Arroyo vs De Venecia: Challenge to Sin Tax Law Passage

9/6/2015 Arroyo vs De Venecia : 127255 : August 14, 1997 : J.
Mendoza : En Banc
ENBANC
[G.R.No.127255.August14,1997]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,

WIGBERTO E. TAADA, and RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE
COMMISSIONEROFINTERNALREVENUE,respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA,J.:
Thisisapetitionforcertiorariand/orprohibitionchallengingthevalidityofRepublicActNo.
8240,whichamendscertainprovisionsoftheNationalInternalRevenueCodebyimposingso
calledsintaxes(actuallyspecifictaxes)onthemanufactureandsaleofbeerandcigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against
respondentsJosedeVenecia,SpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives,DeputySpeakerRaul
Daza,MajorityLeaderRodolfoAlbano,theExecutiveSecretary,theSecretaryofFinance,and
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which
petitionersclaimareconstitutionallymandatedsothattheirviolationistantamounttoaviolation
oftheConstitution.
ThelaworiginatedintheHouseofRepresentativesasH.No.7198.Thisbillwasapproved
onthirdreadingonSeptember12,1996andtransmittedonSeptember16,1996totheSenate
which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A
bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
HouseandSenateversionsofthebill.
The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the
CommitteeonWaysandMeans,proceededtodeliverhissponsorshipspeech,afterwhichhe
was interpellated. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when
Rep.Arroyomovedtoadjournforlackofquorum.Rep.AntonioCuencoobjectedtothemotion
andaskedforaheadcount.Afterarollcall,theChair(DeputySpeakerRaulDaza)declaredthe
presence of a quorum.[1] Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeatedwhenputtoavote.Theinterpellationofthesponsorthereafterproceeded.
PetitionerRep.JokerArroyoregisteredtointerpellate.Hewasfourthintheorder,following
Rep.RogelioSarmiento,Rep.EdcelC.LagmanandRep.EnriqueGarcia.Inthecourseofhis
interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise a question on the quorum,
althoughuntiltheendofhisinterpellationheneverdid.Whathappenedthereafterisshownin
thefollowingtranscriptofthesessiononNovember21,1996oftheHouseofRepresentatives,
aspublishedbyCongressinthenewspaperissuesofDecember5and6,1996:
MR.ALBANO.Mr.Speaker,Imovethatwenowapproveandratifytheconferencecommittee
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/aug1997/127255.htm 1/13
9/6/2015 Arroyo vs De Venecia : 127255 : August 14, 1997 : J. Mendoza : En Banc
report.
THEDEPUTYSPEAKER(Mr.Daza).Anyobjectiontothemotion?
MR.ARROYO.Whatisthat,Mr.Speaker?
THEDEPUTYSPEAKER(Mr.Daza).Therebeingnone,approved.
(Gavel)
MR.ARROYO.No,no,no,waitaminute,Mr.Speaker,Istoodup.Iwanttoknowwhatisthe
questionthattheChairaskedthedistinguishedsponsor.
THEDEPUTYSPEAKER(Mr.Daza).TherewasamotionbytheMajorityLeaderforapproval
ofthereport,andtheChaircalledforthemotion.
MR.ARROYO.Objection,Istoodup,soIwantedtoobject.
THEDEPUTYSPEAKER(Mr.Daza).Thesessionissuspendedforoneminute.
(Itwas3:01p.m.)
(3:40p.m.,thesessionwasresumed)
THEDEPUTYSPEAKER(Mr.Daza).Thesessionisresumed.
MR.ALBANO.Mr.Speaker,Imovetoadjournuntilfouroclock,Wednesday,nextweek.
THEDEPUTYSPEAKER(Mr.Daza).Thesessionisadjourneduntilfouroclock,Wednesday,
nextweek.
(Itwas3:40p.m.)
Onthesameday,thebillwassignedbytheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentativesand
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
CongressashavingbeenfinallypassedbytheHouseofRepresentativesandbytheSenateon
November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November22,1996.
Petitionersclaimthatthereareactuallyfourdifferentversionsofthetranscriptofthisportion
ofRep.Arroyosinterpellation:(1)thetranscriptofaudiosoundrecordingoftheproceedingsin
thesessionhallimmediatelyafterthesessionadjournedat3:40p.m.onNovember21,1996,
which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system (2)
thetranscriptoftheproceedingsfrom3:00p.m.to3:40p.m.ofNovember21,1996,ascertified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman(3)thetranscriptoftheproceedingsfrom3:00p.m.to3:40p.m.ofNovember21,1996
ascertifiedbytheChiefoftheTranscriptionDivisiononNovember28,1996,alsoobtainedby
Rep. Lagman and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four
versionsdifferonthreepoints,towit:(1)intheaudiosoundrecordingthewordapproved,which
appearsonline13inthethreeotherversions,cannotbeheard(2)inthetranscriptcertifiedon
November21,1996thewordnoonline17appearsonlyonce,whileintheotherversionsitis
repeatedthreetimesand(3)thepublishedversiondoesnotcontainthesentence(Y)oubetter
prepare for a quorum because I will raise the question of the quorum, which appears in the
otherversions.
Petitionersallegationsarevehementlydeniedbyrespondents.However,thereisnoneedto
discussthispointaspetitionershaveannouncedthat,inordertoexpeditetheresolutionofthis
petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by the
respondents.Petitionersagreethatforpurposesofthisproceedingthewordapprovedappears
inthetranscripts.
OnlytheproceedingsoftheHouseofRepresentativesontheconferencecommitteereport
onH.No.7198areinquestion.PetitionersprincipalargumentisthatR.A.No.8240isnulland
voidbecauseitwaspassedinviolationoftherulesoftheHousethattheserulesembodythe
constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitutionitself.TheycontendthatthecertificationofSpeakerDeVeneciathatthelawwas
properlypassedisfalseandspurious.
Morespecifically,petitionerschargethat(1)inviolationofRuleVIII,35andRuleXVII,103
of the rules of the House,[2] the Chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the
House,didnotcallfortheyeasornays,butsimplyaskedforitsapprovalbymotioninorderto
prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum (2) in violation of Rule
XIX,112,[3]theChairdeliberatelyignoredRep.Arroyosquestion,Whatisthat...Mr.Speaker?
anddidnotrepeatRep.Albanosmotiontoapproveorratify(3)inviolationofRuleXVI,97,[4]
the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albanos
motion and afterward declared the report approved and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121122,
Rule XXI, 123, and Rule XVIII, 109,[5] the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on
Rep.Arroyosquestionwhich,itisalleged,isapointoforderoraprivilegedmotion.Itisargued
that Rep. Arroyos query should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on
November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remainedupontheresumptionofthesession.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November
21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo
fromformallychallengingtheexistenceofaquorumandaskingforareconsideration.
PetitionersurgetheCourtnottofeelboundbythecertificationoftheSpeakeroftheHouse
thatthelawhadbeenproperlypassed,consideringtheCourtspowerunderArt.VIII,1topass
on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government, and they
ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[6] which affirmed the
conclusivenessofanenrolledbill,inviewofthechangedmembershipoftheCourt.
TheSolicitorGeneralfiledacommentinbehalfofallrespondents.Inaddition,respondent
DeVeneciafiledasupplementalcomment.Respondentsdefenseisanchoredontheprinciple
of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the
properforumfortheenforcementoftherulesoftheHouseandthatthereisnojustificationfor
reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine.Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for
the adoption by each House of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be
soughtinthecourtsexceptinsofarastheyimplementconstitutionalrequirementssuchasthat
relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events,
respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the
House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference committee reports on
meremotion,werefaithfullyobserved.
Inhissupplementalcomment,respondentDeVeneciadeniesthathiscertificationofH.No.
7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives,
coveringthesessionsofNovember20and21,1996,showsthatOnMotionofMr.Albano,there
being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No.
7198.[7]ThisJournalwasapprovedonDecember2,1996overtheloneobjectionofpetitioner
Rep.Lagman.[8]
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that
Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is
thereforedismissed.
First.It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 2627. Petitioners do not
claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the
rulesoftheHouse,Rep.Arroyowaseffectivelypreventedfromquestioningthepresenceofa
quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provisionthateachHousemaydeterminetherulesofitsproceedings[9]andthatforthisreason
theyarejudiciallyenforceable.Tobeginwith,thiscontentionstandstheprincipleonitshead.In
thedecidedcases,[10]theconstitutionalprovisionthateachHousemaydeterminetherulesofits
proceedings was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of
autonomyofthelegislativebranchtoconductitsbusinessfreefrominterferencebycourts.Here
petitionerscitetheprovisionfortheoppositepurposeofinvokingjudicialreview.
Butthecases,bothhereandabroad,invaryingformsofexpression,alldenytothecourts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to
comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a
constitutionalprovisionortherightsofprivateindividuals.InOsmeav.Pendatun,[11]itwasheld:
At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation,modificationorwaiveratthepleasureofthebodyadoptingthem.And it has been
saidthatParliamentaryrulesaremerelyprocedural,andwiththeirobservance,thecourtshave
noconcern.They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failuretoconformtoparliamentaryusagewillnotinvalidatetheaction(takenbyadeliberative
body)whentherequisitenumberofmembershaveagreedtoaparticularmeasure.
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,[12] the rule was stated thus: The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutionalrestraintsorviolatefundamentalrights,andthereshouldbeareasonablerelation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
wouldbebetter,moreaccurate,orevenmorejust.Itisnoobjectiontothevalidityofarulethat
adifferentonehasbeenprescribedandinforceforalengthoftime.Thepowertomakerulesis
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challengeofanyotherbodyortribunal.
InCrawfordv.Gilchrist,[13]itwasheld:TheprovisionthateachHouseshalldeterminethe
rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing
rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative matters but in the absence of
constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such
authorityextendstoadeterminationoftheproprietyandeffectofanyactionasitistakenbythe
bodyasitproceedsintheexerciseofanypower,inthetransactionofanybusiness,orinthe
performanceofanydutyconferreduponitbytheConstitution.
InStateexrel.CityLoan&SavingsCo.v.Moore,[14]theSupremeCourtofOhiostated:The
provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the
controloftheGeneralAssembly.Havingmadetherule,itshouldberegarded,butafailureto
regard it is not the subjectmatter of judicial inquiry.It has been decided by the courts of last
resortofmanystates,andalsobytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,thatalegislativeactwill
notbedeclaredinvalidfornoncompliancewithrules.
InStatev.SavingsBank,[15]theSupremeCourtofErrorsofConnecticutdeclareditselfas
follows: The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules of its own
proceedingsandshallhaveallpowersnecessaryforabranchoftheLegislatureofafreeand
independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly
within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative
departmentforthecourttosetasidesuchactionasvoidbecauseitmaythinkthattheHouse
hasmisconstruedordepartedfromitsownrulesofprocedure.
InMcDonaldv.State,[16] the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: When it appears that an act
wassopassed,noinquirywillbepermittedtoascertainwhetherthetwohouseshaveorhave
not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introductionandfinalpassage.Thepresumptionisconclusivethattheyhavedoneso.Wethink
no court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for noncompliance with the rules of
proceduremadebyitself,ortherespectivebranchesthereof,andwhichitortheymaychange
orsuspendatwill.Ifthereareanysuchadjudications,wedeclinetofollowthem.
Schweizer v. Territory[17] is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of
Oklahomaprovidedforthreereadingsonseparatedaysbeforeabillmaybepassedbyeach
house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned
may,bytwothirdsvote,suspendtheoperationoftherule.Plaintiffwasconvictedinthedistrict
court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling
statutewasnotproperlypassedbythelegislaturebecausethesuspensionoftheruleonthree
readingshadnotbeenapprovedbytherequisitetwothirdsvote.Dismissingthiscontention,the
StateSupremeCourtofOklahomaheld:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular
manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules,
or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a
statutory provision for the direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its
entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto; but this alone, even though it is
shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be
no reason for the courts refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each branch
of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations.
McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N. W. 187; State v. Brown,
33 S.C. 151, 11 S. E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S. W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice
Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings.Hewrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts
ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. The above principle is subject,
however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than
members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.[18]
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
insteadofseekingredressintheHouse,chosetotransferthedisputetothisCourt.Wehaveno
morepowertolookintotheinternalproceedingsofaHousethanmembersofthatHousehave
tolookoverourshoulders,aslongasnoviolationofconstitutionalprovisionsisshown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on
whichourconstitutionalorderrests.Dueregardfortheworkingofoursystemofgovernment,
morethanmerecomity,compelsreluctanceonourparttoenteruponaninquiryintoanalleged
violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our
power.
Second.Petitioners,quotingformerChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcionssponsorshipinthe
ConstitutionalCommission,contendthatunderArt.VIII,1,nothinginvolvingabuseofdiscretion
[bytheotherbranchesofthegovernment]amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionisbeyond
judicial review.[19] Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy
requirementofArt.VIII,5and,therefore,totherequirementofajusticiablecontroversybefore
courtscanadjudicateconstitutionalquestionssuchasthosewhichariseinthefieldofforeign
relations.ForwhileArt.VIII,1hasbroadenedthescopeofjudicialinquiryintoareasnormally
left to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security,[20] it has
notaltogetherdoneawaywithpoliticalquestionssuchasthosewhichariseinthefieldofforeign
relations.Aswehavealreadyheld,underArt.VIII,1,thisCourtsfunction
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the
Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.[21]
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on
accountmerelyofnoncompliancewithrulesofproceduremadebyitself,itfollowsthatsucha
case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has gone beyond the
constitutionallimitsofitsjurisdictionsoastocallfortheexerciseofourArt.VIII,1power.
Third.PetitionersclaimthatthepassageofthelawintheHousewasrailroaded.Theyclaim
that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albanos
motionapproved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report,MajorityLeaderRodolfoAlbanomovedfortheapprovalandratificationoftheconference
committeereport.The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared:
Therebeingnone,approved.AtthesametimetheChairwassayingthis,however,Rep.Arroyo
was asking, What is that . . . Mr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking
simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders
motion,theapprovaloftheconferencecommitteereporthadbythenalreadybeendeclaredby
theChair,symbolizedbyitsbangingofthegavel.
Petitionersarguethat,inaccordancewiththerulesoftheHouse,Rep.Albanosmotionfor
theapprovaloftheconferencecommitteereportshouldhavebeenstatedbytheChairandlater
theindividualvotesoftheMembersshouldhavebeentaken.Theysaythatthemethodusedin
thiscaseisalegislatorsnightmarebecauseitsuggestsunanimitywhenthefactwasthatoneor
somelegislatorsopposedthereport.
NoruleoftheHouseofRepresentativeshasbeencitedwhichspecificallyrequiresthatin
casessuchasthisinvolvingapprovalofaconferencecommitteereport,theChairmustrestate
the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor
Generalhaspointedout,themannerinwhichtheconferencecommitteereportonH.No.7198
wasapprovedwasbynomeansauniqueone.Ithasbasisinlegislativepractice.Itwastheway
the conference committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of
1991andtheconferencecommitteereportonthebillsamendingtheTariffandCustomsCode
wereapproved.
In1957,thepracticewasquestionedasbeingcontrarytotherulesoftheHouse.Thepoint
wasansweredbyMajorityLeaderArturoM.Tolentinoandhisanswerbecametherulingofthe
Chair.Mr.Tolentinosaid:
Mr. Tolentino. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter
of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been
the procedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the
voting comes in.
....
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is
now on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial
compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional
requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote
by saying Is there any objection? and nobody objects, then the Chair announces The bill is approved on
second reading. If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide would have been proper. So, if
that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I believe there is
substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and
the Chair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against.[22]
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better,
moreaccurateandevenmorejust.[23]Theadvantagesordisadvantages,thewisdomorfollyof
amethoddonotpresentanymatterforjudicialconsideration.[24]InthewordsoftheU.S.Circuit
Court of Appeals, this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstandingthedeferenceandesteemthatisproperlytenderedtoindividualcongressional
actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even
attemptingadiagnosisoftheproblem.[25]
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken
everytimeaHousehastovote,exceptonlyinthefollowinginstances:uponthelastandthird
readingsofabill,[26]attherequestofonefifthoftheMemberspresent,[27]andinrepassingabill
overthevetoofthePresident.[28]Indeed,consideringthefactthatintheapprovaloftheoriginal
bill the votes of the Members by yeasandnays had already been taken, it would have been
sheertediumtorepeattheprocess.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a
result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.[29] It would
appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem,
becausewhenitresumedat3:40p.m.onthatdayRep.Arroyodidnotsayanythinganymore.
WhileitistruethattheMajorityLeadermovedforadjournmentuntil4p.m.ofWednesdayofthe
following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he wanted to
say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows:
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four
oclock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)
ThisJournalwasapprovedonDecember2,1996.Again,nooneobjectedtoitsapprovalexcept
Rep.Lagman.
Itisthusapparentthatpetitionerspredicamentwaslargelyoftheirownmaking.Insteadof
submittingthepropermotionsfortheHousetoactupon,petitionersinsistedonthependencyof
Rep.Arroyosquestionasanobstacletothepassageofthebill.ButRep.Arroyosquestionwas
not,informorsubstance,apointoforderoraquestionofprivilegeentitledtoprecedence.[30]
And even if Rep. Arroyos question were so, Rep. Albanos motion to adjourn would have
precedenceandwouldhaveputanendtoanyfurtherconsiderationofthequestion.[31]
Giventhisfact,itisdifficulttoseehowitcanplausiblybecontendedthatinsigningthebill
whichbecameR.A.No.8240,respondentSpeakeroftheHousebeactedwithgraveabuseof
his discretion. Indeed, the phrase grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdictionhasasettledmeaninginthejurisprudenceofprocedure.It means such capricious
andwhimsicalexerciseofjudgmentbyatribunalexercisingjudicialorquasijudicialpowerasto
amounttolackofpower.AsChiefJusticeConcepcionhimselfsaidinexplainingthisprovision,
the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, 1 extends to cases where a branch of the
governmentoranyofitsofficialshasactedwithoutjurisdictionorinexcessofjurisdiction,orso
capriciouslyastoconstituteanabuseofdiscretionamountingtoexcessofjurisdiction.[32]
Here,themattercomplainedofconcernsamatterofinternalprocedureoftheHousewith
whichtheCourtshouldnotbeconcerned.Torepeat,theclaimisnotthattherewasnoquorum
butonlythatRep.Arroyowaseffectivelypreventedfromquestioningthepresenceofaquorum.
Rep.Arroyosearliermotiontoadjournforlackofquorumhadalreadybeendefeated,astheroll
callestablishedtheexistenceofaquorum.Thequestionofquorumcannotberaisedrepeatedly
especiallywhenthequorumisobviouslypresentforthepurposeofdelayingthebusinessofthe
House.[33]Rep.Arroyowaivedhisobjectionbyhiscontinuedinterpellationofthesponsorforin
sodoingheineffectacknowledgedthepresenceofaquorum.[34]
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be
presentonNovember21,1996,onlythefive,i.e.,petitionersinthiscase,arequestioningthe
mannerbywhichtheconferencecommitteereportonH.No.7198wasapprovedonthatday.
Noone,exceptRep.Arroyo,appearstohaveobjectedtothemannerbywhichthereportwas
approved.Rep.JohnHenryOsmeadidnotparticipateinthebicameralconferencecommittee
proceedings.[35]Rep.LagmanandRep.Zamoraobjectedtothereport[36]butnottothemanner
it was approved while it is said that, if voting had been conducted, Rep. Taada would have
votedinfavoroftheconferencecommitteereport.[37]
Fourth.Undertheenrolledbilldoctrine,thesigningofH.No.7198bytheSpeakerofthe
HouseandthePresidentoftheSenateandthecertificationbythesecretariesofbothHousesof
CongressthatitwaspassedonNovember21,1996areconclusiveofitsdueenactment.Much
energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice
Davide,todisputingthisdoctrine.Tobesure,thereisnoclaimeitherhereorinthedecisionin
theEVATcases[Tolentinov.SecretaryofFinance]thattheenrolledbillembodiesaconclusive
presumption. In one case[38] we went behind an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determinewhethercertainprovisionsofastatutehadbeenapprovedbytheSenate.
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certificationofthepresidingofficersofbothHousesthatabillhasbeendulypassed.Underthis
rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the threefourths vote needed to pass a
proposedamendmenttotheConstitutionhadnotbeenobtained,becauseadulyauthenticated
billorresolutionimportsabsoluteverityandisbindingonthecourts.[39]ThisCourtquotedfrom
WigmoreonEvidencethefollowingexcerptwhichembodiesgood,ifoldfashioned,democratic
theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the
misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have
almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of
trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate
legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit
upon the name of popular government.[40]
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference
committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed
have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee surreptitiously inserted
provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled
copy of the bill. To disregard the enrolled bill rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our government.[41]
Ithasrefusedtolookintochargesthatanamendmentwasmadeuponthelastreadingofa
bill in violation of Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution that upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendmentshallbeallowed.[42]
Inothercases,[43]thisCourthasdeniedclaimsthatthetenorofabillwasotherwisethanas
certifiedbythepresidingofficersofbothHousesofCongress.
Theenrolledbilldoctrine,asaruleofevidence,iswellestablished.Itiscitedwithapproval
bytextwritershereandabroad.[44]Theenrolledbillrulerestsonthefollowingconsiderations:
. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the
custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that
assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving
the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the Constitution.[45]
Tooverrulethedoctrinenow,asthedissenturges,istorepudiatethemassiveteachingof
ourcasesandoverthrowanestablishedruleofevidence.
Indeed,petitionershaveadvancednoargumenttowarrantadeparturefromtherule,except
to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new members may be
assumedtohaveanopenmindonthequestionoftheenrolledbillrule.Actually,notthreebut
four(Cruz,Feliciano,Bidin,andQuiason,JJ.)havedepartedfromtheCourtsinceourdecision
intheEVATcasesandtheirplaces havesincebeentakenbyfournewmembers(Francisco,
Hermosisima,Panganiban,andTorres,JJ.)Petitionersarethussimplybankingonthechange
inthemembershipoftheCourt.
Moreover,asalreadynoted,thedueenactmentofthelawinquestionisconfirmedbythe
JournaloftheHouseofNovember21,1996whichshowsthattheconferencecommitteereport
onH.No.7198,whichbecameR.A.No.8240,wasapprovedonthatday.Thekeepingofthe
JournalisrequiredbytheConstitution.Art.VI,16(4)provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting
such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
Constitutiontoberecordedtherein.[46]Withrespecttoothermatters,intheabsenceofevidence
tothecontrary,theJournalshavealsobeenaccordedconclusiveeffect.Thus,inUnitedStates
v. Pons,[47] this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as
publicmemorialsofthemostpermanentcharacter,thus:Theyshouldbepublic,becauseallare
required to conform to them they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the
faithofwhathasbeendeclaredtobelawshallnotbedestroyedtomorrow,oratsomeremote
periodoftime,byfactsrestingonlyinthememoryofindividuals.Asalreadynoted,thebillwhich
becameR.A.No.8240isshownintheJournal.Henceitsdueenactmenthasbeendulyproven.
___________________
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this
Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregardeditsownrulesofprocedure,ortoallowthosedefeatedinthepoliticalarenatoseek
arematchinthejudicialforumwhenpetitionerscanfindtheirremedyinthatdepartmentitself.
The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined,oflegislativeskullduggery.Itwouldbeactinginexcessofitspowerandwoulditself
beguiltyofgraveabuseofitsdiscretionwereittodoso.Thesuggestionmadeinacase[48]may
instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the
repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240.In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court
mustassumethatCongressoranyHousethereofactedinthegoodfaithbeliefthatitsconduct
was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that
body.[49]
WHEREFORE,thepetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionisDISMISSED.
SOORDERED.
Narvasa,C.J.,Padilla,Melo,Kapunan,Francisco,andHermosisima,Jr.,JJ.,concur.
Romero,J.,hasaseparateopinion.
Puno,J.,hasaseparateconcurringanddissentingopinion.
Davide,Jr.,J.,joinedtheconcurringanddissentingopinionofJusticePuno.
Vitug,J.,hasaseparateconcurringopinion.
Regalado,J.,intheresult.
Bellosillo,J.,tooknopartduetorelationshipwithparties.
Panganiban,J.,tooknopart.Formercounselofaparty.
Torres,Jr.,J.,onleaveduringthedeliberations.
[1]JournalNo.39,pp.66,68Rollo,pp.210,212TranscriptofNovember21,1996session,pp.3952Rollo,pp.
368381Petition,p.6,par.10Rollo,p.8.
[2]
RuleVIII,35.Voting.Everymemberpresentinthesessionshallvoteoneveryquestionputunlessheinhibits
himselfonaccountofpersonalpecuniaryinteresttherein.
RuleXVII,103.MannerofVoting.TheSpeakershallrisetoputaquestionsayingAsmanyasareinfavorof(as
thequestionmaybe),sayAyeand,aftertheaffirmativevoteiscounted,Asmanyasareopposed,sayNay
....
[3]Rule XIX, 112.Reading and Withdrawal of Motions.The Speaker shall state the motion or, if in writing, shall
causeittobereadbytheSecretaryGeneralbeforebeingdebated.Amotionmaybewithdrawnanytime
beforeitsapproval.
[4]Rule XVI, 97.Recognition of Member.When two or more members rise at the same time, the Speaker shall
recognizetheMemberwhoistospeakfirst.
[5]
RuleXX,121.Definition.Questionsofprivilegearethoseaffectingtheduties,conduct,rights,privileges,dignity,
integrityorreputationoftheHouseorofitsmembers,collectivelyorindividually.
122. Precedence. Subject to the tenminute rule, questions of privilege shall have precedence over all other
questions,exceptamotiontoadjournandapointoforder.
RuleXXI,123.DefinitionandPrecedence.Aprivilegedmotionpertainstoasubjectmatterwhich,undertherules,
takesprecedenceoverothers.
Theorderofprecedenceofprivilegedmotionsisdeterminedineachcasebytherules.
RuleXVIII,109.WhoMayVoteProcedureExceptions.Whenabill,reportormotionisadoptedorlost,amember
whovotedwiththemajoritymaymoveforitsreconsiderationonthesameorsucceedingsessionday.The
motionshalltakeprecedenceoverallotherquestions,exceptamotiontoadjourn,aquestionofprivilege,
andapointoforder.
[6]235SCRA630(1994).
[7]Rollo,p.228.
[8]Id.,p.229.
[9]Art.VI,16(3).
[10]E.g.,UnitedStatesv.Ballin,Joseph&Co.,144U.S.1,36L.Ed.321(1862)ExxonCorp.v.FTC,589F.2d582
(1978)Murrayv.Buchanan,674F.2d14(1982)Metzenbaumv.FederalEnergyRegulatoryComn,675
F.2d1282(1982).SeealsoOsmeav.Pendatun,109Phil.863(1960).
[11]109Phil.at87071.SeealsoEVATcases[Tolentinov.SecretaryofFinance],235SCRA630.
[12]144U.S.at5,36L.Ed.at32425(emphasisadded).
[13]64Fla.4159So.963,968(1912)(emphasisadded).
[14]124OhioSt.256,177N.E.910,911(1931)(emphasisadded).
[15]79Conn.141,64Atl.5,910(1906)(emphasisadded).
[16]80Wis.407,50N.W.185,186(1891)(emphasisadded).
[17]5Okl.297,47Pac.1094(1897)(emphasisadded).
[18] Enrique M. Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines Annotated 188189 (1977) Pacete v. Secretary of the
CommissiononAppointments,40SCRA58(1971).
[19]Petition,p.25,quotingthesponsorshipspeechofformerChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion,chairmanofthe
CommitteeonJudiciaryoftheConstitutionalCommission,in1RecordsoftheConstitutionalCommission
436(SessionofJuly10,1986).
[20]Gonzalesv.Macaraig,191SCRA452(1990)SeeMarcosv.Manglapus,177SCRA668,695(1989)Lansang
v.Garcia,42SCRA448(1971).
[21]Cov. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692,701 (1991) Llamas v. Orbos, 202
SCRA849,857(1991)Lansangv.Garcia,42SCRAat480481(emphasisadded).
[22]4Cong.Rec.413414(Feb.15,1957).
[23]United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 144 U.S. at 5, 36 L.Ed. at 32425 State v. Lewis, 186 S.E. 625, 630
(1936).
[24]UnitedStatesv.Smith,286U.S.6,76L.Ed.954(1931).
[25]Greggv.Barrett,771F.2d539,549(1985).
[26]Art.VI,26(2).
[27]Id.,16(4).
[28]Id.,27(1).
[29]Id.,p.17id.,p.19.
[30]Inocencio Pareja, Rules of the House of Representatives Commented and Annotated 331 (1963) Reynaldo
Fajardo,PrinciplesofParliamentaryProcedure157158,172173(1963).
[31]RuleXIX,13.
[32]1RecordsoftheConstitutionalCommission436(SessionofJuly10,1986).
[33]AliceSturgis,StandardCodeofParliamentaryProcedure,17(1950).
[34]PaulMason,ManualofLegislativeProcedure335(1953).
[35]ConferenceCommitteeReport,Rollo,p.36Petition,p.14Rollo,p.16.
[36]Ibid.
[37]Petition,p.14Rollo,p.16.
[38]Astorgav.Villegas,56SCRA714(1974).
[39]Mabanagv.LopezVito,78Phil.1,12(1947).
[40] Id. at 17, quoting 4 John Wigmore, Treatise on the Law on Evidence 1350 at 702 (1940). This excerpt is
preserved in the Chadbourne edition of this locus classicus. See 4 Wigmore on Evidence 1350 at 834
(JamesH.Chadbourne,ed.1972).
[41] EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance], 235 SCRA at 672. Cf. Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131
(1969).
[42]PhilippineJudgesAssnv.Prado,227SCRA703,710(1993)Moralesv.Subido,27SCRA131.
[43]CascoPhilippineChemicalCo.,Inc.v.Gimenez,7SCRA347(1963)Resins,Inc.v.AuditorGeneral,25SCRA
754(1968).
[44]4WigmoreonEvidence1350(JamesH.Chadbourne,ed.1972)6ManuelV.Moran,CommentsontheRules
ofCourt115(1980)7VicenteJ.Francisco,TheRevisedRulesofCourt(Pt.II)454(1973).
[45]MarshallField&Co.v.Clark,143U.S.649,672,36L.Ed.294,303(1891).
[46]ThefollowingarerequiredtobeenteredontheJournal:(1)Theyeasandnaysonthethirdandfinalreadingof
a bill (Art. VI, 26(2)) (2) the yeas and nays on any question, at the request of onefifth of the members
present(Id.,16(4))(3)theyeasandnaysuponrepassingabilloverthePresidentsveto(Id.,27(1)and(4)
thePresidentsobjectiontoabillwhichhehasvetoed.(Id.)
[47]34Phil.729,735(1916),quotingStateexrel.Herronv.Smith,44Ohio348(1886).
[48]Greggv.Barrett,771F.2d529.
[49]Metzenbaumv.FederalEnergyRegulatoryComn,675F.2d1282.

Arroyo vs De Venecia: Challenge to Sin Tax Law Passage

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Arroyo vs De Venecia: Challenge to Sin Tax Law Passage

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

9/6/2015 Arroyo vs De Venecia : 127255 : August 14, 1997 : J.

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA,

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

Você também pode gostar