Asia y La Responsabilidad de Proteger

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Yang RazaliKassim
The Geopolitics
of Intervention
Asia and the
Responsibility
to Protect
123
SpringerBriefs in Political Science
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Yang Razali Kassim
The Geopolitics of
Intervention
Asia and the Responsibility to Protect
123
Yang Razali Kassim
Nanyang Technological University
Singapore
Singapore
ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic)

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DOI 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4
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Preamble
The turn of the twenty-first century has been accompanied by the growing para-
mountcy of the human condition or what is increasingly being referred to as human
security. The post-Cold War peace has been interrupted by turmoil, while the
paradigm of the nation-state has come under unprecedented pressure in the face of
the increasingly borderless nature of the globalised world. As inter-state conflicts
recede to the background, intra-state tensions have increased, triggered by such
post-modern crises as weak governance, weak states and failing states. At the same
time, the well-being of the individual has come under severe stress, aggravated by
the growing disruption in the cosmic order and the balance of nature, caused in
large part by destructive human activity. All in all, there is growing primacy of
human security as the degenerating condition of the individual puts unprecedented
pressure on the state to protect the well-being of the people under its care.
At the international level, the push for the protection of the individual has taken
on the form of a new norm in support of humanitarian intervention called the
responsibility to protect (R2P). But while the United Nations has adopted R2P as a
principle, many member-states, especially those from the global South, still har-
bour serious reservations. One of the most critical attitudes is the view that R2P is
but a doctrine pushed by the West or the industrialised North under the cloak of the
UN to advance its hegemony of the post-Cold War international order. Proponents
of this view refers to such assertiveness as new interventionism.
Such critiques have been vociferously dismissed and counter-argued by the
advocates of R2P who say there is a crucial, and nuanced, difference between
interventionismincluding humanitarian interventionismand R2P. While
interventionism justifies the use of force by the international community on
humanitarian grounds, R2P supports the use of force only as a last resort, and
even so, only with the unanimous endorsement of the United Nations Security
Council in strictly four specific cases of mass atrocity crimesgenocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
But the outbreak of the game-changing people power revolts throughout the
Middle East and North Africa since December 2010referred to popularly as the
Arab Spring but in effect a wave of uprisings or people power revolutionshas put
R2P totally on the defensive. This is happening even as the new norm was for the
first time successfully, though controversially, applied by the international com-
munity over Libya. The backlash on R2P has given rise to sharper accusations of
v
vi Preamble
neo-imperialism by the West and consequently a countervailing push in the form

of the idea of the responsibility while protecting (RWP). Since its emergence, the
new international debate is shaping around whether RWP is an alternative norm to
R2P, or whether it marks the implementing phase in the evolution of the doctrine
of international protection.
Regardless, RWP marks the global push and pull over the idea of humanitarian
intervention. Significantly, this tusslewhich is at once intellectual, diplomatic
and geopoliticalwas being played out in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, beginning with Tunisia and quickly spreading to neighbouring
countries Egypt and Libya like a domino until it hovered over Syria. It is over
Syria that the international community has been locked in an excruciating stale-
mate over whether and how to protect Syrian civilians trapped in a political crisis
between an increasingly unpopular regime and a revolting population. This book
serves to capture the current geopolitics of international intervention and its
relationship with the fledgling doctrine of R2P.
This book looks at the theme in the context of Asia which is broadly defined as
stretching from West Asia to East Asia. West Asia includes the Middle East,
which is approached in the context of the Arab Uprisings or what is popular
referred to as the Arab Spring, thus touching Northern Africa. Asia also includes
sub-continental Asia, the biggest part of which is India. East Asia in turn
encompasses the swathe of land from Russian Asia in Siberia, China, Japan, South
Korea to Southeast Asia and Australia and Oceania. This conceptual definition of
Asia coincides with the one used by Chandra Muzaffar in his book Whither
WANA? Reflections on the Arab Uprisings. He prefers WANA which stands for
West Asia and North Africa to MENA or the Middle East as WANA describes a
geographical region that embraces almost the whole of the Arab world and other
countries in that space such as Iran and Turkey. Because it is geographical, he
says, it is ideologically neutral (Muzaffar 2013).
This brief also serves as an observation of the attitudes and policies of the key
countries towards R2P and humanitarian intervention broadly defined as the threat
or use of force in the international arena to alleviate human suffering, besides
assessing the possible future of the norm of civilian protection. Given the ongoing
crisis surrounding R2P and humanitarian intervention, more will certainly be heard
in the future about this increasingly significant but controversial theme.
Yang Razali Kassim
Reference
Muzaffar, C. (2013). Whither WANA? Reflections on the Arab Uprisings. JUST
International. Retrieved December 30 2013, from http://issuu.com/juste-books/
docs/whither_wana_reflections_on_the_ara/1
Contents
1 Rise of the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 New Era of Humanitarian Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Responsibility While Protecting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.2 Beyond R2P? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Geopolitics of RWP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Rise of BRICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Genesis and Debates on R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.1 Humanitarian Intervention and R2P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2 The Arab Uprisings and the P5 Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2.1 R2Ps Tussle Over Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2 R2P, Realpolitik and Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 The Arab League and R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Future of R2P in the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3 China as a P5 Player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 29

3.1 China and the Arab Uprisings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 29
3.1.1 Chinas Stance Over International Humanitarian
Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 30
3.1.2 Evolution of Chinas Non-intervention Policy. . . . ..... 34
3.1.3 Schools of Thought on Chinas Attitude Towards
Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2 Impact of Chinas Evolving Stance on Intervention . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Chinas Middle East Policy Towards the Arab Uprisings . . . . . . 40
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4 China, India, Japan and an Emerging Eastphalian Order? . . . . . . 43

4.1 The Rise of Eastphalia? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2 India and Eastphalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.1 Indias Position on Non-intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.2 Domestic Criticisms of Indias Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.2.3 Indias Strategic Thinking on Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . 47
vii
viii Contents
4.2.4 Indias Place in Eastphalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

4.3 Japan and R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3.1 Four Contesting Perspectives on R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.2 The Conservative View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3.3 Revisionist View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.4 The Liberal View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.5 The Peaceniks View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.3.6 Japan, R2P and Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5 ASEAN and R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

5.1 Malaysias Unusual Interventionist Stance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.2 R2P-Like Situations in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.3 Rohingya: New Test Case of R2P in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . 61
5.4 ASEANs Attitude Towards R2P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.5 ASEANs Doctrine of Non-interference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
5.6 Reconciling Sovereignty and Humanitarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.7 Typology of R2P Positions in ASEAN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.8 Promoting R2P in Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.9 CSCAP Study on R2P 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6 Critiques and Critics of R2P . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

6.1 New Humanitarianism? . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.2 Five Major Critiques . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.3 The Future of Humanitarian Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
7 Geopolitics of Intervention: Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

7.1 Small Five Versus P5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Origin of S5: Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V) . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.3 Reforming the Veto System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.4 Genesis of R2NV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.5 Beyond UN Reform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.6 New Politics of Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.7 R2P, the Emerging Global Order and Eastphalia . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
8 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97
8.1 International Intervention: A Turning Point? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 97
8.1.1 International Intervention Without International Law? . .. 102
8.1.2 Saudi-US Relations: Intervention
and Geopolitical Reconfiguration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 104
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 106
Chapter 1
Rise of the Responsibility While
Protecting (RWP)
Abstract The outbreak of a wave of people power revolts, starting in Tunisia in

December 2010 and spreading quickly throughout the Middle East and North
Africa, caused unprecedented instability in a politically sensitive region. Like a
sudden volcanic eruption, the conflagration was as stunning as it was surprising,
triggering major societal upheavals from Libya and Egypt to Yemen, Bahrain and
Syria, apart from leading to political changes in other regional states such as
Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Lebanon and Oman. The revolts or the Arab
Spring, as they are popularly referred to in the media, are in effect the Arab
Revolution and one of modern historys unexpected political phenomena. They
also put to severe test the United Nations experiment in the fledgling international
relations doctrine known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), adopted by the
world body just 5 years earlier in 2005. R2P was designed to bridge the gulf
between naked unilateral international intervention as in the US-led invasion of
Iraq in 2003, on the one hand, and international helplessness in the face of mass
atrocity crimes within the borders of sovereign states, on the other. R2P would
permit and justify international intervention only as a last resortwhen states fail,
are unwilling, or are even breaching their responsibility to protect their own people
through state-induced mass atrocity crimes. R2P was invoked for the first time by
the UN during the Arab Uprisings, but quickly became controversial for leading to
regime change in Libya. The subsequent backlash against R2P saw many countries
opposed to its application in Syria and is widely seen as the key cause of the
current political stalemate in the UN. Attempts to unblock the diplomatic logjam at
the UN has given rise to a new initiative known as responsibility while protecting
(RWP). But is RWP a counter-response to roll back R2P, or is it a move to better
implement R2P as the new doctrine to resolve the international communitys
dilemma over human suffering?

Keywords Responsibility while protecting (RWP) Responsibility to protect

(R2P) Humanitarian intervention Sovereignty BRICS UN security council
resolutions 1970 and 1973
Y. R. Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 1

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_1, The Author(s) 2014
2 1 Rise of the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP)
1.1 New Era of Humanitarian Intervention
In 2011, 6 years after the United Nations overwhelmingly adopted the concept of
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the world body invoked it twice to protect
civilians in Libya from the onslaught of their own government in the wake of the
Arab uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa. By way of
two Security Council resolutions, UNSC 1970 and UNSC 1973, the UN imposed a
no-fly zone to prevent the Gaddafi regime from bombing its own citizens and
authorised all necessary measures to protect ordinary Libyans who had risen up
against their longstanding ruler, inspired by the dethronement of other
authoritarian leaders first in Tunisia and then in Egypt. The political convulsions
had a knock-on effect and spread to other countries in the region specifically
Yemen and Bahrainconvulsions that continue to reverberate in Syria even at the
time of writing.
Whilst the political upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt that brought down President
Zine al-Bidin and Hosni Mubarak did not lead to international humanitarian
intervention, the upheaval in Libya did bring world attention, partly because of the
brutality inflicted by the Gaddafi regime on the Libyan protesters who were largely
helpless in the face of the regimes atrocities. Yet, the fall of Gaddafi unleashed a
raging controversy in the international community, especially at the UN, precisely
because the international humanitarian intervention under R2P had led to regime
changewhich was never the purpose of R2P. Indeed, a fundamental principle
separating R2P from its predecessor conception of humanitarian intervention was
that R2P would stop short of regime change. This distinguishing tenet was central
to the idea of R2P when it was first advanced by its conceptualisers in the 2001
report by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS), primarily to assuage its detractors that R2P was not a post-Cold War
version of Western neo-imperialism in disguise.
The fall of Gaddafi not only contravened that principle but proved the worst
fears of its critics while shaking the confidence of the many fencesitters on the
intellectual divide over R2P, especially in the developing world, but also two
major veto-wielding powers in the Security CouncilRussia and China. The
critical impact of this mishandling of R2P in Libya caused a serious setback for
UN intervention when the Arab uprisings spread to Syria in the same year and the
Assad regime responded with armed aggression against a largely defenceless
civilian population who had also risen up against the regime. A major cause of the
setback was the double-veto by Russia and China who were convinced by now that
intervention would only serve the agenda of the West and were therefore strongly
against a Western-sponsored initiative to pass an R2P-like resolution on the Assad
regime. At the time of writing, the UN was still sorely in a stalemate over Syria. It
was against this backdrop that an unlikely playerBrazilinitiated the move to
bridge the gulf between the proponents and detractors of R2P.
1.1 New Era of Humanitarian Intervention 3
1.1.1 Responsibility While Protecting
Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 2011 amidst

the controversy over Libya and the evolving crisis in Syria, Brazilian President
Dilma Rousseff took the position that much had been said about the responsibility
to protect but not the responsibility while protecting, whereas the two concepts
must be developed together (Rousseff 2012). It was then expanded on in a
concept note to the UN Security Council two months later on 9 November by her
Permanent Representative to the UN, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti. RWP was a
clever turn of the phrase, and one that was to reflect a subtle tweaking of R2P. This
idea of twinning R2P with the responsibility while protecting was further
expounded by her foreign minister, Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, who in his UNGA
speech on 9 November 2011, articulated what seemed like a new, but more cau-
tious approach to international intervention as conceived under R2P. Patriota
essentially argued for some form of control over the implementation of R2P so that
international intervention to protect civilians against mass atrocities would not
lead to unwanted damage. As with Rousseff, he entitled the concept as
Responsibility while protecting, which has since been referred to as RWP
(UNGA, Letter of 9 Nov 2011 by Permanent Representative of Brazil to UN
Secretary General). Patriota said it was Brazils view that the international
community must demonstrate a high level of responsibility while protecting
(UNGA 2011, 9 Nov). It was a political, as much as an intellectual, response to the
growing but fundamentally controversial concept of R2P which the UN adopted in
2005 to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes, including crimes induced by
their own state.
In tabling the idea of RWP, Brazil prefaced it with the assertion that there is a
growing perception that the concept of responsibility to protect might be misused
for purposes other than protecting civilians, such as regime change, a perception
that may make it more difficult to attain the protection objectives pursued by the
international community (UNGA 2011, 9 Nov). Elaborating on President
Rouseffs twinning concept, Patriotta said both R2P and RWP, as such, should
evolve together. This twinned evolution must be based on an agreed set of at least
eight fundamental principles, parameters and procedures, namely the following as
listed in the Brazilian concept note contained in the Letter of 9 November to the
UN:
1. Prevention and preventive diplomacy;
2. Rigour in pushing for peaceful means;
3. The use of force, including the exercise of the responsibility to protect, must
always be authorised by the Security Council;
4. The authorisation of the use of force must be limited and strictly governed by
international law;
5. The use of force must produce little violence and instability;
6. The use of force must be judicious, proportionate and limited to the objectives
established by the Security Council;
7. These guidelines must be observed throughout the entire length of the

authorisation;
8. The Security Council must ensure the accountability of those to whom
authority is granted to resort to force.
The immediate reaction to the Brazilian initiative was to see as a riposte to the
troubled implementation of R2P over Libya which had caused a major diplomatic
fracas at the UN, with many developing countries, especially China and India, but
also Russia, accusing the Western powers, specifically Britain, France and the
United States, of pursuing a neo-imperialist agenda. Indeed, Brazils RWP initiative
has given a new twist to R2Pa highly controversial concept that emerged with the
end of the Cold War that essentially sought to justify international intervention on
humanitarian grounds but under strict conditions to protect civilians facing mass
atrocities. R2P has attracted both supporters and detractors since it was advocated by
its initial conceptualisers in 2001, in particular the ICISS, and prior to that Francis M.
Deng when he was the Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) and until recently the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide. Despite its polarising impact, R2P was eventually adopted
by the United Nations in 2005 at the World Summit of that year.
R2P was fundamentally controversial because it went against the long-estab-
lished Westphalian doctrine of state sovereignty that has been the backbone of the
global order which the UN upholds and epitomises. By adopting R2P, the UN
itself is lending legitimacy to the new doctrine that seemingly has the effect of
undermining the sovereignty of states that make up the membership of the UN.
The doctrinal justification for the UN is that while the end of the Cold War has
reduced inter-state conflicts, there had been a spate of intra-state crises in the
1990s which led to domestic conflicts and mass atrocities in the wake of states that
were either distintegrating, such as Yugoslavia, or failing, such as Rwanda. Yet the
international community as embodied by the UN had been helpless to intervene
due to the competing veto powers of the exclusive UN Security Council group of
the Permanent Fivethe United States, Russia, China, Britain and France. R2P
provided at least the moral justification and the force of international consensus for
the UN to intervene on humanitarian grounds.
To the supporters of R2P, Brazils move was a revisionist idea aimed at stalling or
even rolling back the growing norm. To the critics of R2P, who invariably are
defenders of state sovereignty, Brazils RWP was a welcome development that
could bridge the deep gulf between the advocates of R2P and its critics. By pro-
moting its new big-idea of RWP (Economist 2012), Brazil was seen as positioning
itself between the two camps over the R2P divide. Brazil was also seen as gearing up
to carve for itself a role as an emerging power through the new multilateral forum
called BRICS, involving Russia, India, China and South Africa. Regardless, Brazils
RWP idea has stoked further the ongoing controversial debates about international
humanitarian intervention in the name of protecting civilians against mass atrocities,
which R2P strictly defines as referring to four specific crimesgenocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
1.1.1.1 Reaction to RWP
Gareth Evans, one of the intellectual fathers of R2P and a force behind the ICISS,
welcomed Brazils initiative as an important and very constructive contribution to
the debate (Evans 2012a). He said it came at a time when dialogue is urgently
needed in the wake of criticism about the way the United Nations civilian pro-
tection mandate was implemented in Libya in 2011. Evans noted that the Brazilian
initiative questioned not the merits of the R2P principle itself, but rather Security
Council working methods. R2P itself is here to stay, Evans emphasised (Evans
2012a). But he conceded that the Brazilian move for RWP reflected the backlash
against R2P, led by the BRICS, against the way the Libyan mandate was imple-
mentedat least after the initial implementation of the no-fly-zone and following
the aversion for the brutal Gaddafi attack on Benghazi. He saw the backlash as
serious, and unless the issues of concern are addressed UNSC agreement to any
future coercive military action is going to be impossible. Just as bad, he said,
this issue has poisoned the atmosphere for lesser coercive measures, as evidenced
by the current UNSC paralysis over Syria.
Evans then enumerated a critique of the implementation of the Libyan mandate,
which he said had prima facie credibility about the implementation of UNSC
1973 on Libya (Evans 2012a). Firstly, the explicit terms of the arms embargo were
breached in the supply of arms to the rebels by some members of the NATO-led
coalition. Secondly, the possibility of achieving a genuine and sustainable
ceasefire and accompanying political negotiation process was not taken seriously
at any stage. Thirdly, air attacks were mounted on fleeing personnel posing no
immediate threat to civilians. Fourth, air attacks were mounted on some targets of
no obvious military significance, such as the compound at which Gaddafi relatives
were killed. Fifthly, the international coalition comprehensively supported the
rebel side in what rapidly became a civil war: whatever it might have been at the
outset, the objective quickly became not civilian protection but regime change, he
said.
To these objections, the Western powers in the Security Council or P3 have
mounted several responses, chief of which is this: Protecting civilians in areas like
Tripoli that were under Gaddafis direct control could not have been accomplished
by any other means than overturning his regime. If one side was supported in a
civil war, this was because (as subsequently seen in Syria) a regimes one-sided
killing sometimes leads initially-unarmed civilians to seek arms to fight backand
to recruit army defectors. Evans noted that such a defence had real weight, though
it did not directly address the breach of the UNSCs very explicit arms embargo.
Neither did it meet the concerns about Council process which were at the heart of
the BRICS (and especially Brazilian) critique.
Whatever substance such arguments might have, Evans noted, they were not
discussed in these terms in the Security Council. The P3 was unwilling to debate
not only criteria for the use of military force and how they might apply to this case,
but the detailed scope of the specific mandate given. Other members of the
Security Council were not given the kind of detailed information about the extent
of threats to civilians or the military realities on the ground (Evans 2012a).
Evans argued that supporters of the doctrineFriends of R2Pcannot be in
denial about the force of these criticisms. They have to focus now on a strategy for
dealing with them. Indeed, he said, the best available vehicle is Brazils RWP
initiative, noting that RWP was rapidly gaining momentum. He saw the Brazilian
initiative as containing two crucial elements: First, the need to give serious
attention to key prudential criteria before the UNSC agreed to any use of coercive
military force, especially last resort, proportionality and balance of consequences.
Second, the need for a monitoring and review mechanism by which the UNSC can
be properly informed about, and maintain effective scrutiny of, the way in which
use-of-force mandates were actually implemented (Evans 2012a).
1.1.2 Beyond R2P?
Lending further support to the Brazilian initiative for RWP, Evans proposed that
going forward, a major effort should be made to give practical applicability to the
RWP proposal. He saw a possible resolution for debate by the UNGA. What was
needed, he said, was a constructive and cooperative spirit by those on both sides
of the Libya debate, and an attempt to again find common groundwhich should
not be impossible (Evans 2012a). As for Syria, he said, finding consensus in the
Security Council on how to implement R2P in such a hard case might have come
too late to help in that country where the UN was facing a serious stalemate to
implement R2P. But the alternative to such cooperation would be worsea return
to the bad old days of Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo: either total inaction in the
face of mass atrocity crimes, or international action which is outlawed by the UN
Charter (Evans 2012a).
The emergence of RWP, nonetheless, reflected the political crisis in the
international community over what the UN could or should do in an era when mass
atrocities were taking place with greater frequency as inter-state wars receded.
Brazils position on RWP, as intimated by Evans in his various responses, reflected
two other significant developments: the first is the growing geopolitical clout of the
grouping to which Brazil belongsBRICS. The second is the growing influence of
Asias emerging powersChina and Indiain international diplomacy, including
in the debates over the wisdom and efficacy of R2P.
But is RWP a new concept to rival R2P? Or is it an attempt to re-negotiate the
conceptual foundation of R2P, as the International Coalition for Responsibility to
Protect (ICR2P) critiques? Not to Francis Deng, another intellectual progenitor of
R2P even before he was appointed Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General
on the Prevention of Genocide. Rather, to him, RWP is a principle for the
implementation. (ICR2P 2011). In other words, he does not think RWP would roll
back R2P as a humanitarian interventionist strategy. As he sees it, R2P has moved
from debates over the concept to issues of implementationand RWP is but the
latest rendition of this. Whilst he concedes that response to RWP has been positive,
taking it as a new concept might have the effect of generating a debate parallel to
and detracting from that on RtoP. Approaching it as a strategy for implementing
R2P on the other hand, he says, would sharpen the debate on how best to respond
to R2P situations.
Regardless, proponents of R2P such as the International Coalition for
Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) are increasingly accepting the fact that RWP is
having a profound influence on the development of R2P. The new concepts
appeal lies in its emphasis on prevention as the best policy and that the use of
force in particular must be regularly monitored and periodically assessed so as to
minimise the impact on civilians (ICR2P 2011). Since Brazilian President Rousseff
first introduced it as responsibility in protecting at the UN in September 2011,
which was then expanded in a concept note to the UNSC 2 months later on 9
November by Brazils Permanent Representative Maria Viotti, there has been
growing debate on the critical contribution of RWP. Many scholars and com-
mentators have reflected on how RWP will impact on R2P and more importantly,
the international response to future situations of genocide, war crimes, crimes
against humanity and ethnic cleansing (ICR2P 2011). While some fear that RWP
could potentially challenge R2P, others such as those in the Kofi Annan Interna-
tional Peacekeeping Training Centre see RWP as a clarifying principle of RtoP
rather than a new concept rivalling an existing concept (ICR2P 2011). RWP is
also seen as creating much-needed space to restore faith in the RtoP norm.
Commentators like Nana Afadzinu of the West Africa Civil Society Institute
(WACSI) argue in geopolitical termsthat RWP could give developing countries
the assurance that the RtoP is not just as tool for promoting the imperialist agenda
(ICR2P 2011).
1.2 Geopolitics of RWP
1.2.1 Rise of BRICS
Brazils RWP initiative, however, could also be viewed in the context of the
geopolitics undergirding R2P, especially the growing clout of BRICS. Evans
conceded that there had been BRICS anger over the push for regime change in
Libya by the United States, United Kingdom and Francethe three Western
powers in the Security Council known as the Permanent 3 or P3which was why
the RWP proposal drew almost contemptuous initial reaction from the three
powers. Evans see the critical charge against R2P being led by Russia, China and
the BRICS which comprises Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Rus-
sias motivation, according to him, could be read with some cynicism of its close
economic and military connections with Syrias ruling Assad regime. China has
always been highly sensitive on the issue of sovereignty and intervention. Given
that the whole BRICS group were in 2011 sitting on the Security Council, this
charge against R2P gave an interesting foretaste of the kind of Security Council
membership more representative of current world power balances that many of us
have been arguing for (Evans 2012a, b, c, d).
The BRICS were now suspicious of any resolution on Syria as it could be used
as an excuse to force regime change again, as in Libya. Evans, however, noted an
emerging compromise between the P3 powers, on the one hand, and Brazil, on the
other (Evans 2012a, b, c, d; Stuenkel 2012). Yet, despite the general apprehension
of the BRICS towards R2P, it did not mean that BRICS members were united
against it and standing cohesively behind RWP. As Evans noted, while India and
South Africa were supportive of RWP, the US and Europe saw RWP as a tactic to
delay resolutions allowing the use of force to prevent mass atrocities, whilst the
positions of Russia and China were not so clear in the beginning. In the end, Russia
and China vetoed the Arab-sponsored Security Council resolution on 4 February
2012 which was backed by the Western powers and would lead to sanctions on
Syria in response to the regimes crackdown on civilians. Moscow said the res-
olution would lead to regime change in Syria, which it opposed. The three other
BRICS membersBrazil, India and South Africaabstained. The stalemate over
Syria is as much a reflection of the Security Councils paralysis in the face of the
situation in Syria (Evans 2012b).
1.3 Genesis and Debates on R2P
During his visit to Singapore on 23 March 2012 as part of his tour of Southeast
Asia, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon stressed the need for countries to
explore regional and global collaborations to prevent mass atrocity crimesin the
same way they cooperated to tackle natural disasters. Speaking at a public lecture,
Ban cited the unified response of Asian countries to the tsunamis of 2004 off
Sumatra, Indonesia and 2011 off Fukushima, Japan as invaluable lessons in what
he called practical sovereignty at work. Leaders of sovereign states chose to
work together to adopt early warning systems and evacuation plans and in the
same way, he said, such early warning and assessment of man-made crises were
needed too. We need to feel earthquakes within fragile societies and see the social
and political tsunamis they produce before they gain unstoppable momentum
(Hussain 2012). To back his point, Ban cited the work of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the AsiaPacific
(CSCAP) which had produced a consensus report on implementing R2P. Its most
promising recommendation, he said, was the establishment of a Risk Reduction
Centre in Southeast Asia that could work with the United Nations and our Joint
Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.
Both are strategies to implement R2P. Indeed, the ascent of Bans speech was
unmistakably on the implementation of R2P. In so doing, the UN chief was trying
to emphasise the fact that R2P as a new norm in international relations should now
1.3 Genesis and Debates on R2P 9
go beyond concept to action. In other words, the time had come for R2P to be
operationalised and implemented following its adoption in 2005 at the UNs World
Summit in what is officially known as the Outcome Document of the High-level
Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on 14-16 September 2005. Indeed, in a
major effort to push R2P into the post-concept phase 4 years after the World
Summit, the UN Secretary-General released the 2009 Report on Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect. It is based on R2Ps three pillars of responsibilitythe
sovereign states responsibility to prevent mass atrocities within its own borders;
the international communitys responsibility to react should that state fail in its
sovereign responsibility; and the international communitys responsibility to
intervene and help rebuild after the response to mass atrocity crimes. The third
pillar calls for as a last resort the deployment of military action. Framed in terms of
three implementation thrusts, the UNSGs report recommended the UN to leverage
on regional and sub-regional arrangements to support R2P (ICR2P 2011).
But Bans call for R2P to go into the implementation phase is sounding more
like a plea from a minority voice. In fact, R2P can be said to have entered another
phasefrom the intense debates over its viability, if not legitimacy, since it was
first proposed, to a fundamental stalemate at the level of realpolitik at the UN.
Worse, R2Ps advance as a norm in the short period since the 2005 World Summit
could potentially be reversed. It is timely to review the progress of R2P since it
was first conceived.
1.3.1 Humanitarian Intervention and R2P
Until September 11, 2011 when terrorism overwhelmed international attention, the
big issue in international relations, advocates of R2P like Evans argued, was the
right of humanitarian interventionthe question of when if ever, it is appropriate
for states to take coercive action, and in particular military action, against another
state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that state (Evans 2004, 2012c).
Man-made internal catastrophe, and what the international community should do
about it was what preoccupied international practitioners, commentators and
scholars more than anything else in the decade after the Cold War. As the threat of
inter-state conflicts receded, a spate of intra-state catastrophes broke out leading to
shocking instances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanitymost of which left the international community challenged and unsure
of how to react. Global debates revolved around cases of international intervention
such as in Somalia in 1993; the lack of effective response to the massacres in
Rwanda in 1994; and the inability of the UN to prevent ethnic cleansing in Sre-
brenica in Bosnia in 1995, followed by NATOs intervention in Kosovo in 1999
without Security Council approval. All of them generated controversy, yet by the
new century, the debates remained inconclusive: Was there a right to intervene?
How? When is it to be exercised? And under whose authority? (Evans 2004,
2012d).
It was against this backdrop that in September 2000, the Canadian government,
on the initiative of its Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy with the assistance of the
United Kingdom and Swiss governments, established the ICISS, co-chaired by
Evans and the Algerian diplomat and UN Special Adviser Mohamed Sahnoun. The
objective was to produce a guide for the international community on how to
respond to internal, man-made, human rights-violating catastrophes. Such man-
made catastrophes shared a common feature: they triggered a dilemma in the UNs
rolehow to reconcile its fundamental principle of state sovereignty and main-
taining peace and security (Evans 2004).
The solution was radicalto rethink sovereignty, not so much in terms of its
essence as control, but as a responsibility (Evans 2004). This fundamental shift in
the concept of sovereignty was made possible by at least five key factors: the
increasing impact in international discourse of the concept of human security;
increasingly, the concept of security has gone beyond states to people; the
increasing impact of international human rights norms; the increasing recognition
in state practice of sovereignty as responsibility; the gradual transition from a
culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international account-
ability. Sovereignty, Evans argued, implied dual responsibilityexternally to
respect the sovereignty of other states; and internally to respect the dignity and
basic rights of all people within the state. Correspondingly, there was a termi-
nology change from the deeply divisive humanitarian intervention to the
responsibility to protect (Weiss et al. 2010). The ICISS report was considered by
the Secretary-Generals High-Level Panel of Threats, Challenges and Change in
2004 which endorsed the ICISS argument that the issue is not the right to
intervene of any state, but the responsibility to protect of every State (Thakur
and Weiss 2009). Thakur and Weiss simplified the idea of R2P as a call to action
on prevention, intervention and post-conflict reconstruction.
The idea of sovereignty as responsibility has a long evolutionary pedigree, with
the ICISS report consolidating a number of disparate trends and ideas and bor-
rowing language first developed by Francis Deng and Roberta Cohen to help
address the problem of IDPs. Deng introduced the concept of sovereignty as
responsibility in the African context in the 1980s, which gained momentum with
Kofi Annans articulation in the 1990s of two sovereignties and the formulation
of the responsibility to protect in 2001 in the ICISS report (Thakur and Weiss
2009). R2Ps state champion from start to finish was Canada, with several like-
minded countries and non-state entities supporting, such as Norway, Switzerland,
the MacArthur Foundation and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC).
Since then, R2P has become a prominent feature of international debates about
preventing genocide and mass atrocities and about protecting potential victims.
Adopted unanimously by heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World
Summit and reaffirmed twice since by the Security Council, R2P however is often
used interchangeably with humanitarian intervention (HI). Advocates of R2P
argued that R2P differed from humanitarian intervention in that it places emphasis
on the primary responsibility of the state to protect its own population through the
novel idea that the international community might respond to genocide and mass
atrocities (Bellamy 2010). The other differentiating feature of R2P is that, unlike in
the original proposal by the ICISS, it emphasised international assistance to states
and downplayed the role of armed intervention. Evans see a key difference
between R2P and the right of humanitarian intervention as advocated by the
North but resisted by the South is conceptualR2P replaces the divisive language
of humanitarian intervention with the non-confrontational language of R2P and
recasts the content of the debate about R2P accordingly (Evans 2012d).
Thakur and Weiss in fact described humanitarian intervention as having a bad
name and feared the danger of rollback caused by aggressive humanitarian
warriors. Because of this, the ICISS explicitly argued againstand called for a
deliberate shift from humanitarian intervention to the concept of R2P. The ICISS
reports R2P formulation, they argued, was less confrontational and polarising,
and more likely to lead to a consensus across the bitter NorthSouth divide
(Thakur and Weiss 2009). But this differentiation has also been contested by others
who see R2P and humanitarian intervention as essentially two sides of the same
coin. The idea that R2P can, and should distance itself from the issue of
humanitarian intervention is, I contend, illogical. (Hehir 2012). Hehir says the
very first sentence of the 2001 ICISS report states:
This report is about the so-called right of humanitarian intervention: the
question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coerciveand in
particular militaryaction against another state for the purpose of protecting
people at risk in that other state (Evans et al. 2001).
R2P, despite being a radical concept in international relations, had become part
of the diplomatic language of humanitarian emergencies, used by governments,
international organisations, NGOs and independent commissions to justify
behaviour, cajole compliance, and demand international action (Bellamy 2010).
As an idea and a concept, it is as powerful as it is controversial and divisive, yet
has made a swift ascension from the periphery to the centre of international
discourse (Hehir 2012). In the process of this rise, R2P has dethroned, Hehir says,
the ostensibly old-fashioned and/or pejorative term humanitarian intervention.
In the process of the polarisation of states, the divide is not clear cut, although
at the conceptual level, there are two campsthose for R2P and those against
R2Por to paraphrase Jean Bricmontthe idealists (referring to those for R2P)
and the realists (referring to those who see R2P as advancing neo-imperialist
agendas of the West).
This classification emerged during a debate on R2P on the sidelines of the UN
general assembly between Evans, described as a leading advocate of R2P, and
Naom Chomsky and Bricmont, described respectively as one of the worlds
leading anti-imperialist intellectuals and a Belgian theoretical physicist and
philosopher. When Evans dismissed Chomskys historical analysis supporting the
anti-imperialist view, Bricmont intervened to juxtapose the two intellectual camps
by explaining that the difference between the two worlds of Mr. Evans and myself
is that I look at the real world and real relationships of forces in the world and
Mr. Evans lives in a paper world where things are written on paper very precisely
with all the guidelines and all the norms, etc. The UN Charter is very well written
yet its still violated by the powerful (Fenton 2009). Fentons view reflects the
perspective of those who are generally sceptical of R2P which they see as a
Trojan Horse for the advancement of the Western powers.
Yet at the level of realpolitik, it is even more unclear to distinguish between the
advocates of R2P and its critics. To characterise it in terms of an EastWest divide
is tempting but not really accurate as there have been instances when the Western
powers were against pro-R2P proposals. Indeed, the US was opposed to the idea of
R2P when it was proposed by the ICISS because Washington did not want to feel
constrained by it. Still, it can be said that generally the chief proponents of R2P
amongst states are primarily the Western countries namely the USA, Canada,
France, Britain and Switzerland.
The deep controversy surrounding R2P, both as a concept and as an imple-
mentation strategy in international relations, has continued unabated, especially
after Libya and Syria. The primary critique is that it is a neo-imperialist doctrine
by the Western powers to advance their strategic interests post-Cold War by
undermining the national sovereignty and political autonomy of the weak
(Bellamy 2010). There remained profound disagreements about the function,
meaning and proper use of R2P, while the principle itself had been inconsistently
applied. For example, France argued for R2P to be used on Myanmar following the
regimes inaction to protect its citizens during Cyclone Nargis; and Russia when it
justified its military intervention in Georgia under R2P. Yet, in both cases, there
was no apparent failure to protect populations from genocide and mass atrocities.
Bellamy characterised R2P as a policy agenda in need of implementation.
Notwithstanding the moral argument used to justify the redefining of sover-
eigntyin essence if not in principleR2P has not been able to remove itself from
being seen as in fundamental conflict with the principle of state sovereignty. From
the start, R2P had faced, as Evans put it, a revolt to prevent the principles
development. Despite its adoption at the World Summit in 2005, it took 6 months
of intense debate for the Security Council to unanimously adopt Resolution 1674,
reaffirming the World Summits provisions regarding the responsibility to
protect. At the forefront of the revolt, or more accurately, resistance, to R2P were
two veto-wielding non-Western members of the Security CouncilRussia and
Chinaalong with many of the developing countries, such as India, Venezuela,
Cuba, Egypt, Sudan and Malaysia (Thakur and Weiss 2009). R2P was not an idea
that started off pitting the East and the West because there were many developing
countries that either stood in the middle ground, or on a case-by-case basis, aligned
themselves with the West. Over time, however, R2P has been showing signs of
evolving into a norm dividing the West and the Rest. A good example of this is the
growing clout in the evolution of R2P of the BRICS groupingBrazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa.
The revolt against R2P reached its climax with the outbreak of the Arab
Uprisings or what is popular referred to as the Arab Spring in 2011 when R2P was
applied on Libya but ended in a stalemate over the crisis in Syria within a year. It
was the paralysis over Syria that had fuelled the growing interest in RWP. As a
new concept that could potentially challenge R2P, RWP found itself quickly
embraced by the UN Secretary-General in his Report of 25 July 2012 entitled
Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response. The UNSG welcomed the
responsibility while protecting as underscoring the prevention and protection
principles of R2P. The essence of responsibility while protecting is doing the
right thing, in the right place, at the right time and for the right reasons (Report of
the Secretary General 2012, July 25). In embracing RWP, the UN also defused the
potential explosion in popularity of a rival concept, though not before implicitly
acknowledging that there could have been mistakes in the manner R2P had been
pursued or implemented since it was first adopted in 2005.
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Chapter 2
The Arab Uprisings and the P5 Powers
Abstract The wave of Arab revolts in the Middle East and North Africa since
December 2010 is the most significant outbreaks of inter-related uprisings at the
dawn of the twenty-first century. Popularly known as the Arab Spring, the Arab
Uprisings as it should be more appropriately called, have engulfed the wider
international community in the most intense diplomatic wars in the modern era.
Global concerns over the outbreak of atrocities and the destabilising effects of the
revolts have led to high-level realpolitik pitting two major campsthose who are
pushing for international intervention to protect civilian populations led largely by
the West and industrialised North versus those who are resisting this push in the
name of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference led mainly by
Russia, China and the developing South. For the first time, the Arab world has
been openly split, as Arab brethrens are forced to take sides against Arab breth-
rens, even advocating intervention in Libya and Syria and finding themselves as
bedfellows with the Western powers. The revolt of the masses in the Middle
Eastor West Asia as some would prefer to call the regionis yet to come to an
end. But the intense power politics in the UN suggest that the future of the Middle
East will be defined more by the Permanent Five than the Arab world itself.

Keywords Arab spring No-fly-zone Regime change Yemeni option UN

contact group UN-Arab League Joint Six-Point Peace Plan
2.1 R2Ps Tussle Over Syria
On 29 May 2012, Australia announced that it was expelling two Syrian diplomats,
becoming the first of several countries to take diplomatic action in response to the
worsening internal crisis in Syria as the death toll rose with fresh reports of a
massacre of civilians, including women and children, in the rebel village of Houla.
Australia was followed immediately by at least seven countries France, Germany,
Britain, Italy, Spain, Turkey and the United States, with Canada following hot on

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_2, The Author(s) 2014
16 2 The Arab Uprisings and the P5 Powers
the heels by expelling all Syrian diplomats as part of the worldwide diplomatic
response (Nicholson 2012, 30 May). Foreign Minister Bob Carr stated on televi-
sion that the expulsion was a message of revulsion to Syria in response to the
massacres of unarmed civilians who had been protesting against the regime, which
UN estimates then put the total number of deaths at the start of the conflict to at
least 10,000. By 2012, the death toll had climbed to at least 100,000, according to
the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon. The primarily Western
response led to a Syrian counter-response when Damascus on 5 June 2012 retal-
iated by expelling the envoys of several Western countries and Turkey. It was
reported that the diplomatic retaliation against the Australia-led protest came as
Russia and China began talks on the Syria crisis, which Beijing said was at
crossroads. The talks demanded both government and rebel forces to halt the
violence as proposed by UN-Arab League joint special envoy Kofi Annan in a six-
point peace plan.
The Syrian uprising was inspired by the series of internal revolts in North
Africa and the Middle East, widely referred to as the Arab Spring, that began in
Tunisia in December 2010 and led to the downfall of autocratic leaders in Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt and Yemen. Of the four leaders who were toppled by the revolts,
Gaddafi was the one who faced the full force of the new norm in international
politics called the Responsibility to Protect.
While Tunisias Zine-El-Abidine Ben Ali and Egypts Hosni Mobarak were
deposed by their peoples before there was time for any international intervention,
Gaddafis heavy-handed response to Libyas own uprising drew global attention.
This was partly because the largely Western media which managed to gain access
into Libyan territory and subsequently through the digital world, brought the
Libyan crisis to the homes, laptops and handphones of millions of people around
the globe. The worldwide attention brought added pressure on UN members,
eventually leading to the UN Security Council to pave the way for international
military intervention to support the Libyan people. The first move was the intro-
duction of Resolution 1970 which imposed an arms embargo and other interna-
tional sanctions on the regime, and then Resolution 1973 which imposed a no-fly
zone by NATO to protect the civilians from air attacks by the Libyan forces. Just
as significantly, it legitimised all necessary measures to support the unarmed
civilians. Analysts see UNSCR 1973 as giving the legal basis for international
intervention in the Libyan crisis. The combined effect of the two resolutions was to
strengthen the Libyan civilian resistance, which eventually overwhelmed Gadd-
afis regime and led to his eventual downfall and physical lynching by his people.
When Ban Ki Moon announced Security Council Resolution 1973, he indirectly
invoked R2P as the enabling norm. In a statement soon after the resolution was
adopted, he said: The Security Council today has taken an historic decision.
Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international communitys
determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpe-
trated upon them by their own government In adopting this Resolution, the
Security Council placed great importance on the appeal of the League of Arab
States for action. (Ban 2011). Resistance to the resolutions was defused when the
2.1 R2Ps Tussle Over Syria 17
Arab League supported the motions and even contributed arms through Qatar. In
the event, the two resolutions were carried without any veto. But while UNSCR
1970 was adopted unanimously by the Security Council, UNSCR 1973 saw five
abstentions, including two veto-wielding members of the Permanent Five (P5)
Russia and Chinaalong with India, Brazil and Germany. These abstentions
would later prove to be the beginning of a major backlash on the UNs inter-
ventionist posture in the Arab uprisings.
The downfall and eventual death of Gaddafi enraged the Arab League which
did not expect the international intervention to lead to regime change in Libyaas
this was not what they had expected of R2P. There was intense debate with the
Western powers that backed the NATO intervention, namely the US, Britain and
France, who had rationalised that in this instance, it was extremely difficult to
protect the unarmed civilians without removing Gaddafi and his coterie of sup-
porters. In the aftermath of Gaddafis downfall, Libya has been going through a
political transition as a new regime thrown up by the uprising tries to find its feet.
In the meanwhile, the key survivor of the Gaddafi regime, Saif-al_Islam Gaddafi,
has become the subject of a tussle between the new regime and the International
Criminal Court (ICC). The new regime wants to put him on trial in Libya while the
ICC wants him to be tried outside Libya to ensure that Saif-Islam gets a fair trial.
The controversial nature of the application of R2P in Libya was a key reason for
the backlash. Subsequently, there has been a stiff resistance to international
intervention in Syria despite the brutal counter-offensive by the Assad government
which had shocked the international community. Spearheaded by Russia and
Chinathe veto-wielding members of the P5critics of R2P had always been
suspicious that the new norm was designed, or could be used, to advance Western
interests following the end of the Cold War. Their primary fear had been the
pursuit of regime change in the non-Western world, especially on those countries
that do not practise the Western model of statecraft and nation-building through
democratic values and civil liberties. Russia and China would have vetoed Res-
olutions 1970 and 1973 over Libya had the Arab League not supported the reso-
lutions. The downfall of Gaddafi seemed to have caused a sense of regret on the
part of Russia and China who did not want a repeat of what they saw as a strategic
mistake in Libya. It was this fear of regime change in Syria that led to their double-
veto of resolutions on Syria on 12 February 2012 and on 19 July 2012the third
joint veto by Russia and China since the Arab uprisings began. The first was in
October 2011 when they vetoed a European-drafted resolution threatening sanc-
tions on Syria. (UN Security Council 2012, 19 July).
The Russian and Chinese vetoes followed the Arab Leagues initial intervention
to encourage a peaceful resolution between the Assad regime and the civilian
opposition. When that initiative broke down, the Arab League suspended Syria from
the League on 12 November 2012 and escalated it to the UN Security Council, which
paved the way for a joint UN-Arab League peace initiative led by former US
Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The special envoy called for a ceasefire and a dia-
logue between the regime and the civilian opposition. But the Arab Leagues sus-
pension of Syrias membership also caused Assad to harden his stance against the
uprising, which in turn led to a downward spiral of the unrest. Indeed, Assad saw the
Arab Leagues initiative as designed to pave the way for his downfall. Russia,
lending support to Syria, its strategic ally in the Middle East, argued that the draft
resolution it had vetoed was an attempt at regime change in Syria which Moscow
was against (Charbonneau 2012, Feb 4). Indeed, the Russian foreign minister was
explicit in linking the push for regime change to what he termed as the larger
political game. In an article published in Huffpost, Sergei Lavrov wrote: What
seems to prevail in that option are attempts to bring about regime change in
Damascus as an element of a larger regional geopolitical game. These schemes are
undoubtedly targeting Iran, since a large group of States including the USA and
NATO countries, Israel, Turkey and some States of the region appear to be interested
in weakening that countrys regional positions. (Lavrov 2012).
Russia continues to provide arms to give critical support to the Assad regime,
while Venezuela has shipped fuel to circumvent the effect of international sanc-
tions. Iran has, by its own admission, sent troops into Syria to aid in the crack-
down. The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) said in a
statement that these actions undermined efforts to bring an end to the mass atrocity
crimes perpetrated by the Syrian government (GCR2P 2012). Indeed, the Arab
League plan, among other things, called for a political transition in Syria and for
Assad to step aside. The massacre in Houla triggered the unprecedented worldwide
diplomatic expulsion of Syrian diplomats.
Carr said that the option of sanctions was being looked into by the international
community. In fact, in a subsequent remark, the Australian foreign minister said
Australia was open to discussion about military intervention in Syria, although he
conceded that there were huge logistical and political hurdles to intervening in that
country, given Syrias well-armed military. The lack of unity within the Syrian
opposition was also a major factor in the way of any military intervention (Flitton
and Ireland 2012). But Carrs disclosure of a possible military intervention sug-
gested that all options consistent with the principle of R2P were being considered,
although this would be highly unlikely given the lack of unanimity within the
Security Council due to the certainty of Russian and Chinese vetoes. While the
Russian and Chinese double-veto was obviously coordinated, diplomats were
quoted as saying that the initiative was Russias which China followed. Indeed,
several Western diplomats offered the view prior to the vote that a Russian veto
would be a sign of the re-Putinisation of Russian foreign policy (Charbonneau
2012, Feb 4). Now that Putin is back in the presidency, a more forceful resistance
to international intervention, whether under R2P or not, can be expected.
2.2 R2P, Realpolitik and Syria
There are contending views as to why Russia opposed the Syria resolution. Some
analysts noted that Russia, despite its earlier veto, actually supported the Security
Councils condemnation of the Houla killings, describing it as the first positive
2.2 R2P, Realpolitik and Syria 19
news to come out of the Syrian crisis for months. It opened up the possibility that
the US and Russia may find common cause in easing out Assad to defuse the
rebellion without bringing about regime change (Tisdall 2012, 28 May). Russia
had been under intense diplomatic pressure to shift its pro-Assad position that had
begun to damage its wider interests in the Middle East, in relation to Saudi Arabia
and the Gulf states (who are all opposed to Assad) and bilaterally with key
European powers and the US. A larger factor is the return of Putin to the foreign
policy helm whose approach is that of an unsentimental calculator of national
advantage. Some analysts say the most important issue in his international agenda
was not Syria, or any of the other Arab Spring uprisings but his meeting with
Barack Obama when both were due to meet at the 1819 June G20 Summit in
Mexico (McGeough 2012, 20 June). As Tisdall sees it, both leaders have larger
strategic goals to achieve and to secure from the other: Putin wanted guarantees
against US-led missile defence plans in Europe and Asia; acceptance of the
Caucasus status quo following the Russian-backed secession of Georgian territo-
ries in 2008, which Russia had intervened under the cover of R2P; Putin wanted a
peaceful resolution of the crisis over Irans nuclear programme and US assurance
that it would block any Israeli military action against Iranian nuclear facilities, and
would not take part in any such action itself. For Moscow, a war along its southern,
central Asian flank would be far more destabilising politically and economically
than any amount of turmoil in Syria (Tisdall 2012).
In turn, Obama was said to be wanting reciprocal gestures from Putin as well:
cooperation on a successful, negotiated conclusion to the Iranian saga, plus help in
dealing with common challenges such as North Korea. In other words, there were
plenty of incentives for both sides to reach an accommodation on Syria. American
officials reportedly noted a possible Russian inclination towards some kind of deal
over Syria, according to the New York Times, which said Thomas Donilon,
Obamas national security adviser, discussed Syria with Putin in Moscow during a
visit in May 2012. And when Obama raised Assads future with the Russian Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the G8 meeting, Medvedev appeared receptive,
according to the American officials (Tisdall 2012). Under the reported deal, Russia
would agree to the removal of Assad and his replacement by a less controversial
government figure, following the example of the transition in Yemen. The regime
would remain largely intact, and so too would Russias Syrian sphere of interest,
including its commercial relationship and its naval base. For his part, under such a
scenario, Obama would be able to claim that the Syrian crisis had been defused
without resort to international military intervention (Tisdall 2012). And that would
also save R2P from criticism that it has become a convenient tool for regime
change.
The so-called Syrian version of the Yemeni option was said to be gathering
steam within weeks of the Houla massacre, apparently first raised by the Arab
states and now backed by the US (McGeough 2012). Under the option, Assad, like
the former leader of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh, would be given immunity and
exile while his regime would more or less survive. While the White House tried to
coax support for the deal from a reluctant Moscow, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton was busily setting the scene for acceptance of such a deal, arguing that
there could be no military intervention because there was no way Russia and China
would support it. While the Russians were not enthusiastic, the rebels were
impressed neither by the Yemen option nor by the Annan initiative (McGeough
2012). Money and weapons were being supplied by the Arab and Gulf states. In
the absence of a UN blessing for Libya-style campaign by the world community, it
was likely that in time, the US and European governments would make similar
commitments. Writing in The Guardian, a rebel leader Haitham Maleh was quoted
by McGeough as saying: We are not asking for boots on the groundthe West
supported the overthrow of Col Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, whose activities now
appear minor compared with whats going on in Syria. To fail to do the same now
is hypocrisy. (McGeough 2012). But the US had taken a more cautious public
stance, with Defence Secretary Leon Panetta saying any military action in Syria
would need backing from the UN, although he described the latest violence as
intolerable. Panetta replied with a categorically no when asked by the media if
he could foresee a scenario in which the US would back military intervention even
without UN authorisation (Los Angeles Times 2012).
The scepticism notwithstanding, hope for a solution was kept alive with what
appeared to be international backchannel efforts in Europe. Re-installed Russian
president Vladimir Putin met the new French president Francois Hollande as well
as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and efforts were reportedly underway to
revive a Putin idea to host a conference of representatives of the Syrian regime and
the rebels. While Merkel was expected to argue for tougher action, Hollande
reportedly was in favour of military intervention (Lyons 2012, June 2). At the
same time, however, Moscow appeared to want to moderate any hopes of inter-
national intervention when the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov
told the media: We have always said we are categorically against any interven-
tion.as this would only worsen the situation and would lead to unpredictable
consequences both for Syria itself and for the region as a whole (McGeough 2012).
Still, it would be Putin who would decide following his June summit with Obama.
There would be a lot of horse-trading to do. But if Obama can go some way to
reassuring his Russian counterpart on some or all of these, then Putin perhaps can
be convinced to throw Assad under the busalong with the Cold War senti-
mentality that makes him want to cling to Moscows last client state in the Middle
East. (McGeough 2012).
By 7 June 2012, however, reports emerged of Annan tinkering with a radical
idea for reviving his peace plan for Syriaa roadmap for political transition that
would be negotiated through a contact group, among other nations, Russia and
Iran (Ignatius 2012, June 5). Annans new plan, disclosed by The Washington
Post, was outlined by a diplomat who was familiar with the UN mission. The
proposal, which was to be presented to the Security Council came as Annans
peace efforts were hitting a dead end in Damascus, leading to growing concerns
that the Syrian crisis was spiralling into an all-out civil war. The Washington Post
report said what was intriguing about Annans new approach was that it could give
Russia and Iran, two key supporters of Assads survival, some motivation to
2.2 R2P, Realpolitik and Syria 21
remove him from power, while giving them some leverage to protect their interests
in a post-Assad Syria. The reason Annan was said to be toying with this uncon-
ventional approach was that nothing else had worked. The West wants Russia to
broker a deal but so far Putin had not seen enough benefits to Moscow to embrace
this course.
To break the deadlock, Annan would create his contact group comprising the
Permanent Five (Britain, China, France, Russia and the US) plus Saudi Arabia and
perhaps Qatar to represent the Arab League, as well as Turkey and Iran. This group
would then draft the transition plan and take it to Assad and the Syrian opposition.
The roadmap would call for a presidential election to choose Assads successor,
plus a parliamentary vote and a new constitutionwith a timeline for achieving
these milestones. Assad would presumably depart for Russia, which was report-
edly said to have offered him exile, with Iran also said to have him exile. Assad
was also rumoured to have transferred US$6 billion in Syrian reserves to Moscow.
Under this scenario, Assad presumably could avoid international prosecution for
war crimes. A week prior to the report about what appeared to be Annans Plan
B, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov had said that Moscow was not wedded
to Assad remaining in power, but yet the Russians had done nothing by 6 June
2012 to move Assad towards the exit. If Annans idea of a contact group could not
take off, there were not any obvious alternatives left other than a deepening civil
war (Ignatius 2012).
Indeed, by the evening of 6 June, Russia and China issued a joint statement
reaffirming their strong opposition to intervention in Syria. The joint statement was
released following a summit between Putin and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao
in Beijing in which the two leaders opposed any attempt to impose regime change
in Syria, while calling for support for the original six-point peace plan by Annan.
Russia and China are decisively against any attempts to regulate the Syrian crisis
with outside military intervention, as well as imposinga policy of regime
change, the joint statement said (The Australian, 7 June 2012, p. 14; Chan 2012,
June 9). Saudi Arabia reportedly said that it was time for Moscow to take the
initiative to bring the Syrian crisis to an end. The time has come for Russia to
change its stance from supporting the Syrian regime to working to stop the killing
and (supporting) a peaceful transition of power, said Saudi Foreign Minister Saud
al-Faisal.
A day later, US Secretary of State Clinton and British Prime Minister David
Cameron, riding on news of yet another massacre in the village of al-Kubeir near
Hama, pressed for a transfer of power and the formation of a representative interim
government. Assad must transfer power and depart Syria, Clinton said after a
strategy session with Arab and Western powers in Istanbul. Separately, Cameron
said in Oslo more pressure must be applied on the Assad regime to isolate Syria,
isolate the regime, to put pressure on and to demonstrate that the whole world
wants to see a political transition from this illegitimate regime to actually see one
that can take care of its people. (The Australian, 8 June 2012, p 12).
In what looked like a growing diplomatic tussle to influence the future course of
Syria, or at least to shape international opinion over the crisis, Russia and China
issued another diplomatic counter-offensive on the same day, this time through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) which they led at the end of the Central
Asian groups summit. The SCOs statement made clear it opposed military
intervention, and that member states are against military intervention into this
regions affairs, forcing a handover of power or using unilateral sanctionsin
an apparent rebuttal of the remarks by Clinton and Cameron. Apart from Russia
and China, the SCO comprises Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The opposition to intervention in Syria was also relevant to Iran, an SCO observer
state, which received moral support when the SCO warned as unacceptable any
use of force against Iranan oblique reference to US and Israeli plans to attack
Irans nuclear programme. (The Australian, 8 June 2012).
The intensifying diplomatic war between the Western powers and Russia and
China was obviously trending towards a stalemate. By the time Obama and Putin
met on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Los Cabos, Mexicoagainst the
backdrop of a silent military coup in Egypt on 18 June and conflicting reports of
the death of MubarakObama and Putin failed to agree on a breakthrough deal
that would appease the international community. Media reports painted the two
leaders as being cool towards each other, yet both tried to give an impression of
some movement. Obama said: We agreed that we need to see a cessation of the
violence, and that a political process has to be created to prevent civil war.
(McGeough 2012, 20 June). No mention was however made about what the
political process would lead to, especially on the fate of Assad. Nor was there any
hint of a Yemeni option. Putins spin was equally lacking in detail, except to say:
We have found many common points on this issue. Instead, their statement did
not go beyond a joint acknowledgement that the Syrian people should indepen-
dently and democratically decide their own future (McGeough 2012, 20 June). In
other words, Russia, with the backing of China, succeeded in rolling back the push
for international intervention that could have led to regime change in Syria. For
good measure, on 20 July 2012, Putins office issued a statement warning against
any move to bypass the Security Council. RIA Novosti, which reported this,
suggested that this warning came on the heels of the remarks by US Ambassador to
the UN Susan Rice following the Russia-China tandem veto of the Western-
backed UN Security Council resolution. Rice had said that the US and its partners
have no choice but to look to partnerships and actions outside of this council to
protect the Syrian people. In the Russian presidents opinion, any attempt to act
without the [UN] Security Councils approval will be inefficient and will under-
mine the authority of this international organization, Putins spokesman Dmitry
Peskov said (RIA Novosti 2012, July 20). Kofi Annan has an explanation for the
dogged opposition by Russia and China to intervention in Syriaa sense of
betrayal or of being outmanoeuvred by the West over Libya. Russia and China
have been very hesitant to allow the United Nations Security Council to take
certain steps in the Syrian case, because they believe they were duped in the
Libyan situation, Annan, who had by now resigned from his mediator role, said in
a dialogue in Singapore on the theme of his book Interventions: A Life in War and
Peace. (Annan 2012a).
2.3 The Arab League and R2P 23
2.3 The Arab League and R2P
The outbreak of the Arab Uprisings came like a bolt of thunder for the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region which has long been characterised by autocratic
rule. The uprising in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011 which
started it all caught not only the region but also the whole world by surprise. After
the overthrow of President Ben Ali, equally stupefying was the speed of the
political contagion. It spread first to Egypt, bringing down Hosni Mubarak, before
turning to Libya and deposing Muammar Gaddafi, and then spreading to other
parts of the region, such as Yemen and Bahrain, even Morocco and to a certain
extent parts of Saudi Arabia, before engulfing Syriathe strongest Arab state after
Egypt militarily. It is in Syria where the Arab Uprisings are currently roiling, and
showing no signs of a resolution by mid 2013.
The speed with which the political inferno burned the region has been a
shocking wake-up call to the long-ruling political elite whose political models
must necessarily be revisited to ensure national stability and economic progress.
One other consequence has been to jolt the divided region to be more proactive
and more united to resolve its own problems and challenges and to be seen to be
doing so. One of the key criticisms of the Arab street is the failure of the regions
leaders to show leadership in the face of pressing political challenges. The Arab
League for instance has been long dismissed as ineffective as a multilateral plat-
form representing the voice of the Arab world. The series of revolts and uprisings,
however, has led to the emergence of a new face for the organisationone that is
more assertive and cohesive, displaying a clearer sense of purpose as a regional
grouping representing Arab group interests.
The ICR2P notes that the Arab League took a strong position against the use of
force by the Gaddafi regime, and at a meeting on 3 March 2011, suspended Libya
from the League and began to consider imposing a no-fly zone. On 12 March
2011, the Arab League convened an extraordinary session and called on the
Security Council to bear its responsibilitiesand to take the necessary measures to
impose immediately a no-fly zone as well as take measures to protect the pop-
ulation while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighbouring
states (ICR2P 2012). While Gaddafi had never been a popular leader in the Arab
world, it was probably the first time that the Arab League had acted so firmly
against one of its own member-leaders. This was to be repeated a year later when
Syrias Bashar al-Assad was similarly suspended, partly contributing to the
political stalemate faced by the UN over acting on Syria.
Another major Arab forum, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which met on
7 March 2011, also called on the UN Security Council to take all necessary
measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over Libya, and
condemned the crimes committed against civilians, the use of heavy arms and the
recruitment of mercenaries by the Libyan regime. Within the GCC, its key
playerSaudi Arabiahas also been more vocal and open as a regional leader.
Western news agencies reported in March 2012, quoting a top Arab diplomat, that
Saudi Arabia was beginning to send arms as well as other military equipment to
the Syrian rebels to stop the bloodshed by the Assad regime. The delivery was
through Jordan for the Free Syrian Army. On 7 February 2012, Saudi Arabia and
its five GCC partners expelled Syrian envoys while withdrawing their own dip-
lomats from Damascus over the mass slaughter of civilians. (BBC 2012, Feb 7).
In March, Saudi foreign minister Saud al-Faisal publicly defended the right of the
Syrian opposition to arm itself. In the same month, the Syrian information minister
Adnan Mahmoud accused Saudi Arabia and Qatar of backing armed terror gangs
and demanding they took responsibility for the resulting bloodshed.
The display of new-found resolve by the Arab regional organisations was not an
easy act of political will because moving against a fellow Arab state had never
been in the culture of the region. As the ICR2P noted, the initial support by these
organisations for the implementation of a no-fly zone quickly faded following the
passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 and the subsequent military
campaign launched by states including France and the US, which was ultimately
overtaken by NATO. Suddenly caught in a dilemma for fear of a public backlash
from the NATO bombings of a fellow Arab state, the Arab League spoke out
against the NATO airstrikes and declared that the campaign differed greatly from
the no-fly zone initially desired to protect civilians from Gaddafis forces. The
momentary wavering of support by the Arab League and other regional organi-
sations highlights the concerns and debates that arose in the aftermath of Reso-
lution 1973 and the actions of NATO member states as to whether NATOs actions
over-reached the implementation of a no-fly zone (ICR2P 2012).
2.4 Future of R2P in the Middle East
One year after the Arab Uprisings turned to Syria, with the civil unrest showing no
signs of a resolution, critics and sceptics of R2P are beginning to read the last rites
of the doctrine. R2P is not only in crisis, but one colourful phrasing in Foreign
Policy even described it in one breath: R2P, RIP. (Abrams 2012). Indeed, the
international political stalemate over Syria, which began with the controversial
application of R2P over Libya, will exacerbate the furious debate over the viability
and propriety of R2P as an emerging international norm. Critics charge that the
Syrian crisis, as was the case of Libya, had exposed R2P as a crusading utopi-
anism mandating perpetual war for peace. Supporters worry that R2P will be
discredited as a farce if Assad is allowed to massacre innocents with impunity
(Foreign Policy 2012). The present state of affairs is likely to rage even more
furiously, which neither the supporters nor the critics of R2P can claim to have
won conclusively, if ever. Some scholars take the middle ground to say both
supporters and critics of R2P are wrong.
Beauchamp, for example, argues that military intervention in Syria would not
only be a misapplication of R2P but would radically weaken the doctrines role in
building both a better Middle East and a better world. Our responsibility to protect
2.4 Future of R2P in the Middle East 25
both Syrians and the R2P doctrine itself demands that we stay out of it. (Foreign
Policy 2012). It is a common misconception that R2P is simply a convenient
excuse for military intervention against atrocities, he says. Core R2P documents
are clear that the third pillar of R2P about intervention is not restricted to military
action, in fact, military intervention is permitted by the doctrine only in extreme
cases and, even so, only when the extreme case itself passes stringent tests.
On the other hand, Beauchamp argues, Syria interventionists do have a point
when they say ignoring Syria could damage the doctrines credibility. The alter-
native, however, is to go for an R2P-friendly middle ground between non-
involvement and military force. He says a number of analysts have proposed
diplomatic, legal, and economic strategies that could midwife an end to violence.
Some examples include referring Assad and/or other regime leaders to the ICC for
prosecution, offering Russia assurances that its interest in Syria will be respected if
Assad falls, in exchange for slackening its support for him, or creating an inter-
national agreement to repudiate any future debt accrued during the crackdown as
odious debt. A coordinated international effort incorporating some of these
proposals, spearheaded by the US and its allies, is the best approach the interna-
tional community could take to end the violence, Beauchamp says.
If the future of R2P hinges on the fate of Syria, then 12/12/12or the 12th of
December 2012could be a fateful date. On this symbolic day, a new and pos-
sibly more united opposition coalition, first formed in Doha, Qatar, officially
emerged in a major meeting in Marrakech, which was endorsed by over 100
countries including Arab states and the Western powers. This development was
presented as paving the way for greater humanitarian aid, possibly military
assistance, and eventually international intervention. The announcement of the
formation of the Syrian National Coalition was reported as reflecting a hardening
consensus that the Syrian uprising might be approaching a tipping point. The
Friends of Syria group which links the Gulf Cooperation Council and Turkey as
well as the United States, France and Britain but excludes Russia and China, called
on Assad to step aside arguing that he had lost legitimacy (TODAY 2012, 13
Dec). Obamas announcement of explicit support for the new opposition coalition
marked a new phase of American engagement while Russia was caught in a
dilemma, as reflected in the contradicting statements of its top foreign ministry
officials.
Deputy foreign minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Moscows key envoy for the
Middle East, was reported as saying that Russia was making plans for a possible
evacuation of thousands of its citizens in Syria as Assads forces were losing more
and more control and territory. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out the victory of
the Syrian opposition. (BBC News 2012, 13 Dec). This was the first time that
Moscow had publicly acknowledged that the Syrian leader was facing possible
defeat. The Russian foreign ministry subsequently stated that Bogdanovs remarks
did not constitute any change of position on the part of Moscow towards Assad and
that it remained opposed to international intervention.
Notwithstanding the unprecedented revolts and the crisis over intervention in
the region, can R2P be mainstreamed in the Middle East? Doubtless,
circumstances are such that this would be a monumental task. Nonetheless, some
scholars, such as Javad Heydarian, see hope. Writing in the Foreign Policy Journal,
he says the popular uprisings across the Arab world actually provide a perfect
opportunity for advocates of R2P to engender and institutionalise norms which
accentuate the central role of the state in protecting its citizens life, liberty and
property (Heydarian 2011). R2P, he argues, has become more sensible in the
context of the Middle East for several reasons. Firstly, the region has been the site
for atrocious crimes, especially in the last centurythe ethnic cleansing of Pal-
estinians in 1948 preceding the Zionist creation of the state of Israel; massive war
crimes during the Algerian independence movement; Saddam Husseins ethnic
cleansing of the Kurds; repeated war crimes and massacres during Israels invasion
of Lebanon (19822006); Algerias dirty war after the 1991 elections to block
the victorious Islamists from taking power; and the 2008 Israeli invasion of Gaza.
Hardly anyone was held accountable for the crimes, he says, either collectively or
individually under the auspices of international law.
Secondly, the region is a hotbed of conflicts, military intervention by foreign
powers, inter-state and intra-state wars, and long-standing territorial conflicts.
There have been three ArabIsraeli Wars, two Gulf Wars, and the Lebanese Civil
War. Lastly, the region is home to one of the most durable and repressive
authoritarian regimes operating in business as usual mode despite the demise of
autocratic leaders in a number of north African republics. To put it bluntly,
principles such as state responsibility and accountability are yet to take hold within
the bureaucracy, despite the fact that precisely such principles have inspired
successful protests in Egypt and Tunisia. (Heydarian 2011).
While R2P encourages accountability and democratic governance on the part of
the state, it can be hardly effective in relatively stable autocracies, he says, which
see R2P as undermining their privileged position. It took mega-protests and
unprecedented international pressure to get autocrats like Hosni Mubarak out.
Notwithstanding the rise of people power in the Middle East and North Africa,
resistance to change could be discerned in the harsh counter-responses from the
ruling regimes. While the clash of wills ultimately led to the downfall of several
long-serving leaders, this does not mean that there have been no attempts at regime
continuity. In the case of Egypt, the military attempted to hold on to power by first
siding with the protesters and eventually pushing Mubarak out; then it tried to seek
a sharing of power to protect its interests before subsequently challenging the
legitimacy of the elected leadership. In the ongoing tussle for power, the militarys
top brass was ultimately replaced by the elected president, Morsi. What we have
witnessed is a case of an attempt at neo-authoritarianism.
Theoretically, Heydarian argues, R2Ps mission can be said to be the transfor-
mation of the international community and individual states into responsible actors.
Assuming this to be the case, this mission is founded on a constructivist under-
standing of International Relationsthe power of norms in shaping state behaviour.
At the same time, Heydarian is cautious about putting too much hope on pre-
scriptive normsassuming R2P is entrenched as a normshaping the behaviour of
states. Although R2P has been shifting towards the aspect of prevention,
2.4 Future of R2P in the Middle East 27
institutionalising R2Pas a means to prevent mass atrocitiesis highly volun-

teeristic and contingent on the political will of those who wish to adopt it. This, he
says, is problematic because given the nature of politics in the West Asian region
great sensitivity to foreign interference and external influenceit is doubtful to see
any significant welcoming of R2Ps more preventive aspects.
R2P, he adds, remains to be ambiguous on how it could uniquely and precisely
tackle underlying structural factors that give birth to mass atrocities. If R2P seeks to
be preventive in essence, it would face theoretical as well as practical problems. If
R2P seeks to transcend personal violence and rather focus on structural violence-
a form of violence that cant be identified with a specific actor, but is more or less the
product of the way structures of power, security apparatus, and commerce are
establishedit would need to delve into issues such as rampant poverty, repression,
and entrenched human rights violation. Thus, inevitably, R2P would need to
address these issues within the framework of good governance, human security, as
well as, democratisation. But the theoretical pitfall is that R2P might overstretch
and get conceptually interwoven with other concepts.
The political setback is that R2P might face greater resistance and opposition
from Middle Eastern states, who would paint R2P as a re-packaged beachhead
for western-imposed political reform. Nonetheless, as democratic revolutions
sweep across the region, now is the perfect opportunity for progressives, liberal
institutions, and the international community to assist in the process of orderly
transition to a system where R2P and democracy serve as pillars of the political
authority. (Heydarian 2011).
Kofi Annan, the UN chief who was instrumental in the birth of the doctrine of
R2P, however takes a long view. If there is any positive outcome of the tragic turn
of events in the Middle East, it is that, on balance, countries can no longer hide
behind the cloak of national sovereignty to do as they please towards their own
citizens and as a shield against foreign intervention. Theres also a message for
those outside a countrythey cannot use the concept of sovereignty as a reason
not to intervene. Some crimes are so shameful that we cannot sit back, Annan said
in the Singapore dialogue. (Annan 2012a) In his book, Annan describes R2P as a
deceptively benign-sounding concept. In fact, as weve seen, it represents a deep
and disturbing challenge to those leaders who wish to treat their people with
impunity. (Annan 2012b).
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docs/2012/sc10714.doc.htm
Chapter 3
China as a P5 Player
Abstract The outbreak of the Arab Uprisings has brought to the fore the growing
diplomatic heft of China, the only Asian member of the Permanent Five in the UN
Security Council. Together with Russia, China has been putting its stamp on how
the political crises in the Middle East and North Africa should be handled and
resolved by the international community. At the heart of Chinas approach to
conflict resolution by the Security Council is its defence of the long-standing
principle of state sovereignty and how this should be reconciled with the growing
push by the international community, largely by the West, for humanitarian
interventiona concept that remains controversial and perceived by the devel-
oping South and weak states as a cloak for neo-imperialism. The resulting fun-
damental tension between these competing pulls is manifested in the power
politics at the UN. Chinas position over the issue of international humanitarian
intervention in Libya and Syria, is itself, however, under pressure at home as
domestic critics debate Beijings traditional conservative adherence to the prin-
ciple of non-interference. In truth, Chinas attitude towards the idea of interna-
tional humanitarian intervention is still evolving.

Keywords Non-intervention Non-interference New interventionism Libyan

model Darfur Harmonious world theory
3.1 China and the Arab Uprisings
THE SUDDEN and unexpected eruption of the Arab Uprisings and the political
turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa have brought to the fore Chinas
growing diplomatic muscle in international politics. One of the Permanent Five
members of the exclusive UN Security Council, China has rarely flexed its veto
power which membership bestows. But together with Russia, China has been
playing an increasingly major role in the diplomatic power game. Indeed, Russia
and China form a formidable counterweight to the P3, the three strong Western

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_3, The Author(s) 2014
30 3 China as a P5 Player
camp in the five-member veto-wielding UN Security Council led by the United

States and comprising the United Kingdom and France. The combined weight of
Russia and China was vividly demonstrated throughout the Arab Uprisings which
began in December 2010 in Tunisia, but especially during the diplomatic clashes
over the Libya and Syria crises.
Russia and China have been unmistakable about their misgivings about inter-
national humanitarian intervention or what some scholars see as its new iteration
known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Within the Security Council, these
two pillars of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)a new Eurasian
geopolitical counterweight to the Western bloc formed in 2001have been acting
in tandem to oppose the implementation of the third leg of R2P which supports
forcible intervention as a last resort. This is despite both Russia and China having
been among the countries that embraced R2P when it was adopted by the majority
of UN members at the World Summit in 2005. Russia and China have made no
secretthrough statements in the UN and elsewherethat their main apprehen-
sion about R2P is that the doctrine could be misused to advance what they see as
the Wests agenda to dominate the post-Cold War world, including by replacing
regimes and leaders who are not friendly towards the Wests strategic interests. In
the debates on the application of R2P during internal political crises that involved
mass atrocities since the end of the Cold War, fears of regime change had been
forcefully articulated, the most vivid and crucial being during the Arab Spring
since it began in Tunisia at the end of 2010, but especially over Libya and Syria.
3.1.1 Chinas Stance Over International Humanitarian

Intervention
Chinas role in the geopolitics of international humanitarian intervention and R2P

has been a matter of close observation given Beijings core position in favour of
non-intervention and non-interference. Indeed, Chinas foreign policy is governed
and guided by its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the Constitution, one
of which is the principle of non-intervention and non-interferencetwo terms
which China uses interchangeably (Qiao 2011). Given the centrality of non-
intervention and non-interference in Chinese foreign policy, it is hardly surprising
that China has been steadfast in opposing international intervention during the
Arab Spring. Indeed, Chinese leaders regularly echo this tenet of its foreign policy
whenever there is an opportunity. Chinas reservations towards international
intervention in Libya and opposition to it in Syria fit into this pattern of foreign
policy behaviour. This, however, does not fully explain Chinas attitude towards
non-intervention. Indeed, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the
Constitution notwithstanding, Chinas foreign policy posture towards non-inter-
vention/non-interference seems to reflect a growing flexibility. Chinese scholars
have noted variations in attitude ranging from dogmatic adherence to non-inter-
ference, on the one hand, to pragmatic application of the non-interference policy,
3.1 China and the Arab Uprisings 31
on the other, that allows China to intervene without abandoning its principle of
non-interference. In other words, short of a shift away from the principle of non-
intervention, Chinas posture towards non-interference has been evolving towards
some form of interventionist stance.
Scholars like Zhongying Pang argue that while Beijing continues to adhere to
the rule of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, a steadily
rising China is exploring how it can play a more constructive role in relation to
international engagement with major political and humanitarian crises. In fact,
Pang describes the policy evolution in stronger terms, calling it a transformation
of Chinas role in relation to international intervention, which he sees as being
driven by Chinas growing integration with the global political economy. Facing
big challenges, great pressures and many uncertainties, China has to balance its
traditional commitment to non-interference with its responsibilities as a great
power (Pang 2009).
Pang notes that although there are many aspects of continuity, Chinese foreign
policy has changed in several important respects. One most notable way can be
seen in its evolving attitude towards international engagement in political and
humanitarian crises. In fact, the overarching narrative about China today is one
that refers to it as a rising economic and political powera force not to be trifled
within the context of the global economy and international security. As Pang notes,
Chinas new economic power has been felt in global trade negotiations beyond the
UN Security Council where it holds a permanent seat with veto power. As part of
its more assertive role in world politics, China is forging new economic and
strategic partnerships with the United States, European Union, ASEAN, Russia,
Africa as well as recently Japan (Pang 2009). Continuing this trend, on 13 May
2012, China took the first strategic step of forming a free trade area in Northeast
Asia, together with Japan and South Korea, by launching free trade negotiations
with the two neighbouring countries. (Kassim 2012). Chinese scholars see this
development as a milestone initiative (Wu Baiyi, in a conversation with the
author on 30 May 2012 uses this term). Such an initiative by China is a psycho-
logical breakthrough because of Chinas historical baggage carried over from the
days of Imperial Japan. Chinas growing ease with FTAs can be traced to its first
move towards the FTA game when it surprised ASEAN in 2000 with an overture
to form an FTA. This has since come into force on 1 January 2010 with the
emergence of the ASEANChina Free Trade Agreement, ACFTAwhich the
Chinese prefer to call the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, CAFTA). Fearing
it would lose out, the formation of ACFTA motivated Japan to embark on its own
FTA with ASEAN, beginning with a joint declaration of leaders in 2002 and
culminating in an agreement with ASEAN in 2008. Framed as a special economic
relationship, it was called the Comprehensive Economic Partnership out of a
concern that ASEAN could become Chinas economic backyard. The apparent
rivalry between Japan and China to woo ASEAN in terms of trading relationships,
however, influenced both Northeast Asian countries to come to the conclusion that
it would be to their mutual benefit to form their own free trade area in the north,
together with another economic dynamo, South Korea.
Pang describes Chinas role in international cooperation and conflict as

unique, because, unlike other great powers, China adheres to the principle of
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. This has conditioned
and constrained its direct involvement in, and responses to, international crises,
conflicts and their resolutions. Today, Pang says, China continues to use the
principle to resist Western intervention in its own domestic politics. In its bilateral
relations with many developing and non-Western countries in Asia, Africa and
Latin America, China continuously and repeatedly insists that it will not
abandon these principles but instead maintain thema position that has generally
been well received in the developing world (Pang 2009).
Notwithstanding its persistent rhetorical commitment to non-interference and
non-intervention, Pang as well as a number of other Chinese scholars argue, China
in practice seems to be changing its position in relation to international engage-
ment in political and humanitarian crises. In other words, China is rethinking its
stance on international intervention, as reflected in several indicators (Pang
2009). First, China is increasingly involved in multilateral interventions mandated
and organised either by the UN or other regional organisations operating with the
UN Security Council. Second, and consequently, China has become one of the
largest troop contributing countries to UN peace operations, in fact contributing
more troops to UN operations than any other P5 members except France. Third,
China has been active in post-conflict resolution efforts in many states and soci-
eties affected by civil strife. Fourth, as Chinese citizens go global in business,
education, travel and employment, the government has been forced to recognise
that the growing Chinese overseas interests will require protection, which in turn
calls for a more outward-looking and engaging foreign policy. Such a foreign
policy will have to be supportive of global and regional institutions that help
resolve international and transnational disputes, including disputes involving or
affecting Chinese interests (Pang 2009).
Despite China being one of the 191 countries that took part in the 2005 World
Summit which adopted R2P, Pang does not consider China as having endorsed the
new Western-initiated and promoted idea of Responsibility to Protect, although
China has endorsed many international resolutions and statements, which have
actually been influenced by the idea. (Pang 2009). He however sees signs that
Chinas understanding of this principle is beginning to change in relation to R2P,
while noting that China scholars like Linda Jakobson have begun to describe
Chinas position on non-interference as an unhelpful burden in relation to its all
important energy relations with the world. Jakobson has also been quoted else-
where as saying that for China, a policy of non-interference is not a credible policy
for a nation that wants to be respected as a responsible global power (Large 2008)
(Jakobson 2007). Indeed, Large has observed that Chinas policy of non-inter-
ference in Sudan, especially over Darfur, has suffered a strain because of the
contradictory positions of not interfering in the internal affairs of another country,
yet being drawn into Sudanese politics because of the growing Chinese com-
mercial interests in Sudan, especially over oil (Large 2008).
Pang argues that whether rapidly or slowly, Chinas foreign policy in general,
and its adherence to the principle of non-interference in particular, are in a deep
process of transition. As its economy grows and becomes more exposed to global
risks and uncertainties, Chinese foreign policymakers are being forced to react to
the changes and challenges at home and abroad. This raises the question of what
the rise of China and the transformation of its foreign policy means for the global
debate about international engagement and intervention in political and humani-
tarian crises (Pang 2009).
Pang outlines the evolution of Chinese foreign policy in relation to international
intervention in terms of a few phases. Since the late 1970s and almost the whole of
1980s, China had played little substantial role in international intervention.
However, 1982 was a turning point when China formally declared its indepen-
dent foreign policy for peace after its opposition to the Soviet Unions Afghan
War and Beijings establishment of diplomatic relations with the US in 1979. Pang
argues that the policy significantly strengthened Chinas non-interference position.
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and under the tightened sanctions
against China imposed by the West following the Tiananmen crackdown. China in
the 1990s strictly pursued a low key foreign strategy while continuing to resist the
West interference in Chinas domestic affairs. But since the late 1990s Chinas
attitude to international intervention entered a process of change. While it still
maintains the principle of non-interference/non-intervention, China no longer
simply challenges or opposes international intervention initiated by the West.
In 2001, when R2P was being developed as a doctrine by the ICISS, some
Chinese scholars initially strongly criticised the concept and worried this would
justify military intervention by the US or European powers. But gradually, Chinese
analysts recognised that the concept of R2P could bridge the sharp difference
between supporters of a right of humanitarian intervention and supporters of the
principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. But they stressed that inter-
national intervention based on R2P must only be carried out under strict condi-
tionalities, particularly the pre-condition of a Security Council mandate. Chinas
official attitude towards R2P is reflected in its Position Paper on the United
Nations Reforms issued in 2005 in which Beijing stated:
When a massive humanitarian crisis occurs, it is the legitimate concern of the
international community to ease and defuse the crisis. Any response to such a
crisis should strictly conform to the UN Charter and the opinions of the country
and the regional organisation concerned should be respected. It falls on the
Security Council to make the decision in the frame of UN in light of specific
circumstances which should lead to a peaceful solution as far as possible.
Whenever it involves enforcement actions, there should be more prudence in the
consideration of each case (see www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t199318.htm as cited
in Pang 2009).
In 2004, when the UN Secretary-General formed the High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, which produced the key policy report A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, there was a senior Chinese member on
the panel (Pang 2009). In fact, China supported several UN moves in support of
R2P-like situations. In 2005, China endorsed a Security Council-mandated arms

embargo on Sudan because of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. In 2006, China
supported the Security Councils reaffirmation of R2P in Resolution 1674. China
has also participated in several international sanctions such as those imposed on
North Korea, including Resolution 1718 following Pyongyangs nuclear tests.
China has a strong record supporting many UN peacekeeping missions since the
early 1990s, including troop contributions to peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in
conflict-stricken areas in Southeast Asia, Middle East, Latin America and Africa.
In 1992, when the UN conducted a major PKO in Cambodia (UNTAC), China
contributed around 800 engineers and over 100 military observers. In 2000, China
contributed to the PKO in East Timor. Indeed, participation in UN PKOs is now
considered a major indicator of Chinas foreign policy shift. China has also made
extensive use of diplomacy to assist international efforts in Darfur and it was
Chinese diplomacy that persuaded the Sudanese government to consent to the
deployment of UNAMID, the hybrid UN peacekeeping mission formed by the UN
and the African Union (Pang 2009).
Given all these indications of a shift in Chinese attitude towards international
intervention, or what Pang describes as transformations of its foreign policy,
China can be said to be renovating its principle of non-interference. Quoting
another Chinese scholar Wang Yizhou, China is conducting, he says, a form of
constructive intervention in international affairs. (Pang 2009).
3.1.2 Evolution of Chinas Non-intervention Policy
Adding a variation to Pangs view of a phased evolution of China policy on non-

intervention, the evolution can be characterised in terms of four phases. In Phase I,
when Chinas Five Principles of Peace Coexistence was embedded in the Con-
stitution, non-interference (or non-intervention), became a guiding principle of
Chinas foreign policy. In 1955, Prime Minister Zhou En-Lai proposed non-
interference as one of the five principles of the AfroAsian Conference in
Bandung that gave birth to the Non-Aligned Movement. However, I would argue
that the principle was not strictly adhered to. In the 1960s and 1970s, Maoist China
exported its revolution, thus interfering in the internal affairs of others, especially
Southeast Asia, which saw communist insurgencies that were inspired and insti-
gated by China, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Indo-China
(Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos). Such interference, however, came to a stop ever
since Deng Xiaoping embarked on a strategic shift towards socialism with
Chinese characteristicsthat is a socialist market economy. Since then, China
was sensitised to accusations of interference. At the same time, Beijing became
increasingly sensitive since the 1980s to external interference in its own internal
affairs, especially over Taiwan. This led to a reversion to the emphasis on non-
interference.
In Phase II, two trends since the 1980s emerged. As China developed and grew
in economic strength and stature, its economic and commercial interests expanded
worldwide, leading to an expansion of its geostrategic interests. Domestically,
internal politics became more liberalised as the people clamoured for a voice and
for political participation. Both trends conflated amid increasing nationalism,
putting growing pressure on Chinas leadership and politics. The cumulative effect
is that Chinas ideological stance on non-intervention underwent a period of
softening, despite the official adherence to non-intervention.
In Phase III, three critical points in Chinas attitude on non-intervention can be
discerned. The first is its position on R2P. While Beijing was initially critical of
R2P when it was first promoted in the ICISS report in 2001, that scepticism later
softened into a cautious embrace of R2P in 2005 when the UN held the World
Summit and the World Summit Outcome document adopted R2P. At the same
time, in 2008, Chinas stand-offish stance towards Sudans internal conflict over
Darfur saw its non-interventionist stance being interpreted by others as being
protective of an unpopular regime for the sake of securing Chinas demand for
Sudanese oil.
The third point came in 2011 over Libya when China voted for the UN Security
Council 1970 that was consistent with R2P and supported international humani-
tarian intervention in Libya. Resolution 1970 condemned the use of force by the
Gaddafi regime against civilians, imposed an arms embargo on Libya, a travel ban
and asset freeze on key leaders of the regime, and referred the situation in Libya to
the International Criminal Court. Chinaalong with Brazil, Germany, India and
Russiahowever, abstained from Resolution 1973 which imposed a no-fly zone
on Libya and authorised all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians
under attack. Chinas abstention over Resolution 1973 allowed it to walk a tight
rope between supporting intervention and adhering to its non-interference prin-
ciple. But it was also significant that China did not veto such a move.
The fourth critical point in the evolution of Chinas policy on non-intervention
came on 5 October 2011 when together with Russia, it vetoed a European-drafted
Security Council resolution to intervene in Syria and threatened sanctions. Chinas
ambassador Li Baodong said his country opposed interference in [Syrias]
internal affairs. It was a very unpopular stance, not just with the West, but also
with the Arab world which supported intervention to bring an end to the civil strife
and bring about a political transitionmeaning regime change in Syria. Middle
East analysts see the veto as an expression of Chinese, as well as Russian, anger
over the way the Western powers had handled the Libya issue. Marwan Bishara,
Aljazeeras senior political analyst, said: Russia and China believe Europe and
the US misused and abused UN resolution 1973 concerning Libya. Both countries
are angry (over) the way it was implemented in Libya, and thats certainly
backfiring and overspilling in the case of Syria (Aljazeera 2011).
3.1.3 Schools of Thought on Chinas Attitude Towards

Intervention
While scholars seem to agree that Chinas attitude towards non-intervention has
been evolving, there appears to be a growing debate amongst Chinese intelli-
gentsia, policymakers and opinion leaders about the direction of this evolution, in
other words about how precisely the shifts and changes have been in terms of
Chinas position on non-interference, non-intervention and state sovereignty.
Different schools of thought appear to be emerging about which direction China
should take, and whether China should abandon its non-interference policy. Some
key ideas have been advanced by their respective proponents but at least three
schools of thought can be discerned:
3.1.3.1 Conservative School: Not Easy for China to Abandon

Non-interference
This school of thought argues that, despite the evolving stance on non-interference,
it is not easy for China to change its policy of non-intervention because of
domestic core interestsnamely Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiangwhich Beijing does
not want others to interfere in. In future, China will have to exercise its influence to
persuade governments to change, but not for China to intervene in their internal
affairs, what more to pursue regime change. Proponents of this school cite the
examples of Chinas posture over Darfur when it resisted international pressures to
intervene but used diplomacy to persuade the Sudanese government to accept the
UNAMID peacekeeping mission; Chinas posture over Libya when it supported
Resolution 1970 to intervene in Libya to stop the atrocities but abstained from
Resolution 1973 which endorsed all necessary measures to intervene; and over
Syria when China strongly opposed international humanitarian intervention that
would lead to regime change, thus reverting to its traditional stance on non-
intervention and non-interference. One of its key proponents is Wu Bingbing of
Peking University.
3.1.3.2 Conditionality School: Qualified Support for Intervention
This school of thought recommends that China should give conditional support for
forcible intervention, but China should also be open to soft interference by
others, such as external criticism of its own policies. One of its advocates is
Shitong Qiao, also of Peking University. Like Wu, he also sees some difficulty in
China moving away from the traditional doctrine of non-intervention, as seen in
Chinas new diplomatic strategy of the Harmonious World Theory (Qiao 2011)
(Yu 2011). This new strategy emerged as a response to Western pressure on China
to be a responsible stakeholder, and was first coined by Hu Jintao at the 50th
anniversary of the Bandung Conference. Qiao sees a rising China having to take on
more responsibility in future, even to intervene in the internal affairs of others.
China, he argues, can help resolve humanitarian crises through soft interference
such as was the case in Darfur. Qiao proposed two specific ideas: First, China does
not have to be an active advocate of forcible intervention. Second, China should
not veto or threaten to veto a Security Council resolution when most members
have agreed on forcible intervention.
Another advocate of this school of thought is Liu Tiewa of Beijing Foreign
Studies University who sees a shift in Chinas foreign policy from absolute non-
intervention to conditional international intervention. She argues that China
does support international intervention but under strict given rules, based on the
UN Charter and with the consent of the protagonists in a conflict. The change of
stance was carried out from no intervention at all to actively advocating the
passage of the Security Council resolution on Darfur, and then to the support for
Resolution 1970 and abstention from Resolution 1973 over Libya (Liu 2012).
3.1.3.3 Pro-intervention School: Support for Active International

Intervention
There are also Chinese scholars who see China increasingly having to take a more
aggressive posture in international intervention. Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua Uni-
versity, for example, declared in a New York Times article that he represented
those who believed that China needs to be more bold and assertive in its foreign
policy in line with its new stature as an emerging major power. Yan noted that
there is a change of mood in China from no-one challenging the principle of non-
intervention a few years ago to open debates on the issuewith some even not
opposing sending troops overseas, such as to Libya (Yan 2011). Since the 2008
Beijing Olympics, he says, Chinese scholars have been debating whether China
should take on more international responsibility, leading to the emergence of two
competing ideas. On the one hand is a growing chorus of critics questioning
Chinas decades-old foreign policy doctrine of keeping a low profile, as first
propounded by Deng Xiaoping. On the other hand is the Chinese mainstream that
the international calls for China to take on more international responsibilities is a
conspiracy by Western countries to exhaust Chinas economic resources by sad-
dling it with more obligations overseas. Reflecting this cautious stance since the
end of the Cold War has been Chinas tendency of abstention from voting at the
UN. Yan argues that the idea for a more assertive role appears to be gaining
influence.
A few years ago, almost no Chinese scholar challenged the principle of non-
intervention, of infringing on the sovereignty of nations. Recently there are more
and more debates on this issue (Yan 2011). The debate on Chinas international
role has coincided with what he argues are certain changes in foreign policya
shift from a self-absorbed power obsessed with sovereignty to an influential
international actor, not least of which is Chinas growing economic might: Soon
after Japans Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, Chinese rescue teams were
despatched to Japan while Prime Minister Wen Jiabao expressed deep sympathy
with the Japanese government and people; over the Libya crisis, China broke its
traditional reticence to vote for UN sanctions against the Gaddafi regime, although
Beijing reverted to its policy of abstention by refraining from the vote for military
action against Libya; for the first time, China despatched a warship and four
military aircraft to evacuate Chinese citizens from Libya, which according to Yan,
totalled 35,860 nationals and 2,100 foreigners from 12 other countries being
evacuated by the Chinese team from Feb 22 to March 5. Chinas policy on Libya
is clearly a break from the principle of keeping a low profiletoday, there is
increased recognition of the fact that China must exercise positive influence on
international affairs (Yan 2011).
The conclusion we can make from the debates within China is clear: the policy
of non-intervention and non-interference is undergoing a major flux as China
emerges as a major power. The process of change has not reached its high point
yet, but there are clearly implications on the external environment. The diverging
views are also a reflection of the increasingly complex process of foreign policy-
making within the Chinese leadership where many centres of power are emerging.
The diplomatic clashes that China has been involved in with the West over Libya
and Syria are harbingers of the future China. As its economic interests expand, so
will its geostrategic interests, which in turn will demand changes to its foreign
policy on international humanitarian intervention.
3.1.3.4 China as a Rule Maker
There are also Chinese scholars who see China as already acting as a rule maker on
the question of international intervention, balancing its principle of non-inter-
vention with the growing international activism borne out of necessity. This school
of thought sees Chinas posture over Darfur as a good case in point and argues that
China may utilise it new-found power and status to remake international rules
regarding territorial sovereignty (Lee et al. 2012).
While oil was a factor that influenced the behaviour of China over Darfur, it
was not the only one. More fundamentally, it was Chinese policy of opposing
interventionism but increasingly accepting the principle of humanitarianism. In the
case of Darfur, China promoted a new rule for humanitarian intervention
essentially a conditional interventionwhich required involvement of actors at
three levels: national level (by the host country), regional level (by a relevant inter-
governmental organisation), and the global level (by the UN). Lee argues that
through influence without interference, China weighed in on the Sudanese
government to accept a hybrid form of intervention comprising peacekeeping
troops from the UN and the African Union, with a predominantly African char-
acter. Because of Chinas close ties with the Sudanese government, and because
both Khartoum and the AU were opposed to seeing white, European troops
coming into Sudan, the result was diplomatic leverage for Beijing, with Chinese
peacekeepers also allowed in. Chinas participation in the humanitarian inter-

vention in Darfur reflects a new Chinese approach to conflict resolution in the
making (Lee et al. 2012). Chinas orchestrated humanitarian intervention in
Darfur was characterised by two featuresit was sanctioned by the UN but carried
out by a regional body, and that host-country (Sudan) consent was sought and
Khartoum in fact dictated the terms of reference of the peacekeeping operation.
This school of thought argues that the Darfur model could well become a
watershed in international relations. In cases where Chinas core interests,
particularly those related to its national integration and state-building, are at stake
and where the West is reluctant to embroil itself or wants to avoid a head-on
confrontation with China, China may make international rules (Lee et al. 2012).
3.2 Impact of Chinas Evolving Stance on Intervention
Chinas evolving posture on international intervention as applied on developments

in the Middle East and North Africa during the Arab Spring has not been without
its consequences. In fact, the impact on this West Asian region has been signifi-
cant, given Beijings traditionally friendly position towards the Middle East, even
generating tensions in ways that have not been seen before between China and the
Arab world. These emerging tensions have surfaced in public discourses. A good
illustration of this was a seminar in Singapore on China and the Middle East which
debated the implications of recent events in the region on both China and the Arab
world. There was a clear clash of perspectives between the Arab world and China
in the seminar organised by the Middle East Institute on China and the Middle East
to discuss the implications of a rising political and economic relationship between
the two sides. (Insights 2012).
Key sentiments aired during the seminar referred to a sea change in Arab
perception and attitude towards China in an unfavourable way. The year 2011
when the Arab Spring broke out was described as a turning point in contemporary
ArabChina relationship and Arab perception of China. While for the past
60 years China had been viewed as a friend of the Arabsthe power that would
challenge US dominance in the Middle Eastthis appeared to be no longer the
case after Libya and Syria. While the economic leg of the relationship would
continue to flourish, the political side was predicted to decline. Abdul Khaleq
Abdullah of the United Arab Emirates, a key speaker at the seminar which this
author attended, declared: A new view of China is emerging in the Arab world,
that China has been acting irresponsibly in the region, that it does not understand
the region, and that China is a (rising) superpower that is not welcome.
Three key issues emerged that clearly were critical of Chinas posture during
the Arab Spring: First, that China was seen as taking sides in the Middle East, and
getting more involved in the complex politics of the region; second, that Chinas
reactions showed that the Arab Spring did not resonate well with it; and third, that
Chinas veto of the Security Council resolution on Syria calling on Assad to step
down completely took the Arab world by surprise. Abdul Khaleq also discerned
what he called several symbolic first-timers that he urged China to pay attention to:
First, the burning of the Chinese flag in Arab capitals - which never happened
before, indicating a new mood in the region; second, slogans in the Arab social
media describing China and Russia as the new enemies of the Arab people,
when previously, Abdul Khaleq said, the words China and friends were syn-
onymous; third, in the new list of Arab friends and enemies, China is not on the
list, which he said is an unexpected turn of events; fourth, due to Chinas veto on
Syria, there were calls for a boycott of Chinese productssomething unimagin-
able just a year ago when boycotts were usually targeted at the US; fifth, a shift in
Saudi Arabias attitude, with Riyadh clearly unhappy with the double veto over
Syria by China and Russia, which could result in King Abdullah reviewing his
look east strategy towards China.
In a nutshell, the Arab view of China as articulated by Abdul Khaleq was that it
was on the wrong side of history. Before 2011, while the Arab world was said to
be ready to welcome China as the next superpower, now, there could be second
thoughts of China as a future superpower, especially in relation to its interests in
the Middle East. Chinas stance over the issue of international intervention in
Libya and Syria was seen as a political blunder. If China is seen in the Arab
world as making more political blunders, there will be a price. The price will not
be just slogans but second thoughts about China as a strategic partner, he said.
3.3 Chinas Middle East Policy Towards

the Arab Uprisings
Some China scholars like Bo Zhiyue argue that since the 1990s, China has pursued
a balance policy in the Middle East so as to enjoy good relations with all countries
in the region. The primary driver of this policy is economic rather than strategic
interests (Bo 2012). This policy of balance is manifested, for example, in the
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, the seeming avoidance of
sensitive areas in the diplomatic visits of Chinese leaders to avoid involvement
in political rows, so as to protect Chinas economic interests. Essentially, China
wants to do business with everyone in the region, regardless of individual coun-
tries relations with each other (Bo 2012). Since the early 1990s, Chinas trade
with the region has increased rapidly. In 1994, the total trade between China and
the region was only 2.2 % of Chinas overall trade. By 2010, the proportion of
Chinas Middle East trade had increased to 6.8 %. Chinas exports to the region
grew from 2.8 % in 1994 to 5.8 % in 2010 while its imports from the region
expanded from 1.6 % in 1994 to 7.3 % in 2010. If the Middle East region were to
be taken as single country, it would now rank as Chinas fourth of fifth largest
trading partner.
3.3 Chinas Middle East Policy Towards the Arab Uprisings 41
Other scholars of China, however, have argued that the economic rationale is
only one dimension of Chinas Middle East policy which is increasingly under-
pinned by political and strategic considerations. These considerations all came into
play during the Arab Spring Uprisings, during which China vetoed three UNSC
resolutions on Syria, justifying them with its foreign policy principle of non-
interference. Justyna Szczudlik-Tatar, for instance, see this in terms of Chinas
manoeuvring approach towards the Middle East in which Beijing would
simultaneously talk with the opposition, support some of the UNs initiatives, yet
oppose sanctions. Combined, the objective is to prevent the domino effect on
Chinas interests, strengthen relations with other Middle East states and assert
Chinas international relevance, the last of which has been especially underscored
by the three Chinese vetoes. The vetoes demonstrated that it could forge an alli-
ance with Russia against the US, which China sees as trying to contain its rise.
(Szczudlik-Tatar 2012).
In the course of the Arab Uprisings, Chinas foreign policy towards the epochal
event has been clearly marked by its contrasting stances towards Libya and Syria.
Despite Chinas principle of non-interference, Beijing voted in favour of UNSCR
1970 in support of sanctionspartly out of concern for the fate of the 36,000
Chinese citizens working in Libyabut abstained from voting on UNSCR 1973
establishing a no-fly zone. There are those who argue that Beijing sees UNSCR
1973 to justify NATOs military intervention to protect civilians in Libya as new
interventionism based on the Libyan modelwhich means using the rhetoric
of democracy and human rights to effect a regime change. The Libyan experience
has also brought economic losses to China because the new Libyan authorities are
not eager to respect contracts signed by the previous regime with China. China,
feeling itself outmanoeuvred in Libya by NATO, does not want to be seen as a
supporter of military intervention in Syria. Chinas economic engagement in Syria
is not as extensive as in Libya, thus giving Beijing more room to manouever, such
as supporting Annans mission but opposing UNSC resolutions for intervention
(Szczudlik-Tatar 2012).
References
Aljazeera (2011, October 5). China and Russia veto UN sanctions on Syria. Retrieved August 10,
2012, from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/10/2011104223132792190.html
Bo, Z. (2012). Chinas Middle East policy: Strategic concerns and economic interests, in
insights. Singapore: Middle East Institute.
Insights. (2012). China and the Middle East: Implications of a rising political and economic
relationship. Singapore: Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore.
Jakobson, L. (2007). The burden of non-interference, 14 China economic quarterly Q2 in China
digital times. Retrieved July 20, 2012, from http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/07/
the-burden-of-non-interference-linda-jakobson/
Kassim, Y. R. (2012). East Asian regionalism: End of ASEAN centrality? RSIS commentaries,
116/2012, 4 July.
Large, D. (2008). China and the contradictions of non-interference in Sudan. Review of African
Political Economy, 35(115), 93106.
Lee, P. K., Chan, G., & Chan, L.-H. (2012). China in Darfur: Humanitarian rule-maker or rule-
taker? Review of International Studies, 38, 423444.
Liu, T. (2012). China and responsibility to protect: Maintenance and change of its policy for
intervention. Pacific Review, 25(1), 153173.
Pang, Z. (2009). Chinas non-intervention question. Global Responsibility to Protect, 1, 237252.
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Institute of International Affairs, 76(409), 12.
Qiao, S. (2011). Whither Chinas Non-Interference Principle?, European Society of International
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SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967551
Yan X (2011, March 31). How assertive should a great power be? New York Times. Retrieved
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Yu, X. (2011). A Harmonious World and Chinas peaceful development. International Review.
Winter 2006, 45, 121.
Chapter 4
China, India, Japan and an Emerging
Eastphalian Order?
Abstract The growing influence of China and India in international politics,

concomitant with their rise as emerging powers, has encouraged scholars to assess
more closely the phenomenon of the rise of the East. In the context of the doctrine
of the responsibility to protect and humanitarian intervention, some have even
theorised about the possible emergence arguably and perhaps quite controversially
of an Eastphalianorder. Continuing from the previous discussion on Chinas role
as a P5 player, this chapter looks at the positions of two other Asian powersIndia
and Japanand the domestic tensions they respectively face in the whole debate
about R2P and international humanitarian intervention. Whilst India is an
emerging power at a time when Japan is seen as waning, though not necessarily in
terminal decline, what are the potential rolesor otherwiseof both Asian states
in the prospective Eastphalian order?

Keywords Eastphalia Westphalia Beijing consensus Asian model Five
principles of peaceful co-existence UN human rights council Fukushima
disasters
4.1 The Rise of Eastphalia?
Writing in The Australian, the German opinion leader, Volker Perthes, argues that
global problems are no longer solved, crises managed, or global rules defined in
the traditional wayby a few, mostly Western powers. Incipient great and middle
powers, such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea and South Africa,
he says, are emerging and they also want their say. While the P5 still defend their
veto power, they can no longer dispose off sufficient resources, competence and
legitimacy to cope with global challenges or crises on their own. The good news
for the US, EU and other members of what Perthes calls the Old West is that
most, if not all, of the emerging powers position themselves for a more active
global role also as democracies. The not so good news is that these new powers do

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_4, The Author(s) 2014
44 4 China, India, Japan and an Emerging Eastphalian Order?
not necessarily share the Old Wests political agenda. Similarly, the new middle
and great powers do not always agree, in fact are generally more sceptical of
international sanctions and military interventions (Perthes 2012, June 19).
Moreover, some of these states differ substantially with the US and the EU on
approaches to regional conflicts, especially in the Middle East. Differences also are
apparent, he says, where new middle or great powers have formed clubs, such as
BRICS, together with non-democratic powers. India, Brazil and South Africa, he
adds, are using such formats in a pragmatic way to pursue their respective national
interests or simply to demonstrate their increased national weight. There is little
agreement between them, on the one hand, and the two P5 members of the
BRICSChina or Russiaon the other, on political values or fundamental
questions of international order. China and Russia, along with many other states in
the Global South, tend to defend the principle of non-interference. They are also
generally reluctant to support the US or European attempts to project democracy
or human rights in other countries. The international order is becoming more
pluralistic. The task for established Western democracies is to accept and cope
with such democratic differences on the international level and seek multilateral
coalitions to manage or solve problems (Perthes 2012).
The growing influence of Asian players as incipient middle or great powers
have led some scholars in the West as well as Asia to hypothesise about the
potential rise of Eastphalia or an Eastpahlian order in which China seems des-
tined to dominate. This is not just about the rise of the East but also about an Asian
alternative to Westphaliathe concept of the nationstate based on the doctrine of
territorial sovereignty and non-interference arising from the Treaty of Westphalia
in 1648 that ended the European Wars. Scholars on the ascendancy of Asia say
with power shifting towards the East, Asian preferences and ideas have a greater
opportunity than ever to affect world politics, potentially supplanting Western
dominance and universal principles known for centuries as Westphalian concepts
with the Eastphalian alternative (Kim et al. 2009). As a vision of world order,
this new Eastphalian system challenges Western preferences for universal adop-
tion of transnational principles such as democracy, free market economics, and
human rights. The conservatism of an Eastphalian approach, they say, could
radically restrict the influence of Western power and ideas that have for so long
dominated the fate of humanity. A manifestation of the idea of Eastphalia is the
Asian model or Beijing Consensus of economic development (Kim et al. 2009).
This school of thought further argues that Asian concepts of coexistence may
transform the concept of human security shielded by sovereignty and advanced
domestically through powerful and pervasive governments. The increasing inter-
national profiles and influence of India and China in particular signal the potential
for a pan-Asian perspective on human security, they add. This trajectory would
adversely affect more universal and interventionist visions of human security,
which have stimulated ideas such as the responsibility to protect individuals,
communities, ethnic or religious groups, and entire societies from global threats or
threats posed by their own governments (Kim et al. 2009).
4.2 India and Eastphalia 45
4.2 India and Eastphalia
4.2.1 Indias Position on Non-intervention
Notwithstanding the fact that India is a democracy while China is not, both share
similar views on the principle of non-interference. Indeed, apart from China, India
is the other Asian country that has been much in the news since the outbreak of the
international diplomatic fracas over the Arab Uprisings. Both constitute the Asian
pillars of the emerging BRICS. India and China are the key Asian players that have
led the counter-response to the largely Western push for the emerging norm of
responsibility to protect, R2P. But Indias position on the issue of international
intervention is not so straightforward. While it accepts R2P as a new norm, its
posture with regard to international humanitarian intervention, which R2P justifies
as a last resort to protect civilians against atrocities, has been characterised by
resistance or opposition. Consequently, Delhis attitude towards non-intervention
has been marked by conflicting signals, triggering criticisms even from its
domestic constituency. But when India chooses to take a strong stand against non-
intervention, its diplomats can be hard-hitting.
An example of such a stance were the comments made during one informal UN
meeting on 22 February 2012 by Indias Permanent Representative Hardeep Singh
Puri who castigated over-enthusiastic membersof the international community
for invoking selectively R2P to force regime change in Libya and Syria. He
pointed out that as soon as UN Resolution 1973 was adopted endorsing all
necessary measures, including a no-fly zone to force Libya into a ceasefire, these
over-enthusiastic memberswhom he did not name completely ignored the
ceasefire initiative. The only aspect of the resolution of interest to them was the
use of all necessary means to bomb the hell out of Libya, he said. Three years
prior to that UN speech, speaking at the General Assembly during a discussion on
R2P, Puri had made clear where India stood, reaffirming the sentiments of many
other countries that harboured suspicions about R2P, including China and Russia:
Responsibility to protect should in no way provide a pretext for humanitarian
intervention or unilateral action (Larouche Pac 2012).
Like China, India is enjoying growing clout in international politics and diplo-
macy arising from its rising economic stature. BRICS gives India more room for
manoeuvre than another regional grouping which Delhi has long been associated
withthe South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Unlike
SAARC, BRICS is not severely saddled with intra-regional historical baggage,
although the issue of mutual trust is still a factor hovering over the relationship
between China and India. The two neighbours had clashed in a brief armed border
conflict in 1962 and the Indian army had recently predicted a war with a more
adventurous China by 2017, according to the Hindustan Times, citing a secret
military exercise called Divine Matrix in which the Indian military envisaged a war
scenario with its nuclear-armed neighbour (Global Research 2009). Some Indian
scholars see BRICS as an ideal platform for India to reach out to China as a counter-
current to forge greater trust and collaboration with Beijing as Delhi, a Soviet ally
during the Cold War, now pursues a geo-strategic shift towards the US. Active
involvement in BRICS will help India cushion misplaced Chinese concerns
regarding a possible India-US strategic tie-up in Asia(Muni 2011).
By its third summit in Brasilia, the BRICS was already endorsing in its dec-
laration the aspirations of India and Brazil to play a greater role in the United
Nations. Play both did, in fact, a significant role during the diplomatic battles over
Libya and Syria. Weeks before the Brasilia summit, India, along with other BRICS
members, opposed the US and European move to impose a no-fly zone over Libya.
When the Western powers and the Arab states pushed for Security Council Res-
olution 1973 mandating all necessary measures to protect Libyan civilians from
regime atrocities, India, Brazil, Russia, China and South Africathe entire BRICS
group who are also members of the Security Councilabstained. UNSCR 1973
was passed with 10 votes, with Germany being the other abstention. The show of
solidarity of the BRICS of which India was a part was highly significant. As Tim
Dunne and Jess Gifkins note: Does this response by the BRIC powers foreshadow
an era of non-intervention will be upon us when we transition to a post-American
world? (Dunne and Gifkins 2011).
4.2.2 Domestic Criticisms of Indias Stance
Notwithstanding its solidarity with BRICS, Indias posture on the issue of inter-
national intervention has come under fire from its domestic critics for its lack of
consistency. Although India expressed strong reservations over intervention in
Libya, it shifted its position on the Syria question, voting with the West and the
Arab League at the UN and discussed options for the Assad regime, including a
political transition. The Indian mission had argued that Delhis position was a
principled support for the political process in Syria, but an article in the Times of
India criticised it as being based neither on principle nor pragmatism. Contrary to
the claim of a principled stand, it was pointed out that India chose not to intervene
during the Maldives crisis during the same week as the Syria vote, welcoming the
new president Mohamed Waheed Hassan and refusing to back Maldives demo-
cratically elected leader, Mohammad Nasheed. In going along with the West over
Syria, India was also criticised for taking the wrong step on three counts. First, it
ignored the larger power struggle that aimed to isolate Iran next; second, India had
undermined BRICS solidarity which it tried so hard to build in recent years; and
third, if India was trying to be pragmatic, it gained little by turning around on its
Syria policy so late in the day (Haidar 2012).
Other Indian scholars who see Delhis decision to abstain from Resolution 1973
as not being about high principles argue that it was neither about expressing its
non-aligned credentials or its non-Western identity. Indias smaller neighbours in
the subcontinent would certainly scoff at the notion that non-intervention is a
central principle of Indias foreign policy since they have been at the receiving end
of Delhis many interventions, militarily and politically. (Mohan 2011). Among

the most notable of Indias regional interventions he argued were Indias despatch
of troops into politically troubled East Pakistan to pave the way for the creation of
Bangladesh in 1971 and to keep the peace in Sri Lanka during 19871990.
Pakistan has a long list of Indian interventions while Nepal might argue that
Indias political intervention is a permanent part of its national life. When it
comes to the subcontinent, India says it has special responsibility to maintain
peace and order in the region and insists that other powers should not intervene in
the region. This is not very different from the notion of a sphere of influence often
claimed by many major powers (Mohan 2011).
4.2.3 Indias Strategic Thinking on Intervention
While not denying the inconsistency in Indias policy on intervention, some Indian
scholars see a strategic logic in its interventionist stance towards its smaller
neighbours. India views its neighbourhood in terms of three rings or concentric
circles. The first is an inner coreits territory and its domestic affairswhich it
will not allow the UN or the international community to interfere with. The second
is the outer coreits neighbourhood or sphere of influencewhich India will not
allow the UN or international community to intervene. The third is the world
beyond the first two rings where India may intervene as and when it suits its vital
interests, for which Indias position shifts on a case-by-case basis (Muni, interview
with the author, 30 April 2012). He also cited the instances of India sending troops
into both East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Sri Lanka under claims of genocide,
though the doctrine of R2P did not exist thenboth of which issues fell within its
second strategic ring. Like China, India has serious reservations about R2P out of
fear this could be used to break down its resistance to foreign intervention in its
internal affairsKashmir in the case of India.
In contrast to the critics, Indian scholars who belong to this school of thought
see consistency in Indias position of reiterating principles, notwithstanding its
conflicting behaviour on R2P. Within its own sphere of influence, India does not
hesitate to undertake R2P-like interventions. But beyond its area of influence,
Indias position on R2P shifts, depending on the strategic and foreign policy
interests, as well as its capabilities to intervene. For instance, following the racially
inspired coups in 1987 and 2000 in Fiji where there are many Fijians of Indian
origin, there was domestic pressure on the Delhi government to do something.
India made statements to that effect but did not intervene, while Australia was
more active in intervening due to proximity. Muni believes that if a similar crisis
were to break out in countries nearer to India and where Indian interests were more
vital, Delhis reactions would be different.
As India grows in economic power in step with its expanding economic, global
investments and strategic interests, Indias strategic calculus may change
accordingly. In such a scenario, should Indias vital national and economic
interests be involved, India may intervene beyond its immediate vicinity, espe-
cially if it succeeds in its ambition to be a permanent member of the UN Security
Council. Otherwise, Indias strategy to protect its vital interests globally will be to
resort to other means, such as mobilising friends and allies to support its goal. The
underlying point is one of capability. If we are not capable, how do we intervene?
Ultimately, it is a policy decision to weigh the overall calculus of interests. You
want to protect your people overseas, but can you protect them? Do you have the
capability? There are various other means, like going to the UN, your friends,
says Muni (Muni interview 2012).
This notwithstanding the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has been asked by
the foreign minister, S. M. Krishna, to pay greater attention to and be involved
with the problems of Indians overseas. In the past, the ministry has been active in
assisting in the evacuation of large numbers of Indian citizens in trouble-prone
countries, most recently in Libya, and in a big way at the time of the first Gulf
War. It should not come as a surprise if India in future takes on a more active
profile to protect its citizens overseas during times of crisis.
4.2.4 Indias Place in Eastphalia
Notwithstanding the contradictions in Indias attitude towards non-intervention,

there appears to be a larger strategic perspective behind its growing activism in
international politics and diplomacy. This has to do with its place in the potential
rise of Eastphalia. While China fits neatly into this conception of Eastphalia, some
scholars, including Indian ones, are contending that Indias place in the potential
dawning of an Eastphalian international system should not be overlooked,
although its fit is more complex and enigmatic. India is the worlds largest
democracy, not a centrally planned political economy like China. Yet it is opposed
to global democratisation and human rights through its support for non-interven-
tion, which suggests an Indian vision of an Eastphalian international system
(Fidler and Ganguly 2010). Central to their argument is Indias strong embrace of
the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which defines its position on sov-
ereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states. The Five Principles, not
unlike Chinas Five Principles given the common origin, were promulgated in
1954 along with China and what was then known as Burma which subsequently
inspired the Non-Aligned Movement. Fidler and Ganguly argue that India dem-
onstrated this reality in its determined opposition to the application of R2P in
specific cases, namely the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar and the end of
the Tamil Tiger insurgency in Sri Lanka. In both cases, they say, India stood
shoulder-to-shoulder with China and other Asian affairs in opposing any R2P
intervention into the domestic affairs of Myanmar and Sri Lanka.
Indias hostility to R2P, refusal to alter political and economic relations with
atrocity-generating regimes, and opposition to any interference in the Kashmir
issue is reflective of the Five Principles, though this is only part of the story, argue
Fidler and Ganguly. The fact is India remains dependent on foreign sources of oil
and gas, and as its economy continues to grow, this dependence increases. In other
words, the more India emerges as a major power, the more dependent it becomes
on the global economy and other countries from whom India sources its vital needs
for economic growth, especially oil and gas. India, therefore, can scarcely afford to
alienate key suppliers of these sources of energy supplies, such as Myanmar, Iran
and Sudan. Conveniently, the Five Principles provide political cover for diplo-
macy designed to reduce Indias vulnerability to energy supply shortages or crises
(Fidler and Ganguly 2010).
They, however, see Indias place in Eastphalia as neither assured nor predict-
able because India does not seem to be sure of itself in this potential new global
order. An alternative path for India is to become the stabiliser and shaper of the
shift towards an Eastphalian order by acting as a bridge between East and West.
Unlike China, India can do this, they say, because it has the characteristics that
give it, potentially, a unique place at the table of the great powers. First, its vibrant
democracy gives India political standing with the West that China does not have,
nor is expected to have for decades. Second, Indias sensibilities about sover-
eignty, political and territorial independence, and non-interference give it credi-
bility among those nations, especially in Asia, that have made the Five Principles
the basis of their international relations. Third, Indias sensitivity to the plight of
developing nations would also give it stature with the developing world. They
argue that under this perspective, India could emerge as the linchpin power of an
Eastphalian order. It could stabilise Eastphalia by making sure neither China nor
the US is emboldened or threatened to upset the balance of power. Similarly, India
could act as a broker between the universalist sentiments of Western powers,
which gravitate towards interventions in the domestic affairs of other states, and
the nationalistic preferences of Asian and other non-Western states to emphasise
sovereignty and non-interference (Fidler and Ganguly 2010).
Kim, Fidler and Ganguly see the Five Principles as also laying the basis for the
emergence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967,
which was reinforced in 1994 with the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum on
security issues. More recently, they say, the first India-ASEAN summit in 2002
explicitly referred to the Five Principles while India and China jointly celebrated
the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles in 2004. Beyond Asia, both India and
China have used the Five Principles to shape their relations with countries across
the Middle East and Africa. They argue that the concepts underlying the Five
Principles derive from the basic tenets of the Westphalian system but Asian
countries have embraced them and given them an Asian texture. Notions of sov-
ereignty and non-interference are now recognised as Asian characteristics and pan-
Asian commitment to the Five Principles makes them a cornerstone for an East-
phalian perspective on international relations.
The emphasis across Asia, including ASEAN, on sovereignty and non-inter-
vention contrasts with the more interventionist ideas pursued by the US and the
European Union which have adopted strategies that are actually counter to the
fundamental concepts of the Westphalian system. Their strategies revolve around
the promotion of a liberal, democratic and economic project that involves inter-
vention in the internal affairs of other states and seeks the homogenisation of
politics, economies, cultures and peoples (Kim et al. 2010).
But the attempted use of the R2P principle by Western governments and aid
groups in Myanmar following Cyclone Nargis in 2008, they say, triggered a
unified response from Asian states, including India and China. The Asian states,
including ASEAN, emphasised the need to respect Myanmars sovereignty and
provide humanitarian assistance in ways that did not intervene in its domestic
affairs. The Myanmarese human security crisis saw Asian countries re-empha-
sising the bedrock principles of the Eastphalian perspectiveopposing the
application of a radical principle favoured by the West. This group of scholars see
the Cyclone Nargis episode as offering a prelude to what may transpire beyond the
Asian region as Chinese and Indian influence grows and as world politics becomes
more Asian-centric. They also argue that Sri Lankas ability to secure Indian and
Chinese support in the UN Human Rights Council to defeat Western-backed
resolutions critical of Colombos bloody crushing of the Tamil Tiger insurgency as
perhaps a sign of the arrival of Eastphalia. Pan-Asian opposition to the principle
of the responsibility to protect and the human rights approach informing it raises
questions as to whether this principle and the concept of human security it contains
have much of a futureespecially as China, India and the Asian region grow in
power and influence relative to the West (Kim et al. 2010).
4.3 Japan and R2P
In contrast, Japans place in Eastphalia is, however, vague. This is largely in view
of its ambivalent attitude towards R2P and the notion of non-intervention. Sig-
nificantly, despite Japans status as an economic superpower, current literature
tends to refer more to China and India as the pillars of a potential Eastphalian
order. One key explanation for this is the seeming lack of confidence amongst
scholars in Japans ability to play its role in nurturing Eastphalia, or even as a
bridge builder between East and West, as Fidler and Ganguly have envisioned for
India, within the Eastphalian paradigm. A crucial factor behind this lack of con-
fidence is Japans close alliance with the US and its historical legacy and problems
with China. More generally, scholars like Mulgan see the fundamental reason
being Japans waning power and influence in Asia (Mulgan 2009).
Japans peripheral role in a possibly emerging Eastphalian order arising from its
vague policy towards R2P, has been characterised by detachment. Honna argues
that as the second largest contributor to the UN budget, Japan is expected to play a
role in implementing R2P, but Tokyo has been unenthusiastic about actively
engaging in the R2P discourse. She argues that Japans official statements tend to
reflect a distancing from R2P (Honna 2012). Another Japanese scholar, Miki
Honda, is more critical, pointing to the wide gap between Japans rhetoric and the
reality of its civilian protectiondespite being one of the Asia Pacifics key
4.3 Japan and R2P 51
supporters of R2P. The provisions of the World Summit Outcome Document of

2005 which adopted R2P and the Security Council Resolution 1674 of 2006 which
reaffirmed it have not yet been translated into action by the Japanese govern-
ment. (Honda n.d). It is instructive at this point to review Japans attitude towards
R2P and how others view Tokyos behaviour towards the issue of international
intervention.
Officially, Japan welcomes and expresses support for R2P. Honna argues that
this does not, however, mean that Tokyo strongly supports efforts to mainstream
R2P policies. Japan also does not share its Asian neighbours concerns that R2P
provides a pretext for unilateral intervention in a states domestic affairs. In fact
since the 1990s, she argues, Japans foreign policy discourse has converged on the
concept of human security and its approach to R2P has focused consequently on
human security, which has become its core diplomatic policy. Originally, it was
seen as a foreign policy concept aimed at reinventing and relegitimising its
overseas development assistance (ODA) in the post-Cold War era. Given the
economic orientation of Japans human security doctrine, the freedom from want
aspect of the UNs two-dimension definition of human security was valued over
its the freedom from fear. An array of programmes has been developed within
its human security framework to advance Japans foreign policy, but none directly
addressing the fear factor. It is instructive at this point to assess what Japans
attitude is towards R2P (Honna 2012).
Such a selective interpretation and implementation of its human security policy
met its first serious challenge in 2001 when the US launched its global war on
terrorism, which forced Japan, as a US ally, to join the campaignwhich was
essentially a unilateral international intervention into Iraq and Afghanistan.
Japans decision to send only a token contingent of engineers provoked strong
domestic opposition but the government justified it by emphasising the humani-
tarian mission of Japans Self-Defence Forces (SDF). Since then, Honna argues,
Tokyo became more inclined towards the human security discourse and thus
justified its commitment to international peace-building efforts. Through human
security diplomacy, Japan has insisted on a bigger role for post-conflict rebuilding,
arguing that non-military, development-oriented assistance is needed for sustain-
able peace. According to Honna, the Iraq experience became a breakthrough for
the Japanese government to bridge the boundary between freedom from want and
freedom from fear in conducting its human security policy. Japan, however, in so
doing, is not being inconsistent with the doctrine of R2P because R2P proponents
have argued that the third pillar of R2P is supportive of peace-building and
reconstruction after an intervention.
The emergence of the R2P doctrine with the UN adoption of it through the
World Summit Outcome document in 2005, however, posed the second challenge
for Japans human security policy. R2Ps focus on freedom from fear by its
emphasis on reaction to the four mass atrocity crimesgenocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanityput pressure on Tokyo to review
its position on human security which was postured towards the freedom from want.
But supporting R2P might signal that Japan is abandoning its post-World War 2
pacifism, while opposing R2P could weaken Japans position in UN diplomacy

and undermine its ambition for a permanent seat in the Security Council. Con-
sequently, Japan took the compromise position of passively supporting the World
Summit adoption of R2P While passive support for R2P has become Japans
official stance in international diplomacy, domestic consensus remains elusive due
to different worldviews and ideological orientations (Honna 2012).
4.3.1 Four Contesting Perspectives on R2P
According to Honna, there are four contesting perspectives on R2P amongst

Japans policy making and academic circlesthe conservative view; the revi-
sionist view; the liberal view; and the peace activism view.
4.3.2 The Conservative View
This school stresses the incompatibility of Japans human security policy and R2P.
Official statements of the ministry of foreign affairs are basically in line with this
view, which argues that Japans human security diplomacy should not be linked to
R2P. For example, in 2005, a Japanese diplomat in charge of human security,
Kinichi Komano, who spoke at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human
Security Network in Ottawa, argued that the use of force as a last resort to
intervene in humanitarian crises must not be regarded as a measure undertaken
within the framework of human security. Such a humanitarian intervention can
better be interpreted, Komano said, as an implementation of the philosophy of
responsibility to protect rather than human security (Komano 2005). Three
years later, speaking at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Davos, Prime Minister
Yasuo Fukuda advanced a similar view by stressing that Japan does not intervene
by force, as a matter of national policy, in such conflict situations where the
international community may have to seriously consider fulfilling their respon-
sibility to protect; we are a nation that has primarily focused on humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance (Fukuda 2008). In the following year, the Japanese
ambassador to the UN Yukio Takasu, in his statement to a General Assembly
meeting on R2P, made a clear distinction between R2P and human security: They
each have a different basis and origin in the WSO. The purpose of human security
as agreed in paragraph 143 of the WSO is to enable individuals to be free from fear
and want. As such, use of force is not envisaged in this concept. On the other
hand, the purpose of the R2P as agreed in paragraphs 138140 of the WSO is to
protect populations from the four most serious types of human rights viola-
tions(Takasu 2009). There is a fundamental reason why Japanese leaders and
foreign policymakers insist on this distinction between R2P and human security.
The conservatives take the position a conflation of the two concepts could
undermine Japans human security diplomacy and suggest to its neighbours that
Tokyo is shifting towards a more assertive policy of humanitarian intervention,
which could revive fears of a militaristic Japan.
4.3.3 Revisionist View
There are also advocates of a more robust international role for the SDF advanced
by what Honna calls a revisionist view about R2P. A group of revisionist poli-
cymakers has consolidated power over the last decade for whom R2P has opened a
window of opportunity for Japan to conduct a more active role and beyond non-
military activities. For the revisionists, R2P creates a legitimate basis for using the
SDF to normalise Japans military function and amend Article 9 of the Consti-
tution that constrains Japans security posture. The revisionist view has emerged in
tandem with the rise of nationalist agendas led by factions within the dominant
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) following the end of the Cold War. The rightist
politicians also see Chinas growing influence as a threat to Japan, causing them to
push for a restrengthening of Japans power.
4.3.4 The Liberal View
The rise of the revisionists and their exploitation of the R2P amid the war on terror
to advance their agenda of normalising Japan, however, has provoked a domestic
backlash seeking to retain the security constraints embedded in Article 9. The
liberals even want to roll back defence guidelines that appear to flout Article 9.
The liberals fear that the revisionists are recklessly endangering the country by
undermining Japans pacifist identity, especially in Asia. They have concerns
about R2Ps uncertain status under international law and the potential for abuse.
Despite such reservations and the implications of R2P on Japans identity, the
liberals regard R2P as a significant step towards preventing mass atrocities. They
are also supportive of Japans human security approach because it has limited the
scope of Japans international involvement to non-military matters.
4.3.5 The Peaceniks View
In contrast to the liberals, there are the peace activists who act in solidarity with
the global anti-neoliberal network who question the concept of R2P. The peace
activists argue that R2P focuses too much on the state in determining the cause of
mass atrocities. They also see it as a doctrine that threatens to undermine Article 9
as it could provide political cover for the overseas deployment of the SDF in
support of UN military interventions.
Honna argues that there has been a shift in the position of the liberals since
2009 when the UN Secretary General introduced his report on R2P on Imple-
menting the Responsibility to Protect. The 2009 report clarified and consequently
mollified some of the concerns of the liberals about the legitimacy of R2P and the
tight rules of implementation to prevent abuse. As a result, the liberals are now
likely advocates of the R2P doctrine, though I would argue that the mishandling of
R2P in Libya during the Arab Uprising which led to regime changecontrary to
the doctrine of R2Pmay cause a rethink amongst the liberals. It is also not
certain, in Honnas view, if they could overcome the objections of the mainstream
conservatives who now dominate Japans foreign policy establishment, nor find
common ground with the revisionists.
4.3.6 Japan, R2P and Natural Disasters
Japans triple disaster in 2011 in Fukushima, north of Japan, in which a powerful

earthquake and the resulting tsunami caused a nuclear plant meltdown, has
highlighted the urgent need for a rethink on the issue of natural disasters and their
impact on human security. Scholars on human security argue that earthquakes,
tsunamis and climate disruption have focused international attention on environ-
mental disasters and the ability of the global community to respond adequately and
immediately. Whatever the magnitude of the humanitarian violations in Libya and
Syria, analysts like Linda Malone argue that they are eclipsed by the sheer
magnitude of the combined impact of the Tohoku earthquake, tsunami and nuclear
disaster on 11 April 2011, even though the death toll was surprisingly not massive.
Still the triple disaster caused a nuclear scare and forced a shutdown of the nuclear
reactors in the area, even triggering an international rethink of nuclear power as a
source of energy (Malone 2011). She criticises the UN, including Secretary
General Ban Ki Moon, of being too quick to deny that R2P applies to environ-
mental crises, including climate change and its consequences. She argues that the
four specific mass atrocity crimes targeted by R2Pgenocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanitycan be applied as much as on abusive
governments and non-state actors that inflict environmental damage. There is a
pressing need for reconsideration in an environmental context, before the next
disaster occurs in a state that is unable, and unwilling, to act(Malone 2011).
In essence, at the broader conceptual level, there are two conflicting schools of
thought when it comes to applying R2P to natural disasters. The first school argues
that coercive intervention is permissible in case of natural disasters, whose primary
advocates include Canada and France. In 2008 the French foreign minister pushed
for the use of R2P to justify international humanitarian intervention in Myanmar
following Cyclone Nargis because of the Myanmar governments inaction in the
face of unprecedented death and destruction in the country. The French push was,
however, opposed by ASEAN, of which Myanmar is a member. The second school

takes a contrary view. Apart from ASEAN, its advocates include Japan and the UN
Secretary General. This school argues that it is vital for R2P to be restricted to the
four specific mass atrocity crimes so that R2P does not end up being about
protecting everybody from everything, but eventually protecting nobody from
anything. Ban describes R2P as being narrow but deep. Expanding the under-
standing of R2P will dissipate its effectiveness in addition to creating the possi-
bility of R2P being deemed unreasonably interventionist (National Law School of
India Review n.d.).
In the wake of the 2011 triple disaster, the NLSIR posed the question whether
R2P can be applied to Japan, especially in view of it being disaster-prone. Can the
international community stage coercive intervention in the domestic affairs of
Japan to mitigate the damage of the tsunami and earthquakes?
The NLSIR believes the answer to this poser lies in whether the two conflicting
schools of thought can be reconciled. The NLSIR believes it can. In a scenario
where the predicament of the people is a direct result of the inaction of the state,
this inaction moves into the realm of state failure and amount to an atrocity. This
can, and must, be corrected by the international community under R2P. The
NLSIR argues that such an approach should be handled with care. However, one
must be careful to apply this to the current situation in Japan particularly in the
absence of any such gross neglect of the Japanese government in this regard
(NLSIR n.d.).
References
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Retrieved June 11, 2012, from http://www.lowyinterpreter.com/post/2011/04/15/
Libya-R2PA-perfect-storm-.aspx
Fidler, D. P., & Ganguly, S. (2010). India and Eastphalia. Indiana Journal of Global Legal
Studies, 17(1), 147 (Article 7).
Fukuda, Y. (2008). Address by HE Mr Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, Session on The
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January.
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Kim, S. W., Fidler, D. P., & Ganguly, S. (2009). Eastphalia rising? Asian influence and the fate of
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tiary of Japan in Charge of Human Security. Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human
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Malone, L. A. (2011, April 4). IntLawGrls. Retrieved August 12, 2012, from http://www.
intlawgrrls.com/2011/04/responsibility-to-protect-libya-to.html
Mohan, C. R. (2011, April). India, Libya and the principle of non-intervention. ISAS Insights, No
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Mulgan, A. G. (2009). Why Japan cant lead. World Policy Journal, 26, 101110. (in footnote of
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a-multipolar-world/story-e6frg6ux-1226399093496
Takasu (2009, 24 July). Statement by Ambassador Yukio Takasu. Permanent Representative of
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Chapter 5
ASEAN and R2P
Abstract Amongst the many that endorsed R2P in 2005 during the UN World
Summit were the ASEAN states. Yet, R2P has enjoyed only lip service in
Southeast Asia. A key factor behind this is the principle of non-interference, a key
doctrine in the groups worldview in inter-state relations. This chapter reviews the
reasons for this lukewarm attitude towards R2P and where the ASEAN states stand
over the issue of international intervention especially Libya and Syria. Notwith-
standing the ambivalent reception to R2P in Southeast Asia, efforts are being made
by scholars and think tanks to mainstream the concept within policy-making. Is a
typology of R2P positions within ASEAN emerging?

Keywords Gulf cooperation council Cyclone nargis Rohingya ASEAN

way Organisation of islamic cooperation (OIC) Five principles of peaceful

co-existence Constructive engagement
5.1 Malaysias Unusual Interventionist Stance
ON FRIDAY 13 May 2011, a rather unusual statement was issued by the Prime
Ministers Office in Malaysia. Prime Minister Najib Razak said in the statement
attributed to him that his country was ready to send peacekeeping troops to assist
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stabilise the political
situation in Bahrain arising from the Arab Uprisings protests which had spilled
over from Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and other parts of the Middle East and
North Africa. The statement, issued on the night of 13 May, was timed with his
visit to Riyadh on 1314 May 2011 and was meant for the Arab world to know.
Malaysia fully backs all sovereign decisions taken by Saudi Arabia and GCC
states to safeguard the stability and security of the region in these trying times, his
statement said, as reported by Bernama, the official news agency, which was
published by the Arab media and the international news agencies.

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_5, The Author(s) 2014
58 5 ASEAN and R2P
Making clear that the peacekeeping troops would be sent only if there was an
invitation from the Bahraini government, the PMs statement stressed further that
Malaysia supported the national dialogue process launched by Crown Prince
Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa to address the aspirations of Bahrainis and to de-
escalate tension in the country. Considering these facts, Prime Minister Najib is
pleased to announce that Malaysia stands ready to contribute peacekeepers to the
Kingdom of Bahrain, if invited to do so by the Bahraini leadership, the statement
said. These forces will assist the legitimate mission of GCC forces, which are
playing a vital role in ensuring the success of the national dialogue in Bahrain
(Bernama 2011).
It is not clear if the invitation was eventually extended by the Bahraini gov-
ernment, but nothing was heard about the Malaysian peacekeeping mission
thereafter. The government was silent about it, as were the Malaysian media. This
was not the only unusual thing about the statement. Historically, Malaysia has
rarely, if ever, sent peacekeeping troops to help quell a revolt in another country,
although it has an impressive record of serving UN peacekeeping missions since
the 1960 Congo Mission. The implication of the statement was that Malaysia
would now be willing to despatch its forces to help quell a civil unrest overseas.
The 13 May statement therefore came across as an unprecedented move or a
significant policy change. But it appeared designed more to win favour from the
GCC, especially Saudi Arabia, than a policy of supporting international inter-
vention in times of a political crisis in a friendly country. As the statement did not
make clear that the peacekeeping mission would be carried out within a United
Nations mandate if embarked upon, it would presumably be a regional peace-
keeping effort by the GCC countries. For Malaysia, even this would be
unprecedented.
Although not much was heard about the peacekeeping initiative, it was the first
public sign of the Malaysian leadership being uneasy about the implications of the
Arab Uprisings on Malaysia. A year later, on 28 April 2012, when a major civil
society protest known as Bersih 3.0 broke out at the Merdeka Square in the heart of
the capital Kuala Lumpur, Najib reacted rather strongly, accusing the protesters of
trying to stoke an Arab Spring in Malaysia (Roughneen 2012). UMNO Youth
leader Khairy Jamaluddin was quoted by The Guardian as saying that opposition
groups cited social movements in the Middle East to instigate people to take part
in street revolutions and, in the process, manufacture a Malaysian version of the
Arab Spring. Former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad and former police chief
Haniff Omar added to the shrill by accusing the protesters of having been infil-
trated by communists. A previous mass protestBersih 2.0which took place
ahead of the 2008 general election, led to the worst performance by the ruling
Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition since 1969.
But the leadership within Najibs ruling party was clearly divided over his
portrayal of the Malaysian protestthe third such action by the coalition of civil
society groups whose activists overlapped with opposition-linked forces. Not long
after, a deputy minister in Najibs party, UMNO, which is the dominant party with
BN, publicly disagreed with the prime minister over his rendering of Bersih 3.0 as
5.1 Malaysias Unusual Interventionist Stance 59
a Malaysian-style Arab Uprising in the making. Saifuddin Abdullah, known for his
independent-minded streak, wrote in a newspaper column that he could not agree
the protest was aimed at ousting the government, had links with communism, or
was designed to engineer an Arab Spring-style of public groundswell against the
government leading eventually to its downfall. I disagree if Bersih 3.0 is accused
of having been under communist influence or that it wants to topple the govern-
ment through street protests. Even more inaccurate if it is likened to the Arab
Spring. This is because the factors that led to the Arab Spring do not exist here (in
Malaysia), Saifuddin said. Bersih 3.0 is not the Arab Spring. It is not (like the
protests that were) anti-Marcos or anti-Suharto or even pro-Aung San Suu Kyi, he
added (Chooi 2012).
Bersih itself has denied that it was out to instigate a Middle East-style revolt.
The leader of the protest movement, Ambiga Sreenavasan told CNN: Well, let me
tell you where we are coming from. We dont want an Arab Spring. Indeed, she
said, Bersih was not opposed to the possibility of the present government returning
to power after the polls (Chooi 2012). The United Nations, however, has con-
demned Prime Minister Najib Razaks crackdown on the Bersih 2.0 rally as
excessive and expressed disappointment and alarm at the targeting of indi-
viduals in the run-up to the July 9 protest. We are very concerned by the recent
crackdown on peaceful demonstrators by the government in Malaysia, AFP
reported Rupert Colville, spokesperson for the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights as saying (Yousaytoo 2012).
Saifuddins reference to Marcos and Suharto, the former leaders of the Phil-
ippines and Indonesia, was significant as both were regarded by their citizens as
autocratic presidents who were eventually deposed by their own peoples power
revolution in 1986 and 1998, respectivelywell ahead of the Arab Spring. Suharto
was succeeded by BJ Habibie who, despite his short tenure introduced major
political reforms and even paved the way for the eventual breakaway and inde-
pendence of East Timor after a period of turmoil which led to UN peacekeeping
intervention spearheaded by Australia. Aung San Suu Kyi is the pro-democracy
leader whose policy of civil disobedience since 1990 had led to significant political
changes a decade later in Myanmar. The Myanmarese governments inaction over
the massive casualties from Cyclone Nargis in 2008 led to a major international
dispute between France and ASEAN whether R2P-backed intervention should be
implemented. ASEAN was stunned by the French push for humanitarian inter-
vention in Myanmar on account of R2P. As it was seen as an affront to ASEANs
long-standing principle of non-interference, the group blocked the move, arguing
that R2P was never about humanitarian intervention in response to natural
disasters but to mass atrocities crimes. But ASEAN eventually settled for a tri-
partite humanitarian response to Nargis in which the UN worked through ASEAN
to assist Myanmar overcome the tragedy of Nargis. In so doing, ASEAN recon-
ciled the international communitys extension of humanitarian assistance to a
member state without breaching the principle of non-interference.
60 5 ASEAN and R2P
5.2 R2P-Like Situations in Southeast Asia
In other words, there have arguably been circumstances within Southeast Asia/
ASEAN that approximated R2P-like situationseven preceding the rise of the
doctrine of R2P. Another clear instance where the UN had intervened in Southeast
Asia was in Cambodia following the 1991 Paris Peace Agreement, though this was
the result of a proactive ASEAN mediation role. Scholars are debating whether
some ongoing internal conflicts within ASEAN are potential sources of future
international intervention given the many deaths that have been reported while the
conflicts seem to have gone on for years without resolution. Two clear examples
are the situations in southern Thailand and in Mindanao, southern Philippines.
When two ASEAN members, Cambodia and Thailand, clashed for the first time in
a shooting skirmish in 2008 and the problem threatened to get out of hand, there
were concerns within the region whether it could explode and worsen to the extent
that international peacekeeping would be required. In the end, when Indonesian
foreign minister Marty Natalegawa mediated and defused the tension, some saw
that move as having pre-empted a potential R2P-like situation, although such a
prognosis would be stretching the argument too far.
Notwithstanding the many examples of civil conflict within Southeast Asia
since the creation of ASEAN, only two had invited international intervention in the
form of peacekeeping missionsCambodia in 1991 and East Timor in 1999and
both took place way before the doctrine of R2P was adopted by the UN in 2005. It
could be argued that ASEANs diplomatic posture in the 1980s of opposing
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia that followed the bloody rule of the Khmer
Rouge, and ASEANs subsequent mediation of the Cambodia issue, was a form of
international intervention initiated by the Southeast Asian region through ASEAN
to bring about peace in its backyard, culminating in the 1991 Paris Peace
Agreement. In the case of East Timor, the UN intervened after Indonesia unilat-
erally agreed to accept an international peacekeeping force under the banner of the
UN, which was led by Australia but involving some ASEAN countries to soften
the sensitivity of Australian participation. According to Annan, who was UN
Secretary General at the time, the UN intervention had the mandate of rebuilding
post-crisiswhich were elements of the future R2P when it was adopted: On
September 15, the Council unanimously passed a resolution authorising the mul-
tinational force, to be known as INTERFET. And 5 days later, the first Australian
troops landed on the beaches of East Timor in a force that crucially, included
Malaysian and Thai troops. After the swift restoration of order by the international
force, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
was established in October 1999 with a mandate to rebuild the devastated country
and prepare for its independence (Annan 2012).
Although the UN model for intervention in East Timor predated R2P, it could be
argued that it is a precedent that could be the template for future humanitarian
interventions by the world body whereby peacekeeping will be accompanied by a
host of other elements including peace-building, rebuilding and reconstruction
5.2 R2P-Like Situations in Southeast Asia 61
post-conflict. Outside the R2P framework, but within the context of international
humanitarian assistance, the UN and ASEAN seem to have developed the habit of
cooperation and coordination on this front. Following the experience of Cyclone
Nargis in which the UN and ASEAN interacted closely to bring about humanitarian
assistance, the UN and ASEAN have been swift in their response to the tragedy in
Myanmar of the Rohingyas (Thalang 2012).
5.3 Rohingya: New Test Case of R2P in Southeast Asia
Indeed, events in Myanmars Rakhine state over the outbreak of ethnic tensions
relating to the Rohingya is emerging as the latest test case for the relevance of R2P
in Southeast Asia. The Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect sees
the crisis in Rakhine state as clearly falling within the scope of R2P as the violent
attacks on either side of the ethnic divide constitute crimes against humanity
(APCR2P 2012). According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,
a 2009 Harvard Law report called for the creation of an international commission
of inquiry, and a possible referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
light of its finding that there was a prima facie case that the government was
contravening prohibitions against crimes and humanity and war crimes (GCR2P
2010). Indeed, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in an emergency
summit in Mecca on 1415 August 2012, had used similar language, declaring the
atrocities on the Rohingya as crimes against humanity, thus linking the issue with
one of the four mass atrocity crimes under R2P that could justify international
humanitarian intervention (Kassim 2012).
The international media reported that a committee of the UN General Assembly
expressed serious concern on 26 November 2012 over the new spate of violence
between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists, with the 193-nation General Assem-
blys Third Committee, which focuses on rights issues, approving by consensus a
non-binding resolution expressing particular concern about the situation of the
Rohingya minority in Rakhine state, urges the government to take action to bring
about an improvement in their situation and to protect all their human rights,
including their right to a nationality (Nichols 2012). In the face of the growing
concern for the ethnic clashes, it is pertinent to note that China and Russia vetoed a
2007 draft Security Council resolution on Myanmar on the grounds that the
atrocities in that country was not a threat to international peace and security
(GCR2P 2012). This not withstanding, ASEAN foreign ministers had issued a
four-point statement on 17 August 2012 stating their concerns and offering
humanitarian assistance upon the request of the Government of Myanmar.
ASEAN had in fact offered to work closely with the Myanmar government and the
UN following the tripartite model of providing relief to the victims of Cyclone
Nargis in 2008. Myanmar however rejected the offer on the ground that the crisis
was an internal affair of the country. ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan
had cautioned that the atrocities were of concern to ASEAN because if they were
62 5 ASEAN and R2P
not resolved, could radicalise the Rohingya Muslims and destabilise Southeast
Asia (Kassim 2012).
The Rohingya issue has also triggered a greater consciousness about the
ASEAN Charter which, in a break from ASEANs past, advocates greater human
rights in the regional grouping. Increasingly being cited for a role is the ASEAN
Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) which has a special
mandate to promote human rights in the region. For example, in an article in The
Jakarta Post on 6 September 2012, Indonesian scholar Hafid Abbas says the resort
to AICHR would be consistent with the spirit of non-interference, presumably
because Myanmar, as an ASEAN member has also subscribed to it, and thus
AICHR could enable the facilitation of capacity building for law-enforcement,
such as community policing in Rakhine state (Abbas 2012, Sept 6). Other scholars,
however, note that the Rohingya issue has put ASEAN, especially Indonesia as a
Muslim majority country, in a dilemmaof how to reconcile the principle of non-
interference with the moral obligation to stop the atrocities on the Rohingya
(Karim 2012, Aug 3).
Mochammad Faisal Karim argues that the resort to R2P can in fact strengthen
ASEAN in at least three ways: first, it should not be seen as a mechanism for
interference but for prevention of mass atrocities, which is a goal consistent with
the principle; second, ASEAN can be the regional mechanism to implement R2P
which member states have adopted at the UN in any case, and that R2P can thus be
contextualised with ASEAN values through the ASEAN Way. Moreover
ASEAN has existing mechanisms to implement R2P, such as AICHR and the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In other words, the implication of his argument is
that adopting R2P to respond to the Rohingya issue would contribute to the
mainstreaming of R2P in the region and prevent similar atrocities in the future
(Karim 2012). GCR2P took the position that apart from ASEAN, the UN Security
Council, the US, India and Thailand are potentially the most influential actors on
Myanmar and would be in a position to determine what policy options could
prevent the outbreak of mass atrocities in Myanmar.
5.4 ASEANs Attitude Towards R2P
All this notwithstanding, what is ASEANs official attitude towards R2P? To begin
with, whilst ASEAN member states were amongst the many that embraced R2P in
2005 when the UN adopted it as part of the World Summit Outcome Document
(WSOD), it is clear that ASEAN countries are basically still apprehensive of R2P,
especially given the resonance of international reservations about non-interfer-
ence, which is a long-standing principle for the grouping. Another important factor
is ASEANs preoccupation with development and economic growth as well as
regional political stability. Every annual summit of ASEAN leaders, and every
meeting of ministers and senior officials, are focused on the core agenda of
bringing development, economic growth and integration to the region. Even the
5.4 ASEANs Attitude Towards R2P 63
theme of human security is relatively new to ASEAN in its five decades of

existence, and mainstreaming human security within ASEAN official thinking and
rhetoric has been a huge challenge. This is not to say that there has been no
progress. Over the last few years, the language of human security has begun to
creep into ASEAN statements, both of high-ranking individuals such as the
ASEAN Secretary General and official communiques. Surin Pitsuwan began the
push to popularise human security at the 31st ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference
in 1998 when he was serving as foreign minister of Thailand. It was not until a
decade later that ASEAN, through its Secretary General Ong Keng Yong,
acknowledged that ASEAN had gone beyond traditional security given the
growing threats to human security the region faced such as through trafficking in
persons, terrorism, transnational crime and pandemics. Mainstreaming R2P to be a
key policy orientation within ASEAN, however, is a totally different challenge
given the nature of R2P as a norm or doctrine. R2Ps biggest hurdle is the fact that,
being pro-interventionist on the humanitarian front, it clashes with the core
ASEAN principle of non-intervention and non-interference.
Thakur gives three reasons why R2P has not gone far in Southeast Asia. First, it is
poorly understood and widely misinterpreted in the region. Second, it is still seen as
a challenge to state sovereignty, and third, R2P lacks champions in the region
(Thakur 2011). Indeed, it is not clear whether R2P has been fully accepted within
ASEAN despite its embrace by individual member states at the UN level. But
ASEAN diplomats the author spoke to provide some indicators. ASEAN has no
time for R2P. We have other pressing things to worry about. It is a concept that is still
stuck in the UN, Europe. It is difficult to get a discussion going on R2P within
ASEAN. ASEAN is right now not in the mood for R2P, says a senior ASEAN
diplomat who had served his country at the UN and was in the thick of the diplomatic
battles between the advocates and opponents of R2P. I dont see us in the future
reaching any agreement on R2P, adds the diplomat (senior ASEAN diplomat 2012).
The bleak future of R2P in ASEAN has to do with the diplomatic debacle in
2011 over Libya and subsequently Syria. As it was, even before Libya, many
developing countries were trying to roll back R2P after they had embraced the
norm in 2005 when it was adopted by the UN. If there had been a sense of regret
about adopting R2P, the situation had become worse after Libya, the senior dip-
lomat says. We are now stuck. My conclusionthere is not much we can do on
R2P. Until and unless we are ready to confront the big issue of intervention, we
will be stuck. I am not that hopeful about R2P.
5.5 ASEANs Doctrine of Non-interference
Apart from the epochal Libya factor, ASEANs discomfort with R2P is to be
expected given the nature of ASEAN and its political culture. Like China and India,
many of the ASEAN member states are also entrenched in the doctrine of non-
interference which was adopted from the inception of the regional grouping in 1967.
64 5 ASEAN and R2P
The aversion to non-interference could be attributed to the genesis of the organi-

sation. Indonesia as ASEANs de facto leader, was the host of the Bandung
Conference of 1955 which popularised the India-China nexus of the Five Principles
of Peaceful Coexistence. Sukarnos adventurism in the early 1960s and military
incursions into Malaysia, which then included Singapore, through his policy
of Konfrontasi contradicted and deviated from the Bandung doctrine of
non-interference, until he was deposed by Suharto in 1966. To rebuild regional trust,
Suharto subsequently laid the groundwork for the creation of an association
of Southeast Asian nations based on the principles of mutual respect and
non-interference in each others affairs. Since the creation of ASEAN in 1967,
non-interference and mutual respect have been a bedrock of ASEAN solidarity
which defined ASEANs interaction and relationships not only within the group but
also with other regional groupings and trade partners. In the 1990s when the
European Union began to harp on ASEANs human rights record, the group took
issue with such criticism. When Myanmar later joined ASEAN, the rest of ASEAN
took on a position of defending Myanmar when the latter was criticised by the West.
ASEAN solidarity built on non-interference was even pursued at the expense of the
regions diplomatic relations with the EU. Indeed, ASEAN-EU relations suffered a
setback in the later years because the EU did not want to take part in meetings where
Myanmar was present, whilst ASEAN did not want to ditch a fellow member just to
suit the EUs discomfort.
But within closed doors, ASEAN did take up the external criticisms of
Myanmar with the regimes leaders, arguing that the diplomatic cost to the larger
group must not be left unattended. Non-interference was rationalised in terms of
constructive engagement. But publicly, ASEAN maintained its solidarity as a
group, closing ranks with each other whenever one of them came under diplomatic
attack. This show of solidarity was most vivid when ASEAN defended Myanmar
against the French push for international intervention in that countrys failure to
address the sufferings of its people over Cyclone Nargis. This ASEAN Way must
have had a favourable on the Myanmarese leaders because within a decade of the
countrys membership of ASEAN, a sea-change in political attitudes in the
Myanmar leadership could be discerned. By 2010, an internal Myanmarese rec-
onciliation had taken place. The shackles on Aung San Suu Kyi were released and
a gradual political liberalisation has been taking place since then within the
country. The sea-change in Myanmar played a role in no small way to the strategic
shift by the US towards Asia in its pivot to the region, although this shift has led
to a growing apprehension in the region over increasing tensions between the US
and China.
The apparent ability of the ASEAN Way to produce changes in behaviour when
employed to deal with the regions internal challenges will have the effect of
convincing ASEAN that its approach of non-interference, or its variant of con-
structive engagement, is more effective than the largely Western approach of
confrontational diplomacy and intervention. This will make it more difficult for
R2P to be accepted beyond lip service in ASEAN, especially post-Libya.
5.6 Reconciling Sovereignty and Humanitarianism 65
5.6 Reconciling Sovereignty and Humanitarianism
Bellamy and Beeson refer to this ASEAN version of reconciling sovereignty with
the need for constructive engagement, particularly within the context of pursuing
humanitarian goals, as responsible sovereignty (Bellamy and Beeson 2010).
While sovereignty remains the bedrock of the Southeast Asian regional order,
there are signs post-Nargis, they say, that the way sovereignty is conceived in the
region is gradually beginning to change. Several of the regional governments
believed Myanmar was behaving irresponsibly and that it was appropriate for
ASEAN to try to persuade the government of Myanmar to change its course, even
though the issue in question was a domestic affair. Bellamy and Beeson argue that
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand had come to this view
on their own accord, although many Western commentators had claimedwithout
much evidencethat this was the result of pressure from the West. ASEAN
governments responded quickly and positively to the Secretary Generals call for
them to provide assistance and gradually applied increasing pressure as Myanmar
rebuffed efforts to secure better humanitarian access. That pressure included public
and private entreaties to the regimes leadership.ASEANs response to the post-
Nargis crisis suggests that the region no longer regards sovereignty as a blanket
justification for whatever the state chooses to do to its own population (Bellamy
and Beeson 2010).
To be sure, R2P applies only to four mass atrocity crimes and does not extend
to humanitarian crisesa key reason why ASEAN successfully blocked the
French foreign ministers push for humanitarian intervention in Myanmar during
Cyclone Nargis in the name of R2P. This notwithstanding, the regions response,
they argue, does indicate the emergence of a new conception of responsible
sovereignty as key states become less hostile to sovereignty-challenging princi-
ples, and authoritative figures like the ASEAN Secretary General give qualified
support to new ideas and principles. At the same time, Bellamy and Beeson are
cautious to add that this nascent conception of responsible sovereignty may not
overcome opposition to interference in the domestic affair of Southeast Asian
states. This means that for it to make headway, R2P must be reconciled with the
principle of non-interference and applied in a manner consistent with it. They offer
some possible guidance on how such a reconciliation might happen:
First, regional engagement in situations of humanitarian crises must be predi-
cated on the consent of the relevant state. Second, moral pressure may be applied
by ASEAN as a collective to secure that consent. In the instance of the Myanmar
government being persuaded to open up to humanitarian access, it was ultimately,
Myanmars generals who appeared to have believed that they faced a choice
between the ASEAN path of agreeing to a humanitarian mission and a more
intrusive international intervention under the authority of the UN Security Council.
Third, the new concept of responsible sovereignty can be linked to the ASEAN
Charter, which for the first time in the associations history, sets out shared
expectations about the proper role of states in Southeast Asia. Some of these
66 5 ASEAN and R2P
expectations, as spelt out in Article 2 of the Charter, referred to adherence to rule

of law, good governance and respect for fundamental freedoms, the promotion
and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice. In the event of
a serious breach of Article 2, the matter should be referred to the ASEAN
Summit for a decision.
Bellamy and Beeson argue that this is significant in two ways: First, the
standards of responsible sovereignty enunciated in the Charter were agreed
through consensus by the ASEAN members themselves. In other words, they
shared commitments rather than external impositions. Second, should ASEAN
fail to deal with the grave breaches of its own Charter, this would have the effect
of undermining and delegitimising the Charter and discrediting ASEAN. As a
result, members may suffer negative consequences from another members non-
compliance with shared standards of behaviour or what the association has agreed
that they should do. All this does suggest, they argue, that ASEAN states and the
ASEAN Secretariat might adopt a more flexible approach, as they did in the
aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.
5.7 Typology of R2P Positions in ASEAN
Whilst Southeast Asia is generally not yet warming up to R2P despite regional
countries having been part of the universal embrace of the norm, there are different
nuances in position amongst them. These differing nuances can even the basis of a
typology of positions on R2P, as Capie outlines (Capie 2012). Capie argues that
there is as yet no Southeast Asian state that has decided to place R2P at the heart of its
foreign policy and advocate for its adoption, or has been a strong supporter of R2P.
A closer look at references to R2P by Southeast Asian governments, he says, also
reveals considerable selectivity in government support for the norm. In UN debates
about the protection of civilians for example, ASEAN members have followed the
approach of endorsing pillar one and aspects of pillar two, but have been wary about
supporting even the greatly narrowed post-WSO third pillar. He gave the example
of Vietnam telling a UN debate in 2008 that while it accepted the argument that
states bore the responsibility to protect their own civilians, the UN could help
improve their national capacity to fulfil this responsibility by providing technical
assistance and conducting awareness-raising activities. However, when it came to
pillar three activities, Vietnam was much more cautious, calling for further studies
on the creation and application of any international mechanism to implement R2P.
The typology of support for R2P in Southeast Asia can roughly be mapped out
as follows:
Based on the observation of Bellamy and Davies, the Philippines is said to be
the only one Southeast Asian country that can be called an R2P advocatealong
with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea in the wider East Asian and
Pacific region. However, the Philippine support of R2P has been highly incon-
sistent in its usage of the R2P language. A larger group of Southeast Asian
5.7 Typology of R2P Positions in ASEAN 67
governments fall in the category of R2P engagedcountries that supported R2P

at the WSO in 2005, but are however cautious about their support. This is because
while they support some aspects of R2P operationalization, they might equally
oppose the application of R2P to some other situations (Bellamy and Davies
2009). Among the ASEAN members identified in this category are Singapore,
Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.
A third category of fence-sitters comprises Cambodia, Malaysia, Brunei,
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (from 2005 to 2007). Myanmar falls in the final
category of opponent. Malaysia has also been described as being highly critical
about what it sees as the potential abuse of the R2P norm. Although it has been
more vocal in its criticisms of R2P than most, Capie says, its concerns about the
potential misuse of pillar three reflect a widely held view in ASEAN. Citing a
report by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Capie says
there is almost no support for the reactivein particular the coercive military
component of the third pillar of the R2P (RSIS 2009:2 in Capie). He notes that
Malaysia, Cambodia and the Philippines have all expressed concerns that linking
R2P to various forms of help might politicise development assistance. Thailand
offered support for R2P at the World Summit in 2005 but has since dropped almost
any mention of the norm as successive governments have been concerned at the
possibility of outside involvement in the conflict in southern Thailand. Similarly,
Manilas support for R2P weakened after 2005 as concerns grew that R2P might
be applied to the conflict in Mindanao.
Capie cites the Asia Pacific Centre for Responsibility to Protect (APCR2P) as
rightly noting this significant aspect: ASEAN does not have an official position on
R2P and has made no statement which suggests consideration has been afforded to
the ways in which the Association might aid the implementation of R2P in
Southeast Asia. The Association, he adds, has not launched any initiatives or
activities invoking the responsibility to protect. It is notable, he says, that even
those regional governments deemed to be most supportive of R2P, such as the
Philippines and Indonesia, have not been strong advocates within Southeast Asia.
It is striking when we focus on the venue for R2P discourse, that positive
references to R2P overwhelmingly come when ASEAN states are addressing UN
debates in New York There has been no similar use of R2P language in the
regional context (Capie 2012). Indeed, as he rightly observes, ASEAN does not
have a formal position on R2P and has said nothing that would lead anyone to
believe that it plans to help implement R2P. Neither ASEAN nor the ASEAN
Regional Forum has institutionalised R2P in any form.
5.8 Promoting R2P in Southeast Asia
Is there scope for R2P being promoted further in Southeast Asia despite the lip
service support the norm gets from regional governments? Some ASEAN scholars
believe so. One of them, Rizal Sukma, agrees that the biggest opportunity will
68 5 ASEAN and R2P
come from the emergence of the ASEAN Political and Security Community
(APSC)the first of three pillars on which the vision of an ASEAN Community
will rise (Sukma 2012). Supporting Noel Moradas 2006 study on the state of R2P
in Southeast Asia, Rizal assesses that the APSC (originally known as the ASEAN
Security Community) could provide a logical start for the mainstreaming of R2P in
ASEAN as it may provide broad and indirect support for building the capacity of
states to recognise, prevent and respond to conflicts. He however argues that the
immediate utility of the APSC for preventing the four crimes that R2P has tar-
getedgenocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
remains to be seen. Arguing further that Moradas study stopped short of exploring
how the ASEAN (Political) Security Community could fulfil such an expectation,
Rizal spells out the supporting factors as follows: The primary objective of ASEAN
does resonate well with the R2P principle as ASEAN is a regional exercise in
preventing the occurrence of conflict and conflict prevention has become a central
norm in ASEAN, as typified in the ASEAN way which constitutes three key
normsnon-interference, consensus style of decision-making, and non-use of
force or the threat of use of force as a means of settling disputes. Essentially, the
imperatives of the ASEAN way have served a preventive role, diffusing tensions
and conflicts by encouraging dialogue and promoting trust and confidence among
its member states. The centrality of conflict prevention as a norm within ASEAN
provides an important basis for the promotion of R2P. Citing Morada, Rizal says:
ASEAN already has a number of norms and values related to peace and conflict
prevention that could be the starting point for R2P promotion in the region.
Rizal, however, adds that while APSC seems to provide an entry point for R2P
promotion in Southeast Asia, the APSC also has at least four shortcomings which
may stand in the way of the development of R2P in the region. First, APSC is
never about intra-state conflict; it is about how the region manages inter-state
tensions. It is therefore not clear how APSC can help address the four crimes that
are the focus of R2P. Even in the area of promotion and protection of human
rights, which contributes directly to R2P, ASEAN does not live up to its own
promise. When the ASEAN Charter was finalised, APSC turns out to be about the
promotion, not the protection, of human rights. Second, APSC is about promoting
cooperation based on the principle of non-interference. Rizal argues that this
renders ambiguous the extent to which R2P could be promoted within APSC, or be
in tension with the principles of R2P. Third, the APSC lacks an enforcement
mechanism, which means it suffers from the same problem that ASEAN has all
along faced. Fourthly, treating the APSC as an entry point to push for greater
acceptance and implementation of R2P in Southeast Asia would encounter what
Bellamy calls the dilemma of comprehensiveness. Bellamy argues that widening
the responsibility to prevent would overwhelm the R2P agenda with human
security issues, leading to the diversion of attention from the prevention of
genocide and mass atrocities.
In the final analysis, argues Rizal, promoting R2P within ASEAN faces at least
four challengessuspicion of R2Ps intent; misconception within ASEAN that
R2P-like situations will never occur in Southeast Asia, despite recent examples of
5.8 Promoting R2P in Southeast Asia 69
serious violence and mass atrocities such as Cambodia in 1975 and East Timor in
1999; misconception of R2P itself that it is about military intervention, which
leads to regional conversations about R2P often overlooking the importance of the
first two pillars of R2Pthe responsibility to prevent and the responsibility to
assist. Fourthly, the reluctance to accept the third pillar on international inter-
vention, apart from the sovereignty issue, is also due to a lack of faith in the UN as
a neutral arbiter and the possibility of political biases and hidden agendas in the
pursuit of coercive military force. Rizal argues that the aversion for interference
and use of force had affected Indonesias attempt to persuade ASEAN to set up an
ASEAN Peacekeeping Force. Although that proposal was in 2003, or 2 years
before the UNs adoption of R2P, an ASEAN PKF which could be necessary to
stop mass atrocities as enunciated under R2P, was resisted by some member states.
In other words, ASEAN is yet to see the need for the use of military force in
maintaining peace in the region. More importantly, even if ASEAN does want to
move toward that direction, it has neither the mechanism nor the capacity to do so
(Sukma 2012).
5.9 CSCAP Study on R2P 2011
Notwithstanding the lukewarm response to R2P in Southeast Asia, efforts continue

to be made to popularise the norm towards greater acceptability within the region,
especially within the policy-making circles. The gradual push for R2P has been
largely led by the actors outside the government but enjoying links with official-
dom through semi-official connections or personal contacts such as think-tanks and
thought leadership groups as well as NGOs and civil society players. A key
contributor in terms of ideas is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific (CSCAP) which put up a set of proposals in July 2011 entitled Respon-
sibility to Protect: Delivering on the Promise. The chapter outlined 12 policy
recommendations on the implementation of R2P in the regionto translate the
concept from words to deeds. The result of a series of discussions across the
region, CSCAPs report contained three key conclusions: First, R2P is consistent
with regional norms and with the principle of non-interference, which is the
bedrock of ASEAN. Second, CSCAP calls for the convening of an ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) Experts Meeting to consider the 12 recommendations and
prepare proposals for implementing R2P in the Asia Pacific, including ASEAN.
Third, regional arrangements in the Asia Pacific region should play an important
role in implementing R2P so as to enhance regional peace and security (Pacific
Forum 2011). Symbolically, the group had its final meeting in Phnom Penh and
visited the Tuol Sleng genocide museum, site of one of the centurys worst mass
atrocity crimes when 17,000 people were tortured and killed during the reign of
terror by the Khmer Rouge. It was a tacit but significant reminder that Southeast
Asia is not without its share of horrors that would nullify the argument that the
region does not need norms like R2P.
70 5 ASEAN and R2P
Although geared towards the larger Asia Pacific, it is significant that the ful-
crum of the policy recommendations is the ARF, which is anchored in Southeast
Asia but geared towards the pursuit of peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. The
12 policy recommendations fall into three categories for national governments,
regional arrangements in the Asia Pacific and for global institutions and partner-
ships with the Asia Pacific. The report says the recommendations are designed for
national governments, regional arrangements and the regions global partners to
begin to implement R2P and build a future free of the crimes witnessed at Toul
Sleng. There are five recommendations that CSCAP highlights in particular:
(1) enhanced partnership between the UN and the Asia Pacific region, including
strengthened high-level dialogue, officials-level cooperation and joint training;
(2) establishment of a regional risk reduction centre to provide early warning and
assessment of situations likely to result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing
and crimes against humanity; (3) strengthening of regional capacity to employ
diplomacy, mediation and other consensual measures to prevent the escalation of
crises into situations that might give rise to the four R2P crimes; (4) working
towards the establishment of a regional standing capacity for preventing and
responding to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;
and (5) the provision of voluntary background briefings by states and the estab-
lishment of regional mechanisms to support national capacity building aimed at
strengthening the capacity of states to fulfil their responsibility to protect. The
challenge now is to deliver on the commitment and ensure that the region never
again hosts the inhumanity witnessed at Tuol Sleng (Pacific Forum 2011).
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Retrieved November 30, 2012, from http://www.yousaytoo.com/un-condemns-najib-
administration-for-excessive-crackdown-on-bersih/894679 http://www.yousaytoo.com/un-
condemns-najib-administration-for-excessive-crackdown-on-bersih/894679
Chapter 6
Critiques and Critics of R2P
Abstract Since its emergence as a bold idea in the ICISS report of 2001 and
subsequently adopted by the UN at the 2005 World Summit, R2P has remained
deeply controversial for its inherent support of the doctrine of international
humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding critical differences between the con-
cept of humanitarian intervention and R2P. Indeed, despite the UN embrace, R2P
has not gone very far in terms of its implementation by member states. But the
Libya crisis in 2011 marked R2Ps high point when for the first time, the UN
invoked R2P to pass a resolution in support of international intervention in that
country to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. Yet, that intervention has
not been without problems. This chapter reviews some of the critiques and critics
of R2P since the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

Keywords Humanitarian intervention Protection of civilians New humani-

tarianism Mass atrocity prevention (MAP) R2P-plus Preventive responsibility
6.1 New Humanitarianism?
THE MILITARY intervention in Libya is seen by some as the first real test of the
international communitys new rules for humanitarian intervention (HI). Charles
Homans argues that R2P was intended to be the first piece in a new international
legal framework for stopping war crimes after a century of ad hoc humanitarian-
ism. But whether this marks the dawn of a new era, or the same old approach
debated in a new vocabulary, he says, is open to question (Homans 2011). The
rumblings in international diplomacy since the Arab uprisings and the consequent
controversies surrounding the push for international intervention in Libya and Syria
have, nonetheless, also strengthened the intellectual offensive against the idea of HI.
Invariably, this also means putting on the defensive the R2P school of thought
indeed eroding faith in this emerging doctrineeven though the notions of inter-
national intervention and R2P are not, strictly speaking, synonymous. The Global

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_6, The Author(s) 2014
74 6 Critiques and Critics of R2P
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, for example, argues that HI is about the
right of states to act coercively against others to stop atrocities; on the contrary,
R2P, as adopted by the UN, is about the responsibility of states to act to protect their
own people, and to assist other states to do so, with coercive action only permissible
in the most extreme and exceptional circumstances (GCR2P 2012).
There is, nonetheless, a blurred line separating the two, and indeed, post-Libya,
the ambiguity between international intervention and R2P has led to the supporters
of R2P scrambling to clarify and distinguish the conceptual and operational dif-
ference between international intervention and R2P. One of the most active
defenders of R2P, Gareth Evans, who played a key part in the genesis of R2P,
argues it is a fundamental mistake to maintain that R2P is no more than old HI
wine in a new bottle. HI is couched in divisive language while the responsi-
bility to protect is inherently non-confrontational. It is therefore a big break-
through, he adds, that HI has been replaced by the non-confrontational stance of
R2P, and for the content of the debate over R2P to be recast accordingly. Indeed,
as he sees it, there are at least three crucial differences between R2P and the right
of HI: First, R2P is primarily about prevention, whereas HI is only about reac-
tion. Second, R2P is about a whole continuum of reactive responsesfrom
diplomatic persuasion, to pressure, and non-military measures like sanctions and
the International Criminal Court process; only in extreme, he argues, exceptional
and last resort cases do military action come into play, whereas HI in only about
military action. Third, R2P is about a wide range of actors, starting with the
sovereign state where the problem exists, and others in the international com-
munity able and willing to assist that state prevent mass atrocities, whereas HI
focuses only on the role of those able and willing to apply coercive military force.
For supporters of R2P to continue to use humanitarian language, even just to
describe the really sharp end of the R2P response continuum, is to blur these
critical distinctions between HI and R2P (Evans 2012d).
At the core of the raging controversy is the deep-seated, fundamental tension
between intervention and sovereignty. Whilst R2P may have succeeded to an
extent to highlight the limits of sovereignty, the critiques and critics of R2P
found in abundance since the CISS report in 2001have only grown in intensity
and tenor ever since the crises over Libya and Syria. Nicholas Glover, for instance,
argues that in claiming a paradigmatic shift from the Western-centric concept of
the right to intervention, the R2P doctrine seemingly provided a stronger dis-
cursive link with the idea of humanitarianism (Glover 2011). Conflating the
concept of R2P with the idea of new humanitarianism radicalised the doctrine
within an emancipatory framework. The notion of emancipation, however, is
trapped, he says, in Western-centrism, associated with limiting emancipation to
the Enlightenment/and or more contemporary Western movements of liberty and
progress. The asserted nexus between R2P and emancipation has been located in
prevailing discourses of human security, humanitarianism and Liberal peace-
building. This radical veneer has enabled the R2P doctrine to be enmeshed with
the institutions of international politics, resulting in R2P being affirmed by all UN
member states at the World Summit (Glover 2011). Seemingly, R2P has become
6.1 New Humanitarianism? 75
an established principle of international politics and appears, he says, increasingly

to be the hegemonic framework through which the role of the international
community is understood in relation to crisis, conflict and humanitarian
emergencies.
Glover, however, raises questions about the implications of this conception of
R2P: Can intervention by one state or group of states become truly humanitarian
and an emancipatory act for the purposes of protecting humans in another? Can
emancipation ever be perpetrated by external agents? Can emancipation ever be
violent? How might an indigenous form of emancipation be realised under con-
ditions of extreme insecurity? Critiquing the legitimacy of R2P, Glover also takes
fundamental issue with the perceived righteousness of building peace and trans-
forming conflict and post-conflict space from without. He contends that R2Ps
vision of peace and emancipation is limited as it delegitimises the subaltern in a
framework of violence, poverty, illiberalism and destructive resistance. Such a
framework constructs peace as governance and empowers the international
community to attempt to transform instability-inducing illiberal sovereigns, into
Liberal governance regimes free of tension and antagonism.
In the context of the crisis in Libya, Glover argues that the humanitarian
bombing of Libya and the strategy to advise and arm rebel groups has served to
normalise Western and Western-supported violence, perpetuate armed conflict and
marginalise the victims purported to be at the heart of R2P. The Wests
commitment to war and violence in Libya subverts the very peace and freedoms it
proclaims. Also, he contends, despite its emancipatory intent, the practice of R2P
in Libya is predominantly about mitigating the consequences of a failed state on
Europes periphery and securing the Liberal order of states (Glover 2011). In a
similar strain, some critics of R2P see the new doctrine in neo-imperialist terms.
Though a reiteration of a familiar refrain, this critique has been updated with the
latest in foreign policy stances by the world power that still has the capacity for
imperial dominationthe USA. Wayne Madsen, for example, sees the new
Obama doctrine called Mass Atrocity Prevention (MAP) as imperialism masked as
humanitarian interventionism. MAP, he says, is the Pentagons operational plan to
implement the White Houses R2P doctrine, with Libya as its first major test. The
new American policy initiative was justified by the 2008 report of the Genocide
Prevention Task Force co-chaired by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
and former Secretary of Defence William Cohen. Madsen argues that the task
force was heavily influenced by the neo-conservative and federally funded US
Institute of Peace, as well as George Soros-funded think tanks like the Centre for
American Progress and pro-Israeli organisations like the US Holocaust Memorial
Museum. Madsen adds that a White House press briefing on Obamas MAP
doctrine specifically mentioned Libya, Syria, Sudan, Cote dIvoire and Kyrgyzstan
as examples of when US diplomatic and stronger intervention was required
(Madsen 2011).
6.2 Five Major Critiques
One other study that has enumerated the challenges and critiques of R2P is by
Hugh Breakey as part of his review of R2P and the protection of civilians in armed
conflicts (PoC) (Breakey 2011). Breakey neatly identifies two main forms of R2P.
The first is the concept as expressed in the seminal 2001 ICISS report which he
refers to as R2P2001. The second is the norm that was ultimately accepted by the
UN at the 2005 World Summit of General Assembly and Security Council, which
he refers to as R2P2005. The latter versionR2P2005he argues, is a diluted
form of R2P2001, though retaining of its spirit and substance. Whilst R2P2001
proposed a broader range of civilian protection, R2P2005 targets the protection of
civilians from four specific mass atrocity crimesgenocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity. The nexus between R2P and the concept of
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts is considerably more plastic, he says,
and takes four conceptual forms. PoC1 is the protection of civilians norm that
constrains militaries in armed conflicts. PoC2 is the protection of civilians
concept as it appears in Peace Operations literature. PoC3 is the protection of
civilians concept used by the UN Secretary General and UN Security Council
when considering action. PoC4 is the developing concept of humanitarian pro-
tectionthe commitment to protection and civilian safety as enacted by
humanitarian actors such as the ICRC, UNHCR, Oxfam and others.
Breakey also draws attention to the distinction between the commonly used
term HI and military intervention for human protection purposes. He argues
that the latter is to reflect the terminological judgement of the original ICISS report
to refer to coercive military actions undertaken without the consent of the host
state in order to protect the civilian population. The conceptual core of R2P as
drawn out by ICISS, he says, has two central elements. The first concerns a shift in
the understanding of sovereignty from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as
responsibility. The second element of R2P is that while the state has primary
responsibility for protection of its citizens, if the state should be unwilling or
unable to fulfil that mandate, then the responsibility shifts to the international
community. Outlining the many diverse criticisms of R2P, Breakey lists at least
five broad categories of what he describes as the major critiques of R2Pfirst,
issues of specificity and codification; second, the lack of commitment to R2P
duties by individual states; third, R2P as Trojan Horse and redecorated colo-
nialism; fourth, concerns with the role of the UN Security Council and the use of
the veto; and fifth, the nothing new critique.
First, on the issue of specificity, Breakey cites Bellamy as summing up the
wide-ranging problems regarding this in R2P2005. Bellamy has argued that it is
imperative that states now return to some of the fundamental questions the ICISS
raised: Who, precisely, has the responsibility to protect? When is that responsi-
bility acquired? What does the responsibility to protect entail? And how do we
know when the responsibility to protect has been divested? (Bellamy 2006). As to
the question what is to be protected, there is some lack of clarity on what issues
6.2 Five Major Critiques 77
trigger R2P. Some, for instance, questioned whether climate change and nuclear
non-proliferation can create a triggering situation. In a similar vein, but more
concretely, it is debated whether the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar caused by
Cyclone Nargis in 2008 was an instance where R2P should have been deployed or
invoked. Breakey notes that Caballero-Anthony and Chng accept that R2P2005 is
not applicable to instances like Cyclone Nargis and have argued for a non-coercive
R2P-Plus that is explicitly responsive to such catastrophes (Caballero-Anthony
and Chng 2009). As to what form prevention could take, Breakey argues that
despite the emphasis on R2Ps preventive aspects, the Preventive Responsibility
in R2P2005as embodied in Pillar Twois too broad to be workable. Breakey
notes that Bellamy takes the potential breadth of the Responsibility to Prevent as
a central issue requiring resolution. Then there is the lack of precision in terms of
obligations. Commentators have queried, he says, what the precise obligations are
of the international community as imposed by R2P, adding that the lack of
specificity has contributed to the perception of R2P as a tool of Western powers to
undermine sovereignty.
The biggest drawback in the current formulation of R2P, he says, is the lack of
clarity about who will lead international action, and when. Related to this larger
critique is the question whether there is a legalas distinct from moral or polit-
icalobligation to intervene. Breakey says many authors argue that the language
and status of R2P2005 as formulated implies there is no legal dutya position
widely accepted across UN member states and key actors, and present in the
negotiations leading up to the WSOD. Edward Luck, one of the early thought
leaders on R2P, was quoted as saying: While the third pillar of R2P does not, of
itself, impose new legal obligations on the international community in cases of
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, it is consistent
with evolving state practice, at least since the 1990s, toward enhanced cooperation
in such situations. Breakey argues that if this is right, then there are questions
regarding viewing R2P as an emerging legal norm. But that is not all. If there is
no legal obligation to be beholden to a responsibility to react to atrocities, then
states will not likely recognise a political or moral duty to react, he says.
The second major critique is the lack of commitment to R2P duties by indi-
vidual states in the international community, as reflected in their inconsistent
commitment and flagrant disregard for R2P duties. The third and the central cri-
tique levelled at R2P, Breakey adds, and the main impediment to action in support
of R2P, is the view that R2P is a Trojan Horse for self-interested invasions by
powerful international actors. Some member states even charged that R2P is a
vehicle for redecorated colonialism in an era of globalisation that is post-
imperial, whilst Osama bin Laden attacked it as a peculiarly Western concept. All
these charges have been resurrected against R2P in the wake of the Arab uprisings.
The fourth major critique concerns the role of the UN Security Council and the
use of the veto. Under R2P2005, the use of coercive force requires the authori-
sation of the Security Council. Breakey says that while this to some extent allays
concerns about unilateralism, it also created controversy and discontent. He quotes
Thakur as saying that the legitimacy of the UNSC as the authoritative validator of
international security action suffers from a quadruple legitimacy deficitper-

formance, representational, procedural and accountability: Its performance legit-
imacy has an uneven and selective record; it is unrepresentative from any point of
view; its decision-making is neither democratic nor transparent; and it is not
answerable to the General Assembly, the World Court, the nations of the peoples
of the world (Thakur 2010). Breakey says some UN member states have begun to
try to link the legitimacy of R2P2005 to Security Council reform. More common
has been a call for members of the P5 to resist using the veto, with 35 governments
in the 2009 General Assembly debates on R2P calling for restrictions on its use in
cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
Another criticism of R2P is the Nothing New critiquethat far from being a
revolutionary change in international relations as some call it, R2P2005 effec-
tively contributes nothing new to international affairs given that the UNSC actually
has the authority to intervene in internal conflicts it if wants to.
There are also other critiques of R2P worth noting, Breakey says. First,
Kuperman has put forward an important worry that the type of humanitarian
response encapsulated in R2P could in fact embolden insurgents to provoke brutal
state-responses by promising a shield against such responseor what he calls the
moral hazard of military intervention for humanitarian purposes (Kuperman
2004). A second concern is that R2P may be able to be rhetorically deployedand
was in fact rhetorically deployed, according to Bellamy, by the Sudanese gov-
ernment over Darfuras a norm telling against HI, by demanding that the pro-
tection of civilians is the sovereign states responsibility. Third, some critics have
charged, he says, that R2P was in fact too deferential towards state sovereignty.
Fourth, resistance to R2P can be justified on progressive liberal grounds. For
instance, Jennifer Welsh was cited as arguing that the idea of sovereign equality
that mandates a horizontal system of justice between states, rather than a poten-
tially hierarchical one, has substantial moral attractions (Welsh 2010). Lastly, R2P
can seem to induce an air of naivety into proceedingsinducing ground-level
actors to have unrealistic hopes for international action and for states to have what
he sees as ungrounded fears about intervention and regime change.
6.3 The Future of Humanitarian Intervention
One of the most powerfully argued critiques of R2P is found in Aidan Hehirs
book The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future of
Humanitarian Intervention. A self-confessed critic of the norm, Hehir says he is
critical of R2P in its present form. Its ambiguity is such that it can be used by
different parties for different goals, as a result of which R2P has failed to con-
solidate its identity since its formulation at the World Summit in 2005. R2P has
also failed to resolve the contested issues and answer difficult questions which
inspired the debate on HI in the 1990s. He says he is critical of R2P not because he
is against international HI but because he sees the hype over R2P as distracting
6.3 The Future of Humanitarian Intervention 79
from the fundamental need for UN reform to allow it the power to intervene.
Indeed, the book seeks to contribute to the building of an alternative pro-inter-
vention constituency. Hehir dismisses the attempt to separate R2P from HI as
illogical (Hehir 2012a). The very first sentence of the ICISS report on The
Responsibility to Protect, he says, reads:
This report is about the so-called right of humanitarian intervention: the question of
when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coerciveand in particular military
action against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state
(ICISS 2001).
He cites the example of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to

Protect (ICR2P) which published an educational tool in 2011 specifically focused
on distancing the concept from HI (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org) He
agrees with the criticism that this widely evident attempt to move away from HI is
simply evasiveness born from unwillingness to tackle the difficult issues related to
intervention. He argues that the only means to avoid the perennial cycle of what
he calls inhumanitarian non-intervention is wholesale reform of the international
systemincluding reform of the UN and its power structure. Since the end of the
Cold War, the international system has exposed what he describes as two major
failingsthe influence of politics on decision-making in the Security Council and
the lack of a standing military force capable of being deployed to intervene, both
of which are interlinked (Hehir 2012a). Indeed, the UN has been consistently
criticised, especially by the smaller member states, ever since it was created after
World War II for being substantially flawed and a failure, for being the playground
for realpolitik where real power resides in the hands of the five veto-wielding
permanent members of the Security Council known as P5China, France, Russia,
the UK and the USA. To reiterate Thakur, the UNSC suffers a legitimacy crisis as
the authoritative validator of international security action; he calls it a quadruple
legitimacy deficitperformance, representational, procedural and accountability:
Its performance legitimacy has an uneven and selective record; it is unrepresen-
tative from any point of view; its decision-making is neither democratic nor
transparent; and it is not answerable to the General Assembly, the World Court, the
nations of the peoples of the world.
Indeed, to the most obvious question as to what will happen if any judicial body
such as the International Criminal Court sanctioned military intervention against
any of the P5, Hehirs answer is simplethis would not happen, obviously
because of the blocking powers of the veto. Such immunity extends to the allies
of the P5 powers should they have treaties that enable their big power friends to
protect them from any international intervention. Indeed, the P5 has resisted any
attempt to curtail or limit their discretionary power, even at the 2005 World
Summit which launched R2P. By extension, any crisis that erupts in a state of little
strategic interest to the P5 may not attract P5 attention.
Notwithstanding the moral and humanitarian arguments to justify the push for
R2P, the execution of international intervention is at the core, all about naked
Realpolitik. This assertion by Hehir in a separate writing in e-International
relations is also longstanding and widely shared in the world of policymakers,

academia, scholars and students of international relations. The US and the UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon have criticised Russia and China for their double
veto against at least two draft resolutions on Syria. Hehir argues that it must also
be noted that the Russians and Chinese are not unique in blocking Security Council
resolutions for reasons of national interest. Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, the
United States has used the veto more times than the other Council members and
often in obviously cynical ways. In the wake of the double veto on Syria on 4
February 2012, the US ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, condemned Russia and
China for their shameful behaviour, yet just over a year before on the 18
February 2011, she vetoed a resolution condemning illegal Israeli settlements. In
that instance the US stood alone against the other four permanent members and all
ten non-permanent members of the Security Council (Hehir 2012b). Syria dem-
onstrates in all too graphic detail, he argues, the limits of R2P and the pressing
need for creative thinking about profound reforms of the UN which address the P5
veto and the absence of a UN standing army. R2P was conceived in response to the
fundamental question posed by Kofi Annan in 1999 how the international com-
munity should we respond to gross and systematic violations of human rights that
affect every precept of our common humanity. In a stern critique of the new
doctrine, Hehir says R2P has answered this question by reaffirming the discredited
system it was established to reform (Hehir 2012a). The ultimate context within
which R2P best operates, he argues in advocating an alternative strategy, must
involve a major structural reform of the UN system, backed by a strengthening of
international law.
References
Bellamy, A. (2006). Whither the responsibility to protect? humanitarian intervention and the
2005 world summit. Ethics & International Affairs, 20(2), 143169.
Breakey, H. (2011). The responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians in armed
conflicts: Review and analysis. Institute for Ethics: Governance and Law, Griffith University.
Caballero-Anthony, M., Chng, B. (2009). Cyclones and humanitarian crises cyclones and
humanitarian crises: Pushing the limits of R2P in southeast Asia, Global Responsibility to
Protect, 1(2), 135155(21).
Evans, G. (2012d). R2P and RWP after Libya and Syria. Gareth Evans blog. Retrieved November
18, 2012 from http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech485.html
GCR2P (2012). R2P Frequently asked questions.
Glover, N. (2011). A Critique of the theory and practice of R2P. e-International Relations blog.
Hehir, A. (2012a). The Responsibility to Protect. Palgrave Macmillan, New York: Rhetoric,
Reality and the future of Humanitarian Intervention.
Hehir, A. (2012b, March 14). Syria and the responsibility to protect: Rhetoric meets reality. e-
International Relations. Retrieved October 12, 2012 from http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/14/
syria-and-the-responsibility-to-protect-rhetoric-meets-reality/
Homans, C. (2011, October 10). Responsibility to Protect: A Short History. Foreign Policy.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001). The Respon-
sibility to Protect. Ottawa: IDRC.
References 81
Kuperman, A. J. (2004). Humanitarian hazard. Harvard International Review, 26(1).

Madsen, W. (2011). The Obama Doctrine: Imperialism masked as humanitarian interventionism,
Strategic Culture Foundation, Strategic-Culture.org.
Thakur, R. (2010). Law, legitimacy and United Nations. Melbourne Journal of International Law,
11, 126 (1 May).
Welsh, J. M. (2010). Implementing the responsibility to protect: Where expectations meet reality.
Ethics and International Relations. 24(4), 415430.
Chapter 7
Geopolitics of Intervention: Way Forward
Abstract The rise of R2P and the doctrine of international humanitarian inter-
vention has triggered a backlash on the UN. As the critiques grew in tenor and
intensity since the outbreak of the Arab Uprisings, an unlikely diplomatic battle
has been brewing in the UN which could shape the future course of R2P and
humanitarian intervention. At the core of this battle is the rise of the Small Five
or S5 that attempt to limit the unbridled veto power of the P5. The motivating
force of the S5 is the R2P-related concept of RN2Vthe responsibility not to veto.
Beyond the UN reform, scholars are looking at what they call the new politics of
protection and where R2P and international humanitarian intervention fit into the
larger phenomenon of the emerging global order. A major question being explored
is whether the trend towards international humanitarian intervention will give rise
to an Eastphalian order in which the principle of sovereignty, now under threat
largely from the West, is being defended by the East and the non-Western powers.

Keywords Small five Responsibility not to veto UN reform Veto system

New politics of protection International criminal court
7.1 Small Five Versus P5
THE EXCRUCIATING stalemate at the UN Security Council seemed to have left

no wriggle room for a peaceful political solution to the Syria crisis. By July 2012,
the opponents of the Syrian regime were desperately looking to the UN without
success; Russia and China trice vetoed UN initiatives by the West and the Arab
League to resolve the crisis involving a political transition that Moscow and
Beijing viewed as unfavourable to the Assad regime. When the Syrian opposition
eventually resorted to deadly suicide bombings that month which killed four top
security chiefs close to President Bashar Al Assad, including the defence minister
as well as his brother-in-law, the diplomatic battle at the UN over whether and how
to intervene in Syria had escalated to a new political stratosphere. This diplomatic

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_7, The Author(s) 2014
84 7 Geopolitics of Intervention: Way Forward
battle took the form of a group of five small states that had been emboldened to
take on what appeared to be a suicidal mission of their ownchallenging the
veto powers of the Permanent Five. The group of small states, comprising Sin-
gapore and Switzerland as well Costa Rica, Jordan and Liechtenstein, called
themselves the Small Fivepresumably to amplify the unevenness of their
battle and in so doing underscoring the selflessness of their mission on behalf of
the smaller members of the UN. The rise of the S5 has since been characterised by
the media and analysts in dramatic terms, such as Small Five Challenge Big
Five Over Veto Powers (Deen 2012) and David v Goliath (Avaaz.org 2012).
The S5 was described as an unlikely group of small countries that came together
to challenge the unchecked power of the P5 and to try and build a more effective
UN, albeit a battle confined to issues concerning crimes against humanity
(Avaaz.org 2012).
On 28 March 2012, the S5 presented a draft resolution to the General Assembly
seeking to improve the working methods of the Security Council, but stopping
short of proposing amendments to the UN Charter (UNGA 2012a). The vote would
be historic as it requested the P5 to consider refraining from using their vetoes on
action aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanitythree of four core mass atrocities defined by R2P as justifying
humanitarian intervention (the fourth being ethnic cleansing). And when a P5
member does flex its veto, it should explain why, unlike the current practice. The
S5 argued that the resolution, with an annexe of 20 recommendations, would have
no bearing on the separate negotiations for reform and expansion of the Security
Council that have been going on since 2006. Although such a resolution would not
be binding, it would send a political and moral message on improving the
accountability, transparency and effectiveness of the Security Council.
The P5, however, had already counter-signalled that the GAthe UNs highest
policymaking bodyto which the S5 belongs had no business making such rec-
ommendations to the Security Council. On 16 May, a day before the vote was to be
taken, Switzerland, on behalf of the S5, decided to withdraw the bold resolution.
Ambassador Paul Seger, the Swiss Permanent Representative, explained that the
resolution was withdrawn following increasing pressure from opponents of the
resolution. He said the S5 had decided to pull it back to avoid the prospect of
intense and politically complex procedural wrangling that would engulf the
entire Membership and leave everyone confused (UNGA 2012b; Seger 2012).
The five permanent members of the Security Council told us clearly that they
would not see favourably any kind of resolution regarding working methods of the
Security Council, adding that this is the sole and exclusive domain of the
Security Council, the Swiss envoy said. If common sense is indeed the common
denominator of this Assembly, then this resolution would pass with ease, he told
the media after the S5 withdrawal of its draft (Seger 2012; Emch 2012). A former
foreign minister of a small state who had seen action at the UN, Iftekhar Chow-
dhury, viewed the P5 comeback as a reversal of roles in the biblical slaying of
David by Goliath. The S5 were never seen as harbouring any ambitions them-
selves, given their size and capabilities. Therefore, they took it upon themselves to
7.1 Small Five Versus P5 85
spread only goodness and light, and help somewhat improve in their view, ever so
moderately, the global multilateral system. This they sought to do through a low-
key resolution in the General Assembly. But even that modest goal was seen as too
ambitious by those who regarded themselves as ruling the roost, and shot down,
with no quarters given (Chowdhury 2012).
Seger disagreed with the legal opinion of the UNs top legal adviser that the
draft resolution was to be considered under the rubric of comprehensive reform of
the Security Council and should therefore be submitted to a qualified two-thirds
majority of all member states. A former legal adviser to the Swiss government
himself, Seger said the UN Charter provided that the General Assembly could
make recommendations to the Council, and that it was in this spirit the S5 had
submitted the text. Our reform proposals were concrete and pragmatic steps
designed to improve the work of the Security Council and its cooperation with the
General Assembly. They could be implemented today without the need for any
amendment to the UN Charter, said Seger (Emch 2012). Although the Security
Council consists of only five permanent members with veto powers and ten non-
permanent members without veto powers, all of the 193-member UN are obliged
to implement the decisions of the Council. The S5 argued that more transparency
and inclusiveness would lead to greater political acceptance and better imple-
mentation of the Councils decisions.
The World Federalist MovementInstitute for Global Policy said although the
S5 was compelled to withdraw their potentially historic resolution, NGOs had
hoped this was just the opening chapter. Its executive director William Pace
described the Security Council as dysfunctional. The dysfunctional pillars of
the Cold War Security Council must be remolded and by the Council agreeing to
the provision not to use the veto to block action on major ware crimes, genocide
and other crimes against humanity would be an indispensable beginning, he said
(Deen 2012). Scholars of international relations viewed this episode as clearly
showing that the P5 was still running the world body. But they are coming under
increasing challenge, their credibility is weakening, and their moral failure is
becoming increasingly obvious to an ever larger majority of the international
community, said Stephen Zunes, professor of politics and international studies at
the University of San Francisco.
A leading critic of US policy in the Middle East, he said the resolution was
timely not only because of the repression in Syria but the nearly unanimous vote of
the US House of Representatives in May 2012 to veto any Security Council
resolutions critical of Israel (Deen 2012). Whilst the US, UK and France were
furious with the double vetoes by Russia and China over Syria, it was the three
Western allies that led the charge to stop the S5s proposed changes from coming
to a vote. The veto power has long been a source of resentment within the UN
membership because it privileges the P5 powers with virtual immunity, placing
them above the law and protecting their allies and friends (Avaaz.org 2012). It is
no secret that the US, for instance, had routinely used its veto power to shield
Israel from Security Council measures demanding resolution on the Palestinian
question. For the P5, the veto represents the most critical instrument of power to
protect, preserve and expand their spheres of influence. Still, despite the with-
drawal of the draft resolution, the initiative of the S5 was widely viewed as
groundbreaking. The fact that there was such strong resistance against acting on
the draft resolution, and at the same time a lot of support for the substance of our
endeavours to improve the working methods, means that we have struck a nerve. A
new chapter is starting now, said Seger (Emch 2012).
7.2 Origin of S5: Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V)
The S5 has its genesis in the concept of the Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V).
This in turn could be traced to the 2001 ICISS report which called for a restraint on
the veto power of the Security Council, and to the reports concept of R2P which
was adopted in modified form in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.
The idea of RN2V itself, however, had been discussed for nearly a decade in a
variety of international forums as an element of R2P. The term was created by Don
Kraus, CEO of Citizens for Global Solutions (CGS) which put up a paper in 2010
expounding the way forward for RN2V. Essentially, the paper by Ariela Blatter
proposed that the P5 should agree not to use their veto power to block action in
response to genocide and mass atrocities which would otherwise pass by a
majority (Blatter 2010). As the ICISS report had stated:
An issue which we cannot avoid addressing, however, is that of the veto power enjoyed by
the present Permanent Five. Many of our interlocutors regarded capricious use of the veto,
or threat of its use, as likely to be the principle obstacle to effective international action in
cases where quick and decisive action is needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian
crisis. As has been said, it is unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of
humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern. Of particular concern is the possi-
bility that needed action will be held hostage to unrelated concerns of one or more of the
permanent membersa situation that has too frequently occurred in the past.
The ICISS recommended that the Security Council agree to a code of con-
duct on the exercise of their veto power. The CGS subsequently explored further
the idea of a code of conductor what was subsequently referred to as the
responsibility not to veto (RN2V)in its 2010 paper (International Coalition
for the Responsibility to Protect 2012). As the CGS puts it:
Momentum for the idea of a responsibility not to veto continued in the debates leading up
to the World Summit in 2005. However, the final version of the outcome document did not
address any measures that would limit the P5s veto powers in relation to situations of
mass atrocities. According to accounts of the long process of drafting the outcome doc-
ument this particular omission was due in large part to P5 pressure.
The idea of RN2V would, however, not go away. It re-emerged with the UN
Secretary-Generals 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. As
Ban Ki-Moon stated:
7.2 Origin of S5: Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V) 87
Within the Security Council, the five permanent members bear particular responsibility
because of the privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the
Charter. I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto
in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to protect,
as defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and to reach a mutual understanding
to that effect. (http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org 2012).
As the ICRtoP noted, despite the endorsement of the UN Secretary-General and

the efforts of the S5, the veto has remained a complex issue in formulating col-
lective responses to situations of mass atrocities, as clearly displayed by the Syrian
conflict. By July 2012, Russia and China had flexed three times their vetoesin
tandemto stymie a Western-led push for intervention in Syria, which they
argued was designed to bring about regime change in Syria, something both
countries were against. While the RN2V idea is far from being accepted by the P5,
the ICRtoP sees RN2V as remaining an important initiative that is here to stay.
The basic logic behind the 2010 CGS paper is four-fold: the R2P agenda to
prevent mass atrocities deserves support; the Security Council has a vital role to
play in R2P; the P5 has special responsibilities both to take action to prevent or
stop mass atrocities but also not to block potential humanitarian protection mis-
sions; and that this responsibility could be carried out effectively if the P5 agreed
not to wield their veto power in certain circumstances (Blatter 2010). In line with
this, the CGS report proposed at least four key recommendations:
First, as the Security Council is crucial in the global response to genocide and
mass atrocities, the RN2V proposal can address the Councils perceived credibility
gap;
Second, civil society in P5 states has an important role to play and must be
engaged;
Third, the US should play a leading role in making an RN2V agreement a
reality;
Fourth, the Obama Administration must adopt the findings of US Secretaries
Albright and Cohens Genocide Prevention Task Force to adopt the RN2V as US
policy and utilise the Secretary of State to engage in robust diplomatic efforts to
secure an agreement with the P4.
The Genocide Prevention Task Force was launched in 2007 and released its
report to the public in the following year. Funded by private foundations, its goals
were: (1) to spotlight genocide prevention as a national priority; and; (2) develop
practical policy recommendations to enhance the capacity of the US government
to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities.
7.3 Reforming the Veto System
The UN Charter grants the P5 veto power in three key areas related to Security
Council decision-making, Charter amendments and the appointment of the Sec-
retary-General. Strangely, nowhere does the Charter oblige the P5 to provide an
explanation for any vetoes they may cast (Blatter 2010). There had been many
attempts to place limits on the P5 veto powers, with regular calls for reform, most
ending without much success. But the nearest to what could be deemed a headway
was in 1950 from within the P5 when the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson
developed a proposal to neuter the Soviet Unions veto power in relation to the
Korean War. His effort came to be known as the Uniting for Peace procedure
whereby the P5 could turn to the General Assembly to respond to aggression and
threats to international peace and security when the Security Council was pre-
vented from fulfilling its obligations because of a threat of a veto. Since the
transfer of an issue from the Security Council to the General Assembly was
considered a procedural matter, it was therefore not subject to the P5 veto. Since
then the Uniting for Peace procedure has been used on more than ten occasions to
facilitate UN action short of the use of force. But its use has been rare in recent
decades, with the last occasion being in 1997 to take action against Israel (Blatter
2010).
The 1960s also saw debates on how to reform the Security Council but these led
only to a change in the number of members (from 11 to 15), not to the veto power.
Attempts to abolish the veto power also came to nothing, such as those which took
place under the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Rep-
resentation in 1993. Indeed, the debate quickly focused on the number of Security
Council seats than on veto power per se. The same thing happened in the debates
leading up to the 2005 World Summit (Blatter 2010). The options of Security
Council reform boiled down to whether the Council would increase in size from 15
to 24 members, but not entailing any change in the number of veto-wielding
powers. This process seemed to confirm the conclusion of the UN Secretary-
Generals High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that there was no
practical way of changing the existing members veto powers (Blatter 2010).
What these various cases show, Blatter argues, is that there have long been
arguments made which seek to limit the use of the vetowithout necessarily doing
away with the veto system altogether.
But as the CGS report also highlights, the actual use of the P5 veto is only part
of the story. Equally significant are the important roles played by a wide range of
informal processes within the UN system. The political terrain becomes signifi-
cantly more complicated once a distinction is made between the formal, overt use
of the veto and the informal, threatened or anticipated use of the veto. In fact, the
veto power can be used for deterrence and coercive purposes without actually
being cast. As a result, two types of informal vetoes have emerged: the first is the
effective veto when on certain issues, non-permanent members have enough
influence among the P5 to wield an effective veto at the Council. The second is
the anticipatory veto, namely the unspoken rule that the UN Secretariat should
discern what the Security Council was likely to accept, then to prepare policy
within this range of options. In other words, the veto system exists within a
broader web of understanding which influences expectations about what are
realistic policies when it comes to matters of international peace and security
(Blatter 2010).
7.3 Reforming the Veto System 89
The CGS report argues that after the Cold War, there has been an era of
unprecedented great power cooperation in the Security Council, with only 13
vetoes between January 1990 and March 2003. Since the 2005 World Summit
Document which adopted R2P, there have been five vetoed draft resolutions, says
the CGS report which was published just before the outbreak of the Arab Spring.
The five vetoes were US vetoes relating to the Middle East situation (July and
November 2006); Russian and Chinese vetoes of both draft resolutions concerning
the situations in Myanmar (January 2007) and Zimbabwe (July 2008); and the
Russian veto of a draft resolution relating to Georgia (June 2009). None of these
vetoes, the CGS says, were cast to block an actor contemplating a humanitarian
military intervention in response to R2P-related crimes. Since the outbreak of the
Arab Spring, there have been three more vetoes by Russia and China during the
Syria crisisall to block what they saw as a push to bring about regime change in
Syria.
7.4 Genesis of R2NV
The idea of R2NV itself traces its origins to the early discussions about R2P in
2001 when France, a member of the P5, first proposed a new code of conduct
for the P5 in the context of a responsibility to protect (Blatter 2010). The French
foreign minister Hubert Vedrine proposed that in matters where their vital national
interests were not involved, the P5 states would not use their veto to obstruct draft
resolutions. This code of conduct, he argued, was a more achievable option than
formally amending the UN Charter to change the veto. This proposal led to the
ICISS to recommend that the P5 should agree not to apply their veto power to
obstruct the passage of resolutions authorising military intervention for human
protection purposes. In 2003, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed a High-
Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change whose report, A More Secure
World, in 2004 referred to the anachronistic character of the veto mechanism. The
panel recommended that any proposal for Council reform refrain from expanding
the veto power and that the P5 pledge to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of
genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. The momentum for the idea of
RN2V continued leading up to the World Summit in 2005. However, the final
version of the World Summits Outcome Document did not address any measures
that would limit the P5s veto powers in relation to situations of mass atrocities.
According to accounts of the long process of drafting the outcome document this
particular omission was due in large part to P5 pressure (Blatter 2010).
In 2008, the idea of RN2V was put back on the agenda by an alternative and
bipartisan group of Americans who were planning a different approach to R2P.
This was the Genocide Prevention Task Force initiative chaired by former sec-
retaries Albright and Cohen with the involvement of the US Holocaust Memorial
Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy and the Institute of Peace. The
Task Force was assigned to develop a blueprint to align the US government to
prevent genocide and mass atrocities worldwide. The Obama administration

subsequently created a new position on the US National Security Staff to coor-
dinate its policies on preventing and responding to mass atrocities and genocide. In
2010, the first director for War Crimes, Atrocities and Civilian Protection was
appointed for that purpose (Blatter 2010). Among other suggestions, the Task
Force had considered the P5 veto. Shortly after the formation of the Task Force,
the new Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon released his 2009 report, Implementing
the Responsibility to Protect, which called for reform of the way the P5 wielded
their veto power. The CGS says that the idea of a responsibility not to veto had
clearly been debated for at least a decade, even making some headway within P5
states. Yet it has made no discernible public progress in the arena that really
counts: the Security Council. Moreover, it is noticeable that even senior figures in
the Obama administration who are self-proclaimed supporters of R2P have not
made public mention of the responsibility not to veto.What is perhaps more
telling is that all references to the R2NV were removed from the final version of
the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document despite being present in earlier draft
of the text. In sum, the P5s commitment to the Responsibility to Protect must be
questioned (Blatter 2010).
The push for RN2V is, however, not without criticism. Some scholars view the
idea of RN2V as not sustainable on its own without a larger reform of the UN
itself. Daniel Levine, for instance, says ultimately, the RN2V proposal would be
stronger if it were part of a package of more fundamental institutional changes,
including improving the UNs ability to respond to budding crises non-violently
(Levine 2011). Whilst Hehir has made a strong case for fundamental UN reforms
to give it power to intervene. Specifically, he made two proposalsfirst, the
creation of a judicial body with the power to judge how to respond to an intra-state
humanitarian crisis; and second the creation of a standing, independent UN
military force that can be deployed by such a judicial body (Hehir 2012).
7.5 Beyond UN Reform
While the push for UN reform enters a new phase, as signified by the emergence of
the idea of RN2V, R2P itself as a new norm continues to be intensely debated. The
key issue is whether R2P is fundamentally flawed and in contradiction of the
Westphalian doctrine of state sovereignty and non-interference, or whether R2P,
having been adopted by the UN, is facing largely a crisis of implementation.
Brazils push for RWP, upon which this book begins, manifests this tension and
the consequent push and pull of ideas over R2P. Critics of R2P see the rise of RWP
as part of the backlash against R2P. Supporters of R2P, however, argue that RWP
does not actually challenge the foundation of R2P but is consistent with the
implementation phase of R2P.
There have also been proposals for R2P to go beyond the narrow confines of the
four mass atrocitiesgenocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
7.5 Beyond UN Reform 91
humanityso that international intervention can be justified to respond to natural

calamities and humanitarian disasters. Lloyd Axworthy, a former Canadian foreign
minister and one of the early proponents of R2P, is one such thinker. Speaking at a
public lecture on R2P and the Arab Spring on 24 May 2012, Axworthy stressed the
importance of neither imposing nor repeating colonial practices when engaging in
foreign intervention, noting serious international concerns when military action in
Libya progressed from human security to regime change.
R2P, he says, entails much more than troops on the ground and dropping bombs.
It is also not just about peacekeeping but also includes peace building through early
prevention, as well as the responsibilities to respond and rebuild. R2P can, and
should be applied, he said, to situations beyond mass atrocities and state brutality, for
example, where famine and natural disasters occur, or where governments are not in
a position to protect their citizens (Centre for International Governance Innovation
2012). In so doing, Axworthy was actually harking back to the original conception of
R2P when it was first propounded in the ICISS report of 2001 which extended the
scope of the concept to humanitarian disasters. That broader conception was,
however, resisted and narrowed down to the four mass atrocity crimes when it was
adopted by the World Summit in 2005. Axworthys proposal also went back to 2008
when Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar created a diplomatic storm following the
Myanmar regimes inaction in the face of the consequent humanitarian disasters,
triggering calls for international intervention on humanitarian grounds. Such a push
by France was strongly opposed by the UN and ASEAN which reminded that R2P
did not extend to humanitarian intervention.
Axworthys idea was preceded 3 years earlier by a similar proposal by
Caballero-Anthony and Chng in the wake of Cyclone Nargis. They argued that it
was time for an R2P variant to be explored given the lack of international con-
sensus on R2P on the one hand, and the urgency to act to provide humanitarian
relief and protection on the other. They proposed the idea of R2P Plus that is
responsive to different kinds of human security threats, such as those caused by
intentional state neglect in times of natural disasters. The notion of a R2P-Plus is
aimed at finding a convergence between the advocates of the strict interpretation of
the R2P and those who argue for an R2P that is more attuned to the realities of
Asia (Caballero-Anthony and Chng 2009). R2P-Plus focuses almost exclusively
on the preventive aspect of R2P and removes the capacity for aggression or armed
interference. It retains the objectives of R2P while omitting the reactive aspect of
R2P which they argue had hindered the operationalisation of the principle. By
eliminating the potential for aggression, we blunt the arguments of those who
accuse the R2P of being a neo-imperialist instrument. At the same time, the
absence of aggression allows the emphasis to be placed on the core idea of the
protection of civilians and the prevention of humanitarian crises or civilian con-
flicts from escalating into full-blown international crises (Caballero-Anthony and
Chng 2009). Calling it a second-best variant of R2P, they argue that R2P-Plus
could present a more acceptable base and allow for a careful navigation around
the tensions created by state sovereignty, the principle of non-interference, and the
compelling need to respond to humanitarian crises.
7.6 New Politics of Protection
Bellamy and Williams argue that the international community has entered a new
phase which they call the new politics of protection, as shaped by the global
response to the crises in Cote dIvore and Libya, and by extension, I would argue,
the crisis in Syria. Developed over the past decade, this new politics has four
principal characteristics. First, encouraged by the UN Secretariat, the Security
Council has framed these crises in terms of human protection. Second, the Security
Council has demonstrated a repeated willingness to authorise the use of military
force for protection purposes. Third, regional organisations have become impor-
tant gatekeepers, influencing how issues are framed and the range of policy
options available to the Security Council; Fourth, international society has
exhibited a commitment to working through the Security Council to fashion
responses to human protection crises (Bellamy and Williams 2011). This new
agenda, they day, however, faces a range of unresolved challenges.
First, differences remain over how to interpret Security Council mandates. For
example, in the Libyan case, prior to the adoption of UNSCR 1973, interpretation
issues came up when US diplomats briefed their counterparts from hesitant states
about the activities required to implement a no-fly zone and protect civilians.
Interpretation issues came up again in debate on the protection of civilians in May
2011. India, for instance, asked Who watches the guardians? China opposed any
attempt to wilfully interpret the resolutions or to take action that exceed those
mandated by the resolution. Second, there is the related challenge of the rela-
tionship between human protection and other goals, such as regime change. A
recurring theme since the Security Council enforced its will on Libya has been
severe complaints whether civilian protection might be used as a faade for other
agenda. As the Russian representative put it, and as cited by Bellamy and Williams,
the noble goal of protecting civilians should not be compromised by attempts to
resolve any unrelated issues. Or as the Brazilian representative argued, exces-
sively broad interpretations of the protection of civilianscouldcreate the per-
ception that it is being used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change.
China summed up the basic principle that many states want to see adhered to: There
must be no attempt at regime change or involvement in civil war by any party under
the guise of protecting civilians. The problem with this view, Bellamy and Wil-
liams argue, is that it offers no answer as to how the UN and/or coalitions might
protect civilians from regimes that attack them without targeting, weakening and
ultimately changing the behaviour of the regime in question.
The third challenge relates to the role of regional organisations as gatekeepers.
Bellamy and Williams posit that international responses to protection crises are
most effective when there is a strong partnership between the UN and relevant
regional organisations. Nevertheless such gatekeeping presents at least two com-
plications: First, what should be done when the regional organisations disagree, as
the Arab League and the African Union did in the case of Libya? In future, Council
members might be tempted to go forum shopping to find regional bodies that
7.6 New Politics of Protection 93
better reflect their own positions in order to legitimise those views. The second
complication arises when regional gatekeepers block decision action. While the
Arab League and its representative in the Security CouncilLebanonfacilitated
intervention in Libya, it prevented the Council from even condemning violence
against civilians in Syria. Bellamy and Williams argue that if the Security
Councils path is blocked, concerned states will look for alternative avenues to
protect vulnerable populationsas the US and EU did in the case of Syria by
imposing unilateral sanctions on the Syrian regime. Fourth, human protection
requires external actors to engage in local wars and politicswhich will blur the
lines between protection and other agendas such as regime change.
Bellamy and Williams argue that efforts to develop doctrine for civilian protection
operations have followed two main strands. The first is the Protection of Civilians
agenda within contemporary peace operations. This has influenced thinking on
guidelines, principles and to some extent peace operations doctrine within the UN,
EU and the AU. The second strand has emerged, they say, from attempts to develop
new doctrine for the US military to conduct protection operations effectively. The
most recent example of this type of approach has been MAROthe Mass Atrocity
Response Operations military handbook. This sketches ways to halt widespread and
systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combat-
ants. According to Bellamy and Williams, this handbook has started an important
debate about how civilians might be protected, although it needs significant
development with the US and beyond if the new politics of protection is to live up to
its stated objectives (Bellamy and Williams 2011).
Another facet of the politics of protection is the expansion of international law.
Russell Trood, in his book The Emerging Global Order, argues that as the twenty-
first century unfolds, international law may play an expanding role as a means of
enhancing order in the conduct of international affairs. The new century, he says,
could well be the era of deepening legalisation in international politics, as seen
in some manifestations of this trend: the closing of the philosophical gap that
divided the moral universes of East and West following the end of the Cold War; a
shift towards a more universal and cosmopolitan set of norms in international
affairs; and the growth in international humanitarian law from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 to the Covenants of the 1960s through the
evolving norms in relation to the responsibility to protect.
An obvious example of this extension of international humanitarian law is the
growing legal authority of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Initiated in
2002, by states that signed up to the Rome Statute to address gross abuses of
human rights in the world, the ICC is empowered to hold and prosecute individuals
accountable for crimes against war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Independent of the UN, it can investigate cases referred to it by the Security
Council and by parties to the treaty. The shift, Trood says, has persuaded some
scholars to abandon the label of international law in favour of other conceptu-
alisations such as the common law of mankind, transnational law or world
law. Since the break-up of Yugoslavia, and especially since the emergence of
R2P, there have been several notable cases of the new ICC flexing its legal power,
such as the prosecutions of the Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladic, Laurent
Gbagbo of Cote dIvore, Joseph Kony of Uganda, Charles Taylor of Liberia and
Saif al-Islam of Libya. The ICC, however, is not without its weaknesses. The US
not only refuses to be a party to the ICC convention but is also actively seeking
ways to resist the jurisdiction of the court in relation to its own citizens (Trood
2008). Apart from the US, Russia, China and Israel also refuse to subject them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the ICC. On 1 August 2012, Amnesty International
called on the Security Council to refer Syrias Assad to the ICC to face charges of
possible war crimes, though this may be difficult to implement as Syria has not
ratified the treaty despite being a signatory state.
7.7 R2P, the Emerging Global Order and Eastphalia
It could be argued that the new politics of protectionwith its varied faces namely
R2P and international humanitarian interventionis one of the many manifesta-
tions of the emerging global order triggered by the end of the Cold War. This new
global order, still evolving and in a state of flux, is multi-faceted and complex, but
one of its major features is the driving force of globalisation. Trood defines
globalisation as the growing interconnectedness of people, markets and ideas
which he describes as the most pervasive force in contemporary international
relations. No other force in world affairs, he says, has the capacity to alter so
profoundly the destiny of so many people as globalisation.
But Trood argues that globalisations grandest visionariesthose who saw the
future unfolding according to the norms and values of the Washington Consensus,
with its supposed power of the markets to create and sustain wealth, inspire the
spread of democracy and to shape the human condition free of war and violence
are destined to be disappointed. As the differing responses of China, Russia and
India have shown over the geostrategic crises thrown up by the Arab Spring,
globalisation does not in and of itself encourage either free markets or liberal
democracy. Increasingly, there are signs that globalisation will confront the
international community with new and more complex security challenges, and
these challenges are part of globalisations changing face (Trood 2008).
Over the coming decades, Trood says, globalisation will spur strong economic
growth in China and India as well as Russia and Brazil. Before the middle of the
new century, and provided they stay the course, the economies of China and India
could be larger than that of the US as Beijing and New Delhi simultaneously
become new nodes of geopolitical power. Ultimately, their values will shape their
foreign policy postures, including their attitudes towards principles and concepts
such as sovereignty, non-interference, humanitarian intervention and the respon-
sibility to protect. Indeed, if their international policies pursued over the course of
the Arab Spring are early signs, their worldviews within the framework of the
emerging global order will be increasingly at odds with those of the established
West as championed especially by the US and the EU.
7.7 R2P, the Emerging Global Order and Eastphalia 95
One of the central features of the emerging international order is the idea of the
nation-state coming under pressure. As Trood suggests, long the most important
actor in international relations, the nation-state is confronting tests to its sover-
eignty. Indeed, as the new millennium begins, the nation-state is in trouble. Not
for the first time in history, but so much so that some analysts have argued that
statism in part of a bygone era, and that we no longer live in a world of com-
peting nation-states, where power in the coin of the realm (Trood 2008). In this
new world, so the argument goes, states are being weakened and some are failing,
confronted by an array of forces in the international system. As a consequence,
the distinction between foreign and domestic policy is disappearing, borders are
becoming porous, sovereignty is being eroded, new mechanisms of order and
means of governance are evolving, and other institutions and networks of power
are emerging to challenge the states supremacy (Trood 2008).
Indeed, the concept of sovereignty is undergoing profound redefinition, he says.
While sovereignty can mean many things, for centuries, a central principle has
been the Westphalian notion that the state enjoyed both the legal and political
authority to exercise control over their people and territory. But increasingly,
governments are losing elements of their much vaunted sovereignty. In some
cases, the loss is voluntary, as states cede power to international institutions, agree
to multilateral cooperation or enter into constraining alliances. Other states seek to
be more protective guardians of their sovereignty, but they too are struggling in the
face of global challenges. In the case of the failed state, where the state collapses
and sovereignty is lost through the failure of government, the effects will be felt
throughout the international system. I would argue that Syria in 2012, at the height
of its political crisis, is a case of a monumental tussle over the principle of
sovereignty: the UN Security Council, supported by the Western powers and the
Arab League, is overriding Syrian sovereignty by justifying it in the name of
humanitarian international intervention to protect Syrias civilian population. On
the other hand, Russia and China have been vehemently opposed to such inter-
vention as it could amount to the removal of Assad and therefore a regime
changewhich is the most extreme form of Syrias loss of sovereignty.
Trood argues that the future of the Western liberal order is, nonetheless, an
unresolved issue. While some global forces work in favour of deepening its roots
within the international system, others may work against it. An order radically
different from Western preferences could emerge, one more directly shaped by
non-Western interests (Trood 2008). As highlighted in an earlier chapter in this
book, other scholars have argued that, indeed the emerging global order could be
an Eastphalian one. In the traditional notion of Westphalian sovereignty, the
nation-state is sacrosanct, enjoying territorial inviolability. Within its secure bor-
ders, the nation-state wields unchallenged authority over its people. This tradi-
tional notion has, however, been challenged in the last two decades by the push for
R2P and international humanitarian interventionironically by the Western
adherents of Westphaliasuch as the US and the EU. In the Eastphalian order,
state sovereigntyin a case of double ironyis being defended by the East, or
more specifically by the non-Western powers such as China, Russia, India and
Brazil. Scholars of the idea of Eastphalia are not suggesting that the Eastphalian
order is a certainty; but they are, nonetheless, pointing to its possible emergence in
the future. Whether or not the new emerging global system will be an Eastphalian
order will depend to a large extent on how the worlds major powers and other key
international actors come out of the current imbroglio over Syriaindeed over the
entire phenomenon of the Arab Uprisings which began in Tunisia, and is yet to
enter its endgame.
References
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avaaz.org/480/a-new-united-nations
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and the responsibility to protect. International Affairs 87(4), 825850.
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files/public/documents/RN2V_White_Paper_CGS.pdf
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of R2P in Southeast Asia. Global Responsibility to Protect, 1(2), 135155.
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2012/ga11234.doc.htm
Chapter 8
Postscript
Abstract The doctrine of R2P may have entered a new phase when the Syrian
crisis, already tragic as it is, took an alarming turn towards the last quarter of 2013
with chemical weapons being deployed. This marked a significant escalation of the
crisis, threatening a larger regional conflagration, with warnings of a possible third
world war even raised. But an unexpected twist came when the Assad regime,
amid US threats of a military intervention, conceded to global pressure for the first
time since the Syrian crisis broke out and agreed to an international dismantling of
Syrias chemical weapons. This surprising development raised hopes of a political
solution to the Syrian crisis, backed by the P5, which if it comes to pass, will raise
the credibility of R2P. Equally unexpected, however, was the rupture in US-Saudi
relationsa casualty of Washingtons high diplomacy with the Russians to break
the international stalemate over Syria, which had come at the expense of Saudi
influence and regional hegemony. These twists and turns in the geopolitics of
intervention have raised one fundamental question: what is the future of R2P?

Keywords Third world war War crimes Chemical weapons OPCW Geneva

II International law Saudi-US relations
8.1 International Intervention: A Turning Point?
21 AUGUST 2013 was a turning point in the global diplomatic tussle over the role
of international intervention in peace, stability and security. This was the day when
the international community was suddenly abuzz with reports of a deadly turn in
the Syria crisis, leading to a flurry of diplomatic moves and counter-moves. It
culminated in talk of an international armed intervention against the Assad regime
and even a third world war. It all started with media reports, including by Al
Arabiya English and Russia Today, carrying breaking news quoting the Syrian
opposition of a deadly chemical attack in the surburbs of Damascus which killed
some 1400 people, mostly civilians. George Sabra, the president of the Syrian

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-4585-48-4_8, The Author(s) 2014
98 8 Postscript
National Council was quoted as claiming that chemical weapons were used in what
was subsequently known as the Eastern Ghouta massacre. Sabra considered the
attack as a turning point in the Syrian regimes military operations, further
alleging that the poison gas attack was not the first time and that it was used for
annihilation rather than terror (Russia Today 2013, August 21). Images of victims
in various postures of agony and suffering went viral on the Internet. A week later,
amidst heightened global interest on 28 August, the British Foreign Secretary
William Hague declared: This is the first use of chemical warfare in the 21st
century. It has to be unacceptable. We have to confront something that is a war
crime, something that is a crime against humanity (Sparrow 2013, August 28).
What followed was a shrill cry from Western capitals, especially the United
Kingdom, the United States and France for an international response to the war
crime. Hagues reference to crime against humanity was clearly aimed at trig-
gering international intervention as would be justified by the humanitarian doctrine
of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
Not surprisingly, counter-accusations were made by the Syrian regime and its
chief backer, Russia, that the chemical attack was launched by the opposition
rebels to provoke a Western military intervention. War drums were beaten fran-
tically as both London and Washington built up the momentum for an international
military response, mobilising political support from their respective political
constituencies. Reflecting the heightened tensions, talk of a new world war sur-
faced as Bashar al Assads deputy foreign minister warned on 4 September 2013
that the regime would take every measure to respond to any US attack. The
Syrian government will not change position even if there is World War III. No
Syrian can sacrifice the independence of his country, Faisal Muqdad said in an
interview with AFP and reported widely in the global media (Al Arabiya 2013,
September 4). References to a third world war were alarming, no doubt. Hitherto,
no international conflict since the end of the Cold War had led to such language
being used. All this served to underscore how explosive the instability in the
Middle East had become, and by extension, how nasty a turn the Arab Spring had
taken. What ensued was a flurry of further statements and debates worldwide about
the legality of both the chemical attack and the growing Western readiness to
launch a military strike on the Assad regime, led by the United States, the United
Kingdom and Francethree of the five members of the UN Security Council
sometimes known as the P3.
While the P3 declared that there was no doubt the use of chemical weapons on
civilians was a war crime, Russia and Chinathe other two members of the
UNSCwarned that any military intervention not sanctioned by the UNSC would
be against international law. Interestingly, in the heat of all these tensions, the
centrality of international law came into sharp focus with debates ensuing whether
humanitarian intervention in Syria would indeed be consistent with international
law. Against this backdrop, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon cautioned the US
and France that any punitive action against Syria would be legal only in self-
defence or had UNSC authorisationin other words any such military interven-
tion would be illegal without the unanimous support of the UNSC, or more
8.1 International Intervention: A Turning Point? 99
specifically all five of the UNSC members. Ban told a news conference at the UN:
As I have said repeatedly, the Security Council has primary responsibility for
international peace and security. The use of force is lawful only when in exercise
of self-defence in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter and or
when the Security Council approves such action. The UN chief also declared that
if confirmed, any use of chemical weapons by anyone under any circumstances
will be a serious violation of international law and an outrageous war crime
(Charbonneau 2013, September 3).
Bans statement on article 51, however, hit the nail on its head, though
somewhat ironic: after all, the core issue that had defined the diplomatic crisis over
Syria was the paralysis of the UNSC due to the five powers cancelling each other
out through their mutual veto on Syria. The paralysis was also the reason why the
US, Britain and France appeared to have been posturing controversially for an
intervention that would bypass the UN. We have tried those other methods, the
diplomatic methods, and we will continue to try those. But they have failed so far,
Hague told BBC Radio 4s Today programme. Indeed, quite controversially, Hague
argued that a military option could be legal under international law even without
UN approval. It is possible under many different scenarios. But anything we
propose to do, the strong response we have talked about, whatever form that takes,
will be subject to legal advice, must be in accordance with international law,
Hague added in a statement that appeared seemingly self-contradictory (Al Alam
2013, August 26). There was, however, a precedence when military intervention
was undertaken without UNSC authorisation: Following Russias veto of UN
intervention in the Balkans, NATO went ahead to intervene there without a UN
mandate (Euronews 2013, August 20). The difference now over the Syria crisis is
that the international community did not seem to have the appetite for more
warsnot even the Western nations campaigning for international intervention.
Hence, embarrassingly for Prime Minister David Cameron, the British parliament
voted down his push for a military intervention in Syria. Even in the US, President
Barack Obama was having difficulty getting support from Congress.
On 1 September, Obama presented his case for a targeted military action
against the Assad regime, while making clearwith an eye on the war-wariness of
the US publicthat this would not be an open-ended intervention, and there will
be no American troops on the ground (The White House 2013). Yet Obama
appeared doomed to suffer the same embarrassing fate as Cameron as Congress
was uncertain whether to vote in favour of his intervention plan. But fortuitously
for Obama, a surprising turn of events saw Russia making a diplomatic move to
defuse the growing tensions. Taking advantage of a casual remark by US Secretary
of State John Kerry suggesting that Syria hand over its chemical weapons to the
international community for destruction as one possible way out to defuse the
imminent attack, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov floated a proposal: With
the immediate concurrence of Syria, Lavrov proposed that the Assad regime
decommission all its chemical arsenal and hand over the entire stockpile to
international control. What followed was an equally surprising turn away from
war-mongering to diplomacy as the USA and Russia engaged in high-level
100 8 Postscript
negotiations that would lead to a roll back of the Western plan for a military
intervention in Syria in return for an unprecedented plan to eliminate the Assad
regimes chemical warfare capabilities. Obama seized on the opportunity to delay
US intervention in Syria. In a nationally-televised address on the eve of the
anniversary of the September 11, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on New York and
Washington, Obama said he would pursue the proposal by Russia to have Syria
surrender to the international community its stockpiles of chemical arms (The
Straits Times 2013a, September 12).
On 14 September 2013, both Kerry and Lavrov announced, following 3 days of
talks in Geneva, an agreement between the US and Russia to eliminate Syrias
chemical weapons stockpile. Under the plan, Syria must submit a comprehensive
listing of its chemical weapons arsenal within a week, UN weapons inspectors
would be on the ground in Syria no later than November, and the goal would be,
according to Lavrov, the complete destruction of Syrias chemical weapons by the
middle of 2014. Kerry said if Syria did not comply with the agreement, which
must be finalised by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), it would face consequences under Chap. 7 of the UN Charter, which
covers sanctions and military action. Kerry said Obama reserved the right to use
military force in Syria while Lavrov said UN Security Council would act if Syria
breached the deal. In the case of those demands not being fulfilled, or in the case
of anyone using chemical weapons, the Security Council will take measures
according to Chap. 7 of the United Nations Charter, Lavrov said at the joint press
conference with Kerry. But significantly, Lavrov added: There (is) nothing said
about the use of force and not about any automatic sanctions (The Sunday Times
2013, September 15).
Regardless, Russias offer of a diplomatic solution, which Syria went along with
totally, was a game-changer; it raised the stature of Russian President Vladimir
Putin as a leader who could match, if not better Obama in the game of diplomatic
chess. Indeed, Putin took it to an unprecedented level when an op-ed written in his
name appeared in the New York Times on September 11at about the same time
that Obama announced his acceptance of the Russian offeraddressing directly
the American people on the folly of a military intervention in Syria. Putins article
elevated the level of the diplomatic debate to the fundamentals of war and peace.
Indeed, what Putin did was not only uncharacteristic of Russian diplomacy but also
marked another turning point in the Syria crisisfrom the battle ground in Syria to
the diplomatic front. Entitled A Plea for Caution from Russia, Putin began by
explaining that he had decided to speak directly to the American people and their
political leaders because of insufficient communication between our societies.
He immediately turned to the role of the UN and how it was established to prevent
a repeat of the devastation of World War Two when the Russians and Americans
were allies once and defeated the Nazis together. He said the UN founders
understood that decisions affecting war and peace should happen only by con-
sensus, and with Americas consent, the veto by the Security Council permanent
members was enshrined in the UN Charterwhich subsequently underpinned, he
argued, the stability of international relations for decades. No one wants the
United Nations to suffer the fate of the League of Nations, which collapsed
because it lacked real leverage. This is possible if influential countries bypass the
United Nations and take military action without Security Council authorisation
(Putin 2013, September 11).
The potential strike by the US against Syria, despite strong opposition from
many countries, he said, would result in potentially spreading the conflict far
beyond Syrias borders, unleash a new wave of terrorism, undermine multilateral
efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
further destabilise the Middle East and North Africa, and throw the entire system
of international law and order out of balance. Justifying Russias consistent veto
of UNSC resolutions seen as unfavourable to the Assad regime, he said Moscow
was not protecting the Syrian regime but international law.
It was important to use the UN Security Council as preserving law and order in
todays complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international
relations from sliding into chaos. The law is still the law, and we must follow it
whether we like it or not. Under current international law, force is permitted only
in self-defence or by the decision of the Security Council. Anything else is
unacceptable under the United Nation as Charter and would constitute an act of
aggression.
Putin then turned towards the US, describing it as being swept by an alarming
trend of military intervention in the internal conflicts of other countries. Around
the world, he said, millions were increasingly seeing America not as a model of
democracy but as relying solely on brute force and asked whether this was in
Americas long-term interest. We must stop using the language of force, he said,
and return to the path of civilised diplomatic and political settlement. Describing
Assads willingness to place its chemical arsenal under international control for
subsequent destruction as a new opportunity to avoid military action, Putin noted
Obamas interest in engaging in dialogue with Russia on Syria, which he said
would build on what he described as the growing trust between him and Obama
(Putin 2013). In the week of 28 September, the media reported that the deeply
divided UN Security Council had reached a breakthrough, agreeing on a resolution
that would require Syria to give up its chemical weapons, though there would be
no automatic penalties if the Syrians failed to comply. The agreement reportedly
was a compromise among the US, its allies and Russia about how to enforce the
resolution which would eliminate Syrias chemical weapons programme. On 1
September, it was reported that Syria had destroyed all its declared chemical arms
production equipment, and placed all chemical weapons under seal, said the
OPCW. The Security Council deal, it was reported, would amount to the most
significant international diplomatic initiative of the Syrian civil war. US Ambas-
sador to the UN Samantha Power said in a Twitter message that the resolution
established a new norm against the use of chemical weapons (The Straits Times
2013b, September 28). Indeed, the OPCW was to later win the Nobel peace prize
for peace. As all this was happening, the larger diplomatic solution for Syria was
being pursued with Geneva IIa second attempt at diplomatic talks amongst the
key parties in the Syrian crisis as well as their respective backers. The OPCW
102 8 Postscript
statement came as the joint UN-Arab League peace envoy Lakhdar Brahimi was
preparing to meet the warring parties in Syria for the Geneva II talks.
8.1.1 International Intervention Without International Law?
The turn of events in Syria brought the focus back to the core issue of international
interventionwhether it is legal or not in the eyes of international law. Not-
withstanding the apparent progress made in defusing the Syrian crisis, this legality
remained unclear and opinion remained divided whether an armed intervention in
Syria to protect civilians from the brutality of their own ruling regime would be
legally acceptable. Indeed, some, like Aeyal Gross, revived the fundamental
question whether the debate over the legality of American intervention raised key
issues beyond international lawis it humanitarian action or it is a new form of
imperialism? Gross argued that the use of unilateral force by other states in the
name of humanitarian intervention could become a slippery slope towards
exploitation by those states, and could lead to a new kind of imperialism. Indeed,
Gross argument reflected the fundamental hesitation of Russia and China, after
the Western-led intervention in Libya, to support the UNSC resolution for inter-
vention in Syria which had led to the current paralysis in the UN over Syria (Gross
2013, August 31).
The ongoing debate over the legality of military intervention in Syria had led to
the BBC carrying a programme reflecting the debates on this fundamental issue.
On the one hand, scholars like Geoffrey Robertson, an international human rights
lawyer, argued that there had never been any need for a Security Council reso-
lution approving action to stop, punish or deter a crime against humanity. Pointing
to the NATO intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, he said that was
carried out without a UN resolution, which Russia would have blocked. The
world cannot ban chemical weapons and then sit by idly while a state uses them to
kill civilians. However there is a burden of proof on those who wish to establish
beyond doubt the culpability of the Syrian state. This would best be done by
bringing evidence before an international court, he said. But this is perhaps
premature and the evidence will have to be brought before the Security Council
and if the majority [of member] accepts it then they can go ahead with deterrence
by use of force. That resolves the legal question but there are obviously political
and moral questions involved, argued Robertson (BBC 2013, August 29). A
somewhat different view was offered by Dmitry Babich, a political analyst at
Voice of Russia. He said Russia would certainly say that this action would be
illegal because it definitely would not get the mandate of the UN Security Council.
While he acknowledged that there were precedents when military action was taken
against Yugoslavia in 1999, which Russia strongly argued against, and in Iraq in
2003, which did not have UN approval, Russia would argue that these were cases
where law was breached. So the fact that law had been breached twice before
doesnt make another illegal action legal, he said. Babich added that as the use of
chemical weapons had been banned under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, theoret-
ically, the US could use that as a reason for intervention. But since there is indeed
no proof that whats happened in Damascus was not a provocation by the oppo-
sition, it would also not be a very good justificationespecially since we have the
experience of the Iraq war where Western troops never discovered any weapons of
mass destruction.
Sinan Ulgen, chairman of the Istanbul-based Centre of Economic and Foreign
Policy Studies, said for a military intervention to really enjoy full legitimacy, a UN
Security Council resolution would be neededthe legal basis for which would be
Article 39 and 42 of the UN Charter. If a Security Council resolution is not
realistic politically, there are three other options. The first is to remain in the UN
system and invoke a provision that has not been used beforethe 1950s during the
Korean crisiswhen the Security Council was blocked. The second option lies
under R2P while the third is one which would come into force if Syria were
deemed to have violated one of the legal obligations of the international order by
using chemical weapons which had been banned under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
Dapo Akande, a law lecturer at Oxford University, was clear that it would be very
difficult to argue that any use of force would be lawful if there was no UN
Security Council authorisation for the use of force. But the argument that was put
forth by the UK, Dapo said, was the closest one could come to a legal basis
namely the doctrine of humanitarian intervention that is the idea that force is
permissible when there is pressing humanitarian need. But this is a view of
international law that has been rejected by most states, even the US. The related
doctrine of responsibility to protect also does not create a legal right for inter-
vention without Security Council approval, he added.
Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg of the International Society for Military law and
the Law of War argued that since there is a lack of Security Council resolutions in
the Syria case, and since there is no treaty expressly providing for the use of force,
the only legal basis we could have would be customary international law. In the
case of Syria, the issue of chemical weapons may become a critical factor. Not
only the use but also the possession and manufacture of chemical weapons is
prohibited. But does this mean that other states are entitled to respond by the use
of force if a state uses such prohibited weapons on its territory? The relevant
treaties preventing chemical weapons use do not provide for this. Von Heinegg
added: But there are doubts as to whether such a use of forceor humanitarian
interventionhas already become an established rule of international law. We
may now be in a situation where the pendulum may swing in one direction or the
other in that debate, without us being able to predict where it will swing (BBC
2013, 29 August).
Indeed, writing in The Straits Times, Simon Chesterman said the world was far
from being in a utopia for international law, notwithstanding the success of the
international community in defusing the threat of chemical weapons in Syria.
Arguing that the view of an interventionist US being a major threat to international
peace and security is misconceived, he said a far greater threat now is a US,
diminished by a decade of mismanaged foreign policy and distracted by its
104 8 Postscript
dysfunctional domestic politics, would disengage completely. In the end, he said,

what the world got was the US avoiding a war that it did not want or need; Russia
reasserting a role for itself as a major power; and Syria continuing to brutally
suppress the rebellion against Assads reignalbeit with conventional weapons
only. All this was formalised, he said, in the compromise Resolution 2118 which
threatened Chap.7 measurespossibly meaning economic sanctions or the use of
force, though if Syria failed to comply with the resolution, the Security Council
must meet again to negotiate what happens next. But Chesterman argued that the
resolution was significant because it had stated that the use of chemical weapons
constituted a threat to international peace and security. This means that the
Security Council can act in response to any such use, whether or not a state is party
to the conventions prohibiting such weapons and whether they are used in war or
against ones own population (Chesterman 2013, 2 October).
8.1.2 Saudi-US Relations: Intervention and Geopolitical

Reconfiguration?
Obamas decision to forego military intervention in Syria in favour of the Russian

formula for a solution in Syria has had an unintended consequence. This is the
incipient unravelling of one of the most strategic partnerships in the Middle East
ties between the US and Saudi Arabia.
In late October 2013, wire agencies began reporting based on unofficial sources
close to Saudi policy of a major shift in the Saudis dealings with the US in
protest at the perceived inaction over the Syria war, apart from its overtures to
Iran. Saudi Arabias chief of intelligence, Prince Bandar Sultan reportedly told
European diplomats that Washington had failed to act effectively on the Syria
crisis and the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, was growing closer to Tehran, and had
failed to back Saudi support for Bahrain when it crushed an anti-government revolt
in 2011, the wire agencies quoted the source as saying. The shift away from the
US is a major oneSaudi doesnt want to find itself any longer in a situation
where it is dependent. Prince Bandar told diplomats that he plans to limit inter-
action with the US This happens after the US failed to take any effective action
on Syria and Palestine (The Straits Times 2013c, 23 October). Saudi anger
reportedly boiled over after the US dropped the threat of military strikes in
response to the poison gas attack in Damascus in Augustafter Assad agreed to
give up his chemical arsenal following the diplomatic deal between the US and
Russia. The source said the apparent shift in ties between Riyadh and its traditional
ally would have wide-ranging consequences, including on arms purchase and oil
sales. It also comes after Saudi Arabia uncharacteristically rejected a usually much
sought-after 2-year term on the Security Councilin a rare display of anger at the
UNs inaction over the crisis in Syria (The Straits Times 2013c). What all this
showed also, argued James Jeffrey, is that the upheavals of the Arab Uprisings
since the end of 2010 and the turn of 2011 had not ended and that major diplomatic
turmoil may be in the offingif the Obama administration failed to take heed of
the Saudi warning. What made the Saudi-US dispute more worrying for regional
stability and secure energy lines is the repeated and open nature of the Saudi
rebuke, Jeffrey said. The former national deputy national security adviser added
that this was aggravated by the Saudi refusal to assume the UN Security Council
seat it was elected to, followed by the public scolding of the US by the current
Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Such an open tone has not been
seen in earlier Saudi disagreements with the US (Jeffrey 2013).
In the final analysis, the big question begging to be asked is this: Has R2P
succeeded as a new norm in international politics? Has the world become a more
stable place since it was introduced and adopted by world leaders at the UN in
2005? Perhaps it is still too early to make a judgement call. Still, there are already
voices that have declared R2P as having failedat least over the trying issue of
Syria. David Petrasek, for example, said R2P has failed to build an international
consensus for action to protect civilians in Syria. Worse, he said, R2Ps implicit
support for military action without UN authorisationeven though as a last
resorthas contributed to the UNs paralysis. Re-building an international con-
sensus to act against atrocity would require rethinking R2P, he added. At its core
R2P is about building the greatest possible consensus for international action to
prevent or halt mass atrocity. As long as the doctrine, and many of its proponents,
remain fixated on the possibility of military action outside UN control, R2P is
likely to hamper, not hasten, the moment when such a consensus is certain
(Petrasek 2013, September 13).
Syriathe last sovereign state to be afflicted by the Arab Uprisings, has come
to embody all that is ailing international intervention, or more specifically R2P as a
humanitarian doctrine.
As the epitome of the Arab Uprisings at its ugliest, Syria has exposed the
fundamental weakness of the current international order. This weakness is
reflected in the paralysis of the UN system as it grapples with the critical question
of whether to intervene or not to intervene militarilyin the name of humanitarian
concernsin a sovereign state that was going through a self-inflicted implosion, so
as to protect Syrian civilians from the brutality of their own ruling elite. At the
time of writing, the international quest for a political solution to the Syrian crisis
remained elusive, with plans for second round of peace talks dubbed Geneva II,
not showing signs of real progress, safe for the moderated atmospherics. Still, the
Arab Uprisings will eventually have to come to a halt as even the worst of conflicts
must sooner or later wind down to an end. Over the longer term, in a post-conflict
scenario, will the Middle East crisis lead to a restructuring of the international
order, including a reform of the UN system? Will the international community
finally resolve the excruciating tensions that have proven to be inherent in the
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect? At this point, Syria has underscored the
paradox that has come to characterise R2P: that despite the strides achieved by
R2P as a new doctrine of international intervention, the world is none the wiser
about what it is all about.
106 8 Postscript
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SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

For further volumes:

ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2013958149

The Author(s) 2014

Printed on acid-free paper

Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

neo-imperialism by the West and consequently a countervailing push in the form

Yang Razali Kassim

1 Rise of the Responsibility While Protecting (RWP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2 The Arab Uprisings and the P5 Powers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

3 China as a P5 Player . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 29

4 China, India, Japan and an Emerging Eastphalian Order? . . . . . . 43

4.2.4 Indias Place in Eastphalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

5 ASEAN and R2P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

6 Critiques and Critics of R2P . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

7 Geopolitics of Intervention: Way Forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Abstract The outbreak of a wave of people power revolts, starting in Tunisia in

Y. R. Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 1

1.1 New Era of Humanitarian Intervention

1.1.1 Responsibility While Protecting

Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on 21 September 2011 amidst

7. These guidelines must be observed throughout the entire length of the

1.1.1.1 Reaction to RWP

1.1.2 Beyond R2P?

1.2 Geopolitics of RWP

1.2.1 Rise of BRICS

1.3 Genesis and Debates on R2P

1.3.1 Humanitarian Intervention and R2P

2.1 R2Ps Tussle Over Syria

Y. R. Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 15

2.2 R2P, Realpolitik and Syria

2.3 The Arab League and R2P

2.4 Future of R2P in the Middle East

institutionalising R2Pas a means to prevent mass atrocitiesis highly volun-

Communitys Determination to Protect Civilians from Own Governments Violence.

3.1 China and the Arab Uprisings

Y. R. Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 29

camp in the five-member veto-wielding UN Security Council led by the United

3.1.1 Chinas Stance Over International Humanitarian

Chinas role in the geopolitics of international humanitarian intervention and R2P

Pang describes Chinas role in international cooperation and conflict as

R2P-like situations. In 2005, China endorsed a Security Council-mandated arms

3.1.2 Evolution of Chinas Non-intervention Policy

Adding a variation to Pangs view of a phased evolution of China policy on non-

3.1.3 Schools of Thought on Chinas Attitude Towards

3.1.3.1 Conservative School: Not Easy for China to Abandon

3.1.3.2 Conditionality School: Qualified Support for Intervention

3.1.3.3 Pro-intervention School: Support for Active International

3.1.3.4 China as a Rule Maker

peacekeepers also allowed in. Chinas participation in the humanitarian inter-

3.2 Impact of Chinas Evolving Stance on Intervention

Chinas evolving posture on international intervention as applied on developments

3.3 Chinas Middle East Policy Towards

Abstract The growing influence of China and India in international politics,

4.1 The Rise of Eastphalia?

Y. R. Kassim, The Geopolitics of Intervention, SpringerBriefs in Political Science, 43

4.2 India and Eastphalia

4.2.1 Indias Position on Non-intervention

4.2.2 Domestic Criticisms of Indias Stance

of Delhis many interventions, militarily and politically. (Mohan 2011). Among

4.2.3 Indias Strategic Thinking on Intervention

4.2.4 Indias Place in Eastphalia

Notwithstanding the contradictions in Indias attitude towards non-intervention,