressure, the two-state
solution becomes less valuable as a talking point.
190

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Resolved: The United States should no longer pressure Israel

to work toward a two-state solution.

March 2017 PF Brief*

2 Topic Analysis by Abraham Fraifeld 14

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins 31

5.9 AT: Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

5.15.2 Ending support for a two-state solution opens up further foreign

6 Con Cards 114

6.20.2 Well-developed and high-tech border security systems can ensure

6.26 AT: Economic Harms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

The quality of instruction at VBI is unparalleled. More than just an invalu-

VBI is a perfect mix of enjoyment and helpfulness, and Im really thankful

VBI has definitely been an enlightening experience. Out of my three years

VBI Philadelphia (Swarthmore College) July 1st through July 14th

VBI Los Angeles: Session I (Loyola Marymount University, Flagship Three-Week

With best wishes,

Jake Nebel and Chris Theis, Executive Directors

Abraham Fraifeld, Public Forum Director

Emboldened by Trumps recent signaling toward Israel, which has included

2.2 Definitions and Framing

2.2.1 A kind of longwinded discussion on ground parsing

Resolution: I no longer want to eat meat.

1. If I eat meat and affirm, I adopt a different diet.

4. If Im a vegetarian and I negate, I adopt a different diet.

If I am an omnivore, negating means I continue with the status quo. By contrast, if Im

Resolution: US should no longer pressure Israel

Whats pressure? Generally, pressure in diplomatic negotiations is anything that re-

3. Carrot-and-Stick pressure: One party creates leverage and dangles it to achieve

1. Speeches and Statements

The White House warned Israel on Thursday in a surprising statement

As president-elect, Trump was asked by Israel Hayom, the Hebrew-

This is mounting pressureat least for the next six days.

3. UN Statements Resolution Action

2.2.3 Two Tricky Framework/Overview Options

Taking Advantage of Vagueness in the Mandate

David Keyes, Netanyahus spokesman told the Associated Press,

Netanyahu himself said in 2013,

[P]eace is premised on mutual recognition, of two states for two peoples,

The Long View

2.3 Affirmative Arguments

This is an argument mostly from an article in Foreign Affairs.6 Foreign Affairs,

And this could lead to a two state solution,

2.3.2 The two state solution is impossible or undesirable

Those who continue to portray a two-state solution as a possibility are - in-

Frida Ghitis of CNN argues,

The impulse among that younger demographic is realistic. At a recent meet-

2.4 Negative Arguments

2.4.1 Alternatives Are Not Viable

Maintaining the status quo is not viable.

The one state solution is impossible.

Many left-wing Palestinian academics and activists, and some far-left-wing

2.4.2 Pressure prevents heel-digging

Pressure works, particularly when civil society is targeted.

Tony Karon of Time Magazine argued,

the requisite compromises. Believing that a two-state solution is in the best

3.0.1 Overview of Two State Solution

The two-state solution would establish an independent Palestinian state

3.0.2 Two state solution wont happen without U.S. pressure

This was taken by Israel as tacit American approval of Israels intention to

In the wake of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus declaration that

Need pressure instead of unconditional support to get Israel to change policies

Several difficulties that may be impossible for U.S. pressure to overcome

1. Borders: There is no consensus about precisely where to draw the line.

Netanyahu often dismisses important issues and panders to fear