March 23, 1929
1928
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member
of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last
general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. As notary public, he can execute
for you a deed of sale for the purchase of
land as required by the cadastral office; can
renew lost documents of your animals; can
make your application and final requisites
for your homestead; and can execute any
kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help
you collect your loans although long
overdue, as well as any complaint for or
against you. Come or write to him in his
town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free
consultation, and is willing to help and serve
the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written
in Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18,
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to
inform you of the approaching date for our
induction into office as member of the
Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next
month. Before my induction into office I
should be very glad to hear your suggestions
or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in
particular. You can come to my house at any
time here in Echague, to submit to me any
kind of suggestion or recommendation as
you may desire.
I also inform you that despite my
membership in the Board I will have my
residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come
back home on the following day here in
Echague to live and serve with you as a
lawyer and notary public. Despite my
election as member of the Provincial Board,
I will exercise my legal profession as a
lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot
see me at home on any week day, I assure
you that you can always find me there on
every Sunday. I also inform you that I will
receive any work regarding preparations of
documents of contract of sales and affidavits
to be sworn to before me as notary public
even on Sundays.
 I would like you all to be informed of this
matter for the reason that some people are in
the belief that my residence as member of
the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would
then be disqualified to exercise my
profession as lawyer and as notary public.
Such is not the case and I would make it
clear that I am free to exercise my
profession as formerly and that I will have
my residence here in Echague.
I would request you kind favor to transmit
this information to your barrio people in any
of your meetings or social gatherings so that
they may be informed of my desire to live
and to serve with you in my capacity as
lawyer and notary public. If the people in
your locality have not as yet contracted the
services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would
be willing to handle the work in court and
would charge only three pesos for every
registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the
applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as originally conceived related to disbarments of members
of the bar. In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar
Association, said codal section was amended by Act No. 2828 by
adding at the end thereof the following: "The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of
Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in
1908 and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and
28 of the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT.
The most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be
the outcome of character and conduct. The
publication or circulation of ordinary simple
business cards, being a matter of personal taste or
local custom, and sometimes of convenience, is not
per se improper. But solicitation of business by
circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally
unprofessional to procure business by indirection
through touters of any kind, whether allied real
estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure
the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for
business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments concerning the manner of their conduct,
the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other
like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR
THROUGH AGENTS. It is unprofessional for a
lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except
in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and
litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt
up defects in titles or other causes of action and
inform thereof in order to the employed to bring suit,
or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any
other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients, or to employ agents or runners for like
purposes, or to pay or reward directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court
or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or
others who may succeed, under the guise of giving
disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or
others, to seek his professional services. A duty to
the public and to the profession devolves upon every
member of the bar having knowledge of such
practices upon the part of any practitioner
immediately to inform thereof to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals was a crime at the common law, and
one of the penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney
was disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been
provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the
bar itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind
statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a
profession and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would be
unprofessional. (State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann.
Cas., 625; People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L.,
1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly
practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession.
It works against the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in
incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the
admitted facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited
cases in defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only
remaining duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should
here be taken. The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the
representative of the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the
case, suggests that the respondent be only reprimanded. We think
that our action should go further than this if only to reflect our
attitude toward cases of this character of which unfortunately the
respondent's is only one. The commission of offenses of this nature
would amply justify permanent elimination from the bar. But as
mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there
are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his
acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his
promise not to commit a similar mistake in the future. A modest
period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring
attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that this result is
reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the
court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance and should,
therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of
practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the
court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of
one month from April 1, 1929,
AC No. 99-634 June 10, 2002
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity
to both cause and client, even if the client never paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a
profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or suspension or any
other disciplinary action against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by
Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn Statement alleging the
following:
"x x x xxx xxx
"That in connection with my business, I was
introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta, sometime in
September, 1998, in his office at the Respicio,
Magulta and Adan Law Offices at 21-B Otero
Building, Juan de la Cruz St., Davao City, who
agreed to legally represent me in a money claim and
possible civil case against certain parties for breach
of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta prepared for me the demand letter and
some other legal papers, for which services I have
accordingly paid; inasmuch, however, that I failed to
secure a settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint, which
he subsequently drafted, copy of which is attached
as Annex A, the filing fee whereof will require the
amount of Twenty Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from the
parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999, deposited
the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta, copy of the Receipt attached as Annex B,
upon the instruction that I needed the case filed
immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty. Alberto
C. Magulta that the complaint had already been filed
in court, and that I should receive notice of its
progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for such
notice from the court or from Atty. Magulta but there
seemed to be no progress in my case, such that I
frequented his office to inquire, and he would
repeatedly tell me just to wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case, considering
that I am told to wait [every time] I asked; and in my
last visit to Atty. Magulta last May 25, 1999, he said
that the court personnel had not yet acted on my case
and, for my satisfaction, he even brought me to the
Hall of Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at
about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office of the
City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the building
and told to wait while he personally follows up the
processes with the Clerk of Court; whereupon,
within the hour, he came back and told me that the
Clerk of Court was absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around by
Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office of the
Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty. Magulta's
complaint to personally verify the progress of my
case, and there told that there was no record at all of
a case filed by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on my
behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27,
1999, attached as Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to and
treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C. Magulta at his
office the following day, May 28, 1999, where he
continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was
being caused by the court personnel, and only when
shown the certification did he admit that he has not
at all filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to
appease my feelings, he offered to reimburse me by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5,
1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively, copies of which are attached as
Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and deception
I was made to suffer, I wish to complain Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta for misrepresentation,
dishonesty and oppressive conduct;"
xxx xxx x x x.1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22, 1999 Order of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline,2 respondent filed his Answer3
vehemently denying the allegations of complainant "for being totally
outrageous and baseless." The latter had allegedly been introduced as
a kumpadre of one of the former's law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand letter against Regwill
Industries, Inc. -- a service for which the former never paid. After
Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of complainant, replied
to this letter, the latter requested that another demand letter -- this
time addressed to the former -- be drafted by respondent, who
reluctantly agreed to do so. Without informing the lawyer,
complainant asked the process server of the former's law office to
deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which had required a three-
hour meeting, respondent drafted a complaint (which was only for
the purpose of compelling the owner to settle the case) and prepared
a compromise agreement. He was also requested by complainant to
do the following:
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr. Nelson
Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC
Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property claimed
by complainant's wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never paid for his services by
complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling him why, complainant
later on withdrew all the files pertinent to the Regwill case. However,
when no settlement was reached, the latter instructed him to draft a
complaint for breach of contract. Respondent, whose services had
never been paid by complainant until this time, told the latter about
his acceptance and legal fees. When told that these fees amounted to
P187,742 because the Regwill claim was almost P4 million,
complainant promised to pay on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the amount of P25,000 to
respondent's secretary and told her that it was for the filing fee of the
Regwill case. When informed of the payment, the lawyer
immediately called the attention of complainant, informing the latter
of the need to pay the acceptance and filing fees before the complaint
could be filed. Complainant was told that the amount he had paid
was a deposit for the acceptance fee, and that he should give the
filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told respondent to suspend
for the meantime the filing of the complaint because the former
might be paid by another company, the First Oriental Property
Ventures, Inc., which had offered to buy a parcel of land owned by
Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on for two months, but the
parties never arrived at any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again relayed to respondent his
interest in filing the complaint. Respondent reminded him once more
of the acceptance fee. In response, complainant proposed that the
complaint be filed first before payment of respondent's acceptance
and legal fees. When respondent refused, complainant demanded the
return of the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount using his own
personal checks because their law office was undergoing extensive
renovation at the time, and their office personnel were not reporting
regularly. Respondent's checks were accepted and encashed by
complainant.
Respondent averred that he never inconvenienced, mistreated or
deceived complainant, and if anyone had been shortchanged by the
undesirable events, it was he.
The IBP's Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated March 8, 2000, the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) opined as follows:
"x x x [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited by
complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for
the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainant's deposit of the filing fees for the
Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on
the part of respondent was created and that was to
file the Regwill complaint within the time frame
contemplated by his client, the complainant. The
failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to
his misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part,
unbecoming a member of the law profession. The
subsequent reimbursement by the respondent of part
of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to impress
upon the respondent the gravity of his offense, it is
recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of one (1) year." 4
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the Commission's recommendation.
Main Issue:
Misappropriation of Client's Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent
lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and
(b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing
fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not give him the filing fee
for the Regwill complaint; hence, the former's failure to file the
complaint in court. Also, respondent alleges that the amount
delivered by complainant to his office on January 4, 1999 was for
attorney's fees and not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and
ability in the prosecution or the defense of the client's cause. They
who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the
interests of the client, but also serve the ends of justice. They do
honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for
the legal profession.5 Members of the bar must do nothing that may
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession. 6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no lawyer-client
relationship existed between him and complainant, because the latter
never paid him for services rendered. The former adds that he only
drafted the said documents as a personal favor for the kumpadre of
one of his partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was established from the
very first moment complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the former's business. To constitute professional
employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is not necessary that any
retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his
service had been sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind,
consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with
the consultation, then the professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the
close personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant
or the nonpayment of the former's fees.8 Hence, despite the fact that
complainant was kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and that
respondent dispensed legal advice to complainant as a personal favor
to the kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file the complaint he
had agreed to prepare -- and had actually prepared -- at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the client's interest. Rule 18.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that lawyers should
not neglect legal matters entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that once lawyers agree to
take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to such cause and
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. 9
They owe entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
the maintenance and the defense of the client's rights, and the
exertion of their utmost learning and abilities to the end that nothing
be taken or withheld from the client, save by the rules of law legally
applied.10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of respondent that the
receipt issued by his office to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that it was quite
incredible for the office personnel of a law firm to be prevailed upon
by a client to issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment for
something else. Moreover, upon discovering the "mistake" -- if
indeed it was one -- respondent should have immediately taken steps
to correct the error. He should have lost no time in calling
complainant's attention to the matter and should have issued another
receipt indicating the correct purpose of the payment.
The Practice of Law -- a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often forget that the practice
of law is a profession and not a business.11 Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. 13 Duty
to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves. The practice of
law is a noble calling in which emolument is a byproduct, and the
highest eminence may be attained without making much money.14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount given by complainant
-- as evidenced by the receipt issued by the law office of respondent
-- the latter also violated the rule that lawyers must be scrupulously
careful in handling money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity.15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that lawyers shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and
properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross
violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.16 It may be true that they have a
lien upon the client's funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them until
their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they
may apply such funds to the satisfaction of such fees and
disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of
their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their
failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 17 In any event,
they must still exert all effort to protect their client's interest within
the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. 18
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his
legal fees the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and thus failed
to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
On the other hand, we do not agree with complainant's plea to disbar
respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty.19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of
violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of
the Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a copy in
respondent's file.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions.
While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age, holders of a college degree, and must
not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members
of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-
C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation
of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of
law by maintaining an office where he is
held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation,
 and fixing and collecting fees for services
rendered by his associate. (Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193
N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in
the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava,
(105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions
consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects,
and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
 with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work
of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.],
194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting
orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the
dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in
following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual
for attorneys engaging in the active practice
of their profession, and he follows some one
or more lines of employment such as this he
is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155
NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or
service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
(111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show
that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of
law."
MR. FOZ. Before we
suspend the session, may I
make a manifestation which
I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on
the Commission on Audit.
May I be allowed to make a
very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING
OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will
please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do
with the qualifications of
the members of the
Commission on Audit.
Among others, the
 qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They
must be Members of the
Philippine Bar" I am
quoting from the provision
"who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at
least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which
would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to
interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are
using their legal knowledge or legal talent
in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee
on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it
up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in
the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will
Commissioner Foz yield to
just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect,
saying that service in the
COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the
requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in
the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must
consider the fact that the
work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily
involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are
employed in COA now
would have the necessary
qualifications in
accordance with the
Provision on qualifications
under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the
construction given to this is
that this is equivalent to the
practice of law.
 MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public
accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in
many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois],
[1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term,
as commonly understood, means "an individual or organization
engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms
may be organized as professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram,
Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . .
. in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law.
(State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222,
140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128
Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental
realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be
workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at
once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little
time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers
do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of
both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind
reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late
Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an
attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as
businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d]
as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has
been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine,
surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services
outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as
tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a
client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the
lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the
work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find
that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for
many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation
work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed
both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is
organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common
of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure
from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may
be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other
professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-
policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate
problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications
of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition
of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of
information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors,
the appraisal of major trends, the necessity
of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast
decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing
equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession
are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject
of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for
productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved
through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems.
Lawyers, particularly with either a master's
or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning
at the legal policy level of decision-making
now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other
professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving
corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because of
the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in
securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate
lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-
time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and
magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate
lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For
one, the number of attorneys employed by a
single corporation will vary with the size
and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a
staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and
purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and
in other capacities which require an ability
to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved
in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may
have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer
is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs
provide one of the few opportunities
available to corporate lawyers to enter the
international law field. After all,
international law is practiced in a relatively
small number of companies and law firms.
Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an
area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to
experienced attorneys while the younger
attorneys do their "international practice" in
law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate
Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role
of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is
one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice
direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak.
No longer are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining the
subject study to the Corporation Code and
the Securities Code but an incursion as well
into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues
deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into
current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles,
with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting
managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and
policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting
strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make,
and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of
the nation-state is being reduced as firms
deal both with global multinational entities
and simultaneously with sub-national
governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but
with each other often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation
in decision-making within the corporation is
rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a
stakeholder in some cases participating
in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards
and other decision-making roles. Often
these new patterns develop alongside
existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as
well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology.
New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is
world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary
spanning, the office of the Corporate
Counsel comprises a distinct group within
the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-
term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context
interaction such as the groups actively
revising their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting
team achievements within the organization.
In general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial
capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-
vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships
of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the
corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems
dynamics has been found an effective tool
for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the
system dynamics principles more accessible
to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables
users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of
a law department, it can be used to appraise
the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the
cost and risk involved in managing a
portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation
Management. Computer-based models can
be used directly by parties and mediators in
all lands of negotiations. All integrated set
of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be
used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and
management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers
requires special skills that comprise a major
part of the general counsel's responsibilities.
They differ from those of remedial law.
Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal
entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the
framework within which are undertaken
those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to
facilitate the relationships needed in trying
to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the
Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as
one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its
global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing
 expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-
makers, coping internally with more
complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis
that knowing corporate law is not enough to
make one a good general corporate counsel
nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even
if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the
understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to
grasp not only the basic legal "constitution'
or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar
and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would
admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next
is a dilemma of professional security: Will
the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon
C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office
as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared
null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having
passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has
been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his
professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled
the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief
executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being
knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has
worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban
land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was
cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-
Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129
Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty.
Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a
negotiating panel acts as a team, and which
is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation.
Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such
as the legal counsel), the finance manager,
and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the
team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing
Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a
country's Constitution; it lays down the law
as far as the loan transaction is concerned.
Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can
be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2)
borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of
default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important
role in any debt restructuring program. For
aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key
factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work
paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser
of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of
Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises,
perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in
the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation.
Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or
an economist in the formulation of a model
loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be
carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction
with the guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate
School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis
supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set
of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the
contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties,
but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is
sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an
adherence to the rule of law in domestic and
international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no
banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The
Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments,"
Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol.
15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters,
1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice
of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking
into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission,
143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer
in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest
 to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified
for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be
an encroachment on the discretion vested
upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments
of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond,
etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales,
Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall
be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years
without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term
of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate
opinion, suffice it to say that his definition
of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of
the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by
the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from
the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz
states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law
practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or
defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law.
In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has
been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts
of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks
one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one
thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President?
And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action
be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the
public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that
he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The
judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case,
there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments
rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject
the nominee, whom the Commission has
confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the
confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that
killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the
procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for
help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the
procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
 THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL
5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am
6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave.,
Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
vs. Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent. during office hours.

R E SO L U T I O N Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage.

Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's
REGALADO, J.:
Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
desist from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.,
the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed by law."
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as 522-2041; 521-0767
follows:
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above
Annex A reproduced are champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law
profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the
SECRET MARRIAGE? integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal
P560.00 for a valid marriage. profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication
of said advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged
in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services"
through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the services
advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services
should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme
Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the
issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3)
Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers'
Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas
(FIDA) to submit their respective position papers on the controversy
and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of
which this Court takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or
not the services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as
advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this
case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present hereunder
excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by
them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the
two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-
a-vis "legal services", common sense would
readily dictate that the same are essentially
without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies like birth,
marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to
state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the
view espoused by respondent (to the effect
that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no
uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the
same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the
administrative supervision of this Honorable
Court to perpetually restrain respondent
from undertaking highly unethical activities
in the field of law practice as aforedescribed.
4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." gives the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that
it offers legal services to the public, the
advertisements in question give the
impression that respondent is offering legal
services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
this to be so, as earlier mentioned,
apparently because this (is) the effect that
the advertisements have on the reading
public.
The impression created by the
advertisements in question can be traced,
first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such
a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes
the rendering of legal services for legal
problems, just like a medical clinic connotes
medical services for medical problems.
More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic
connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as
published in the advertisements subject of
the present case, appears with (the) scale(s)
of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal
services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a
person being represented as a lawyer from
Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the
nature of the service or services being
offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether
respondent is merely offering "legal support
services" as claimed by it, or whether it
offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it
becomes unnecessary to make a distinction
between "legal services" and "legal support
services," as the respondent would have it.
The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading
public that legal services are being offered
by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant
to induce the performance of acts contrary to
law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent
claims, the advertisements in question are
only meant to inform the general public of
the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize to
Guam divorce, and any law student ought to
know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine
Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family
Code (defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is
special contract of
permanent union between a
man and woman entered
into accordance with law for
the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable
social institution whose
nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by
law and not subject to
stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may
fix the property relation
during the marriage within
the limits provided by this
Code.
By simply reading the questioned
advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a
marriage celebrated in accordance with our
law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages,
or serves to induce, violation of Philippine
law. At the very least, this can be considered
"the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst,
this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall
not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point
out that advertisements such as that shown
in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains
a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words
"Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage,"
if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent
union," the inviolable social institution,"
which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its
sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to
encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication
of applications for a marriage license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to
be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that
the above impressions one may gather from
the advertisements in question are accurate.
The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the
advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen
that criminal acts are being encouraged or
committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las
Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not
extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the
"legal support services" respondent offers do
not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical
consequence is that, in the eyes of an
ordinary newspaper reader, members of the
bar themselves are encouraging or inducing
the performance of acts which are contrary
to law, morals, good customs and the public
good, thereby destroying and demeaning the
integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent
should be enjoined from causing the
publication of the advertisements in
question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from
further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very
least, from offering such services to the
public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing
computerized legal research, electronic data
gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized
legal forms, investigators for gathering of
evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not
be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the
practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved
in the case at bar can be better performed by
specialists in other fields, such as computer
experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such
field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements
for admission to the Bar. To prohibit them
from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the
great benefits and advantages of modern
technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a
computer will be doing better than a lawyer
using a typewriter, even if both are (equal)
in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however,
should be careful not to allow or tolerate the
illegal practice of law in any form, not only
for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the
protection of the public. Technological
development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if
respondent is allowed to perform all of its
services, but only if such services are made
available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be
offering technical assistance, not legal
services. Alternatively, the more difficult
task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public
in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar
may be undertaken. This, however, may
require further proceedings because of the
factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some
of respondent's services ought to be
prohibited outright, such as acts which tend
to suggest or induce celebration abroad of
marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While
respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to include,
in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain
course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or
capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a
lawyer should be consulted before deciding
on which course of action to take, and that it
cannot recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to possible
sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise,
advertising should be directed exclusively at
members of the Bar, with a clear and
unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals
cannot be ignored. But nobody should be
allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal"
for profit, without such term being clearly
defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of
regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be
considered, the corporation's Article of
Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in
the practice of law but engaged in giving
legal support services to lawyers and
laymen, through experienced paralegals,
with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3,
Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the
public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for
its enumerated services fall within the realm
of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court.
For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent's own commercial
advertisement which announces a certain
Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling the
fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." is offering and rendering legal services
through its reserve of lawyers. It has been
held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering
opinions, and advising clients as to their
legal right and then take them to an attorney
and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1984 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice
of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation
employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the
scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds
out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services.
It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business
conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who
have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline
of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name,
the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who
wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur.
270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also
all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged
in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's
position, in answer to the issues stated
herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the
practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not
only unethical, but also misleading and
patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the
power to supress and punish the Legal
Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral
advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in
the practice of law. It claims that it merely
renders "legal support services" to answers,
litigants and the general public as enunciated
in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5
of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above,
clearly and convincingly show that it is
indeed engaged in law practice, albeit
outside of court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its
advisory services on Persons and Family
Relations Law, particularly regarding
foreign divorces, annulment of marriages,
secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa
related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require
the application of the aforesaid law, the legal
principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advices based thereon and which
activities call for legal training, knowledge
and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in
the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of
respondent fall squarely and are embraced in
what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this
Honorable Court, paramount consideration
should be given to the protection of the
general public from the danger of being
exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one
to take a rigorous four-year course of study
on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or
sciences course and then to take and pass the
bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in
many jurisdiction as an aid to the
administration of justice, there are in those
jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these
paralegals to deal with the general public as
such. While it may now be the opportune
time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines.
In the meantime, this Honorable Court may
decide to make measures to protect the
general public from being exploited by those
who may be dealing with the general public
in the guise of being "paralegals" without
being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public
should also be protected from the dangers
which may be brought about by advertising
of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present
Code of Professional Responsibility from
advertising, it appears in the instant case that
legal services are being advertised not by
lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be
taken to protect the general public from
falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer
such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements
of Respondent, however, seems to give the
impression that information regarding
validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of
marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign
investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail
of its services. The Respondent's name
The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help
matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that
Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by
paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors
in any medical clinic, when only
"paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied
by the very admissions of its President and
majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who
gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the
Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are
clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the
purpose of gain which, as provided for under
the above cited law, (are) illegal and against
the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal
in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases,
but it is illegal in that in bold letters it
announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could
work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but
immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency
and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is
certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized
only by officers authorized to do so under
the law. And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA,
Canada and other countries the trend is
towards allowing lawyers to advertise their
special skills to enable people to obtain from
qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of
advertisements such as are the subject matter
of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an
illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal
act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements
that seem to project that secret marriages
and divorce are possible in this country for a
fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this
clinic about how they could go about having
a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor
should ever be attempted, and seek advice
on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because
it falsely represents to the public to be able
to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the
Supreme Court held that solicitation for
clients by an attorney by circulars of
advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in
the practice of law, such as management
consultancy firms or travel agencies,
whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that
Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law.
In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be
engaged in independently of the practice of
law) involves knowledge of the law does not
necessarily make respondent guilty of
unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no
one . . . . acting as a
consultant can render
effective service unless he is
familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be
careful not to suggest a
course of conduct which the
law forbids. It seems . . .
.clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and
his use of that knowledge as
a factor in determining what
measures he shall
recommend, do not
constitute the practice of
law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our
knowledge of the law
accurate or inaccurate
moulds our conduct not
only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are
serving others. Bankers,
liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather
precise knowledge of the
laws touching their
particular business or
profession. A good example
is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning,
building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement
house statutes, and who
draws plans and
specification in harmony
with the law. This is not
practicing law.
But suppose the architect,
asked by his client to omit a
fire tower, replies that it is
required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations
expert cites, in support of
some measure that he
recommends, a decision of
the National Labor
Relations Board. Are they
practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice
or information, and the legal
question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-
legal problem.
It is largely a matter of
degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one
intending to erect a building
on his land to engage a
lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to
the building code and the
like, then an architect who
performed this function
would probably be
considered to be trespassing
on territory reserved for
licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-
empted by lawyers, or
custom placed a lawyer
always at the elbow of the
lay personnel man. But this
is not the case. The most
important body of the
industrial relations experts
are the officers and business
agents of the labor unions
and few of them are
lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has
been the practice for some
years to delegate special
responsibility in employee
matters to a management
group chosen for their
practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal
thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same
service that the larger
employers get from their
own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial
relations is growing into a
recognized profession for
which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading
universities. The court
should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a
widespread, well-
established method of
conducting business is
unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men
who customarily perform a
certain function have no
right to do so, or that the
technical education given
by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in
their business.
In determining whether a
man is practicing law, we
should consider his work
for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can
imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise
as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his
client along the path charted
by law. This, of course,
would be the practice of the
law. But such is not the fact
in the case before me.
Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic
and psychological lines. The
law only provides the frame
within which he must work,
just as the zoning code
limits the kind of building
the limits the kind of
building the architect may
plan. The incidental legal
advice or information
defendant may give, does
not transform his activities
into the practice of law. Let
me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work,
he performed services
which are customarily
reserved to members of the
bar, he would be practicing
law. For instance, if as part
of a welfare program, he
drew employees' wills.
Another branch of
defendant's work is the
representations of the
employer in the adjustment
of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with
or without a mediator. This
is not per se the practice of
law. Anyone may use an
agent for negotiations and
may select an agent
particularly skilled in the
subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is
free to accept the
employment whether or not
he is a member of the bar.
Here, however, there may
be an exception where the
business turns on a question
of law. Most real estate
sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of
the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and
the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the
opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that
only a lawyer can accept the
assignment. Or if a
controversy between an
employer and his men
grows from differing
interpretations of a contract,
or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should
not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion
here, since the situation is
not presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government, especially before
trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of
the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by
the Congress, may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by
counsel, or by other representative. Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of
his work, defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board
allows, even arguing questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood,
53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at
pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a
person engaged in a lawful calling (which
may involve knowledge of the law) is not
engaged in the practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not
customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal
advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to
the work for any particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer
and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional
Responsibility succintly states the rule of
conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in
another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall
make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic
appears to render wedding services (See
Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine,
straightforward marriages, like securing a
marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute
practice of law. However, if the problem is
as complicated as that described in "Rx for
Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case,
then what may be involved is actually the
practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the
Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give
information on divorce, absence, annulment
of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and
"B" Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore
where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and
determines by himself what courses of
action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that
aside from purely giving information, the
Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law
to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the
publication of a legal text
which publication of a legal
text which purports to say
what the law is amount to
legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or
rules stated in the text may
be accepted by a particular
reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this.
. . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the
forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be
filled out, constitutes the
unlawful practice of law.
But that is the situation with
many approved and
accepted texts. Dacey's
book is sold to the public at
large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with
a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that
relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the
status of attorney and
client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN
A PARTICULAR
SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer
general advice on common
problems, and does not
purport to give personal
advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a
designated or readily
identified person. Similarly
the defendant's publication
does not purport to give
personal advice on a
specific problem peculiar to
a designated or readily
identified person in a
particular situation in
their publication and sale of
the kits, such publication
and sale did not constitutes
the unlawful practice of law
. . . . There being no legal
impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis
for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an
office for the purpose of
selling to persons seeking a
divorce, separation,
annulment or separation
agreement any printed
material or writings relating
to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the
memorandum of
modification of the
judgment against defendant
having an interest in any
publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce
and against his having any
personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The
record does fully support,
however, the finding that for
the change of $75 or $100
for the kit, the defendant
gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts
concerning particular
problems which might arise
in the preparation and
presentation of the
purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal
remedies and assistance in
the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin
conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly
with reference to the giving
of advice and counsel by the
defendant relating to
specific problems of
particular individuals in
connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought
and should be affirmed.
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its
services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-
advisory. "It is not controverted, however,
that if the services "involve giving legal
advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par.
6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that
a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically
objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion)
that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family
Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically
objectionable. The second paragraph thereof
(which is not necessarily related to the first
paragraph) fails to state the limitation that
only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are
available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of
law" becomes exigent for the proper determination of the issues
raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause
"practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and
doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts
which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal
knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It
includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal
instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although
such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally
engages in three principal types of professional activity: legal advice
and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power
and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property
according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients,
advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that
extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the
doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to determine
whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the
knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited
to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation
of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It
embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.
(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23,
193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of
law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in
the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their right
under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by
law or authorized to settle controversies and
there, in such representative capacity,
performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their
clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one
who, in a representative capacity, engages in
 the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or
outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.
W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava
(105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of such
actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters or estate and guardianship
have been held to constitute law practice, as
do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves
the determination by the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions
consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court.
It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects
and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved
in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate
relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work
of the lawyer which involves appearance in
court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public
that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666,
citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass],
194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
 Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
197 A. 139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in
and out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at
bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support
services can neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said
proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services
it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of
giving ready information by trained
paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission
and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by
laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding
investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from
government or non-government agencies,
like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment
records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information
about laws of other countries that they may
find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or
adoption laws that they can avail of
preparatory to emigration to the foreign
country, and other matters that do not
involve representation of clients in court;
designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities
engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation
merely involve mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the
installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids
and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the
general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function
is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and
advise him or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may
be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent
and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since
law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely
giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday
Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems,"
where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty.
Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted
everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices
on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building
along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion
domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his
staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are
"specialists" in various fields can take care
of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in
taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation, and family law.
These specialist are backed up by a battery
of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in
1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical
field toward specialization, it caters to
clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in
clients. "when they come, we start by
analyzing the problem. That's what doctors
do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the
symptoms and so on. That's how we operate,
too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical
terms, require surgery or follow-up
treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes
of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an
affidavit of loss can be taken care of by our
staff or, if this were a hospital the residents
or the interns. We can take care of these
matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a
common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty.
Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive
"treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If
you had a rich relative who died and named
you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would
refer you to a specialist in taxation. There
would be real estate taxes and arrears which
would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the
right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly
trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich
relatives will, then you would need a
litigator, who knows how to arrange the
 problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its
services is not controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in
the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P.
WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that the main
purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate
undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered
by private respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The
permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and
not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom
respondent would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines
there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who meet
the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various
statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a
lawful business except for members of the bar who have complied
with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court.
Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of
attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of
legal science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or
defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to
the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The
justification for excluding from the practice of law those not
admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little
control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position
that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not
of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer
studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also
evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set
up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United
States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited
acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As
pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law
are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another
or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in
scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission
therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in
the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has
not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted
intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons
who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making
known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified
and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed
to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in
anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35
Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of
the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription
against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is
a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs.
vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held
to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru
paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers
 of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The
most worthy and effective advertisement
possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is
the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well
as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective
service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs
no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He
easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited.
The canons of the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule
against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the
canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data must
not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public
or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names
and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally
for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the
public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the
profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted.
The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the
law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which
even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the
above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45
which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied
upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case
explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an
initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the
specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or
the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked
by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public
about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found
that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our
legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements
of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which
is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer,
subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in
allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice
of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic,
Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are
involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or
illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was
created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly
not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative
that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different
proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of our law and
jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule
against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent
is the concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute
the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of
the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's
corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-
off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for
such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN
herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the
publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which
is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B"
of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution
be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the
Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,

Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., JUVY P. CIOCON-REER, A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-
concur 3210-RTJ
ANGELINA P. CIOCON,
MARIVIT P. CIOCON- Present:
HERNANDEZ, and
REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR., CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

Complainants, BRION,

PERALTA,*
SERENO, and

- versus - REYES, JJ.

JUDGE ANTONIO C. LUBAO,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 22,
General Santos City, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 20, 2012
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
----x

RESOLUTION
*
 receipt of the order. Complainants further alleged that on 30
CARPIO, J.: September 2008, a copy of the order was sent by registered mail to
the defendants, which they should have received within one week or
The Case
on 7 October 2008. Complainants alleged that the 30-day period
within which to submit memoranda expired on 6 November 2008.
Juvy P. Ciocon-Reer, Angelina P. Ciocon, Marivit P. Ciocon-
Since the defendants failed to submit their memorandum on 6
Hernandez, and Remberto C. Karaan, Sr. (complainants) filed an
November 2008, complainants alleged that they should be deemed to
administrative complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao (Judge
have waived their right to adduce evidence and Judge Lubao should
Lubao) of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch
have decided the case. Yet, four months passed from 6 November
22, for gross ignorance of the law, rules or procedures; gross
2008 and Judge Lubao still failed to make his decision.
incompetence and inefficiency; violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019; violations of Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised
In his Comment, Judge Lubao explained that the parties
Penal Code; violations of pertinent provisions of the Code of Judicial
were required to submit their respective memoranda on 12
Conduct, The New Code of Judicial Conduct per A.M. No. 03-05-01-
September 2008. The Order was sent to the parties through registered
SC, and Canons of Judicial Ethics; and dishonesty and grave
mail on 30 September 2008. Judge Lubao alleged that the plaintiffs
misconduct.
submitted their memorandum on 10 November 2008 but the court
did not receive the registry return card on the notice to the
The Antecedent Facts
defendants. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent a
letter-request to the Post Office of General Santos City asking for
Complainants are the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 7819 (Juvy
certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under
P. Ciocon-Reer, et al. v. Gaspar Mayo, et al.) for Unlawful Detainer,
Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. However,
Damages, Injunction, etc., an appealed case from the Municipal Trial
the court did not receive any reply from the Post Office.
Court of General Santos City, Branch 3. Complainants alleged that
on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the
Judge Lubao further explained that on 20 May 2009, for the
parties to submit their respective memoranda within 30 days from
greater interest of substantial justice, the defendants were given their
last chance to submit their memorandum within 30 days from receipt
of the order. In the same order, he directed the plaintiffs to coordinate
with the branch sheriff for personal delivery of the order to the
defendants. However, the plaintiffs failed to coordinate with the
branch sheriff and the order was sent to the defendants, again by
registered mail, only on 17 June 2009.
Judge Lubao informed the Court that complainant Remberto
C. Karaan, Sr. (Karaan) is engaging in the practice of law even
though he is not a lawyer. Judge Lubao asked this Court to require
Karaan to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for
unauthorized practice of law.
Karaan filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Judge
Lubaos failure to submit his comment on time to complainants
administrative complaint is a violation of the existing rules and
procedure and amounts to gross ignorance of the law. As regards his
alleged unauthorized practice of law, Karaan alleged that Judge
Lubao was merely trying to evade the issues at hand.
The Findings of the OCA
In its Memorandum dated 13 April 2010, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) reported that a verification from the
Docket and Clearance Division of its Office revealed that Karaan
also filed numerous administrative complaints 1 against judges from
different courts, all of which were dismissed by this Court.
In its evaluation of the case, the OCA found that there was no
evidence to show that the orders issued by Judge Lubao were tainted
with fraud, dishonesty or bad faith. The OCA stated that the matters
raised by complainants could only be questioned through judicial
remedies under the Rules of Court and not by way of an
administrative complaint. The OCA stated that Karaan could not
simply assume that the order of 12 September 2008 had been
received by the defendants without the registry return card which
was not returned to the trial court.
The OCA found that based on the pleadings attached to the
records, it would appear that Karaan was engaged in the practice of
law. The OCA also noted the numerous frivolous and administrative
complaints filed by Karaan against several judges which tend to
mock the judicial system.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the complaint
against Judge Lubao for lack of merit. The OCA further
recommended that Karaan be required to show cause why he should
not be cited for contempt of court for violation of Section 3(e), Rule
1
71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Resolution dated 24 November 2010, this Court
dismissed the complaint against Judge Lubao for being judicial in
nature and for lack of merit. This Court likewise directed Karaan to
show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for violating
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Karaan filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
the complaint against Judge Lubao. Karaan denied that he had been
assuming to be an attorney or an officer of the court and acting as
such without authority. He alleged that he did not indicate any PTR,
Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number in his documents. He
further stated that A.M. No. 07-1674 filed against Judge Lindo was
not actually dismissed as reported by the OCA.
Karaan thereafter filed Supplemental Arguments to the
motion for reconsideration and compliance to the show cause order.
Karaan reiterated that he never represented himself to anyone as a
lawyer or officer of the court and that his paralegal services, rendered
free of charge, were all for the public good. He stated that he assists
organizations which represent the interests of senior citizens, the
indigents, and members of the community with limited means.
In a Memorandum dated 8 November 2011, the OCA found
no merit in the motion for reconsideration. The OCA noted Judge
Lubaos explanation that the case was summarily dismissed by the
municipal trial court without service of summons on the defendants.
Thus, Judge Lubao deemed it proper to issue the order requiring all
parties to submit their memorandum to give all concerned the
opportunity to be heard. The OCA stated that the remedy against
Judge Lubaos action was judicial in nature. The OCA found that the
claim of Karaan that he could prove the receipt of the order by one
Mr. Mayo is immaterial because it was not in the records of the case
where Judge Karaan based his order.
The OCA noted that Karaan, through the use of intemperate
and slanderous language, continually attributed all sorts of malicious
motives and nefarious schemes to Judge Lubao regarding the
conduct of his official function but failed to substantiate his
allegations. The OCA further noted that this case is just one of the
many cases Karaan filed against various judges in other courts where
the same pattern of accusations could be observed.
The OCA found Karaans explanation on the show cause
order unsatisfactory. The OCA noted Karaans modus operandi of
offering free paralegal advice and then making the parties execute a
special power of attorney that would make him an agent of the
litigants and would allow him to file suits, pleadings and motions
with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his clients.
The OCA noted that Karaans services, on behalf of the
underprivileged he claimed to be helping, fall within the practice of
law. The OCA recommended that Karaan be declared liable for
indirect contempt and be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment
for 10 days at the Manila City Jail and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a
warning that a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or
other offense, against the courts, judges or court employees will
merit more serious sanctions.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the OCAs recommendation that the motion
for reconsideration of the Courts 24 November 2010 Resolution
dismissing the complaint against Judge Lubao has no merit.
Not all administrative complaints against judges merit a
corresponding penalty. In the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject
to disciplinary action.2 We agree with the OCA that the remedy of
the complainants in this case is judicial in nature. Hence, the denial
of their motion for reconsideration of this Courts 24 November 2010
2
Resolution dismissing the administrative case against Judge Lubao is
in order. As the OCA stated, Karaan could not make assumptions as
to when the defendants received the copy of Judge Lubaos order
without the registry return receipt. While Karaan claimed that he
knew when one of the parties received a copy of the order, this claim
was unsupported by evidence and was not in the records of the case
when Judge Lubao issued his 20 May 2009 Order giving the
defendants their last chance to submit their memorandum. The
records would also show that Judge Lubao had been very careful in
his actions on the case, as his branch clerk of court even wrote the
Post Office of General Santos City asking for certification as to
when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under Registry Receipt
No. 690, was received by the defendants. There was no evidence that
Judge Lubao acted arbitrarily or in bad faith. Further, Judge Lubao
could not be faulted for trying to give all the parties an opportunity
to be heard considering that the records of the case would show that
the court a quo summarily dismissed the case without issuing
summons to the defendants.
We likewise agree with the OCA that Karaan was engaged in
unauthorized practice of law.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,3 the Court ruled that practice of law
3
means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
4
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to
practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill.5 Here, the OCA was able to establish the
pattern in Karaans unauthorized practice of law. He would require
the parties to execute a special power of attorney in his favor to
allow him to join them as one of the plaintiffs as their attorney-in-
fact. Then, he would file the necessary complaint and other
pleadings acting for and in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact,
agent or representative of the parties. The fact that Karaan did not
indicate in the pleadings that he was a member of the Bar, or any
PTR, Attorneys Roll, or MCLE Compliance Number does not detract
from the fact that, by his actions, he was actually engaged in the
practice of law.
Under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
person [a]ssuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority, is liable for indirect contempt of
court. Under Section 7 of the same rules, a respondent adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court
4 WHEREFORE, we DENY the motion for reconsideration of the
5 6
or a court of equivalent or higher rank may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) months, or both. If a respondent is adjudged guilty of contempt
committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one
(1) month, or both.
Following the ruling of this Court in In re: Joaquin T.
Borromeo,6 the OCA recommended that Karaan be cited for indirect
contempt and be sentenced to serve an imprisonment of ten days at
the Manila City Jail, and to pay a fine of P1,000 with a warning that
a repetition of any of the offenses, or any similar or other offense
against the courts, judges or court employees will merit further and
more serious sanctions. The OCA further recommended that a
memorandum be issued to all courts of the land to notify the judges
and court employees of Karaans unauthorized practice of law and to
report to the OCA any further appearance to be made by Karaan.
However, the records would show that Karaan is already 71 years
old. In consideration of his old age and his state of health, we deem
it proper to remove the penalty of imprisonment as recommended by
the OCA and instead increase the recommended fine to P10,000.
Courts Resolution dated 24 November 2010 dismissing the
complaint against Judge Antonio C. Lubao for being judicial in
nature. We find REMBERTO C. KARAAN, SR. GUILTY of
indirect contempt under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure and impose on him a Fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000).

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the

land for their guidance and information. The courts and court
employees are further directed to report to the Office of the Court
Administrator any further appearance by Remberto C. Karaan, Sr.
before their sala.

SO ORDERED.

January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF

THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1
submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest
recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the
proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order
the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving
recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial
and other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3
and all parties were thereafter granted leave to file written
memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in
this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a
strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court
created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took
effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as
follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve
the administration of justice, and enable the
Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand
pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the purposes of
this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the same purpose shall be
included in the annual appropriations for the
Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual
data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions,
sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the
Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is
thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration
of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the
meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt
the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3
to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the
official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires
membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of
all persons whose names appear in the Roll
of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified
Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless
it is decreed by an entity with power to do
so: the State. Bar integration, therefore,
signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar
as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule
of Law, integration fosters cohesion among
lawyers, and ensures, through their own
organized action and participation, the
promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in
general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its
members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and
conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its
members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of
cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of
law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of
the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and
publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal
research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations
thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other
things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in
maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the
abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting
officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally
cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and
self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection
of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law,
and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of
disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so
that the poor may not lack competent legal
service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational
materials that are difficult to obtain in many
of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of
continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of
the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law
libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the
people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal
advice, and on the functions and duties of
the Filipino lawyer; and
 (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and
meaningful country-wide involvement of the
lawyer population in the solution of the
multifarious problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the
Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec.
13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of
the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that
"the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new
power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere
legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote
public interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar
would be constitutional hinges on the effects of Bar integration on
the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and
freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion
made by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its
Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar
integration measures has been put in issue,
the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this
reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise
and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right
but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a
lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation; and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the
State, the administration of justice, as an
officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege
clothed with public interest, it is far and just
that the exercise of that privilege be
regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be
discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an
organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring
expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient
means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the
corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of
the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but
unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his Integrated
Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified
Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a
question of compelled financial support of
group activities, not involuntary
membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities
serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar
to the end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in
this fashion be shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel
a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.
The legal profession has long been regarded
as a proper subject of legislative regulation
and control. Moreover, the inherent power
of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar
includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by
the members does not mean that the Court
levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an
exaction for regulation, while the purpose of
a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as
an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would
not be possible to push through an
Integrated Bar program without means to
defray the concomitant expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily
includes the power to impose such an
exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power
to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does
not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest promoted by the integration
of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential
inconvenience to a member that might result
from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to
voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views
be opposed to positions taken by the Unified
Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due
to promote measures to which said member
is opposed, would not nullify or adversely
affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition
the right to practice law upon membership in
the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to
understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the
member's dues to fulfill the very purposes
for which it was established.
The objection would make every
Governmental exaction the material of a
"free speech" issue. Even the income tax
would be suspect. The objection would carry
us to lengths that have never been dreamed
of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his
conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers
already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new
regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have
not had and through which, by proper work,
they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective
manner than they have been able to do in the
past. Because the requirement to pay dues is
a valid exercise of regulatory power by the
Court, because it will apply equally to all
lawyers, young and old, at the time Bar
integration takes effect, and because it is a
new regulation in exchange for new
benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not
unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should
ordain the integration of the Bar at this time requires a careful
overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the
United States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1)
improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful
participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the
Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination
of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8)
more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective
discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its
members, to the courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the
unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar
associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an
impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by
opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty
years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has
been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the
public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The
official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration
show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission
in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of
15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in
their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor
of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it,
and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of
eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of
unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while
not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed
opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers
who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court
Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06
per cent) are non-committal. 5 All these clearly indicate an
overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary
conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the
attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.