G.R. Nos.

152613 & 152628

APEX MINING CO., INC., vs. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp.,(SEM) et. al

G.R. No. 152619-20

BALITE COMMUNAL PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE vs. southeast mindanao
gold mining corp.

G.R. No. 152870-71

THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD AND ITS MEMBERS, THE HON. VICTOR O.
RAMOS (Chairman), UNDERSECRETARY VIRGILIO MARCELO (Member) and
DIRECTOR HORACIO RAMOS (Member) vs. southeast mindanao gold mining
corporation

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Facts: On 27 February 1931, Governor General Dwight F. Davis issued Proclamation No. 369,
establishing the Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve consisting of approximately 1,927,400
hectares.

The disputed area, a rich tract of mineral land, is inside the forest reserve located at
Monkayo, Davao del Norte, and Cateel, Davao Oriental, consisting of 4,941.6759 hectares. It
later became known as the "Diwalwal Gold Rush Area."

The SEM filed a motion for reconsideration for the Decision of the Court. It ruled held
that the assignment of Exploration Permit (EP) 133 in favor of SEM violated one of the
conditions stipulated in the permit, i.e., that the same shall be for the exclusive use and benefit of
Marcopper Mining Corporation (MMC) or its duly authorized agents. Since SEM did not claim
or submit evidence that it was a designated agent of MMC, the latter cannot be considered as an
agent of the former that can use EP 133 and benefit from it. It also ruled that the transfer of EP
133 violated Presidential Decree No. 463, which requires that the assignment of a mining right
be made with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). The Assailed Decision also pointed out that EP 133 expired by non-renewal
since it was not renewed before or after its expiration.

Moreover, it ruled that it is the prerogative of the Executive Department to undertake

directly the mining operations of the disputed area or to award the operations to private entities
including petitioners Apex and Balite, subject to applicable laws, rules and regulations, and
provided that these private entities are qualified.

On the other hand, Apex filed a Motion for Clarification of the Assailed Decision,
praying that the Court elucidate on the Decisions pronouncement that "mining operations, are
now, therefore within the full control of the State through the executive branch." Moreover, Apex
asks this Court to order the Mines and Geosciences Board (MGB) to accept its application for an
exploration permit.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled that it is impossible for SEM to acquire mining rights
over the disputed area in accordance with the Bill of 1902 was still the operative law, since it
was only in 1984 that MMC, SEMs predecessor-in-interest, filed its declaration of locations and
its prospecting permit application in compliance with Presidential Decree No. 463. It was on 1
July 1985 and 10 March 1986 that a Prospecting Permit and EP 133, respectively, were issued to
MMC. This is inconsistent with what the SEM asserted that MMC or SEM could have acquired a
perfected mining claim under the auspices of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Whatever mining rights
MMC had that it invalidly transferred to SEM cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be
considered "mining rights" as contemplated under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and immortalized
in McDaniel and Gold Creek Mining.
 Furthermore, SEM likens EP 133 with a building permit. SEM likewise equates its
supposed rights attached to the exploration permit with the rights that a private property land
owner. This analogy has no basis in law. As earlier discussed, under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, national wealth, such as mineral resources, are owned by the State and not by their
discoverer. The discoverer or locator can only develop and utilize said minerals for his own
benefit if he has complied with all the requirements set forth by applicable laws and if the State
has conferred on him such right through permits, concessions or agreements. In other words,
without the imprimatur of the State, any mining aspirant does not have any definitive right over
the mineral land because, unlike a private landholding, mineral land is owned by the State, and
the same cannot be alienated to any private person as explicitly stated in Section 2, Article XIV
of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court reiterated that EP 133 expired by non-renewal on 6 July 1994. Moreover, the
transfer of the permit to SEM was done in contravention of Presidential Decree No. 463
requiring prior approval from the proper authority, hence invalid.

Therefore, SEM is not entitled to conduct mining activities in the disputed mineral land.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. In addition, the Court held that the State, through
the Executive Department, should it so desire, may now award mining operations in the disputed
area to any qualified entities it may determine. The Mines and Geosciences Bureau may process
exploration permits pending before it, taking into consideration the applicable mining laws, rules
and regulations relative thereto.
 G.R. No. 163101

BENGUET CORPORATION vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL

RESOURCES-MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD and J.G. REALTY AND MINING
CORPORATION

FACTS:

Benguet and J.G. Realty entered into a Royalty Agreement with Option to Purchase (RAWOP) ,
wherein J.G. Realty was acknowledged as the owner of four mining claims with a total area of
288.8656 hectares. The parties also executed a Supplemental Agreement. The mining claims
were covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) Application No. APSA-V-0009
jointly filed by J.G. Realty as claim-owner and Benguet as operator.

After some time, the Executive Vice-President of Benguet, Antonio N. Tachuling, issued a letter
informing J.G. Realty of its intention to develop the mining claims. However, J.G. Realty,
through its President, Johnny L. Tan, then sent a letter to the President of Benguet informing the
latter that it was terminating the RAWOP. The latter alleged that petitioner violated some of the
provisions of the RAWOP, specifically on non-payment of royalties and non-fulfillment of
obligations stipulated therein.

J.G. Realty filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity/Cancellation of the RAWOP. POA issued a
Decision, cancelling the RAWOP and its Supplemental Agreement. BENGUET was
subsequently excluded from the joint MPSA Application over the mineral claims. Subsequent
MR was denied. Said decision was upheld by DENR-MAB.

Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or no the filing of the petition with the Supreme Court is proper.

HELD:
NO. the instant petition can be denied outright as Benguet resorted to an improper
Remedy.

The last paragraph of Section 79 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7942 or the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995 states, A petition for review by certiorari and question of law may be filed
by the aggrieved party with the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of the order
or decision of the [MAB].

The Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final
orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial
agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls
under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated
under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91among these
agencies areindicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the
existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed
included therein.

The judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
Thus Benguet should have filed the appeal with the CA.

Petitioner having failed to properly appeal to the CA under Rule 43, the decision of the MAB has
become final and executory. On this ground alone, the instant petition must be denied.
 [G.R. No. 148267. August 8, 2002]
ARMANDO C. CARPIO, petitioner, vs. SULU RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS:
A petition filed by respondent for Mines Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA)
No. MPSA-IV-131, covering certain areas in Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioner filed an
opposition/adverse claim thereto, alleging that his landholdings in Cupang and
Antipolo, Rizal will be covered by respondents claim, thus he enjoys a preferential
right to explore and extract the quarry resources on his properties. The Panel of
Arbitrators of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau of the DENR rendered a Resolution
upholding petitioners opposition/adverse claim.
Respondent appealed. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss appeal on the
ground of respondents failure to comply with the requirements of the New Mining
Acts Implementing Rules and Regulations.
On June 20, 1997, the Mines Adjudication Board rendered the assailed Order
dismissing petitioners opposition/adverse claim. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of said Order which was denied by the Board. A petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 43, seeking a reversal of the MAB Decision was filed. Citing
Section 79 of Chapter XIII of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), the CA
ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the Decision of the Mines Adjudication
Board (MAB). The adjudication of conflicting mining claims is completely
administrative in nature.Under Section 79 of RA 7942, the findings of fact by the
MAB as well as its decision or order shall be final and executory.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not appeals from the Decision or Final Orders of the Mines Adjudication Board
should be made directly to the Supreme Court as contended by the respondent and the Court of
Appeals, or such appeals be first made to the Court of Appeals as contended by herein petitioner.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.
We clarify. Factual controversies are usually involved in administrative actions; and the CA
is prepared to handle such issues because, unlike this Court, it is mandated to rule on questions
of fact. In Metro Construction, we observed that not only did the CA have appellate jurisdiction
over CIAC decisions and orders, but the review of such decisions included questions of fact and
law. At the very least when factual findings of the MAB are challenged or alleged to have been
made in grave abuse of discretion as in the present case, the CA may review them, consistent
with the constitutional duty of the judiciary.
To summarize, there are sufficient legal footings authorizing a review of the MAB Decision
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. First, Section 30 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
mandates that [n]o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent. On the other hand,
Section 79 of RA No. 7942 provides that decisions of the MAB may be reviewed by this Court
on a petition for review by certiorari. This provision is obviously an expansion of the Courts
appellate jurisdiction, an expansion to which this Court has not consented. Indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging the appellate jurisdiction of this Court would unnecessarily
burden it.
Second, when the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, transfers to the
CA pending cases involving a review of a quasi-judicial bodys decisions, such transfer relates
only to procedure; hence, it does not impair the substantive and vested rights of the parties. The
aggrieved partys right to appeal is preserved; what is changed is only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided. The parties still have a remedy and a competent tribunal to
grant this remedy.
 Third, the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure included Rule 43 to provide a uniform rule on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies. Under the rule, appeals from their judgments and final
orders are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified petition for review. A quasi-judicial
agency or body has been defined as an organ of government, other than a court or legislature,
which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. MAB falls
under this definition; hence, it is no different from the other quasi-judicial bodies enumerated
under Rule 43. Besides, the introductory words in Section 1 of Circular No. 1-91 -- among these
agencies are -- indicate that the enumeration is not exclusive or conclusive and acknowledge the
existence of other quasi-judicial agencies which, though not expressly listed, should be deemed
included therein.
Fourth, the Court realizes that under Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 as amended by RA No.
7902, factual controversies are usually involved in decisions of quasi-judicial bodies; and the
CA, which is likewise tasked to resolve questions of fact, has more elbow room to resolve them.
By including questions of fact among the issues that may be raised in an appeal from quasi-
judicial agencies to the CA, Section 3 of Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 and Section 3
of Rule 43 explicitly expanded the list of such issues.
According to Section 3 of Rule 43, [a]n appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided whether the appeal involves
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Hence, appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies even only on questions of law may be brought to the CA.
Fifth, the judicial policy of observing the hierarchy of courts dictates that direct resort from
administrative agencies to this Court will not be entertained, unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained from the appropriate lower tribunals, or unless exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy falling within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction.
In brief, appeals from decisions of the MAB shall be taken to the CA through petitions for
review in accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
 G.R. No. 169080
CELESTIAL NICKEL MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION,
vs. MACROASIA CORPORATION(formerly INFANTA MINERAL AND INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION),
BLUE RIDGE MINERAL CORPORATION, and LEBACH MINING CORPORATION,

FACTS:

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Infanta Mineral and Industrial
Corporation (Infanta) entered into a Mining Lease Contract V-1050.

Infantas corporate name was then changed to Cobertson Holdings Corporation and
subsequently to its present name, Macroasia Corporation.

After sometime, Celestial filed a Petition to Cancel the subject mining lease contracts and
other mining claims of Macroasia including those covered by Mining Lease Contract No. V-
1050, before the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) of the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB) of
the DENR.

Blue Ridge, in an earlier letter-petition, also wrote the Director of Mines to seek
cancellation of mining lease contracts and other mining rights of Macroasia and another entity,
Lebach Mining Corporation (Lebach), in mining areas in Brookes Point.

Celestial is the assignee of 144 mining claims covering such areas contiguous to Infantas
(now Macroasia) mining lode claims. Celestial also holds an MPSA with the government which
covers 2,835 hectares located at Ipilan/Maasin, Brookes Point, Palawan and two pending
applications covering another 4,040 hectares in Barangay Mainit also in Brookes Point.

Celestial sought the cancellation of Macroasias lease contracts.

Macroasia refuted the grounds for cancellation invoked by Celestial.

Based on the records of the Bureau of Mines and findings of the field investigations, the
POA granted the petition of Celestial to cancel the Mining Lease Contracts of Macroasia; and
found the claims of the others indubitably meritorious. It gave Celestial the preferential right to
Macroasias mining areas. It upheld Blue Ridges petition, but only as against the Mining Lease
Contract areas of Lebach, and the said leased areas were declared automatically abandoned. It
gave Blue Ridge priority right to the aforesaid Lebachs areas/mining claims. Blue Ridge and
Macroasia appealed before the MAB.

Lebach did not file any notice of appeal with the required memorandum of appeal; thus,
with respect to Lebach, the above resolution became final and executory.

The MAB made a decision upholding the Decision of the POA to cancel the Mining
Lode/Lease Contracts of Macroasia.

However, the MAB, subsequently issued a resolution vacating its previous decision,
holding that neither the POA nor the MAB had the power to revoke a mineral agreement duly
entered into by the DENR Secretary. The MAB further held that the power to cancel or revoke a
mineral agreement was exclusively lodged with the DENR Secretary.

Celestial and Blue Ridge made an appeal.

The CA Special12th Division affirmed the MAB Resolution which upheld the exclusive
authority of the DENR Secretary to approve, cancel, and revoke mineral agreements. The CA
also denied Celestials Motion for Reconsideration.
 While the CA Special 10th Division granted Blue Ridges petition; reversed and set aside
the Resolutions of the MAB; and treated the cancellation of a mining lease agreement as a
mining dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the POA under Sec. 77 of RA 7942,
explaining that the power to resolve mining disputes, which is the greater power, necessarily
includes the lesser power to cancel mining agreements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is only the Secretary of the DENR who has the jurisdiction to cancel
mining contracts and privileges?

HELD:

YES. It is only the Secretary of the DENR who has jurisdiction to cancel mining
contracts and privileges.

After a scrutiny of the provisions of PD 463, EO 211, EO 279, RA 7942 and its implementing
rules and regulations, executive issuances, and case law, we rule that the DENR Secretary, not
the POA, has the jurisdiction to cancel existing mineral lease contracts or mineral agreements
based on the following reasons:

The power of the DENR Secretary to cancel mineral agreements emanates from his
administrative authority, supervision, management, and control over mineral resources under
Chapter I, Title XIV of Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.

It is the DENR, through the Secretary, that manages, supervises, and regulates the use and
development of all mineral resources of the country. It has exclusive jurisdiction over the
management of all lands of public domain, which covers mineral resources and deposits from
said lands. It has the power to oversee, supervise, and police our natural resources which include
mineral resources. Derived from the broad and explicit powers of the DENR and its Secretary
under the Administrative Code of 1987 is the power to approve mineral agreements and
necessarily to cancel or cause to cancel said agreements.

Under RA 7942, the power of control and supervision of the DENR Secretary over the
MGB to cancel or recommend cancellation of mineral rights clearly demonstrates the authority
of the DENR Secretary to cancel or approve the cancellation of mineral agreements.

The DENR Secretarys power to cancel mining rights or agreements through the MGB
can be inferred from Sec. 230, Chapter XXIV of DENR AO 96-40 on cancellation, revocation,
and termination of a permit/mineral agreement/FTAA.
G.R. No. 162331 November 20, 2006

LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., Petitioner,

vs.
WMC RESOURCES INTL. PTY. LTD., WMC PHILIPPINES, INC. and SAGITTARIUS
MINES, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Philippine Government and WMC Philippines, the local wholly-owned subsidiary of

WMC Resources International Pty. Ltd. (WMC Resources) executed a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement, denominated as the Columbio FTAA No. 02-95-XI (Columbio FTAA) for
the purpose of large scale exploration, development, and commercial exploration of possible
mineral resources in an initial contract area of 99,387 hectares located in the provinces of South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur, and North Cotabato in accordance with Executive
Order No. 279 and Department Administrative Order No. 63, Series of 1991.
The Columbio FTAA is covered in part by 156 mining claims held under various Mineral
Production Sharing Agreements (MPSA) by Southcot Mining Corporation, Tampakan Mining
Corporation, and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. (collectively called the Tampakan Companies), in
accordance with the Tampakan Option Agreement entered into by WMC Philippines and the
Tampakan Companies on 25 April 1991, as amended by Amendatory Agreement dated 15 July
1994, for purposes of exploration of the mining claims in Tampakan, South Cotabato. The
Option Agreement, among other things, provides for the grant of the right of first refusal to the
Tampakan Companies in case WMC Philippines desires to dispose of its rights and interests in
the mining claims covering the area subject of the agreement.

WMC Resources subsequently divested itself of its rights and interests in the Columbio
FTAA, and on 12 July 2000 executed a Sale and Purchase Agreement with petitioner Lepanto
over its entire shareholdings in WMC Philippines, subject to the exercise of the Tampakan
Companies exercise of their right of first refusal to purchase the subject shares. On 28 August
2000, petitioner sought the approval of the 12 July 2000 Agreement from the DENR Secretary.
In the interim, on 10 January 2001, contending that the 12 July Agreement between petitioner
and WMC Philippines had expired due to failure to meet the necessary preconditions for its
validity, WMC Resources and the Tampakan Companies executed another Sale and Purchase
Agreement, where Sagittarius Mines, Inc. was designated assignee and corporate vehicle which
would acquire the shareholdings and undertake the Columbio FTAA activities. On 15 January
2001, Sagittarius Mines, Inc. increased its authorized capitalization to P250 million.
Subsequently, WMC Resources and Sagittarius Mines, Inc. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of
Shares of Stocks on 23 January 2001.

After due consideration and evaluation of the financial and technical qualifications of
Sagittarius Mines, Inc., the DENR Secretary approved the transfer of the Columbio FTAA from
WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines, Inc. in the assailed Order. According to said Order,
pursuant to Section 66 of Department Administrative Order No. 96-40, as amended, Sagittarius
Mines, Inc. meets the qualification requirements as Contractor-Transferee of FTAA No. 02-95-
XI, and that the application for transfer of said FTAA went thru the procedure and other
requirements set forth under the law.

Aggrieved by the transfer of the Columbio FTAA in favor of Sagittarius Mines, Inc.,
petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Order of the DENR Secretary with the Office of the
President. Petitioner assails the validity of the 18 December 2001 Order of the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approving the application for and
the consequent registration of FTAA No. 02-95-XI from WMC Philippines to Sagittarius Mines,
Inc.on the ground that: 1) it violates the constitutional right of Lepanto to due process; 2) it
preempts the resolution of very crucial legal issues pending with the regular courts; and 3) it
blatantly violates Section 40 of the Mining Act.
 In a Decision dated 23 July 2002, the Office of the President dismissed the petition

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, particularly Section 40 thereof
requiring the approval of the President of the assignment or transfer of financial or technical
assistance agreements should have a retroactive application to the Columbio FTAA.

HELD:

NO. Applying the above-cited law retroactively would contradict the established legal
doctrine that statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the
contrary is expressly stated or necessarily implied from the language used in the law.

In the case at bar, there is an absence of either an express declaration or an implication in

the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 that the provisions of said law shall be made to apply
retroactively, therefore, any section of said law must be made to apply only prospectively, in
view of the rule that a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively,
unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed
to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied.
 G.R. No. 152644
JOHN ERIC LONEY,STEVEN PAUL REID and PEDRO B. HERNANDEZ,
Vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

Petitioners are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident
Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper),
a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque. Marcopper had been storing
tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a
drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed
a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels
end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac
and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal
Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1067 or the
Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067), the National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD
984), the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942), and Article 365 of the RPC for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
Petitioners moved to quash the Informations.
The MTC is convinced that as far as the three (3) aforesaid laws are concerned, only the
Information for violation of Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942) should be maintained and the
Information for violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code should also be maintained
and heard in a full blown trial because the common accusation therein is reckless imprudence
resulting to [sic] damage to property. It is the damage to property which the law punishes not the
negligent act of polluting the water system. The prosecution for the [v]iolation of Philippine
Mining Act is not a bar to the prosecution for reckless imprudence resulting to [sic] damage to
property.

Petitioners subsequently filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court. For
its part, public respondent filed an ordinary appeal with the same court assailing that portion of
the Consolidated Order quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984.

RTC granted public respondents appeal but denied petitioners petition.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion and contends that they should only be prosecuted for violation of Article 365
of the RPC.

Court of Appeals affirmed RTCs ruling. The appellate court held:

The doctrine laid down in the Relova case does not squarely apply to the case at
Bench since the Informations filed against the petitioners are for violation of four separate and
distinct laws which are national in character.

This Court finds that there is not even the slightest indicia of evidence that would
give rise to any suspicion that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in reversing the Municipal Trial Courts quashal of the
Informations against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1067 and P.D. 984. This Court equally
finds no error in the trial courts denial of the petitioners motion to quash R.A. 7942 and Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion.
ISSUE:
1 WON CA erred in finding that
2 Whether RTSs ruling, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, contravenes People v.
Relova.

HELD:

The Filing of Several Charges is Proper

1 The contention has no merit.

In R.A. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act), the additional fact that must be
established is the willful violation and gross neglect on the part of the accused to
abide by the terms and conditions of the Environmental Compliance Certificate,
particularly that the Marcopper should ensure the containment of run-off and silt
materials from reaching the Mogpog and Boac Rivers. If there was no violation or
neglect, and that the accused satisfactorily proved [sic] that Marcopper had done
everything to ensure containment of the run-off and silt materials, they will not be
liable. It does not follow, however, that they cannot be prosecuted under the Water
Code, Anti-Pollution Law and the Revised Penal Code because violation of the
Environmental Compliance Certificate is not an essential element of these laws.

People v. Relova not in Point

Petitioners reiterate their contention in the Court of Appeals that their prosecution
contravenes this Courts ruling in People v. Relova. In particular, petitioners cite the Courts
statement in Relova that the law seeks to prevent harassment of the accused by multiple
prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements.

This contention is also without merit

The issue in Relova is whether the act of the Batangas Acting City Fiscal in charging one
Manuel Opulencia (Opulencia) with theft of electric power under the RPC, after the latter had
been acquitted of violating a City Ordinance penalizing the unauthorized installation of electrical
wiring, violated Opulencias right against double jeopardy. We held that it did, not because the
offenses punished by those two laws were the same but because the act giving rise to the charges
was punished by an ordinance and a national statute, thus falling within the proscription against
multiple prosecutions for the same act under the second sentence in Section 22, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, now Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. We held:

The petitioner concludes that:

The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas

City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that
the second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof
and that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first information.

The above argument[s] made by the petitioner [is] of course correct. This
is clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved
which reads as follows:
 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. x x x

and from our case law on this point. The basic difficulty with the petitioners
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of
the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule:
the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in
the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22)
embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection,
against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an
ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the
same act or set of acts. x x x (Italicization in the original; boldfacing supplied)

Thus, Relova is no authority for petitioners claim against multiple prosecutions based on
a single act not only because the question of double jeopardy is not at issue here, but also
because, as theCourt of Appeals held, petitioners are being prosecuted for an act or incident
punished by four national statutes and not by an ordinance and a national statute. In short,
petitioners, if ever, fall under the first sentence of Section 21, Article III which prohibits
multiple prosecution for the same offense, and not, as in Relova, for offenses arising from the
same incident.
 G.R. No. 163509

PICOP RESOURCES, INC., vs. BASE METALS MINERAL RESOURCES CORPORATION

and THE MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD

FACTS:

Central Mindanao Mining and Development Corporation (CMMCI for brevity) entered into a
Mines Operating Agreement (Agreement for brevity) with Banahaw Mining and Development
Corporation (Banahaw Mining for brevity) whereby the latter agreed to act as Mine Operator for
the exploration, development, and eventual commercial operation of CMMCIs eighteen (18)
mining claims located in Agusan del Sur.

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Banahaw Mining filed applications for Mining Lease
Contracts over the mining claims with the Bureau of Mines. So that Banahaw Mining was issued
a Mines Temporary Permit authorizing it to extract and dispose of precious minerals found
within its mining claims. Upon its expiration, the temporary permit was subsequently renewed
thrice by the Bureau of Mines, the last being on June 28, 1991.

Since a portion of Banahaw Minings mining claims was located in petitioner PICOPs logging
concession in Agusan del Sur, Banahaw Mining and petitioner PICOP entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement, whereby, in mutual recognition of each others right to the area
concerned, petitioner PICOP allowed Banahaw Mining an access/right of way to its mining
claims. Banahaw Mining converted its mining claims to applications for Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA for brevity).

While the MPSA were pending, Banahaw Mining, on December 18, 1996, decided to sell/assign
its rights and interests over thirty-seven (37) mining claims in favor of private respondent Base
Metals Mineral Resources Corporation (Base Metals for brevity). The transfer included mining
claims held by Banahaw Mining in its own right as claim owner, as well as those covered by its
mining operating agreement with CMMCI.

Upon being informed of the development, CMMCI, as claim owner, immediately approved the
assignment made by Banahaw Mining in favor of private respondent Base Metals, thereby
recognizing private respondent Base Metals as the new operator of its claims.

On March 10, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended Banahaw Minings pending
MPSA applications with the Bureau of Mines to substitute itself as applicant and to submit
additional documents in support of the application. Area clearances from the DENR Regional
Director and Superintendent of the Agusan Marsh and Wildlife Sanctuary were submitted, as
required.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent Base Metals amended MPSA applications were
published in accordance with the requirements of the Mining Act of 1995.

On November 18, 1997, petitioner PICOP filed with the Mines Geo-Sciences Bureau (MGB),
Caraga Regional Office No. XIII an Adverse Claim and/or Opposition to private respondent Base
Metals application. After the submission of their respective position paper, the Panel Arbitrator
issued an Order disapproving private respondent Base Metals MPSA on the reasons that adverse
claim was filed on time, that the granting of the MPSA application on area subject of an IFMA or
PTLA which is covered by a Presidential Warranty, the panel believes it cannot, unless the
grantee consents thereto, without the grantees consent, the area is considered closed to mining
location (sec. 19) (b) (No. 2), DAO No. 96-40) and that the mining location in forest or
timberland is allowed only if such forest or timberland is not leased by the government to a
qualified person or entity and if it is leased the consent of the lessor is necessary, in addition to
the area clearance to be issued by the agency concerned before it is subjected to mining
operation.

Plantation is considered closed to mining locations because it is off tangent to mining. Both are
extremes. They can not exist at the same time. The other must necessarily stop before the other
operate.

Private respondent Base Metals filed a Notice of Appeal with public respondent MAB, the latter
rendered the assailed decision setting aside the Panel Arbitrators order. The Court of Appeals
upheld the decision of the MAB.

Hence this petition.

PICOP presents the following issues: (1) the 2,756 hectares subject of Base Metals MPSA are
closed to mining operations except upon PICOPs written consent pursuant to existing laws, rules
and regulations and by virtue of the Presidential Warranty; (2) its Presidential Warranty is
protected by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution; and (3) it does not raise new issues
in its petition.

PICOP asserts that its concession areas are closed to mining operations as these are within the
Agusan-Surigao-Davao forest reserve established under Proclamation No. 369 of then Gov. Gen.
Dwight Davis. The area is allegedly also part of permanent forest established under Republic Act
No. 3092 (RA 3092), and overlaps the wilderness area where mining applications are expressly
prohibited under RA 7586. Hence, the area is closed to mining operations under Sec. 19(f) of
RA 7942.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is, by law, closed to mining
activities

Whether or not the Presidential Warranty is a contract protected by the non-impairment

clause of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Anent the first issue, the Court ruled that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA is,
by law, not closed to mining activities.

There is no evidence in this case that the area covered by Base Metals MPSA has been
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.

Even granting that the area covered by the MPSA is part of the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve, such does not necessarily signify that the area is absolutely closed to mining
activities. Contrary to PICOPs obvious misreading of our decision in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.
Garcia, supra, to the effect that mineral agreements are not allowed in the forest reserve
established under Proclamation 369, the Court in that case actually ruled that pursuant to PD 463
as amended by PD 1385, one can acquire mining rights within forest reserves, such as the
Agusan-Davao-Surigao Forest Reserve, by initially applying for a permit to prospect with the
Bureau of Forest and Development and subsequently for a permit to explore with the Bureau of
Mines and Geosciences.

Moreover, Sec. 18 RA 7942 allows mining even in timberland or forestty subject to

existing rights and reservations. Similarly, Sec. 47 of PD 705 permits mining operations in forest
lands which include the public forest, the permanent forest or forest reserves, and forest
reservations
 With regard to the second issue, the Court do not subscribe to PICOPs argument that the
Presidential Warranty dated September 25, 1968 is a contract protected by the non-impairment
clause of the 1987 Constitution. An examination of the Presidential Warranty at once reveals that
it simply reassures PICOP of the governments commitment to uphold the terms and conditions
of its timber license and guarantees PICOPs peaceful and adequate possession and enjoyment of
the areas which are the basic sources of raw materials for its wood processing complex. The
warranty covers only the right to cut, collect, and remove timber in its concession area, and does
not extend to the utilization of other resources, such as mineral resources, occurring within the
concession.

The Presidential Warranty cannot be considered a contract distinct from PTLA No. 47
and IFMA No. 35. It is merely a collateral undertaking which cannot amplify PICOPs rights
under its timber license. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause
cannot be invoked.
 G.R. No. 139548. December 22, 2000

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION vs. ALBERTO G. BUMOLO et al.,

FACTS:

MARCOPPER MINING CORPORATION registered its mining claims in Pao, Kasibu,

Nueva Vizcaya with the DENR from February 02,1982 to October 12, 1982. Private respondents
Alberto G. Bumolo and others registered their mining claims in the same area from 28 July 1981
to 22 September 1988, which claims were subsequently converted into Mineral Production
Sharing Agreements (MPSA).

On March 12, 1982 petitioner entered into Option Agreements over the mining. Under
the Agreements, petitioner was granted the exclusive and irrevocable right to explore the mining
claims for three (3) years with provision for extension.

On December 23, 1982 and March 26, 1987 petitioner filed Prospecting Permit
Applications (PPA) with the Bureau of Forest Development, DENR, on the alleged ground that a
portion of the area covered by the mining claims was within the Magat River Forest Reservation
under Proc. 573 of June 26, 1969 and with DAR on account of alleged coverage of the other
portion within the Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino Civil Reservation under Proc. 1498 of 11 September
1975.

On 15 July 1991 Executive Director Leonardo A. Paat rejected petitioners Prospecting

Permit Application (PPA) on the ground that the Memorandum of July 08, 1991 endorsed by the
Regional Technical Director for Mines revealed that the area covered was outside government
reservation; that the prospect claim was in conflict with existing claims; and, that the area had
been extensively explored in the early 1980's.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Regional Executive Director Samuel Paragas

recommended to the DENR Secretary that petitioner's request for reconsideration be denied; that
the existing rights of mining claim holders be respected; and, that the prior legal rights of
MPSA/Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement applicants over subject area be
recognized.

As regards petitioner's PPA filed with the DAR, it appeared that it was issued a clearance
to prospect for six (6) months from December 11, 1995.

On August 15, 1997 petitioner appealed to public respondent Mines Adjudication Board (MAB).
Petitioner maintained that subject area was within the Magat River Forest Reservation. On June
11, 1998 the rejection of the PPA was affirmed whereas the mining claims of respondents Alberto
G. Bumolo et al. that had been converted into a MPSA, subject to compliance with R.A.
7942 and DAO No. 96-40, were given due course.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. Respondent MAB denied petitioners motion .

ISSUE:

Whether respondent MAB erred in finding that the area subject of the PPA was outside
the Magat River Forest Reservation.

HELD:

Respondent MAB correctly upheld the ratiocination of Regional Executive Director

Paragas in denying petitioner's PPA.
The disapproval of Marcoppers PPA moreover, did not emanate from a single
recommendation of the RTD for Mines. Records would show that as early as May 31, 1989
x x x the Bumolo group of PD 463 claims which Marcopper has eventually surrounded by
filing its own PAO 1-30 group of claims x x x x was confirmed by the Forest Engineering
Section of the region to be outside proclaimed watershed areas, wilderness, national parks
and existing government reforestation projects x x x x
In other words, the circumstance that the area covered by petitioner's PPA is outside the
Magat River Forest Reservation has been adequately established by the following evidence: (a)
confirmation as early as 31 May 1989 by the Forest Engineering Section of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan; (b) the 8 July 1991 Memorandum Report of Regional Technical Director Punsal Jr.;
and, (c) plotting provided by the National Mapping and Resources Information Authority per its
2 June 1995 indorsement of the maps to the office of the Regional Executive Director.
Petitioner contests the exclusion of the area subject of its PPA within the Magat River Forest
Reservation based merely on the alleged "typographical error committed by somebody in the
Engineering Section of the DENR." Aside from the fact that the allegation does not have
anything to support it, the aforementioned documents which the Regional Executive Directors
relied upon in denying the PPA had already settled the issue.
Furthermore, respondent MAB even fortified the bases for the rejection of petitioner's PPA. As
plotted by the Lands Management Sector of DENR Region 2 contained in the sketch plan of 11
November 1996 and as shown in the Land Use map of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of Dupax, Nueva Vizcaya, the area covered under the PPA is indeed outside
any government reservation.
 [G.R. No. L-49109. December 1, 1987]

SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY, INC., vs. HON. MINISTER OF NATURAL

RESOURCES JOSE J. LEIDO, JR. AND DIRECTOR OF MINES JUANITO C.
FERNANDEZ

FACTS:

Petitioner is a mining corporation, it alleges that it is the holder of fifty valid mining
claims situated in Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, acquired under the Philippine Bill of 1902.

P.D. No. 1214 was issued, requiring holders of subsisting and valid patentable mining
claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a mining lease
application within one year from the approval of the Decree. Petitioner accordingly filed a
mining lease application, but "under protest", with a reservation annotated on the back of its
application that it is not waiving its rights over its mining claims until the validity of Presidential
Decree No. 1214 shall have been passed upon by this Court.

Three days before filing the disputed mining lease application, petitioner filed this special
civil action for certiorari and prohibition, alleging that it has no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to protect its rights (except by said petition). Petitioner
assails Presidential Decree No. 1214 as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of
property without due process of law.

Petitioner avers that its fifty (50) mining claims had already been declared as its own
private and exclusive property in final judgments rendered by the CFI Camarines Norte

In answer, the respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition
as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies

We agree with respondents' contention that it is premature for the Court to now make a
finding on the matter of whether petitioner had abandoned its mining claims. Until petitioner's
appeal shall have been decided by the Office of the President, where it is pending, petitioner's
attempt to seek judicial recognition of the continuing validity of its mining claims, cannot be
entertained by the Court.

The decisions of the CFI of Camarines Norte, relied upon by petitioner, do not foreclose a
proceeding, such as DNR Case No. 4140, to determine whether petitioner's unpatented mining
claims have remained valid and subsisting.

Respondents further contend that, even assuming arguendo that petitioner's mining claims
were valid at the outset, if they are deemed abandoned and cancelled due to non-compliance with
the legal requirements for maintaining a perfected mining claim, under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902, petitioner has no valid and subsisting claim which could be lost through
the implementation of Presidential Decree no. 1214, thus giving it no standing to question the
Decree.

Petitioner, on the other hand, would rebut respondents' argument by declaring that it
already had a vested right over its mining claims even before Presidential Decree No. 1214. The
Court is not impressed that this is so.

The cases cited by petitioner, true enough, recognize the right of a locator of a mining
claim as a property right. This right, however is not absolute. It is merely a possesory right,
more so, in this case, where petitioner's claims are still unpatented. They can be lost through
abandonment or forfeiture or they may be revoked for valid legal grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD:

YES. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was not bound to exhaust administrative
remedies on the question of whether or not its mining claims are still subsisting before
challenging the constitutionality of said Decree. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of
the State, as owner, over lands of the public domain, of which petitioner's mining claims still
form a part, and over the patrimony of the nation, of which mineral deposits are a valuable asset.
It may be underscored, in this connection, that the Decree does not cover all mining claims
located under the Phil. Bill of 1902, but only those claims over which their locators had failed to
obtain a patent. And even then, such locators may still avail of the renewable twenty-five year
(25) lease prescribed by Pres. Dec. No. 463, the Mineral Development Resources Decree of
1974.

Mere location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the mining claim. It
merely segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would-be
locators from locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To
rule otherwise would imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over
a located mining claim. This, we cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the
intention of the lawmaker that the locator should faithfully and consistently comply with the
requirements for annual work and improvements in the located mining claim.

Presidential Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art. XIV of the 1973 Constitution which
states:

"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines
belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and
resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be
the measure and the limit of the grant".

The same constitutional mandate is found in Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
declares:
"All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

 [G.R. No. 135190. April 3, 2002]

SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BALITE

PORTAL MINING COOPERATIVE and others similarly situated; and THE
HONORABLE ANTONIO CERILLES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), PROVINCIAL MINING REGULATORY
BOARD OF DAVAO (PMRB-Davao), respondents.

FACTS:

The instant case involves a rich tract of mineral land situated in the Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest Reserve known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area. the land has been embroiled in
controversy (DIWALWAL Conflict) since the mid-80s due to the scramble over gold deposits
found within its bowels.

On June 24, 1997, the DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order No. 97-03 which
provided, among others, that:

The DENR shall study thoroughly and exhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the
mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Such study shall include, but shall not be
limited to, studying and weighing the feasibility of entering into management agreements or
operating agreements, or both, with the appropriate government instrumentalities or private
entities, or both, in carrying out the declared policy of rationalizing the mining operations in the
Diwalwal Gold Rush Area; such agreements shall include provisions for profit-sharing between
the state and the said parties, including profit-sharing arrangements with small-scale miners, as
well as the payment of royalties to indigenous cultural communities, among others. The
Undersecretary for Field Operations, as well as the Undersecretary for Legal and Legislative
Affairs and Attached Agencies, and the Director of the Mines and Geo-sciences Bureau are
hereby ordered to undertake such studies. x x x

On July 16, 1997, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus before the Court of Appeals. It prayed for the nullification of Memorandum Order
No. 97-03.

On March 19, 1998, the Court of Appeals, dismissed the petition. It ruled that the DENR
Secretary did not abuse his discretion in issuing Memorandum Order No. 97-03 since the same
was merely a directive to conduct studies on the various options available to the government for
solving the Diwalwal conflict. The assailed memorandum did not conclusively adopt direct
state utilization as official government policy on the matter, but was simply a manifestation of
the DENRs intent to consider it as one of its options, after determining its feasibility through
studies. MO 97-03 was only the initial step in the ladder of administrative process and did not,
as yet, fix any obligation, legal relationship or right.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

WON CA erred when it concluded that the assailed memorandum order did not adopt the
direct state utilization scheme in resolving the Diwalwal Conflict.
HELD:

No since the challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt direct state utilization as
a policy in resolving the Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum clearly indicate that
what was directed thereunder was merely a study of this option and nothing else. Contrary to
petitioners contention, it did not grant any management/operating or profit-sharing agreement to
small-scale miners or to any party, for that matter, but simply instructed the DENR officials
concerned to undertake studies to determine its feasibility.

Additionally, there can be no valid opposition raised against a mere study of an

alternative which the State, through the DENR, is authorized to undertake in the first place.
Worth noting is Article XII, Section 2, of the 1987 Constitution , which specifically provides:

SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and
conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant. (Underscoring ours)

Likewise, Section 4, Chapter II of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 states:

SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral Resources. - Mineral Resources are owned by the State and the
exploration, development, utilization, and processing thereof shall be under its full control and
supervision. The State may directly undertake such activities or it may enter into mineral
agreements with contractors. (Underscoring ours)

Thus, the State may pursue the constitutional policy of full control and supervision of the
exploration, development and utilization of the countrys natural mineral resources, by either
directly undertaking the same or by entering into agreements with qualified entities. The DENR
Secretary acted within his authority when he ordered a study of the first option, which may be
undertaken consistently in accordance with the constitutional policy enunciated above.
Obviously, the State may not be precluded from considering a direct takeover of the mines, if it
is the only plausible remedy in sight to the gnawing complexities generated by the gold rush. As
implied earlier, the State need be guided only by the demands of public interest in settling for
this option, as well as its material and logistic feasibility.

In this regard, petitioners imputation of bad faith on the part of the DENR Secretary when the
latter issued MO 97-03 is not well-taken. Hence petition denied.
G.R. No. L-69997 September 30, 1987

UNGAY MALOBAGO MINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, GREGORIA
BOLANOS, AUREA ARAOJO, GERVACIO ARAOJO, MARIA BERNAL, FELIX
DETECIO, JESUS ASUNCION, MELENCIO ASUNCION and BIENVENIDO
ASUNCION, respondents.

FACTS: Before us is a petition which seeks to set aside the decision of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming the dismissal of the petitioner's action for annulment and cancellation
of free patents granted to the private respondents on the ground that the petitioner has no
personality to file an action for reversion, the lands involved being public In character.

On July 20, 1962, the President of the Philippines granted 8 mining patents in mineral claims
located at Ungay, Malobago, Albay. Back in 1959, 2 of the patentees assigned their rights to the
mining claims in favor of petitioner. The Register of Deeds of Albay issued the respective
original certificates of titles pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496 in the names of John Canson,
Jr., Carlos Stilianopulos, and the petitioner.

Subsequently, or from 1968 to 1974, the free patents were granted by the respondent Director of
Lands and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued by the Register of Deeds
of Albay to the names of the same appelee. All the patents covered portions of the lots covered
by the patents belonging to the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint for annulment and cancellation of patents against the private
respondents and prayed that all the free patent titles issued in their favor for properties over
which original certificates of title had already been issued in its favor be declared null and void.

The Director of Lands, who was impleaded as a formal defendant, filed his answer alledging,
among others, that the petitioner has no personality to institute the cancellation proceedings
inasmuch as the government is the grantor and not the petitioner, and it should be the grantor
who should institute the cancellation proceedings.

On January 25, 1980, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that
since the disputed properties form part of disposable land of the public domain, the action for
reversion should be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines and that, therefore, the petitioner lacks personality to institute the annulment
proceedings.

The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court.

On April 5, 1984, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court. It ruled that the titles
issued to the petitioner cover mineral lands which belong to the public domain and that these
cannot be the subject of private ownership. According to the Court, under Section 101 of the
Public Land Law, only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead has the authority to
institute an action on behalf of the Republic for the cancellation of the respondents' titles and for
reversion of their homesteads to the Government.

ISSUES:

a Whether or not the appellate court committed an error of law when it ruled that the lands
in question belong to the public domain;
b Whether or not the appellate court erred in discussing the complaint on the ground that
the petitioner had no personality to institute the same.

RULING:

A. With regard to the first issue, the petitioner maintains that since its mining claims were
perfected prior to November 15, 1935, the date when the 1935 Constitution took effect, the
applicable law is the Philippine Bill of 1902 and that under this Act, a valid location of a mining
claim segregates the area from the public domain.

The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, argues that the petitioner's mining patents covered by
Torrens Titles were granted only in 1962 by the President of the Philippines, by authority of the
Constitution of the Philippines. Under the then Constitution, except for public agricultural lands,
natural resources which includes all mineral lands, shall not be alienated. (Art. XIII, Section 1,
1935 Constitution) Therefore, what the mining patents issued in 1962 conveyed to petitioner was
only the ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals within the area covered
by the petitioner's Torrens Titles but not the ownership of the land where the minerals are found.

We rule for the private respondents.

The Philippine Bill provides the procedures for the perfection of mining claims but not the dates
when such procedures were undertaken by any prospector or claimant.

Petitioner has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the locations of its mining
claims were perfected prior to November 15,1935 when the Government of Commonwealth was
inaugurated. In fact neither the original complaint nor the amended one alleged the perfection of
petitioner's mining rights prior to November 15, 1935. All that petitioner offers as evidence of its
claims were the original certificates of titles covering mining patents which embodied a uniform
"WHEREAS" clause stating that the petitioner "has fully complied with all the conditions,
requirements, and provisions of the Act of the United States of Congress of July 1, 1902, as
amended, ..." In the absence of proof that the petitioner's claims were perfected prior to the 1935
Constitution, the provision of the latter with regard to inalienable lands of the public domain will
apply.

Article XIII, Section I of the 1935 Constitution provides:

All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established
under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall
be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another
twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the at of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, although the original certificates of titles of the petitioner were issued prior to
the titles of the private respondents, the former cannot prevail over the latter for the provisions of
the Constitution which governed at the time of their issuance prohibited the alienation of mineral
lands of the public domain.

In the case of Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA 499), this Court ruled that a grantee does not
become the owner of a land illegally included in the grant just because title has been issued in his
favor:.

A patent is void at law if the officer who issued the patent had no authority to do
so (Knight v. Land Ass. 142 U.S. 161, 12 Sup. Ct., 258, 35L ED. 974; emphasis
supplied). If a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
mistake or oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens System,
or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because it
is a public forest, the grantee does not, by virtue of said certificate of title alone,
become the owner of the land illegally included. (See Ledesma vs. Municipality
of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769)

Moreover, patents and land grants are construed favorably in favor of the Government, and most
strongly against the grantee. Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention
of the Government, is to be resolved in its favor

B. The appellate court did not likewise err in concluding that the petitioner has no personality to
institute the action below for annulment and cancellation of patents. The mineral lands over
which it has a right to extract minerals remained part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain and thus, only the Solicitor General or the person acting in his stead can bring an action
for reversion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. 179674 July 28, 2009

PYRO COPPER MINING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
MINES ADJUDICATION BOARD-DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, MINES AND GEO-SCIENCES BUREAU DIRECTOR
HORACIO C. RAMOS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR SAMUEL T. PARAGAS, REGIONAL
PANEL OF ARBITRATORS ATTY. CLARO E. RAMOLETE, JR., ATTY. JOSEPH
ESTRELLA and ENGR. RENATO RIMANDO, and MONTAGUE RESOURCES
PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the
business of mining. On 31 March 2000, petitioners Application for Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA), for the exploration, development and commercial utilization of certain
pyrite ore and other mineral deposits in a 4,360.71-hectare land in Dasol, Pangasinan, was
approved and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was issued in its favor.

Private respondent is also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines
and engaged in the business of mining. Private respondent filed an Application for Exploration
Permit with MGB covering the same properties covered by and during the subsistence of APSA-
SF-000089 and MPSA No. 153-2000-1 of petitioner. In turn, petitioner filed a Verified
Protest/Opposition to the Application for Exploration Permit of the private respondent. It was
allegedly filed with the Panel of Arbitrators on 30 August 2005 and was received by the latter on
5 September 2005.

Prior, however, to petitioners filing of its Verified Protest/Opposition to the private respondents
Application for Exploration Permit, petitioners MPSA No. 153-2000-1 was cancelled, a Motion
for Reconsideration was likewise denied.

The MGB issued EP No. 05-001 to private respondent.

Panel of Arbitrators dismissed motu proprio the Verified Protest/Opposition of petitioner.

Petitioner elevated by appeal to the MAB which was also dismissed.

The case was elevated to the Court of appeals but judgment was rendered against the petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the Panel of Arbitrators has jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No.
05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent.

HELD:

NO. The Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to cancel, deny and/or revoke EP No.
05-001 issued by MGB to private respondent

Section 77 of Republic Act No. 7942 establishes the jurisdiction of the Panel of Arbitrators, thus:

Sec. 77. Panel of Arbitrators. x x x. Within thirty (30) working days, after the submission of
the case by the parties for decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to
hear and decide on the following:
 1 Disputes involving rights to mining areas;

2 Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits;

3 Disputes involving surface owners, occupants and claimholders/concessionaires; and

4 Disputes pending before the Bureau and the Department at the date of the effectivity
of this Act.

The Panel of Arbitrators only has jurisdiction over adverse claims, conflicts, and oppositions
relating to applications for the grant of mineral rights, but not over cancellation of mineral rights
already granted and existing.

As to who has jurisdiction to cancel an existing exploration permit, Section 28 of DAO NO. 96-
40 explicitly provides:

Section 28. Cancellation of an Exploration Permit. The

Director/concerned Regional Director may cancel the Exploration Permit
for failure of the Permittee to comply with any of the requirements and for
violation(s) of the terms and conditions under which the Permit is issued.
For renewed Exploration Permits, the Secretary upon the recommendation
of the Director shall cause the cancellation of the same.

According to Section 5 of DAO No. 96-40, Director means the Director of the MGB Central
Office, while Regional Director means the Regional Director of any MGB Regional Office.
As the authority to issue an Exploration Permit is vested in the MGB, then the same necessarily
includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. Indisputably, the authority
to deny, revoke, or cancel EP No. 05-001 of private respondent is already lodged with the MGB,
and not with the Panel of Arbitrators.