Collective Bargaining Agreement

Padua, Arjie Paul C.
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Collective Bargaining Agreement
The Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter CBA), like a compromise

agreement, is the result of the mutual concession of the parties, particularly of the: Sole and
Exclusive Bargaining Agent (hereinafter SEBA) and of the Management. The agreement
contains the stipulation of the parties wherein they had agreed to meet "halfway" from their
contradicting demands. Said agreement must contain such stipulations that must be beyond the
minimum as provided in the Labor Code; otherwise, such "Sweetheart CBA" is void and the
responsible parties shall suffer the penalties provided under the Labor Code for committing
Unfair Labor Practice (hereinafter ULP). Not only is CBA desirable, it is also mandatory.
The SEBA and the management, which represents the employer, have the "duty
to bargain" and to arrive at a mutually agreed upon concessions to be contained in the CBA.
Failure, refusal, or bargaining in bad faith, subjects the parties responsible thereto to penalties
for commission of a ULP, because such acts constitute ULP. It is commonly misunderstood that
the SEBA must be the one to initiate the negotiations to arrive at a CBA. Contrary to such
popular opinion is the fact that both of them, or either of them, must initiate said negotiations.
The CBA has a term of effectivity of five (5) years, and it is intended to afford the
Appropriate Bargaining Unit (hereinafter ABU) benefits beyond that which is provided under
Labor Standards. For such reason, Sweetheart CBA's are considered as ULP's.
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR
FACTS: On Sept 6, 1984 the med-arbiter certified the Divine Word University Employees Union as the
sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word University. The union submitted its proposals on
March 7, 1985. The Universitys reply requested that a preliminary conference be held on May 28, 1985.
Before the conference the VP of the union resigned and withdrew the proposals hence the PC was
cancelled. After three years, the affiliate of the union, Associated Labor Union, requested a conference
with the University for the purposes of continuing the bargaining negotiations. Not having heard from the
university, a follow up request was sent and warned the university from intereference. The university
maintained it silence. The union thereafter filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock
and ULP, refusal to bargain, discrimination and coercion. Conferences were held after the filing of the
notice of strike and the parties came to an agreement. It was found however, that the university filed for a
petition for certification election one hour before the agreement was concluded. The union then submitted
proposals which were again ignored by the university. Marathon conciliations were held to no avail. The
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Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction and directed that all striking workers to report back to work within 24
hours.
ISSUE: Whether or not certification election can be held after CBA was agreed upon after 5 years.
LAW: ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in
collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later
than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
CASE HISTORY: NLRC: dismissed. SOLE: dismissed. SC: dismissed.
RULING: NO.
An employer who is requested to bargain collectively may file a petition for certification election
any time, except upon clear showing the existence of either:
1) petition is filed within one year from the issuance of a final certification election result; OR
2) when a bargaining deadlock had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become
the subject of a valid notice of strike or lockout.
Deadlock is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of

neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or factions. There is a deadlock when there is a
complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal and opposed forces.
The records of the case show that there was no reasonable effort at good faith bargaining on the
part of the university.
The union after submitting proposals which were ignored by the university remained passive.
Technically, the university has the right to file the petition for certification election as there was no
bargaining deadlock. However such right was forfeited by its inaction.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. Despite the fact that the fundamental law of the
land encourages the formation of unions, and that doubts shall be resolved in favor of labor, the unions
ought to respect this favor through not letting a substantial amount of time lapse before they file their
actions against wrongful acts of the management. The management cannot be left in a position where
they hang in fear of the impending action against them for quite too long.
LAKAS NG MANGAGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN VS MARCELO ENTERPRISE
FACTS: On May 23, 1967, the Lakas had existing CBAs within the bargaining units in the respective
companies comprising Marcelo Companies. The said CBAs were entered into while they were affiliated
with a national federation, Phil Social Security Labor Union. Two of the CBAs were about to expire in May
and June 1967. The other one faced conflict as there was a rival union. On March 14, 1967, the
management of Marcelo Steel received a letter requesting negotiation of a new CBA from PSSLU in
behalf of UNWU. There were also proposals from the unions in Marcelo Tire and Marcelo Rubber as the
existing CBA was about to expire. Same day, the union on Marcelo Tire revoked the authorization of
PSSLU as their agent. Afterwards, the rival union submitted its own proposals. Another request was
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received on May 3, 1967 and May 23, 1967 from two different unions. As the management was confused
as to which of the union really represents the workers, the president asked for the proof of authorization
from the unions and they were informed of the conflicting claims and suggested that they file for
certification election and the decision of the court shall be followed and respected. PSSLU refused the
suggestion of the management and said that they will file ULP for refusing to bargain with them. All of the
unions subsequently filed a Notice of Strike.
ISSUE: Whether there is a legitimate representation for purposes of collective bargaining.
LAW: Article 240: Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or workers shall
acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate
labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements.
xxx The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit where it seeks to operate; xxx.
CASE HISTORY: Court of Industrial Relations: Denied.
RULING: NONE.
Lakas was not the bargaining representative, yet the management did not ignore the demand for
collective bargaining neither it was refused.
Marcelo Companies may rightfully demand for reasonable proof of majority representation on the
part of the supposed or putative bargaining agent as it is a natural consequence of the employers duty to
bargain with the bargaining agent who represents the majority of the workers. It is, however, necessary
that such demand is made in good faith and not as a pretext of delay or evasion.
OPINION: It is only just and equitable that, in case of confusion on the part of the management, said
management question as to who is the true and correct bargaining agent, this is especially true because
of the by-stander rule; Because in accordance with this rule, the management/employer has no
participation or whatsoever in the election of the sole and exclusive bargaining agent.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS TRAJANO
FACTS: Capitol Medical Center is a hospital in QC. CMCEA-AFW is duly registered labor union acting as
the certified collective bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the hospital. The Union sent a
letter to the hospital requesting a negotiation of their CBA. The hospital refused to bargain with the union
as it challenges the unions legitimacy. The union filed for the cancellation of the certificate of registration
of the union. A notice of strike was filed by the union in return. There was a conference, however, the
parties still failed to amicably settle. The union staged a strike but they were subsequently ordered to
return to work and the management to resume usual operations.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration is a prejudicial question
before the Sec of Labor could order parties to bargain collectively.
LAW: Article 278 (g): When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike
or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for
compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining
the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has
already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
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immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all
workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of
Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to
ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (M). CA: (M).
RULING: NO.
The pendency of the petition for cancellation does not preclude collective bargaining and the
assumption of the jurisdiction by the Sec of Labor as he has the discretionary power to assume
jurisdiction when the exigency of the situation calls for it.
OPINION: I disagree with the herein ruling. I am of the opinion that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies must still be upheld. The case herein involves only the personal interests of the
employees and the management; and not the interest in a national scale.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS CONFESOR
FACTS: Standard Chartered is foreign Banking Corporation doing business in the Philippines. The
exclusive bargaining agent is the Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union.
In August 1990, the bank and the union signed a five year CBA and renegotiate after 3 years.
Prior to the expiration of the three year period and before the 60 day freedom period, the union initiated
the negotiations. The bank gave a counter-proposal. The parties agreed to settle the differences in a
meeting.
The non-economic provisions were noted as deferred however it was manifested that it should be
changed to deadlock to indicate that it is not yet resolved. The negotiations of the economic provisions
were commenced. Umali, the president of the union, said that the means on how the union got what it
wanted during the first negotiation of the 1987 will be applied again if needed in order to get what it
wanted.
The union insisted the economic provisions however; the union proposed that the bank make a
revision of itemized proposal. On June 15, 1993 the union said that it would be best if they seek third
party assistance if the counter proposal was not revised. Afterwards, the bank presented a
counterproposal.
The union, then declared deadlock and filed a notice of strike before NCMB. The bank filed a
complaint for ULP alleging that the union did not bargain in good faith, violated the no strike-no lockout
clause, and that the bank suffered nominal and actual damages and was forced to litigate and hire the
services of a lawyer.
The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered the parties to
execute a CBA incorporating the dispositions: CBA shall be retroactive to April 1, 1993; effective for two
years; the provisions which are not expressly repealed or modified are retained and without prejudice to
the agreements as the parties may arrive at in the meantime. The banks complaint for ULP was
dismissed for lack of merit. Both parties filed for MR to no avail. On March 22, 1994, the parties signed
the CBA.
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ISSUE: Whether the Bank violated its duty to bargain by committing surface bargaining; and
Whether the Union committed ULP through Blue Sky Bargaining
LAW: Article 259: It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice:
xxx (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this code.
CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (M). SC: (M)
RULING: NO.
It was held that the Union failed to show that the Bank committed such acts.
Surface bargaining is the going through the motions of negotiating without any legal intent to
reach an agreement. The determining factor is a question of intent of the party in question and intent is
inferred from the totality of the challenged partys conduct away or at the bargaining table. The Bank
likewise failed to show that the economic demands by the union are exaggerated or unreasonable.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling. It would be totally unjust and inequitable for an employer to be held to
commit ULP simply because the union or SEBA is dissatisfied with the result of the negotiations. In fact,
Substantial Proof is a light quantum of evidence for them to prove; correspondingly, failure to prove it
renders their logic full of flaws.
KIOK LOY VS NLRC
FACTS: On Oct 3, 1978 the Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa a LLO won in the certification election and
subsequently certified in a resolution by the BLR as the sole bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant. The companys MR was denied.
On Dec 7, 1978 the union furnished the company of its proposal for the CBA and requested for a
counterproposal to no avail. Two subsequent requests were made but itbwere ignored and remained
unacted byt the company. The union then filed a notice of strike with the BLR based on the ground of
unresolved economic issues in the CBA.
Conciliation proceedings were made but the amicable settlements failed. Compulsory arbitration
was resorted however the parties failed to submit position papers then there were subsequent
postponements and resets of the hearing. Upon the submission of the union of its position paper, it was
again reset to another date, the company filed its position paper on May 28, 1979.
There were postponements again.
The labor arbiter submitted a report to NLRC and declared that the company is guilty of
unjustified refusal to bargain. The draft agreement submitted was found to be reasonable under the
premises.
ISSUE: Whether the company violated its duty to bargain.
CASE HISTORY: LA: Union. NLRC: Union. SC: Union.
RULING: YES.
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The SC found that there was a valid cause to complain against the company.
Collective bargaining is the negotiations towards a collective agreement, democratic frameworks

designed to stabilize the relations between the labor and management and to create a climate of sound
and stable industrial peace.
It is a mutual responsibility of both parties; however, the employer is not under the obligation of
initiating contract negotiation.
Jurisdictional preconditions:
1) status of majority representation of the employees
2) proof of majority
3) demand to bargain
The three Jurisdictional preconditions enumerated above were proved by the union.
A companys refusal to make counter proposal may indicate bad faith and especially true when
left unanswered. The undue delay during the compulsory arbitration leads to no other conclusion except
that it is unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling. Without any counter-offer or acceptance, how can collective bargaining
commence? The management herein was evidently in bad faith due to the fact of successive petitions for
postponement.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR
FACTS: The parties has a pending case before the Secretary of Labor who rendered a decision ordering
that they execute the CBA incorporating the modifications made by the Secretary.
Some of the alleged members of the union filed an intervention and reconsideration as well as the
supervisors union. They were ordered to file comments. Petitioner warns that if the wage increase of
P2,200.00 per month as ordered by the Secretary is allowed, it would simply pass the cost covering such
increase to the consumers through an increase in the rate of electricity. This is a non sequitur. The Court
cannot be threatened with such a misleading argument. An increase in the prices of electric current needs
the approval of the appropriate regulatory government agency and does not automatically result from a
mere increase in the wages of petitioners employees. An estimate by the All Asia financial analyst stated
that petitioners net operating income for the same year was about P5.7 billion, a figure which the Union
relies on to support its claim. Assuming without admitting the truth thereof, the figure is higher than the
P4.171 billion allegedly suggested by petitioner as its projected net operating income. The P5.7 billion
which was the Secretarys basis for granting the P2,200.00 is higher than the actual net income of P5.1
billion admitted by petitioner. It would be proper then to increase this Courts award of P1,900.00 to
P2,000.00 for the two years of the CBA award. For 1992, the agreed CBA wage increase for rank-and-file
was P1,400.00 and was reduced to P1,350.00; for 1993; further reduced to P1,150.00 for 1994. For
supervisory employees, the agreed wage increase for the years 1992-1994 are P1,742.50, P1,682.50 and
P1,442.50, respectively. Based on the foregoing figures, the P2,000.00 increase for the two-year period
awarded to the rank-and-file is much higher than the highest increase granted to supervisory employees.
ISSUE: Retroactivity of the CBA
LAW: Article 253-A: If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on
the duration of retroactivity thereof.
CASE HISTORY: SOLE: Union. SC: (M).
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RULING: The Court in the January 27, 1999 Decision, stated that the CBA shall be effective for a period
of 2 years counted from December 28, 1996 up to December 27, 1999. Parenthetically, this actually
covers a three-year period. Labor laws are silent as to when an arbitral award in a labor dispute where the
Secretary had assumed jurisdiction by virtue of Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code shall retroact. In general,
a CBA negotiated within six months after the expiration of the existing CBA retroacts to the day
immediately following such date and if agreed thereafter, the effectivity depends on the agreement of the
parties.
On the other hand, the law is silent as to the retroactivity of a CBA arbitral award or that granted
not by virtue of the mutual agreement of the parties but by intervention of the government. Despite the
silence of the law, the Court rules herein that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the
expiration of the last CBA shall retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or
their union. Absent such an agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the
six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of
a CBA, the Secretarys determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over
arbitral awards shall control. It is true that an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an
agreement voluntarily entered into by the parties because it requires the interference and imposing power
of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction. However, the arbitral award can be
considered as an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been
entered into by the parties. The terms or periods set forth in Article 253-A pertains explicitly to a CBA. But
there is nothing that would prevent its application by analogy to an arbitral award by the Secretary
considering the absence of an applicable law.
OPINION: I agree with the aforementioned ruling. The law should not be interpreted as to be completely
silent in case there is a law that would be applicable through analogy. The Philippine courts are not only
courts of law, but also of equity.
MANILA CENTRAL LINE CORPORATION vs. MANILA CENTRAL LINE FREE WORKERS UNION-
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR
FACTS: This case arose out of a collective bargaining deadlock between petitioner and private
respondent Manila Central Line Free Workers Union-National Federation of Labor. The parties collective
bargaining agreement had expired on March 15, 1989. As the parties failed to reach a new agreement,
private respondent sought the aid of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on October 30, 1989,
but the deadlock remained unresolved.
At the initial hearing before the labor arbiter, the parties declared that conciliation efforts before
the NCMB had terminated and it was their desire to submit the case for compulsory arbitration.
Accordingly, they were required to submit their position papers and proposals, which they did, and in
which they indicated portions of their respective proposals to which they agree, leaving the rest for
arbitration.
The LA ordered the petitioner UNION and the respondent COMPANY are directed to execute and
formalize their new five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) retroactive to the date of expiry of the
1986-1989 CBA by adopting the provisions in the aforementioned text which incorporated therein in the
dispositions set forth by this Arbitrator within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Decision.
Petitioner also contends that in ordering the new CBA to be effective on March 15, 1989, the
expiry date of the old CBA, the labor arbiter acted contrary to Art. 253-A of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Retroactivity of the CBA
LAW: Article 253-A: If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties shall agree on
the duration of retroactivity thereof.
CASE HISTORY: LA: (U). NLRC: (U). SC: (U).
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RULING: Art. 253-A refers to collective bargaining agreements entered into by the parties as a result of
their mutual agreement. The CBA in this case, on the other hand, is part of an arbitral award. As such, it
may be made retroactive to the date of expiration of the previous agreement.
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of
arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as
herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine
the effectivity thereof.
OPINION: The Secretary of Labor is a person whose position grants him authority to act as such by virtue
of his vast knowledge and experience with regard to labor law. And as such, he should be accorded with
discretion to supply the law with applicable suppletory interpretations based on the long line of decisions
of the Supreme Court.
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY, CO., INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
FACTS: The National Federation of Labor (NFL, for brevity) was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co.,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Company). As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit which it represented. However, the
same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by petitioner Company, so that the former was prompted to
file a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to bargain
collectively. Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid issued an order declaring (a) herein petitioner
Company guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA between the regular
rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company. Petitioner Company appealed the
above order to the NLRC. On November 15, 1989, the NLRC rendered a decision dismissing the appeal
for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied. Petitioner Company filed a
petition for certiorari with this Court. But the Court dismissed said petition. The records of the case were
remanded to the arbitration branch of origin of the execution of Labor Arbiter Abdulwahids Order, dated
March 31, 1987, granting monetary benefits consisting of wage increases, housing allowances, bonuses,
etc. to the regular rank-and-file employees. Following a series of conferences to thresh out the details of
computation, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo S. Villena issued an Order, dated October 18, 1993, directing
petitioner Company to pay the 142 employees entitled to the aforesaid benefits the respective amounts
due them under the CBA. Petitioner Company complied; and the corresponding quitclaims were
executed. The case was considered closed following NFLs manifestation that it will no longer appeal the
October 18, 1993 Order of Labor Arbiter Villena. The petitioner filed for relief was filed and was treated as
an appeal by the NLRC, which was granted. Petitioner Company filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondents are entitled to the benefits under the CBA because they are
employees hired after the term of a CBA are not parties to the agreement, and therefore, may not claim
benefits thereunder, even if they subsequently become members of the bargaining unit.
LAW: Article 264: When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However,
either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior
to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.
CASE HISTORY: LA: (U). NLRC: (U).
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RULING: YES. When a collective bargaining contract is entered into by the union representing the
employees and the employer, even the non-member employees are entitled to the benefits of the
contract. To accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason would constitute
undue discrimination against nonmembers. The benefits under the CBA in the instant case should be
extended to those employees who only became such after the year 1984. To exclude them would
constitute undue discrimination and deprive them of monetary benefits they would otherwise be entitled to
under a new collective bargaining contract to which they would have been parties. Since in this particular
case, no new agreement had been entered into after the CBAs stipulated term, it is only fair and just that
the employees hired thereafter be included in the existing CBA. This is in consonance with our ruling that
the terms and conditions of a collective bargaining agreement continue to have force and effect even
beyond the stipulated term when no new agreement is executed by and between the parties to avoid or
prevent the situation where no collective bargaining agreement at all would govern between the employer
company and its employees.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. The employees hired subsequent to the adoption
of the CBA have no other means to negotiate their desires; hence, at least, they should be accorded with
the terms and conditions of the previous CBA.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION-PTGWO vs. HON. MA. NIEVES D. CONFESOR
FACTS: June 28, 1990, petitioner-union San Miguel Corporation Employees Union PTGWO entered
into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with private respondent San Miguel Corporation (SMC) to
take effect upon the expiration of the previous CBA or on June 30, 1989. Magnolia and Feeds and
Livestock Division were spun-off and became two separate and distinct corporations: Magnolia
Corporation (Magnolia) and San Miguel Foods, Inc. (SMFI). Notwithstanding the spin-offs, the CBA
remained in force and effect. The CBA was renegotiated in accordance with the terms of the CBA and
Article 253-A of the Labor Code. Negotiations started sometime in July, 1992 with the two parties
submitting their respective proposals and counterproposals. During the negotiations, the petitioner-union
insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of the spun-off corporations:
Magnolia and SMFI; and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA shall be effective only for the remaining
period of two years or until June 30, 1994. SMC, on the other hand, contended that the
members/employees who had moved to Magnolia and SMFI, automatically ceased to be part of the
bargaining unit at the SMC. Furthermore, the CBA should be effective for three years in accordance with
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code. Unable to agree on these issues with respect to the bargaining unit and
duration of the CBA, petitioner-union declared a deadlock on September 29, 1990. On October 2, 1992, a
Notice of Strike was filed against SMC. In order to avert a strike, SMC requested the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board (NCMB) to conduct preventive mediation. No settlement was arrived at despite
several meetings held between the parties. On November 3, 1992, a strike vote was conducted which
resulted in a yes vote in favor of a strike. On November 4, 1992, private respondents SMC, Magnolia
and SMFI filed a petition with the Secretary of Labor praying that the latter assume jurisdiction over the
labor dispute in a vital industry.
ISSUES: Whether the duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective for three years or
for only two years.
LAW: Article 265: Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as
the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately
before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after
its execution.
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CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (3 years).
RULING: Three Years.
This new provision states that the CBA has a term of five (5) years instead of three years, before
the amendment of the law as far as the representation aspect is concerned. All other provisions of the
CBA shall be negotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. The phrase All other provisions
simply refers to the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non-economic provisions, except representation.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the court. This is in accordance with the elementary rule in statutory
construction that whenever the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation.
RIVERA vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU
FACTS: On June 5, 1998, PAL pilots affiliated with the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
(ALPAP) went on a three-week strike, causing serious losses to the financially beleaguered flag
carrier. As a result, PALs financial situation went from bad to worse. Faced with bankruptcy, PAL adopted
a rehabilitation plan and downsized its labor force by more than one-third. On July 22, 1998, PALEA went
on strike to protest the retrenchment measures adopted by the airline, which affected 1,899 union
members. The strike ended four days later, when PAL and PALEA agreed to a more systematic reduction
in PALs work force and the payment of separation benefits to all retrenched employees. On August 28,
1998, then President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 16 creating an Inter-Agency
Task Force (Task Force) to address the problems of the ailing flag carrier.
On September 4, 1998, PAL management submitted to the Task Force an offer by private
respondent Lucio Tan of a plan to transfer shares of stock to its employees. On September 10, 1998, the
Board of Directors of PALEA voted to accept Tans offer and requested the Task Forces assistance in
implementing the same. Union members, however, rejected Tans offer. Under intense pressure from
PALEA members, the unions directors subsequently resolved to reject Tans offer. On September 17,
1998, PAL informed the Task Force that it was shutting down its operations effective September 23, 1998,
preparatory to liquidating its assets and paying off its creditors. On September 23, 1998, PAL ceased its
operations and sent notices of termination to its employees. Two days later, the PALEA board wrote
President Estrada anew, seeking his intervention. PALEA offered a 10-year moratorium on strikes and
similar actions and a waiver of some of the economic benefits in the existing CBA. Tan, however, rejected
this counter-offer. On September 27, 1998, the PALEA board again wrote the President for proposals.
On October 2, 1998, PALEA members cast their votes in a DOLE-supervised referendum. Of the votes
cast, 61% were in favor of accepting the PAL-PALEA agreement. On October 7, 1998, PAL resumed
domestic operations. On the same date, seven officers and members of PALEA filed this instant petition
to annul the September 27, 1998 agreement entered into between PAL and PALEA.
ISSUE: Whether the agreement was meant merely to suspend the existing PAL-PALEA CBA, and to
foreclose any renegotiation or any possibility to forge a new CBA.
LAW: Article 265: Terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Any Collective Bargaining Agreement
that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of
five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be
entertained and no certification election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment
outside of the sixty-day period immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be
renegotiated not later than three (3) years after its execution. Any agreement on such other provisions of
the Collective Bargaining Agreement entered into within six (6) months from the date of expiry of the term
of such other provisions as fixed in such Collective Bargaining Agreement, shall retroact to the day
immediately following such date. If any such agreement is entered into beyond six months, the parties
shall agree on the duration of the retroactivity thereof. In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of the
collective bargaining agreement, the parties may exercise their rights under this Code.
CASE HISTORY: Direct action to the Supreme Court through a Petition for Certiorari.
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RULING: NO. The assailed PAL-PALEA agreement was the result of voluntary collective bargaining
negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial situation faced by the employer, with the
peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial peace at PAL, but preventing the latters
closure. We find no conflict between said agreement and Article 265 of the Labor Code.
OPINION: The agreement is in consonance with the purpose of the labor code, specifically with its
provisions relating to labor relations, to promote industrial peace. And as such, it must be upheld.
DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES v ABARQUEZ
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent and the exclusive collective bargaining agent of the rank and
file workers entered into collective bargaining agreement under Sections 1 and 3, Article VIII thereof,
provide for sick leave with pay benefits each year to its employees who have rendered at least one (1)
year of service with the company, thus: Section 1. Sick Leaves The Company agrees to grant 15 days
sick leave with pay each year to every regular non-intermittent worker who already rendered at least one
year of service with the company. However, such sick leave can only be enjoyed upon certification by a
company designated physician, and if the same is not enjoyed within one year period of the current year,
any unused portion thereof, shall be converted to cash and shall be paid at the end of the said one year
period. And provided however, that only those regular workers of the company, whose work are not
intermittent, are entitled to the herein sick leave privilege. Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the
company who are members of the Regular Labor Pool shall be entitled to vacation and sick leaves per
year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number of hours rendered including
overtime. Upon its renewal, the coverage of the said benefits was expanded to include the "present
Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this Agreement." Section 3, Article VIII, as revised, provides,
thus: "Section 3. All intermittent field workers of the company who are members of the Regular Labor
Pool and present Regular Extra Labor Pool as of the signing of this agreement shall be entitled to
vacation and sick leaves per year of service with pay under the following schedule based on the number
of hours rendered including overtime. Any unused portion thereof at the end of the current year was
converted to cash and paid at the end of the said one-year period pursuant to Sections 1 and 3, Article
VIII of the CBA. The commutation of the unused portion of the sick leave with pay benefits of the
intermittent workers or its conversion to cash was, however, discontinued or withdrawn when petitioner-
company under a new assistant manager, Mr. Benjamin Marzo (who replaced Mr. Cecilio Beltran, Jr. upon
the latter's resignation), stopped the payment of its cash equivalent on the ground that they are not
entitled to the said benefits under Sections 1 and 3 of the 1989 CBA.
ISSUE: Whether the intermittent field workers are entitled to conversion to cash of any unused sick
leave.
LAW: Article 252: Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under
such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but
such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
CASE HISTORY: National Conciliation and Mediation Board: (U).
RULING: YES. It was said that CBA is not an ordinary contract but impressed with public interest, thus it
must yield to the common good.
It is erroneous for petitioner to isolate Section 1, Article VIII of the 1989 CBA from the other
related section on sick leave with pay benefits, specifically Section 3 thereof, in its attempt to justify the
discontinuance or withdrawal of the privilege of commutation or conversion to cash of the unused portion
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of the sick leave benefit to regular intermittent workers because well-settled is it that the said privilege of
commutation or conversion to cash, being an existing benefit, the petitioner-company may not unilaterally
withdraw, or diminish such benefits.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. Many of the applicants conduct inquiries with the
current employees of employers with regard to the benefits that said employees offer. They rely upon
such fact that in case they would be hired, they would enjoy the same benefits. Thus, withdrawal of the
same would constitute, indeed, injustice.
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY v PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION
FACTS: On May 31, 1939, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an order, directing the petitioner
herein, Pampanga Bus Company, Inc., to recruit from the respondent, Pambusco Employees' Union, Inc.,
new employees or laborers it may need to replace members of the union who may be dismissed from the
service of the company, with the proviso that, if the union fails to provide employees possessing the
necessary qualifications, the company may employ any other persons it may desire. This order, in
substance and in effect, compels the company, against its will, to employ preferentially, in its service, the
members of the union.
ISSUE: Whether the right of the employer to select its employees was violated.
LAW: 1987 Constitution, Article 3, Section 18: (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his
political beliefs and aspirations. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
CASE HISTORY: Court of Industrial Relations: (U).
RULING: Yes. We hold that the court has no authority to issue such compulsory order. The general right
to make a contract in relation to one's business is an essential part of the liberty of the citizens protected
by the due-process clause of the Constitution. The right of the laborer to sell his labor to such person as
he may choose is, in its essence, the same as the right of an employer to purchase labor from any person
whom it chooses. The employer and the employee have thus an equality of right guaranteed by the
Constitution. "If the employer can compel the employee to work against the latter's will, this is servitude. If
the employee can compel the employer to give him work against the employer's will, this is oppression."
(Mills vs. United States Printing Co)
OPINION: I agree with the aforementioned Ruling. Whatever may be the advantages of "collective
bargaining," it is not bargaining at all, in any just sense, unless it is voluntary on both sides.
ATU v TRAJANO
FACTS: Private respondent TUPAS filed a petition for a certification election. ATU opposed said petition.
Nonetheless, the petition was granted. ATU claims that TUPAS: (1) filed the petition even though it did not
contain the signatures of 30% of the workers; and (2) filed the petition when the contract-bar rule still
exists because a new collective bargaining agreement had been entered into by ATU with the company.
ISSUE: Whether TUPAS was barred to file the petition under the contract-bar rule.
LAW: Section 3, Rule 5, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations: a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty days prior to the expiry date of an
existing collective bargaining agreement.
CASE HISTORY: Med-Arbiter: ATU. Director of Labor Relations: ATU.
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RULING: NO. The said CBA was entered into at a time when the petition for certification election had
already been filed by TUPAS and was then pending resolution. The CBA cannot be deemed permanent,
precluding the commencement of negotiation by another union with the management. In the meantime
however, so as not to deprive the workers of the benefits of the said agreement, it shall be recognized
and given effect on a temporary basis, subject to the results of the certification election. The agreement
may be continued in force if ATU is certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers or
may be rejected and replaced in the event that TUPAS emerged as the winner.
OPINION: I agree with the above-mentioned ruling. The current petition clearly is a mere dilatory tactic in
order to maintain the status quo.
AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES v. CLAVE
FACTS: On January 4, 1960, the petitioner entered into a contract with the Marine Security Agency for
the latter to guard and protect the petitioner's vessels while they were moored at the port of Manila. It was
stipulated in the contract that its term was for one year commencing from the date of its execution and it
may be terminated by either party 30 days' notice to the other. The relationship between the petitioner and
Marine Security Agency is such that it was the latter who hired and assigned the guards who kept
watching over the petitioner's vessels. The guards were not known to petitioner who dealt only with the
agency on matters pertaining to the service of the guards. A lump sum would be paid by petitioner to the
agency who in turn determined and paid the compensation of the individual watchmen.- Upon prior notice
given by the petitioner to the Marine Security Agency, the contract was terminated on January 4, 1961,
after it had run its term. After the termination of its contract with Marine Security Agency, the petitioner
executed a new contract with the Philippine Scout Veterans Security and Investigation Agency also for the
purpose of having its vessels protected while they called at the port of Manila, and this contract was also
for a fixed period of one year.- private respondents protested against the termination- On February 6,
1961, the respondent Union passed a resolution abolishing itself with the following reasons:1. Termination
of Contract of the Marine Security Agency with the American President Lines.2. Inability of the Marine
Security Agency to provide employment3. Inability of the members and the Union to provide maintenance
in the coming months.- On December 10, 1962, the respondent union passed another resolution reviving
itself.- On March 21, 1963, the Maritime Security Union, through private respondents filed a complaint
against the petitioner for unfair labor practice under RA 875. Their complaint, wherein they charged that
the petitioner had refused to negotiate an agreement with them and had discriminated against them with
regard to their tenure of employment by dismissing them for no other reason than their membership with
the union and union activities, was lodged with the defunct Court of Industrial Relations. However, before
that court could resolve the case, the Labor Code was enacted and the case was transferred to the NLRC
under Arbiter Lomabao.- Arbiter Lomabao found the petitioner to be an employer of the private
respondents and guilty of ULP against them.- The NLRC affirmed with the qualification that only those
complainants who are 60 years oldor younger and capacitated to discharge their former duties should be
reinstated without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and with three years of backwages; and
those who could not be so reinstated should be given separation pay in addition to their backwages for
three years. The Minister of Labor affirmed, and the Office of the President affirmed as well.
ISSUES: whether the petitioner refused to negotiate a CBA with the said individual watchmen and
discriminated against them in respect to their tenure of employment by terminating their contract because
of their union activities.
LAW: Article 248: Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any
of the following unfair labor practice: xxx To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other
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terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization. xxx.
CASE HISTORY: NLRC: (U). SOLE: (U)
RULING: NO. There is no employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and the members of
the respondent agency, it should necessarily follow that the petitioner cannot be guilty of unfair labor
practice as charged by the private respondents.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. There cannot be, indeed, an unfair labor practice
when there is no relationship between them as governed by the labor code.
GENERAL MILLING CORP v CA
FACTS: In its two plants located at Cebu City and Lapu-Lapu City, petitioner General Milling Corporation
(GMC) employed 190 workers. They were all members of private respondent General Milling Corporation
Independent Labor Union. On April 28, 1989, GMC and the union concluded a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) which included the issue of representation effective for a term of three years. The day
before the expiration of the CBA, the union sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter-
proposal be submitted within ten (10) days. However, GMC had received collective and individual letters
from workers who stated that they had withdrawn from their union membership, on grounds of religious
affiliation and personal differences. Believing that the union no longer had standing to negotiate a CBA,
GMC did not send any counter-proposal.
On December 16, 1991, GMC wrote a letter to the unions officers, Rito Mangubat and Victor
Lastimoso. The letter stated that it felt there was no basis to negotiate with a union which no longer
existed, but that management was nonetheless always willing to dialogue with them on matters of
common concern and was open to suggestions on how the company may improve its operations. In
answer, the union officers wrote a letter dated December 19, 1991 disclaiming any massive disaffiliation
or resignation from the union and submitted a manifesto, signed by its members, stating that they had not
withdrawn from the union.
ISSUE: Whether GMC is guilty of ULP.
LAW: Article 248: Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit
any of the following unfair labor practice: (g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by
this Code; xxx.
Article 250: Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in
collective bargaining: (a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later
than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice. xxx.
CASE HISTORY: NLRC: (U). SOLE: (U)
RULING: Yes. GMCs failure to make a timely reply to the proposals presented by the union is indicative
of its utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union. Its excuse that it felt the union no longer
represented the workers, was mainly dilatory as it turned out to be utterly baseless. Failing to comply with
the mandatory obligation to submit a reply to the unions proposals, GMC violated its duty to bargain
collectively, making it liable for unfair labor practice.
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OPINION: I agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would be to render the
provision regarding the duty to bargain inutile, for employers would merely desist from entering into the
process of bargaining in order to prevent the adoption of CBAs.
NESTLE PHIL v NLRC
FACTS: Four (4) collective bargaining agreements separately covering the petitioner's employees in its
Alabang/Cabuyao factories; Makati Administration Office. (Both Alabang/Cabuyao factories and Makati
office were represented by the respondent, Union of Filipro Employees [UFE]);Cagayan de Oro Factory
represented by WATU; and Cebu/Davao Sales Offices represented by the Trade Union of the Philippines
and Allied Services (TUPAS), all expired on June 30, 1987. UFE was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent for all regular rank-and-file employees at the petitioner's Cagayan de Oro factory, as well
as its Cebu/Davao Sales Office. In August 1987, while the parties, were negotiating, the employees at
Cabuyao resorted to a "slowdown" and walk-outs prompting the petitioner to shut down the factory.
Marathon collective bargaining negotiations between the parties ensued. On September 1987, the UFE
declared a bargaining deadlock. On September 8, 1987, the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and
issued a return to work order. In spite of that order, the union struck, without notice, at the
Alabang/Cabuyao factory, the Makati office and Cagayan de Oro factory on September 11, 1987 up to
December 8, 1987. The company retaliated by dismissing the union officers and members of the
negotiating panel who participated in the illegal strike. The NLRC affirmed the dismissals on November 2,
1988. On January 26, 1988, UFE filed a notice of strike on the same ground of CBA deadlock and unfair
labor practices. However, on March 30, 1988, the company was able to conclude a CBA with the union at
the Cebu/Davao Sales Office, and on August 5, 1988, with the Cagayan de Oro factory workers. The
union assailed the validity of those agreements and filed a case of unfair labor practice against the
company on November 16, 1988. After conciliation efforts of the NCMB yielded negative results, the
dispute was certified to the NLRC. The NLRC issued a resolution on June 5, 1989, whose pertinent
disposition regarding the union's demand for liberalization of the company's retirement plan for its
workers. The NLRC issued a resolution denying the motions for reconsideration. With regard to the
Retirement Plan, the NLRC held that anent management's objection to the modification of its Retirement
Plan, the plan is specifically mentioned in the previous bargaining agreements thereby integrating or
incorporating the provisions thereof to the agreement. By reason of its incorporation, the plan assumes a
consensual character which cannot be terminated or modified at will by either party. Consequently, it
becomes part and parcel of CBA negotiations. Petitioner alleged that since its retirement plan is non-
contributory, Nestle has the sole and exclusive prerogative to define the terms of the plan because the
workers have no vested and demandable rights, the grant thereof being not a contractual obligation but
merely gratuitous. At most the company can only be directed to maintain the same but not to change its
terms. It should be left to the discretion of the company on how to improve or modify the same.
ISSUE: Whether the workers have vested and demandable rights over the retirement plan.
LAW: Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith.
CASE HISTORY: NLRC: (U). SOLE: (U).
RULING: YES. The inclusion of the retirement plan in the collective bargaining agreement as part of the
package of economic benefits extended by the company to its employees to provide them a measure of
financial security after they shall have ceased to be employed in the company, reward their loyalty, boost
their morale and efficiency and promote industrial peace, gives "a consensual character" to the plan so
that it may not be terminated or modified at will by either party.
OPINION: I agree with the Ruling. CBAs are in the nature of a contract between the employer and the
SEBA. As such, it must be accorded the force of law as between them, otherwise, the CBA is useless and
futile.
RAZON v SOLE
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FACTS: Petitioner E. Razon, Inc. (ERI) is a corporation organized in 1962 principally to bid for the right to
operate arrastre services in Manila. They acquired rights to operate Manilas south harbor starting 1974.
(The company was later renamed MPSI)
On July 19, 1986 or two years before the expiration of the eight-year term, the PPA cancelled the
management contract for alleged violations thereof. PPA took over the cargo-handling operations as well
as all the equipment of MPSI
Two days later or on July 21, 1986, the PPA issued Permit No. 104286 for cargo-handling
services to Marina Port Services, Inc. (MARINA). The latter began the arrastre services and required all
workers of ERI/MPSI to accomplish individual information sheets. Weeks later, the bulk of the 2,700
employees concerned discovered that they had been hired by MARINA as new employees effective July
21, 1986. Hence, they clamored for the payment of their separation pay but both the MARINA and
ERI/MPSI refused to be liable therefor.
Secretary took jurisdiction. He held that it was MPSIs liability to pay the separation pay, even if
MARINA assumed the liabilities of MPSI. This was because such liability was personal (in personam),
hence not enforceable against a successor-employer.
ISSUE: WON MARINA assumed liability for paying the employees separation pay by honoring the terms
and conditions in the CBA between Razon and its employees.
CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (MARINA)
RULING: NO. By absorbing ERI/MPSI employees and honoring the terms and conditions in the collective
bargaining agreement between ERI/MPSI and the employees, MARINA did not assume the responsibility
of ERI/MPSI to pay separation pay to its employees. The fact that a couple of days later, the PPA, without
public bidding, issued to MARINA, permit to operate, does not imply that MARINA stepped into the shoes
of ERI/MPSI as if there were absolute identity between them. There is no privity of contract between
ERI/MPSI and MARINA so as to make the latter a common or even substitute employer that it should be
burdened with the obligations of the former. Admittedly, the consequent separation from the employment
of its employees was not of the ERI/MPSIs own making. However, it may not validly lay such
consequence on the lap of MARINA which, like itself, had no hand in the termination of the management
contract by the PPA.
OPINION: I agree with the Ruling. The fact that MARINA honored the CBA, does not mean that it is
already a continuation of MPSI. The act of honoring the CBA is a mere act if liberality on its part.
MACTAN WORKERS v ABOITIZ
FACTS: Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapu-lapu City is employing laborers and
employees belonging to two rival labor unions. Namely plaintiff, Mactan Workers Union(MWU) and
intervenor appellant Associated Labor Union (ALU). On November 28, 1964, the defendant Cebu
Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. and the Associated Labor
Union entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement which mandate a profit sharing bonus of
10% of its net income derived from the direct operation of its shipyard and shop in LapuLapu City for its
labourers and workers. The profit sharing bonus shall be paid by the company to ALU of which ALU will
deliver it to the employees. Unclaimed bonuses shall be returned to the management. The delivery should
be in 2 instalments, 1st payable in March and the 2nd payable in June every year.
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In 1965, the 2nd instalment given in June were not received by members of the rival Mactan
Workers Union (MWU) because they did not went to the ALU office to receive their shares. After the 60
day period has lapse, ALU returned the funds to the management with an advice to management to
refrain from delivering the amount to the members of MWU without a court order otherwise ALU will take
steps to protect the interests of its members. Because of the warning from ALU, the company deposited
the amount of P4,035.82 with the Labor Administrator. The MWU filed a case with the lower court to
recover the amount. The lower court ordered the company to deliver the sum of money to ALU and for
ALU to pay the members of MWU their corresponding shares. Hence, the appeal of intervenor ALU.
ISSUE: Whether the intervenor ALU and defendant company violated the terms and conditions of the
CBA.
CASE HISTORY: RTC: (U).
RULING: YES. The terms and conditions of the CBA constitute the law between the parties. Those who
are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a CBA
extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit including those who do not belong
to the chosen bargaining labor organization.
OPINION: I agree with the Ruling. It is a well-settled rule in Labor law based on a long line of decisions of
the Supreme Court, that the SEBA serves merely as the sole bargaining agent and not as the sole union
to benefit from the CBA. To rule otherwise would be to set-up a situation where-in the LLOs would fight
over for the position of being the SEBA so that they can benefit from the CBA with a mindset that they
would not be able to enjoy the CBA were they not the SEBA.
ALEX FERRER vs. NLRC
FACTS: Petitioners were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental Foundry Corporation
(OFC) in Malanday, Valenzuela, Metro Manila which was under the management of Hui Kam Chang. As
piece workers, petitioners earnings ranged from P110 to P140 a day. They had been in the employ of
OFC for about ten years at the time of their dismissal in 1989. Samahang Manggagawa ng Occidental
Foundry Corporation-FFW (SAMAHAN) and the OFC entered into a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) which would be effective for the three-year period between October 1, 1988 and September 30,
1991. Sec. 1 The company agrees that all permanent and regular factory workers in the company who
are members in good standing of the union or who thereafter may become members, shall as a condition
of continued employment, maintain their membership in the union in good standing for the duration of the
agreement. Sec. 3 The parties agree that failure to retain membership in good standing with the
UNION shall be ground for the operation of paragraph 1 hereof and the dismissal by the company of the
aforesaid employee upon written request by the union. The aforesaid request shall be accompanied by a
verified carbon original of the Board of (sic) Resolution by the UNION signed by at least a majority of its
officers/directors.
On May 6, 1989, petitioner Alex Ferrer and the SAMAHAN, filed in the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), a complaint for the expulsion from SAMAHAN of the following officers: Genaro
Capitle (president), Jesus Tumagan (vicepresident), Godofredo Pacheco (auditor), and Marcelino
Pacheco (board member). The complaint was founded on said officers alleged inattentiveness to the
economic demands of the workers. However, on September 4, 1989, petitioners Diaz and Alex Ferrer
withdrew the petition. On September 10, 1989, petitioners conducted a special election of officers of the
SAMAHAN. Said election was, however, later questioned by the FFW. Nonetheless, the elected set of
officers tried to dissuade the OFC from remitting union dues to the officers led by Capitle who were allied
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with the FFW. Later, however, Romulo Erlano, one of the officers elected at the special election,
manifested to the DOLE that he was no longer objecting to the remittance of union dues to the officers led
by Capitle. Petitioners move to stage a strike based on economic demands was also later disowned by
members of the SAMAHAN. The intra-union dispute led the union in requesting that Ferrer and others be
dismissed. Petitioners sent individual letters to Hui Kam Chang professing innocence of the charges
levelled against them by the SAMAHAN and the FFW and pleading that they be reinstated, to no avail.
Thus, contending that their dismissal was without cause and in utter disregard of their right to due
process of law, petitioners, through the FEDLU, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor
practice before the NLRC.
CASE HISTORY: LA: (M). NLRC: (M).
RULING: CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance therewith is mandated by
the express policy to give protection to labor. Said policy should be given paramount consideration unless
otherwise provided for by law.
No hearing was ever conducted by the SAMAHAN to look into petitioners explanation of their
moves to oust the union leadership under Capitle, or their subsequent affiliation with FEDLU. The
Samahan did not comply with their own law even if the employees are the erring parties. While the law
recognizes the right of an employer to dismiss employees in warranted cases, it frowns upon arbitrariness
as when employees are not accorded due process. An employee may be considered illegally dismissed
because he was not accorded fair investigation.
OPINION: I agree with the above ruling. The prerogative of dismissing should not have been whimsically
done for it unduly exposes oneself to a charge of unfair labor practice, more so without due process.
TUPAS v FERRER-CALLEJA
FACTS: From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
workers in the Meat and Canning Division of the Universal Robina Corporation, with a 3-year collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) which was to expire on November 15, 1987.
Within the freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA, TUPAS filed an amended
notice of strike on September 28, 1987 as a means of pressuring the company to extend, renew, or
negotiate a new CBA with it.
On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to the IGLESIA NI
KRISTO sect, registered as a labor union. On October 12, 1987, the TUPAS staged a strike.
ROBINA obtained an injunction against the strike, resulting in an agreement to return to work and
for the parties to negotiate a new CBA. The next day, October 13, 1987, NEW ULO, claiming that it has
the majority of the daily wage rank and file employees numbering 191, filed a petition for a certification
election at the Bureau of Labor Relations (Annex A).
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TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and that the members of the
NEW ULO were mostly members of the Iglesia ni Kristo sect which three (3) years previous refused to
affiliate with any labor union. It also accused the company of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS
bargaining rights (Annex B).
ISSUE: whether the petition to hold a certification election should be granted.
LAW: Article 264: When there is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall
also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its lifetime. However,
either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior
to its expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties.
CASE HISTORY: Med-Arbiter: NEW ULO. Bureau of Labor Relations: NEW ULO.
RULING: Yes. Upholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union
for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own
union. The public respondent correctly observed that the recognition of the tenets of the sect should
not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of
religious affiliation.
The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom
period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEWULO, to challenge TUPAS
claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before
TUPAS old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with the company on
December 3, 1987. As pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a certification election is the best forum in
ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely
choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot. Since it has not been shown that this order is
tainted with unfairness, this Court will not thwart the holding of a certification election.
OPINION: I agree with the Ruling. Since there was already a presence of unfairness and bad faith, it is
best to leave it to the Appropriate Bargaining Unit as to who they want to represent themselves.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED v BCI EMPLOYEES
FACTS: On June 23, 1959, the Benguet-Balatoc Workers Union (BBWU), for and in behalf of all
Benguet Consolidated, Inc (BENGUET) employees in its mines and milling establishment located at
Balatoc, Antamok and Acupan, Mt. Province, entered into a Collective Bargaining Contract (CONTRACT)
with BENGUET. The CONTRACT was stipulated to be effective for a period of 4-1/2 years, or from June
23, 1959 to December 23, 1963. It likewise embodied a No-Strike, No-Lockout clause. 3 years later, or on
April 6, 1962, a certification election was conducted by the Department of Labor among all the rank and
file employees of BENGUET in the same collective bargaining units. BCI EMPLOYEES & WORKERS
UNION (UNION) obtained more than 50% of the total number of votes, defeating BBWU. The Court of
Industrial Relations certified the UNION as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of all
BENGUET employees as regards rates of pay, wages, hours of work and such other terms and conditions
of employment allowed them by law or contract. Later on, the UNION filed a notice of strike against
BENGUET. UNION members who were BENGUET employees in the mining camps at Acupan, Antamok
and Balatoc, went on strike. The strike was attended by violence, some of the workers and executives of
the BENGUET were prevented from entering the premises and some of the properties of the BENGUET
were damaged as a result of the strike. Eventually, the parties agreed to end the dispute. BENGUET and
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UNION executed the AGREEMENT. PAFLU placed its conformity thereto. About a year later or on
January 29, 1964, a collective bargaining contract was finally executed between UNION-PAFLU and
BENGUET. Meanwhile, BENGUET sued UNION, PAFLU and their Presidents to recover the amount the
former incurred for the repair of the damaged properties resulting from the strike. BENGUET also argued
that the UNION violated the CONTRACT which has a stipulation not to strike during the effectivity thereof.
ISSUE: Did the Collective Bargaining Contract executed between Benguet and BBWU on June 23, 1959
and effective until December 23, 1963 automatically bind UNION-PAFLU upon its certification, on August
18, 1962, as sole bargaining representative of all BENGUET employees.
LAW: Doctrine of Substitution (General Maritime Stevedores Union v. South Sea Shipping Lines): We
also hold that where the bargaining contract is to run for more than two years, the principle of substitution
may well be adopted and enforced by the CIR to the effect that after two years of the life of a bargaining
agreement, a certification election may be allowed by the CIR, that if a bargaining agent other than the
union or organization that executed the contract, is elected, said new agent would have to respect said
contract, but that it may bargain with the management for the shortening of the life of the contract if it
considers it too long, or refuse to renew the contract pursuant to an automatic renewal clause.
CASE HISTORY: RTC: (M).
RULING: NO. BENGUET erroneously invokes the so-called
BENGUETs reliance upon the Principle of Substitution is totally misplaced. This principle,
formulated by the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there occurs a
shift in employees union allegiance after the execution of a bargaining contract with their employer,
merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed between
employer and employees thru their agent, the employees can change said agent but the contract
continues to bind them up to its expiration date. They may bargain however for the shortening of said
expiration date. The substitutionary doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the validly
executed collective bargaining contract with their employer by the simple expedient of changing their
bargaining agent. And it is in the light of this that the phrase said new agent would have to respect said
contract must be understood. It only means that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot
renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to negotiate with management for the
shortening thereof.
OPINION: I concur. This is in consonance with the principle of binding effect of contracts. To rule
otherwise would be to allow the members of the ABU to renege on their obligations as a privy to the CBA.
INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILL v VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CALICA
FACTS: Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills Union and respondent Indophil Textile Mills, Inc. executed a CBA
Indophil Acrylic Manufacturing Corp. was formed and registered with the SEC. It became operational and
hired workers according to its criteria and standards. The petitioner union contends the plant facilities built
and set up by Acrylic should be considered as an extension or expansion of the facilities of respondent
Company. In other words, it is the petitioner's contention that Acrylic is part of the Indophil bargaining unit;
that the creation of the Indophil Acrylic is a device of respondent Indophil Textile to evade the application
of the CBA between the union and the company to Acrylic people. On the other hand, respondent Indophil
Textile submits that it is a juridical entity separate and distinct from Acrylic and cited a case decided by the
Supreme Court, which ruled that two corporations cannot be treated as single bargaining unit even if their
business are related.
Voluntary Arbitrator: ruled in favor of the respondent and found that the provision in the CBA
between Indophil Textile Inc. and Indophil Textile Union does not extend to the employees of Indophil
Acrylic Corp.
ISSUE: Whether the voluntary arbitrator committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to disregard the
corporate entity of Indophil Acrylic.
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LAW: Doctrine of Separate and Distinct Personality: which states that the corporation has a separate and
distinct personality.
Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Coporate Entity: when valid grounds therefore exist, the legal
fiction that a corporation is an entity with a juridical personality separate and distinct from its members or
stockholders may be disregarded.
Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
CASE HISTORY: Voluntary Arbitrator: (M). SC: (M)
RULING: NO. Acrylic Indophil Corporation cannot be considered an extension of Indophil Corporation, as
to cover in one bargaining unit all employees thereof. Note separate corporate entities: doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate entity not applied. The fact that the businesses of private respondent and
Acrylic are related, that some of the employees of the private respondent are the same persons manning
and providing for auxiliary services to the units of Acrylic, and that the physical plants, offices and facilities
are situated in the same compound, it is our considered opinion that these facts are not suffcient to justify
the piercing of the corporate veil of Acrylic. Hence, the Acrylic not being an extension or expansion of
private respondent, the rank-and-File employees working at Acrylic should not be recognized as part of,
and/or within the scope of the petitioner, as the bargaining representative of private respondent.
OPINION: I agree with the Ruling. Piercing should not be used lightly, otherwise, it would discourage
investors to engage in the formation of corporations. Because corporations are formed and built mostly
because of one important aspect: the doctrine of limited liability arising from the doctrine of separate and
distinct personality.
LAGUNA COLLEGE v CIR
FACTS: On the appropriate bargaining unit, petitioner Laguna College, changing its original stand,
proposed two separate units, namely, college unit composed of the professors and instructors in the
College, and high school unit comprising the high school teachers. On the other hand, LACTA (the union)
proposed only one unit the employer unit composing of all the teachers in the entire Laguna College.
ISSUE: Whether there can be two bargaining units in this case.
LAW: Article 243: Coverage and employees right to self-organization. All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational
institutions, whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant,
intermittent and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual aid and protection.
CASE HISTORY: CIR: 1. Director of Labor Relations: 1
RULING: No. From the evidence adduced, it is believed that the factors in favor of employer unit far
outweigh the reasons for the establishment of two separate bargaining units as proposed by petitioner. It
is not denied that college teachers are governed by rules and regulations of the Bureau of Private
Education (CHED, kun sa yana pa), which are different from the rules and regulations for high school
teachers; that the high school department of petitioner was organized at a different time from the college
department; that the set-up in the two departments are different; and that the high school teachers are
paid per period or subject, while the college teachers are paid on the hourly basis. But it is not also denied
that these two departments are under the control of only one board of trustees; that they are housed in
one and the same building; that there is but one cashier and only one registrar who himself is the
administrative officer of the whole Laguna College. As a matter of fact, the function of the Administrative
Officer extends even to the high school department. It is a fact that there are some teachers involved in
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this case who are teaching both in the college and high school departments which is a decisive proof of
community of interest of these teachers and which negates the establishment of two bargaining units
OPINION: I agree with the Ruling. To rule otherwise would give rise to the situation wherein the
elementary teachers of the petitioner will be left out without a bargaining representative.
FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization v Sama-Samang

Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa FVC-Solidarity of Independentand General Labor Organizations
FACTS: The petitioner was the recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of FVC
Philippines, Inc.. Pursuant to their CBA, at the end of the third year in their five-year term, petitioner and
FVC renegotiated and extended the life of the CBA by four months. Nine daysbefore the expiry of the
original period, respondent filed a petition with the DOLE for certification election for the same rank-and-
file unit covered by the CBA. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that petition was filed beyond the
60-day freedom period, specifically 60 days before the expiration of the amended CBA. The Med-Arbiter
decided in favor of petitioner, was reversed by DOLE Sec., then reinstated upon Motion for
Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals eventually ruled for respondent, reasoning that although the
parties may renegotiate the economic and non-economic provisions of the CBA, the five-year
representation period of the original CBA is not affected. The CA concluded that the reckoning point for
the freedom period was the expiration of the original CBA.
ISSUE: whether the extension of the life of the CBA extended the exclusive bargaining representation
status as well.
LAW: Article 265: Any Collective Bargaining Agreement that the parties may enter into shall, insofar as
the representation aspect is concerned, be for a term of five (5) years. No petition questioning the majority
status of the incumbent bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification election shall be
conducted by the Department of Labor and Employment outside of the sixty-day period immediately
before the date of expiry of such five-year term of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. All other
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be renegotiated not later than three (3) years after
its execution.
CASE HISTORY: Med-Arbiter: (P). DOLE: (R). CA: (R)
RULING: NO. By the express provision of Article 253-A (now Article 265) of the Labor Code, the exclusive
bargaining representation status of a union in a CBA cannot go beyond five years.
The renegotiation and extension of the CBA does not bring with it the extension of the exclusive
bargaining status. Thus, the freedom period to file a petition for certification election is reckoned from the
expiration of the original five-year period, regardless of any extension of the CBA.
The respondents petition was filed within the proper period. Nevertheless, the certification
election in this case could not be enforced as the respondent already desisted from contesting the
petitioners status.
OPINION: I agree with the ruling. This is in consonance with the elementary rule in Statutory Construction
that when the law is clear, there is no room for interpretation.
DLSU v DLSU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
FACTS: BLR Regional Director Alex E. Maraan, in its Decision, ordered the conduct of an election of
union officers to be presided by the Labor Relations Division of the Department of Labor and
Employment-National Capital Region considering that the members of the Baez faction were not elected
by the general membership but were appointed by the Executive Board to their positions since 1985,
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therefore in a hold-over capacity. Relying on this, DLSU said that there is a conclusion of fact that there is
an absolute void in the leadership of respondent. Furthermore, that normal relations with the union cannot
occur until the said void in the leadership is appropriately filled. Affected by the temporary suspension of
normal relations is the renegotiation of the economic provisions of the 2002-2005 CBA. No renegotiation
can occur given the void in the leadership. However, the petitioner seemed to disregard the Decision of
BLR Director Cacdac that there is no void in respondents leadership. That the decision of BLR Regional
Director should not be construed as an automatic termination of the incumbent officers tenure of office
ISSUE: Whether an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refuses to bargain considering the
intra union dispute concerning the election of officers, is not yet settled.
CASE HISTORY: Voluntary Arbitrator: (U). SOLE: (U). SC: (U).
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the Decision of the Secretary of Labor
which said that the University is guilty of refusal to bargain amounting to an unfair labor practice under
Article 248(g) of the Labor Code. Indeed there was a requirement on both parties of the performance of
the mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement.
Such an act constituted an intentional avoidance of a duty imposed by law. There was nothing in
orders of Director Maraan and Cacdac which restrained or enjoined compliance by the parties with their
obligations under the CBA and under the law. The issue of union leadership is distinct and separate from
the duty to bargain. Anent the so called void in the Union leadership, it was declared that the same
doesnot constitute a valid ground to refuse to negotiate because petitioners] duty to bargain under the
law is due and demandable under the law by respondent as a whole and not by any faction within the
union. Besides, it was clarified that there was no void in the leadership in the first place. Furthermore,
when Baez faction won the election eventually, still, the petitioner refused.
OPINION: I concur with the Ruling. The CBA constitutes an agreement between the parties, however,
such contract is mandated by law. If the law would not punish the act of desisting to bargain, such
agreements would not be created, thus rendering the law inutile.
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Collective Bargaining Agreement

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Padua, Arjie Paul C.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (hereinafter CBA), like a compromise

DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR

CASE HISTORY: NLRC: dismissed. SOLE: dismissed. SC: dismissed.

Deadlock is the counteraction of things producing entire stoppage: a state of inaction or of

LAKAS NG MANGAGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN VS MARCELO ENTERPRISE

ISSUE: Whether there is a legitimate representation for purposes of collective bargaining.

CASE HISTORY: Court of Industrial Relations: Denied.

CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS TRAJANO

CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (M). CA: (M).

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION VS CONFESOR

CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (M). SC: (M)

KIOK LOY VS NLRC

There were postponements again.

ISSUE: Whether the company violated its duty to bargain.

CASE HISTORY: LA: Union. NLRC: Union. SC: Union.

Collective bargaining is the negotiations towards a collective agreement, democratic frameworks

1) status of majority representation of the employees

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR

ISSUE: Retroactivity of the CBA

CASE HISTORY: SOLE: Union. SC: (M).

ISSUE: Retroactivity of the CBA

CASE HISTORY: LA: (U). NLRC: (U). SC: (U).

CASE HISTORY: LA: (U). NLRC: (U).

RULING: Three Years.

RIVERA vs. HON. EDGARDO ESPIRITU

DAVAO INTEGRATED PORT STEVEDORING SERVICES v ABARQUEZ

CASE HISTORY: National Conciliation and Mediation Board: (U).

PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY v PAMBUSCO EMPLOYEES UNION

CASE HISTORY: Court of Industrial Relations: (U).

CASE HISTORY: Med-Arbiter: ATU. Director of Labor Relations: ATU.

AMERICAN PRESIDENT LINES v. CLAVE

CASE HISTORY: NLRC: (U). SOLE: (U)

GENERAL MILLING CORP v CA

ISSUE: Whether GMC is guilty of ULP.

CASE HISTORY: NLRC: (U). SOLE: (U)

NESTLE PHIL v NLRC

CASE HISTORY: NLRC: (U). SOLE: (U).

CASE HISTORY: SOLE: (MARINA)

MACTAN WORKERS v ABOITIZ

CASE HISTORY: RTC: (U).

ALEX FERRER vs. NLRC

CASE HISTORY: LA: (M). NLRC: (M).

ISSUE: whether the petition to hold a certification election should be granted.

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED v BCI EMPLOYEES

CASE HISTORY: RTC: (M).

RULING: NO. BENGUET erroneously invokes the so-called

INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILL v VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR CALICA

CASE HISTORY: Voluntary Arbitrator: (M). SC: (M)

LAGUNA COLLEGE v CIR

ISSUE: Whether there can be two bargaining units in this case.

CASE HISTORY: CIR: 1. Director of Labor Relations: 1

FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization v Sama-Samang

CASE HISTORY: Med-Arbiter: (P). DOLE: (R). CA: (R)

DLSU v DLSU EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

CASE HISTORY: Voluntary Arbitrator: (U). SOLE: (U). SC: (U).

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