Senate Hearing, 108TH Congress - Nasa: Human Space Flight

S. HRG.
108837
NASA: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND

SPACE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
APRIL 2, 2003
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman

TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
GORDON SMITH, Oregon RON WYDEN, Oregon
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BILL NELSON, Florida
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
ROBERT W. CHAMBERLIN, Republican Chief Counsel
KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
GREGG ELIAS, Democratic General Counsel
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
CONRAD BURNS, Montana JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada RON WYDEN, Oregon
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
(II)
CONTENTS
Page
Hearing held on April 2, 2003 ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Senator Breaux ................................................................................. 3
Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3
Statement of Senator Brownback ........................................................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 40
WITNESSES
Chase, Brian E., Executive Director, National Space Society ............................. 14
Roland, Alex, Professor of History, Duke University ........................................... 18
Article from Discover, dated November 1985, entitled The Shuttle, Tri-
umph or Turkey? ........................................................................................... 21
Smith, Marcia S., Resources, Science and Industry Division, Congressional
Research Service .................................................................................................. 4
(III)
NASA: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2003
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE,
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room
SR253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator BROWNBACK. The hearing will come to order.
Thank you all for joining us today. I think well be joined by
some other members a little bit later on. Theres a briefing going
on right now by Secretary Rumsfeld that a number of people have
gone over to, and I certainly dont blame them. I was tempted, my-
self, to postpone the hearing for an hours period of time, but find-
ing an hour during the day is just tough to find. I decided to go
ahead and go forward with the hearing. I would anticipate well
probably be joined by some other members here a little bit later on.
America has consistently proven her leadership in space science
and technology. Predominance of America in space came from the
charge set forth by President Kennedy to land a man on the moon
and return him safely to earth. The technological advances made
during the Apollo era were a result of the U.S. space program
pushing forward in human space exploration. Today, I hope to take
a look back briefly at the recent history of human space explo-
ration, specifically the Space Shuttle, as well as a look forward at
what the vision of NASA should be.
This is going to be one of a number of hearings that I anticipate
well do in this Subcommittee looking at the future of NASA. Mov-
ing towards a reauthorization bill for NASA hasnt been done for
now some 10 years. Through these hearings I hope to mold to-
gether an effective effort to move forward a reauthorization bill for
NASA.
Recently, the Shuttle has been a topic of many discussions and
debates in the wake of the Columbia Shuttle disaster. As these de-
bates continue, I hope well be able to add to that discussion today.
In the wake of the Columbia tragedy and the decision to not re-
place Columbia, we must take a close look at our efforts in devel-
oping the next launch vehicle for NASA. It is imperative that we
make our way to space and do so as quickly and as safely as pos-
sible. As tempting as it is to accelerate the process of developing
(1)
2
our next launch vehicle, we must do so as safely as we possibly

can.
I cannot say right now whether more money is the answer to the
problems NASA has encountered in their quest for a new launch
vehicle. I fully intend to look at the budget of NASA and determine
where they are hurting, where they are operating successfully, and
where they are involved with projects that could be better accom-
plished by another agency or by the private sector. I certainly hope
that today we can bring to light some of the issues behind the fu-
ture of human space flight and help determine where NASA needs
to go.
When President Kennedy challenged America to send a man to
the moon and return him safely to earth by the end of the decade,
NASA was sent on a mission in which the only option for the out-
come was success. It seems it is going to take that same kind of
dedication and determination to successfully accomplish the next
step in human space exploration.
The future of the space program is also contingent upon the role
that private businesses play in the process. As the government
looks at ways to save costs, NASA will have to rely more heavily
on private investment and commitments. Spurring competition
within the private sector could reduce the pressure on NASA to ac-
complish everything in space. For example, Trans Orbital, a Cali-
fornia company, is working on the first commercial project to the
moon. Theyre calling it the Trailblazer. It is exactly what this
country needs right now, someone or something to blaze the trails
between the earth and the stars in human exploration.
Currently, NASA and Russia are the only countries successfully
launching humans into space. We are continually hearing com-
ments by the Chinese and reports that, as early as October, they,
too, will be launching its first astronaut into space. If China does
become the third space-faring nation, we are faced with a more
complicated and urgent matter here in America.
Today, I hope to learn more about how NASA came to the deci-
sion of using the Shuttle and if the Shuttle is the best means of
space transportation for the future. Additionally, Id like our wit-
nesses to comment on the role of human space exploration and the
overall goals of NASA. Just a few weeks ago, members of NASAs
Advisory Council announced their concerns that NASAs decision to
build an orbital space plane lacks vision. I hope that today we can
help determine what a vision for human space flight in the U.S.
should look like and bring focus where we are currently lacking.
In the days immediately following the Columbia tragedy, I stated
that we needed to step back and take a close look at where NASA
has been, where they are currently, and where they need to go in
the future. Thats exactly what well be discussing today.
Marcia Smith, with the Congressional Research Service, will talk
with us about the fundamental question of, how did we get here.
That is, how did the U.S. get to the current point of using the
Space Shuttle as our means of transportation to and from space.
I welcome her to the Committee and her years of expertise in
studying this issue.
Mr. Brian Chase, with the National Space Society, will discuss
access to space and human space flight initiatives related to new
3
space transportation systems. Mr. Chase will lay out access to

space as the most critical part of any space exploration effort. This
is something that the founders of this organization, Dr. Von Braun,
would agree with.
And, finally, well hear from Dr. Alex Roland, a former NASA
historian and current professor at Duke University. Dr. Roland will
discuss the flaws of the current space program and present his rec-
ommendations on how NASA should proceed with space explo-
ration.
We look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses in this first
hearing.
Before we go there, Id like to turn to my colleague from Lou-
isiana, where I guess KU will be going, but Duke wont. I dont
mean to rub it in, Dr. Roland. But to New Orleans on Saturday,
were excited about that. We normally lose to Duke, but we finally
got over it this time.
[Laughter.]
Senator BREAUX. Sure. Well, we welcome you to New Orleans,
and the team, and wish you the very best. Its going to be a great
event.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator BREAUX. I thank you for having this hearing. I think its
timely, and its important. Hopefully, it will be very informative. I
think this country is, indeed, at the crossroads of where were going
to be in the future with regard to exploration of space.
There are many who look at the Space Shuttles recent disaster
as a reason to call for the termination of space exploration. I think
that is not a correct conclusion, I think that we obviously need to
find out what went wrong. I think NASA and the independent
board are looking at that, will find out what happened, and take
the necessary steps to correct it.
We will explore space because it is there and because we learn
a lot and develop new technology from those efforts, which benefit
all of us in ways that we could only dream of a couple of genera-
tions ago.
I do think that its important to have this opportunity to assess
where we are, where were going to be, and what needs to be done.
I have no doubt that all the workers and the thousands of employ-
ees and contractors that are all part of what we call space explo-
ration will continue to do a remarkable job.
I look forward to the witnesses testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Breaux follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX, U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Mr. Chairman, as Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology,
and Space, I look forward to working with you this Congress, particularly as the
Subcommittee examines issues related to the Space Shuttle Columbia tragedy,
NASA, and the future of space flight.
Today, we are at a critical juncture for manned space flight, and perhaps a turn-
ing point in its history. I am a strong supporter of human space flight and of the
thousands of workers who enable it. Their efforts have taken us to the very edge
of what was dreamed possible forty years ago, and to the doorstep of a new era of
exploration and development. I have no doubt that the United States will continue
to send people to space. However, we must do so with a full acknowledgment of the
4
risks, a commitment to continue to minimize those risks, and a vision for what hu-
mans can and should aim to accomplish in space.
The discussion about the future of space which we are beginning today will not
come to focus solely on Columbia and its loss. The future of the Space Shuttle has
broad implications for the International Space Stationa program in which the
United States and its International partners have already made a significant invest-
ment. Without the Shuttle, it will be difficult to keep the Station fully supplied and
further construction will be halted.
We see and applaud NASAs actions to recover the space agenda. Even as the Co-
lumbia Accident Investigation Board continues its work on the causes of the acci-
dent, NASA has begun to plan for the Shuttles return to flight. And there are dis-
cussions underway among the international partners, too, on the use and servicing
of the Space Station for the foreseeable future. We judge these to be prudent and
necessary actions. In addition, and now in parallel to the Columbia investigation,
last fall NASA instituted a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) plan to assure
the long term future of the Space Shuttle. This newly implemented annual planning
process culminated in a SLEP summit a few weeks ago at which NASA and its
human spaceflight stakeholders identified a series of proposed initiatives that they
deemed necessary to ensure the Shuttles ability to effectively support the Inter-
national Space Station. Finally, this team of senior NASA and industry managers
also defined the criteria to be used by the NASA leadership to evaluate the proposed
programs and make investment decisions and recommendations necessary to assure
the long term viability of the Shuttle.
When the results of the investigation are known, NASA will make any modifica-
tions needed to make the Shuttle safer and will consider how it will proceed to com-
plete the assembly and support the crew and logistics needs of the International
Space Station. In the mean time, the Agency will need to retain the critical skills
of the current Shuttle and Space Station workforces, both inside and outside the
agency. For thirty years, these workers have been a critical part of NASAs suc-
cesses, and they will be needed for the continued success of the human space flight
program.
In addition, we must begin planning for a time beyond the current era of the
Space Shuttle and Space Station. Although the answer to the question, Why fly hu-
mans in space? may have required no better response than, Because it is there,
the loss of Columbia chastens each of us to ask the harder questions before us: At
what risk, towards what ends, and in what time frame can we do it safely and se-
curely. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for convening this first of many discussions this
Committee will have on this subject over the coming year, and I hope that todays
discussion can begin to lay out the agenda we need to pursue in examining these
questions.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Breaux.

First will be Ms. Marcia Smith, specialist in aerospace tech-
nology policy from the Congressional Research Service. The floor is
yours. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF MARCIA S. SMITH, RESOURCES, SCIENCE AND

INDUSTRY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, Senator Breaux, thank you for invit-
ing me here today to discuss the history of the human space flight
program in the context of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident. I
ask that my written statement be made part of the record.
Senator BROWNBACK. Without objection.
Ms. SMITH. You asked that I address the fundamental question
of how did we get here. The answer has two components. Why does
the United States have a human space flight program? And why
did we decide to build the Space Shuttle?
Senator BROWNBACK. Ms. Smith, pull that microphone up a little
closer to you, if you would. Thanks.
Ms. SMITH. The dream of people journeying into space has been
the lore of science fiction for centuries. By the time Sputnik 1 ush-
5
ered in the space age in 1957, a cadre of enthusiasts was ready to

make such dreams a reality.
Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in
1958, creating NASA and establishing as one objective the preser-
vation of the role of the United States as a leader in . . . space
science and technology.
In 1959, NASA selected the first group of astronauts, the Mer-
cury 7. Two years later, the first human orbited the earth.
But it was not one of the Mercury 7; instead it was a Soviet cos-
monaut, Yuri Gagarin. Gagarins flight added new impetus to the
U.S. program. Americas leadership in space science and tech-
nology, its international prestige, and, many believed, its national
security, were at stake.
Three weeks later, Alan Shepard became the first American in
space, but it was a suborbital flight. The United States did not
match Gagarins feat until 10 months later, when John Glenn be-
came the first American in orbit.
The risks were high in those early flights, yet the Nation was
willing to accept those risks, and pay the costs, to ensure American
preeminence. Indeed, only 3 weeks after Alan Shepards flight,
President Kennedy called on the nation to commit itself to the goal
of landing a man on the moon by the end of the decade, and the
Nation said yes. Although the space program has changed in many
ways since then, human space flight as an indicator of techno-
logical preeminence appears to remain a strong factor in its sup-
port.
And there are other reasons. President George H. W. Bush, the
first President Bush, may have articulated them best in July 1989,
when, on the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo lunar landing, he
announced a commitment to returning humans to the moon and
going on to Mars. He said, Why the moon? Why Mars? Because
it is humanitys destiny to strive, to seek, to find, and because it
is Americas destiny to lead.
That is not to say that human space flight is without con-
troversy. The debate over the need to send humans into space is
as old as the space program itself. And over the past 42 years, little
progress seems to have been made in bridging the divide between
those who believe human space flight is essential, and those who
believe it is a waste of money and an unnecessary risk to human
life. Since your other witnesses here this afternoon are going de-
bate that topic, I will not.
Suffice it to say that, to date, the United States and other coun-
tries have decided that human space flight is worth the costs and
the risks. Representatives of 31 countries have traveled into space
over the past 42 years on American and Russian spacecraft. And
later this year, China is expected to launch its own astronaut into
space for the first time.
The next question is, why the Shuttle?
As 1969 dawned and the first Apollo lunar landing neared, Presi-
dent Nixon took office and faced the question of what goals should
guide the space program in the post-Apollo years. He established
a Space Task Group chaired by Vice President Agnew that devel-
oped a plan to build a space station, a reusable space transpor-
tation system to service it, and to send humans to Mars.
6
But after America won the moon race, support for expensive
human space missions waned. NASA found that it had to pick just
one of those new projects. It chose the reusable space transpor-
tation systemthe Space Shuttle. One goal of the Shuttle program
was to significantly reduce the cost of launching people and cargo
into space.
The reusable Space Shuttle was intended to replace all other
U.S. launch vehicles, so-called expendable launch vehicles that
can only be used once. By transferring all space traffic to the Shut-
tle, NASA projected that the Shuttles development and operations
costs would be amortized over a large number of launches, 48 per
year, with resulting cost efficiencies.
Senator BROWNBACK. How many per year?
Ms. SMITH. Forty eight.
Senator BROWNBACK. Per year?
Ms. SMITH. Per year.
Dr. ROLAND. At one time, they said 60.
Ms. SMITH. That premise has not held true, however. The costs
were higher, and the flight rate lower. Today, many point to the
Shuttle as a technical success but an economic failure.
NASA has initiated several attempts to develop successors to the
Shuttle, with the continued goal of reducing costs. Each attempt
has failed in turn, in large part because anticipated technological
advances did not materialize. Late last year, NASA announced that
it would continue operating the Shuttle until at least 2015 and per-
haps 2020 or longer. Despite the Columbia tragedy, NASA officials
have made clear that plan is unchanged.
Congress is now again assessing the costs and benefits of human
space flight. Based on past experience, many expect that the deci-
sion will be made to continue the human space flight program es-
sentially unchanged once the cause of the Columbia accident is de-
termined and fixed; but there are a number of options to consider,
from returning the Shuttle to flight as soon as possible to termi-
nating the human space flight program entirely. I summarize those
options in my written statement and would be happy to discuss
them with you if you wish.
Thank you, and Id be happy to answer any questions that you
have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARCIA S. SMITH, RESOURCES, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY

DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here
today to discuss the history of the human space flight program in the context of the
Space Shuttle Columbia accident. You asked that I address the fundamental ques-
tion of How did we get here? The answer has two components: Why does the
United States have a human space flight program, and why did we decide to build
the Space Shuttle? These are complex issues and my brief statement cannot do
them justice. But I will try to provide an overview of some of the factors that shaped
those decisions in the past, and summarize options as you reassess those decisions
for the future.
Why Human Space Flight?
The dream of people journeying into space was the lore of science fiction for cen-
turies. By the time Sputnik 1 ushered in the Space Age on October 4, 1957, a cadre
of enthusiasts was ready to make such dreams a reality.
7
Congress passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in July 1958, creating
NASA and establishing as one objective the preservation of the role of the United
States as a leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the ap-
plication thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and outside the atmos-
phere. NASA opened its doors on October 1, 1958, and 6 months later the first
group of astronautsthe Mercury 7was selected.
Two years later, on April 12, 1961, the first human orbited the Earth. But it was
not one of the Mercury 7. Instead, it was a Soviet cosmonaut, Yuri Gagarin.
Gagarins flight added new impetus to the U.S. program. Americas leadership in
space science and technology, its international prestige, and, many believed, its na-
tional security, were at stake. Three weeks later, Alan Shepherd became the first
American in space, but it was a suborbital flight. The United States did not match
Gagarins feat until 10 months later, when John Glenn became the first American
in orbit.
The risks were high in those early flights. We had little experience with launching
rockets into space, and with the spacecraft that protected the astronauts. Yet the
nation was willing to accept those risks, and pay the cost, to ensure American pre-
eminence. Indeed, only three weeks after Alan Shepards flight, President Kennedy
called on the nation to commit to the goal of landing a man on the Moon by the
end of the decade, and the nation said yes. Although the space program has changed
in many ways over the past four decades, human space flight as an indicator of
technological preeminence appears to remain a strong factor.
Human space flight is risky. It has claimed the lives of 17 American astronauts
and four Russian cosmonauts in spaceflight-related accidents so far. 1 While this is
a relatively small percentage of the more than 400 people who have made space
journeys, their loss is felt deeply. Human space flight also is quite expensive. NASA
will spend about $6 billion on the Space Shuttle and Space Station programs in this
fiscal year. Yet we persevere. President George H.W. Bush articulated what many
consider a guiding impetus. In July 1989, on the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo
lunar landing, he stood on the steps of the National Air and Space Museum and
announced a commitment to returning humans to the Moon, and going on to Mars.
He said:
Why the Moon? Why Mars? Because it is humanitys destiny to strive, to seek,
to find, and because it is Americas destiny to lead.
That is not to say that human space flight is without controversy. The debate over
the need to send humans into space is as old as the space program itself. Over the
past 42 years, little progress seems to have been made in bridging the divide be-
tween those who believe human space flight is essential, and those who believe it
is a waste of money and an unnecessary risk to human life. The Senate Committee
on Aeronautical and Space Sciencesthe predecessor to this Subcommitteeheld
hearings on that debate forty years ago, and little has changed. I know your other
witnesses today will resume that dialogue, so I will not devote much of my state-
ment to it. Briefly, critics of human space flight believe that robotic probes can gath-
er the needed scientific data at much less cost, and that humans contribute little
to space-based scientific research. They point out that no ground-breaking scientific
discoveries have emerged from 42 years of human space flight that can be uniquely
attributed to the presence of humans in space. Proponents insist that human inge-
nuity and adaptability are essential for some types of basic research in space, and
can rescue an otherwise doomed mission by recognizing and correcting problems be-
fore they lead to failures. While proponents point to the value of spin-off tech-
nologies that were developed for human space flight but found broader application
in medicine or other fields, critics argue that those technologies probably would
have been developed in any case. Past economic studies that attempted to quantify
the value of spin-offs were criticized because of their methodologies, and critics sug-
gest that investing federal monies in non-space areas might have yielded equally
valuable spin-offs or led directly to new scientific knowledge or technologies. The
two sides of this debate have been, and remain, quite polarized. To date, the United
States and other countries have decided in favor of human space flight, despite its
risks and costs.
1 The 17 American astronaut spaceflight-related fatalities counted here include the three Apol-
lo 204 astronauts who were killed in a pre-launch test in 1967. Some sources exclude these as-
tronauts because they were not killed in an actual spaceflight. The table at the end of this state-
ment provides more information on the space tragedies that ended in death: the 1967 Apollo
fire (3 deaths), the 1967 Soyuz 1 mission (one), the 1971 Soyuz 11 mission (three), the 1986
Space Shuttle Challenger accident (seven), and the 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia accident
(seven). The Columbia accident is also discussed in CRS Report RS21408 and CRS Issue Brief
IB93062.
8
While a desire for preeminence has been one motivation in pursuing human
spaceflight, it has not precluded cooperation. Even at the height of U.S.-Soviet space
competition in the early days of the Space Race, the United States and Soviet Union
also worked togetherat the United Nations through the Committee on Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, and through bilateral cooperative agreements as early as 1962.
In 1963, President Kennedy proposed that the two countries cooperate in sending
astronauts to the Moon, but the Soviets did not accept the offer. Human space flight
cooperation between the two countries, and with other countries, grew as the space
programs matured. 2 The United States and Soviet Union agreed to a joint docking
of a Russian Soyuz and an American Apollo in 1975 to demonstrate detente in
space. The United States brought Canada and the European Space Agency (ESA)
into the Space Shuttle program, with Canada building a remote manipulator system
(Canadarm) and ESA building the Spacelab module for conducting scientific ex-
periments in the Shuttles cargo bay. In 1977, the Soviet Union began launching
cosmonauts from allied countries to its space stations, and the United States in-
cluded representatives of many other countries in Space Shuttle crews beginning in
1983. To date, astronauts and cosmonauts from 29 other countries 3 have journeyed
into space on American or Russian spacecraft. And today, of course, 15 nations
the United States, Russia, Canada, Japan, and 11 European countriesare partners
in building the International Space Station.
The international landscape has influenced the course of human space flight over
these decades. But fundamentally, the desire to pursue such activities seems based
on a quest for national technological preeminence and a yearning to explore new
frontiers.
Why the Shuttle?
The first decade of the U.S. human space flight program saw the execution of the
Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. As 1969 dawned and the first Apollo lunar
landing neared, President Nixon took office and faced the question of what goals
should guide the space program in the post-Apollo years. He established a Space
Task Group, chaired by Vice President Agnew, to develop recommendations. The
groups report laid out a plan that called for developing a space station, a reusable
space transportation system to service it, and sending humans to Mars. But after
America won the Moon Race with the Apollo 11 landing in July 1969, it became ap-
parent that support for expensive human space missions was waning. Attention
turned to other national priorities, and NASA found that it had to pick just one of
those new projects. It decided that the first step should be development of the reus-
able space transportation systemthe Space Shuttle. One goal of the Shuttle pro-
gram was to significantly reduce the cost of launching people and cargo into space.
President Nixon announced the Shuttle program in 1972. It was quite controversial
in Congress, but ultimately was approved.
The reusable Space Shuttle was intended to replace all other U.S. launch vehicles,
so-called expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) that can only be used once. By trans-
ferring all space traffic to the Shuttle, NASA projected that the Shuttles develop-
ment and operations costs would be amortized over a large number of annual
launches48 flights per year with resulting cost efficiencies.
That premise has not held true, however. The costs were higher than expected,
and the annual flight rate much lower. Since 1981 when the Shuttle was first
launched, the greatest number of launches in a single year has been nine. One fac-
tor in the lower launch rate was policy changes in the aftermath of the 1986 Space
Shuttle Challenger accident. The Reagan White House reversed the decision to
phase out ELVs and announced that, with few exceptions, the Shuttle could be used
only for missions requiring the Shuttles unique capabilities such as crew inter-
action. Commercial communications satellites, expected to comprise a large share of
Shuttle launches, no longer could be launched on the Shuttle. While that provided
a market for the resurrected ELVs, the effect on the Shuttle program was many
fewer launches and a higher cost-per-launch. Today, many point to the Shuttle as
an outstanding technical success, but an economic failure.
In the 22 years since the Shuttles first flight, NASA (sometimes working with
DoD) has initiated several attempts to develop a successor to the Shuttlea second
generation reusable launch vehiclewith the continued goal of reducing costs.
2 There has been extensive cooperation in other space activities as well since the beginning
of the Space Age.
3 Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Ro-
mania, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Ukraine, United King-
dom, and Vietnam.
9
Each attempt has failed in turn, in large part because anticipated technological ad-
vances did not materialize. Thus, the Shuttle continues to be the sole U.S. vehicle
for launching people into space, and the only launch vehicle capable of meeting the
International Space Stations requirements for taking cargo up and back. Late last
year, NASA again reformulated its plan to develop a successor to the Shuttle, as-
serting that an economic case could not be made at this time for investing as much
as $3035 billion in such a vehicle. Instead, NASA plans to continue operating the
Shuttle until at least 2015 (instead of 2012), and perhaps 2020 or longer.
That decision was made prior to the Columbia tragedy, but NASA officials have
subsequently made clear that no change is expected. NASA plans to build an Or-
bital Space Plane that could supplement (but not replace) the Shuttle early in the
next decade, and there are discussions about potentially flying the Shuttle with as
few as two crew members, or perhaps autonomously (without a crew), in the long
term future. For the present, however, NASA asserts that the Shuttle is needed to
support the International Space Station program, and to service the Hubble Space
Telescope.
Options for the Future
In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, Congress is again assessing the costs and
benefits of human space flight. Congress has faced these questions beforein the
early days of the Space Age, after the 1967 Apollo fire that took the lives of three
astronauts, after the United States won the Moon Race, and after the 1986 Space
Shuttle Challenger tragedy that claimed seven lives. Based on past experience,
many expect that the decision will be made to continue the human space flight pro-
gram essentially unchanged once the cause of the Columbia accident is determined
and fixed. But there are a number of options to consider, each with its own set of
advantages and disadvantages. The major options and some of the associated pros
and cons are discussed next.
1. Terminate the U.S. human space flight program, including the Space
Shuttle, U.S. participation in the International Space Station (ISS) pro-
gram, and plans to develop an Orbital Space Plane.
Pros: The annual budget for the Space Shuttle is approximately $4 billion, and
for the Space Station is approximately $2 billion. That amount of funding, plus
whatever would be spent on the Orbital Space Plane (which is still in the formula-
tion phase) could be saved, or redirected to other space or non-space priorities such
as robotic space flight, scientific research, homeland security, or the costs of the
Iraqi war. Human lives would not be at risk. Human spaceflight might remain a
long term vision.
Cons: To the extent that human space flight is still perceived as a measure of
a nations technological preeminence, that advantage would be lost. 4 Although the
United States is the leader of the International Space Station (ISS) program, ISS
could continue without U.S. involvement, as long as the other partners had the req-
uisite funds. 5 Thus, the more than $30 billion U.S. investment in the Space Station
could be lost for American taxpayers, while the other partners could continue to use
it for their own purposes. Without servicing missions by the Space Shuttle, the
Hubble Space Telescope might not achieve its scientific potential, and non-Shuttle
options for disposing of it at the end of its life would have to be developed. 6 There
also could be consequences for the U.S. aerospace industry, particularly Boeing and
Lockheed Martin. 7
Terminate the Shuttle and Orbital Space Plane programs, but continue
participation in the ISS program, relying on Russian vehicles for taking
U.S. astronauts to and from space when possible.
4 Some would find this ironic at a time when China is about to become only the third country
capable of launching people into space. It has launched four test spacecraft as part of that goal;
the first launch carrying a Chinese astronaut, or taikonaut, is expected late this year.
5 The ISS program is an international partnership among the United States, 11 European
countries, Japan, Canada, and Russia. The Russians have three decades of experience in oper-
ating space stations without a Space Shuttle. Most of the remaining segments of the Space Sta-
tion are designed to be launched on the Shuttle, so construction would remain stalled until and
unless some other launch vehicle becomes available to launch the remaining segments, but oper-
ation of the existing space station could continue using Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft
if funds are available.
6 At least one more servicing mission is planned in 2004 to enable the telescope to operate
until 2010. At that time, NASA plans to use the Shuttle to return the telescope to Earth because
it does not want it to make an uncontrolled reentry into the Earths atmosphere. Such a reentry
could pose hazards from falling debris.
7 The two companies operate the Space Shuttle (under a joint venture called United Space Al-
liance). Boeing is also the prime contractor for the Space Station program.
10
Pros: The annual budget for the Space Shuttle is approximately $4 billion, so
that amount of funding, plus whatever would be spent on OSP, could be saved or
redirected to other space or non-space priorities (as above). The lives of fewer astro-
nauts would be at risk. Compared to Option 1, this would leave open the possibility
of U.S. use of the Space Station whenever NASA could obtain flight opportunities
on Russias Soyuz spacecraft.
Cons: Similar to Option 1, but if the United States wanted to continue using ISS,
it would need to work with the other partners to solve the problem of how to deliver
cargo to and return it from ISS. 8 If only the Soyuz spacecraft is used to take crews
to and from the Space Station, agreements would have to be reached with Russia
on how often American astronauts would be included in the Space Station crews and
how much it would cost. 9 The issues related to the Hubble Space Telescope and the
U.S. aerospace industry (discussed above) would remain.
3. Terminate the Shuttle program, but continue participation in the ISS
program and continue to develop the Orbital Space Plane or another re-
placement for the Shuttle.
Pros: The annual budget for the Space Shuttle is approximately $4 billion, so
that amount of funding could be saved, or redirected to other space or non-space
priorities (as above). Costs for developing and operating an Orbital Space Plane or
a successor to the Shuttle are not yet known, however, so there might not be any
net savings over the long term. A new vehicle might be safer and more cost effec-
tive.
Cons: The disadvantages of this option would be similar to those for Option 2,
except that at some point in the future, a U.S. human space flight vehicle would
become operational, ameliorating questions about access to the Space Station by
American crews.
4. Continue the Shuttle program, but with fewer missionsperhaps lim-
iting it to space station visitsand as few crew as possible.
Pros: Would limit the risk to Shuttle crews. If the Space Station was equipped
with a system to inspect the Shuttle prior to undocking, 10 problems could be identi-
fied and possibly repaired. Continues U.S. leadership in space and any resulting
benefits therefrom.
Cons: There would be little, if any, financial savings from this option. 11 Astro-
naut lives would remain at risk. The question of what to do with the Hubble Space
Telescope (discussed above) would remain if flights were limited only to space sta-
tion visits.
5. Resume Shuttle flights as planned.
Pros: Allows construction and utilization of the Space Station to continue as
planned. Allows the Hubble Space Telescope to be serviced and returned to Earth.
Continues U.S. leadership in space and any resulting benefits therefrom.
Cons: There would be no financial savings, and costs would be incurred to fix the
Shuttle. The risk to human life would remain.
Options 4 and 5 could be coupled with directives to NASA to:
equip the Space Station with a system that could inspect the Shuttle while it
is docked;
8 Vehicles other than the Shuttle are available, or are expected to become available in the next
few years, to take cargo to the Space Station, but none can bring cargo back to Earth. Russias
Progress spacecraft is the only other cargo craft available today. Russia has indicated that it
cannot afford to build more than about three per year, however, which is insufficient to resupply
even a two-person crew (this problem is being addressed currently). Under the Iran Non-
proliferation Act, NASA is prohibited from making payments to Russia in connection with the
Space Station program unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain
technologies to Iran. Without such a certification, NASA could not pay Russia for Progress
flights. Europe and Japan are both developing spacecraft that will be able to take cargo to the
Space Station, but they will not be available for several years, and cannot return cargo to Earth.
U.S. expendable launch vehicles potentially could be used to take cargo to the Space Station,
although a cargo spacecraft equipped with autonomous rendezvous and docking systems would
have to be developed. These also probably would not be able to return cargo to Earth.
9 The Iran Nonproliferation Act (discussed in the previous footnote) would also prohibit U.S.
payments to Russia for Soyuz flights unless the President certifies that Russia is complying with
the Act.
10 This would be in addition to inspections that could be accomplished using Department of
Defense ground- and space-based sensors.
11 There are only two non-space station missions on the Shuttles schedule today, both to the
Hubble Space Telescope. At NASAs current estimate of the marginal cost of a Shuttle launch
($115 million), that would save only $230 million. The costs for fixing the problems that caused
the Columbia accident are unknown, but seem likely to exceed that amount.
11
upgrade the Shuttle to make it safer, perhaps including additional crew escape
systems or making the crew cabin survivable if the vehicle breaks apart;
develop systems to enable the Shuttles to fly autonomously (without a crew);
and/or
accelerate efforts to build a successor to the Shuttle with the emphasis on im-
proved safety, even if that meant not reducing costs as much as desired.
Summary
Mr. Chairman, as I said, this brief statement provides only a cursory review of
these complex issues. As the world readies to celebrate the 42nd anniversary of Yuri
Gagarins historic flight 10 days from now, the future of the U.S. human space flight
program is in question. Apart from the broad questions of whether the U.S. human
space flight program should continue, a more specific focus may be the cost of re-
turning the Shuttle to flight status and how long it will take. Those answers will
not be known until the cause of the Columbia accident is determined, and remedies
identified. If the costs are high, difficult decisions may be needed on whether to use
the funds for the Shuttle, for other space initiatives, or for other national priorities
such as paying for the Iraqi war and homeland security. While many expect that
the United States will once again rally behind NASA, only time will tell if the past
is prologue.
BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT: 19612003

United States
Mercury (19611963)
Purpose: To demonstrate that humans can travel into space and return safely.
Flights: Six flights (two suborbital, four orbital). Alan Shepard, first American in
space (on suborbital flight), May 5, 1961. John Glenn, first American in orbit, Feb.
20, 1962.
Gemini (19651966)
Purpose: To prepare for lunar missions by extending the duration of spaceflight
(to 14 days), developing experience in rendezvous and docking, and demonstrating
ability to work outside the spacecraft (extravehicular activityEVA)
Flights: 10 flights. Ed White conducted first U.S. EVA (June 1965).
Apollo Lunar Program (19671972)
Purpose: To land men on the Moon and return them safely to Earth.
Flights: Eleven flights, nine to the Moon. Of the nine, two (Apollo 8 and 10) were
test flights that did not attempt to land, one (Apollo 13) suffered an in-flight failure
and the crew narrowly averted tragedy and were able to return to Earth, and six
(Apollo 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, and 17) landed two-man teams on the lunar surface. Neil
Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin were the first humans to set foot on the Moon on July
20, 1969, while Mike Collins orbited overhead.
Space Tragedy The Apollo program saw the first spaceflight-related tragedy
when the three-man crew (Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee) of the first
Apollo mission was killed on January 27, 1967, when fire erupted in the Apollo com-
mand module during a pre-launch test. The Apollo program resumed flights 21
months later.
Skylab (19731974)
Purpose: First U.S. Space Station
Flights: The Skylab Space Station was launched in May 1973. Three three-person
crews were launched to Skylab using Apollo capsules from 1973 to 1974, extending
the duration of human space flight to a new record of 84 days. A wide variety of
scientific experiments were conducted. Skylab was not intended to be permanently
occupied. It remained in orbit, unoccupied, until 1979 when it made an uncontrolled
reentry into the Earths atmosphere, raining debris on western Australia and the
Indian Ocean.
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (1975)
Purpose: Cooperation with the Soviet Union.
Flight: A three-man Apollo crew docked with a two-man Soyuz crew for two days
of joint experiments to demonstrate detente in space. This was the last flight in
the Apollo series. No Americans journeyed into space for the next six years while
waiting for the debut of the Space Shuttle.
Space Shuttle (1981present)
Purpose: Reusable launch vehicle for taking crews and cargo to and from Earth
orbit.
12
Flights: Pre-Challenger. Twenty four successful Shuttle missions were launched
from 19811986. The Shuttles were used to take satellites into space; retrieve mal-
functioning satellites (using Canadarm, a remote manipulator system built by
Canada); and conduct scientific experiments (particularly using the Spacelab module
built by the European Space Agency). Sally Ride became the first American woman
in space in 1983, Guion Bluford became the first African American in space in 1983,
and Kathy Sullivan became the first American woman to perform an EVA in 1984.
Senator Jake Garn and then-Representative (now Senator) Bill Nelson made Shuttle
flights in 1985 and 1986 respectively.
Space Tragedy: On January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded 73
seconds after launch when an O-ring in a Solid Rocket Booster failed. All seven
astronauts aboard were killed: Francis (Dick) Scobee, Mike Smith, Judy Resnik,
Ellison Onizuka, Ron McNair, Gregory Jarvis, and Christa McAuliffe (a school-
teacher). The Space Shuttle returned to flight 32 months later.
Post-Challenger. From September 1988January 2003, the Shuttle made 87 suc-
cessful flights. Nine of these docked with the Russian Space Station Mir. Since
1998, most Shuttle flights have been devoted to construction of the International
Space Station.
Space Tragedy: On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart
as it returned to Earth from a 16-day scientific mission in Earth orbit. All seven
astronauts aboard were killed: Rick Husband, William McCool, Michael Anderson,
David Brown, Kalpana Chawla, Laurel Clark, and Ilan Ramon, an Israeli. The
cause of the accident is under investigation.
International Space Station (1998present)
Purpose: Space Station
Flights: The United States initiated the Space Station program in 1984. In 1988,
nine European countries (now eleven), Canada, and Japan formally became partners
with the United States in building it. In 1993, the program was restructured due
to cost growth, and Russia joined the program as a partner. Construction began in
1998 and is currently suspended pending the Space Shuttles return to flight. Suc-
cessive three-person crews have permanently occupied ISS since November 2000.
The three-person crews are alternately composed of two Russians and one Amer-
ican, or two Americans and one Russian. ISS is routinely visited by other astronauts
on Russian Soyuz spacecraft or the Space Shuttle (prior to the Columbia accident)
some of whom are from other countries.
Soviet Union/Russia
Vostok (19611963)
Purpose: To demonstrate that humans can travel into space and return safely.
Flights: Six flights (all orbital). Yuri Gagarin, first man in space (made one orbit
of the Earth), Apr. 12, 1961. Valentina Tereshkova, first woman in space, June 16,
1963.
Voskhod (19641965)
Purpose: Modified Vostok spacecraft used to achieve two more space firsts: first
multi-person crew, and first EVA.
Flights: Two flights. Vokhod 1 carried three-person crew. On Voskhod 2, Alexei
Leonov performed the first EVA (March 1965).
Soyuz (1967present)
Purpose: To develop a spacecraft for taking crews back and forth to Earth orbit.
Early flights extended the duration of human space flight (to 18 days) and practiced
rendezvous and docking. Flights since Soyuz 10 (1971) have been largely devoted
to taking crews back and forth to Soviet Space Stations (Salyut and Mir, see below),
and to the International Space Station.
Flights: The Soyuz is still in use today, although it has been modified several
times. The original Soyuz was replaced by Soyuz T in 1980, by Soyuz TM in 1987,
and by Soyuz TMA in 2002. There were 40 flights of Soyuz, 15 of Soyuz T, 34 of
Soyuz TM, and one flight of Soyuz TMA to date. (A few of these missions did not
carry crews.)
Space Tragedy: The Soyuz program saw the first Soviet space tragedy when Vladi-
mir Komarov was killed during the first Soyuz mission on April 24, 1967. The crafts
parachute lines tangled during descent and he was killed upon impact with the
Earth. The Soyuz program resumed flights 18 months later.
Salyut 1 (1971)
Purpose: First Space Station
Flights: Salyut 1 was launched in April 1971. This was a first generation Soviet
Space Station with only one docking port. Two crews were launched to the Space
13
Station. The first docked, but was unable to open the hatch to the Space Station,
and returned home.
Space Tragedy: The second crew, Soyuz 11, docked and entered the Space Sta-
tion, and remained for three weeks. When they returned to Earth on June 29, 1971,
an improperly closed valve allowed the Soyuzs atmosphere to vent into space. The
three cosmonauts (Georgiy Dobrovolskiy, Vladimir Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev)
were not wearing spacesuits and asphyxiated. The Soviets had eliminated the re-
quirement for spacesuits because they had confidence in their technology, and three
space-suited cosmonauts could not fit in the Soyuz as it was designed at that time.
The Soyuz returned to flight 27 months later. The Soviets have required spacesuits
since that time, and launched only two-person crews for the next 10 years until the
Soyuz T version was introduced which could accommodate three cosmonauts in
spacesuits.
Other First Generation Salyut Space Stations (19741977)
Unnamed launch (1972) did not reach orbit.
Salyut 2 (1973) broke apart in orbit.
Kosmos 557 (1973) broke apart in orbit.
Salyut 3 (1974) hosted one crew (another was unable to dock) and was designated
in the West as a military space station dedicated to military tasks.
Salyut 4 (19741975) hosted two crews, and was designated in the West as a civil-
ian space station. A third crew was launched to the Space Station, but the launch
vehicle malfunctioned and the crew landed in Siberia (the so-called April 5th anom-
aly or Soyuz 18A).
Salyut 5 (19761977) hosted two crews and was designated in the West as a mili-
tary space station. A third crew was unable to dock.
Soyuz-Apollo Test Project (1975)
Purpose: Cooperation with the United States
Flight: A three-man Apollo crew docked with a two-man Soyuz crew for two days
of joint experiments to demonstrate detente in space. This was the last flight in
the Apollo series. No Americans journeyed into space for the next six years while
waiting for the debut of the Space Shuttle.
Second Generation Salyut Space Stations (19771986)
Purpose: Expand space station operations. The second generation space stations
had two docking ports, enabling resupply missions and visiting crews that would
remain aboard the Space Station for about one week visiting the long duration space
station crews, who remained for months. These space stations were occupied inter-
mittently over their lifetimes.
Salyut 6 (19771982) hosted 16 crews (two others were unable to dock). The Sovi-
ets increased the duration of human space flight to 185 days. The visiting crews
often brought cosmonauts from other countries. The first non-U.S., non-Soviet in
space was Vladimir Remek of Czechoslovakia in 1978.
Salyut 7 (19821986) hosted 10 crews. A new duration record of 237 days was set.
Among the visiting crews was the second woman to fly in space, Svetlana
Savitskaya. She visited Salyut twice (in 1982 and 1984), and on the second mission,
become the first woman to perform an EVA. One crew that was intended to be
launched to Salyut 7 in 1983 suffered a near-tragedy when the launch vehicle
caught fire on the launch pad. The emergency abort tower on top of the launch vehi-
cle propelled the Soyuz capsule away from the launch pad to safety. Unlike all the
previous Soviet Space Stations, which were intentionally deorbited into the Pacific
Ocean, Salyut 7 made an uncontrolled reentry in 1991, raining debris on Argentina.
There was insufficient fuel for a controlled reentry.
Third Generation Mir Space Station (19862001)
The Mir Space Station was a modular space station with six docking ports. The
core of the Space Station was launched in 1986. Additional modules were added
through 1996. Mir hosted a large number of crews, and inaugurated the era of per-
manently occupied space stations where rotating crews were aboard continuously.
Mir was permanently occupied from 1989 to 1999. A new duration record of 438
days was set. In 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States
and Soviet Union increased cooperative activity in human spaceflight, including
Russian cosmonauts flying on the U.S. Shuttle, and American astronauts making
multi-month stays on Mir. Nine U.S. Space Shuttles docked with Mir from 1995
1998. In 1997, a fire erupted inside Mir when a candle used to generate oxygen
malfunctioned. That same year, a Russian cargo spacecraft (Progress) collided with
Mir during a failed docking attempt. These events called into question the wisdom
of keeping crews on Mir, but both the Russians and the Americans continued to
send crews to the Space Station. Mir was intentionally deorbited into the Pacific
Ocean in 2001.
14
International Space Station (1998present)
Purpose: Space Station
Flights: The United States initiated the Space Station program in 1984. In 1988,
nine European countries (now eleven), Canada, and Japan formally became partners
with the United States in building it. In 1993, the program was restructured due
to cost growth, and Russia joined the program as a partner. Construction began in
1998 and is currently suspended pending the Space Shuttles return to flight. Suc-
cessive three-person crews have permanently occupied ISS since November 2000.
The three-person crews are alternately composed of two Russians and one Amer-
ican, or two Americans and one Russian. ISS is routinely visited by other astronauts
on Russian Soyuz spacecraft or the Space Shuttle (prior to the Columbia accident)
some of whom are from other countries.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thanks, Ms. Smith. And I appreciate your

expertise thats been available for many years to Congress to help
us look at this overall issue. We will get into a lot of this in the
questions and answers.
Mr. Chase, executive director of The National Space Society, wel-
come, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. CHASE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

NATIONAL SPACE SOCIETY
Mr. CHASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Breaux.
Robust low-cost access to space is the key to expanding our op-
portunities in space, whether in low-earth orbit or beyond, and this
issue is even more critical in the wake of the loss of the Space
Shuttle Columbia.
NASAs 2004 budget submission contains important elements of
an integrated space transportation plan to begin addressing this
important issue. The first element of the plan is the Service Life
Extension Program which addresses the need to upgrade the Space
Shuttle fleet and its supporting infrastructure. The Space Shuttle
is the only vehicle that can complete the International Space Sta-
tion, so we need to return the fleet to service as quickly as is fea-
sible to let it complete that mission.
Although the original estimates for the Shuttles costs were very
optimistic, as has already been said, the Space Shuttles capabili-
ties remain unmatched today. But we cannot escape the need for
a backup to the Shuttle, so the second element of the plan is to pro-
vide a complementary capability to transfer crews to and from the
Space Station.
The current proposal, called the orbital space plane, would be
launched aboard evolved expendable launch vehicles, EELVs, de-
veloped jointly by the Department of Defense and industry and
now operated commercially by Boeing and Lockheed Martin as the
Delta 4 and Atlas 5. While the orbital space plane could serve as
a component for a next-generation launch vehicle, it serves only as
a complement to, not a replacement for, the Shuttle during this
phase. The additional benefit of the orbital space plane would be
its utility in future human missions, all of which will require crew
transfer capabilities.
The third element of NASAs plan is the development of a next-
generation launch system that would ultimately replace the Space
Shuttle. The next-generation launch technology program, which is
being conducted jointly with the Department of Defense, focuses on
new technologies that can lead to launch systems with much great-
15
er reliability and much lower costs. This NASA/DoD partnership is

one that should be encouraged and fostered.
These three elements are all important efforts to improve our ac-
cess to space, and I believe NASAs initial plan is a prudent step
in that direction. However, there are also several critical factors
that could be major stumbling blocks to its success.
First, the loss of Columbia dramatically underscores the urgency
to develop a secondary capability to launch crews to and from the
Space Station. The orbital space plane can be built using todays
technology, and most of the designs under consideration have been
studied in several variations for the last 20 to 30 years, so there
needs to be a very serious effort to accelerate this program while
keeping it focused on its core mission of launching and retrieving
crews.
Second, NASA has to reexamine a backup capability to launch
unmanned cargo to the International Space Station. NASAs Alter-
nate Access to Station initiative was doing just that, but that pro-
gram is slated to be terminated this summer without moving into
the test or development phase. The Alternate Access to Station pro-
gram should get a fresh look from NASA.
Third, once the orbital space plane and some form of a backup
cargo capability are activated, we should not rush to an artificial
deadline to develop a new launch system. While its important for
us to continue making investments in new launch technology, its
equally important that we develop a strategic plan for our space ex-
ploration efforts and not waste time and money jumping from pro-
gram to program.
Finally, I believe a key, yet overlooked, element in this debate is
the evolved expendable launch vehicle I mentioned earlier. Al-
though designed initially for unmanned missions, the fleet of
EELVs represent significant improvements in safety, reliability,
and efficiency over their predecessors. Once modified for human
launch requirements to handle orbital space plane missions, the
EELVs will represent a formidable and versatile fleet of vehicles
that can fulfill an even wider range of missions than they perform
today. Importantly, by expanding the EELVs market to include
crew and cargo to ISS, that improves our Nations competitiveness
in the commercial space arena, as well.
In summary, I believe NASAs plan to be a reasonable approach.
We should begin making the investments now to ensure we can
complete the International Space Station and then build a robust,
yet simple, secondary capability to transfer crew and cargo to and
from orbit. Beyond that, though, we should carefully consider our
next steps as part of a long-term space architecture that provides
a bold vision for the future. We can certainly begin building some
of that infrastructure today, but we need a roadmap to put that in-
frastructure to work.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear today and look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chase follows:]
16
PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. CHASE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SPACE
SOCIETY
Chairman Brownback, Senator Breaux and Members of the Subcommittee, thank
you for inviting me here today.
I am pleased to present testimony to the Subcommittee on behalf of the National
Space Society, a nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting space exploration.
NSS has approximately 22,000 members around the world, including space profes-
sionals, astronauts, business leaders, elected officials, and, most important, every-
day citizens without ties to the space industry who support the exploration, develop-
ment, and eventual settlement of space.
The Subcommittee has asked NSS to provide its perspective on NASAs human
space flight programs and how those initiatives relate to efforts to develop new
space transportation systems. In our view, access to space is the most critical part
of any future space exploration efforts, so I appreciate the opportunity to share our
thoughts today.
NASAs Integrated Space Transportation Plan
Robust, low cost access to space is the key to expanding opportunities in space,
whether in Low Earth Orbit or beyond. In light of the loss of the Space Shuttle Co-
lumbia, it is more important than ever for our nation to address the issue of how
we transport people and cargo to and from space. Indeed, although the Columbia
investigation and now the war in Iraq occupies the nations attention, NASAs gen-
erally overlooked FY 2004 budget submission contains important elements of an In-
tegrated Space Transportation Plan to begin addressing this critical issue.
The first element of the Integrated Space Transportation Plan is the Service Life
Extension Program, which addresses the need to upgrade the Space Shuttle fleet
and the infrastructure that supports it. The Space Shuttle is the only vehicle that
can complete the International Space Station, so we need to return the fleet to serv-
ice as quickly as is feasible to let it complete that mission.
Although the original estimates for the Shuttles cost and performance were very
optimisticwhich means today we have a system that is significantly more expen-
sive and more challenging to operate than was ever envisionedthe Space Shuttle
remains a very unique and important asset in our nations launch inventory. It com-
bines the capabilities of a heavy lift launch vehicle, a small Space Station, an on-
orbit repair depot, and a system that can return cargo to Earth, among other func-
tions. Its capabilities, despite being conceived 30 years ago, remain unmatched
today by any vehicle flying or by anything even on the drawing board. So any men-
tion of a replacement of the Shuttle has to be viewed as only a partial replace-
ment, since future vehicles will likely not be as versatile as the Space Shuttle is
today.
But we cannot escape the realities of the need for a backup to the Shuttle, regard-
less of its impressive capabilities. The second element of the plan is to provide a
complementary capability to transfer crews to and from the Space Station. The cur-
rent proposal, called the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), would be launched aboard
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles developed jointly by the Department of De-
fense and industry, and which are now operated commercially by Boeing and Lock-
heed Martin as the Delta IV and the Atlas V, respectively. The requirements laid
out by NASA call for the OSP to be able to launch at least four crew members to
ISS, stay on orbit for long periods of time, and to serve as a lifeboat to evacuate
the ISS crew in the case of emergencies, replacing the Russian Soyuz capsules that
perform that function today.
While the OSP could serve as a component of a next generation system, it serves
only as a complement tonot a replacement forthe Shuttle during this phase of
the Integrated Space Transportation Plan. The OSP would relieve much of the Shut-
tles burden of launching crew to and from ISS and allow the Shuttle fleet to focus
on the launch of heavy cargo and components, but both vehicles would be flown dur-
ing this time period. The additional benefit of the development of the OSP or similar
vehicle would be its utility in future human missions, all of which will require crew
transfer capabilities.
The third element of NASAs plan is the development of a next generation launch
system that would ultimately replace the Space Shuttle, meaning it would launch
both crew and cargo. The Next Generation Launch Technology program, which is
being conducted jointly with the Department of Defense, is a restructured element
of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI), and focuses on new technologies and new sys-
tems that can lead to launch systems with much greater reliability and much lower
costs than systems today.
17
The Challenges
These three elementsupgrading the Space Shuttle, developing a backup system
to launch crews to and from the Space Station, and investing in next generation
launch technologiesare all critical components in a national plan to significantly
improve our access to space, and I believe NASAs initial outline is a prudent step
in that direction. However, there are also several critical factors that can be major
stumbling blocks to the success of this plan.
First, the loss of Columbia dramatically underscores the urgency to develop a sec-
ondary capability to launch crews to and from ISS, and it is not clear that this sense
of urgency is shared by all of NASAs managers at the program level. Additionally,
the natural inclination for NASAs talented engineers will be to develop the latest
technology for use in the Orbital Space Planebut that urge must be strongly re-
sisted. The OSP can be built using todays technology, and most of the designs
under consideration have been studied in several variations for the last 2030 years.
NASAs stated goal of a fully operational system by 2012 must be accelerated, and
it must also be done as simply as possible by focusing on its core mission of launch-
ing and retrieving crews.
Second, NASA has to reexamine a backup capability to launch cargo to the Inter-
national Space Station. A program to do just thatNASAs Alternate Access to Sta-
tion initiativewas examining several potential options to launch unmanned cargo
to ISS using expendable launch vehicles, but that program is slated to be termi-
nated this summer without moving into the test or development phase. The AAS
program should get a fresh look from NASA so that, when combined with the Or-
bital Space Plane program, we will have both assured crew and cargo access to the
International Space Station. The European Space Agency is working on the Auto-
mated Transfer Vehicle, which is designed to be a robotic cargo vessel for ISS. That
system may offer the capabilities to fulfill this need, but it is an option which may
or may not be viable depending on the state of international affairs. But both the
crew and cargo launch capabilities are needed regardless of what long-term choices
we make about human space exploration, so it is advisable to fund and begin these
programs as soon as possible.
Third, once the Orbital Space Plane and some form of backup cargo capability are
activated, the United States will possess a significant launch capability that can
meet multiple needs. With these complementary capabilities available, we should
not rush to an artificial deadline to develop and field a new launch system. The
Shuttle and existing fleet of expendable launch vehicles, coupled with the OSP and
a cargo delivery system, can meet many of our nations needs for the near term,
and the Shuttle still possesses capabilities that should be carefully reviewed before
we decide to retire the entire fleet. While it is important for us to continue making
investments in new launch technology, it is equally important that we develop a
strategic plan for our space exploration efforts and not waste time just jumping from
program to program.
Fourth, the nascent partnership between NASA and the Department of Defense
in developing next generation launch technology should be encouraged and fostered.
For years, an adversarial relationship existed between the two agencies, yet the
skills and experience each brings to the space arena have been recognized as critical
to both civil and national security needs.
Finally, I believe a key yet overlooked element in our nations space launch capa-
bilities is the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle mentioned earlier. Although de-
signed for unmanned missions, the two vehicles represent significant improvements
in safety, reliability, and efficiency over their predecessors. Indeed, both the Delta
IV and Atlas V represent, in many ways, revolutionary improvements in access to
space. These systems are already in production and operation, and they are capable
today of meeting the launch requirements for unmanned scientific, national secu-
rity, and commercial missions. Once modified for human launch requirements, the
EELVs will represent a formidable and versatile fleet of vehicles that can fulfill an
even wider range of missions. Importantly, by developing a crew and perhaps cargo
capability that can be launched aboard EELVs, that improves our nations competi-
tiveness in the commercial space arena by strengthening the market for those vehi-
cles.
The reason it is important to highlight the potential role of EELVs is because ex-
pendable launch systems are usually ignored in the discussion of next generation
launch systemsmost people assume that only reusable launch vehicles can fulfill
that role. But the economics of reusable versus expendable systems is not as simple
as it first appears. The key to low cost reusable vehicles is routine use that allows
expenses to be amortized over a large number of flights. For an expendable vehicle,
the key is low cost production, which can be achieved in part through launch rates
that are high enough to maximize the efficiency of the production and assembly op-
18
eration. Generally speaking, the launch rate for a reusable system has to be very
high before it effectively competes with the cost of an expendable launcher. The best
option for a next generation system may indeed turn out to be a reusable launch
system, but it could also be a further evolution of the EELV or a derivative of the
Space Shuttle.
The Future of Human Space Exploration
The choices made today in space transportation investments will obviously impact
our capabilities for future space exploration missions, but there are decisions that
can and should be made even as we work to develop a long term vision for our fu-
ture in space. We know that completing the International Space Station requires the
Space Shuttle, and that in order to successfully operate the Space Station we need
a robust yet simple backup capability for crew and cargo. So those are two elements
of space transportation planning that should proceed as quickly as possible and ac-
celerated where feasible.
Beyond those elements, we should carefully consider our next steps. Focusing ex-
clusively on reusable launch vehicles may be the right choice if we seek routine ac-
cess for crew and low-to-medium weight cargo. But if we opt to launch heavy cargo
(such as components for a mission to Mars), then expendable launch vehicles may
better fill that role. So the nation needs to develop a long-term space exploration
architecture to provide a clear direction for the future to help direct these efforts.
NASA has begun an initiative to accomplish this important task, but it needs public
and political support to remain a key part of the NASA agenda. Without that under-
lying vision for tomorrow, it makes it more difficult to make the right decisions
today.
So the choice before our nation is complex, but, importantly, it is not an either-
or proposition. In order to fund future launch systems, we do not have to can-
nibalize the Shuttle program, and in order to fund the Shuttle we do not have to
forgo future investments in next generation launch technology. I also know you have
to wrestle with difficult budget choices in a wide range of areas and, as stewards
of the publics money, I know you consider it important to make investments that
are worthwhile and have a benefit to the taxpayers.
Space exploration is worthwhile endeavor and a sound investment in the future,
and it is an investment that can be made even while meeting other needs in our
nation. It is important to invest in the future, and it is important, as a society, to
continue opening frontiers. History teaches us that societies that have pushed their
frontiers outward have prospered; those that have not have withered and faded into
the history books. No society has ever gone wrong opening up the frontier, and we
shouldnt stop now.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chase, and I look forward

to discussion as well.
Dr. Alex Roland is professor of history at Department of History,
Duke University, and a former historian for NASA. Thank you for
joining us today. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF ALEX ROLAND, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY,

DUKE UNIVERSITY
Dr. ROLAND. Thank you.
Senator Brownback, Senator Breaux, thank you for the oppor-
tunity to share with you my views on human space flight, which
will be considerably different than what youve heard so far, though
there are many points of convergence.
The Columbia accident confirmed what the Challenger accident
made clear; systemic flaws in the Space Shuttle render it
unsustainable as a safe, reliable, and economical launch vehicle.
The Rogers Commission issued two critical injunctions to NASA
do not rely on the Space Shuttle as the mainstay of your launch
capability; begin at once to develop a next-generation launch vehi-
cle. Sixteen years later, NASA is massively dependent upon the
Shuttle; no replacement is in sight.
19
I have appended to my written remarks an article explaining

how and why the Shuttle program became systemically flawed.
Briefly stated, NASA made two mistakes in Shuttle development in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, it traded development costs
for operational costs. Second, it convinced itself that a recoverable
launch vehicle would be inherently more economical than an ex-
pendable. NASA promised savings of 90, even 95 percent in launch
costs. In practice, it costs more to put a pound of payload in orbit
aboard the Shuttle than it did aboard the Saturn launch vehicle
that preceded it.
These mistakes produced a program that cannot work. NASA
could conceivably operate the Shuttle safely and reliably, but it
dares not admit what it would cost.
The evidence for this was abundant before the Challenger acci-
dent. Instead of listening to that data, NASA consistently allowed
its judgment to be clouded by its hopes and predictions for human
activities in space. The agency cares about astronaut safety, but its
trapped by its own claims about Shuttle costs. And, unlike expend-
able launch vehicles, the Shuttle grows more dangerous and more
expensive to fly with each passing year.
In what it euphemistically called success-oriented management
that is, hoping for the bestNASA assumed, in 1970, that each or-
biter would fly 50 times. In those heady days, NASA was expecting
60 Shuttle flights a year by 1985, meaning that a fleet of five Shut-
tles would be completely replaced every 5 years. No one imagined
that a Shuttle would be in service after 20 years, let alone 30 or
40 years.
Unfortunately, nothing practical can be done now to save the
Shuttle program. A crew escape system would help reduce the risk
to human life, but it cannot eliminate it. It is not clear that crew
escape could have saved the astronauts aboard either Columbia or
Challenger. Nor will an infusion of new money suffice. The United
States spends more on space then the rest of the world combined.
NASA has ample funding to support a robust space program. It has
simply wasted too much of that money flying astronauts on unnec-
essary missions aboard a ruinously expensive spacecraft.
We should drastically curtail human space flight until we have
a safe, reliable, and economical launch vehicle. In the meantime,
anything we want to do in space, except having humans there as
an end in itself, we can do more effectively and efficiently with
automated spacecraft controlled from earth. Whenever we put peo-
ple in a spacecraft, we change the primary goal, be it reconnais-
sance or communication, science or exploration, to bringing the as-
tronauts back alive. Most of the weight, and, hence, the cost, of
manned missions comes from safety and life-support systems. The
astronauts contribute little. Even had the astronauts aboard Co-
lumbia known of the damage to their spacecraft, they could not
have saved themselves.
NASA should begin at once to carry out the recommendations of
the Rogers Commission. It should limit Shuttle flights to a bare
minimum. It should convert the Space Station into a space plat-
form to be visited, but not inhabited. And it should use the savings
from these actions to fund development of a new launch vehicle.
20
I have enormous confidence in NASAs ability to achieve a vital

and productive space program, including both human and auto-
mated missions. But to achieve that goal, it must do the right
thing. That means phasing out the Shuttle. It is a death trap and
a budgetary sinkhole. NASA must develop a stable of launch vehi-
cles that will open up the promise of space.
I believe that we should send people into space only when they
have something to do there commensurate with the risk and cost
of sending them. Given the liabilities of the Shuttle, I do not know
of any mission now that meets that criterion.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roland follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEX ROLAND, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, DUKE UNIVERSITY
Senators, thank you for the opportunity to share with you my views on human
spaceflight.
The Columbia accident confirmed what the Challenger accident made clear. Sys-
temic flaws in the Space Shuttle render it unsustainable as a safe, reliable, and eco-
nomical launch vehicle. The Rogers Commission issued two critical injunctions to
NASA. Do not rely on the Space Shuttle as the mainstay of your launch capability.
Begin at once to develop a next-generation launch vehicle. Sixteen years later NASA
is massively dependent on the Shuttle; no replacement is in sight.
I have appended to my written remarks an article explaining how and why the
Shuttle program became systemically flawed. Briefly stated, NASA made two mis-
takes in Shuttle development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. First, it traded de-
velopment costs for operational costs. Second, it convinced itself that a recoverable
launch vehicle would be inherently more economical than an expendable. NASA
promised savings of 90 percent, even 95 percent, in launch costs. In practice, it costs
more to put a pound of payload in orbit aboard the Shuttle than it did aboard the
Saturn launch vehicle that preceded it.
These mistakes produced a program that cannot work. NASA could conceivably
operate the Shuttle safely and reliably, but it dares not admit what it would cost.
The evidence for this was abundant before the Challenger accident. Instead of lis-
tening to the data, NASA consistently allowed its judgment to be clouded by its
hopes and predictions for human activities in space. The agency cares about astro-
naut safety, but it is trapped by its own claims about Shuttle costs. And, unlike ex-
pendable launch vehicles, the Shuttle grows more dangerous and more expensive to
fly with each passing year. In what it euphemistically called success-oriented man-
agement, i.e., hoping for the best, NASA assumed in 1970 that each orbiter would
fly fifty times. But in those heady days, NASA was expecting sixty Shuttle flights
a year by 1985, meaning that a fleet of five Shuttles would be completely replaced
every five years. No one imagined that a Shuttle would be in service after twenty
years.
Unfortunately, nothing practical can be done now to save the Shuttle. A crew es-
cape system would help reduce the risk to human life, but it cannot eliminate it.
It is not clear that crew escape could have saved the astronauts aboard either Co-
lumbia or Challenger. Nor will an infusion of new money suffice. The United States
spends more on space than the rest of the world combined. NASA has ample fund-
ing to support a robust space program. It has simply wasted too much of that money
flying astronauts on unnecessary missions aboard a ruinously expensive spacecraft.
We should drastically curtail human spaceflight until we have a safe, reliable, and
economical launch vehicle. In the meantime, anything we want to do in space, ex-
cept having humans there as an end in itself, we can do more effectively and effi-
ciently with automated spacecraft controlled from earth. Whenever we put people
in a spacecraft we change the primary goalbe it reconnaissance or communication,
science or explorationto bringing the astronauts back alive. Most of the weight
and hence the cost of manned missions comes from safety and life support systems.
The astronauts contribute little. Even had the astronauts aboard Columbia known
of the damage to their spacecraft, they could not have saved themselves.
NASA should begin at once to carry out the recommendations of the Rogers Com-
mission. It should limit Shuttle flights to a bare minimum. It should convert the
Space Station into a space platform, to be visited but not inhabited. And it should
use the savings from these actions to fund development of a new launch vehicle. I
have enormous confidence in NASAs ability to achieve a vital and productive space
21
program, including both human and automated missions. But to achieve that goal,
it must do the right thing. That means phasing out the Shuttle. It is a death trap
and a budgetary sink hole. NASA must develop a stable of launch vehicles that will
open up the promise of space.
I believe that we should send people into space only when they have something
to do there commensurate with the risk and cost of sending them. Given the liabil-
ities of the Shuttle, I do not know of any mission that now meets that criterion.
Discover, November 1985
THE SHUTTLE, TRIUMPH OR TURKEY?

BY ALEX ROLAND
The American taxpayer bet about $14 billion on the Shuttle. NASA bet its reputa-
tion. The Air Force bet its reconnaissance capability. The astronauts bet their lives.
We all took a chance.
When John Young and Robert Crippen climbed aboard the orbiter Columbia on
April 12, 1981 for the first Shuttle launch, they took a bigger chance than any U.S.
astronauts before them. Never had Americans been asked to go on a launch vehicles
maiden voyage. Never had astronauts ridden solid-propellant rockets. Never had
Americans depended on an engine untested in flight.
Next to the orbiter was an external tank holding 1.3 million pounds of liquid oxy-
gen and liquid hydrogen, flanked by booster rockets containing two million pounds
of solid propellant. Beneath Young and Crippen were the three main engines, which
had failed with alarming regularity on the test stand. The escape system that would
separate them from this pyrotechnic nightmare should the engines fizzle again had
been scrappedto save money.
The tiles that would protect the spacecraft from the consuming heat of re-entry
had fallen off by the dozens on Columbias comparatively gentle flight to Cape Ca-
naveral atop a 747. None of them had been subjected to the rigors of a launch, when
six million pounds of thrust would accelerate the Shuttle from zero to 4,000 feet per
second in about a minute and a half.
If the tiles stayed on, they would begin to do their work as the Shuttle, traveling
at 17,500 m.p.h., re-entered the atmosphere. At 50 miles up heat would begin to ion-
ize the air molecules flowing around the vehicle, blocking communications and en-
gulfing the spacecraft in a fireball that one astronaut has likened to the inside of
a blast furnace. The orbiter, again provided the tiles stayed on, would pass out of
this inferno at about 34 miles up, slowed now to 8,200 m.p.h., but still flying nose
up, with the glide ratio of a pair of pliers, as a NASA engineer put it. Finally,
it would nose over and pass through 20,000 feet on a 22-degree glide slope, about
seven times steeper than the normal angle for a commercial aircraft. If all went
well, the Shuttle would flare out at about 2,000 feet and touch down on the runway
moving at something like 200 m.p.h., five to ten percent faster than the supersonic
transport, the fastest-landing commercial airplane. And the Shuttle would have to
land on the first pass: the two jet engines that were to give it a fly-around capability
had been jettisoned during development.
Tom Wolfe assures us that astronauts thrive on this sort of risk. And, indeed,
Young and Crippen came up winners in their gamble. But what of the American
people? Has their bet on the Shuttle paid off ? And what of NASA and the Air
Force? Its on these questions that any assessment of the success of the American
Shuttle program turns.
And any such assessment must begin with the four critical years from 1969
through 1972. Both NASA and the country got new chief executives in 1969. Rich-
ard Nixon, an old friend of the space program, moved into the Oval Office deter-
mined to end the war in Vietnam, to restore domestic tranquillity, and to bring the
federal budget under control. Thomas Paine became NASA administrator, deter-
mined to parlay the first moon landing in July 1969 into a mandate for NASA to
take the next logical step in space. Paine envisioned himself as a latter-day Hora-
tio Nelson, head of a band of brothers whom he encouraged to swashbuckle and
buccaneer with him on the high seas of space. These true believers saw the Apollo
landing as the sparkling achievement of a decade gone sour. It required an encore
of even greater scope and daring. Nothing less than a manned mission to Mars
would do.
Nixon might publicly call the voyage of Apollo 11 the greatest week in the history
of the world since the Creation, but he wasnt about to mortgage his administration
and a distressed U.S. economy to a commitment that would look like an imitation
of John Kennedys famous man-on-the-moon proposal of 1961. Nixon appointed a
22
Space Task Group, chaired by Vice President Spiro Agnew, to lay out the options.
Agnew quickly signed on with the band of brothers: he came out for the Mars mis-
sion, a manned space station in earth orbit, a Space Shuttle to ferry men and mate-
rials to the station, and a tug to move things around in space. His report pre-
sented choices of pace and sequence, but they all ended up on Mars.
Congress went into orbit, and Nixon went underground. Some liberals in both
houses, claiming that the $25 billion spent on Apollo could have been put to better
use in social programs on earth, assailed the Mars mission as the pipe dream of
a bureaucracy gone mad. Many officials in the administration agreed. Nixon himself
withdrew from the debate and let his subordinates fight it out.
Bereft of presidential support, NASA came down to earthfast. First it aban-
doned the Mars mission, except as a long-term goal. Then it abandoned the Space
Station. Finally, it settled on the Space Shuttle, a re-usable spacecraft designed to
reduce by two orders of magnitude the cost of placing cargo in orbit.
The notion of re-usable spacecraft dates back to the 1920s in Germany. The U.S.
was, in fact, moving in that direction with the X-series aircraft of the 1950suntil
Sputnik set off the space race. The Soviets had used a modified intercontinental bal-
listic missile to launch Sputnik; the U.S. responded in kind, launching its first space
shots and even the early manned missions of Mercury and Gemini on military rock-
ets. Soon a stable of civilian launch vehicles was developed, dominated by the
mighty Saturn, which could put more than 50 tons of payload into low earth orbit.
But all these launch vehicles were throwaways. They boosted one spacecraft into
orbit and then fell back to earth to incinerate in the atmosphere. They were also
expensive; a Saturn cost $185 million dollars. If Paine and his band of brothers were
to swashbuckle in the new ocean of space, as Kennedy had called it, they had to
find a cheaper way of getting out to sea.
The most logical solution was a re-usable launch vehicle to Shuttle men and cargo
to and from orbit. There were several varieties of these. Those that received serious
consideration in the U.S. would lift off vertically like rockets and fly back hori-
zontally like airplanes. The simplest was the single-stage-to-orbit vehicle, which
would carry all the fuel, engines, and aerodynamic features needed to power itself
into orbit and fly back to earth. The two-stage fully re-usable Shuttle would consist
of a spacecraft mounted atop a recoverable booster, both of which would be piloted,
winged vehicles; the booster would power its cargo to near escape velocity and then
glide back home. Finally, the partly re-usable Shuttle would have a returnable or-
biter on an expendable rocket; youd lose the rocket on each mission but youd save
the spacecraft.
The relative appeal of these configurations depended on three variables: payload,
launch rate, and development costs. The bottom line was cost per pound of payload
in orbit. With expendable launch vehicles NASA had achieved rates of $500 to
$1,000 per pound. In 1969 George Mueller, NASA associate administrator for
manned space flight, set the tone for the post-Apollo era when he called for a Shut-
tle that could take off and land at major airports and place as many as 50,000
pounds of payload in orbit at costs approaching $5 a pound.
Beyond those startling parameters, what kind of Shuttle would this be? Opinion
within NASA ranged from a Chevy to a Cadillac. Swashbucklers at headquarters
and elsewhere preferred a large Shuttle that would enjoy economies of scale and be
capable of carrying the Space Station components of the future. They were seconded
by officials of the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, Ala., builder of the Sat-
urn rocket. Marshall wanted a mandate to produce a large new engine. Flight spe-
cialists at the Manned Spaceflight Center in Houston knew that a smaller craft had
more manageable aerodynamic characteristics on re-entry and landing. Each of
these groups contributed to the designs that NASA ordered from contractors.
The din of competing proposals drowned out voices of caution within the agency.
In a journal article now famous in NASA circles, A.O. Tischler, head of the chemical
propulsion division of NASAs office of advanced research and technology, argued for
an evolutionary approach to the next generation of launch vehicles, as opposed to
the quantum leap favored by the band of brothers. The principal cost in space trans-
portation, he said, isnt hardware but people. The salaries of the 30,000 people
NASA employed at the Kennedy Space Center were almost half a billion dollars a
year, imposing an overhead cost of about $500 per pound on all launches. Add to
that the personnel costs at mission control in the Johnson Space Center, at the
tracking and telemetry stations around the world, and at all the other NASA facili-
ties, and the cost of a manned mission in space was higher than the projected costs
of the Shuttle, regardless of which sort of hardware was developed. What was need-
ed, Tischler insisted, was a better understanding of the cargo of the future, for the
type of launch vehicle would be determined primarily by the volume of traffic. Be-
fore making a precipitous, total-immersion dive into the future . . . it would be
23
shrewd to make sure first that we know how to swim, he argued. Once begun,
there is no way back.
The true believers would have none of this. They looked at the same evidence and
reached different conclusions. Tischler likened the propulsion problems of the Shut-
tle to those of the SST, which was then being hotly debated in the U.S.: If you fall
short of design requirements, you have the option of flying part of your passengers
all of the way or all of your passengers part of the way across the ocean.
Mueller looked at studies of the supersonic transport that predicted a market for
900 American SSTs in 1985, and extrapolated a market for 50 Space Shuttles. Obvi-
ously, something besides the data was driving perceptions of what to do next in
space.
The skeptics views were driven by experience. As they had learned in the Apollo
program, development on the cutting edge of technology always runs afoul of the
unexpected. It would be better, they believed, to move along incrementally and not
let predictions outrun data.
Wernher von Braun likened this go-slow approach to life on a cruise ship, prompt-
ing Paines injunction to swashbuckle. Buccaneers, said a NASA memorandum,
stake out and create powerful outposts of stability, sanity, and real future value
for mankind in the new uncharted seas of space and global technology.
The swashbucklers won out. Before Paine left NASA in 1970, the agency was
leaning toward not just a Space Shuttle, but a Cadillac of Space Shuttles. A fully
re-usable orbiter, about the size of a DC9 airliner, would be launched atop a first
stage that could also be flown back for re-use. A new engine producing 400,000 to
550,000 pounds of thrust would be developed for use on both vehicles. The orbiter
would have a life of 100 missions with only minor refurbishment between flights,
comparable to normal operations for commercial jets. It would carry a cargo weigh-
ing 65,000 pounds and measuring 15 feet in diameter and 60 feet in length. It would
be able to land on a conventional runway and fly again in two weeks. The price tag
was $10 billion to $14 billion for a vehicle to be ready in the mid-l970s.
The public attack on this plan sprang first from Capitol Hill. Senators Walter
Mondale, William Proxmire, Clifford Case, and Jacob Javits warned their colleagues
that the Shuttle was a cats-paw for a manned space extravaganza that would cost
between $20 billion and $25 billion. They cited distinguished space scientists like
James Van Allen and Thomas Gold, who said the U.S. had no compelling need or
use for such a vehicle, which they believed would drain money from other, worthier
space activities.
Joseph Karth, chairman of the House subcommittee on space sciences and appli-
cations and a NASA supporter, wondered if the proposed Shuttle was technically
feasible. This is going to be more difficult than most people on the Hill suspect or
NASA has led us to believe, he said. And anyone who tells you this can be done
for six or eight billion dollars is out of his mind.
These critics were drowned out by colleagues scrambling to get Shuttle business
for their districts or states. While few congressmen grasped the technological com-
plexity of the program, all of them readily understood its pork barrel potential.
The critics never had a chance, but they did wring some important commitments
from NASA. Most had to do with cost, which soon became the programs overriding
concern. During 1970, the agency brought the maximum price down from $14 billion
to less than $10 billion, and promised that even this sum would be amortized within
a decade by cheaper launches. In short, the Shuttle would pay for itself.
Still, it was left to the Office of Management and Budget to do most of the moder-
ating of NASAs lavish planning. Few OMB officials believed the U.S. needed a
Shuttle, and surely not the one NASA had in mind. But the key man at OMB, dep-
uty director Caspar Weinberger, disagreed. He wanted to proceed with a Shuttle,
but he let his staff negotiate NASA down to a cheaper model. In mid1971 OMB
informed NASA that its annual budgets during Shuttle development couldnt exceed
the 1971 level of $3.2 billion. That allowed for a Chevy, and a stripped-down one
at that.
But the Air Force refused to ride in a Chevy, and Air Force endorsement of the
Shuttle carried great weight in Congress, in the White House, and at OMB. To keep
that endorsement, NASA had to retain an expensive set of options, including the
65,000-pound payload capacity, an inertial upper stage for placing satellites in high
earth orbit, and a cross-range capability of 1,100 miles. (This meant that the craft
had to be able to fly 1,100 miles right or left of its space trajectory on re-entry,
which would give it the ability to land from almost any orbit. Only a delta-winged
vehicle could practically provide that flight characteristic. The simpler, straight-
winged vehicle NASA preferred could not.) But while the Air Force insisted on these
features, it refused to pay for them. NASA was caught in a cost squeeze from which
there seemed no escape.
24
At the insistence of OMB, NASA turned to a think tank for help with its financial
woes. It chose Mathematica, Inc., headed by Princeton economist Oskar
Morgenstern. Using data provided by prospective Shuttle contractors, Mathematica
concluded, just as NASA wanted, that the new vehicle would pay for itselfif it had
a launch rate of more than 30 flights a year, a very conservative estimate in those
heady times.
The Mathematica report strengthened NASAs hand, but it didnt carry the day.
Critics at OMB and the White House still doubted that the Shuttle was worthwhile.
In the closing months of 1971, Shuttle designs popped up and fell like ducks in a
shooting gallery. This one was too expensive. That one would take too long to de-
velop. The next one failed to meet the cross-range requirements of the Air Force.
A climactic meeting was arranged with Weinberger and OMB director George
Shultz. NASA Administrator James Fletcher came prepared to trade away the pay-
load capacity that NASA and the Air Force wanted. He was amazed to learn that
Nixon and his domestic policy adviser, John Ehrlichman, cognizant of both the up-
coming 1972 election and the boost the Shuttle would give the slumping aerospace
industry, had decided to approve the Shuttle with whatever payload bay NASA felt
necessary.
From this war of wills emerged a Shuttle that no one had willedexcept perhaps
the Air Force. Congress, OMB, the Air Force, and NASA had all pulled in different
directions: Congress toward cost recovery, OMB toward low development costs, the
Air Force toward operational capabilities, and NASA toward a future of manned
space flight. Instead of a horse, NASA got a camelbetter than no transportation
at all and indeed well suited for certain jobs, but hardly the steed it would have
chosen.
Fletcher rushed off to San Clemente to join Nixon at a press conference announc-
ing the decision to go ahead with the Shuttle and revealing its configuration. Nixon
promised the American people that the Shuttle would revolutionize space transpor-
tation and take the astronomical cost out of astronautics. Fletcher promised that
by the end of this decade the nation will have the means of getting men and equip-
ment to and from space routinely, on a moments notice, if necessary, and at a small
fraction of todays cost. The two men posed for reporters with a model of the Shut-
tle. But it was the wrong Shuttle. Fletcher had taken with hun an earlier version,
not the one that was eventually built. Plans called for a single-stage, only partly
re-usable Shuttle, fed by an expendable external tank.
In a curious piece of technical inconsistency, NASA promised two different costs
for orbiting payloads. Fletcher announced that the new Shuttle would put payloads
in orbit for $100 a pound, but he also claimed a cost of less than $10 million dollars
a flight, which yields a cost of something more than $150 a pound. Both figures
were dependent on a launch rate of 60 flights a year by 1985 and a two-week turn-
around time for refurbishing the orbiter. The first orbital test flight was projected
for March 1, 1978. The total development cost was put at $5.5 billion, subsequently
scaled down to $5.15 billion, with a 20 percent ceiling on overruns. This was about
half the development cost NASA had estimated for its fully reusable Shuttle.
NASA had gotten out of its bind by trading operational costs for development
costs. Except for a new engine, the launch vehicle would rely heavily on proved tech-
nologies. An expendable external tank and recoverable solid boosters would help
keep development costs below the ceiling set by OMB, although they would raise
the cost of each launch. But Mathematica had told NASA it would break even at
30 or more launches a year, and it was expecting 60 a year by 1985. There seemed
to be plenty of cushion. So NASA promised all things to all men.
Then it developed a management technique to match. Success-oriented manage-
ment is a euphemism for betting on the come. You assume everything will work
as designed, so you test only at the end, when the entire machine is put together.
This not only saves the time that would otherwise be spent on intermediary tests;
it also creates an aura of confidence. No tests, no failuresand absence of failure
is success.
A version of this technique had been used in the Apollo program. All-up testing,
as it was called then, delayed the final check-out of the three stages of the Apollo
launch vehicle until they were mated on the pad at Cape Canaveral. It succeeded
largely because expensive redundancies were built into Apollo and problems were
drowned in money. The Shuttle had no room for such luxuries.
For a while success-oriented management seemed to work. The first Shuttle or-
biter, named Enterprise in deference to Star Trek enthusiasts, rolled out within a
year of its scheduled completion date. No major shortcomings had come into public
view, and between 1974 and 1977 NASA had even absorbed more than $300 million
in OMB cut-backs in Shuttle funding.
25
Behind the scenes, however, normal development snags were taking their toll, and
NASAs reduced budget meant there was no money to prevent these snags from be-
coming big problems. Inevitably, the weight of the launch vehicle rose. Something
had to go. Two escape rockets on the orbiter were jettisoned, leaving the astronauts
locked onto the launch vehicle during lift-off. The auxiliary jet engines and their fuel
tank were scrapped, meaning that the Shuttle would have no fly-around capability.
A number of other features went by the boards, and with each deletion NASA
moved farther away from the spacecraft it had envisioned.
The public and Congress knew little of this. About the only public controversy was
stirred by an April 1977 report by the House Committee on Appropriations. Among
other things, it criticized NASA and the Rocketdyne Company for deciding to pro-
ceed with production of the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME), a decision the com-
mittee felt might have been influenced more on contract scheduling and costs than
the maturity of the design. Indeed, during 1977, the SSME began to experience an
ominous series of turbopump failures.
But in August of that year, the public watched Enterprisess first test flight large-
ly unaware of the problems mounting behind the scenes. The orbiter lifted off its
747 carrier with grace and conviction at 20,000 feet and glided down to a flawless
landing at Edwards Air Force Base. It looked like another virtuoso performance by
NASA, just what the public had come to expect from the folks that had given it
Apollo.
Then came 1978 and more engine failures. New rocket engines routinely have
taken more time and money to develop than expected and have been full of bugs.
But they usually end up delivering more power than specified. The development of
a new engine was a curious risk for NASA, and it was probably taken mainly to
give the Marshall Space Flight Center something to do. NASA compounded the risk
by betting that its new engine would deliver 109 percent of its rated capacity. In
a bargain-basement development program this gamble never had a chance. When
the Shuttle engines first went on the test stand, they couldnt deliver even 100 per-
cent of their rated capacity, but weight growth in the Shuttle demanded the full 109
percent if the craft was to perform its mission.
The engine was simply too advanced to work to full capacity the first time around.
In 1978, NASA couldnt get one to survive so much as a run-up on the test stand.
In five tests, four different engines and one turbopump were damaged, resulting in
four months of down time and $21 million in repairs and modifications. By the end
of the year, the illusion of NASAs infallibility was in tatters.
But its troubles were just beginning. Earlier manned spacecraft had solved the
problem of re-entry heating with ablative thermal surfaces, materials that eroded
during re-entry and carried the heat with them. Obviously this wouldnt do for a
craft that was to fly 100 missions. NASA turned to re-usable ceramic tiles, for which
it set breathtaking performance standards. The insulation not only had to weigh
just 1.7 pounds per square footthe highly advanced Apollo shielding had been 3.9
pounds per square footbut also had to fit the irregular contour of the Shuttle
body, withstand temperatures ranging up to 2,750 degrees, and be cheap.
Tiles made of rigidized silica fibers with borosilicate glass coating met all these
specifications. Some 31,000 of them, in black high-temperature and white low-tem-
perature versions, were ordered to cover the Shuttle fuselage save the areas of high-
est and lowest re-entry heat. The difficulties arose not with the insulating material
but with placing the tiles on the spacecraft. Each one had to be individually de-
signed, molded, machined, and applied to ensure that it met the exacting tolerances
set by NASA: for example, the gaps between tiles had to range from 0.025 to 0.075
of an inch.
NASA and Rockwell International, the contractor tiling the Shuttle, badly mis-
judged the task. Putting the tiles on Columbia, the first orbiter scheduled to fly in
space, ended up taking roughly 670,000 hours, or about 335 man-years. The craft
still lacked 10,000 tiles when Rockwell shipped it to Cape Canaveral in March 1979.
The missing tiles were air-shipped to Florida, where a motley team of Rockwell em-
ployees installed them at the rate of less than two tiles per man per week. At var-
ious times, college students, a few tomato pickers, hippies, and assorted smokers of
God-knows-what answered the Rockwell call for labor. Despite NASAs disclaimers,
it seems few had any incentive to work well or quickly. Some wanted the job to go
on indefinitelyand it almost did.
Then NASA concluded that the glue holding the tiles in place provided negative
margins of safety. So 25,000 of them were densifiedthat is, removed and
reglued with a densified bonding surface. What wasnt known was that the water-
proofing material applied overall was quietly dissolving the glue beneath the tiles
that werent densified.
26
While public and congressional attention shifted between the comic opera of tile
installation and the Chinese fire drill of failing engines, still another criticalal-
though less noticedshortcoming precluded launch of the first Shuttle in 1979, or
even 1980. Kenneth Cox, who was in charge of navigation, guidance, and control for
the Shuttle, says he couldnt have approved the Shuttle for flight in those years
without significant risk. He simply didnt trust the data he was getting from com-
puterized flight simulations. This would be the first spacecraft to carry a crew on
its maiden voyage. The astronauts safety would depend heavily on the reliability
of computer models and wind tunnel experiments. But computers are only as good
as the data and assumptions that go into them, and no wind tunnel in the world
was capable of duplicating the flight regime of the Shuttle. This craft had to go from
re-entry at 25 times the speed of sound to landing, one hour later, at about 200
m.p.h. Separate wind tunnels could re-create segments of that descent, but the tun-
nels had different characteristics and functioned at different Reynolds numbers. In
other words, you could find a slow wind tunnel to test a full-scale orbiter, and you
could find a fast tunnel to test a very small model of the Shuttle, but until the Shut-
tle itself flew you could never be sure that the test results were exactly comparable.
The Shuttle was known around NASA as the Flying Brickyard; it was Coxs job
to ensure that he had anticipated and built into the flight control system all the
characteristics of a brickyard traveling at Mach 25. And he had to program the five
on-board computers to check each other, identify mistakes, and overrule errant com-
mands. If the computer fails, said Cox, youve bought the farm. All this took
time. A lot of time.
Development dragged on past the original launch date of March 1, 1978 and into
1979. Congress began to ask embarrassing questions. Talk was heard in Wash-
ington of abandoning the Shuttle altogether, although most observers agreed that
it had really proceeded too far for that. Besides, whatever doubts there were about
the floundering project were obscured by a coating of SALT. The Air Force would
soon be dependent on the Shuttle to launch its space missions. The most impor-
tantand the most secrecy-shroudedof these involved the orbiting of reconnais-
sance satellites. If Shuttle operations were delayed further, the Air Force faced a
hiatus between the use of its last expendable launch vehicles and the availability
of the Shuttle. The Air Force, and indeed the entire intelligence community, dreaded
this prospect. Perhaps more important, so did Jimmy Carter, who in the spring of
1979 was concluding the SALT II treaty. He would have to convince a skeptical Con-
gress that the U.S. had the reconnaissance capability to verify Soviet compliance.
There could be no gap in launch vehicle availability.
The administration asked for more money for NASA in 1979, and Carter made
it clear that he wanted the Shuttle to get whatever funding was necessary in the
coming years to put it back on schedule. Congress went along because it had already
poured more than $10 billion into the project and because the military implications
were so serious. In 1979, General Lew Allen, the Air Force Chief of Staff, said,
Whatever else the Shuttle does and whatever other purposes it will have, the pri-
ority, the emphasis, and the driving momentum now has to be those satellite sys-
tems which are important to national security. For the first time since 1971, cost
was no longer the main determinant in Shuttle development.
NASA paid a price for this reversal of fortunes: the myth that the U.S. had an
independent civilian space program was irretrievably shattered. In Fiscal Year 1980
the military budget for space activities exceeded NASAs for the first time since the
beginning of the Apollo program. With the Pentagon now piping the tune on Shuttle
development, some observers wondered aloud if an independent civilian space agen-
cy could survive.
The infusion of money nevertheless had the desired effect. The first Shuttle flew
on April 12, 1981, somewhat reviving NASAs reputation and quieting public criti-
cism. Since that first launch, some three years late, the operational record of the
Shuttle has been improving steadily, if slowly. After four successful test missions,
the first operational flight went up on Nov. 11, 1982, and was followed by four mis-
sions in 1983 and four in 1984. Eight flights are scheduled for this yearof which
six had taken place when DISCOVER went to pressand 14 next. On the basis of
this record, NASA has sought and won Ronald Reagans approval to begin develop-
ment of the Space Station, the orbiting outpost the Shuttle was designed to serve.
The record of the Shuttle so far is decidedly mixed. The bad news is that its not
up to specifications. The solid rocket boosters came in over their design power, but
the troublesome main engines have yet to achieve the 109 percent of thrust NASA
anticipated. This shortfall, combined with weight growth on the launch vehicles, has
restricted payload capacity to 47,000 pounds instead of the specified 65,000. NASA
is developing a liquid boost module to add thrust on lift-off.
27
The turn-around time between the first and second Shuttle launches was four
months. The gap is now down to about two months, but the two weeks originally
projected seems impossible. Most Shuttle flights have landed at Edwards Air Force
Base, where the dry lake bed provides a cushion against the erratic behavior of the
landing gear. There are no plans to land on commercial runways; they are simply
too short. The shock and vibration of launch are taking a far higher toll on the main
engines than anticipated; it seems unlikely that any of them will survive NASAs
goal of 50 launches.
The first flights of Columbia, Challenger, and Discovery were late; Atlantis was
to be launched in early October. Many follow-on missions have been late as well;
five have been scrubbed altogether. Some satellites launched from the Shuttle have
been either lost entirely or placed in erroneous orbits, requiring depletion of their
limited fuel supplies to set them right. These mishaps werent the fault of the Shut-
tle, but the complete space transportation system has yet to achieve the reliability
of the expendable launch vehicles it replaced.
The good news is similarly compelling. Most of the shortcomings are under control
and getting better. The orbiter and the external tank are getting lighter. Launches
are more regular. Turn-around time is decreasing. The bugs that always infest new
technology are disappearing.
Even with the bugs, the Shuttle is the most sophisticated spacecraft ever flown,
a generation ahead of the rest of the world and the envy of all spacefaring nations.
Its main engines have the highest thrust-to-weight ratio of any ever developed; its
thermal protection is the lightest and most efficient ever flown. The Shuttle has re-
trieved satellites. It has served as a platform for astronauts repairing satellites in
place. It has provided capacity for scientific experiments on a scale that dwarfs the
capabilities of Apollo and the Soviet Soyuz. The Shuttle has more versatility and
potential than any other spacecraft ever flown, and it has also delivered on the
promise to routinize space flight.
Have the taxpayers, then, gotten their moneys worth? Ah, thats another ques-
tion. One answer is undoubtedly no. Another is surely yes. The choice between them
is philosophical and political more than it is technical.
Cost has driven the Shuttle from the outset. Cost dictated the shape and pace of
its development. Cost remains its only compelling raison detre. And cost is the prin-
cipal criterion by which it should be judged.
Judged on cost, the Shuttle is a turkey. The problem isnt that it cost too much
to develop, as OMB had feared, but that it costs too much to fly, which no one seems
to have anticipated. The Shuttle cost something like $14 billion (in 1985 dollars) to
develop, well within the budget and the 20 percent fudge factor predicted by NASA
in 1972.
But NASA also promised then to amortize the Shuttles development costs, what-
ever the total. That notion was abandoned years ago, and with it went the Shuttles
main initial selling point. By the time NASA went back to Congress for more money
in 1978, it had ceased to claim that the investment in the Shuttles development
would ever pay off. The Shuttle simply cant fly cheaply enough to turn a profit. No
one knows exactly how much a flight costs, but its nothing like the $10 million that
Fletcher predicted in 1972. Nor does payload fly at $100 per pound. In 1985 dollars,
these predictions convert into $25.8 million per launch and $258 per pound. Earlier
this year the Congressional Budget Office suggested five ways to compute the costs
of a Shuttle flight, and they ranged from one and a half to six times these pre-
dictions.
Accounting Meth. Cost per Launch Cost per Pound*
Short-run marginal cost $42 million $646/$893

Long-run marginal cost $76 million $1,169/$1,617
Average full operational cost $84 million $1,292/$1,787
Average full cost less development $108 million $1,662/$2,298
Average full cost $150 million $2,308/$3,191
*65,000 pound payload/47,000 pound payload
In 1972 Fletcher pegged the cost per pound of payload on a Saturn rocket at
$1,677 (in 1985 dollars). So if and when the Shuttle gets up to its rated payload
capacity of 65,000 pounds it will cost, under the most reasonable accounting method
(average full cost less development), about the same per pound as an Apollo launch
13 years ago.
Bad as it is that the American taxpayer wont be reimbursed for Shuttle develop-
ment, its worse still that more development money is being poured into the Shuttle
to bring it tip to specs. Worst of all, even when these investments are written off,
28
every Shuttle flight in 1986 will cost the American taxpayer a minimum of $50 mil-
lion. NASA Administrator James Beggs reported earlier this year that NASA was
budgeted on average $121 million for each of the 14 flights scheduled in 1986, four
and a half times the amount predicted by Fletcher in 1972. Since the commercial
rate to hire a completely dedicated Shuttle payload is $71 million, the American tax-
payer would subsidize Shuttle operations next year to the tune of $700 million if
all 14 flights were made and each earned its full commercial rate. In fact, fewer
than half the flights will earn the full commercial rate. Americans can look forward
to subsidizing all Shuttle missionsincluding foreign, commercial, and Air Force
flightsfor the foreseeable future. Like old John Henry, each Shuttle flight hauls
as many as 24 tons and what does it get? Another day older and deeper in debt.
Why not raise Shuttle fees? Simple. Ariane. While the U.S. was abandoning ex-
pendable vehicles and developing the Shuttle, the European Space Agency went
about developing its own launch vehicle. Now Ariane is operational and luring cus-
tomers away from the U.S. The Shuttle and Ariane are both heavily subsidized,
launching spacecraft for all corners at losses amounting, in the U.S. at least, to hun-
dreds of millions of dollars annually. (Ariane has no fixed pricing policy, so outsiders
cant be sure just what it charges for any given flight or how much it loses.)
Ariane handcuffs the U.S. If America continues to subsidize flights, it increases
the loss to the taxpayer. If it raises prices, it will lose businesseven U.S. busi-
nessto Ariane, which already includes among its customers GTE and Satellite
Business Systems, which is jointly owned by IBM and Aetna Life & Casualty. This
would reduce the number of Shuttle flights, which would increase the cost of each
flight, which would also increase the net loss to the taxpayer. In 1973 NASA envi-
sioned 60 Shuttle flights a year by the sixth year of operation. Mathematica pegged
the break-even point at more than 30 flights a year. Now NASA hopes to have 24
flights a year by the end of this decadebut dont bet on it.
In short, the Shuttle is an economic bust, with no prospect of making money. Its
the SST of space, a remarkable piece of technology that costs more than its worth
in the marketplace.
But cost, say Shuttle supporters, isnt the best criterion for judging the spacecraft.
In fact, they contend, the cost constraints that have crippled the program from the
outset account in large measure for the Shuttles development problems and dis-
appointing operations. Retired NASA engineer James Nolan goes so far as to say
that the American people got the Shuttle they deserved. Others are more cir-
cumspect. New technology, they argue, always entails the fits and starts that the
Shuttle has experienced, but the development must be done. The Europeans, the
Japanese, even the Chinesenot to mention the Sovietsare moving aggressively
into space, and if the U.S. wants to remain competitive it must invest in the future.
Furthermore, supporters contend, new uses for the Shuttle are just around the
corner. It has unique capabilities that may be very important in the commercializa-
tion of space. Orbital manufacturing of crystals, pharmaceuticals, and space struc-
tures can take advantage of near-zero gravity to achieve results impossible on earth.
Even tourism in space is now within reach; the Hyatt chain already has a commer-
cial featuring a future hotel in orbit. The prospects, say the Shuttle faithful, are lim-
ited only by our imagination. Mueller claimed in 1969 that the Space Shuttle, by
its very existence and economics, may generate the traffic it requires to make it eco-
nomical.
That kind of logic tends to get circular and metaphysical. You would only build
a Shuttle if you had some reason for sending men into space, but you cant know
all the masons until they get there. Christopher Columbus is the classic example
of this phenomenon. According to this line of thinking, you simply must bet on the
unknown occasionally, for even when predictions are wrong, the unexpected may
prove a greater blessing.
To date the Shuttle has found no gold in orbit. Nor is it likely to. A second-genera-
tion Shuttle may be necessary for the space transportation system to become truly
economical, but thats not to be the next step in space. When the Shuttle went oper-
ational in 1982, NASA began to argue that the orbiter opened the way to develop-
ment of the Space Station. The purpose of the Shuttle in the first place had been
to reduce the prohibitive costs of resupplying the Space Station. Of course, it hasnt
done that, nor does it have any prospects of doing that. The real cost of putting a
pound of payload in orbit is at the same prohibitive level as 16 years ago. But rather
than make good on its promise, rather than develop a second-generation Shuttle
that might prove profitable, NASA is pressing on with the Space Station.
Does Shuttle development, then, have anything to teach the U.S. as it embarks
on the development of a space station? It surely cant tell Americans what will hap-
pen, but it can offer a handful of cautionary thoughts. First, as Tischler warned in
1969, the desire of the aerospace industry, which includes members of government
29
agencies, to build exquisite and innovative equipment does not of itself justify
spending the taxpayers money. Second, beware of civil servants, however well in-
tentioned, who propose to swashbuckle with the public purse. Third, high technology
designed to cost will end up costing. And finally, progress is in the eye of the be-
holder.
Senator BROWNBACK. Good statements by all.

Lets run the clock at 7 minutes and then we can bounce back
and forth and probably go a couple of rounds here.
Ms. Smith, do we know what the cost per Shuttle flight is now?
Ms. SMITH. Thats not an easy question to answer. It depends on
how you look at it. There are two ways that those costs are usually
described. One is called average costs, and the other is called
marginal costs. The average costs essentially take the annual
Shuttle budget and divide it by however many flights there were
that year. So five flights or six flights, whatever, you just do the
math; it comes out to $400 million, $500 million a year.
Senator BROWNBACK. $400 to $500 million
Ms. SMITH. $400 to $500 million per flight, Im sorry.
Senator BROWNBACK.per flight.
Ms. SMITH. Yes.
The marginal costs are the additive costs of flying an additional
Shuttle mission in a given year, or the costs that you would save
if you did not fly a particular Shuttle mission. So it doesnt account
for the infrastructure cost, basically, of the Shuttle program.
NASA currently calculates the marginal costs of a Shuttle flight
at $115 million a year. Thats in full cost accounting.
Senator BROWNBACK. Okay.
Mr. Chase, what should the vision be as to why we are going to
space? If you were to articulate that in a way that the American
people would identify with, what would that vision be as to why
we should be going to space?
Mr. CHASE. I think the traditional reasons that have been put
forwardspin-offs and the valued education and the value for
international cooperationthose are all benefits, but those arent
the overall rationale for going to space. I dont think any one of
those can justify the expenditures and the programs.
I think theres something much bigger at stake here, and that is,
if you look historically, societies that have expanded their frontiers
are the ones that have prospered, the ones that have the energy
and the drive within that society to do other things, whether its
economically or other areas of success within that society. And I
think that as soon as the society begins to or stops exploring and
stops opening that frontier, they begin to risk some long-term detri-
mental effects. Thats not something youll see in 5 or maybe even
10 years, but you have a long-term detrimental effect that will im-
pact society. So I think that thats one of the motivating factors,
that that is a hallmark of societies that are successful and are lead-
ers in their world. So I think thats an important reason.
Clearly, there are a lot of outstanding benefits to the motivation
aspect in terms of motivating the next generation of explorers, the
next generation of scientists and engineers, and, frankly, for that
matter, the next generation of business leaders and lawyers and
anyone else who may be engaged in that business or aspire to a
higher calling.
30
So theres a lot of reasons to go. I dont think theres any single

reason that is a
Senator BROWNBACK. But how would you articulate it to the
American people? If we continue forward, this is billions of dollars
annually, how would you articulate it?
Mr. CHASE. I think you would articulate it by saying that this
is important to the future of ournot just our society, but even in
some ways our civilization, to continue being a leader in the world.
And its important for their kids to have opportunities that they see
a hope for the future.
You know, theres not a lot that we look at that says, Heres the
vision for 10 years down the road. Theres something hopeful that
you may be able to step foot on another planet or another plan-
etary body and have the chance to experience something that no
human has experienced before, to have experiences that nobodys
ever had before. I think that can be a very motivating factor for
a child or even for someone today who is interested in that field.
Senator BROWNBACK. So its to open space for the vision of hu-
manity as always pressing forward?
Mr. CHASE. It really is. There are economic reasons, there are so-
cial reasons, but its a continuous expansion of our frontiers and of
our understanding of society and then obviously the benefits
through technology that accrue to the society thats used to do that.
Senator BROWNBACK. Dr. Roland, how would you answer that
question? Whats the vision for why we should be pursuing space?
Dr. ROLAND. There are two things. I think it is important to do
exploration in space. But its my very strong belief that any explo-
ration that you want to do in space with our current technology,
you will achieve far more with automated spacecraft than you will
with people. Any mission you do in space costs ten times as much
if you send people along. So if you want to go to Mars and explore,
you can send 10 unmanned missions for the price of one manned
mission. And the main purpose of the manned mission becomes
simply returning the humans.
Im not saying thats an unimportant national goal. It is inspira-
tional and exciting, but its kind of a feel-good space program. And
right now I dont feel very good about our space program.
I think we get much more sustained payoff, and we have consist-
ently over the last 40 years, from our automated spacecraft. Weve
spent two-thirds of our budget on manned space flight, and were
doing basically what we were doing 40 years ago. We send astro-
nauts up into low-earth orbit and they float around and come back.
And its our unmanned spacecraftthe communications satellites,
the applications satellites, the reconnaissance satellites, the deep-
space probestheyre the ones that have given us all the payoff.
So I think if we want to tell the American people that the space
program is good for them, thats where we should be making our
investment.
Senator BROWNBACK. If you based it on scientific discovery of
whats taking place, you would stand by your previous com-
ment
Dr. ROLAND. Absolutely.
Senator BROWNBACK.and can you quantify that?
31
Dr. ROLAND. Yes. I recommend to you an exercise. I tried a short

time ago to find any scientific results from Shuttle or Space Station
research that was written up in refereed scientific journals. It
doesnt appear there, because it isnt important science. All the
science that NASA gets published in the best journals is coming
from the automated spacecraft.
Now, the one exception to that is there are some human physi-
ology experiments that are written up, but thatsagain, its sort
of a circular argument. Were going to send people in space so they
can learn to survive in space in case we ever find anything for
them to do in space.
Senator BROWNBACK. Ms. Smith, what would your comment be
about the scientific information that were getting? Does it come
more from the manned or from the unmanned launches?
Ms. SMITH. There is scientific information that comes from both
human and robotic spaceflight. I do have to agree with Dr. Roland
that it is difficult to point to some breakthrough scientific discovery
that can be directly traced to the presence of humans in space.
There have been many space stations, both on the American side
and on the Russian side, and Shuttle flights and all sorts of other
flights. They do gather a great deal of data about biology, which
is useful if you are going to continue launching humans into space.
They also learn things that can be applied here on Earth. So there
are medical advances that other scientists say have developed be-
cause of the space program.
But critics of the space program argue that those advances would
have been made anyway, even if you had not been launching hu-
mans into space, and they might have been made sooner if you had
not devoted the sums of money to the space program and you had
devoted them to earth-based research instead.
But there is scientific data that comes back from the human
space flights, and theres a lot of data that comes back from the
robotic flights.
Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chase, your response? And then I want
to go to Senator Breaux.
Mr. CHASE. Well, I think the debate between humans versus ro-
bots is actually a little bit of a false argument. I think that any
space program is a balanced approach. You have both human ex-
ploration and you have robotic exploration. Theres no doubt that
there are destinations in our solar system that a human will prob-
ably never, ever be able to set foot, and robots are going to be a
critical role in that exploration.
But theres also things that robots will never be able to do with
current technology or even technology in the mid- to long-term fu-
ture that humans will have to fulfill. Theres a certain amount of
interaction with the environment, the mobility, the dexterity, the
response time that a human possesses. A robot can be sitting on
the surface of a planet and not know whats sitting behind it unless
its turned that direction by an operator; and, even then, they may
not know exactly what it is. It takes a human to get down there
and interact with that object or that environment to understand
whats going on.
Now, the other thing that I think puts this in perspective is, I
would proffer an exercise as well. I would challenge any earth-
32
based scientist that does work in a laboratory and ask them,

Would you be willing to substitute a robot for the work youre
doing in your laboratory? And I dare say the answer is no, they
would not be willing to do that, because they know they can
achieve more with humans in that loop and in that capacity.
Today we have the technology to replace humans to go to Antarc-
tica with probes and robotic measuring systems. We dont do that.
We could send probes to the bottom of the ocean, but we dont do
that. We send humans. So theres a reason that scientists in the
scientific arena have humans in the loop, per se, in those discov-
eries.
Senator BROWNBACK. Senator Breaux?
Senator BREAUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel
for their testimony.
Dr. Roland, are you saying that this particular Space Shuttle is
defective, or do you think that any reusable Space Shuttle that is
manned is not the proper approach? I mean, is this one uniquely
defective in what you think, or do you think that if we did a
VentureStar or a type of program which was a different type of re-
usable vehicle, that that could be okay, it could be a better way of
doing it? Or do you just fundamentally think that the reusable
manned space vehicle is not the right way to go?
Dr. ROLAND. I think this one is uniquely defective, and I think
its conceivable that the reusable idea could still work. And I think
NASA was fully justified in pursuing it. It seemed like a good idea
at the time. What we underestimated was the wear and tear on the
spacecraft that requires such an extensive amount of maintenance
and wears out the spacecraft faster than we thought. That eco-
nomic model doesnt work.
Also, at the time, NASA was basing all its projections on an un-
realistic economic model of how many flights there would be. And
those two things together make this particular reusable not work-
able.
And I think we just dont know if we can design and operate a
robust reusable that will have a lifetime that will really make it
worthwhile. It might be that theres some combination of the two
where our orbiter is reusable but it launches on an expendable, and
that the cost balance might show up there.
Im just encouraging them to take the experience weve gained
from the Shuttle, which is not trivial, and design a better launch
vehicle.
Senator BREAUX. How much of your concerns with this particular
Shuttle are because of the way it is launched through the rocket
type of launch as opposed to like a regular airplane, which would
be a suborbital type of operation?
Dr. ROLAND. Right, I think if we could build a small orbiter that
could be launched from an airplane, at least theoretically that
sounds much more appealing. Of course the whole problem is that
when any launch vehicle lifts off the ground, it has to carry all the
fuel it needs to get into orbit, so the enormous cost is in the first
100 feet and then it starts going down rapidly after that. So if we
can develop another launch vehicle thatll get the orbiter up to a
level where its only a hop into space, then we have an entirely dif-
ferent technological model.
33
Senator BREAUX. Is it your understanding that NASA, at this

point, really doesnt have any plans to look at an alternative type
of vehicle and theyre now planning to use this one through the
year 2020?
Dr. ROLAND. Thats what they told us in the fall. We were wait-
ing to see what they were going to do about the Shuttle fleet. And
their solution was to try and prolong its life and defer, essentially,
development of a replacement launch vehicle. And I think thats
the great problem. Im not opposed to the program theyve designed
in general or manned space flight in general. Its just that this is
not the vehicle thats going to achieve our objectives for us.
Senator BREAUX. From your knowledge, what type of vehicle
would be an option, and what would that option look like?
Dr. ROLAND. I tend to think that we ought to separate cargo and
people, and that we need a small orbiter to take people into and
out of space. Thats the vehicle in which we should invest all the
safety and life-support systems, and we just make it as safe as we
possibly can, but make it smaller, just to carry the people. Then
we have separate automated launch vehicles; they can be either ex-
pendable or reusable launch vehicles, the heavy-lift vehicles, the
trucks that carry the material up there. The astronauts meet them
in orbit and do their business and then the astronauts come back
safely. And then you have a vehicle thats not only a launch vehicle
for the astronauts and much safer, but its an emergency crew re-
turn vehicle, as well, and you solve two problems at once.
Senator BREAUX. So youre not really saying that we just
shouldnt do manned space flights at all. Youre just separating the
vehicle that takes humans up from a separate vehicle that perhaps
would be used for heavier payloads and would not necessarily have
to have the extreme human safety precautions maintained.
Dr. ROLAND. Yes, this is what we do with our expendable launch
vehicles. This is what the Air Force does. You accept a certain
amount, a certain probability of failure. In other words, if you get
up to 95, 96, 97 percent success rate, its economically infeasible to
try and get that any higher, and so you accept an occasional loss
of one of those launch vehicles. But we cant do that with people.
And so we ought to separate those two functions have a much high-
er safety standard for the smaller and lighter vehicle just to get the
people and down.
Senator BREAUX. Mr. Chase and Ms. Smith, can you comment on
that? Mr. Chase, you were talking about how you need humans in
space, but it seems like what Dr. Roland is really suggesting is
that you would still have humans in space; you would just have a
different vehicle for getting there and then youd have a different
vehicle for the heavier payloads that would be necessarily utilized
in space. Do you have any comments on that?
Mr. CHASE. Yes, sir. Although I dont agree with Mr. Rolands
contention on some of the lack of the value of the Shuttle at this
present time, I think that we actually have a lot of areas of agree-
ment in terms of where this ought to go. And some of the items
that I outlined in my testimony are a three-stage approach that
NASA is planning for their future space transportation needs.
What NASA has finally realized, and the space community has re-
alized, is that we cant take this jump in one bite, so to speak, in
34
one step. We cant go just straight from the old system to a brand
new system that is a single-stage to orbit that incorporates all the
latest technology.
What weve realized is that we have to do an evolutionary ap-
proach. And the evolutionary approach is we continue to use the
Shuttle for the duration needed to finish the Space Station. The
next step is, you do exactly what Mr. Roland mentioned, which is
put a crew transfer system in place that can take the burden off
of the Shuttle to transfer a crew to and from the Space Station and
be used for future missions. And then the next stage is that crew
transfer system could become part of a next-generation launch
technology. So you have a three-pronged approach to this problem.
And I do
Senator BREAUX. Of course, the problem, at least in my informa-
tion from NASA, is theyre not thinking in that terms right now.
Were talking about until year 2020 using the Space Shuttle as
both a human delivery system as well as a cargo delivery system.
And theres not a lot on the books right now, from the standpoint
of looking at the next generation. Its just not even being started
yet.
Mr. CHASE. They did have a restructuring of their Space Launch
Initiative program, which was to address the next-generation sys-
tem. And out of that program is the orbital space plane and what
theyre calling next-generation launch technology, which is being
done in conjunction with the Department of Defense.
I think I mentioned in my oral testimony that thats an impor-
tant relationship to develop, and I think its important for this rea-
son. The DoD has a very strong track record in developing X vehi-
cles and test vehicles for their eventual systems. And I think thats
important element that has been missing in some of NASAs ef-
forts. We try to go too quickly to an operational system, or just do
one X vehicle and all the technology is thrown into that one sys-
tem. And I think a multiple approach, where we test technology on
a variety of X vehicles and have the experience from DoD in doing
that, will go a long way to solving that problem.
Senator BREAUX. Okay, those are good suggestions.
Thank you very much, both of you.
Senator BROWNBACK. Let me ask youyouve got some good
thoughts, but I want to hearWe hear a number of different
schools of thought. Theres been, I think, a beautiful public debate
thats taken place since this last Shuttle disaster about doing more
space probes. Everybody agrees we should be in space. Should we
be doing more unmanned? More manned? Should we be going back
to the moon and colonizing the moon? Should we be going to Mars
and beyond? Great debate, and the sort of thing we really ought
to be talking about in broad scale, and Im delighted were having
that sort of discussion.
Ms. Smith what is the rationale? If we were to say to the people
that are most supportive of this, we need to go to the moon and
establish a long-term presence, an exploration presence, on the
moon, whats the major reason for us to do that?
Ms. SMITH. Well, there are advocates of returning humans to the
moon that would say that you could use the lunar surface as a
place for scientific observatories, you could put telescopes on the far
35
side of the moon, you could mine the moon for helium-3 and bring
it back to earth and use it for fusion reactors.
Senator BROWNBACK. Im sorry, for what?
Ms. SMITH. Helium-3 and use it for fusion reactors. There are
others who would like to put solar power systems on the moon and
beam the energy back to earth. So there are a number of concepts
out there for practical utilization of the lunar surface. And if you
also wanted to commit to sending humans to Mars someday, then
you might set up fuel production sites on the moon using the lunar
materials to produce the fuel that you would need to go to Mars.
So the visionaries in the space field lay out a number of scenarios
as to why it is that you might want to go back to the moon.
There are others, however, who feel that weve been to the
moonBeen there, done that, dont need to go back again. That
we really need is a commitment to going to Mars. In fact, some of
the Apollo astronauts who have been to the moon have that point
of view. They see going out to other places in the solar system as
part of this destiny to explore, and they feel that we need to move
on from what we did in the 1960s and start a new quest to send
humans to Mars.
Senator BROWNBACK. Whats the purpose of going to Mars?
Ms. SMITH. Exploration. To set up settlements there. Again, to do
scientific research, to do a lot of geological research. They make the
argument that Mr. Chase was making earlier, that if you have hu-
mans on site, that theyre much better at doing science than robots
because theyre adaptable. When you send a robotic probe to some
distant destination, if you havent programmed it with the informa-
tion it needs, then its not going to be able to adapt to changing
circumstances, whereas people can.
So those who argue in favor of sending people to Mars want the
people there on site, because the feeling is that they can do better
scientific exploration there. They can look at the geological sites
and decide which rocks are the most important, as former Senator
Schmitt did when he was on the moon in Apollo 17, because he was
a geologist and he was trained to do that. So people see that as,
sort of, the added value of having people there, that you can get
more bang for your buck even though the bucks are so much great-
er when youre including humans.
Senator BROWNBACK. The cost of doing an unmanned mission to
Mars versus a manned mission to Mars, do we have any idea of
what factor were looking at?
Ms. SMITH. There are a number of ranges of cost estimates for
sending people to Mars. Theres a gentleman whos very enthusi-
astic about this, Bob Zubrin, who has very low cost estimates. I be-
lieve its in the $10 billion range. And when NASA was last asked
the question back when President Bush gave his speech in 1989,
they came up with a program that was about $400 billion.
The robotic probeshow expensive they are depends on how fo-
cused they are in their missions. But theyre probably, you know,
$100 million, something like that. Its a vast difference.
Senator BROWNBACK. Dr. Roland, give me your perspective on
why we should or shouldnt go back to the moon or to Mars.
Dr. ROLAND. If the moon were paved in diamonds, it would cost
more to go get them than theyre worth here on Earth. One of the
36
reasons we havent gone back to the moon is that we discovered

nothing there worth going back for. It is true that you could do
some science there and you could do some experiments, but nothing
where the payoff is anywhere near the cost. And I think the same
thing is true in Mars.
This notion that humans, in situ, do better research than ma-
chines, I think is simply not true. I dont know of any particular
activity that a human is going to do on Mars that a machine cant
do. Remember, our machines are controlled from earth. We send
them out, and we tell them what to do. We dont have to pre-pro-
gram. We direct them around. We have them get samples.
Twenty-five years ago, NASA could have sent an automated
probe to Mars to take soil samples and bring them back. We could
have it down in the Air and Space Museum now. And we havent
done those automated missions that we ought to be doing.
I have no doubt that someday humans will go to Mars, and well
probably go back to the moon, and well probably colonize the moon
or Mars or some other place in space, but not with the technology
that we have now. What we have now is a technology that allows
us to do an enormous amount of scientific exploration, and thats
being cut off while we float astronauts around in near-earth orbit.
Its just an imbalance of our priorities.
I agree that the space program has to have some balance of pri-
orities, but throughout NASAs history its been spending two-
thirds of its money on manned space flight and we get very little
payoff from that.
Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chase, I want to give you a chance to
respond to any of those comments, please.
Mr. CHASE. I think that theres another avenue of this discussion
thats worth having, as well, because I think that you can make the
case that there are reasons to go back to the moon and go to Mars,
and I also believe that we will be doing that at some point down
the road. However, I think theres another consideration, which is
it may be better for NASA to build capabilities that allow us to
make decisions when were ready to make those choices.
For example, low-cost access to space is a critical part of what-
ever sort of mission youre planning, whether its to launch a probe
to do an environmental study of the earth, whether its a military
satellite, whether its a mission to the Space Station, whether its
a mission to the moon or to Mars. And so low-cost access to space
is a major part of any sort of an element of future space explo-
ration.
Another good example is, NASA has begun a look at nuclear pro-
pulsion and power, Project Prometheus, that is in the Fiscal Year
2004 budget proposal. That is a capability that is critical to both
human and robotic probes. That is a capability that will allow us
to go places in the solar system we just cant go with chemical rock-
ets. And thats a capability that can be built for a number of appli-
cations, and then when we decide and make a decision about where
to go, we can apply those capabilities to those missions.
Now, there is somewhat of a danger in establishing a single des-
tination for the program. Obviously, that gives you the ability to
rally behind that destination, and theres a lot of very attractive
reasons to do that, and thats probably the direction most people
37
think of today is saying lets go back to a single place. But if you

apply all of your resources and all of your technology behind a sin-
gle destination and you either never get that mission going or it
has a failure en route, youre left with nothing in the inventory for
you to do next. So thats why theres a rationale and a growing
sense, even at NASA by Administrator OKeefe, that we need to
build capabilities to do a number of missions, and then as those
missions come about, assemble those capabilities into the space-
craft that can achieve that mission.
Senator BROWNBACK. In my discussions with the Administrator
and with other people that have thought about the space program,
a number of them will identify that we will need to build the capac-
ity to travel in space and thats what our objective should be. We
need to build the capacity that we could get to and from Mars in
a relative period of time so that humans could take it, and have
the capacity to do it. We dont necessarily need to say right now
that our objective is to go back to the moon or to Mars, but we need
to be able to build the capacity. Wed probably test that technology
and use it through the unmanned to build up the capacity where
we could do it in a manned capacity. But our objective isnt to go
to the moon or to Mars. Its to open up space for human exploration
for humanity, how do you react to that?
Dr. ROLAND. It seems to me that there is a tendency to associate
our current space age with the age of Columbus, and I think its
the wrong analogy. Were in the age of Leif Ericsson. We have
managed to get to the moon, but we dont have a robust technology
and a robust infrastructure which will allow us to stay there and
exploit and create a permanent presence there. Our effort ought to
be invested in developing that capability and infrastructure, not in
trying to demonstrate that we can do a technological feat.
I think it was very important, in the context of the Cold War,
to send humans to the moon as a demonstration of our techno-
logical prowess. But I dont think we have to prove anything any-
more. I think we have to have a rational space program that builds
up the infrastructure that will allow us to do all of these things in
space, and were not doing it now. Were spending our money flying
astronauts around and not developing the launch vehicles we need
for the future.
Ms. SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I cant resist bringing to your atten-
tion a study that was done in 1985 to 1986, with which I was asso-
ciated, from the National Commission on Space, called Pioneering
the Space Frontier. And the overarching theme of that report was
that we should open up the solar system for science, exploration,
and development. And the space transportation system laid out in
there, which was called the Bridge Between Worlds, was, in fact,
a series of spacecraft that went on interlocking orbits so that you
could access Mars and the areas around Mars basically anytime
you wanted to.
So there are folks who have thought about these things for a lot
of years. The problem has always been money. Theyre very expen-
sive to do, and the Nation has other priorities.
And what many people who are proponents of human space flight
have been searching for has been that catalyzing effect that would
make it imperative for America, or for planet Earth, to go out there
38
and do it again. We had that compelling reason to go to the moon.

And, as Dr. Roland said, its hard to find that compelling reason
to send humans to Mars because of the expense involved in it.
So I think on various bookshelves around town and around the
country youd find a lot of studies that came out with ideas of how
you could accomplish this.
One of the concerns of the Commission on Space was that they
didnt want to do another Apollo program, which was a dead-ended
program. You went there, you picked up a rock, you came home,
and it was done with. They wanted to establish that infrastructure
so that you could go, not once, but repeatedly, over and over again,
that you had that infrastructure in place. The problem has always
been the funding for it.
Senator BROWNBACK. Youre talking about a catalyzing event.
Are we coming upon one if the Chinese launch into space? Weve
had testimony in this Committee that they will shortly thereafter
announce that they are going to the moon and to stay.
Dr. ROLAND. I can remember debating with former NASA Admin-
istrator Dan Goldin, who was making the same argument ten years
ago, threatening that if we gave up our lead in human exploitation
of space, the Japanese were going to move ahead of us and that
they had a manned space program.
It is a bad way to make our national policy to think that these
symbolic programs are the best way to proceed into the future. We
have 40 years of experience in space now. We really know what
works and doesnt work, and we dont have to put on demonstration
programs to prove were better than other people. We just have to
develop a rational program that will achieve our goals.
My historical explanation for why were in this dilemma now is
what I call the barnstorming era of space flight. We are now in
the era of space flight which is analogous to barnstorming in the
1920s. Weve learned how to fly, but we didnt have any idea what
to do with the capability. So we would go out to the annual picnic
and take Aunt Emma up for a trip. Right now we are just showing
off in space that we know how to fly. It was in the 1930s, when
the airplane turned into a commercially useful tool and a militarily
useful tool. Then it started to develop its own technological trajec-
tory. We dont have such a trajectory now for manned spaceflight.
Senator BROWNBACK. But would we, Dr. Rolandif we, though,
continued to go out for the Aunt Emma picnic
Dr. ROLAND. Right, uh-huh.
Senator BROWNBACK.and watch the launch and come back
Dr. ROLAND. Right.
Senator BROWNBACK.wont we learn as we go along? Then well
be able to get to a point that we find, a very good logistical, mili-
tary, commercial reasons for us to be up on the moon on a perma-
nent basis. If were up there knocking around and exploring, will
we find things that we hadnt thought of previously? Isnt that ac-
tually even the truth of most of human discovery? Is you go not be-
cause you particularly know why youre going, or what youre going
to get, but once you get there, you find out that what you come
back with, the reasoning is far different, but very important?
Dr. ROLAND. Senator, I agree completely, and weve been doing
this for 40 years, and weve found out what works: unmanned com-
39
munications satellites, unmanned reconnaissance satellites, earth

resources satellites, scientific probes. We have a whole repertoire of
space activity that works and is of proven productivity and useful-
ness. It hasnt happened with people yet.
Now, Im not saying that we should stop sending people, but we
havent had that catalytic event where people have demonstrated
that theyre indispensable to some very useful activity in space. I
think one of the reasons is that we dont have the right infrastruc-
ture.
If we could put people in space for free, there would be lots of
things for them to do up there which would be worth the cost. If
it costs a billion dollars to put them in space, there arent very
many things up there that are worth the cost.
And, with all due respect to Marcia, I would maintain that $1
billion is a much better estimate of what a Shuttle flight really
costs, including the total overhead. I can give you a citation on
that. And thats $1 billion a flight if you dont include amortization
of the development costs.
When NASA proposed the Shuttle, it said it was going to be so
cheap that it was going to amortize its development costs in the
first 12 years. Of course, it never did. So you should, actually, be
putting amortization of development costs into the cost of a Shuttle
flight. And if you do that, the number is $1.7 billion a flight. But
I think $1 billion is a good rough figure for what its really costing.
So its a very expensive proposition to be putting people up there.
As a matter of fact, the space telescope is my favorite example. Its
used as an exemplar of how useful manned space flight is. Well,
we could have had two or three space telescopes for the price of the
program we have, because were spending all that money every
time we go up to repair it. Wed be much better off having several
automated space telescopes. Theyd be in a more useful orbit,
theyd be of a more practical design, and we wouldnt be tied down
to the Shuttle as we are now.
Senator BROWNBACK. Some observers have suggested that NASA
should explore developing a replacement for the Space Shuttle in-
stead of trying to extend the existing program and complementing
it with an orbital space plane. What are the challenges to this ap-
proach? And do you support going that way?
Mr. Chase?
Mr. CHASE. I believe that the Shuttle has inherent capabilities
that need to be maintained to complete the Space Station, first and
foremost. The remaining components of the Space Station are in
most of them are at the Kennedy Space Center in Florida waiting
for launch, and those can only be launched on the Space Shuttle.
You can argue that that was a design flaw, that we should have
allowed those components to be flown in other systems, but the bot-
tom line is if we intend to complete the Space Station, we have to
have the Shuttle to do that. And there are a lot of things that have
been neglected in the investments that need to be made in the
Shuttle infrastructure, both the vehicles themselves and the infra-
structure at the Kennedy Space Center and other NASA centers
that support the Shuttle.
And thats been done to some degree, because theres been a
sense of an either/or proposition, that if youre going to fund the
40
Shuttle, you cant do next-generation launch investment; or if

youre going to do next-generation launch investment, you have to
starve the Shuttle. And that is not the case. You can do both.
And, in fact, there are a lot of ways to integrate the Shuttle pro-
gram into next-generation systems and research. For example, the
Shuttle can be used as a test bed for some of the new technologies
that are being looked at for next-generation systems.
So I think you have to have a period where youre flying the
Shuttle, youre also flying an orbital space plane, which is kept as
simple as possible, to do the crew transfer, and then youre also
doing investment in the next-generation systems.
The key is I believe that NASA has matured its thinking of the
point to know that we do have to have that balanced parallel ap-
proach, rather than simply embarking on a single replacement sys-
tem and then when that fails we not only have not upgraded the
Shuttle, but we dont have a replacement system to replace it.
Going back, as well, to the exploration discussion, I think that
there has been a maturing of the thinking that we cant have a
mission simply to go there, that we have to have to build the infra-
structure and build the capability that lets us do missions long-
term, not just a flags and footprint type program, which is what
a lot of people describe Apollo as being.
So I think we have a phased approach that involves multiple sys-
tems being brought online.
Senator BROWNBACK. Weve been joined by a person with per-
sonal experience, Mr. Nelson, Senator Nelson of Florida. The floor
is yours to ask questions.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Roland, I did not see you, because I was looking straight at
a TV camera. Were you the Dr. Roland that was on a CBS program
with me?
Dr. ROLAND. Yes, sir.
Senator NELSON. I guess I dont remember2 months ago, or so.
Dr. ROLAND. Yes, something like that. Thats right.
Senator NELSON. You made a statement, and I heard it through
my earpiece, that the Rogers Commission had recommended that
the Space Shuttle be terminated.
Dr. ROLAND. I believe what I saidwhat I meant to say and
what I said in my prepared testimony herewas that the Rogers
Commission said, Do not make the Shuttle the mainstay of your
launch capability. In other words, they were encouraging NASA,
not to stop flying, but to get on with developing a stable of launch
vehicles where you could choose the vehicle best adapted for any
particular mission.
Senator NELSON. And that was clearly the conclusion as a result
of the Challenger tragedy
Senator NELSON.17 years ago, was that instead of the Space
Shuttle being the space transportation system which it was
thought to be, that you would use the Space Shuttle primarily
where you needed the human in the loop, and you would use ex-
41
pendable rockets to put up other payloads that you did not need
the human in the loop. That was the final result.
Dr. ROLAND. I went back and looked at the Rogers Commission
report, last night, in fact, and that isnt exactly what they said.
They took their charge very seriously, and it was only to advise
NASA on what to do about the Shuttle program. So they were very
cautious about what this other stable of launch vehicles should be.
I am quite sure that in their press discussions surrounding the re-
lease of the report, they did say that they thought there should be
another stable of launch vehicles. And I dont think they limited
manned space flight to the Shuttle. I think they were anticipating
a follow-on manned launch vehicle.
Senator NELSON. And 17 years later, here we are.
Dr. ROLAND. Here we are, thats right. Yes, sir.
Senator NELSON. And we dont have one.
Senator NELSON. I would hope that we would accelerate those
technologies, and Ive been kind of nipping at the heels of the Ad-
ministration to try to get them to do that and not to look to NASA
as the sole source of the funding for developing new technologies
since, in fact, other agencies clearly have an interest in this, as
well.
Dr. ROLAND. I agree completely.
Senator NELSON. Other agencies, I might say, that are a lot more
flush with cash than is NASA.
Senator NELSON. Well, as you look from the experience of what
we learned 17 years ago and some of the mistakesnow, Mr.
Chairman, you might want to rein me in, because I might be get-
ting far afield. Youre talking basically about the future of manned
space flight, so I will ask questions that are directly related to
thatNASA learned a number of lessonsand I would address
this to each of the three17 years ago, NASA learned a number
of lessons, and it wasnt only about cold weather stiffening rubber-
ized gaskets, but it was also about mistakes in human communica-
tion, where communication is like water; its really easy to flow
from the top down, but its not necessarily as easy to flow from the
bottom up. Do you think that NASA learned those lessons and
practiced those learned lessons on into this experience?
Dr. ROLAND. I think they learned them and then forgot them
again. I think the Columbia accident was very similar to the Chal-
lenger accident in the sense that it was a systemic flaw within the
system. It was a stressed system in which the operators were pro-
ceeding with inadequate resources for what they were trying to do.
They performed heroically, but they had more problems in the sys-
tem than they had resources to fix, and that meant looking the
other way when a lot of problems arose. And when problems arose,
stick your head in the sand and hope for the best. Thats what hap-
pened on Challenger, and thats what happened on Columbia.
Senator NELSON. What do you think, Ms. Smith?
Ms. SMITH. Well, I dont mean to put you off, Senator, but I think
that until the Columbia Accident Investigation Board determines
exactly what went wrong, we arent going to know the answer to
that question.
42
Senator NELSON. Mr. Chase?

Mr. CHASE. I have to agree with Marcia that we wont know the
answers until the investigation is finished. I can certainly offer
some preliminary assessments that I believe to be the case.
Ive had the privilege of working at the Johnson Space Center,
Ive worked for a NASA contractor, Ive lived in the community
around Kennedy Space Center, and so Ive observed NASA from a
variety of angles, both from within the agency and outside.
I think with Challenger, and certainly as your experience with
the agency would probably concur, there were a series of severe en-
demic problems within the agency that resulted in the Challenger
disaster. There was a problem of suppression of information from
the top, an active suppression of information.
I think in Columbia, to date, we have not seen that there has
been an active suppression of the information. You can debate
whether or not certain pieces of information were elevated properly
from within management and engineering, it seems, but I have not
seen evidence, to date, that indicates that there was an active ef-
fort to squelch that discussion.
The what-if-ing scenarios of what happens to a vehicle and what
happens to systems goes on on every single mission. I had the op-
portunity to work console for three different Shuttle missions while
I worked for the Space Station Program, and thats part of what
you do, is you understand the details of what happens to that vehi-
cle and what happens to those systems, and you go the absolute
worst-case scenarios, and you talk about those. It just happens that
e-mail now puts that down on paper, and some of that is now
transmitted and can be taken out context.
So I think thats a difference in those two areas. Im sure that
well find areas that need to be improved, and those improvements
certainly need to be made. But I think that is a very dramatic dif-
ference between the two incidents.
Senator NELSON. The question of photographs, Ms. Smith, what
do you think? Looks like NASA is going to be taking photographs,
if such an occurrence should occur in the future. What do you think
about whether or not they should have taken photographs this
time?
Ms. SMITH. Well, again, Senator, not to put you off, but I dont
think CRS would take a position one way or the other. I think
NASA has explained itself. It said that it had gotten photographs
in the past and had not found them particularly helpful in trying
to determine whether or not there had been missing tiles on pre-
vious flights, and so they felt that they would not be particularly
helpful in this case. So theyve explained why they chose not do
that, and it would be up to Admiral Gehman and his team to de-
cide whether or not that was a good management choice.
Senator NELSON. So you dont have a personal opinion about
that?
Ms. SMITH. No, sir.
Senator NELSON. Go ahead, Mr. Chairman. Ive got several other
questions, but
Senator BROWNBACK. Ive had my chance. I was just getting
ready to close the panel down when you came in.
Senator NELSON. Do you have another panel coming?
43
Senator BROWNBACK. No, this is it. So if you have another couple

of questions, go ahead and ask them and then well finish up.
Senator NELSON. May I have more than a couple?
[Laughter.]
Senator BROWNBACK. All right. We may bounce back and forth
a little bit here. I may give you the gavel and go on. Go ahead.
Senator NELSON. Id love that, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator NELSON. The last time I had the gavel in this Sub-
committee, we went for 5 hours.
[Laughter.]
Senator BROWNBACK. Oh, well, I couldnt handle that.
Senator NELSON. As we look at some of the things that are hap-
pening, do you have any technical suggestions for this Committee
about buying some more time if youve got a damaged area of an
orbiter and you want to buy some more timeIm not suggesting
there was anything that could be done to save this particular mis-
sion and crewsuch as cold soaking or a higher angle of attack or
keeping the crew in space longer to rescue themif youre dam-
aged area is your left wing, keeping your left wing up instead of
the roll reversal taking it back into a left wing down? Any sugges-
tions?
Dr. ROLAND. Senator, I dont have the technical competence to
answer that specifically, but I do have a suggestion that I thinks
in the same realm. I think in the future, until we either have a
clearer idea and clearer prospects of a new and safer Shuttle, that
all Shuttle missions in the future should go to the Space Station
and should involve an inspection of the Shuttle before it returns.
And, additionally, we might want to considerweve been speak-
ing earlier about developing a small astronaut orbiter which would
be only to transport people to and from orbitwe might want to
consider using the Shuttle unmanned as a heavy-lift vehicle. It can
fly up and it can fly back without the astronauts onboard. This
would not hold down the costs, but it surely holds down the risk
to human life of a technology that I think is becoming more fragile
as time goes on.
Senator NELSON. Any other comments?
Mr. CHASE. No, I dont have the technical background or the cur-
rency with the programs to make the recommendations.
Senator NELSON. The future of human space flight. Where, in
your opinions, would you like to see us go as we get back into fly-
ing with the Space Shuttle? What would you like to see the pro-
gram evolve into?
Mr. CHASE. Senator, one of the discussions that weve been hav-
ing is this notion of a destination-driven program versus building
capabilities that let us go multiple destinations, and I think thats
a very good debate to have. Im not sure that that debate has been
decided, but clearly NASA is moving towards this notion of build-
ing capabilities to do a number of things. Rather than simply build-
ing a vehicle that goes to Mars or just goes to the moon, why not
build capabilities that let us do a number of things in space that
can be applied to robotic missions, to human missions, and any-
thing else that we may want to do.
44
One of the recommendations put forward in the Commission on

the Future of the Aerospace Industry, chaired by Congressman
Robert Walker, was just that notion, that you need to develop the
capabilities to do a number of missions. And, in a lot of ways, thats
more exciting, to understand that you have the capability through
developing nuclear propulsion and power options for in-space trans-
portation, but you can then take that and apply it to a number of
missions, to send a robotic probe to Europa, to send a human mis-
sion to Mars. That, I think, opens up your possibilities. You have
some challenges in perhaps how you motivate that team that devel-
ops the systems, because they may not know exactly what theyre
driving towards. But it does open up your possibilities, and thats
where I think we should go.
The most important element in all of that is the access to space.
Getting low-cost access to space is critical. The capabilities of the
Shuttle are critical for the short- and near-term. Then as you de-
velop and phase in the next-generation systems, thats what en-
ables you to drop the costs. And I was encouraged by your com-
ments earlier and your comments in the past related to the role
that the Department of Defense can play in future space access,
both in developing next-generation RLVs and perhaps how the fleet
of the evolved expendable launch vehicles, EELVs, can play in our
space transportation needs. Those are very robust and very new
systems that are much simpler, much more efficient than their
predecessors. I think theres a major role for them to play in future
access.
Ms. SMITH. Well, Senator, Im not allowed to take positions or
have opinions, so about all I can offer in this context is that it
Senator NELSON. But youre one of the great experts on space.
[Laughter.]
Ms. SMITH. But it may be useful to have the context set for
where it is that NASA and America expect to go in the long-term
in human exploration. Most of NASAs programs have this long-
term view. The planetary program does, the astronomy program
does. But when you get to human space flight, the Space Station
is basically it. Because its taken so many more years than people
expected for it to become operational, and its still not there yet,
people have sort of given up looking at what is beyond space sta-
tion. In fact, NASA, I dont think even has a cutoff for when the
Space Station is going to stop operations or transition to something
else.
And so in terms of trying to develop an architecture for the fu-
ture and decide what your options are and what kind of launch ve-
hicles you need and whether you want to have one vehicle for
human space flight and another vehicle for cargo, you really need
to know where it is down the road all of this is going to be taking
you.
And I know that there are a few people at NASA who have been
looking at this over these past few years, but because of the fund-
ing situation at NASA, I think there arent a lot of people there
who feel that they can stand up and say, Oh, yeah, this is the way
its going to be. And so I think that, you know, even after all these
years and after all the studies that have been done on future space
goals, that here we are in 2003 and its still not clear what direc-
45
tion this is all leading in. And I think thats an important compo-
nent of then backtracking and saying, So what kind of launch ve-
hicles do I need?
Dr. ROLAND. I dont think, with our current technology, there are
any missions for people in space that are worth the cost and the
risk, but that does not mean that theres not a value for human
missions in spaceconceivably on a space station, conceivably
going to the moon, going to Mars. And the question is, when will
the cost come down enough that the value of having people there,
which is now so much more expensive, intersects with that cost?
I think the space program should be focused on making that hap-
pen sooner rather than later, and that means launch vehicle devel-
opment. I think Mr. Chase and I agree that access to space is the
big issue, and thats where we should be concentrating our research
and development.
Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, Ill conclude my comments just
by responding to Dr. Roland.
In one sense, I agree with you, and that is that the risks for
human space flight are not accurately projected. Indeed, in a flight
that I participated in 17 years ago, at the time it was generally
thought to be catastrophic one in 100. It ended up being one in 25.
And now we know, its two in 113. And thats why I have been un-
relenting in my advocacy for the safety upgrades on the Space
Shuttle and have been unforgiving, Mr. Chairman, to a NASA that
has not pressed with those safety upgrades as a first priority of
business; instead, stealing money from the Space Shuttle, which
would have gone into safety upgrades and other things, and put-
ting it in other things in NASA. So in that regard, I think youre
right.
Where I would disagree with youand this is my concluding
comment, Mr. Chairman, because I know you want to shut down
and that is that Americans are, by nature, explorers. Were about
to celebrate the 200th anniversary of Lewis and Clark. And that
was a big deal in the day. That was like an Apollo project in their
day. And that reaped enormous benefits for us. And I think that
we need, as a country, not only the development of the technologies
and all of those spinoffs to the value of our society here on the
planet, but fulfilling that part of our nature as explorers.
For example, one of my crew mates, Dr. Franklin Chang Diaz,
has been developing over the last 30 years a plasma rocket that
hes just about ready to test if NASA will keep giving him the
money. Hes got a 30-university consortium, hes got a test model,
and this thing would ultimately take us to Mars in 39 days instead
of 10 months, which is conventional technology, would solve the
problem of gravity, because it would accelerate half the way and
decelerate the remaining half way, and would create a magnetic
field around the rocket, which would help us repel the solar flares.
And so these are the kind of things that I think weve got to be
visionary in. And Im so grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, because
you are a visionary, and Im glad that youre the Chairman of this
Committee.
Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson, As-
tronaut Nelson.
46
I want to thank the panelists, as well. This is the start of a

lengthy process. Its been going on for some period of time. But we
do want to fulfill the dreams of us as explorers, and I dont think
anybody on the panel disagrees with that. Its just how we do that
and how we proceed forward.
I want to thank all of you, individually, for your expertise and
your continued support and enthusiasm for how America proceeds
forward into space.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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S. HRG.

NASA: HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Chairman

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2003

our next launch vehicle, we must do so as safely as we possibly

space transportation systems. Mr. Chase will lay out access to

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Senator Breaux.

STATEMENT OF MARCIA S. SMITH, RESOURCES, SCIENCE AND

ered in the space age in 1957, a cadre of enthusiasts was ready to

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARCIA S. SMITH, RESOURCES, SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY

BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMAN SPACE FLIGHT: 19612003

Senator BROWNBACK. Thanks, Ms. Smith. And I appreciate your

STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. CHASE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

er reliability and much lower costs. This NASA/DoD partnership is

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chase, and I look forward

STATEMENT OF ALEX ROLAND, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY,

I have appended to my written remarks an article explaining

I have enormous confidence in NASAs ability to achieve a vital

Discover, November 1985

THE SHUTTLE, TRIUMPH OR TURKEY?

Accounting Meth. Cost per Launch Cost per Pound*

Short-run marginal cost $42 million $646/$893

Senator BROWNBACK. Good statements by all.

So theres a lot of reasons to go. I dont think theres any single

Dr. ROLAND. Yes. I recommend to you an exercise. I tried a short

based scientist that does work in a laboratory and ask them,

Senator BREAUX. Is it your understanding that NASA, at this

reasons we havent gone back to the moon is that we discovered

think of today is saying lets go back to a single place. But if you

and do it again. We had that compelling reason to go to the moon.

munications satellites, unmanned reconnaissance satellites, earth

Shuttle, you cant do next-generation launch investment; or if

Senator NELSON. Mr. Chase?

Senator BROWNBACK. No, this is it. So if you have another couple

One of the recommendations put forward in the Commission on

I want to thank the panelists, as well. This is the start of a

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