1) Ong Chia v.
Republic of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended
Digested by: MDP
Facts: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the decision of the RTC South Cotabato admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner was born in Amoy, China. At the age of 9 he arrived at the port of
Manila. Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment
and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had
four children. In 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted
as a Filipino citizen under the Revised Naturalization Law. Petitioner, after stating
his qualifications as required and lack of the disqualifications of the law, his
petition was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that
processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was
suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented
three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac
Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the
court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness
against him, he remarked that the testimony of the petitioner himself is already
convincing that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to
counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as
the petitioner himself.
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2)
failed to state all his former place of residence; (3) failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines; (4)
has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been
insufficient or misdeclared; and (5) failed to support his petition with the
appropriate documentary evidence.
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for
naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in
which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise
been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed
to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended
that his petition must fail. The state also annexed income tax returns allegedly
filed by petitioner to show that his net income could hardly support himself and
his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married
twice, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from
1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to
present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a
copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by
petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married
Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in
accordance with the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been
living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage.
This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his
wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include
said address in the petition.
CA: Reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization.
It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not
precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up
for the first time on appeal.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia
failed to state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO
CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous application. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include
the same militates against a decision in his favor. This is a mandatory
requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names
to come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might
adversely affect his application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he
formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." The Law requires
the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence."
This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is
fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to
give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the
publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the
petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus
defeating the purpose of the law.
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
when he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of
wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 1
cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as
required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from
becoming a citizen.
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00,
exclusive of bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His
failure to file an income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet"
confirms that his income is low. Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong
Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The
monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to
his income to make it lucrative it is contingent, speculative and precarious.
Issue: WON appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of
which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scraps of paper
devoid of any evidentiary value,"
Ruling: The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 of the
Rules of Court which provides that These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy
or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
The rule on formal offer of evidence now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by
analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the
more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.
Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later
on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to
object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right
to procedural due process. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the
rule prohibiting the admission of evidence is to afford the opposite
party the chance to object to their admissibility. Petitioner cannot claim
that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State.
Petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents
presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents petitioner's marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income
tax returns are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing
of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these
documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.
Address: "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of
the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits
that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published and
such publication constitutes substantial compliance. It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
government and against the applicant. As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7
clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition
his present and former places of residence. This provision and the rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization
Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.
2) Bantolino, et al v. Coca-cola Bottlers, G.R. No. 153660, 10 June 2003
Digested by: KAD
Facts: Petitioners Bantolino, et.al., filed a complaint against respondents for
unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal. The respondents filed for the
dismissal of the complaint alleging that there was no employer-employee
relationship. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the employees, and ordered their
reinstatement and payment of the back wages. Labor Arbiter ruled that in
contrast with the negative declarations of respondent as to the existence of
employer-employee relationship, the testimonies of the complainants were more
credible as they sufficiently supplied every detail of their employment, specifically
identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their places of assignment, aside
from their dates of engagement and dismissal. The NLRC sustained the decision
of the Labor Arbiter. However, the Court of Appeals modified such decision on the
ground that the affidavits of the complainants should not have been given
probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo
cross-examination, thus mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 2
Issue: Whether or not administrative bodies such as the NLRC should be strictly
bound by the rules of evidence.
Ruling: NO. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical
niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. To require
otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature
of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the
application of the technical rules of evidence. The argument that the affidavit is
hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not
persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings
before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on
the basis of position papers only." Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor
Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or
hearing. Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process.
3) Cirtek Employees v. Cirtek Electronics, 6 June 2011
Digested by: JV
Facts: Cirtek Electronics avers that petitioner, in filing the petition for certiorari
under rule 65 availed of a wrong remedy. The Court erred in resolving a factual
issue (whether the August 24, 2005 MOA was validly entered into) which is not
the office of petition for certiorari.
Respondent-movant maintains that the Secretary of Labor cannot insist on a
ruling beyond the compromise agreement entered into by the parties; and that,
as early as February 5, 2010, petitioner Union had already filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment a resolution of disaffiliation from the
Federation of Free Workers resulting in the latters lack of personality to represent
the workers in the present case.
The petitioner indeed availed of the wrong remedy, however the Court resolved
to give it due course since whether the petition was filed under Rule 65 or Rule
45 it was filed within 15 days from petitioners receipt of the resolution of CA
denying its MR. The ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures is to
achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor is empowered to give arbitral
awards in the exercise of his authority to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes.
Ruling: Yes. Secretary of Labor acted well within his jurisdiction. While an
arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered
into by the parties, the award can be considered as an approximation of a
collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into
by the parties.
The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the
minutes of the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the
rule on parol evidence is erroneous. Parol evidence rule should not be
strictly applied in labor cases. In labor cases, the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Labor Arbiter is not precluded from
accepting and evaluating evidence other than and even contrary to what is
stated in the CBA.
4) Atienza v. Board of Medicine, 9 February 2011
Digested by: CMU
Facts: Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal
Medical Center (RMC) for check-up. She was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin
III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The
tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that
her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent
kidney operation.
Private respondent's husband, Romeo Sioson, filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors
who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation. It was alleged
in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the
said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private
respondent's fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-
functioning and non-visualizing kidney. The complaint was heard by the
[BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private
respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal
offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary
evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving
that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated. Exhibit A to D were certified photocopies of the X-ray request
forms on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.
Petitioners Allegations: He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because
the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and
intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
The Board of Medicine admitted the documentary evidence offered by private
respondent. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The BOM denied the motion for
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 3
reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that
it should first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its
probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can
determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it
through the process of admission. Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously
adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOM's
Orders which admitted Editha Sioson's Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Issue: WON the evidence offered by Editha Sioson are admissible or not.
Ruling: The evidence is admissible.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly
applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the
BOM. [I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or
incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the
consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on
the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the
admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same
pieces of evidence. Admissibility of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at
all. On the other hand, the Probative value of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Petitioner's insistence that the admission of Editha's exhibits violated his
substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner
mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in
accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in
these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the
admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of
either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not
prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the
fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is
presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms filed in connection
with Editha's medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries
interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached
as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III's counter affidavit filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for
negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who
handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered
the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha's exhibits, that her
"kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time" of her
operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the
truth respecting a matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts
which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial
notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical
sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take
judicial notice that Editha's kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as
with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.
Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 4
 (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical
locations of Editha's kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical
positions, whether left or right, of Editha's kidneys, and the removal of one or
both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her
abdominal area. In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as
copies of the exhibits, is allowed. Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that
the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits "because [it]
transferred from the previous building, . . . to the new building." Ultimately,
since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted
Editha's formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall
determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
5) Gomez v. Gomez, G.R. No. 156284, 6 February 2007
Digested by: AS
6) People v. Turco, 337 SCRA 714 (2000)
Digested by: JQ
7) State of Missouri v. William Arthur Bull, 339 S.W. 2d 783 Mo. 1960,
Digested by: TS
Facts: About 2:30 in the afternoon of October 15, 1958, two colored men, one of
them tall and the other short, entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South
39th Street. The taller man spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a
cigarette lighter, he also talked about buying and looked at watches and rings. As
the taller man looked at jewelry and made his purchase the shorter man looked in
the cases and moved about in the store. Later in the day, about 5:50, as John
Krekeler was placing rings and watches in the safe preparatory to closing the
store two men entered, one of them tall and the other short, and Krekeler
immediately recognized them as the two men who had been in the store at 2:30,
especially the taller man. He recognized the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall
hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a scar on his face. The shorter man
started to walk behind the counter and as Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a
long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my face." Both men followed Krekeler, the
shorter man with the gun in "his back," directing him to the watch repair
department and finally into the rest room in the rear of the store. He was told not
to turn around and stood facing the wall. He could hear jewelry being dumped
into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register. The two men left Krekeler in the
rest room and after hearing the door slam he called the police. The two men had
taken watches and rings of the stipulated value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash
from the register. Krekeler identified the appellant from pictures, and three weeks
later, after his capture, in a hospital and upon the trial positively identified him as
the taller of the two holdup men.
The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a new trial that a police officer
was permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken
from his person. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial
and irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in
this case;
Issue: WON testimony as to the $258.02 is admissible?
Ruling: NO. Unlike the roll of dimes in State v. Hampton, Mo., 275 S.W.2d 356,
the testimony as to the $258.02 was not offered in proof of the substantive fact
of the crime. In that case the five-dollar roll of dimes wrapped in a roll of green
paper was found on the defendant the same day of the burglary and while the
fact was a circumstance admissible in evidence it was held to not constitute
substantive evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis of the defendant's
innocence of burglary.
The proof of the money here was evidently on the theory that Ball did not have or
was not likely to have such a sum of money on his person prior to the
commission of the offense.
As to this the facts were that he had been out of the penitentiary about eight
months and the inference the state would draw is that he had no visible means of
support and no employment and could not possibly have $258.02 except from
robberies. Of course, there was no such proof and Ball claimed that he had
worked intermittently for a custodian or janitor of an apartment house and that
he had won the $258.02 in a series of crap games at a named place. Not only
was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as
having come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were not admissible in
evidence (annotation 3 A.L.R. 1213), the charge here was that Ball and his
accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the cash
register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash
register, it was simply a total of $140. Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was
no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 (annotation
123 A.L.R. 119) and in all these circumstances "The mere possession of a
quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of
money charged as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination
and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as the
money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." 1 Wigmore,
Evidence, Sec. 154, p. 601. In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 5
record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his arrest came from or
had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of
his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence (State v.
Garrett, 285 Mo. 279, 226 S.W. 4), the evidence was not in fact relevant
and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend
to prove the offense for which the appellant was on trial the jury may
have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.
The admission of the evidence in the circumstances of this record infringed the
right to a fair trial and for that reason the judgment is reversed and the cause
remanded.
8) Lopez v. Heesen, 69 N.M. 206, 365 P. 2d 448 N.M. 1961, 22 August
1961
Digested by: DJT
Facts: This is an action for damages arising from a shooting incident where the
complainant, Mr. Lopez was injured as a result of an accidental discharge of a
rifle belonging to Mr. Heesen.
Mr. Heesen is a former military officer who went into deer hunting. The rifle was
manufactured by Sears and Co. In the course of deer hunting, the rifle
accidentally discharged hitting Mr. Lopez in the chest. Originally, the action was
filed against Mr. Heesen but eventually the complaint was amended to implead
the manufacturer. The case went on appeal but only insofar as the manufacturer.
The theory of the complainant was that the safety mechanism of the rifle is
defective and unsafe because it readily goes into fire from safety mode. The
manufacturer interposed the defense that the safety mechanism of the rifle is not
defective. In order to prove its defense, the manufacturer presented an expert
witness to prove the reputation of the company that manufactured the safety
mechanism and the reputation of the other companies, which manufactured
guns, which used the same safety mechanism. The witness tried to prove that for
all the years that these companies were in business, they have never been sued
for alleged defective safety mechanisms. Mr. Lopez objected to these pieces of
evidence on the ground of irrelevancy. He argued that the reputation of the
manufacturer is irrelevant to the issue of whether the safety mechanism is
defective.
Issue: WON the reputation of the company that manufactured the safety
mechanism and the reputation of the other companies which used the same
mechanism is relevant
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the reputation of the company that
manufactured the safety mechanism as well as the reputation of other companies
that uses the same kind of safety mechanism is relevant because it has a logical
connection to the fact in issue. The fact that no suit has been filed against them
arising from the same complaint is relevant evidence. It tends to prove or
disprove the fact in issue.
9) People v. Bongcarawan, G.R. No. 143944, 11 July 2002
Digested by: DPS
Facts: Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an
Information which reads, thus:
That on or about March 13, 1999, in Iligan City, the said accused, without
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing
approximately 400 grams, without the corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known
as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA 7659.
During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland
passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At about
3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan
City when its security officer received a complaint from a passenger about her
missing jewelry. The passenger suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no.
106 as the culprit. The security officer and four (4) other members of the vessel
security force accompanied the passenger to search for the suspect whom they
later found at the economy section. The suspect was identified as the accused,
Basher Bongcarawan, he was then informed of the complaint and was invited to
go back to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no
jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the
economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and
brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security, the accused
opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing
white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to be shabu, the security
personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures
of the accused beside the suitcase and its contents. They also called the
Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. At about 6:00 a.m., some members of the
Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized
items--the Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag and eight (8) small plastic packs of
white crystalline substance. When asked about the contraband articles, the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 6
accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican Alex Macapudi
to bring the suitcase to the latters brother in Iligan City. The accused and the
seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). The accused was brought to the PAOCTF
Headquarters, while the packs of white crystalline substance were sent to the NBI
Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic
Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the substance to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, weighing 399.3266 grams.
The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about
10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican Alex Macapudi. He
was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses
and watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudis brother at the Iligan port.
He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big luggage full
of clothes, a small luggage or maleta containing the sunglasses and brushes he
bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of Macapudi. He stayed at cabin
no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at
the Iligan port, he took his baggage and positioned himself at the economy
section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a
friend, Ansari Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel
security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin no.
106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily
went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked. Subsequently,
he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and
took the big luggage and Macapudis Samsonite suitcase. He left the
small maleta containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be
confiscated by the security personnel. When requested, he voluntarily opened the
big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he
claimed was not his and had a secret combination lock. The security personnel
forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside
which they suspected to be shabu. They took pictures of him with the
merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to
the Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.
On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment against Bongcarawan.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu which was allegedly forcibly opened and searched without
the consent of the accused is admissible as evidence against him.
2.) Whether or not Bongcarawan can be convicted of the crime charged even if
he has no knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug.
Ruling:
1.) Yes, it is admissible as evidence. The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and
seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case
of People v. Marti, in the absence of governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The
constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom
the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
In this case, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel
security personnel. It was only after they found shabu inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of
the suitcase and the contraband items was therefore carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.
The vessel security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not
discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of the
state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law.
2.) Yes. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following
facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. The first two elements were sufficiently
proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are left with the third.
Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of such possession. Hence, the burden of evidence is
shifted to the accused to explain the absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
In this respect, Bongcarawan has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated,
self-serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the trial court. We find
no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.
Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to deserve credence and weight in
law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 7
baggage, he knew it would be inspected. Why he got the Samsonite suitcase
allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the
owner remains unclear. He also claims that he did not present his
small maleta for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive
sunglasses and brushes would be confiscated, but he brought the Samsonite
suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even
watches.
The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.
To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican Alex
Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but presented no evidence to support
his claim.
Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is
the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can easily be
fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that
a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no knowledge or intent to
possess the same.
10) People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57
Digested by: LT
Facts: Andre Marti and his common law wife went to the booth of Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders carrying with them 4 packs of wrapped packages.
The proprietress asked the if the package can be examined but was refused and
was reassured that the package contained books, cigars, and gloves and were
gifts to his friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Before delivery to the to the Bureau of
Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, following the standard operating procedure, Mr.
Job Reyes (Proprietor) opened the box for final inspection. When he opened the
box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom and out of curiosity took a several grams
of the contents thereof.
Mr. Reyes prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requested
laboratory sample he extracted from the package. In the presence of NBI agents,
Mr. Job brought out of the box in which the package were placed and opened the
top flaps, removed the styro-foan and look out the cellophane wrappers from
inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were found to have been contained
inside the cellophane wrapper. The other packages were likewise opened by
Reyes and found to contain marijuana leaves. The NBI made an inventory and
took charge of the box. After examination by forensic chemists, the dried leaves
were found to be marijuana flowering tops. Thereafter, an information was filed
against Marti for violation of RA 6425, known as the Dangerous Drug Act.
Marti contended that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure and of privacy of communication (Sec 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argued that it should be held inadmissible as evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the subject searched and seized is admissible as evidence.
Ruling: In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule
and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be
noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained
were invariably procured by the State acting through the medium of its law
enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a
private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant
validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual,
allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the
State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same
should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore
applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power
is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search
is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for
its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention
of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 8
extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked
against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign
authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of
the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in
serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected
through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged violation,
non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and
communication.
Appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages
which contained prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national,
whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila; that in the course of their 30-
minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him
P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national was about to
leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as
incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can easily be
fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could
not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4) parcels and shell out
P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the
undertaking without first ascertaining its contents. As stated by the trial court,
"(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that
as the marijuana flowering tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete
stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply
accept such undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from
a complete stranger on his mere say-so"
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. As
records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his
complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed, the German
national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in
the contract of shipment. On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the
owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that, things
which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.
At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.
11) People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565
Digested by: LAR
Facts: Early morning of 27 August 91, Horace Barker was brutally slain and
Teresita, the wife, badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery in
their home at Tuba, Benguet. The suspects of the crime of robbery with homicide
and serious physical injuries were Rene Salvamante (former houseboy of the
spouse) and co-conspirator Richard Malig y Severino and Hector Maqueda aka
Putol.
Witnesses of the prosecution:
Mike Tabayan and Mark Pacio who positively identified salvamante and
maqueda as the men who asked directions from them
Norie Dacara and Julieta Villanueva (the housemaids of the spouses) and
Teresita Mendoza Barker.
The charge against Malig was dropped because further evaluation of the
evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him. Maqueda was captured
while Salvamante was still at large.
On 4 March 1992, Maqueda was arrested Guinyangan and he was thereafter
brought in the Benguet Provincial Jail. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime at the Barker house
on 27 August 1991.
Maquedas Contention:
Alibi - that at the time the crime Was committed he was not in Benguet but
in Sukat, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, and the failure of the star witnesses
(Teresita and the housemaids) for the Prosecution to identify him. He alleges
that Teresita, when investigated at the hospital, Pointed to Richard Malig as
the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the
two housemaids gave a description of Salvamante's companion that fitted
Richard Malig.
last time he was with salvamante was on the day after Christmas in calauag
and he helped the latter in selling a cassette recorder
Trial Court Ruling:
Trial court had doubts on the identification of Maqueda by prosecution witnesses
Teresita Mendoza Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva and thus
disregarded their testimonies on this matter, it decreed a conviction "based on
the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well as on circumstantial
evidence.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 9

The circumstances shown by the prosecution which tend to show the guilt of the
accused are:
1. A physical demonstration to which the accused and his counsel did not offer
any objection shows that despite his being handicapped, accused Maqueda could
well and easily grip a lead pipe and strike a cement post with such force that it
produced a resounding vibration. It is not farfetched then to conclude that
accused Maqueda could have easily beat Mr. Barker to death.
2. His presence within the vicinity of the crime scene right after the incident in the
company of accused Salvamante was testified to by Mike Tabayan, the only
prosecution witness who noticed the defective hands of the accused. As they had
to ask for directions from the witness in the Tagalog dialect shows that they were
strangers to the place.
3. Accused Maqueda knows or is familiar with accused Rene Salvamante as they
from the same town. By his own testimony, accused Maqueda has established
that he Salvamante are close friends to the point that they went out together
during the Christmas vacation in 1991 and he even accompanied Salvamante in
selling the black radio cassette recorder.
4. His Motion to Grant Bail contains this statement that he is willing and
volunteering to be State witness in the above-entitled case, it the accused in
appearing that he is the least guilty along This in effect, supports his extrajudicial
confession trade to the police at Although he claims that he did not his signature
would lean his as he was just told that release from detention, this is a flimsy
excuse which cannot Had he not understood what the motion meant, he could
have easily asked his sister and brother-in-law what it meant seeing that their
signatures up already affixed on the motion.
5. This time, his admission to Prosecutor Zarate that he was at the Barker house
that fateful morning and his even more damaging admission to Ray Dean Salvosa
as to what he actually did can be considered as another circumstance to already
bloster the increasing circumstances against the accused.
6. The accused's defense is alibi. As stated in a long Line of cases, alibi is at best
a weak defense and easy of fabrication. For alibi to be given credence, it must
not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
at the time of its commission. This defense easily crumbles down as Tayaban
placed accused Maqueda at vicinity of the crime scene.
The combination of all these circumstances plus extrajudicial confession produce
the needed proof beyond reasonable doubt that indeed accused Maqueda is guilty
of the crime.
Issue: WON the circumstances shown is sufficient for conviction?
Ruling: YES. In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean
Salvosa and his willingness to be a state witness, Maqueda's participation in the
commission of the crime charged was established beyond moral certainty. His
defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission he was not only at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his
participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to
Prosecutor Zarate and Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court,
established beyond doubt by circumstantial evidence. The following circumstances
were duly proved in this case:
(1) He and a companion were seen a kilometer away from the Barker house
an hour after the crime in question was committed there;
(2) Rene Salvamante, who is still at large, was positively identified by Mrs.
Barker, Norie Dacara, and Julieta Villanueva as one of two persons who
committed the crime;
(3) He and co-accused Rene Salvamante are friends;
(4) He and Rene Salvamante were together in Guinyangan, Quezon, and
both left the place sometime in September 1991;
(5) He was arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon, on 4 March 1992; and
(6) He freely and voluntarily offered to be a state witness stating that "he is
the least guilty."
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute
an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points
to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e. the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any
other hypothesis except that of guilty.
The rule is settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the requirements of
time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed, he must demonstrate that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the
time of its commission. 34 Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban,
which Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 10
Maqueda and a companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the
waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba, Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the
house of the Barkers. It was not then impossible for Maqueda and his companion
to have been at the Barker house at the time the crime was committed.
Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda started
working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying
his, testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27
August 1991.
12) Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699
Digested by: JS
Facts: This is a petition for review against the decision of the CA upholding the
decision of rtc. The decision is ordering petitioner to return the documents and
papers she took from the drawer of her husband in his clinic. Cecilia went to the
clinic of her husband ransacking the latters drawer and cabinets, and taking
documents and papers intended by the former to use for legal separation and
malpractice against Dr. Martin. Dr. Martin filed a case for the return of the 157
documents and for an injunctive relief against petitioner to prevent Cecilia to use
the taken documents as evidence for her case. The RTC decided in favor of Dr.
Martin and the same is upheld by the appellate court.
Issue: is the CA correct in upholding the decision of the RTC?
Ruling: YES. The CA is correct in upholding the decision of RTC. Indeed the
documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The
constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and
correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party
against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to
the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
13) Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC, 280 SCRA 735
Digested by: KN
Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug
Corporation. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received two memorandums, one warning
her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts
because the same was a prohibited practice and another warning her not to
negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department, as this would impair the company's control of purchases and,
besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that
he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
regarding:
Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266 representing
purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previews P.O.s
issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No.
19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of
P640.00). YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that
the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets
per sales invoice no. 266 as per their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the
undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check no.
892068 dated November 9, 1989.
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied
having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice. However, upon
conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed that
the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a
matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope
containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her "talagangganyan, bukas." It
appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms.
Catolico.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to
explain, within twenty-four hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico
asked for additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour
extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was
informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on
preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company.
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing
Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able to make a satisfactory explanation. In
said letter she protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened
an envelope addressed to Catolico.
In a letter to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained
that the check she received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of
overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as
it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.
On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a
memorandum notifying Catolico of her termination finding her actuation
constituting an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 11

Catolico filed with the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and
illegal suspension. Arbiter Lopez decided that although there is no proof of unfair
labor practice, her dismissal is without just cause and due process. He thus
declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it
would not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded
separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half month's pay for every year of
service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal
suspension "representing 30 days work."
Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it
aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due
process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.
NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners
were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment.
It found that petitioner's evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn
by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter
opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence
pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution.
Issue: WON the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP is inadmissible in evidence
pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution
Ruling: The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People
vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel
for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On
the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities.
(Sorry this is the only reason the case gave. Though there is also a manifestation
by the OSG that there was no violation of the right of communication but the
reason is that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an envelope from
one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business
communication in which it had an interest. But this obviously cannot be taken as
part of the ruling because it is more of like a comment. Furthermore, its opinion
regarding observance by petitioner of due process is different to that of the
Supreme Court. It said that the requirement of just cause and due process was
complied with because petitioner gave her an opportunity to explain.)
Illegal Dismissal
Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires
that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to
answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself,
and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity
connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to
enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation.
In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side,
no hearing was ever conducted. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of
"evidences in Waterous possession," which were not, however, submitted. What
the "evidences" other than the sales invoice and the check were, only the
Supervisor knew.
It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay
information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor executed an affidavit relative to this
case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay
evidence carries no probative value.
Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. MBTC
Check No. 222832 allegedly showing payment of P384 per unit was never
presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from Yung Shin offered by petitioners.
Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do
not indicate an overcharge. The difference in price may then be attributed to the
different packaging used in each purchase order.
Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no
case can justify an employee's dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of employment; and even the
dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion.
Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial employee, to which class of
employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted.
Separation Pay
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's
reinstatement would not be to the best interest of the parties, he correctly
awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is
computed at one month's salary for every year of service. 35 In this case,
however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half month's
salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As
such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.
14) Bon v. People, G.R. No. 152160, 13 January 2004
Digested by: IP
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 12
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is
admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement was true, but that it was
in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence
necessary to convict the accused.
Facts: Petitioner Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for
violating Section 68 of PD 705, together with Rosalio Bon. In the month of
January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Sorsogon, the accused cut, gather
and manufacture into lumber 4 narra trees, 1 cuyao-yao tree, and 1 amugis tree,
valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the knowledge and consent of the
owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper
authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents.
Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander
Mendones, Manuel Dangalan, Nestor Labayane and TeresitaDangalan-Mendoza.
Teresita owns a titled agricultural land under located in Basud, Sorsogon,
administered by Virgilio Bon. She sent her brother Manuel to investigate upon
receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut and sawed
into lumber by her administrator. Manuel sought the help of barangay tanod,
Julian Lascano. Together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo
Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon went to the land and they
discovered 6 stumps of trees. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the
cutting and sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that he
sawed the trees into six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.
In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the
accusation. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio denied the charge. He said that he
was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990.
He mentioned that the purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant
of the land. Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land and was
instituted as such by Teresitas father, but that Teresita wanted to eject him. He
and Teresita have an agrarian case. Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio
Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar Narvaez
indicted him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him.
RTC: Convicted Virgilio Bon and Jeniebre for the crime charged. Rosalio Bon was
acquitted.
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution
witnesses credibility and the sufficiency of the evidence proving their guilt.
CA: Sustained the trial courts assessment of the credibility of Julian Lascano and
Manuel Dangalan. Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered
the cutting of trees. The appellate court held that despite the absence of direct
evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict
petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of
evidence under Section 4 of Rule 133 of ROC were amply satisfied by the
following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and
Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the
trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Teresita,
demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990,
petitioner asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees. The CA held, however,
that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside
from the testimony of Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into
flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latters participation in the
offense charged. It thus acquitted him.
Issues:
(1) The admissibility of Virgilios purported extrajudicial admission of the
allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the
cutting of the trees; and
(2) The credibility and the sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses
Ruling: The Petition has no merit.
(1) Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
Petitioner contends that Lascanos and Dangalans separate testimonies regarding
his alleged extrajudicial admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore,
inadmissible. He also argues that his supposed admission should not have been
admitted, because it had been taken without the assistance of counsel at a time
when he was already regarded as a suspect.
We disagree. Under Sec 36 of Rule 130 of the ROC, any evidence -- whether
oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not
on the witness stand. Hence, information that is relayed to the former by the
latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay. In the instant case,
Lascano and Dangalan testified that they had heard petitioner admit to having
ordered the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as
hearsay for three reasons:
First, they were indisputably present and within hearing distance when
he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of
fact that had been derived from their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that
the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not necessarily that the
matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to
a person who is not on the witness stand is admissible; it is not covered
by the hearsay rule. Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto ruled
that evidence regarding the making of such statement is not secondary
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 13
 but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is
barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans testimony, because
he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that
when parties fail to object to hearsay evidence, they are deemed to have
waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted.
Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the testimonies
of the persons who heard it fall under Sec 26 of Rule 130 of the ROC which
provides that: "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no
man would make any declaration against himself, unless it is true. The testimony
of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not
given during a custodial investigation and, certainly, not to police authorities.
Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of freedom of action in any significant way. Constitutional procedures on
custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary
manner.
(2) Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses
deserve to be respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their
demeanor as they testified. Equally established is the rule that factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight
when such findings affirm those of the trial court, as in this case. This Court
refrains from disturbing the CAs findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a gross
misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them. We affirm the lower courts
assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence. Punishable under
Sec 68 of the Forestry Code are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest
products without the legal documents.
Petitioner was charged with the first offense. It was thus necessary for the
prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting, gathering or manufacture of
lumber from the trees. It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented.
This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial court
may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. Conviction may be based on
circumstantial evidence, as long as the circumstances proven constitute
an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that
the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary
that the following elements concur: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements. The RTC
considered the following proven facts and circumstances: Accused Virgilio Bon,
being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and
big trees. He has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before
the barangay tanod, Julian Lascano, that he ordered the cutting of the trees and
the sawing thereof by his son-in-law, accused Jeniebre. His admission was
corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Jeniebre to saw the lumber. His
extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and
not under custodial investigation.
The CA found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners
culpability: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano and Natividad Legaspi,
petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February
12, 1990, he and his son Rosalio went to Teresita, demanding that she pay the
value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner asked her to
forgive him for cutting the trees.
The records also show that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and
manufacture of lumber from the trees was proven by the prosecution through the
following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps, the
investigation report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of the trees, and
the CENROs computation of the value of the timber generated from the felled
trees. This fact, together with the circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to
no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.
15) People v. Ulysses Garcia, G.R. No. 1451761, 30 March 2004
Digested by: AD
In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of QUALIFIED THEFT -- took, stole,
and carried away punctured currency notes due for shredding in the total amount
of P194,190.00, belonging to the Central Bank of the Philippines. There was grave
abuse of confidence they being at the time employed as Currency Reviewers,
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 14
Driver, Currency Assistant I and Money Counter and as such they had free access
to the property stolen.
Facts: Pedro Labita of Central Bank went to the Theft and Robbery Section of
Western Police District Command (WPDC), and filed a complaint for Qualified
Theft against Santiago Peralta, Armando Datuin, Jr., Ulysses Garcia, Miguelito de
Leon, Librando Flores and Antonio S. Loyola. Pedro Labita submitted to the
investigating officer at WPDC, punctured currency notes in bills (face value o
Php194,190.00). Was recovered by the BSP Cash Department during its cash
counting of punctured currency bills submitted by different banks. The punctured
bills were rejected by the BSP money counter machine. Investigation revealed, it
was determined that said rejected currency bills were actually punctured notes
already due for shredding which means, theyre no longer intended for circulation.
Before these notes could be shredded, they were stolen from the BSP by the
above-named accused.
Ulysses Garcia (driver of armoured car of BSP) was apprehended while waiting for
a passenger bus on his way to BSP. Garcia gave three separate statements
admitting guilt . He also identified his cohorts, and accomplices. Hence, the other
named accused were called for questioning and later charged with qualiied theft.
Defense Argument:
- That Garcia was dragged to ride the car; was arrested without a valid
warrant of his arrest. He was handcuffed, hit, blindfolded. Later on,
dragged down the car and up and down the stairs. Suddenly, he felt
somebody frisk his pocket.
- At a safe house, someone was telling him the name of his co-accused
and if refused, would box him at his chest. His mouth was covered and
water was poured on the accused. When he cant bear the torture, he
obeyed their instructions. His ears were hit by the palms and as he was
being brought down, he felt somebody returning his personal belongings
to his pocket (license, coin purse, and impt papers). His blindfolds were
removed when he reached the police officer.
- "It was actually Mr. Labita, and not accused-appellant Garcia, who gave
the answers appearing in accused-appellant Garcia's alleged three sworn
statements dated November 4, 1992, November 5, 1992 and November
6, 1992. It was said that he was asked to sign the sworn statements by
Colonel otherwise, he would be tortured again.
Trial Court:
- rejected the disclaimer by Garcia of his own confessions, as such
disclaimer was "an eleventh hour concoction to exculpate himself and his
co-accused." The trial court found his allegations of torture and coerced
confessions unsupported by evidence. Further, it held that the recovery
of three pieces of perforated P100 bills from Garcia's wallet and the flight
of Peralta and Datuin Jr. were indicative of the guilt of the accused.
Issue: WON the following are admissible as evidence?
1. Sufficiency of evidence
- the three confessions given by Garcia and the three perforated P100
currency notes confiscated from him
2. extrajudicial confessions
- alleged three Sworn Statements of Garcia were obtained without the
assistance of counsel.
Ruling:
"SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incomunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited."
In the three extrajudicial confessions, Garcia was not assisted by Atty. Sanchez.
The signature of the latter on those documents was affixed after the word
"SAKSI." That the lawyer did not assist Garcia during the investigation. That he
only signed as a witness.
RTC is erred when it admitted as evidence his sworn statement absence presence
of a counsel.
The right to counsel is to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The basic law requires that any
waiver of this right must be made in writing and executed in the presence of a
counsel. Hence, the lawyer's role cannot be reduced to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession. The accused is entitled to
effective, vigilant and independent counsel.
A waiver in writing, which the trial court relied upon in the present case, is not
enough. Without the assistance of a counsel, the waiver has no evidentiary
relevance.
PERFORATED CURRENCY
The OSG evades the issue and argues, instead, that appellants waived the
illegality of their arrest when they entered a plea. He further contends that the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 15
exclusion from the evidence of the three punctured currency bills would not alter
the findings of the trial court.
This is wrong. It was Garcia who was unlawfully arrested. The legality of
an arrest can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby. Objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal, and third parties cannot avail themselves of it.
NO LAWFUL ARREST
At the time of his arrest, he had not committed, was not committing, and was not
about to commit any crime. Neither was he acting in a manner that would
engender a reasonable ground to suspect that he was committing a crime. .
Nonetheless, not having raised the matter before entering his plea, he is deemed
to have waived the illegality of his arrest. Note, however, that this waiver is
limited to the arrest. It does not extend to the search made as an incident thereto
or to the subsequent seizure of evidence allegedly found during the search.
Without a judicial warrant, arrests are allowed only under the following
exceptional circumstances: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view, (3) search of a moving motor vehicle, (4) customs search,
(5) stop and frisk situations, and (6) consented search.
Where the arrest was incipiently illegal, it follows that the subsequent search was
similarly illegal. Any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provision
is legally inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. In the present
case, the perforated P100 currency notes were obtained as a result of a search
made without a warrant subsequent to an unlawful arrest; hence, they are
inadmissible in evidence.
16) People v. Vinecario, G.R. No. 141137, 20 January 2004
Digested by: KR
Facts: On the night of April 10, 1995, as about fifteen police officers were
manning a checkpoint at Ulas, Davao City pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
2735, otherwise known as the COMELEC gun ban, a motorcycle with three men
on board namely appellant Victor Vinecario (Vinecario), Arnold Roble (Roble)
Gerlyn Wates (Wates) sped past of the police officers. When they were ordered to
return to the checkpoint, a police officer asked what the backpack contains which
the appellants answered that it was only a mat. The police officers suspected that
it was a bomb and when appellant opened the bag it turns out that its contents
were marijuana. The three were then brought to the police station and later to
Camp Catitipan and there they were investigated by police officials without the
assistance of counsel, following which they were made to sign some documents
which they were not allowed to read. The Regional Trial Court rendered them
guilty for transporting, possessing and delivering prohibited drugs under Article IV
of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659), and imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the search conducted by the police officers was incident
to a lawful arrest and there was probable cause to justify the search and
seizure of the backpack.
2. Whether or not there was conspiracy among the appellants.
Ruling:
1. Yes. Searches conducted in checkpoints are valid for as long as they are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way
least intrusive to motorists. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be
regarded as violative of an individuals right against unreasonable
search. Checkpoints are not illegal per se. Thus, under exceptional
circumstances, as where the survival of organized government is on the
balance, or where the lives and safety of the people are in grave peril,
checkpoints may be allowed and installed by the government.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been
declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause,
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted
to flee. In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing the
checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers,
their suspicious and nervous gestures when interrogated on the contents
of the backpack which they passed to one another, and the reply of
Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-appellants sped away from the
checkpoint, that he was a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in
an attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with their
inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on
the part of the law enforcers that appellants were offenders of the law
or that the contents of the backpack were instruments of some offense.
2. Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Where
the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be
liable as principals. To exempt himself from criminal liability, the
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 16
 conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the unlawful plan to commit the crime.
In People v. Concepcion, this Court held:
Proof of agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may
be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met
together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of
an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be
carried out. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.
In the case at bar, as established by the evidence, appellants connived
in unlawfully transporting the subject marijuana. Roble, who was driving
the motorcycle at Ulas, did not stop but instead sped away upon seeing
the checkpoint in a clear attempt to avoid inspection by the police
officers. When asked as to the contents of the backpack by SPO1 Goc-
ong, appellants passed the same to one another, indicating that they
knew its contents. These circumstances manifest appellants concerted
efforts and cooperation towards the attainment of their criminal
objective.
In fine, appellants defenses fail in light of their clearly proven act of
delivering or transporting marijuana.
The evidence shows that accused-appellant was apprehended in the act
of delivering or transporting illegal drugs. Transport as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean: to carry or convey from one
place to another. When accused-appellant used his vehicle to convey the
package containing marijuana to an unknown destination, his act was
part of the process of transporting the said prohibited substance.
Inherent in the crime of transporting the prohibited drug is the use of a
motor vehicle. The very act of transporting a prohibited drug, like in the
instant case, is a malum prohibitum since it is punished as an offense
under a special law. The mere commission of the act constitutes the
offense and is sufficient to validly charge and convict an individual
committing the act, regardless of criminal intent. Since the appellant was
caught transporting marijuana, the crime being mala prohibita, accused-
appellants intent, motive, or knowledge, thereof need not be shown.
17) People v. Eric Guillermo, G.R. No. 147786, 20 January 2004
Digested by: MC
Facts: This case is for automatic review of the judgment of the RTC of Anitpolo
City finding Guillermo guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer death
penalty. Guillermo was accused of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco
Keyser, the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp. On March
22, 1998, prosecution witness Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to
Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he saw appellant Eric G. Guillermo
enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him
to be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw
Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser checked the pump motor of the deep well, which
was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also went inside the part of
the building occupied by Keyser Plastics.[9] Campos paid scant attention to
Keyser. Later, at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his
logbook, when he heard some loud noises (kalabugan) coming from the Keyser
Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was coming from
the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay much attention to the sound.
At around noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his
duties when he saw appellant Guillermo look through one of the holes in the
dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had killed
Victor Keyser and needed Campos assistance to help him carry the corpse to the
garbage dump where he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos
immediately dashed off to telephone the police. Guillermo claimed being
maltreated by Keyser which was his motive for killing the latter. Keysers death
shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was
interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto Gus
Abelgas of ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews
were subsequently broadcast nationwide. Appellant admitted to David that he
committed the crime and never gave it second thought. At the trial, appellant
Guillermos defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a victim of
police frame-up. He testified that he had been an employee of Keyser for more
than a year prior to the latters death. On the date of the incident, he was all
alone at the Keyser Plastics factory compound as a stay-in employee. Other
employees have left allegedly due to Keysers maltreatment of them.
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence. He
points out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his
constitutional rights nor was he made to understand the same by the police
investigators. In fact, he says, he was only made to read said rights in printed
form posed on the wall at the police precinct. He was not provided with the
services of counsel during the custodial investigation, as admitted by SPO1 Reyes.
In view of no showing on record that he had waived his constitutional rights,
appellant argues that any evidence gathered from him, including his alleged
confession, must be deemed inadmissible.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 17
Issue: If it is a Sunday and no lawyer is available, can this be waived?
Ruling: No. While the investigating officer was aware of the appellants right to
be represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one
on the flimsy excuse that it was a Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the
officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record is bare of any
showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the
presence of counsel. As well said in People v. Dano, even if the admission or
confession of an accused is gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or
even if it had been voluntarily given.
Under Article III of the Constitution, a confession to be admissible must satisfy
the following requisites: (a) the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession
must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (c) the
confession must be express; and (d) the confession must be in writing. The right
of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on
the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplates an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Absent that
understanding, there is a denial of the right to be informed, as it cannot be said
that the person has been truly informed of his rights. Ceremonial shortcuts in the
communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it
diminishes the liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the appellants confession to
SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to
his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (known, also
as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not
elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the
offense. The rights enumerated in the Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are
meant to preclude the slightest use of the States coercive power as would lead an
accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from
freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power.
The facts in this case clearly show that appellant admitted the commission of the
crime not just to the police but also to private individuals (media and the security
guard). Thus, the RTC decision is affirmed.
18) People v. Lita Ayangao, G.R. No. 142356, 14 April 2004
Digested by: CT
Facts: Appellant Lita Ayangao was charged with transporting 14.75 kilograms of
marijuana in an information. The prosecution presented three witnesses: PO3
Nestor Galvez, PO3 Bienvenido Sagum and Chief Forensic Chemist Daisy
Panganiban-Babor. Meanwhile, the defense presented the testimonies of the
appellant and Reynaldo Nunag, purok chairman of Sitio Makabakle.
According to the police officers who are members of the Criminal Detection and
Intelligence Group based at Diamond Subdivision, Balibago, Angeles City, they
have received an information from an informant that a woman will be
transporting bulks of marijuana leaves from Mountain Province to Sapang Biabas,
Mabalacat, Pampanga.
At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of August 13, 1999, their informant went to
their headquarters and informed them that their suspect is due to arrive at
Sapang Biabas, Mabalacat. So the police officers went to Sapang Biabas, and
when the informant pointed at the particular woman who was carrying two sacks
with camote fruits on top, they have proceeded to the woman. When the officers
requested the woman to put out the contents of the sacks, they have discovered
that it contained some camote fruits and 15 brick-like substance wrapped in
brown paper and masking tape. Since one of the bricks was damaged on the side,
they have seen that the contents were dried marijuana leaves. Hence, they
apprehended the woman and confiscated the contents of the sack. After
examination, it was confirmed that the contents were indeed, marijuana.
However, the defense has another version of the facts. Lita Ayangao claimed that
she only went to Sapang Biabas due to the request of Magda Dumpao to help the
latter over some transactions regarding Dumpaos sold house. Allegedly, Ayangao
was only at the place to talk to Alarcon who was acting as the Dumpaos agent
and when she was already sleeping at Alarcons house, she was apprehended by
the police officers and brought inside a car. While she was inside the car, she saw
a sack and a carton box. Consequently, Reynaldo Nunag, the purok chariman,
testified that he did not notice anything unusual incident nor he saw the arrest of
the accused.
The trial court found the prosecutions version to be credible, held that accused
was guilty of violating Section 4 of Article II of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A.
7659 by transporting fourteen kilograms and seventy five hundredths (14.75) of a
kilogram of marijuana, a prohibited drug, without authority and sentenced her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Lita Ayangao-Batong-og (sic) is
further ordered to pay a fine of five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos.
Hence, the appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the lower court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of
prosecutions witnesses.
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 18
2. WON the lower court erred in not considering favorably the defense of alibi as
a ground for the acquittal of defendant-appellant.
Ruling:
1. No, this Court finds that the prosecution was able to discharge its burden of
proving the appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The decision of the trial
court was supported by the evidence on record.
Regarding the credibility of witnesses, this Court has ruled time and again that
this is a matter best assessed by the trial court judge since he has the opportunity
to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the stand.8 Besides, in
this case, the inconsistencies criticized by the appellant were minor ones involving
negligible details which did not negate the truth of the witnesses testimonies nor
detract from their credibility.
The judgment call of the trial court on which of the two conflicting testimonies to
believe should prevail because it involved the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses. Thus, without proof that some facts or circumstances of weight or
substance having a bearing on the result of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied, this Court will not overturn such finding as the
judge was in a better position to observe the demeanor of the two witnesses.
2. No, the trial court did not err in considering favorably the defense of alibi as a
ground for the acquittal of defendant-appellant.
Appellants alibi could not prevail over the overwhelming evidence presented by
the prosecution. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak and for it to serve as basis
for an acquittal, the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence:
(a) his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense
and
(b) the physical impossibility to be at the scene of the crime.
The appellant failed to meet these two requirements. Jaime Alarcons house
where appellant claimed to be sleeping at the time of her arrest, was only 10
meters from the tricycle terminal where she was arrested by the officers. Thus,
the trial court was correct in ruling that the alibi of appellant was not enough to
acquit her of the charges.
Review:
Miranda rights- Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived.
Validity of Arrest- The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was
actually committing a crime when she was arrested transporting marijuana, are
act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting warrantless
search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless arrest authorized
the arresting police officers to validly search and seize from the offender (1) any
dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
19) People v. Laguio, Jr., G.R. No. 128587, 16 March 2007
Digested by: RP
FACTS: Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of
the DILG namely arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain
Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of
the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were
identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operaton was conducted.
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand
over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. They denied the
allegations and claimed that they were talent managers and gymnast instructors.
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but
admitted that they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of
a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and
that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in
Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on
the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed
the same under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that Wang, who was
described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked
towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he together with Captain
Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves
to him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence
Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of
the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of
Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed gun. The BMW contains shabu and
various unlicensed guns and ammunitions. Then and there, Wang resisted the
warrantless arrest and search.
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused
Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended
Demurrer to Evidence. On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a
Manifestation to the effect that it had rested its case only in so far as the charge
EVIDENCE CASE DIGEST (2016-2017) 19
for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act is concerned. (3 charges were filed
against him and RTC acquitted Wang on all charges)
Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the
dismissal of the three cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search
warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecutions evidence against him.
Considering that the prosecution has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer,
Wang filed an Amplification to his Demurrer of Evidence. The prosecution filed its
Opposition alleging that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the
lawful arrest. Trial court granted Wang's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him.
ISSUE: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search
warrant.
RULING: NO. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any
suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would
reasonably invite the attention of the police. He was merely walking from the
Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded
him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned
by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent
any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5.
What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that
Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for
illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang
to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon
the duo's declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning
of the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang
may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting
officers conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to
find a person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the
employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently establish the
existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in
paragraph (b) of Section 5.
The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the
warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the
illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
The People's contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search
and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will
validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record,
Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. The
implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more
than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless
arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang's claim that he
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
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