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CHAPTER III: principality and not a foreign country within the meaning
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE of Sec. 122, NIRC. In effect, the Collector insists that
the acquisition of international personality is a condition
G.R. NO. L-13250, OCTOBER 29, 1971 sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V. ANTONIO country."
CAMPOS RUEDA
Upon appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, the CTA ruled
FACTS:
that the expression foreign country in Sec. 122 refers
Antonio Campos Rueda was the administrator of the
to a government of that foreign power which, although
estate of late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, a
not an international person in the sense of international
Spanish national and Tangier resident, in the
law, does not impose transfer or death taxes upon
Philippines. In the estate tax return he filed with the
intangible person properties of Philippine citizens not
Collector of Internal Revenue, Rueda claimed the value
residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
of intangible personal properties as exempt from taxes
exemption from such taxes. It was therefore not
under the proviso of Sec. 122, NIRC:
necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect
the Philippine Government in order to entitle the estate
of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the
of Estrella to the exemption benefits of Sec. 122.
time of his death was a resident of a foreign country
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer
ISSUE: Whether Section 22, NIRC requires that the
tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
foreign country possesses an international personality
person property of the Philippines not residing in that
to come within its terms.
foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country
of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his
HELD:
death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Tangier comes
death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
within the term foreign country of Sec. 122 because
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines
independence is not a condition of statehood. The
not residing in that foreign country.
following definitions of a State were provided by the
Court to justify Tangiers statehood:
The Collector, however, denied the exemption and
- it is a politically organized sovereign community,
assessed the estate of deficiency estate and inheritance
independent of outside control, bound by penalties of
taxes (amounting to P161, 874.95) for the transfer of
nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting
intangible personal properties in the Philippines. The
through a government functioning under a regime of law
Collector reasoned that there is no reciprocity between
(Pound)
Tangier and the Philippines because Tangier is a mere
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 2
- a sovereign person with the people composing it, G.R. NO. 104226, AUGUST 12, 1993
viewed as an organized corporate society under a CONCHITA ROMUALDEZ-YAP V. CIVIL SERVICE
government, with the legal competence to exact COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
obedience to its commands (Willoughby)
- a body-politic organized by common consent for
FACTS:
mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the
Conchita Romualdez-Yap filed a petition for certiorari to
general welfare (Cooley)
question her separation from the Philippine National
- the juridical personification of the nation (Esmein)
Bank. She was the Senior Vice President of the Fund
- a territorial society divided into government and
Trust Department of PNB. While she was on leave of
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy
absence for medical reasons (April 1, 1986 February
over all other institutions (Laski)
20, 1987), PNB underwent reorganization (December 3,
- a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,
1986 by virtue of the Revised Charter of PNB or
politically organized, exercising by means of its
Executive Order No. 80) that caused the abolition of the
government its sovereign will over the individuals within
Fund Trust Department. As a result of the
it and maintaining its separate international personality
reorganization, Romualdez-Yap was notified of her
separation from service (effective February 1987,
The SC emphasized, however, that as long as there is
though the letter erroneously stated 1986). She
power entrusted to its government to maintain within its
contested her separation in the Civil Service
territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into
Commission, arguing that her separation was made in
international relations (McIver), international law does
bad faith because, among others: (1) it was based on
not exact independence as a condition of statehood.
her close identification with the previous regime, being
the sister of Imelda Marcos; (2) her separation was
Assuming that Tangier was bereft of international
antedated on February 16, 1986, prior to the effectivity
personality, jurisprudence supports the finding that Sec.
of Executive Order No. 80 on December 3, 1986; (3) the
122 treats even a principality as a foreign country.
Fund Transfer Department has recently been restored;
Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara considered
and (4) she was not extended preference in
California as a foreign country. In Kiene v. Collector of
appointment to the positions in the new staff.
Internal Revenue, the tiny principality of Liechtenstein,
The CSC and the Supreme Court upheld the validity of
with hardly an international personality, was found to fall
her separation.
under the exemption of Sec. 122.
ISSUE: Whether the separation arising from
reorganization was made in good faith
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 3
HELD: YES
1. Requirements for a valid reorganization Reorganization in either case must be made in good
Reorganization is a management prerogative exercised faith. According to Dario v. Mison: Reorganizations in
pursuant to a business judgment. While a distinction this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided
can be made between a government bureau or office they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is
performing constituent functions (e.g. Customs) and a carried out in "good faith" if: (1) it is for the purpose of
government-owned or controlled corporation performing economy, or (2) to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
ministrant functions (e.g. PNB), the common test for those events, no dismissal (in case of dismissal) or
their valid reorganizations is the test of good faith. separation actually occurs because the position itself
ceases to exist. Otherwise, an "abolition" is void ab
CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS are those which initio if it is nothing else but a separation or removal, is
constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security
in nature. These are functions which our government is of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith.
required to exercise to promote its objectives as
expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised 2. The reorganization of PNB was done in good
by it as an attribute of sovereignty. faith.
The SC found the following circumstances as indicative
On the other hand, MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS are of PNBs good faith in pursuing reorganization:
those undertaken by way of advancing the general it was by virtue of a valid law
interests of society, and are merely optional functions of it was pursued to achieve economy considering
government. These are functions which it may exercise PNBs critical financial situation at the time
to promote merely the welfare, progress and prosperity the year "1986" stated in the notice of her separation
of the people. The option is exercised on the basis of from the service was a typographical error where
the following are the principles: (1) that a government PNB had submitted documents supporting its stand
should do for the public welfare those things which that the separation actually took effect on 16
private capital would not naturally undertake; and (2) February 1987.
that a government should do those things which by its the later restoration of the Fund Transfer
very, nature it is better equipped to administer for the Department, which took effect after the lapse of over
public welfare than is any private individual or group of four years from the date it was abolished in 1987,
individuals (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine was primarily caused by the improved financial
Islands). Examples are commercial or universal capability and present needs of PNB
banking which is, not a governmental but, a private the appointment of SVP Federico Pascual as head of
sector endeavor. the International Department, from among other
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 4
officers including Yap, is because his qualifications G.R. NOS. L-55963 & 61045, FEBRUARY 27, 1991
far exceeded those of the other candidates for the SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA
position, being a lawyer from the University of the FONTANILLA V. HONORABLE INOCENCIO D.
Philippines, a Bachelor of Arts degree holder from MALIAMAN AND NATIONAL IRRIGATION
Ateneo de Manila, a Master of Laws graduate of ADMINISTRATION
Columbia Law School, and a Masteral Arts in Public
Administration graduate of the London School of NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION V.
Economics; he had also undergone extensive SPOUSES JOSE FONTANILLA AND VIRGINIA
seminars at the International Department and had FONTANILLA
been assigned in several foreign branches of PNB;
FACTS:
he held the second highest position of Executive
Sps. Fontanilla sued the National Irrigation
Vice President and served as Acting President of
Administration for damages, arising from the tortious act
PNB; while Yap only holds a Bachelor of Science in
of its driver, Hugo Garcia. NIA denied liability, alleging
Commerce Degree from Assumption Convent and
that it is a government agency tasked with
has undergone only one seminar on Management
governmental functions and is, therefore, not liable for
and Leadership Training Program.
the tortious acts of its driver who is not a special agent.
The SC had ruled that NIA was liable as a government
Assuming that her separation was made in bad faith, an
entity exercising proprietary functions. Thus NIA filed a
action for a quo warranto proceeding prescribes 1 year
Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it is a
from the questioned termination. She was separated
governmental entity.
from PNB on February 16, 1987 and it was only in 1989
or about 2 years after when she brought the matter to
ISSUE: Whether NIA is a government entity exercising
the CSC. By her inaction in questioning her termination
governmental or proprietary functions.
within a period of 1 year, she was considered to have
acquiesced to her separation from the service and
HELD:
abandoned her right to the position.
1. NIA is a governmental entity exercising
proprietary functions.
Governmental functions are classified into governmental
/ constituent and proprietary / ministrant.
GOVERNMENTAL / CONSTITUENT FUNCTIONS
involve the exercise of sovereignty and are thus
considered as compulsory. PROPRIETARY /
MINISTRANT FUNCTIONS connote merely the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 5
exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as Unions), the functions performed by such enterprises
optional. are basically proprietary in nature. Its general purposes
are not essentially public in their nature, but are only
2. The operation of an irrigation system is a incidentally so.
proprietary function.
In the United States where its irrigation districts are Therefore, an irrigation district is the owner of its system
identical to Philippine irrigation systems, irrigation in a proprietary rather than a public capacity, and must
districts are characterized, according to jurisprudence, assume and bear the burdens of proprietary ownership
as public quasi corporations organized to conduct a (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). According to
business for the private benefit of the owners of land McQuillin (The Law of Municipal Corporations), when
within its limits (Nampa v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist.). municipalities undertake to supply water at price, they
They are not considered as exercising sovereign are engaged in trade. Although the State may regulate
functions where they furnish no facilities for the the service and rates of water plants owned and
administration of the sovereign government and its operated by municipalities, such property is not
officers have no power or authority to exercise any of employed for governmental purposes and in the
the functions of the general government, or to enforce ownership and operation thereof, the municipality acts
any of the laws of the state or any of its other in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative
subdivisions, or collect taxes other than those assessed interference. Consequently, they are liable as any
by the district. They have no more power or authority private company would be for any negligence in laying
than that of the officers of a private corporation out of its pipes, in keeping them in repair, or in
organized for like purposes (Holderbaum vs. Hidalgo furnishing potable water through them.
County Water Improvement District). They are thus
considered as businesses because the land owners, as NIA was not created for purposes of local government.
members of the corporation, control the affairs of the NIA was created as a body corporate with a corporate
district and alone are benefited by its operations. While personality separate and distinct from the government
public benefit and public welfare may be found in the for the purpose of "constructing, improving,
operation of certain enterprises (like those engaged in rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation
the supply of electric power, or in supplying telegraphic, systems in the Philippines, including all communal and
telephonic, and radio communication, or in the pump irrigation projects." While it is essentially a
production and distribution of prime necessities,), and service agency of the government aimed at promoting
even though the service rendered caters to the public interest and public welfare, such fact does not
community as a whole and the goal is for the general make NIA essentially and purely a "government-
interest of society (NAWASA v. NWSA Consolidated function" corporation. Certainly, the state and the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 6
community as a whole are largely benefited by the Register of Deeds. However, the writ had not been
services NIA renders, but these functions are only executed for 24 years until the OSG, representing the
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is Republic of the Philippines, initiated a complaint for
the irrigation of lands. revival of judgment and cancellation of titles on April 21,
1999, against the successors-in-interest of Rafael
Galvez.
G.R. NO. 143377, FEBRUARY 20, 2001 Shipside filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
SHIPSIDE INCORPORATED V. COURT OF APPEALS the Republic was not the real party in interest because
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES the real property covered by the titles were allegedly
part of Camp Wallace (Wallace Air Station) and under
FACTS:
the ownership and administration of the Bases
An action for revival of judgment was instituted by the
Conversion Development Authority under Republic Act
Republic of the Philippines but which the Court
No. 7227; and that the action has prescribed. The
dismissed, having found that the Republic was not the
Republic, however, countered that prescription does not
real party in interest.
run against the State, which is still the real party in
The issue began when Rafael Galvez obtained an
interest because the transfer of the military reservations
Original Certificate of Title over four lots in La Union.
to the Conversion Authority does not amount to an
He sold Lots 1 and 4 to Mamaril, Llana, Bustos and
abdication on the part of the Republic of its interests,
Balatbat, who obtained TCTs in their names and who, in
but simply a recognition of the need to create a body
turn, subsequently sold the same lots to Lepanto
corporate which will act only as its agent for the
Consolidated Mining Company. Lepanto obtained a
realization of its program. The MTD was dismissed thus
TCT in its name. Meanwhile, unknown to Lepanto, CFI
Shipside raised the issue before the Supreme Court.
La Union ordered the cancellation of Galvez/s title over
the lots in a land registration case initiated by the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines
Republic of the Philippines. The Order was issued on
is a real party in interest and can thus claim the
February 1, 1963, but the same subjects lots were
imprescriptibility of the States action N
unknowingly sold by Lepanto to Shipside Incorporated
on October 28, 1963. Shipside had obtained a TCT in
HELD:
its name and had been exercising proprietary rights
The action to revive judgment has prescribed (CA
since then.
Decision became final on October 23, 1973 while the
The CFI Order was contested by Galvez, but was
action for revival of judgment was instituted only in
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The CA Decision
1999, or more than 25 years) under NCC 1144(3): an
became final and executory on October 23, 1973. A
writ of execution was issued and served upon the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 7
action upon a judgment "must be brought within 10 general, do not make the BCDA equivalent to the
years from the time the right of action accrues." Government. Other corporations have been created by
government to act as its agents for the realization of its
The Republic, represented by the OSG, cannot invoke programs, the SSS, GSIS, NAWASA arid the NIA, to
imprescriptibility of State actions because the Republic count a few, and yet, the Court has ruled that these
is not the real party in interest, having transferred the entities, although performing functions aimed at
ownership of Camp Wallace, which used to belong to promoting public interest and public welfare, are not
the government, to the Bases Conversion and government-function corporations invested with
Development Authority. Under Sec. 4 of R.A. 7227 governmental attributes.
(Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), the
BCDA owns, holds and/or administers military The Republic cannot also invoke E.B. Marcha Transport
reservations including Wallace Air Station and, under Co., Inc. v. IAC which held that the Republic is the
Sec. 4, all areas covered by the Wallace Air Station are proper party to sue for the recovery of possession of
hereby transferred to the BCDA. Being the owner of the property, which, at the time of the institution of the suit,
areas covered by Camp Wallace, it is the BCDA, not the was no longer held by the national government but by
Government, which stands to be benefited if the land the Philippine Ports Authority. In E.B. Marcha, the
covered by Shipsides title is cancelled. claims of the Republic and the Philippine Ports Authority
against the petitioner therein were the same and to
The Republic also cannot invoke the relationship of dismiss the complaint in E.B. Marcha would have
mere agency between the Government and BCDA. brought needless delay in the settlement of the matter
BCDA is an entity invested with a personality separate since the PPA would have to re-file the case on the
and distinct from the government, having been created same claim already litigated upon. Such is not the case
as a body corporate and vested with the powers of a at bar since to allow the government to sue herein
corporation (Sec. 3, R.A. 7227). It is not a mere agency enables it to raise the issue of imprescriptibility, a claim
of the Government but a corporate body performing which is not available to the BCDA. The rule that
proprietary functions. While public benefit and public prescription does not run against the State does not
welfare, particularly, the promotion of the economic and apply to corporations or artificial bodies created by the
social development of Central Luzon, may be State for special purposes, it being said that when the
attributable to the operation of the BCDA, yet it is title of the Republic has been divested, its grantees,
certain that the functions performed by the BCDA are although artificial bodies of its own creation, are in the
basically proprietary in nature. The promotion of same category as ordinary persons (Kingston v. LeHigh
economic and social development of Central Luzon, in Valley Coal Co., 241 Pa 469). To hold otherwise is to
particular, and the country's goal for enhancement, in begin bad precedent as it would allow the Republic to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 8
HELD:
G.R. NO. L-32052, JULY 25, 1975 1. PVTA is an agency exercising governmental
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION functions.
V. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL Under its Charter (R.A. 2265), PVTA was established
to, among others, promote the effective merchandising
FACTS:
of Virginia tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets
Labor claims (overtime compensations) were filed by
so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a
laborers against the Philippine Virginia Tobacco
basis of economic security; create, establish, maintain,
Administration before the Court of Industrial Relations.
and operate processing, warehousing and marketing
The claims were granted by CIR. PVTA sought to
facilities in suitable centers and supervise the selling
declare the nullity of the decision on the ground that CIR
and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will
had no jurisdiction over it and that the Eight-Hour Labor
enjoy reasonable prices that secure a fair return of their
Law did not apply to it being an agency exercising
investments; and improve the living and economic
governmental functions.
conditions of the people engaged in the tobacco
The laborers of PVTA sued the latter before the CIR for
industry.
payment of their overtime services (in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them) by virtue of
The distinction, however, between constituent and
the Eight-Hour Labor Law (C.A. No. 444). PVTA sought
ministrant functions of governments as set forth in
the dismissal of the suit on the following ground that it is
Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation has become
an agency exercising governmental functions and by
futile in the era of welfare states where the increased
such reason, the 8-Hour Labor Law does not apply to it
responsibility to provide for the general welfare
(lack of cause of action) and the CIR has no jurisdiction.
necessitated the expanded role of government.
The CIR ignored these defenses and ruled in favor of
According to Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity
the laborers.
of the social conscience," resulted in "a state which
seeks to realize more fully the common good of its
members." Chief Justice Makalintal explained in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 9
harsh contract which [does] obtain between the levels of grounds that: 1. It violates the due process clause,
the rich and the poor" may be minimized. There is no following the American principle of laissez faire, and 2. It
longer any constitutional obstacle to a government constitutes an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for private
enterprise. It is a response to a trend noted by Justice The Reflector Law reads: "(g) Lights and reflector when
Laurel in Calalang v. Williams for the humanization of parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or
laws and the promotion of the interest of all component flares visible one hundred meters away shall be
elements of society so that man's innate aspirations be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such
attained. vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not
well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger
2. The exercise of governmental functions does not passing traffic. Furthermore, every motor vehicle shall
exempt an agency from the operation of labor be provided at all times with built-in reflectors or other
laws. similar warning devices either pasted, painted or
Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia ruled that it is attached to its front and back which shall likewise be
precisely CIR and not ordinary courts that should pass visible at light at least one hundred meters away. No
upon labor controversies. On the other hand, the Eight- vehicle not provided with any of the requirements
Hour Labor Law provides that it shall apply to all mentioned in this subsection shall be registered."
persons employed in any industry or occupation,
whether public or private. ISSUE: W/N the Reflector Law violates the due
process clause, following the American principle of
laissez faire.
to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of state action. No constitutional objection to regulatory
the state." ~Calalang v. Williams measures adversely affecting property rights, especially
the power to prescribe regulations to promote the so when public safety is the aim, is likely to be heeded,
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, unless of course on the clearest and most satisfactory
and general welfare of the people." ~Primicias v. proof of invasion of rights guaranteed by the
Fugoso Constitution.
Justice Laurel, concurring in Antamok Goldfields
2. Laissez faire principle no longer recognized in US. Mining Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, said that the
There was a period in American history where series 1935 Constitution did away with the laissez-
of legislations tending to reduce economic inequality faire doctrine.
(e.g. in People v. Pomar, a provision providing for during the Commonwealth era, no constitutional
maternity leave with pay thirty days before and thirty infirmity was found to have attached to legislation
days after confinement; in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, covering such subjects as collective
a statute providing for minimum wages) were struck bargaining, 22 security of tenure, 23 minimum
down as violative of the due process clause, under the wages, 24 compulsory arbitration, 25 the regulation of
theory that individuals should have unrestricted freedom tenancy 26 as well as the issuance of securities, 27 and
in entering into contracts (laissez faire). control of public services.
But under Pres. Roosevelts The New Deal
administration the US Supreme Court began rejecting 4. Galo thus could have profited by a little more
the laissez faire doctrine. diligence in the scrutiny of Philippine decisions rendered
with not unexpected regularity, during all the while our
3. Laissez faire doctrine had always been rejected in the Constitution has been in force attesting to the demise of
Philippines such a shibboleth as laissez-faireThe Reflector Law is
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro: The doctrines thus immune from the attack so recklessly hurled
of laissez-faire and of unrestricted freedom of the against it. It can survive, and quite easily too, the
individual, as axioms of economic and political theory, constitutional test.
are of the past
the Constitutional Convention saw to it that the ISSUE: W/N the Reflector Law (A.O.) is contrary to the
concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
government the responsibility of coping with social and HELD: No, it is not.
economic problems with the commensurate power of The A.O. states: No motor vehicles of whatever
control over economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to style, kind, make, class or denomination shall be
its commitment to promote the general welfare through registered if not equipped with reflectors. Such
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 12
reflectors shall either be factory built-in-reflector often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to
commercial glass reflectors, reflection tape or luminous anticipate and proved for the multifarious and complex
paint. The luminosity shall have an intensity to be situations that may be met in carrying the law in effect.
maintained visible and clean at all times such that if All that is required is that the regulation should germane
struck by a beam of light shall be visible 100 meters to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
away at night." regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to
penalty for non-compliance is rejection or suspension the standards that the law prescribes ... "
of vehicles registration and a fine. It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic
doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no
delegate its legislative power to the two other branches doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety
of the government What cannot be delegated is the which is the prime consideration in statutes of this
authority under the Constitution to make laws and to character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of
alter and repeal them the power of petitioner as Land Transportation
A distinction has rightfully been made between Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to
delegation of power to make the laws which necessarily give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which purpose.
constitutionally may not be done, and delegation of
authority or discretion as to its execution to exercised
under and in pursuance of the law, to which no valid ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT
objection call be made. DESICCATORS V. PHILIPPINE COCONUT
The test is the completeness of the statute in all its AUTHORITY
term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the
legislatureThe legislature does not abdicate its
FACTS:
functions when it describes what job must be done, who
the Philippine Coconut Authority issued on March 24,
is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the
Justice J. B. L. Reyes in People vs. Exconde: "It is
withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all
well establish in this jurisdiction that, while the making of
regulation of the coconut product processing industry.
laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
In its whereas clause, it stated that it is the policy of the
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
State to promote free enterprise unhampered by
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules
protective regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red
and regulations to implement a given legislation and
tapes. As such, the PCA will no longer require any
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature
coconut processing plant to apply with PCA and the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 13
latter shall no longer issue any form of license or permit The Philippine Coconut Authority is an
as condition prior to establishment or operation of such independent public corporation . . . directly reporting to,
mills or plants. Rather, it shall limit itself only to simply and supervised by, the President of the Philippines, and
registering coconut product processors for the purpose charged with carrying out the State's policy "to promote
of monitoring their volumes of production, administration the rapid integrated development and growth of the
of quality standards. coconut industrythrough a regulatory scheme set up
The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of by law.
registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated Through this scheme, the government, on August 28,
coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to 1982, temporarily prohibited the opening of new coconut
appeal to the Office of the President processing plants and, four months later, phased out
When petitioner received no reply from the Office of the some of the existing ones in view of overproduction in
President, they brought this suit for the coconut industry which resulted in cut-throat
certiorari and mandamus before the SC. competition, underselling and smuggling of poor quality
PCA: case should be dismissed as they did not wait for products and ultimately in the decline of the export
Presidents reply, thereby violating principle of performance of coconut-based commodities. The
exhaustion of administrative remedies. establishment of new plants could be authorized only
upon determination by the PCA of the existence of
ISSUE: W/N rule on exhaustion of administrative certain economic conditions and the approval of the
remedies applies. President.
On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the
HELD: No, it does not. existing plants was ordered by the government after
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of
remedies before a party may seek judicial reviewhas existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the
obviously no application here. The resolution in question problem considering that the total available limited
was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making market is not adequate to support all the existing
or legislative power. However, only judicial review of processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the
decisions of administrative agencies made in the number of existing processing plants.
exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the It was only on October 23, 1987 when the PCA
exhaustion doctrine. adopted Resolution No. 058-87, authorizing the
establishment and operation of additional DCN plants,
ISSUE: W/N PCAs resolution is valid. subject to the approval of the President, in view of the
increased demand for desiccated coconut products in
HELD: No, it does not. the world's markets. This authorized the opening of new
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 14
plants in "non-congested areas only as declared by the all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the
PCA" and subject to compliance by applicants with "all production of inferior products and the like, which badly
procedures and requirements for registration. This form affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut
of "deregulation" was approved by President Aquino. industry.
These measures the restriction in 1982 on entry In the first "whereas" clause of the questioned
into the field, the reduction the same year of the number resolution as set out above, the PCA invokes a policy of
of the existing coconut mills and then the lifting of the free enterprise that is "unhampered by protective
restrictions in 1987 were adopted within the regulations and unnecessary bureaucratic red tape" as
framework of regulation as established by law "to justification for abolishing the licensing system. But free
promote the rapid integrated development and growth of enterprise does not call for removal of "protective
the coconut industry. The PCA could have only worked regulations."
under this structure. At all events, any change in policy must be made by
In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the the legislative department of the government. The
PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond
resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.
opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual
dismantling of the regulatory infrastructureIn effect,
the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V.
these matters, but in case of violations of standards EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE
there would be nothing much it would do. MANILA
Under the Revised Coconut Code, the role of the
FACTS:
PCA is "To formulate and adopt a general program of
About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the
development for the coconut and other palm oil industry
treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of
in all its aspects." And To regulate the marketing and
the Spanish Dominions of the relief of those damaged
the exportation of copra and its by-products by
by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine
establishing standards for domestic trade and export..
Islands on June 3, 1863.
By limiting the purpose of registration to merely
Subsequently, a central relief board was appointed to
"monitoring volumes of production [and] administration
distribute the money. It allotted $365,703.50 to the
of quality standards" of coconut processing plants, the
various sufferers named in its resolution, which was
PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost
published in the Official Gazette.
completely to market forces how the coconut industry
Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte
will develop. The result can very well be a repeat of
de Piedad, the Philippine Government directed its
1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-
treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 15
$80,000 of the relief fund in four installments of $20,000 Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief
each. board, there be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to
On account of various petitions of the originally be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the
intended beneficiaries of the money, the Philippine disposal of the relief board." The Monte de Piedad
Government sued Monte de Piedad to recover the agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be
$80,000. The lower court ruled in favor of the approved by the Government of Spain, the same would
Government. be returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be
Monte de Piedad asserts: given to it as a donation.
1. The sum was actually a donation, not a loan,
2. the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to 2. The present Philippine government has the
return the $80,000 to the Government, even considering prerogative to enforce charities, as parens patriae
it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty. If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict
Hence, the present Philippine government cannot with the political character, constitution or institutions of
maintain this suit. the new sovereign, they became inoperative or lost their
3. The Philippine Government has no competence to force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the
institute the suit. The money was part of a charitable United States, but if they are among "that great body of
subscription, whereby the donors were people in Spain, municipal law which regulates private and domestic
the donees were people in the Philippines, and the rights," they continued in force and are still in force
Government was merely a trustee. It was never the unless they have been repealed by the present
owner of the money, and therefore could not sue for its Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear
recovery as it is not the proper party. from their very nature and character.
4. Monte de Piedad declined to return the $80,000 when Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine
ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved
1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the upon he United States. Chancellor Kent: In this
time this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912 country, the legislature or government of the State,
as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of
HELD: public nature, by virtue of its general superintending
1. Evidence shows that the money was a loan, not a authority over the public interests, where no other
donation. person is entrusted with it. .
The Monte de Piedad, after setting forth in its petition to Mormon Church v US: it is a most beneficient
the Governor-General its financial condition and its functions, and often necessary to be exercised in the
absolute necessity for more working capital, asked that interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to
out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the those who cannot protect themselves.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 16
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A statute Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally acquired
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws and
if any other possible construction remains. courts of the Philippines had become courts of Japan,
as the said courts and laws creating and conferring
Another is that where great inconvenience will result jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now,
from a particular construction, or great mischief done, it follows that the same courts may continue exercising
such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before
presume that such construction was not intended by the the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, until
makers of the law, unless required by clear and abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
unequivocal words. upon them are repealed by the said government.
Annulling judgments of courts made during the DECISION: Writ of mandamus issued to the judge of
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
should not be construed to mean that judicial proceedings in civil case no. 3012.
proceedings are included in the phrase processes of
any other governments. SUMMARY OF RATIO:
1. International law says the acts of a de facto
In the case of US vs Reiter, the court said that if such government are valid and civil laws continue even
laws and institutions are continued in use by the during occupation unless repealed.
occupant, they become his and derive their force from 2. MacArthur annulled proceedings of other
him. The laws and courts of the Philippines did not governments, but this cannot be applied on judicial
become, by being continued as required by the law of proceedings because such a construction would violate
nations, laws and courts of Japan. the law of nations.
3. Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue
It is a legal maxim that, excepting of a political nature, hearing the case pending before it.
law once established continues until changed by some ***3 kinds of de facto government: one established
competent legislative power. IT IS NOT CHANGED through rebellion (govt gets possession and control
MERELY BY CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY. Until, of through force or the voice of the majority and maintains
course, the new sovereign by legislative act creates a itself against the will of the rightful government)
change. through occupation (established and maintained by
military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the
enemy in the course of war; denoted as a government
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 19
those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of distorted monarchical conception of the nature of
calumny and insults in which the elements of writing and political authority, as opposed to the American
publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. conception of the protection of the interests of the
The Libel Law must have had the same result on public, have been obliterated by the present system of
other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance government in the Islands.
article 256. it must be noted that this article punishes contempts
against executive officials, although its terms are broad
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for
sovereignty over the Philippines on article 256 of the contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a
Spanish Penal Code. government based upon American principles. Our
It is a general principle of the public law that on official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some
acquisition of territory the previous political relations of authority greater than the people but it is an agent and
the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here servant of the people themselves. These officials are
used to denominate the laws regulating the relations only entitled to respect and obedience when they are
sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish The crime of lese majeste (crime against the crown,
Penal Code was enacted by the Government of Spain crimes against the Cortes and its members and against
to protect Spanish officials who were the the council of ministers) disappeared in the Philippines
representatives of the King. With the change of with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. Ministers of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no
sense a continuation of the old, although merely for
convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws VILAS V. CITY OF MANILA (1911)
were continued. The demands which the new
FACTS:
government made, and makes, on the individual citizen
Vilas, Trigas, and Aguado are creditors of Manila as it
are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of
existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands
the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted
(PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to them,
position that the citizen must speak of him only with
under its present charter, the Government of the PI is
bated breath.
the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the
of the old city. The Supreme Court of the Philippine
genius and fundamental principles of the American
Islands denied relief, holding that the present
character and system of government. Penalties out of
municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in
all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 21
no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. belong to the peaceful possession of property of all
Thus it was elevated to the US Supreme Court. kinds.
Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals
ISSUE: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to were safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an
the US followed by a reincorporation of the city, the extinction or dissolution of corporations. The legal entity
present municipality liable for obligations of old city. survived both military occupation and cession. The
YES corporate identity and liability of the city was not
extinguished.
HELD: That there is a total abrogation of the former political
The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is
the property rights of the old city and to the right to obvious. That all laws theretofore in force which are in
enforce all its causes of action. There is identity of conflict with the political character, constitution, or
purpose between Sp and Am charters and substantial institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their force,
identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants. is also plain. But it is equally settled in the same public
Argument against liability: Ayuntamiento of Manila was law that that great body of municipal law which
a corporation entity created by the Sp government . regulates private and domestic rights continues in force
When the sovereignty of Sp ceased, municipality, until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. In Chicago,
ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of principal and R. I. & P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, it was said:
agent, death of principal=death of agent 'It is a general rule of public law, recognized and acted
Dual Character of Municipal Corporations: upon by the United States, that whenever political
1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are
sovereignty of the state transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the
2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. municipal laws of the country, that is, laws which are
Stands for the community in the administration of local intended for the protection of private rights, continue in
affairs wholly beyond the sphere of the public purposes force until abrogated or changed by the new
for which its governmental powers are conferred government or sovereign. By the cession, public
In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, property passes from one government to the other, but
there is no public reason for presuming their total private property remains as before, and with it those
dissolution as a mere consequence of military municipal laws which are designed to secure its
occupation or territorial cession. peaceful use and enjoyment. As a matter of course, all
McKinleys instruction: relinquishment or cession cannot laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the
in any respect impair the property or rights which by law political character, institutions, and constitution of the
new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 22
cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power-and was the summary one established in Chapter II of
the latter is involved in the former-to the United States, Executive Order No. 157 of the Chairman of the
the laws of the country in support of an established Executive Commission, made applicable to the trial
religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or violations of said Act No. 65 by section 9 thereof and
authorizing cruel and unusual punishments, and the section 5 of said Ordinance No. 7.
like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force The petition for habeas corpus is based on the ground
without any declaration to that effect; and the laws of that the Court of Special and Executive Criminal
the country on other subjects would necessarily be Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 "was a political
superseded by existing laws of the new government instrumentality of the military forces of the Japanese
upon the same matters. But with respect to other laws Imperial Army, the aims and purposes of which are
affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, repugnant to those aims and political purposes of the
and designed to secure good order and peace in the Commonwealth of the Philippines, as well as those of
community, and promote its health and prosperity, the United States of America, and therefore, null and
which are strictly of a municipal character, the rule is void ab initio," that the provisions of said Ordinance No.
general, that a change of government leaves them in 7 are violative of the fundamental laws of the
force until, by direct action of the new government, they Commonwealth of the Philippines and "the petitioner
are altered or repealed.' has been deprived of his constitutional rights"; that
Peralta is being punished by a law created to serve the
political purpose of the Japanese Imperial Army in the
PERALTA V. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (1945) Philippines, and "that the penalties provided for are
much (more) severe than the penalties provided for in
FACTS:
the Revised Penal Code."
Peralta, a member of the Metropolitan Constabulary of
The Solicitor General opined that the Court of Special
Manila charged with the supervision and control of the
and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created, and the
production, procurement and distribution of goods and
summary procedure prescribed therefor are tinged with
other necessaries, was prosecuted for the crime of
political complexion; that the procedure prescribed in
robbery. He was found guilty and sentenced to life
Ordinance No. 7 does not afford a fair trial, violates the
imprisonment, which he commenced to serve on August
Constitution of the Commonwealth, and impairs the
21, 1944, by the Court of Special and Exclusive
Constitutional rights of accused persons under their
Criminal Jurisdiction, created in section 1 of Ordinance
legitimate Constitution.
No. 7 promulgated by the President of the so-called
The features of the summary procedure adopted by
Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority
Ordinance No. 7, assailed by Peralta and the Solicitor
conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the
General as impairing the constitutional rights of an
said Republic. And the procedure followed in the trial
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 23
accused are: that court may interrogate the accused case it is a government imposed by the laws of war and
and witnesses before trial in order to clarify the points in so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or
dispute; that the refusal of the accused to answer the the rest of the world those laws alone determine the
questions may be considered unfavorable to him; that if legality or illegality of its acts." The fact that the
from the facts admitted at the preliminary interrogatory it Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a
appears that the defendant is guilty, he may be military government and was run by Filipinos and not by
immediately convicted; and that the sentence of the Japanese nationals is of no consequence. The so-called
sentence of the court is not appealable, except in case Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and
of death penalty which cannot be executed unless and organized as a sovereign state independent from any
until reviewed and affirmed by a special division of the other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth
Supreme Court composed of three Justices. and reality, a government established by the belligerent
occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was
FIRST ISSUE: of the same character as the Philippine Executive
What is the nature and status of the government Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority
established in the Islands by the Japanese forces of was the same the Japanese military authority and
occupation under the designation of Republic of the government. As General MacArthur stated in his
Philippines? proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which
has been already quoted, "under enemy duress, a so-
In the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and called government styled as the 'Republic of the
Dizon it washeld: Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943,
The Philippines Executive Commission, which was based upon neither the free expression of the peoples"
organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil States.' Japan had no legal power to grant
government established by the military forces of independence to the Philippines or transfer the
occupation and therefore a de facto government of the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the
second kind. As Halleck says, "the government latent sovereignty of the Filipino people, before its
established over an enemy's territory during the military military occupation and possession of the Islands had
occupation may exercise all the powers given by the matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or
laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means
subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is recognized in the law of nations.
of little consequence whether such government be
called a military or civil government. Its character is the As the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de
same and the source of its authority the same. In either facto government of the second kind (of paramount
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 24
force), the question involved cannot be decided in the is totally independent of the constitution and the laws of
light of the Constitution of the Commonwealth the territory, since occupation is an aim of warfare, and
Government; because the belligerent occupant was the maintenance and safety of his forces, and the
totally independent of the constitution of the occupied purpose of war, stand in the foreground of his interest
territory in carrying out the administration over said and must be promoted under all circumstances or
territory; and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme conditions.
Court of the United States in the cases involving the
validity of judicial and legislative acts of the Confederate SECOND ISSUE:
States, considered as de facto governments of the third The validity of the creation of the Court of Special and
kind, does not apply to the acts of the so-called Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary
Republic of the Philippines which is a de procedure adopted for that court
facto government of paramount force. The Constitution
of the so-called Republic of the Philippines can neither It is well established in International Law that "The
be applied, since the validity of an act of a belligerent criminal jurisdiction established by the invader in the
occupant cannot be tested in the light of another act of occupied territory finds its source neither in the laws of
the same occupant, whose criminal jurisdiction is drawn the conquering or conquered state, it is drawn
entirely from the law martial as defined in the usages of entirely form the law martial as defined in the usages of
nations. nations. The authority thus derived can be asserted
either through special tribunals, whose authority and
In the case of United States vs. Rice, the Supreme procedure is defined in the military code of the
Court of the United States held that, by the military conquering state, or through the ordinary courts and
occupation of Castine, Maine, the sovereignty of the authorities of the occupied district."
United States in the territory was, of course, suspended,
and the laws of the United States could no longer be The so-called Republic of the Philippines, being a
rightfully enforced there or be obligatory upon the governmental instrumentality of the belligerent
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the occupant, had therefore the power or was competent to
belligerent occupant. By the surrender the inhabitants create the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
passed under a temporary allegiance to the British Jurisdiction. No question may arise as to whether or not
government, and were bound by such laws, and such a court is of political complexion, for it is mere a
only, as it chose to recognize and impose. And governmental agency charged with the duty of applying
Oppenheim, in his Treatise on International Law, says the law to cases falling within its jurisdiction. Its
that, in carrying out the administration over the occupied judgments and sentences may be of political
territory and its inhabitants, "the (belligerent) occupant complexion, or not depending upon the nature or
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 25
vested in the legitimate government. What may be occupation and that SC should hold that no treason
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty could have been committed during it because Art. 114
with the control and government of the territory of the RPC was not then in force. He also does not
occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the agree with the majority that adopting theory of
occupant. The sovereignty itself is not suspended and suspended allegiance would lead to disastrous
subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of consequence for the reason that the suspension does
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or not exempt the occupant from complying with the
sovereign also subsists, and therefore there is no such Hague Regulation of not involving the population to take
thing as suspended allegiance, on which petitioner's part in the military operations against their own country.
contention rests. He also said that the Commonwealth was an
instrumentality of the US and had no sovereignty of its
Adopting the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance own and that treason committed against it or the US is
would lead to disastrous consequences for it would not treason against the sovereign and independent
sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a Republic of the Phil.
free and sovereign country to be a party in the nefarious
task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence. REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR
FACTS:
The second contention was also invalid since the
Respondent judge Guillermo Villasor ordered in a
change of government from Commonwealth to Republic
previous case to release funds from bank accounts
does not affect the prosecution of crime of treason
belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines as
committed during the former, because it is an offense
compensation to two construction companies.
on the same government and sovereign people for Art.
The Philippine government sought to reverse Villasor's
XVIII of the 1935 Constitution provided that upon the
decision, on the ground that it did not authorize the
withdrawal of the sovereignty of the US, the
release of funds.
Commonwealth of the Philippines will be known as the
Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUE: WoN Villasor had the authority and jurisdiction
Dispositive: Petition was denied.
to order the release of funds as restitution for damages
in a suit against the State?
PARAS, J., DISSENTING OPINION
He said that in Peralta v. Director of Prisons, the SC
HELD/RATIO:
held that the Constitution of the Commonwealth
No. Article XV, Section 16 of the 1935 Constitution
Government was suspended during the Japanese
says, "The State may not be sued without its consent."
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 27
from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick regarded as being against the state itself, although it
in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled has not been formally impleaded.
to immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it
interpret trends and developments in their respective can be established that he is acting within the directives
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an
ministries or departments in the home government. He indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic the two sovereigns.
mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that
simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial The buy-bust operation and other such acts are
court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic indication that the Philippine government has given its
immunity is contentious. imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within
Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States
Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance
the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer
a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but scope of his official function or duties.
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be
barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from
suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a LASCO vs. United Nations Revolving Fund for
state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. Natural Resources Exploration (UNFRFNRE)
The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an 23 February 1995
individual but for the State, in whose service he is,
FACTS:
under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium
that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert Petitioners were dismissed from their employment
jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if with UNRFNRE, which is a special fund and
the judgment against an official would require the state subsidiary of the UN.
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, UNRFNRE: Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over it
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity under the
the damages decreed against him, the suit must be 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 29
the UN. This is backed up by a letter from the DFA wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be
confirming this. immune from search, requisition, confiscation,
1991- LA dismissed the complaint, MR denied. expropriation and any other form of interference,
NLRC affirmed. whether by executive, administrative, judicial or
They then filed for certiorari without first seeking a legislative action.
reconsideration of the NLRC. Certiorari was not
proper because petitioners failed to ask for ISSUE: W/N UNRFNRE enjoys diplomatic immunity.
reconsideration but the SC gave due course
because of the implications in international law. HELD/RATIO:
YES. The diplomatic immunity of private respondent
Petitioners: acts of mining exploration and exploitation was sufficiently established by the letter of the DFA,
are outside the official functions of an international recognizing and confirming the immunity of UNRFNRE
agency protected by diplomatic immunity. Even in accordance with the 1946 Convention on Privileges
assuming that private respondent was entitled to and Immunities of the United Nations where the
diplomatic immunity, petitioners insisted that private Philippine Government was a party. The issue whether
respondent waived it when it engaged in exploration an international organization is entitled to diplomatic
work and entered into a contract of employment with immunity is a "political question" and such determination
petitioners. Moreover, it is a Constitutional mandate that by the executive branch is conclusive on the courts and
the State shall afford full protection to labor and promote quasi-judicial agencies. The courts can only assume
full employment and equality of employment jurisdiction over private respondent if it expressly
opportunities for all (1987 Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 3). waived its immunity, which is not so in the case at
bench (Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
OSG: UNRFNRE is covered by the mantle of diplomatic the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, Art. III,
immunity. It is a specialized agency of the UN and Sec. 4).
under the UN Charter (Art. 105), it enjoys privileges and As a matter of state policy as expressed in the
immunities necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes. Constitution, the Philippine Government adopts the
The Philippines is a signatory to the Convention on the generally accepted principles of international law (1987
Privileges and Immunities Specialized Agencies of the Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 2). Being a member of the
UN in which Sec. 4 states that the specialized United Nations and a party to the Convention on the
agencies, their property and assets, wherever located Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
and by whomsoever held shall enjoy immunity from of the United Nations, the Philippine Government
every form of legal process and Sec. 5 states that the adheres to the doctrine of immunity granted to the
property and assets of the specialized agencies,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 30
in Southeast Asia by mutual co-operation among the NLRC- MTD denied, petitioner is not immune from
member governments of the Center. Being an suit and assuming that if, indeed, it is an international
intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising
and freedom from control of the state in whose territory the issue of jurisdiction.
its office is located. SC (1992)- dismissed petition for certiorari
Pursuant to its being a signatory to the Agreement, the
Republic of the Philippines agreed to be represented by ISSUE: W/N the NLRC had jurisdiction.
one Director in the governing SEAFDEC Council
(Agreement Establishing SEAFDEC, Art. 5, Par. 1) and HELD/ RATIO:
that its national laws and regulations shall apply only NO. It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is
insofar as its contribution to SEAFDEC of "an agreed an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity.
amount of money, movable and immovable property (See first SEAFDEC case). AJ Isagani Cruz stated:
and services necessary for the establishment and Certain administrative bodies created by agreement
operation of the Center" are concerned (Art. 11.). It among states may be vested with international
expressly waived the application of the Philippine laws personality when two conditions concur, to wit:, that
on the disbursement of funds of petitioner SEAFDEC- their purposes are mainly non-political and that they are
AQD. autonomous,i.e., not subject to the control of any state.
Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the Anent the issue of waiver of immunity, suffice it to say at
issue of jurisdiction is unavailing because estoppel does the moment that the petitioner has timely raised the
not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has issue of jurisdiction. While the petitioner did not question
none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by the public respondent's lack of jurisdiction at the early
law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties stages of the proceedings, it, nevertheless, did so
can provide one. before it rested its case and certainly well before the
proceedings thereat had terminated.
After being duly served with summons the late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
defendants filed their answer in which, after making the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting
some admissions and denials of the material his case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
averments of the complaint, they interposed a only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction,
counterclaim. This counterclaim was answered by when adverse.
the plaintiffs. The action was commenced in the CFI of Cebu on July
RTC- found in favor of Tijam and a writ of execution 19, 1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety
was issued against the Suretys bond. The Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising
filed to deny the motion for execution and motion to the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon
quash the writ all denied by the cour the filing of the first motion for execution against the
CA affirmed the CFI. On MR, Surety filed its Motion counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written
to Dismiss alleging that a month before the filing of opposition thereto praying for its denial but also asked
the case before the RTC, RA 296 or the Judiciary for an additional affirmative relief that it be relieved of
Act of 1948 became effective. Under such law, the its liability under the counter-bond upon the grounds
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil relied upon in support of its opposition lack of
actions where the value of the subject-matter or the jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of them.
amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, Then, at the hearing on the second motion for execution
exclusive of interest and costs; that the Court of First against the counter-bond, the Surety appeared, through
Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and counsel, to ask for time within which to file an answer or
decide the case. CA forwarded the case to the SC. opposition thereto. This motion was granted, but instead
of such answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion
ISSUE: W/N Surety may question the jurisdiction of to dismiss mentioned heretofore. It could have raised
the CFI. the question of the lack of jurisdiction but failed to do so.
Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the
HELD/RATIO: court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the
NO. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
question in different ways and for different reasons. submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have jurisdiction.
been done earlier. Furthermore, it has also been held
that after voluntarily submitting a cause and
encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 33
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION V. ISSUE: W/N the grant of diplomatic privileges and
CALLEJA immunities granted to ICMC extends to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor laws.
FACTS:
On February 23, 1981, an Agreement was forged HELD/RATIO:
between the Philippines and then High YES. There is no doubt that ICMC was granted
Commissioner for Refugees, providing for a refugee immunity. Article II of the MOA between the Philippine
operating center in Bataan. ICMC was accredited by Government and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have
the Philippine Government to operate the refugee the status of a specialized agency. Article III, Sections 4
operating center. On July 14, 1986, Trade Unions of and 5 of the Convention on the Privileges and
the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) filed Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted by the UN
with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a General Assembly on Nov. 21, 1947 and concurred by
Petition for Certification Election among the rank and the Senate on May 17. 1949, explicitly provides that
file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed specialized agencies, including their properties and
the petition on the ground that it is an international assets, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal
organization registered with process. Moreover, DFAs opinion expressing its view
the United Nations and, hence, enjoys diplomatic that the conduct of the Certification Election is volatile of
immunity. ICMCs diplomatic immunity constitutes a categorical
On February 7, 1987, the Med-Arbiter sustained recognition by the Executive Branch that ICMC indeed
ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack enjoys immunities accorded to international
of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Bureau of Labor organizations, which determination has been
Relations (BLR) reversed the Med-Arbiters decision held to be political question
and ordered for the immediate conduct of the conclusive upon the courts in order not to embarrass a
certification election. On July 15, 1988, ICMCs political department of the government. The term
request for recognition as a specialized agency was international organization generally describes an
granted by the Dept. of Foreign Affairs including the organization set up by agreement between two or
grant of corresponding diplomatic privileges and more states. They are organized mainly as a means
immunities, as evidenced by a MOA between the for conducting general international business in which
Philippine Government and ICMC. The latter then the member states have an interest. Specialized
sought for the dismissal of the TUPAS petition for agencies are international organizations having
Certification Election invoking the immunity expressly functions in particular fields, as mentioned in Articles 57
granted by the Philippine Government, through and 63 of the UN Charter. There are basically three
the DFA. propositions underlying the grant of international
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 34
immunities to international organizations: 1.international ICMCs immunity does not deprive labor of its basic
institutions should have a status which protects them rights. ICMC employees are not without recourse
against control or interference by any whenever there are disputes to be settled. Section 31 of
one government in the performance of functions or the the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
effective discharge of which they Specialized Agencies of the United Nations 17 provides
are responsible to democratically constituted that "each specialized agency shall make provision for
international bodies in which all the nations concerned appropriate modes of settlement of: (a) disputes arising
are represented; 2. No country should derive any out of contracts or other disputes of private character to
national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on which the specialized agency is a party."Moreover,
common international funds; and, 3. The international pursuant to Article IV of the Memorandum of Agreement
organization should, as a collectivity of States members, between ICMC and the Philippine Government,
be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official whenever there is any abuse of privilege by ICMC, the
business customarily extended to each other by its Government is free to withdraw the privileges and
individual member States. The theory behind all three immunities accorded. The immunity granted being "from
propositions is said to be essentially institutional in every form of legal process except in so far as in any
character. "It is not concerned with the status, dignity or particular case they have expressly waived their
privileges of individuals, but with the elements immunity," it is inaccurate to state that a certification
of functional independence necessary to election is beyond the scope of that immunity for the
free international institutions from national control and to reason that it is not a suit against ICMC.
enable them to discharge their responsibilities
impartially on behalf of all their members."The raison A certification election cannot be viewed as an
dtre for these immunities is the assurance of independent or isolated process. It could trigger off a
unimpeded performance of their functions by series of events in the collective bargaining process
the agencies concerned. The exercise of jurisdiction by together with related incidents and/or concerted
the Department of Labor over ICMC would defeat the activities, which could inevitably
very purpose of immunity accorded to the agency, involve ICMC in the "legal process," which includes "any
which is to shield the affairs of international penal, civil and administrative proceedings.
organizations, in accordance with international practice,
from political pressure or control by the host country to
the prejudice a member States of the organization, and KAPISANAN NG MANGGAGAWA AT TAC SA IRRI V.
to ensure the unhampered performance of their SECRETARY OF LABOR
functions.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 35
respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the
residence in the Philippines. motion was denied on the main ground that the
petitioners had not presented any evidence that their
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both acts were official in nature.
employed as game room attendants in the special
services department of the NAVSTA. On October 3, Issue/Held/Ratio:
1975, the private respondents were advised that their W/N the petitioners were performing their official duties.
employment had been converted from permanent full- YES.
time to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance
proceedings to the rules and regulations of the U.S. Sanders, as director of the special services department
Department of Defense. The hearing officer of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its
recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full- personnel, including the private respondents. Given the
time status. However, in a letter addressed to petitioner official character of the letters, the petitioners were
Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing officer's being sued as officers of the United States government
report. The letter contained the statements that: a ) "Mr. because they have acted on behalf of that government
Rossi tends to alienate most co-workers and and within the scope of their authority. Thus, it is that
supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi and Wyers have government and not the petitioners personally that is
proven, according to their immediate supervisors, to be responsible for their acts. It is stressed at the outset that
difficult employees to supervise;" and c) "even though the mere allegation that a government functionary is
the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case being sued in his personal capacity will not
with anyone, (they) placed the records in public places automatically remove him from the protection of the law
where others not involved in the case could hear." of public officers and, if appropriate, the doctrine of state
Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of
petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval official character will not suffice to insulate him from
Personnel explaining the change of the private suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a
respondent's employment status. So, private personal tort committed without or in excess of his
respondent filed for damages alleging that the letters authority. These well-settled principles are applicable
contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment not only to the officers of the local state but also where
of the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their the person sued in its courts pertains to the government
personal and proprietary rights. However, petitioners of a foreign state, as in the present case. Assuming that
argued that the acts complained of were performed by the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants
them in the discharge of their official duties and that, have a right to the payment of damages, such award
consequently, the court had no jurisdiction over them will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 37
ISSUE/HELD:
W/N petitioner has exhausted all administrative
remedies before filing his petition to the Supreme Court.
VETERANS MANPOWER V. COURT OF APPEAL YES. A public official may sometimes be held liable in
his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
FACTS:
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services,
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-
Inc.) alleges that the provisions of RA5487 (Private
SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were
Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the
performed as part of their official duties, without malice,
Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and
gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had
combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favor and
against them in their private capacities. Furthermore,
institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine Association of
the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore,
that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
VMPSI questions the provision on requiring all private
1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the
security agencies or company security forces to register
State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
as members of any PADPAO chapter organized within
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a
the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of
legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC
such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction
Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
over the public respondents.
per guard for8hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of
Metro Manila. PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat PNB V. CIR
competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks FACTS:
and Sewerage System lower than the standard Petitioners motion to quash a notice of garnishment
minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be
PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of garnished was the money of the People's Homesite and
membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in
the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court
Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation which had become final and executory. A writ of
Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the Manansala had previously been issued. He was the
State, which had not given consent thereto. counsel of the prevailing party, the United Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of the
ISSUE/HELD: order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the
W/N VMPSIs complaint against the PCChief and PC- appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as
SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent. authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution
was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 41
garnishment "may be public in character." The order of and that the same became final and executory on
August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason,
motion to quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, therefore, for withholding action in this case.
reads as follows: The Philippine National Bank moves [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the Philippine
to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank
branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff is therefore ordered to comply within five days from
of this Court. It contends that the service of the notice receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6,
by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court 1970."
contravenes Section11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, There was a motion for reconsideration filed by
as amended which reads:" 'All writs and processes petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22,
issued by the Court shall be served and executed free 1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person
authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs ISSUE/HELD/RULING: W/N the funds mentioned may
and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the be garnished
law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon
City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of
Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly
garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief
officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The Court Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that
finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 the funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the
has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed government, and that, as such, the same may not be
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as
now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the a government owned and controlled corporation. The
Ex-Officio Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and
of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant
execution and notices of garnishment in an area to Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October
encompassing the whole of the country, including 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous established 'all the powers of a corporation under the
with that of the Court itself, which is national in nature. Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be
... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the sued and may be subjected to court processes just like
appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as
PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to amended."
Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 42
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association Peoples Homesite and Housing Corp. (a GOCC)
v. Manila Hotel Company, this Court, through Justice deposited in PNB.
Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that PNB assailed the order on 2 grounds (1) that the
when the government enters into commercial business, appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as
it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated authorized deputy sheriff to serve the writ of
like any other corporation. By engaging in a particular execution was contrary to law and (2) that the
business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the funds subject of the garnishment "may be public
government divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign in character. CIR denied PNBs motion to quash
character, so as to render the corporation subject to the hence PNB filed this petition for certiorari.
rules of law governing private corporations."
Issue/Held/Ratio:
Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public 1. w/n Peoples Homesite and Housing Corp. (a
Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the GOCC), can be considered a public fund and
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental in effect exempt from garnishment? NO
concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are
immune from garnishment. It is an entirely different General rule is that governmental funds are
matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. immune from garnishment however it is now
Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is settled in our jurisprudence that when the
"possessed of a separate and distinct corporate government enters into commercial business,
existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be
funds may be levied upon or garnished treated like any other corporation. By engaging
in a particular business thru the instrumentality
of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself
PNB V CIR pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as
to render the corporation subject to the rules of
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies
law governing private corporations." If the
Facts:
office or agency or entity has its own charter
vesting it a separate and distinct corporate
Petition for certiorari was filed to assail the validity
existence then it can sue and be sued.
of a writ of execution granted in favour of Atty.
Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or
Manansala (counsel for United Homesite
garnished.
Employees and Laborers Associationprevailing
party). The writ sought to garnish the money of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 43
RAYO V CIF BULACAN It is sufficient to say that the government has organized
a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it
to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A.
Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies
No. 6395, Sec. 3 (d).) As a government owned and
Facts:
controlled corporation, it has a personality of its own,
On Oct 26, 1978, during "KADING" the NPC, distinct and separate from that of the Government.
acting through its plant superintendent, Benjamin (National Shipyards and Steel Corp. vs. CIR) Moreover,
Chavez, caused to opened simultaneously all the the charter provision that the NPC can "sue and be
three floodgates of the Angat Dam as a result sued in any court" is without qualification on the
several towns in Bulacan were inundated (hardest cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort
hit in Norzagaray). About a hundred of residents claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners.
died properties worth million of pesos destroyed
or washed away. Petitioners were one of the
many victims of the inundated town filed
complaint for damages against NPC and Chavez.
NPC raised its defense that "in the operation of
the Angat Dam it is performing a purely SSS V CA
governmental function hence it cant be sued
without the express consent of the State. Keywords: Suit against incorporated agencies
Petitioners opposed and argued that NPC is Facts:
performing merely proprietary functions and that March, 1963 spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro
under its own organic act, Sec.3 (d) of RA 6395, it Concio Cruz were granted real estate loan of
can sue and be sued in any court. P48,000 by SSS with their located at Lozada
Street, Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal as collateral.
Issue/Held/Ratio: Spouses Cruz complied with their monthly
payments although there were times when delays
1. w/n NPC performs a governmental function with were incurred in their monthly payments which
respect to the management and operation of the were due every first 5 days of the month
Angat Dam? YES July 9, 1968, SSS filed for the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage executed by Spouses Cruz
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 44
thereby concede its liability. That statutory law abroad. No moral and temperate damages as
has given to the private-citizen a remedy for the negligence of SSS is not so gross as to
the enforcement and protection of his rights. warrant moral and temperate damages. With
The SSS thereby has been required to submit the ruling out of compensatory, moral and
to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its temperate damages, the grant of exemplary or
right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether corrective damages should also be set aside.
the SSS performs governmental or proprietary
functions thus becomes unnecessary to SAN FERNANDO LA UNION V FIRME
belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen
Keywords: State may be sued provided there is an
may bring a suit against it for varied
express/implied consent to be sued.
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain
Facts:
compensation in damages arising from
Issue/Held/Ratio:
contract and even for tort.
Even conceding that the SSS is not, in the
December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving
main, operated for profit, it cannot be denied
a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
that, in so far as contractual loan agreements
and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a
with private parties are concerned, the SSS
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg
enters into them for profit considering that the
and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
borrowers pay interest, which is money paid
truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
for the use of money, plus other charges. In so
Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the
far as it is argued that to hold the SSS liable
impact, several passengers of the jeepney
for damages would be to deplete the benefit
including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of
funds available for its covered members,
the injuries they sustained 4 others suffered
suffice it to say, that expenditures of the
varying degrees of physical injuries.
System are not confined to the payment of
social security benefits. A compliant for damages against, Third Party
SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as Complaint and cross claims were filed.
awarded RTC and CA as the basis used by Respondent Judge Firme ordered Alfredo Bislig
the lower courts for the award of actual and Municipality of San Fernando to pay the heirs
damages (cancelled trip abroad)were too of Banina with P1,500.00 as funeral expenses
speculative. It appears that Spouses Cruz's and P24,744.24 as the lost expected earnings of
passports had already expired and they did
the late Laureano Bania Sr., P30,000.00 as
not secure the necessary visas for their trip
moral damages, and P2,500.00 as attorney's
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 46
fees. The complaint against Estate of Nieveras functions and can be held answerable if it is shown that
and Balagot was dismissed. Petitioners filed an they were acting in proprietary capacity. In the case at
MFR which respondent Judge Firme denied bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to
Naguilian River to get a load of sand and gravel for the
hence this appeal on certiorari.
repair of San Fernandos municipal streets, a
governmental function. The municipality cannot be held
Issue/Held/Ratio: liable for the torts committed by its regular employee
1. w/n municipality of San Fernando is suable? YES who was then engaged in the discharge of
governmental functions.
Under Art XVI sec 3 Constitutional Law, the State may
not be sued without its consent. Consent can be implied
or expressed. Expressed consent may be embodied in NIA V CA
a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the Keywords: Its charter provides that it may sue and be
standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of sued.
money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt Facts:
case. Implied consent is when government enters into 1967 NIA constructed an irrigation canal on the
business contracts descending to the level of the other property of Isabel and Virginia Tecson which
contracting party or when State files a complaint passed through Venturas landholdings as said
opening itself to counter claim. Municipal Corporations irrigation canal traverses the Cinco-Cinco Creek
are suable because their charters grant them the which abuts said landholding. The irrigation canal
competence to sue and be sued. has 2 outlets which provide private respondents
landholdings with water coming from said canal
2. w/n municipality of San Fernando liable for torts? and at the same time serve to drain the excess
NO water of said landholdings.
In 1975 Ventura filed a complaint for the
Test of liability of the municipality depends on whether abatement of nuisance with damages against
or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is petitioners NIA alleging that the outlets
performing governmental or proprietary functions. As constructed on both sides of the irrigation canal
emphasized in the case of Torio vs. Fontanilla, the were not provided with gates to regulate the flow
distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of of water from the canal to their landholdings
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of which resulted to the inundation of said
its agents which result in an injury to third persons. landholdings causing the destruction of the
Nevertheless, Municipality are not liable for the torts planted crops and also prevented them from
committed by them in the discharge of governmental planting on their landholdings.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 47
Lower court ruled in favor of the Ventura and no pre-existing contractual relation between the
ordered NIA to pay for damages of P35,000 and parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
P5,000 attorneys fee; CA affirmed. the provisions of this Chapter. Thus, petitioners
are liable for the damages caused by their
Issue/Held/Ratio: negligent act.
1. w/n NIA is immune from suit for quasi-delict? NO In this case NIA constructed irrigation canals on
NIA is not immune from suit, by virtue of the express the landholdings of the plaintiffs by scrapping
provision of P.D. No. 552 granted NIA the power to away the surface of the landholdings to raise the
exercise all the powers of a corporation under the embankment of the canal. As a result of the
Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent said construction, in 1967 the landholdings of the
with the provisions of this Act. Paragraph 4 of said law plaintiffs were inundated with water. Although it
also provide that petitioner NIA may sue and be sued in cannot be denied that the irrigation canal of the
court for all kind of actions, whether contractual or NIA is a benefit to the Venturas, the delay of
quasi-contractual, in the recovery of compensation and almost 7 years in installing the safety measures
damages as in the instant case considering that private such as check gates, drainages, ditches and
respondents action is based on damages caused by paddy drains has caused substantial damage to
the negligence of petitioners. the annual harvest of the plaintiffs of about 30
cavans per hectare. The failure of NIA to provide
2. w/n NIA is not liable for tort since it did not act the necessary safeguards to prevent the
through a special agent as required under inundation of plaintiffs landholdings is the
paragraph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code? NIA proximate cause of the damages to the poor
is liable. farmers.
Paragph 6, Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines states that: The State is responsible
in like manner when it acts through a special PNR V. IAC
agent; but not when the damage has been G.R. NO. 70547 JANUARY 22, 1993
caused by the official to whom the task done
FACTS: The imputation of culpa on the part of herein
properly pertains, in which case what is provided
petitioners as a result of the collision between its train,
in article 2176 shall be applicable. Article 2176
bound for Manila from La Union, with a Baliwag transit
of said Code provides that: Whoever by act or
bus at the railroad crossing on the road going to
omission causes damage to another, there being
Hagonoy, Bulacan on August l0, 1974, is the subject of
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
the petition at bar directed against the judgment of
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
affirmance rendered by respondent court.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 48
driver after collating the mass of evidence, the The charter also provides:
conclusion reached thereafter thus commands great Sec. 4. General powers. The Philippine National
respect especially so in this case where respondent Railways shall have the following general powers:
court gave its nod of approval to the findings of the court (a) To do all such other things and to transact all such
of origin. business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
PNR also failed to install a semaphore or at the very conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the
least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public corporation; and
of the passing train amounts to negligence. (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
corporation under the Corporation Law. (This refers to
In Malong, Justice Aquino, speaking for the Court en Sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad
banc, declared: corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
The Manila Railroad Company, the PNR's predecessor, Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every
as a common carrier, was not immune from suit under corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
Act No. 1510, its charter. corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law
The PNR Charter, Republic Act No. 4156, as amended provides that every corporation has the power to sue
by Republic Act No. 6366 and Presidential Decree No. and be sued in any court.
741, provides that the PNR is a government A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any
instrumentality under government ownership during its formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
50-year term, 1964 to 2014. It is under the Office of the and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
President of the Philippines. Republic Act No. 6366 against the authority that makes the law on which the
provides: right depends (Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa vs.
Sec. 1-a. Statement of policy. The Philippine National Polyblank, 205 U.S. 353, 51 L. 3d 834).
Railways, being a factor for socio-economic The public service would be hindered, and public safety
development and growth, shall be a part of the endangered, if the supreme authority could be
infrastructure program of the government and as such subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen and,
shall remain in and under government ownership during consequently, controlled in the use and disposition of
its corporate existence. The Philippine National the means required for the proper administration of the
Railways must be administered with the view of serving Government (The Siren vs. U.S., 7 Wall. 152, 19 L. ed.
the interests of the public by providing them the 129). (at pp.65-66).
maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest To the pivotal issue of whether the State acted in a
utility by the public, the economy of operation must be sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR for the
ensured so that service can be rendered at the purpose of engaging in transportation, Malong
minimum passenger and freight prices possible. continued to hold that:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 50
. . . in the instant case the State divested itself of its "SEC. 4. General powers. - The Philippine National
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is Railways shall have the following general powers:
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a railroad
Company. The PNR did not become immune from suit. corporation under the Corporation Law." (This refers to
It did not remove itself from the operation of Articles sections 81 to 102 of the Corporation Law on railroad
1732 to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers. corporations, not reproduced in the Corporation Code.)
The correct rule is that "not all government entities,
whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from Section 36 of the Corporation Code provides that every
suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the character corporation has the power to sue and be sued in its
of the objects for which the entity was organized." corporate name. Section 13(2) of the Corporation Law
provides that every corporation has the power to sue
and be sued in any court.
MALONG V. IAC
L-49930, AUG. 7, 1985 Issue: 1.WON the State acted in a sovereign capacity or
corporate capacity when it created PNR.
FACTS: On Oct. 30, 1977 Jaime Aquino, a paying
2.WON PNR, being a govt instrumentality, is
passenger, fell and died from a PNR train. This
immune from suit.
happened because he had to sit near the door of the
coach. This train was overloaded in view of the
Decision: It acted in a corporate capacity. No, it is not
upcoming All Saints Day. His parents (Malong spouses)
immune from suit.
prayed in the CFI of Pangasinan that PNR be ordered to
pay them damages. The court dismissed the complaint
Reasoning: SC held that the State divested itself of its
saying it had no jurisdiction because PNR, being a govt
sovereign capacity when it organized the PNR which is
instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.
no different from its predecessor, the Manila Railroad
Malong spouses appealed to the SC.
Company. MRC is not immune from suit according to its
charter. The point is that when the government enters
PNRs charter provides the ff:
into a commercial business it abandons its sovereign
SECTION 1-a. Statement of policy. - The Philippine
capacity and is to be treated like any other private
National Railways must be administered with the view of
corporation. Suits against State agencies with relation
serving the interests of the public by providing them the
to matters in which they have assumed to act in a
maximum of service and, while aiming at its greatest
private or nongovernmental capacity, and various
utility by the public, the economy of operation must be
suits against certain corporations created by the State
ensured so that service can be rendered at the
for public purposes, but to engage in matters
minimum passenger and freight prices possible.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 51
partaking more of the nature of ordinary business discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
rather than functions of a governmental or political employment in order to discourage them from pursuing
character, are not regarded as suits against the State. the union activities.
In this case the State has impliedly given its consent to
be sued by engaging into a business activity. The petitioners Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador and
Mariano Ledesma denied the charges of unfair labor
Judgment: The order of dismissal is reversed and practices attributed to the and, by way of affirmative
set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for defenses, alleged, among other things, that
further proceedings. respondents Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza
Ponciano Arganda and Teodulo Toleran were
suspended pending result of an administrative
investigation against them for breach of Civil Service
BUREAU OF PRINTING VS. THE BUREAU OF rules and regulations petitions; that the Bureau of
PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be sued;
that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern
engaged for the purpose of gain but is an agency of the
Republic performing government functions.
G.R. No. L-15751 January 28, 1961
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government
FACTS:
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
The action in question was upon complaint of the
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it
respondents Bureau of Printing Employees Association
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive
(NLU) Pacifico Advincula, Roberto Mendoza, Ponciano
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with
Arganda and Teodulo Toleran filed by an acting
the execution of all printing and binding, including work
prosecutor of the Industrial Court against herein
incidental to those processes, required by the National
petitioner Bureau of Printing, Serafin Salvador, the
Government and such other work of the same character
Acting Secretary of the Department of General
as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the
Services, and Mariano Ledesma the Director of the
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be
Bureau of Printing. The complaint alleged that Serafin
authorized to undertake.
Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been engaging in
unfair labor practices by interfering with, or coercing the
ISSUE:
employees of the Bureau of Printing particularly the
Whether or not the petitioners be sued.
members of the complaining association petition, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization an
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 52
HELD: FACTS:
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing On January 30, 1972, the vessel S/S "Pacific Hawk"
cannot be sued. The record also discloses that the with Registry No. 170 arrived at the Port of Manila
instant case arose from the filing of administrative carrying, among others, 80 bales of screen net
charges against some officers of the respondent Bureau consigned to Bagong Buhay Trading. Said importation
of Printing Employees' Association by the Acting was declared through a customs broker under Entry No.
Secretary of General Services. Said administrative 8651-72 as 80 bales of screen net of 500 rolls with a
charges are for insubordination, grave misconduct and gross weight of 12,777 kilograms valued at $3,750.00
acts prejudicial to public service committed by inciting and classified under Tariff Heading No. 39.06-B of the
the employees, of the Bureau of Printing to walk out of Tariff and Customs Code 2 at 35% ad valorem.
their jobs against the order of the duly constituted
officials. Since the customs examiner found the subject shipment
reflective of the declaration, Bagong Buhay paid the
Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus duties and taxes. Thereafter, the customs appraiser
are authorized to institute and investigate administrative made a return of duty.
charges against erring subordinates. For the Industrial
Court now to take cognizance of the case filed before it, Acting on the strength of an information that the
which is in effect a review of the acts of executive shipment consisted of "mosquito net" made of nylon
officials having to do with the discipline of government dutiable under Tariff Heading No. 62.02 of the Tariff and
employees under them, would be to interfere with the Customs Code, the Office of the Collector of Customs
discharge of such functions by said officials. ordered are-examination of the shipment. A report on
the re-examination revealed that the shipment consisted
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of prohibition is of 80 bales of screen net, each bale containing 20 rolls
granted. The orders complained of are set aside and the or a total of 1,600 rolls.
complaint for unfair labor practice against the petitioners
is dismissed, with costs against respondents other than Re-appraised, the shipment was valued at $10.15 per
the respondent court. yard instead of $.075 per yard as previously declared.
Furthermore, the Collector of Customs determined the
FAROLAN JR v. CTA subject shipment as made of synthetic woven fabric with
100% ad valorem. Thus, Bagong Buhay Trading was
G.R. No. 42204 January 21, 1993 assessed P272,600.00 as duties and taxes due on the
shipment in question.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 53
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Accordingly, a defendant in a civil suit must be (1) a
Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED. The Collector of Customs is natural person; (2) a juridical person or (3) an entity
directed to expeditiously re-compute the customs duties authorized by law to be sued. Neither the Bureau of
applying Tariff Heading 39.02 at the rate of 35% ad Customs nor (a fortiori) its function unit, the Customs
valorem on the 13,600 kilograms of polyethylene plastic Arrastre Service, is a person. They are merely parts of
imported by private respondent. the machinery of Government. The Bureau of Customs
is a bureau under the Department of Finance (Sec. 81,
Revised Administrative Code); and as stated, the
Customs Arrastre Service is a unit of the Bureau of
MOBIL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION, INC., VS. Custom, set up under Customs Administrative Order
CUSTOMS ARRASTRE SERVICE No. 8-62 of November 9, 1962 (Annex "A" to Motion to
Dismiss, pp. 13-15, Record an Appeal). It follows that
the defendants herein cannot he sued under the first
two abovementioned categories of natural or juridical
FACTS: persons.
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against the Customs Arrastre ISSUE:
Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value Whether or not defendant is immune from suit.
of the undelivered case in the amount of P18,493.37
plus other damages. The defendants filed a motion to HELD:
dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being Thus, the ruling therein was that the Court of Industrial
persons under the law, defendants cannot be sued. Relations had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
After plaintiff opposed the motion, the court, on April 25, case, but not that the Bureau of Customs can be sued.
1964, dismissed the complaint on the ground that Said issue of suability was not resolved, the resolution
neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Bureau of stating only that "the issue on the personality or lack of
Customs is suable. Plaintiff appealed to Us from the personality of the Bureau of Customs to be sued does
order of dismissal. not affect the jurisdiction of the lower court over the
Appellant contends that not all government entities are subject matter of the case, aside from the fact that
immune from suit; that defendant Bureau of Customs as amendment may be made in the pleadings by the
operator of the arrastre service at the Port of Manila, is inclusion as respondents of the public officers deemed
discharging proprietary functions and as such, can be responsible, for the unfair labor practice acts charged by
sued by private individuals. petitioning Unions".
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 55
The Bureau of Printing is an office of the Government Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DAR and
created by the Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No. Sultan Security Agency.
2657). As such instrumentality of the Government, it 2. LA: found them jointly and severally liable with
operates under the direct supervision of the Executive Sultan Security Agency for the payment of the money
Secretary, Office of the President, and is "charged with claims. Since both didn't appeal, the decision became
the execution of all printing and binding, including work final and executory. The LA then issued a writ of
incidental to those processes, required by the National execution commanding the city sheriff to enforce the
Government and such other work of the same character judgment against their property.
as said Bureau may, by law or by order of the 3. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
(Secretary of Finance) Executive Secretary, be mandamus with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction
authorized to undertake. with the NLRC contending that the LA didnt acquire
jurisdiction over DAR thus the decision was null and
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any void. Likewise, it pointed out that the attachment or
corporate or juridical personality, the Bureau of Printing seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
cannot be sued. Any suit, action or proceeding against DARs governmental functions to the prejudice of the
it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a public good.
suit, action or proceeding against the Government itself, 4. NLRC temporarily suspended the enforcement
and the rule is settled that the Government cannot be and execution of judgment to enable DAR to source
sued without its consent, much less over its objection. It and raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against
must be remembered that statutory provisions waiving it. It also dismissed the petition for injunction.
State immunity from suit are strictly construed and that 5. DAR filed a petition for certiorari claiming that
waiver of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for
will not be lightly inferred. refusing to quash the writ of execution. It faults the
NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim
DAR V. NLRC, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 against DAR, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More
importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has disregarded
1. DAR and Sultan Security agency entered into a
the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
contract for security services. However, several
6. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that
guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages,
DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances,
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime
Agency.
pay as well as for damages before the Regional
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 56
ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable. YES Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State to be
"sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability
HELD: arising from contract, express or implied but the
1. Generally, the State cant be sued without its money claim first be brought to the Commission on
consent. The States consent may be given Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083,
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be provides the legal basis for the State liability but the
made through general or special law. prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof
2. The general law waiving the immunity of the state must still be pursued in accordance with the rules
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
Philippine government "consents and submits to be amended by P.D. 1445.
sued upon any money claims involving liability 7. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
arising from contract, express or implied, which could effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
serve as a basis of civil action between private prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
parties." 8. The universal rule that where the State gives its
3. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded consent to be sued by private parties either by
when the State itself commences litigation, thus general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into action "only up to the completion of proceedings
a contract. anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
4. Here, the government is deemed to have descended of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
to the level of the other contracting party and to have since government funds and properties may not be
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
not all contracts entered into by the government satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
must still be made between one which is executed in public funds must be covered by the correspondent
the exercise of its sovereign function and another appropriation as required by law.
which is done in its proprietary capacity
5. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION V.JOSE
from its being a governmental entity when it entered TEODORO
into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character 1. On November 10, 1950, EO 365 abolished the
6. The claims of private respondents arising from the National Airports Corporation and replaced it with the
Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Civil Aeronautics Administration. Before the abolition,
PAL paid to the NAC, P65, 245 as fees for landing
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 57
LARKINS V NLRC, FEBRUARY 23, 1995 Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such
execution be made subject to existing international
1. Private respondents are employees of de Guzman
agreements diplomatic protocol
Custodial Services, which had a contract to maintain
the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins
Squadron at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However,
HELD: No
the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the
1. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the
dormitories with the de Guzman Custodial Services
Philippines and the United States of America
was terminated. These employees were allowed to
Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
continue working for 3 AGS but the new contractor,
R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
JAC Maintenance Services chose to bring in his own
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
workers.
Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
2. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against
military bases in the country.
Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col
2. The Agreement mandates that summonses and
Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air
other processes issued by Philippine courts and
Force who were assigned to oversee the
administrative agencies for United States Armed
dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment
Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by
Philippines could be served therein only with the
LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
employees and ordered reinstatement with full back
giving his permission, he should instead designate
pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not
another person to serve the process, and obtain the
possible.
server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
3. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor
The labor arbiter didnt follow the procedure and
Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person
instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and
because no summons or copies of the complaints,
NOT the Base Commander.
both original and amended, were ever served on her.
3. They contend, however, that they sent notices of the
Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with
hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not
notices of hearing were not in accordance with the
summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
provisions of the R.P. U.S. Military Bases
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without
Agreement of 1947.
the latter being served with summons. In the
4. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: In the
absence of service of summons or a valid waiver
event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and
thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the
considering our finding that the real party respondent
Labor Arbiter are null and void.
is the United States Government through its Armed
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 60
4. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and Committee established in Article III of the Base
participated in the oral argument before the said Labor Agreement.
body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of 7. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over the
summons and a voluntary submission of her person case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is void.
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have
raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in
relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, V.HON.
jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, JUNE 10, 1988
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said
agency over the person of the defendant, then this 1. Private respondents, American Citizens with
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons permanent residence in the Philippines, were both
5. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US is employed as gameroom attendants in the special
the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS services department of the NAVISTA (US Naval
where the appellees previously worked as dormitory Station). They were advised that their employment
attendants is just one of the various units of the had been converted from permanent full time to part
United States Armed Forces inside the said military time. They instituted grievance proceedings which
base. resulted in a recommendation for their reinstatement
6. Under the "Agreement Between the Government of plus backwages.
the Republic of the Philippines and the Government 2. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau,
of the United States of America Relating to the commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing
Employment of Philippine Nationals in the United officers report and asked for the rejection as Mr.
States Military Bases in the Philippines" otherwise Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most
known as the Base Labor Agreement of May 27, coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be
1968, any dispute or disagreement between the difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath
United States Armed Forces and Filipino employees not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed
should be settled under grievance or labor relations the records in public places.
procedures established therein (Art. II) or by the 3. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages
arbitration process provided in the Romualdez- against Sanders claiming that the allegations were
Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement dated libelous imputations that had exposed them to
September 5, 1985. If no agreement was reached or ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The
if the grievance procedure failed, the dispute was private respondents made it clear that the petitioners
appealable by either party to a Joint Labor were being sued in their private/personal capacity.
Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 61
the acts complained of were performed by them in that the letter he had written (which included the
the discharge of their official duties thus the court libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
state immunity. information regarding the case of the private
respondents. M
ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
both petitioners - NO write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is with the conversion of the private respondents' type
being sued in his personal capacity will not of employment even before the grievance
automatically remove him from the protection of the proceedings had even commenced. This act is
law of public officers and the doctrine of state clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of immediate superior of Sanders and directly
official character will not suffice to insulate him from answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
personal tort committed without or in excess of his the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary
authority. problems of the department and contained
2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldnt have been denied recommendations for their solution, including the re-
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act designation of the private respondents. There was
for which he was being sued was done in his official nothing personal or private about it.
capacity on behalf of the American government. The 6. Given the official character of the above-described
United States had not given its consent to be sued. letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being
3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against sued as officers of the United States government. As
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown they have acted on behalf of that government, and
to be acting officially in the name of the American within the scope of their authority, it is that
government. government, and not the petitioners personally, that
4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners is responsible for their acts.
are being called to account were performed by them 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as that the claimants have a right to the payment of
director of the special services department of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by
NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
including the private respondents, and had a hand in United States government as their principal. This will
their employment, work assignments, discipline, require that government to perform an affirmative act
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 62
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, respondents are themselves American citizens, it
thus making the action a suit against that would seem only proper for the courts of this country
government without its consent. to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and
8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau to treat it as coming under the internal administration
director could be sued for damages on a personal of the said base.
tort committed by him when he acted without or in
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property WYLIE V RARANG [GR No. 74135 (May 28, 1992)]
without paying just compensation therefor although PONENTE: J. Gutierrez
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was FACTS:
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the Petitioners Wylie and Williams were the Assistant
state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party Administrative Officer and Commanding Officer,
defendant, as it was not responsible for the respectively, of the US Naval base in Subic.
defendant's unauthorized act. Respondent Aurora Rarang was an employee in the
9. In the case at bar, the government of the United Office of the Provost Marshal assigned as the
States has not given its consent to be sued for the Merchandise Control Guard.
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is Wylie, as one of his duties, supervised the publication of
the American government itself that will have to the Plan of the Day a daily publication that featured
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the among others, an action line inquiry. On Feb. 3, 1978,
amount that may be adjudged for the private an inquiry was published saying that confiscated goods
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for were being consumed/ used for personal benefit by the
lack of jurisdiction. merchandise control inspector and that a certain
10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of Auring was, in herself, a disgrace to the office.
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of Rarang, being the only person named Auring in the said
good faith, which has not been overturned by the office, went to press an action for damages against
private respondents. Even mistakes concededly Wylie and Williams and the US Naval Base. (That
committed by such public officers are not actionable Rarang was indeed the Auring mentioned in the inquiry
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated was proven by the apology letter issued by Wylie for the
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad inadvertent publication.)
faith.
11. Since the questioned acts were done in the She alleged that the article constituted false, injurious,
Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach
performance of their official duties and the private
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 63
her honesty, virtue and reputation exposing her to public without this affirmation, court is still bound by the
hatred, contempt and ridicule. doctrine of incorporation. The doctrine is applicable
not only to suits against the state but also to
Defendants alleged that (1) defendants acted in complaints filed against officials for acts allegedly
performance of their official functions as officers of the performed by them in discharge of their official duties.
US Navy and are thus immune from suit (2) US Naval
Base is immune from suit being an instrumentality of the The traditional rule of immunity excepts a State
US Government and (3) the RTC has no jurisdiction from being sued in the courts of another State
over the subject matter and the parties involved. without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary
consequence of the principles of independence and
Lower court ruling: defendants pay damages equality of States. Because the activities of states have
because acts were not official acts of the US multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them
government, but personal and tortious acts (which are between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
not included in the rule that a sovereign country cant be imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
sued without its consent). Suit against US Naval Base (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
was dismissed. extends only to acts jure imperii.
Ratio. Our laws and, we presume, those of the petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable
United States do not allow the commission of crimes for the damages they caused the private respondent.
in the name of official duty. The general rule is
that public officials can be held personally REPUBLIC v SANDIGANBAYAN [GR No. 142476
accountable for acts claimed to have been (March 20, 2001)]
performed in connection with official duties where Ponente: J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of FACTS:
bad faith. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize July 31, 1987: the Republic and PCGG filed with
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a the Sandiganbayan for the reconveyance,
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the reversion, accounting, restitution and damages
Republic. against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and 60 other
defendants.
Under Art. 2176 of the civil code, whoever by act On the strength of the complaint, PCGG issued
or omission, causes damage to another, there being several sequestration orders, one of which covers
fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage a Breguet Falcon 50 (aircraft).
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no o The Falcon jet was leased by Unichem
pre-existing contractual relation between the from Faysound Ltd. (a US company)
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by o The lease lapsed in 1987, Unichem should
the provisions of this Chapter. have returned in to the owner, Faysound.
o Cojuangco or any of the defendants has
Indeed the imputation of theft contained in the not claimed ownership or interest in the
POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation Falcon jet
against the character and reputation of the o Unichem has not been sequestered, only
private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted the shared of Cojuangco in Unichem
that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly have been sequestered
recommended the deletion of the name Auring if 1987: the lease has been expired for 2 years.
the article were published. The petitioners, PCGG filed a Motion for Authority to Sell
however, were negligent because under their Sequestered Aircraft pending Litigation with the
direction they issued the publication without Sadiganbayan, because said aircraft was fast
deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra deteriorating
vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious o Sandiganbayan denied saying that there
act which ridiculed the private respondent. The was no justification, prima facie or
otherwise, for the seizure of the jet.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 65
o PCGG filed petition for certiorari with the of Fuller Aircraft's claim which, per decision
SC. SC issued a TRO directing the of the Texas Court, amounts to
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from $14,928,457.29.
enforcing its assailed Resolution The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan an Ex-
Relying on the TRO, PCGG sold the aircraft to Parte Motion to Withdraw the amount previously
Walter Fuller Aircraft, Inc. deposited with the PNB for the account of the
SC dismissed PCGGs petition holding that "the Sandiganbayan in trust for the beneficial owner
decision to sell the aircraft is not within the limited and that PNB be immediately directed to release
administrative powers of the PCGGbut requires the funds on deposit to the Bureau of Treasury for
the sanction of the Sandiganbayan which can transmission to Walter Fuller Sales, Inc., with the
grant or withhold the same in the exercise of above Agreement and decisions of the US
sound discretion and on the basis of the evidence Federal Courts
before it." o Sandiganbayan denied the motion saying:
FAYSOUND FILED WITH THE DISTRICT (a) it does not appear from the
COURT OF ARKANSAN AN ACTION TO records that the person lawfully
RECOVER THE FALCON JET FROM FULLER entitled to the escrow deposit has
AIRCRAFT. been determined;
o The District Court ordered that the title to (b) the motion contravenes the ruling
the Falcon jet be returned by Fuller to of the Supreme Court in Republic v.
Faysound Sandiganbayan requiring the PCGG
o Fuller sued the Republic and PCGG for to deposit the proceeds of the sale of
breach of warranty and damages a the sequestered aircraft with the
decision was rendered against the Republic PNB; and
and PCGG ordering them to pay Fuller the (c) although the records disclose two
amount of $13,945,443.01 authenticated copies of foreign
the PCGG, in order to settle the money judgments, there is no indication that
judgment against it, entered into an copies of the deed of sale of the
"Agreement"6with Fuller Aircraft providing, aircraft and the compromise
among others, that the Republic of the agreement have been duly
Philippines agreed to pay Fuller $11 million on authenticated.
October 15, 1996 and $3 million, in equal o MR by PCGG was denied
monthly installments, beginning November 15, In the present petition: Republic contends that
1996 and ending October 15, 1997 in settlement respondent Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 66
discretion when it denied PCGG'S motion to Moreover, inasmuch as the sale of the aircraft by the
release the funds deposited in escrow with PCGG to Fuller Aircraft is void, it follows that the
the PNB to the Bureau of Treasury for "Agreement" between the PCGG and Fuller Aircraft
transmission to Fuller Aircraft. is likewise a nullity.
o The Sandiganbayan failed to file a
comment on the instant petition. Thus, this Correspondingly, petitioner Republic cannot be bound
Court has no way of determining why it by the terms of the said "Agreement" and thus, there
failed to resolve in more than one can be no cause of action against it.
decade who is lawfully entitled to the
escrow deposit In Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan, this Court ruled that the
PCGG or any of its member may be held civilly
ISSUE/S: liable if they did not act in good faith and within the
WON Republic is liable for Agreement with Fuller scope of their authority in the performance of their
Aircraft. NO. official duties. Likewise, in Director of Bureau of
Communications vs. Aligaen, this Court held that
HELD/RATIO: unauthorized acts by its government officials or
As shown by the records, Faysound Ltd. is the owner officers are not acts of the State.
of the Falcon jet. In fact, this is admitted by petitioner
Republic itself. As mentioned earlier, Cojuangco or any Petitioner must, therefore, take immediate appropriate
of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0033 has no interest action against the PCGG personnel involved in the
in it. Clearly, this aircraft was erroneously unauthorized sale of the aircraft.
sequestered. It is thus patently illegal for the PCGG
to sell it to Fuller Aircraft. US v REYES [GR No. 79253 (March 1, 1993)
Ponente: J. Davide Jr.
Considering the circumstances obtaining in this case, FACTS:
we rule that petitioner Republic cannot be held liable
under the "Agreement." It must be stressed that Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen,
petitioner did not authorize the PCGG to enter into worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange
such contract with Fuller Aircraft. Granting that the (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG)
PCGG was so authorized, however, it exceeded its headquarters in QC. Shes married to Edgardo, a
authority. Worse, the sale of the aircraft was without Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US
the approval of the Sandiganbayan. Navy & stationed in San Francisco.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 67
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2)
the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the
manager. performance of her official functions under Phil-US
Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases
retail store Bradford managed, where she had Agreement of 1947. They claim that US has rights,
purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the
already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. It will
ID checker approached her & told her that she needed also use facilities & areas w/in bases & will have
to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya effective command over the facilities, US personnel,
approached Bradford to protest the search but she was employees, equipment & material. They further claim
told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine
on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search procedure observed at base retail outlets to protect &
on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other safeguard merchandise, cash & equipment pursuant to
curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she par. 2 & 4(b) of NAVRESALEACT SUBIC INST.
was allowed to leave afterwards. 5500.1.
Montoya learned that she was the only person July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
subjected to such search that day & she was informed attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave
by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG the country & was removing & disposing her properties
employees are not searched outside the store unless w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by
there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. Montoya RTC.
cant recall any circumstance that would trigger July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to
suspicion of a wrong-doing on her part. She is aware of dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX
Bradfords propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highly-
and/or shoplifting. discriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due
Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no to excess in authority and since her liability is personal,
action was taken. Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3)
Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due Bradfords act was committed outside the military base
to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the
petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case
May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her
Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with authority.
USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a
that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 68
attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to
present evidence & Bradford declared in default for dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene.
failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have
claiming that search was unreasonable, reckless, subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction.
oppressive & against Montoyas liberty guaranteed by
Consti. She was awarded P300k for moral damages, 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
P100k for exemplary damages & P50k for actual denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. NO
expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining
Order. SC granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to
decision. dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court.
Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action
employee thus not performing governmental functions. is necessary so that Court would be able to render a
Even if she were performing governmental acts, she valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
would still not be covered by the immunity since she complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause
was acting outside the scope of her authority. She of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred
his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But
believes that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have
because act was done outside the territorial control of already brought this petition to the SC.
the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses
where US has been given right to exercise its 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. NO
jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic
immunity. She further claims that RP courts can inquire Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec.
into the factual circumstances & determine WON 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to
Bradford is immune. complaints filed against officials of the state for acts
allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties
ISSUES/RATIO: since it will require the state to perform an affirmative
1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction YES act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages.
This will be regarded as a case against the state even if
Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the it has not been formally impleaded. But this is not all
Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like encompassing. Its a different matter where the public
asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the official is made to account in his capacity as such for
present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 69
With the change of government after the EDSA in his official capacity is not enough to protect such
Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC, herein official from liability for acts done without or in excess of
petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written his authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority
notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and
respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner capricious manner in which that authority was exercised
terminated the so-called verbal agreement with GABI amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be
and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and held liable for damages"8 according to the Court of
the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In Appeals. Hence, this petition.
another notice dated March 5, 1988, respondents were
given until March 8, 1988 to vacate. Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in not holding that private
The latter notice was signed by private respondent respondents complaint against petitioner, as
Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the
conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is state which cannot be sued without its consent.
totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing 2. WON CA erred in not holding that petitioners act
the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, of terminating respondent GABIs concession is
then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he was merely valid and done in the lawful performance of
acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, official duty.
Iglesias as president was knowledgeable enough to run
GABI as well as its business. Held:
GABI's action for damages and injunction was 1. NO - The doctrine of state immunity from suit
subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the applies to complaints filed against public officials
complaint was actually directed against the State which for acts done in the performance of their duties.
could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the
trial court ruled that GABI could not claim damages RULE: Suit must be regarded : as one against the state
under the alleged oral lease agreement since GABI was where satisfaction of the judgement against the state
a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it where the satisfaction of the judgement against public
could only recover damages upon proof of the profits it official concerned will require the state itself to perform
could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted positive act, such as appropriation of the amount
that no such proof was presented. necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision The rule does not apply where the public official is
of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful
mere allegation that a government official is being sued and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 72
not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability approved by the Secretary of Public Works and
arising from acts committed in bad faith. It also does not Communications, Antonio V. Raquiza
apply when the official acts in his personal capacity,
although the acts complained of may have been A canvass or public bidding was conducted on May 5,
committed while he occupied a public position. 1967 wherein the bid of the Singkier Motor Service
owned by respondent Felipe Singson was accepted.
Lansang is not being in his capacity as NPDC chairman
but in his personal capacity. This is evident in paragraph After being approved by Secretary of Public Works, a
4 of the complaint which states that petitioner was sued voucher for the payment of the parts reached the hands
allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the of Highway Auditor Sayson for pre-audit which later
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. approved it finding it just and reasonable. He approved
the payment of for payment in the sum of P34,824.00,
2. NO - There was no evidence of any abuse of with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00. His
authority on the part of Lansang. reason for withholding the 20% was to submit the
Public streets, Public parks are beyond the commerce voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising
of man. Rizal park is beyond the commerce of man and, Auditor
thus, could not be subject of a lease contract. GABI was The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of
allowed to occupy office and kiosk space in the park P34,824.00 to respondent Singson.
was a matter of accommodation by previous
administrators. Lansang may validly discontinue the Sayson received a telegram from the Supervising
accommodation extended to private respondents, who auditor who found that there was an overpricing on the
may be ejected from the park when necessary. spare parts and equipments as shown in the vouchers.
Because of the failure of Singson to receive the balance
of the purchase price, he filed for mandamus with the
SAYSON V. SINGZON lower court which was granted. Thus this petition with
DECEMBER 19, 1973 the SC.
action for specific performance. The suit disguised as although the suit was filed in the name of the Public
one for mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, they
the vouchers for payment, is a suit against the State, were filed against them in their official capacity and thus
which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court the action is one against the National Government.
except with the consent of the State. Thus this petition for certiorari.
What respondent should have done was to file his claim
with the General Auditing Office, under the provisions of ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in granting the
Com. Act 327 which prescribe the conditions under motion to dismiss on the ground that it is a suit
which money claim against the government may be filed against the National Government
HELD/RATIO: YES,
MINISTERIO V. CEBU The government is immune from suit without its
AUGUST 31, 1971 consent. If it appears that the action, would in fact hold
it liable, the doctrine calls for application.
However, it is a different matter where the public official
FACTS:
is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
Petitioners filed a complaint for payment of just
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. An
compensation for a registered lot, containing an area of
action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or
1045 square meters, which the National Government
the director of a State department on the ground that,
through its authorized representatives took physical and
while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades
material possession of and used for the widening of the
the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
Gorordo Avenue, a national road. They also allege that
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
demanded either payment or return of the property to
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State.
which
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
defendants Public Highway Commissioner and the
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
Auditor General did not reply.
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure
indicated by the governing law at the time, a complaint
Defendants, through the Solicitor General filed a motion
would have been filed by it, and only upon payment of
to dismiss on the ground that the suit in reality was one
the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender
against the government and therefore should be
to the party entitled to such payment of the amount
dismissed, no consent having been shown.
fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon the
land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the
The lower court dismissed the petition and held that it
public use defined in the judgment
was a suit against the government. It was also held that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 74
HELD/RATIO:
No. The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE V NLRC that the State may not be sued without its consent.
NOVEMBER 11, 1993 However, such is rule is not absolute for it does not say
that the state may not be sued under any
FACTS:
circumstances.
In 1989, the Department of Agriculture and Sultan
The States' consent may be given expressly or
Security Agency entered into a contract for security
impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
services to be provided by the latter to the said
general law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the
governmental entity. In 1990 a similar contract was
general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit
made with the same conditions except for the increase
is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
in the monthly rate of the guards.
government "consents and submits to be sued upon
In September 1990, several guards filed a complaint for
any money claims involving liability arising from
underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
basis of civil action between private parties."
holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for damages,
In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has
The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the
Agency for the payment of money claims. This decision
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
became final and executor.
performed any act proprietary in character. Moreover
The Labor Arbiter forthwith issued a writ of execution
the suit filed by the security guards is a money claim
against the vehicles of DA. A petition for injunction,
entered into in its governmental capacity and thus falls
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
under the purview of Act no. 3083 provided that the
writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the
money claim first be brought to the Commission on
NLRC. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Labor
Audit.
Arbiter was null and void and had of no legal effect for
the failure of Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over
petitioner. G.R. NO. 90478, NOVEMBER 21, 1991
NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. Thus the REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN
appeal on certiorari with the SC
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON the suit against the DA is a suit against The PCGG filed a case for reconveyance, reversion,
the National Government which requires its consent accounting, restitution and damages against Bienvenido
R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago etc.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 75
Tantoco and party however questioned the case filed it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its
against them. The Sandiganbayn admitted their sovereign character and sheds its immunity from suit,
Interrogatories and granted the motion for production descending to the level of an ordinary litigant. The
and inspection of documents. PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the
This was objected to by the PCGG. However, after State, even while assuming to represent or act for the
hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two (2) State
Resolutions on September 29, 1989, the first, denying The suggestion that the State makes no implied waiver
reconsideration (of the Resolution allowing production of of immunity by filing suit except when in so doing it acts
documents), and the second, reiterating by implication in, or in matters concerning, its proprietary or non-
the permission to serve the amended interrogatories on governmental capacity, is unacceptable.
the plaintiff. Thus the present petition for certiorari. It can hardly be doubted that in exercising the right of
The PCGG contends that none none of its members eminent domain, the State exercises its jus imperii, as
may be "required to testify or produce evidence in any distinguished from its proprietary rights or jus gestionis.
judicial proceeding concerning matters within its official Yet, even in that area, it has been held that where
cognizance," since it is covered by the States immunity private property has been taken in expropriation without
from suit. just compensation being paid, the defense of immunity
from suit cannot be set up by the State against an
ISSUE: WON the PCGG is covered under State action for payment by the owner
immunity?
HELD: NO, they had impliedly waived it by instituting G.R. NOS. L-71998-99 JUNE 2, 1993
the case, the act of bringing suit must entail a waiver of DE LOS SANTOS V. IAC
the exemption from giving evidence; by bringing suit it
brings itself within the operation and scope of all the
FACTS:
rules governing civil actions, including the rights and
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land which they
duties under the rules of discovery. Otherwise, the
alleged to have been misappropriated without their
absurd would have to be conceded, that while the
knowledge or consent by Lorenzo Cadiente, who
parties it has impleaded as defendants may be required
constructed a road and a creek.
to "disgorge all the facts" within their knowledge and in
Alleging that if completed, the road and the creek would
their possession, it may not itself be subject to a like
"serve no public profitable and practicable purpose but
compulsion.
for respondents' personal profit, to the great damage
The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense
and prejudice of the taxpayers and the petitioners," the
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But
same petitioners invoked their rights under Art. IV Secs.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 76
1 and 2, of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
and prayed for the issuance of restraining order or a writ doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
of preliminary injunction to stop the construction. An invoked.
action for damages was also filed. In this case, respondent government officials executed
The trial court ruled that since the construction was a a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for
project by Minister of Public Works, the respondents public use is concerned. As in the Amigable case, no
cannot be sued without the consent of the State. expropriation proceedings were initiated before
construction of the projects began
ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit? Public respondents' belief that the property involved is
public, even if buttressed by statements of other public
HELD: NO, it had impliedly given his consent. officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioners'
Quoting MInisterio v CFI: property, especially since it was under the Torrens
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit system in Santos name. A public infrastructure loses its
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an laudability if, in the process of undertaking it, private
injustice on a citizen. Had the government followed the rights are disregarded
procedure indicated by the governing law at the time, a Quoting Republic v Sandiganbayan, It can hardly be
complaint would have been filed by it, and only upon doubted that in exercising the right of eminent domain,
payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or the State exercises its jus imperii, as distinguished from
after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the its proprietary rights of jus gestionis. Yet, even in that
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon area, it has been held that where private property has
the land so condemned" to appropriate the same to the been taken in expropriation without just compensation
public use defined in the judgment. If there were an being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would set up by the State against an action for payment by the
not be in the said plaint they are now. It is unthinkable owner.
then that precisely because there was a failure to
abide by what the law requires, the government G.R. NO. 131544, MARCH 16, 2001
would stand to benefit. It just as important, if not more EPG CONSTRUCTION V. SECRETARY VIGILAR
so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of the
officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is
FACTS:
not too much to say that when the government takes
Ministry of Human Settlement, through the BLISS
any property for public use, which is conditioned upon
Development Corporation, initiated a housing project on
the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
a government property along the east bank of the
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the
Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. For this purpose,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 77
the Ministry of Human Settlement entered into a duly compensated on the basis of quantum meruit
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Ministry of for construction done on the public works housing
Public Works and Highways,2 where the latter project.
undertook to develop the housing site and construct In this case, although the verbal contracts are indeed
thereon 145 housing units. null and void due to lack of proper appropriation of
By virtue of the MOA, the Ministry of Public Works and public funds, the records reveal that the verbal request
Highways forged individual contracts with herein and assurance of then DPWH Undersecretary Canlas
petitioners for the construction of the housing units. led petitioners-contractors to undertake thecompletion
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and of the government housing project, despite the absence
funding covered only around "2/3 of each housing unit. of covering appropriations. On the principle of quantum
Due to the verbal assurance of the DPWH merui, it would be the apex of injustice and highly
Undersecretary, petitioners agreed to undertake and inequitable to defeat petitioners-contractors' right to be
perform "additional constructions"4 for the completion of duly compensated for actual work performed and
the housing units, despite the absence of appropriations services rendered, where both the government and the
and written contracts to cover subsequent expenses for public have, for years, received and accepted benefits
the "additional constructions from said housing project and reaped the fruits of
While petitioners completed these agreements, even petitioners-contractors' honest toil and labor.
the verbal one, the Government failed and afterwards
refused to compensate them arguing that the contracts
were null and void due to the absence of proper
appropriation of public funds. G.R. NO. L-48214, DECEMBER 19, 1978
The government further argues that they are covered by SANTIAGO V. GOVT OF PHIL
States immunity from suit.
FACTS:
ISSUE: WON respondents are covered by State
Ildefonso Santiago filed an action against the
immunity?
Government represented by the Director of the Bureau
of Plant Industry for the revocation of a deed of donation
HELD: NO
executed by him and his spouse in with the Bureau of
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
Plant Industry as the donee.
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
As alleged, such Bureau, contrary to the terms of the
citizen. Justice and equity sternly demand that the
donation, failed to "install lighting facilities and water
State's cloak of invincibility against suit be shred in this
system on the property donated and to build an office
particular instance, and that petitioners-contractors be
building and parking [lot] which should have been
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 78
constructed and ready for occupancy on or before the conditions of such donation. He has the right to be
December 7, 1974. That led him to conclude that under heard.
the circumstances, he was exempt from compliance Under the circumstances, the fundamental
with such an explicit constitutional command. postulate of non-suability cannot stand in the way.
The lower court however dismissed the case under the It is made to accommodate itself to the demands of
rule that the state cannot be sued without its consent. procedural due process, which is the negation of
arbitrariness and inequity. The government, in the
ISSUE: WON the state is immune from suit? final analysis, is the beneficiary. It thereby manifests its
adherence to the highest ethical standards, which can
HELD: NO only be ignored at the risk of losing the confidence of
While the court concedes that the general rule is for a the people, the repository of the sovereign power.
government body to be immune from suit and a partys The judiciary under this circumstance has the grave
remedy would therefore be to file a claim with such responsibility of living up to the ideal of objectivity and
general office, this case falls under an exception. It impartiality, the very essence of the rule of law. Only by
would be manifestly unfair for the Republic, as donee, displaying the neutrality expected of an arbiter, even if it
alleged to have violated the conditions under which it happens to be one of the departments of a litigant, can
received gratuitously certain property, thereafter to put the decision arrived at, whatever it may be, command
as a barrier the concept of non-suitability. That would be respect and be entitled to acceptance.
a purely one-sided arrangement offensive to one's
sense of justice. Such conduct, whether proceeding
from an individual or governmental agency, is to be GR. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916
condemned. MERRITT V. GOVERNMENT OF PHIL ISLANDS
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
FACTS:
citizen. the alleged failure to abide by the conditions
Merritt was riding on his motorcycle when he was hit by
under which a donation was given should not prove an
a General Hospital ambulance causing extensive injury.
insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent
He therefore filed a case for tort against the
likewise being presumed. Where there is consent, a
Government. The Government however claims
suit may be filed. Consent need not be express. It
immunity from suit.
can be implied.
The decision goes no further than to rule that a donor,
ISSUE: WON the government is immune from suit?
with the Republic or any of its agency being the donee,
is entitled to go to court in case of an alleged breach of
HELD: NO
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 79
The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it The position of the Republic has been fortified with the
contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present
definite order or commission to perform some act or Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its
charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to consent."
the claim Under CC1903(5). "The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this
In this case, since the chauffeur of the ambulance was jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935]
not a special agent, the Government cannot be held Constitution is a logical corollary of the positivist
liable without its consent. concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates
the assertion of any legal right as against the state, in
itself the source of the law on which such a right may be
REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA predicated. "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the
government without its consent, as it has operated in
FACTS:
practice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by
the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and
defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending
ever-widening scope of state activities at present being
civil suit for the collection of a money claim arising from
undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants
an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private
may still exist, is, from an objective appraisal of all
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.
factors, minimal. In the balancing of interests, so
unavoidable in the determination of what principles must
At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines
prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the
Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where
verdict must be, as it has been these so many years, for
Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a
its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of
court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office
constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance Co.,
or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national
Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
government unless consent be shown, had been
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the
applied in 53 other decisions.
State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus,
Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of
whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss
Administration agreed to had no binding force on
dated October 4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari
the government.
and prohibition.
On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Philippines, in effect, waived its right of non-suability,
Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on but it will be remembered that the Republic intervened
November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the in the case merely to unite with the defendant Attorney
property with the Philippine Alien Property General of the United States in resisting plaintiff's
Administrator. claims, and for that reason asked no affirmative relief
On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the against any party in the answer in intervention it filed
Vested Property Claims Committee of the Philippine
Alien Property Administrator,
US VS. RUIZ
The claimant, however, took no appeal to the Philippine
FACTS: Petitioner invited the submission of bids for
Alien Property Administrator, so the decision of the
repair of its wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay
committee became final
Area. Eligion and Co. responded to the invitation and
submitted bids. Said company was requested by
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as
telegram to confirm its price proposals and for the name
administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez,
of its bonding company, and from which it complied.
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila
Later, the United States, through its agent, informed
against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later
said company that it was not qualified to receive an
substituted by the Attorney General of the United
award at the project for the poorly completed projects it
States) for the recovery of the property in question with
awarded to third parties.
back rents.
The company sued petitioner for specific performance
Plaintiffs action was dismissed.
and if no longer possible, for damages. It also asked for
a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
ISSUE: Can the plaintiff claim for damages? NO
from entering into contracts with others.
HELD: The claim for damages for the use of the
property against the intervenor defendant Republic of
The United States entered a special appearance for the
the Philippines to which is was transferred, likewise,
purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the Court
cannot be maintained because of the immunity of the
over the subject matter of the complaint and the
state from suit. The claim obviously constitutes a charge
persons of the defendants, the subject matter of the
against, or financial liability to, the Government and
complaint being acts and omissions of the individual
consequently cannot be entertained by the courts
defendants as agents of the defendant United States of
except with the consent of said government. Plaintiff
America, a foreign sovereign which has not given its
argues that by its intervention, the Republic of the
consent to this suit or any other suit for the cause of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 82
action asserted in the complaint. U.S. filed a motion to allegedly due to the abolition of his position. He was
dismiss and opposed the writ. The Trial Court denied also advised that he was under administrative leave
the motion and issued a writ. until April 27, 1992, although the same was not charged
against his leave.
ISSUE: Whether United States may be sued On March 31, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint
with the Department of Labor and Employment on the
HELD: No. The restrictive application of state immunity ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed
is proper only when the proceedings arise out of from service by JUSMAG
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated ISSUE: Can JUSMAG be sued? NO
differently, a state may be said to have descended to
the level of an individual can be thus deemed to have HELD: It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the
tacitly given its consent to be sued only when the services of private respondent, it was performing a
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign governmental function on behalf of the United States
functions. In this case, the projects are an integral part pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated
of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of March 21, 1947. Hence, we agree with petitioner that
both the U.S. and the Philippines, undisputed a function the suit is, in effect, one against the United States
of the Government of the highest order, they are not Government, albeit it was not impleaded in the
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business complaint. Considering that the United States has not
purposes. waived or consented to the suit, the complaint against
JUSMAG cannot not prosper.
JUSMAG V. NLRC
FACTS: Private respondent was one of the seventy-four INDONESIA V. VINZON
(74) security assistance support personnel (SASP) FACTS: Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented
working at JUSMAG-Philippines. He had been with by its Counsellor, Siti Partinah, entered into a
JUSMAG from December 18, 1969, until his dismissal Maintenance Agreement in August 1995 with
on April 27, 1992. When dismissed, he held the position respondent James Vinzon, sole proprietor of Vinzon
of Illustrator 2 and was the incumbent President of Trade and Services. The Maintenance Agreement
JUSMAG PHILIPPINES-FILIPINO CIVILIAN stated that respondent shall, for a consideration,
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (JPFCEA), a labor maintain specified equipment at the Embassy Main
organization duly registered with the Department of Building, Embassy Annex Building and the Wisma Duta,
Labor and Employment. His services were terminated the official residence of petitioner Ambassador
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 83
Soeratmin. The equipment covered by the Maintenance private entities to maintain the premises, furnishings
Agreement are air conditioning units, generator sets, and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of
electrical facilities, water heaters, and water motor its agents and officials. It is therefore clear that
pumps. It is likewise stated therein that the agreement petitioner Republic of Indonesia was acting in pursuit of
shall be effective for a period of four years and will a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract with
renew itself automatically unless cancelled by either respondent for the upkeep or maintenance of the air
party by giving thirty days prior written notice from the conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities,
date of expiry. water heaters, and water motor pumps of the
Indonesian Embassy and the official residence of the
On the other hand, respondent claims that the aforesaid Indonesian ambassador.
termination was arbitrary and unlawful. Respondent
cites various circumstances which purportedly negated
petitioners alleged dissatisfaction over respondents G.R. NO. 76607, FEBRUARY 26, 1990
services UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREDERICK M.
SMOUSE AND YVONNE REEVES VS. HON.
Hence, on December 15, 2000, respondent filed a ELIODORO B. GUINTO
complaint against petitioners docketed as Civil Case
Note: These cases have been consolidated because
No. 18203 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
Branch 145. On February 20, 2001, petitioners filed a
United States filed motions to dismiss these cases.
Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the Republic of
Indonesia, as a foreign sovereign State, has sovereign
CASE#1: Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa
immunity from suit and cannot be sued as a party-
Area Exchange, U.S. Air Force, solicited bids for barber
defendant in the Philippines.
services through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw.
Private respondents who have been concessionaires
ISSUE: Can respondent sue Republic Of Indonesia?
inside Clark for years submitted their bids.
NO
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon. The private
respondents filed a complaint in the court below to
HELD: There is no dispute that the establishment of a
compel PHAX and the individual petitioners to cancel
diplomatic mission is an act jure imperii. A sovereign
the award to defendant Dizon, to conduct a rebidding for
State does not merely establish a diplomatic mission
the barbershop concessions.
and leave it at that; the establishment of a diplomatic
On July 22, 1986, the petitioners filed a motion to
mission encompasses its maintenance and
dismiss and opposition to the petition for preliminary
upkeep. Hence, the State may enter into contracts with
injunction on the ground that the action was in effect a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 84
suit against the United States of America, which had not acting in their official capacity when they did the acts
waived its non-suability. The individual defendants, as complained of and that the complaint against them was
official employees of the U.S. Air Force, were also in effect a suit against the United States without its
immune from suit. consent.
CASE#2: Fabian Genove filed a complaint for damages ISSUE: W the cases should be dismissed on the ground
for his dismissal as cook in the U.S. Air Force of immunity from suit - YES.
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio
City. It was found during investigation that Genove had 1. General Principles: The rule that a state may not be
poured urine into the soup stock used in cooking the sued without its consent is one of the generally
vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as accepted principles of international law that we have
club manager, suspended him and referred the case to adopted as part of the law of our land under the
a board of arbitrators, who found him guilty and constitution. Even without such affirmation, we would
recommended his dismissal. Col. David C. Kimball of still be bound by the generally accepted principles of
the PACAF Clark Air Force Base effected his dismissal. international law under the doctrine of incorporation.
Genove then filed a complaint in RTC Baguio. Under this doctrine, such principles are deemed
Defendants, joined by USA, alleged that Lamachia, as incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a
an officer of the U.S. Air Force stationed at John Hay Air condition and consequence of its membership in the
Station, was immune from suit for the acts done by him society of nations.
in his official capacity. They argued that the suit was in As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state
effect against the United States, which had not given its immunity is based on the justification given by Justice
consent to be sued. Holmes that "there can be no legal right against the
authority which makes the law on which the right
CASE#3: Luis Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O' depends." There are other practical reasons for the
Donnell, an extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign
following a buy-bust operation conducted by officers of state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the
the U.S. Air Force and special agents of the Air Force added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in
Office of Special Investigators (AFOSI). As a result of parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign
the filing of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.
employment. Defendants alleged that they had only A contrary disposition would, in the language of a
done their duty in the enforcement of the laws of the celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of nations."
Philippines inside the American bases pursuant to the In the case of the United States of America, the
RP-US Military Bases Agreement, and that they were customary rule of international law on state immunity is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 85
expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases involved. If found liable, they and they alone must
Treaty. Article III thereof provides as follows: satisfy the judgment.
It is mutually agreed that the United States shall have
the rights, power and authority within the bases which 2. However, in Case#3, it is clear that the individually-
are necessary for the establishment, use, operation and named petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of
defense thereof or appropriate for the control thereof their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust
and all the rights, power and authority within the limits of operation. It cannot for a moment be imagined that they
the territorial waters and air space adjacent to, or in the were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when
vicinity of, the bases which are necessary to provide they apprehended and later testified against the
access to them or appropriate for their control. complainant. It follows that for discharging their duties
It bears stressing at this point that this does not confer as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
on the United States of America a blanket immunity for impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which
all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. has not given its consent to be sued.
Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are Luis Bautista invokes Article 2180 of the Civil Code
also insulated from suit in this country merely because which holds the government liable if it acts through a
they have acted as agents of the United States in the special agent. The argument, it would seem, is
discharge of their official functions. premised on the ground that since the officers are
There is no question that the United States of America, designated "special agents," the United States
like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly government should be liable for their torts.
waived its non-suability if it has entered into a contract But the circumstance that a state is suable does not
in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it
contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
that no such waiver may be implied. sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the
The other petitioners in the cases before us all aver they state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
have acted in the discharge of their official functions as waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
officers or agents of the United States. However, this is the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
a matter of evidence. The charges against them may liable.
not be summarily dismissed on their mere assertion that The said article establishes a rule of liability, not
their acts are imputable to the United States of America, suability. The government may be held liable under this
which has not given its consent to be sued. In fact, the rule only if it first allows itself to be sued through any of
defendants are sought to be held answerable for the accepted forms of consent.
personal torts in which the United States itself is not Moreover, the agent performing his regular functions is
not a special agent even if he is so denominated, as in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 86
the case at bar. No less important, the said provision private person's. They are not agencies of the United
appears to regulate only the relations of the local state States Armed Forces nor are their facilities demandable
with its inhabitants and, hence, applies only to the as a matter of right by the American servicemen. These
Philippine government and not to foreign governments establishments provide for the grooming needs of their
impleaded in our courts. customers and offer not only the basic haircut and
shave (as required in most military organizations) but
3. In Case#2, the Court can assume that the restaurant such other amenities as shampoo, massage, manicure
services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of and other similar indulgences. And all for a fee.
the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by the Also, the barbershop concessionaires are under the
United States government in its proprietary capacity. terms of their contracts, required to remit to the United
Such services are not extended to the American States government fixed commissions in consideration
servicemen for free as a perquisite of membership in of the exclusive concessions granted to them in their
the Armed Forces of the United States. Neither does it respective areas.
appear that they are exclusively offered to these This being the case, the petitioners cannot plead any
servicemen; on the contrary, it is well known that they immunity from the complaint filed by the private
are available to the general public as well, including the respondents in the court below.
tourists in Baguio City, many of whom make it a point to
visit John Hay for this reason.
So the officers cannot invoke the doctrine of state G.R. NO. L-26400,, FEBRUARY 29, 1972
immunity to justify the dismissal of the damage suit VICTORIA AMIGABLE VS.NICOLAS CUENCA, AS
against them by Genove. Such defense will not prosper COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS AND REPUBLIC
even if it be established that they were acting as agents OF THE PHILIPPINES
of the United States when they investigated and later
dismissed Genove. For that matter, not even the United NATURE: appeal from the decision of the Court of First
States government itself can claim such immunity. The Instance of Cebu dismissing Amigable's complaint.
reason is that by entering into the employment contract
with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, FACTS:
it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from 1. Victoria Amigable owns a lot in Cebu City shown by a
suit. TCT No. T-18060 issued by Register of Deeds on
February 1, 1924. Without prior expropriation or
4. In Case#1, we also find that the barbershops subject negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said
of the concessions granted by the United States lot, with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the
government are commercial enterprises operated by construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. Note:
these avenues were already existing in 1921.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 87
2. March 27, 1958 - Amigable's counsel wrote the It is unthinkable then that precisely because there was a
President of the Philippines requesting payment of the failure to abide by what the law requires, the
portion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government would stand to benefit.
government. The Auditor General disallowed it. 2. Considering that no annotation in favor of the
3. February 6, 1959 - Amigable filed a complaint against government appears at the back of her certificate of title
the Republic and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
ownership and possession of the 6,167 sqm of land. remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered
4. July 29, 1959 - the court held that that it had no owner, she could bring an action to recover possession
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action for the of the portion of land in question at anytime because
recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
her lot in question on the ground that the government
cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither
original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide G.R. NO. 129406, MARCH 6, 2006
plaintiff's money claim against the government; nor did it REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE
have jurisdiction over the claim for moral damages PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
because the government had not given its consent to be GOVERNMENT (PCGG) VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed (SECOND DIVISION) AND ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO
NATURE: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
ISSUE: W Amigable may properly sue the government
Rules of Court to nullify the Resolutions of the
under the facts of the case - YES. Case remanded to
Sandiganbayan
the court a quo for the determination of compensation
FACTS:
1. Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu - where
1. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1, the PCGG
the government takes away property from a private
issued writs placing under sequestration all business
landowner for public use without going through the legal
enterprises, entities and other properties, real and
process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
personal, owned or registered in the name of private
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the
respondent Benedicto, including 227 shares in Negros
government without thereby violating the doctrine of
Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI).
governmental immunity from suit without its consent.
2. So the PCGG representatives sat as members of the
The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, a
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a
resolution assessing a monthly membership due of
citizen. Had the government followed the procedure,
P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. The 227 sequestered
petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now.
shares were declared delinquent (bec. it could not pay
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 88
the membership due) and so it had to be disposed of in monetary liability on a government agency, thus
an auction sale. necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy
3. Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the the judgment claim. But, as Benedicto correctly
Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the
defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the
accounting, reconstitution and damages that PCGG government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No.
filed with the Sandiganbayan against Roberto S. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the
Benedicto. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be
and private respondent Benedicto entered into a effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when
Compromise Agreement, wherein Republic agreed and the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the
bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby
shares, impliedly recognizing that the shares of stock descends to the level of a private individual and thus
are not ill-gotten. opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the
4. Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act of
assailed Resolution directing PCGG to deliver to the filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a
Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the plaintiff
free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its
thereof, to pay their value. PCGG failed to comply. immunity against private respondent Benedictos
prayers in the same case.
ISSUE: W Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with
in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic
membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and
shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When
foreclosure sale thereof - NO. the State enters into contract, through its officers or
1. PCGG, as a receiver of the sequestered 227 shares, agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose
has the function to pay outstanding debts pertaining to and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority,
the sequestered entity or property. It contends, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights
however, that membership dues owing to a golf club and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued
cannot be considered as an outstanding debt. even without its express consent, precisely because by
2. (relevant part) In a last-ditch attempt to escape entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the
liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied
state immunity from suit. As argued, the order for it to from the very act of entering into such contract, breach
pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 89
of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired
other party to the agreement. jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void. The
petitioner also pointed out that the attachment or
G.R. NO. 104269, NOVEMBER 11, 1993 seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE VS.THE petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. the public good.
6. NLRC refused to quash the writ of execution. DAR
Nature: petition for certiorari to nullify the decision of now filed a petition for certiorari. It argues: (1) that
NLRC 5th Division NLRC cannot assume jurisdiction over a money claim
against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the
FACTS: exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit; (2)
1. Apr 1, 1989 - DAR entered into a contract for security NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-
services with Sultan Security Agency. On 13 September suability of the State.
1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed
a complaint for underpayment of wages, etc. against the ISSUE: W DAR waived its immunity from suit by
DAR and Sultan Security Agency. concluding a service contract with Sultan Security
2. The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on Agency - NO. Petiiton for Certiorari granted.
31 May finding herein petitioner and jointly and severally 1. The rule that "the State may not be sued without its
liable with Sultan Security Agency for the payment of consent," is not really absolute for it does not say that
money claims. The decision became final and the state may not be sued under any circumstances. On
executory. the contrary, as correctly phrased, the doctrine only
3. On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of conveys, "the state may not be sued without its
execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at
execute the judgment against the property of the two times be sued.
respondents. 2. The States' consent may be given expressly or
4. The City Sheriff levied on execution the motor impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
vehicles of DAR. These units were put under the general law or a special law. Implied consent, on the
custody of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
petitioner, pending their sale at public auction or the commences litigation, thus opening itself to a
final settlement of the case, whichever would come first. counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this
5. DAR filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and situation, the government is deemed to have descended
mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction to the level of the other contracting party and to have
with NLRC CDO, alleging that the writ issued was
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 90
divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied an opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a
upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, liability.
however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered
into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one
which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary
capacity.
3. In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from
its being a governmental entity when it entered into the
questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character.
4. But, be that as it may, the claims of private
respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday
pay, overtime pay and similar other items, arising from
the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of
the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied.. .
Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No.
327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No.
1145, the money claim first be brought to the
Commission on Audit.
5. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides
the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution,
enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued
in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down
in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.
6. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does
thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution
against it. tersely put, when the State waives its
immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 91
completion of proceedingsanterior to the stage of the payment of their back-wages and other
execution and that the power of the Courtsends when emoluments. The City Government appealed the
the judgment is rendered, since government funds decision but such was dismissed.
andproperties may not be seized under writs of The City paid Santiago P75,083.37 as partial
execution or garnishment tosatisfy such judgments, is payment of her back-wages. The others were paid in
full.
based on obvious considerations of publicpolicy.
The City appropriated funds for her unpaid back
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by
salaries (supplemental budget #3) but the City
thecorresponding appropriation as required by law. refused to release the money to Santiago. The City
The functions andpublic services rendered by the State of Caloocan argued that Santiago was not entitled to
cannot be allowed to be paralyzedor disrupted by the back wages.
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at public auction one
specific objects, as appropriated by law. of the motor vehicles of the City Government for
4. The above applies even to an attempted garnishment P100,000. The amount was given to Santiago. The
of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. City Government questioned the validity of the motor
5. Another reason is that moneys sought to be vehicle; properties of the municipality were exempt
garnished, as long as theyremain in the hands of the from execution. Judge Allarde denied the motion and
disbursing officer of the Government, belongto the directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at public
latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be auction 3 more vehicles.
entitled toa specific portion thereof. And still another The City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance
reason which covers bothof the foregoing is that every 0134 which included the amount of P439,377.14
consideration of public policy forbidsit. claimed by Santiago as back-wages, plus interest.
Judge Allarde issued an order to the City Treasurer
to release the check but the City Treasurer cant do
so because the Mayor refuses to sign the check.
CITY OF CALOOCAN V. ALLARDE Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately
FACTS garnish the funds of the City Government of
Mayor Marcial Samson of Caloocan abolished the Caloocan corresponding to the claim of Santiago.
position of Assistant City Administrator and 17 other Notice of garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but
positions via Ordinance 1749. The affected the City Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that
employees assailed the legality of the abolition. the garnishment was illegal and that it would hold
The CFI declared abolition illegal and ordered the PNB liable for any damages which may be caused
reinstatement of all the dismissed employees and by the withholding the funds of the city.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 93
appropriated funds for her unpaid back salaries subject to his claim property of the defendant in the
(supplemental budget #3) but the City refused to hands of a third person, or money owed by such third
release the money to Santiago. The City of Caloocan person nor garnishee to the defendant. The rule is and
argued that Santiago was not entitled to back wages. has always been that all government funds deposited in
On July 27, 1992 Sheriff Castillo levied and sold at the PNB or any other official depositary of the Philippine
public auction one of the motor vehicles of the City Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
Government for P100,000.The amount was given to whether by general or special deposit, remain
Santiago. The City Government questioned the validity government funds and may not be subject to
of the motor vehicle; properties of the municipality were garnishment or levy, in the absence of a corresponding
exempt from execution. Judge Allarde denied the appropriation as required by law. Even though the rule
motion and directed the sheriff to levy and schedule at as to immunity of a state from suit is relaxed, the power
public auction 3 more vehicles. On October 5, 1993 the of the courts ends when the judgment is rendered.
City Council of Caloocan passed Ordinance No. 0134 Although the liability of the state has been judicially
which included the amount of P439,377.14 claimed by ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
Santiago as back-wages, plus interest. Judge Allarde whether to pay the judgment or not, and execution
issued an order to the City Treasurer to release the cannot issue on a judgment against the state. Such
check but the City Treasurer cant do so because the statutes do not authorize a seizure of state property to
Mayor refuses to sign the check. On May 7, 1993 satisfy judgments recovered, and only convey an
Judge Allarde ordered the Sheriff to immediately implication that the legislature will recognize such
garnish the funds of the City Government of Caloocan judgment as final and make provision for the satisfaction
corresponding to the claim of Santiago. Notice of thereof. However, the rule is not absolute and admits of
garnishment was forwarded to the PNB but the City a well-defined exception, that is, when there is a
Treasurer sent an advice letter to PNB that the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
garnishment was illegal and that it would hold PNB
liable for any damages which may be caused by the In such a case, the monetary judgment may be legally
withholding the funds of the city. enforced by judicial processes. Herein, the City Council
of Caloocan already approved and passed Ordinance
ISSUE: Whether or not the funds of City of Caloocan, in No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount
PNB, may be garnished (i.e. exempt from execution), to of P439,377.14for Santiagos back-wages plus interest.
satisfy Santiagos claim. This case, thus, fell squarely within the exception. The
judgment of the trial court could then be validly enforced
HELD: Garnishment is considered a specie against such funds.
of attachment by means of which the plaintiff seeks to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 95
of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating proper appropriation required under the law, citing the
from its public funds an amount corresponding to the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The RTC
balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the
1987, less the sum of P99,743.94 deposited in Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said dismissal and
Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under petitioner now filed this petition for review.
execution may be validly effected on the public funds
of petitioner deposited in the said account. ISSUE: Whether or not funds of the Municipality of
Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution.
enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should No. The notice of garnishment was made pursuant to an
be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. order of attachment against Labradors property. By the
process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the
garnishee for a debt due to the defendant. The debtor
PACIFIC PRODUCTS V ONG stranger becomes a forced intervenor. The Director of
the Bureau of Commerce and Industry, an officer of the
By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually
Government of the Philippine Islands, when served with
sues the garnishee for a due from the defendant. The
the writ of attachment, thus become party to the
debtor-stranger becomes a forced intervenor; when
action. It becomes a suit against the state without their
served with the writ of attachment, he becomes a party
consent.
to the action. Money in the hands of government agency
(engaged in governmental functions), even if due to a
In this case, immunity from suit was not waived because
third party, is not liable to creditors of the third party
the Bureau entered into a business transaction with
through garnishment. To allow this would be to allow a
BML. The Bureau is a service bureau, not engaged in
suit against the State without its consent.
business.
FACTS:
PPI filed a case against Labrador; the Sheriff was
It further was never proved that Labrador was doing
ordered to attach Labradors properties.
business under the name BML trading.
In the mean time, BML Trading won a bid to supply the
Petition dismissed.
Bureau of Telecommunications worth 10,500 for copper
sulfate. This was garnished by the Sheriff as Labrador
was doing business under the name BML Trading. BML PACIFIC PRODUCTS V. ONG
however assigned its rights to Ong as Ong advanced FACTS:
the necessary funds to purchase the copper sulfate. He Petitioner Pacific Products filed an action for sum of
filed a third party claim. money against Hilarion Labrador, doing business
under the name and style of BML Trading and
ISSUE: Supply. A court order was issued directing the Sheriff
Could the money payable to BML be garnished even if it of Manila to attach the properties of the latter.
was still in the possession of the Bureau of BML Trading won in a bid to supply the Bureau of
Telecommunications? Telecommunications with 15,000 pounds of
bluestone copper sulfate worth P10,500.00.
HELD: Labrador, as agent of BML Trading delivered the
compound.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 98
Before the Bureau could release the payment to ISSUE: WON the garnishment was illegal and void
BML Trading, the Sheriff of Manila garnished YES. Petition denied.
P9,111.70 out of the P10,500.00.
Unknown to Pacific, BML Trading, through its RATIO:
attorney in-fact, H.D. Labrador assigned its tights It is noted that the notice of garnishment served
over the P10,500.00 to respondent, Vicente Ong. upon the Bureau of Telecommunications was made
o It was Ong who advanced the necessary funds to pursuant to an order of attachment issued by the trial
purchase the copper sulfate and the parties court in the case for sum of money against Labrador.
agreed that the profits will be shared by BML At the time of such service, the amount against
Trading and Vicente Ong on a 40-60 percent which the notice was issued was still in the
basis. It was also their agreement that BML possession and control of the Bureau.
Trading will waive its share in the net profits o Petitioner contends that immunity from suit was
which may be realized from the transaction waived when the Bureau entered into a business
should it fail to secure the release of the payment. transaction with BML Trading since in this
Pacific learned about the assignment only when a jurisdiction, it is "a well established doctrine that
copy of the third party claim filed by Ong with the when the Government engages in business, it
Office of the Sheriff of Manila was served on them. abdicates part of its sovereign prerogatives and
H.D. Labrador was declared in default and was ascends to the level of a citizen".
ordered to pay Pacific the sum of P 9,111.70. The o This contention is not correct. Suability would
corresponding writ of execution was issued and the follow only if the contract entered into by the
Sheriff of Manila further garnished Pl,181.65 of the government is in the exercise of a proprietary as
P10,500.00 in the possession of the Bureau. distinguished from a governmental function. The
Ong's third party claim was frustrated when Pacific Bureau is a service bureau and is not engaged in
filed an Indemnity Bond with the Office of the Sheriff. business.
Ong filed an action for damages against Macario By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually
Ofilada in his capacity as Sheriff of Manila, the sues the garnishee for a debt due to the defendant.
Pacific Products, and the First Quezon City The debtor stranger becomes a forced intervenor a
Insurance. party to the action upon service of the writ of
RTC dismissed the complaint but the CA reversed attachment. The State, by virtue of its sovereignty
the decision. Hence, the instant appeal by certiorari may not be sued in its own courts except by express
filed by Pacific. authorization by the Legislature, and to Subject its
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly
what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 99
moneys sought to be garnished, as long as it ministrant. The former involves the exercise of
remains in the hands of the disbursing officer of the sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter
Government, belong latter, although the defendant in connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions
garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion and thus considered as optional.
thereof. And still another reason which covers both The National Irrigation Administration is a
of the foregoing is that every consideration of public government agency with a juridical personality
policy forbids it. separate and distinct from the government. It is not a
mere agency of the government but a corporate
body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it
FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN may be held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its special
FACTS:
agent.
In an earlier decision, National Irrigation
o NIA was not created for purposes of local
Administration (NIA) was declared liable for the
government. While it may be true that the NIA
injuries, resulting in the death, of Francisco
was essentially a service agency of the
Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and
government aimed at promoting public interest
Virginia Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or
and public welfare, such fact does not make the
negligence of NIAs driver employee Hugo Garcia.
NIA essentially and purely a "government-
The Court held that NIA is a government agency
function" corporation.
performing proprietary functions.
o NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing,
NIA maintains, however, that it does not perform improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an national irrigation systems in the Philippines,
agency of the government tasked with governmental including all communal and pump irrigation
functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous projects." Certainly, the state and the community
act of its driver Garcia, who was not its special as a whole are largely benefited by the services
agent. For this, they have filed a motion for the agency renders, but these functions are only
reconsideration. incidental to the principal aim of the agency,
which is the irrigation of lands.
ISSUE: WON NIA may be held liable for damages o NIA is a government agency invested with a
caused by its driver - YES corporate personality separate and distinct from
the government. It has its own assets and
HELD: liabilities. It also has corporate powers to be
The functions of government have been classified exercised by a Board of Directors.
into governmental or constituent and proprietary or
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 100
ISSUE:
Could the award for moral damages be awarded?
HELD:
Yes. The solicitor general argues that Garcia was a
regular driver, not a special agent who was performing a
job or act foreign to his usual duties. Hence, the liability
CHAPTER IV:
should not be borne by the government agency, but by
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
Garcia himself.
The liability of the state has two aspects: its public or QUEZON CITY V ERICTA
governmental aspects were it is liable for the tortuous FACTS:
acts of special agent only and its private or business Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 provides that: At least 6%
aspects where it becomes liable as ordinary employer. of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall
be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 101
Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into
to be determined by competent City Authorities.. effect and discharge the powers and duties
For years, that section of the Ordinance was not conferred by this act and such as it shall deem
enforced but 7 years after enactment, the City necessary and proper to provide for the health and
Council passed a resolution to request the City safety, , and for the protection of property therein;
Engineer to stop any further selling of lots where the and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines
owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
space intended for paupers. The power to regulate does not include the power to
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the
petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and power to confiscate.
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to o The ordinance in question not only confiscates
annul Sec. 9 of the Ordinance in question, alleging but also prohibits the operation of a memorial
that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the park cemetery, because under Sec. 13 -
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and Violation of the provision thereof is punishable
the Revised Administrative Code. with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon
conviction thereof the permit to operate and
ISSUE: WON Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is a valid maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or
exercise of police power - NO cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal
provision in effect deter one from operating a
HELD: memorial park cemetery.
Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 cannot be justified under o It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate
the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If
license fee, and regulate such business, trades, and he is deprived of his property outright, it is not
occupation as may be established or practiced in the taken for public use but rather to destroy in order
City. to promote the general welfare.
Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived o Sec. 9 of Ordinance 6118 is not a mere police
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers a person of his private property without due
of government by which the state interferes with the process of law, nay, even without compensation.
property rights, namely-. (1) police power,
(2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
The police power of Quezon City is defined as To ICHONG V HERNANDEZ
make such further ordinance and regulations not FACTS:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 102
RATIO: FACTS:
Charter of the United Nations imposes no strict or Commonwealth Act No. 567, otherwise known as the
legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of Sugar Adjustment Act, was enacted due to the threat
their subjects and the Declaration of the Human to the sugar industry by the imminent imposition of
Rights adopted by the United Nations General export taxes upon sugar. It provides for an increase
Assembly contains nothing more than a mere of the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar, on a
recommendation or a common standard of graduated basis, on each picul of sugar
achievement for all peoples and all nations manufactured, to stabilize the sugar industry so as to
o This can be inferred from the fact that prepare it for the eventuality of the loss of its
members of the United Nations Organizations, preferential position in the US market.
such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit Walter Lutz, in his capacity as administrator of the
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover
most nations of the world laws against from the CIR the sum of P14,666.40 paid by the
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are estate as taxes, under section 3 of the Act; alleging
adopted. that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being
All that the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry
and China guarantees is the equality of treatment to exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally
nationals of any other country." levied.
o The nationals of China are not discriminating CFI dismissed the action, hence this appeal.
against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States - ISSUE: WON the tax levied under CA 567 is
who are granted special rights by the unconstitutional NO
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging
in the retail trade. RATIO:
o Even supposing that the law infringes upon the The tax provided for in CA 567 is not a pure exercise
said treaty, the treaty is always subject to of the taxing power. The tax under said Act is levied
qualification or amendment by a subsequent with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
law and the same may never curtail or restrict rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened
the scope of the police power of the State. sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the
great industries of our nation,
its promotion, protection, and advancement,
LUTZ V ARANETA therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 104
Hence, the said objectives of CA 567 are of public Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian
concern and CA 567 is therefore constitutional. Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.
Even from the standpoint that CA 567 is a pure tax o 3 - a petition by owners of land which was
measure, it cannot be said that the devotion of tax placed by the DAR under the coverage of
money to experimental stations to seek increase of Operation Land Transfer.
efficiency in sugar production, utilization of by- o 4 a petition invoking the right of retention
products and solution of allied problems, as well as under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands
to the improvements of living and working conditions not exceeding seven hectares.
in sugar mills or plantations, without any part of such The petitioners in this consolidated petition are rice
money being channeled directly to private persons, and sugar landowners. All of which are agricultural
constitutes expenditure of tax money for private lands.
purposes.
ISSUE: WON the aforementioned legal measures are
constitutional - YES
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V
SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM RATIO:
There are traditional distinctions between the police
FACTS:
power and the power of eminent domain that
This case (land for the landless) is a consolidation
logically preclude the application of both powers at
of several cases because they involve common legal
the same time on the same subject. Recent trends,
questions, including serious challenges to the
however, would indicate not a polarization but a
constitutionality of specific laws.
mingling of the police power and the power of
o 1 a petition alleging the constitutionality of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an
PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.
implement of the former like the power of taxation.
Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5
o To the extent that the measures under
hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. The
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
tenants were declared as full owners by EO
landowners, there is an exercise of the police
228 and as qualified farmers under PD 27.
power for the regulation of private property in
The petitioners now contend that President
accordance with the Constitution. But where,
Aquino usurped the legislatures power.
to carry out such regulation, it becomes
o 2 a petition by landowners and sugar
necessary to deprive such owners of whatever
planters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental
lands they may own in excess of the maximum
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229.
area allowed, there is definitely a taking under
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 105
the power of eminent domain for which A statute may be sustained under the
payment of just compensation is imperative. police power only if there is concurrence
The taking contemplated is not a mere of the lawful subject and the method.
limitation of the use of the land. What is The subject and purpose of the Agrarian
required is the surrender of the title to and the Reform Law is valid, however what is to
physical possession of the said excess and all be determined is the method employed
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor to achieve it.
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the
power of eminent domain. ORTIGAS & CO. V COURT OF APPEALS
o The promulgation of PD 27 by President
FACTS:
Marcos was a valid exercise of police power
and eminent domain. Petitioner Ortigas & Co. sold to a parcel of land in
o The power of President Aquino to promulgate Greenhills Subdivision IV to Emilia Hermoso.
Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was Conditions for the sale include restrictions on the use
authorized under Sec. 6 of the Transitory of the land for the construction of residential housing
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore only and the non-erection of signs and billboards for
it is a valid exercise of Police Power and advertisement purposes. Such conditions were
Eminent Domain. annotated on the back of the title of the property.
o RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of Respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the lot from
the regulation under CARP becomes Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty and
necessary to deprive owners of whatever constructed a single story commercial building for
lands they may own in excess of the Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales company.
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a Petitioner filed a complaint against Hermoso,
taking under the power of eminent domain for seeking the demolition of the commercial structure.
which payment of just compensation is The complaint was later amended to include a prayer
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is and impleaded Ismael G. Mathay III and J.P.
required is the surrender of the title and the Hermoso Realty, the latter having 10% interest in the
physical possession of said excess and all lot.
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor The trial court issued the writ of preliminary
of the farmer. injunction, but the appellate court reversed the
decision upon Mathays special civil action for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 106
leads to the conclusion that they gained early access the learned professions requiring scientific or
to the test questions. technical knowledge may be required to take an
A statistical analysis concluded that there must be examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their
some unusual reason creating the clustering of chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the
"strong enough to eliminate the normal variations public from the potentially deadly effects of
that one should expect from the examinees [of incompetence and ignorance among those who
Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort, energy, would practice medicine.
etc." To be granted the privilege to practice medicine,
The respondents filed a special civil action for the applicant must show that he possesses all the
mandamus to compel the petitioners to proceed with qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
their oath taking ceremony. The RTC decided in their Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully
favor and the CA affirmed this decision. complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority.
ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus may lie - NO Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as
RATIO: being less than satisfactory, then the privilege will
The function of mandamus is not to establish a not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable
right but to enforce one that has been established from a matter of right, which may be demanded if
by law. There must be a well-defined, clear and denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the
certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
established rule that a license to practice satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the
medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without
government. thwarting the legislative will.
The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional
right of every citizen to select a profession or
course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and CHAVEZ V ROMULO
equitable admission and academic requirements. FACTS:
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a
Charter, their exercise may be so regulated speech before the members of the PNP stressing the
pursuant to the police power of the State to need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the
order, safety, and general welfare of the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the
people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 109
issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms Outside of order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of
Residence (PTCFOR). crimes, the President deemed it best to impose a
Acting on President Arroyos directive, respondent nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating
Ebdane issued the Guidelines in the Implementation factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is
of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of the interest of the public in general.
Residence The assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner possession of firearms. What they proscribe is
to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the merely the carrying of firearms outside of
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) residence. However, those who wish to carry their
to reconsider the implementation of the assailed firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for
Guidelines. However, his request was a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable
denied. Thus, he filed the present petition regulation. If the carrying of firearms is regulated,
impleading the public respondents. necessarily, crime incidents will be
curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt for
ISSUE: WON the issuance of the assailed guidelines is their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their
a valid exercise of police power YES homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it would
RATIO: be difficult for criminals to roam around with their
Even if petitioners PTCFOR constitutes a property guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for the
right protected by the Constitution, the same cannot PNP to apprehend them.
be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond
the reach of the States police power. All property in
the state is held subject to its general regulations, SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLDMINING
necessary to the common good and general welfare. CORPORATION V BALITE PORTAL MINING
The test for determining the validity of a measure is: FACTS:
o The interests of the public generally, as Marcopper Mining Corporation was granted
distinguished from those of a particular class, Exploration Permit No. 133 over 4,491 hectares of
require the exercise of the police power; and land, which included the Diwalwal area.
o The means employed are reasonably
Thereafter, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
necessary for the accomplishment of the
7076, or the People's Small-Scale Mining Act which
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
established a Small-Scale Mining Program to be
individuals.
implemented by the DENR Secretary and created
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board (PMRB)
basis for its issuance was the need for peace and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 110
under the DENR Secretary's direct supervision and the unwarranted condition that certain studies
control. be conducted before mining and environmental laws
A petition for the cancellation of EP No. 133 and the are enforced by the DENR.
admission of a Mineral Production Sharing
Arrangement (MPSA) proposal over Diwalwal was ISSUE: WON MO 97-03 impairs the petitioners rights
filed with the DENR Regional Executive Director, under EP 133 NO
docketed as RED Mines Case.
While the RED Mines case was pending, Marcopper RATIO:
assigned its EP No. 133 to petitioner Southeast The challenged MO 97-03 did not conclusively adopt
Mindanao Gold Mining Corporation, which in turn direct state utilization as a policy in resolving the
applied for an integrated MPSA over the land Diwalwal dispute. The terms of the memorandum
covered by the permit. clearly indicate that what was directed thereunder
The Mines and Geosciences Bureau accepted and was merely a study of this option and nothing
registered the integrated MPSA application of else. Consequently, the petition was premature. The
petitioner and thereafter, several cases were filed. said memorandum order did not impose any
Republic Act No. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act, obligation on the claimants or fix any legal relation
was enacted. Pursuant to this statute, the cases whatsoever between and among the parties to the
were referred to a Regional Panel of Arbitrators dispute.
tasked to resolve disputes involving conflicting With respect to the alleged vested rights claimed by
mining rights. The panel subsequently took petitioner, it is well to note that the same is invariably
cognizance of the RED Mines case, which was based on EP No. 133, whose validity is still being
consolidated with the cases. disputed in the Consolidated Mines cases. Until a
The DENR Secretary issued Memorandum Order positive pronouncement is made in the Consolidated
No. 97-03 which Mines cases, EP No. 133 cannot be deemed as a
provided that the DENR shall study thoroughly and e source of any conclusive rights that can be impaired
xhaustively the option of direct state utilization of the by the issuance of MO 97-03.
mineral resources in the Diwalwal Gold-Rush Area. Under no circumstances may petitioners rights
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari, under EP No. 133 be regarded as total and
prohibition and mandamus praying for absolute. EP No. 133 merely evidences a privilege
the nullification of MO 97-03 on the ground that the granted by the State, which may be amended,
"direct state utilization" espoused therein would modified or rescinded when the national interest so
effectively impair its vested rights under EP No. 133; requires. This is necessarily so since the
and that the memorandum order arbitrarily imposed exploration, development and utilization of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 111
countrys natural mineral resources are matters penalties on erring motorists. Therefore, MMDA has no
impressed with great public interest. Like timber authority to confiscate licenses.
permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the MMDA: 1. a license to operate a motor vehicle is
grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the neither a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege
purview of the non-impairment of contract and due subject to reasonable regulation under the police power
process clauses of the Constitution, since the State, in the interest of the public safety and welfare. 2.
under its all-encompassing police power, may alter, Revocation or suspension of this privilege does not
modify or amend the same, in accordance with the constitute a taking without due process as long as the
demands of the general welfare licensee is given the right to appeal the revocation. He
has 3 options: 1. Voluntaryily pay, file a protest with the
MMDA Adjudication Committee, 3. Request referral of
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT TVR to Public Prosecutor.
AUTHORITY, PETITIONER, VS. DANTE O. Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through
GARIN, RESPONDENT. its Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining
FACTS:
the procedures for the use of the Metropolitan Traffic
Atty. Dante Garins drivers license was confiscated
Ticket (MTT) scheme. Under the circular, erring
by the MMDA for illegal parking along Gandara St.. He
motorists are issued an MTT, which can be paid at any
was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR), requiring
Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may no longer
him to appear before the MMDA Traffic Operations
confiscate drivers' licenses as a matter of course in
Center for appropriate action within 48 hours.
cases of traffic violations
Garin claims: 1. In the absence of any IRR, Sec. 5(f)
of RA No. 7924 (MMDAs charter), which authorizes it to
confiscate and suspend or revoke driver's licenses in
HELD:
the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations, grants
1. A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that
the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring
the state may withhold in the exercise of its police
motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial
power.
determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby
a license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property
violating the due process clause of the Constitution; 2.
right, but a privilege granted by the state, which may be
the provision violates the constitutional prohibition
suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its
against undue delegation of legislative authority,
police power, in the interest of the public safety and
allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose
welfare, subject to the procedural due process
unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other
requirements
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 112
The power to license imports further power to or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other
withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise
with prescribed conditions. of police power.
Commonwealth v. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of
great speed and power. The use of them constitutes an 3. Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with
element of danger to persons and property upon the the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.
highwayse Legislature, in the exercise of the police Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 7924 enumerates the
power of the commonwealth, not only may, but must, "Functions and Powers of the Metro Manila
prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec.
operated on the highways. One of the primary 5(f) states that the petitioner shall "install and administer
purposes of a system of general regulation of the a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines
subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure and penalties for all kinds of violations of traffic rules
the competency of the operator of motor vehicles. and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in
nature, and confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
2. The MMDA is not vested with police power. licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and
regulations
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly
Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom
Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police legislative powers have been delegated (the City of
power, let alone legislative power, and that all its Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded
functions are administrative in nature. and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and suspend or
There is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that revoke drivers' licenses in the exercise of its mandate of
empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact transport and traffic management.
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. V. DSWD
nature . here is no grant of authority to enact
FACTS:
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare
R.A. No. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act) was
of the inhabitants of the metropolis.
signed into law in 2004. Under Section 4(a), senior
citizens are entitled to a grant of 20% discount from all
Insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is
establishments relative to the utilization of services in
understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 113
basis in the Constitution (Article XV, Section 4; Article CAMARINES NOTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
XIII, Section 11) (CANORECO); RUBEN, N. BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L.
To implement the above policy, the law grants a ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MERCELITO
twenty percent discount to senior citizens. As a form of B. ABAS; AND REYNALDO V.
reimbursement, the law provides that business ABUNDO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES,
establishments extending the twenty percent discount to IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; REX
senior citizens may claim the discount as a tax TANTIONGCO; HONESTO DE JESUS; ANDRES
deduction. IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; AND VICENTE
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power LUKBAN, RESPONDENTS.
which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
FACTS:
general welfare for its object. Police power as been
- CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized
described as the most essential, insistent and the least
under the provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
as the National Electrification Administration Decree.
public needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature
As of March 1995, its Officers (Pres treas) were
by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
Barrameda, Espiritu, Enero and Abas, respectively.
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
- In May 1995, CANONECO Directors Obias, Ochoa,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
Pascua and Ilan held a special meeting of the Board of
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be
Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the
for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of
meeting 5 showed that President Ruben Barrameda,
the subjects of the same.For this reason, when the
Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and Treasurer Marcelito
conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
Abas were absent despite the fact that he had called the
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas
because property rights, though sheltered by due
and Espiritu for the holding thereof, the three chose not
process, must yield to general welfare.
to appear.
Moreover, the right to property has a social
- In that meeting, those present declared all positions in
dimension. While Article XIII of the Constitution provides
the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold
the precept for the protection of property, various laws
elections, which resulted in the present directors being
and jurisprudence, particularly on agrarian reform and
elected as the new officers.
the regulation of contracts and public utilities,
- Barrameda, et al challenged the above resolutions and
continuously serve as a reminder that the right to
the election of officers by filing with the Cooperative
property can be relinquished upon the command of the
Development Authority (CDA) a Petition for Declaration
State for the promotion of public good
of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election of Officers.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 115
The CDA resolved the petition in favor of the petitioners to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board
and declared the election null and void. of directors of a private enterprise including electric
in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the cooperatives
CDA and with the active participation of some officials of
the National Electrification Administration (NEA), the ISSUE: May the Office of the President validly
group of Norberto Ochoa, et al forcibly took possession constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and
of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?
as officers .
Fortunately, pursuant to the writ of execution and HELD: petition is impressed with merit.
order to vacate issued by the CDA, the petitioners were Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to
able to reassume control of the CANORECO and to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and Section 17 of R.A.
perform their respective functions. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the
However, the President of the Philippines issued coverage of said laws. Under Article 34 of the Code, the
Memorandum Order No. 409 constituting an Ad Hoc general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive
Committee to temporarily take over and manage the power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint
affairs of CANORECO, to efficiently and effectively the members of the board of directors and to remove
address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte them for cause.
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from
not to prejudice and endanger the interest of the people the Board of Directors of CANORECO the power to
who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such
electricity The present Board may be called upon to power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit temporarily.
render advisory services. Nothing in law supported the take-over of the
Petitioners: 1.) There is no provision in the management of the affairs of CANORECO, and the
Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly, "suspension," if not "removal," of the Board of Directors
authorizing the President or his representatives to lake and the officers thereof.
over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. The Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative
exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of dispute. Article 121 of the Cooperative Code is explicit
the business or commerce and that the power to on how the dispute should be resolved: be settled
regulate does not include the power to take over, amicably in accordance with the conciliation or
control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. mediation mechanismsShould such a
2.) Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them from conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall
their positions as members of the Board of Directors of be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.
CANORECO. The President does not have the authority
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 116
Even granting for the sake of argument that the party interference in the management and operation of
aggrieved by a decision of the CDA could pursue an cooperatives.
administrative appeal to the Office of the President on
the theory that the CDA is an agency under its direct
supervision and control, still the Office of the President G.R. NO. 135962, MARCH 27, 2000
could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
party, supplant or overturn the decision of the CDA AUTHORITY V. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION,
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with INC.
validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409.
FACTS:
Police power is the power inherent in a government to
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA) association
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the
of homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision
order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of
in Makati City. BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune
society. 15 It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By
Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may
MMDA notified BAVA that pursuant to MMDAs
also be exercised by the President and administrative
mandate to rarionalize the use of Metro Manilas roads,
boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all
Neptune St. would be opened to vehicular traffic. Thus,
municipal levels, including the barangay. 16 Delegation
it requests BAVA to open the points of entry and exit on
of legislative powers to the President is permitted in
that street. It also informed BAVA that the perimeter wall
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the
separating Neptune and Kalayaan ave, a public road,
Constitution. 17 The pertinent laws on cooperatives,
would be demolished.
namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No.
BAVA instituted a case for injunction, asserting that
269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645 do not provide for
MMDA has no authority to order the opening of a private
the President or any other administrative body to take
road without a municipal ordinance.
over the internal management of a cooperative.
MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to
Furthermore, It violates the basic underlying principle
public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed
enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that
with police power in the delivery of basic services in
cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their
Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic
affairs shall be administered by persons elected or
management which involves the regulation of the use of
appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members.
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and
Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section
welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police
1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as
power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the
provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-
consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate
Appellate Court. There is no need for the City of Makati
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 117
to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation,
public. urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public
safety. The basic service of transport and traffic
HELD: management includes the following:
Police power is an inherent attribute of (b) Transport and traffic management which include the
sovereignty. police power is lodged primarily in the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of
National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize
group or body of individuals not possessing legislative the existing transport operations,infrastructure
power. The National Legislature, however, may requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion
delegate this power to the President and administrative of safe and convenient movement of persons and
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal goods; provision for the mass transport system and the
corporations or local government units. Once delegated, institution of a system to regulate road
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as users; administration and implementation of all traffic
are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and
Local government units exercise police power through traffic education programs, including the institution of a
their respective legislative bodies. single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila"
With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in The scope of the MMDA's function is limited to the
1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special delivery of the seven (7) basic services. Thee powers of
development and administrative region" and the the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
the region placed under "a development management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation
authority" referred to as the MMDA. of a system and administration. There is no syllable in
"Metro-wide services" are those "services which have R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police
metro-wide impact and transcend local political power, let alone legislative power.
boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it its functions are administrative in nature and
would not be viable for said services to be provided by these are actually summed up in the charter itself: The
the individual local government units comprising Metro MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide coordinative functions, and in the process
services and the scope of these services cover the exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the
following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila,
traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and without diminution of the autonomy of the local
management; (4) flood control and sewerage government units concerning purely local matters.
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 118
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the two Sangalang and Mandamus to enjoin the MMDA from implementing
cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both its wet flag scheme because:
involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal (1) has no legal basis because the MMDAs governing
council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it;
basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a
contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by summary punishment for jaywalking;
petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against
The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the (4) violates pedestrian rights as it exposes pedestrians
MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of to various potential hazards.
Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its Fernando: dismiss because of petitioners lack of
authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of standing to litigate and for violation of the doctrine of
roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, contendeds that the
movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against
and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the jaywalking.
scope of transport and traffic management. By no Francisco: the Court should take cognizance of the
stretch of the imagination, however, can this be case as it raises issues of paramount and
interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance- transcendental importance.
making power, much less police power. Secondly, the
MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. HELD: Case dismissed.
Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present 1. No standing
MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) no showing of direct injury; no showing of illegal
No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter expenditure of money; no showing of clear statutory or
possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on constitutional violation to merit transcendental
the present MMDA. importance
2. Violated doctrine of hierarchy of courts
petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
ERNESTO FRANCISCO V. BAYANI FERNANDO IN HIS when he filed this petition directly with us. This Courts
CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE MMDA jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while
FACTS:
concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (petitioner), as member of
of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, an
of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.
original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 119
FACTS: the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the
- Pursuant to MMDAs recommendation to decongest Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not
traffic by eliminating bus terminals along Metro Manilas between third persons.
thoroughfares, and providing instead ,ass transport
terminal facilities, President Arroyo issued E.O. 179, HELD: The MMDAs Motion for Reconsideration must
designating MMDA as the implementing Agency for the fail
project. 1. There is a justiciable controversy
- Viron Transportation Co. filed a petition for declaratory The E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDAs plan
relief, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals
Circular closing all bus terminals in Metro Manila. Viron now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares
asserts that theMMDAs authority to regulate traffic and providing more convenient access to the mass
does not include the power to direct provincial bus transport system to the commuting public through the
operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus provision of mass transport terminal facilities
deprive them of the use of their property. Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and
-Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), Management to allocate funds of not more than one
another provincial bus operator, asked the court to hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost
declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for of the construction of the north and south terminals. And
transgressing the possessory rights of owners and the E.O. was made effective immediately.
operators of public land transportation units over their a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal
respective terminals. Averring that MMDA Chairman had been drawn up, and construction of the terminal is
Fernando had begun to implement a plan to close and already in progress. The MMDA in fact affirmed that the
eliminate all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in government had begun to implement the Project.
the whole of the metropolis and to transfer their
operations to common bus terminals, Mencorp prayed 2. EO 179 involves 3rd persons
for the issuance of a TRO. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the
- MMDA asserts: there is no justiciable controversy in Project for which the concerned government agencies
the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of are directed to coordinate their activities and resources,
the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination the existing bus terminals owned, operated or leased by
of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro third persons like respondents would have to be
Manila. the E.O. is only an administrative directive to eliminated; and respondents would be forced to operate
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and from the common bus terminals. It cannot be gainsaid
to make available for use government property along that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on
EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 121
mean, among other things, the loss of income from the Even if it had police power, the test for valid police
operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. power is: (1) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
3. EO 179 is ultra vires. exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably
E.O. No. 125,which former President Aquino issued necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
in the exercise of legislative powers, mandated the not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, the means employed in this case (closing terminals),
programming, coordinating, implementing, regulating as ruled in Lucena v JAC Liner, constitutes undue
and administrative entity to promote, develop and taking of private property and creates monopolies. It
regulate networks of transportation and thus failed to go for the less intrusive means.
communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC
includes the power to
establish and administer comprehensive and TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC.,
integrated programs for transportation and FELICISIMO CABIGAO AND ACE TRANSPORTATION
communications. CORPORATION V. THE BOARD OF
it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is TRANSPORTATION AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE
authorized to establish and implement a project such as BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION
the one subject of the cases at bar.
FACTS:
By designating the MMDA as the implementing
- The Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which declares that no
the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering
car beyond six years shall be operated as a taxi. All
E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.
models older that 6 years are ordered withdrawn from
In another vein, the validity of the designation of
public service and thereafter may no longer be
MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of
registered and operated as taxis.
authority to it under R.A. No. 7924 (MMDAs charter),
- Pursuant to the Circular, the Director of the Bureau of
which merely grants MMDA with planning, monitoring,
Land Transportation issued an implementing Circular
coordinating functions for the delivery of metro-wide
stating: all taxi units with year models over six (6) years
services, including transportation and traffic
old are now banned from operating as public utilities in
management.
Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be
In the case of MMDA v. Bel-Air, it was ruled that the
considered as automatically dropped as public
MMDA has no legislative, police power. Hence, it has
utilities and, therefore, do not require any further
no authority to close terminals, and no authority to
dropping order from the BOT. taxi units within the
implement the project.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 122
National Capitol Region having year models over 6 P.D. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the
years old shall be refused registration. power to fix just and reasonable standards,
- Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), a classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and
who are grantees of CPC to operate taxicabs within followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles.
Manila, filed a Petition with the BOT seeking to nullify it provides procedural guidelines for said agency to
MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the follow in the exercise of its powers: that it may also can
registration and operation of earlier models which were conferences, require the submission of position papers
phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, or other documents, information, or data by operators or
they are roadworthy and fit for operation other persons that may be affected by the
- Petitioners claim: 1.) they were denied procedural due implementation of this Decree, or employ any other
process as they were not called upon to submit position suitable means of inquiry.
papers nor summoned to attend any conference as it is clear from the provision, however, that the
regards the issuance of the BOT Circular, 2.) fixing the leeway accorded the Board gives it a wide range of
ceiling at six (6) years is arbitrary and oppressive choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
because the roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not
their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are mandatory that it should first call a conference or
subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition require the submission of position papers or other
should be taken into consideration at the time of documents from operators or persons who may be
registration. Their right to substantive due process is affected, this being only one of the options open to the
thereby violated, 3.) their right to equal protection of the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority.
law is violated because the Circular is being enforced in Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of
Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi the Circulars is not violative of procedural due process.
industry. As regards substantive due process argument, it is
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and
ISSUES: recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can
1. W/N BOT violated petitioners right to Procedural open the door to the adoption of multiple standards,
and Substantive Due process. possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
2. W/N BOT violated petitioners right to equal reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an
protection of the law. vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span
of six years supplies that reasonable standard.
HELD:
1. No, it is not violated. 2. No, it is not violated.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 123
Corporation A Franchise To Operate a Jai Alai in that had earlier been granted to ADC. This was granted
Manila. This franchise was cancelled by Aquinos EO by Judge Reyes.
169.
ISSUES:
The case~ 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the
- In March-April 1974, Judge Pacquing of RTC Manila Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper
issued a series of orders ordering Mayor Alfredo Lim to 2. whether or not the Associated Development
issue a permit/license to Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to
Corporation (ADC), allowing it to operate the jai-alai, maintain and operate the jai-alai
pursuant to Manila Ordinance No. 7065. 3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
- Subsequently, Executive Secretary Guingona issued a committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the
directive to then chairman of the Games and temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of
Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. preliminary injunction) and the writ of
to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or to withdraw preliminary mandatory injunction
such grant of authority, to ADC to operate the jai-alai in
the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are HELD:
properly resolved: 1. Yes, it is proper
1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals allowed
franchisers issued by local governments is intervention even beyond the period prescribed in
unconstitutional. Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled
2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power to in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention
issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to
Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all
considering that the franchise has no duration, and purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open
appears to be granted in perpetuity. the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation,
3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a should intervenors' claim be proven to be true."
Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development the resulting injustice and injury in this case, should
Corporation in view of executive Order No. 392 which the national government's allegations be proven correct,
transferred from local governments to the Games and are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned
Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai. the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and
- ADC then filed a petition for prohibition, injunction, operate the jai-in favor of ADC. The national
mandamus against Guingona and Sumulong seeking to government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065
prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 125
jai-alai operations is void since Republic Act No. 954, No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by
approved very much earlier than said Ordinance No. Congress.
7065 requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila
franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board
Assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954
ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as
effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771 referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954
which expressly revoked all existing franchises and did not remove the power of the Municipal Board
permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to
(including the jai-alai) issued by local governments. support its alleged possession of a valid franchise,
On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance namely the Charter of the City of Manila and Manila
No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". It is
pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate
Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or
constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such
protection and non-impairment clauses power "to franchise".
it will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in
in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was
issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which
in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the therefore means that a license or permit issued by the
present controversy City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity,
on the question of whether or not the government such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not
is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the
be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its national government to so operate. Even this power to
officials or agents regulate was removed from local governments and
transferred to the GAB in 1951.
2. No, it does not. It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the
Petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 954 Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting
effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus
Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is generally prohibited by law, unless another law is
argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act enacted byCongress expressly exempting or excluding
certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 126
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros
gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. River.
Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It - The order was based on National Pollution Control
breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest Commission ("NPCC") and DENR reports which found
and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, that Solar textile was bleaching, rinsing and dyeing
a vice and a social ill which government must minimize textiles with wastewater being directly discharged
(if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic untreated into the sewer. Solars Wastewater Treatment
development. Plant was noted unoperational and the combined
There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal wastewater generated from its operation was about 30
protection clause since the decree gallons per minute and 80% of the wastewater was
revoked all franchises issued by local governments being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading
without qualification or exception. to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. Result of the analyses
of the sample taken showed that the wastewater is
3. yes, there was grave abuse of discretion. highly pollutive
Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for - Solar went to the RTC QC on petition for certiorari with
the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. preliminary injunction, asserting that its right to due
While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent process was violated. Under the Board's own rules and
judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the
No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life,
Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant
legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so life." The reprots made no finding of such a threat.
as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary - Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it
injunction. has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend
the operations of an establishment when there is prima
facie evidence that such establishment is discharging
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD V. COURT OF effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
APPEALS AND SOLAR TEXTILE FINISHING exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the
CORPORATION NPCC. the reports before it concerning the effluent
discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River
FACTS:
provided prima facie evidence
- Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order
- RTC dismissed the petition, saying that appeal and
directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from
not certiorari was the proper remedy, and that the
utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations
Board's subsequent Order allowing Solar to operate
which were discharging untreated wastewater directly
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 127
temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and seemed very casual about its continued discharge of
academic. CA reversed the RTC order. untreated, pollutive effluents into the Tullahan- Tinerejos
River, presumably loath to spend the money necessary
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in to put its Wastewater Treatment Plant ("WTP") in an
reversing the trial court on the ground that Solar had operating condition.
been denied due process by the Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by
law and regulations in situations like that here presented
HELD: The Board is sustained. precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and
Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders: (a) other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to
whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment wait until protracted litigation
pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or The relevant pollution control statute and
welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such implementing regulations were enacted and
discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
set by the [NPCC]." power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare
it is not essential that the Board prove that an and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of
"immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, plant and animal life, commonly designated as the
or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like
"the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." those here involved, through the exercise of police
Inspections reports show that there was at power.
least prima facie evidence before the Board that the Where the establishment affected by an ex
effluents emanating from Solar's plant exceeded the parte cease and desist order contests the correctness of
maximum allowable levels of physical and chemical the prima facie findings of the Board, the Board must
substances set by the NPCC and that accordingly there hold a public hearing where such establishment would
was adequate basis supporting the ex parte cease and have an opportunity to controvert the basis of suchex
desist order issued by the Board. parte order. That such an opportunity is subsequently
Also, previous owner of the plant facility Fine Touch available is really all that is required by the due process
Finishing Corporation had been issued a Notice of clause of the Constitution in situations like that we have
Violation directing it to cease and refrain from carrying here. The Board's decision rendered after the public
out dyeing operations until the water treatment plant hearing may then be tested judicially by an appeal to
was completed and operational. Solar, the new owner, the Court of Appeal
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 128
owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was
not seen fit to assert and protect his rights. Executive
Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional,
and the supersedeas bond is cancelled.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 130
JMM PROMOTION V. COURT OF APPEALS was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare
of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3.
FACTS:
Short of a total and absolute ban against the
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory
deployment of performing artists to high risk
banned the deployment of performing artists to Japan
destinations, a measure which would only drive
and other destinations. This was relaxed however with
recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the
the introduction of the Entertainment Industry Advisory
very least rationalizes the method of screening
Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen
performing artists by requiring
and train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In
reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and
pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary of
limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment
included an Artists Record Book which a performing
as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme
artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The
at least lessens the room for exploitation by
Federation of Talent Managers of the Philippines
unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated
the right to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights
and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V. COMELEC (1995)
court ruled in favor of EIAC.
FACTS:
ISSUE: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772
Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of
not less than one-half page for the common use of
HELD: political parties and candidates. The Comelec space
The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge,
is a valid exercise of police power. Police power among all candidates to enable them to make known
concerns government enactments which precisely their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also
promote the general welfare or the common good. As be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital
the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed election information.
validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners
to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-
requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or profit organization of newspaper and magazine
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 131
with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of to provide for the health and safety, , and for the
the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience
same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City
Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Council may prescribe under the provisions of
Administrative Code. subsection (jj) of this section.
permitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-
43 in the case of stalledvehicles obstructing the public enforcement authorities in Metropolitan Manila from
streets. Even the confiscation of drivers licenses for removing the license plates of motor vehicles (except
traffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed when authorized under LOI43) and confiscating drivers
by the decree. After no motion for reconsideration of licenses for traffic violations within the said area.
the decision was filed the judgment became final and
executory. Nothwithstanding the Gonong decision, still For a municipal ordinance to be valid the following
violations of the said decision transpired, wherein there requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene
were several persons who sent complaint letters to the the
Court regarding the confiscation of drivers licenses Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or
and removal of license plate numbers. oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not
On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, be unreasonable; and 6) must be general
Series of 1991, authorizing itself to detach license and consistent with public policy.
plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned
motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures
traffic in Metro Manila.On July 2, 1991, the Court under consideration did not pass the first criterion
issued a resolution regarding the matter which stated because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605
that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in does not allow either the removal of license plates or
conflict with the decision of the Court, and that the Court the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations
has received several complaints against the committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
enforcement of such ordinance. the decree authorizing the MMA to impose such
sanctions. Thus local political subdivisions are able
ISSUE: to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of
W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance legislative power from the national legislature (except
No. 7, Series of 1998 are valid exercise of delegated only that the power to create their owns ources of
power to local government acting as agents of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the
the national legislature? Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with
what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As
HELD: delegates of the Congress, the local government unit
No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of
Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and the principal. In the case at bar the enactments in
Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 136
against the decree, which has the force and effect of a ISSUE:
statute. Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No.
3375-93 are valid
considered valid: June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower
o Must not contravene the constitution court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it included
o Must not be unfair or oppressive motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments,
o Must not be partial or discriminatory be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several
o Must not prohibit but it may regulate reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of
o Must be general and consistent with public policy police power and it constitutes a denial of equal
o Must not be unreasonable protection under the law.
Therefore, the petition is DENIED and the challenged d
ecision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court.
building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that 1964- Lakeview Development Corp. bought a parcel
matter will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply of land in Carmona, Cavite. LDC was succeeded by
because there are no "pure" places where there are Credito Asiatico Inc. LDC/CAI undertook to develop
impure men. the property into a residential and industrial estate
thus it applied with the Municipal Council of Carmona
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to for an ordinance approving the zoning and
address the core issues of morality. Try as the subdivision of the property,
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster 1976- Kapasiyahang Bilang 30 was approved
the illusion that it can make a moral man out of it granting the application and affirming the project. A
because immorality is not a thing, a building or consolidated survey was approved by the Bureau of
establishment; it is in the hearts of men. Lands. The housing project was registered with the
National Housing Authority and was granted a
The Ordinance violates equal protection clause and is locational clearance from the Human Settlements
repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local Regulatory Commission and the Ministry of Local
Government Code merely empowers local government Government and Community Development subject to
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments certain conditions.
enumerated in Section 1 thereof. 1980- the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cavite
declared certain areas including the subject land as
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental industrial areas.
personal and property rights adn impairs personal 1987- while developing a phase of the property, a
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance complaint for damages with TRO and PI were filed
contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and against CAI in the RTC of Cavite. The plaintiffs
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently therein alleged that they were the actual tillers of the
detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the land. The defendant had surreptitiously applied for
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the conversion of the 35.8-hectare portion of the
the City Council unde the Code had no power to enact aforesaid property from agricultural to residential and
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void. the same was granted by the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform but that the parties had earlier agreed that
PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS ASSOCIATION, INC. V CA the plaintiffs would remain in the peaceful
DARAB V CA possession of their farmholdings. Notwithstanding
such agreement, CAI ordered the bulldozing of the
FACTS: property, by reason of which the plaintiffs suffered
actual damages. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 139
that the bulldozing was done without any permit from Peaceful Possession and Cultivation with Damages
the concerned public authorities. with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and PI before
CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a the DAR Adjudication Board Reg. IV against CAI et
compromise agreement whereby CAI donated al.
parcels of land in consideration of the execution of DARAB granted the TRO.
deeds of quitclaims and waivers. CAI admitted that the CAI was the registered owner
Despite the civil case, CAI went on with its project. of the property, but specifically denied that the
Meantime, the remaining plaintiffs entered into a plaintiffs were recognized by the CAI as tenants-
compromise agreement with CAI in which the latter occupants of the aforesaid property since
would execute Deeds of Donation in exchange for 1961. They asserted that the CAI did not consent to
their quitclaim. Thereafter, the plaintiffs and the CAI the cultivation of the property nor to the erection of
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. the plaintiffs houses. They further averred that the
1991- TC granted the motion and dismissed the CAI had entered into a compromise agreement with
complaint. the occupants of the property. They also alleged that
However, the project was again opposed by another they secured a permit from the Municipal Planning
group of farmers claiming that since 1961, they had and Development Offices before bulldozing activities
been occupying a parcel of public agricultural on the property were ordered.
land. They tilled the said agricultural lands and The defendants raised the following as their special
planted it with rice, corn, vegetables, root crops, fruit and affirmative defenses among others: (a) the
trees and raised small livestock for daily survival. plaintiffs action is barred by the dismissal of their
The petitioners requested that the DAR order an complaint; (b) the plaintiffs had waived their rights
official survey of the aforesaid agricultural and interests over the property when they executed
lands. Pending resolution of their petition, the deeds of waiver and quitclaim in favor of CAI; (c)
petitioners and twenty (20) others banded together then Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella had issued an
and formed a group called Pasong Bayabas Farmers Order dated July 3, 1979, converting the property
Association, Inc. (PBFAI) affiliated with Kalipunan ng into a residential area and withdrawing the property
Samahan ng Mamamayan, Inc. (KASAMA). from the coverage of the CARL. Finally, the
1994- Domingo Banaag, in his capacity as President defendants contended that the property had an 18%
of PBFAI, filed a petition for compulsory coverage of slope and was undeveloped; as such, it was exempt
a portion of the CAI property under Rep. Act No. from the coverage of the CARL, under Section 10 of
6657. Rep. Act No. 6657.
The PBFAI-KASAMA, representing the farmers- 1996- PARAD dismissed the complaint and found
tenants, filed a complaint for Maintenance of that the plaintiffs abandoned and renounced their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 140
tenancy rights over the land in question and barred undeveloped; hence, it falls within the exemption.
from instituting the instant complaint on the ground And that as early as 1976, the land was already
of Res Judicata; that the remaining 29 other plaintiffs classified by the Municipality of Carmona as
were not bonafide tenants but mere interlopers on residential.
the land in question and consequently not entitled to Petitioners: the property subject of the suit is
security of tenure. It declined to resolve the issue agricultural land; hence, covered by the CARL. They
whether or not the property was covered by RA 6657 assert that the reclassification of the property made
and on whether the conversion of the property to by the Municipal Council of Carmona was subject to
non-agricultural was legal and efficacious. the approval of the HSRC, now the HLURB, as
Petitioners appealed. The appealed was transmitted provided for by EO648, sec. 5 but since there was no
to the DARAB. Meantime some of them executed such approval, the said resolution was ineffective.
quitclaims waiving their rights from the property in They argue that RA6657 sec. 65, the DAR is vested
the suit. Thus CAI filed a Motion to with exclusive authority to reclassify a landholding
Lift Status Quo Order and Motion to Dismiss alleging from agricultural to residential. The petitioners submit
that the status quo order illegally extended the that the exclusive authority of the DAR is not
restraining order issued on September 13, 1996. It negated by RA7160, sec.60 (LGC). They also insist
was also alleged that the complainants-appellants that the conversion of the property under
were not qualified beneficiaries of the CARL. The Kapasiyahang Blg30, was subject to the approval of
CAI asserted that the re-classification of the land use the DAR, conformably to DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series
was valid and legal, and concluded that since the of 1990. Moreover, the development of the property
property was not agricultural, it was not covered by had not yet been completed even after RA6657 took
the CARL and, thus, beyond the jurisdiction of the effect. Hence, it was incumbent upon the respondent
DARAB. to secure an exemption thereto, after complying with
1997- DARAB reversed PARAD decision. MR DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1994.
denied. CAI: the property was validly reclassified by the
CA- reversed DARAB and reinstated the PARAB Municipal Council of Carmona pursuant to its
decision. The CA ruled that under RA6657, sec. 10, authority under RA2264 or Local Autonomy Act of
all lands with 18% slope and over, except those 1959. Until revoked, the reclassification made by the
already developed, shall be exempt from the council remained valid. Per DOJ Opinion No. 40,
coverage of the said Act. The CA noted that the Series of 1990, the private respondent was not
exception speaks of 18% in slope and undeveloped required to secure clearance or approval from the
land. Per report of the PARAD, the property subject DAR since the reclassification took place on June
of the suit has an 18% slope and was still 15, 1988, when RA6657 took effect. The respondent
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 141
asserts that it had complied with all the requirements the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the
under PD 957, as amended. Morevore, other areas in question continued to be developed as a low-
agencies had already previously found the property cost housing subdivision, albeit at a snails pace. This
unsuitable for agricultural purposes. The respondent can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA
asserts that the petitioners-individuals are mere members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners
squatters and not tenants on the property of the from continuing with such development. The enormity of
private respondent. Hence, the PARAD had no the resources needed for developing a subdivision may
jurisdiction over the petition of the PBFAI, as well as have delayed its completion but this does not detract
the individual petitioners. Consequently, the DARAB from the fact that these lands are still residential lands
had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeals from and outside the ambit of the CARL.
the decision of the PARAD. Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity
are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands
ISSUE (with regard to eminent domain): previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
W/N the subject property is covered by RA 6657 or effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than
the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). respondent DAR.
RA2264, sec. 3 amending the Local Government
HELD/RATIO: Code, specifically empowers municipal and/or city
NO. RA6657 provides that the CARL shall cover, councils to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity regulations in consultation with the National Planning
produced, all public and private agricultural lands. As Commission. A zoning ordinance prescribes, defines,
to what constitutes agricultural land it is referred to as and apportions a given political subdivision into specific
land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this land uses as present and future projection of
Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, needs. The power of the local government to convert or
commercial or industrial land. The deliberations of the reclassify lands to residential lands to non-agricultural
Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. lands reclassified is not subject to the approval of DAR.
Agricultural lands are only those lands which are RA6657, sec. 65 relied upon by the petitioner applies
arable and suitable agricultural lands and do not only to applications by the landlord or the beneficiary for
include commercial, industrial and residential lands. the conversion of lands previously placed under the
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the agrarian reform law after the lapse of five years from its
undeveloped portions of the property cannot in any award. It does not apply to agricultural lands already
language be considered as agricultural lands. These converted as residential lands prior to the passage of
lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to RA6657.
be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 142
Petitioners: They assert that public respondent compensation. On the other hand, police power is the
DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing power of the state to promote public welfare by
Rules and Regulations, cannot, on its own, permit restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
entry into a private property and allow taking of land property. Although both police power and the power of
without payment of just compensation. eminent domain have the general welfare for their
Public respondents: Sec. 76 is not a taking provision object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two
but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue with the latter being used as an implement of the
of which, the state may prescribe regulations to former, there are still traditional distinctions between the
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good two.
order, safety and general welfare of the people. This A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence
government regulation involves the adjustment of leads to a cogent deduction that where a property
rights for the public good and that this adjustment interest is merely restricted because the continued use
curtails some potential for the use or economic thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or where
exploitation of private property. Public respondents property is destroyed because its continued existence
concluded that "to require compensation in all such would be injurious to public interest, there is no
circumstances would compel the government to compensable taking. However, when a property interest
regulate by purchase." is appropriated and applied to some public purpose,
there is compensable taking.
ISSUE: Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
CAMC FTAA are void because they allow the unjust possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent
and unlawful taking of property without payment of reason appears why said power may not be availed of
just compensation, in violation of Section 9, Article to impose only a burden upon the owner of the
III of the Constitution. condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may,
HELD/RATIO: through expropriation, be subjected to an easement
NO. The Mining Act was held to be valid. Sec. 76 of right of way.
the Mining Act as well as the DENR IRR provided for The requisites of taking in eminent domain
just compensation. include (Castellvi v CA):
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right (1) the expropriator must enter a private
of the state (and of those entities to which the power property;
has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private (2) the entry must be for more than a
property to public use upon payment of just momentary period.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 144
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are
of legal authority; accorded to them where they may build warehouses,
(4) the property must be devoted to public port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other
use or otherwise informally appropriated or infrastructures necessary for mining operations. All
injuriously affected; these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the
(5) the utilization of the property for public affected areas the beneficial ownership of their lands.
use must be in such a way as to oust the owner Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the commence.
property. While the Court declared that Sec. 75 is a taking
As shown by jurisprudence, a regulation which provision, this does not mean that it is unconstitutional
substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights on the ground that it allows taking of private property
and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public without the determination of public use and the payment
use amounts to compensable taking. In the case at bar, of just compensation. The taking to be valid must be for
the entry referred to in Sec. 76 and the easement rights public use. Public use as a requirement for the valid
under Sec. 75 of RA 7942 as well as the various rights exercise of the power of eminent domain is now
to CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public
deprivation of proprietary rights. The CAMC FTAA welfare and public convenience. It includes the broader
grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Public use
Exploration Contract Area, the full right of ingress and as traditionally understood as "actual use by the public"
egress and the right to occupy the same. It also has already been abandoned. Mining industry plays a
bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry pivotal role in the economic development of the country
into private lands by surface owners or occupants and is a vital tool in the governments thrust of
thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting accelerated recovery. Irrefragably, mining is an industry
minerals therein. which is of public benefit.
The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a
simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining
rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting
Panganiban, J.
mining activities such as exploration, extraction and
2 December 1998
processing of minerals. Mining right holders build mine
infrastructure, dig mine shafts and connecting tunnels,
FACTS:
prepare tailing ponds, storage areas and vehicle depots,
install their machinery, equipment and sewer systems. Private respondent Helena Benitez is the registered
owner of 2 parcels of land in Cavite.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 145
1982- Philippine Human Resources Development W/N the respondent judge may quash a writ of
Center and the Japanese International Cooperation possession on the ground that the expropriating
Agency entered into an agreement which involved government agency is already occupying the property
the establishment of a Construction Manpower sought to be expropriated.
Development Center.
1983- MOA between Benitez and PHRDC by which HELD/RATIO:
she would lease and/or sell for a period of 20 years NO. Sec. 7 of EO1035 (providing for the
the subject property in favor of PHRDC. It was procedures and guidelines for the expeditious
granted permit by Benitez and the Philippine acquisition by the government of private real
Womens University to undertake land development, properties or rights thereon for infrastructure and
electrical and road network installations and other other government development projects) provides
related works necessary to attain its that when the government or its authorized agent
objectives.... Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took makes the required deposit, the trial court has a
possession of the property and erected buildings and ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. There
other related facilities necessary for its operations. being a deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine
After the lease contract expired, negotiations began National Bank (PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00
on the purchase of the property on a plain offer from which is equivalent to the assessed value of the
Benitez to sell the same. It was agreed that the property subject matter hereof based on defendants
purchase price would be at P70 per sqm. In view of 1990 tax declaration, coupled with the fact that notice to
this agreement, PHRDC prepared a Deed of defendant as landowner has been effected, the Motion
Absolute Sale. for Issuance of Writ of Possession should be granted.
However, for reasons known only to her, Benitez did The expropriation of real property does not include
not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging on mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although
her commitment to sell the lot in question. eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there
1995- She and PWU demanded payment of rentals may also be compensable taking of only some, not all,
and to vacate the premises. It later filed an unlawful of the property interests in the bundle of rights that
detainer suit against petitioner. constitute ownership. In this case, it is manifest that the
For failure to acquire the property, CMDF instituted a petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public
complaint for eminent domain under EO1035. A writ interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of
of possession was issued by the Court but later eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner
quashed. intended to acquire not only physical possession but
also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own
ISSUE: the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 146
and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of 20 November 2000
title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised Pardo, J.
by an owner over the subject property. Its actual
occupation, which renders academic the need for it to FACTS:
enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of Conrado Leviste filed with the RTC of Daet, CN a
all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not complaint for collection of a sum of money and
attend its initial physical possession of the property foreclosure of mortgage against Philippine Smelter
because the lease, which had authorized said Corp (PSC). PSC was declared in default and the
possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not RTC found in favor of Leviste.
merely possession de facto but possession de jure as A writ of execution was issued. Two parcels of land
well. in the name of PSC were sold at a public auction in
What will happen if the required writ of possession favor of Vines Realty Corp. A writ of possession was
is not issued? It would be absurd to require petitioner to issued in favor of VRC. The writ included the power
first vacate the property in view of the adverse judgment lines of CANORECO standing on certain portions of
in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards, the subject property.
order the trial court to issue in petitioners favor a writ of Later, VRC moved for the removal and demolition of
possession pursuant to the expropriation improvements on the land, including the electric
proceedings. Such a scenario is a bureaucratic waste posts. CANORECO opposed on the ground, among
of precious time and resources. This precisely is the other reasons, that petitioner was not a party to the
sort of pernicious and unreasonable delay of case and therefore not bound by the judgment of the
government infrastructure or development projects, trial court and that it had subsisting right-of-way
which EO 1035 intended to address by requiring the agreements over said property.
immediate issuance of a writ of possession. Ineludibly, RTC issued writ of demolition.
said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere CANORECO filed with CA a petition for prohibition
physical possession that is gained by entering the with restraining order and preliminary injunction
property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim which was eventually denied. Meantime, the sheriff
of acquiring ownership over, or even the right to went through with the demolition.
possess, the expropriated property. Clearly, an
ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the ISSUE:
States power of eminent domain. W/N petitioner is entitled to retain possession of the
power lines located in the land sold at public
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. CA auction as a result of extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 147
expropriated property, the RTC approved -- the value and the use of the affected property; as
Chairperson Minda B. Teoxons recommended well as endanger lives and limbs because of the
amount of P550 per square meter as just high-tension current conveyed through the lines.
compensation for the property. The trial court Respondent was therefore deemed entitled to a
opined that the installation thereon of the 350 KV just compensation, which should be neither more
Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
would impose a limitation on the use of the land for property taken. Accordingly, the appellate found
an indefinite period of time, thereby justifying the the award of P550 per square meter to be proper
payment of the full value of the property. and reasonable.
Further, the RTC held that it was not bound by the
provision cited by petitioner -- Section 3-A of ISSUE:
RA6395 (revising the Charter of the Napocor), as W/N the assessed compensation was just.
amended by Presidential Decree 938. This law
prescribes as just compensation for the acquired HELD/RATIO:
easement of a right of way over an expropriated YES. An easement of a right of way transmits no
property an easement fee in an amount not rights except the easement itself, and respondent
exceeding 10 percent of the market value of such retains full ownership of the property. The acquisition of
property. The trial court relied on the earlier such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
pronouncements of this Court that the observed by the CA, considering the nature and the
determination of just compensation in eminent effect of the installation power lines, the limitations on
domain cases is a judicial function. Thus, the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive
valuations made by the executive branch or the respondent of normal use of the property. For this
legislature are at best initial or preliminary only. reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just
CA: affirmed the RTC holding that RA 6395, as compensation, which must be neither more nor less
amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude than the monetary equivalent of the land.
expropriation. Section 3-A thereof allowed the Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
power company to acquire not just an easement of equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
a right of way, but even the land itself. Such expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but
easement was deemed by the appellate court to be the owners loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the
a "taking" under the power of eminent domain. The meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey
CA observed that, given their nature, high-powered thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for
electric lines traversing respondents property the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
would necessarily diminish -- if not damage entirely and ample.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 149
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the evidence submitted to them; neither did they
the just compensation to which the owner of a misappreciate the clear preponderance of evidence.
condemned property is entitled is generally the market The amount fixed and agreed to by the trial court and
value. Market value is "that sum of money which a respondent appellate court has not been grossly
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner exorbitant or otherwise unjustified.
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
price to be given and received therefor." Such amount is
not limited to the assessed value of the property or to REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V PLDT
the schedule of market values determined by the
provincial or city appraisal committee. However, these
En Banc
values may serve as factors to be considered in the
27 January 1969
judicial valuation of the property.
The nature and character of the land at the time of
FACTS:
its taking is the principal criterion for determining how
much just compensation should be given to the
landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the
property and its surroundings, as well as its RCA Communications, Inc., entered into an
improvements and capabilities, should be considered. In agreement whereby telephone messages, coming
fixing the valuation at P550 per square meter, the trial from the United States and received by RCAs
court had considered the Report of the commissioners domestic station, could automatically be transferred
and the proofs submitted by the parties. The price to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
of P550 per square meter appears to be the closest collected by the PLDT for transmission from the
approximation of the market value of the lots in the Philippines to the United States.
adjoining, fully developed San Francisco Village Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Subdivision. Considering that the parcels of land in Telecommunications set up its own Government
question are still undeveloped raw land, it appears to Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation
the Court that the just compensation of P550 per square and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the
meter is justified. Both the Report of Commissioner PLDT to enable government offices to call private
Bulao and the commissioners majority Report were parties. Its application for the use of these trunk lines
based on uncontroverted facts supported by was in the usual form of applications for telephone
documentary evidence and confirmed by their ocular service, containing a statement, above the signature
inspection of the property. As can be gleaned from the of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules
records, they did not abuse their authority in evaluating and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with
the Public Service Commission. One of the many
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 150
rules prohibits the public use of the service furnished Telephone Company, in CFI of Manila praying in its
the telephone subscriber for his private use. The complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT to
Bureau has extended its services to the general execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau,
public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned for the use of the facilities of defendants telephone
by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its system throughout the Philippines under such terms
(the Bureaus) own schedule of rates. Through these and conditions as the court might consider
trunk lines, a Government Telephone System (GTS) reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction
subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in against the defendant company to restrain the
the same way that the latter could make a call to the severance of the existing telephone connections
former. and/or restore those severed.
1958- DoT entered into an agreement with RCA CFI rendered judgment that it could not compel the
Communications, Inc. for a joint overseas telephone PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
service whereby the Bureau would convey radio- because the parties were not in agreement; that
telephone overseas calls received by RCAs station under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of
to and from local residents. But PLDT complained to Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to
the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau servicing government offices alone, nor was there
was violating the conditions under which their Private any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since
Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time
PLDTs facilities, referring to the rented trunk lines, that their use by the Bureau was to be public
for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was
the use of government offices but even to serve neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles
private persons or the general public, in competition of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice
with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that that would result from the disconnection of the trunk
if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent,
April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone although it dismissed both the complaint and the
connections. When the PLDT received no reply, it counterclaims.
disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the
Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The result was ISSUE:
the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone May the PLDT be compelled to enter into an
services, from the rest of the world, except the interconnection contract with the petitioner?
United States.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit HELD/RATIO:
against the defendant, Philippine Long Distance
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 151
YES. Generally, parties cannot be coerced to enter into compensation is paid therefor. Ultimately, the
a contract where no agreement is had between them as beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the
to the principal terms and conditions of the contract. users of both telephone systems, so that the
Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the condemnation would be for public use.
essence of our contractual system, and by express
provision of the statute, a contract may be annulled if BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU V HEIRS OF
tainted by violence, intimidation, or undue influence. But PASTOR
while the Republic may not compel the PLDT to
celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
Panganiban
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
20 June 2000
require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone
FACTS:
system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the Petitioner filed before the MTC a Complaint to
payment of just compensation to be determined by expropriate property of the respondents.
the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent In an Order the MTC dismissed the Complaint on
domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that
and possession of, the expropriated property; but no "eminent domain is an exercise of the power
cogent reason appears why the said power may not be to take private property for public use after payment
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of of just compensation.
condemned property, without loss of title and The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, before it, holding that an action for eminent domain
through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of affected title to real property; hence, the value of
right of way. The use of the PLDTs lines and services the property to be expropriated, Concluding that
to allow inter-service connection between both the action should have been filed before the MTC
telephone systems is not much different. In either case since the value of the subject property was less
private property is subjected to a burden for public use than P20, 000.
and benefit. If, under section 6, Article XIII, of the Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to the SC,
Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national raising a pure question of law.
welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon
payment of just compensation, there is no reason why ISSUE:
the State may not require a public utility to render
services in the general interest, provided just
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 152
Who has jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna filed 2 complaints
or expropriation where the assessed value of the for expropriation against Bardillon for the purpose of
subject property is P20,000? erecting a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of
its constituents. The 1st complaint was filed before the
HELD/RATIO: MTC following the failure of the parties to reach an
RTC. An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary agreement on the purchase offer but the complaint was
estimation. An expropriation suit does not involve the dismissed for lack of interest for failure of the barangay
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the to appear at the pre-trial. The 2nd complaint was filed
exercise by the government of its authority and right to before the RTC but Bardillon filed an MTD on the
take private property for public use. True, the value of ground of res judicata. The RTC judge denied the MTD
the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary holding that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just proceeding so res judicata does not apply. The CA also
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental dismissed the petition on the same ground and ignored
to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is the RTCs writ of possession despite the pending MR of
determined only after the court is satisfied with the the ruling dismissing the complaint.
propriety of the expropriation. In addition, The
government does not dispute respondents' title to or ISSUE:
possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question Who had jurisdiction?
of who has a better title or right, for the government
does not even claim that it has a title to the property. It HELD/RATIO:
merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to RTC.An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction
"appropriate and control individual property for the of the RTC regardless of the value of the land because
public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or the subject of the action is the governments exercise of
welfare may demand." Remanded to RTC. eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction, res judicata
DEVORAH BARDILLON V BARANGAY MASILI does not apply even if the order of dismissal may have
been an adjudication on the merits.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of
Panganiban, J.
possession in an expropriation case are found in
30 April 2003
Section 2, Rule 67. For LGUs, expropriation is also
governed by Sec. 19 of the LGC. In expropriation
FACTS:
proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 153
entry are: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation 1979- NPC filed its second expropriation case
sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of against Pobre for additional land are to be used for
the amount equivalent to 15% of the FMV of the its well site. It deposited 10% of the total market
property to be expropriated based on its current tax value of the lots covered by the second
declaration. In this case, the issuance of the Writ of expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered
Possession in favor the city after it filed the complaint the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial courts
and deposited the amount required was proper because issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
it had complied with the foregoing requisites. The issue 1984- Pobre filed MTD second complaint for
of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly expropriation claiming that NPC damaged his
addressed to the RTC in the course of the expropriation property. He prayed for just compensation of all the
proceedings. lots affected by NPCs actions and for the payment
of damages.
NAPOCOR V CA, POBRE 1985- NPC filed MTD of the second expropriation
case on the ground that it had found an alternative
Carpio, J. site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981
12 August 2004 the project within the Property due to Pobres
opposition.
FACTS: CFI-granted NPCs MTC but allowed Pobre to
Pobre was the owner of a parcel of land which he adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The
developed into a resort-subdivision which he trial court admitted Pobres exhibits on the
named the Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision. damages because NPC failed to object. It denied
1972- Pobre leased lots in the subdivision to NPC NPCs motion to reconsider the submission of the
case for decision. It eventually found in favor of
1977- NPC filed its expropriation case against
Pobre and ordered NPC to compensate him. CA
Pobre to acquire a portion of his property. CFI
affirmed.
ordered the expropriation upon payment of P25 per
sqm. While this first expropriation case was
ISSUE:
pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the
W/N NPC must pay just compensation for the entire
site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The
property.
dumping of waste materials altered the topography
of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act
HELD/RATIO:
on Pobres complaints and NPC continued with its
YES. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case
dumping.
restores possession of the expropriated land to the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 154
landowner. However, when possession of the land Pobres entire 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC did
cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal
neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the expropriation of the Property. Even as the second
only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well
demand payment of just compensation. In this case, it is aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire
no longer possible and practical to restore possession Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to
of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer Pobres repeated demands for NPC to abate the
habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC
worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second
Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had expropriation on the ground that it had found an
physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter alternative site and there was stiff opposition from
Property. The Court has ruled that if the government Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case
takes property without expropriation and devotes the five years after it had already deprived the Property
property to public use, after many years the property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter
owner may demand payment of just compensation. This disregard for Pobres property rights. Thus the SC
principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate computed the compensation for the entire property
that private property shall not be taken for public use based on the valuation of the commissioners at 6%pa
without just compensation. interest plus temperate and exemplary damages.
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation
when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation.
Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG
recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of
FACTS:
Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before
parcel of land, which the City of Pasig sought to
commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.
expropriate a portion thereof for the sports
It has been held that the usual procedure in the
development and recreational activities of the residents
determination of just compensation is waived when the
of Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994.
government itself initially violates procedural
Masikip refused.
requirements. NPCs taking of Pobres property without
filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to
paying him just compensation is a transgression of
expropriate said portion of land for the alleged purpose
procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC
that it was in line with the program of the Municipal
should have initiated expropriation proceedings for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 155
ocular inspection was conducted during the trial. If, at construction of such steel mill was considered a priority
all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the and major industrial project of the government. Pursuant
subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not to the expansion program of the NSC, Proclamation No.
notified thereof. The petitioner was, therefore, deprived 2239 was issued by the President of the Philippines on
of its right to due process. It bears stressing that an November 16, 1982 withdrawing from sale or settlement
ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is a large tract of public land located in Iligan City, and
thereby received and the parties are entitled to be reserving that land for the use and immediate
present at any stage of the trial. Consequently, where, occupancy of NSC.
as in this case, the petitioner was not notified of any
ocular inspection of the property, any factual finding of Since certain portions of the aforesaid public land were
the court based on the said inspection has no probative occupied by a non-operational chemical fertilizer plant
weight. The findings of the trial court based on the and related facilities owned by Maria Cristina Fertilizer
conduct of the ocular inspection must, therefore, be Corporation (MCFC), LOI No. 1277, also dated
rejected. November 16, 1982, was issued directing the NSC to
negotiate with the owners of MCFC, for and on behalf
of the Government, for the compensation of MCFCs
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) V. CA present occupancy rights on the subject land.
FACTS:
Negotiations between NSC and MCFC failed.
ISA was created by PD No. 272 in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry.
ISSUE: W/N the Government is entitled to be
substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISAs
PD No. 272 initially created ISA for a term of 5 years
term.
counting from August 9, 1973. When ISAs original term
expired on October 10, 1978, its term was extended for
HELD:
another 10 years by EO No. 555 dated August 31,
Yes. Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers
1979.
or attributed normally associated with juridical
personality. There is, however, no provision in PD No.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or
owned subsidiary of the National Development
comprehensive juridical personality separate and
Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the
distinct from that of the government. The ISA in fact
National Government, embarked on an expansion
appears to the Court to be a non-incorporated agency
program embracing, among other things, the
or instrumentality of the RP, or more precisely of the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. The
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 158
Government of the Philippines. It is common knowledge Republic, no special statutory provision having been
that other agencies or instrumentalities of the shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
Government of the Republic are cast in corporate form, other entity or agency of the Republic.
that is to say, are incorporated agencies or In the instant case, ISA substituted the expropriation
instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a representative of the Republic of the Philippines
juridical personality distinct from the personality of the pursuant to its authority under PD 272.
Republic. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the
Republic of the Philippines and not the NSC, even
We consider that the ISA is properly regarded as an though the latter may be an ultimate user of the
agent or delegate of the RP. The Republic itself is a properties involved.
body corporate and juridical person vested with the full
panoply of powers and attributes which are From the foregoing premises, it follows that the
compendiously described as legal personality. Republic is entitled to be substituted in the expropriation
proceedings in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA
When the statutory term of non-incorporated agency having expired. Put a little differently, the expiration of
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the ISAs statutory term did not by itself require or justify the
assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.
are reassumed by the RP, in the absence of special
provisions of law specifying some other disposition
thereof, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. V. CA
duties and functions, etc. to some other identified
FACTS:
successor agency or instrumentality of the RP.
Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of land
situated in Tondo Manila.
When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
Filstream filed an ejectment suit before MTC Manila
consequence of such expiry must be looked for, in the
against the occupants of the said property on the
first instance, in the charters and, by way of
ground of termination of the lease contract and non-
supplementation, the provisions of the Corporation
payment of rentals.
Code. Since in the instant case, ISA is a non-
Judgment was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993
incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic,
ordering private respondents to vacate the premises
its powers, duties and functions, assets and liabilities
and pay back rentals to petitioner.
are properly regarded as folded back into the
Government and hence assumed once again by the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 159
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1993, while the case is still for public use without just compensation (Art. 3, Section
pending before the MTC, the private respondents filed a 9, 1987 Constitution)".
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against
Filstream before RTC Manila. Subsequently on The governing law that deals with the subject of
November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved expropriation for purposes of urban land reform and
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development
initiate the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation, and Housing Act of 1992) and Sections 9 of which
purchase, or other legal means the properties of specifically provide the order of lands to be acquired for
Filstream, among others. The said properties were to be socialized housing which shows that private property is
sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area the last one that should be expropriated. Moreover,
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the Section 10 the same law provides for the modes of
City of Manila. acquisition an states that the modes include "community
mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
City of Manila filed a complaint for eminent domain to consolidation, land banking, donation to the
expropriate the aforecited parcels of land owned by Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated
petitioner Filstream before RTC Manila. Pursuant to purchase, and expropriation. Provided, however, That
this, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession which expropriation shall be resorted to only when other
ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed modes of acquisition have been exhausted."
premises to the City of Manila.
Upon examination of the records, the court found that
ISSUE: W/N the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis the City of Manila has not complied with Sections 9 and
whether or not the expropriation is valid. 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's properties were
expropriated and ordered condemned in favor of the
HELD: City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the
No. The City of Manila has the power of eminent acquisition of other lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279
domain as expressly granted by the Local Government have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of
Code and the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. petitioner Filstream's right to due process which must
However, this power is not unlimited. The basic rules accordingly be rectified.
still have to be followed, which are as follows: "no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a
without due process of law, nor shall any person be paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent
denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, domain for the general good considering that the right of
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be taken the State to expropriate private property as long as it is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 160
for public use always takes precedence over the interest legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation
of private property owners. However we must not lose was never consummated because the government did
sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the not actually enter the land nor were the owners paid any
exercise of such right are also entitled to protection, compensation.
bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right
cannot override the guarantee of due process extended HELD:
by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed
In this regard, vigilance over compliance with the due against the expropriator. The payment of just
process requirements is in order. compensation for private property taken for public use is
an indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's
sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe
SAN ROQUE REALTY V. REPUBLIC this requirement renders the taking ineffectual,
notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
FACTS:
disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental
Certain parcels of land were the subject of an
power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over private
expropriation proceeding initiated by the then
rights.
Commonwealth of the Philippines. Judge Felix Martinez
ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00 as pre-condition
Republic manifestly failed to present clear and
for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. A
convincing evidence of full payment of just
Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land.
compensation and receipt thereof by the property
However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not
owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually
transferred to the government.
made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary
course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of
Eventually, the land was subdivided and new titles were
title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the
issued by the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels
government on the certificate of title.
were acquired by San Roque, which begun construction
of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the
Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's power
Republic filed the present case alleging that it is the
or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land
owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue of the
Registration Act. There is no showing that the Republic
1938 Decision in the expropriation case.
complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.
San Roque claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It
also claimed that there was no valid expropriation
because it was initiated by the executive branch without
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 161
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent road and vacant lot offered for sale situated similarly as
upon the Republic to cause the registration of the the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to
subject properties in its name or record the decree of be expropriated which was found by the Committee to
expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the Republic be badly needed by the company as a site for its heavy
fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining
to do so for 56 years. vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does
not appear to be very imperative and necessary and
would only cause unjustified damage to the firm. The
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN V. IAC desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a
public road to decongest the volume of traffic can be
FACTS:
fully and better attained by acquiring the other available
Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed
roads in the vicinity maybe at lesser costs without
with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan,
causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate
Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of
business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to
land to enable the storage of the respondent's heavy
expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity
equipment.
offered for sale for a wider public road to attain
In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan,
decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the
passed Resolution to expropriate same land. It hereafter
Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken
filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil
will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and
action for expropriation.
therefore, will not suffice to improve and decongest the
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the
flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area. ...
market value of the land, with the Philippine National
Bank, the trial court issued a writ of possession in favor
Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle,
of the petitioner.
adjacent and on the western side of the strip of land,
RTC issued an order declaring the taking of the property
and extending also from Malhacan Road to Bulac Road
as lawful. IAC affirmed.
and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much
wider than the lot sought to be expropriated, it seems
HELD:
that it is more just, fair, and reasonable if this lot is the
From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this
one to be expropriated.
Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity
for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to expropriate the
aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and
Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road. BARDILLON V. BRGY MASILI
Considering that in the vicinity there are other available
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 162
FACTS:
2 Complaints for eminent domain were filed by the Brgy
Masili for the purpose of expropriating a (144) square
meter-parcel of land owned by Bardillon. Bardillon
acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation
the said lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Bardillon argues that the CA erred when it ignored the
RTCs Writ of Possession over her property, issued
despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the
ruling dismissing the Complaint.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 163
Held: FACTS:
SC not persuaded. Barangay Masili filed two complaints to expropriate a
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of 144 sqm parcel of land owned by Bardillon for a multi-
possession in an expropriation case are expressly and purpose hall; their first offer was 200,000. The case was
specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the dismissed for the failure of reopndent and counsel to
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On the part of local appear at pre-trial (MTC). The second complaint was
government units, expropriation is also governed by approved (RTC). The Court of Appeals affirmed the
Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, ruling that the MTC had no jurisdiction and the RTC
in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for validly ruled.
authorizing immediate entry are as follows:
(1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in ISSUE:
form and substance; and 1. Could the MTC have jurisdiction over the case?
(2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of No, An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the
the fair market value of the property to be expropriated RTC regardless of the value of the land because the
based on its current tax declaration. subject of the action is the governments exercise of
eminent domain a matter incapable of pecuniary
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of estimation.
Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed the 2. Did the CA err when it ignored the issue of entry
Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount upon the premises?
required was proper, because it had complied with the No. The Writ of Possession was valid. The requirements
foregoing requisites. for the issuance of a writ of possession in an
expropriation case are governed by Rule 67, Section 2
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and Section 19 of the
matter properly addressed to the RTC in the course of Local Government Code.
the expropriation proceedings. If petitioner objects to
the necessity of the takeover of her property, she should The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are 1) the
say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC has filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form
the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of and substance 2) the deposit of the amount equivalent
the right of eminent domain and to determine whether to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be
there is a genuine necessity for it. expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
Held: Petition denied. The expropriation is valid.
Petitioners filed an action for nullity of Ordinance 1843 FACTS: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for
for being unconstitutional. the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the
ISSUE: Is Cebu City ordinance no. 1843 violative of conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff
substantive due process claims that it is necessary that such public improvement
Yes. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and
domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be that the said lands are within their jurisdiction.
of public character. Government may not capriciously or
arbitrarily choose which private property should be Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation
expropriated. In this case, there was no showing at all was not necessary because other routes were available.
why petitioners property was singled out for They further claimed that the expropriation of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 165
cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to All private property may be expropriated, except money
them and to all those persons owing and interested in and choses in action. Even services may be subject to
the graves and monuments that would have to be eminent domain.
destroyed.
FACTS: The Bureau of Telecommuncations set up a
The lower court ruled that the said public improvement Government Telephone System using its equipment but
was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government
question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the offices to call private parties. PLDT complained that the
right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that bureau was violating the conditions of the
the courts have no right to inquire and determine the interconnection referring to the rented trunk lines,
necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an because the government used the liens not only for
appeal. government offices but even to serve private persons or
the general public, in competition with the business of
ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and PLDT. They gave notice and disconnected the trunk
hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. lines being rented by the Bureau.
HELD: The courts have the power of restricting Petitioner commenced a suit against PLDT praying for
the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable the right of the Bureau of Telecommunications to
necessities of the case and for the purposes designated demand interconnection between the Government
by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or Telephone System and that of PLDT so that the
entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it Government Telephone System could make use of the
must comply with the conditions accompanying the lines and facilities. PLDT compels it cannot be
authority. The necessity for conferring the authority compelled to enter into this contract without any prior
upon a municipal corporation toexercise the right agreement.
of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the ISSUE:
municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a Can an interconnection between PLDT and the GTS be
particular case under the conditionsimposed by the a valid object for expropriation?
general authority, is a question that the courts have the
right to inquire to. HELD: Yes, in an exercise of eminent domain, the
Republic may require the telephone company to permit
interconnection as the needs of the government service
REPUBLIC V PLDT may require, subject to payment of just compensation.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 166
The use of lines and services to allow inter-service The City of Manila and City Engineer must issue a
connection between the telephone systems is similar to license allowing her to construct her terrace.
an easement of right of way.
PEOPLE V FAJARDO
Municipal oridnance prohibiting a building that would
AYALA DE ROXAS V CITY MANILA impair the view of the plaza from the highway was
Imposing an easement is considered taking. taking.
No the property was deemed taken only when the used a portion of said lot, with an area of 6,167
expropriation proceedings commenced. square meters, for the construction of the Mango
The elements of taking are: Requisites for valid taking: and Gorordo Avenues.
expropriator must enter a private property, entry must It appears that said avenues were already
be for more than a momentary period, entry must be existing in 1921 although they were in bad
under warrant or color of authority, property must be condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and
devoted to public use or otherwise informally beautiful avenues that they are now and that the
appropriated, and utilization of the property must be in tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and the
such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of formal construction in
beneficial enjoyment of the property. 1925.
1958, Amigable's counsel wrote the President for
In the case at bar, these elements were not persent payment of the portion of her lot which had been
when the government entered and occupied the appropriated by the government. The claim was
property under a contract of lease. indorsed to the Auditor General, who disallowed
it.
2. What is just compensation? 1959, Amigable filed against the Republic of the
It is to be deermined as of the date of filing the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity
complaint. In the instant case, the taking must be as Commissioner of Public Highways for the
reckoned when the complaint for eminent domain was recovery of ownership, possession of the 6,167
filed. square meters of land traversed by the Mango
A price of P5/sqm is fair. and Gorordo Avenues and for compensatory
damages in the sum of P50,000.00.
AMIGABLE V CUENCA Defendants filed a joint answer 1) that the action
was premature, the claim not having been filed
Keywords: Power of eminent domain; taking in the first with the Office of the Auditor General; 2) that
constitutional sense the right of action for the recovery of any amount
which might be due the plaintiff, if any, had
FACTS: already prescribed; 3) that the action being a suit
Victoria Amigable owner of Lot in Banilad Estate, against the Government, the claim for moral
Cebu City reflected no annotation in favor of the damages, attorney's fees and costs had no valid
government of any right or interest in the property basis since Government had not given its consent
appears at the back of the TCT. Without prior to be sued; and 4) that it was the province of
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government Cebu that appropriated and used the area hence
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 169
Amigable has no cause of action against the annotation in favor of the government appears at
defendants. the back of her certificate of title and that she has
CFI ruled that it doesnt have jurisdiction as the not executed any deed of conveyance of any
government cant be sued without its consent; portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
Amigable appealed. remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered
owner, she could bring an action to recover
Issue/Held/Ratio: possession of the portion of land in question at
anytime because possession is one of the
1. w/n Amigable may properly sue the government? attributes of ownership.
YES However, since restoration of possession of said
Where the government takes away property from portion by the government is neither convenient
a private landowner for public use without going nor feasible at this time because it is now and has
through the legal process of expropriation or been used for road purposes, the only relief
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly available is for the government to make due
maintain a suit against the government without compensation which it could and should have
thereby violating the doctrine of governmental done years ago. To determine the due
immunity from suit without its consent. The compensation for the land, the basis should be
doctrine of governmental immunity from suit the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an For damages, Amigable is entitled of legal
injustice on a citizen. Had the government interest on the price of the land from the time it
followed the procedure indicated by the governing was taken up to the time that payment is made by
law at the time, a complaint would have been filed the government.
by it, and only upon payment of the compensation VELARMA V CA
fixed by the judgment, or after tender to the party
Keywords:
entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may
Facts:
it have the right to enter in and upon the land so
This case arose from an ejectment suit filed by
condemned, to appropriate the same to the public
Pansacola against Velarma before RTC which alleged:
use defined in the judgment. It is not too much to
(1) that sometime in May 1981, Velarma surreptitiously
say that when the government takes any property
built his dwelling on a portion of her land at Barangay
for public use, which is conditioned upon the
Lual, Quezon (2) that the matter was reported to the
payment of just compensation, to be judicially
Barangay Captain who conducted several conferences
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
but Velarma still refused to vacate (3) that Panascola
the jurisdiction of a court. Considering that no
filed Criminal Case against Velarma in 1986 for violation
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 170
of P.D. No. 772 (the Anti-Squatting Law); (4) that the Although Publio Pansacola signified before the
trial court convicted petitioner of the offense and Sangguniang Bayan of Mauban his agreement to the
imposed a fine of P 1,500.00 on him; (5) that, despite transfer of that portion of his land traversed by the new
such judgment and repeated demands to vacate, provincial highway and its shoulder in exchange for a
Velarma continued occupying the property, compelling corresponding portion of the old abandoned provincial
her to bring the suit. road, there was no execution of any deed to perfect the
RTC: Ordered Velarma to vacate the property. Trial agreement. An engineer was appointed to survey the
court found that Panascola had satisfactorily old abandoned road, but this act does not in any
established her ownership over the parcel of land in manner convey title over the abandoned road to the
question and that Velarma occupied Panascolas land Pansacola spouses nor extinguish their ownership over
without authority of law and against the will of the owner the land. No evidence was introduced by Velarma to
through strategy and stealth. The argument of Velarma show that the survey was actually undertaken and a
that Panascola has no cause of action against him since specific portion of the abandoned road partitioned and
it was already the municipality that owns the lot by virtue conveyed to the Pansacolas. It must be stressed that
of an agreement between the former owner Publio the agreement to transfer the property was made in
(husband of Pansacola) to exchange the subject lot 1974. More than twenty years later, no actual transfer
with an abandoned road and bridge of the Municipality had yet been made. Unless and until the transfer is
consummated, or expropriation proceedings instituted
REYES V CA by the government, Panascola continues to retain
of Mauban (recorded in the minutes of a meeting of ownership of the land.
Sangguniang Bayan), failed. But trial court held that
Velarmas claim was unwarranted as there was no deed Keywords: Public benefit is now synonymous with
had ever been executed to perfect the deal between the public welfare or public benefit; Relocation site for
municipality and Publio therefore Panascola remained informal settlers was converted into a low-cost housing
the owner of the property. CA affirmed. project.
Facts:
Issue/Held/Ratio:
1. w/n Velarmas agreement to sell the property to 1977, NHA filed separate complaints for the
the government as evidenced by the minutes of a expropriation of sugarcane lands in Dasmarias,
meeting of the Sangguniang Bayan, absent a Cavite belonging to the petitioners. The stated
formal deed, constitute a sufficient ground to public purpose of the expropriation was the
defeat a forcible entry suit? NO expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement
Project to accommodate the squatters who were
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 171
relocated from Metro Manila. TC granted the actually pursued the public purpose of the
expropriation and the payment of just expropriation when it entered into a contract with
compensation. Arceo C. Cruz involving the construction of low
For the alleged failure of respondent NHA to cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
comply with the said order, petitioners filed a qualified low income beneficiaries; (2) there is no
complaint for forfeiture of rights before RTC and condition imposed in the expropriation judgment
alleged that NHA had not relocated squatters that the subject properties shall revert back to its
from the Metro Manila on the expropriated lands original owners in case the purpose of
in violation of the stated public purpose for expropriation is terminated or abandoned; (3) the
expropriation and had not paid the just payment of just compensation is independent of
compensation fixed by the court. the obligation of herein petitioners to pay capital
NHA averred that it had already paid a substantial gains tax; and (4) in the payment of just
amount to herein petitioners and that the compensation, the basis should be the value at
expropriation judgment could not be executed in the time the property was taken. CA affirmed.
view of several issues: 1) concerning capital
gains tax; 2) registration fees and other expenses Issue/Held/Ratio:
for the transfer of title to respondent NHA and for
attorney's fees of Atty. Joaquin Yuseco, Jr., 1. w/n NHA failed to comply with the conditions and
collaborating counsel for petitioners. in effect forfeited its right to expropriate? NO
Ocular inspections showed that: 1) only one of 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the
the lots is already occupied by relocatees whose exercise of the power of eminent domain over
houses are made of light materials with very few private properties upon payment of just
houses partly made of hollow blocks. The compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article
relocatees were relocated only in 1994; 2)most of III states that private property shall not be taken
the area is almost occupied by houses and for public use without just compensation. The
structures, most of which are made of concrete constitutional restraints are public use and just
materials are not being occupied by squatters compensation. Petitioners cannot insist on a
TC dismissed the complaint filed and held that: restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of
(1) respondent NHA is not deemed to have the Constitution by contending that the contract
abandoned the public purpose for which the for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated
subject properties were expropriated because the public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
relocation of squatters involves a long and concept of public use is no longer limited to
tedious process. It ruled that respondent NHA traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 172
that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of of eminent domain or by purchase, the former
"use by the public" has been abandoned. The owner retains no rights in the land, and the public
term "public use" has now been held to be use may be abandoned, or the land may be
synonymous with "public interest," "public devoted to a different use, without any impairment
benefit," "public welfare," and "public of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to
the former owner."
ESTATE OF JIMINEZ V PEZA
convenience." Keywords: Public use
The act of NHA in entering into a contract with a Facts:
real estate developer for the construction of low Issue/Held/Ratio:
cost housing on the expropriated lots to be sold to
qualified low income beneficiaries cannot be 1981, PEZA filed an expropriation proceedings on
taken to mean as a deviation from the stated 3 parcels of riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of
public purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco
it that the expropriation of private land for slum de Malabon Estate, is registered in the name of
clearance and urban development is for a public Salud Jimenez. Jimenez contended that said lot
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to would only be transferred to a private corporation,
private homeowners, commercials firms, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
entertainment and service companies, and other utilized for a public purpose. RTC then released
private concerns. Lot 1406-A from expropriation while the
Moreover, the Constitution itself under Section 1, expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained.
Article XIII of the Constitution which provides that: PEZA then appealed to CA.
"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest Jimenez offered a compromise with PEZA
priority to the enactment of measures that protect namely: 1) Withdrawal of PEZAs appeal with
and enhance the right of all the people to human respect to Lot 1406-A in consideration of the
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political waiver of claim for damages; 2) swap of Lot 1406-
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for since PEZA has no money yet to pay for the lot.
the common good. To this end, the State shall The swap arrangement recognized the fact that
require the acquisition, ownership, use and the lot 1406-B is considered expropriated in favor
disposition of property and its increments." of the government based on Order of the
When land has been acquired for public use in Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However,
fee simple unconditionally, either by the exercise instead of being paid the just compensation for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 173
said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid ascertained by 3 commissioners. It ends with an order
with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. PEZA fixing the amount to be paid to the dependant.
approved the compromise agreement was signed In the case at bar, the first phase was concluded
by Jadiniano. already order of expropriation became final and the
However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot parties subsequently entered into a compromise
434 to Jimenez as PEZA was not the registered agreement regarding the mode of payment of just
owner of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but compensation. When respondent failed to abide by the
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on March terms of the compromise agreement trial court could
13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to only validly order the rescission of the compromise
Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993. agreement anent the payment of just compensation
TC annulled the said compromise agreement and inasmuch as that was the subject of the compromise.
directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A However, on August 4, 1991, the trial court gravely
to the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said order abused its discretion when it ordered the return of Lot
PEZA moved for its reconsideration but it was 1406-B. It, in effect, annulled the Order of Expropriation
denied. dated July 11, 1991 which was already final and
executory. The trial court gravely abused its discretion
Issue/Held/Ratio: by setting aside the order of expropriation which has
long become final and executory and by ordering the
1. Having upheld the rescission of the compromise return of Lot 1406-B to the petitioner. Its action was
agreement, what is then the status of the clearly beyond its jurisdiction for it cannot modify a final
expropriation proceedings? The situation of the and executory order. A final and executory order can
parties will revert back to status before the only be annulled by petition to annual the same on the
execution of the compromise agreement, that is, ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or a
the second stage of the expropriation petition for relief from a final order or judgment under
proceedings, which is the determination of the Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. However, no petition to
just compensation. that effect was filed.
Expropriation proceedings involve 2 phases. The first According to Jimenez, the appellate court erred in
phase ends either with an order of expropriation (when interpreting "original demand" as the fixing of just
the right of plaintiff to take the land and the public compensation. Jimenez claims that the original demand
purpose to which they are to be devoted are upheld) or is the return of Lot 1406-B as stated in petitioner's
an order of dismissal. Either order would be a final one motion to dismiss the complaint for expropriation
since if finally disposes of the case. The second phase inasmuch as the incorporation of the expropriation order
concerns the determination of just compensation to be in the compromise agreement subjected the said order
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 174
to rescission. Since the order of expropriation was what public use the expropriated property would be
rescinded, the authority of respondent to expropriate utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, respondent
and the purpose of expropriation have again become leased a portion of the lot to commercial banks while the
subject to dispute. Once the first order becomes final rest was made a transportation terminal. Said public
and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority to purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act No.
expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be 7916, a law amending respondent PEZA's original
questioned. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the charter.
incorporation of the expropriation order in the
compromise agreement did not subject said to FILSTREAM V CA
rescission but instead constituted an admission by Keywords:
Jimenez of Pezas authority to expropriate the subject Facts:
parcel of land and the public purpose for which it was Filstream is the registered owner of or parcels of
expropriated. It is crystal clear from the contents of the land situated in A. Rivera St. in Tondo Manila. In
agreement that the parties limited the compromise 1993, Filstream filed an ejectment suit before
agreement to matter of just compensation to petitioner. MTC Manila against the occupants of the said
Said expropriate order is not closely intertwined with the property on the ground of termination of the lease
issue of payment such that failure to pay by respondent contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment
will also nullify the right of respondent to expropriate. No was rendered for Filstream on Sept 14, 1993
statement to this effect was mentioned in the ordering private respondents to vacate the
agreement. The Order was mentioned in the agreement premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The
only to clarify what was subject to payment. respondents appealed before the RTC and then
CA, which both affirmed the MTC decision.
2. w/n PEZA expropriated for Public use? YES On May 25, 1993, while the case is still pending
Peza has the legal authority to expropriate the subject before the MTC, the private respondents filed a
Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a valid public complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange
purpose. The term "public use" has acquired a more against Filstream before RTC Manila. On
comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the November 5, 1993, the City of Manila approved
term signifying strict use or employment by the public Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S.
has been added the broader notion of indirect public Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,
benefit or advantage. PEZA expropriated the subject expropriation, purchase, or other legal means the
land for the construction of terminal facilities, structures properties of Filstream, among others. The said
and approaches thereto. The authority is broad enough properties were to be sold and distributed to
to give the respondent substantial leeway in deciding for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 175
qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land temporary restraining order and preliminary
Use Development Program of the City of Manila. injunction, which was granted. A Petition for
On May 23, 1994, respondent City of Manila filed Certiorari was subsequently filed by City of Manila
a complaint for eminent domain to expropriate of in another RTC branch to reverse the MTC
the subject land owned by petitioner Filstream decision denying the motion to quash the writ of
before RTC Manila. Pursuant to this, the trial execution. Thereafter, the cases filed by the
court issued a Writ of Possession which ordered respondent and the City of Manila were
the transfer of possession over the disputed consolidated and an injunction was issued
premises to the City of Manila. Filstream filed a against the writ of execution. These cases were
Motion to Dismiss the complaint for eminent however dismissed by RTC upon motion of
domain and a motion to Quash the Writ of Filstream for violation of the SC Circular against
Possession, which were denied by the RTC, forum shopping. Thereafter, Filstream filed an Ex-
along with the 2 MR's subsequently filed. parte Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA Demolition and Ejectment, which as granted.
which was denied for procedural flaws. As a consequence of the dismissal of the
The decision of the MTC on the ejectment case consolidated cases, private respondents filed a
became final and upon motion of Filstream, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer
MTC issued a Writ of Execution and Notice to for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
vacate the premises. Private respondents filed a and preliminary injunction before the Court of
Motion to Recall/Quash the Writ of Execution and Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the same
Notice to Vacate alleging the existence of a and directed the MTC of Manila to desist from
supervening event in that the properties subject of implementing the order of demolition dated
the dispute have already been ordered January 23, 1997, unless otherwise directed.
condemned in an expropriation proceeding in Thus, Filstream filed a Petition for Certiorari
favor of the City of Manila for the benefit of the before the Supreme COurt seeking to nullify the
qualified occupants thereof, thus execution shall Resolutions of the Court of Appeals which
be stayed. MTC denied the motion and upheld granted herein private respondents' prayer for a
the Writ and the Notice. On April 22, 1996, the TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the same
trial court issued an order commanding the being null and void for having been issued in
demolition of the structure erected on the grave abuse of discretion.
disputed premises, that prompted the private
respondents to file a Petition for Certiorari and Issue/Held/Ratio:
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 176
1. w/n the injunction issued is valid vis-a-vis w/n the Upon examination of the records, the court found
expropriation is valid? NO that the City of Manila has not complied with
Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. 7279. Filstream's
The City of Manila has the power of eminent properties were expropriated and ordered
domain as expressly granted by the Local condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans
Government Code and the Revised Charter of the any showing that resort to the acquisition of other
City of Manila. However, this power is not lands listed under Sec. 9 of RA 7279 have proved
unlimited. The basic rules still have to be futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner
followed, which are as follows: "no person shall Filstream's right to due process which must
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due accordingly be rectified.
process of law, nor shall any person be denied Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has
the equal protection of the laws (Art. 3, Sec. 1, a paramount interest in exercising its power of
1987 Constitution); private property shall not be eminent domain for the general good considering
taken for public use without just compensation that the right of the State to expropriate private
(Art. 3, Section 9, 1987 Constitution)". property as long as it is for public use always
The governing law that deals with the subject of takes precedence over the interest of private
expropriation for purposes of urban land reform property owners. However we must not lose sight
and housing is Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban of the fact that the individual rights affected by the
Development and Housing Act of 1992) and exercise of such right are also entitled to
Sections 9 of which specifically provide the order protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of
of lands to be acquired for socialized housing this superior right cannot override the guarantee
which shows that private property is the last one of due process extended by the law to owners of
that should be expropriated. Moreover, Section the property to be expropriated. In this regard,
10 the same law provides for the modes of vigilance over compliance with the due process
acquisition an states that the modes include requirements is in order.
"community mortgage, land swapping, land
assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation
to the Government, joint-venture agreement,
negotiated purchase, and expropriation. Provided,
however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
only when other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted."
MANOSCA V CA
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 177
1. w/n the municipality may expropriate private beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or
property by virtue of a municipal resolution which the Mayor to issue.
was disapproved by the Sangguniang The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
Panlalawigan? YES, municipality can expropriate. authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution No.
43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has
Eminent domain, the power which the the power to exercise the right of eminent domain
Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to
case, is a fundamental State power that is promulgate said resolution, pursuant to Section 9
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that
right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and
sale to the State, private property for public use or could be used as lawful authority to petition for
purpose. the condemnation of petitioners' property.
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise
the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is
expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, the local Government Code in force at the
time expropriation proceedings were initiated.
Section 9 of said law states: Sec. 9. Eminent
Domain. A local government unit may, through
its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain
and institute condemnation proceedings for public
use or purpose.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of
Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action
which does not render said resolution null and
MUN. OF PARANAQUE V V.M. REALTY CORP
void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of Keywords: Public use; lack of compliance in filing of
B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang expropriation
Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal Facts:
resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is Municipality of Paranaque issued SB Resolution for
complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corp over
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 180
two parcels of land for the purpose of alleviating the power to expropriate private property only when
living conditions of the underprivileged by providing authorized by Congress and subject to the latters
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing control and restraints, imposed through the law
project. It was stated purpose that petitioner declined conferring the power or in other legislations. In this
the offer of negotiated sale by the Municipality. RTC case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs
finding the complaint for expropriation sufficient in form the power of eminent domain thus, the following
and substance granted it. essential requisites must concur before an LGU can
In 1994, respondent argued that (a) the complaint failed exercise the power of eminent domain:
to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of
RA 7160 (the Local Government Code); and (b) the the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or
cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular
or res judicata. TC denied the petition and the MFR private property.
hence this appeal. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public
use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor
Issue/Held/Ratio: and the landless.
1. w/n resolution duly approved by the municipal 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required
council has the same force and effect of an under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other
ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation pertinent laws.
case of a valid cause of action? NO 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made
Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated,
municipal council for the purpose of initiating an but said offer was not accepted.
expropriation case substantially complies with the In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to
requirements of the law because the terms ordinance exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a
and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no
bestowing authority on the local government unit compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation authorized through an ordinance.
proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the
eminent domain. Implementing Rules, which requires only a resolution to
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is
legislative branch of government, which may delegate clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the
the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the seeks to implement it.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 181
More importantly, DAR asserts that NLRC has 13. But, in this case, the Department of Agriculture
disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
the State. from its being a governmental entity when it entered
12. On the other hand, the respondents, argue that into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
DAR has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by fact, performed any act proprietary in character
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security 14. The claims of private respondents arising from
Agency. the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, gives the consent of the State
ISSUE: W/N DAR can be sued and be held liable to be "sued upon any moneyed claim involving
HELD: YES liability arising from contract, express or implied but
9. Generally, the State cant be sued without its the money claim first be brought to the Commission
consent. The States consent may be given on Audit. The Labor code, in relation to Act No.
expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be 3083, provides the legal basis for the State liability
made through general or special law. but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction
10. The general law waiving the immunity of the state thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the
from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
Philippine government "consents and submits to be amended by P.D. 1445.
sued upon any money claims involving liability 15. When the State waives its immunity, all it does, in
arising from contract, express or implied, which could effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
serve as a basis of civil action between private prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
parties." 16. The universal rule that where the State gives its
11. Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded consent to be sued by private parties either by
when the State itself commences litigation, thus general or special law, it may limit the claimant's
opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into action "only up to the completion of proceedings
a contract. anterior to the stage of execution" and that the power
12. Here, the government is deemed to have of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
descended to the level of the other contracting party since government funds and properties may not be
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
However, not all contracts entered into by the satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
distinction must still be made between one which is public funds must be covered by the correspondent
executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and appropriation as required by law.
another which is done in its proprietary capacity
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 183
NATIONAL AIRPORTS CORPORATION VS.JOSE including all appropriations or the unreleased and
TEODORO unexpended balances thereof, shall likewise be
transferred to the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
6. On November 10, 1950, EO 365 abolished the Sec 3 likewise empowers CAA to execute contracts
National Airports Corporation and replaced it with the of any kind and to grant concession rights.
Civil Aeronautics Administration. Before the abolition,
PAL paid to the NAC, P65, 245 as fees for landing ISSUE: W/N NAC/CAA may be sued
and parking on Bacolod Airport No. 2 for the period HELD/RATIO: Yes. CAA should have been made the
up to and including July 31, 1948. defendant.
7. These fees are said to have been due and payable 1. The above provisions confer upon the CAA the
to the Capitol Subdivision Inc which owned the land power to sue and be sued. The power to sue and be
used by the NAC as airport, and thus the owner sued is implied from the power to transact private
commenced an action against PAL in 1951 to business. And if it has the power to sue and be sued
recover the amount. on its behalf, the CAA should have the power to
8. PAL countered with a third party complaint against prosecute and defend suits for and against the
the NAC, which at that time had been dissolved thus National Airports Corporation, having acquired all the
CAA was served with summons. The complaint properties, funds and choses in action and assumed
alleged that it had paid to the NAC the fees claimed all the liabilities of the latter. To deny the NACs
by Capitol Division. creditors access to the courts of justice against the
9. Sol Gen: filed a MTD on the ground that the court CAA is to say that the government could impair the
lacks jurisdiction to entertain the TPC because NAC obligation of its corporations by the simple expedient
has lots its juridical personality and because agency of converting them into unincorporated agencies.
of the Phils, unincorporated and not possessing 2. Not all government entities, whether corporate or
juridical personality under the law, is incapable of non corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suing and being sued. suits is determined by the character of the
10. E0 365, Sec 7: All records, properties, equipment, obligations for which the entity was organized
assets, rights, choses in action, obligations, liabilities 3. Suits against state agencies with relation to matters
and contracts of the National Airport Corporation in which they have assumed to act in private or
abolished under this Order, are hereby transferred nongovernment capacity, and various suits against
to, vested in, and assumed by, the Civil Aeronautics certain corporations created by the state for public
Administration. All works, construction, and purposes, but to engage in matters partaking more of
improvements made by the National Airports the nature of ordinary business rather than functions
Corporation or any agency of the National
Government in or upon government airfields,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 184
LARKINS V NLRC FEBRUARY 23, 1995 Forces stationed at Clark Air Base, let such
execution be made subject to existing international
5. Private respondents are employees of de Guzman
agreements diplomatic protocol
Custodial Services, which had a contract to maintain
the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
ISSUE: W/N jurisdiction was acquired over Larkins
Squadron at Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However,
Held: No
the contract for the maintenance and upkeep of the
8. The "Agreement Between the Republic of the
dormitories with the de Guzman Custodial Services
Philippines and the United States of America
was terminated. These employees were allowed to
Concerning Military Bases," otherwise known as the
continue working for 3 AGS but the new contractor,
R.P. U.S. Military Bases Agreement, governed the
JAC Maintenance Services chose to bring in his own
rights, duties, authority, and the exercise thereof by
workers.
Philippine and American nationals inside the U.S.
6. They filed a complaint with the NLRC against
military bases in the country.
Cunanan, owner of JAC Maintenance, Lt. Col
9. The Agreement mandates that summonses and
Frankhauser and Larkin (both members US Air
other processes issued by Philippine courts and
Force who were assigned to oversee the
administrative agencies for United States Armed
dormitories) for illegal dismissal and underpayment
Forces personnel within any U.S. base in the
of wages. Cunanan was dropped as defendant by
Philippines could be served therein only with the
LA. The Labor Arbiter granted all claims of the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds
employees and ordered reinstatement with full back
giving his permission, he should instead designate
pages or separation pay if reinstatement is not
another person to serve the process, and obtain the
possible.
server's affidavit for filing with the appropriate court.
7. Larkin appealed to the NLRC claiming that the Labor
The labor arbiter didnt follow the procedure and
Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over her person
instead addressed the summons to Frankhauser and
because no summons or copies of the complaints,
NOT the Base Commander.
both original and amended, were ever served on her.
10. They contend, however, that they sent notices of
Larkins argued that the attempts to serve her with
the hearings to her. Notices of hearing are not
notices of hearing were not in accordance with the
summonses. The Labor Arbiter cannot acquire
provisions of the R.P. U.S. Military Bases
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent without
Agreement of 1947.
the latter being served with summons. In the
8. NLRC affirmed LA decision but declared that: In the
absence of service of summons or a valid waiver
event this decision is executed and/or enforced, and
thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered by the
considering our finding that the real party respondent
Labor Arbiter are null and void.
is the United States Government through its Armed
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 186
11. Although Larkins appealed to the NLRC and Labor Committee established in Article III of the
participated in the oral argument before the said Base Labor Agreement.
body, this does not constitute a waiver of the lack of 14. No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the LA over
summons and a voluntary submission of her person the case and the person of Larkins. Judgment is
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. She may have void.
raised in her pleadings grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in
relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR, VS.HON.
jurisdiction. If an appearance before the NLRC is REGINO T. VERIDIANO II JUNE 10, 1988
precisely to question the jurisdiction of the said
agency over the person of the defendant, then this 4. private respondents, American Citizens with
appearance is not equivalent to service of summons permanent residence in the Philippines, were both
12. Also, NLRC admitted that the government of US employed as gameroom attendants in the special
is the real party respondent in this case. The 3 AGS services department of the NAVISTA (US Naval
where the appellees previously worked as dormitory Station). They were advised that their employment
attendants is just one of the various units of the had been converted from permanent full time to part
United States Armed Forces inside the said military time. They instituted grievance proceedings which
base. resulted in a recommendation for their reinstatement
13. Under the "Agreement Between the Government plus backwages.
of the Republic of the Philippines and the 5. Sanders, special services Director, and Moreau,
Government of the United States of America commanding officer, disagreed with the hearing
Relating to the Employment of Philippine Nationals in officers report and asked for the rejection as Mr.
the United States Military Bases in the Philippines" Rossi (one of the defendants) tends to alienate most
otherwise known as the Base Labor Agreement of coworkers and supervisors and have proven to be
May 27, 1968, any dispute or disagreement between difficult to supervise. Also, they were both under oath
the United States Armed Forces and Filipino not to discuss the case with anyone but they placed
employees should be settled under grievance or the records in public places.
labor relations procedures established therein (Art. 6. Both respondents filed in the CFI for damages
II) or by the arbitration process provided in the against Sanders claiming that the allegations were
Romualdez-Bosworth Memorandum of Agreement libelous imputations that had exposed them to
dated September 5, 1985. If no agreement was ridicule and caused them mental anguish. The
reached or if the grievance procedure failed, the private respondents made it clear that the petitioners
dispute was appealable by either party to a Joint were being sued in their private/personal capacity.
Sanders, et al. filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 187
the acts complained of were performed by them in that the letter he had written (which included the
the discharge of their official duties thus the court libelous allegations) was in fact a reply to a request
had no jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of from his superior, the other petitioner, for more
state immunity. information regarding the case of the private
respondents. M
ISSUE: W/N court has acquired jurisdiction over 5. As for Moreau, what he is claimed to have done was
both petitioners NO write the Chief of Naval Personnel for concurrence
1. The mere allegation that a government functionary is with the conversion of the private respondents' type
being sued in his personal capacity will not of employment even before the grievance
automatically remove him from the protection of the proceedings had even commenced. This act is
law of public officers and the doctrine of state clearly official in nature, performed by Moreau as the
immunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of immediate superior of Sanders and directly
official character will not suffice to insulate him from answerable to Naval Personnel in matters involving
suability and liability for an act imputed to him as a the special services department of NAVSTA In fact,
personal tort committed without or in excess of his the letter dealt with the financial and budgetary
authority. problems of the department and contained
2. Baer v. Tizon: MTD shouldnt have been denied recommendations for their solution, including the re-
because it had been sufficiently shown that the act designation of the private respondents. There was
for which he was being sued was done in his official nothing personal or private about it.
capacity on behalf of the American government. The 6. Given the official character of the above-described
United States had not given its consent to be sued. letters, the petitioners were, legally speaking, being
3. Syquia v Lopez: granted MTD a complaint against sued as officers of the United States government. As
certain officers of the U.S. armed forces also shown they have acted on behalf of that government, and
to be acting officially in the name of the American within the scope of their authority, it is that
government. government, and not the petitioners personally, that
4. Here, it is clear that the acts for which the petitioners is responsible for their acts.
are being called to account were performed by them 7. Assuming that the trial can proceed and it is proved
in the discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as that the claimants have a right to the payment of
director of the special services department of damages, such award will have to be satisfied not by
NAVSTA, had supervision over its personnel, the petitioners in their personal capacities but by the
including the private respondents, and had a hand in United States government as their principal. This will
their employment, work assignments, discipline, require that government to perform an affirmative act
dismissal and other related matters. It is not disputed to satisfy the judgment, viz, the appropriation of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 188
necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, respondents are themselves American citizens, it
thus making the action a suit against that would seem only proper for the courts of this country
government without its consent. to refrain from taking cognizance of this matter and
8. Festejo v. Fernando, the Court held that a bureau to treat it as coming under the internal administration
director could be sued for damages on a personal of the said base.
tort committed by him when he acted without or in
excess of authority in forcibly taking private property
without paying just compensation therefor although LAGCAO V JUDGE LABRA GR 155746
he did convert it into a public irrigation canal. It was
1. Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of
not necessary to secure the previous consent of the
Cebu, one of which was Lot 1029 in Capitol Hills.
state, nor could it be validly impleaded as a party
Petitioners purchased it on installment basis but then
defendant, as it was not responsible for the
the 210 lots eventually were reverted back to the
defendant's unauthorized act.
Province of Cebu. The province tried to annul the
9. In the case at bar, the government of the United
sale thus the petitioners (buyers) prompted the latter
States has not given its consent to be sued for the
to sue the province for specific performance and
official acts of the petitioners, who cannot satisfy any
damages. TC ruled in favor of petitioners and
judgment that may be rendered against them. As it is
ordered Province to execute the final deed of sale.
the American government itself that will have to
CA affirmed the decision thus thereafter, TCT was
perform the affirmative act of appropriating the
issued in the name of petitioners.
amount that may be adjudged for the private
2. However, when they took possession of the lot, it
respondents, the complaint must be dismissed for
was already occupied by squatters thus petitioners
lack of jurisdiction.
instituted ejectment proceedings against the
10. Even under the law of public officers, the acts of
squatters. MTC issued demolition order.
the petitioners are protected by the presumption of
3. When it was about to be implemented, Mayor Garcia
good faith, which has not been overturned by the
requested the deferment on the ground that the City
private respondents. Even mistakes concededly
was still looking for a relocation site for the squatters
committed by such public officers are not actionable
thus the MTCC issued orders suspending the
as long as it is not shown that they were motivated
demolition.
by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad
4. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the suspension
faith.
period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
11. Since the questioned acts were done in the
City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as
Olongapo Naval Base by the petitioners in the
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
performance of their official duties and the private
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 189
5. Then, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 2. Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the
1772 which included Lot 1029 among the identified expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the
sites for socialized housing. SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the
6. Ordinance No. 1843 was then enacted by the SP of homeless and low-income residents of the City.
Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to 3. However, the local government units do not possess
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent
of Lot 1029 to be used for the benefit of the domain in seeking solutions to this problem.
homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual 4. There are two legal provisions which limit the
occupants thereof. exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
7. Petitioners then filed with the RTC then the CA after deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
it was dismissed, an action for declaration of nullity process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
of Ordinance No. 1843 for being unconstitutional as equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property
it sanctions the expropriation of their property for the shall not be taken for public use without just
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor compensation.
contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated 5. Thus, the exercise by local government units of the
in the Constitution. They allege that it will benefit only power of eminent domain is not absolute. Section 19
a handful of people of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise
must comply with the provisions of the Constitution
ISSUE: W/N this expropriation contravenes the 6. Condemnation of private lands in an irrational or
Constitution yes piecemeal fashion or the random expropriation of
1. Local government units have no inherent power of small lots to accommodate no more than a few
eminent domain and can exercise it only when tenants or squatters is certainly not the
expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of condemnation for public use contemplated by the
RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local Constitution. This is depriving a citizen of his
government units the power to expropriate. property for the convenience of a few without
Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to perceptible benefit to the public.
Section 19 of RA 7160: Eminent Domain. A local 7. RA 7279 is the law that governs the local
government unit may, through its chief executive and expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or provide the priorities in the acquisition of land. It shall
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, be made in the ff order:
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the a. Those owned by the Government or any of its
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 190
a. Atty. Castillo and Ms. Ragadio the property oppose the majority report. Petitioner could have
classified as unirrigated riceland shall have a filed a motion raising all possible grounds for
fair market value of P500.00 per square meter objecting to the findings and recommendations of the
b. Atty. Alog submitted his report recommending commissioners. It could have moved the trial court to
that NPC pay the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles an remand the report to the commissioners for
easement fee of P20,957.88 and the Spouses additional facts. Or it could have moved to expunge
Chiong be paid total easement fees of the majority report, for reasons petitioner could
P9,187.05.The affected properties of the Heirs muster. Petitioner, however, failed to seize the
of Agrifina Angeles were assessed by Atty. opportunity to register its opposition.
Alog to have a fair market value of P22.50 per 2. The fair market value of the 4,000 square meters
square meter, while those of the Spouses occupied by the petitioner was fixed by the trial court
Chiong were assigned a fair market value of at P500.00 per square meter. The appellate court
P15.75 per square meter. affirmed the said valuation.
5. Court then gave due course to the report of Atty 3. NPC the expropriation was not to be limited for the
Castillo and Ms. Ragadio. purpose of easement of right-of-way. In fact, in their
6. Dissatisfied, NPC filed a special civil action for Answer, the Heirs of Agrifina Angeles, alleged that
certiorari with the appellate court: it alleged that the petitioner had actually occupied an area of 4,000
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion square meters wherein it constructed structures for
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it: its transmission lines and was seeking to occupy
(a) directed NPC to pay just compensation for the another 4,000 square meters. Petitioner failed to
land taken without first issuing an order of controvert this material allegation.
expropriation; (b) adopted the compensation 4. In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the
recommended by the two commissioners without a general rule is that the just compensation to which
hearing; and (c) directed petitioner to pay the full the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the
market value of the property instead of a mere market value.
easement fee. 5. Market value is that sum of money which a person
7. CA: dismissed. NPC moved for reconsideration. desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner
willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a
ISSUE: W/N full market value of the property instead of price to be given and received therefor.
easement fee should be paid 6. The rule, however, is modified where only a part of a
HELD: YES certain property is expropriated. In such a case the
1. A formal hearing or trial was not required for the owner is not restricted to compensation for the
petitioner to avail of its opportunity to object and portion actually taken. In addition to the market value
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 192
of the portion taken, he is also entitled to recover for way agreement was executed between them and
the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining paid P4180 as Right of Way damages.
part of the property. At the same time, from the total 2. Now, De Onorio demanded payment for the taking of
compensation must be deducted the value of the her property but when Eslaban refused, she filed a
consequential benefits complaint against him before RTC praying for
7. In fixing the valuation at P500.00 per square meter, compensation for the portion of her property used in
the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court had the construction of the canal.
considered the reports of the commissioners and the 3. Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General,
proofs which included the fair market value of filed an Answer, in which he admitted that NIA
P1,100.00 per square meter proffered by the constructed an irrigation canal over the property of
respondents. the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain landowner
8. This valuation by owners of the property may not be whose property had been taken for irrigation
binding upon the petitioner or the court, although it purposes, but petitioner interposed the defense that:
should at least set a ceiling price for the the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation canal
compensation to be awarded. was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters;
9. The trial court found that the parcels of land sought and respondent was not entitled to compensation for
to be expropriated are agricultural land, with minimal the taking of her property considering that she
improvements. It is the nature and character of the secured title over the property by virtue of a
land at the time of its taking that is the principal homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.
criterion to determine just compensation to the 4. TC: ordered the National Irrigation Administration to
landowner. Hence, the trial court accepted not the pay de Onorio 107k as just compensation. Petitioner
owners valuation of P1,100 per square meter but appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision
only P500 as recommended in the majority report of hence this petition.
the commissioners.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM
ESLABAN V DE ONORIO THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF
GR 146062 THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
1. the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
1. Clarita de Enorios lot was affected a the main
contested property was built only on October 6,
irrigation canal construction of the NIA. Her husband
1981, several years after the property had been
agreed to the construction provided that they be paid
registered on May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior
by the government for the area taken after the
expropriation proceedings should have been filed
processing of the documents by the COA. A right of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 193
and just compensation paid to the owner thereof taking, not as of the time of filing of the action of
before it could be taken for public use. eminent domain.
2. the rule is that where private property is needed for 6. It is now provided that SEC. 4. Order of
conversion to some public use, the first thing that the expropriation. If the objections to and the defense
government should do is to offer to buy it. If the against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
owner is willing to sell and the parties can agree on property are overruled, or when no party appears to
the price and the other conditions of the sale, a defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue
voluntary transaction can then be concluded and the an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff
transfer effected without the necessity of a judicial has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
action. Otherwise, the government will use its power expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
of eminent domain, subject to the payment of just in the complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation, to acquire private property in order to compensation to be determined as of the date of the
devote it to public use. taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
3. it is the market value which should be paid or "that whichever came first.
sum of money which a person, desirous but not 7. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
given and received therefor." court from determining the just compensation to be
4. just compensation means not only the correct paid.After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the
the payment of the land within a reasonable time proceeding except on such terms as the court deems
from its taking. Without prompt payment, just and equitable.
compensation cannot be considered "just" for then 8. Thus, the value of the property must be determined
the property owner is made to suffer the either as of the date of the taking of the property or
consequence of being immediately deprived of his the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
land while being made to wait for a decade or more 9. In this case, the proper valuation for the property in
before actually receiving the amount necessary to question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level
cope with his loss. for 1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by
5. In the Ansaldo case, there are instances where the the commission (composed of the provincial
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato)
the expropriation suit, in which case just constituted by the trial court to make an assessment
compensation shall be determined as of the time of of the expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a
per hectare basis.14
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 194
tax credit can be availed of and carried over to the representing the assessed value of the lands for
next taxable year. taxation purposes as determined under PD No. 76.
6. It must also be stressed that unlike in Sec. 229 of the 3. VISCA prayed in its complaint that a writ of
Tax Code wherein the remedy of refund is available possession be issued since P.D. No. 42 allows the
to the taxpayer, Sec. 4 of the law speaks only of a entity expropriating the land to take possession
tax credit, not a refund. thereof upon deposit with the PNB of the amount
7. The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments equivalent to the assessed value of the subject
can be deemed as their just compensation for private properties.
property taken by the State for public use. The 4. Petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. They
privilege enjoyed by the senior citizens does not alleged that (1) the lands sought to be expropriated
come directly from the State, but rather from the were not within the area specified under PD No.
private establishments concerned. 1107; (2) the amount of P74,050.00 did not
constitute just compensation; (3) P.D. No. 794
providing that the just compensation shall not be in
excess of the current and fair market value declared
by the owner or administrator, or such market value
PANES V VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE as determined by the provincial assessor, which is
NOVEMBER 27, 1996 lower, was unconstitutional; (4) P.D. No. 1107 was
also unconstitutional for impairing the freedom of
1. Marcos issued PD1107 establishing the Philippine
contract and violating the equal protection clause;
Root Crops Research and Training Center in the
and (5) there was no public necessity for the
Visayas State College of Agriculture (VISCA). It had
acquisition by VISCA of petitioners' lands.
the power to expropriate lands situated within the
5. 1298 tenants filed a motion to intervene alleging that
barrios, thus VISCA filed a complaint for
they were tenant-tillers and occupants of the lands
expropriation against petitioners to:
involved in the expropriation proceedings, their
a. Establish experimental fields
tenure of work as tenants being secured and
b. Construct buildings laboratories and housing
protected by law, they cannot be removed from their
facilities for the personnel of the Root Crops
landholdings through eminent domain. TC granted
Center; and
the intervenors motion to which VISCA filed its reply.
c. integrate and conduct country-wide
It denied that they were tenants and that their
researches on root crops.
reliance to the decree was misplaced since the
2. Respondent VISCA deposited the amount of
proscription therein against the ejectment or removal
P74,050.00 with the Philippine National Bank
of tenants is applicable as regards landowners,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 196
landholders and agricultural lessors and not as equivalent to the assessed value of the subject
regards the State or those acting for and in its behalf. property for purposes of taxation, has been rendered
6. TC denied motion for the issuance of a writ of ineffectual by the ruling in Export Processing Zone
possession because expropriation was not one of Authority v. Dulay
the causes provided for in the agrarian laws. PD 42 2. P.D. No. 1533 determines the just compensation in
was only applicable to untenanted private properties expropriation cases to be the fair and current market
and that there is doubt as to whether the lands to be value declared by the owner of the property sought
expropriated were indeed within the area indicated to be expropriated or such market value as
by PD 1107 to be proper for expropriation. determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
7. CA: dismissed the expropriation case as it was Thus, the determination of just compensation, by
tainted with GAD when it denied immediate virtue of the enactment of P.D. No. 1533, was
possession of the properties. The authority of the converted from being a judicial prerogative to an
petitioner to take immediate possession of the executive decision. Because the executive
subject properties appear clear and explicit. The determination of just compensation in eminent
contention of the petitioners that PD 42 applies only domain proceedings renders the courts inutile in a
to untenanted lands is not convincing for there is matter which under the Constitution is reserved to
nothing in PD 42 that indicates this. them for final determination, SC declared P.D. No.
8. Petitioners filed for petition of review and likewise 1533 to be unconstitutional and void.
assailed the constitutionality of PD 1107 on the 3. In the instant case, VISCA deposited an amount
grounds that it impairs the freedom of contract with the PNB representing the assessed value of the
guaranteed by the Constitution; it violates the equal lands for taxation purposes as determined under
protection of law and the tenurial security guaranteed P.D. No. 76. On the basis of this deposit, VISCA
by the Constitution and it runs counter to the prayed in its complaint that a writ of possession be
agrarian laws. issued, the same being sanctioned under P.D. No.
42 which allows the entity expropriating the land to
ISSUE: W/N VISCA is entitled to a writ of take possession thereof upon deposit with the PNB
possession NO of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of
1. The finding of the CA insofar as it found that VISCA the subject properties for purposes of taxation.
has the right to a writ of possession upon compliance 4. In the light of the declared unconstitutionality of P.D.
with the requirements of P.D. No. 1533 in relation to No. 76, P.D. No. 1533 and P.D. No. 42 insofar as
P.D. Nos. 1107 and 42, i.e., payment of an amount they sanction executive determination of just
equivalent to 10% of the amount of compensation for compensation in expropriation cases, it is imperative
the property which is, under P.D. 42, the amount that any right to the immediate possession of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 197
subject property, accruing to VISCA, must be firmly Realty Services, Inc. was no longer the owner of the
grounded on a valid compliance with Section 2 of premises in question and as correctly contended by
Rule 67 that there must be a deposit with the Juliano, the relation between Juliano and Belen were
National or Provincial Treasurer of the value of the also deemed terminated.
subject property as provisionally and promptly 4. Belen appealed to the CA which was resolved
ascertained and fixed by the court having jurisdiction against him.
of the proceedings. 5. The Appellate Court took account of Presidential
Decree No. 1670 as the decisive factor in
determining the "pivotal and decisive issue
BELEN V CA whether Manotok Realty, Inc., Belens lessor, has
MARCH 11, 1991 retained ownership of the lot in question, the
expropriating law invoked by Juliano (PD 1670).
1. Belen leased a small portion of land (100sqm) from
6. The decision declared that by virtue of the decree,
Manotok Services situated in Tondo, Manila. Belen
Manotok Realty, Inc. ceased to be the owner of the
built his house there. Juliano occupied part of the
land, including the lot leased to Belen, and could not
land; he bought a house standing there and moved
interfere with the possession, administration, control
in without Belens knowledge. Upon learning about
and disposition of the NHA; its only right being to
Juliano, they came up with an agreement that
claim the just compensation thereof; that as a result,
Juliano could continue staying on the land
Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in
temporarily and would pay of the rental to
question also ipso facto ended, as well as the
Manotok Realty. However, the houses were burned.
sublease between Belen and Juliano, since a
Belen acceded to Julianos continued stay on the
sublease can never extend beyond the duration of
condition that it should only be for 1 years. When
the sublessor's lease of the sublessor. Belen
Juliano failed to leave the presmies, Belen brought
appealed by certiorari to the SC
suit in the MTC.
2. MTC: ordered Juliano to vacate the property. He
ISSUE: W/N Manotok Realty was still the owner of the
appealed to the RTC. RTC reversed the judgment.
land considering it didnt receive money as payment for
3. RTC: PD No. 1670 has expropriated real property
the subject property yet
along the Estero de Sunog-Apog, Tondo, Manila
HELD: yes
formerly owned by the Manotok Realty, Inc. Juliano
1. PD 1670 is unconstitutional for being violative of the
is a prospective beneficiary of the Bliss Project being
owners right to due process of law. The decrees do
undertaken by the National Housing Authority at the
not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or
site in question. Therefore, when the complaint in
procedure by which the petitioners can question the
this case was filed on September 13, 1982, Manotok
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 198
propriety of the expropriation of their properties or 7. PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
the reasonableness of the just compensation. Having thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
failed to provide for a hearing, the Government deemed void ab initio, including particularly the
should have filed an expropriation case under Rule taking of possession of the property by the National
67 of the Revised Rules of Court but it did not do so. Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the
2. But it did not deem it necessary because the same into a housing project and the selection of the
enactment of the questioned decrees which beneficiaries thereof.
rendered, by their very passage, any questions with
regard to the expropriation of the properties, moot
and academic. In effect, the properties under the REPUBLIC (DAR) V CA
decrees were "automatically expropriated." OCTOBER 30, 1996
3. This becomes more evident when the NHA wrote the
1. ACIL Corporation owned several hectares of land in
Register of Deeds and requested her to cancel the
Linoan, Dvao del Norte which the government took
certificate of titles of the petitioners, furnishing said
pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Register of Deeds only with copies of the decrees to
Law (RA 6657). Certificates were cancelled and new
support its request.
ones issued and distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.
4. The Court observed that contrary to Rule 67 and
2. The lands were valued by Land Bank however, in the
established precedents, the decrees provided for the
Statement of Agricultural Landholdings which ACIL
determination of just compensation at a time earlier
corporation filed with DAR, a lower Fair Value
than that "of the actual taking of the government or at
Acceptable to Landowner was stated and that based
the time of the judgment by the court, whichever
on this statement, Land Bank valued the land
came first."
uniformly.
5. Apart from this, the fixing of the value of the property
3. ACIL rejected the governments offer, pointing out
was left by the decrees to the City Assessor.
that nearby lands planted to the same crops were
6. In P.D. No. 76, P.D. No. 464, P.D. No. 794, and P.D.
valued at the higher price per hectare.
No. 1533, the basis for determining just
4. ACIL then filed a Petition for Just Compensation in
compensation was fixed at the market value
the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. It
declared by the owner or the market value
prayed that DAR be ordered to pay 24, 717.40
determined by the assessor, whichever is lower.
instead of the 15, 311 which was stated on the
Here, there is no mention of any market value
statement ACIL filed with DAR.
declared by the owner. Sections 6 of the two decrees
5. RTC dismissed its petition on the ground that ACIL
peg just compensation at the market value
should have appealed to the DAR Adjudication
determined by the City Assessor.
Board. ACIL moved for reconsideration but its motion
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 199
was denied thus it filed a petition for certiorari with b. (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses
the CA contending that a petition for just under [R.A. No. 6657]."
compensation under RA 6657 falls under the 3. The provision of 50 must be construed in harmony
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC. CA with this provision by considering cases involving the
granted his petition. It remanded the case to the RTC determination of just compensation and criminal
for further proceedings. cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657.
6. In turn, DAR filed this petition for review on certiorari. 4. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot
be granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain
ISSUE: W/N in cases involving claims for just (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
compensation under RA 6657 an appeal from the criminal cases.
decision of the provincial adjudicator to the DARAB 5. EPZA v. Duly - the valuation of property in eminent
must first be made before a landowner can resort to domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot
RTC be vested in administrative agencies
HELD: N 6. Apart from the fact that only a statute can confer
1. 50 grants the DAR primary jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction on courts and administrative agencies
and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and rules of procedure cannot it is noteworthy that the
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters New Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, which was
involving the implementation of agrarian reform," adopted on May 30, 1994, now provide that in the
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction event a landowner is not satisfied with a decision of
of the Department of Agriculture and the Department an agrarian adjudicator, the landowner can bring the
of Environment and Natural Resources. However, matter directly to the Regional Trial Court sitting as
57 provides: The Special Agrarian Courts shall Special Agrarian Court.
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all 7. Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the
petitions for the determination of just compensation Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of
to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal determining the value of lands placed under land
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall reform and the compensation to be paid for their
apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian taking. Through notice sent to the landowner
Courts, unless modified by this Act. pursuant to 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes
2. Thus Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a
Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive summary administrative proceeding is held and
jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit: afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional
a. (1) "all petitions for the determination of just (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the
compensation to landowners" and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 200
case may be, depending on the value of the land, credible real estate broker, or the judge himself
fixes the price to be paid for the land. would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his
8. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he own as to the value of the land in question.
may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Nevertheless, if he formulates such an opinion, he
Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for must base it upon competent evidence."
the determination of compensation cases under R.A. 4. The petitioner strongly maintains that the respondent
No. 6657. court's act of determining and ordering the payment
of just compensation to private respondents without
formal presentation of evidence by the parties on the
MERALCO V PINEDA reasonable value of the property constitutes a
FEB 13, 1992 flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process.
1. MERALCO filed a complaint for eminent domain for
5. It stressed that respondent court ignored the
the lots of the 42 private respondents. The complaint
procedure laid down by the law in determining just
alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230 KV
compensation because it formulated an opinion of its
Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No.
own as to the value of the land in question without
220 at Pililla, Rizal, MERALCO needs portions of the
allowing the Board of Commissioners to hold
land of the private respondents consisting of an
hearings for the reception of evidence.
aggregate area of 237,321 square meters. Despite
petitioner's offers to pay compensation and attempts
ISSUE: W/N the court can dispense with the
to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed
assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an
to reach an agreement
expropriation proceeding and determine for itself
2. But despite the opposition, the court issued an order
the just compensation
authorizing MERALCO to take or enter upon the
HELD: YES
possession of the property. Private respondents then
1. Sec. 5 of Rules 67, ROC: Upon the entry of the order
filed a motion for withdrawal of deposit claiming that
of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more
they are entitled to be paid 40 pesos per sqm and
than three competent and disinterested persons as
prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the sum of
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court
71k from MERALCOs deposit account with the PNB.
the just compensation for the property sought to be
This they did 3x and Judge Pineda then granted the
taken.
motion of withdrawal.
2. Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten days,
3. The court then stressed that it will appoint
or even before the expiration of such period but after
commissioners to determine just compensation or
all the interested parties have filed their objections,
dispenses with them and adopts the testimony of a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 201
the court may, after hearing, accept the report and hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture Agreement
render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for on Subdivision and Housing Projects. He arrived at
cause shown, it may recommit the same to the the amount of just compensation on its own, without
commissioners for further report of facts; or it may the proper reception of evidence before the Board of
set aside the report and appoint new commissioners, Commissioners. Private respondents as landowners
or it may accept the report in part and reject it in part; have not proved by competent evidence the value of
and it may make such order or render such judgment their respective properties at a proper hearing.
as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential 6. Likewise, MERALCO has not been given the
to the exercise of his right of condemnation, and to opportunity to rebut any evidence that would have
the defendant just compensation for the property so been presented by private respondents.
taken. 7. In an expropriation case such as this one where the
3. Binan case: There are2 stages in every action of principal issue is the determination of just
expropriation. compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is
a. The first is concerned with the determination of indispensable to allow the parties to present
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the evidence on the issue of just compensation.
power of eminent domain and the propriety of 8. Contrary to the submission of private respondents,
its exercise in the context of the facts involved the appointment of at least 3 competent persons as
in the suit. commissioners to ascertain just compensation for
b. The second phase of the eminent domain the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
action is concerned with the determination by requirement in expropriation cases.
the Court of "the just compensation for the 9. While it is true that the findings of commissioners
property sought to be taken." This is done by may be disregarded and the court may substitute its
the Court with the assistance of not more than own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so
three (3) commissioners. for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners
4. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis have applied illegal principles to the evidence
of the evidence before, and findings of, the submitted to them or where they have disregarded a
commissioners would be final, too. It would finally clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the excessive
issue. 10. Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners is a
5. Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the substantial right that may not be done away with
valuation of P40.00 per square meter on a property capriciously or for no reason at all.
declared for real estate tax purposes at P2.50 per
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 202
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. 8. June 29, 1981 - CA modified the trial court's decision
MAURA SANTOS and 43 more claimants and adopted the commissioners' report. It added 6%
G.R. No. 57524, January 08, 1986 legal rate of interest from February 7, 1969, the date of
1. 66,096 square meters of land in Paraaque and the filing of the complaint.
Muntinlupa claimed by 44 persons is being 9. Republic contends that CA erred in disregarding the
expropriated, for the widening and con-struction of fact that 14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their
interchanges in the Manila South Diversion Road. lots to the Republic at P40 a square meter.
2. The Appraisal Committee of Rizal fixed at P40 per
square meter. The Government deposited that amount Issue: What is the correct valuation of the expropriated
with the provincial treasurer who deposited it in the land - only P40 per square meter for the expropriated
Philippine National Bank. Some respondents, including lands.
Maura Santos, withdrew the amounts.
3. CFI Rizal granted the fiscal's motion fixing the 1. We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court
provisional value at P2,641,190. erred in relying on the commissioners' report whose
4. A writ of possession was issued to the Republic of recommendation was not substantiated by trustworthy
the Philippines. 14 claimants did not object to the evidence.
valuation of P40 a square meter. They were paid the 2. Also, the appraisal of P100 a square meter for the
amounts due to them at that price land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the
Those sales were contemporaneous sales convincingly filing of the instant expropriation case.
indicative of the fair market value of the lands at the 3. The statement in the 1970 report of the
time of the expropriation in the later part of 1968 or early commissioners that according to the owners of adjoining
in 1969. lots the prices per square meter ranged from P150 to
6. As to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a P200 and that subdivision lots in the vicinity were being
square meter, the trial court, pursuant to section 5, Rule sold at P85 to P120 a square meter was not based on
67 of the Rules of Court, appointed three any documentary evidence. It is manifestly hearsay.
commissioners to determine the just compensation. The More-over, those prices refer to 1970 or more than a
commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970 year after the expropriation was effected.
recommended that the just compensation for the lands 4. In the case of Maura Santos, it should be noted that
should be P100 a square meter except the land of the expropriation undeniably increased the value of the
Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square meters remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square
which should be evaluated at P60 a square meter. meters. She was already paid P1,036,360 for her
7. May 13, 1972 - trial court fixed P100 a square meter expropriated land.
as the uniform price to be paid to the claimants
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 204
5. Furthermore, the commissioners should not have square meters, respectively, or a total of 84.425 square
glossed over the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out meters.
of 44 had willingly sold their lands to the Government at 3. NAPOCOR deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the
P40 a square meter as fixed by the provincial Appraisal provisional value of the land in accordance with Section
Committee of which the provincial assessor was a 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Then it filed an Urgent
member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that was a Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
reasonable price. Possession, which the trial court granted in its March 9,
6. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not 1999 Order, which was granted.
bound by the commissioners' report. It may make such 4. However, the trial court dropped Sps Dela Cruz and
order or render such judgment as shall secure to the their mortgagee, Metrobank, as parties-defendants in
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right view of the Motion to Intervene filed by
of condemnation, and to the defendant just respondent/intervenor Virgilio M. Saulog, who claimed
compensation for the property expropriated. ownership of the land sought to be expropriated from
respondents spouses Dela Cruz. As to the just
compensation for the property of Saulog, successor-in-
G.R. NO. 156093, FEBRUARY 2, 2007 interest of the Dela Cruz spouses, the trial court ordered
NATIONAL POWER CORP. V.SPOUSES DELA the latter and petitioner to submit their compromise
CRUZ, METROBANK, DASMARIAS, CAVITE BRANCH, agreement.
REYNALDO FERRER, AND S.K. DYNAMICS 5. Meanwhile, trial court issued an Order directing the
MANUFACTURER CORP. constitution of a Board of Commissioners with respect
to the property of respondent S.K. Dynamics.
NATURE: petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules 6. October 05, 1999. - commissioners recommended
of Court, Napocor seeks to annul CA decision which that the fair market value of the real properties is
affirmed RTC decision fixing FMV at P10,000 per sqm P10,000.00 per square meter. However, the
1. NAPOCOR decided to acquire an easement of right- commissioners did not afford the parties the opportunity
of-way over portions of land within the areas of to introduce evidence in their favor, nor did they conduct
Dasmarias and Imus, Cavite for the construction and hearings before them. Upon the submission of the
maintenance of the proposed Dasmarias-Zapote 230 commissioners report, petitioner was not notified of the
kV Transmission Line Project. completion or filing of it nor given any opportunity to file
2. November 27, 1998 - petitioner filed a Complaint for its objections to it.
eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of 7. December 28, 1999 - RTC Order fixed the just
right-of-way against respondents as registered owners. compensation to be paid by petitioner at PhP 10,000.00
The affected areas were 51.55, 18.25, and 14.625 per square meter. Napocor filed Motion for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 205
Reconsideration claiming it is exorbitant, unjust and mandatory requirement in expropriation cases. In the
unreasonable. RTC denied this MR, explaining that the instant expropriation case, where the principal issue is
price for 1999 must be considered, which is the time the determination of just compensation, a hearing
when the writ of possession was issued. before the commissioners is indispensable to allow the
8. CA affirmed RTC: The nature and character of the parties to present evidence on the issue of just
land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to compensation. While it is true that the findings of
determine just compensation to the land owner. CA commissioners may be disregarded and the trial court
noted that since the property underwent important may substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter
changes and improvements, "the highest and most may only do so for valid reasons, that is, (1) where the
profitable use of the property is good for residential and commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
commercial purposes. evidence submitted to them, (2) where they have
disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or (3)
ISSUE/HELD/RATIO: where the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
1) W the respondents were denied due process - Yes. or excessive. Thus, "trial with the aid of the
1. The fact that no trial or hearing was conducted to commissioners is a substantial right that may not be
afford the parties the opportunity to present their own done away with capriciously or for no reason at all."
evidence should have impelled the trial court to 4. There are very specific rules for expropriation cases
disregard the commissioners findings. The absence of that require the strict observance of procedural and
such trial or hearing constitutes reversible error on the substantive due process because expropriation cases
part of the trial court because the parties (in particular, involve the admittedly painful deprivation of private
petitioners) right to due process was violated. property for public purposes and the disbursement of
2. Based on Rule 67 Sec. 6-8, it is clear that in addition public funds as just compensation for the private
to the ocular inspection performed by the two (2) property taken. Therefore, it is insufficient to hold that a
appointed commissioners in this case, they are also Motion for Reconsideration in an expropriation case
required to conduct a hearing or hearings to determine cures the defect in due process.
just compensation; and to provide the parties the
following: (1) notice of the said hearings and the 2) W the valuation of just compensation was correct -
opportunity to attend them; (2) the opportunity to No.
introduce evidence in their favor during the said 1. In this case, the commissioners arrived at the figure
hearings; and (3) the opportunity for the parties to argue of P10, 000 in question after their ocular inspection of
their respective causes during the said hearings. the property, wherein they considered the surrounding
3. The appointment of commissioners to ascertain just structures, the propertys location and, allegedly, the
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 206
prices of the other, contiguous real properties in the to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
area. 6657).
2. It is settled that just compensation is to be 2. 1 June 2001 - Sps received from the Department of
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually Agrarian Reform (DAR) a copy of the notice of land
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation valuation and acquisition which contains an offer of
proceedings. Where the institution of the action P315,307.87 as compensation for 3.195 hectares of the
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation property. Petitioners rejected the offer.
is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the 3. DARAB conducted a summary administrative
complaint. proceeding to etermine the valuation and compensation
3. The commissioners report itself is flawed considering of the subject property. DARAB ordered the LBP to pay
that its recommended just compensation was pegged petitioners the original amount offered by DAR.
as of October 5, 1999, or the date when the said report 4. Aggrieved, Sps filed an original petition for the
was issued, and not the just compensation as of the determination of just compensation before the Regional
date of the filing of the complaint for expropriation, or as Trial Court of Balanga City, Bataan. They offered the
of November 27, 1998. The period between the time of appraisal report presented in Civil Case No. 7171, a
the filing of the complaint (when just compensation prior just compensation case involving a parcel of land
should have been determined), and the time when the adjacent to the property subject of this case.
commissioners report recommending the just 5. The Court of Appeals ruled that the SAC should have
compensation was issued (or almost one [1] year after refrained from taking judicial notice of its own decision
the filing of the complaint), may have distorted the in Civil Case No. 7171 in resolving just compensation in
correct amount of just compensation. the present case, especially because it disregarded the
other factors set in RA 6657. According to the Court of
Appeals, the SAC should have judiciously made an
G.R. NO. 170422, MARCH 07, 2008 independent finding of fact and explained the legal basis
SPS. EDMOND LEE AND HELEN HUANG V. LAND thereof, hence the CA remanded the case to the trial
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES court for proper and judicious determination of just
compensation, appointing for that purpose a set of
NATURE: Petition assailing the CA decision in Land
commissioners.
Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Edmond Lee and Helen
6. Sps allege that the remand of the case would give
Huang.
LBP undue opportunity which it already had during the
proceedings a quo, and which opportunity it failed to
1. 7 August 2001 - Sps Huang received a notice
take advantage of. Also, it argues that R.A. No. 6657
informing them that their landholding is covered by the
does not at all require the SAC to consider all the seven
governments compulsory acquisition scheme pursuant
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 207
factors enumerated therein in its determination of just 3. We find that the factors required by the law and
compensation. enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not
observed by the SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly
ISSUE: W remand of the case is proper for the the valuation arrived at in the appraisal report. However,
determination of proper valuation - YES. this is not to say that the Court favors the valuation
given by LBP. We find that LBPs valuation is too low
1. SACs reliance on the valuation made by the vis-- vis the value suggested by the appraisal
appraisal company is misplaced, since the valuation company. All told, we find that the remand of the case is
was not arrived at using the factors required by the law in order to better determine the proper valuation of the
and prescribed by the AO No. 5. subject property.
circumscribed to appoint three commissioners, unlike private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for
the modality under Rule 67. Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction. They sought to compel DAR to
With the remand of the case, it is now up to the SAC, or finally determine the just compensation of their
to the parties, to determine if there is a need to avail of properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
commissioners to arrive at the proper valuation of the bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked",
subject land. "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private
respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same.
3. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order
G.R. NO. 118712, OCTOBER 6, 1995 No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COURT OF and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
DEVELOPMENT CORP. designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land
before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as
G.R. NO. 118745 OCTOBER 6, 1995 provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. COURT respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the
OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & "reserved" the compensation in their names as
DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL. landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking
possession of the property, the compensation must be
1. Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
deposited in cash or in bonds.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No.
4. DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate
118745) and Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No.
of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial
118712) following the adverse ruling by the Court of
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465. However, the
ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in
petitions were ordered consolidated.
the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of
2. Private respondents are landowners whose
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175
landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected
SCRA 343). Landbank declared that the issuance of the
to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Aggrieved by the
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority
alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with
where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used.
respect to the valuation and payment of compensation
for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 209
be full payment of just compensation before the title to Mangondato, and under the mistaken belief that it
the expropriated property is transferred. forms part of the public land reserved for use by
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit NAPOCOR for hydroelectric power purposes under
of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and Proclamation No. 1354 of the President of the
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is Philippines dated December 3, 1974.
unacceptable. 2. NAPOCOR alleged that the land was until then
To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate possessed and administered by Marawi City, so that in
the amounts already deposited in their behalf as exchange for the citys waiver and quitclaim of any right
compensation for their properties simply because they over the property, NAPOCOR had paid the city a
rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that financial assistance of P40.00 per square meter.
they have already been deprived of the possession and 3. Mangondato demanded compensation from
use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of NAPOCOR. NAPOCOR refused to compensate
eminent domain. insisting that the property is public land and that it had
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between already paid financial assistance to Marawi City in
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final exchange for the rights over the property.
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of 4. More than a decade later NAPOCOR acceded to the
exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the fact that the property belongs to Mangondato. On
same. The immediate effect in both situations is the August 14, 1990, NAPOCORs board passed
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and Resolution No. 90-316 resolving that Mangondato be
possession of his property for which he should be fairly paid the base price of P40.00 per square meter for the
and immediately compensated. 12,132 square meter portion (P485,280.00) plus 12%
interest per annum from 1978 (P698,808.00) pending
the determination whether P100.00 per square meter is
RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF THE the fair market value of the property. So Mangondato
PROPERTY = date of filing the complaint, unless was paid P1,184,088.00.
filing came after actual taking 5. March, 1992 - the parties executed a Deed of Sale Of
A Registered Property where NAPOCOR acceded to
Mangondatos request of provisional payment of
G.R. NO. 113194. MARCH 11, 1996 P100.00 per square meter excluding interest and
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. COURT OF without prejudice to Mangondatos pursuance of claims
APPEALS AND MACAPANTON MANGONDATO for just compensation and interest. Mangondato was
paid P1,015,412.00 in addition to the P1,184,088.00
1. 1978 - Napocor took possession of a 21,995 square
meter land situated in Marawi City, owned by
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 212
earlier paid to him by NAPOCOR which payments total ISSUE: What is the correct basis for the valuation of just
P2,199,500.00 for the 12,995 square meter land. compensation: (1) 1992 or at the time of filing of
6. However, Mangondato still demanded that he be complaint for eminent domain, or (2) 1978 or at the time
paid P300 oer square meter because his land was of taking.
classified as industrial.
7. July 7, 1992 - Mangondato filed before the lower HELD: Here, SC followed the general rule (filing
court Civil Case No. 605-92 against NAPOCOR seeking complaint), because only in 1992 did petitioner manifest
to recover the possession of the property and the its intention to exercise the power of eminent domain.
payment of a monthly rent of P15,000.00 from 1978 SC affirmed the CA when the latter held that: If We
until the surrender of the property. decree that the fair market value of the land be
8. July 27, 1992 - Napocor filed Civil Case No. 610-92 determined as of 1978, then We would be sanctioning a
which is a Complaint for eminent domain against deceptive scheme whereby NAPOCOR, for any reason
Mangondato over the subject property other than for eminent domain would occupy anothers
9. Mangondato answered that he treats the property and when later pressed for payment, first
P2,199.500.00 so far received by him as partial negotiate for a low price and then conveniently
payment for the rent for the use of his property. expropriate the property when the land owner refuses to
Mangondato prayed that he be compensated in accept its offer claiming that the taking of the property
damages for the unauthorized taking and continued for the purpose of eminent domain should be reckoned
possession of his land from 1978 until the filing of the as of the date when it started to occupy the property
Complaiant. Furthermore, he argues that should the and that the value of the property should be computed
lower court order the expropriation of the subject as of the date of the taking despite the increase in the
property, that the just compensation for the land be meantime in the value of the property.
reckoned from the time of the filing of the expropriation
case. RATIO:
10. The lower court ordered NAPOCOR to deposit with 1. The general rule in determining just compensation
the Philippine National Bank the amount of in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
P10,997,500.00, provisionally fixing the value of the date of the filing of the complaint. Normally, the time of
land at P500.00 per square meter. NAPOCOR opposed the taking coincides with the filing of the complaint for
the provisional value quoted by the lower court saying expropriation. Hence, many rulings of this Court have
that the basis of the provisional value of the land should equated just compensation with the value of the
be the assessed value of the property as of the time of property as of the time of filing of the complaint
the taking which in this case is 1978. consistent with the above provision of the Rules. So too,
where the institution of the action precedes entry into
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 213
the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained that the property was public land and wrongly justified
as of the time of the filing of the complaint. its possession by alleging it had already paid financial
2. The general rule, however, admits of an exception: assistance to Marawi City in exchange for the rights
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the over the property. Only in 1990, after more than a
date it was taken and not at the date of the decade of beneficial use, did the petitioner recognize
commencement of the expropriation proceedings. The private respondents ownership and negotiate for the
exception finds application where the owner would be voluntary purchase of the property. A Deed of Sale with
given undue incremental advantages arising from the provisional payment and subject to negotiations for the
use to which the government devotes the property correct price was then executed. learly, this is not the
expropriated -as for instance, the extension of a main intent nor the expropriation contemplated by law. This is
thoroughfare. a simple attempt at a voluntary purchase and sale.
3. Side Issue: Where is there "taking" of property? Obviously, the petitioner neglected and/or refused to
This Court has defined the elements of taking as the exercise the power of eminent domain.
main ingredient in the exercise of power of eminent Only in 1992, after the private respondent sued to
domain in Republic v. Castelvi: recover possession and petitioner filed its Complaint to
A number of circumstances must be present in the expropriate, did petitioner manifest its intention to
taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) exercise the power of eminent domain.
the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entrance into private property must be for more than a
momentary period; (3) the entry into the property should G.R. NO. 146062, JUNE 28, 2001
be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. V. CLARITA VDA. DE
property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise ONORIO
informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5)
NATURE: petition for review of CA which affirmed RTC
the utilization of the property for public use must be in
ordering National Irrigation Administration (NIA) to pay
such a way to oust the owner and deprive him of all
respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as just
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
compensation for the taking of the latters property.
Here, in this case, the petitioners entrance in 1978 was
1. Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in
without intent to expropriate or was not made under
Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato.
warrant or color of legal authority, for it believed the
2. October 6, 1981 - Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project
property was public land covered by Proclamation No.
Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the
1354. When the private respondent raised his claim of
main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting
ownership sometime in 1979, the petitioner flatly
a 24,660 square meter portion thereof.
refused the claim for compensation, nakedly insisted
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 214
3. 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
between respondent and the NIA. The NIA then paid right to take the property sought to be condemned, for
respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way the public use or purpose described in the complaint
damages. Respondent subsequently executed an upon the payment of just compensation to be
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. .
waived any compensation for damages to crops and ..
improvements which she suffered as a result of the It is now provided that
construction of a right-of-way on her property SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to
4.The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum and the defense against the right of the plaintiff to
of P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement. expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party
5. Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court
property, but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the
respondent filed on December 10, 1990 a complaint plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of in the complaint, upon the payment of just
P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her compensation to be determined as of the date of the
property used in the construction of the canal taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
constructed by the NI whichever came first.
2. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST property may be appealed by any party aggrieved
COMPENSATION SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the
THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR FROM THE TIME OF court from determining the just compensation to be
THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION - TAKING! paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not
1. There are instances where the expropriating agency be permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding
takes over the property prior to the expropriation suit, in except on such terms as the court deems just and
which case just compensation shall be determined as of equitable.
the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the 3. Thus, the value of the property must be determined
action of eminent domain. either as of the date of the taking of the property or
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4 provided: the filing of the complaint, "whichever came first."
Order of condemnation. When such a motion is 4. Even before the new rule, however, it was already
overruled or when any party fails to defend as required held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that
by this rule, the court may enter an order of the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 215
after the passage of time, represents the true value to the trial court to make an assessment of the
be paid as just compensation. It was, therefore, error for expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per
the Court of Appeals to rule that the just compensation hectare basis.
to be paid to respondent should be determined as of the
filing of the complaint in 1990, and not the time of its G.R. NO. 129998, DECEMBER 29, 1998
taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. LOURDES
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and HENSON
it was respondent who filed the complaint.
NATURE: appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the
5. Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by
Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court of
many factors. It may be enhanced on account of its
Appeals , which affirmed with modification the decision
taking for public use, just as it may depreciate. As
of the Regional Trial Court, ordering Napocor to pay
observed in Republic v. Lara:
respondents landowners/claimants just compensation
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
for the taking of their five (5) parcels of land
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be
1. March 21, 1990 - NPC originally instituted with RTC
enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the
for eminent domain, later amended on October 11,
entry by the plaintiff upon the property may have
1990, for the taking for public use of five (5) parcels of
depreciated its value thereby; or there may have been a
land, owned or claimed by respondents, with a total
natural increase in the value of the property from the
aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to
expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
general economic conditions. The owner of private
2. Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of
property should be compensated only for what he
the five (5) parcels of land sought to be expropriated,
actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation
situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga.
shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels
loses is only the actual value of his property at the time
of land, comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square
it is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be
meters, for the expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.
paid can be truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual
3. July 10, 1990 - the court fixed the provisional value of
whose property is taken, "but to the public, which is to
the land at P100.00 per square meter, for a total area of
pay for it" . . . .
63,220 square meters of respondents' property, to be
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in
deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.
question is P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for
Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990.
1982, based on the appraisal report submitted by the
4. September 5, 1990 - trial court issued a writ of
commission (composed of the provincial treasurer,
possession in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11,
assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato) constituted by
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 216
1990, the court's deputy sheriff placed petitioner in Subdivision. The land in question, however, was an
possession of the subject land undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in
5. April 5, 1991 - the trial court issued an order character, though re-classified as residential.
appointing three (3) commissioners to aid the court in 3. Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a board of
the reception of evidence to determine just commissioners to help it determine the market value of
compensation for the taking of the subject property. the land did not conduct a hearing on the report of the
6. May 19, 1993 - the trial court rendered judgment commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair market
fixing the amount of just compensation to be paid by value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of
petitioner for the taking of the entire area of 63,220 lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This
square meters at P400.00 per square meter, with legal finds no support in the evidence. The valuation was
interest thereon computed from September 11, 1990, even higher than the recommendation of anyone of the
when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, commissioners.
plus attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the
proceedings. Petitioner then appealed to CA, which
affirmed the RTC. REPUBLIC V KER CO. [GR NO. 136171 (JULY 2, 2002)]
Facts: Petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of
ISSUE: W the valuation of the commissioners is correct
Davao City apetition for expropriation of portions of two
- No, because they based the valuation on adjacent
parcels of land owned by respondent. Petitioner needed
residential lots.
the parcels of land for the widening of the road
1. The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are
component of J.P. Laurel-BuhanginInterchange in
undeniably idle, undeveloped, raw agricultural land,
Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision
bereft of any improvement. Except for the Henson
of a fair just compensation for defendant Ker
family, all the other respondents were admittedly farmer
Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner
beneficiaries under operation land transfer of the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has
Department of Public Works and Highways alleging that
been re-classified as residential. The nature and
just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner
character of the land at the time of its taking is the
alleged that when the petition for expropriation was
principal criterion to determine just compensation
filed, the taxdeclaration of the property indicated its
to the landowner.
assessed value at a lower price.
2. In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
fixed the value of the land at P400.00 per square meter,
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ker Company was
which was the selling price of lots in the adjacent fully
given a decision for fair just compensation.
developed subdivision, the Santo Domingo Village
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 217
CITY OF CEBU VS. SPOUSES APOLONIO AND BLASA The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National
DEDAMO Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals. We did not
[G.R. NO. 142971, MAY 7, 2002] categorically rule in that case that just compensation
should be determined as of the filing of the complaint.
We explicitly stated therein that although the general
DAVIDE, JR., C .J:
rule in determining just compensation in eminent
FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of
domain is the value of the property as of the date of the
Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against
filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception:
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo.
where this Court fixed the value of the property as of the
The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 218
date it was taken and not at the date of the longer be found because the records were
commencement of the expropriation proceedings." completely destroyed and lost when the Office of
the City Engineer was demolished by typhoon
Nitang in 1994.
NEPOMUCENO V CITY OF SURIGAO [GR NO. 146091 RTC ordered the City to pay spouses
(JULY 28, 2008)] Nepomuceno the sum of P5,000.00 as attorneys
fees, and the further sum of P3,260.00 as
FACTS:
compensation for the portion of land in dispute,
Maria Paz Nepomuceno filed a complaint to
with legal interest thereon from 1960 until fully
recover a 652 sq. m. portion of her 50,000 sq. m.
paid, and upon payment, directing her to execute
lot which was occupied, developed and used as a
the corresponding deed of conveyance in favor of
city road by the city government of Surigao. Maria
the said City.
Paz alleged that the city government neither
o The claims for moral and exemplary
asked her permission to use the land nor
damages are denied for lack of basis
instituted expropriation proceedings for its
CA modified the RTC decision and held that
acquisition.
petitioners were entitled to P30,000 as moral
She wrote respondent (then Surigao City Mayor)
damages for having been rebuffed by Mayor
Salvador Sering a letter proposing an amicable
Sering in the presence of other people. It also
settlement for the payment of the portion taken
awarded petitioners P20,000 as attorneys fees
over by the city. They subsequently met with
and litigation expenses considering that they were
Mayor Sering to discuss their proposal but the
forced to litigate to protect their rights and had to
mayor rebuffed them in public and refused to pay
travel to Surigao City from their residence in
them anything.
Ormoc City to prosecute their claim. The CA
A second letter was sent to sought the Mayors affirmed the decision of the trial court in all other
reconsideration but they were again turned down. respects.
respondents admitted the existence of the road in SPOUSES NEPOMUCENO claim that, in fixing
question but alleged that it was constructed way the value of their property, justice and equity
back in the 1960s during the administration of demand that the value at the time of actual
former Mayor Pedro Espina. At that time, the lot payment should be the basis, not the value at the
was owned by the spouses Vicente and Josefa time of the taking as the RTC and CA held. They
Fernandez who signed a road right-of-way demandP200/sq. m. or a total sum of P130,400
agreement in favor of the municipal government. plus legal interest.
However, a copy of the agreement could no
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 219
petitioner. The same were denied by the February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the
respondent court. said motion allowing 12% interest per annum.
Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid Subsequently, the other private respondents filed
consolidated decision, which became final and motions also praying that the legal interest on the
executory. just compensation awarded to them be computed
May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the
[Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August
the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import.
praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the NPC moved for a reconsideration of the lower
unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging
expropriated from her, including legal interest that the main decision had already become
which she computed at 6% per annum. The final and executory with its compliance of
said motion was granted by the lower court. depositing the sums of money as just
Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner compensation for the lands condemned, with
to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said
money as adjudged in the joint decision dated main decision can no longer be modified or
June 15, 1979. changed by the lower court; and that PD 116 is
Petitioner complied with said order and deposited not applicable to this case because it is Art.
the sums of money with interest computed at 6% 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.
per annum. January 25, 1982, the lower court denied
February 10, 1981, one of the private petitioner's, motion for reconsideration.
respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through
counsel, filed with the trial court an ex- ISSUE:
parte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for WON in the computation of the legal rate of interest on
the first time, that the legal interest on the just just compensation for expropriated lands, the law
compensation awarded to her by the court be applicable is Central Bank Circular No. 416 which
computed at 12% per annum as allegedly fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.
"authorized under and by virtue of Circular
No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to HELD/RATIO:
PD 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court NO.
that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the
courts, in the absence of express contract, shall Central Bank Circular No. 416 reads:
be computed at 12% per annum."
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 221
By virtue of the authority granted to it under The purpose of the rule on ejusdem generis is to give
Section 1 of Act No. 2655, as amended, effect to both the particular and general words, by
otherwise known as the "Usury Law," the treating the particular words as indicating the class and
Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 1622 dated the general words as including all that is embraced in
July 29, 1974, has prescribed that the rate of said class, although not specifically named by the
interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, particular words.
goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract as Applying the said rule on statutory construction to
to such rate of interest, shall be twelve per cent Central Bank Circular No. 416, the general term
(12%) per annum. "judgments" can refer only to judgments in cases
involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the Central credits.
Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits. his has already been settled in Obviously, therefore, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and
several cases decided by this Court. Private not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable
respondents, however, take exception to the inclusion of to the case at bar. Said law reads:
the term "judgments" in the said circular, claiming that Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment
such term refers to any judgment directing the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs a delay,
of legal interest, which term includes the questioned the indemnity for damages, there being no
judgment of the lower court in the case at bar. stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of
the interest agreed upon, and in the absence of
The term "judgments" as used in Section 1 of the Usury stipulation, the legal interest, which is six
Law, as well as in Central Bank Circular No. 416, should percent per annum.
be interpreted to mean only judgments involving loan or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, following the Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions
principle of ejusdem generis. Under this doctrine, where requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in
general terms follow the designation of particular things connection with any delay in the performance of the
or classes of persons or subjects, the general term will obligation arising therefrom other than those covering
be construed to comprehend those things or persons of loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.
the same class or of the same nature as those
specifically enumerated. In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not
a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but
expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 222
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation The area which the DAR offered to acquire
regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial excluded idle lands, river and road located
court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the
legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just DAR to indorse the case to the Department of
compensation for the properties expropriated is Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a
delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind summary administrative proceeding.
of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower Pending litigation, DARAB requested Land Bank
court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by to open a trust account in the name of Wycoco
way of damages, and not by way of earnings from and deposited the compensation offered by DAR.
loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply. In the meantime, the property was distributed to
farmer-beneficiaries.
Wycoco decided to forego with the filing of the
WYCOCO V CASPILLO [GR NO. 146733 (JANUARY 13, required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13,
2004)] 1993, the instant case for determination of just
J. Ynares-Santiago compensation with the Regional Trial Court of
FACTS: Cabanatuan City.
Wycoco is the registered owner of a 94.1690 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land Wycoco. It ruled that there is no need to present
situated in the Sitios of Ablang, Saguingan and evidence in support of the land valuation
Pinamunghilan, Barrio of San Juan, Licab, Nueva inasmuch as it is of public knowledge that the
Ecija. prevailing market value of agricultural lands sold
In line with the CARP of the government, Wycoco in Licab, Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to
voluntarily offered to sell the land to the 150,000.00 per hectare. The court thus took
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 judicial notice thereof and fixed the compensation
million. for the entire 94.1690 hectare land at
P142,500.00 per hectare or a total of
After the DARs evaluation of the application and
P13,428,082.00. It also awarded Wycoco actual
the determination of the just compensation by the
damages for unrealized profits plus legal interest.
Land Bank of the Philippines, a notice of intention
to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for
ISSUES:
P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco ( modified to
P2,280,159.82).
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 223
(1) WON the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, give way to and in recognition of the courts
validly acquired jurisdiction over the instant case for power to determine just compensation.
determination of just compensation.
(2) Assuming that it acquired jurisdiction, WON the 2. NO.
compensation arrived at is supported by evidence. In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the
(3) WON Wycoco can compel the DAR to purchase the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged
entire land subject of the voluntary offer to sell. prevailing market value of agricultural lands in
(4) WON the awards of interest and damages for Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of
unrealized profits is valid. its intention to take judicial notice thereof.
The DAR cannot be compelled to purchase the Accordingly, the just compensation due Wycoco
entire property voluntarily offered by Wycoco. The should bear 12% interest per annum from the
power to determine whether a parcel of land may time LBP opened a trust account in his name up
come within the coverage of the Comprehensive to the time said account was actually converted
Agrarian Reform Program is essentially lodged into cash and LBP bonds deposit accounts. The
with the DAR. That Wycoco will suffer damages basis of the 12% interest would be the just
by the DARs non-acquisition of the approximately compensation that would be determined by the
10 hectare portion of the entire land which was Special Agrarian Court upon remand of the
found to be not suitable for agriculture is no instant case. In the same vein, the amount
justification to compel DAR to acquire the whole determined by the Special Agrarian Court would
area. also be the basis of the interest income on the
cash and bond deposits due Wycoco from the
4. PARTLY MERITOUS time of the taking of the property up to the time of
In some expropriation cases, the Court imposed actual payment of just compensation.
an interest of 12% per annum on the just
compensation due the landowner. It must be The award of actual damages for unrealized
stressed, however, that in these cases, the profits should be deleted. The amount of loss
imposition of interest was in the nature of must not only be capable of proof, but must be
damages for delay in payment which in effect proven with a reasonable degree of certainty. The
makes the obligation on the part of the claim must be premised upon competent proof or
government one of forbearance. It follows that the upon the best evidence obtainable, such as
interest in the form of damages cannot be applied receipts or other documentary proof. None having
where there was prompt and valid payment of just been presented in the instant case, the claim for
compensation. Conversely, where there was unrealized profits cannot be granted.
delay in tendering a valid payment of just
compensation, imposition of interest is in order.
This is because the replacement of the trust DE KNECHT V CA [GR NO. 108015 (MAY 20, 1998)]
account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso
facto cure the lack of compensation; for
Facts: The instant case is an unending sequel to
essentially, the determination of this
several suits commenced almost twenty years ago
compensation was marred by lack of due
involving a parcel of land located at the corner of the
process.
south end of EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City.
The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 225
and her son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts however ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their
constructed eight houses, leased out the seven and residence was demolished.
occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the
government filed for the expropriation of Knechts The Knechts continuously claimed ownership of the
property. The government wanted to use the land for property and allege that they must be given just
the completion of the Manila Flood Control and compensation.
Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA
towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City Treasurer ISSUE: Whether or not Knechts are the lawful owners
of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay of the land at subject.
real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As
a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer HELD: The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were
sold the property at public auction for the same amount not the ownersanymore of the said land. The Knechts'
of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were right to the land had been foreclosed after they failed to
respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa Babiera (the redeem it one year after the sale at public auction.
Babieras) and respondent Spouses Alejandro Since the petitions questioning the order of dismissal
and Flor Sangalang (the Sangalangs). Subsequently, were likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals and
Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent this Court, theorder of dismissal became final and res
Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, judicata on the issue of ownership of the land.
the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 Petitioners contended that they did not receive notice of
authorizing the national government to expropriate their tax delinquency. Neither did they receive notice
certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. of the auction sale. However, this question has been
The property of the Knechts was part of those previously raised in the cases which have been already
expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave set aside. The court is not a trier of facts. Res judicata
out just compensation for the lands expropriated under has already set it. The Knechts therefore are not the
B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and received partial lawful owners of the land and are not any longer
payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts accountable for just compensation given by the
were demolished and the government took possession government.
of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Since
the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal of an
house, Salem filed a case against them for unlawful action. It is a rule that precludes parties from relitigating
detainer. As defense, the Knechts claimed ownership of Issue actually litigated and determined by a prior and
the land and building. The Municipal Trial Court final judgment. It pervades every well-regulated system
of jurisprudence, and is based upon two grounds
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 226
embodied in various maxims of the common law one, Province of Rizal, and lies along the water front of
public policy and necessity, that there should be a limit Manila Bay, a few miles south of the city of
to litigation; and another, the individual should not be Manila. It is stated in communication of the
vexed twice for the same cause. When a right of fact Governor-General that the property in question is
has been judicially tried and determined by a court of desired by the Government of the Philippine
competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial Islands for military and aviation purposes.
has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it Numerous persons are named in the complaint as
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the defendants because of their supposed ownership
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To of portions of the property intended to be
follow a contrary doctrine would subject the public expropriated. In the list of persons thus impleaded
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals appear the names of the three petitioners herein,
and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition of namely, the Visayan Refining Co., Dean C.
the parties to the preservation of the public tranquility. Worcester, and Fred A. Leas, who are severally
owners of different portions of the property in
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former judgment or question.
order is final; (2) the judgment or order is one on the Visayan Refining, Worcester and Leas nterposed
merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction a demurrer, questioning the validity of the
over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there is proceedings on the ground that there is no Act of
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, the Philippine Legislature authorizing the exercise
of subject matter and of cause of action. of the power of eminent domain to acquire land
for military or aviation purposes.
Contemporaneously with the filing of their
VISAYAN REFINING V CAMUS [GR NO. L-15870 ( demurrer, the same parties moved the Court of
DECEMBER 3, 1919)] First Instance to revoke its order of September
J. STREET 15, giving the plaintiff provisional possession.
FACTS: This motion is based substantially on the same
Sept. 13, 1919: the Governor-General directed ground as the demurrer, that is, the lack of
the Attorney-General to cause condemnation legislative authority for the proposed
proceedings to be begun for the purpose of expropriation, but it contains one additional
expropriating a tract of land of an area of about allegation to the effect that the deposit in
1,100,463 square meters, commonly known as court of the sum of P600,000, had been made
the site of Camp Tomas Claudio. Said land is without authority of law.
located in the municipality of Paraaque,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 227
1988, after B.P. Blg. 340 was passed Pasay City RTC, Br. 111, declared Guerrero the
authorizing the expropriation of a portion of the rightful owner of the 920-square meter
land, consisting of 1,380 square meters, of the De expropriated property and ordered payment to
la Ramas. The only issue in this case is who, him of just compensation for the taking of the
between the De la Ramas and Guerrero, is/are land.
entitled to receive payment of just
compensation for the taking of 920 square ISSUE: WON Guerrero is entitled to receive just
meters of the land in question? compensation.
o The De la Ramas claim that they should
receive the amount of just compensation HELD/RATIO:
because when they agreed to sell Lot 834 YES.
in 1988 to Guerrero, it did not include the Expropriation may be initiated by court action or by
portion expropriated by the Republic since, legislation.[25] In both instances, just compensation is
at that time, such portion had been determined by the courts.
expropriated by the government by virtue of
B.P. Blg. 340, which took effect on The expropriation of lands consists of two stages. As
February 17, 1983. explained in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia:
o On the other hand, Alfredo Guerrero The first is concerned with the
argues that the title to the expropriated determination of the authority of the plaintiff
portion of Lot 834 did not immediately pass to exercise the power of eminent domain
to the government upon the enactment of and the propriety of its exercise in the
B.P. Blg. 340 in 1983, as payment of just context of the facts involved in the suit. It
compensation was yet to be made before ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the
ownership of the land was transferred to action, "of condemnation declaring that the
the government. As a result, petitioners still plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
owned the entire Lot 834 at the time they property sought to be condemned, for the
agreed to sell it to Guerrero. Therefore, public use or purpose described in the
since Guerrero obtained ownership of Lot complaint, upon the payment of just
834, including the 920 square meters compensation to be determined as of the
expropriated by the government, he has the date of the filing of the complaint". . . .
right to receive the just compensation over The second phase of the eminent domain
the said property. action is concerned with the determination
by the court of "the just compensation for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 230
the property sought to be taken." This is including the expropriated area, which was then owned
done by the court with the assistance of not by the De la Ramas.
more than three (3) commissioners. . . .
It is true that the contract to sell did not convey to
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that Guerrero the subject parcel of land described therein.
expropriation is said to have been completed. Moreover, However, it created an obligation on the part of the De
it is only upon payment of just compensation that title la Ramas to convey the land, subject to the fulfillment of
over the property passes to the government. Therefore, the suspensive conditions therein stated. The
until the action for expropriation has been completed declaration of this contracts validity, which paved the
and terminated, ownership over the property being way for the subsequent execution of the Deed of
expropriated remains with the registered owner. Absolute Sale on March 8, 1994, following the order of
Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights the Regional Trial Court for its execution, by the Clerk of
pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of Court, Branch 113, Pasay City, effectively conveyed
his property, subject to the power of the State ultimately ownership of said parcel of land to Guerrero.
to acquire it through expropriation.
In the case at hand, the first stage of expropriation CITY OF MANILA V ROXAS [GR NO. L-39671 (JUNE 29,
was completed when B.P. Blg. 340 was enacted 1934)]
providing for the expropriation of 1,380 square meters of
J. Hull
the land in question. The constitutionality of this law was
FACTS:
upheld in the case of Republic v. De Knecht. In 1990,
the government commenced the second stage of The City of Manila appeals from the orders of the
expropriation through the filing of a petition for the Court of First Instance of Manila awarding to two
determination of just compensation. This stage was private property owners whose lands were taken
not completed, however, because of the intervention by expropriation proceedings, an allowance for
of Guerrero which gave rise to the question of the taxes paid to the City of Manila under protest,
ownership of the subject land. Therefore, the title to the covering a period of time between the
expropriated property of the De la Ramas remained with dispossession of the owners and the taking of title
them and did not at that point pass to the government. by the city.
five years, the Republic failed to pay them their just basis of non-payment, respondents ignore the fact that
compensation for the expropriated area. the right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of
During this period, Pres Estrada also issued an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy
proclamation No. 22 which transferred 20 hectares of of rescission might perhaps apply After condemnation,
said property to Bulacan State University and another 5 the paramount title is in the public under a new and
hectares was dedicated for the propagation of Philippine independent title;] thus, by giving notice to all claimants
carabaos. to a disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a
Petitioner filed its manifestation that it would be judicial process for securing better title against all the
depositing the amount equivalent to the just world than may be obtained by voluntary conveyance.
compensation of the property. Respondent filed a The court also cited Valedhueza v Republic, wherein it
counter motion to raise the price of the property or an was held that both by virtue of the judgment, long final,
option to have the property returned to them. in the expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon
RTC issued the assailed order of returning the property their title certificates, plaintiffs are not entitled to recover
to the respondents. CA affirmed this decision. possession of their expropriated lots - which are still
devoted to the public use for which they were
ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to the return of expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value
the expropriated property for the failure of petitioner to of the same.
pay the just compensation for it. The case cited by respondents which is Sorsogon v Vda
de Villaroya, wherein the court ordered the return of the
HELD/RATIO: property does not apply in the case at hand. That case
No, The right of eminent domain is usually understood involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to
to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty merely delegated and of limited application.
for a public purpose
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the
conventional sense, for the condemning authority is not REPUBLIC V VICENTE LIM
required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. JUNE 29, 2005
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect
FACTS:
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession
The petitioner, Republic instituted expropriation
of the property, and the defendant asserts title or
proceedings with the CFI of Cebu for Lots 932 and 939
interest in the property, not to prove a right to
of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
owned by the Denzons, for the purpose of establishing
taking. In arguing for the return of their property on the
a military reservation for the Philippine Army. RTC
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 233
ordered the land to be expropriated upon payment of predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16, 248.40 as
just compensation. reasonable market value of the two lots in question.
For failure of the petitioner to pay the just Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several
compensation, in 1961, Valdehueza and Panerio, the decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate.
successor in interest of the Denzons filed a suit for Such prolonged obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect
damages and recovery of possession of the land to private rights and to the rule of law, which we cannot
against AFP. CFI ruled in favor of Valdehueza and countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private
Panerio but held that they were not entitled to the return property.
of the property because of the notation in the TCT which While it is true that all private properties are subject to
stated that, subject to the priority of the National the need of government, and the government may take
Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of land, them whenever the necessity or the exigency of the
Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a occasion demands, however, the Constitution
reasonable market value. They were ordered to guarantees that when this governmental right of
execute a deed of sale in favor the Republic. expropriation is exercised, it shall be attended by
In 1964, since the Republic still failed to pay the just compensation. From the taking of private property by
compensation Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged the the government under the power of eminent domain,
land to Vicente Lim, who later foreclosed the mortgage there arises an implied promise to compensate the
in 1976 for the formers failure to pay. owner for his loss.
In 1991, Lim instituted a suit for quieting of title against There are two stages in expropriation. The first stage
AFP and the Republic. The RTC held that Lim was the determines the authority to exercise the power of
absolute and exclusive owner of the property. This eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the
decision was sustained by the CA. context of the facts involved in the suit. The second
A petition for certiorari was filed with SC but the SC phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with
affirmed the CA decision. A second motion for the determination by the court of the just compensation
reconsideration was filed. for the property sought to be taken. It is only upon the
completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
ISSUE: WON the Republic has retained ownership of to have been completed.
the land despite its failure to pay respondents The recognized rule is that title to the property
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation. expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just
HELD/RATIO: compensation, and that non-payment of just
As early as May 19, 1966, in Valdehueza, this Court compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does
mandated the Republic to pay respondents not entitle the private landowners to recover possession
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 234
of the expropriated lots. However, the facts of the In the appeal to RTC, the decision was reversed. Belen
present case do not justify its application. It bears appealed but this was dismissed upon the expropriation
stressing that the Republic was ordered to pay just of the said property by Presidential Decree No. 1670.
compensation twice; the first was in the expropriation His appeal with the CA was also denied. The decision
proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven declared that by virtue of the decree, Manotok Realty,
(57) years have passed since then. We cannot but Inc. ceased to be the owner of the land, including the lot
construe the Republics failure to pay just compensation leased to Belen, and could not interfere with the
as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such possession, administration, control and disposition of
circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In the National Housing Authority (NHA); It also held that
cases where the government failed to pay just Manotok's lease contract with Belen over the lot in
compensation within five (5) years from the finality question also ipso facto ended, as well as the sublease
of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, between Belen and Juliano. Thus the appeal on
the owners concerned shall have the right to certiorari with the SC
recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that the government ISSUE: WON there was valid expropriation of the
cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. property
HELD/RATIO:
No. PD No. 1670, together with a companion decree,
BELEN V CA numbered 1669 which attempted to expropriate by
similar legislative fiat another property, the so-called
A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100)
"Tambunting Estate" was struck down by this Court
square meters, more or less, belonging to the Manotoc
as "unconstitutional and therefore, null and void.
Services, Inc. was leased to Pedro M. Belen. In the
The Court found that both the decrees, being "violative
early part of 1978 part of the land came to be occupied
of the petitioners' (owners') right to due process of law,"
by Alfredo Juliano and his family without Belens
failed "the test of constitutionality," and that, additionally,
consent. Belen and Juliano came to an agreement that
they were tainted by another infirmity as regards "the
he would be allowed to stay temporarily by paying half
determination of just compensation."
of the rentals to Manotok Services
PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in reliance
A fire razed their properties. Upon Julianos pleas, he
thereon and in accordance therewith must also be
was allowed to build another house in the property for a
deemed void ab initio, including particularly the taking of
period of 2 years. However, after the stipulated
possession of the property by the National Housing
period, he still refused to vacate and thus a suit was
Authority and its attempts to convert the same into a
filed against him wherein the court (MTC) ordered him
to vacate the premises.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 235
housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries During this period, Filstream filed for motion for
thereof. execution for the ejectment suit which became final. The
private respondents filed for a motion to quash or stay
the execution due to the supervening event which is the
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL V CA expropriation the said property which was denied. Thus
JANUARY 23, 1998 private respondents filed for a writ of preliminary
injunction with the RTC which was granted. The case
FACTS:
for issuance of writ of execution and petition for
Petitioner Filstream is the owner of adjacent parcels of
certiorari with RTC were consolidated. A motion to
land situated in Antonio Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila.
dismiss was filed by Filstream for violation of Supreme
On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an ejectment suit
Court Circular No. 04-94 (forum shopping).
before MTC of Manila against private respondents on
Filstream then filed for writ of demolition which was
the grounds of termination of the lease contract and
granted. Private respondents then filed petition for
non-payment of rentals. MTC ordered respondents to
certiorari and prohibition with the CA which granted a
vacate the premises and pay the back rentals. This
preliminary injunction. Filstream now files a petition
decision was affirmed by the RTC and CA upon which
for certiorari with the SC to nullify the resolutions of
the decision became final and executory.
the CA. The two cases were consolidated.
However, pending the earlier a case, a negotiation has
already taken place between Mayor Lim of Manila and
ISSUE:
Filstream for the acquisition by negotiation of said
WON petitioners were denied due process of law by
property. The said properties were to be sold and
the CA when it outrightly dismissed its petition for
distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to
failure to submit clear and readable copies.
the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. Thus the city of Manila filed a suit for eminent
HELD/RATIO:
domain with the RTC of Manila. Filstream filed a motion
Yes. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural
to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
rules in this case would defeat rather than meet the
that this was filed only to circumvent the decision in the
ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the
ejectment suit and that the price offered was too low
substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the appeal
and thus violative of the just compensation provision.
filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss and held the land
property rights over the disputed premises which have
expropriated upon payment of just compensation by the
been expropriated and have in fact been ordered
public respondents. Appeal to the CA was denied for
condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the
failure to submit clearer and readable copies. Thus the
dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation
petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 236
ISSUE:
WON the right to due process of the petitioners was FRANCIA V MUNICPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN
violated by respondent Republic MARCH 24, 2008
A complaint for expropriation was filed by respondent
Municipality of Meycauayan against petitioners Francia
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 238
complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and (9) months and thirteen (13) days from the filing of
substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent the Original Complaint, before it filed the Motion for
to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the Issuance of Writ of Possession.
property to be expropriated based on its current tax No, Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 does not put a time
declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, limit as to when a local government may immediately
the issuance of a writ of possession becomes ministerial take possession of the real property. As long as the
In City of Manila v. Serrano this Court ruled that expropriation proceedings have been commenced and
hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not the deposit has been made, the local government unit
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements cannot be barred from praying for the issuance of a writ
provided in Rep. Act No. 7279. x x x The determination of possession.
of this question must await the hearing on the complaint
for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
condemnation of the properties sought to be
expropriated. From the foregoing, it is clear that an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted if compliance
with the requirements for socialized housing has been NAPOCOR V POBRE
made. This hearing, however, is not a hearing to AUGUST 12, 2004
determine if a writ of possession is to be issued, but
FACTS:
whether there was compliance with the requirements for
Pobre is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land
socialized housing.
("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of
For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements
Tiwi, Albay which he later began developing as a resort-
are required: the sufficiency in form and substance of
subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs
the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In
Resort Subdivision."
fact, no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of
In 1965, NPC started to become interested in the
possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of
property after it was certified by the Commission on
the complaint for expropriation can be determined by
Volcanology that the thermal mineral water and steam
the mere examination of the allegations of the
suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial
complaint.
or industrial use. NPC is a public corporation created to
generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other
WON there has been a waiver on the part of
power and to transmit electric power nationwide and is
petitioner to ask for immediate possession since it
authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the
took the latter eight (8) months and twelve (12) days
right of eminent domain
from the filing of the Amended Complaint, and nine
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 241
Initially in 1972, it leased 11 lots from Pobre for a period Motion for reconsideration with the RTC was denied. CA
of one year. However, in 1975, it filed an expropriation affirmed RTC decision. Thus petition with the SC.
case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-
meter portion of the Property to which the court granted ISSUE: WON petitioner had the right to dismiss its
upon payment of just compensation. NPC began drilling own complaint in eminent domain cases.
operations and construction of steam wells. NPC No, NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 171
dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right
by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of
altered the topography of some portions of the Property. the complaint once the defendant had served on the
NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment
continued with its dumping. before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of
Thirdly, on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its the complaint. Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed
second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss,
additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the
the property subject of the petition. NPC needed the lot same applies.
for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the
Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint
Republic Act No. 5092 precisely because the landowner may have already
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for suffered damages at the start of the taking. The
expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the
Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the complaint has always been subject to court approval
lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of and to certain conditions
damages.
On 1985, NPC also filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that it had found an alternative site and that it G.R. NO. 139495. NOVEMBER 27, 2000
had already abandoned the said project in Pobres MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
property. AUTHORITY (MCIAA) V. COURT OF APPEALS AND
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss but without VIRGINIA CHIONGBIAN
prejudice to Pobres allegation in relation to damages he
incurred. RTC later ruled in favor of Pobre and ordered 1
SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order
NPC to pay the value iof the property and for Pobre to of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for
execute the deed of sale upon full payment. summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice,
except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has
once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit
shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 242
merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession that its present use differs from the purpose originally
of the property, and the defendant asserts title or contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings.
interest in the property, not to prove a right to The argument is of no moment. The property has
possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the assumed a public character upon its expropriation.
taking. Surely, petitioner, as the condemnor and as the owner
Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: of the property, is well within its rights to alter and
(1) the taking must be for public use, decide the use of that property, the only limitation being
(2) just compensation must be given to the private that it be for public use.
owner of the property. (2)as ruled in Valdehueza v Republic, plaintiffs are not
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots -
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance which are still devoted to the public use for which they
between the State interests, on the one hand, and were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market
private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively value
restraining the former and affording protection to the In this case, petitioner has occupied, utilized an
latter. exercised dominion over the property pursuant to the
In determining public use, two approaches are utilized judgment. The right of the expropriatory authority is far
from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which
(1) public employment or the actual use by the the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in
public, and remproceeding, condemnation acts upon the
(2) public advantage or benefit. property.After condemnation, the paramount title is in
It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to the public under a new and independent title; thus, by
constant growth, which is to say that as society giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title,
advances, its demands upon the individual so condemnation proceedings provide a judicial process
increases, and each demand is a new use to which the for securing better title against all the world than may be
resources of the individual may be devoted. obtained by voluntary conveyance.
In this case, the expropriated property has been shown (3) The constitutional limitation of just
to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a compensation is considered to be the sum
significant portion thereof being ceded for the expansion equivalent to the market value of the property,
of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for broadly described to be the price fixed by the
the propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in seller in open market in the usual and ordinary
line with the requirements of public purpose. course of legal action and competition or the fair
Respondents question the public nature of the utilization value of the property as between one who
by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 246
receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at ISSUE: WON the property is covered by CARP despite
the time of the actual taking by the government. fact that part of it is a watershed area?
Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having HELD: remanded to DARAB
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must RA 6657 provides for two modes of acquisition: (1)
include interests on its just value to be computed from compulsory (2) voluntary.
the time the property is taken to the time when In compulsory acquisition of private lands, the
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the landholding, the landowners and farmer beneficiaries
court. must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall
In fine, between the taking of the property and the send a notice of acquisition to the landowner, by
actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) conspicuous place in the municipal building and
the position he was in before the taking occurred. barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
In this case, the lower court was correct in imposing If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a
interests on the zonal value of the property to be deed of transfer in favor of the government and
computed from the time petitioner instituted surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty (30) days
condemnation proceedings and took the property. from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the
purchase price.
G.R. NO. 112526, OCTOBER 12, 2001 If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make
STA ROSA REALTY V CA a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative
proceedings to determine just compensation for the
FACTS:
land. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding
Sta Rosa Realty was the registered owner of two
payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response
parcels of land that according to petitioner, were
from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation
watersheds which respondents usurped its rights.
in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The
These respondents sought an easement of right of way
DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and
over the area and petitioned DAR for compulsory
cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the
acquisition, which Sta Rosa objected to since the area
name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall
was not appropriate for agricultural purposes.
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries.
DARAB however ruled in favour of the acquiisiton and
For a valid implementation of the CARP Program, two
ordered payment to Sta Rosa.
notices are required: (1) the notice of coverage and
letter of invitation
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 247
(2) the notice of acquisition sent to the landowner of CARP because of its very high slopes, the Court
The importance of the first notice, that is, the notice of directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the
coverage and the letter of invitation to a conference, issue.
and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are
steps designed to comply with the requirements of
administrative due process. The implementation of the G.R. NO. 139083, AUGUST 30, 2001
CARL is an exercise of the State's police power and PARIS V ALFECHE
the power of eminent domain.
FACTS:
POLICE POWER: To the extent that the CARL
Florencia Paris is the registered owner of a parcel of
prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an
land tenanted by respondents who are recipients of
exercise of police power for the regulation of private
Emancipation Patents. Paris argues that since she is
property in accordance with the Constitution.
entitled to a retention of seven (7) hectares under P.D.
EMINENT DOMAIN: But where, to carry out such
27 and/or 5 hectares and 3 hectares each for her
regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in
children under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also a
Law (CARL), the tenants are not supposed to acquire
taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking
the subject land and the Emancipation Patents
contemplated is not mere limitation of the use of the
precipitately issued to them are null and void for being
land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and
contrary to law.
physical possession of the excess and all beneficial
She argues that her homesteads are exempt from land
rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer
reform. In support of her position, she cites the
beneficiary
cases Alita v. CA8 and Patricio v. Bayug,9 in which the
In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the
Court ruled that homesteaders had a superior right to
property in question. However, payment of just
cultivate their homesteads as against their tenants.
compensation was not in accordance with the
procedural requirement. The law required payment in
ISSUES:
cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done
(1) WON Paris lands are exempt from land reform? NO
by DAR.
(2)WON Paris is entitled to just compensation? YES
Furthermore, there is still uncertainty as to the proper
classification of the land. While The authority of the
HELD:
municipality of Cabuyao, Laguna to issue zoning
(1)
classification is an exercise of its police power, due to
PD 27, which provides the retention limit, states:
proof showing that the the disputed parcels of land may
be excluded from the compulsory acquisition coverage
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 248
"In all cases, the landowner may retain an area of not (2)
more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is Although, under the law, tenant farmers are already
cultivating such area or will now cultivate it." deemed owners of the land they till, they are still
Clearly, the right to retain an area of seven hectares is required to pay the cost of the land, including interest,
not absolute. It is premised on the condition that the within fifteen years before the title is transferred to them.
landowner is cultivating the area sought to be retained In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondents
or will actually cultivate it upon effectivity of the law. complied with the requirement of full payment of the
In the case at bar, neither of the conditions for retention cost of the parcels of land. As they themselves
is present. As admitted by petitioner herself, the subject admitted, their value had not even been determined yet.
parcels are fully tenanted; thus, she is clearly not In the absence of such determination, the Court cannot
cultivating them, nor will she personally cultivate any rule that just compensation has already been fully paid.
part thereof. Undoubtedly, therefore, she has no right to
retain any portion of her landholdings
neither petitioner nor her heirs are personally cultivating G.R. NO. 155746, OCTOBER 13, 2004
the subject homesteads. The DAR and the CA found LAGCAO V LABRA
that respondents were the ones who had been
FACTS:
cultivating their respective portions of the disputed
The province of Cebu donated to the city of Cebu
properties.
parcels of land which the petitioners purchased on
However, petitioner can retain five (5) hectares in
instalment basis. However, problems as to their
accordance with Section 6 of RA 6657, which requires
ownership ensued. First, the Province of Cebu tried to
no qualifying condition for the landowner to be entitled
reacquire the land from which the petitioners were able
to retain such area. This ruling is in line with Association
to get a favourable decision from the court. Second, the
of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
lot they purchased had squatters which they instituted
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from which we quote:
ejectment proceedings against but during a request of
". . . In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
deferment of the demolition by the City to find another
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any, under PD
location for the squatters, the Sagguninang Panlungsod
No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new
of Cebu passed a resolution that identified Lot 1029 as
retention rights provided for by RA No. 6657, which in
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by
Thus the present petition by the petitioners alleging that
the decree."
the expropriation of the property is unconstitutional?
Petitioner's heirs, however, are not entitled to awards of
three (3) hectares each, since they are not actually
ISSUE: WON the property may be subject to
tilling the parcels or directly managing the farm
expropriation?
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 249
FACTS:
HELD: NO The City of Mandaluyong filed expropriation
While housing is one of the most serious social proceedings against defendants for urban land reform
problems of the country, local government units do not purposes. The respondents argued that they had no
possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of right to expropriate due to the ff:
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this problem. (1) Not for a public purpose
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain (2) Lots are too small and petitioner already has a lot
is (1) genuine necessity and (2) that necessity must be of other lots for socialized housing
of public character. (3) the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set
of property for purposes of urban land reform and by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00
housing. Sec 9 and 10 provide for (1) order in per square meter.
acquisition of land (2) priority in modes of acquisition. The TC ruled in the favour of respondents, stating that
In this case, the order was not followed. Private lands they were small property owners thus exempt from
rank last in the order of priority for purposes of expropriation. This was affirmed by CA thus the present
socialized housing. In the same vein, expropriation petition.
proceedings may be resorted to only after the other
modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with ISSUE: WON the lands may be expropriated?
these conditions is mandatory because these are the HELD: NO
only safeguards of oftentimes helpless owners of private Due to the passage of the Urban Det and Housing Act,
property against what may be a tyrannical violation of all city and municipal govts were
due process when their property is forcibly taken from (1) mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands and
them allegedly for public use. improvements within their respective localities
The City of Cebu failed to establish that (1) no other (2) identify lands for socialized housing and
land is appropriate for their housing projects and (2) resettlement areas for the immediate and future
exhausted all other modes of acquisition and made a needs of the underprivileged and homeless in the
valid and definite offer. urban areas,
The petition is therefore granted in favour of petitioners (3) acquire the lands
to reacquire their land. (4) dispose of said lands to the beneficiaries of the
program
Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the
G.R. NO. 137152, JANUARY 29, 2001 following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable
CITY OF MANDALUYONG V FRANCISCO lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 250
abandoned or idle lands; (4) lands within the declared Taxation) due to violation of the following constitutional
Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal provision:
Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by the
and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been expressed in the title thereof.
acquired; and (6) privately-owned lands. Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation shall be
They also may be acquired through the following uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
modes: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) progressive system of taxation.
land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) The petitioner stressed that it violates the equal
donation to the government; (6) joint venture protection clause as it only imposed taxes upon one
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) who practice his profession and not to those who are
expropriation. engaged to single proprietorship.
The mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: Article III, Section 1 No person shall be deprived of . .
(a) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of . property without due process of law, nor shall any
acquisition have been exhausted; person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
(b) parcels of land owned by small property owners are
exempt from such acquisition. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7496 violates the
In this case, the SC found that the respondents fell aforestated provision of the constitution
under small property owners which is define: those HELD:
whose only real property consists of residential lands The SC ruled in the negative. The said law is not
not exceeding three hundred square meters (300 sq.m.) arbitrary; it is germane to the purpose of the law and;
in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square applies to all things of equal conditions and of same
meters (800 sq.m.) in other urban areas." The partition class.
of the property six months after the filing of the It is neither violative of equal protection clause due to
expropriation case, terminated the co-ownership by the existence of substantial difference between one who
converting into certain and definite parts. Consequently, practice his profession alone and one who is engaged
the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 to proprietorship. Further, the SC said that RA 7496 is
square meter limit set in R.A. 7279 just an amendatory provision of the code of taxpayers
where it classifies taxpayers in to four main groups:
TAN V. DEL ROSARIO (237 SCRA 324) Individuals, Corporations, Estate under Judicial
Settlement and Irrevocable Trust. The court would have
FACTS:
appreciated the contention of the petitioner if RA 7496
Petitioner seeks declaration of unconstitutionality of
was an independent law. But since it is attached to a
RA7496 (also known as Simplified Net Income
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 251
Later, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it
account," by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) 1024, and were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil
ordered released from the National Treasury to the and petroleum products paid by consumers as well as
Ministry of Energy. some tax revenues are inputted and from which
President Corazon C. Aquino, amending PD 1956, amounts are drawn from time to time to reimburse oil
promulgated Executive Order No. 137, expanding the companies, when appropriate situations arise, for
grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude
possible cost under recovery incurred due to the importation. The OPSF is thus a buffer mechanism
reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and
amount of the under recovery being left for petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating
determination by the Ministry of Finance. every so often, and oil companies are allowed to
Petitioner argues, among others, that "the monies recover those portions of their costs which they would
collected pursuant to P.D. 1956, as amended, must be not otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or existing at any given time.
a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is collected for a
specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, this Court upheld
'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the the legality of the sugar stabilization fees and explained
purpose indicated, and not channeled to another their nature and character, viz.: The tax collected is not
government objective." Further, that since "a 'special in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a
fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the
power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily
although the use thereof is limited to the special in the exercise of the police power of the State.
purpose/objective for which it was created." Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may
be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise
ISSUES: of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the
1. Whether or not the powers granted to the OPSF is a special fund is plain from the special
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) under P.D. 1956, as treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of general fund; and while it is placed in what the law
the State. NO. refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review
HELD: The OPSF was established precisely to protect of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures
local consumers from the adverse consequences that comply with the constitutional description of a "special
such frequent oil price adjustments may have upon the fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 253
HELD: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select ISSUE: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite
what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the
may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did
and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to not have juridical personality as the constitutional
judge which cities or municipalities should be exemption for religious purpose is valid.
empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that
imposed by the National Government. That matter is HELD: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under
within the domain of political departments. The Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates
argument against double taxation may not be invoked if exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on
one tax is imposed by the state and the other is such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 254
from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the perpetuity of the purposes for which the universal
property used for religious purpose is not a violation of charge is imposed (e.g. to ensure the viability of the
the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of countrys electric power industry), further boosting the
gift inter vivos. position that the same is an exaction primarily in pursuit
of the States police objectives
The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the
real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax If generation of revenue is the primary purpose and
on the property donated to the church for religious regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax;
purpose. but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the
imposition a tax.
GEROCHE V. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
The taxing power may be used as an implement of
FACTS: RA 9136, otherwise known as the Electric
police power. The theory behind the exercise of the
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), which
power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes,
sought to impose a universal charge on all end-users of
government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the
electricity for the purpose of funding NAPOCORs
general welfare and well-being of the people.
projects, was enacted and took effect in 2001.
to 1957. In 1954, City Ordinance 3634 and 3816 were other hand, Ordinances 3634 , 3301 and 3816 imposed
passed; where the term general merchandise found taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale
therein included all articles in Sections 123 to 148 of the or retail, and are revenue measures enacted by the
Tax Code (thus, also liquor under Sedctions 133 to Municipal Board of Manila.
135). The Tabacalera paid its wholesalers and retailers
taxes. In 1954, the City Treasurer addressed a letter to Both a license fee and a tax may be imposed on the
an accounting firm, expressing the view that liquor same business or occupation, or for selling the same
dealers paying the annual wholesale and retail fixed tax article, without it being in violation of the rule against
under Ordinance 3358 are not subject to the wholesale double taxation. The contrary view of the Treasurer in
aand retail deaklers taxes prescribed by City its letter is of no consequence as the government is not
Ordinances 3634, 3301, and 3816. The Tabacalera, bound by the errors or mistakes committed by its
upon learning of said stopped including quarterly sworn officers, specially on matters of law.
declaratons required by the latter ordinances, and in The company, thus, is not entitled to refund
1957, demanded refunde of the alleged overpayment.
The claim was disallowed.
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS.
ISSUE: Whether there is a distinction between COURT OF APPEALS
Ordinance 3358 and Ordinances 3634, 3301 and 3816,
FACTS:
to prevent refund to the company.
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax
Delinquency from the City of Paraaque for the taxable
HELD: Generally, the term tax applies to all kinds of
years 1992 to 2001. MIAAs real estate tax delinquency
exactions which become public funds. Legally,
was estimated at P624 million.
however, a license fee is a legal concept quite distinct
The City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer,
from tax: the former is imposed in the exercise of
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
police power for purposes of regulation, while the latter
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
is imposed under the taxing power for the purpose of
Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the
raising revenues. Ordinance 3358 prescribes municipal
Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the
license fees for the privilege to engage in the business
real estate tax delinquency.
of selling liquor or alcohol beverages; considering that
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition
the sale of intoxicating liquor is (potentially) harmful to
for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary
public health and morals, and must be subject to
injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition
supervision or regulation by the State and by cities and
sought to restrain the City of Paraaque from imposing
municipalities authorized to act in the premises. On the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 257
real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Paranaques Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government and thus exempt from local taxation.
Government Code expressly withdrew the tax MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
exemption privileges of government-owned and- capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no
controlled corporations upon the effectivity of the Local stockholders or voting shares.
Government Code. Respondents also argue that a MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has
basic rule of statutory construction is that the express no members. A non-stock corporation must have
mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. members.
An international airport is not among the exceptions MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim functions. MIAA is like any other government
that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is
real estate tax. vested with corporate powers.
MIAAs contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are When the law vests in a government instrumentality
owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become
itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
that its taxation would not inure to any public advantage, organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it
since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax remains a government instrumentality exercising not
creditor. only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus,
MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
ISSUE: domain, police authority and the levying of fees and
WON Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises all the
from real estate tax under existing laws? Yes. Ergo, the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law,
real estate tax assessments issued by the City of insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
Paraaque, and all proceedings taken pursuant to such provisions of this Executive Order.
assessments, are void.
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by
HELD: the Republic
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
Corporation The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of
public dominion and therefore owned by the State or the
Republic of the Philippines.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 258
No one can dispute that properties of public dominion The Court has also ruled that property of public
mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like roads, dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by be the subject of an auction sale.
the State, are owned by the State. The term ports Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through
and Buildings constitute a port constructed by the public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on
State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA execution or auction sale of any property of public
Airport Lands and Buildings are properties of public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic Essential public services will stop if properties of public
of the Philippines. dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public and auction sale. This will happen if the City of
use because they are used by the public for Paraaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale
international and domestic travel and transportation. of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment
The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other of real estate tax.
charges from the public does not remove the character
of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
public use. MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and
The charging of fees to the public does not determine Buildings in trust for the Republic. Section 48, Chapter
the character of the property whether it is of public 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines instrumentalities like MIAA to hold title to real properties
property of public dominion as one intended for public owned by the Republic. n MIAAs case, its status as a
use. The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, mere trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is
as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, clearer because even its executive head cannot sign the
constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the
operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does President of the Republic can sign such deed of
not change the character of MIAA as an airport for conveyance.
public use. Such fees are often termed users tax. This
means taxing those among the public who actually use d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a
a public facility instead of taxing all the public including Reorganization
those who never use the particular public facility. The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the
Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the
Commerce of Man Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 259
toreorganize a division in the Bureau of Air The Eleventh Congress was composed of 10
Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. senators from LAMP, 7 senators from Lakas-NUCD-
The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the Airport UMDP, 2 independents, and 1 each from LP, Aksyon
Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Demokrasya, PRP, and Gabay Bayan. During its first
Republic. No party claims any ownership rights over regular session, Senator Fernan was declared the duly
MIAAs assets adverse to the Republic. elected President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2.
Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned the minority, he was assuming the position of minority
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political leader. He explained that those who had voted for
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a those who had voted for him, the losing nominee,
taxable person following are exempted from payment of belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested
the real property tax. that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP
Party, numbering 7 and thus also a minority, had
However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader.
that MIAA leases to private entities are not exempt from Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that
real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by he had received a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-NUCD-
hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator
subject to real estate tax. Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator
Guingona as the Senate Minority Leader.
It is the petitioners' position that when the
Constitution says that the Senate President shall be
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V GUINGONA GR NO. 134577 (18 elected by a majority of its members, then those who
NOVEMBER 1998) did not vote for the Senate President would constitute
(POLITICAL QUESTION) the minority. Thus, by recognizing the Lakas-NUCD-
UMDP senators as the minority block, the Constitution
has been violated.
Petitioners herein filed a petition for quo warranto calling
for the Court to annul the election of Senator Juan
ISSUE: (1) WON the Court has jurisdiction over the
Flavier as the Senate Minority Floor Leader and
case; (2) WON there has been a violation of Section
declaring Senator Francisco Tatad as the rightful holder
16(1), Article 16 of the Constitution.
of that position.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 260
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, RODRIGUEZ V GELLA 92 PHIL 603, GR NO. L-6266
the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, (SAME; EMERGENCY POWERS DELEGATED TO THE
like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the PRESIDENT)
Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It
does not follow, however, that therefore Executive
On 16 December 1941, Congress, pursuant to Section
Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
26, Article VI of the then Constitution, passed CA 671,
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to
"declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war
the President, that they must be enacted instead by the
involving the Philippines and authorizing the President
Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI
to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such
of the Constitution provides as follows: "(2) The
emergency." Subsequently, Congress filed HB 727
Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
intending repeal CA 671 but which the President vetoed
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
on the ground that war was still subsisting as a fact due
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
to the Korean War.
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
Subsequently still, the President issued EO 545
duties or imposts within the framework of the national
and 546 appropriation funds for various purposes.
development program of the Government." There is
Petitioners seek to invalidate the issuances.
thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
ISSUE: WON the EOs are valid.
restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within
HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the
specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or
EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered
imposts . . . ."
ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual
emergencies or calamities emanating from the last
(See also: Philippine Interisland Shipping Association v
world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without
CA GR No. 100481, 22 January 1997 where the
such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of
Legislature delegated the power to fix rates to the
merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed
President who may then exercise such power directly
to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the
without first withdrawing the earlier delegation made to
president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of
the Philippine Ports Authority.)
Congress must be given due weight. For it would be
absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might
delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be
able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its
powers than to take them back. This is not right and is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 263
not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be
likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the
consent of the agent is necessary only in the sense that
he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same
way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the
relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can
it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is
coupled with interest.
PEOPLE V VERA 65 PHIL 56, GR NO. L-45685 doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a
(SAME; DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE; DELEGATION TO violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS) challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which
reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those
provinces in which the respective provincial boards
Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at
Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated
rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of
of the Probation Office. This only means that only
the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the
provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation
Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
officer may have a system of probation within their
Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge
locality. This would mean to say that convicts in
Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the
provinces where no probation officer is instituted may
petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
not avail of their right to probation.
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu
(Note: The decision said that Legislatures may validly
Unjieng under probation because, among other things,
leave the determination of the applicability of measures
Act No. 4221, the Probation Law, is an undue
to the people [so-called option laws] but that such laws
delegation of legislative power in that it subjects the
can only be of local application. The effectivity of laws of
effectivity of the measure to the absolute discretion of
general application cannot without running afoul of non-
the provincial boards in Section 11 thereof: This Act
delegation and equal protection.)
shall apply only in those provinces in which the
(See also: Osmena v Orbos, Tablarin v Gutierrez 152
respective provincial boards have provided for the
SCRA 730, Eastern Shipping v POEA 166 SCRA 533,
salary of a probation officer.
and, in contrapposto, Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center
v Garcia)
ISSUE: WON there is an undue delegation of legislative
power.
HELD: The act of granting probation is not the same as
pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES V POEA
of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because 243 SCRA 666, GR. NO. 114714
there is no set standard provided by Congress on how (SAME; DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES)
provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of
probation. The provincial boards are given absolute Respondent POEA issued Board Resolution 1 in
discretion which is violative of the constitution and the January 1998, mandating the increase compensation
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 265
and benefits the provided for in POEA's Standard provide for sufficient standards that the administrative
Employment Contract for Seafarers. Thus, the contract agency can follow.)
now provides that:
in case of death, the employer should pay the
beneficiaries in the amount of $50,000 and U.S. V ANG TANG HO 43 PHIL 1, GR NO. L-17122
additional $7000 to each child under 21 but not (SAME; SAME; TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION;
more than 4 children; COMPLETENESS TEST)
if done within war or warlike area, it should be
doubled.
On 30 July 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 2868 authorizing the Governor General to issue the
Petitioners filed an action seeking to nullify the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
resolution contending that the POEA does not have the
distribution of rice, palay, and corn. Pursuant to this Act,
power and authority fix rates for compensation and
on 1 August 1919, the Governor General issued EO 53
benefits as the same is a function of the Legislative.
fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
Subsequently, respondent Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer,
HELD: The Court found the issuance of Board
sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of
Resolution 1 valid. While the making of laws is a non-
eighty centavos, a price much higher than that
delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress,
prescribed by the EO. He was thus charged and found
the latter may nonetheless validly delegate the authority
guilty of violating EO 53.
to promulgate rules and regulations to administrative
Respondent now challenges the validity of the
agencies in implementing a given legislation and
issuance.
effectuate its policies. This is because the legislature
may sometimes find it impractical, if not impossible, to
HELD: The Court found in favor of respondent. Act No.
anticipate all the situations that may be met in carrying
2868 is an invalid delegation of legislative power
the law into effect. All that is required is that the
because it is not a complete issuance in and of itself.
regulation should be germane to the objects and
The completeness of a measure can be determined if,
purpose of the law and that the regulation is not in
upon leaving the hands of the Legislature, nothing is left
contradiction to but in conformity with the standards
for the Executive and its administrative agencies but to
prescribed by the law. This is power of subordinate
enforce the policy enunciated therein. In the case at bar,
legislation.
it will be observed that what the respondent violated is
(Note: It goes without saying that for there to be a valid
EO 53 and not Act 2868. As a matter of fact, the Act
delegation of the rule-making power, the law effecting
does not penalize the sale of rice, palay, or corn at any
such a delegation must be complete in itself and must
price. It is only the EO which provided for that. Thus, Act
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 266
2868 was incomplete when it was passed by the institutions as they may see fit. The Court found this to
Legislature as it did not state any clear cut policy which be a roving commission which provided the Executive
the Executive was then to enforce. It left the officers so empowered with a wide and sweeping
determination of the policy with the Executive. authority, unrestrained by the usual standard and
(Note: In Calalang v Williams, the Court held that reasonable guidelines or limitations to be observed in
something as general as public interest or public executing their mandate. Such authority, the Court said,
welfare was sufficient as a policy statement.) is too laden with danger of partiality, abuse, and
corruption. The Court said that the Executive's authority
had to be canalized within banks to keep it from
YNOT V IAC 148 SCRA 659, GR NO. L-74457 overflowing.
(SAME; SAME; SAME; SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST) (See also: de la Llana v Alba 112 SCRA 294, Demetria
v Alba 148 SCRA 208, Lozano v Martinez 146 SCRA
323)
Then President Marcos issued EO 626-A, making the
interprovincial transport of carabaos and carabeef as
well as the slaughtering of caraboas in a manner not
complying with EO 626 illegal. Petitioner Ynot was CHIONGBIAN V ORBOS 245 SCRA 253, GR NO. 96754
apprehended transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to (SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME)
Iloilo and pursuant to EO 626-A, the animals were
summarily confiscated. Section 13 of RA 6734 authorized the President to
Petitioner challenges the validity of EO 626-A merge existing administrative regions. Thus, President
insofar as it imposes a penalty without according the Aquino issued EO 429, Providing for the
ownder the right to be heard. Furthermore, petitioner Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
challenges the exercise by Persident Marcos of Mindanao. Petitioners seek the nullification of the
legislative power under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 subject EO contending that the provision allowing the
Constitution. President to merge existing administrative regions did
not provide for a sufficient standard by which the
HELD: The Court struck down the measure because it, President may exercise such power. Hence, the
among others, was an undue delegation of legislative provision was an undue delegation of legislative power.
power. The Court observed that the Chairman of the
National Meat Inspection Commission or, as the case HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. It said that
may be, the Director of Animal Industrey were given while RA 6734 does not explicitly provide for the
authority to dispose of the confiscated animals/meat standard by which the President may exercise the
products by distributing them to charitable and similar power to reorganize, such standard may nonetheless be
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 267
abstracted from other statutes which have been enacted withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund manged by the
on the same subject. For example, in RA 5435, the PSALM. The ERC approved the petitions, authorizing
President was given the power to reorganize the that collection of the same from the end-users on a
Executive Department to promote simplicity, economy, monthly basis and, eventually, the withdrawal of up to
efficiency in government to enable it to pursue its P70M from the STF. On the basis of the same, the
programs consisted with the national goals for Panay Electric Company, Inc. charged petitioner and all
accelerated social and economic development. The other end-users with the Universal charge which was
Creation and subsequent reorganization of reflected in their monthly electric bills.
administrative regions have been by the President Petitioners now come before the Court to assail
pursuant to the authority granted to him by the law. The the Universal Charge provided for in the EPIRA to be
choice of President is logical because the division implemented through the IRR in that the charge is in the
intended to facilitate the administration of executive nature of a tax and the power of taxation is a strictly
departments and local governments. It has been legislative function. Thus, delegating the same to and
traditionally lodged in the President. By conferring the administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional.
President the power to merge existing regions,
Congress merely followed a pattern set in previous HELD: All that is required for the valid exercise of this
legislation. There is no abdication by Congress of its power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation be
legislative power in conferring on the President the germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
power to merge administrative regions that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but
inconformity with, the standards prescribed by the law.
These requirements are denominated as the
GEROCHI V DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY GR NO. 159796, 17 completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
JULY 2007 Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
(SAME; SAME; SAME; SAME) terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such
that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001. On April
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to
5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-
determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority
Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with
and prevent the delegation from running riot. The Court
respondent ERC a petition for the availment from the
finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its
Universal Charge of its share for Missionary
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all
Electrification. Subsequently, NPC filed another petition
its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains
praying for the proposed share from the Universal
sufficient standards.
Charge for the Environmental Charge be approved for
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 268
Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and
that within one (1) year from the effectivity thereof, a judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without
Universal Charge to be determined, fixed and approved an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to
by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end- take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the
to be paid as Universal Charge, the amount Philippines (the Philippine government under the
nevertheless is made certain by the legislative Japanese).
parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover,
contrary to the petitioners contention, the ERC does not ISSUES: (1) Whether or not judicial proceedings and
enjoy a wide latitude of discretion in the determination of decisions made during the Japanese occupation were
the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is complete and valid and remained valid even after the American
passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative occupation; (2) Whether or not the October 23, 1944
power. proclamation MacArthur issued in which he declared
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, that all laws, regulations and processes of any other
to ensure the total electrification of the country and the government in the Philippines than that of the said
quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
of electric power and watershed rehabilitation and effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
management the requirements for valid delegation, as occupation and control invalidated all judgments and
they provide the limitations on the ERC's power to judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; (3) And
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. whether or not if they were not invalidated by
MacArthurs proclamation, those courts could continue
hearing the cases pending before them.
C. THE INCORPORATION CLAUSE
HELD: Political and international law recognizes that all
KIM CHAN V VALDEZ TAN KEH 75 PHIL 113, GR NO. L-5 acts and proceedings of a de facto government are
(DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION) good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese
occupation may be considered de facto governments,
Co Kim Chan had a pending civil case, initiated during
supported by the military force and deriving their
the Japanese occupation, with the Court of First
authority from the laws of war.
Instance of Manila. After the Liberation of the Manila
Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually
and the American occupation, Judge Arsenio Dizon
remain in force unless suspended or changed by the
refused to continue hearings on the case, saying that a
conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war,
proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 269
for the existence of a state of insurrection and war did force until now, it follows that the same courts may
not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases
government or the regular administration of the laws. pending therein before the restoration of the
And if they were not valid, then it would not have been Commonwealth Government, until abolished or the laws
necessary for MacArthur to come out with a creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are
proclamation abrogating them. repealed by the said government.
The second question, the court said, hinges on
the interpretation of the phrase processes of any other
government and whether or not he intended it to annul PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION OF THE
all other judgments and judicial proceedings of courts PHILIPPINES V DUQUE GR NO. 173034, 9 OCTOBER 2007
during the Japanese military occupation. If, according to (SAME; WHAT CONSTITUTES GENERALLY ACCEPTED
international law, non-political judgments and judicial PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW)
proceedings of de facto governments are valid and
remain valid even after the occupied territory has been
PHAP filed this petition for certiorari seeking to nullify
liberated, then it could not have been MacArthurs
the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be
(RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code) claiming that the RIRR is
in violation of international law.
not valid as it contains provisions that are not
A well-known rule of statutory construction is: A
constitutional and go beyond the scope of the Milk
statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of
Code. The Milk Code was issued by President Cory
nations if any other possible construction remains.
Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986.
xxx xxx xxx
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
Annulling judgments of courts made during the
that the law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the
Japanese occupation would clog the dockets and
International Code of Marketing and Breastmilk
violate international law, therefore what MacArthur said
Substitutes (ICBMS), a code adopted by the World
should not be construed to mean that judicial
Health Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA
proceedings are included in the phrase processes of
also adopted severel resolutions to the effect that
any other governments.
breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
xxx xxx xxx
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not
Therefore, even assuming that Japan legally
permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH
acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, and the laws
issued the assailed RIRR.
and courts of the Philippines had become courts of
Japan, as the said courts and laws creating and
Relevant ISSUE: WON the pertinent international
conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in
agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 270
of the land and may be implemented by DOH through classified as SOFT LAW non-binding norms,
the RIRR. principles and practices that influence state behavior.
Soft law is not part of international law.
HELD: Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Constitution,
international law can become domestic law by
transformation (thru constitutional mechanism such as IN RE: GARCIA 2 SCRA 984 (15 AUGUST 1961)
local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional (SAME; IN CONFLICTS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
declaration i.e treaties). Admittedly, the ICBMS and MUNICIPAL LAW, MUNICIPAL LAW SHOULD BE UPHELD)
WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not
been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as
Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of
required under Section 21, Article 8. However, the
law in the Philippines without submitting to the required
ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through
bar examinations. In his verified petition, he asserts that
a local legislation such as the Milk Code. The Milk Code
he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino
is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
parentage. He had taken and finished the course of
On the other hand, the Court ruled that DOH
Bachillerato Superior in Spain and was approved,
failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
selected and qualified by the Insitututo de Cervantes
resolutions are customary international law that may be
for admission to the Central University of Madrid where
deemed part of the law of the land. For an international
he studied and finished the law course, graduating there
rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
as Licenciado en derecho. Thereafter he was allowed
established that such rule is being followed by states
to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims that
because they consider it as obligatory to comply with
under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic
such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions,
Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the
although signed by most of the member states, were
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is
enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member
entitled to the practice the law profession in the
states. Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted
Philippines without submitting to the required bar
most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code,
examinations.
the WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for
exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding
ISSUE: WON a treaty can modify regulations governing
up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for
admission to the Philippine Bar
breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as
domestic law nor are they followed in our country as
HELD: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The
well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of
provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 271
Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by of securing a certification from the Natl Economic
the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals.
Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000
and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino planters. Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay
citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive
Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is
own country and is not entitled to the privileges without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction", because
extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the RA 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by
Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to government agency.
the laws and regulations of the contracting state in
whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2
profession. executive agreements entered into by Macapagal.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. The
not have been intended to modify the laws and former may not interfere in the performance of the
regulations governing admission to the practice of law in legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
the Philippines, for reason that the Executive his veto power. He may not defeat legislative
Department may not enroach upon the consitutional enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by
prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules indirectly repealing the same through an executive
for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, agreement providing for the performance of the very act
and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between
being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. a treaty and a statute, the one which is latest in point of
time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the
GONZALES V HECHANOVA 9 SCRA 230, GR NO. L-21897 contracts adverted to are not treaties. No such
(SAME; SAME) justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation,
without completely upsetting the principle of separation
Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two
of powers and the system of checks and balances
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the
which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
importation of rice without complying with the requisite
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 272
VI. BILL OF RIGHTS Relations found PBMEOs officers guilty of unfair labor
practice.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CIR. It
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189 (1973) ruled that the demonstration held by petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacanang was against alleged
abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
PBMEO, a legitimate labor union, decided to stage a employer, herein private respondent firm, said
mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to their freedom of expression in general and of their right
be participated in by the workers in the first, second and of assembly and of petition for redress of grievances in
third shifts. PBM informed PBMEO that the particular before the appropriate governmental agency,
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union the Chief Executive, against the police officers of the
guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, municipality of Pasig. They exercised their civil and
however, that any demonstration for that matter should political rights for their mutual aid and protection from
not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the what they believe were police excesses.
Company. It also warned the PBMEO representatives It also ruled that while the Bill of Rights also protects
that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, property rights, the primacy of human rights over
who without previous leave of absence approved by the property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms
Company, particularly the officers present who are the are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may
for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an survive," permitting government regulation only "with
illegal strike. Petitioners and their members numbering narrow specificity."
about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift
Simon, Jr. v. Commission on Human Rights
workers should not be required to participate in the 229 SCRA 117 (1994)
demonstration and that the workers in the second and
third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration.
Hence, PBM with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in Simon, Jr. (in his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City)
relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all sent a "Demolition Notice" to respondents (officers and
of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for members of the North Edsa Vendors Association, Inc) in
'No Strike and No Lockout.'" The Court of Industrial which they were given a grace-period of three (3) days
within which to vacate the questioned premises of North
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 276
EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being
private respondents were informed that their stalls enforced or redressed in a civil action."
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park." Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the
Afterwards, private respondents filed a letter-complaint right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late establishment or administration of government, the right
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what
along North EDSA. Acting on the complaint, the CHR are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari
directed the petitioners to "desist from further stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties,
demolition, with the warning that violation of said order erected by private respondents on a land which is
would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." The planned to be developed into a "People's Park." More
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss stating that the than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon
Commission's authority should be understood as being City which is a busy national highway. The consequent
confined only to the investigation of violations of civil danger to life and limb is thus to be likewise simply
and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is
in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
privilege to engage in business." The CHR denied the first place, even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be
motion to dismiss. that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
The Court ruled that the extent of CHR's investigative discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this
power is limited to all forms of human rights violations instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order
involving civil and political rights." for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and
The term "civil rights," has been defined as referring carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
"(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
and are not connected with the organization or
administration of government. They include the rights of Republic v. Sandiganbayan
property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, 407 SCRA 10 (2003)
freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his
citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 277
practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not
AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position
Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as
Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing
against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead that he enjoyed close association with former President
Dimaano as co-defendant. After so many Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim
postponements due to inability of petitioner to show that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case
further evidence, private respondents filed their motion before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's
to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had
case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence
by reason of mere position held without showing that by filing numerous motions for postponements and
they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos. extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the amended complaint petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete
and ordered the return of the confiscated items to presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that
respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized
case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the subject items. The search warrant did not
the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a these items was therefore, void, and unless these items
determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be
The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise returned to the person from whom the raiding team
denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set seized them.
aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
The primary issue for resolution herein is whether Ermita-Malate Motel and Motel Operators Assn. v. City Mayor,
PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for
unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. The other
issues involved the propriety of the dismissal of the
case before the presentation of evidence and the The City of Manila enacted an ordinance requiring
legality of the search and seizure. patrons to fill up a prescribed form stating personal
The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions information such as name, gender, nationality, age,
of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG address and occupation before they could be admitted
to a motel, hotel or lodging house. This ordinance was
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 278
enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful thrill seekers." The challenged ordinance then
to public morals. Petitioners challenged the "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
constitutionality of the ordinance alleging that the transients and guests of these establishments by
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being requiring these transients and guests to fill up a
unreasonable and violative of due process. The City registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby
answered that the challenged ordinance bears a open to public view at all times, and by introducing
reasonable relation to a proper purpose, which is to several other amendatory provisions calculated to
curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
police power. The trial court ruled that the ordinance as transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the
unconstitutional. license fees was intended to discourage
In reversing the lower courts decision, the "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose
Supreme Court held that the mantle of protection other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the
associated with the due process guaranty does not income of the city government."
cover petitioners. This particular manifestation of a
police power measure being specifically aimed to Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 124 (1919)
safeguard public morals is immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) filed an action for the issuance
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the of a writ of mandamus against Joaquin Natividad,
scope of police power which has been properly Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu, Philippine
characterized as the most essential, insistent and the Islands, to compel him to issue a certificate of Philippine
least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the registry to the petitioner for its motor vessel Bato. The
great public needs." Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as his
There is no question but that the challenged reason that all the stock- holders of Smith, Bell & Co.,
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of
practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note the Philippine Islands. Smith, Bell & Co. (Ltd.) argues
of the then Councilor Herminio Astorga included as that Act No. 2761 deprives the corporation of its
annex to the stipulation of facts speaks of the alarming property without due process of law because by the
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and passage of the law the company was automatically
fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the deprived of every beneficial attribute of ownership in the
existence of motels, which "provide a necessary Bato and left with the naked title to a boat it could not
atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" use. The issue is whether the Government of the
and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and Philippine Islands, through its Legislature, can deny the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 279
registry of vessels in its coastwise trade to corporations casual, without first securing an employment permit
having alien stockholders. from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
The Supreme Court ruled that the right to due process P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or
is universal in their application to all persons within the consular missions of foreign countries, or in the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes Government and any foreign government, and those
aliens. Private corporations, likewise, are "persons" working in their respective households, and members of
within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination,
property is concerned. who are not paid monetarily or in kind. Respondents
However, the apparent purpose of the Philippine challenged the constitutionality of said ordinance on the
Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien shipping ground that is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable,
act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is to being applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of
encourage Philippine ship-building. Hence, while Smith, their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore,
Bell & Co Ltd., a corporation having alien stockholders, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of
is entitled to the protection afforded by the-due process the Constitution. The trial court held the ordinance as
of law and equal protection of the laws clause of the unconstitutional.
Philippine Bill of Rights, nevertheless, Act No. 2761 of The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts
the Philippine Legislature, in denying to corporations decision and ruled that the ordinance in question
such as Smith, Bell & Co. Ltd., the right to register violates the due process of law and equal protection
vessels in the Philippines coastwise trade, does not rule of the Constitution.
belong to that vicious species of class legislation which Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
must always be condemned, but does fall within permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of the or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic
police power, and so does not offend against the right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
constitutional provision. means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines
as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, 86 SCRA 270 (1978) territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be
deprived of life without due process of law. This
guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter
The City of Manila enacted an ordinance which of protection under the due process and equal
prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
participate in any position or occupation or business citizens.
enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 280
deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential,
section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
the prior approval of the Department Head, the power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the
provincial governor of any province in which non- public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police
a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes
habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be an advancement of the public interests, for, besides
selected by him and approved by the provincial board, promoting peace and good order among landowners in
was challenged. particular and the people in general, it helps increase
the industries of the country, and makes for the
Issue: Whether or not the said law is constitutional.
development of the natural resources, with the
Held: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court consequent progress of the general prosperity. And
sustained the constitutionality of this section of the these ends are pursued in a special manner by the
Administrative Code. The reasons for the section State through the exercise of its police power.
included (1) it was an attempt for the advancement of
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
the non-Christian people of the province (2) the only
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory
successful method for educating the Manguianes was to
nor class legislation, and stated among other things: ". .
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
. one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly
Solicitor-General added the following; (3) The protection
interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor
introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
can one say that due process of law has not been
Among other things, it was held that the term "non- followed. To go back to our definition of due process of
Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law;
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced
to degrees of civilization. The term "non-Christian" it according to the regular methods of procedure
was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class."
geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the
other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)
Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 282
Property is anything that can come under the right of two classes -- those who may and those who may not
ownership and be the subject of contract. It represents become citizens, one class being permitted, while the
more than the things it owns; it includes the right to other is forbidden, to own and as defined.
secure, use, and dispose of them.
The court disagreed with appellants and ruled that the
Facts: US citizens wanted to lease their agricultural case involved the privilege of owning or controlling
land to Nakatsuka, a Japanese farmer. A Washington agricultural land within the State. The quality and
statute disqualified aliens who had not in good faith allegiance of those who own, occupy and use the farm
declared intention to become citizens of the United lands within its borders are matters of highest
States from taking or holding interests in land in the importance, and affect the safety and power of the State
State for farming or other purposes. It provided that itself. The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right
upon the making of such prohibited conveyance the safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to lease
land shall be forfeited to the State and the grantors be their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have
subject to criminal punishment, and the alien also, if he such lease.
failed to disclose the nature and extent of his interest.
Nuez v Averia GR No L-38415 (1974)
Citizens owning land in Washington and an alien
Japanese, desirous of consummating a lease to the
Public office is not property but one unlawfully ousted
alien for farming, sued to enjoin the state attorney
from it may institute an action to recover the same,
general from taking criminal and forfeiture proceedings,
flowing from the de jure officers right to office.
as he threatened to prosecute them. Complainants
Facts: Nuez contested the election results for the
alleged that the restriction violated the federal and state
Mayoralty of Tarnate, Cavite on the ground of fraud,
constitutions and conflicted with a treaty with Japan.
irregularities, and corrupt practices. The original
Issue: Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or protestee was Edgardo Morales who was ambushed
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth and killed, hence succeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo
Amendment? de Leon.
Nuezs protest was denied on the ground that it was
Held: No. Appellants contend that the act contravenes
moot and academic, citing the Presidents General
the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners
Order 3&4 to remove from office all incumbent
from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and
government officials and employees.
makes it a criminal offense for them to lease it to the
alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of
Issue: Were the dismissal orders valid?
farmer; and they contend that it is repugnant to the
equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 283
Held: The Court in its unanimous joint decision en buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the
banc in the similar cases Election Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the
of Paredes, Sunga and Valley has already declared ballot."
such dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "(I)t Bince v COMELEC GR No 111624-25 (1995)
must be emphasized that the `right' of the private
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not The court has recognized while public office is not
only by virtue of Section 9 of Art. XVII of the New property to which one may acquire a vested right, it is
Constitution but principally from their having been nevertheless a protected right.
proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a Facts:
result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if The elections for the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of
in fact and in law, they were not duly elected to their Pangasinan, 6th District was composed of 10
respective positions and consequently, have no right to municipalities.
hold the same, perform their functions, enjoy their
Private Respondent Micu objected to the
privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should
inclusion of the Certificates of Canvass for San
not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of office given
Quintin, on the ground that it contained false
to them by said constitutional provision," and that "(I)t is
statements.
erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Art. XVII of
the New Constitution, the term of office of the private The Provincial Board of Canvassers ruled against
respondents expired, and that they are now holding Micu. Micu appealed to the COMELEC which
their respective offices under a new term. We are of the credited Micu with 1,535 votes and Bince with
opinion that they hold their respective offices still under 1,055 votes from San Quintin.
the term to which they have been elected, although the
same is now indefinite." Micu and the Municipal Board of Canvassers filed
petition for correction of votes. Bince ultimately
The Court further stressed therein that "(T)he had 27,370 votes and Micu had 27,369 votes.
Constitutional Convention could not have intended, as Bince was not proclaimed winner because of the
in fact it did not intend, to shield or protect those who absence of authority from COMELEC and filed a
had been unduly elected. To hold that the right of the formal motion for such authority.
herein private respondents to the respective offices
which they are now holding, may no longer be subject to COMELEC promulgated an order directing the
question would be tantamount to giving a stamp of PBC to continue with the canvass and proclaim
approval to what could have been an election victory the winning candidates.
characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 284
The PBC acted on the petitions for correction, office is not property under Section 1 of the
allowing such. Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III,
1987 Constitution), and one cannot acquire
Bince appealed arguing the PBC had no a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A.,
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is,
nevertheless, a protected right
MICU filed an urgent motion for the PBC to
(BERNAS J., The Constitution of the
reconvene and proceed with canvass. Bince filed
Republic of the Philippines, vol. I, 1987 ed.,
a petition for preliminary injunction and alternative
40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543
prayer for proclamation as winner.
[1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432
The PBC Chairman filed a petition with [1924]). Due process in proceedings before
COMELEC seeking a definite ruling as to who the respondent COMELEC, exercising its
should be proclaimed, as there were corrections quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice
already made in a separate sheet of paper of the and hearing, among others. Thus, although
Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan which cases, the power to annul or suspend the
corrections if to be considered by the Board in its proclamation of any candidate. We had
canvass and proclamation, Micu will win by 72 ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on
votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March
not be considered, candidate Alfonso Bince, Jr. 1988), Reyes vs. Commission on
will win by one (1) vote. Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988)
and Gallardo vs. Commission on
Bince was proclaimed winner. Micu filed an Elections (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989)
urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul that the COMELEC is without power to
Proclamation. The COMELEC ruled in his favor partially or totally annul a proclamation or
and annulled the proclamation of Bince. suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing.
Bince filed for certiorari, arguing the COMELEC Micu filed a motion to hear the pending incidents
resolution was promulgated without prior notice left in court. Both parties filed their respective
and hearing. The court ruled [relevant to position papers. The COMELEC ruled that Bince
syllabus] was to be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office Micu filed an MR which was granted.
without due process of law. Although public
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 285
Issue: Who was entitled to the seat? against him by private respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for
Held: Micu. In Tayug, the total votes received by harassment, abuse of authority and oppression.
petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 As required, petitioner filed a written explanation as to why
when it should only have been 2,415. Petitioner Bince, he should not be dealt with administratively, with the
in effect, was credited by 71 votes more. Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in accordance with
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185.
but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his
reflected the total number of votes as 2,185. On the
counsel, public respondent Provincial Board conducted
other hand, the same SOV indicated that private
a hearing of the aforecited administrative case. During
respondent Micu garnered 2,892 votes but he actually
the hearing, private respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed
received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4
to present evidence, testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and
votes.
on the basis of the evidence presented, the responden t
Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private
Provincial Board passed Resolution No. 51
respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the
preventively suspending petitioner from his office
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the sixth district of
as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.
Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption
into public office was therefore flawed from the In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
beginning, the same having been based on a faulty with prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to
tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not annul and set aside Resolution No. 51 of public
commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the respondent Provincial Board, preventively suspending
illegal proclamation. him from office and to enjoin public respondent from
As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect enforcing and/or implementing the order of preventive
to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such suspension and from proceeding further with the
as the one at issue should not, as much as possible, administrative case. According to petitioner, the order of
reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious preventive suspension embodied in Resolution No.
judicial time and waste valuable taxpayers' money, if 51 issued by the Provincial Board is arbitrary, high-
they can be settled below without prejudice to any party handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative of Section
or to the ends of justice. 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing and
Crespo v Provincial Board 160 SCRA 66 (1988) investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before
preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of
Facts: Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial
Nueva Ecija, in the local elections of 1967. On 25 Board, petitioner adds, has grossly violated the
January 1971, an administrative complaint was filed fundamental and elementary principles of due process.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 286
On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary In Azul vs. Castro, 9 this Court said: From the
injunction. earliest inception of institutional government in our
country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been
Issue: Was petitioner denied due process?
fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice
Held: Yes. In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc. would be impossible without the right to notice and to be
6 this Court held: It is a principle in American jurisprudence board. The emphasis on substantive due process and
which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction other recent ramifications of the due process clause
that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is sometimes leads bench and bar to overlook or forget that due
a "property right and the wrongful interference therewith process was initially concerned with fair procedure. Every
is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be law student early learns in law school definition
property within the protection of a constitutional submitted by counsel Mr. Webster in Trustees of
guaranty of due process of law. Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518) that
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was due process is the equivalent of law of the land which
issued without giving the petitioner a chance to means "The general law; a law which hears before it
be heard. To controvert the claim of petitioner that he was not condemns, which proceeding upon inquiry and renders
fully notified of the scheduled hearing, respondent judgment only after trial ... that every citizen shall hold
Provincial Board, in its Memorandum, contends his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the
that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis, counsel for the protection of the general rules which govern society. A
petitioner mayor made known by a request in writing, sent sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition
to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to be of judgment only after a lawful hearing by a coldly
given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said neutral and impartial judge are essential elements of
petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent procedural due process.
Board's meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time The petition, however, has become moot and academic.
allowed for the counsel for the petitioner mayor to Records do not show that in the last local elections held on18
appear as requested by him, he failed to appeal." The January 1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.
contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in t he
absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the
proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein Republic v Rosemoor Mining & Development Corporation GR No
149927 (2004)
can be gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the
written explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into A mining license that contravenes a mandatory
account. The assailed order was issued mainly on the provision of law under which it is granted is void. Being
basis of the evidence presented ex parte by respondent a mere privilege, a license does not vest absolute rights
Wycoco. in the holder. Thus, without offending the due process
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 287
the report as if it were the majority report instead would exclude nineteen of them and limit as
of a minority report of one and forthwith referred it plotters "the six persons who were on the service
to respondent Tanodbayan "for final resolution stairs while Senator Aquino was descending, and
through the legal system" and for trial in the one General Custodio as the crime could not
Sandiganbayan. In contrast, when the majority have been planned without his intervention.
report was submitted Marcos coldly received the - Galmans widow, et al filed the present action
authors and could scarcely conceal his instant alleging that respondents Tanodbayan and
rejection of their report with the grim statement Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
that "I hope you can live with your conscience constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
with what you have done." justice and gross violation of the constitutional
- Both majority and minority reports were one in rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people
rejecting the military version that Rolando Galman of the Philippines to due process of law. They
was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the asserted that the Tanodbayan did not represent
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando the interest of the people when he failed to exert
Galman had no subversive affiliations." They genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and
were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the important testimonial and documentary evidence
staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan
that Galman, the military's "fall guy" was "not the Justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in
assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT favor of the accused, and that their acts "clouded
troopers who gunned down Galman and the with the gravest doubts the sincerity of
soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the government to find out the truth about the Aquino
service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with assassination." They pray that the SC retrain the
one another, gave a perjured story to us Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan from rendering a
regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. decision on the merits in the pending criminal
Aquino and the mowing down, in turn, of Galman cases and that judgment be rendered declaring a
himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination was mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the
the product of a military conspiracy, not a Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an
communist plot. impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor.
- The only difference between the two reports is - Although the SC initially granted a TRO, it later
that the majority report found all the twenty-six withdrew the same. Thus, the Sandiganbayan
private respondents case headed by then AFP issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
military conspiracy, while the minority report totally absolving them of any civil liability. It in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 289
acquittal where the prosecution which represents the absolution as innocent of all the respondents-accused.
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due Notwithstanding the laudable efforts of Justice Herrera
process. Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to the case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution
due process is thereby violated. The cardinal precept is was already foregone conclusion, they could not cope
that where there is a violation of basic constitutional with the misuse and abuse of the overwhelming powers
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate
serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed and threaten its witnesses, secure the irrecantation or
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the prevent them from testifying. Fully aware of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of overcoming their natural fear and reluctance to appear
jurisdiction. and testify, respondent Sandiganbayan maintained a
Reasoning "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and announced its
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after months time or less than a year, pursuant to the
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and scripted scenario. The prosecution complained of "the
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards
without the express consent of the accused. The lower (it)" and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand
court was not competent as it was ousted of its and contempt proceedings as compared to the nil
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained of
to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on
terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for making assurances that if given a certain period, they
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts will be able to produce their witnesses," Herrera
amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its
and does not expose the accused to a second evidence" and cited other pending cases before
jeopardy.- More so does the rule against the invoking respondent court that were pending trial for a much
of double jeopardy hold in the cases at bar where as we longer time where the" dizzying tempo" and "fast pace"
have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the were no tmaintained by the court. Manifestly, the
authoritarian president ordered respondents prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due
Sandiganbayan and Tanod bayan to rig the trial and process of law with a partial court and biased
closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 291
President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. Tabuena replied, Yes, sir, I will do it. This order
A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal was followed by a Presidential memorandum
such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In repeating said order.
legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither - Tabuena, caused the release of P55 Million of
binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless MIAA funds through a managers check for said
thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible amount payable to Tabuena, which was
and unspeakable affront to the society andthe people. encashed and delivered to Marcos personal
To paraphrase Brandeis: If theauthoritarian head of the secretary. No receipt was issued.
government becomes the law breaker, he breeds - The disbursement of the P55 Million was, as
contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a described by Tabuena and Peralta themselves,
law unto himself, he invites anarchy. out of the ordinary and not based on the normal
Dispositive procedure. Not only were there no vouchers
Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is prepared to support the disbursement, the P55
granted. Million was paid in cold cash. Also, no PNCC
judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings receipt for the P55 Million was presented. It was
in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of even affirmed that were no payments made to
acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010and 10011 PNCC by MIAA.
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther - Tabuena claimed that he was merely complying
Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases with the MARCOS Memorandum.
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and Issue:
with careful regard for the requirements of due process, W/N the Sandiganbayan violated Tabuenas rights when
so that the truth maybe finally known and justice done to it propounded several questions to witnesses.
all.
Held:
LUIS A. TABUENA, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE Yes IT DID
SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, While going over the records, we were struck by the
respondents. way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the
FRANCISCO, J.:
questioning of a defense witness and of the accused
Facts: themselves.
- Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay
directly to the presidents office and in cash what Simply consider the volume of questions hurled by the
the MIAA owes the Philippine National Sandiganbayan. Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16)
Construction Corporation (PNCC), to which questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 292
only asked six (6) questions on cross-examination After when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the
the defense opted not to conduct any re-direct dual role of magistrate and advocate.
examination, the court further asked a total of ten (10)
questions Questions from the court after Tabuenas
cross-examination totalled sixty-seven (67), more than IMELDA R. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
five times Prosecutor Viernes questions on cross- SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and THE PEOPLE OF THE
examination (14), and more than double the total of PHILIPINES, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
direct examination and cross-examination questions
which is thirty-one. The questions of the court were in
the nature of cross examinations characteristic of Facts:
confrontation, probing and insinuation.i[ - Imelda Marcos, was Minister of Human
Settlement while Jose P. Dans, Jr. was the
This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to Minister of Transportation and Communication.
question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind The two served as ex oficio Chairman and Vice-
upon any material point which presents itself during the Chairman, respectively, of the Light Rail
trial of a case over which he presides But not only Transport Authority (LRTA). Marcos was also
should his examination be limited to asking Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
clarificatory questions, the right should be sparingly Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc.
and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should (PGHFI).
stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor - Marcos, in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFI,
intervening in the conduct of the trial. and Jose P. Dans, Jr. as Vice Chairman of LRTA,
signed the Lease Agreement by virtue of which
Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in LRTA leased to PGHFI a parcel of land.
fact can one avoid the impression that the - Marcos, as Chairman of PGHFI then signed a
Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more Sublease Agreement with Transnational
precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in Construction Corporation (TNCC).
proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the - Marcos was subsequently charged for entering
Justices cross-examined the witnesses supplementing into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be
those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
the latters questions in length. government.
- The Sandiganbayan convicted Marcos of the
The cold neutrality of an impartial judge requirement of charge after it found that the rental price
due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta stipulated in the Lease Agreement was unfair and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 293
unreasonably low in contrast to the rental rate in First. Section 4, Rule VI categorically provides that
the Sub-lease Agreement with the TNCC. "sessions of the Sandiganbayan, whether en banc or
- It appeared, however, that during the deliberation division, shall be held in its principal office in the
period the First Division of the Sandiganbayan Metropolitan Manila where it shall try and determine all
composed of Presiding Justice Garchitorena and cases filed with it.
Associate Justices Balajadia and Atienza could
not agree on whether to convict or acquit the Second. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not allow
petitioner in the five (5) criminal cases pending unscheduled discussion of cases.
against her. Unlike Garchitorena and Balajadia,
Atienza was in favor of exonerating Marcos. As Third. The rules of Sandiganbayan do not also allow
there was no unanimity of votes, Presiding informal discussion of cases. The deliberations in case
Justice Garchitorena formed a Special Division of at bar did not appear on record. The informal discussion
five (5) justices composed of himself, Balajadia, of the three justices came to light only when petitioner
Atienza, Amores, and del Rosario. moved to inhibit Presiding Justice Garchitorena after her
- It was found that Presiding Justice Garchitorena conviction.
and Justices Balajadia and del Rosario lunched
together in a Quezon City restaurant where they Fourth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the
discussed petitioner's cases in the absence of presence of a non-member in the deliberation of cases.
Justices Atienza and Amores and in the presence
of a non-member of the Special Division. Thereat, Fifth. The rules of the Sandiganbayan do not allow the
Presiding Justice Garchitorena, and Justices, exclusion of a member of a Division, whether regular or
Balajadia and del Rosario agreed with the special, in the deliberation of cases. Justices Atienza
position of Justice Atienza to acquit Marcos in and Amores were members of the Special Division but
some cases, and convict her in others. After the were not present when petitioner's cases were
meeting, Garchitorena dissolved the Special discussed over lunch in a Quezon City restaurant. In
Division. effect, Atienza and Amores were disenfranchised. They
were denied their right to vote for the conviction or
Issues: acquittal of petitioner.
W/N Sandiganbayan violated Marcos right to due
process. These irregularities violated the right of petitioner to be
tried by a collegial court. Pursuant to the rules of
Held: Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except
ABSOLUTELY. upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 294
her cases are before a regular division of three (3) could sway the opinion of this Court towards the
justices or a Special Division of five (5) justices. It is acquittal of petitioner.
indispensable that their vote be preceded by discussion
and deliberation by all the members of the division. Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that
Before the deliberation by all, any opinion of a justice is the decision of the First Division of the respondent
but tentative and could be changed. It is only after all Sandiganbayan convicting the petitioner is void for
the justices have been heard should the justices reach a violating her right to substantive and procedural due
judgment. No one opinion can be denigrated in process of law.
importance for experience shows that an opinion that
starts as a minority opinion could become the majority As a general rule, a void decision will not result in the
opinion after the collision of views of the justices. The acquittal of an accused. The case ought to be
right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings
by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is for a void judgment does not expose an accused to
entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members. double jeopardy. But the present case deserves a
different treatment considering the great length of time it
In the case at bar, Presiding Justice Garchitorena had has been pending with our courts.
already created the Special Division of five (5) justices
in view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices More than six (6) years passed but petitioner's
in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a prosecution is far from over. To remand the case to the
vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, Sandiganbayan will not sit well with her constitutional
especially the new justices in the persons of Justices right to its speedy disposition. Section 16, Article III of
Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view the Constitution assures "all persons shall have the right
of the cases against her. to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
We reject the rationalization that the opinion of Justice
Amores was of de minimis importance as it cannot The rationale for both Section 14(2) and section 16 of
overturn the votes of the three justices convicting the Article III of the Constitution is the same, "justice
petitioner. This is a mere guesswork. The more delayed is justice denied." Violation of either section
reasonable supposition is that said opinion could have should therefore result in the acquittal of the accused.
changed the opinions of the other justices if it is based Imelda R. Marcos is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
on an unbiased appreciation of facts and an undistorted charged.
interpretation of pertinent laws. That minority opinion
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 295
GEORGE I. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE paragraph (d), of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
COMMISSION and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Practices Act. The penalty imposed was forced
respondents. resignation without benefits.
Facts: - On appeal, the decision was modified by the Merit
- George I. Rivera, the Manager of Corporate Systems Protection Board ("MSPB") which
Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines reduced the penalty to suspension for 1 year.
("LBP"), was charged by the LBP President with - On appeal by Rivera and LBP to the CSC, the
dishonesty and violation of Anti-Graft laws on the CSC sustained the decision of the LBP.
basis of affidavits by Lao and Perez. - Rivera claims he was denied due process when
- Rivera allegedly told Perez, the Marketing Hon. Thelma P. Gaminde, who earlier
Manager of Wynner which had a pending loan participated in her capacity as the Board
application with LBP, that he could facilitate the Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken
processing, approval and release of the loan if he action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also
would be given a 10% commission (which he took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in
received). He also received from Lao, a Wynner the resolution of petitioner's motion for
investor, P20,000.00 pocket money for his trip to reconsideration with the CSC.
the United States, as well as additional funds for
his plane ticket, hotel accommodations and Issues:
pocket money for still another trip to Hongkong. W/N Rivera was denied due process.
- Rivera was further charged with having served
and acted, without prior authority required by Held:
CSC Memo Circ. 1025 as the personal consultant YES, HE WAS.
of Lao and as consultant in various companies In Zambales Chromite Mining Company vs. Court of
where Lao had investments. He drew and Appeals, 8 the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
received salaries and allowances approximately and Natural Resources was set aside by this Court after
P20,000.00 a month. it had been established that the case concerned an
appeal from the Secretary's own previous decision he
- After a formal investigation, the LBP held Rivera
handed down while he was yet the incumbent Director
guilty of grave misconduct and acts prejudicial to
of Mines. Calling the act of the Secretary a "mockery of
the best interest of the service in accepting
administrative justice," the Court said:
employment from a client of the bank and in
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate
thereby receiving salaries and allowances in
officer might not turn out to be a farce, then reviewing
violation of CSC Rules. He was also found to
officer must perforce be other than the officer whose
have transgressed the prohibition in Section 3,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 296
decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no he was assigned to serve the check-in counter of
different view or there would be no real review of the Japan Air Lines (JAL) for Flight 742.
case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a - Mrs. Lolita Kondo, a passenger of Flight 742 filed
biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since a complaint alleging that Singson required her to
being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken pay US $200.00 for alleged excess baggage
in his first view of the case. without issuing any receipt. A confrontation took
place where Singson was asked by the security
officer to empty his pockets. The dollars paid by
Given the circumstances in the case at bench, it should Ms. Kondo were not found in his possession.
have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit However, when the lower panel of the check-in
herself totally from any participation in resolving counter he was manning was searched, $265
Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning was found.
and consequence to a fundamental aspect of due - Singson was administratively charged and
process. investigated by a committee formed by PAL,
which found him guilty and recommended his
The argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not dismissal. PAL dismissed Singson.
participate in MSPB's decision is unacceptable. It is not - Singson then lodged a complaint, which was
denied that she did participate, indeed has concurred, in heard by the Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino who
MSPB's resolution denying the motion for found PALs evidence in terminating Singsons
reconsideration of MSPB's decision. employment insufficient. Thus, he ordered
Singsons reinstatement.
The case should be remanded to the CSC for resolution - On appeal to the NLRC (Raul Aquino was by this
without the participation of Commissioner Gaminde. time the presiding commissioner), the judgment
was reversed. Singsons Motion for
MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR Reconsideration was denied (this time, Aquino
RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. had no part).
(PAL), respondents.
- Singson assails the Resolution of the NLRC on
Facts: account of Commissioner Raul T. Aquino's
- Singson was employed by PAL as Traffic participation in reviewing and reversing on appeal
Representative Passenger, Handling Division. his own decision as labor arbiter
His duty consisted of checking in passengers and
baggage for a particular flight. On June 7, 1991 Issue:
W/N Singson was denied due process.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 297
People v. Castillo (1998) it also held that this was absorbed by abuse of superior
strength.
propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such dragged the victims into the white car, beat them so
questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, they would not be able to resist, held them captive
appellant would still be convicted. against their will, and raped them. Marijoy was thrown to
a deep ravine, resulting to her death, while Jacqueline
There was no showing that the judge had an interest, has remained missing until now. Discharged state
personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at witness Davidson Valiente Rusia positively identified the
bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly appellants as the malefactors. His detailed narration of
and in the manner that preserves the ideal of the cold the circumstances leading to the horrible death and
neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee disappearance of Jacqueline has all the earmarks of
of due process. That the trial judge believed the truth. Despite the rigid cross-examination conducted by,
evidence of the prosecution more than that of the the defense counsel, Rusia remained steadfast in his
defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He testimony. The details he supplied to the trial court were
simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of of such nature and quality that only a witness who
the prosecution witnesses than to that of the accused. actually saw the commission of the crimes could furnish.
What is more, his testimony was corroborated as to its
People v. Larranaga (2003) material points by several disinterested witnesses who
also identified the appellants. Most of them are neither
friends, relatives nor acquaintances of the victim's
Facts: family. As the Court reviewed closely the transcript of
Appellants assailed before the Supreme Court the stenographic notes, it could not discern any motive on
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finding their part why they should testify, against the appellants.
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of In the same vein, it was improbable that the prosecution
kidnapping and serious illegal detention committed would tirelessly go through the rigors of litigation just to
against the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong and destroy innocent lives. Thus, as between the appellants'
sentencing each of them to the penalties of two (2) mere denial and the positive identification and
reclusiones perpetua. Among other things, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court was
appellants questioned the sufficiency of the evidence of convinced that the trial court did not err in according
the prosecution. weight to the latter. Anent appellants' alibi, a thorough
examination of the evidence for the defense showed
Held: The Court reviewed the records exhaustively and that the appellants failed to meet the requirements of
found no compelling reason why it should deviate from time and place. They failed to establish by clear and
the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the trial convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
court. There was a clear and overwhelming evidence them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
that appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 302
Chiong sisters were abducted. In view of the foregoing, no time wasted by dispensing with the testimonies of
the Court affirmed the decision of the trial court but with witnesses which are not relevant. Remarks which
modifications as to the penalty imposed and the award merely manifest a desire to confine the proceedings to
of damages. Considering that the victims were raped, the real point in issue and to expedite the trial do not
that Marijoy was killed and that both victims were constitute a rebuke of counsel.
subjected to dehumanizing acts, the imposition of the
death penalty on the appellants was, according to the
Court, in order.
CRUZ and PAITIM vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (2001)
Topical: Appellants imputes bias and partiality to Judge
Ocampo when he asked questions and made
FACTS: On September 9, 1994 it was discovered by the
comments when the defense witnesses were testifying.
Civil Service Commission that Paitim, Municipal
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a
Treasurer of Bulacan took the non-professional
judge may properly intervene during trial to promote
examination for Cruz after the latter had previously
expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of
failed in the said examination three times. The CSC
time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities.
found after a fact finding investigation that a prima facie
The test is whether the intervention of the judge tends to
case exists against Paitim for DISHONESTY, GRAVE
prevent the proper presentation of a cause or the
MISCONDUCT and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE
ascertainment of the truth in the matter where he
BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE.
interposes his questions or comments. Records show
that the intervention by way of comment of Judge
The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering
Ocampo during the hearing was not only appropriate
a general denial of the material averments of the
but was necessary. One good illustration is his
"Formal Charge." They also declared that they were
explanation on alibi. Seeing that the appellants' counsel
electing a formal investigation on the matter. The
were about to present additional witnesses whose
petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss
testimonies would not establish the impossibility of
averring that if the investigation will continue, they will
appellants' presence in the scene of the crime, Judge
be deprived of their right to due process because the
Ocampo intervened and reminded appellants' counsel
Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the
of the requisites of alibi, thus: . . . Surely, we cannot
Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time. On
fault Judge Ocampo for exhaustively reminding
November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon issued an
appellants' counsel of the parameters of alibi to ensure
"Investigation Report and Recommendation "finding the
that there will be an orderly and expeditious
Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their
presentation of defense witnesses and that there will be
dismissal from the government service. Petitioners
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 303
maintain that the CSC did not have original jurisdiction mandated to hear and decide administrative case
to hear and decide the administrative case. Allegedly, in instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal
accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, including actions of its officers and the agencies
Title 1, Book V, Administrative Code of 1987, the CSC attached to it pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A,
is vested with appellate jurisdiction only in all Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the
administrative cases where the penalty imposed is Administrative Code of 1987.It can not be denied that
removal or dismissal from the office and where the the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that
complaint was filed by a private citizen against the a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against them.
government employee. They were properly informed of the charges.
Theysubmitted an Answer and were given the
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners right to due process opportunity to defend themselves. Petitioners can
was violated when the CSC acted asinvestigator, not,therefore, claim that there was a denial of due
complainant, prosecutor and jugde all at the same time. process much less the lack of jurisdiction on thepart of
the CSC to take cognizance of the case.
HELD: NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the
CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an
impartial judge. As an administrative body, its decision
was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of Tejano v. Ombudsman (2005)
administrative bodies, being considered experts in their
Facts: A report of Philippine National Bank (PNB)
field, are binding on the Supreme Court. The records
Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October
clearly disclose that the petitioners were duly
1992, discovered an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the
investigated by the CSC. After a careful examination of
amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes
the records, the Commission finds respondents guilty
Subdivision (V&G). It implicated Vice President
asc harged. The photograph pasted over the name
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive
Gilda Cruz in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) during the
Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller
July 30, 1989 Career Service Examination is not that of
Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch,
Cruz but of Paitim. Also, the signature over the name of
including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of
Gilda Cruz in the said document is totally different from
V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of
the signature of Gilda Cruz. Petitioners' contention that
P2.2 million of PNB funds. The resolution by the Graft
they were denied due process of law by the fact that the
Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended
CSC acted as investigator, complainant, prosecutor and
the filing of the proper information for violation of
judge, all at the same time against the petitioners is
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 was affirmed by
untenable. The CA correctly explained that the CSC is
the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, Office of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 304
Special Prosecutor, Deputy Special Prosecutor and Relations Commission, because one of its members,
Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor. A Commissioner Raul Aquino, participated in the review of
reinvestigation was granted. The Special recommended the case which he had earlier decided on as a former
the dismissal of the case, concurred by the Deputy labor arbiter. Likewise, the SC struck down a decision of
Special Prosecutor. On 10 December 1999, Presidential Executive Assistance Jacobo Clave over a
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier resolution of the Civil Service Commission, in which he,
participated in the initial preliminary investigation as then concurrently its Chairman, had earlier concurred.
Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation
for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation
assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the of the instant case and having recommended the filing
case aggressively. Petitioner attributes partiality on the of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman
part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the
the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should
that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary have delegated the review to his Deputies pursuant to
investigation of the same when he was a Special Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770
Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the
filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan. In earlier recommending the filing of information, then
Special Prosecutor Desierto was already convinced,
Issue: Whether Desierto acted with grave abuse of from that moment, that probable cause exists to indict
discretion the accused. It becomes a farfetched possibility that in
a subsequent review of the same, Ombudsman
Ratio: Yes. Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, Desierto would make a turnabout and take a position
committed grave abuse of discretion. The officer who contradictory to his earlier finding.
reviews a case on appeal should not be the same
person whose decision is under review. InZambales Due process dictates that one called upon to resolve a
Chromite Mining Company v. Court of Appeals, the dispute may not review his decision on appeal. In order
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
Resources was set aside by this Court after it had been might not turn out to be farce, the reviewing officer must
established that the case concerned an appeal of the perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
Secretarys own previous decision, which he handed under review; otherwise, there could be no different
down while he was yet the incumbent Director of view or there would be no real review of the case. The
Mines. The SC has equally declared void a decision decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
rendered by the Second Division of the National Labor inevitably, it would be the same view since being
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 305
human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his 21654 was denied by another reviewing officer,
first view of the case. Ombudsman Marcelo, does not cure the infirmity of
Ombudsman Desiertos actuation. As stressed
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good in Singson v. NLRC:
Government concedes the applicability of the prohibition
on the reviewing officer to handle a case he earlier . . . The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the
decided, thus: fact that the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner
Where the circumstances do not inspire confidence in was denied by two commissioners and without the
the objectivity and impartiality of the judge, such judge participation of Commissioner Aquino. The right of
should inhibit voluntarily or if he refuses, he should be petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from
prohibited from handling the case. A judge must not the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an
only be impartial but must also appear impartial as an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial
His actuation must inspire that belief. review of three commissioners. The denial of
petitioners right to an impartial review of his appeal is
This is an instance when appearance is as important as not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due
reality. process.
she leased her share in the property to petitioner for a effected by leaving copies of the summons at the
period of five years counted from 1986; that the said defendants dwelling house or residence with some
lease expired and was not extended thereafter; and that person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or
petitioner refused to vacate the property despite by leaving the copies at the defendants office or regular
demands therefor. place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof. Otherwise stated, service of summons
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of upon the defendant shall be by personal service first
petitioner. At the time of service of summons at and only when the defendant cannot be promptly served
petitioners house, he was not at home as he was then in person will substituted service be availed of. The
confined at the National Bureau of Investigation substituted service should be availed only when the
Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), defendant cannot be served promptly in person.
Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996, where he was Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by
undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally
dependency. Thus, on February 2, 1996, a liaison and the failure of such efforts. The statement should be
officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court made in the proof of service. This is necessary because
with a certification that petitioner will be unable to substituted service is in derogation of the usual method
comply with the directive to answer the complaint within of service.
the reglementary period, inasmuch as it will take six
months for him to complete the rehabilitation program In the case at bar, the sheriffs Return of Summons
and before he can be recommended for discharge by simply states:
the Rehabilitation Committee. The trial court, despite This is to certify that on this date: 26th day of January I
the written certification from NBI-TRC, granted have caused the service of summons, together with the
respondents motion to declare petitioner in default and attached complaint and its annexes issued in the above
ordered them to present evidence ex-parte. entitled case upon defendant REGALADO SAMARTINO
thru ROBERTO SAMARTINO, Brother of the defendant
Issue: Whether the summons were properly served to acknowledge receipt of said court processes by affixing
Sarmartino his signature at the lower left portion of the original
summons hereto attached.
Held: No. n actions in personam, summons on the
defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to Clearly, the above return failed to show the reason why
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive it, personal service could not be made. It failed to state
by tendering it to him. If efforts to serve the summons that prompt and personal service on the defendant was
personally to defendant is impossible, service may be rendered impossible. It was not shown that efforts were
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 307
made to find the defendant personally and that said be informed of the claim against him and the theory on
efforts failed; hence the resort to substituted service. As which such claim is premised.
stated above, these requirements are indispensable
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it Delos Santos v. NLRC (2001)
seeks to bind the defendant to the consequences of a
suit even though notice of such action is served not
Facts: On 3 May 1991 petitioner De los Santos (janitor)
upon him but upon another whom law could only
was illegally dismissed for alleged frustrated qualified
presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.
theft when he was moving to the adjacent lot of the
For this reason, failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully
company upon instruction of a certain Narciso. Narciso
comply with the requirements of substituted service
Honrado admitted responsibility for the haul and his
renders said service ineffective.
error in declaring the electric cables as scrap. The
general manager, apparently appeased by Honrados
Furthermore, nowhere in the return of summons or in
apology, issued a memorandum acknowledging receipt
the records of this case is it shown that petitioners
of his letter of apology and exculpated him of any
brother, on whom substituted service of summons was
wrongdoing. However, the company through its counsel
effected, was a person of suitable age and discretion
filed on 9 July 1993 a criminal complaint for frustrated
residing at petitioners residence.
qualified theft against Honrado and herein petitioner De
los Santos. The complaint however was subsequently
There being no valid substituted service of summons,
dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig for lack
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
of evidence. On 23 August 1993, upon request of Top-
of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of
Flite, alleged manpower agency of De los Santos,
summons is not only required to give the court
CAMARA STEEL terminated his services.
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to
afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim
Aggrieved by his illegal termination, De los Santos
made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules
sought recourse with the Labor Arbiter who on 29 March
regarding the service of summons is as much an issue
1994 rendered a decision ordering respondent
of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due
CAMARA STEEL to reinstate Delos Santos CAMARA
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
STEEL went to the NLRC for recourse. Top-Flite filed
be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
a Motion for Intervention praying that it be permitted to
support of his defense. It is elementary that before a
intervene in the appeal as co-respondent and,
person can be deprived of his property, he should first
accordingly, be allowed to submit its own memorandum
and other pleadings. Respondent CAMARA STEEL
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 308
empathically argues that Top-Flite, although impleaded includes submission of pleadings in compliance with the
as respondent in NLRC-NCR Cases, subject of the order of the court or tribunal. A fortiori, administrative
present appeal, was never summoned for which reason tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered
it was deprived of procedural due process, therefore the by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements subject
case should be remanded. to the observance of fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases
Issue:Whether jurisdiction over Top-Flit was acquired. presented before them. In labor cases, a punctilious
Yes. adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed in
the interest of the workingman. A remand of the case,
Held: CAMARA STEEL obviously wants to impress as the NLRC envisions, would compel petitioner, a lowly
upon the SC that Top-flite, being a necessary party, worker, to tread once again the calvary of a protracted
should have been summoned and the failure to do so litigation and flagellate him into submission with the lash
would justify the remand of the case to the Labor of technicality.
Arbiter. However, the records show that Top-Flite was
not only impleaded in the aforementioned case but was Bautista v. CA (2004)
in fact afforded an opportunity to be heard when it
submitted a position paper. This much was admitted by
Top-Flite in par. 5 of its Motion for Intervention where it Facts: On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E.
stated that "movant submitted its position paper in the Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles
cases mentioned in the preceding paragraph but the filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills,
Presiding Arbiter ignored the clear and legal basis of International, Inc., for quieting of title. This complaint
the position of the movant." In other words, the failure was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa
of Top-Flite to receive summons was not a fatal Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo and Nelly
procedural flaw because it was never deprived of the Javellana.
opportunity to ventilate its side and challenge petitioner
in its position paper, not to mention the comment which Petitioners alleged in their Amended Complaint that
it submitted through counsel before the SC. It moved to they have been in actual and uninterrupted possession
intervene not because it had no notice of the of Lot 5753 of the Imus Estate; that they discovered that
proceedings but because its position paper allegedly the land was covered by a reconstituted title in the
was not considered by the Labor Arbiter. While name of respondents; and that the said title and the
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can be derivatives thereof are spurious. Hence, they prayed
acquired by service of summons, it can also be acquired that they be declared the absolute owners of the land in
by voluntary appearance before the court which dispute.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 309
substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to (7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection
prevent. given to all forms of media by the due process and
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing Tatad v Sandiganbayan
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums. Yap, J.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies 21 March 1988
have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast
corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain
frequency without regard for government regulation or Facts:
for the rights of others. All forms of communication are Tatad, as Secretary of the Department of Public
entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of Information, was charged with alleged violations
expression clause. of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must and Corrupt Practices Act. Apparently, no action
take the particular circumstances of broadcast media was taken on said report.
into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether Five years later, he resigned. Two months
by government or through self-regulation by the industry thereafter, another complaint was lodged by
itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated Antonio de los Reyes against him this time with
handling. the Tanodbayan for the same charges.
The government has a right to be protected against 1980- The Tanodbayan referred the complaint of
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently de los Reyes to the Criminal Investigation Service
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to (CIS) for fact-finding investigation. Roberto P.
organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread Dizon, CIS Investigator of the Investigation and
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be Legal Panel, PSC, submitted his Investigation
informed. Radio and television would have little reason Report recommending appropriate legal action on
for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, the matter.
obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances. Since Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint against
they are the most convenient and popular means of him, claiming immunity from prosecution by virtue
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also of PD 1791, but the motion was denied. MR also
deserve special protection. denied.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy with the Tanodbayan for final disposition.
1985- the Tanodbayan approved a resolution
recommending that informations be filed against
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 312
petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. Accordingly, the proceedings and wait to resolve the issue only
five informations were filed against him. after the trial?
Petitoner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
consolidated motion to quash the informations on Held/Ratio:
the follow grounds: YES. Antonio de los Reyes original complaint, which
1 The prosecution deprived accused-movant of due was termed a report, was filed in 1974. Coming to the
process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of case at bar, the following relevant facts appear on
the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of record and are largely undisputed. The "report" was
jurisdiction to file the informations; made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of
2. Prescription of the offenses charged 3 of the 5 cases; 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary
3. The facts charged where he allegedly failed to file Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had
Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the year 1973 do resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the
not constitute an offense; 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
4. No prima facie case against the accused-movant complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan
Sandiganbayan rendered its challenged acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980-which was
resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash. around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation
MR denied. was accepted by Pres. Marcos. By October 25, 1982, all
Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was
violated the constitutional mandate of "due already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in was only on July 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved
unduly prolonging the termination of the by the Tanodbayan, recommending the ring of the
preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding criminal informations against the
corresponding informations only after more than a accused Francisco Tatad. Five (5) criminal informations
decade from the alleged commission of the were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all
purported offenses, which amounted to loss of against petitioner Tatad alone.
jurisdiction and authority to file the informations A painstaking review of the facts cannot but leave the
impression that political motivations played a vital role in
Issue: activating and propelling the prosecutorial process in
Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to this case. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were,
due process and the right to "speedy disposition" only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with
of the cases against him as guaranteed by the President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established
Constitution? May the court, ostrich like, bury its procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
head in the sand, as it were, at the initial stage of investigation, which require the submission of affidavits
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 313
and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the preliminary investigation, including substantial
respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
referred the complaint to the Presidential Security for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part
Command for finding investigation and report. of the procedural due process constitutionally
There was such blatant departure from the established guaranteed by the fundamental law. Not only under the
procedure as a dubious, but revealing attempt to involve broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
an office directly under the President in the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
prosecutorial process, lending credence to the suspicion cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
that the prosecution was politically motivated. (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the
Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's
the impression that their noble office is being used or constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3) years
prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends or cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light
other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.
fundamental objective of serving the interest of justice
even handedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, Inocencio Gonzales v CSC
powerless or mighty. Only by strict adherence to the Puno, J.
established procedure may the public's perception of 2 September 1993
the of the prosecutor be enhanced.
Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under
preliminary investigation cannot be justified on the basis
of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) Facts:
prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve Gonzales was employed at the Agricultural
a case under preliminary investigation by him from its Training Institute of the Department of Agriculture
termination. While this period fixed by law is merely for 36 years. On his 25th year of service, he
"directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be received a merit award recognizing his
disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute continuous, dedicated, and faithful service in the
impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that the law government. On his 30th year, he repeated the
has included a provision that is deliberately intended to feat. His record of service is without any wart of
become meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter. malfeasance or misfeasance in office.
There was violation of the constitutional right of the 1990- He had to visit his children in the US so he
accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the took several leaves of absences.
requirements of the law governing the conduct of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 314
On June 25, 1990, petitioner wrote to the Director Protection Board (MPSB) for appropriate action.
of ATI requesting approval of a leave without pay On April 30, 1991, the Board ruled that petitioner
starting from the second week of July to was duly notified before he was dropped from the
December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason roll. His appeal was dismissed. His motion for
his desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical reconsideration was rejected. Petition to the CSC
check-up free of charge due to my childrens' was denied.
medical plan benefits". The letter was personally
delivered by petitioner's wife. It carried his Issue:
address in US. W/N petitioner was accorded due process before he
For unknown reason, the Director of ATI did not was dropped from the rolls.
act on the letter-request. It was neither approved
nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, ATI Held/Ratio:
started acting adversely on petitioner's request. NO. It ought to be self-evident that security of tenure
ATI's Assistant Director and OIC wrote to can not be a shield against absences without proper
petitioner declaring him absent without official approval by the authorities. Leaves are matters of
leave for more than thirty (30) days and warning private convenience and cannot prejudice public
him that should he not report within five (5) days service. Their approval is discretionary as it depends on
from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped the higher needs of public service.
from the rolls. The letter was addressed at Be that as it may, petitioner's third argument where he
petitioner's house in QC. The letter, however, was invokes the protection of the due process clause of the
returned to sender (ATI). Constitution should be sustained.
What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar CSC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1985 is the
import in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues governing rule on notice before an employee can be
of the Philippine Journal, a newspaper, of general dropped from the rolls due to absence without
circulation. On October 24, 1990, ATI dropped leave, viz:
petitioner from its rolls. He was not furnished a 4. The agency should notify in writing the employee,
copy of the order. who is absent without leave (AWOL) for thirty (30) days,
When he came back from the US and reported for to report within five (5) days from receipt of notice,
work on November 19, 1990, he found out that otherwise, he shall be dropped from the rolls.
Mercedes Puruganan had been appointed to his The Circular does not specifically state where the notice
position. By himself, he protested to the Civil shall be sent. In the case at bar, ATI knew that
Service Commission on December 14, 1990. His petitioner was staying in the US. The letter of June 25,
letter-protest was endorsed to the Merit Systems 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 315
carried his address in the United States. The records do request, if only because petitioner was abroad and
not show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of needed reasonable time and resources to return to the
petitioner's correct address. Despite this knowledge, Philippine on a five (5) day call. The OIC did not explain
however, the letter of ATI's Asst. Director and OIC was why all of a sudden the "exigencies of the service"
inexplicably mailed to his house in QC. The letter was required the immediate return of the petitioner. If the
not received by petitioner per certification of the "exigencies of the service" were real why was he
Postmaster of the Bureau of Post of Quezon City. allowed to go on leave. Worse still, the order dropping
The disputed ruling cuts too deeply on petitioner's right petitioner from the rolls was never sent to him.
to continue his employment in the government and Petitioner did not also know he had been replaced till he
unduly dilutes the protection of due process. To be sure, returned to the Philippines on November.
the cavalier attitude of respondent Commission is
deplorable considering that on line is the thirty six (36)
long years of faithful and dedicated, service to the Alfredo Lim and Rafelito Garayblas v CA
government of the petitioner. Nothing less than strict Carpio, J.
compliance with the demands of due process should 12 August 2002
have been demanded by the respondent Commission
from the officials of ATI in light of the equities of the
case. Nor can we give our concurrence to the further Facts:
ruling of the respondent Commission that the denial of Bistro filed a petition before the RTC against
due process to the petitioner was cured by the Mayor Lim who allegedly instructed policemen to
publication of said notice in three (3) issues of the inspect and investigate its license as well as work
Philippine Journal. Notice by publication might have permits and health certificates of its staff,
been proper if the address of petitioner were unknown. The inspection resulted in stoppage of work in the
Since the officials of ATI knew the whereabouts of night club and restaurant operations.
petitioner, they have no legal warrant to notify him thru Later, Mayor Lim refused to accept application for
the newspapers. business license and work permits for that year.
There are other acts, both covert and overt, which show Bistro interposes that municipal corporations
that ATI officials did not accord fair treatment to the cannot prohibit operations of nightclubs. They
petitioner. Petitioner filed his request for leave without may regulate but not prevent.
pay on June 25, 1990 while still in the United States. RTC- issued preliminary injunction.
Though petitioner has no right to presume that his Lim, however, issued an order closing Bistros
request would be granted, nonetheless it was no less a operations.
duty on the part of officials ATI to act immediately on the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 316
Bistro filed a contempt case against Lim which The mayor indeed had authority to inspect and
was later withdrawn in exchange that the investigate for violations of conditions but does not have
preliminary injunction be respected. power to order a police raid on these establishments on
Lim- filed a motion to dissolve the injunction guise of inspection or investigation. Lim acted beyond
alleging that the power of the mayor to inspect his authority.
and investigate commercial establishments and
staff is implicit in Manilas revised charter and in Unicraft Industries v CA
the LGC. Ynares-Santiago, J.
RTC- denied motion 26 March 2001
CA- denied Lims petition. A writ of PI may issue if
the act sought to be enjoined will cause Facts:
irreparable injury to the movant or destroy the Private respondents were employees of Unicraft
status quo before a full hearing can be held on for at least over a year, performing work
the merits. necessary and desirable to its operation. Its
principal office was in Apao, Mandaue City and
Issue: when it opened a branch in Lapu-Lapu, private
W/N Bistro was denied due process. respondents were transferred there.
Unicraft however failed to comply with certain
Held/Ratio:
requirements and it was ordered closed by the
YES. Injunction proper.
local government thus effecting the mass
There was no due process in the order to close the
dismissal of private respondents.
business. Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific
Private respondents: contended that they were
violation of conditions of its business licenses or
dismissed because of their union activities.
permits. He refused to grant the license even without
considering whether the legal prerequisites were met. Petitioner: no illegal dismissal, the closure of the
The authority of mayors to issue business permits is branch was virtue of a lawful order of the LG.
beyond question (LGC and Manila Charter). The power Unicraft and its counsel failed to appear before
to refuse to issue such license and permits is premised the Voluntary Arbitrator who found in favor of
on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for issuance private respondents.
of such license and permits. The mayor must observe Unicraft filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
due process by giving the applicant notice and of Appeals contending that they were denied
opportunity to be heard. opportunity to be heard in the proceedings before
the voluntary arbitrator. CA remanded to the VA.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 317
The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of terminated the security guards (private
Appeals, may be sent by the offended party or the respondents).
drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired Thus these private respondents filed a
lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters. The complaintfor illegal dismissal, underpayment of w
prosecution presented and marked in evidence two ages, nonpayment of overtime pay, premium pay
letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent forholiday and rest day, service incentive leave
to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no pay, 13th month pay, and attorneys fees against
evidence that would establish petitioners actual receipt LF and petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.
of any demand letter which could have served as notice Meanwhile, LF filed a crossclaim against
to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication petitioner. Petitioner denied liability on account
that they were actually received by petitioner. No of illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-
acknowledgement receipt or return card for the first and employee relationship existed between it and the
second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such private respondents. They also wanted the cross-
omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is claim be dismissed.
fatal to its cause. The Labor Arbiter declared LF and petitioner
jointly and severally liable to pay the money
Mariveles Shipyard v CA claims of complainants. It also ordered LF to
Quisumbing, J. reinstate to former or equivalent positions the
11 November 2003 respondents without loss of seniority rights and
privileges with full backwages.
Facts: NLRC affirmed in toto. CA denied petitioners
special civil action for certiorari.
In October 1993, petitioner corporation, Mariveles
Shipyard Corp., engaged the services of Longest Petitioner avers that there was denial of due
Force Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to process of law when the Labor Arbiter failed to
render security services at its premises. Longest have the case tried on the merits. Petitioner adds
Force deployed its security guards at petitioners that the Arbiter did not observe the mandatory
shipyard at Mariveles, Bataan. According to language of the then Sec. 5(b) Rule V (now
petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms Section 11, per amendment in Resolution No. 01-
of the security contract with Longest Force 02, Series of 2002) of the NLRC New Rules of
(LF). However, it found the services Procedure which provided that: If the Labor
unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to Arbiter finds no necessity of further hearing after
terminate its contract with LF. In turn, LF the parties have submitted their position papers
and supporting documents, he shall issue an
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 320
Order to that effect and shall inform the parties, JRM owned Tropicana and Copacabana hotels.
stating the reasons therefor However, it only had controlling interest in Tropicana, as
Copacabana was managed by its owners (siblings Yu).
Issue: The two hotels became direct competitors. Pertinent
W/N petitioner was denied due process. financial and business information was being leaked
from Copacabana to Tropicana. Ricardo Valladolid (pet)
Held/Ratio: was employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone
NO, he was given ample opportunity to present his switchboard operator. He was subsequently transferred
side. The essence of due process is simply an to the position of clerk-collector. He was suspected to
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative be the leak who sends important information to the
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an competitor.
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type Order of May 2, 1979 (December 26, 1979): In
hearing. The requirement of due process in labor cases response to the application for clearance and
before a Labor Arbiter is satisfied when the parties are Valladolids complaint for Illegal Dismissal, the Regional
given the opportunity to submit their position papers to director issued this order. The Deputy Minister of Labor,
which they are supposed to attach all the supporting in a succinct Order, dismissed both appeals after finding
documents or documentary evidence that would prove no sufficient justification or valid reason to alter, modify,
their respective claims, in the event the Labor Arbiter much less reverse the Order appealed from.
determines that no formal hearing would be conducted
or that such hearing was not necessary. In any event, Contention c/o JRM: The order of Hon. Amado Inciong
as found by the NLRC, petitioner was given ample (resp) failed to state the facts and conclusion of law
opportunity to present its side in several hearings upon which it is based, thus unconstitutional.
conducted before the Labor Arbiter and in the position
papers and other supporting documents that it had Memorandum decision: Only dispositive portion is
submitted. We find that such opportunity more than authored by the SC. The rest is copied from the
satisfies the requirement of due process in labor cases. decision of the lower court. Not prohibited, still valid, but
it is not encouraged.
of the constitutional requirement set forth in Article 8, As earlier noted, the essence of due process is simply
section 14, which is required of decisions or courts of an opportunity to be heard, to explain ones side, or to
record. However, the assailed order is not a decision of seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
a court of record. The Ministry of Labor is an complained of. In the case at bar, private respondents
administrative agency with quasi-judicial functions, with were given ample opportunity to do just that but they
rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, failed, for unknown reasons, to avail themselves of such
summary, and non-technical. As the Deputy Minister opportunity. They themselves moved that they be
was in full accord with the findings of fact and the allowed to present additional affidavits on August 19,
conclusions of law drawn from shoes facts by the 1991, but they never did; no valid reason was given for
Regional director, there was no necessity of discussing their failure to do so. Their contention that the labor
anew the issues raised therein. arbiter failed to rule on their motion deserves scant
consideration. It is axiomatic in fact, it is plainly
commonsensical that when a counsel asks for an
extension of time within which to file a pleading, he must
be ready with that pleading on the date specified in his
FERNANDEZ v. NLRC motion, even absent a resolution or order disposing of
his motion.
the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the freedom of
and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned speech/expression.
respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the HELD:
cases against two Members of the Court." Statements There was no violation. The Court did not purport to
of the respondent saying that the SCs order '"heightens announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was
the people's apprehension over the justice system in simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the
this country, especially because the people have been Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct
go scot-free was publicized in leading newspapers. tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice."
Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to
explain in writing why he should not be punished for Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the
contempt of court for making such public statements "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the nature and were made in such a manner and under
resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the
the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent
Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction
responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of
expect due process from this Court, that the Court has the judicial system of a country and the destruction of
become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. the standards of professional conduct required from
The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has
and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. some implications to the society.
Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of
speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for
this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than SEC OF JUSTICE v. JUDGE RALPH LANTION
the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and
contempt charges."
FACTS:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 324
had already been conducted in that country. But Muoz. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the
because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn,
before those proceedings could be completed, it was filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
hindered from continuing with the due processes for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The NBI
prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due agents arrested and detained him. Muoz filed a petition
process now has thus become hollow. He already had for bail which was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr.
that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
taking it, he ran away. extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
flight risk. After Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
In this light, would it be proper and just for the from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
government to increase the risk of violating its treaty Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private
obligations in order to accord Respondent Jimenez his respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
personal liberty in the span of time that it takes to Order denyinghis application for bail and this was
resolve the Petition for Extradition? His supposed granted by respondent judge.
immediate deprivation of liberty without the due process
that he had previously shunned pales against the ISSUE:
governments interest in fulfilling its Extradition Treaty W/N the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
obligations and in cooperating with the world community amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing
in the suppression of crime. Indeed, constitutional private respondent to bail?
liberties do not exist in a vacuum; the due process rights HELD:
accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
against exigent and palpable government interests. discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
allowing private respondent to bail. Accordingly,
GOVT OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt
servanda demands that the Philippines honor its
obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
FACTS: with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it
The Philippines and Hong Kong signed an Agreement does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons. obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process
Hong Kong Court. Department of Justice (DOJ) guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these
received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent also by international conventions, particularly the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 326
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy
an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a in the amounts indicated on the disbursement voucher
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. and the purchase order. Consequently, the DILG
Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate against the respondents. After preliminary investigation,
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended
that a new standard which he termed clear and the indictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On
convincing evidence should be used in granting bail in review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
extradition cases. According to him, this standard recommended the dismissal of the complaints against
should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan and Ramirez. Formal
but higher than preponderance of evidence. The charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against
potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea
evidence that he is not a flightrisk and will abide with all and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal
the orders and processes of the extradition court.In this information. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a
case, there is no showing that private respondent reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the
presented evidence to show that he is nota flight risk. Office of the Special Prosecutor recommended the
Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial dismissal of the charges against Flores and Tanchanco.
court to determine whether privaterespondent may be In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor
granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing made a sudden turnabout as regards Roxas, Nacpil and
evidence. Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused.
FACTS: HELD:
Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a It appears that the charge against respondents was
Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no
Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC- motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said
INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the
units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committee mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those
voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of
manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract the charge against the said respondents, could not and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 327
should not be made the basis for impleading them as Due to so many postponements made by the
accused in this case without violating their right to due respondent, including the no-show of their European
process. employees as witnesses, the case tilted out of their
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived favor. One of their witnesses was stricken from the list
of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated due to his non-appearance in the day that the cross-
the complaint against them without their knowledge. exam on him was to be finished and the judge moved
Due process of law requires that every litigant must be for a finality regarding the postponements (ie. no
given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be postponements were to be made again)
present and defend himself in person at every stage of
the proceedings. Ortigas claimed that while in Rome, the discrimination
against him took place. Moreover, when he asked for a
seat change to first class during the stop overs, he
wasnt given any. He was only given the option when he
Ortigas v Lufthansa was already in Hong Kong, about 3 hours only from
J. Barredo Manila.
Issues:
Facts:
1. WON the lower court acted in grave abuse of
Francisco Ortigas, and defendant Lufthansa German
discretion when it denied the defendants motion for
Airlines, appealed from the decision of the Court of First
postponement on Sept 24, 1966.
Instance of Manila, condemning the defendant to pay
2. WON the lower court erred in striking out the
plaintiff an indemnity for the former's failure to "comply
testimony of one of the defendants witnesses even if his
with its obligation to give first class accommodation to a
testimony was not finished
Filipino passenger holding a first class ticket," This was
3. WON the lower court erred in making the defendant
due to giving of the space instead to a Belgian and the
pay indemnities
improper conduct of its agents in dealing with him which
Held: No to all. Judgment modified raising damages
was filled with discrimination.
from 100k to 150k.
During the trial, there were several postponements of
Ratio:
the trial from both sides. Three hearings were
1. The case had been pending for about three years
postponed on the request of the plaintiffs, 4 on the
and had actually suffered during that period even more
request of both parties, and 10 on the request of
than the usually permissible number of continuances,
respondents.
quite often to suit the convenience of defendant's
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 328
counsel. Notice of the September 28, 1966 schedule knowledge of the date of the hearing about a month
had been served on counsel the month previous. It must before, defendant did not see to it that its expected
be assumed that due preparations and arrangements witnesses were not assigned to do duty on the day they
were to be made since the receipt of that notice to were supposed to appear in court. We cannot believe
insure the presence in Manila for the expected Lufthansa could be so undermanned that such a simple
witnesses on the date set. Under the circumstances, the adjustment of its personnel had to be "impossible."
excuse given by defendant that the witnesses could not
leave their respective stations and places of work to 2. The right of a party to cross-examine the witnesses of
attend the trial is plainly unacceptable. There was his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil
enough time and opportunity for defendant to have cases, no less than the right of the accused in criminal
made the corresponding adjustments in the cases. The express recognition of such right of the
assignments of its personnel so as to enable its accused in the Constitution does not render the right of
witnesses to be in court. parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is
an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by
As it is, there was actually no basis at all for the the fundamental law.
exercise of discretion on the part of the trial judge in a
manner favorable to it. Trials may be postponed Subject to appropriate supervision by the judge in order
because of the absence of evidence only when such to avoid unnecessary delays on account of its being
absence is justified. Mere absence is not a justification unduly protracted and to needed injunctions protective
in itself. Section 4 of Rule 22 is sufficiently clear on this of the right of the witness against self-incrimination and
point. It provides that "A motion to postpone a trial on oppressive and unwarranted harassment and
the ground of absence of evidence can be granted only embarrassment, a party is absolutely entitled to a full
upon affidavit showing the materiality of evidence cross-examination as prescribed in Section 8 of Rule
expected to be obtained, and that due diligence has 132 thus: "Upon the termination of the direct
been used to procure it." This means that it must be examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
shown to the court that due diligence had been adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
exercised in either securing the presence of the examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient
evidence (witnesses) or preventing the absence thereof. fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
Indeed, even if such reason were given earlier on reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
September 24, 1966 the court would have been as well issue." Until such cross-examination has been finished,
justified in denying the requested postponement. We the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as
cannot see any reason why, despite its having complete and may not, therefore, be allowed to form
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 329
part of the evidence to be considered by the court in was necessary to determine what evidence could be
deciding the case. considered to be for the defendant. And so when
counsel for plaintiff asked the court to strike out the
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it testimony so far given by Lazarri, there was practically
is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly no alternative for the court but to grant the same.
cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to Indeed, defendant's counsel could not and did not offer
cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of any objection thereto.
such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not
and cannot be done or completed due to causes 3. In the light of all the foregoing, there can be no doubt
attributable to the party offering the witness, the as to the right of Ortigas to damages, both moral and
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered exemplary. Precedents We have consistently adhered
incompetent. to so dictate.
Lopez- According to the Court, such omission placed
In the case at bar, however, the Supreme Court has not plaintiffs in a predicament that enabled the company to
opted not to rely exclusively on the foregoing keep the plaintiffs as their passengers in the tourist
considerations. In order to satisfy as to whether or not class, thereby retaining the business and promoting the
defendant stands to be irreparably prejudiced by the company's self-interest at the expense of,
impugned action of the trial court relative to the embarrassment, discomfort and humiliation on the part
testimony of Lazzari, the justices have just the same of the plaintiffs.
gone over the transcript thereof. After considering the
same, they claimed that even his direct testimony, These precedents, as may be seen, apply four-square
without taking into account anymore his answers to the to herein plaintiffs case. Defendant's liability for willful
cross-examination questions of counsel for plaintiff, and wanton breach of its contract of carriage with
cannot be of much weight in establishing the defenses plaintiff is, therefore, indubitable.
in defendant's answer.
Facts: Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the
for a change of status from provisional to permanent person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of
under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a
submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was
Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
eligibility of the teachers. In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC
Regional Director, petitioner denied the accusation. His
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the motion to dismiss was denied.
certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. Teacher witnesses for the prosecution Alforjas and
The signature of Civil Service Commission Director Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz
Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A.
said certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed 6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated
initially forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service Alforjas and Delgados testimonies. They all identified
Regional Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the
eligibilities and for appropriate action through an fake certificates of eligibility.
indorsement letter dated September 26, 1991. In its resolution, the CSC found Emin guilty. In his
Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin
found that said applications for civil service eligibility issues of (1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction
under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the over the administrative cases against the public school
certificates of eligibility they submitted were genuine as teachers; and (2) whether petitioner was accorded due
their control number belonged to the batch issued to process. The CA dismissed the appeal.
CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But the
records showed that these certificates were never ISSUE:
issued to any one. (1) whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over
Two separate investigations were conducted by Director the present case;
Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil (2) whether or not petitioner was accorded due process.
Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the
R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the
Office, and (2) on how the teachers got said certificates, coverage of the term teachers are limited to: (1) public
The teachers concerned were asked to report to the school teachers in the professorial staff of state colleges
Office and bring the original copies of their certificates of and universities; and (2) school nurses, school
eligibility. On several dates, the teachers appeared and physicians, school dentists, and other school employees
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 331
under the category of medical and dental personnel. administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general words and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative
following an enumeration of persons or things, by words due process cannot be fully equated with due process in
of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be its strict judicial sense.
construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or examination as most of the submissions were written. In
class as those specifically mentioned. Had Congress our view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been
intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from deprived of due process merely because no cross-
the coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so examination took place. The rule is well established that
by clear and concise language. due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded
As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
Investigating Committee that should have investigated the controversy or given opportunity to move for a
his case conformably with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS In the present case, the record clearly shows that
Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit during the
Rules of Procedure. However, at this late hour, the preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to
proceedings conducted by the public respondent CSC Dismiss. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds. Under the Order of the Commission. The essence of due
the principle of estoppel by laches, petitioner is now process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity
barred from impugning the CSCs jurisdiction over his to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
case. reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service Neither is there merit in petitioners assertion that he
Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient was denied the right to due process when the CSC
opportunity to be heard and defend himself against Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator,
charges of participation in faking civil service eligibilities prosecutor, judge and executioner. The report submitted
of certain teachers for a fee. Not only did he answer the by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director
charges before the CSC Regional Office but he Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely
participated in the hearings of the charges against him recommendatory in character to the Civil Service
to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his Commission itself. Such procedure is not unusual in an
participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary. administrative proceeding.
Equally unmeritorious is petitioners contention that he Petition is denied.
was denied due process. He avers that he was not Rodson Phil. v. CA
allowed cross-examination. It is well to remember that in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 332
The respondent filed its urgent motion to quash the ISSUE: WON the court erred when it resolved the
subpoena on the ground that the witness was a resident respondent's formal offer of evidence and admitted
of Quezon City, which was more than fifty (50) such documentary evidence before they could file
kilometers away and, as such, could not be compelled their comment or opposition thereto.
to testify under Section 9 of Rule 23 of the Revised Petitioners assert that during the hearing of March 26,
Rules of Court. 1996, the petitioners called the attention of the court to
In its Order, Judge Martin A. Ocampo inhibited himself the fact that they had not yet filed their comment on the
upon motion of the petitioners from further hearing the respondents formal offer of evidence, and that the court
case. The case was re-raffled to Branch 11, presided by declared that there was no need for them to do so as
Judge Isaias P. Dicdican. After a review of the records, yet because of the unresolved motion. They
the trial court discovered that the petitioners motion to emphasized that even after the court denied their
recall Mary Maquilan had already been denied; that the motion to recall Maquilan as witness and ordered them
petitioners had not yet filed their comment on the to present her as a hostile witness on rebuttal evidence,
respondents formal offer of documentary evidence; the court still failed to resolve the respondents formal
and, that the said formal offer of evidence had not yet offer of evidence.
been resolved by the court. The TC issued an Order SC ruled that the petitioners were amply accorded the
admitting the respondents documentary evidence for chance and/or opportunity to register their objections to
the purposes they were offered. the private respondents offer of evidence. For as early
The petitioners filed a Motion to Defer the Hearing Set as May 27, 1994, the petitioners were already charged
and prayed that they be given a chance to file their with knowledge or notice that they were being required
written objection to the formal offer of evidence filed by to file their comments and/or objection to the offer of
the respondent. The trial court denied the motion and evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that action on the
ruled that the ten-day period given to the petitioners per offer was put on hold pending the resolution of the
its Order of March 29, 1994 had long since elapsed. It motion to recall a witness. Resultantly, since the
emphasized that the order holding in abeyance its ruling disposition of the motion to recall was made the
on the respondents formal offer of evidence did not toll condition sine qua non for further action on the private
the ten-day period for the filing of the petitioners respondents offer of evidence, the petitioners should
comment thereon. have lost no time in submitting their comment to the
The petitioners, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari offer once, or as soon as the court denied on March 29,
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The appellate 1996, their motion to recall Ms. Maquilan for further
court rendered its assailed Decision and dismissed the cross-examination.
petition for being devoid of merit. Even during the time that the petitioners were supposed
to file their motion to recall, they had already played fast
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 334
and loose with court processes. Even then, as correctly unresolved motion. The respondent had already
argued by the respondent, there was actually no more presented its lone witness, Maquilan, who already
time to suspend, as it had long expired on June 12, testified on direct and cross-examination. Hence, the
1997, for which reason the respondents formal offer of respondent was obliged to formally offer its
documentary evidence was truly ripe for resolution. documentary evidence as provided by Section 35, Rule
Hence, We hold, that far from gravely abusing his 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
discretion, the respondent judge acted prudently and It bears stressing that the petitioners still have the right
judiciously. to adduce rebuttal evidence to controvert or overcome
The petitioners failed to append to their petition at bar a the probative weight of the respondents documentary
copy of their motion for reconsideration of the July 17, evidence. Moreover, since the petitioners were aware
1997 Order of the trial court, admitting the documentary that the respondent had a counterclaim of P29,000,000,
evidence offered by the respondent. The said pleading it behooved them to observe diligence and vigilance in
is very relevant in this case, because we could there filing their comment without delay. However, by their
discern if the petitioners had prayed for a chance to file own negligence, the petitioners failed to file the said
their comment on or opposition to the admission of the comment. As such, the petitioners are not entitled to a
respondents documentary evidence, and incorporated writ of certiorari to shield themselves from their own
therein their objections to the said motion, if any. omission and negligence. It must be stressed that he
Even considering the merits of the case, the petition who comes to court for equitable relief must do so with
must still fail. clean hands.
Irrefragably, the petitioners had until June 12, 1994 AILINANG MAROHOMBSAR VS. JUDGE SANTOS ADIONG
within which to file their comment on the respondents G.R. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004
formal offer of evidence. The ten-day period within
which to file such comment was not suspended by the
Facts:
filing and, thereafter, the pendency of the petitioners
Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in the
motion to recall Maquilan as a witness for additional
civil case for injunction. The case was filed by Yasmira
cross-examination. What was merely suspended by
Pangadapun questioning the legality of Marohombsars
such motion was the trial courts resolution of the
appointment as Provincial Social Welfare Officer of the
respondents formal offer of evidence. The petitioners
DSWD-ARMM. Prior to his appointment, Pangadapun
failed to file their comment within the period therefor.
used to occupy said position.
Indeed, Judge Martin Ocampo erred in declaring that
the respondents formal offer of evidence was
Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge
prematurely filed, and that the petitioners need not yet
issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for
file their comment thereon because of the petitioners
the issuance of the preliminary injunction. Summons,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 335
together with a copy of the complaint and a notice, was status quo until that determination. Respondent judge
also served on both parties. Marohombsar filed an ex was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his
parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.
was given the time to comment. Respondent judge
issued an order stating that a preliminary conference 2) In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual
had been held and that both parties had waived the requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction
raffle of the case and reset the hearing on the may issue has been relaxed to the point that not all
application for the issuance of a writ of injunction. The petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-
judge gave another time to file her comment again. type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal or trial-type
hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential
During the hearing on the application for the issuance of to due process.
a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers
appeared. Hence, respondent judge considered it In the present case, complainant was able to move for a
submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right
injunction. Hence, this complaint for gross ignorance of to due process was not in anyway transgressed. We
law, abuse of discretion and conduct unbecoming a have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been
judge. denied due process when he has availed of the
opportunity to present his position.
Issues:
1) Whether or not TRO ex parte is allowed in the instant The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a
case. reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. It is a
2) Whether or not trial-type hearing is essential to due rule that a party cannot claim that he has been denied
process. due process when he was given the opportunity to
present his position.
3) Whether or not respondent judge erred in ordering
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. 3) As a matter of public policy, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action
Held: even though such acts are erroneous, provided he acts
1) A TRO is generally granted without notice to the in good faith and without malice. Respondent judge, or
opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him any other member of the bench for that matter, is
until the propriety of granting a temporary injunction can presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner
be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 336
that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an respondent explained that the Contested Ballot Boxes
impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process. were also the subject of two municipal election protests
both filed with the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao,
and both handled by counsel of private respondent. The
RTC ordered them to be brought before the court the
QUINTOS v. COMELEC Contested Ballot Boxes.
Private respondent averred that if COMELEC
Resolution No. 2812 were strictly implemented, the
FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo V. Quintos and private resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of
respondent Jose T. Villarosa were candidates for Paluan would suffer undue delay. The COMELEC would
Governor of Occidental Mindoro in the May 14, 2001 take first custody of the 14 Contested Ballot Boxes. The
elections. Private respondent was declared winner with resolution of the election protests in the Municipality of
57,136 votes. Petitioner lost to private respondent by Paluan would have to wait for the COMELEC to
1,093 votes. complete its revision of the ballots in the Contested
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an election protest Ballot Boxes.
claiming that massive fraud and illegal electoral On August 27, 2001, the COMELEC rendered the
practices were committed in the contested precincts Assailed Order granting private respondents
during the registration, the voting and the counting of Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration
the votes. subject to guidelines.
On June 15, 2001, private respondent filed his Answer Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim. Order of the COMELEC dated August 27, 2001.
Private respondents counsel moved that the Regional On September 12, 2001, the COMELEC denied
Trial Court of Mamburao be allowed to take first custody petitioner's Motion.
of the Contested Ballot Boxes before their transmittal to
the COMELEC. The Comelec denied the motion. TOPICAL ISSUE: Whether the failure to give petitioner
From the COMELECs Order, private respondent filed a the opportunity to comment or oppose private
Manifestation and Motion for Partial Reconsideration. respondents Manifestation and Motion for Partial
Private respondent stated that petitioner identified only Reconsideration is a denial of due process.
one (1) ballot box as subject of his protest. Private Petitioner contends that the COMELEC issued the
respondent, however, identified thirteen (13) ballot Assailed Order of August 27, 2001 without giving him
boxes from the same municipality in his counter-protest. the opportunity to comment or oppose the motion for
Thus, the total number of Contested Ballot Boxes, both partial reconsideration. This, bewails petitioner, violates
in the protest and counter-protest, is 14. Private his right to due process.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 337
The Solicitor General correctly stated that there was no FACTS: Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. is the former
denial of due process since petitioner subsequently filed Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation Office
a motion for reconsideration which the COMELEC (ATO), Department of Transportation and
considered and acted on, albeit unfavorably, in the Communication (DOTC).
Order dated September 12, 2001. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as Respondents Reynaldo D. Fernando, Modesto E.
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a Chief, Chief Administrative Assistant, and Administrative
reconsideration of the assailed action or ruling. Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training
Petitioner cannot successfully invoke deprivation of due Center (CATC). The CATC is an adjunct agency of the
process since the COMELEC gave petitioner the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway
chance to be heard in his motion for reconsideration. communicators and related civil aviation personnel for
The COMELEC, in issuing the Assailed Orders allowing the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast
the Regional Trial Court to take prior custody of the Asian and Pacific region.
Contested Ballot Boxes, did not act without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995
In giving the Regional Trial Court first access to the addressed to the respondents, detailing them to the
Contested Ballot Boxes, the COMELEC sought to Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal
prevent delay in the resolution of the two protest cases effective 2 May 1995.
pending before the trial court. However, first access by Respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia
the Regional Trial Court is only limited to the period of and Undersecretary Josefina T. Lichauco through
time when the COMELEC is still revising other protested petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail
ballot boxes. The primary concern for such arrangement order. On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail
is the expeditious disposition of protest cases, which is order, respondents reported to the Office of
underscored in Section 3 of COMELEC Resolution No. Undersecretary Cal at DOTC.
2812. Without acting on respondents request for
reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19
July 1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under
preventive suspension for 90 days without pay
pending investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
VILLARUEL, JR. v. FERNANDO On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary
Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their return to
their mother unit since more than 90 days had already
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 338
lapsed. Respondents also sought the intervention of the which to file petitioners memorandum. However, the
Ombudsman in their case. Secretary Garcia replied to OSG failed to file the memorandum.
the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to
respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia file the required memorandum. The OSG, through
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for
detail of respondents. Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied the
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner same. The Resolution became final and executory on
failed and refused to reinstate respondents to their 14 June 1997.
mother unit. Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for
Respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy of
Damages with Prayer for a Preliminary Mandatory the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any
Injunction against petitioner which the TC granted. opposition.
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the writ On 17 February 1998, petitioner, through his new
of preliminary injunction, respondents moved to cite counsel, filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner
declare petitioner in default for not filing an answer alleged that the trial courts decision never became
within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of final and executory as the trial court deprived him of
26 January 1996. his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and OSG failed to file petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R.
declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The trial SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his appeal.
court issued a bench warrant against petitioner. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General for certiorari and dismissed the same in the Decision
(OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with the dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts order finding reconsideration but the appellate court denied the
petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.
The TC declared petitioner in default for his failure to file ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process.
an answer to the petition for mandamus and The negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner
damages.The TC ordered Villaruel to pay. of the effects of such negligence and prevent the
Aggrieved, petitioner, represented by the OSG, decision of the trial court from becoming final and
appealed to the Court of Appeals. executory. In short, the OSGs negligence binds
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non- petitioner.
extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within The petition has no merit.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 339
In its Comment/Manifestation, the Register of Deeds distinction between the general jurisdiction of the RTC
informed the cadastral court that Lot No. 6-H-2 covered and its limited jurisdiction when acting as a Land
by TCT No. RT-3972 is registered under herein Registration Court.
petitioners name and that it appears to be clean and
devoid of any encumbrance/annotations. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence on record
shows the existence of an easement of right of way in
On July 23, 1997, the cadastral court issued an Order favor of respondent.
granting the petition of respondent. Petitioner received a
copy of the Order of July 23, 1997. Petitioner entered its On July 9, 1999, petitioner filed its motion for
special appearance and filed a Motion for reconsideration but the appellate court denied it in its
Reconsideration and Recall and expressed caution Resolution of August 9, 1999.
that it was not necessarily submitting itself to the
jurisdiction of the cadastral court. Petitioner contended ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied due process. NO
that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 violated
its fundamental right to substantive and procedural due The SC finds against petitioner.
process, that the petition of respondent was for specific
performance of a private agreement cognizable only by The cadastral court did not deny petitioner of its right to
an ordinary court and not a cadastral court, and that the due process of the law. The essence of due process is
petition of respondent was a procedural shortcut to found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
enforce a stale order citing Rule 39, Section 6 of the submit any evidence in support of ones defense. What
Rules of Court, the statute of limitations and the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.
prescription. As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he would have no reason to
The cadastral court denied petitioners motion for complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that
reconsideration. The court held that firstly, there was no makes up the essence of due process.
violation of substantial or procedural due process as the
court furnished petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, it The records reveal that the cadastral court furnished
heard petitioners motion for reconsideration in open petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its
court, and allowed both parties to submit their previous order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge
respective memoranda including documentary exhibits Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the cadastral
prior to its ruling on the motion. Secondly, the court heard petitioners motion for reconsideration
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or The in open court wherein both parties presented their
Property Registration Decree of 1979 eliminated the respective arguments to defend their rights and the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 341
respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and on petitioner was hailed to Court to answer a criminal
15 July 1955 the Court denied the motion for charge for seduction and although at first all Assistant
reconsideration. Hence this petition. City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the
complaint previously subscribed and sworn to by the
Petitioners Claim: father of the offended girl, yet the petitioner knew that
while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has no final action had been taken by the City Attorney of
discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such Quezon City as the case was still under study.
discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing,"
because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal And as the Solicitor General puts it, "His suddenly
liberty within the meaning and protection of the leaving the country in such a convenient time, can
Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such reasonably be interpreted to mean as a deliberate
liberty without due process of law. attempt on his part to flee from justice, and, therefore,
he cannot now be heard to complain if the strong arm of
Issue: WON the cancellation of passport requires prior the law should join together to bring him back to
hearing justice." In issuing the order in question, the respondent
Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice
Ruling: would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the
exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The from carrying it out.
petitioner is charged with seduction. And the order of
the respondent Court directing the Department of Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the
Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps in order that the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport
accused . . . may be brought back to the Philippines, so were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law," is not passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and
beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. the respondent left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the
Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his
Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot
the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in
against him. withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process
does not necessarily mean or require a hearing.
True, the discretion granted, to the Secretary for
Foreign Affairs to withdraw or cancel a passport already When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it
issued may not be exercised at whim. But here the upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 343
criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing Ombudsman. Both filed for motions for
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite reconsideration contending they were deprived of
to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing due process because they werent afforded the
does not violate the due process of law clause of the opportunity to controvert the evidence against
Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in them before the suspension order was issued. It
him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of was rejected thus this petition for review.
because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing Issue: W/N they were deprived of due process NO
should always be held in order to comply with the due 1. A preventive suspension, however, can be
process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of decreed on an official under investigation after
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative charges are brought and even before the charges
of the said clause. are heard since the same is not in the nature of a
penalty, but merely a preliminary step in an
The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner. administrative investigation.
2. Lastimosa case: suspension was not a
Co v Barbers 290 SCRA 717 punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty
and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
1. Quirino Congressman Cua filed a complaint measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an
before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gov administrative investigation. If after such
Castillo-Co and Engr Ringor alleging that in the investigation, the charges are established and the
course of its investigation in aid of legislation, the person investigated is found guilty of acts
HoR Committee on Good Government chaired by warranting his removal, then he is removed or
him uncovered some irregularities in the purchase dismissed. This is the penalty.
of heavy equipment by the Governor & the 3. The immediate issuance of such order is required
Provincial Engineer in order to prevent the subject of the suspension
2. The equipment purchased was not brand new as from committing further irregularities. Such
required, there was overpricing, lack of public prompt action, moreover, is in consonance with
bidding, lack of inspection, advance payment Section 15 of RA 6770 which exhorts the
prior to delivery and an attempt to cover up the Ombudsman to: xxx give priority to complaints
irregularities. filed against high ranking government officials
3. Co and Ringoer were then placed under and/or those occupying supervisory positions,
preventive suspension for 6 months, a week after complaints involving grave offenses as well as
the complaint was filed. It was signed by the complaints involving large sums of money and/or
director and approved by the deputy properties.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 344
7. It should also be pointed out that it was in 99.82% of the outstanding capital stock of the
petitioners Affidavit of Adverse Claim that Civil bank.
Case No. Q-91-10071 was indicated, not the 4. He likewise executed a promissory note in favor
judgment. As records show, at the time the of Insular Life in the same amount. The Credit
notice of lis pendens and adverse claim was Agreement provides that Insular Life shall have
annotated, the Deed of Assignment has already the prior right to purchase the shares owned by
been entered into by respondent and Sarte, and young and those owned by other stockholders.
TCT No. 122944 was already issued in Thereafter, Insular Life and Insular Life Pension
Evangelistas name on December 21, 1994. Fund informed Young of their intention to acquire
30% (Youngs) and 12% (other SHs) of the
Insular Life Assurance Co v Young GR 140964 2002 Banks outstanding shares
5. Insular Life and Young then entered into a MOA
1. Young acquired by purchase Insular Savings where Insular Life and its Pension Fund agreed to
Bank from the Licaros family for 65,000,000.00. purchase common shares for a total
Young et al obtained 55% equity while Jorge Go consideration of 198M. However, it had
et al owned 45%. The bank then granted them discovered some irregularities in the Banks
loans (153000000) secured by promissory notes. kiting operations. Young took the responsibility
2. Araneta, a stockholder of the Bank, wanted to and offered to the bank the 45% of his holdings
purchase 99.82% of its outstanding capital stock as security.
for 340M on the condition that the ownership of 6. Young admitted that due to business reverses, he
the hsares will be consolidated in Youngs name. shall not be able to pay his obligations under the
Araneta paid Young 14M as downpayment. Credit Agreement between him and Insular thus
Young then bought from Go et al their 45% equity he unconditionally and irrevocably waive the
in the Bank for 153M. to pay this, he obtained a benefit of the period of the loan. Thereafter,
short-term loan of 170M from the International Insular Life instructed its counsel to foreclosure
Corporate Bank to finance the purchase. the pledge constituted upon the shares. IL then
3. However, Araneta backed out and demanded the informed Young. A public auction was conducted
return of the downpayment. Meanwhile, Youngs wherein Insular Life appropriated to itself, not only
loan from Interbank became due. Young entered the original 1,324,864 shares, but also the
into a Credit Agreement with Insular Life for 250,000 shares subsequently issued by the Bank
200M. To secure the loan, he executed a deed of and delivered to Insular Life by way of pledge
Pledge of 1,324,864 shares which represented because there only IL submitted its bid for the first
auction sale and a subsequent auction sale.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 348
7. Young and his associates filed with the RTC a sell since the parties therein specifically
complaint against the bank, IL for annulment of undertook to enter into a contract of sale if the
notarial sale, specific performance and damages stipulated conditions are met and the
alleging that the notarial sale conducted is void as representation and warranties given by Young
it does not comply with the requirement of notice prove to be true. The obligation of petitioner
of the second auction sale. Insular Life to purchase, as well as
8. RTC: dismissed the complaint and ordered the the concomitant obligation of Young to convey
respondents to pay the Bank their respective to it the shares, are subject to the fulfillment of the
loans. They appealed to the CA which reversed conditions contained in the MOA.
the decision. Petitioners filed a motion for 2. Once the conditions, representation and
reconsideration contending that the MOA warranties are satisfied, then it is incumbent upon
executed is not enforceable considering that the parties to perform their respective obligations
Young committed fraud, misrepresented on the under the contract. Conversely, in the event that
warranties and failed to comply with his these conditions are not met or complied with, no
obligations. Dismissed. Hence this petition. obligation on the part of either party arises.
9. The CA reversed the decision ruling that the MOA 3. Since no sale transpired between the parties, the
is binding because it was not validly rescinded. Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Insular
Insular failed to notify Young in exercising its Life purchased 55% of the total shares of the
option to rescind the MOA. The Appellate Court Bank under the MOA. Consequently, its findings
then concluded that Young's loan with Insular Life that the debt of Young has been fully paid and
is deemed fully paid based on the representation that Insular Life is liable to pay for the remaining
and warranty in the MOA that "the entire 45% equity have no basis. It must be
proceeds of the sale shall be used to pay off the emphasized that the MOA did not convey title of
outstanding debt of Robert T. Young to Insular the shares to Insular Life. If ever there was
Life. Likewise, it also concluded that the loans of delivery of the said shares to Insular Life, it was
the other respondents have been fully paid. because they were pledged by Young to Insular
Issue: W/N the MOA was enforceable and that the loan Life under the Credit Agreement.
have been fully paid upon foreclosure of the pledge 4. The Court of Appeals also erred in declaring that
NO. the auction sale is void since petitioners failed to
1. The CA construed the MOA as a contract of sale. send a separate notice for the second auction.
But contrary to the findings of the CA, the MOA Based on Article 2112 of the Civil Code, there is
provisions negate the existence of a perfected no prohibition in the law against the sending of
contract of sale. The MOA is merely a contract to ONE NOTICE for the 1st and 2nd public auction.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 349
5. Petitioners contend that the CA likewise erred 3. Landbank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of
when it declared in its decision that the the Carloses informing them that the loan has
unpaid accounts of the other respondents been approved. TCT was cancelled and
have been fully paid. transferred in the name of Cruz. Years later,
6. There is no showing how the CA reached such petitioners notified delos Reyes that they were
conclusion. In doing so, the Court of Appeals ready to redeem the property but the offer was
violated the constitutional mandate that "no refused. Thus it filed a complaint for reformation
decision shall be rendered by any court without of instrument and damages claiming that the
expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the deed was merely a formality to meet the
law on which it is based." requirements of the bank for the loan.
7. Indeed, due process demands that the parties to 4. Summons and a copy of the complaint were
a litigation be informed of how it was decided with served upon private respondents on August 1,
an explanation of the factual and legal reasons 1994. Cruz/Delos Reyes filed their answer
that led to the conclusions of the court. It must be beyond the reglamentary period, or only on
observed that those respondents did not contest September 1, 1994. Thus, on September 5,
petitioners' counterclaim against them. 1994, petitioners filed a motion to declare private
respondents in default, which the trial court
Lorbes v CA GR 139884 granted in an order dated September 16, 1994.
On September 30 of the same year, petitioners
presented their evidence ex parte before the trial
1. petitioners mortgaged their land to the Carloses. court
A year later, the mortgage obligation had 5. TC: in favor of the petitioners upon finding that
increased and fearing foreclosure of the property, the deed of absolute sale didnt reflect the true
they asked their son-in-law for help. Delos Reyes intention of the parties.
agreed to rdeem the property but because he 6. CA reversed the decision: Cruz/Delos Reyes
didnt have money at the time, he asked his family were denied due process by the refusal of the trial
friend, Cruz, an employee of Land Bank for help. court to lift the order of default against them, and
2. It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of that the transaction between petitioners and Cruz
sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of was one of absolute sale, not of equitable
Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing mortgage. It also held the RTC decision to be
loan with Landbank using the subject property as constitutionally infirm for its failure to clearly and
collateral. distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is
based. The reformation of the Deed of Absolute
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 350
Sale is improper because there is no showing that before the RTC were capably ventilated before
such instrument failed to express the true respondent court, and were taken into account by
intention of the parties by reason of mistake, the latter in reviewing the correctness of the
fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident in the evaluation of petitioners evidence by the RTC
execution thereof. and ultimately, in reversing the decision of the
ISSUE: (topic) W/N there was denial of due process RTC.
YES 5. Applying the foregoing considerations to the
W/N there the deed of absolute sale is an equitable instant case, the Court finds that the true intention
mortgage YES between the parties for executing the Deed of
1. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be Absolute Sale was not to convey ownership of the
liberal in setting aside orders of default for property in question but merely to secure the
judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in housing loan of Cruz, in which petitioners had a
cases where it clearly appears that the reopening direct interest since the proceeds thereof were to
of the case is intended for delay. be immediately applied to their outstanding
2. The issuance of orders of default should be the mortgage obligation to the Carloses.
exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only 6. Understandably, the Deed of Absolute Sale and
in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the its supporting documents do not reflect the true
defendant to comply with the orders of the trial arrangement between the parties as to how the
court. loan proceeds are to be actually applied because
3. In this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in it was not the intention of the parties for these
denying private respondents motion to lift the documents to do so. The sole purpose for
order of default and to strike out the evidence preparing these documents was to satisfy Land
presented by petitioners ex parte, especially Bank that the requirement of collateral relative to
considering that an answer was filed, though out Cruzs application for a housing loan was met.
of time.
4. The default order of the RTC was immoderate Tanada v Tuvera (ratio copied from a digest! )
and in violation of private respondents due
process rights. However, the violation was of a On April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
degree as to justify a remand of the proceedings necessity for the publication to the Official Gazette all
to the trial court, first, because such relief was not unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
prayed for by private respondents, and second, application, and unless so published, they shall have no
because the affirmative defenses and evidence binding force and effect.
that private respondents would have presented
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 351
Respondents contend that publication in the Issue: W/N publication is still required in the light of the
Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for clause "unless otherwise provided"
the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves
provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus 1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in
submitted that since the presidential issuances in Article 2 of the Civil Code, refers to the date of
question contain special provisions as to the date they effectivity and not to the requirement of
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is publication itself, which cannot in any event be
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed omitted. This clause does not mean that the
is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code: Art. 2. Laws legislature may make the law effective
shall take effect after fifteen days following the immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, without its previous publication.
unless it is otherwise provided. 2. The legislature may in its discretion provide that
The interpretation given by respondent is in the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or
accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a extended. Publication requirements applies to 1)
long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that all statutes, including those of local application
publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those and private laws; 2) presidential decrees and
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its executive orders promulgated by the President in
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is same are validly delegated by the legislature or
the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when directly conferred by the Constitution; 3)
the law itself provides for the date when it goes into Administrative rules and regulations for the
effect. purpose of enforcing or implementing existing law
Respondents' argument, however, is logically pursuant also to a valid delegation; 4) Charter of
correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws a city notwithstanding that it applies to only a
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of portion of the national territory and directly affects
other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the only the inhabitants of that place; 5) Monetary
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not Board circulars to "fill in the details" of the Central
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its 3. Further publication must be in full or it is no
effectivity publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
4. The Supreme Court declared that all laws as
above defined shall immediately upon their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 352
general circulation, the NTC has been applying 4. The fact that the amendments to Administrative
the 1978 Rules. Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were filed with, and
ISSUE: W/N the 1993 Revised Rules should be applied published by the UP Law Center in the National
NO Administrative Register, does not cure the defect
1. The absence of publication, coupled with the related to the effectivity of the Administrative
certification by the Commissioner of the NTC Order.
stating that the NTC was still governed by the 5. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
1978 Rules, clearly indicate that the 1993 all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
Revised Rules have not taken effect at the time of contents of the laws.
the grant of the provisional authority to Bayantel. 6. The Administrative Order under consideration is
The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed one of those issuances which should be
with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
no moment. enforce and implement an existing law pursuant
2. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of to a valid delegation.
1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with 7. Thus, publication in the Official Gazette or a
the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives newspaper of general circulation is a condition
the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations
Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --- (1) can take effect.
Every agency shall file with the University of the 8. This is explicit from Executive Order No. 200,
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of which repealed Article 2 of the Civil Code, and
every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the which states that:Laws shall take effect after
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed fifteen days following the completion of their
within three (3) months from the date shall not publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
thereafter be the basis of any sanction against newspaper of general circulation in the
any party or persons. Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided
3. The National Administrative Register is merely a 9. Citing Tanada v Tuvera: Administrative rules and
bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to regulations must be published if their purpose is
the Office of the President, Congress, all to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a
appellate courts, the National Library, other public valid delegation. The only exceptions are
offices or agencies as the Congress may select, interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover nature, or those so-called letters of instructions
publication and mailing or distribution costs. issued by administrative superiors concerning the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 355
rules and guidelines to be followed by their 4. In the meantime, PD 1344 was passed providing
subordinates in the performance of their duties. that the NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
10. Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be hear and decide cases covering unsound real
published in the Official Gazette or in a estate business practices, claims involving
newspaper of general circulation before it can refund, specific performance, etc. The decision of
take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself the NHA shall be final after the lapse of 15 days
mandates that said Rules shall take effect only from date of receipt. It is only appealable to the
after their publication in a newspaper of general President and if there is no appeal within 30 days,
circulation. the decision is deemed affirmed.
11. In the absence of such publication, 5. Tropical, availing of this decree, appealed to the
therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs. President. No copy of the appeal was furnished to
respondent NHA.
6. Cordova then filed a motion for execution, to
Tropical Homes Inc v NHA 152 SCRA 540 (appeal) which NHA issued a Writ of Execution. The
President failed to act on the appeal thus this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
1. Tropical Homes entered into a contract with ISSUE: W/N PD 1344 is unconstitutional on grounds
Cordova for the sale to the latter of a lot at Better that it deprives Tropical access to courts of law and the
Living Subdivision. A 10% downpayment upon manner of appeal is violative of due process NO
the execution of the contract was required and 1. The petitioner has not clearly shown how a ruling
the balance payable monthly. The contract upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1344 will in
provided that upon default in payment of any any way affect the correctness of the decision
installment within 90 days from its due date, the rendered against him. There is no discussion
contract will be automatically cancelled. whatsoever on the merits of the original case. As
2. Since there was non-payment for a period of 7 far as the records show, the NHA decision
months already, the contract was cancelled and appears to be fair and correct.
all earlier payments were considered forfeited in 2. Moreover, the resolution promulgated by
favor of the corporation. Cordova then filed a respondent NHA, was issued before the passage
letter complaint with the Investigating Committee of the questioned decree. The writ of execution it
of the Dept of Trade asking for a refund issued, as admitted by the petitioner in its
3. The case was then referred to the NHA which memorandum, did not in anyway rely upon P.D.
issued the resolution: refund Cordova. MR filed No. 1344.
by Tropical, but denied.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 356
3. The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part 2. On their scheduled meeting, private respondents and
of due process, except where it is granted by the other complaining students travelled all the way
statute in which case it should be exercised in the from Tagum, Davao to the DECS Office in Davao City.
manner and in accordance with the provisions of Their presence in the said office was duly noted by
law. DECS Administrative Officer V, Aquilina Granada who
4. In other words, appeal is a right of statutory and advised them that petitioner will forthwith meet with
not constitutional origin. them. However, instead of conferring with the
5. The fact that P.D. No. 1344 does not specifically aggrieved students, petitioner instead met with the
provide for judicial review of NHA decisions Arriesgado spouses-owners of AIMSFI - who admittedly
affirmed or reversed by the President, does not did not even have a previous appointment.
necessarily preclude judicial review. 3. In view of this apparent discrimination, the students
6. On the issue of "affirmance-by-in action," failure contacted respondent Deputy Ombudsman for
on the part of the President to act upon an appeal Mindanao, Cesar E. Nitorreda who was impelled to
does not necessarily mean that the appealed proceed to the DECS Office to admonish petitioner for
decision automatically becomes final and not conferring with both parties at the same time in
executory. Access to the courts of law may still be order to hear both sides of the controversy. Thereafter,
made as mentioned above. Therefore, any such petitioner presided over the conference between the
decision is far from being final and executory. Arriesgados and the aggrieved students.
4. March 29, 1994 - petitioner submitted to the Office of
DR. RAMON Y. ALBA, petitioner, the Ombudsman a report wherein he claimed that he
vs. had succeeded in facilitating an amicable settlement
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, CESAR Y. between the parties. However, private respondents
NITORREDA, et al., respondents.
affidavit-complaint attested that as a result of the said
FRANCISCO, J.:
dispute, they were barred from taking the final
examinations and participating in the graduation rites.
5. The Office of the Ombudsman found petitioner guilty
Nature: motion for reconsideration of violating Section 4(b), (c) and (e) of R.A. 6713,
1. Respondents were among the twenty five (25) Complaints averments were confirmed by the school
graduating students of the Arriesgado Institute of itself, thru School Principal Ma. Clara Arriesgado, that
Medical Sciences Foundation, Inc. (AIMSFI). They the complaining student were not allowed to take the
sought the intervention of petitioner in settling a dispute final examination until and unless they agree to the
with the said school arising from the implementation of withdrawal of the case they filed in this Office against
certain school policies. herein respondent .
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 357
6. When petitioners motion for reconsideration was [G.R. No. 142888. June 6, 2001]
denied, he filed an Appeal/Petition for Certiorari and/or EVELIO P. BARATA, petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN ABALOS, JR.,
Prohibition With Prayer for Temporary Restraining OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the COURT OF APPEALS,
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
with this Court.
Issue:
W RA 6770 is unconstitutional for failure to provide the Nature: Petition for Review in Certiorari
right to appeal - NO. 1. Petitioner heads the San Miguel Bukid Homeowners'
Held/ Ratio: Association, Inc. whose members have occupied a
1. Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Section 27 of certain parcel of land in Mandaluyong City.
R.A. 6770 and Section 7, Rule III of Administrative 2. Sometime in March 1995, the City Government of
Order No.7 for their failure to provide for the right of Mandaluyong initiated the construction of medium size
appeal in certain cases from the decision of the condominiums and row houses for the benefit of
Ombudsman, maintaining that the same is tantamount qualified members of the said homeowners'
to a deprivation of property without due process of law. association.
As regards this threshold matter, suffice it to say that 3. To give way to the construction, the members of the
this Court has consistently held that: said homeowners' association had to vacate the area
The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of which they were occupying as the medium size housing
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may project and row houses were supposed to be completed
be exercised only in the manner and in accordance within 540 days from June 1995.
with the provisions of the law. 4. When the period for construction lapsed, petitioner
2. Apparently, therefore, the constitutional requirement and the members of the homeowners' association
of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the demanded the completion of the said housing project
denial of the right to appeal for the essence of due but the same allegedly fell on deaf ears.
process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to 5. Alleging that the demands have been ignored,
present evidence in support of ones case. petitioner filed on May 17, 1999 an administrative
The Office of the Ombudsman is vested by law with the complaint against Mayor Abalos, Jr. for violation of
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, and a Section 5 (a) of R.A. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
perusal of the said rules of procedure in administrative Standards for Public Officials and Employees) for failing
cases manifest sufficient compliance with the to act promptly on letters and requests sent by the
requirements of due process. public.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 358
6. July 21, 1999 - Office of the Ombudsman rendered a review of this Court. He contends that whether the
Decision dismissing the administrative complaint "for decision of the Ombudsman is for conviction or acquittal
insufficiency of evidence." of the respondent, it should be reviewed by this Court.
7. September 10, 1999. - The Motion for 2. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 provides:
Reconsideration therefrom was likewise denied. The "SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. - (1) All
order was received by petitioner on October 15, 1999. provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman are
8. November 4, 1999 - petitioner appealed by way of a immediately effective and executory.
petition for review on certiorari with this Court in G.R. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
No. 140272. The Second Division denied the petition in decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
the Resolution of November 24, 1999 in view of A.M. within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and
No. 9-2-02-SC and the ruling in the case of Fabian vs. shall be entertained only on any of the following
Desierto. The resolution was received by petitioner on grounds:
January 18, 2000. (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially
9. February 1, 2000 - petitioner filed a "Petition for affects the order, directive or decision;
Review on Certiorari" with the CA which rendered a (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed
Decision dated April 10, 2000 dismissing the petition on prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for
the ground that the decision exonerating respondent reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days
mayor of administrative charge is not appealable and from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
that the petition was filed out of time. reconsideration shall be entertained.
Issue: Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when
W CA erred in ruling that the Ombudsman's decision of supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
an administrative charge is not appealable - NO. order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of
1. Petitioner claims that respondent court erred in ruling public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
that it has no appellate authority to review the decision than one month's salary shall be final and
of the Ombudsman arguing that pursuant to the unappealable.
decision of this Court in Fabian vs. Desierto, decisions In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
should be taken to the Court of Appeals. He insists that appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
the Ombudsmans decision absolving respondent certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
Abalos of the charge against him is appealable. notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
In his Reply, petitioner stresses that the Office of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
Ombudsman should not restrict the right of appeal of the Rules of Court.
allowed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770 nor limit the power of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 359
The above rules may be amended or modified by the Needless to state, in appropriate cases involving
Office of the Ombudsman as the interest may require." oppressive or arbitrary action, the complainant is not
3. It is clear that any order, directive or decision of the deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under Rule 65
Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty of public of the Rules of Court which apply suppletorily to the
censure, or reprimand, or suspension of not more than Rules of Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman.
one month's salary shall be final and unappealable. 5. The same case teaches that the failure to provide
The last paragraph in Section 27 which provides that in for the right of appeal in certain cases from the
all administratively disciplinary cases, orders, directives, decision of the Ombudsman is not a denial of due
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be process for the right to appeal is not a natural right
appealed to the Supreme Court was rendered invalid nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
and of no effect in the case of Fabian vs. Desierto which privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
laid down the rule that said Section 27 cannot validly and in accordance with the provisions of the law. It
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the should be recalled that the Second Division of this Court
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary in G.R. No.140272 denied the appeal by way of petition
cases without violating the proscription in Section 30, for review on certiorari in its Resolution dated November
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which 24, 1999 precisely in view of the ruling in the Fabian
increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without case. Simply put, the correct recourse was to the Court
its advice and concurrence. of Appeals and not to this Court.
Thus, appeals from decisions of the Office of the This notwithstanding, even on the assumption that
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should appeal is allowed, the same can no longer prosper. As
be brought to the Court of Appeals under the provisions correctly pointed out by private respondent, since the
of Rule 43. The only provision affected by the Fabian Order dated September 10, 1999 of the Ombudsman
ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the denying the motion for reconsideration was received by
proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as petitioner on October 15, 1999, petitioner had until
the proper mode of appeal; all other matters included in October 25, 1999 to appeal in accordance with Section
said Section 27, including the finality or non-finality of 27, R.A. 6770 or at the most, until November 24, 1999,
decisions, are not affected and still stand. if he availed of the 30-day extension provided under
4. Pursuant to AO No. 7, where the respondent is Section 2, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
absolved of the charge, the decision shall be final and Procedure. However, the petition was filed with the
unappealable. It is implicit in Section 27, and with Court of Appeals only on February 1, 2000, way beyond
greater reason, that decisions of the Ombudsman the reglementary period.
absolving the respondent of the charge, should be final
and unappealable.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 360
[G.R. No. 109721. March 11, 1999] of "utter and gross ignorance of procedure and/or
FELIX A. SAJOT, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and negligence or omission, intentional or otherwise, in the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. performance of his avowed professional duty."
7. March 30, 1993 - CA denied the motion for being a
Nature: petition to set aside a resolution of the Court of prohibited pleading. Petitioner received a copy of the
Appeals resolution on April 12, 1993.
1. April 23, 1991 - RTC Branch 118, Pasay City, Issue: W Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion
convicted petitioner and Antonio Tobias in Criminal in dismissing petitioner's appeal for failure to file
Case NO. 97-12635, of estafa. appellant's brief -
2. Antonio Tobias appealed the decision to the Court of 1. Rule 50, Section 1 (e) of the Revised Rules of Court
Appeals, and, thereafter, filed an appellant's brief, which provides -
appeal is now pending therein. "Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal - An Appeal
3. June 24, 1991, petitioner filed with the trial court a may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own
notice of appeal through Attorney Mariano Cervo. motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
Subsequently, the trial court elevated the records to the grounds:
Court of Appeals. xxx
4. February 21, 1992 - petitioner filed with the Court of (e) Failure of appellant to serve and file the required
Appeals a "Petition for Extension of Time to File Brief," number of copies of his brief or memorandum within the
asking for an additional thirty-day period to file time provided by these Rules;"
appellant's brief, which the court granted. On March 20, 2. In Sps. Lawa vs. Court of Appeals, we said:
1992, petitioner filed a "Petition for Second Extension of "True, appeal is an essential part of our judicial system.
Time to File Brief", which the court likewise granted. As such, courts should proceed with caution so as not
Again, on May 14, 1992, he filed a "petition for Third to deprive a party of the right to appeal, particularly if
Extension of Time to File Brief." The court granted the the appeal is meritorious. Respect for the appellant's
motion. right, however, carries with it the correspondent respect
5. November 27, 1992 - CA resolved to dismiss for the appellee's similar rights to fair play and justice.
petitioner's appeal for failure to file his brief within the The appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
third extension granted by the court. Petitioner could party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down
not give any plausible explanation for his failure to file in the Rules of Court."
brief. 3. In Garbo vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
6. March 12, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for "Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the
reconsideration, alleging that his counsel, Attorney adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are
Mariano H. G. Cervo, never submitted the brief because thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 361
the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the Nature: two petitions for certiorari and a petition for
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No.
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the accused together with former President Joseph E.
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
proper cases and under justifiable causes and 1. April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Erap Muslim
circumstances." Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation,
While litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is a received on its behalf a donation in the amount of P200
truism that every case must be prosecuted in Million from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte.
orderly and speedy administration of justice. 2. Petitioner received the donation and turned over the
4. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals denied said amount to the Foundations treasurer who later
him the right to due process when it dismissed his deposited it in the Foundations account with the
appeal because of his counsel's negligence. Equitable PCI Bank.
We do not agree. Petitioner was himself guilty of 3. In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson
neglect. He was aware of his conviction and of the publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada and
requirement of filing an appellant's brief. His excuse his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities,
that he relied on the services of his counsel and that he including its operation on the illegal numbers game
was busy is "flimsy". Were we to accept his excuse, known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the
this Court would have to open cases dismissed many Office of the Ombudsman of several criminal complaints
years ago on the ground of counsel's neglect. In many including Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption,
cases, the fact is that counsel's negligence is matched versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al.,
by his client's own negligence." docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft
Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as
OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De
Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. Funa, versus
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio,
(THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes and Mila Reforma,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757.
LEANDRO MENDOZA, respondents.
4. Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit
CALLEJO, SR., J.: dated February 21, 2001. The other respondents
likewise filed their respective counter-affidavits. The
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 362
Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on
investigation of the complaints and on April 4, 2001, April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging
issued a joint resolution recommending, inter alia, that that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Joseph Estrada, petitioner and several others be 8. May 4, 2001 - during the hearing for the Urgent
charged with the criminal offense of plunder. Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting
5. April 4, 2001 - the Ombudsman filed with the of the arraignment earlier than the June 27, 2001
Sandiganbayan several Informations against former schedule. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the
President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners
post as President, including one for plunder. petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
6. April 5, 2001 - petitioner obtained a copy of the 9. May 17, 2001 - four days before the hearing on
Ombudsmans Joint Resolution finding probable cause petitioners petition for bail, the Ombudsman filed an
against him for plunder. The next day, he filed a Motion urgent motion for early arraignment of all three accused,
for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. This was and a motion for joint bail hearings. Petitioner
denied on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the questioned this in the hearing on his petition for bail. So
amended Information charging petitioner with plunder Sandiganbayan reset the hearing to enable the court to
had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. resolve the prosecutions pending motions as well as
7. Also on April 5, 2001, petitioner filed with the petitioners motion that his petition for bail be heard as
Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To early as possible, which motion the prosecution
Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and opposed.
Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a Determination of 10. May 31, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds Motion Resolution denying petitioners April 6, 2001 Urgent
for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed
Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of by petitioner had already been resolved in its April 25,
the Charges against accused Edward Serapio. 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding petitioner and his co-accused for trial. Petitioner filed a
probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
arrest for the accused, including petitioner. The Resolution.
Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, 11. June 1, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
including petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 26558 on resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well
June 27, 2001. as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558
In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain
the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan,
was set for hearing on May 4, 200. For his part, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 363
case in the manner it determines best conducive to motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the
orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending motions of
directed the other accused to participate in the said bail petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this
hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of Court on June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus
the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered that the Court declare void the questioned orders,
automatically reproduced at the trial. resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan on his
12. However, Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right
15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending to due process. Petitioner likewise prayed for the
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be
to June 26, 2001. declared to have waived their right to present evidence
13. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on
proceed because on said date petitioner filed a motion the failure of the People to adduce strong evidence of
to quash on the grounds that as against him, the petitioners guilt of plunder, that he be granted
amended Information does not allege a combination or provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings.
series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as 15. July 9, 2001 - the Sandiganbayan issued a
against him, the amended Information does not allege a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the
pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel,
scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in to have received on said date a copy of said resolution. The
been illegally received or collected does not constitute motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was
ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of Republic also resolved by the Sandiganbayan.
Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges 16. July 10, 2001 - just before his arraignment in
him of bribery and illegal gambling. Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested to the
By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for
holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to reconsideration of the July 9, 2001 Resolution denying
withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution his motion to quash and for the deferment of his
contended that petitioners motion to quash the arraignment. The Sandiganbayan, however, declared
amended Information was antithetical to his petition for that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in
bail. the Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to
14. The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of an
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 orally argue his motion for reconsideration. When
to enable it to resolve the pending incidents and the petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 364
his arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look
the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him. into the existence of probable cause to charge a person
19. July 20, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court a for an offense in a given case, it may do so in
Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148769, exceptional circumstances, which are present in this
alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its administration of justice or to avoid oppression; (3)
July 9, 2001 Resolution denying his motion to quash, when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory authority; and (4) where the charges are manifestly
allegations of the amended Information against him do false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.[36]
not constitute the crime of plunder; and that he is Petitioner claims that he raised proper grounds for a
charged, under the said amended Information, for more reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the
than one offense. questioned joint resolution, the Ombudsman
20. August 9, 2001 - petitioner filed with the Court disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the
another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. charge of plunder and committed errors of law or
149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans Resolution irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest.
dated 31 May 2001 which denied his April 6, 2001 Issue:
Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 W Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
Resolution denying his motion for reconsideration of its in denying petitioners omnibus motion - NO.
May 31, 2001 Resolution. 1. Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with
21. Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct of
grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus motion preliminary investigations. Citing Raro v.
to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his Sandiganbayan:
arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case No. x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a
26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary
and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a investigations, and leaves to the investigating
reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise
asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence
disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave as will establish probable cause for filing of information
abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He against the supposed offender.
further argues that there exists no probable cause to 2. Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the
support an indictment for plunder as against him. Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for that matter
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 365
resolution and joint resolution, respectively. Petitioner right conferred by statute. The absence of a preliminary
failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds investigation does not impair the validity of the
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Information or otherwise render the same defective and
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
probable cause against petitioner for plunder. Neither case or constitute a ground for quashing the
did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying Information. If the lack of a preliminary investigation
petitioners motion for reinvestigation. does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
3. Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason
petitioners omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan noted can it be said that the denial of a motion for
that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust
accordance with Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 of the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it
the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, be said that petitioner had been deprived of due
23 and 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman process. He was afforded the opportunity to refute the
Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and charges against him during the preliminary
evidence in support thereof were served upon all the investigation.
accused. It was in light of such findings that the 5. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the to determine whether a crime has been committed and
allegation that accused therein (including petitioner) whether there is probable cause to believe that the
were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
the Ombudsmans Resolution dated April 4, 2001 and should be held for tria. As the Court held in Webb
finding probable cause to charge them with plunder vs. De Leon, [a] finding of probable cause needs only
after the conduct of preliminary investigation in to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
connection therewith. crime has been committed and was committed by the
In addition, the Sandiganbayan pointed out that suspect. Probable cause need not be based on clear
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
Ombudsmans resolution, but failed to show in his establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
that the preliminary investigation was tainted by errors certainty of guilt."
of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for 6. Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the
which a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution prosecutor or any other officer authorized to conduct
may be granted. preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to
4. It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary said officers finding and determination of probable
investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a cause, since the determination of the existence of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 366
probable cause is the function of the prosecutor. The PEDRO E. BUDIONGAN, JR., Municipal Mayor; et. al petitioners,
Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner vs.HON. JACINTO M. DELA CRUZ, JR., Asst. Special Prosecutor
failed to establish that the preliminary investigation I; et al. respondents.
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint
resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported by the Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing
facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary. the Memorandum of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, Office of the Ombudsman
1. The Municipality of Carmen, Bohol appropriated the
amount of P450,000.00 for the purchase of a road roller
for the municipality. However, the Municipal
Development Council through Resolution No. 3
recommended that the amount of P450,000.00 be
realigned and used for the asphalt laying of Bernaldez
Street. Discussion thereon was deferred.
2. February 6, 2002 - Municipal Treasurer, Fulgencio V.
Paa, issued a Certificate of Availability of Funds for the
project. Thereafter, the Office of the Municipal Engineer
prepared a Program of Works and Cost Estimates duly
noted/approved by Municipal Budget Officer Taciana B.
Espejo and Mayor Budiongan.
3. March 6, 2002 - Mayor Budiongan issued the Notice
of Award and Notice to Commence Work in favor of
Herbert Malmis General Merchandise and Contractor,
Inc, after public bidding. The Sangguniang Bayan
passed Resolution authorizing Mayor Budiongan to sign
and enter into contract with Malmis relative to the above
project in the amount of P339,808.00. So Malmis
commenced with the project.
4. Thereafter, it was discovered that there was yet no
ordinance approving the realignment of the funds.
Thus, on May 17, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan
passed Ordinance No. 8 approving the realignment of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 367
the fund. On June 14, 2002, Malmis was paid the No. 3019, alleging that petitioners, by prematurely
contract price. awarding to Malmis the project despite the absence of
5. July 3, 2002 - respondents filed a complaint against funds specifically appropriated for such purpose, and
the petitioners before the Office of the Deputy thereafter paying the contract price from the Municipal
Ombudsman for Visayas alleging illegality in the Treasury which was originally appropriated for the
conduct of the bidding, award and notice to commence purchase of a road roller, caused damage and undue
work since there was no fund appropriated for the injury to the government. The Sandiganbayan admitted
purpose. the Amended Information in its Resolution dated August
6. July 31, 2003 - the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman 18, 2005.
found probable cause and recommended the filing of an 10. On even date, petitioners filed with the
information for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Sandiganbayan a Motion for Leave of Court to File
Penal Code against the petitioners. Motion for Reinvestigation arguing that the above
7. Upon review, the Case Assessment, Review and Informations were filed without affording them the
Reinvestigation Bureau of the Office of the Special opportunity to file counter-affidavits to answer/rebut the
Prosecutor, issued the assailed Memorandum dated modified charges. On September 20, 2005, the
April 28, 2004, modifying the charge. Thus, two Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the motion
separate Informations were filed before the insofar as Criminal Case No. 28076 is concerned. It
Sandiganbayan (1) for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. held that it is too late in the day to remand the case for
No. 3019 against the petitioners docketed as Criminal reinvestigation considering that Budiongan had already
Case No. 28075 and (2) for violation of Section 3(h) of been arraigned and the case had long been set for pre-
R.A. No. 3019 against petitioner Budiongan docketed as trial proceedings, with both parties having filed their
Criminal Case No. 28076. respective briefs. As regards Criminal Case No. 28075,
8. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the the Sandiganbayan noted that although the conduct of
information charging them with violation of Sec. 3(e) of the preliminary investigation was regular, petitioners
R.A. No. 3019. In a Resolution dated June 10, 2005, the however were not given the opportunity to seek
Sandiganbayan granted the motion to quash and reconsideration of the modified charges. Thus, it
remanded Criminal Case No. 28075 to the Office of granted leave to the petitioners to file with the Office of
the Ombudsman for amendment of the Information. It the Special Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration (not
held that although Malmis benefited from the contract, a motion for reinvestigation) of the said office's
the same is not unwarranted considering that the project Memorandum dated April 28, 2004.
was implemented, executed and completed. 11. Petitioners maintain that the modification of the
9. June 27, 2005 - an Amended Information was filed charge from violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
charging petitioners with violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. Code to violation of Sections 3(e) and 3(h) of R.A. No.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 368
3019 denied their rights to due process since they affording the petitioners a new preliminary investigation,
were not given the opportunity to answer and present did not amount to a violation of their rights.
evidence on the new charge in a preliminary 3. Furthermore, the right to preliminary investigation is
investigation. deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it
Issue: W the Petitioners were denied the opportunity to before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
present counter-evidence in a new preliminary Petitioner Budiongan was arraigned in Criminal Case
investigation - NO. No. 28076 on March 28, 2005. He was also arraigned
1. The right to a preliminary investigation is not a together with the rest of the petitioners under the
constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 28075 on
statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does December 2, 2005.
not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise 4. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely
render the same defective. It does not affect the to determine whether a crime has been committed and
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a whether there is probable cause to believe that the
ground for quashing the Information. If absence of a person accused of the crime is probably guilty thereof
preliminary investigation does not render the and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause
Information invalid nor affect the jurisdiction of the court needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely
over the case, then the denial of a motion for than not a crime has been committed and was
reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be
Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither
case. on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
2. Petitioners were not deprived of due process and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
because they were afforded the opportunity to refute the certainty of guilt."
charges by filing their counter-affidavits. The 5. The Office of the Special Prosecutor is an integral
modification of the offense charged did not come as a component of the Ombudsman and is under the latter's
surprise to the petitioners because it was based on the supervision and control. Thus, whatever course of
same set of facts and the same alleged illegal acts. action that the Ombudsman may take, whether to
Moreover, petitioners failed to aver newly discovered approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the
evidence nor impute commission of grave errors or investigating prosecutor, is but an exercise of his
serious irregularities prejudicial to their interest to discretionary powers based upon constitutional
warrant a reconsideration or reinvestigation of the case mandate. Generally, courts should not interfere in such
as required under Section 8, Rule III of the Rules of exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in
modification of the offense charged, even without prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 369
save in cases where there is clear showing of grave ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA, petitioners,
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA,
jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman. Absent any SR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
any other officer authorized to conduct preliminary QUISUMBING, J.:
investigation, as in the instant case, courts as a rule
must defer to said officer's finding and determination of
probable cause, since the determination of the 1. December 27, 1991 - Mrs. Imelda Marcos and
existence of probable cause is the function of the Messrs. Benedicto and Rivera were indicted for violation
prosecutor. of Section 10 of Circular No. 960 relation to Section 34
of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No. 265, as
amended) in five Informations. Docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883, the charge sheets
alleged that the trio failed to submit reports of their
foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to
register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the
Central Bank within the period mandated by Circular
No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural and juridical
persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from the Central
Bank. It also required all residents of the Philippines
who habitually earned or received foreign currencies
from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to report such
earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of
the Circular were punishable as a criminal offense
under Section 34 of the Central Bank Act.
2. (9) additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos and
Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different
accounts, were filed with the Manila RTC.
3. January 3, 1992 - (11) more Informations accusing
Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto of the same offense, again
in relation to different accounts, were filed with the same
court. The Informations were similarly worded as the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 370
earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates had earlier entered a similar plea during her
of the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992.
dummies used, the balances and sources of the 10. August 11, 1994 - petitioners moved to quash all the
earnings, and the names of the foreign banks where Informations filed against them. Their motion was
these accounts were maintained. grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping,
4. All of the aforementioned criminal cases were extinction of criminal liability with the repeal of Circular
consolidated before Branch 26 of the said trial court. No. 960, prescription, exemption from the Central
5. Meanwhile, Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 Banks reporting requirement, and the grant of absolute
which revised the rules governing non-trade foreign immunity as a result of a compromise agreement
exchange transactions. It took effect on January 20, entered into with the government.
1992. 11. September 6, 1994 - the trial court denied
6. August 24, 1992 - Central Bank, pursuant to the petitioners motion. Petitioners then filed a motion for
governments policy of further liberalizing foreign reconsideration, but the trial court likewise denied this
exchange transactions, came out with Circular No. motion on October 18, 1994.
1356 which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular No. 12. November 21, 1994 - petitioners moved for leave to
1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank file a second motion for reconsideration. The trial court
approval for foreign exchange-funded expenditures denied petitioners motion and set the consolidated
obtained from the banking system. cases for trial on January 5, 1995.
7. Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, 13. Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition,
contained a saving clause, excepting from their with similar prayers for temporary restraining orders
coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of and/or writs of preliminary injunction were respectively
Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular No. 1353, with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found
violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
1318. Judge in denying petitioners respective Motions to
8. September 19, 1993 - the government allowed Quash, except that with respect to Criminal Case No.
petitioners Benedicto and Rivera to return to the 91-101884, the instant petitions are hereby DISMISSED
Philippines, on condition that they face the various for lack of merit.
criminal charges instituted against them, including the Issue:
dollar-salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter (1) W the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to
cases. Quash for absence of a valid preliminary investigation? -
9. February 28, 1994 - petitioners Benedicto and Rivera NO.
were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges 1. Petitioners contend that the preliminary investigation
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 371
of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
governments ban on their travel effectively prevented ground to quash the information.
them from returning home and personally appearing at
the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and Rivera
further point out that the joint preliminary investigation
by the Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in
one set of cases before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and another set
before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
2. Preliminary investigation is not part of the due
process guaranteed by the Constitution. It is an inquiry
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof.
Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is
personal. It is afforded to the accused by statute, and
can be waived, either expressly or by implication. The
waiver extends to any irregularity in the preliminary
investigation, where one was conducted.
3.Petitioners have expressly waived their right to
question any supposed irregularity in the preliminary
investigation or to ask for a new preliminary
investigation. Petitioners admit posting bail immediately
following their return to the country, entered their
respective pleas to the charges, and filed various
motions and pleadings. By so doing, without
simultaneously demanding a proper preliminary
investigation, they have waived any and all
irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. The trial court did not err in denying the
motion to quash the informations on the ground of want
of or improperly conducted preliminary investigation.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 372
and he, through his counsel denied answering G.R. Nos. 138859-60. February 22, 2001
questions before the court unless they were afforded ALVAREZ ARO YUSOP, petitioner, vs. The Honorable
the proper preliminary investigation. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
5. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's
allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to
preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the Doctrine: The right of a person to preliminary
information charging the latter of the crime of murder. investigation is recognized by the law and is governed
by the Rules of Court. However, the failure to accord
this right does not ipso facto result in the dismissal of
the information; the case is merely suspended, and the
prosecutor directed to conduct the proper investigation.
Nature: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, assailing two Orders of the Sandiganbayan
1. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao issued an Order
dated September 19, 1995, naming the following as
respondents: Benjamin Arao, Frederick Winters, Pelaez
Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay and the city jail
warden of Pagadian City.
2. Ombudsman issued a Resolution dated January 15,
1998, recommending the prosecution of the
aforenamed respondents for violation of Article 269 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 3-a in relation to
Section 3-e of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
Significantly, the name of Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop
was included as one of the persons to be prosecuted,
although he was not one of the original respondents
mentioned in the Order of September 19, 1995.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the
recommendation.
3. April 16, 1998 - Order of Arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 374
the same day, he filed a Motion To Remand Case To ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a
The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary competent officer."
Investigation. 2. The Rules of Court requires such investigation before
4. June 8, 1998 - Sandiganbayan denied the Motion of an information for an offense punishable by at least four
petitioner for his alleged failure to submit himself to the years, two months and one day may be filed in court.
jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. The old Rules, on the other hand, mandates preliminary
5. August 8, 1998 - petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, investigation of an offense cognizable by the regional
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. trial court.
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the 3. Petitioner is charged in Criminal Case No. 24524 with
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the violation of Section 3-a of RA 3019. Such offense is
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted punishable with, among other penalties, imprisonment
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. of six years and one month to fifteen years. Under the
24525 was concerned. aforecited Rules, whether in the old or the revised
6. February 15, 1999 - On the scheduled arraignment, version, he is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been 4. It is undisputed, however, that before the Information
accorded preliminary investigation. against petitioner was filed, no preliminary investigation
7. The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioners plea for had been conducted. In fact, the Office of the
preliminary investigation. Ombudsman admitted that petitioner was denied of his
Issue: W the Sandiganbayan, despite being informed of right to preliminary investigation. We find no basis for
the lack of preliminary investigation with respect to the Sandiganbayans ruling that petitioner had not
petitioner, in Criminal Case No. 24524, committed grave given timely notice nor any statement of the alleged
abuse of discretion in proceeding with his arraignment - inadequacy of the proceeding regarding the filing of the
YES. Information.
Held: 5. First, there was no showing that petitioner was
1. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding notified of the charges filed by Erlinda Fadri. As earlier
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to noted, he had not been named as a respondent in the
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been September 19, 1995 Order. After learning of the filing of
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, the Information against him when he was served a
and should be held for trial.The Court explained that Warrant of Arrest, petitioner did not dally. He
the rationale of a preliminary investigation is to protect immediately informed the Sandiganbayan that no
the accused from the inconvenience, expense and preliminary investigation had been conducted in regard
burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the to him. Several months later, moments before his
reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first arraignment, he reiterated his prayer that the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 375
preliminary investigation be conducted. In this light, the justify the evasion of the requirement set forth in the
Sandiganbayan erred in saying that he had not given Rules of Court for conducting preliminary investigation.
the court timely notice of this deficiency. The law does not sanction such interpretation, for it
6. Even assuming that prior to the filing of the deals merely with the finality of orders, directives and
Information, petitioner had known that the proceedings decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman -- not the
and the investigation against his co-accused were deprivation of the substantive right to a preliminary
pending, he cannot be expected to know of the investigation.
investigators subsequent act of charging him.
Precisely, he had not been previously included therein YUSOP v SANDIGANBAYAN
and, consequently, he had not been notified thereof. February 22, 2001
7. In Go v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the Facts:
right to preliminary investigation is waived when the Acting on an Affidavit-Complaint filed by a certain
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of Erlinda Fadri, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
entering a plea at arraignment. Conversely, if the issued an Order dated September 19, 1995, naming the
accused does invoke it before arraignment, as the following as respondents: benjamin Arao, Fredireck
petitioner did in this case, the right is not waived. Winters, Pelaez Pantaran, Eduardo Dablo, Efren Sissay
8. Neither did the filing of a bail bond constitute a waiver and the city jail warden of Pagadian City. The Order
of petitioners right to preliminary investigation. Under also required respondents, within ten days from receipt
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal thereof, to submit their counter-affidavits and other
Procedure, [a]n application for or admission to bail shall pieces of contraverting evidence.
not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his
arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or The Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao issued a
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence Resolution dated January 15, 1998, recommending the
of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, prosecution of "the aforenamed respondents" for
provided that he raises them before entering his plea. x violation of Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code and
x x. Section 3-a in relation to Section 3-e of Republic Act
9. We stress that the right to preliminary investigation is No. 3019 as amended. Significantly, the name of
substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it Petitioner Alvarez A. Yusop was included as one of the
to petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his persons to be prosecuted, although he was not one of
right to due process. Hence, preliminary investigation the original respondents mentioned in the Order of
with regard to him must be conducted. September 19, 1995. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
10. We disagree with the Sandiganbayans reliance on approved the recommendation. Accordingly, two
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770. This provision cannot Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. They
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 376
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24524 (violation 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan, despite being
of Section 3-a of RA 3019) and 24525 (unlawful arrest informed of the lack of preliminary investigation
under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code). with respect to petitioner, In Criminal Case No.
24524, committed grave abuse of discretion in
On April 16, 1998, an Order of Arrest was issued by the proceeding with his arraignment?
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24524. Petitioner,
however, posted a bail bond before the Regional Trial 2. Is the filing of the bail bond constitutive of a
Court of Dipolog City on May 20 of the same year. On waiver for seeking the right of preliminary
the same day, he filed a "Motion To Remand Case To investigation?
The Ombudsman - Mindanao For Preliminary
Investigation." Held: Petition is partly meritorious remanded in
Sandiganbayan for conduct of Preliminary investigation.
In Resolution dated June 8, 1998, the Sandiganbayan
denied the Motion of petitioner for his alleged failure to Annent to the first issue. We disagree with the
submit himself to the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court. Sandiganbayan's reliance on Section 27 of Republic Act
6770. This provision cannot justify the evasion of the
On August 8, 1998, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, requirement set forth in the Rules of Court for
grounded again on the lack of preliminary investigation. conducting preliminary investigation. The law does not
In an Order dated September 22, 1998, the sanction such interpretation, for it deals merely with the
Sandiganbayan resolved not to take action on the finality of orders, directives and decisions of the Office
Motion, because petitioner had not yet submitted of the Ombudsman -- not the deprivation of the
himself to its jurisdiction insofar as Criminal Case No. substantive right to a preliminary investigation.
24525 was concerned. Moreover, petitioner cannot be bound by the
Ombudsman's January 15, 1998 Resolution, which
On the scheduled arraignment on February 15, 1999, recommended the filing of charges. He was not a party
petitioner reiterated his claim that he had not been to the case and was not accorded any right to present
accorded preliminary investigation. In its two assailed evidence on his behalf.
Orders, the Sandigabayan rejected his claim and
proceeded with the arraignment. In any event, even the Ombudsman agrees that
petitioner was deprived of this right and believes that
Hence, this recourse. the basic rudiments of due process are complied with.
For its part, the Sandiganbayan opted to remain silent
Issue : when asked by this Court to comment on the Petition.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 377
"[a]n application for or admission to bail; shall not In the course of the proceedings, the Ombudsman filed
bar the accused from challenging the validity of before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion
his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued dated 8 January 2002[8] seeking, among others, the
therefor, or from assailing the regularity or issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan
questioning the absence of a preliminary Uy alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
investigation of the charge against him, provided Uy. The Ombudsman alleged that no warrant of arrest
that he raises them before entering his plea. xxx." had been issued against the accused John Doe who
was designated in the Information as Eleuterio Tan,
We stress that the right to preliminary investigation Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy; and that, in order not to
is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To frustrate the ends of justice, a warrant of arrest should
deny it to petitioner would deprive him of the full issue against him after he had been identified to be also
measure of his right to due process. Hence, preliminary using the name Victor Jose Tan Uy with address at
investigation with regard to him must be conducted. 2041 M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. Allegedly, a
positive identification had been made through
VICTOR JOSE TAN UY v OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN photographs, as early as the Senate Impeachment Trial
July 27, 2008 against former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, that
FACTS: John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
charging former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mr. Uy and VICTOR JOSE TAN UY are one and the
together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong same person.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 378
In light of the due process requirement, the standards - Velasquez was charged with acts of lasciviousness
that at the very least assume great materiality and upon the person of AIRA VELASQUEZ, MARY JOY
significance are those enunciated in the leading case OCAMPO and KIMBERLY VELASQUEZ; and rape of
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. This MARY JOY OCAMPO. Velasquez pleaded not guilty to
case instructively tells us - in defining the basic due the charges against him, whereupon the cases were
process safeguards in administrative proceedings - consolidated and jointly tried.
that the decision (by an administrative body) must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or The evidence for the prosecution:
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the - In October 1994, Mary Joy (stepdaughter of accused),
parties affected; only by confining the then 13 years of age, slept in a room she shared with
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to Velasquez, her mother Angelina, and her two half-
the parties, can the latter be protected in their right brothers. When she woke up in the morning, she found
to know and meet the case against them; it should the accused beside her on the floor, her mother having
not, however, detract from the tribunals duty to actively left for the market. He kissed her on the mouth and the
see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to breasts. Then he raised her shirt, pulled down her
use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence shorts and underwear, and kissed her private parts.
and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the Afterward, he inserted his middle finger into Mary Joys
controversy. vagina. Mary Joy felt a sharp pain and tried to resist by
kicking him, which made the latter remove his finger
Mindful of these considerations, we hold that the although he continued kissing her. He then left, but not
petitioners right to due process has been violated. before warning her to keep quiet and not to tell anyone
what he had done to her.
PEOPLE v VELASQUEZ
G.R. Nos. 132635 & 14387275 - 2 weeks later, still in October, while Mary Joy was
MENDOZA; February 21, 2001 watching television alone in the living room, Velasquez
NATURE approached her and, though she tried to evade him, he
- An appeal from the decision of the RTC of Angeles succeeded in forcing her to their room. He lowered her
City, convicting Lamberto Velasquez of (1) acts of shorts and underwear, raised her shirt and bra, and
lasciviousness committed against his granddaughter started kissing her. Then he inserted his middle finger
Aira Velasquez; and (2) rape of his stepdaughter Mary into her vagina and later had sexual intercourse with
Joy Ocampo her. Up to April 1997, Velasquez continuously molested
Mary Joy, sometimes forcing her to masturbate him and
FACTS at other times licking her vagina.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 380
JUDY ANN SANTOS v PEOPLE other sources, such as movies and product
August 26, 2008 endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from
FACTS: petitioner's underdeclaration amounted to
BIR Commissioner Parayno, Jr. wrote DOJ Secretary P1,718,925.52, including incremental penalties; the
Gonzales a letter regarding the possible filing of criminal non-declaration by petitioner of an amount equivalent to
charges against Judy Ann Santos. The letter read: at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return
was considered a substantial underdeclaration of
I have the honor to refer to you for preliminary income, which constituted prima facieevidence of false
investigation and filing of an information in court if or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC,
evidence so warrants, the herein attached Joint Affidavit as amended; and petitioner's failure to account as part
of RODERICK C. ABAD, STIMSON P. CUREG, VILMA of her income the professional fees she received from
V. CARONAN, RHODORA L. DELOS REYES under sources other than ABS-CBN and her underdeclaration
Group SupervisorTEODORA V. PURINO, of the of the income she received from ABS-CBN amounted to
National Investigation Division, BIR National Office manifest violations of Sections 254 and 255, as well as
Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City, Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended.
recommending the criminal prosecution of MS. JUDY
ANNE LUMAGUI SANTOS forsubstantial ISSUE:
underdeclaration of income, which constitutes WON the CTA First Division committed grave abuse of
asprima facie evidence of false or fraudulent discretion in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash.
return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC and
punishable under Sections 254 and 255 of the Tax HELD/RATIO:
Code. NO.
The Petition for Review which petitioner intended to file
In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized before the CTA en banc relied on two grounds: (1) the
the findings of the investigating BIR officers that lack of authority of Prosecuting Attorney Torrevillas to
petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return for taxable file the Information; and (2) the filing of the said
year 2002 filed with the BIR, declared an income of Information in violation of petitioner's constitutional
P8,033,332.70 derived from her talent fees solely from rights to due process and equal protection of the laws.
ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR
offices and those given by petitioner's accountant and Petitioner's argument must fail in light of BIR
third parties, however, confirmed that petitioner received Commissioner Parayno's letter dated 19 May 2005 to
in 2002 income in the amount of at least DOJ Secretary Gonzales referring "for preliminary
P14,796,234.70, not only from ABS-CBN, but also from investigation and filing of an information in court if
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 383
the merits. Its sole purpose is to determine whether a selling of securities without prior registration with the
crime has been committed and whether the respondent SEC; and that its actions are potentially damaging to the
therein is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the local mutual fund industry. Notwithstanding the BSP
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF
parties' evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor securities in this country. Petitioner learned that the
is already satisfied that he can reasonably determine SCB had been prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF
the existence of probable cause based on the parties' securities. Petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for
evidence thus presented, he may terminate the violation of Section 8.1 of the Securities Regulation
proceedings and resolve the case. Code against private respondents but was denied
holding that it should have been filed with the SEC.
Third, petitioner cannot likewise aver that she has been
denied equal protection of the laws. Issue: Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the case.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue Held: Yes. A criminal charge for violation of the
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute.
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Hence, it must first be referred to an administrative
Recognizing the existence of real differences among agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the
men, the equal protection clause does not demand doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts will not determine
absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and of the administrative tribunal, where the
conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and question demands the exercise of sound administrative
liabilities enforced. discretion requiring the specialized knowledge and
expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine
BAVIERA v PAGLINAWAN technical and intricate matters of fact. The Securities
February 8, 2007 Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is
Facts: SCB acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints for
residents foreign securities called GTPMF. These any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and
securities were not registered with the SEC and were regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where
then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB- the complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall
Singapore. The Investment Capital Association of the indorse thecomplaint to the DOJ for preliminary
Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC investigation and prosecution.
a complaint alleging that SCB violated the Revised
Securities Act, particularly the provision prohibiting the AGUIRRE v SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 386
March 3, 2008
FACTS: Gloria Aguirre then appealed to the Secretary of the
On June 11,2002 petitioner Gloria Aguirre instituted a DOJ but Chief State Prosecutor dismissed the petition
criminal complaint for the violation of Revised Penal stating that the Secretary of Justice may motu propio
Code particularly Articles 172 and 262, both in relation dismiss outright the petition if there is no showing of any
to Republic Act No.7610 against respondents Pedro reversible error in the questioned resolution.
Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep, Dr. Pascual and several
John/Jane Doe alleging that John/Jane Doe upon the ISSUE:
apparent instructions of respondents Michelina Aguirre- 1. Whether or not the respondents are liable for the
Olondriz and Pedro Aguirre actually scouted, crime of mutilation
prospected, facilitated solicited and/or procured the 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
medical services of respondents Dr. Pascual and Dr. ruling that the DOJ did not commit grave
Agatep on the intended mutilation via bilateral abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
vasectomy of Laureano Aguirre. excess of jurisdiction when the latter affirmed
the public prosecutors finding of lack of
Olondriz denied that the prospected, scouted, probable cause for respondents Pedro
facilitated, solicited and/or procured any false statement Aguirre, Olondriz, Dr. Agatep and Dr. Pascual
mutilated or abused his common law brother, Laureano to stand trial for the criminal complaints of
Aguirre. She further contends that his common law falsification and mutilation in relation to
brother went through a vasectomy procedure but that Republic Act No. 7610.
does not amount to mutilation.
RULING:
Dr. Agatep contends that the complainant has no legal 1. No, the court held that Article 262 of the Revised
personality to file a case since she is only a common Penal Code provides that:
law sister of Larry who has a legal guardian in the
person of Pedro Aguirre. He further contends that Art. 262. Mutilation. The penalty of
Vasectomy does not in any way equate to castration reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua
and what is touched in vasectomy is not considered an shall be imposed upon any person who
organ in the context of law and medicine. shall intentionally mutilate another by
depriving him, either totally or partially, of
The Assistant City Prosecutor held that the facts alleged some essential organ for reproduction.
did not amount to mutilation, the vasectomy operation
did not deprived Larry of his reproductive organ.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 387
Any other intentional mutilation shall be The executive department of the government is
punished by prision mayor in its medium accountable for the prosecution of crimes, its principal
and maximum periods. obligation being the faithful execution of the laws of the
land. A necessary component of the power to execute
A straightforward scrutiny of the above provision shows the laws is the right to prosecute their violators, the
that the elements of mutilation under the first paragraph responsibility of which is thrust upon the DOJ. Hence,
of Art. 262 of the Revised Penal Code to be 1) that the determination of whether or not probable cause
there be a castration, that is, mutilation of organs exists to warrant the prosecution in court of an accused
necessary for generation; and 2) that the mutilation is is consigned and entrusted to the DOJ. And by the
caused purposely and deliberately, that is, to deprive nature of his office, a public prosecutor is under no
the offended party of some essential organ for compulsion to file a particular criminal information
reproduction. where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence
According to the public prosecutor, the facts alleged did at hand points to a different conclusion.
not amount to the crime of mutilation as defined and
penalized above, i.e. [t]he vasectomy operation did not Put simply, public prosecutors under the DOJ have a
in any way deprived (sic) Larry of his reproductive wide range of discretion, the discretion of whether,
organ, which is still very much part of his physical self. what and whom to charge, the exercise of which
depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
2. No. Probable cause has been defined as the best appreciated by (public) prosecutors. And this
existence of such facts and circumstances as Court has consistently adhered to the policy of non-
would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations,
on the facts within the knowledge of the and to leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of latitude of discretion in the determination of what
the crime for which he was prosecuted. The term constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable
does not mean actual and positive cause nor cause for the filing of an information against the
does it import absolute certainty. It is merely supposed offender.
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is,
the belief that the act or omission complained of The courts duty in an appropriate case, therefore, is
constitutes the offense charged. A finding of confined to a determination of whether the assailed
probable cause merely binds over the suspect to executive determination of probable cause was done
stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. without or in excess of jurisdiction resulting from a grave
abuse of discretion. For courts of law to grant the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 388
extraordinary writ of certiorari, so as to justify the by Larry Aguirre before he was vasectomized; or the
reversal of the finding of whether or not there exists fact that the latter was not consulted. The lack of the
probable cause to file an information, the one seeking two preceding attendant facts do not in any way amount
the writ must be able to establish that the investigating to falsification, absent the contention that it was made to
prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and appear in the assailed report that said consent was
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal obtained. That would have been an untruthful
hostility, and it must be patent and gross as would statement. Neither does the fact that the Psychiatric
amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to Report state that Lourdes Aguirre has Bipolar Mood
perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of Disorder by the same token amount to falsification
law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough. Excess of because said report does not put forward that such
jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the finding arose after an examination of the concerned
case but has transcended the same or acted without patient. Apropos the charge of mutilation, he reasoned
authority. that though the vasectomy rendered Larry unable to
procreate, it was not the permanent damage
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present contemplated under the pertinent provision of the penal
petition, the reasons of the Assistant City Prosecutor in code.
dismissing the criminal complaints for falsification and
mutilation, as affirmed by the DOJ, is determinative of We agree. Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DOJ and the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Assistant City Prosecutor was not shown in the present
case.
In ruling the way he did that no probable cause for
falsification and mutilation exists - the Assistant City ROQUE v OMBUDSMAN
Prosecutor deliberated on the factual and legal milieu of May 12, 1999
the case. He found that there was no sufficient evidence Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process
to establish a prima facie case for the crimes of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands
complained of as defined and punished under Articles the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on
172, paragraph 2, and 262 of the Revised Penal Code complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure
in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, respectively. of said office to resolve a complaint that has been
Concerning the crime of falsification of a private pending for six years is clearly violative of this mandate
document, the Assistant City Prosecutor reasoned that and the public officials' rights. In such event, the
the circumstances attendant to the case did not amount aggrieved party is entitled to the dismissal of the
to the crime complained of, that is, the lack of consent complaint.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 389
against them. Although respondents attempted to justify members of Palawan with the Office of the Tanodbayan.
the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to The controversial act done was in relation to the
review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman purchase and repair of a vessel which was also
Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Note that
six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. pending the case, he won the election and became the
incumbent governor once again.)
We are not persuaded by respondents' arguments that Petitioner filed a motion to suspend preliminary
the Petition for Mandamus became moot and academic investigation dated September 3, 1987 on the ground
when the Complaints were resolved by the Office of the that upon the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman for Mindanao and the Informations were present Tanodbayan has been transformed into the Of
filed. The same contention was rejected in Tatad v. the Special Prosecutor and has, therefore, lost his
Sandiganbayan, wherein the Court declared that long power to conduct preliminary investigation.
and unexplained delay in the resolution of the criminal Before his arraignment, petitioner also filed a motion to
complaints against petitioners was not corrected by the quash the information in the cases filed against him
eventual filing of the Informations. which was denied by the Sandiganbayan. He filed a
motion for reconsideration which was also denied. Thus
Although petitioners prayed only for the issuance of a he filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with the
ruling directing the dismissal of Ombudsman cases, this SC for being issued with grave abuse of discretion
Court, in the interest of the speedy disposition of cases, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (G.R. Nos.
resolves to dismiss the above cases directly. This ruling 116259-60)
is in line with Angchangco, in which the Court dismissed No TRO was issued for his petition, thus his
the complaints outright, although petitioner therein arraignment proceeded and the prosecution moved to
sought merely to compel the ombudsman to do so. suspend him while the case is pending which was
initially opposed by petitioner but said opposition was
SOCRATES V SANDIGANBAYAN later withdrawn.
In the interim, petitioner also filed a motion to include as
Facts: principals other officers involved in the purchase of the
vessel in question. He argued that the non-inclusion of
Petitioner is the incumbent governor of Palawan until these co-principals violates his right to due process and
the respondent Rodriguez was appointed as Acting equal protection of the laws which thus rendered the
Governor in his stead, after the EDSA Revolution in informations null and void. The court without deciding
1986. Two complaints for violation of RA 3019 was filed on his motion, granted the motion to suspend him
by respondent Rodriguez and other provincial board pendent lite for a period of 90 days.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 391
He filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied Ombudsman a reply to complainants
and he filed a petition for certiorari with the SC (2nd manifestation;
certiorari) which was consolidated with his first petition 4) Thus preliminary investigation was started on
for certiorari. June 25, 1990. Respondents then, including the
In relation to G.R. Nos. 116259-60 his ,ain argument is accused herein, were required to submit counter-
that the respondent court did not acquire jurisdiction affidavits;
over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of 5) Interrupting preliminary proceedings again,
six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary petitioner, on August 13, 1990, filed a motion to
investigation and the subsequent filing of the dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds:
informations against petitioner constitutes a violation of (a) That the Honorable Ombudsman has no
his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the jurisdiction over the person of respondent; and
case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad (b) That the complaint does not conform substantially
doctrine to the prescribed form.
Issues: The private complainant was, as a matter of right,
WON there was violation of due process due to the granted a period of time within which to oppose the
6 year dea;ay in the termination of the preliminary motion. The prosecution necessarily had to ponder on
investigation? the motion after protracted deliberations;
Held/Ratio: 6) On April 1, 1991, counsel for the accused filed an
No, the record shows that delay in the filing of the Appearance and Motion for Extension of Time to
Informations in these cases was caused, not by inaction File Appropriate Pleading. Counsel prayed that
of the prosecution, but by the following actuations of the respondents be granted an extension of twenty
accused: (20) days within which to comply with the order of
1) Initially preliminary investigation was held in March 11, 1991;
abeyance on account of the motion of petitioner, 7) The petitioner filed a motion to quash/dismiss on
entitled Motion to Suspend Preliminary December 17, 1991. This pleading was received
Investigation. Until an Ombudsman has been by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman only on
appointed January 13, 1992. It took some time for the
2) Preliminary investigation was interrupted when prosecution to resolve the motion and there never
private complainant, then Governor Victoriano J. was any intimation on the part of the accused that
Rodriguez, filed on April 24, 1989, a letter- the accused was invoking his right to a speedy
manifestation correcting the complaint disposition of the complaint against him. The
3) Only on September 22, 1989 did the accused in motion to quash/dismiss was in fact denied by the
these cases file with the Office of the prosecution in an order dated January 20, 1990;
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 392
8) A motion for reconsideration having been filed functions of which are illegal; that the employer
thereafter, the Informations in these cases were Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice
after all filed on September 16, 1992, but only for discriminating against the National Labor
after the ruling of the prosecution on the motion to Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National
quash/dismiss. Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents
Thus, from the aforementioned sequence of events, it attached are inaccessible to the respondents
can be gleaned that it was the petitioners delaying which are of such far-reaching importance and
tactics which caused the delay of the termination effect that their admission would necessarily
of the preliminary investigation. mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered herein.
ANG TIBAY V CIR
February 27. 1940 ISSUE
J. laurel WON the union was denied procedural due process
by the CIR
Facts:
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. moved for Held/Ratio:
the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of Yes, motion for new trial granted
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of
Industrial Relations for a new trial. They argued that: Indeed, CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical
1) Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of rules of procedure and the Act requires it to "act
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
for him to temporarily lay off the members of the the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
union is entirely false and unsupported by the and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
of Accounts of native dealers in leather; legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner
2) That the supposed lack of leather materials as it may deem just and equitable." HOWEVER this
claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the essential requirements of due process in trials and
Philippine Army. investigations of an administrative character. The
3) that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG primary rights which should be respected are as follows:
TIBAY is a company or employer union 1) The right to a hearing which includes the right
dominated by Teodoro, the existence and of the party interested or affected to present
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 393
his own case and submit evidence in support served if the movant is given opportunity to present at
thereof the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and
2) the tribunal must consider the evidence such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
presented. issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is
3) The decision must have something to support new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
itself. involved is not entirely attributable to the parties
4) the evidence must be substantial. It means adversely affected by the result.
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere NAMIL V COMELEC
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not October 28, 2003
constitute substantial evidence. J. Callejo Sr.
5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least Facts:
contained in the record and disclosed to the On May 14, 2001, the election for the members of the
parties affected. Sangguniang Bayan was held in Palimbang, Sultan
6) The CIR (any tribunal) or any of its judges, Kudarat.
therefore, must act on its or his own On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
independent consideration of the law and Palimbang issued Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
facts of the controversy, and not simply Proclamation (COCVP) No. 80311083 which contained,
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving inter alia, the petitioners and the Sangguniang Bayan
at a decision. winning candidates
7) The CIR (any board or body) should, in all The next day, May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of
controversial questions, render its decision in Canvassers of Palimbang issued COCVP No. 8031109
such a manner that the parties to the which listed the private respondents as winners,
proceeding can know the various issues Private respondent Kapina wrote the COMELEC
involved, and the reasons for the decision requesting that she and the others who were proclaimed
rendered. as winners on May 21, 2001 be recognized as the
8) winning candidates and the new members of the
In the case at hand, except as to the alleged agreement Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbang.
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's After receiving the comments and reports of the election
Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy officers involved in the incident, Commissioner Mehold
the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, , a Sadain submitted his recommendation to the
conclusion of law. The interest of justice would be better COMELEC that there was valid proclamation of private
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 394
respondents and that there being such, adjudication on questioned order based solely on private
the matter is no longer required. This recommendation respondents allegations.
was adopted by the public respondent COMELEC in its Citing Binan v COMELEC, the court held that petitioners
Resolution 4615. cannot be deprived of office without due process of law.
Thus, petitioners moved that Resolution No. 4615 be Although public office is not property under Section 1 of
declared null and void for being issued without the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot
according them due notice and hearing. The petitioners acquire a vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless,
allege that they were never accorded the chance to a protected right. The Court also cited the case of
present their side in connection with the investigation Farinas v COMELEC where it ruled that that the
that was purportedly conducted by Commissioner COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
Sadain and on the memoranda/report of the public proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
respondents officers and only learned about the without notice and hearing.
controversy only when they were notified of the assailed
resolution of the public respondent
members of religious orders or congregations, sect or amount is being collected from every employed alien
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time
or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
Respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was executive .
employed in Manila, filed a petition before the CFI of Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or
Manila to issue a writ of preliminary injunction and standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his
restraining order to stop the enforcement of said discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
ordinance. He argues that said ordinance is municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
discriminatory and violates the rule of uniformity in standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses
taxation. He also states that as a police power measure, no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
it makes no distinctions between useful and non-useful enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and
occupations in the collection of the permit fee. He finally entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor
argues that it is oppressive and unreasonable being arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
applicable only to aliens. issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid,
CFI issued the writ prayed for. Petitioner Mayor Villegas being an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to
files this petition for certiorari with the SC. allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
CIR had exceeded its authority in applying SNIT to Later he was able to return to the Islands but he feared,
professional partnerships. as that he should be again deported by the said
Issue: defendants,. Thus he filed with a petition that a
WON there was violation of the EPC preliminary injunction should be issued against the
Held/Ratio: No plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the
Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal defendant.
protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of
taxation, similarly situated, are to be treated alike both This petition was granted. The defendants filed this
in privileges and liabilities. It does not prohibit present petition with the SC and they argue that since
classification so long as it is germane to the purpose of the power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese
the law and makes substantial distinctions. Such empire is a private one of the governor-general of these
classifications are valid so long as they are not arbitrary islands, and the defendant A. S. Crossfield exceeded
and inappropriate. these authority by trying the case and issuing the
The income tax is imposed not on the professional injunction and refusing to allow the demurrer and motion
partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the partners for the dismissal of the complaint
themselves in their individual capacity computed on Issue:
their distributive shares of partnership profits. The law WON it is within the power of the State to deport aliens
did not intend to place in an unequal footing or in and whether doing such would be a violation of equal
significant variance the income tax treatment of protection and due process of law
professionals who practice their respective professions Held/Ratio:
individually and of those who do it through a general Yes. every government has the inherent power to expel
professional partnership. from its borders aliens whose presence has been found
detrimental to the public interest. . The international
Forbes v Chuoco Tiaco community, as Martens says, leaves States at liberty to
July 30, 1910 fix the conditions under which foreigners should be
Johnson J. allowed to enter their territory. These conditions may be
more or less convenient to foreigners, but they are a
Facts: legitimate manifestation of territorial power and not
contrary to law. the expulsion of foreigners is a political
On the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the measure and that the executive power may expel,
said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the without appeal, any person whose presence tends to
Philippine Islands, defendant Chuoco Tiaco was disturb the public peace.
deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 397
The power to exclude or expel aliens being a power Election Code. Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to
affecting international relations is vested in the political 28, of the 1978 Election Code, which grants the voter
department of the Government. The power to exclude the option to vote either for individual candidates by
aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the names of
foundation, are derived from one source, are supported candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the
by the same reasons, and are, in truth, but the exercise candidates of a political party, group or aggrupation by
of one and the same power. simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the
Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere it if name of the political party, group or aggrupation.
has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners Petitioners argue that the optional straight party voting
of the citizens; that they will create religious scheme is violative of the equal protection clause. They
disturbances or occasion any other disorder contrary to argue that an independent candidate would be
the public safety discriminated against because by merely writing on his
It has been repeatedly decided when a government ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have
is dealing with the political rights of aliens that it is voted for all the candidates of that party, an advantage
not governed by that "due process of law" which which the independent candidate does not enjoy. In
governs in dealing with the civil rights of aliens. For effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a
instance, the courts of the United States have party-member is deprived of the equal protection of the
decided that in the deportation of an alien he is not laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to
entitled to right of trial by jury, the right of trial by Sec 9 of Article XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
jury being one of the steps in the "due process of Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal
law" in dealing with civil rights protection clause in the 1978 Election Code and thus
invalid
Held/Ratio:
No. the 1978 Election Code is valid.
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
Peralta v COMELEC classifications. What is proscribes is a classification
March 11, 1978 which is arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by
J. Antonio a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
Facts: purpose of the law and applies equally to all those
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 belonging to the same class. 14 The equal protection
Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections. They were clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
assailing the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 398
applies alike to all persons within such class, and Ceniza v COMELEC
reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction January 28, 1980
between those who fall within the class and those who CONCEPCION JR., J.:
do not. Exactness in division is impossible and never
looked for in applying the legal test. All that is required Facts:
is that there must be, in general, some reasonable basis On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang
on general lines for the division Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local
Before a voter prepares his ballot, the voter will be able elections on January 30, 1980. It was provided in said
to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate BP that Section 4(1) of the Constitution. any city now
will receive more than one vote, whether he is voted existing with an annual regular derived from
individually or as a candidate of a party group or infrastructure and general funds of not less than forty
aggrupation. The voter is free to vote for the individual million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the
candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation. approval of this Act shall be classified as a highly
The choice is his. No one can compel him to do urbanized city
otherwise. In the case of candidates, the decision on To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections
whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a (COMELEC, for short) adopted Resolution No.
political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to 1421which enumerated the cities which are not entitled
their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials.
of candidacy, a candidate is aware of the Included therein were Cebu City and Mandaue City.
advantages under the law accruing to candidates of The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and
a political party or group. If he wishes to avail registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and Mandaue.
himself of such alleged advantages as an official They assail Section 3 of BP. 51, which uses the annual
candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a income of a given city as the basis for classification of
political party group or aggrupation. In other words, whether or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city
the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be whose voters may not participate in the election of
assumed that the candidate had carefully weighed and provincial officials of the province where the city is
considered the relative advantages and disadvantages geographically located and Republic Act No. 5519,
of either alternative. So long as the application of the otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which
rule depends on his voluntary action or decision, he went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the
cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum
the victim of discrimination. They argue that said law is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based
on substantial distinctions germane to the purpose of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 399
the law which in effect provides for and regulates the industrial activity as to warrant its independence from
exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such the province where it is geographically situated
unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal The practice of allowing voters in one component
protection. They also state that Section 3 of Batas Blg. city to vote for provincial officials and denying the
885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city as same privilege to voters in another component city
highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage
and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in
is not based on substantial distinctions germane to the the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted by
purpose of the law which in effect provides for and law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited
therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for
denial of equal protection. provincial officials while granting it to another individual
Issue: or groups of voters in the same city.
WON, there has been a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.
Held/Ratio: United Democratic Opposition v COMELEC
No. 104 SCRA 17, G.R. No. 56515
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest
(equal protection; scope of equality; political laws)
autonomy of local government units and independence.
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant
Constitution. The amendments were to be placed to a
loss of the right to participate in provincial affairs, more
plebiscite for the peoples approval. The YES vote was
particularly the selection of elective provincial officials
being advanced by KBL Marcos Party while the NO
since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise
vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity
any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said
and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469
city
w/c basically provided that there be equal opportunity,
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities
equal time and equal space on media use for
and component cities on the basis of their regular
campaigns for both sides. On 12 Mar 1981, Marcos
annual income is based upon substantial distinction.
campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from
The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is
9:30pm to 11:30pm. The same was broadcasted live by
capable of existence and development as a relatively
26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide.
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would
UNIDO petitioned before the COMELEC that they be
also show whether the city has sufficient economic or
granted the same opportunity as Marcos has pursuant
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 400
to Resns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping.
UNIDO assailed the denial as a denial of equal They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their
protection before the laws. sentence had become final and executory when the
ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the SC.
protection by virtue of COMELECs denial of their Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot
request. be complexed to rebellion as it is necessarily absorbed
HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO was not denied due therein. Hence, the without such complexion the penalty
process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon
is the considered view of the SC that when Marcos precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right,
conducted his pulong-pulong or consultation with the namely, the denial of equal protection. The petitioners
people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as were convicted by CFI for the very same rebellion for
President/Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as which Hernandez and others were convicted. The law
the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, under which they were convicted is the very same law
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible under which the latter were convicted. It had not and
. . . for the program of government and shall determine has not been changed. For the same crime, committed
the guidelines of national policy. In instances where the under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience,
head of state is at the same time the president of the allow petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others
political party that is in power, it does not necessarily can suffer only prision mayor?
follow that he speaks with two voices when he ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the
dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
certain privileges that the opposition may not have. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The
Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations and radio continued incarceration after the twelve-year period
stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
party to this case. UNIDO must sought contract with accordance with the controlling doctrine, when others
these TV stations and radio stations at their own similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
expense. implications at war with equal protection. That is not to
give it life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory.
Gumabon v Director of Prisons Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical
37 SCRA 420, G.R. No. L-30026 offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the
conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and
the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same
(same; same; political crimes)
crime would be made to suffer different penalties. If
Gumabon et al were charged for rebellion punished
Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment,
under Art 134 of the RPC. Their offense was complexed
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 401
then this would be repugnant to equal protection, people certiorari to the SC, instead of the traditional two
similarly situated were not similarly dealt with. chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
What is required under this constitutional guarantee is appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and
under similar circumstances would be accorded the thereafter to the SC.
same treatment both in the privileges conferred and the ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan
liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: violates equal protection insofar as appeals would be
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. concerned.
For the principle is that equal protection and security HELD: The SC ruled against Nuez. The 1973
shall be given to every person under circumstances, Constitution had provided for the creation of a special
which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases
upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within involving public officials charged with graft and
a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever corruption. The constitution specifically makes mention
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan,
on the rest. precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of
which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the
Nunez v Sandiganbayan public service. It follows that those who may thereafter
111 SCRA 433, G.R. No. L-50581-50617 be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far
Nuez assails the validity of the PD 1486 creating the back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Sandiganbayan as amended by PD 1606. He was Constitution came into force, that a different procedure
accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa through for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as
falsification of public and commercial documents petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all offensive to the equal protection clause of the
public officials, in several cases. It is the claim of Nuez Constitution. Further, the classification therein set forth
that PD1486, as amended, is violative of the due met the standard requiring that it must be based on
process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not
proceedings violates Nuezs right to equal protection, be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
because appeal as a matter of right became equally to each member of the class. Further still,
minimized into a mere matter of discretion; appeal decisions in the Sandiganbayan are reached by a
likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that
excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and decisions therein are more conceivably carefully
there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by reached than other trial courts.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 402
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and Himagan, was a policeman that was implicated in the
women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) murder of Bernabe Machitar. The TC issued an Order
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they suspending petitioner until the termination of the case
are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known
apply equally to all members of the same class. The as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of
Court said that it is a matter of judicial notice that female 1990, which provides:
domestics and similar workers are subjected to Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal
exploitative working conditions marked by physical and Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or information
personal abuse. On the other hand, there is no sufficient in form and substance against a member of
evidence that male OCWs suffer from the same the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed
predicament and that there is no showing that the by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the
government should act in a similar manner with regard court shall immediately suspend the accused from office
to them. The Court here is not saying that there is a until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject
superiority of men over women. All it is saying is that, to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety
based on available evidence, there is a marked (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis
distinction in their working conditions and predicaments. ours).
(see also: Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies v Himagan questions the order stating that an imposition
POEA, 243 SCRA 666; JMM Promotion and of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to
Management v CA; Dumlao v COMELEC; Tolentino v the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
Secretary of Finance; Inchong v Hernandez) constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: WON Himagans right to equal protection has
been violated? NO
RATIO:
HImagan misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous
reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE lifting of preventive suspension in pending
PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. administrative investigation, not in criminal cases. What
11, Davao City, respondents. is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994 preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of
KAPUNAN, J.:
R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and
its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the
Facts: Department" simply means that the provisions of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 404
Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons
regulations are applicable to members of the shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
rules and regulations are not inconsistent withR.A. liabilities enforced. 14
6975. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely
Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in
limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days the instant case. If the classification is based on real
cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the
of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years sameclass; 17 and applies to current as well as future
shall continue until the case is terminated. conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as
The reason why members of the PNP are treated violating the Constitution's equal protection guarantee.
differently from the other classes of persons charged A distinction based on real and reasonable
criminally or administratively insofar as the application considerations related to a proper legislative purpose
of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable,
that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law capricious nor unfounded.
which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative
discussions. COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ,
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a NERIO ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners,
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is vs.HONORABLE CONRADO M. VASQUEZ and CONCERNED
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are CITIZENS, respondents.
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily MENDOZA, J.:
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 ofR.A. Facts:
6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's The Ombudsman received an anonymous letter alleging
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. that funds representing savings from unfilled positions in
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. Because of this,
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate the Ombudsman issued subpoena duces tecum to to
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. the Chief of the EIIB's Accounting Division ordering him
Recognizing the existence of real differences among to bring "all documents relating to Personal Services
men, the equal protection clause does not demand Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 405
vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
1988." sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." 18
The petitioners contest this, stating that the Consequently, while in cases which involve state
Ombudsman was doing indirectly what he could not do secrets it may be sufficient to determine from the
directly, i.e., compelling them (petitioners Almonte and circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
Perez) to produce evidence against themselves. danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose
ISSUE: WON it is within Ombudsmans power to issue military matters without compelling production, 19 no
the order of subpoena duces tecum? YES similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting on
other considerations.
RATIO: Nor is there violation of petitioner's right to the equal
At common law a governmental privilege against protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This only hale respondents via their verified complaints or
privilege is based upon public interest of such sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed,"
paramount importance as in and of itself transcending while in proceedings before the Office of the
the individual interests of a private citizen, even though, Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an
as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce investigation.
his legal rights. 1 First, there can be no objection to this procedure
On the other hand, where the claim of confidentiality because it is provided in the Constitution itself. Second,
does not rest on the need to protect military, diplomatic it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints
or other national security secrets but on a general public "in any form and in a manner," the framers of the
interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts Constitution took into account the well-known reticence
have declined to find in the Constitution an absolute of the people which keep them from complaining
privilege against a subpoena considered essential to the against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
enforcement of criminal laws. Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or and prosecutory agencies of the government because
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor has through official pressure and influence, can quash,
our attention been called to any law or regulation which delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On
considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified the other hand complainants are more often than not
information. EIIB's function is the gathering and poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
evaluation of intelligence reports and information Accordingly, in Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national that testimony given at a fact-finding investigation and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 406
the government. Airwave frequencies have to be similarly required as, in fact, in Philippine Press Institute
allocated as there are more individuals who want to v. COMELEC, 27 we upheld their right to the payment of
broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A just compensation for the print space they may provide
franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other under
things, to amended by Congress in accordance with The argument will not bear analysis. It rests on the
the constitutional provision that "any such fallacy that broadcast media are entitled to the same
franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to treatment under the free speech guarantee of the
amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress Constitution as the print media. There are important
when the common good so requires." 10 differences in the characteristics of the two media,
In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, however, which justify their differential treatment for free
which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves speech purposes.
and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast (1) Because of the physical limitations of the broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the spectrum, the government must, of necessity, allocate
temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise broadcast frequencies to those wishing to use them.
is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may There is no similar justification for government allocation
reasonably be burdened with the performance by and regulation of the print media.
(2)
the grantee of some form of public service. Government spends public funds for the allocation
In the granting of the privilege to operate broadcast and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does
stations and thereafter supervising radio and television not do in the case of the print media. To require the
stations, the state spends considerable public funds in radio and television broadcast industry to provide free
licensing and supervising such stations. 18 It would be air time for the COMELEC Time is a fair exchange for
strange if it cannot even require the licensees to render what the industry gets.
public service by giving free air time. (3) The broadcast media have also established a
the COMELEC however, does not take over the uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
operation of radio and television stations but only the Newspapers and current books are found only in
allocation of air time to the candidates for the purpose of metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
ensuring, among other things, equal opportunity, time, municipalities accessible to fast and regular
and the right to reply as mandated by the Constitution. transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
23
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines
(2) beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and
Petitioners complain that B.P. Blg. 881, 92 singles out shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
radio and television stations to provide free air time. On the other hand, the transistor radio is found
They contend that newspapers and magazines are not everywhere. The television set is also becoming
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 408
or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or all of which are present in this case.
complexed with other crimes; The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed
(2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and
(c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any reasonables of the questioned provisions. The
of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; classification between those pending cases involving
and the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office. commenced and whose cases could have been affected
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 410
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to
substantial distinction that makes real differences. invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to
Evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 40
in the latter the parties had already submitted their (2)
respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
documents. penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. Penal laws
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong acts and establish penalties for their violations; 47 or
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and
cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in provide dor their punishment.
"any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng In this case,.R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it
those cases where trial had already begun are not does not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It
affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not
the new law. come within the prohibition. 5Moreover, the law did not
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has
heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad been ruled that adjective statutes may be made
faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner further contends that the time of their passage. 54
legislature is biased against him as he claims to have In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's
been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review
as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in questions of law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate
paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of
of the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 review to determine if he presumption of innocence has
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices been convincing overcome. 56
allegedly had against petitioner during the committe WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7
hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained.
justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their
presence and participation in the legislative hearings PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter vs.ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
before the committee involves the graft court of which G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000
one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative FACTS:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 411
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full- particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
pledged member of Congress who is now confined at classification from those others who are validly
the national penitentiary while his conviction for restrained by law. A strict scrutiny of classifications is
statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious
on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant discriminations are made in favor of or against groups
filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully or types of individuals.
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including The SC finds that election to the position of
attendance at legislative sessions and committee Congressman is not a reasonable classification in
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
instance of a non-bailable offense. the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him
The primary argument of Jalosjos is the "mandate of from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
as their representative in Congress. Having been re- and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform True, election is the expression of the sovereign power
the functions of a Congressman of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
ISSUE: WON membership in Congress exempt an expects to achieve the continuity of government and the
accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
incarcerated persons in general? NO importance, the privileges and rights arising from
RATIO: having been elected may be enlarged or restricted
The Constitution guarantees the equal protection of by law.
laws.This simply means that all persons similarly WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed.7 The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any
person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
displayed. (ISAE), petitioner, vs.HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
by public officers has never been an excuse to free a CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila;
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. Congress and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
continues to function well in the physical absence of one KAPUNAN, J.:
or a few of its members. Never has the call of a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 412
have similar functions and responsibilities, which they right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse
perform under similar working conditions. contracted the marriage with the pensioner within
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign- three years before the pensioner qualified for the
hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction pension. According to GSIS, Nicolas wed Milagros on
in salary rates without violating the principle of equal 10 July 1983, less than one year from his date of
work for equal pay. retirement on 17 February 1984.
Milagros filed with the trial court a special civil action for
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Cebu City declaratory relief questioning the validity of Section 18
Branch, petitioner, vs. MILAGROS O. MONTESCLAROS, of PD 1146 disqualifying her from receiving survivorship
respondent. pension.
CARPIO, J.
TC: rendered judgment declaring Milagros eligible for
survivorship pension.
FACTS: CA: agreed with the trial court that the retirement
July 10, 1983 - Sangguniang Bayan member Nicolas benefits are onerous and conjugal because the pension
Montesclaros married Milagros Orbiso on 10 July 1983. came from the deceased pensioners salary
Nicolas was a 72- year old widower when he married deductions.
Milagros who was then 43 years old. ISSUES:
January 4, 1985 - Nicolas filed with the GSIS an (1) WON the prohibition is based on reasonable
application for retirement benefits effective 18 February classification? NO
1985 under Presidential Decree No. 1146 or the (2)WON the prohibition under PD 1146 is a denial of
Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 due process? YES,
(PD 1146). In his retirement application, Nicolas RATIO:
designated his wife Milagros as his sole beneficiary. (1)
Nicolas last day of actual service was on 17 February A statute based on reasonable classification does not
1985. violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
January 31, 1986, GSIS approved Nicolas application protection of the law.The requirements for a valid and
for retirement effective 17 February 1984, granting a reasonable classification are:
lump sum payment of annuity for the first five years and (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions;
a monthly annuity thereafter (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
April 22 1992- Nicolas died. Milagros filed with GSIS a (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146. (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
June 8 1992, - GSIS denied the claim because under class.
Section 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 414
Thus, the law may treat and regulate one class mandatory salary deductions from the government
differently from another class provided there are real employee, the government pensions do not constitute
and substantial differences to distinguish one class from mere gratuity but form part of compensation.
another. Thus, the present GSIS law does not presume that
The proviso in question does not satisfy these marriages contracted within three years before
requirements. The proviso discriminates against the retirement or death of a member are sham marriages
dependent spouse who contracts marriage to the contracted to avail of survivorship benefits. The present
pensioner within three years before the pensioner GSIS law does not automatically forfeit the survivorship
qualified for the pension.[31] Under the proviso, even if pension of the surviving spouse who contracted
the dependent spouse married the pensioner more than marriage to a GSIS member within three years before
three years before the pensioners death, the dependent the members retirement or death. The law
spouse would still not receive survivorship pension if the acknowledges that whether the surviving spouse
marriage took place within three years before the contracted the marriage mainly to receive survivorship
pensioner qualified for pension. The object of the benefits is a matter of evidence. The law no longer
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection prescribes a sweeping classification that unduly
between the means employed and the purpose prejudices the legitimate surviving spouse and defeats
intended. The law itself does not provide any reason or the purpose for which Congress enacted the social
purpose for such a prohibition. The classification does legislation.
not rest on substantial distinctions. Worse, the In PD 1146, There is outright confiscation of benefits
classification lumps all those marriages contracted due the surviving spouse without giving the surviving
within three years before the pensioner qualified for spouse an opportunity to be heard. The proviso
pension as having been contracted primarily for undermines the purpose of PD 1146, which is to assure
financial convenience to avail of pension benefits. comprehensive and integrated social security and
(2) insurance benefits to government employees and their
Under Section 5 of PD 1146, it is mandatory for the dependents in the event of sickness, disability, death,
government employee to pay monthly contributions. PD and retirement of the government employees. Where
1146 mandates the government to include in its annual the employee retires and meets the eligibility
appropriation the necessary amounts for its share of the requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that
contributions. It is compulsory on the government is protected by the due process clause. No law can
employer to take off and withhold from the employees deprive such person of his pension rights without due
monthly salaries their contributions and to remit the process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to
same to GSIS. The government employer must also be heard.
remit its corresponding share to GSIS. Considering the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for want of merit.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 415
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power respondents counter that there is no discrimination
of taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and because the law is based on a valid classification in
rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed? accordance with the equal protection clause.
Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a constitutional.
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in
and a classification is reasonable where 1) it is based the concept of due process, as every unfair
upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to discrimination offends the requirements of justice and
the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a
only to present conditions, but also to future conditions separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee
classification applies only to those who belong to the against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
same class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to is the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply
exclude any subsequently established sugar central for requires that all persons or things similarly situated
the coverage of the tax should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is
Philippine Judges v. Prado equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Section 35 of RA 7354 is declared
unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular
No. 92-28 to implement Section 35 of RA 7354
withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA,
RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration
Commission and with certain other government offices.
It is alleged that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue
while withdrawing the franking privilege from judiciary, it
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan
retains the same for the President & Vice-President of
the Philippines, Senator & members of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC, National Census & Facts: On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit
Statistics Office and the general public. The Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 417
Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Paraaque Mayor lays down no guide for granting/denying the permit and
Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and therefore permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by
Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue the Mayor. Finally, the ordinance denies aliens due
a mayor's permit process and the equal protection of the laws
Held: Petitioner's suspected partiality may be gleaned Tiu vs. Court of Appeals
from the fact that he issued a permit in favor of the
unidentified Baclaran-based vendors' associations by
Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress, with the approval
the mere expedient of an executive order, whereas so
of the President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled An
many requirements were imposed on BCCI before it
Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations
could be granted the same permit. Worse, petitioner
Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI's right to
Conversion and Development Authority for this
equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified
Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other
Baclaran-based vendors' associations were not similarly
Purposes. Section 12 thereof created the Subic
situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the
Special Economic Zone and granted thereto special
apparent haste with which said executive order was
privileges.
issued. It would seem that if there was any interest
served by such executive order, it was that of herein
then the President issued Executive Order No. 97-A
petitioner.
(EO 97-A), specifying the area within which the tax-and-
duty-free privilege was operative, viz.:w
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho
Section 1.1. The Secured Area consisting of the
presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base shall be
Facts: An ordinance of the City of Manila prohibited the the only completely tax and duty-free area in the
employment of aliens in any occupation or business SSEFPZ [Subic Special Economic and Free Port Zone].
unless they first secured a permit from the Mayor of Business enterprises and individuals (Filipinos and
Manila and paid a fee of P500. Respondent, an alien, foreigners) residing within the Secured Area are free to
employed in Manila, brought suit and obtained judgment import raw materials, capital goods, equipment, and
from the CFI declaring the ordinance null and void. consumer items tax and duty-free. Consumption items,
however, must be consumed within the Secured Area.
HELD: The ordinance is a tax measure. In imposing a Removal of raw materials, capital goods, equipment and
flat rate of P500, it failed to consider substantial consumer items out of the Secured Area for sale to non-
differences in situations among aliens and for that SSEFPZ registered enterprises shall be subject to the
reason violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also usual taxes and duties, except as may be provided
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 418
herein banking and finance, and (6) the grant of resident status
to certain investors and of working visas to certain
Citing Section 12 of RA 7227, petitioners contend that foreign executives and workers.
the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) We believe it was reasonable for the President to have
the Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area delimited the application of some incentives to the
formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base. However, confines of the former Subic military base. It is this
EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area specific area which the government intends to transform
within which the special privileges granted to the entire and develop from its status quo ante as an abandoned
zone would apply to the present fenced-in former Subic naval facility into a self-sustaining industrial and
Naval Base only. It has thereby excluded the residents commercial zone, particularly for big foreign and local
of the first two components of the zone from enjoying investors to use as operational bases for their
the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively businesses and industries. Why the seeming bias for
discriminated against them, without reasonable or valid big investors? Undeniably, they are the ones who can
standards, in contravention of the equal protection pour huge investments to spur economic growth in the
guarantee. country and to generate employment opportunities for
the Filipinos, the ultimate goals of the government for
Held: We first determine the purpose of the law. From such conversion. The classification is, therefore,
the very title itself, it is clear that RA 7227 aims primarily germane to the purposes of the law. And as the legal
to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into maxim goes, The intent of a statute is the law.[
productive uses. Obviously, the lands covered under Certainly, there are substantial differences between the
the 1947 Military Bases Agreement are its object big investors who are being lured to establish and
operate their industries in the so-called secured area
From the above provisions of the law, it can easily be and the present business operators outside the
deduced that the real concern of RA 7227 is to convert area. On the one hand, we are talking of billion-peso
the lands formerly occupied by the US military bases investments and thousands of new jobs. On the other
into economic or industrial areas. In furtherance of such hand, definitely none of such magnitude. In the first, the
objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend economic impact will be national; in the second, only
economic incentives to attract and encourage investors, local. Even more important, at this time the business
both local and foreign. Among such enticements activities outside the secured area are not likely to
are: (1) a separate customs territory within the zone, (2) have any impact in achieving the purpose of the law,
tax-and-duty-free importations, (3) restructured income which is to turn the former military base
tax rates on business enterprises within the zone, (4) no to productive use for the benefit of the Philippine
foreign exchange control, (5) liberalized regulations on economy. There is, then, hardly any reasonable basis
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 419
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
actually seized; Code.
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against
the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
against them; said applications. The averments thereof with respect to
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal the offense committed were abstract. As a
manner; and consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were issued the warrants to have found the existence of
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to probable cause, for the same presupposes the
be disposed of in accordance with law. introduction of competent proof that the party against
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were committed specific omissions, violating a given
cured by petitioners consent; and that, in any event, provision of our criminal laws.
the effects seized are admissible in evidence against
them. In short, the criminal cannot be set free just As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case
because the government blunders. do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issue is petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest
valid. order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the
the validity of the search warrant issued against their aforementioned applications without reference to any
corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence determinate provision of said laws or codes.
has no cause of action. It should be raised by the The grave violation of the Constitution made in the
officers or board members of the corporation. The application for the contested search warrants was
constitution protects the peoples right against compounded by the description therein made of the
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, papers showing all business transactions including
none of these are met. The warrant was issued from disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit
mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a and loss statements.
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 422
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and He was later searched, without his opposition, and the
seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions following were found: Tan Whys pocketbook, P92 in
of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions bills, Tan Whys ID, and a memorandum of amounts.
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the Malasugui was charged with the crime of robbery with
seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the homicide. He was convicted by the CFI-Cotabato.
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, Malasugui testified at trial that he was forced to produce
thus openly contravening the explicit command of the the bracelet, pocketbook and money, and that the rest
Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be were all fabricated.
particularly described as well as tending to defeat its ISSUE/HELD:
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The W/N the articles taken are admissible in evidence
Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right YES.
of the accused against a defective search warrant is RATIO:
emphasized. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to
have it made of his person or premises, he is precluded
PEOPLE VS. MALASUGUI (2007) from later complaining thereof.
The right to be secure from unreasonable search may
be waived, and such waiver MAY BE MADE expressly
FACTS:
or impliedly.
March 5, 1935 Tan Why, a merchant, was found with
Also, Malasugui was legally arrested without a judicial
several head wounds and a fractured skull on a path
warrant because there were facts personally known to
leading to a barrio in Cotabato, and situated within the
Lt. Jacaria (p.226, middle part) which gave him reason
property of Yu Enching Sero. Tan Why merely
to believe or suspect that a crime had in fact been
responded Kagui when he was asked who had
committed and that Malasugui was responsible.
attacked him. Tan Why was brought to the hospital, but
When the search of the person detained or arrested and
he died shortly afterwards.
the seizure of the effects found in his possession are
Lt. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered the immediate
incidental to a lawful arrest, they cannot be considered
arrest of Kagui Malasugui.
unlawful or unreasonable.
Lt. Jacaria had been informed that Malasugui had just
The Constitution only prohibits those arrests, searches
redeemed 2 pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops
and seizures without judicial warrant which are
and was carrying money, and so when Malasugui was
unreasonable.
brought to him, he asked the latter for the bracelets and
(OLD) Sec. 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads: A
he then voluntarily gave them. After this, Lt. Jacaria
person charged with a crime may be searched for
asked him if he had anything else, he tremblingly
answered in the negative.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 423
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as carrying smuggled copra and coffee, a combined team
proof of the commission of the crime. of Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center
People v. Damaso operatives headed by Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent
of Davao, proceeded to the Velascos room at the
Skyroom Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said document.
Facts: Accsused-appellant charged in an information of Velasco was not inside the hotel room when they
violation of PD 1866 in connection with the crime of entered the room. There are conficting claims whether
subversion assailed the legality of a search and seizure the manicurist Teofila Ibaez or whether Velascos wife,
conducted at his house at night time when he was not who was allegedly inside the room at that time,
around, on the ground that it violated constitutional voluntarily allowed the police officers to enter
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
Held: Issue: Whether there was consent on the part of
Issue: Whether or not a search on a house of a person the person who was the occupant of the hotel room then
without the owners presence is valid. rented by Velasco.
Held: There was an attempt on the part of Lopez and
Held: No. The search in the dwelling of the accused- Velasco to counteract the force of the recital of the
appellant without his knowledge is a violation of the written statement of Teofila Ibaez (allegedly wife of
constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches Tomas Velasco) by an affidavit of one Corazon Y.
and seizures. Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs [GR L-27968, 3 Velasco, and another by Velasco himself; reiterating
December 1975] that the person who was present at his hotel room was
Second Division, Fernando (J): 4 concur, 1 took no part one Teofila Ibaez, a manicurist by occupation. If such
Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict indeed were the case, then it is much more easily
surveillance by the combined team of agents of the NBI, understandable why that person, Teofila Ibaez, who
PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior to its could be aptly described as the wrong person at the
apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao wrong place and at the wrong time, would have signified
City. M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt. her consent readily and immediately. Under the
Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas circumstances, that was the most prudent course of
Velasco. action. It would save her and even Velasco himself from
any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the officers of the law
At about 3:00 p.m. of the said day, when the vessel was be blamed if they would act on the appearances. There
searched and after Captain Pantinople informed the was a person inside who from all indications was ready
team that Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other to accede to their request. Even common courtesy
documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 424
alone would have precluded them from inquiring too W/N: the right against unreasonable search and seizure
closely as to why she was there. Under all the may be invoked against private individuals.
circumstances, therefore, it can readily be concluded Held: No, both American and Philippine jurisprudence
that there was consent sufficient in law to dispense with as well as the records of the code commission attest
the need for a search warrant that the Bill of Rights can only be invoked against the
State and not against private entities. In the instant case
People v. Marti the search and seizure was effected by Job Reyes the
proprietor of the delivery service on his own initiative. As
Facts:
such the authorities had no involvement and the right
- The appellant Andre Marti had a package against unreasonable S & S cannot be invoked to
delivered w/ Manila Packaging & Export render such evidence inadmissible. The bill of rights
Forwarders to a certain Walter Frierz in Zurich
was established to regulate the disparate powers of the
Switzerland.
State in administering justice in order to safeguard
- Upon final inspection by the proprietor of the individuals from abuses as such they were never
forwarder Job Reyes he notice a peculiar smell intended to be operative against private individuals.
emanating from the package and proceeded to Valmonte v. De Villa
investigate. Facts
- He then gave a sample to the NBI narcotics lab 1. The NCR District command was created to
and later brought along 3 NBI agents to his office conduct security operations within the Metro
to have them look at the packages: he personally Manila Area to maintain peace and order.
opens the packages and allows them to be However, petitioners aver that because of the
viewed by the officers. installation of checkpoints, residents of
- After Marti was located and invited for questioning Valenzuela are worried of being harassed and of
the results of the tests came revealing that the their safety being placed at the arbitrary
sample of the content of the packages was disposition of the military. Cars and vehicles were
indeed ganja the devils lettuce. being subjected to regular searches and check-
- Thus Marti was charged and convicted for ups especially at night or at dawn without the
violating RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. benefit of a search warrant or court order.
- On appeal Marti alleges that the ganja 2. The fear increased when one time at dawn,
confiscated should not be held as admissible Parpon, a supply officer of Valenzuela, was shot
evidence against him since the procurement of to death after refusing to submit himself to the
the same went against his right against checkpoint and continuing to speed off despite
unreasonable search and seizure. warning shots fired.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 425
3. Petitioners further contend that the said 3. Where, for example, the officer merely draws
checkpoints give the respondents a blanket aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is
authority to make searches and/or seizures parked on the public fair grounds or simply looks
without search warrant or court order in violation into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do
of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred not constitute unreasonable search.
where a citizen, while not killed, had been 4. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in
harassed. Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
4. Petitioner Valmonte said that he has been considered as a security measure to enable the
stopped and searched without a warrant. NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace
Issue: W/N there was a violation of the constitutional- and order for the benefit of the public.
protected right against unlawful search and seizures Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures
NO to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
Ratio: the interest of public security
1. The constitutional right against unreasonable 5. etween the inherent right of the state to protect its
searches and seizures is a personal right existence and promote public welfare and an
invocable only by those whose rights have been individual's right against a warrantless search
infringed, or threatened to be infringed which is howeverreasonably conducted, the
2. Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the former should prevail.
effect that he had been stopped and searched 6. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military
without a search warrant by the military manning is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the same manner that all governmental power is
the details of the incidents which amount to a susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of
violation of his right against unlawful search and occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during
determine whether there was a violation of these abnormal times, when conducted within
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are an orderly society and a peaceful community
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
resolved according to the facts of each case.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 426
(Macri p. 112-113)
3. ONLY A JUDGE MAY VALIDLY ISSUE A WARRANT
Harvey v Santiago Seized during the petitioners apprehension were rolls
of photo negatives and photos of suspected child
Aberrant case; upheld validity of arrest of pedophiles on prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys
order of the Immigration Commissioner Santiago and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other
because there was probably cause based on months of literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
surveillance. The requirement that probable cause is to found.
be determined by a judge does not extend to PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
deportation because it is not criminal but administrative.
The existence of photographs justified the arrest and
the seizure without warrant. Pedophilia, though not a
crime, was offense to public morals.
(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a
and seizures by CID agents. (3) Whether or Not the writ waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and
of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore,
the deportation charges and the hearing presently
conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas
Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has
promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and become legal, although such confinement was illegal at
social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners the beginning.
was based on the probable cause determined after
close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of
probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of
articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner
as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the
are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69
on Criminal Procedure). of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a)
provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported
upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 428
Deportation after a determination by the Board of to undicue a cautious man to rely on them and act in
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for pursuance thereof.
deportation against them. Deportation
proceedings are administrative in character and
never construed as a punishment but a
preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be
conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court Facts: On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez
proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a David of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas issued
specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of Agent
and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had
with assistance of a counsel if desired. no personal knowledge but through information from a
reliable source. In other words, the applicants
knowledge of facts is based on a mere hearsay. In the
affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as
Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the follows:"That there are being kept is said premises
State and done under the authority of the sovereign books documents, receipts, lists chits, and other papers
power. It a police measure against the undesirable used by him in connection with his activities as
aliens whose continued presence in the country is found money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests,
to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the in violation of the law."At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of
people. the warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board
entered the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez
seized some articles such as internal revenue license,
ledger, journals, cash bonds, check stubs,
memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories,
4. REQUISITES OF A VALID WARRANT Alvarez vs. bill of lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt
Court of First Instance of Tayabas books, promissory notes and checks. On July 8, Alvarez
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal based
on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at
night and for non compliance in the particularity
description rule in issuing warrant. On September 10,
Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez
issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient and upheld the validity of the search warrant.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 429
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 of less than three weeks will be held not to invalidate
the search warrant, while the lapse of four weeks will be
held to be so.
from which the pirated films are supposed to have been The petitioner maintains that the lower court issued the
copied. questioned search warrants after finding the existence
of a probable cause justifying their issuance. According
to the petitioner, the lower court arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant
NBI's two witnesses which were taken through
Facts: Petitioner filed a complaint to conduct searches searching questions and answers by the lower court.
and seizures in connection with the NBIs anti-film
piracy campaign. NBI conducted surveillance and
subsequently filed three applications for search
warrants, eventually isused by the lower court. Private
respondents filed and were granted a motion to lift. The lower court held that the allegation that master
tapes were viewed by the NBI and were compared to
the purchased and seized video tapes from the
respondents' establishments was not persuasive. They
were never shown to the court. The case should be
Issue: WON the judge property lifted the search dismissed as the allegation was not supported by
warrants issued earlier on competent evidence and for that matter the probable
application of NBI on basis of petitioners complaint cause hovers in that grey debatable twilight zone
between black and white resolvable in favor of
respondents herein.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
filing of an Information for Estafa against Marilyn Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in deferring
Carreon, an employee of the Land Transportation the implementations of the warrant of arrest
Office, based on the complaint filed by herein
complainants. The Office of the City Prosecutor found
no cogent reason to reverse, modify, or alter the
resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman and
recommended that the case be set for trial. HELD:
Complainants filed the instant complaint charging both
respondent Judge and his Branch Clerk of Court with NO. The 1987 Constitution provides that no warrant of
ignorance of the law. Complainants take issue of the arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
fact that although respondent Judge already issued a determined personally by the judge after examination
warrant of arrest, he still deferred its implementation to under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
giveaway to a reinvestigation of the case on motion of witnesses he may produce. Preliminary investigation
the accused. They believe that there is no longer any should be distinguished as to whether it is an
reason why the respondent Judge should withhold the investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground
issuance of a warrant of arrest considering that the for the filing of the information or it is an investigation for
Office of the City Prosecutor already made a finding that the determination of a probable cause for the issuance
there exists probable cause to indict the accused. In of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
their Joint Comment, respondent Judge manifests that investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the
the issuance of a warrant of arrest is not a ministerial prosecutions job. The second kind of preliminary
function of a judge as he is mandated to determine the investigation is judicial in nature and is lodged with the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant. judge. In making the required personal determination, a
Respondent Branch Clerk of Court, on the other hand, judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence
claims that it is a ministerial duty on her part to release earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of
duly signed orders, resolutions and decisions of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case
presiding judge of her branch. and is subject to the judges sound discretion. It is not
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the
investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of
the accused, even after having personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
ISSUE: questions and answers. For the determination of
whether probable cause exists and whether it is
necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 436
the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or conducting the preliminary investigation (p.i. for brevity),
discretion. It appears from the records that the he issued a resolution forwarding the case to the
challenged Orders issued by the respondent Judge prosecutor for appropriate action. Petitioner received a
were not at all baseless. The respondent Judge merely subpoena directing him to filehis counter affidavit,
exercised his sound discretion in not immediately affidavit of witnesses and other supportingdocuments.
issuing the warrant of arrest and in suspending further He did it the following day. While proceedings are
proceedings pending reinvestigation of the case. On her ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas corpus with
part, respondent Branch Clerk of Court cannot be the C.A alleging that: the warrant was null and void
faulted for performing a ministerial function, that is, because the judge who issued it was a relative by
releasing Orders duly signed by the respondent Judge. affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the
p.i. were illegal and irregular as the judge doesnt have
jurisdiction on the case. The C.A. granted the petition
holding that the judge was a relative by affinity by 3rd
degree to the private respondent and the p.i. he
Sales v Sandiganbayan conducted has 2 stages, the p.e. and the p.i. proper.
The proceeding now consists only of one stage. He
Determination of probable cause is exclusive province conducted the requisite investigation prior to the
of the judge. issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 complete it. He only examined the witness of
the complainant. But the prosecution instead of
conducting p.i. of his own forwarded the records to the
Ombudsman (OMB for brevity) for the latter to conduct
the same. The OMB directed the petitioner to submit his
counter affidavit, but he did not comply with it finding the
same superfluous. The graft investigator recommended
Facts: The petitioner, the incumbent mayor of the filing of information for murder which the OMB
Pagudpud Ilocos Norte, shot the former mayor and his approved. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution
political rival Atty. Benemerito. After the shooting, he but prevented seeking reconsideration thereof he filed
surrendered himself and hence the police inspector and a motion to defer issuance of warrant of arrest
wife of the victim filed a criminal complaint for murder pending the determination of probable cause. The
against him. The judge after conducting the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. This is now a
preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity) found probable petition for review on the decision of the
cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after Sandiganbayan.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 437
Held: The proper procedure in the conduct of The court cannot accept the Sandiganbayans assertion
preliminary investigation was not followed because of of having found probable cause on its own, considering
the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary the OMBs defective report and findings, which merely
investigation was conducted by 3 different investigators, relied on the testimonies of the witnesses for the
none of whom completed the preliminary investigation prosecution and disregarded the evidence for the
There was not one continuous proceeding but rather, defense.
cases of passing the buck, the last one being the OMB
throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the
charge of murder is a non bailable offense. The gravity
of the offense alone should have merited a deeper and Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the
more thorough preliminary investigation. The OMB did Sandiganbayan, ordering the Sandiganbayan to quash
nothing of the sort but followed the resolution of the the warrant of arrest and remanding the OMB for
graft investigator. He did a worse job than the judge, by completion of the preliminary investigation.
actually adopting the resolution of the graft investigator PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
without doing anything and threw everything to the
Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 438
who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits
delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondents
that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the
upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the
later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall
Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow
her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she
have 3 minor children residing
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
During the preliminary investigation, the complainant
submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other
documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary
investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. there relying on her for support. Petitioner also
Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable questioned the irregularity of the determination of
cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was probable cause during the preliminary investigation
subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of
court then issued a warrant of arrest with a bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the
recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a petitioner from questioning the same. Upon
personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/
the Philippines for Japan on June 17, leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA
2000 without the trial courts permission, and returned to a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure
the Philippines on June order however all the other motions were denied, hence
28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, this case.
and returned on July 12,
2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an
urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold
departure order. Trial court approved the same.
Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a
judicial determination of probable cause and to defer reversible error in determining existence of probable
proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of
documents appended to the Information submitted by respondent Maruyama and the latters documentary
the investigating prosecutor were respondent evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the
Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the petitioner.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 441
120 -
4cases
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded D. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Criminal Procedure which provides that:
already knew that she was a member of the NPA in the In reversing his conviction, the Court said that the law
area. At first, she denied it, but when she saw Morados enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of
she requested the group to go inside the house. Upon a valid search and seizure proceedings. The
entering the house, the group, as well as the Barangay constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches
Captain, saw radio sets, pamphlets entitled 'Ang Bayan', and seizures, being a personal one cannot he waived
xerox copiers and a computer machine. The group by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded
requested the persons in the house to allow them to or one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her
look around. When Luz Tanciangco opened one of the behalf. In the case at bar, the records show that
rooms, they saw books used for subversive orientation, appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
one M-14 rifle, bullets and ammunitions, Kenwood Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper,
radio, artificial beard, maps of the Philippines, allowed the authorities to enter it. The Court found no
Zambales, Mindoro and Laguna and other items. They evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados
confiscated the articles and brought them to their was indeed the appellant's helper, or if it was true that
headquarters for final inventory. They likewise brought she was his helper, that the appellant had given her
the persons found in the house to the headquarters for authority to open his house in his absence. The
investigation. Said persons revealed that appellant was prosecution likewise failed to show if Luz Tanciangco
the lessee of the house and owned the items has such an authority. Without this evidence, the
confiscated therefrom Hence, Basilio Damaso (alias authorities' intrusion into the appellant's dwelling cannot
Bernie Mendoza), was charged and convicted in an be given any color of legality.
information filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City with violation of Presidential Decree No. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the
1866 in furtherance of, or incident to, or in public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
connection with the crime of subversion. Damaso enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights
contends that the search conducted by the PC officers of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
were illegal. The Solicitor General counters that a sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic
search may be validly conducted without a search principles of government. As a consequence, the search
warrant with if the search was conducted with the conducted by the authorities was illegal. It would
consent of the person searched and since the evidence have been different if the situation here demanded
seized was in plain view of the authorities. urgency which could have prompted the authorities to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 dispense with a search warrant.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 443
not indicated in the search warrant, had been illegally manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions"
seized from petitioner. The fact that the members of the having been propounded. Said motion was denied by
police team were doing their task of pursuing subversive the trial court.
is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The
presumption juris tantum of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot by itself prevail
against the constitutionally protected rights of an
individual. While the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 arrest of petitioners, it said that the warrant issued by
the trial court was in the nature of a general warrant,
one of a class of writs long proscribed as
unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally
Pangandaman v. Casar 159 SCRA 599 (1988) subversive of the liberty of the subject. The warrant in
question was issued against fifty (50) "John Does", not
A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or
del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two would identify. Clearly violative of the constitutional
others wounded. The relatives of the victims, filed a injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi describe the person or persons to be seized, the
City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
the incident. The letter adverted to the possibility of voided.
innocent persons being implicated by the parties
involved on both sides none of whom was, however,
identified and promised that supporting affidavits
would shortly be filed. Afterwards, a criminal complaint
for multiple murder was filed with respondent Judge Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of
Casar. Thereafter the Judge "approved the complaint Appeals 262 SCRA 219 (1996), Supra
and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest" against
the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the An intelligence officer of the Videogram Regulatory
witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does." The lawyer for the Board (VRB), received information that private
victims' relatives filed a motion for reconsideration respondent Jose B. Jinco had in his possession pirated
seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent videotapes, posters, advertising materials and other
holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that items used or intended to be
the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 445
Search Warrant No. 90-13 In the case under consideration, the NBI agents could
not have been in a position to know beforehand the
"Unlicensed radio communications equipments such as exact caliber or make of the firearms to be seized.
transmitters, transceivers, handsets, radio Although the surveillance they conducted did disclose
communications equipments, scanners, monitoring the presence of unlicensed firearms within the premises
devices and others." to be searched, they could not have known the
particular type of weapons involved before seeing such
Subject Search Warrant Nos. 90-12 and 90-15 refer to: weapons at close range, which was of course
impossible at the time of the filing of the applications for
"Unlicensed firearms of various calibers and subject search warrants.
ammunitions for the said firearms." Search Warrant No.
90-14 states:
"Chop-chop vehicles and other spare parts."
warrants; and the warrants did not particularly describe and those items not particularly described may be cut
the things to be seized. off without destroying
the whole warrant.
depots/quick service outlet and 800 miscellaneous personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to
structures spread over 155 hectares of land. Searches possess the subject firearms and the place to be
were made by the police who recovered several searched was not described with particularity.
armalites, grenade launcher, 38 caliber revolvers, 45
caliber pistols, hand grenades and ammunitions kept
inside the ammo dam and security headquarters or
office of PICOP. The PNP then filed with the
Department of Justice a complaint for illegal possession In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed
of firearms against petitioners who moved to quash the to describe the place with particularity. It simply
search warrant authorizes a search of "the aforementioned premises,"
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 but it did not specify such premises. The warrant
identifies only one place, and that is the "Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao
on the ground of its illegality. The motion and a del Sur." The PICOP compound, however, is made up
subsequent motion were denied, hence, resort to this of "200 offices/ buildings, 15 plants, 84 staff houses, 1
petition. airstrip, 3 pier/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL
depots/quick service outlets and some 800
miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out
over some one hundred fifty-five hectares." Obviously,
the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus
The requisites for a valid search warrant are: 1) illegal authority to search all the structures found inside
probable cause present; 2) such presence is the PICOP compound.
determined personally by the judge; 3) the complainant
and the witnesses he or she may produce are
personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation; 4) the applicant and the witnesses
testify on facts personally known to them; and 5) the Because the search warrant was procured in violation of
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched the Constitution and the Rules of Court, all the firearms,
and the things to be seized. In the case at bar the explosives and other materials seized were
search warrant was issued based solely on affidavits. "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Since
The trial judge failed to personally examine the these illegally obtained pieces of evidence are
complainant and the witnesses, witness Bacolod had no
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 451
warrant and the search and arrest conducted pursuant 5. PROPERTIES SUBJECT TO SEIZURE Burgos v.
thereto, and the correctness of the judgment of Chief of Staff
conviction.
Facts:
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means - After having allegedly witnessed accused sell
of committing an offense. marijuana outside her house, police
investigators procured a search warrant to search
The above rule does not require that the property to be accuseds house for marijuana.
seized should be owned by the person against whom - Accused claims that while she was seated in the sala,
the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be Sgt. Yte, one of the officers conducting the search, was
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the showing her something which the latter claimed to be a
above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may search warrant when someone uttered the following
be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen words "ito na" coming from the direction of the kitchen.
property must be owned by one other than the person in She, together with Sgt. Yte proceeded to the kitchen
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and saw PFC Luciano holding a plastic bag with four
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 454
Held:
NO THEY DID NOT Furthermore, The police authorities in the case at bar
testified that they submitted an inventory to the court
The search of the accused-appellant's house was without the marijuana, the latter having been turned
conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the over to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Rules of Court which specifically provides that no Having made no return or inventory to the warrant-
search of a house, room or any other premise shall be issuing court, there is no proof that the police really
made except in the presence of the lawful occupant found marijuana in the house of the accused. It is also
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of required that the marijuana received be presented as
the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of evidence. The identity of the marijuana which
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same constitutes the corpus delicti must be established before
locality. This requirement is mandatory to ensure the court.
regularity in the execution of the search warrant.
Violation of said rule is in fact punishable under Article Accused is acquitted.
130 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 455
Facts:
Motion. The subject shabu is ORDERED forfeited in liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2
favor of the State. CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31
January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the
CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat,
7. WARRANTLESS ARREST or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the
CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as
and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, consequence of this positive identification, Dural
vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
BRIG. conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information
charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the
crime of Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority. (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail
GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER recommended). On 15
AGUIRRE, respondents. February 1988, the information was amended to
include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the
filing of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of
On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva.
Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU- The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9
CAPCOM) received confidential information about a February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato
member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen.
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ on 12
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on
verification, it was found that the wounded person, who 15 February 1988. On 26 February 1988, however, Umil
was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is and Villanueva posted bail before the Regional Trial
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 458
Anti-Subversion Act had been filed against them, and court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need
they were accordingly released. not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 offenses which requires the determination by a judge of
the existence of probable cause before the issuance of
a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the
offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing
any warrant of arrest for the crime of rebellion. persons committing overt acts of violence against
government forces, or any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the
situation that involves the very survival of society and its
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested government and duly constituted authorities.
while in the act of shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor
was he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is
unjustified. However, Dural was arrested for being a (http://mclairgarcia.wordpress.com/2011/04/01/umil-vs-
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed ramos/)
subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural
without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit MIGUEL SINGSON, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute AIRLINES, INC. (PAL), respondents.
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements,
or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the
course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 459
PUNO, J.:
YES, IT IS
Facts:
Section 5, Rule 113. Arrest without warrant, when
- Patrolman Fulgencio was instructed by his station lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without
commander to monitor the activities of Sucro, following warrant, arrest a person:
information that Sucro was selling marijuana.
- Pat. Fulgencio hid himself under a house 2 meters (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
away from an adjacent chapel. From there, he observed and he has personal
Sucro enter the chapel, taking something which turned knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart arrested has committed it;
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street
where he handed the same to a buyer. This was done
three times, and every transaction was reported by An offense is committed in the presence or within the
Fulgencio to his superior. view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
- Police officers then intercepted the 3rd buyer, who authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
threw a tea bag containing marijuana to the ground. The sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
buyer admitted that he purchased the bag from disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to
Sucro. the scene thereof.
- Police then arrested Sucro and recovered 19 sticks PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the
chapel.
Held:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 460
Issue:
W/N Bohols arrest, and the search on his person are
However, the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill, legal.
the Receipt of Property Seized, and the booking sheet
are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that there
was no showing that appellant was then assisted by Held:
counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing.
YES
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would
not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes
abundance of other evidence establishing his guilt. unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights
that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without
a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority.
However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment operation does not
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
RICARDO BOHOL, considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113,
accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
- Acting on information that Bohol was engaged in the Procedure:
illegal drug trade, police officers conducted a buy-bust
operation to entrap him. Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace
- P02 Estrada handed Bohol a marked P100 bill and officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
Bohol, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet containing a person:
white crystalline granules which p02 Estrada suspected
to be shabu. Police officers then emerged from their When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
hiding places and arrested has committed, is actually
Bohol. committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 462
Held:
YES
The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
reasonable doubt the elements necessary to offense.
successfully prosecute a case for the illegal sale of a
prohibited drug, namely, (a) identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the
delivery of the things sold and the payment therefor.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee vs. LI YIN
CHU alias ROBERT LI, appellant.
CARPIO, J.:
It is true that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search Facts:
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the - A man showed up at the PNP station at Camp Crame
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the and reported that Robert Li was engaged in illegal drug
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and activity in Metro Manila. The police then planned to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 conduct a buy bust operation on the basis of the report.
- the informer called up appellant and made
arrangement for the purchase of five to ten kilos of
shabu to be delivered between 4 to 5 p.m. that same
particularly describing the place to be searched and the day (July 4,
persons or things to be seized. It is equally true that 1999) in front of Iceberg Food House along Banawe
any evidence obtained in violation of such right shall be Street, Quezon City.
inadmissible in evidence. This right, however, is not - Around 5 oclock in the afternoon, appellant arrived on
without exceptions, as in instances of searches board a blue Honda Civic
incidental to lawful arrests. Under paragraph (a), car with plate number WBY 852. He was approached by
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a peace the informer and both conversed in Chinese since
officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person when in appellant could not speak English or Tagalog. The
his presence the person to be arrested has committed, informer then called SPO1 delos Santos, who was just
about two meters away, to approach. The informer
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 464
informed of his constitutional rights. The police officers Appellant then harps on the poseur-buyers failure to
thereafter confiscated the shabu and the Honda Civic present to appellant the buy- bust money in exchange
car. for the shabu. No law or rule of evidence requires the
simultaneous exchange of the buy-bust money and the
shabu. The well-entrenched principle is that the
Issue: accused commits the crime of illegal sale drugs as soon
W/N Bohols arrest, and the search on his person are as he consummates the sale transaction, whether
legal. payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.
Held:
YES
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 465
True, Delos Santos, as poseur buyer, failed to show buyer did not immediately arrest the suspect but
appellant the buy-bust money. However, Delos Santos returned to the station to make a report. It was only in
satisfactorily explained that he was unable to give the evening of the same day that the police, without a
appellant the buy-bust money because he immediately warrant, arrested the accused.
signaled Pastrana, his back- up, to arrest appellant so
as "to evade any commotion or any armed back-up."
Delos Santos also testified that the buy-bust money,
consisting of genuine and boodle money, existed and Issue:
was at the car which he and the other police operatives W/N the arrest was legal.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Held:
REGALADO, J.:
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by
the NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification.
Based on the very evidence of the prosecution, after the
alleged consummation of the sale of dried marijuana
Facts: Another buy-bust operation with facts of similar leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released appellant
import to those of the immediately preceding cases. Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him into his
Except in this case, the police officer acting as poseur
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 466
custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming arguendo and Molina as they were riding on a trisikad and
that the supposed sale of demanded that they open the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 black bag they were carrying.
- The bag was revealed to contain dried marijuana
leaves. Mula and Molina were
thereafter handcuffed. (note: Paguidopon and the police
marijuana did take place, is decidedly contrary to the did not know Mulas
natural course of things and inconsistent with the name until after they were arrested)
aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation. It is rather
absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. Issue:
It is, in fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law. W/N Bohols arrest, and the search on his person are
legal.
Held:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and YES
GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @ "BOBOY",
accused-appellants. to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
Facts: commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
- SP01 Paguidopon received information that a drug PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
pusher was in Davao. As Mula was passing by on his
motorcycle,t he informant pointed Mula out as the
alleged drug pusher to SP01 Paguidopon.
- The following month, SP01 Paguidopon received In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
information that Mula would be passing through NHA, outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
Ma- a, Davao City. Paguidopon then intercepted Mula holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants
could not be said to be committing, attempting to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 467
Re warrantless arrest
Issue:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 471
Facts: Joselito del Rosario et al. were charged with the police station. The investigator took the statement
special complex crime of of the accused on May
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia 14,1996, and was only subscribed on May 22,1996. All
Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of P200,000.00 the while, he was detained in the police station as
in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were only signed
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 on May 16, 1996. He also executed a waiver of his
detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the
assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera
shot and killed her. Joselito was the alleged driver of the
getaway tricycle involved in the incident.
Joselito: contends that the lower court erred in: (1) Not
finding the presence of threat and irresistible force
employed upon him by his co-accused; (2) Not
Upon finding the name of the owner of the tricycle, the considering his defense that he was not part of the
police proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the house of the conspiracy among co-accused; (3) Not considering the
barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was violations on his constitutional rights as an accused;
summoned and who in turn revealed the driver's name and, (4) Not considering that there was no lawful
and was invited for interview. The driver was accused warrantless arrest within the meaning of Sec. 5, Rule
Joselito del Rosario who volunteered to name his 113, of the Rules of Court.
passengers on May 13, 1996. On the way to the police
station, accused informed them of the bag and lunch
kit's location and the place where the hold- uppers may
be found and they reported these findings to their
officers, Capt. Biag and Capt. Cruz. After lunch, they Issue: W/N Del Rosarios arrest proper.
proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed
men where a shoot-out transpired that lasted from 1:00
to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. After a brief encounter,
they went inside the house where they found Marquez
dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these Held/Ratio:
were happening, accused del Rosario was at the back PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
of the school, after which they went back to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 473
Mendoza, J.
Facts: The accused, armed with an unlicensed Accused-appellant denied involvement in the
homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 incident. The police asked permission to enter and
revolver, with no serial number shot Henry Piamonte, look around the house. He was brought to the Sting
hitting and inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in Cafe for purposes of identification. There, he was
the head which caused the latters instantaneous death. positively identified as the victims companion. The
police investigators asked accused-appellant where the
fatal gun was. But he refused to tell them so his
permission was sought to go back to his house to
conduct a further search. They later found the gun. The
accused was then taken to the police station, where he
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 475
was photographed along with the things seized from indicating that accused- appellant had committed the
him. crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from
which they allegedly inferred that accused-appellant
was probably guilty was based entirely on what they
had been told by others, to wit: by someone who called
the PNP station; by an alleged witness who saw
Issue: accused-appellant and the victim coming out of the
Sting Cafe; by the waitress at the Sting Cafe, who said
W/N arrest proper. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
that the man last seen with the victim was lean,
Held/Ratio: NO. mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a
Under ROC113 5(b), two conditions must concur for a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a
warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has just tricycle driver who told them that the physical
committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace description given by the waitress fitted accused-
officer or private person has personal knowledge of appellant and who said he knew where accused-
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has appellant lived and accompanied them to accused-
committed it. It has been held that personal appellants house. Thus, they merely relied on
knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be information given to them by others.
based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, The search conducted on Gerente's person was
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a
the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .' valid arrest. ROC113.12 provides: Search incident to
lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his
Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
they arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 who is about to be arrested may be armed and might
attack them unless he is first disarmed.
restaurant, surely not a crime in itself. While SPO4 Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the
Clemente claims that accused Sigma Rho Fraternity.
had a bulging waistline, this alone, in the light of the
availing circumstances, is insufficient to constitute
probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
law requires that there first be arrest before a search of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes
can be made the process cannot be reversed. of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-
must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute preservation which permit the police officer to take steps
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; not armed with a deadly weapon that could
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
the view of the arresting officer. officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police
case at bar. Accused- appellant did not act in a officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him,
suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also
was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has be emphasized that a search and seizure should
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
to commit a crime. Reliable information alone, foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
in the presence and within the view of the arresting before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause items found in his possession. The apprehending police
that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 appellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the
Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending
police officers only introduced themselves when they
already had custody of accused-appellant.
With regard to the concept of stop-and frisk: mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a stop-and- stop and frisk principles is applicable to justify the
frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 494
warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
made by the police operatives on accused-appellant. grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line.
PEOPLE v. ESTELLA
ammunitions. The team seized the prohibited drug, the blue cloth. He then informed the officers of 2 other
revolver and ammunitions. The team seized and signed persons who would be making marijuana deliveries.
a receipt for the seized items and arrested appellant.
no warrant and that he should have been given the there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay
opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early
if the informant has given the cops the information about morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, policemen were not pressed for time, this would be
the cops should have ample time to secure a search beside the point for, under these circumstances, the
warrant. information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed
enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted search warrant. While there is an indication that the
is legal. Held: informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal
The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal. Sec 2 that he knew him by name.
Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception, they are:
(2) searches of moving vehicles, On such bare information, the police authorities could
not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consented they could readily have access to a judge or a court that
searches; was still open by the time they could make preparations
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence
presented by the defense. In determining the
opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the
intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; ambient circumstances should be considered,
especially in rural areas.
(6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional
exceptions.
(1) dangerous weapons, and vicinity, converged at the place, identified themselves
as NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission Cruz and Beltran. The P10.00 marked bill used by
of an offense. Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de la Cruz
together with two aluminum foils and containing
marijuana.
incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa
a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to
person to be arrested has committed, is actually the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in
committing or is attempting to commit an offense. It is a plastic bag marked
a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of cash katutak.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a
operation, the malefactors were invariably caught red- demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search
handed. There being no violation of the constitutional and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre
confiscated articles are admissible in evidence where she watched a movie
Balweg. While about to cross the road an old
woman asked her for help in
carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested
by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of
the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be
found. Also, no search warrant was presented.
PEOPLE v. ARUTA
PEOPLE v MALMSTEDT
accused failed to comply, the officer required him to effects of accused and the same were brought to the
bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and
when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the
officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to
open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects In the chemistry report, it was established that the
turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was
filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the
luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the Accused argues that the search of his personal effects
officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was illegal because it was made without a search
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
officer noticed that there were bulges inside the discovered during the illegal search are not admissible
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was as evidence against him.
only after the officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being
further investigation. At the investigation room, the committed by the accused and he was caught in
officers opened the teddy bears and they were found flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
to also contain hashish. Representative samples were personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of
taken from the hashish found among the personal the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 503
true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house.
search warrant when the search was made over the Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged
personal effects of accused, however, under the things three times. These activities are reported through
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was
cause for said officers to believe that accused was then transacting with appellant and was
and there committing a crime. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 506
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was
seated at the rear thereof.
(2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is
merely entrusted to him by an valid, and therefore the RTC
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further ruling be reversed.
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the
next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags,
and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Held:The Constitution guarantees the right of the people
Station. to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful
arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A
lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael officer or a private person under the following
Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. circumstances.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Section 12, Rule 136 of theRules of Court a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged
bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) that the arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was
caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial No. lawful under the circumstances.
770196, two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a
.38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two
(2) live ammunitions for a .22
caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, it is
police station for further investigation. In the course of reasonable considering that it was effected on the basis
the same, the petitioner was asked to show the of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when
necessary license or authority to possess firearms and the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he
so. was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was
the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the
same.
unreasonable searches and seizures has not been identified themselves as police officers. After giving the
violated. prearranged signal to the backup operatives, he and
Cariaga entered the house then announced that they
were going to conduct a search. Under a table, they
found a bag made of abaca
containing twelve more bricks of marijuana. The
People v. Hindoy evidence was marked then turned over to Prianes, who
G.R. No. 132662 (May 10, 2001) transmitted the same to the NBI for chemical analysis.
FACTS: A woman informant came to the station and HELD: The identity of ENRIQUE and BELLA as the
reported that a certain "Bella" of 248 Sto. Rosario St., sellers and possessors of
Mandaluyong, would be receiving a shipment of illegal the seized marijuana cannot be doubted, for they were
drugs that day. On the strength of that information, caught in flagrante delicto in a standard police buy-bust
Antiojo organized a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation. Such positive identification prevails over
operation. At around 3 a.m., the team, headed by their feeble denial and declaration that the abaca bag
Antiojo himself and guided by the woman informant, which contained twelve blocks of marijuana was only
went to said address. Eugenio and Cariaga acted as left to their custody by a certain Marlyn.
poseur-buyers, while SPO4 Rolando Cruz, SPO3
Antonio Nato, and Prianes served as backup. They
knocked on the door and Moreover, under the circumstances, it was the duty of
BELLA's live-in partner ENRIQUE opened it. the police officers to
conduct a more thorough search of the premises after a
successful entrapment, then make the necessary arrest
Eugenio said, "May bagong dating, kukuha kami (If of the suspects and seizure of suspected contraband.
there's new stuff, we'll get some)," referring to The search, being incident to a lawful arrest, was valid
marijuana. ENRIQUE answered, "Meron" (Yes, there is) notwithstanding the absence of a
so Eugenio gave him one P500.00 and five P100.00 PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
marked bills. After counting the money, ENRIQUE
asked BELLA to get the stuff. She complied and brought
a brick of marijuana, with an estimated weight of one
kilogram, which was wrapped in newspaper. ENRIQUE, warrant. In fact, the warrantless search and seizure, as
in turn, handed it over to Eugenio. That was when they an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 511
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against the state has the right to protect society from
Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals,
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of as indeed we have laws punishing the author,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 513
The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit
because of a tip from one their informers simply he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later like and that his business was selling watches and
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during
as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the
injuries allegedly sustained.
People v. Ayangao
ISSUE: WON the arrest was lawful. YES
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is As part of its program to maintain peace and order, the
sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search. NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Although the apprehending officers received the tip Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 residents are worried about their safety and about being
harassed especially when Parpon, a supply officer, was
gunned down allegedly by NCRDC officals.
per se illegal. No proof has been presented before the RUDY CABALLES y TAIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, APPEALS G.R. No. 136292 January 15, 2002
the military indeed committed specific violations of Caballes was charged with theft for stealing cable
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or conductors belonging to
other rights NAPOCOR. These conductors were found in his jeep. It
was alleged that while he was driving his jeepney, two
officers flagged down his jeepney and searched the
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those insides without a warrant. The police officers claimed
which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable that while they were on a routine patrol, they saw his
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but jeepney being unusually covered with kakawati leaves.
is to be resolved according to the facts of each case PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious doesnt ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
constitute probable cause illegal NO
as to justify the search without warrant.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Libnao contends that at the time she was apprehended
by the police officers, she was not committing any
offense but was merely riding a tricycle
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 521
Peace officers are limited to routine checks where the who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage
examination of the bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila;
vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is The warrantless search in the case at bench is not
stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such bereft of a probable cause. The Police Intelligence
would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers Division had been conducting surveillance operation for
made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the information that once a month, Libnao and Nunga
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October
contains as item, article or object which by law is 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will
subject to seizure and destruction be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely,
Jurisprudence: Theres probable cause in the following the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a
instances: (some tricycle and carrying a suspicious- looking black bag,
examples) which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they
where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated were asked who owned it and what its content was,
from the plastic bag carried by the accused; both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 warrantless search and seizure of appellants bag was
not illegal.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 the place sought to be searched. The required probable
cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not detemined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
inside, they ordered Vinecario to open the bag which he Warrantless search of the personal effects of an
did. They notice a small package wrapped in paper and accused has been declared as valid, because of
asked him to take it out. One of the police officers tore existence of probable cause, where the smell of
the paper and the smell of marijuana then was marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
noticeable. They were then brought to the police station. accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
Vinecario and his companions were then charged and and attempted to flee
convicted for violating RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act In light then of appellants speeding away after noticing
of 1972) for having possessed, transported and the checkpoint and even after having been flagged
delivered marijuana down by police officers, their suspicious and nervous
gestures when interrogated on the contents of the
backpack which they passed to one another, and the
reply of Vinecario, when asked why he and his co-
ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was appellants sped away from the checkpoint, that he was
valid YES (probable cause found) a member of the Philippine Army, apparently in an
attempt to dissuade the policemen from proceeding with
Although the general rule is that motorists and their their inspection, there existed probable cause to justify a
vehicles as well as pedestrians passing through reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that
checkpoints may only be subjected to a routine appellants were
inspection, vehicles may be stopped and extensively PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
searched when there is probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some offenders of the law or that the contents of the backpack
offense were instruments of some offense.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that People v. BALINGAN
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 523
G.R. No. 105834 February 13, 1995 ISSUE: W/N the warrantless search and seizure on
board the bus was valid YES Witness Obrera clearly
the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio set forth the events that led to appellant's arrest,
City Police Station received a telephone call from an starting from the receipt by him of an informant's
unnamed male informant. He passed the information tip. He was able to establish that: appellant had
that Balingan was going to Manila with a bag filled with physical possession of the subject gray luggage bag
marijuana. Acting on the information, P/Lt. Manuel from the time she left her house at Brookside until she
Obrera formed a surveillance team monitor appellant's boarded and sat
movements. The team was deployed at different places PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
in Baguio City, including Balingans house on Brookside
and bus stations
Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from
her residence at Brookside and board a taxicab which on the third row behind the driver of Dangwa bus with
proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street. Balingan plate number NTU-
was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage 153 bound for Manila; conducted a search of the same
(like a "maleta") with orange or yellow belts. She then bus at the Kennon Road checkpoint, they found the
boarded the bus. subject gray bag on the overhead luggage compartment
When the bus passed by the checkpoint, Lt. Obrera corresponding to appellant's seat; upon inspection, the
announced a routinary bag was found to contain suspected marijuana
check-up identified himself as a policeman to Balingan flowering tops which even during preliminary tests
and asked her permission to check her luggage; she did yielded positive for the presence of THC, an active
not respond and just looked outside the window. He component of marijuana.
opened the luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and The search and seizure in the case at bench happened
above Balingan and found suspected marijuana in it. in a moving, public vehicle. The search was made
He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. pursuant to a tip received from an informant. Their
Obrera. Lt. Obrera tries to arrest Balingan but the latter surveillance operations revealed that appellant, whose
resisted and tried to bite his hand and furthermore held movements had been previously monitored by the
tightly onto the window pane. Narcotics Division boarded a Dangwa bus bound for
Balingan was then charged and convicted for having Manila carrying a suspicious looking gray luggage bag.
violated RA 6425 (Dangerous Drug Act) When the moving, public bus was stopped, her bag,
upon inspection, yielded marijuana
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 524
Sgt Ani then went to the house Mari Musa and also did not know if the plastic bag belonged to his
approached him when he brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or his father,
came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. who was living in another house about ten arms-length
Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari away.
Musa the P20 marked money. After receiving the
money, Musa went back to his house and came back
and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers
containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two W/N the search and seizure inside his house (the
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that kitchen to be exact) was valid
the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards NO
his companions and raised his right hand.
The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the
inside the house and made the arrest. The agents person of the appellant after arresting him in his house
searched the appellant and unable to find the but found nothing. They then searched the entire house,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in
a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful
marked money, they asked him where it was. The arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one
appellant said that he gave it to his wife. They then arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
found drugs in the kitchen and confiscated them. his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an
Defense: While he was being manicured at one hand, officer who has the right to be in the position to have
his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
their child to sleep. 3 NARCOM agents, who introduced as evidence.
themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to
clothes, got inside Musa's house whose door was open. launch unbridled
The NARCOM agents did not ask permission to enter searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
the house but simply announced that they were general exploratory search made solely to find evidence
NARCOM agents. The NARCOM agents searched Mari of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a applied where a police officer is not searching for
search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just silent. evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag inadvertently comes across an incriminating object
whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 526
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant
police officer in each of them had a prior justification for what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to
an intrusion in the course of which he came respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
PEOPLE V FIGUEROA
presence of other people in the area. Obet, who was in Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was
possession of a .45 caliber pistol, fired it twice toward valid NO
the direction of Palencia, while hurrying towards the
house. Obet then held hostage his mistress, Estrella a warrantless search and seizure is not unreasonable
Brilliantes, and her 2 children for the next 3 hours until and offensive to the
the arrival of one Major Roberto Reyes to whom Obet Constitution if consent is shown.
surrendered. Palencia then brought OBET, his firearm In case of consented searches or waiver of the
and the recovered buy-bust money to the WPD constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it
Headquarters. is fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first
Obet then volunteered the information that his source appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
was Betty thus he, accompanied by Palencia went to involved had
her house. Betty denied being the source. Once inside PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
the house, Obet went to the kitchen and pointed to what
he termed as liquid shabu inside a white pail along with
other drug paraphernalia, such as a beaker spray. The
investigator then seized the items. Palencia said that knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
when he searched Bettys house, he didnt have a existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an
warrant but it was with Bettys consent but he never saw actual intention to relinquish the right.The third condition
Obet nor Betty manufacture the shabu. does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty
DEFENSE: Obet said he was approached by a certain asked for a search warrant
Eva wanting to buy Neither can the search be appreciated as a search
drugs. He told her he wasnt selling. He noticed that incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or
someone was peeping from the dark thus he got his OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest
gun. While he was locking the door, he accidentally did not precede the search. Second, per the
fired it as he forgot it was cocked. He was then arrested. prosecution's evidence OBET was not arrested for
Eva, in front of the police insisted that they go to Bettys possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs as
(his former live-in-partner) house. They searched the a consequence of the buy-bust operation. He
place without Bettys consent and without a warrant surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two
and found drugs inside the kitchen. Betty denied they children, although he was thereafter held in custody for
were hers. further questioning on illegal drugs.
OBET was held in custody and investigated or
interrogated about the source
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 528
The searches conducted on the plastic bag then bag to the police officers. It can be seen that in his
cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any
arrest. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with the police,
justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a), Rule gave them the plastic bag and even revealed his
113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused associates, offering himself as an informant.
perform some overt act that would indicate that he
"has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
neither could the searches be justified under the plain People v Salanguit
view doctrine. An
object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to sight. [G.R. Nos. 133254-55. April 19, 2001]
Where the object seized was inside a closed package,
the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant to search the
be seized without a warrant. However, if the package residence of Robert Salanguit He presented as his
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive witness SPO1 Badua, who testified that as a poseur-
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu
obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salanguits room,
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package and Badua saw that the shabu was taken by Salanguit
is such that an experienced observer could infer from its from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then granted
the article is deemed in plain view. It must be a group of 10 policemen, along with one civilian
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 informer, went to the residence of Salanguit to serve the
warrant. The police operatives knocked on accused-
appellants door, but nobody opened it. They heard
people inside the house, apparently panicking. The
immediately apparent to the police that the items that police operatives then forced the door open and entered
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband the house.
or otherwise subject to seizure. Records show that the After showing the search warrant to the occupants of
dried marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags the house, Lt. Cortes and his group started searching
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were not readily the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
apparent or transparent to the police officers. plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a
However, in Nuevass case, the Court is convinced paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
that he indeed voluntarily surrendered the incriminating substance, and 2 bricks of dried leaves which appeared
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 530
to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint. Note that However, the fact that there was no probable cause to
marijuana wasnt indicated in the search warrant, only support the application for the seizure of drug
shabu. paraphernalia does not make the search warrant is void.
Defense: As they were about to leave their house, they This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia
heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their was in fact seized by the police. None was taken by
house. Suddenly, about 20 men in civilian virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore,
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized
the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to
attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate its existence.
and descended through an opening in the roof. The search warrant authorized the seizure of
When Salanguit demanded to be shown a search methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu but not
warrant, a piece of paper marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being
inside a folder was waved in front of him. As accused- justified on the ground that the drug was seized within
appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the paper the
was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it. plain view of the searching party
Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the
warrant and thus known to the police operatives, it is
reasonable to assume that the police found the packets
ISSUE: W/N the search and seizure was illegal despite of the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search
the issuance of a warrant warrant has been executed, the plain view doctrine
YES can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other
items subsequently found.
w/n marijuana found inside the house is admissible in PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
evidence NO
prior justification whether it be a warrant for another SPO2 Calip went to Brgy. Artacho to conduct anti-
object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or jueteng operations. He urinated at a bushy bamboo
some other legitimate reason for being present fence behind the public school. About (5) meters away,
unconnected with a search directed against the accused he saw a garden of about 70 square meters. There
and permits the warrantless seizure. were marijuana plants in between corn plants and
THE extension of the original justification is legitimate camote tops. He inquired from a storekeeper nearby as
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that to who owned the house with the garden. The
they have evidence before them; the storeowner told him that Alberto Pasudag owned it
plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating
at last emerges. However, a search incident to a lawful
arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and He reported it back to the police station and they
the premises within his immediate control. The rationale assembled a team who went to the house of Pasudag.
for permitting such a search is to prevent the person When they went to his house, he asked Pasudag to
arrested from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, bring him to the backyard.
or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy it. Upon seeing the marijuana plants, the policemen called
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the for a photographer, who took pictures of accused
marijuana was Pasudag standing besides one of the marijuana plants.
found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, They uprooted seven marijuana plants. The team
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was brought accused Pasudag and the marijuana plants to
recovered on accused-appellants person or in an area the police station
within his immediate control. Its recovery, therefore,
presumably during the search conducted after the
shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested
to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid. W/N the search and eventual confiscation of the
marijuana plants was valid NO
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and Ernesto Isip and/or Shalimar Philippines and/or
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall Occupants, June 28, 1985
be inviolable, x x x." Any evidence obtained in violation
of this provision is inadmissible. Shalimar Building, No. 1571, Aragon St., Sta. Cruz,
In the case at bar, the police authorities had ample Manila-Respondents
opportunity to secure
from the court a search warrant. SPO2 Pepito Calip
inquired as to who owned the house. He was
acquainted with marijuana plants and immediately
recognized that some plants in the backyard of the FACTS:
house were marijuana plants. Time was not of the
essence to uproot and confiscate the plants. They were Rolando H. Besarra of the National Bureau of
three months old and there was no sufficient reason to Investigation filed for search warrant concerning the
believe that they would be uprooted on that same day. first two floors of Shalimar Building owned and operated
"The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was by Ernesto Isip and for seizure of UNILAB particularly
any, could not have been more that mere passive Revicon multi vitamins, Disudrin, sundry items that are
conformity given under intimidating or coercive unauthorized production/ manufacture of the said drugs
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all after surveillance of an asset of Armadillo Protective
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee." and Security Agency. After which the search warrant
Even if the confession or admission were "gospel was served on respondent building. The search and
truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and seizure was able to produce 792 bottles of Disudrin and
without a valid waiver of such assistance, the 30 boxes each containing
confession is inadmissible in evidence. 100 pieces of Inoflox. When the seized objects was to
be turned over to the Bureau of Food and Drugs,
respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant or to Suppress Evidence assailing that
United Laboratories, Inc. Petitioner vs the searching team searched from first to fourth floors
G.R. No. 163858 and the building at No. 1524-A, Lacson Avenue, Sta.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 Cruz, Manila while what is indicated on the search
warrant is the first and second floors of Shalimar Bldg.
located at No. 1571, Aragon St. Sta. Cruz thus all those
that was seized were fruit of a poisonous tree thus
inadmissible for evidence. On March 11,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 533
without the benefit of any unlawful search or seizure. It 60 ml, appeared to describe the condition/quality of
must be apparent at the moment of seizure. the bottles inside (as it is
with genuine UNILAB box of the true medicine of the
Since the articles allegedly seized during the same brand). The petitioner pointed out that ABR is
implementation of the search warrant the acronym for amber bottle round describing the
Disudrin and Inoflux products were not included in bottles in which the true and original Disudrin (for
the search warrant, they were, therefore, not lawfully children) is contained.
seized by the raiding team; they are not illegal per se,
as it were, like an arms cache, subversive materials or Objects, articles or papers not described in the warrant
shabu as to justify their seizure in the course of a lawful but on plain view of the executing officer may be seized
search, or being in plain view or some such. No need by him. However, the seizure by the officer of
whatever for some public assay. objects/articles/papers not described in the warrant
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must
adduce evidence, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the confluence of the essential requirements for the
doctrine to apply, namely: (a) the executing law
The NBI manifestation is a glaring admission that it enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial
cannot tell without proper examination or assay that the intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which
Disudrin and Inoflox samples allegedly seized from he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must
respondents place were counterfeit. All the relevant discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and (c)
presumptions are in favor of legality. it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items they observe may be evidence of a crime,
The petitioner avers that the plain view doctrine is contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
applicable in this case because the boxes were found
outside the door of the respondents laboratory on the
garage floor. The boxes aroused the suspicion of the
members of the raiding team precisely because these
were marked with the distinctive UNILAB logos. The PEOPLE V. GUZMAN
boxes in which the items were contained were
themselves so designated to replicate true and GR 117952-53; Feb.14,2001
original UNILAB boxes for the same medicine. Thus, on
the left hand corner of one side of some of the boxes
the letters ABR under the words
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 535
that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-
Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at beatings and maltreatment. Those who were detained
that time. The raid was actually precipitated by also suffered mental and physical torture to extract
intelligence reports that said office was being used as confessions and tactical informations. The respondents
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the contends that the Constitution grants to government the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men power to seek and cripple subversive movements for
coming from the Eurocar building. the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial
target zoning were intended to flush out subversives
and criminal elements coddled by the communities
were the said drives were conducted. They said that
they have intelligently and carefully planned months
GUANZON v DE VILLA ahead for the actual operation and that local and foreign
media joined the operation to witness and record such
181 SCRA 623 [GR No. 80508 (January 30, 1990) event.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the
"saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning" that
were conducted in their place (Tondo Manila) were
unconstitutional. They alleged that there is no Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed
specifictarget house to be search and that there is no consisted of violation of human rights.
search warrant orwarrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplates or identification cards. The residentswere
rudely rouse from their sleep by banging Held: It is not the police action per se which should be
on the walls andwindows of their houses. The prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the methods
residents were at the point of high- powered guns which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on
and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down the facts stated by the parties, it appears to have
to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo been no impediment to securing search warrants or
marks. The residentscomplained that they're homes warrants of arrest before any houses were searched or
were ransacked, tossing their belongings and individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and showing that theobjectives sought to be attained by the
valuables had disappeared after the operation. The "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th rights
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 537
of the squatters and low income families are fully resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the
protected. However, the remedy should not be brought ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were
by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the
not one violator is properly charged. In the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however,
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring that the complainant himself was not subjected to a
soldier or policeman whom the court can order similar interrogation. By his own
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
relief can be given.
device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph case that was dismissed because the instrument used
or detectaphone or walkie- talkie or tape recorder, or was not mentioned in the law).
however otherwise described.
of all the parties, Sen. Tanada said during the as prescrbied by law. Any evidence obtained in violation
deliberations. of this or the preceeding section, shall inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS:
The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
the private communications. respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962,
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor
distinguish. of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver
and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet of her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private respondents
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greeting
Decision: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
Costs against Ramirez. and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
ZULUETA v CA
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other
materials obtained from forcible entrusion and from
unlawful means are admissible as evidence in court
253 SCRA 699 (1996) regarding marital separation and
disqualification from medical practice.
HELD:
The privacy of communication and correspondence
shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the Indeed the documents and papers in question are
court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 541
declaring "the privacy of communication and in confidence by one from the other during the
correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself is freedom of communication; quite another is a
aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who is the party compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
against whom the constitutional provision is to be the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the fidelity that each owes to the other.
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or
which public safety or order require otherwise, as
prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding." WATEROUR DRUG CORPORATION v NLRC
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
GR No. 113271 (October 16, 1997)
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify Facts: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received
evidence of marital infedility. A person, by contracting a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
to privacy as an individual and the constitutional dispense medicine toemployees chargeable to the
protection is ever available to him or to latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited
her. practice. On the same date, Co issued another
memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate
with suppliers of medicine without consulting the
The law insures absolute freedom of communication Purchasing Department, as this would impair the
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither company's control of purchases and, besides she was
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.
without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 542
As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
her responsibility but explained that her act was "due protect the interests of the company.
to negligence," since fellow employee Irene
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by her "propensity the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
to violate company rules," constituted breach of Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her
confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC, counsel. No hearing was ever conducted after the
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her issues were joined through said letters.
side of the controversy.
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
searches and seizures perpetrated by private communication and against unreasonable searches and
individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, seizures which is hereby set aside.
that the citizens have no recourse against such
assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.
March 12, 1987 Per Curiam
In re Wenceslao Laureta
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor
Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the
best interest of the parties, he correctly awarded
separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is computed at one month's salary for
every year of service. In this case, however, Labor
Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-half Facts: Almost identical letters were personally sent to
month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not Justices Narvasa, M. Herrera, and Cruz, and a fourth
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to Justice
the award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Feliciano, all members of the First Division of the
Arbiter. Supreme Court, in a stance of threats to effect a change
of the Courts adverse resolution (in GR 68635: Eva
Maravilla Ilustre vs. IAC being dismissed),
Indeed,, Maravilla-Ilustre filed an Affidavit-Complaint against him for the statements, conduct, acts and
before the Tanodbayan, charging some Members of the charges against
Supreme Court with having knowingly and deliberately the Supreme Court and the official actions of the
rendered, with bad faith, an unjust, extended Minute Justices concerned, and for hiding therefrom in
Resolution anonymity behind his clients name, in an alleged quest
making her opponents the illegal owners of vast for justice but with the manifest intent to bring the
estates; charging some Justices into disrepute and to subvert public confidence
Justices of the Court of Appeals with knowingly in the Courts and the orderly administration of justice.
rendering their unjust resolution PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
through manifest and evident bad faith; and charging
Solicitor General Sedfrey
A. Ordoez and Justice Pedro Yap of the Supreme
Court with having used their power and influence in Issue: Whether the letters addressed to the Supreme
persuading and inducing the members of the First Court justices are matters covered by the constitutional
Division of the Court into promulgating their unjust right of freedom of speech and right to privacy.
extended Minute Resolution of 14
May 1986.
To determine which test to apply, a distinction also has Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content- Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc (TELEBAP). is an
neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the organization of lawyers of radio and television
incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens,
time, place or manner, and under well defined taxpayers, and registered voters. The other petitioner is
standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or GMA Network Inc.
censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. As regards the latter, They are challenging the validity of 92 on the ground
it is the clear and present danger rule which should be that:
applied.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 550
it takes property without due process of law and without frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege
just compensation; subject, among other things, to amendment by
it denies radio and television broadcast companies the Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision
equal protection of the laws; and that any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be
it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the
supervise or regulate Congress when the common good so requires. What
the operation of media of communication or information better measure can be conceived for the common good
during the period of election. than one for free air time for the benefit not only of
candidates but even more of the public, particularly the
voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in
an election? [I]t is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
Issue: WON Sec 92 of BP 881 is unconstitutional paramount.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
As regards the argument that petitioners should be
compensated for the airtime, the court held that Under
92 of B.P. Blg. 881, the COMELEC does not take over
the operation of radio and television stations but only
the allocation of air time to the candidates for the
purpose of ensuring, among other things, equal
Held/Ratio: opportunity, time, and the right to reply as mandated by
the Constitution.
No.
Finally, as regards the differential treatment between
Regulation of the use and ownership of print and broadcast media, the court held that there are
telecommunications systems is in the exercise of the important differences in the characteristics of the two
plenary police power of the State for the promotion of media, which justify their differential treatment for free
the general welfare. speech purposes. Because of the physical limitations of
the broadcast spectrum, the government must, of
All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television necessity, allocate broadcast frequencies to those
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave wishing to use them
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more
individuals who want to broadcast than there are
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 551
It is unlawful:
Facts:
Gonzales v Katigbak
Issue: WON RA 7716 is unconstitutional for being
discriminatory against the press The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez,
President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit
duly registered as a single proprietorship with the
Bureau of Domestic Trade. The issue being raised is in
Held/Ratio: No. The Court held that as a general relation the classification of the film Kapit sa Patalim as
proposition, the press is not exempt from the taxing For Adults Only" by the Board of Review for Motion
power of the State and that what the constitutional Pictures and Television (BRMPT).
guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
out the press or target a group belonging to the press
for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the
content of the publication. Initially, the sub-committee decision was to classify
Since what the law granted to the press was a privilege, said film as For Adults Only. It was only in the
the law could take back the motion for reconsideration that it was allowed to be
privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. shown without any deletions or cuts. However, BRMPT
The reason is that by granting exemptions, the State held that there remains deficiencies in the application so
does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign it will withhold the showing of the film until the
prerogative. In withdrawing the exemption, the law deficiencies were filled up. Thus this petition for
merely subjects the press to the certiorari.
Issue:
Since said warning went unheeded, respondent filed a PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
petition for contempt complaining that the acts of
petitioner and Alfaro concerning movie were
contumacious, within the contemplation of Section 3,
Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. specifically failed to lay down any factual basis
constituting a clear and present danger which will
justify prior restraint of the constitutionally protected
freedom of speech and expression save its plea for time
to hear and resolve the issues raised in the petition for
A cease and desist order was issued was RTC of contempt.
Paranaque. Respondnet also filed a petition for
injunction and damages with the RTC of Makati which MTRCB v ABS-CBN
granted injunction. The appeal by Viva Production to the
CA was denied. Thus this petition before the Supreme
Court. ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the
television (TV) program The Inside Story produced
and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to
pay for their tuition fees. Some of the students were
Issue: named by the segment as belonging Philippine
whether or not the the lower court erred in granting the Womens University and this caused a great uproar in
injunction sought for. the PWU.
Held/Ratio: Thus a petition was filed with the MTRCB alleging that
said episode besmirched the name of the PWU and
Yes. The court took note of the rather unreasonable resulted in the harassment of some of its female
period that had elapsed from the time of the issuance of students. MTRCB initiated a complaint in the MTRCB.
the restraining order by the Paraaque court up to the
writing of this decision. The Court also notes that the
order of the said court
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 557
x x x x x x
WON MTRCB had the power to review the program . Thus, when the law says all television programs,
The Inside Story. the word all covers all television programs, whether
religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside
Story is protected by the constitutional provision on
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 558
Issue:
Petitioners wanted to conduct an election survey Petitioner seeks to enjoin the Commission on Elections
throughout the period of the elections and release to (COMELEC) from enforcing Section 32 of its Resolution
the media the results of such survey as well as publish No. 6520. He claims that said section in the nature of an
them directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on ex post facto law. He urges this Court to believe that the
the publication of election survey results constitutes a assailed provision makes an individual criminally liable
prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech for an election offense for not removing such
without any clear and present danger to justify such advertisement, even if at the time the said
restraint. advertisement was exhibited, the same was clearly
legal.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
into a contract with private parties to use his name and court suits their pasttime. Upon such statement,
image to endorse certain products prior to his becoming petitioner was charged and convicted of libel.
a candidate for public office. The offense, as expressly PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
prescribed in the assailed provision, is the non- removal
of the described propaganda materials three (3) days
after the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520. If
the candidate for public office fails to remove such HELD: The Court acquitted the petitioner. It said that
propaganda materials after the given period, he shall be while the statements of Dr. Alonzo could indeed be
liable under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code considered defamatory, it nonetheless fell within the
for premature campaigning. Indeed, nowhere is it exceptions provided for by the first paragraph of Article
indicated in the assailed provision that it shall operate 354. Consequently, the presumption of malice or malice
retroactively. There is, therefore, no ex post facto law in in law was negated by the privileged character of the
this case. report. The privilege may only be lost by proof of malice
in fact. It is, nevertheless, settled that "[a] privileged
communication should not be subjected to microscopic
examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity.
Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection
LIBEL which the law throws over privileged communications.
The ultimate test is that of bona fides."
Alonzo v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110088, 1
February 1995
petitioner and one of its columnists, Afable. As a presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall
defense, petitioners invoked public interest as a then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein. In
defense saying that the public has a right to know those addition, the Court ruled that petitioner Afables article
running for public office. The CA denied this argument constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest
saying that the public interest and fair comment as it dealt with the character of private respondent who
principles did not apply to the private respondent as he was running for the top elective post in Baguio City at
was, as yet, not a public officer and was thus a private the time. Considering that private respondent assured
citizen. his would-be constituents that he would be donating
millions of his own money, petitioner Afables column
with respect to private respondents indebtedness
provided the public with information as regards his
financial status which, in all probability, was still
HELD: Concededly, private respondent was not yet a unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the
public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article information might have dissuaded some members of the
was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but
said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by such is the inevitable result of the application of the law.
the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution; The effect would have been adverse to the private
this Court had recognized the publics right to be respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs
informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of the interest of private respondent.
candidates for public office. Plainly, the rule only applies
to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair
comment being that which is true, or which if false,
expresses the real opinion of the author based upon
reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds. Fernando v Court of Appeals G.R. No. 159751, 6
While the law itself creates the presumption that December 2006
every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of a Petitioners here were charged for the sale and
communication destroys said distribution of pornographic materials. Upon a valid
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 search warrant, the police searched the premises of the
store Music Fair where they found 25 VHS tapes and 10
different magazines which they deemed were
pornographic. At trial, the accused were convicted of the
crime charged.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 563
Upon appeal, petitioners argue that the prosecution But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to
failed to prove that the materials confiscated from the conclude that the trier of facts has the unbridled
store were indeed pornographic and insist that the discretion in determining what is patently offensive.
materials were covered by the freedom of speech for No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or
being expressions of artistry. exposure of obscene materials unless these materials
depict or describe patently offensive hard core
sexual conduct. What remains clear is that obscenity is
an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judges
HELD: As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the sound discretion. In this case, the trial court found the
State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its confiscated materials obscene and the Court of Appeals
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from affirmed such findings. Findings of fact of the Court of
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify Appeals affirming that of the trial court are accorded
the regulation or limitation. Necessarily, that the great respect, even by this Court, unless such findings
confiscated materials are obscene must be proved. are patently unsupported by the evidence on record or
There is no perfect definition of obscenity but the the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
latest word is that of Miller v. California which facts.
established basic guidelines, to wit:
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
OBSCENITY
(a) whether to the average person, applying
contemporary standards would find the work, taken as a U.S. v Kottinger 45 Phil 352
whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
The accused Kottinger's camera store was raided.
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently Among the photos found were pictures that showed
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by native Filipino inhabitants in their native garb. He was
the applicable state law; and thus charged with violating Section 12 of Act 277, the
Philippine Libel Law. The photos were used as
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious postcards.
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 564
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes
go scot-free was publicized in leading newspapers.
professional conduct required from members of the bar malicious attack on the proceedings of the Court as to
and officers of the courts, which has some implications cast doubt on the integrity of the Court. To be sure,
to the society respondent even stated that he abides by, and respects,
the decision of the Court, and was willing to go through
the usual remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration,
or simply to push anew for the third mode to amend the
Charter. His remarks about the Chief Justice eyeing a
Estrada v Evardone G.R. No. 175147. 6 December Senate seat were mere speculations/personal
2007 observations based on a precedent not derogatory or
contumacious enough to warrant sanction from the
Petitioners allege that respondent made derogatory Court.
remarks against the Supreme Court and then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban after the former handed out
its decision in the Lambino case. It was reported in the
PDI that Evardone asserted that the then Chief Justice We have held that the power to punish for contempt is
had intended to run for the Senate which precipitated inherent in all courts, as it is essential to their right of
junking of the initiative. Thus, petitioners allege that the self-preservation. Courts are universally acknowledged
Evardone meant to undermine the Court and show that to
its decision was tainted with partiality. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
be exercised unless clearly necessary in the interest of restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to
justice. discipline its students and inculcate upon them good
values, ideals and attitude. The right of students to free
speech in school is not always absolute. The court
upheld the right of students for the freedom of
expression but it does not rule out disciplinary actions of
Miriam College Foundation v Court of Appeals G.R. the school on the conduct of their students. Further,
No. 127830. 15 Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides
December 2000 that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely
on the basis of the articles they write
The members of the editorial board of the Miriam PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
College Foundations school paper were subjected to
disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline
Committee after letters of complaint were filed before
the Board following the publication of the school paper EXCEPT when such article materially disrupts class
that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
contents. The Committee found the defendants guilty rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power
and imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to
Defendants filed before the court for prohibition with suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the
preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee enforcement of rules and regulations and the
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over maintenance of a safe and orderly educational
the defendants. environment conducive to learning. That power, like the
power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning
guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that
Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the
HELD: Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution cases filed against respondent students
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic
freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes
the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 568
Ray
158 -2
cases Held: The expulsion/excommunication of members of a
159 - 2 religious institution/organization is a matter best left to
cases the discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons,
160 - 3 of said institution/organization. It is not for the courts to
cases exercise control over church authorities in the
161 3 cases performance of their discretionary and official
functions. Rather, it is for the members of religious
institutions/organizations to conform to just church
regulations.
Facts: German et al went to JP Laurel St to pray and grounds from possible external attacks and
worship in St Luke Chapel. But they were barred by disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for
General Barangan and his underlings from entering the a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the
church because the same is within the vicinity of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and
Malacanang. And considering that Germans group is imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public
expressively known as the August Twenty One morals, public health or any other legitimate public
Movement who were wearing yellow shirts with clench interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden
fists, Barangan deemed that they were not really there to show the existence of grave and imminent danger
to worship but rather they are there to disrupt the lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners.
ongoings within the Malacanang. Respondents were in full control and had the capability
to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and
present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the
security of Malacanang.
Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness under the religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
effective when legal impediments render it impossible accommodation of morality based on religion,
for a couple to legalize their union. provided it does not offend compelling state
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has
proved a compelling state interest, it has to further
demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive
means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed
Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
respondent for such conjugal arrangement. goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to
the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
Held: No and that legislative enactments specifically One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate
spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an exclusively in the House of
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the
merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," Constitution, because it is in
only goes to show that the framers of the law in PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
question never intended to include solicitations for
religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there
is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H.
Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to No. 11197 and S. No.
proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did
power. However, in the case at bar, considering that not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as
earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable therefor and therefore acquitted.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 572
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No.
Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as
Constitution required by the Constitution because the second and
third readings were done on the same day. But this was
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as
urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate requirement not only of printing but also that of reading
exclusively in the House of Representatives as required the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a
by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue separate days and of printing and distribution can
bill which is required by the Constitution to originate be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist legislative practice.
that a revenue statute and not only the bill which PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law must substantially be the same as
the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not H. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Caunca vs.
only to concur with amendments but also to propose Salazar (1949)
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply
means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores
private bills and bills of local application must come who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment
from the House of Representatives on the theory Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid.
the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in residence, which was disallowed by the employment
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
pending receipt of the House bill. advance payment, which was applied to her
transportation expense from the province should be
paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 573
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the Macros vs. Manglapus (1989)
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
advance payment it gave? Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the respondents
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel
documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the of the President's decision to bar their return to the
amount it may advance to a prospective employee or Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by
movement. The fact that no physical force has been the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair
not make less real the deprivation of her personal the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor
place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. the President impair their right to travel because no law
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, has authorized her to do so.
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. They further assert that under international law, their
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
the protection of courts of justice as much as the Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
physical coercion. Philippines.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 574
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers However, right to enter one's country cannot be
granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones
Philippines. country in the same context as those pertaining to the
liberty of abode and the right to travel.
country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel
the United States, "relative to his business transactions has been violated
and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said
motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied
the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person
seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as necessary consequence of the nature and function of a
well as the communication-request of the Securities and bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel make himself available at all times whenever the court
abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on
appropriate writ commanding the Immigration his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to
Commissioner leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has
not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is
no indication that the business transactions cannot be
undertaken by any other person in his behalf.
and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of I. RIGHT TO INFORMATION Chavez vs. PEA and
Appeals denied the petition. Amari (2002)
Facts: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates
Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on
PEA's then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal
Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new
bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which agreement with AMARI involving such reclamation. PEA
has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him asserts that in cases of on-going negotiations the right
from exercising his constitutional right to travel. to information is limited to "definite propositions of the
government." PEA maintains the right does not include
access to "intra-
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 576
application, giving various fiscal incentives owing to the mentioned Article 81 may be disclosed upon the
pioneering status of the investment. The application as consent of the applicant, or by order of a court of
approved specified the province of Bataan as the site competent jurisdiction.
for the proposed investment. However, news broke out
that the investor amended its application to change the
investment site from the province of Bataan to the
province of Batangas. The Congressman of Bataan (the
original site) who opposed the change in location of the The Court ordered that the petitioner could have access
investment, requested the BOI toprovide a copy of the to BOIs records on the original and amended
original application, the amended application, and the applications for registration excluding, however, papers
supporting documents to each. The BOI denied the containing trade secrets and other business and
request, stating that the investor (BPC) refused to give financial information.
consent to the release of the requested documents, PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
relying on Section 81 of the Omnibus Investments
Code, which states: Confidentiality of Applications.
All applications and their supporting documents filed
under this Code shall be confidential and shall not be The documents were used by the Congressman to
disclosed to any person, except with the consent of the support his opposition to the change of location of the
applicant or on orders of a court of competent proposed investment. Unfortunately, the court did not
jurisdiction. articulate a test or definition of what is a commercial or
trade secret.
Decision
GONZALES VS. COMELEC [27 SCRA 835; G.R. L- the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the
27833; 18 APR 1969] substantive evil of elections, whether for national or
local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and
undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
Facts: efficiency in government but of lives as well.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting
the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the
period of election campaign or partisan political activity Respondents contend that the act was based on the
was challenged on: police power of the state. Issue: Whether or Not RA
(1) constitutional grounds - the basic liberties of free 4880 is unconstitutional? NO, but only because they
speech and free press, freedom of assembly and were unable to get the required 2/3 vote.
freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
(2) the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
period of election campaign are matters of political permissible restriction on freedom of speech.
expediency and convenience which only political parties
can regulate or curtail by and among themselves clear and present danger rule - evil consequence of
through self-restraint or mutual understanding or the comment or utterance must be extremely serious
agreement and the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
(3) the regulation and limitation of these political matters against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented.
invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and It has the advantage of establishing according to the
present danger to the state, would render the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It
constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly
without effect. established.
Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as 'dangerous tendency' rule - If the words uttered
amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
rights of speech and press, of assembly and of necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
association. He did justify its enactment however under violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 579
contributions for election campaign purposes, either The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
directly or indirectly." 45 As thus limited the objection commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against
that may be raised as to vagueness has been the election of any party or candidate for public office
minimized, if not totally set at rest. 46 and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of
campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation
However, the challenged statute could have been more of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against
precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional
requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and command.
present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly
explained, such provisions were deemed by the .Unfortunately, the necessary two-third vote, however,
legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary not being obtained, there is no occasion for the power to
and appropriate response not merely to a clear and annul statutes to come into play.
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave
and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, Such being the case, it is the judgment of this Court that
dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of Republic Act No.
late has invariably marred election campaigns and 4880 cannot be declared unconstitutional.
partisan
political activities in this country. G.R. No. 123881 March 13, 1997
The very idea of a government, republican in form, VIVA PRODUCTIONS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet APPEALS AND HUBERT J.P.WEBB, respondents.
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs
and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case
of freedom of expression, this
right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
MELO, J.:
FACTS:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 581
the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less
rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a
and rally." 4 rally or assembly. resort to force is ruled out and
outbreaks of violence to be avoided.For the.
The City of Manila however rejected their petition filing constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury
due to police intelligence reports which strongly militate to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided,
against the advisability of issuing such permit at this
time and at the place applied for." 6 In this case, what is at issue are the places for the
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 assembly. The applicants for a permit to hold an
assembly should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when it will
take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of
The Mayor suggested, however, in accordance, that "a the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the required
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the
safety of the participants themselves and the general . Such application should be filed well ahead in time to
public may be ensured." enable the public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit
ISSUE: WON the order of the mayor to refuse the or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
petition and to change the venue is constitutional? NO indispensable condition to such refusal or modification
that the clear and present danger test be the standard
Free speech, like free press, may be Identified with the for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive
public concern without censorship or punishment. It is evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter.
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse,
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
on a showing, as 's the case with freedom of Thus if so minded, then, can have recourse to the
expression, of a clear and present danger of a proper judicial authority
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 18
In these cases:
There are of course limits to its exercise.What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 583
assurance that all steps for the safety of the rally were
(1) Luneta - There can be no legal objection, absent the to be made.
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the Wherefore the mandatory injunction to the petitioner is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 granted.
ISSUE: WON the conviction of Perez is valid? YES In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious
RATIO: words. He has made a statement and done an act
The provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of together for unlawful purposes.
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings
permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and
effect be seditious.
But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, .G.R. No. 126183 March 25, 1999
the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and
press and of assembly and petition must yield to DE LA CRUZ v CA
punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of
constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution BELLOSILLO, J.:
and the laws, and the existence of the State.
FACTS:
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position,
like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 585
Thus the present petition were petitioners contend they classes in various schools in Metro Manila which
were merely exercising their right to peaceably produced adverse effects upon the students for whose
assemble and should therefore be entitled to education the teachers were responsible.
backwages.
Petitioners contend that classes were not actually
ISSUE: WON petitioners actions fall under peaceful disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately
assembly? NO RATIO: appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely
As ruled in previous cases, the petitioners actions factual assertion which this Court cannot take
"amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the
constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized prompt remedial action taken by Secretary Cario might
stoppage of or absence from work which it was said have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass
teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for protests did not erase the administrative liability of
essentially economic reasons to protest and pressure petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which
the Government to correct their grievances, the strikers were the very reason why such prompt remedial action
perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation became necessary.
of
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED and the
the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated 29
mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not November 1995 and 24 April 1996 are AFFIRMED. No
erase the true nature of the mass actions as costs.
unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which
was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' SO ORDERED.
economic grievances.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 586
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, to reasonable discretion to
Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
NC
RATIO:
G.R. No. 169838 April 25, 2006
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably
BAYAN v ERMITA assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 589
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and
the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of manner of holding public
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the assemblies.21
very basis of a functional democratic polity, without
which all the other rights would be meaningless and A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily
unprotected. shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies22
that would use public places. The reference to "lawful
. But it is a settled principle growing out of the cause" does not make it content-based because
nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 protection. Neither are the words "opinion," "protesting"
and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The
words "petitioning the government for redress of
that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution,
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum
the community or society. The power to regulate the tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is and is independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.
A test has thus been laid down: There is no
previous restraint on the communication of views or Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the
subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for ground of clear and present danger to public order,
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt public safety, public convenience, public morals or
proceedings unless there be a "clear and present public health.
danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a
right to prevent." Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly.
The law refers to "rally, demonstration, march, parade,
In this case, BP 880 was made due to the Courts ruling procession or any other form of mass or concerted
in Reyes v Bagatsing It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. action held in a public place." So it does not cover any
No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but and all kinds of gatherings.
a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in
Osmea v. Comelec,20 where the Court referred to it as
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 590
civilian government officials, personnel from the two of his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear gas
Philippine caused the demonstrators to lie face down on the
Constabulary and the Integrated National Police, and ground; they persisted in their places rather than
from the para-military group disperse. Then, a single shot rang out followed by
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) successive gunfire from different directions. As one
witness had described it, it was like New Years Eve.
The rally was without permit from the local authorities, This firing lasted for a few minutes.
although the plan was not kept secret from them.
Capt. Sanson had been heard by some of the witnesses
The Welga ng Bayan started as scheduled on to have shouted Stop firing repeatedly and, after
September 18, 1985. some time, the firing had stopped, but not soon enough
for men and women from the rallyists group who died
At around noontime on that day, there were speeches and others who were wounded as a result of the gunfire
delivered by speakers from among the demonstrators
using the public address system on an improvised HELD: The use of bullets to break up an assembly of
platform, addressing the crowd assembled in front of the people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot but
Rural Bank. The crowd also shouted anti-Marcos and be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as
anti-Military slogans, among others. PoliLaw Review: Batch 4
HELD: The petititon may be considered moot and ISSUE: Whether or not a written contract between the
academic considering that the TRO issued by the SC school and its employees and students are valid only for
allowed the students to enroll. But there is a need to one semester.
pass squarely on the constitutional question. Respect
for the constitutional rights of peaceable assembly and HELD: The motion was denied. Furthermore, in
free speech calls for the setting aside of the order of conclusion, the court reiterates that while we value the
suspension. Suspending them for one year is out of rights of students to complete their in the school or
proportion considering that the vigorous presentation of university of their choice and while We fully respect their
views was expected. The excitement of the occasion, right to resort rallies and demonstrations for the redress
the propensity of speakers to exaggerate and the of their grievances and as a part of their freedom of
exuberance of the youth should be taken into speech and their right to assemble, still such
consideration. rallies, demonstrations, and assemblies must always
be conducted peacefully, without resort to intimidation,
coercion, violence. Academic freedom in all forms,
demands the full display of discipline. To hold otherwise
would be subvert freedom into degenerate license.
ALCUAZ v. PSBA
Issue. This case considers whether the parents of Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
parochial school children can benefit from the same authority to issue halal certificates and perform other
services afforded to the parents of public school related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the
children. subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is
Held. Affirmed. unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies
and guidelines on the halal certification scheme
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the because said scheme is a function only religious
Supreme Court found the statute was not organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly
unconstitutional because it was designed to provide a perform for the Muslims.
benefit to the parents of all school children, distinct from
any religious function in which the children engaged ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional
provision as to freedom of religion. YES
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES,
INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the Executive Secretary, et al RULING: Without doubt, classifying a food product as
(2003) halal is a religious function because the standards used
are drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates OMA the exclusive power to classify food products as
under DSWD, is a non- governmental organization that halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
extends voluntary services to the Filipino people, Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret
especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect
certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. forced Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the
On October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. Only the prevention
Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating the of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
Philippine Halal welfare of the community can justify the infringement
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion
is constitutionally unacceptable.
Issue: Is the Gonzalez legally entitled to be appointed The records show that petitioner Pastor Dionisio V.
the chaplain? Austria worked with the SDA
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 for twenty eight (28) years from 1963 to 1991.
and petitioner arose from an incident in which petitioner members and relate to matters of faith, religious
assisted his friend, Danny Diamada, to collect from doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
Pastor Rodrigo the unpaid balance for the repair of the
latter's motor vehicle which he failed to pay to Diamada. While the matter at hand relates to the church and its
religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a
religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved
here is the relationship of the church as an
employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely
29 October 1991, petitioner received a letter of secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice
dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational of faith, worship or doctrines of the church. In this
funds, willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross case, petitioner was not ex- communicated or expelled
and habitual neglect of duties, and commission of an from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
offense against the person of employer's duly from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an
authorized representative, as grounds for the employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different
termination of his services. from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from
the religious congregation.
HELD: The case at bar does not concern an
ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the
State from taking cognizance of the same. An K. NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
ecclesiastical affair is
PoliLaw Review: Batch 4 1. Scope
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no a change in the rights of the parties with reference to
violation of the equal protection clause. The equal each other and not with respect to non-parties.
protection clause under the Constitution means that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the Clemons v. Nolting
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other 42 Phil. 702 (1922)
persons or other classes in the same place in like
circumstances. The guaranty of the equal protection of Clemons, an American citizen, agreed to be
laws is not violated by a law based on reasonable employed as an electrical engineer for the government
classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) at the sum of $4,000 per annum. The government
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the promised to pay to the petitioner his salary in "dollars ;"
purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing the contract was made in the United States; the
conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of Government offered to pay the petitioner in "Philippine
the same class. The Court held that there is reasonable currency" at the rate of two to one which Clemons
classification under the Local Government Code to refused; at the time the payment in question was
justify the different tax treatment between electric offered, Philippine currency was at a discount; two
cooperatives covered by P.D. No. 269, as amended, pesos in Philippine currency was not equivalent to one
and electric cooperatives under R.A. No. 6938. "dollar" and the petitioner insisted that his salary should
The Court likewise ruled that there was no be paid in "dollars" or their equivalent value.
violation of the non-impairment clause. The The issue in this case was whether the
constitutional prohibition on the impairment of the Government of the Philippine Islands, when it enters
obligation of contracts does not prohibit every change in into a contract with an officer or employee under a
existing laws. To fall within the prohibition, the change promise to pay his salary in "dollars," pay such salary in
must not only impair the obligation of the existing Philippine currency at the rate of two to one if the officer
contract, but the impairment must be substantial. What or employee insists that his salary should be paid in the
constitutes substantial impairment was explained by this terms (specie) of his contract. Respondent Auditor
Court in Clemons v. Nolting: A law which changes the General contends that under the laws in force in the
terms of a legal contract between parties, either in the Philippine Islands a debt of the Government, payable in
time or mode of performance, or imposes new "dollars," may be paid in Philippine currency at the rate
conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or of two to one even though the debt grew out of a special
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from contract which provided that the same should be paid in
that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the "dollars."
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. The Court said that the right of the legislative
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect department of the state to adopt legislation changing or
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 600
altering the obligation of contract has been answered in respondent filed an action to annul the foreclosure sale
the negative so many times that it scarcely merits the and breach of contract. While the case was yet pending
citation of authorities now in its support. A law which with the trial court, petitioner additionally received from
changes the terms of a legal contract between parties, the Land Bank of the Philippines cash and Land Bank
either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes Bonds in payment of the foreclosed parcels. The trial
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or court ruled against respondent which the Court Appeals
authorizes for its satisfaction something different from reversed.
that provided in its terms, is law which impairs the The Court ruled that the parcels of land in dispute
obligation of a contract and is therefore null and void. were clearly still subject to private respondent's right of
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect redemption. It said that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of
a change in the rights of the parties with reference to impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage
each other and not with respect to non-parties. contracts affecting said lands. There is no question,
however, that the land reform program of the
2. Limitations government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and
a. Police Power mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12),
Philippine National Bank v. Remigio was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of
231 SCRA 362 (1994) the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the
Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-
Respondent obtained a loan from PNB and impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
mortgaged five parcels of land as security. Respondent exercise of the police power of the state. One limitation
defaulted on said loan; hence, PNB extra-judicially on the contract clause arises from the police power, the
foreclosed the properties in question. Respondent made reason being that public welfare is superior to private
partial payments to his indebtedness. Meanwhile, P.D. rights.
No 72 was enacted that mandated agrarian reform.
Under said law, lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not
be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations
promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972. 17 SCRA 25 (1966)
Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer
Program" was launched; among the areas it covered Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and
were the parcels of land. PNB offered to sell the land to Teresa Ilusorio, are co-owners of a parcel of land
respondent at a much higher price as to which he situated in the Barrio of Bantug, Municipality of San
refused since he reasoned that he had already paid Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main respondents
more than double of his previous indebtedness. So, herein i.e. the fifteen (15) winning tenants named in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 601
issues affecting the contract, the respondent court has The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its obligations of contract is limited by and subject to the
efficiency, and dispensed with a primary condition. exercise of the police power of the State in the interest
of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
b. Eminent Domain
c. Taxation
Kabiling v. National Housing Authority
156 SCRA 623 (1987) La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco
39 Phil. 567 (1919)
Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1808, a law authorizing the expropriation of A contract was entered into between La Insular
properties in favor of qualified squatter families, on the and the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and
ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition Rafael Machuca Go-Tauco (as surety), whereby the
against impairment of the obligation of contracts. plaintiff became obliged to supply cigarettes daily to
The Court upheld the constitutionality of said Manuel Nubla Co-Siong in a quantity of not less than
decree. The stated objective of the decree, namely, to two nor more than five boxes of two thousand packages
resolve the land tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza each at a fixed price of P172 per box. When the
area to allow the implementation of the comprehensive contract was executed, cigarettes were subject to a
development plans for this depressed community, specific tax of one peso for each thousand cigarettes
provides the justification for the exercise of the police which liability incurred to the manufacturer, plaintiff-
power of the State. The police power of the State has appellee La Insular. A new law was passed which
been described as "the most essential, insistent and increased the specific tax on cigarettes from P1 to
illimitable of powers." It is a power inherent in the State, P1.20 per thousand cigarettes. The monthly statements
plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely defined, thereafter submitted to the purchaser by the plaintiff
rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state showed this increase. Defendant was not able to pay its
and imposing upon the government limitations to purchases to which La Insular filed suit for specific
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to performance. The trial court acted favorably to La
enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct Insular.
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure The dispute is upon the point of liability for the
to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and increased tax imposed by Act No. 2432. Defendant Co-
welfare. Siong contends that said law increases from P172 to
The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. P182 per box the price which he was obligated to pay
1808 impairs the obligations of contract is without merit.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 603
for the cigarettes, which alteration in the contract has contracting parties is not thereby changed in the sense
the effect of releasing the surety. necessary to release the surety upon the obligation for
The Court held that that in order to effect a the purchase price of the goods.
release of the surety, the change in the contract must,
as a general rule, be made by the principal parties to 3. Franchises, privileges, licenses, etc., do not come
the contract. A recognized exception more apparent within the context of the provision.
than real is found in cases where sureties on official
bonds have been held to be released as a result of C & M Timber Corp. v. Alcala
changes effected by the Legislature in the duration of 273 SCRA 437 (1997), Supra
the official term or in the duties of the officer whose
fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. C & M Timber Corporation seeks the nullification
In the case at bar the Government of the of the order of the Office of the President, declaring as
Philippine Islands was in no sense a party to the of no force and effect Timber License Agreement (TLA)
contract of July 15, 1913, between the plaintiff and the No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA No.
defendants; and it is readily seen that when the 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680
Legislature of these Islands increased the internal hectares of forest land in the municipalities of Dipaculao
revenue tax upon cigarettes, this was an act done by a and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora and the
stranger to the contract, and not by any person in privity Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province. The
therewith. The consequence is that, properly speaking, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
the legislative fiat, placing the burden of the tax on the revoked said license on the grounds of gross violation of
purchaser, did not in any wise affect the obligation of its terms and conditions. It also did not reinstate their
the contract as between the parties. It was merely an TLA saying that it might negate efforts to enhance the
external factor which, supervening upon the situation conservation and protection of our forest resources. On
created by the contract, made it impossible for the appeal, petitioner points out that there is no total log ban
purchaser to realize the benefit which would have in the country; that Congress has yet to make a
accrued to him if the seller had been required to pay the pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this
tax. Nearly all changes in taxation affect existing effect "must be stated in good form, not implied"; and
contracts in some way or other, but this does not that in any case, any new policy consideration should
necessarily change such contracts in a legal sense. be prospective in application and cannot affect
Hence, where an Act of the Legislature imposes a petitioner's vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
new or additional tax upon goods contracted to be sold The Court said that the cancellation of its license
and places the burden of paying said tax upon the does not constitute an impairment of the obligation of its
purchaser, the obligation of the contract between the contract. It cited the case of Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 604
Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary: "while the and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
administration grapples with the complex and COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation media of communication or information during the
of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. . . . period of election.
More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a Radio and television broadcasting companies do
private logging company are pitted against that of the not own the airwaves and frequencies through which
public at large on the pressing public policy issue of they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are
forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and merely given the temporary privilege of using them or
license agreements are the principal instruments by franchise, the exercise of the which may reasonably be
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition burdened with the performance by the grantee of some
of forest resources to the end that public welfare is form of public service, such as providing print space or
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they air time to Comelec. Section 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 must
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to be deemed incorporated in R.A. No. 7252 granting GMA
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a Network, Inc. a franchise and does not constitute denial
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular of due process and that B.P. Blg. 881, 92 is not an
concession area and the forest products therein. They invalid amendment of petitioner's franchise but the
may be validly amended, modified, replaced or enforcement of a duty voluntarily assumed by petitioner
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national in accepting a public grant of privilege.
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed An administrative agency cannot, in the exercise
contracts within the purview of the due process of law of lawmaking, amend a statute of Congress. Therefore
clause." 2 of Resolution No. 2983-A of the Comelec providing
for payment of just compensation is invalid.
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of B.P. Blg. 881, 92 does not single out radio and
the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections television stations in providing free air time. There are
289 SCRA 337, Supra important differences in the characteristics of the
broadcast media and the print media, which justify their
Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646 prohibits the sale differential treatment for free speech purposes.
or donation of print space or air time for political ads, The freedom of television and radio broadcasting
except to the Commission on Elections. Petitioners is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded
challenge the validity thereof on the ground (1) that it to newspaper and print media.
takes property without due process of law and without What the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or
just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, among
broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; other things, is the use by media of information of their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 605
franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print 3) Unless other fully effective means are devised to
space or air time for political ads. In other words, the inform accused person of the right to silence and to
object of supervision or regulation is different from the assure continuous opportunity to exercise it, person
object of the prohibition. must, before any questioning, be warned that he has
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
L. FREE ACCESS TO COURTS may be used as evidence against him, and that he has
Art. III, Sec. 11 right to presence of attorney, retained or appointed. 4)
Defendant may waive effectuation of right to counsel
M. MIRANDA DOCTINE and to remain silent, provided that waiver is made
Art. III, Sec. 12 voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. 5) There can be
no questioning if defendant indicates in any manner and
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) at any stage of interrogation process that he wishes to
consult with attorney before speaking. 6) Police may not
The U.S. Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief question individual if he is alone and indicates in any
Justice Warren, held that statements obtained from manner that he does not wish to be interrogated. 7)
defendants during incommunicado interrogation in Mere fact that accused may have answered some
police-dominated atmosphere, without full warning of questions or volunteered some statements on his own
constitutional rights, were inadmissible as having been does not deprive him of right to refrain from answering
obtained in violation of Fifth Amendment privilege any further inquiries until he has consulted with attorney
against self-incrimination. and thereafter consents to be questioned. 8) Coercion
can be mental as well as physical and blood of accused
It laid down procedural rules which the police and is not the only hallmark of unconstitutional inquisition. 9)
the prosecution should follow when a person is under Incommunicado interrogation of individuals in police-
custodial investigation. 1) Prosecution may not use dominated atmosphere, while not physical intimidation,
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, is equally destructive of human dignity, and current
stemming from custodial interrogation of defendant practice is at odds with principle that individual may not
unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards be compelled to incriminate himself.
effective to secure privilege against self-incrimination. 2)
Custodial interrogation, within rule limiting admissibility
of statements stemming from such interrogation, means People v. De la Cruz
questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after 279 SCRA 245 (1997)
person has been taken into custody or otherwise
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 606
In the early evening of June 23, 1992, the lifeless same. While he admits having been at the residence of
bodies of Teodorico M. Laroya, Jr. and his children, 12- the victims on the night that they were murdered, he
year old Karen Verona D. Laroya and 10-year old John flatly denied having killed them as he left the trio well
Lester D. Laroya, were discovered in their residence by and alive that same night when he proceeded to his
their horrified neighbors. They were all bloodied brother's place in Fort Bonifacio. The trial court
consequent to numerous stab wounds, and each of rendered judgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse.
them had a knife still embedded in and protruding from The Supreme Court held that the accused under
their bodies when found. Karen Verona also bore custodial interrogation must continuously have a
external signs of sexual assault. None of their counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. Prior
neighbors, however, witnessed the gruesome murders. to the commencement of the investigation, the accused
On June 27, 1992, the police authorities apprehended must be informed, on top of all his other rights
appellant. They interrogated appellant regarding the enumerated therein, that where he lacks a counsel of
crimes on the same day that he was arrested. The his choice because of indigence or other incapacitating
investigation commenced at around 9:00 A.M. at the cause, he shall be provided with one. Appellant's
police headquarters in Cainta, Rizal at the time when conviction must be set aside for his extrajudicial
appellant was still without counsel. confession obtained without assistance of counsel is
Appellant, who was afflicted with a problem in inadmissible in evidence against him; that the Bill of
expressing himself and with an impediment in his Rights treats of both "confessions" and "admissions" in
speech (ngo-ngo) and who only reached the fourth the same light. With the exception of appellant's
grade of elementary schooling, was charged with putative extrajudicial confession, no other evidence of
multiple murder. Appellant's defense was that he was his alleged guilt has been presented by the People.
not fully apprised of his constitutional rights prior to and
while undergoing custodial investigation. Appellant PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
testified that although he was conversant with Tagalog, JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO y PASCUAL, accused-
he is unable to read and write, although he can sign his appellant.
name. He bluntly repudiated his extrajudicial confession BELLOSILLO, J
and insisted that he was never assisted by any counsel
of his choice, much less met said Atty. Lorenza Facts:
Bernardino-Villanueva, his supposed counsel. Record - Two men and a woman were seen grappling for
shows that his answers to the questions appearing in possession of a bag. After taking possession of the
his extrajudicial confession are in fluent, flawless and bag, the 2 armed men shot the woman in the head.
expressive Tagalog. Appellant further claimed that he They then boarded a tricycle driven by Del Rosario
was tortured by the police authorities into signing the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 607
and sped away. Witnesses took note of the tricycles This concept of custodial investigation has been
plate number. broadened by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of
- The police then located Del Rosario and invited him issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in
for interview. Del Rosario then gave statements connection with an offense he is suspected to have
concerning the locations and identities of the committed." Section 2 of the same Act further provides
gunmen. (He even went with them to the location of that
the gunmen but one of the gunmen was found dead . . . . Any public officer or employee, or
after a shootout that had taken place earlier) He was anyone acting under his order or in his
thereafter detained in the police station as ordered by place, who arrests, detains or investigates
the Fiscal. His statements were only signed on a later any person for the commission of an
date. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His offense shall inform the latter, in a language
Sinumpaang Salaysay was done with the assistance known and understood by him, of his right to
of Ex-Judge Talavera. He was later charged with remain silent and to have competent and
Robbery with Homicide. independent counsel, preferably of his own
- Transcripts reveal that del Rosario was handcuffed by choice, who shall at all times be allowed to
police because allegedly they had already gathered confer privately with the person arrested,
enough evidence against him and they were afraid detained or under custodial investigation. If
that he might attempt to escape. such person cannot afford the services of
his own counsel, he must be provided with a
Issues: competent and independent counsel by the
W/N Del Rosarios Miranda rights were violated. investigating officer.
Held: From the foregoing, it is clear that del Rosario was
YES, THEY WERE deprived of his rights during custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation is the stage where the police From the time he was "invited" for questioning at the
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an house of the baranggay captain, he was already under
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular effective custodial investigation, but he was not
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating
process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit officers. The police already knew the name of the
incriminating statements. It is well-settled that it tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the
encompasses any question initiated by law enforces robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas. Since
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had
deprive of his freedom of action in any significant way. 41 waived his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 608
Facts: suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
- At 9:30 in the evening a group of eight armed men interrogation and propounds questions to the person to
wearing masks entered a house in Caloocan where elicit incriminating statements.iii[7] Police line-up is not
they robbed the premises and gang raped the owners part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to
niece and employee. counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be
- Bagas, one of the accused, claims that police (with invoked at this stage.iv[8] This was settled in the case of
Ampatin, one of the accused) one day had barged into People vs. Lamsingv[9] and in the more recent case of
the handicrafts factory in Pasay where he was People vs. Salvatierra.vi[10] The right to be assisted by
employed as a stay-in shell cutter. They were looking counsel attaches only during custodial investigation and
for a certain Mario and searched the building. cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
Failing to find said Mario, the police hit Ampatin at the in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial
back of his neck with a gun and uttered, Niloloko lang investigation process. This is because during a police
yata tayo ng taong ito and Magturo ka ng tao kahit line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the
sino. It was at this juncture that Ampatin pointed to investigatory to the accusatoryvii[11] and it is usually the
Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who
look upon. gives a statement in the course of the line-up.viii[12]
- Bagas was then brought to the police station where he
faced the victims of the crime face to face. He was Hence, herein accused-appellant could not yet invoke
asked if he knew the co-accused and replied in the his right to counsel when he was presented for
negative. The policemen then told the told the identification by the complainants because the same
complainants that accused-appellant was one of the was not yet part of the investigation process. Moreover,
suspects. This incited complainants to an emotional there was no showing that during his identification by
frenzy, kicking and hitting him. They only stopped the complainants, the police investigators sought to
when one of the policemen intervened. elicit any admission or confession from accused-
appellant. In fact, records show that the police did not
at all talk to accused-appellant when he was presented
Held: before the complainants. The alleged infringement of
The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 the constitutional rights of the accused while under
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
invoked only by a person while he is under custodial cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession
investigation.ii[6] Custodial investigation starts when the extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an conviction.ix[13] In the present case, there is no such
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular confession or extra-judicial admission.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 610
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his itself to a mere formality."44 We have thus ruled that any
custodial interrogation, the police obtained any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the
- which was used in evidence against him. The records start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as
do not show that he had given one or that, in finding him evidence against him.45
guilty, the trial court relied on such statement. In fact, Here, accused-appellant was identified by Michelle
accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when Darunda in a show-up on January 3, 1997 and by Erma
subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark
committing the crime with which he was charged. In Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his
other words, no uncounseled statement was obtained arrest. Having been made when accused-appellant did
from accused-appellant which should have been not have the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court
excluded as evidence against him. identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses
counsel in a police line-up considering that such is regarding these identifications should have been held
usually not a part of the custodial inquest.42 However, inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal
the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused- lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary]
appellant, having been the focus of attention by the illegality.'"46
police after he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object
as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already immediately when these witnesses were presented by
under custodial investigation when these out-of-court the prosecution or when specific questions regarding this
identifications were conducted by the police. matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132,
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made 36 of the Rules on Evidence, accused-appellant must
in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is be deemed to have waived his right to object to the
brought face to face with the witness for identification, admissibility of these testimonies.47
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a Furthermore, the inadmissibility of these out-of-court
witness from a group of persons gathered for that identifications does not render the in-court identification
purpose.43 During custodial investigation, these types of of accused-appellant inadmissible for being the "fruits of
identification have been recognized as "critical the poisonous tree."48 This in-court identification was
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which what formed the basis of the trial court's conviction of
necessitate the presence of counsel for the accused. accused-appellant. As it was not derived or drawn from
This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings the illegal arrest of accused-appellant or as a
"might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial consequence thereof,49 it is admissible as evidence
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 612
against him. However, whether or not such prosecution PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
evidence satisfies the requirement of proof beyond AUGUSTO MANZANO y REYES, respondent.
reasonable doubt is another matter altogether.
ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE QUISUMBING, J.:
SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE Facts:
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. - Manzano was arrested following a buy-bust operation
where he was caught selling 4 tea-bag sized plastic
PUNO, J.: bags filled with marijuana.
Facts: - Manzano claims he has been "investigated,
- An audit examination revealed that Navallo, Collecting interrogated and made to sign an accomplished
and Disbursing Officer of Numancia National booking sheet and arrest report without the benefit of
Vocational School, had a shortage of P16,483.62. counsel."
- Navallo claims he was deprived of his rights according
to II, 12 of the Constitution when he was pressured Held:
to sign the examination report. This Court has already emphasized that "(w)hen an
arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report
Held: at a police station, he does not (thereby) admit the
Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his commission of an offense nor confess to any
constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III, of the incriminating circumstance." 2 The booking sheet is no
1987 Constitution. 3 Well-settled is the rule that such more than a record of arrest and a statement on how the
rights are invocable only when the accused is under arrest is made. It is simply a police report, and it has no
"custodial investigation," or is "in custody investigation," probative value as an extrajudicial statement of the
4
which we have since defined as any "questioning person being detained. 3 The signing by the accused of
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has the booking sheet and arrest report is not a part of the
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his custodial investigation which would otherwise require the
freedom of action in any significant way." 5 A person presence of counsel to ensure the protection of the
under a normal audit examination is not under custodial accused's constitutional rights.
investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN
in the above rule. alias TOTO, accused. GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO,
accused-appellant.
Bellosillo, J.:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 613
Facts: have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all
- Endino and Galgarin stabbed and shot Dennis Aquino likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him.
in front of his girlfriend in Puerto Princesa City. Aquino
then died. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of
- Galgarin was arrested in Antipolo and was set to be television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the
transported to Palawan to stand trial. On the way to recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases,14 it is
the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme
station where accused Galgarin was interviewed by caution must be taken in further admitting similar
reporters. Video footages of the interview were taken confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
his nephew Edward Endino as the gunman. His attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having
program TV Patrol. an accused admit an offense on television. Such a
- Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he situation would be detrimental to the guaranteed rights
made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice
by the threats of the arresting police officers. He system.
asserted that the videotaped confession was
constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ERIC
exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the GUILLERMO y GARCIA, appellant.
Constitution.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Held: Facts:
Apropos the court a quo's admission of accused- - Guillermo, an employee of Keyser plastics,
appellant's videotaped confession, we find such approached the company guard and calmly told him
admission proper. The interview was recorded on video that he killed Victor Keyser and requested for help in
and it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt carrying the body to the garbage dump so that he may
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of burn it.
newsmen. Such confession does not form part of - Once police arrived at the premises, a half-naked
custodial investigation as it was not given to police Guillermo told them Sir, hindi ako lalaban, susuko
officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit ako, haharapin ko ito. They then found Keysers
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if dismembered limbs and chopped torso. Keysers head
he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could was found in a cement bag.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 614
- When the police asked how he did it, according to the Under Article III of the Constitution,3[43] a confession to
prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed be admissible must satisfy the following requisites: (a)
the victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after the confession must be voluntary; (b) the confession
Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a must be made with the assistance of competent and
carpenters saw. He then mopped up the blood on the independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to express; and (d) the confession must be in writing.
the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of Even if the admission or confession of an accused is
coconut lumber and a carpenters saw. When asked gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of
as to his motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the
Keyser had been maltreating him and his co- absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
employees.2[17] He expressed no regret whatsoever given.
about his actions.
- The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of the
Station for further investigation, which was conducted appellants confession to SPO1 Reyes at the Antipolo
without apprising the appellant about his constitutional PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to
rights and without providing him with the services of his acquittal. The facts in this case clearly show that
counsel. appellant admitted the commission of the crime not just
- Guillermo, who was in police custody, was to the police but also to private individuals.
subsequently interviewed by Gus Abelgas of ABSCBN Appellants spontaneous statements made to a private
and Kara David of GMA 7 where he admitted security guard, not an agent of the State or a law
committing the crime and expressed no remorse. He enforcer, are not covered by the Miranda principles and,
described how he committed the killings as well as his as res gestate, admissible in evidence against him.
motive (he was treated like an animal, being made to Further, when interviewed on separate occasions by the
work for years without being paid and was improperly media, appellant not only agreed to be interviewed by
fed). the news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his
guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
Held: commission of the crime
The confession appellant made while he was under PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the killing of LINDES PAYNOR, accused-appellant.
Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the
protective standards laid down by the Constitution. Regalado, J.:
Facts:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 615
- Aquinaldo, a middle-aged teacher was stabbed and when the body of the accused is proposed to be
killed inside her classroom. Witnesses saw a man in examined. In fact, an accused may validly be compelled
blue maong pants, and white T-shirt printed in front, to be photographed or measured, or his garments or
using slippers and a brown hat, and with a green towel shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
wrapped around his neck. enable the foregoing things to be done, without running
- When police went to Aguinaldos family to inquire for afoul of the proscription against testimonial compulsion
possible suspects, they pointed to appellant, the jilted PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. USMAN
boyfriend of the victims sister, as a possible suspect. HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.
- Policemen went to Paynors workplace and found him
wearing maong pants, white T-shirt with markings in Sarmiento, J.:
front, with a yellow towel wrapped around his neck Facts:
and a brown hat on his head. He was brought to the - Usman Hassan, an illiterate, 15-year-old pushcart
station where he was positively identified by cargador, was accused of murder for stabbing to
witnesses. death Ramon Pichel solely on the basis of one
- Appellant then asseverates that there was a violation witnesss testimony, which was taken only 2 days after
of his rights while under custodial investigation, in light the incident and sworn to 4 days after the killing and
of the Miranda doctrine, when allegedly the police was practically forced out by the police. Witness said
investigators unceremoniously stripped him of his victim was stabbed only once, which was disputed by
clothing and personal items, and the same were later the medico-legal report which found the victim tabbed
introduced as evidence during the trial. 6 times.
- Hassan was also presented alone to the witness by
Held: the police and the relatives of the victim in the Funeral
The Court is not persuaded. The protection of the Parlor.
accused under custodial investigation, which is invoked
by appellant, refers to testimonial compulsion. Section Held:
12, Article III of the Constitution provides that such The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to
accused shall have the right to be informed of his right to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral
remain silent, the right to counsel, and the right to waive parlor, without being placed in the police line-up, was
the right to counsel in the presence of counsel, and that "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where
any confession or admission obtained in violation of his there was none, activated visual imagination, and, all
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. As told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This
held in People vs. Gamboa, this constitutional right unusual, coarse, and highly singular method of
applies only against testimonial compulsion and not Identification, which revolts against the accepted
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 616
principles of scientific crime detection, alienates the Commander) car in the corner of Tomas Morato and
esteem of every just man, and commands neither our Timog, which led to his death.
respect nor acceptance." 20 - Central Intelligence Service (CIS) agents established
Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police through a confidential intelligence information the
investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and involvement of Continente, an employee of the U.P.
the accused did violence to the right of the latter to Collegian in U.P. Diliman.
counsel in all stages of the investigation into the - Continente was taken into custody where he admitted
commission of a crime especially at its most crucial to his participation in the ambush as a member of the
stage the Identification of the accused. surveillance unit under the Political Assassination
Team of the CPP-NPA. Documents were confiscated,
As it turned out, the method of Identification became just including a letter which had the acronyms "STR
a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment, the PATRC" which allegedly mean "Sa Tagumpay ng
scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, Rebolusyon" and "Political Assassination Team,
poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure Regional Command".
adopted in this case in which only the accused was - Itaas was likewise arrested following intelligence
presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and information. He likewise admitted his participation in
in the presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is the ambush as member of the NPAs Sparrow unit.
as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls
- Continente and Itaas insisted on making extrajudicial
within the same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched
confessions to the police despite the absence of
protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-
counsel. They were nevertheless provided with
appellant should be acquitted.
counsel by the police, who assisted them.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, Held:
JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, JAMES DOE, PAUL DOE Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly
and SEVERAL OTHER DOES (at large), accused, repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal
DONATO B. CONTINENTE and JUANITO T. ITAAS, assistance during their respective investigations as
accused-appellants. biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that
De Leon Jr, J.: both appellants never signified their desire to have
Facts: lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been
- Continente et al were charged with the crimes of ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases
where a person under custodial investigation cannot
murder and frustrated murder in connection with the
ambush of US Col. James Rowes (JUSMAG afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the
police investigators, the accused really has the final
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 617
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and One of Algarmes companions reported the incident
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the to the police headquarters. Three policemen, one of
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where whom was identified as Titing Varela, accompanied him
he never raised any objection against the former's to the scene of the crime where they beamed their
appointment during the course of the investigation and flashlights towards the house of Nonong Hatton where
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his he believed the tall man and his companion entered.
statement before the swearing officer.xii[57] According to Algarmes companion, the day after the
If Atty. Manansala and Atty. Corpuz decided against incident when he went to the Police station to shed light
advising the appellants not to give their statements on the incident, he narrated to the police officers what
involving the ambush, the said lawyers were merely really transpired. He told them that the features of the
complying with their oaths to abide by the truth. The assailant was still in his memory and that if they can
counsel should never prevent an accused from freely show or present a person who will fit his description, he
and voluntarily telling the truth.xiii[58] Whether it is an can identify him. He waited at the police station but the
extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the police failed to present any person to him. On the
purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.xiv[59] second day after the incident, he was picked-up from
What is sought to be protected with the constitutional his office and made to identify their suspect who turned
right to counsel is the compulsory disclosure of out to be the accused-appellant. The latter was sitting
incriminating facts. The right is guaranteed merely to on a bench in the police station and a policeman
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the pointed to him as their suspect.
accused to admit something false, not to provide him Hatton interposed the defense of alibi. He testified
with the best defense. that on that same night, from 6:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m.,
he was in the house of his friend to celebrate the
People v Hatton baptism of a friends child. During the entire period, he
got up only twice to go to the comfort room.
16 June 1992
Medialdea, J. Issue:
1. W/N Hatton was properly identified in a police
Facts: line-up.
Faustino Algarme and 3 friends were walking down 2. W/N he was deprived of his right to be
the street when Hatton allegedly stabbed Faustino. represented by counsel.
Hatton and his companion fled while Algarme was
rushed to the hospital where he died. Held/Ratio:
1. NO.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 618
The prosecution through its witness, made it appear represent him. It was fifteen days after his arrest and
that the latter identified the accused-appellant in a the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he
police line-up. The details however, showed otherwise. was presented in a police line-up to be identified by the
From his testimony, it is clear that he did not positively prosecution witness.
identify the accused-appellant. At the time of the In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police
incident he made a very fleeting glance on the person station only to be identified by a witness to the killing of
who stabbed the victim. At that moment, he had the Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial
impression that the assailant was a mestizo. During the investigation.
proceedings in the police station where he was The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
supposed to identify the assailant, he identified the investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
accused-appellant as allegedly the person who stabbed ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or
the deceased, not because he was certain that the admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point
accused-appellant was really the assailant but because or stage. the person being interrogated must be
he was the only mestizo in the station and because he assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
was pointed to the policemen as their suspect. The fact extorting false or coerced admission or confessions
is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for
police line-up. He was pointed to by the police as their the commission of an offense.
suspect. He being the only mestizo in the station, the
witness pointed to him as "the man." From all
indications, the identification of accused-appellant by People v De Guzman
Ongue was suggested by the police and this is
objectionable. Melo, J.
30 June 1993
2. NO.
Hatton argued that when he was presented in a line- Facts:
up of sorts he was not represented by a counsel. This De Guzman et al fired at a family in a jeepney hitting
allegedly violates his constitutional right to counsel the passengers and killing the father. They later
during custodial investigation. hijacked another jeepney and rode away.
This argument raised by appellant has no merit. The The accused were identified from a group of 15
doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S. v Wade is that persons who were presented to 3 of the victims.
the presence of counsel is indispensable in a post- During the joint trial of the cases, they were again
indictment line-up. In this case, the accused had already positively identified the as the perpetrators of the
been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to crimes. Particularly, Lorna Carteciano further testified
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 619
that Victor Nuez was the gunman who shot her Facts:
husband, Major Carteciano, in the head. The decomposing body of a young girl was found in
(Topical) It is alleged that the accused-appellant was the bushes. She was identified as Shirley Victore, who
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel when he was reported missing 3 days before. The NBI
was subjected to a paraffin test without the assistance examination revealed that she was raped and strangled
of counsel. to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to the accused who
Issue: were invited by the police for questioning. However, for
W/N accused was deprived of his constitutional lack of evidence linking them to the crime, they were
right to counsel. allowed to go home.
They returned a few days later and acknowledged
Held/Ratio: having committed the crime. Acting on their admission,
NO. the police immediately conducted an investigation and
He was not then under custodial investigation. The put their confessions in writing. The investigators
right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an however could not at once get the services of a lawyer
investigation, that is, when the investigating officer to assist them in the course of the investigation because
starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of
confessions or admissions from the accused. At such Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be that as it may, the statements of the two accused where
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation the right to remain silent and to be assisted by a competent
right is likewise not violated where during a police line- counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and
up where the accused was identified by the victim, assurance that they understood their rights and did not
because he was not, at that moment, under custodial require the services of counsel, the investigation was
investigation. conducted with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor,
the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La
Union, in attendance to listen to and witness the giving
People v Ordono and Medina of their voluntary statements.
They were thereafter detained. A local radio host
Per Curiam visited them to interview them. A few days later, they
29 June 2000 were brought to the PAO for assistance and counseling.
The PAO lawyer, Atty. Corpuz, apprised each of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 620
before the above-mentioned persons can appear two The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks
(2) conditions must be met: (a) counsel of the accused of the accused on their confessions a few days after
must be absent, and, (b) a valid waiver must be their closed-door meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the
executed. RA 7438 does not therefore unconditionally presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the
and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make
underscores its importance by requiring that a their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained
substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned during custodial investigation without the benefit of
persons be made with caution and with the essential counsel although reduced into writing and later signed
safeguards. in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being
Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other document albeit an indication therein that there was
police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused,
of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12,
(2) accused in continuing with the investigation was of par. (1), are not met. The standards utilized by police
no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the
writing and with the assistance of counsel. accused in the instant case therefore fell short of the
Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2) standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
accused emanating from such uncounselled
interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence in any
proceeding. People v Bagnate
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to
eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission Per Curiam
either. Although there was a showing that the PAO 20 May 2004
lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the
accused, enlightened them on the possible Facts:
repercussions of their admissions, and even gave them The accused was turned over to the police for
time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable custodial investigation. Without asking the name of
advice given by counsel still came several days too late. appellant, the police officer informed him in the Bicol
It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the dialect of his right to remain silent, to be assisted by
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation counsel, that whatever he says may be used against or
when the extrajudicial statements were being taken. in his favor, and that he cannot be tortured or molested.
Asked if he is willing to cooperate, the accused
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 622
assented and gave his name as Amado Magnate. It was the authenticity of the signatures of the accused and
later learned that appellants real name is Amado Atty. Brotamonte. He also explained to the accused the
Bagnate. When appellant told the police of his consequences of his confession to the crimes charged
willingness to confess, he was again informed of his and asked him if he was coerced into admitting them.
rights, and was asked if he wanted to be assisted by Judge Base inspected his body and asked him if he was
counsel but appellant said that his counsel was in forced or coerced. Judge Base then asked him if he was
Manila. The police offered the services of Atty. Paterno still willing to sign it again and he answered in the
Brotamonte, which appellant accepted. Before affirmative saying that his conscience bothered him.
proceeding with the investigation, Atty. Brotamonte Judge Base asked him to sign the confession again in
asked the policemen to leave the investigation room the presence of Atty. Brotamonte, after which the
and conferred with appellant. He introduced himself to accused affixed his signature.
appellant and informed him of his rights. He also asked There were no eyewitnesses to the incident; only the
and examined appellant to see if he was physically extra-judicial confession of appellant showed how the
harmed by the policemen and found none although Atty. crimes were committed by him.
Brotamonte noticed that appellants left hand was Later on, the accused repudiated his extra-judicial
handcuffed to the table. Appellant told Atty. Brotamonte confession before the trial court and assailed its
that he is willing to give a statement. The investigation admissibility alleging that it was executed in violation of
was then conducted in the Bicol dialect, with the police his constitutional rights, particularly his right to a
asking the questions. It was translated thereafter into competent and independent counsel of his own choice;
English with the help of Atty. Brotamonte, for the and that he was not fully apprised of the consequences
purpose of putting it into writing. After typing the first of his confession.
page of the confession, Atty. Brotamonte translated and
explained the contents thereof to appellant, then Atty. Issue:
Brotamonte and appellant signed thereon. W/N his right to counsel was violated.
After appellants confession was typed and signed,
Atty. Brotamonte left the police station and went back to Held/Ratio:
his office. As far as he could recall, the entire process NO. To be considered competent and independent
took more than an hour. for the purpose of assisting an accused during a
The next day, the accused was brought before custodial investigation, it is only required for a lawyer to
Judge Arsenio Base, Jr. of the Municipal Trial Court of be willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of
Tabaco, Albay. Judge Base requested the presence of the accused, as distinguished from one who would
Atty. Brotamonte and subsequently examined the merely be giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless
voluntariness and veracity of the confession as well as recital of the individuals constitutional rights. In People
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 623
v. Basay, the Court stressed that an accuseds right to accused without having been informed of his right to
be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel remain silent, or, without having been given competent
contemplates the transmission of meaningful and independent counsel, preferably his own choice, or
information rather than just the ceremonial and if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he was not
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional provided with one; or the waiver of his rights was not in
principle." writing and not in the presence of counsel; or, that he
The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an was tortured, forced, threatened, intimidated, by
accused from saying anything which might incriminate violence or any other means that vitiated his free will.
him but, rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to There is nothing in the Constitution that mandates a
preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the counsel to inform an accused of the possible penalty for
accused to admit something false. The counsel, the crime he committed. Neither would a presumption
however, should never prevent an accused from freely arise that the counsel is incompetent or not independent
and voluntarily telling the truth. In the present case, the just because he failed to apprise the accused that the
assistance rendered by Atty. Brotamonte is more than imposable penalty for the crime he was about to admit
perfunctory. Before the onset of the investigation, Atty. is death. After all, the imposable penalty is totally
Brotamonte privately conferred with appellant to immaterial to the resolve of an accused to admit his guilt
ascertain the voluntariness of his confession and to in the commission of a crime.
make sure that no force or duress was employed by the
police authorities on the latter to make him admit the People v Lucero
crimes charged. He informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and was clear in explaining to him Puno
the questions propounded by the police. Also, it was 29 May 1995
shown that he signed the confession with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel, Atty. Facts:
Brotamonte, and it was also sworn to by him before Lucero et al were charged with the crime of robbery
Judge Base, who, before administering the oath to with homicide. They ambushed the complainant and
appellant, conferred with him and informed him of his took with them cash and jewelry. Killed in the incident
rights and the consequences of his confession. was the driver of the complainant.
The failure of Atty. Brotamonte to apprise appellant Lucero and the Echavez brothers were apprehended
of the imposable penalty of the crimes he was to admit by the Special Operations Group of the Central
is not a sufficient ground to strike down appellants Intelligence Service (CIS) and brought to their
extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution regards headquarters. Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to
as inadmissible in evidence is confession given by an conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 624
that even before the investigation started, Lucero Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then
verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that signed the statement.
he was the one who shot the driver. In any event, Pfc.
Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He Issue:
informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to remain W/N Lucero was denied the right to counsel.
silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had
no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department Held/Ratio:
about Lucero's need for a lawyer. In due time, Atty. YES.
Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at There was no "substantial" compliance with the
around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the
who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty.
the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of
Lucero was. appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised of appellant's detention. More exactly, he arrived at the
Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant
Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is about his rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he
not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, received no reaction from appellant although his
and that even if he has already given a statement, he impression was that appellant understood him. Worse,
may refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS
Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the agents when his real interrogation started. He said he
impression that Lucero understood his advice. had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down speak well of the importance he gave to his role as
Lucero's statement. When the investigator started counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the
asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to commission of a very serious offense. It was during his
attend the wake of his friend. He gave word that in case absence that appellant gave an uncounselled
of need, he could be reached at his residence. confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two confession for the next day, appellant was brought by
CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial two CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence
statement of was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he
already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two understood the statements he gave and if he signed it
CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined the document and voluntarily. However, the Constitution requires the right
explained to Lucero its legal implications. He asked to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel
Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 625
the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant Consequently, without the extrajudicial confessions, the
received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to convict
him of the crime charged.
People v Bandula From the records, it was shown that when accused-
appellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were
Bellosillo investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no
27 May 1994 counsel present. If at all, counsel came in only a day
after the custodial investigation with respect to accused
Facts: Dionanao, and two weeks later with respect to appellant
The accused were found guilty for robbery with Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both
homicide after killing a lawyer and ransacking his accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the Municipal Attorney
house. of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that
Among the evidence admitted were the alleged violence was used against the accused.
extrajudicial confessions of accused Bandula and
Dionanao that they were merely forced to participate in Issue:
the commission of the crime by "Boy Tall" and "Boy W/N there was a violation of the rights of the
Short." "These extrajudicial confessions made by accused.
accused Teofilo Dionanao and Aurelio Bandula
extracted during custodial investigation," the trial court Held/Ratio:
ruled, "have all the qualities and have complied with all YES. The Constitution requires that counsel be
the requirements of an admissible confession, it independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special
appearing from the confession itself that accused were counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the
informed of their rights under the law regarding police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
custodial investigation and were duly represented by admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty.
counsel (Atty. Ruben Zerna)." Zerna assisted accused Dionanao and Bandula when
On appeal, appellant Bandula argues that the they executed their respective extrajudicial confessions,
extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an
inadmissible in evidence considering that they were independent counsel. As a legal officer of the
extracted under duress and intimidation, and were municipality, he provides legal assistance and support
merely countersigned later by the municipal attorney to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the
who, by the nature of his position, was not entirely an delivery of basic services to the people, including the
independent counsel nor counsel of their choice. maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 626
doubted whether he can effectively undertake the Hernandez et al were arrested, one by one, as suspects
defense of the accused without running into conflict of in the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. The first to be
interests. He is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who apprehended was accused Hernandez. He was
cannot represent the accused during custodial arrested on February 5, 1992 by the Central Police
investigations. District (CPD) in connection with another crime. When
(Morales v Enrile) At the time a person is arrested, it the CPD learned that Hernandez was a suspect in the
shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of Tan kidnapping case, he was turned over to the CIS for
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the investigation.
warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his In the CIS, Hernandez waived his rights to remain
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and silent and to counsel in the presence of one Atty.
that any statement he might make could be used Solomon Villanueva and voluntarily admitted his
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to participation in the crime. In his extrajudicial
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he confession, Hernandez confirmed that in January 1992,
chooses by the most expedient means by telephone his friend, accused Lorenzo, asked him to join his group
if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the to kidnap Sharleen Tan. He revealed their individual
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this participation. He stated that accused Bolante
is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be and Jacob were the ones who abducted
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel Sharleen. Accused Mansuer drove the taxi carrying
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his Bolante, Jacob and Sharleen. They dropped off
behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of Sharleen at a house in John Kennedy Street, Project 8,
the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The Quezon City. It was Jacob who got in touch with
right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not Sharleen's family to demand for ransom. Mansuer and
be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Jacob were the ones who picked up the ransom. After
Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure three days, Jacob gave Hernandez P15,000 as his
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in share of the ransom money. The confession of
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Hernandez led to the apprehension of the other
accused.
People v Hernandez When arrested, accused Lorenzo and Tumaneng
waived their right to counsel and agreed to execute
Puno extrajudicial confessions in the presence of Atty.
4 December 1997 Villanueva. Accused Jacob also executed an
extrajudicial confession and waived his right to counsel
Facts: in the presence of Atty. Solomon Villanueva and his
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 627
common-law wife Margarita Albiso. Meantime, Extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary
accused Famodulan, was invited by the CIS operatives for no sane person would confess to a crime unless he
to shed light on the kidnapping of Sharleen Tan. He has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to
executed a sworn statement where he waived his rights prove the involuntariness of his confession. In the case
to remain silent and to counsel in the presence of Atty. at bar, appellants did not satisfactorily discharge this
Solomon Villanueva. burden.
For their defense, appellants simply denied Their accusation lacks proof and is belied by the
complicity in the kidnapping of Sharleen. Appellants records. No medical certificate was presented to prove
Lorenzo and Tumaneng claimed that their extrajudicial their maltreatment. Neither did they exhibit any physical
confessions were elicited under duress. Appellant marks of violence. The records reveal that appellants
Famodulan maintained that he merely picked up the did not file an administrative or criminal complaint
money as directed by accused Hernandez. against their alleged torturers. During the preliminary
investigation, appellants even subscribed their
Issue: confession before Fiscal Reynaldo Lugtu who certified
1. W/N the extrajudicial confessions are admissible that he personally examined appellants and was fully
in evidence. convinced that they voluntarily executed and
2.(MAIN) W/N Atty. Villanueva not an independent understood their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the
and competent counsel. ( They insist that Atty. trial court rightly rejected appellants' allegation of
Solomon Villanueva who was provided by the CIS maltreatment.
operatives to assist them in the waiver of their rights to 2. ATTY. VILLANUEVA IS AN INDEPENDENT AND
silence and to counsel is neither an independent nor a COMPETENT LEGAL COUNSEL.
competent lawyer. They argue that since Atty. The fact that Atty. Villanueva is a retired member of
Villanueva was once a member of the Judge Advocate's the Judge Advocate's Office should not cast doubt on
Office, his sympathies are suspect. They also assail the his impartiality in assisting appellants during their
competence of Atty. Villanueva to assist them during the custodial investigation. There is no concrete evidence
custodial investigation. Allegedly, at no instance did of bias on the part of Atty. Villanueva. Appellants'
Atty. Villanueva prevent appellants from incriminating charge is specious and speculative. (People v Aquino)
themselves.) The right to counsel is designed to preclude the
slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something which is false. It ought to follow that a lawyer
Held/Ratio: should never prevent an accused from freely and
1. YES. voluntarily telling the truth whether in an extrajudicial
statement or testimony in open court. While our
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 628
litigation is adversarial in nature, its purpose is always to P.Lt. Surapa. Accused-appellant concludes that the
ascertain the truth for justice is not justice unless extrajudicial statement can not thus be utilized against
predicated on truth. The accused under investigation is him for want of competent, independent counsel of his
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of own choice.
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from them. Issue:
In the case at bar, appellants waived their rights to W/N his right to counsel as provided in the
remain silent and to counsel in the presence and with constitution was violated.
the assistance of Atty. Villanueva. Atty. Villanueva
cannot be faulted when he did not prevent appellants Held/Ratio:
from truthfully answering the questions propounded by NO.
the investigators. For allowing the free flow of truth, Quoting the CA, the SC held that the claim of the
Atty. Villanueva cannot be deemed as an incompetent appellant that he was assisted by counsel, not of his
counsel. A lawyer's oath binds him to prevent own choice, is belied by records. During the custodial
falsehood and not to suppress truth. investigation, he failed to indicate in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with
an attorney of his own preference before speaking or
People v Barasina giving any statement. Indeed, there is no showing that
he manifested any resistance when he was assisted by
Melo Atty. Torres. The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as
21 January 1994 counsel by the appellant after the custodial investigation
is an afterthought.
Facts: Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12[1],
The accused shot and killed Fiscal Mayo. He was Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the
apprehended while trying to escape. message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under
(Relevant to topic) On appeal, the accused-appellant investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally
makes reference to the manner the extrajudicial competent and independent attorneys from handling his
confession and waiver were extracted from him in the defense. If the rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a
absence of a lawyer of his own choice. He maintains custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the
that he procured the services of Atty. Romeo Mendoza accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of
in the course of the custodial investigation but it was the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one
turned out that it was Atty. Abelardo Torres who reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
assisted during the interrogation upon the directive of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 629
This absurd scenario could not have been contemplated W/N he was assisted by an ineffectual counsel
by the framers of the charter. rendering his extrajudicial confession inadmissible.
Held/Ratio:
People v Jerez NO. EJ admissible.
When appellant executed the extrajudicial
Romero confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel,
29 January 1998 Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If
indeed his confession were obtained as a result of
Facts: coercion and intimidation by policemen at the police
The accused were charged with the crime of robbery station, he could have informed the Mayor of the
with double homicide. maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines authorities, the extra-judicial confession voluntarily
Norte Integrated National Police testified that upon made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. The
appellants arrest, the latter was apprised of his presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and
constitutional rights. In the presence of Atty. Augusto voluntariness stands unless the defense proves
Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police otherwise.
ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing, Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it
signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal denied his right to have an independent counsel of his
Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or own choice. The records show that at the time the
not appellant understood the consequences of his extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant
confession. disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice
Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be
defense and that the extra-judicial confession was available as he is due to depart for Manila on the same
allegedly obtained through the use of physical violence, day. Subsequently, Major Rosales suggested that Atty.
coercion and intimidation. Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available,
Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation
and credence to the extra-judicial statement, stating that and the latter answered in the affirmative.
at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where
ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the
constitutional rights and interests. services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in
Issue: the police investigators, the accused has the final
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 630
choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and People vs. Niero Suela (2002)
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where Facts:
he never raised any objection against the formers 3 armed men (Niero Suela, Edgar S. and Edgardo
appointment during the course of the investigation and Batocan) rob the house of Rosas. They took tv, cash,
the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his jewelries etc amounting to P657K and stabbed & killed
statement before the swearing officer. Thus, once the Gabilo. Edgar Suela contacted Rosas secretary, telling
prosecution has shown that there was compliance with her that if Rosas will agree, he will relay information as
the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation to the identity and whereabouts of those responsible for
advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary Gabilos death for P200K. An entrapment ensued and
and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his this effected his arrest. While under detention, the
confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on Suelas expressed their desire to give an extrajudicial
the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession confession. Hence, they were brought to the IBP for the
is admissible until the accused successfully proves that taking down of their confessions. In the extra judicial
it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat confession of the Suelas they also impleaded Edgardo
or promise of reward or leniency. Batocan who also participated in the crime. A warrant of
Although appellant thereafter claimed that the arrest was issued against Batocan, during his custody
confession he gave was made under duress, there is, he also expressed his desire to give an extrajudicial
however, no evidence on record to support the confession. The trial court held that the appellants
same. In People v. Villanueva, the Court declared that had been assisted by competent and independent
voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its counsel during the execution of their extrajudicial
language such that if upon its face the confession confessions. The letter of Nerio Suela addressed to
exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to Director Rosas asking him for forgiveness as well as the
cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, discovery of the stolen TV set and knife in the formers
which could possibly be supplied only by the accused, house, further convinced his guilt. Finding the presence
reflecting spontaniety and coherence which of one aggravating circumstance (disguise) with no
psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to mitigating circumstance, the trial court sentenced them
which violence and torture have been applied, it may be to death. Hence, this automatic review of the Decision.
considered voluntary. A scrutiny of the sworn statement
discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the Issue:
commission of the offense charged which the accused 1. w/n batocans extrajudicial confession as
himself could only have known. admissible evidence against him? No
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 631
2. w/n extrajudicial confessions of the Suelas as as an incident of a valid arrest. It is clearly a fruit
admissible against them? No of a poisonous tree and as such, could not be
admitted and appreciated against the accused.
Held:
1. With respect to Batocan, he did not finish first a. As to Nerio Suelas letter to Director Rosas,
year high school. He was interviewed before he this was written while Nerio was no longer
gave his confession for around five minutes. After under custodial investigation. In open court,
this initial interview with Atty. Rous, counsel just he admitted having written it. The fact that
listened nonchalantly to the he was not assisted by counsel when he
questions propounded by the police and to the wrote it will not make the letter inadmissible
answers given by Batocan. Atty. Rous attention in evidence. Even excluding the wristwatch
even seemed divided for while hewas attending and the written extrajudicial confessions,
the custodial investigation, he was also looking there is still material evidence on
over another paperwork on his desk. In view of record which prove beyond reasonable
these, the court is not convinced that Batocans doubt the commission of robbery with
extrajudicial confession was obtained without homicide. While under the new rules,
violating his constitutional rights. an aggravating circumstance that is NOT
alleged in the information CANNOT be
2. As to the Suelas, Atty. Sansano did not appreciated in determining the criminal
understand the exact nature of appellants rights liability of the accused, the rules do not
to counsel and to remain silent during their prevent its appreciation for the purpose of
custodial investigations. He viewed a refusal to determining civil liability.
answer as an obstruction in the
investigation. Moreover, when he interviewed Aquino vs. Paiste
appellants, he did not even bother to find out the
gist of their proposed statements in order to Aquino, Garganta, and Adeling went to the house of
apprise them of the nature and consequences of Paiste to convince her respondent to buy a gold bar
their extrajudicial confessions. Clearly and sadly, owned by a certain Arnold, an Igorot. After Paiste was
appellants were not accorded competent and shown a sample of the gold bar, she agreed to go with
independent counsel whom they could rely on them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was
to look after their interests. As to the admissibility told that it was genuine. However, she told the three
of the wristwatch, it is of limited probative value that she had no money.
as it was taken without a search warrant and not
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 632
Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
house of respondent the following day. The two police carries out a process of interrogations that lend
convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, itself to eliciting incriminating statements, that the rule
Pampanga to meet Arnold and see the gold bar. Arnold begins to operate.
informed her that it was worth PhP 60,000. After
respondent informed them again she had no money, In CAB, petitioner was brought by respondent before
petitioner continued to press her that buying the gold the NBI to be investigated, she was already under
bar would be good investment. Due to their insistence custodial investigation and the constitutional guarantee
Paiste bought the gold bar for Php 50,000. Paiste had for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in. Since
the gold tested but it turned out to be fake; Paiste then she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with
proceeded to petitioner's house to inform the latter that one in the person of Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.
the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to However, it can be gleaned from the amicable
see Garganta, and that she had nothing to do with the agreement, as aptly pointed out by the CA, that the
transaction. custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for
the crime was either aborted or did not push through as
Paiste brought petitioner to NBI in the presence of a the parties, petitioner, and respondent agreed to
certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner amicably amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a
promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and waiver of right to counsel appended was executed with
the document they both signed would be disregarded both parties affixing their signatures on it in the
should they locate Garganta. Subsequently, Paiste filed presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.
charges against Aquino for Estafa. RTC held petitioner,
Garganta et. al. guilty as charged, CA affirmed. It is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in
the person of Atty. Uy, which was not objected to .
Verily, she was provided with an independent counsel
Issue: w/n the amicable settlement executed in the NBI and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the
is admissible as evidence? YES slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The lawyer, however, should never
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
by law enforcement officers after a person has been the truth." An amicable settlement is not and does not
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or
of action in any significant way. It is only after the admission but is a contract between the parties within
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an the parameters of their mutually recognized and
unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 633
excuses no one. The right against self-incrimination is custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as
not self- executing or automatically operational. It must the commencement of an adversary proceeding against
be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the suspect.24
the protection does not come into play. It follows that He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
failure to claim it at the appropriate time. used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
2) Rights in Custodial Interrogation afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
treats of a second right, or better said, group of rights. those rights must be afforded to him throughout the
These rights apply to persons "under investigation for interrogation. After such warnings have been given,
the commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
investigation by police authorities; and this is what knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree
makes these rights different from that embodied in the to answer or make a statement. But unless and until
first sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or of interrogation can be used against him.
administrative. The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
investigation for an offense was not in the 1935 atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement
Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of without full warnings of constitutional rights."
the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, "
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under Not every statement made to the police by a person
investigation for the commission of an offense"-- involved in some crime is within the scope of the
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial
counsel, and to be informed of such right, 21 interrogation," or "under investigation for the
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other commission of an offense," the statement is not
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against protected. Thus, in one case, 29 where a person went to
him; a police precinct and before any sort of investigation
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself
rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. up for the killing of an old woman because she was
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this
procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police Court ruled that such a statement was admissible,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 635
compliance with the constitutional procedure on sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by
custodial interrogation not being exigible under the arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The thesis
circumstances. was however so far divorced from the actual and correct
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case state of the constitutional and legal principles involved
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime as to make application of said thesis to the case before
and subsequently charged with its commission in court, him tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or
has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus
producing evidence, to wit: rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.
the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but In CAB Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
after having been taken into custody or otherwise interrogation, as the term should be properly
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on understood, prior to and during the administrative
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed which he appeared to have had a hand. It is also clear,
thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free posed to him on the first day of the administrative
will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
rights rejected; and proceedings should be recorded, the record having
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal
a) to refuse to be a witness; action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K)
such refusal; that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross- day before the investigation, offering to compromise his
examination by the prosecution; liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had
other than that for which he is then prosecuted. not been accorded to Ramos.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that
respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and Magtoto vs. Manguera (1975)
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, *case did not discuss the facts of the case, it focused on
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken them a discourse of the history of the Right Against Self
as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one Incrimination. (Lifted relevant text from case)*
with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 636
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against why the Miranda-Escobedo rule was expressly included
himself. Any person under investigation for the as a new right granted to a detained person in the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain present provision of Section 20, Article IV of the New
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. Constitution.
No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other When Delegate de Guzman (A) submitted the draft of
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against this Section 20, Article IV to the October 26, 1972
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section meeting of the 17-man committee of the Steering
shall be inadmissible in evidence, and specifically, the Council, Delegate Leviste (O) expressly made of record
portion thereof which declares inadmissible a that "we are adopting here the rulings of US Supreme
confession obtained from a person under investigation Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases." And We cannot
for the commission of an offense who has not been agree with the insinuation in the dissenting opinion of
informed of his right (to remain silent and) to counsel. Justice Castro that the Delegates did not know of the
existence of the second paragraph of Art. 125 of the
We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional Revised Penal Code.
mandate has and should be given a prospective and not Hence, We repeat, this historical background of Section
a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession 20, Article IV of the New Constitution, in Our considered
obtained from a person under investigation for the opinion, clearly shows that the new right granted therein
commission of an offense, who has not been informed to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of
of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in such right under pain of his confession being declared
evidence if the same had been obtained after the inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. prospective and not a retroactive effect. It did not exist
Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence before its incorporation in our New Constitution, as We
against the accused, if the same had been held in the Jose and Paras cases, supra.
obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, The authors of the dissenting opinions ignore the
even if presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he historical fact that the constitutional and legal
had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no guarantees as well as the legal precedents that insure
law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that the confession be voluntary, underwent a slow and
that date. tedious development. The constitutional guarantee in
question might indeed have come late in the progress of
The Constitutional Convention at the time it deliberated the law on the matter. But it is only now that it had come
on Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution was under Section 20 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
aware of the Escobedo and Miranda rule which had That is all that our duty and power ordain Us to
been rejected in the case of Jose. That is the reason proclaim; We cannot properly do more.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 637
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the Definitive ruling in Morales, Jr., vs. Enrile issued the
presence of counsel. guidelines to be observed by law enforcers during
custodial investigation. The court specifically ruled that
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or (t)he right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, counsel. Thereafter, in People vs. Luvendino, x x
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention x. The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right
are prohibited. to counsel is not to be given legal effect was initially a
judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated on 20 March
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
inadmissible in evidence against him.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that doctrine
sanctions for violations of this section as well as affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of requirements and restrictions outlined
torture or similar practices and their families. in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do
not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the date
In Magtoto case it held that the provisions of the of promulgation ofMorales.Pursuant to the above
1973 Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of
Charter) must be prospectively applied. By parity of the Morales and Galit rulings because he executed his
reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to
Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983.
right to counsel during custodial investigation must be
made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied Petitioners contention that Article III, Section 12 of
retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect
confession was made prior to the effectivity of said for being favorable to him as an accused, cannot be
Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
counsel during custodial investigation without the provides that (p)enal laws shall have a retroactive
benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony
Constitution should, by such argumentation, be who is not a habitual criminal, what is being construed
admissible. here is a constitutional provision specifically contained
in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 640
statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration Held: The stereotyped "advice" of the Miranda rights
of the individual rights and privileges which the appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions
Constitution is designed to protect against violations by which are later repudiated assumed the nature of a
the government, or by individuals or groups of legal form or model. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and
individual. It is a charter of liberties for the individual artificial style does not create an impression of
and a limitation upon the power of the state. Penal laws, voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the
on the other hand, strictly and properly are those accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free and
imposing punishment for an offense committed against unconstrained giving up of a right is missing. Whenever
the state which the executive of the state has the power a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the
to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes person entitled to that protection, the presumption is
punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a always against the waiver. Consequently, the
crime or offense against its law. prosecution must prove with strong, convincing
evidence that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and
People v. Jara (1986)
deliberately manifested that he was not interested in
having a lawyer assist him during the taking of that
Facts:
confession and such proof was absent here.
Appellants were found guilty of robbery with homicide fo
r the killing and robbery of Ampara on June 9, 1978. In
People vs. Mahinay(1999)
another case, two of the appellants were found guilty of
homicide for the killing on the same date of Luisa Jara
Facts: Accused was convicted for rape and homicide of
while Felicisimo Jara, the husband of the
a 12 year old girl. He assailed the court decisions
deceased, was found guilty of parricide. Two of the
contending that his conviction was based on
appellants, Raymundo Vergara and
circumstantial evidence that fails to prove his guilt
Bernardo Bernadas, made extrajudicial confessions
beyond reasonable doubt and that an extrajudicial
implicating Jara as the mastermind. The confessions
confession was taken from him in violation of his
were taken while the two were held incommunicado in
constitutional rights on custodial interrogation.
the presence of five policemen and after two weeks of
detention.
Issue: w/n court erred in convicting the accused merely
on ground of circumstantial evidence and not beyond
Issue: there was a valid waiver of right to counsel
reasonable ground? No
during extrajudicial confession? No
w/n his rights to lawful custodial investigation was
violated?
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 641
void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses confession was extracted under threat and intimidation;
to speak; (2) the lawyer's (Atty. Jungcos participation was only as
9. That the person arrested must be informed that a witness during the signing of the prepared confession
he may indicate in any manner at any time or and not during the investigation or interrogation itself;
stage of the process that he does not wish to be and (3) appellant was made to sign the confession
questioned with warning that once he makes such without having read it and without the presence
indication, the police may not interrogate him if of counsel.
the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun; Issue: w/n the appellants confession admissible? YES
10. The person arrested must be informed that
his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the Held:
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar A confession is defined in jurisprudence as a
him from invoking it at any time during the declaration made voluntarily and without compulsion or
process, regardless of whether he may have inducement by a person, stating or acknowledging that
answered some questions or volunteered some he has committed or participated in the commission of a
statements; crime. In jurisprudence, no confession can be admitted
11. He must also be informed that any in evidence unless it is given: 1. Freely and voluntarily,
statement or evidence, as the case may be, without compulsion, inducement or trickery 2. Knowingly
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, based on an effective communication to the individual
whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in under custodial investigation of his constitutional rights;
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. and 3. Intelligently with full appreciation of its
importance and comprehension of its consequences.
When all these requirements are met and the
confession is admitted in evidence, the burden of proof
that it was obtained by undue pressure, threat or
People vs. Fabro (1997) intimidation rests upon the accused. This adherence to
the Constitution is further confirmed by the confession
Facts: Nicomedes Fabro, and four others were charged itself. It starts off with a Pasubali wherein appellant was
with murder of a certain Dionisio Joaquin. RTC found informed of his constitutional rights and a Pagpapatunay
them guilty. In Fabros appeal, he contends that his which confirmed that he understood said rights. Both
defense of alibi should be considered and that parts also serve as a written proof of appellants waiver
his extrajudicial confession must be deemed in fulfilment of the requirements of the Constitution.
inadmissible for the following reasons: (1) appellants Confession - It is a declaration made voluntarily and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 643
was interrogated, whether he was medically examined During the investigation, accused was apprised of his
before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the
efforts trying to discover late body marks of assistance of counsel. When appellant was asked to
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical give a written statement, he refused to do so pending
abuse alone. arrival of his lawyer. Accused contends that his arrest
and the seizure of the bag containing prohibited drugs
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was null and void. He also contends that he was not
was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains assisted by counsel during custodial investigation,
in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused where he was forced to sign the photocopy of the
colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These marked money, the Receipt of Property Seized, and the
physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. Booking and Information Sheet.
They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa
Rebada that the victim was raped.These are Issue:
inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 1. w/n the arrest of the accused and the seizure of
Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial the plastic bag were valid? Yes
interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the 2. w/n the documents (photocopy of the marked
crime without the benefit of counsel. twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and
the Booking and Information Sheet) signed by
People vs de Lara (1994) the accused during the investigation were
Facts: admissible in evidence? No
After a surveillance conducted, a buy-bust operation
was conducted by the police, as a consequence of Held:
which, accused was arrested. The accused already 1. The accused was caught in flagrante as a result
pocketed the marked money and handed two foils to the of a buy-bust operation. There was no need for a
police when he sensed the presence of police warrant. The policemen were not only authorized
operatives. He tried to retrieve the two foils but he was but were also under obligation to apprehend the
prevented from doing so. He tried to escape by running drug pusher even without a warrant. The
inside his house. The police pursued him and were able policemens entry into the house of the accused
to subdue him. The accused admitted that he kept without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a
prohibited drugs in his house. He even showed the person caught committing an offense in flagrante.
arresting officers a blue plastic bag containing The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid.
prohibited drugs. The team, together with the accused, The seizure of the plastic bag was the result of
proceeded to WPD headquarters for investigation. the accuseds arrest inside the house. A
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 645
contemporaneous search may be conducted testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while
upon the person of the arrestee and the he was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave
2. There was no showing that accused was then more credence to their categorical declarations than to
assisted by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into the appellant's denials. That is as it should be for as law
writing. (The rejection of these evidence would enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their
not affect the conviction of the accused in view of official duties in a regular manner. Their task of
the abundance of other evidence establishing his apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade
guilt.) is difficult enough without legal and procedural
technicalities to make it doubly so.
PEOPLE V LINSANGAN
themselves. It is not an extra-judicial statement and (i.e., 10 February 1983), there was no rule of doctrine
cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction". prescribing that waiver of the right to counsel may be
However, we sustain appellant's contention that his validly made only with the assistance of counsel. It is
signature on the Receipt of Property Seized is scarcely necessary to add that we are here referring
inadmissible as evidence, as it was given without the only to extrajudicial confessions and waivers which
assistance of counsel. In People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA were made voluntarily and intelligently.
732 (1992), we stated that appellant's signature on this
document is a declaration against his interest and a tacit
admission of the crime charged. Any admission taken PEOPLE v. DY
from appellant, as a result of a violation of his Facts:
constitutional right, is inadmissible in evidence against Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island
him. But even disregarding this exhibit, the remaining and was sentenced with murder before the trial court for
evidence on record is sufficient to sustain appellant's shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused
conviction. contends the court erred in admitting the presentation of
the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police
officer and made a confession on the crime and
PEOPLE V LUVENDINO informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a
Facts: statement the accused denied to have done. They
Luvendino contends that the "demonstration" or re- assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that
enactment and his extrajudicial confession were such statement was not made in writing and is in
effected and secured in the absence of a valid waiver by violation of the due process required in custodial
him of his constitutional rights and that the re-enactment investigation.
and the confession should be held inadmissible in
evidence because they had been involuntarily made. Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented by the
prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
Held: accused.
Luvendino validly waived his right to counsel so far as
his extrajudicial confession was concerned, although he Held:
was not assisted by counsel when he initially signed his In view of the documentary evidence on record the
confession at the police headquarters (disregarding for defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral
present purposes only, the subsequent events in the confession made by the accused to the officer and
office of the Provincial Fiscal). At the time the telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
extrajudicial confession and waiver were first executed surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 647
against him. This is because such confession was made additional evidence to support its case. To disregard a
unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was major portion of the prosecutions case at a late stage
not under investigation when he made the oral during an appeal goes against the norms of
confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke fundamental fairness. Indeed, justice is dispensed not
compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial only for the accused, but also for the prosecution. Be
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES that as it may, and even if we now affirm appellants
GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the conviction for murder, we do not, however agree with
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of the trial courts imposition of the death sentence,
what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral because the proven aggravating circumstance of
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a dwelling was not alleged in the Information.
case it must be given in substance. Thus the oral
confession made by the accused outside the ambit of N. RIGHT TO BAIL
custodial investigation can be admissible in court and
was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the PEOPLE V FITZGERALD
accused being guilty of the crime. Facts:
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in granting
respondent Fitzgerald's Motion for Bail despite the fact
PEOPLE V SAMUS that the latter was charged with a crime punishable by
Facts: reclusion perpetua(rape of a 13 year old girl) and the
Appellant claims that his alleged confession to the evidence of his guilt is strong.
media while in police custody cannot be admitted in
evidence. He further contends that the pair of earrings, Held:
the turnover receipt, as well as the testimonies of It is bad enough that the CA granted bail on grounds
Pontaos and Bitos, relative thereto should be excluded other than those stated in the Motion filed by
for being fruits of the poisonous tree. respondent; it is worse that it granted bail on the mere
claim of the latter's illness. Bail is not a sick pass for an
Held: ailing or aged detainee or prisoner needing medical
While it is true that the confessions of appellant were care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of illness is
made without benefit of counsel, they are still not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
admissible in evidence because of appellants failure to courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick.
make timely objections before the trial court. If only the There may also be an existing proposition for the
defense had proffered them on time, the prosecution "selective decarceration of older prisoners" based on
could have been warned of the need to present findings that recidivism rates decrease as age
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 648
increases. But, in this particular case, the CA made no ISSUE: Whether or not the court should affirm the
specific finding that respondent suffers from an ailment Hernandez ruling.
of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in HELD:
danger. It merely declared respondent not in the best of Enrile filed for habeas corpus because he was denied
health even when the only evidence on record as to the bail although ordinarily a charge of rebellion would
latter's state of health is an unverified medical certificate entitle one for bail. The crime of rebellion charged
stating thatrespondent's condition required him to "xxx against him however is complexed with murder and
be confined in a more sterile area xxx." That medical multiple frustrated murders the intention of the
recommendation was even rebuffed by the CA itself prosecution was to make rebellion in its most serious
when, in its Resolution, it held that the physical form so as to make the penalty thereof in the maximum.
condition of respondent does not prevent him from The SC ruled that there is no such crime as Rebellion
seeking medical attention while confined in prison. with murder and multiple frustrated murder. What Enrile
et al can be charged of would be Simple Rebellion
because other crimes such as murder or all those that
ENRILE V SALAZAR may be necessary to the commission of rebellion is
Facts: absorbed hence he should be entitiled for bail. The SC
In February 1990, SenEnrile was arrested. He was however noted that a petition for habeas corpus was not
charged together with Mr. & Mrs. Panlilio, and Honasan the proper remedy so as to avail of bail. The proper step
for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple that should have been taken was for Enrile to file a
frustrated murder which allegedly occurred during their petition to be admitted for bail. He should have
failed coup attempt. Enrile was then brought to Camp exhausted all other efforts before petitioning for habeas
Karingal. Enrile later filed for the habeas corpus alleging corpus. The Hernandez ruling is still valid. All other
that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. crimes committed in carrying out rebellion are deemed
That he was charged with a criminal offense in an absorbed. The SC noted, however, that there may be a
information for which no complaint was initially filed or need to modify the rebellion law. Considering that the
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was essence of rebellion has been lost and that it is being
denied due process; denied his right to bail; and used by a lot of opportunists to attempt to grab power.
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant
issued without the judge who issued it first having
personally determined the existence of probable cause. LAVIDES V CA
Facts:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 649
ManoletLavides was arrested on April 3, 1997 for child motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail
abuse under R.A. No. 7610. His arrest was made because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
without a warrant as a result of an entrapment arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing
conducted by the police. of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at
Lavides filed a motion to quash the informations against once and thereafter be released on bail. These
him and asked the trial court to suspend the scenarios certainly undermine the accuseds
arraignment scheduled. constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon
Trial court, in separate orders, denied petitioners valid complaint or information sufficient to charge him
motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, with a crime and his right to bail.
and to suspend arraignment. Accordingly, petitioner was
arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him and then ordered him released CARPIO V MAGLALANG
upon posting bail bonds. Facts:
An information for murder was filed against Escao and
Held: ten other unindentified persons by the provincial fiscal in
In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted the Regional Trial Court of Bataan at Balanga. Four
before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be days later, the Acting Executive Judge of said court
precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the issued an order of arrest against Escao recommending
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there no bail for his provisional liberty.
would then be no need for the arraignment of the In opposing said application, the public prosecutor
accused. In the second place, the trial court could averred that the accused was charged with a capital
ensure the presence of petitioner at the arraignment offense for which no bail may be availed of, that the
precisely by granting bail and ordering his presence at reasons advanced in said application would be
any stage of the proceedings, such as arraignment. overcome by strong and sufficient evidence; and that
Under Rule 114, 2(b) of the Rules on Criminal during the custodial investigation, he was represented
Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that "the by counsel.
accused shall appear before the proper court whenever
so required by the court or these Rules," while under Held:
Rule 116, 1(b) the presence of the accused at the A reading of the April 2, 1987 order convinces us that
arraignment is required. the court below was remiss in its duty as enunciated in
On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an People vs. San Diego. Without summarizing the factual
accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated
position where he has to choose between (1) filing a the number of prosecution witnesses but not their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 650
respective testimonies, and concluded that the evidence charge investigation only after one year because
presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men
strong" to deny bail to Escao. On this point alone, the were involved in the failed coup.
order granting bail to Escao should be invalidated.
BAYLON V SISON
COMMENDADOR V DE VILLA Facts:
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on granting bail to the accused charged with double
June 5, 1990, but the application was denied. He filed murder. Prosecution was not given notice of at least 3
with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus days before the scheduled hearing for bail in violation of
with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing of
preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from
provisional liberty. However he was not released the schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution
immediately. The RTC now declared that even military also assails that they were not given the chance to
men facing court martial proceedings can avail the right present evidence that strongly prove the guilt of the
to bail. accused. Respondent judge justifies not having
committed grave abuse of discretion since the
Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the prosecution did not interpose objection with his orders
accused right to bail. and the lack of previous notice was cured with the filing
of motion for reconsideration.
Held:
The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in abuse in discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.
the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy trial Held:
is given more emphasis in the military where the right to The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the
bail does not exist. discretion of the judge in granting bail to the accused
On the contention that they had not been charged after considering that the motion for bail was filed on a
more than one year from their arrest, there was Saturday and the hearing was immediately conducted
substantial compliance with the requirements of due on Monday thereby depriving the prosecution to make
process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day notice rule
Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre- embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 651
well established rule of law that bail is not a matter of trial was set. Again, the petition for bail was not heard
right and requires a hearing where the accused is on said date as the prosecutions witnesses in
charged with an offense which is punishable by death, connection with said petition were not notified. Another
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Respondent attempt was made to reset the hearing to July 17, 1995.
judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of
petition for bail before making an outright grant of this Complainant allegedly saw the accused in Rosario, La
motion. Union on July 3, 1995 and later learned that the
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes: accused was out on bail despite the fact that the petition
. . The prosecution must first be accorded an had not been heard at all. Upon investigation,
opportunity to present evidence because by the very complainant discovered that bail had been granted and
nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis a release order dated June 29, 1995 was issued on the
of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed basis of a marginal note dated June 22, 1995, at the
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused bottom of the bail petition by Assistant Prosecutor Oliva
is strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised which stated: No objection: P80,000.00, signed and
regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural approved by the assistant prosecutor and eventually by
due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence respondent Judge. Note that there was already a
submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the release order dated June 29, 1995 on the basis of the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial marginal note of the Assistant Prosecutor dated June
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright 22, 1995 when the hearing of the bail petition was
arbitrariness. aborted and instead arraignment took place) when
another hearing was scheduled for July 17, 1995.
BASCO vs. RAPATALO
269 SCRA 220 Respondent Judge alleged that he granted the petition
based on the prosecutors option not to oppose the
petition as well as the latters recommendation setting
FACTS: An information for murder was filed against the bailbond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred
Morente. The accused Morente filed a petition for bail. that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the
The hearing for said petition was set for May 31, 1995 petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to
by petitioner but was not heard since the respondent approve it or not. He further declared that when he
Judge was then on leave. It was reset to June 8, 1995 approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the
but on said date, respondent Judge reset it to June 22, prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more
1995. The hearing for June 22, 1995, however, did not familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary
materialize. Instead, the accused was arraigned and investigation. Furthermore, the private prosecutor was
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 652
not around at the time the public prosecutor 114, section 7 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
recommended bail. Respondent Judge stated that in states, No person charged with a capital offense, or an
any case, the bailbond posted by accused was offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on imprisonment when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall
account of complainants motion for reconsideration. be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor apparently criminal action.
conformed to and approved the motion for
reconsideration. Accused is confined at the La Union When the grant of bail is discretionary, the
Provincial Jail. On August 14 1995, in a sworn letter- prosecution has the burden of showing that the
complaint, complainant Basco charged respondent evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
Judge Leo M. Rapatalo with gross ignorance or willful However, the determination of whether or not the
disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial
an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by
and conducting a hearing. the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
ISSUE: CAN A JUDGE SET BAIL EVEN W/O hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of
CONDUCTING A HEARING OR RECEIVING the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be
EVIDENCE? NO. weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial
HELD: If the denial of bail is authorized in capital discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
offenses, it is only in theory that the proof being strong, submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of
the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, cross examination and to introduce his own evidence in
rather than face the verdict of the court. Hence the rebuttal.
exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should
be applied in direct ratio to the extent of probability of To be sure, the discretion of the trial court, is not
evasion of the prosecution. In practice, bail has also absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and
been used to prevent the release of an accused who exercised within reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion,
might otherwise be dangerous to society or whom the by its very nature involves the exercise of the judges
judges might not want to release. individual opinion and the law has wisely provided that
It is in view of the abovementioned practical function of its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while
bail that it is not a matter of right in cases where the allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of
person is charged with a capital offense punishable by his own individual views, prevent them from getting out
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Article of control.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 653
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence An evaluation of the records in the case at bar reveals
of guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of that respondent Judge granted bail to the accused
judicial discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a without first conducting a hearing to prove that the guilt
hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses of the accused is strong despite his knowledge that the
to just file a comment or leave the application for bail to offense charged is a capital offense in disregard of the
the discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required procedure laid down in Section 8, Rule 114 of the Rules
if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in of Court as amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. 94.
Corollarily, another reason why hearing of a petition for The absence of objection from the prosecution is never
bail is required, as can be gleaned from the Tucay v. a basis for granting bail to the accused. It is the courts
Domagas, is for the court to take into consideration the determination after a hearing that the guilt of the
guidelines set forth in Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules accused is not strong that forms the basis for granting
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 654
- WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should
despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is strong which should be strong to justify denial. this
evidence proving respondents guilt for the crime determination is a matter of judicial discretion.
charged.
- By judicial discretion, the law mandates the
HELD determination of whether proof is evident or the
YES presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident
- The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed to proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear,
mention and include some facts which are significant strong evidence which leads a well guarded
factors and circumstances which are strong, clear, and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an
convincing. Consideration of the said factors and offense has been committed as charged, that the
circumstances would have resulted in the denial of bail. accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be
Reasoning punished capitally if the law is administered.
- Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides: Presumption great exists when the circumstances
All persons, except those charged with offenses testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to
of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on probability of any other conclusion.
recognizance as may be provided by law. the right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the In other words, the test is not whether the evidence
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of
guilt.
- Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides:
No person charged with a capital offense, or an - In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life judge are as follows:
imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong, 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of application for bail or require him to submit his
criminal prosecution. recommendation;
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail
- In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to
matter of right considering that the punishment for the present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
offense is reclusion perpetua. the grant of the bail is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 656
provincial prosecutor Romeo Sacquing was presented ISSUE: WON the allegations of the complainant would
by the respondent to disprove the accusation that he warrant the imposition of administrative sanction against
granted bail to the accused without conducting any respondent judge. YES.
hearing.
HELD: Bail should be fixed according to the
2. Catral allegedly reduced bailbond for an illegal circumstances of each case. The amount fixed should
possession of firearms case from 180K (recommended be sufficient to ensure the presence of the accused at
by prosecutor) to 30K without hearing. Catral says that the trial yet reasonable enough to comply with the
bailbond recommended was 180K. Accused filed for constitutional provision that bail should not be
reduction and there was no opposition from prosecutor. excessive. Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required to
3. Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a homicide be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he must
case was granted with a bailbond of P14,800.00 by be asked for his recommendation because in fixing the
Judge Segundo Catral. The amount is too low. It is amount of bail, the judge is required to take into account
because this Nilo de Rivera is another goon of Julio a number of factors such as the applicant character and
Bong Decierto. Catral averred that he was acting on the reputation, forfeiture of other bonds or whether he is a
recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor and fugitive from justice.
mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable amount
of bailbond coupled by the fact that the evidence on When the accused is charged with an offense
record is merely circumstantial and there was no punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
eyewitness to the commission of crime granted bailbond imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
in the sum of P14,800.00. hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, not only to take into account the
4. Jimmy Siriban the right hand man of Julio Bong guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules
Dicierto was sued for concubinage and convicted by of Court, but primarily to determine the existence of
Judge Herminio del Castillo in MTC. Jimmy Siriban strong evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the
appealed and it was elevated to the RTC Branch 08, the accused.
sala of Judge Segundo Catral. Judge Segundo Catral
acquitted Jimmy Siriban, rumors in Aparri spread that Respondent judge, in two instances, granted bail to an
the wife of Judge Segundo Catral went to Jimmy Siriban accused charged with murder, without having
house to get an envelope. conducted any hearing as to whether the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 658
The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in accused were still at large as he even had to direct their
cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a arrest in the same order where he simultaneously
comment or leave the application of bail to the sound granted them bail. At this juncture, there is a need to
discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise required if reiterate the basic principle that the right to bail can only
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail. The otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be
importance of a hearing has been emphasized in not a premature, not to say incongruous, to file a petition for
few cases wherein the court ruled that, even if the bail for some whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to
interpose an objection to the motion for bail, it is still Trillanes IV v. Pimentel
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask G.R. No. 179817,
searching questions from which it may infer the strength June 27, 2008
of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it against the
accused.
FACTS:
The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup detat in
against the accused is strong is a matter of judicial relation to the Oakwood Incident. In the 2007
discretion, It may rightly be exercised only after the elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year
evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner
the discretion is directed to the weight of evidence and now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all
since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly official functions of the Senate, alleging mainly that his
exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still
a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case,
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner there was already conviction.
having the right of cross examination and to introduce
evidence in his own rebuttal. ISSUE:
Whether or not valid classification between
The procedural lapse of respondent judge is aggravated petitioner and Jalosjos exists
by the fact that even though the accused in Criminal
Case No. 07-874, People v. Ahmed Duerme, have yet RULING:
to be arrested, respondent already fixed bail in the sum
of P200,000.00. Respondent evidently knew that the The petition is bereft of merit.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 659
xxx That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup
d'etat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses
however. covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
in the pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to charged.
Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from application for bail and for release on recognizance was
denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 660
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an controlling is the determination of whether the evidence
application for bail or imported from a trial court's of guilt is strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right nor of
accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional discretion.
liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of
the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage PEOPLE VS. FORTES
of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement 223 SCRA 619
with its underlying rationale of public self-defense 25 JUN 1993
applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the
find relevance as a factor in ascertaining the reasonable 1987 Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the
amount of bail and in cancelling a discretionary grant of Revised Rules of Court, as amended, that before
bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 661
Constitution did not prohibit this, the right to bail conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
becomes meaningless. The sole permissible function of would amount to a refusal and render nugatory the
money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, constitutional right to bail, SC will not hesitate to
and declared that bail set at a higher figure than an exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required
amount reasonably calculated to fulfill thus purpose is remedy. There is grim irony in an accused being told
"excessive", that he has a right to bail but at the same time being
required to post such an exorbitant sum.
Therefore, that fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as
the bail is clearly violative of the Constitution. Under the However, because petitoner escaped from jail, no
circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the Judges order.
the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed
P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated Government of the US vs. Judge Puruganan
murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the GR No 148571
Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses. Facts:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
Guidelines in the fixing of bail: United States Government, through diplomatic channels
(1) ability of the accused to give bail requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also
(2) nature of the offense known as Mario Batacan Crespo. A Petition for
(3) penalty for the offense charged Extradition was filed with the RTC, but before the court
(4) character and reputation of the accused could act, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
(5) health of the accused Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion, which prayed that
(6) character and strength of the evidence petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial hearing. This was granted. After the hearing, Jimenez
(8) forfeiture of other bonds submitted a required Memorandum, which sought an
(9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue,
arrested he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for
hearing and the court directing the issuance of a
Discretion is with the court to rule upon the warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary
question of bail. We must stress, however, that where liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 663
On December 21, 2001, petitioner government filed an fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed.
urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was While not a treaty, the principles contained in the
denied by respondent judge. said Declaration are now recognized as customarily
binding upon the members of the international
Issue: community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the
W/N trial court committed GAD amounting to lack or SC, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held
excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to that under the Constitution, the principles set forth
bail for there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory in that Declaration are part of the law of the land. In
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
proceedings? which the Philippines signed and ratified.
admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal two (2) years without having been convicted of any
proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this crime. By any standard, such an extended period of
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental
pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation
cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under of liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant
international conventions to uphold human rights. him bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no While our extradition law does not provide for the grant
justification why it should not also be allowed in of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the UDHR prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right
applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why to due process under the Constitution.
it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue. demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under
the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations
various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning and defeats the purpose of extradition. However, it
respect for the promotion and protection of human does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More
to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
impaired. Constitution, but also by international conventions, to
which the Philippines is a party. We should not,
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for
administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to satisfactorily met.
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced
to transfer to the demanding state following the In this case, there is no showing that private respondent
proceedings. Temporary detention may be a presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk.
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
length of time of the detention should be reasonable. court to determine whether private respondent may be
Records show that Munoz had been detained for over
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 666
granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
evidence. supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly
asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable
probability that the accused will not comply with this
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
198 SCRA 130
5 JUN 1991 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen
years and was an escapee from detention when
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no
committed before and after February 1986. Private known address;
respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado
(a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's
Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) License to substantiate his false identity;
the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite,"
defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has turned out to be also a false address;
been extinguished. This was denied. 5. He and his companions were on board a private
vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which address were also found to be false;
was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid
PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. for his arrest.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942
and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the
amendatory decrees. right to bail.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, "That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in the
providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of Municipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo,
rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
favorable to him. court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another to
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another better realize their purpose armed with a knife and a .38
case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were caliber revolver respectively, with treachery and/or
made therein: accused to remain under custody, evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, stab and shot
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a Nicanor Tamorite with the knife and .38 caliber revolver
condition that they will submit themselves in the with which they were then provided, inflicting upon the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was said Nicanor Tamorite stab wounds and gun shot
dismissed. wounds on the different parts of his body which caused
his death immediately thereafter."
Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We - prosecution recommended NO BAIL for the provisional
hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the liberty of the accused.
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver - July 22, 1991 - TC issued a WARRANT OF ARREST
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, against the accused
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person
with a right recognized by law. - October 18, 1991 TC ordered the case ARCHIVED
for failure to locate the two accused
PEOPLE v MANES
303 SCRA 231 - June 24, 1992 - Sergon and Ramil Manes were
PARDO; February 17, 1999 ARRESTED in Romblon, Romblon
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 668
- September 17, 1992 - Upon ARRAIGNMENT, both SERGON Manes with a gory knife and he also saw
accused pleaded NOT GUILTY to the information Nicanor running away, with blood on his back.
- August 25, 1992 - accused filed a PETITION FOR Ramil Manes pursued Nicanor and shot him hitting him
BAIL which was opposed by the prosecution. TC did not at the back, just above the waistline. Both accused
hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accused invoke continued to chase Nicanor who ran towards the
the right to bail at any stage of the trial. premises of the house of ADING Ablado. Ramil Manes
fired two more shots. It could not be determined
- January 13, 1995 - TC convicted the accused of whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the accused
murder were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading.
Jose who was near Nicanor when the two accused
- February 10, 1995 - both accused appealed to SC chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan
where accused questioned TCs failure heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told
his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and
(a) to hear the petition for bail that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and
(b) to consider defense of relative in favor of Ramil the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of
Manes and Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of
(c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a mere victim of the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with
Tamorite's unlawful aggression 2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab
wound.
According to the prosecution
> June 23, 1991 5 in the afternoon, ALAN Catequista According to the accused(Ramil)
with NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita, went to see > June 23, 1991 in the afternoon, he was at home
a basketball game at the barangay plaza. When the cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts
game was over, Alan approached and invited Nicanor to coming from the direction of the barangay basketball
go home; at that time, he was still seated. Accused court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his
RAMIL Manes approached Nicanor and pointed a 38 house. He went to the window to check what it was. He
caliber revolver at him, saying "It is a bad luck you did saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete
not kill me during the fiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. pavement and several persons were ganging up on him,
Now I will be the one to kill you." Nicanor ran to Alan three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose.
and used him as a shield from Ramil. At that point, Alan They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting
heard a thud and as he looked back, he saw accused him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 669
gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the
basketball court. accused. While the accused can apply for bail and
have the court hear his application summarily and
> While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a promptly, such right may be waived expressly or
warning shot to prevent Nicanor from stabbing his impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try
brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of the case without resolving the petition for bail that
Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about appellants filed.
three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten
meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial
shot that hit Nicanor who fell to the ground. Meanwhile, court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only
Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the direction in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure
of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second to bring to the attention of the trial Court at the earliest
shot because he saw the group of Alan approaching opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived
armed with guns .12 Ramil and his brother Sergon went their right to bail.
into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they
were arrested in Romblon. - the defense of relative FAILED TO PROSPER
- prosecutions set of facts was favored by the court because:
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
with the accessory penalties of the law and to and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to
Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus be heard by counsel.
P21,250.00, as actual damages.
The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of
the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show
PEOPLE v HOLGADO whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was
GR No. L-2809 (March 22, 1950) real and whether it had reference tothe commission of
Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No
court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal investigation was opened by the court on this matter in
detention because according to the information, being a the presence of the accused and there is now no way of
private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable determining whether the supposed instruction is a good
motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the
house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with
depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.
He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with
was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the
was presented to indict the latter. simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was
not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the
Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it
proceedings in the trial court. that the accused be assisted by counsel especially
because of the qualified plea given by him and the
Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the
defendant appears without attorney, he must be court.
informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney
being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the PEOPLE v SANTOCILDES
aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney GR No. 109149 (December 21, 1999)
de oficio todefend him. A reasonable time must be Facts: On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged
allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. with the crime of rape of a girl less than 9 years old.
Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no Appellant contends that he was represented
person shall be held to answer for a during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong,
criminaloffense without due process of law", and that all who for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 671
and even conducted the direct examination and cross- rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed
examinations of the witnesses. On appeal, however, with or performed perfunctorily.
appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty.
Igmedio S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Hence, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of
Ompong is actually not a member of the bar. Appellant conviction and ordered the remand of the case to
therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to the trial court for new trial.
counsel should necessarily result in his acquittal of the
crime charged. The Supreme Court also directed the IBP to investigate
Ompong's unauthorized practice of law.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand,
maintains that notwithstanding the fact that appellant's PEOPLE v AGBAYANI
counsel during trial was not a member of the bar, GR No. 122770 (January 16, 1998)
appellant was afforded due process since he has been Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-
given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal year old daughter and was found guilty of the crime of
that said person "presented the evidence for the rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court
defense with the ability of a seasoned lawyer and in by the new counsel of the accused assailing the
general handled the case of appellant in a professional irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
and skillful manner." accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the
accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the
Issue: Whether or not the accused was deprived, violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation
though no fault of his own, to be defended by a person for trial.
authorized to practice law amounting to denial of
due process. Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to
disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
Held: The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground
Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 to reverse the judgment of conviction and to send the
Constitution. Such right is guaranteed to minimize the case back for a new trial.
imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused
is pitted against the awesome prosecutorymachinery of Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to
the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the
principle of due process which basically means that a accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to
person must be heard before being condemned. The reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court
due process requirement is a part of a person's basic must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 672
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and date, despite appointment by the court of Atty. Mario
that such a presumption can only be overcome by an Rivera as de officio counsel for the accused, hearing
affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been was re-set to September 8, 1970 on motion of Atty.
held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or Rivera, who was prompted to ask for it because of
that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to accused desire to be represented by a de parte
inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be counsel. Prior to the next hearing, Atty. Rivera moved to
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of withdraw as de officio counsel and it was favorably
such right. acted on by the court on September 7, 1970. At the
second hearing on September 8, 1970, for failure of the
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides de officio and de parte counsels to appear, despite a
that after a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to second call of the case, the hearing was re-set for the
two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good next day and the court appointed Atty. Dominador
cause grants him further time. It must be pointed out Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio
so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible counsel was in Court, so Atty. Rivera was reappointed
error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes
be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, only. The accused del Rosario entered a plea of guilty
appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, butqualified it with the allegation that he committed the
he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to crime out of fear of his co-accused Eloy Magsi and the
believe that the counsel who represented the appellant other coaccused. Appellant was found guilty of murder
was not prepared during the trial as records showed he and made to suffer the death penalty.
was able to cross-examine the complainant and there
was no ground to claim he is incompetent to represent
the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the Issue: Whether or not there was a violation of the rights
decision of the lower court. of the accused.
PEOPLE v MAGSI
GR No. L-32888 (August 12, 1983) Held: YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of
Facts: Soon after appellant was apprehended on cases should not be effected at the sacrifice of the basic
August 20, 1970, his arraignment was scheduled before rights of the accused. Citing People vs. Domingo (55
the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. SCRA 243-244): the trial courts
The case was actually set and rescheduled for six (6) shouldexercise solicitous care before sentencing the
times, first of which was on August 1, 1970. On that accused on a plea of guilty especially in capital offenses
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 673
by first insuring that the accused fully understands the while in the original complaint there were two other
gravity of the offense, the severity of the consequences accused with the same surname as the lawyer,
attached thereto as well as the meaning and Geronimo Pajarito and Samuel Pajarito, after such
significance of his plea of guilty; and that the prudent preliminary investigation, no doubt due to the efforts of
and proper thing to do in capital cases is to take Atty. Geronimo Pajarito, possibly a kinsman, they were
testimony, to assure the court that the accused has not both discharged for lack of probable cause, the court
misunderstood the nature and effect of his plea of guilty. ask the appellant if he has a lawyer; after answering in
Mere pro-forma appointment of de officio counsel, who the negative, the Court then appointed Atty. Pajarito as
fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused, counsel de oficio for the defendant. After marking it of
resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of record that he was appointed as counsel de oficio, the
evidence when in fact none was conducted, perfunctory Attorney was ask whether he wanted to confer with the
queries addressed to the accused whether he appellant. This was answered with: I think I know the
understands the charges and the gravity of the penalty, case. The Court then immediately proceeded with the
are not sufficient compliance. hearing. In the decision itself, there is this meaningful
admission by the court: No evidence was presented for
PEOPLE v MALUNSING and in behalf of appellant Manuel Villegas.
GR No. L-29015 (April 29, 1975)
Facts: It was the failure of the lower court to respect the Issue: Whether or not the appointed counsel de oficio
constitutional right to counsel, so it is alleged, that is Atty. Geronimo Pajarito lacks candor in the exercise of
the basis for seeking the reversal of a conviction for his profession.
murder of appellant Manuel Villegas. The appellant is a
very old man, ignorant and unlettered; during the entire Held: It is not enough that a counsel de oficio was
proceeding in the case, the appellant while present did appointed, were the accused has indicated that he
not know what was going on; the trial court never wanted a lawyer of his own choice, a decision prompted
apprised the appellant of his fundamental right to be moreover by the fact that he had lost confidence in the
assisted by a lawyer; the trial court did not even bother number of the bar thus designated. Nor is it to manifest
inquiring why the appellant Manuel Villegas did not take respect for this right if the counsel de oficio thus named,
the witness stand. Attorney Geronimo Pajarito explicitly instead of conferring with the accused, would just
manifested in the opening of the trial that appellant blithely inform the judge that he was already fully
intimated to him that he had his own lawyer. There was prepared for his exacting responsibility. It was
an admission that he did appear for him in the unintended but the result could not rightly be
preliminary investigation but only because there was no distinguished from pure travesty. Appellant could then
other counsel. Parenthetically, it may be observed that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 674
rightfully invoke this constitutional guarantee of right to clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right
counsel. to counsel, for although he was provided with one, he
could not understand and communicate with him
PEOPLE v CUIZON concerning his defense such that, among other things,
GR No. 109287 (April 18, 1996) no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was
FACTS: Cuizon, Pua, and Paul Lee are found guilty of denied his right to have compulsory process to
transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine guarantee the availability of witnesses and the
hydrochloride, also known as shabu. production of evidence on his behalf, including the
services of a qualified and competent interpreter to
However, Appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or enable him to present his testimony. In sum, he was
understand a word of English or Filipino and only knows denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the
Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of
stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his origin for a re-trial.
testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28,
1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the PEOPLE v SERZO
reception of Lees testimony, his counsel, although GR No. 118435 (June 20, 1997)
notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the FACTS: Alfredo (victim) together with his wife Adelaida
trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their Alcantara were staying inside their house comfortably
right to present additional evidence, and the case was watching television when Susana Serzo mother of the
considered submitted for decision after the filing of accused and one Epifania Bentilacion came knocking at
memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask their doorsteps and pleading for help to bring out her
for the reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he grandchildren who were being held inside their house
submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who by her son (Mario Serzo Jr) the accused in this case.
was assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his The spouses were able to rescue the grandchildren and
memorandum. to bring them to a safer place. When returning to their
house, Alfredo Alcantara who was walking just
ISSUE: WON the trial court violated Paul Lee's armslength ahead of his wife, was attacked by accused
constitutional right to due process. Mario Serzo from behind. Accused stabbed Alfredo at
his back forcing the latter to scamper for his dear life
RULING: YES. The SolGen was right in saying that the and was declared dead on arrival in the hospital.
trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make Appellant was charged with murder filed by Rizal
available compulsory process and to see to it that Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Filipinas Z. Aguilar-Ata.
accused appellant Lee was given his day in court. It is Thereafter, pre-trial was waived and the case
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 675
proceeded to trial on the merits. After arraignment and restrict the accused's option to retain a counsel de parte
trial, accused was found guilty of the crime charged. if the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or
The accused contends that he was denied his right to the chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or the
counsel, a narration of the proceedings before the trial attorney declines to represent the accused for a valid
court, arraignment was set by the trial court during reason, e.g. conflict of interest and the like.
which appellant appeared without counsel. In this case, appellant had been given ample time
Consequently, the trial court appointed Atty. Wilfredo to secure the services of a counsel de parte, but his
Lina-ac as counsel de oficio for the arraignment only. subsequent appearances in court without such counsel
The presentation of evidence for the defense was reset and his act of allowing this situation to continue until the
as appellant was not ready to testify and he manifested presentation of his evidence betrays his lack of intention
his intention to secure the services of a counsel de to do so. It even appears that he was merely delaying
parte hence Atty. Lina-ac was relieved as counsel de his own presentation of evidence on purpose to the
oficio as a consequence Appellant appeared without prejudice of the offended party, the trial court and the
counsel, forcing the trial court to appoint another orderly administration of justice. Furthermore, appellant
counsel de oficio, respectively Bella Antonano and Atty. did not demonstrate in what way the services of his
Bonifacia Garcia. The trial court convicted the accused counsels de oficio were unsatisfactory. He did not cite
of the crime of murder. Hence, appealed was made to any instance substantiating his claim that he was not
the SC. effectively represented. In short, he was afforded a
chance to be heard by counsel of his own choice, but by
ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in not giving the his own neglect or mischief, he effectively waived such
defendant-appellant time to engage counsel of his own right. It taxes the mind to think that, almost two years
choice. since appellant first invoked his right to be represented
by counsel de parte, he still could not find one who
RULING: would suit his needs and desires. Neither did he
NO, SC affirmed the decision of the trial court. cooperate with his court-named lawyers.
The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed by the Therefore, it do not constitute a deprivation of
Constitution. The right covers the period beginning from appellant's constitutional right to counsel because he
custodial investigation, well into the rendition of was adequately represented by three court-appointed
judgment and even on appeal however right to counsel lawyers: Atty. Lina-ac, Atty. Antonano and Atty. Garcia.
de parte is not absolute. The court is obliged to balance Courts are not required to await indefinitely the pleasure
the privilege to retain a counsel of choice against the and convenience of the accused as they are also
states's and the offended party's equally important right mandated to promote the speedy and orderly
to speedy and adequate justice. Thus, the court may administration of justice. Nor should they countenance
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 676
Facts: - On September 24, 1986 at about 1:15 am, Sgt must show that Andrada has the real interest to
Sumabong, Sgt Gaces and Cpl Aresinio Ugerio were surrender unconditionally to the police authorities.
eating at the Marlows Restaurant in Baguio City. When - In this case however, surrender was not
Cpl Ugerio talked to a woman who passed by their spontaneous.
table, petitioner Peter Andrada, approached him and
scolded him. Sgt. Sumabong advised Andrada to pay PEOPLE v VALDESANCHO
his bills and go home as he was apparently drunk. GR No. 137051-52 (May 30, 2001)
- As Sumabong was paying the bills, he heard FACTS: Two counts of the crime of rape was charged
Ugerio moan in pain. He then saw Andrada hacking against Vicente Valdesancho. It was alleged that the
Ugerio with a bolo. Sumabong approached them but rape was committed against Elvie Basco on August 15
Andrada ran away. Andrada was then arrested in a and 16 1994, respectively. All evidence of the
waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and prosecution tried to prove that the victim was raped by
Magsaysay Ave. the accused on these dates.
- Andrada invoked self defense claiming that
Ugerio and Sumabong slapped his face and pointed The accused interposed the defense of alibi. He
their guns to his head. He also said that he ran away to contends that Elvie together with her mother, Leonida,
his house in Camdas Subd. He checked to see if his filed the instant cases against them because of the
mother was around to accompany him to surrender, but serious quarrel between Erlinda (wife of the accused
nobody was home. On his way to surrender, he say his and the older sister of the victim) and Leonida because
mother with a policeman. They proceeded to the police of the latter's relationship with a lesbian. He also said
station in Magsaysay Ave where Andrada surrenderd. that he had no misunderstanding or quarrel with Elvie.
The RTC however ruled against Andrada. He proved that on these dates he was in the town of
Sta. Maria helping Ka Usting prepare for the town fiesta.
Issue: WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary He also proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie,
surrender can be invoked by Andrada was no longer living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She
already transferred to Minayutan, Famy, Laguna where
Held: No she was in Grade 2.
Ratio: - Evidences showed that Andrada, after attacking The accused was convicted for two counts of rape
the victim, ran away. However, he was apprehended by committed on August 15 and 16, 1993 when the
the policemen who were in the waiting shed. informations filed against him alleged August 15 and 16,
- For voluntary surrender to be accepted as a 1994 as the dates when the crimes were committed. He
mitigating circumstance, it should be spontaneous and it contends that he was denied due process to defend
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 678
himself. His whole defense of alibi centered around sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be
August 15 and 16, 1994, the alleged dates of the rape had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In
incidents. order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made
ISSUE: WON the accused was denied of his right to be up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against the complaint with reasonable particularity of time,
him. place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and
circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a
RULING. YES. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 specific allegation of every fact and circumstances
Constitution mandates that no person shall be held necessary to constitute the crime charged."
liable for a criminal offense without due process of law.
It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the PEOPLE v CRISOLOGO
accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of GR No. 74145 (June 17, 1987)
accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be FACTS:
heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Zosimo Crisologo alias Amang, a deaf-mute,
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took was charged for robbery and homicide committed on 1
effect on December 1, 2000, provides that in all criminal May 1976 in Calamagoy, Poblacion Magsaysay, Davao
prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be del Sur. Accused was allegedly informed of the charged
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him through sign language but apparently no
against him. To convict an accused for an offense not sign language expert or representative was available.
alleged in the complaint or information violates such The accused through a counsel de oficio waived the
right. reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial
proceeded without any evidence being presented on his
The rationale behind informing the accused in writing of part. Finally, without the services of an expert in sign
the charges against him was explained by this Court as language ever being utilized at any stage of the
early as 1904 in U.S. v. Karelsen,[27] viz: proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and
"First. To furnish the accused with such a description of sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency
the charge against him as will enable him to make his was recommended, however, in view of the accused's
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction infirmity and his nearly ten-year detention as a suspect.
or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution ISSUE:
for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the Whether or not the accused was given due
facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are process of law and the insufficiency of the purely
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 679
circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the and all necessary means must be provided, and the law
constitutional presumption of innocence be in his favor. so contemplates, that the accused must not only be
HELD: confronted by the witnesses against him, but he must
The Supreme Court held that the absence of an be accorded all necessary means to know and
interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed understand the testimony given by said witnesses, and
to the accused, a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense must be placed in a condition where he can make his
with which he was charged and who could also have plea rebut such testimony, and give his own version of
communicated the accused's own version of the the transaction upon which the accusation is based.
circumstances which led to his implication in the crime,
deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a PEOPLE v QUITLONG
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Not even the GR No. 121502 (July 10, 1998)
accused's final plea of not guilty can excuse these FACTS
inherently unjust circumstances. - Calpito was a student from Baguio city. One time, he
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign wanted some fishballs so he and Gosil bought some
language and of any other means, whether in writing or fishballs worth P15. When Calpito counted his change,
otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against he found out that he only received P35 for his P100.
him denied the accused his fundamental right to due Confronted by Calpito and Gosil, the fishball vendor
process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the factual would not admit that he had short-changed Calpito. The
process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused 3 men kept arguing. Moments later, Soriano saw eight
was determined was not safeguarded. The accused men rushing towards Gosil and Calpito. Calpito got
could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard stabbed and fell to the ground.
by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the - The RTC found Ronnie Quitlong, Salvador Quitlong
nature and cause of the accusation against him in the and Emilio Senoto guilty of murder for the killing of
proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake. Jonathan Calpito. Accused-appellants, shortly after the
The Constitution of this state expressly provides that an filing of the information, submitted a motion for
accused has a right to be heard by himself and counsel, reinvestigation alleging that it was a certain Jesus
also, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; Mendoza who stabbed the victim. The trial court acted
against him, and, further to be confronted by the favorably on the motion. The City Prosecutor filed a
witnesses, who are to testify against him. In motion to admit an amended information on the basis of
constructing this constitutional provision it needs no affidavits. The information, as amended, included
discussion in deciding that all this must be done in a Jesus Mendoza among the named accused. But unlike
manner by which the accused can know, the nature and accused-appellants who were immediately arrested
the cause of the accusation he is called upon to answer, after the commission of the crime, Jesus Mendoza
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 680
remained at large. At their arraignment, the detained shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the
accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. accusation against him. The right to be informed of any
- On 21 April 1995, the trial court, following his such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules.
evaluation of the respective submissions of the - object of informing an accused in writing of the
prosecution and the defense, including their rebuttal and charges against him: First. To furnish the accused with
sur-rebuttal evidence, rendered its now assailed such a description of the charge against him as will
decision. enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection
ISSUES against a further prosecution for the same cause; and
1. WON the RTC abused its discretion and/or acted third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
in excess of or without jurisdiction in finding that there may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support
was conspiracy between and among the accused- a conviction, if one should be had. (United States vs.
appellants Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542). In order that this requirement
2. WON the RTC gravely abused its discretion may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions
and/or acted in excess of or without jurisdiction in of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and
finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime of intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with
Murder instead of Homicide reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the
HELD complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
1. YES, Quitlong is guilty of murder while the other 2 are fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
only accomplices. charged
2. NO, the crime was qualified The crime committed DISPOSITION appellant Ronnie Quitlong is found guilty
was qualified by abuse of superiority. While superiority of the crime of murder for the killing of Jonathan Calpito.
in number would not per se mean superiority in Appellants Salvador Quitlong and Emilio Senoto, Jr.,
strength, enough proof was adduced, however, to show are found guilty as accomplices in the commission of
that the attackers had cooperated in such a way as to the crime.
secure advantage of their superiority in strength
certainly out of proportion to the means of defense People v Marcelo
available to the person attacked. March 22, 1999
- Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in J. Vitug
particular, mandates that no person shall be held
answerable for a criminal offense without due process Facts:
of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 681
Carmelita lives with her two daughters Josefina and No. Section 6, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal
Jaezel. Not far from their residence is the store owned Procedure, in relation to Section 11 thereof, provides
by accused Ernesto Marcelo. The children grew fond of that the complaint or information would be sufficient if it
Ernesto because he usually gives them candies and in states the name of the accused; the designation of the
time Carmelita felt at ease with him and would leave the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
children under his care when she is away. of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
On March 8, 1993, Josefina would complain to her party; the approximate time of the commission of the
mother about a pain in her vagina and Carmelita would offense, and the place wherein the offense was
even notice her daughter inserting her hand in her panty committed. With respect particularly to the time of the
to prevent it from touching her vagina. When this commission of the offense, it is not necessary to state
strange behavior recurred, she confronted her daughter in the complaint or information the precise time at which
who admitted that accused, would insert his finger, and the offense was committed except when time is a
then later on his penis into his vagina. An information for material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be
rape was then filed against Ernesto. RTC convicted him. alleged to have been committed at any time as near to
Ernesto argues that the information averred to have the actual date at which the offense was committed as
taken place on 11 March 1993 and 06 March 1993, the information or complaint will permit.
pointing out that the trial court convicted him in Criminal
Case No. Q-93-51492 despite its opinion that rape had
been committed not on 06 March 1993 but in the People v Ambray
morning of 08 March before Carmelita arrived to fetch February 25, 1999
her children. He thus argues that the allegation in the J. Gonzaga-Reyes
information, not being sufficiently definite on the date of
the commission of the crime, has violated the Facts:
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the Melenia Hernandez, the victim, was a grade three
nature and cause of accusation against him so as to student at the time of the alleged rape. She was the
give him the full opportunity to prepare for his defense. daughter of the common law wife of the accused
Issue: Ambray. On March 13, 1996, she said that at around
WON the right of the accused to be informed of the 2am, the accused woke her up and brought her to bed
nature and cause of accusations against him was and inserted his penis on her vagina and sexually
violated when the information failed to state the exact abused her. She was not able to see her mother
date the rape was committed. immediately, thus she revealed the incident to her aunt
Held/ Ratio: which led to the filing the information against accused.
RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 682
Issue: Facts:
WON the penalty imposed against the accused should The Senados were sleeping in their household when
have been reduced suddenly they heard a gunshot which hit their light
which thus causing the room to be covered in total
Held/Ratio: darkness. Afterwards, four bursts of gunfire were
subsequently heard. When the firing ceased, she saw
Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which accused Paglinawan holding an M16 rifle looking at
amended Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code to which their house which was lighter because of a bulb. He
the accused is charged provides for attendant found and his wife and children injured, and another
circumstances for which the imposable penalty is death. child, Jerry, dead. An information was filed against
The first circumstances provides: 1. When the victim is appellant accusing him of murder. RTC convicted only
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a convicted him for murder qualified with treachery.
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by Issue:
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or WON, accused can also be found guilty for the injuries
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. suffered by the wife and children
Held/Ratio:
Although it was shown that the accused is the common- No. the information filed in this case is only for the
law spouse of the victims mother, the first special murder of Jerry Senados, the seven-year old child of
qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the Segundino and Millianita Senados. Though the
indictment on which he was arraigned. The failure to prosecution established in the testimony of its witnesses
allege the fact of relationship between the accused and that Millianita Senados and Junior Senados were
the victim in the information for rape is fatal and injured, the court cannot hold accused-appellant liable
consequently bars conviction of its qualified form which for said injuries since he was not properly charged
is punishable with death. Qualifying circumstances therefore. The Constitution is clear that an accused has
must be properly pleaded in the indictment in order not the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
to violate the constitutional right of the accused to be accusation against him. Hence, a person cannot be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the convicted of a crime for which he has not been charged,
accusation against him otherwise, he would be denied the due process of law
appellant Braulio Abalos in the MTC of Dagupan City. The Rules of Court, particularly Rule 110, Section 13,
On December 12, 1994, another Information for indeed frowns upon multiple offenses being charged in
Falsification of Private Document was filed against the a single information. However, petitioner failed to
accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of raise this issue during arraignment, in Lingayen as
Lingayen, Pangasinan. well as in Dagupan. His failure to do so amounts to
On June 5, 1995, during his arraignment before the a waiver and his objection on this point can no
Dagupan Municipal Trial Court, the accused-appellant longer be raised on appeal. In his Motion to Quash
entered a plea of not guilty. On August 7, 1995, he filed filed in Dagupan City, petitioner alleged lack of
a Motion to Quash, arguing that the Municipal Trial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in his Motion to Quash
Court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. filed in Lingayen, petitioner alleged forum-shopping,
Initially, the motion to quash was granted, but this was double jeopardy, lack of jurisdiction, and that the facts
later reversed in a motion for certiorari filed in the RTC. do not constitute an offense. He only raised the issue of
On the MTC Lingayen, he also filed a motion to quash multifariousness of offenses alleged in his petition
but this was also denied. He appealed in both cases, before this Court. By this time, his objection is belated,
which was consolidated by the CA who later decided to and obviously to no avail.
dismiss his appeals, Thus the petition on certiorari.
Primarily, petitioner assails the assumption of People v Palarca
jurisdiction over the criminal cases for falsification by the May 29, 2002
MTCC-Dagupan and the MTC- Lingayen. He argues J. Ynares-Santiago
that both courts could not have simultaneous jurisdiction
over his case. He avers that only one crime was Private complainant, a 70 year widow was tending to
committed pursuant to the unified and indivisible nature her sari-sari store, while accused, who was a frequent
of the criminal intent proved buyer in the store, was finishing his two bottles of beer.
Issue: While complainant was drinking her pills for her
insomnia, accused entered the kitchen and forcibly
WON the informations filed in Lingayen as well as in raped her. An information was filed against him for rape
Dagupan, MTCC, were dismissible for multiplicity of through force and intimidation. RTC found him guilty
offenses merged in one information. beyond reasonable doubt and imposed upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus the appeal to the
Held/Ratio: SC.
WON an information lacking certain material allegations On August 3, 1959, a criminal information for damage to
may still sustain a conviction. property through reckless imprudence against petitioner
and a certain Chi Chan Tan with the CFI Pampanga. As
Held/Ratio: there were no further proceedings, petitioner on May 19,
1965 moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent
Yes, the accused-appellant failed to interpose any Judge denied this on July 10, 1965. After two more
objection to the presentation by the prosecution of years, came the trial with the complainant having
evidence which tended to prove that he committed the testified on direct examination but not having as yet
rape by force and intimidation. While generally an been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not trial set for June 7, 1967 such witness did not show up.
clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule The provincial fiscal moved for postponement. Counsel
is not without exception. The right to assail the for petitioner, however, not only objected but sought the
sufficiency of the information or the admission of dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused
evidence may be waived by the accused-appellant. In to speedy trial.
People v. Lopez, we held that an information which Initially, respondent judge granted the dismissal, but he
lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a later reversed himself and proceeded with the trial.
conviction when the accused fails to object to its Issue:
sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency was cured WON the right of the accused to a speedy trial was
by competent evidence presented therein. Thus - violated.
Held/Ratio:
Failure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional Yes. The right to a speedy trial means one free from
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary
accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right objective being to assure that an innocent person may
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation
which would be invalid if taken against his will. or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the
shortest possible time compatible with the presentation
and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he
Acebedo v Sarmiento may interpose. The remedy in the event of a non-
December 16, 1970 observance of this right is by habeas corpus if the
J. Fernando accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the
Facts: case
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 687
In the case at hand, Petitioner not once but twice did the case with respect to the accused Manaois for May
seek to have the prosecution for damage to property 18, 1987.
against him terminated as the matter was pending for at On June 11, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for
least six years, the first time he sought to put an end to postponement on the ground that he has a serious eye
it. When at last, the trial stage was reached, the ailment (cataract in both eyes) that needs immediate
complaining witness testified on direct examination but medical attention. In an order dated June 16, 1987, the
made no appearance when his cross-examination was Court granted the said motion and reset the hearing of
to be continued. A clear case of a denial of the right to a the case to July 30, 1987. This was also postponed
speedy trial was thus made out. There was an order of when counsel for the accused failed to appear during
dismissal that amounted to an acquittal. No the hearings. When the RTC on September 16, 1987
reconsideration could therefore be had without reset the hearing to October 15, 1987 private
offending the provision on double jeopardy. complainant was in Manila recuperating from a second
eye operation.
People v Ginez On September 25, 1987 private complainant filed with
May 27, 1991 the Fiscal's Office a complaint for libel against private
J. Paras complainant Esquivel, the person identified by Manaois
as the editor of the August 3, 1986 issue of the People's
Facts: Bagong Taliba, for his possible inclusion as one of the
An information for libel was filed on January 27, 1987 accused
before the RTC of San Fernando, La Union against On October 15, 1987, the respondent court issued an
Ramon Labo, Jr., Francis Floresca and Perfecto Order dismissing the case as against respondents Labo
Manaois as editor/publisher of the "People's Bagong and Floresca for failure of private complainant Justice
Taliba" in connection with the publication of the article Guerrero to appear. The motion for reconsideration was
captioned "Inihablang Ex-Justice" in its August 3, 1986 denied and thus this instant petition.
issue.
On April 13, 1987, private complainant filed a motion for Issue:
joint hearing and at the same time asked the court to WON the rights of the accused to a speedy trial had
defer the hearing already scheduled for April 20 and 21, been violated.
1987, on the ground that the other accused, Manaois,
had lately been arrested and filed bond for his Held/Ratio
provisional liberty. The motion was granted and the No. the court held that said right has not been violated
court reset the case for the arraignment and pre-trial of and held that the dismissal of the case as regards
private respondents Labo and Floresca is premature
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 688
and erroneous. "The right of an accused to a speedy selling soy sauce using the name and trademark of
trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution but the Marca Pina Soy Sauce, passing off their product as
same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a the genuine article. For various reasons, the
reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It prosecution of the case stalled (delay in the
secures rights to a defendant but it does not preclude presentation of witnesses, a statutory change in the
the rights of public justice." court with jurisdiction over cases with the same subject
Private complainant's absences at the hearings of the matter, petitioners filed motions instead of responsive
case were in good faith and that he had justifiable and pleadings, etc.) and the proceedings lasted for six
meritorious reasons therefore. Said absences are years. Thus the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
evidently not capricious, oppressive, nor vexatious information (at the RTC) claiming that their right to
to the two accused who had waived their speedy trial had been violated by the lackadaisical
appearance at the trial of the case. It should be attitude of the public attorney in prosecuting the case.
remembered that the right to a speedy trial is
relative, subject to reasonable delays and HELD: The Court ruled against the petitioners. It ruled
postponements arising from illness, medical that the right to speedy disposition of cases was for the
attention, body operations, as in the instant case benefit and protection of the accused in criminal cases
where it was satisfactorily proven that private in order that: (1) oppressive pre-trial incarceration would
complainant had to undergo eye operations, be prevented; (2) the anxiety and concern of the
hospitalization and a medical check-up abroad. accused would be minimized; and (3) the possibility of
The subject case for libel was dismissed on October 15, the defense being impaired would be limited. As such,
1987, some eight and a half months after the the factors to be examined in disposing claims of
information was filed. This period is not such an speedy trial are the following: (a) length of delay (not
extended, prolonged or lengthy duration as to cause really indicative of a violation, it is merely a trigger for
capricious and vexatious delay. While accused the analysis); (b) reason for the delay (it must be
persons do have rights, many of them choose to demonstrated that the delay was capricious, oppressive,
forget that the aggrieved also have the same rights unreasonable, and vexatious; or it must be due top
unjustifiable causes; delay due to the ordinary course of
UY v ADRIANO justice is not a violation); (c) assertion of the right (the
G.R. No. 159098. 27 October 2006. accused must assert the right at the soonest possible
(right to speedy trial; purpose; factors) instance); (d) prejudice to the accused (the accused
must specifically allege how their rights as enumerated
Petitioners were charged for the violation of Article 188 above had been violated).
of the Revised Penal Code for manufacturing and
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 689
impartial. The Court said that the judge in this case the defendant several clarificatory questions. The trial
failed miserably. Given the obvious hostility of the judge court convicted. Upon automatic appeal to the SC,
toward the defense, it was inevitable that all the defendants charge the trial judge with impartiality
protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as alleging that he took over the work of the prosecution by
they in fact were, dismissed. The accused are asking questions which were well-within the
admittedly notorious criminals who were probably even responsibility of the prosecution. Specifically, defendant
proud of their membership in the Commando gang even alleges that the judge took over from the prosecution
as they flaunted their tattoos as a badge of and asked questions in a leading manner, interrupted
notoriety. Nevertheless, they were entitled to be the cross-examination when the answer would be
presumed innocent until the contrary was proved and beneficial to the prosecution, asked questions alluding
had a right not to be held to answer for a criminal to the character of the defendant which the defense
offense without due process of law. The judge could not object to.
disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too
eager to convict the accused, who had manifestly
HELD: No merit. The allegation of bias and prejudice is
earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of
not well-taken. It is a judges prerogative and duty to
the trial, "You want me to dictate the decision now?" he
ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth.
was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and
Questions which merely clear up dubious points and
obviously waiting only to be formalized. Considering the
bring out additional relevant evidence are within judicial
way they were tried, we now declare that they should
prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that
not be detained in jail a minute longer. While this is not
allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be
to say that the accused are not guilty, it does mean that,
received with caution, especially when the queries by
because their constitutional rights have been violated,
the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety
their guilt, if it exists, has not been established beyond
of a judges queries is determined not necessarily by
reasonable doubt and so cannot be pronounced. Due
their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by
process has stayed the uneven hand of the quick
the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by
condemnor and must set the defendants free.
such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions
PEOPLE v CASTILLO
propounded by the trial judge. In fact, even if all such
G.R. No. 120282. 20 April 1998
questions and the answers thereto were eliminated,
(right of the accused; impartiality of the judge;
appellant would still be convicted.
clarificatory questions)
Defendant was accused of the killing of Tony Dometita. As correctly observed by the solicitor general, there
During trial, the judge of the trial court propounded upon was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 691
or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He criminal cases. For another, our idea of a fair and
is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch
manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal of the cold neutrality with the world. Our judges are learned in the law and
of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
process (Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18). That the performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
trial judge believed the evidence of the prosecution exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
was biased. He simply accorded greater credibility to
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to that At best, appellant can only conjure possibility or
of the accused. prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation
and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejsndro, et
PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
G.R. No. 121038-45. 25 January 1999.
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
(impartial trial; media publicity) as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that
This is the rape-slay case of Allan Gomez and Eileen the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply
Sarmenta for which former Mayor Antonio Sanchez of that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. The
Calauan, Laguna was convicted. Defense claims that Court also said that in fact, media enhances the rights
they were denied the right to an impartial trial because of the accused as it brings to the publics eye possible
of the pervasive media coverage of the case which violation of such rights.
characterized the defendants as being guilty of the
crime. GARCIA v DOMINGO
52 SCRA 143 (1973)
(rights of the accused; public trial)
HELD: Denied. Citing the case of People v Teehankee,
the Court said that, Pervasive publicity is not per For the convenience of the parties, the respondent
se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The judge held hearings in the comfort of his airconditioned
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to- chambers instead of in the courtroom. No objection was
day, gavel-to-gavel coverages does not by itself prove made by anyone by this arrangement. After judgment
that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial was rendered against the accused, counsel for the
judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is defense sought to invalidate the proceedings as being
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench violative of the accuseds right to public trial.
from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 692
motives, interest and memory, and exhibit the a process directed to a person requiring him to attend
improbabilities of his testimony. In other words, the and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at
ultimate purpose of cross-examination is to test the any investigation conducted under the laws of the
truth or falsity of the statements of a witness during Philippines, or for taking of his deposition." Although the
direct examination. Unfortunately, for the accused, subpoena he caused to be issued purports to be in a
these objectives of cross-examination were never form for criminal cases pending in his court, it was not,
attained in this case because of the continued failure in fact, issued in connection with a criminal case or for
and refusal of witness Cordero to appear for his cross- any other pending case in his court nor for any
examination. investigation he was competent to conduct pursuant to
law or by direction of this Court. It was designated for a
CAAMIC v GALAPON specific purpose, viz.,administrative conference. That
A.M. No. MTJ-93-887. 7 October 1994 purpose was, in no way connected with or related to
(subpoena; nature; purpose) some of his administrative duties because he knew from
the beginning that it was for a confrontation with the
In a letter addressed to the Court Administrator, complainant as solicited by Generosa Sandagan for the
petitioner sent complaint charges for grave coercion latter to get a share in the death benefits of Edgardo
against respondent judge. She alleged that she Sandagan which was received by the complainant.
received a subpoena from the respondent ordering her Generosa had not filed any action in respondent's court
to appear in court. When she did, she claims that she for her claim; neither is there any case in respondent's
was threatened, berated, and coerced by respondent court concerning such death benefits. What Generosa
into giving him P8,000.00 to the judge which wanted was for respondent to act as mediator or
represented the amount that she received as death conciliator to arrive at a possible compromise with the
benefit resulting from the death of her common-law complainant, which was, obviously, non-official and
husband. Respondent filed a comment materially absolutely a private matter. Not being then directly or
denying the allegations in the complain saying that the remotely related to his official functions and duties,
subpoena was issued upon the request of one accommodating the request and using his official
Generosa Sandagan who, as it turns out, is the mother functions and office in connection therewith was, by any
of petitioners common-law-husband and who was yardstick, improper. The public trust character of his
merely seeking the recovery of the proceeds of the office would have been enough reason for him to
death benefits of her son. decline the request. And, there being no case in his sala
in connection with which complainant could be
HELD: The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and subpoenaed, respondent then had absolutely no power
fined the judge with further admonition. A subpoena "is or authority to issue one to the complainant. He thus
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 694
exhibited his ignorance of the elementary rule on witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
issuance of subpoenas. process to secure the attendance of witnesses
There is something more, however, in this case. In and the production of evidence in his
using the subpoena form for criminal cases, which was behalf. However, after arraignment trial may
never explained by respondent, nothing could have proceed notwithstanding the absence of the
been intended but to sow fear in the mind of the accused provided that he has been duly notified
complainant and compel her attendance, for her failure and his failure to appear is unjustified.
to do so would have subjected her to "the penalty of
law." There was, therefore, some element of The lower court proceeded with the trial. The case was
intimidation, oppression or abuse of authority, which dismissed against the five accused, while proceedings
aggravates his apparent ignorance of the law on against de la Vega were held in abeyance. The
issuance of subpoenas. Considering that it was done defendant sought reconsideration of the abeyance but
upon request of a party which has no case before his was denied.
court, he invited legitimate criticism against his office as
an instrument of oppression. ISSUE 1: WON court loses jurisdiction over an accused
who escapes from detention after arraignment
GIMENEZ v NAZARENO
160 SCRA 1 HELD 1: NO. In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the
(rights of the accused; trial in absentia; requisites) person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for
voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary
Respondent de la Vega, along with five others, was appearance is accomplished by appearing for
charged with murder. He was arraigned and pleaded arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in
not guilty. Before the scheduled date of the first this case. Where the accused appears at the
hearing, he escaped from detention. Prosecutors file a arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged,
motion to proceed with the hearing in absentia, invoking jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and
Sec 19, Art IV of the 1973 Constitution: this continues until the termination of the case,
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, ISSUE 2: WON an accused who has been tried in
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself absentia retains his right to present evidence and cross
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and examine witnesses
cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 695
HELD 2: NO. The requisites for a trial in absentia are: accused is part of his defense. R e s p o n d e n t J u d g e
(1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the D a n i e l M a c a r a e g o f t h e C F I , invoking the case
accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to of Aquino v Military CommissionNo.2 denied the
appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. The right motion:
to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses is a
personal right and can be waived. Failure to appear The issue at bar was one of those squarely raised in
during trial, after due notice, constitutes a waiver of the Aquino case where six out of ten Justices
these rights. Thus, rendering judgment for a trial in voted that the accused may not be compelled to
absentia is not a violation of the right to be presumed be present during the trial when he is to
innocent. The accused is still presumed to be innocent, b e identified by the witnesses of the
and his conviction must be based on evidence showing prosecution w h i l e f o u r v o t e d t h a t t h e
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. accused may be compelled in this
instance. The reason of the m a j o r i t y i s
PEOPLE v MACARAEG t h a t t h e a c c u s e d m u s t n o t b e compelled
CONCEPCION; January 14, 1986 to assist the prosecution in proving its case.
The rule adopted by the Court in the case of Aquinovs. Rex Magumnang was charged with highway robbery
Military Commission No. 2 (supra) is that while the with homicide along with the other accused. However
accused may waive his presence at the trial of the After arraignment and during the trial, he escaped from
case, his presence may be compelled when he is to be confinement and had not been apprehended since then.
identified. The trial court found him guilty. He therefore seeks to
appeal the conviction.
The Court said: Since only 6 Justices are of the view ISSUE: WON he may appeal his conviction? NO
that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all . Under Section 8, Rule 122 of the 1985 Rules of
stages of the proceedings while Justices are in Criminal Procedure, the Court, may "upon motion of the
agreement that he may so waive such right, appellee or on its own motion, dismiss the appeal if the
except when he is to he identified, the result is appellant escapes from prison or confinement or jumps
that the respondent Commission's Order bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
requiring his presence at all times the appeal." In this case, appellant Magumnang
d u r i n g t h e proceedings before it should be remained at large even as his appeal was pending.
m o d i f i e d , i n t h e sense that petitioners presence Hence, by analogy his appeal must be dismissed.
shall be requiredonly in the instance just indicated. The reason for this rule is because once an accused
escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or
Petition GRANTED, orders of respondent Judge flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Judge is ordered and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction
toi s s u e the necessary process to of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to
c o m p e l t h e attendance of the accused at seek relief from the court.
the hearing of thec r i m i n a l case for Thus when as in this case he escaped from
p u r p o s e s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Temporary TRO confinement during the trial on the merits and after his
lifted and set aside arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and
the judgment against him was promulgated evenas he
remained at large, he should not be afforded the right to
appeal unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction
G.R. No. 92415 May 14, 1991 of the court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15)
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- days from the notice of the judgment against him. While
appellee, vs. OMAR MAPALAO and REX at large, he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is
MAGUMNANG, defendants-appellants. deemed to have waived the same and he has no
GANCAYCO, J.:p standing in court.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 697
By the same token, an accused who, after the filing of Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so
an information, is at large and has not been hold, that an escapee who has been duly tried in
apprehended or otherwise has not submitted himself to absentia waives his right to present evidence on his
the jurisdiction of the court, cannot apply for bail or be own behalf and to confront and cross-examine
granted any other relief by the courts until he submits witnesses who testified against him.
himself to its jurisdiction or is arrested.
The jurisdiction of the court once acquires, is not lost P. HABEAS CORPUS
upon the instance of parties but continues until the case
is terminated. Where the accused appears at the G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000
arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner, vs.THE
jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU
this continues until the termination of the case, OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA
notwithstanding his escape from the custody of the law. (IN PLACE OF THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA
A trial in absentia will thus occur when the following CITY JAIL), THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II,
requisites are present: REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, and THE
CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
(1) that there has been an arraignment; QUISUMBING, J.:
(2) that the accused has been notified; and Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under
(3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is detention since May 21, 1981, up to present1 by reason
unjustified. of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has He was requesting transfer from Manila City Jail to the
the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City,2 but the Jail
To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the Presiding
render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer
absentia. cannot be effected without the submission of the
ON PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: He is still requirements, namely, the Commitment Order or
presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still Mittimus, Decision, and Information.3 It was then
be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such discovered that the entire records appear to have been
evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable destroyed due to a fire.
doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process He filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
since the accused was given the opportunity to be Corpus due to his continued detention without any valid
heard judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right
to due process.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 698
ISSUE: WON Petitioner should be released under writ WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit,
of habeas corpus? NO and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RATIO: was devised and exists as a speedy and SO ORDERED.
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr.,
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of JJ., concur.
personal freedom.13 It secures to a prisoner the right to
have the cause of his detention examined and CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR
determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful (Sorry couldnt find the original case!)
authority. Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores
a consequence of a judicial proceeding, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment
(a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An
resulting in the restraint of a person, advanced payment has already been given to Estelita
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid.
or However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another
(c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such residence, which was disallowed by the employment
sentence is void as to such excess.15 agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint restrained. The employment agency wanted that the
by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks advance payment, which was applied to her
such restraint.The petition does not make out a case. transportation expense from the province should be
The Director of Prisons is holding the prisoner under paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.
process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits
the legality of his detention. The mere loss or Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the
destruction of the record of the case does not invalidate right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the
the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the advance payment it gave?
prisoner's release.
Also, in order that a judgment may be subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount
lack of jurisdiction.The proper remedy in this case is for it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has
either petitioner or public respondents to initiate the absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of
reconstitution of the judgment of the case movement. The fact that no physical force has been
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 699
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and the
not make less real the deprivation of her personal respondents to make a return of the writ on or before
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one July 2, 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; After the return of the
place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. respondents, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, the petition of Jackson and denied his plea for a writ
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the of habeas corpus.[22]
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other
psychological element that may curtail the mental ISSUE: WON petition for habeas corpus should be
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. granted? NO
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to
the protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or RATIO:
physical coercion.
RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, vs. HON. FLORITO Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as
S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF amended, provides that except as otherwise expressly
IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend
to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
Rodolfo M. Villaceran of the Philippine National Police rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
filed an application with RTC-Pampanga for the person entitled thereto. The ultimate purpose of the
issuance of a search warrant against petitioner writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from
Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen, a.k.a. Allen unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is
Miller, and Jaime C. Bueta for the search of the articles granted to test the right under which he is detained.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening
events may bar his release or discharge from
The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus with the custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
Court on June 28, 1999 against the Commissioner of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
the CID and John Doe and Jane Doe; and on the same application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if
date, the Court issued a resolution (a) directing the the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of same supervening events such as the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 700
that the crime charged in the information against him causing the death of two people and injuriesto nine
had already prescribed. others.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the
COURSE and DISMISSED. respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and
"each party must prove his own affirmative
allegations," 13 just as the burden of proof of self-
G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988 defense in a killing rests on the accused
JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners, vs. In this case, respondents were unable to prove that the
BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY alleged release occurred.
CARIAN, respondents. (1) The signatures of the detainees on their release
TEEHANKEE, C. J.: papers were falsified.
FACTS: (2) Respondents did not follow the prescribed standard
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the parents of procedure for releasing detainees:
two young persons, Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos (3) The inherent implausibility of respondent Carian's
who werevarrested with others by the military, detained reason for supposedly releasing the detainees that
in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to they had agreed to act as spies.
have been released after nine days. But they were not (4( What is likewise difficult of comprehension is that
released to their parents, who had been visiting them, according to the affidavits of Major Cabauatan and Lt.
nor to any other responsible person and were never Maranon, elements of their command after encountering
seen or heard from by anyone since then. a group of "heavily armed men" captured the detainees
Alleging that the signatures of the desaparecidos on with other alleged Comminist Terrorists; with one
their release papers were falsified and thus, they were casualty on the latter's side, yet all of them except the
never released by the military said release being a two detainees "were released on or before September
scheme of the respondents to prolong their detention, 23, 1981, having been found out that no sufficient
torture and interrogation, the petitioners-parents filed evidence would be established to warrant their further
the petition at bar on December 17,1981. detention"
ISSUE: WON habeas corpus may be issued? NO However, the Court regrets that it cannot grant the relief
RATIO: sought by petitioners. It is not the repository of all
The release of a detained person renders the petition remedies for every grievance.. It is not a trier of facts,
for habeas corpus moot and academic.. Where, nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct
however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as
alleged release of the detainees, which we share, of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos.
particularly, where the standard and prescribed ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case
procedure in effecting the release has not been to the Commission on Human Rights for investigation
followed, then the burden of proving by clear and and appropriate action as may be warranted by its
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 704
findings, and to furnish the Court with a report of the In this regard, the formalities required for petitions
outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon. for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such
This Resolution is immediately executory. petitions, although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-petition
. forms), may be entertained so long as they are sufficient
in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the
January 4, 1995 petitions are filed may refer the matter to the
G.R. No. 117568 Commission on Human Rights or to the Public
ROLANDO ANGELES y BOMBITA, petitioner, vs. Attorneys Office for possible assistance to the prisoners
DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent. concerned
Vitug, J.:
The foregoing notwithstanding, Angeles petition
Rolando Angeles y Bombita was charged and for habeas corpus cannot be granted. Petitioner, it
sentenced to life imprisonment for the illegal possession appears, has only served the minimum of his
of shabu. He has now lodged a petition for habeas sentence; however, he may, if qualified, be released
corpus, invoking on parole pursuant to Section 5 of the Indeterminate
(a) Republic Act No. 7659, which has reduced the Sentence Law which reads:
penalties prescribed under the original provisions of the Sec. 5. It shall be the duty
Dangerous Drugs Act, and WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus,
(b) the recent ruling of this Court in People vs. Martin being still premature, is DISMISSED.
Simon y Sunga, 3 which has confirmed the retroactive
application of the above-numbered amendatory law. G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
ISSUE: WON the petition of habeas corpus may CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,
prosper? NO (LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo
Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA
RATIO: R. TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R.
All courts of competent jurisdiction mat entertain TORRES), petitioners, vs.THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU
petitions for habeas corpus to consider the release of OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS,
prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents.
Act who have served the maximum of the applicable HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:
penalties newly prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659. FACTS:
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and
children of Wilfredo Torres. A conditional pardon was at
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 705
first granted to Torres but the Board of Pardons and not a requirement for the President to determine
Parole resolved to recommend to the President the whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted because a conditional pardon
he had been charged with twenty counts of estafa
before, and convicted of sedition. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
Thus, the Minister of Justice issued "by authority of the pronouncement as to cost
President" an Order of Arrest and
7
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was CONTADO v. TAN
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to
serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. FACTS: This petition for habeas corpus was flied on
ISSUE: WON the petition for habeas corpus is valid? November 20, 1978 by Nora Contado, Adelina Razon
NO and Nena Tizon in behalf of their spouses Crispo
RATIO: Contado, Cesar Razon and Jimmy Tizon. The
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a respondents are Rufilo L. Tan, the then Municipal Mayor
person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or of Llorente, Eastern Samar
unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of
Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the Petitioners alleged that on September 13,1978, their
grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked spouses were arrested by members of the Integrated
because of a breach thereof, the determination of which National Police of Llorente, Eastern Samar,
is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his
final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, In their separate amended returns, respondents denied
2000. the material allegations of the petition stating that they
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in (respondents) merely invited the three missing persons
the first place was the exclusive author of the for questioning and reiterated that they had been
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary released on the same day on September 13, 1978 at
prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own 8:00 p.m. Respondents prayed that the petition be
judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the dismissed for being moot and academic.
subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the Petitioners, in their reply to the separate amended
same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the returns, stated that the subject persons were never
grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted released on September 13,1978 or on any day
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final thereafter as shown by the affidavits of one Diosdado
judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is Camora and one Diomedes Bono.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 706
The Court herein exercises this power on a corrective HELD: It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy
and not a retaliatory or vindictive principle (though it disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in
could impose a heavier penalty and order respondents" criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all
imprisonment for a substantial period of time) and cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 707
proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial killing of Joemarie Bedia and Joey Panes committed on
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a May 29, 1988 in Bo. Obrero, Lapuz, La Paz, Iloilo City.
case may demand expeditious action on all officials who
are tasked with the administration of justice. Upon his arraignment on November 20, 1989, petitioner
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr., 153 entered a plea of "not guilty". The prosecution started
SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy disposition of cases" is a presenting its witnesses on January 21, 22, and 23,
relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of 1991. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss or Demurrer
"speedy trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal to Evidence on February 27, 1991. On the other hand,
proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible Vicente Sumbang was convicted of Homicide by the
concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City on March 27, 1991.
the circumstances of each case. What the Constitution On January 14, 1992, Republic Act No. 6975 otherwise
prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive known as the "Philippine National Police (PNP) Law"
delays which render rights nugatory. took effect. The PNP law provides among others for the
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with sufficient integration of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
definiteness and clarity of some facts, the claimants National Police (PC-INP) into the PNP including its
were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a functions, officers and other enlisted personnel and also
bill of particulars. When claimants filed their provides for the continuation of court-martial
"Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved to strike proceedings against PC-INP criminal offenders already
out the complaint from the records for failure of arraigned prior to its effectivity. The composition of the
claimants to submit a proper bill of particulars. While the general court-martial RECOM 6 was also subjected to
POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the changes and petitioner's criminal case remained
complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the pending and unresolved.
deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be filed in response On February 17, 1999 and August 4, 1999, respectively,
to the complaint, the records of employment of the more Letter Order Nos. 80 and 436 of the National
than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from various Headquarters, Philippine National Police (NHQ-PNP)
countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated were issued by the PNP Director General constituting
as far back as 1975. general court-martial PRO 6, Iloilo City which took over
SAMBANG v. GENERAL COURT MARTIAL petitioner's criminal case. The respondent general
court-martial then scheduled the dates for the
Facts: Petitioner, then a constable 2nd class (C2C) in continuation of the hearing of petitioner's case.
the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and his brother On September 29, 1999 hearing, petitioner moved for
Vicente Sumbang, a civilian, were accused with the the dismissal of the case alleging among others that
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 708
there was inordinate delay in the trial of his case which already presented its four witnesses, all of whom,
is in violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial except for the fourth witness, were cross-examined by
and disposition of his case petitioner's counsel on January 21, 22, and 23, 1991,
respectively.
HELD: "It must be here emphasized that the right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy LICAROS v. SANDIGANBAYAN
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive Facts: On 5 June 1982, the Legaspi City Branch of the
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial Central Bank was robbed and divested of cash in the
are asked for and secured, or when without cause or amount of P19,731,320.00.
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to
In the evening of June 6, 1982, Modesto Licaros (no
elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally
relation to herein petitioner), one of the principal
applicable is the balancing test used to determine
accused, together with four companions, delivered in
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
sacks a substantial portion of the stolen money to the
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that
Concepcion Building in Intramuros, Manila where Home
matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and
Savings Bank had its offices, of which herein petitioner
the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length
was then Vice Chairman and Treasurer. The delivery
of delay, reason for the delay, defendant's assertion or
was made on representation by Modesto Licaros to
non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
former Central Bank Governor Gregorio Licaros, Sr.,
defendant resulting from the delay, are considered."
then Chairman of the Bank and father of herein
petitioner, that the money to be deposited came from
Although it is unfortunate that it took about eight years
some Chinese businessmen from Iloilo who wanted the
from 1991 before the trial of this case was resumed, in
deposit kept secret;
1999, we do not find such delay as amounting to a
violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial considering
As of this writing, and more than ten (10) years after the
that such delay could not be attributable to the
case submitted for decision, the Sandiganbayan has not
prosecution. The cases cited by petitioner upholding
rendered the Decision.
the right of the accused to a speedy trial are not in point
since the delay therein complained of was due to the
HELD: On June 20, 1990, Criminal Case No. 6672 was
vacillation and procrastination of the prosecuting officers
deemed submitted for the decision of the
and their lack of conscientiousness in the discharge of
Sandiganbayan. Since then, no action has been taken
their duties, which circumstances do not obtain in the
by the anti-graft court. On March 23, 2000, petitioner
case at bar. The prosecution in the instant case had
filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss, grounded on the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 709
violation of his right to a speedy not stress the consequences and problems inherent in
disposition. Unfortunately, even this Motion has not this pending litigation and/or criminal prosecution which
been ruled upon by public respondent. include the prospects of unrealized business
transactions, stagnant professional growth, hampered
Under Section 6 of PD 1606 amending PD 1486, the
travel opportunities and a besmirched
Sandiganbayan has only 90 days to decide a case from
reputation. Furthermore, it is worth noting that petitioner
the time it is deemed submitted for
has been charged merely as an accessory after the fact
decision. Considering that the subject criminal case
due to his being a senior executive of the bank where
was submitted for decision as early as June 20, 1990, it
the principal accused tried to deposit the stolen
is obvious that respondent court has failed to decide the
money. Clearly then, the dismissal sought by herein
case within the period prescribed by law. Even if we
petitioner is justified under the circumstances and in
were to consider the period provided under Section
accordance with the guidelines set forth in the above-
15(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which is 12
cited case.
months from the submission of the case for decision,
the Sandiganbayan would still have miserably failed to
TILENDO vs. OMBUDSMAN
perform its mandated duty to render a decision on the
G.R. No. 165975
case within the period prescribed by law. Clearly then,
Facts:
the decision in this case is long overdue, and the period
Tilendo is President of the Cotabato City State
to decide the case under the law has long expired
Polytechnic College (CCSPC).
As earlier discussed, more than ten years has lapsed CCSPC had an appropriation of P6 million for the
since the subject case has been deemed submitted for construction of its Agriculture Building and Science
decision. The delay cannot at all be attributed to Academic Building.
petitioner, who has neither utilized dilatory tactics nor Concerned Faculty Members of the CCSPC filed before
undertaken any procedural device to prolong the the Ombudsman a letter-complaint against Tilendo for
proceedings. As a matter of fact, he has been violation of RA 3019. Complaint basically alleged that
continuously pushing for the resolution of his case even Tilendo enriched himself and his family while he was
during the early stages of the prosecution. Moreover, it President of the CCSPC, using government funds for
is undeniable that such delay has caused much personal purposes. The complaint likewise accused
prejudice, distress and anxiety to herein petitioner, Tilendo of diverting and misusing the funds allocated for
whose career as bank executive and businessman has the construction of the CCSPC Agriculture Building.
suffered the stigma of being shackled to an unresolved The Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao endorsed the
criminal prosecution, virtually hanging like a Damocles anonymous complaint to the National Bureau of
sword over his head for more than a decade. We need
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 710
discovered that mobilizations fees advanced to conduct of the preliminary investigation in this case was
contractors amounting to P15,798,675.00 remained warranted by the sequence of events. Because of the
unrecouped, when these were supposed to be deducted complexity of the transactions complained of which
from contractors progress billings. were contained in a two-page report from the COA, the
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) sought further
On December 8, 1992, the Office of the President,
substantiation of the allegations therein and requested
through then Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante,
for the complete report of the COA Special Audit
asked the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary
Office. The authenticated SAO Report No. 93-04 was
investigation. Thus, the Commission on Audit,
received by the GIO on November 16, 1994. It was only
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, instituted a
then that the GIO required all forty-one respondents to
complaint for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
file their counter-affidavits.
Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) against regional
officials of Cotabato City and DPWH-ARMM. The Most of the respondents, including some of
complaint was docketed as Case No. OMB-0-92-2771. petitioners herein, moved for extensions of time. All the
counter-affidavits were received in August 1995, owing
On July 31, 1998, Graft Investigation Officer II Gay
to the number of respondents. Thereafter, the COA
Maggie F. Balajadia-Violan recommended the
filed reply-affidavits on February 24, 1996 and May 29,
indictment of petitioners, among others, for various
1996. It was only after the submission of the last
violations of RA 3019. The recommendation was
pleading, i.e., the reply-affidavits, that the preliminary
approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
investigation can be said to have been concluded. The
Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr. on October 8, 1998, and by
time to resolve the cases commences from this date.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto on October 16,
1998.[1]Immediately thereafter, 21 criminal informations In the application of the constitutional guaranty of
were filed against petitioners before the Sandiganbayan the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular
as Criminal Cases Nos. 24963-24983 regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. Well-settled is the rule that the
Petitioenrs say that the DELAY OF ALMOST SIX (6)
right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
YEARS TO RESOLVE THE PRELIMINARY
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
INVESTIGATION DISREGARDED THE
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
OMBUDSMANS DUTY, AS MANDATED BY THE
oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or
CONSTITUTION AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770
not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
violated their constitutional rights.
considered and balanced are: the length of delay, the
reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert
HELD: As meticulously detailed by the Ombudsman
above, the period of time that elapsed during the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 713
such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by respondent or any military personnel facing charges
the delay before the General Courts Martial, for that matter a
The records of this case show that petitioners raised judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a
their objections to the perceived delay in the resolution speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable. In
of the complaints against them only on September 27, the case at bench, the records of the case may
1999, when they filed their Omnibus Motion with the indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and
Sandiganbayan. It would appear, therefore, that our courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules,
petitioners impliedly acquiesced in the delay in the cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain
proceedings. substantive rights have been or are being denied in the
meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion of
ABADIA v. COURT OF APPEALS the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which mandates the duty of the Courts of
Facts: Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
he was detained for nine months without charges. On on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against government
private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate
General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th As admitted by counsel for respondents, there is no
Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct time frame within which to transmit the records of the
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively. case to the reviewing authority as well as time limitation
within which the Chief of Staff must act on the
HELD: In the context of the constitutional protection recommendation of dismissal However, it must be
guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals stressed that the absence of a rule does not give to the
particularly the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot Chief of Staff indefinite time within which to act at the
accept petitioners submission that the absence of any expense of the constitutional right of a citizen to enjoy
specific provision limiting the time within which records liberty and to be protected from illegal or arbitrary
of general courts martial should be forwarded to the detention.
appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing Respondent court, therefore, did not commit an abuse
authority to decide on the case would deny private of discretion in ordering the petitioners to act with
dispatch in dealing with the private respondents case.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 714
Over three years have elapsed since the respondents Nos. Q-93-49988 and 49989
arrest. To this day, there is no indication and it has not
been alleged that records of the case have been The SOolicitor General then invoked the right to speedy
forwarded to the appropriate military appellate authority. disposition of cases for the accused
This case does not even involve complex issues of fact
and law. The central issue which the appropriate military HELD: As to the length of delay, it is established that
appellate authority will have to review is whether or not the prosecution did not take any action on petitioners
the General Court Martial was correct in dismissing the case for two years. From the time that Criminal Case
case on grounds of prescription under Article 38 of the No. Q-91-18037 was dismissed on August 23, 1991, the
prosecution failed to effect the very simple remedy of
Articles of War.
filing two separate informations against petitioner until
October of 1993. Indeed, there was a delay in the
DIMAYACYAC v. JUDGE ROXAS refiling of the proper informations. However, the
prosecution was never given the opportunity to explain
Facts: An information for falsification of public the circumstances that may have caused such delay
documents docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 precisely because petitioner never raised the issue of
at the RTC of Quezon City was filed against petitioner the length of time it took the prosecution to revive the
along with some others. case. There is nothing on record to show what
happened during the two-year lull before the filing of the
Before his arraignment, petitioner moved to quash the proper informations. Hence, it could not be ascertained
information on two (2) grounds. First, that the officer that peculiar situations existed to prove that the delay
who filed the information had no legal authority to do so, was vexatious, capricious and oppressive, and
and second, that more than one offense was charged in therefore, a violation of petitioners constitutional right to
the information. speedy disposition of cases.
What the records clearly show is that petitioner never
RTC granted motion to quash asserted his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
The only ground he raised in assailing the subsequent
More than two (2) years after the quashal of the filing of the two informations is that he will be subjected
information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18037 or on to double jeopardy. It was only the OSG that brought to
October 19, 1993, the Quezon City Prosecutor filed light the issue on petitioners right to a speedy
against the same accused including petitioner two (2) disposition of his case, and only when the case was
informations for falsification of public documents brought to the appellate court on certiorari. Even in this
docketed at the Quezon City RTC as Criminal Case
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 715
petition before us, petitioner did not raise the issue of in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this
his right to a speedy disposition of his case. appeal by respondent Board.
Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with
that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that
the complainants, he being the party proceeded against while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 716
must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not FACTS: Accused was charged with the crime of rape
be accomplished according to means or methods with homicide. The trial court convicted him of murder
offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the only. The trial court rejected the photographs taken of
human personality. More and more in line with the the accused immediately after the incident on the
democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual ground that the same were taken when the accused
even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is was already under the mercy of the police.
given due weight. The constitutional foundation
underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... HELD: The taking of pictures of an accused, even
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. without the assistance of counsel, being purely a
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional
rights against self-incrimination.
People v. Rondero (Scope of Right Against Self- Villaflor v. Summers (Scope of Right Against Self-
Incrimination) Incrimination)
The accused was seen by the victims father with an ice Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of
pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject
year old victim was later found dead and half naked with herself into physical examination to test whether or not
lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. He was she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of
convicted of homicide only. adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused
to such physical examination interposing the defense
Held: Guilty of the special complex crime of rape with that such examination was a violation of her
homicide. The absence of sperm does not negate the constitutional rights against self-incrimination.
commission of rape since the mere touching of the
pudenda by the male organ is already considered as Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a
consummated rape. The presence of physical injuries violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against
on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force self-incrimination.
on her person. Contusions were found on Mylenes
face, arms and thighs. Hence, death is the appropriate Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights.
penalty. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
People v. Gallarde (Scope of Right Against Self- against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
Incrimination) compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 717
to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the 0033), where its members acted as incorporators, or
body of the accused is permissible. simply, as stockholders etc; delivered documents which
Page 218 substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., (1) stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares
Regala v. Sandiganbayan (Scope of Right Against registered in the client's name, and (2) a blank deed of
Self-Incrimination) trust or assignment covering said shares; acted as
Facts: Clients consulted the petitioners, in their capacity nominees-stockholders of the said corporations involved
as lawyers, regarding the financial and corporate in sequestration proceedings (as office practice)
structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional 4. August 20, 1991 - respondent PCGGs "Motion to
advice in the form of, among others, the deeds of Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third Amended
assignment covering their client's shareholdings. Complaint" excluded private respondent Raul Roco
from complaint in PCGG Case No. 33 because of his
Petitioners fear that identifying their clients would undertaking that he will reveal the identity of the
implicate them in the very activity for which legal advice principal/s for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
had been sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill- the companies involved in
gotten wealth in the aforementioned corporations. PCGG Case No. 33.
1. July 31, 1987 complaint before the Sandiganbayan 5. Third Amended Complaint said defendants
of PCGG vs. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., (principal conspired in helping set up, through the use of the
defendant) et al. for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, coconut levy funds, UCPB, UNICOM, COCOLIFE,
i. e., shares of stocks in named corporations in PCGG COCOMARK, CIC, and more than 20 other coconut
Case No. 33 (Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "R. P. v. levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of
Cojuangco, et al." San Miguel Corporation shares
2. Defendants named in the case are herein petitioners
(plus private respondent Raul S. Roco) - then partners 6. ACCRA Investments Corporation - became the
of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and holder of approximately 15 million shares (roughly
Cruz Law Offices (ACCRA Law Firm). 3.3%) of total outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of
31 March 1987; 44 among the top 100 biggest
3. ACCRA Law Firm acquired info on assets of clients, stockholders of UCPB (about 1,400,000 shareholders);
personal and business circumstances; assisted in a wholly-owned investment arm
organization and acquisition of business associations
and/or organizations (companies listed in Civil Case
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 718
7. Edgardo J. Angara - holding approximately 3,744 the reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence of
shares as of February, 1984 of UCPB PCGG against Roco
8. Expanded Amended Complaint of ACCRA said that 13. Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that he
is only in legitimate lawyering; became holders of did actually not reveal identity of the client, nor
shares of stock in the corporations listed but do not undertook to reveal the identity of the client for whom he
claim any proprietary interest in the said shares of acted as nominee-stockholder.
stock; said Avelino V. Cruz an incorporator in 1976 of
Mermaid Marketing Corporation but for legitimate 14. March 18, 1992 - respondent Sandiganbayan
business purposes and already transferred shares promulgated Resolution herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners for their refusal to comply with
9. Petitioner Paraja Hayudini - denied being onvolved in the conditions by PCGG
the alleged ill-gotten wealth
15. Hence, petition for certiorari, grounds: strict
10. "COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October application of the law of agency; absolutely no evidence
8, 1991 with Counter-Motion of ACCRA moving that that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had undertaken to
respondent PCGG similarly grant the same treatment to reveal, disclosure not constitute a substantial distinction
them (exclusion as parties-defendants) as accorded or equal protection clause, favoritism and undue
Roco. preference; not holding that, under the facts of this
case, the attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners
11. Conditions precedent for the exclusion of ACCRA lawyers from revealing the identity of their
petitioners, namely (PCGGs Comment): (a) the client(s) and the other information requested by the
disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) documents PCGG; unreasonable or unjust
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c)
deeds of assignments petitioners executed for clients ISSUE: Privileged Information
covering shares Whether or not the lawyers fiduciary duty (uberrimei
fidei) may be asserted in refusing to disclose the identity
12. PCGGs supposed proof to substantiate compliance of clients [name of petitioners' client(s)] under the facts
by Roco: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of his the and circumstances obtaining in the instant case
counsel reiterating previous request for reinvestigation;
(b) Affidavit as Attachment; (c) Letter of the Roco, HELD: The High Court upheld that petitioners' right not
Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices originally requesting to reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the
breach of fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 719
the facts of the instant case clearly fall within recognized individual of a crime. (case at bar BAIRD
exceptions to the rule that the client's name is not EXCEPTION)
privileged information. Sandiganbayan resolution 4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem
annulled and set on which the client seeks legal assistance (case at
aside. Petitioners excluded from complaint. bar)
1. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to 5. Nature of the attorney-client relationship has been
divulge the name or identity of this client. Reasons: previously disclosed and it is the identity which is
1. Court has a right to know that the client whose intended to be confidential
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh
and blood. 3. Petitioners were impleaded by PCGG as co-
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the attorney- defendants to force them to disclose the identity of their
client relationship has been established. The attorney- clients, after the "bigger fish" as they say in street
client privilege does not attach until there is a client. parlance the names of their clients in exchange for
3. Privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of exclusion from the complaint. (Primavera Farms, Inc., et
the relationship. al. vs. PCGG Mario Ongkiko) - "so called client is Mr.
4. Due process considerations require that the Eduardo Cojuangco" (leverage to nail clients)
opposing party should, as a general rule, know his
adversary. 4. No valid cause of action. It would seem that
petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as
2. BUT (Exceptions/Racio Decidendi): When the defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
client's name itself has an independent significance, prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
such that disclosure would then reveal client performed in the course of their duties as lawyers.
confidences
1. A strong probability exists that revealing the client's 5. The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised
name would implicate that client in the very activity for on the Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
which he sought the lawyer's advice. (Baird exception operarum (contract of lease of services) where one
for freedom of consultation) person lets his services and another hires them without
2. Disclosure would open the client to civil liability. reference to the object of which the services are to be
(case at bar) performed. Their services may be compensated by
3. Government's lawyers have no case against an honorarium or for hire, and mandato (contract of
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be
the said name would furnish the only link that would placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 720
that he gained by the contract to the person who e. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: The
requested him. lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of the
client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
6. OTHERS: Privileged Communication Laws rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and
Applicable ability,"
a. Old Code of Civil Procedure enacted by the
Philippine Commission on August 7, 1901. Section 383 7. Equal protection clause - a guarantee which provides
"forbids counsel, without authority of his client to reveal a wall of protection against uneven application of status
any communication made by the client to him or his and regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee
advice given thereon in the course of professional operates against uneven application of legal norms so
employment." that all persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment.
b. Rules of Court Sec. 24: Disqualification by reason of
privileged communication. The following persons 8. Violates the equal protection guarantee and the right
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the against self-incrimination and subverts the lawyer-client
following cases: An attorney cannot, without the confidentiality privilege.
consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or his advice SEPARATE OPINIONS (THREE OTHER JUSTICES:
given thereon in the course of VITUG, DAVIDE AND PUNO)
VITUG, J., concurring:
c. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states, Sec. 20: duty
of an attorney: (e) to maintain inviolate the confidence, 1. Confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship -
and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of allows the lawyer and the client to institutionalize a
his client, and to accept no compensation in connection unique relationship based on full trust and confidence
with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval. 2. A situation of what it could elicit from a counsel
against his client, unreasonable and with thinly
d. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: disguised threat of incrimination.
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he
shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting
him. 1. Court must confine itself to the key issue, issue
burried: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion in not excluding the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 721
defendants, the petitioners herein, from the Third 2. In the cases cited by the majority, the lawyers
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. concerned were merely advocating the cause of their
clients but were not indicted for the charges against
2. Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of their said clients. Here, the counsel themselves are co-
discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners' defendants duly charged in court as co-conspirators.
prayer to exclude them. The prerogative to determine
who shall be made defendants in a civil case is initially 7. Lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the
vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. commission of a crime or against the prosecution of the
lawyer therefor.
3. If Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a
lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely 8. As a general rule, the identity of a defendant in a
answerable therefor to his principals/clients and, criminal prosecution is a matter of public record and,
probably, to this Court in an appropriate disciplinary thus, not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
action if warranted. Identity of a client is not within the lawyer-client privilege
in this manner because every litigant is in justice entitled
4. They have no right to make such a demand for until to know the identity of his opponents.
they shall have complied with the conditions imposed
for their exclusion, they cannot be excluded except by PUNO, J., dissenting:
way of a motion to dismiss. The rule of confidentiality 1. MAIN POINT OF PUNO: Sandiganbayan committed
under the lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated the
exclude a party. It is merely a ground for disqualification metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by
of a witness. failing to recognize the exceptions. But petitioners need
to prove that prove they fall within the exceptions to the
5. The revelation is entirely optional, discretionary, on general rule. Needs factual basis.
their part. The attorney-client privilege is not therefor
applicable. The lawyer-client privilege provides the 2. REASON: Attorney-client privilege is not a magic
petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal mantra whose invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure
defendants for recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. drape he who invokes it with its protection. Plainly put, it
is not enough to assert the privilege.
6. Wrong use of American jurisprudence in ponencia:
1. Issue of privilege contested therein arose in grand 3. Legal advice exception may be defeated through a
jury proceedings on different States. prima facie: in furtherance of present or intended
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 722
continuing illegality, as where the legal representation ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to
itself is part of a larger conspiracy. [like this case] take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
4. Atypical of the usual case where the hinge issue The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the
involves the applicability of attorney-client privilege: purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
petitioners included as defendants and conspirators. determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified.
5. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose when
PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the complaint ISSUE: Whether or not the order violates the
on condition they reveal the identity of their client. petitioner's right against self-incrimination.
6. The issue poses a trilemma: need for courts to HELD: Yes. The constitutional inhibition is directed not
discover the truth, need to protect adversary system of merely in giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well
justice, need to keep inviolate the constitutional right the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word
against self-incrimination and effective counsel in of mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the
criminal litigations. accused has a right to hold secret.
7. Attorney-client privilege can never be used as a Writing is something more than moving the body, or the
shield to commit a crime or a fraud. hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of intelligence
8. PCGG relented on its original stance as spelled out in and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that
its Complaint that petitioners are co-conspirators in the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
crimes and cannot invoke the attorney-client privilege. whether or not he is the falsifier.
does not exist, and which may identify him as the testified and/or produced documentary and other
falsifier. evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in
response to an invitation issued by the board. Among
It cannot be contended in the present case that if those who testified and produced evidence before the
permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's board are the respondents in this petition.
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the Respondents contend that their individual testimonies
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit before said board should not be admitted in evidence
A, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for
obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by
even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies
specimens without resorting to the means complained could not be excluded because the immunity was not
herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal available to them because of their failure to invoke their
right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact
in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the Finding Board.
hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do
not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This Issue: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-
innocent persons. incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in
evidence.
Note: Measuring or photographing the party is not within
the privilege. Nor is the removal or replacement of his Held: 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all
garments or shoes. legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only
with the function of determining the facts and
p. 218 circumstances surrounding the killing, but more
Galman v. Pamaran (Immunity) importantly, the determination of the person or persons
Facts: In order to determine the facts and criminally responsible therefore so that they may be
circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a brought before the bar of justice.
free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all
aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other
was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment
aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their
hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 724
2. One which grants Transactional Immunity - grants As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion,
to which his compelled testimony relates. meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer
UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of
It is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive
type of immunity statutes (Use Immunity). It grants compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be
merely immunity from use of any statement given before offered to the witness before he can be required to
the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional
or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or right. But in this case, the compulsion has already
producing evidence do not render the witness immuned produced its desired results the private respondents
from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the had all testified without offer of immunity. Their
right against self-incrimination. He is merely saved from constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only
the use against him of such statement and nothing way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to
more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact
prosecuted even if he sets up his right against self- been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the
incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to
hallmark of due process, demands that private answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the
respondents should have been informed of their rights testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized
to remain silent and warned that any and all statements under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the
to be given by them may be used against them. This, immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to
they were denied, under the pretense that they are not depend on a claim of the privilege against self-
entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so incrimination which the same law practically strips away
inform them. from the witness.
respondent herein. An advanced payment has already individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or
been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for physical coercion.
her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to
transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by People v Lagman and Zosa, et. Al, 66 Phil. 13 (Service in
the employment agency. Further she was detained and defense of the State)
her liberty was restrained. The employment Facts: In these two cases (G.R. Nos. 45892 and
agency wanted that the advance payment, which was 45893), the appellants Tranquilino Lagman and
applied to her transportation expense from the province Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section
should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National
to leave. Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants,
being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty
Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register
right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of
advance payment it gave? said year, notwithstanding the fact that they had been
required to do so. The evidence shows that these two
Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount appellants were duly notified by the corresponding
it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in
absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of order to register for military service in accordance with
movement. The fact that no physical force has been law, and that the said appellants, in spite of these
exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does notices, had not registered up to the date of filing of the
not make less real the deprivation of her personal information.
freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one
place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege
Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, in defense that they have not registered in the military
to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has
existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and
cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no
psychological element that may curtail the mental military leanings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will.
If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of
a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to First Instance to one month and one day of
the protection of courts of justice as much as the imprisonment, with the costs.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 727
Held: The Court held that The National Defense Law, in The circumstance that the appellants have dependent
so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does families to support does not excuse them from their duty
not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the to present themselves before the Acceptance Board
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of because, if such circumstance exists, they can ask for
the Government to defend the State cannot be deferment in complying with their duty and, at all events,
performed except through an army. To leave the they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to
organization of an army to the will of the citizens would attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69
be to make this duty of the Government excusable of Commonwealth Act No. 1).
should there be no sufficient men who volunteer to
enlist therein. Robertson v. Baldwin (1897) (Naval enlistment)
The Court refused to apply the 13th Amendment to
The right of the Government to require compulsory merchant seamen who had jumped ship, been caught,
military service is a consequence of its duty to defend and been impressed back into maritime service without
the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the due process. The Court explained that 13th
life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In the case of Amendment's ban on involuntary servitude, even
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. though absolute on its face, contained various implicit
Rep., 385), it was said that, without violating the exceptions. In support of the finding of an exception to
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if the 13th Amendment, the Court argued that the Bill of
need be, against his will, against his pecuniary interests, Rights also contained unstated exceptions:
and even against his religious or political convictions, to
take his place in the ranks of the army of this country, The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten
and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. In Amendments to the constitution . . . [are] subject
the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Feb., 233), it to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from
was also said that this is not deprivation of property the necessities of the case. . . . Thus, the freedom
without due process of law, because, in its just sense, of speech and of the press (article 1) does not
there is no right of property to an office or employment. permit the publication of libels, blasphemous or
The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws indecent articles, or other publications injurious to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 728
public morals or private reputation; the right of the off, suspending, or dismissing any laborer affiliated with
people to keep and bear arms (article 2) is not the petitioning union. Conversely, the workers were
infringed by law prohibiting the carrying of enjoined from staging walk-outs or strikes during the
concealed weapons; the provision that no person pendency of the hearing.
shall be twice put in jeopardy (art. 5) does not
prevent a second trial, if upon the first trial the jury Gotamco Saw Mill subsequently filed an urgent motion
failed to agree, or the verdict was set aside upon asking that the petitioning union be held in contempt of
the defendant's motion. . . . court for having staged a strike during the pendency of
the main case, for picketing on the premises of the saw
In 1897, state laws which barred individuals from mill, and for grave threats which prevented the
carrying concealed weapons were common, and usually remaining laborers from working. The union alleged that
upheld by state supreme courts; the laws did not forbid one of its representatives conferred with the
state militias from carrying concealed weapons. The management of the saw mill, but instead of entertaining
prohibitions on concealed carry are the exceptions that their grievances, the saw mill ordered the stoppage of
prove the rule. Only if the Second Amendment is an the work and employed four new Chinese laborers
individual right does the Court's invocation of a without express authority of the court and in violation of
concealed carry exception make any sense. Section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The CIR
ruled that there was a violation of the previous order of
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa v. Gotamco Saw Mill the CIR by the union, which warranted the
(GR No. L-1573, 29 March 1948) commencement of contempt proceedings and that the
(Return to work order in industries affected with public saw mill did not violate Section 19 of CA 103.
interest)
Issue: W/N Section 19 of CA 103 is unconstitutional for
Facts: The Kaisahan ng Manggagawa ng Kahoy sa being in violation of the organic proscription of
Pilipinas declared a strike against Gotamco Saw Mill involuntary servitude.
because the latter did not accede to the formers
request of a salary increase. While the case was being Ruling: NO. Section 19 of CA 103 does not offend
heard by the Court of Industrial Relations, the parties against the constitutional inhibition proscribing
reached a temporary wage arrangement and the involuntary servitude. The provisions of CA 103 were
workers were ordered to go back to work while the saw inspired by the constitutional injunction making it the
mill was ordered to increase the salaries of the workers concern of the State to promote social justice to insure
by P2.00, let them take home small pieces of lumber to the well-being and economic security of all the people.
be utilized as firewood, and was enjoined from laying- In order to attain this object, Section 19 was
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 729
promulgated which grants to labor what it grants to order for the reason that the public has an interest in
capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital. preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the
Among other things, Section 19 lays down the implied wheels of industry.
condition that when any dispute between the employer Several laws promulgated which apparently
or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has infringe the human rights of individuals were
been submitted to the CIR for settlement or arbitration, subjected to regulation by the State basically in
pursuant to the provisions of the Act, and pending the exercise of its paramount police power.
award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer From Justice Perfectos concurring and dissenting
shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so opinion: If the laborers should feel that they are
joined by the court after hearing and when public compelled against their will to perform something
interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that which is repugnant to their conscience or dignity,
he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, they need not resort to any court action to seek
which shall be issued only after hearing when public judicial settlement of the controversy, as they can
interest so requires or when the dispute cannot, in its resign from their work and there is no power that
opinion, be promptly decided or settled. Thus, the can compel them to continue therein.
voluntariness of the employees entering into such a
contract of employmenthe has a free choice between U. PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS
entering into it or notwith such an implied condition,
negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude PEOPLE V. DIONISIO
ensuing.
FACTS: On or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in
Manila City, Rosauro Dionisio, a person who is not duly
Issue: W/N the previous order of the CIR, which ordered
authorized in any capacity by the Games and
the union laborers to go back to work, is unconstitutional
Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did then
for being in violation of the organic proscription of
and there willfully and unlawfully offer, arrange and
involuntary servitude.
collect bets for the Special Daily Double Race being
then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club at Makati
Ruling: NO. The order of the court was for the
and for that purpose has in possession the cash amount
striking workers to return to their work. That order was
of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program, dated August
made after hearing, and Section 19 of CA 103
19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet
authorizes such order when the dispute cannot in its
of Daily Double receipt. He was thereby charged in
opinion be promptly decided or settled. The very
violation of Republic Act No. 3063.
impossibility of prompt decision or settlement of the
dispute confers upon the CIR the power to issue the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 730
ISSUE: Whether or not the penalty applied to his brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class
offense infringes the Constitutional provision that suit requesting the Court to declare some provisions
Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the
unusual punishment inflicted. (Art III Sec. 1 clause 19, implementing Administrative Order 62 issued pursuant
of the Constitution of the Phils) thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The
petition was captioned as an action for declaratory
RULING: Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in relief, over which the Court does not exercise
themselves cruel and unusual punishment, for the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest
Constitutional structure has been interpreted as involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for
referring to penalties that are inhumane and barbarous, prohibition instead.
or shocking to the conscience and fines or
imprisonment are definitely not in this category. Nor Petitioners have assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c
does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual and d, of the Generics Act prescribing graduated
punishment. penalties (ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less
The Social Scourge of Gambling must be stamped out. that P10,000 and the suspension of the physician's
The laws against gambling must be enforced to the license to practice his profession for one [1]) year or
limit. (Peo v. Gorostiza, 77 Phil 88) longer, at the discretion of the court) for violations of its
provisions.
DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON (PROHIBITED
PUNISHMENTS) Held: Petitioners' allegation that these penalties violate
Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act the constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and
6675 was published in two newspapers of general cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit. Penal
circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed.
March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in They are the "teeth" of the law. Without them, the law
Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on,
Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 for physicians, dentists and veterinarians may freely
dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of
the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for suspension or cancellation of the physician's license is
violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of neither cruel, inhuman,or degrading. It is no different
the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the from the penalty of suspension or disbarment that this
Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or
Association, the national organization of medical violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and
doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional Judicial Conduct.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 731
by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense o In support of his contention, accused-
theory in Furman centered not so much on appellant largely relies on the ruling of the
the nature of the death penalty as a U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia::
criminal sanction but on the discrimination "Rape is without doubt deserving of serious
against the black accused who is meted out punishment; but in terms of moral depravity
the death penalty by a white jury that is and of the injury to the person and to the
given the unconditional discretion to public, it does not compare with murder,
determine whether or not to impose the which does involve the unjustified taking of
death penalty. human life. Although it may be
accompanied by another crime, rape by
o Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death
definition does not include the death of or
penalty because it was cruel and unusual
even the serious injury to another person.
per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court
The murderer kills; the rapist, if no more
nullified all discretionary death penalty
than that, does not. Life is over for the
statutes in Furman, it did so because the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim,
discretion which these statutes vested in
life may not be nearly so happy as it was,
the trial judges and sentencing juries was
but it is not over and normally is not beyond
uncontrolled and without any parameters,
repair. We have the abiding conviction that
guidelines, or standards intended to lessen,
the death penalty, which 'is unique in its
if not altogether eliminate, the intervention
severity and irrevocability' x x x is an
of personal biases, prejudices and
excessive penalty for the rapist who, as
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial
such, does not take human life"
judges and sentencing juries.
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing
Accused-appellant maintains that the death
ruling on two grounds:
penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading
punishment for the crime of rape mainly because 1) That the public has manifested its rejection of
the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the the death penalty as a proper punishment for
taking of life. the crime of rape through the willful omission
by the state legislatures to include rape in their
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 735
new death penalty statutes in the aftermath of rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
Furman; weapon or by two or more persons resulting in
insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson
Phil. SC: Anent the first ground, we fail to see
resulting in death.
how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took
own culture.
the form of a constitutional question of whether or
2) That rape, while concededly a dastardly
not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive
contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual
or unusual punishment in violation of the
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological
constitutional proscription against cruel and
balance, does not involve the taking of life.
unusual punishment.
Phil. SC: We disagree with the court's
predicate that the gauge of whether or not a o Harden v. Director of Prison- "The penalty
crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
attendance of the circumstance of death on excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S.,
the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact 436, the United States Supreme Court said
an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive that 'punishments are cruel when they
justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a involve torture or a lingering death, but the
tooth".
punishment of death is not cruel, within the
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
meaning of that word as used in the
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
constitution. It implies there something
specified crimes under specific circumstances.
inhuman and barbarous, something more
As early as 1886, though, capital punishment
than the mere extinguishment of life.
had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the o People v. Limaco- "x x x there are quite a
Spanish Penal Code of 1870. number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the
or unwise or ineffective. However, as long
penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence
as that penalty remains in the statute
with the enemy during times of war, qualified
books, and as long as our criminal law
piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 736
provides for its imposition in certain cases, reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a
it is the duty of judicial officers to respect patent disregard and mockery of the law,
and apply the law regardless of their private public peace and order, or public morals. It
opinions," is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution outrageous to a civilized society and hence,
simply states that congress, for compelling shock the moral self of a people.
reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose
the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision The right of a person is not only to live but to live
imposes a requirement that for a death penalty a quality life, and this means that the rest of
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form society is obligated to respect his or her individual
of a higher incidence of crime should first be personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or
perceived and statistically proven following the her own physical body, and the value he or she
suspension of the death penalty. Neither does puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological,
the said provision require that the death penalty material and social preferences and needs.
be resorted to as a last recourse when all other
o Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
society
ransom resulting in the death of the victim
o What R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected
Congress, in the interest of justice, public to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
order and rule of law, and the need to resulting in death, and drug offenses
rationalize and harmonize the penal involving minors or resulting in the death of
sanctions for heinous crimes, finds the victim in the case of other crimes; as
compelling reasons to impose the death well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide,
penalty for said crimes. kidnapping and serious illegal detention
where the victim is detained for more than
o Heinous crime is an act or series of acts
three days or serious physical injuries were
which, by the flagrantly violent manner in
inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
which the same was committed or by the
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 737
with homicide, rape or intentional the respect, freedom, and physical and moral
mutilation, destructive arson, and integrity to which every person has a right. It
carnapping where the owner, driver or causes grave damage that can mark the victim for
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an
or raped, which are penalized by reclusion outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by only the victim but the society itself.
their very nature.
Francis v Resweber
SC: The death penalty is imposed in heinous Where a mechanical failure in the electric chair
crimes because: prevented the execution of the convict and another
execution date was scheduled by the warden, the US
o The perpetrators thereof have committed Supreme Court denied the plea of the convict that he
unforgivably execrable acts that have so was being subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment
as there is no intent to inflict unnecessary pain or any
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal
unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.
acts with severely destructive effects on the The situation of the victim is just as through he has
national efforts to lift the masses from suffered the anguish in any other occurrence, such as a
abject poverty through organized fire in the cellblock.
governmental strategies based on a January 13, 1947
disciplined and honest citizenry Facts: Francis was convicted of murder and was
sentenced to electrocution. The electric chair sent out a
o They have so caused irreparable and current but failed to cause his death because of some
substantial injury to both their victim and mechanical difficulty. He was removed from the chair
the society and a repetition of their acts and returned to prison. A new death warrant was
issued.
would pose actual threat to the safety of
Francis argued that a new execution would constitute
individuals and the survival of government, double jeopardy (5th Amendment) and cruel and
they must be permanently prevented from unusual punishment (8th Amendment).
doing so Issue: Was an order for re-execution tantamount to
cruel and unusual punishment?
People v. Cristobal: "Rape is the forcible violation No. There is no cruel and unusual punishment. The fact
of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does that Francis has already been subjected to a current of
injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds electricity does not make his subsequent execution any
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 738
more cruel in the constitutional sense than any other The SC said that the suspension of the execution of the
execution. The cruelty against which the Constitution death sentence is indisputably an exercise of judicial
protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the power, as an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It is not a
method of punishment, not the necessary suffering usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve,
involved in any method employed to extinguish human although its effect is the same; the temporary
life humanely. The fact that an unforeseeable accident suspension of the execution of the death convict. It
prevented consummation does not add an element of cannot be denied however that Congress can amend
cruelty to a subsequent execution. RA 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life
Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a imprisonment. The effect is a commutation of sentence.
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel Facts: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO
within the meaning of that word as used in the staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
barbarous, something more than the mere Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO
extinguishment of life. arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the
Dispositve: Petition denied. Re-execution is ordered. rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
Dissent (Burton, Douglas, Murphy, Rutledge): power of the executive to grant reprieve.
Subjecting Francis to the electric chair again is a cruel
and unusual punishment. In determining whether the
proposed procedure is unconstitutional, we must Issue: Whether or not the SC, after the decision in the
measure it against a lawful electrocution. The contrast is case becomes final and executory, still has jurisdiction
that between instantaneous death and death by over the case
installments -- caused by electric shocks administered
after one or more intervening periods of complete
consciousness of the victim. Electrocution, when Held: The finality of judgment does not mean that the
instantaneous, can be inflicted by a state in conformity SC has lost all its powers or the case. By the finality of
with due process of law. The all-important consideration the judgment, what the SC loses is its jurisdiction to
is that the execution shall be so instantaneous and amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
substantially painless that the punishment shall be the judgment has become final, the SC retains its
reduced, as nearly as possible, to no more than that of jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
death itself. Electrocution has been approved only in a
form that eliminates suffering. The power to control the execution of the SCs decision
is an essential aspect of its jurisdiction. It cannot be the
Echegaray v Secretary of Justice subject of substantial subtraction for the Constitution
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 739
vests the entirety of judicial power in one SC and in President to commute final sentences of conviction. The
such lower courts as may be established by law. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
the process of execution of decisions where exclude each other for the simple reason that there is
supervening events may change the circumstance of no higher right than the right to life. To contend that only
the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
because of these unforeseen, supervening equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of
contingencies that courts have been conceded the the government.
inherent and necessary power of control of Pagdayawon v Secretary of Justice
its processes and orders to make them conform to law The mere pendency in the two houses of Congress of a
and justice. bill seeking the repeal of RA 7659 should not per se
warrant the outright issuance of a temporary restraining
The Court also rejected public respondents contention order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has
that by granting the TRO, the Court has in become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function should not be considered as a ground for the stay of a
under Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution. In truth, an death sentence.
accused who has been convicted by final judgment still Facts: Thirty death row inmates sought to enjoin the
possesses collateral rights and these rights can be execution of their death sentences in view of a possible
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death repeal of laws authorizing the imposition of death
convict who becomes insane after his penalty.
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of The SC has the power to control the enforcement of its
insanity. The suspension of such a death sentence is decisions, including the issuance of a TRO to stay the
indisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a execution of a death sentence which is already final.
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though Issue: Can a TRO be issued for the death sentences?
its effects are the same as the temporary suspension of No. The mere pendency of a bill in either or both houses
the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it of Congress should not per se warrant outright issuance
cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend of a temporary restraining order to stay the execution of
the Death Penalty Law by reducing the penalty of death a death sentence that has become final. In fact, being
to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a
is like that of commutation of sentence. But the exercise ground for a stay of a death sentence. While newspaper
of Congress of its plenary power to amend laws cannot reports indicate the supposed acquiescence of a
be considered as a violation of the power of the number of senators and congressmen to the abolition of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 740
the death penalty, such is by no means an assurance A trust receipt arrangement does not involve a simple
that these same legislators will eventually vote for the loan transaction between a creditor and debtor-importer.
modification or repeal of the law. Apart from a loan feature, the trust receipt arrangement
has a security feature that is covered by the trust receipt
V. Non-imprisonment for Debt itself. That second feature is what provides the much
Art. III, Sec. 20 needed financial assistance to our traders in the
People v. Nitafan importation or purchase of goods or merchandise
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: through the use of those goods or merchandise as
Facts: collateral for the advancements made by a bank. The
- Betty Sia Ang received in trust from Allied Banking title of the bank to the security is the one sought to be
Corp Gordon Plastics, plastic sheeting and Hook protected and not the loan which is a separate and
Chromed, in the total amount of P398,000.00, distinct agreement.
specified in a trust receipt, under the obligation on her The Trust Receipts Law punishes the dishonesty and
part to sell the same and account for the proceeds of abuse of confidence in the handling of money or goods
the sale or return the same to Allied Bank if unsold. to the prejudice of another regardless of whether the
latter is the owner or not. The law does not seek to
- However, she later paid only P283,115. Allied Bank
enforce payment of the loan. Thus, there can be no
thus charged Betty Sia Ang with estafa.
violation of a right against imprisonment for non-
- On motion, Judge Nitafan quashed the information on
payment of a debt. The misuse of trust receipts
the ground that a trust receipt transaction is an
therefore should be deterred to prevent any possible
evidence of a loan being secured so that there is, as
havoc in trade circles and the banking community .
between the parties to it, a creditor-debtor relationship.
The offense is punished as a malum
The penal clause of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is
prohibitum regardless of the existence of intent or
inoperative because it does not actually punish an
malice. A mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the
offense mala prohibita. The law only refers to the
sale or the goods if not sold, constitutes a criminal
relevant estafa provision in the Revised Penal Code.
offense that causes prejudice not only to another, but
- Betty Sia Ang asserts that P.D. 115 is unconstitutional
more to the public interest.
as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for non-payment of a debt. She argues
The enactment of P.D. 115 is a valid exercise of the
that where no malice exists in a breach of a purely
police power of the State and is, thus, constitutional.
commercial undertaking, P.D. 115 imputes it.
W. Double Jeopardy
Held:
Art. III, Sec. 21
PD 115s penal clause is valid
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 741
Held:
1. Requisites To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites must have
a. Valid complaint or information obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a
b. Filed before a competent court valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
c. To which the defendant has pleaded convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Icasiano v Sandiganbayan
Facts: Double jeopardy does not apply in the present
- In 1987, Romana Magbago filed an administrative controversy because:
complaint with the Supreme court against MTC Judge 1. the Supreme Court case was administrative in
Icasiano for grave abuse of authority, manifest character while the Sandiganbayan case also against
partiality and incompetence for issuing orders of said petitioner is criminal in nature.
detention against Magbago for contempt of court. The
2. the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit in 1988.
complaint with the Ombudsman cannot bar the present
- Magbago, had apparently filed with the Office of the
prosecution because it was dismissed in the preliminary
Ombudsman, also in 1987, a complaint charging
investigation stage. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et
Judge Icasiano with a violation of RA 3019 (Anti Graft
al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the
and Corrupt Practices Act). This was likewise
Philippines, a preliminary investigation is not a trial to
dismissed during the preliminary investigation stage.
which double jeopardy attaches.
- A similar complaint, however, appeared to have been
filed with the office of the Tanodbayan which was People v Grospe
transferred to the (then) newly-created Office of the Facts:
Ombudsman. The Special Prosecutor working on the - Manuel Parulan was charged with B.P. 22 involving a
case was not aware of the previous complaint and check with the amount of P86K and with estafa for a
dismissal thereof, and thus filed an information against check with an amount of P11k. The two cases were
Judge Icasiano with the Sandiganbayan. tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and
- Judge Icasiano asserts that the information should be defense being the same for the two suits.
quashed because he would be twice put in jeopardy - The trial court dismissed the two cases on the ground
for the same offense. of lack of jurisdiction, saying that the two essential
elements that make up the offenses involving
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 742
dishonored checks, did not occur within the territorial prosecution had already concluded the presentation of
jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in its evidence and the defense was about to finish theirs
Bulacan where false assurances were given. when the prosecution filed a motion to charge
- The People filed a petition for certiorari challenging the Gonzales with rape since the evidence submitted
dismissal as being issued with grave abuse of indicated that the crime evidently committed was rape
discretion. and not qualified seduction.
- Parulan argues that the order of dismissal was, in - The trial court thus dismissed the case for qualified
effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and seduction and the prosecution filed 6 informations for
that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the rape with the RTC. Gonzales entered a plea of not
merits, would subject him to double jeopardy. guilty to the charges.
Held: Held:
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside The requisites for double jeopardy:
the void decision of the trial court does not place (1) The previous complaint or information or other
Parulan in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to
be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an sustain a conviction;
adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
Respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his (3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to
Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. the charge; and
Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a dismissed without his express consent.
subsequent case based on the same offense. When all the above elements concur, a second
The dismissal being null and void (as it was erroneous), prosecution for (a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt
the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to commit the said offense, or (c) a frustration of the
to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no said offense, or (d) any offense which necessarily
second proceeding which would subject the accused to includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense
double jeopardy. charged, can be rightly barred.
There is no question that the Municipal Trial Court did
Gonzales v Court of Appeals not have the requisite jurisdiction to try the offense of
Facts: rape, a crime that lies instead within the province of the
- Gonzales was charged with qualified seduction with Regional Trial Court.
the MTC, to which he pleaded not guilty. The
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 743
Moreover, the dismissal of Criminal Case for qualified re-set the arraignment as the prosecution intended to
seduction by the Municipal Trial Court not only was file several other cases of rape against the accused.
provisional but likewise with the express consent of the An amended information for rape was later filed
accused. against Navarro, as the principal accused. He filed a
(Note: Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of motion to quash the amended information. RTC granted
Court provides: the motion finding that Navarro was not one of those
Sec. 11. When mistake has been made in charging the identified by petitioner to have abused her, and that the
proper offense. When it becomes manifest at any Information failed to show his particular participation in
time before judgment, that a mistake has been made in the crime. Navarro, however, was not released from
charging the proper offense, and the accused cannot be detention as there were still pending cases against him.
convicted of the offense charged, or of any other MR was denied. Hence this case for certiorari.
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall Meanwhile, Navarros other co-accused were
not be discharged, if there appears to be good cause to arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charges
detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the against them. Trial commenced as regards their
accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss respective cases. Later, Navarro escaped from
the original case upon the filing of the proper detention and has remained at large.
information.) Before presentation of evidence, it dropped the
infromations against the other 6 principal accused for
insufficiency of evidence which was granted by the trial
court
Joan Flores v Hon. Francisco Joven, RTC-Surigao
del Sur, Emmanuel Navarro Issue:
W/N the RTC erred in quashing the information.
Austria-Martinez
27 December 2002 Held/Ratio:
YES. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the
Facts: records of this case adequately show that respondent
Flores caused the filing of a criminal against Navarro Navarro was identified as one of those who sexually
and 9 other persons for rape. Before the accused were abused petitioner. In the Flores sworn statement, she
arraigned, Navarro filed a motion to dismiss on the stated that she knew the perpetrators by face and
ground that the complaint did not sufficiently describe further declared under oath that she was able to identify
the crime of rape and in any of its forms. The trial court them later at the police station during line-up
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 744
having been no standing plea at the time the court a NO. The mere filing of two informations charging the
quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no same offense is not an appropriate basis for the
double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy
Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a has not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or
quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the termination of the case without the consent of the
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or accused. Moreover, it appears that private respondent
even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case
so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to
lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is speak, in the case at bar. Legal jeopardy attaches only
perforce null and void. (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
d. Defendant was previously acquitted or entered, and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
terminated without his express consent. Where there is no former conviction, acquittal, dismissal
or termination of a former case for the same offense, no
People v Hon. Gregorio Pineda, CFI Rizal and jeopardy attaches.
Consolacion Naval
People v Hon. Martin Villarama, and Jaime Manuel
Melo
16 February 1993 Medialdea
23 June 1992
Facts:
Consolacion Naval was accused of having committed Facts:
the crime of estafa before the CFI of Rizal, Branches 19 Jaime Manuel was charged with violation of Section
and 21. She moved for the quashal of the second 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended for having in
charge on the supposition that she was in danger of his possession 0.08 grams of shabu. During the
being convicted for the same felony. Judge Pineda of arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
Branch 21 found in her favor. Thereafter, trial ensued after which the prosecution
rested its case. Counsel for Manuel verbally manifested
Issue: W/N the court was correct in granting the in open court that private respondent was willing to
motion to quash. change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A. No.
Held/Ratio: 6425, as amended. That same day, the respondent
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 746
Judge issued an order directing Manuel to secure the stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still
consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his
the promulgation of the decision. The prosecutor filed plea thereafter.
his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution to a lesser offense under Rule 116.2 is not demandable
already rested its case; (2) the possibility of conviction by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
of private respondent of the crime originally charged addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial
was high because of the strong evidence of the court.
prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court In the case at bar, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a
and the prosecutor had expended would be put to lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested
waste. Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave its case. The trial court need not wait for a guideline
of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on
therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the
Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against
accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. the said motion, it behooves the trial court to
Subsequently, respondent Judge rendered a decision assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as
granting the accused's motion. MR of prosecution was all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
denied. change of plea to the end that the interests of justice
and of the public will be served. A reading of the
Issue: disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the
W/N it was proper for the RTC to grant the request strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
to plead to a guilty to a lesser offense without the Apparently, the judgment under review dwelt solely on
prosecutors and the offended partys consent. only one of the three objections (i.e. waste of valuable
time already spent by the court and prosecution)
Held/Ratio: interposed by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive.
YES. Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process It must be recalled that the other two grounds of
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a objection were that the prosecution had already rested
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to its case and that the possibility of conviction of the
court approval. It usually involves the defendant's private respondent of the crime originally charged was
pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution.
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in
for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. hand, the respondent judge's acceptance of the private
Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial respondent's change of plea is improper and irregular.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 747
The counsel for the private respondent argues that offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured
only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.
involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because
there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the No Double Jeopardy
latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent
the trial court could allow the accused to change his maintains that the private respondent's change of plea
plea. and his conviction to the lesser offense of violation of
However, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open
clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended to review otherwise his constitutional right against
party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to double jeopardy will be violated.
a lesser offense. The reason for this is obvious. The Such supposition has no basis. The right against
Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal. double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule
Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where both
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former. respondent's change of plea. Since this is not the
It would not also be correct to state that there is no situation here, the private respondent cannot claim this
offended party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which
themselves, they are made so by law because they states: Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double
infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by jeopardy. xxx However, the conviction of the accused
drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense
is malevolent and incessant. Such pernicious effect is which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their former complaint or information under any of the
families. As a result, society's survival is endangered following instances: c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and
of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the of the offended partyUnder this rule, the private
offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of respondent could still be prosecuted under the original
the people, the government files the criminal action in charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as
the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal amended because of the lack of consent of the Fiscal
who represents the government is duty bound to defend who also represents the offended party,i.e., the state.
the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change
that it is as though he were the person directly injured of plea was irregular and improper.
by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 748
Gorion vs. RTC of Cebu (1992) the court denied the petitioners motion to dismiss on
the ground that the order of dismissal of 28 September
Facts: 1990was set aside in the aforesaid order. Petitioner filed
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Estafa a motion to reconsider the other denying his motion to
involving the amount of P50, 000. Upon his dismiss, alleging that he cannot be blamed or faulted for
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and the a.) the failure of the stenographer b.) any error in the
court set the pre-trial and trial of the case on Apr 17, dismissal of the case c.) the inclusion of the case in the
1990. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what calendar of Sept 28 1990.
transpired on Apr 17, 1990. However, it appears that
hearing was again scheduled for Sept 27 and Issue/held/ratio:
28 1990. When the case was called for hearing on Sept 1. w/n an order dismissing a criminal case after
27, neither the petitioner nor his counsel was present. accused had been arraigned, issued in open
Not wanting to take advantage of their absence, and court through inadvertence or mistake during a
considering that there were other cases to be heard, the hearing that had already been cancelled, be set
prosecutor moved for the cancellation of the hearing on aside by the court and the case tried without
that date as well as the hearing to be held on the placing the accused in double jeopardy? No
following day, which the court granted. The hearing was Double Jeopardy yet.
reset, unfortunately the case was still included in the The erroneous dismissal order of Sept 28 1990
trial calendars of the court for Sept 28. When the case was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily; it
was called for the hearing on that date, only the fiscal unquestionably deprived the State of a fair opportunity
appeared for prosecution. The court then issued an to present and proved its case. Thus, its right to
order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute. On due process was violated. The said order is null and
Jul 2, 1991, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss alleging void and hence, cannot be pleaded by the petitioner to
therein that the dismissal of the case by the bar the
court on Sept 28 1990 without his consent amounted to subsequent annulment of the dismissal order or a re-
his acquittal; hence, he would be placed in opening of the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
double jeopardy if the case were to be reopened or cont The dismissal of Sept 28 1990, being null and
inue. The trial court set aside the dismissal order of void because the trial court lost its jurisdiction to issue
Sept 28 1990 in its Order of Aug 9 1991 on the ground the same and violated the right of the prosecution to
that the court was only misled in issuing the same due due process. The three requisites of double jeopardy
to the stenographers failure to transcribe the order are: 1.) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
given in open court issued the previous day, hence, it second 2.) The first jeopardy must have been validly
was issued without due process. Also on the same day,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 749
terminated and 3.) A second jeopardy must be for the the court a quo in one respect only - the increase of the
same offense as that in the first. indemnity to be paid by the appellant to the heirs of the
Legal jeopardy attaches only; a. upon a valid victims from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 as ruled in
indictment b. Before a competent court c. various cases including that cited in Our decision
after arraignment d. when valid plea has been entered SC, acting on the afore-cited motion to clarify decision
e. when the case was dismissed or otherwise declared that this Court had affirmed the decision of the
terminated without the express consent of the accused. court a quo with regard to the penalty of imprisonment
It having been shown that in this case, the requisites of imposed in the said trial courts decision.
a valid termination of the first jeopardy are not present, Respondent Judge then set the promulgation of the
the petitioner cannot hide behind the protective mantle decision anew.
of double jeopardy. The petition is dismissed The accused, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside
Promulgation.
Cuison vs. CA (1998)
Issue/Held/Ratio:
Facts: 1. w/n petitioners right against double jeopardy
RTC found Eduardo Cuison guilty of the crime of double was violated? NO
homicide, sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 6
years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day. He was also To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Sapigao P30,000.00 following must be proven:
and heirs of Castro P30,000.00. CA affirmed RTCs x x x (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to
decision with the modification that civil indemnity was the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
increased to P50,000.00 In a petition for review in SC it validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for
was remanded to RTC for promulgation of decision. the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
However, respondent Judge promulgated [on April 4, necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
1995] the decision of [the Court of Appeals] only with information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a
respect to the modified civil liability of the accused but frustration thereof (citations omitted).
did not commit the accused to jail to commence service And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid
of his sentence. indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
OSG filed for motion for clarification of the arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been
aforementioned decision, On Aug 17, 1995, CA entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
rendered a Resolution which states in pertinent portions terminated without the express consent of the accused.
thereof: In the dispositive portion of this Courts Petitioner contends that the promulgation by Judge
decision, We simply modified the appealed decision of Ramos on Apr 4, 1995 of the Respondent Courts
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 750
decision of Jun 30, 1991 by reading its dispositive charge. Upon hearing, private prosecutor and defense
portion has effectively terminated the criminal cases counsel admitted the jurisdiction of the Court and the
against the petitioner x x x. identities of the accused. Initial hearing was set. During
As a rule, a criminal prosecution includes a civil the hearings, the prosecution presented its witnesses
action for the recovery of indemnity. Hence, a decision and rested its case after the presentation of the
in such case disposes of both the criminal as well as the testimonies. However, instead of presenting evidence,
civil liabilities of an accused. Here, trial court the defense filed a demurrer to evidence on the ground
promulgated only the civil aspect of the case, but not that the prosecution failed to identify the spouses as the
the criminal. accused. The case was dismissed and the spouses
As earlier observed, the promulgation of the CA Bermoy were acquitted. Upon appeal to the CA, the
Decision was not complete. In fact and in truth, the ruling was affirmed. It held that even assuming that the
promulgation was not merely incomplete; it was also trial court erred, the acquittal of the accused can no
void. In excess of its jurisdiction, the trial judge longer be reviewed either on appeal or on petition for
rendered a substantially incomplete promulgation on certiorari for it would violate the right of the accused
April 4, 1995, and he repeated his mistake in his April against double jeopardy.
12, 1996 Order. We emphasize that grave abuse of
discretion rendered the aforementioned act of the trial Issue/held/ratio:
court void. Since the criminal cases have not yet been 1. w/n double jeopardy has attached in the case?
terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet NO
attached. Hence, double jeopardy cannot prosper as a
defense. For double jeopardy to apply, Section 7 of Rule 117 of
We must stress that Respondent Courts questioned the 1985 Rules on Crim Pro requires the following
Decision did not modify or amend its July 30, 1991 elements in the first criminal case:
Decision. It merely ordered the promulgation of the (a) The complaint or information or other formal charge
judgment of conviction and the full execution of the was sufficient in form and substance to sustain
penalty it had earlier imposed on petitioner. a conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
PS Bank vs. Spouses Bermoy (2005) (c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded;
and
Facts: (d) He was convicted oracquitted or the case was
Petitioner charged spouses Pedrito and Gloria Bermoy dismissed without his express consent.
with estafa through falsification of a public document.
Upon arraignment, the spouses pleaded not guilty to the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 751
On the last element, the rule is that a dismissal with the petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he
express consent or upon motion of the accused immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police
does not result in double jeopardy. However, this rule is and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon
subject to two exceptions, namely, if the dismissal is the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down
based on insufficiency of evidence or on the denial of and were immediately apprehended.
the right to speedy trial. A dismissal upon demurrer to
evidence falls under the first exception. Since such A complaint grave threats was filed against the
dismissal is based on the merits, it amounts to petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed
an acquittal. All the elements were present in the by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners.
criminal case. Thus, the Information for estafa through Mabuyo filed a MFR thus the dismissal was reversed.
falsification of a public document against respondent Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition,
spouses was sufficient in form and substance to sustain damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the
a conviction. The trial court had jurisdiction over the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed
case and the persons of respondent for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and
spouses. Respondent spouses were arraigned during ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this
which they entered not guilty pleas. Finally, the case instant petition.
was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Consequently, the right not to be placed twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense became Issue/held/ratio:
vested on respondent spouses. 1. w/n dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of
acquittal? NO
Dismissal of action 2. w/n the judge ignored petitioners right against
double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207? NO
Paulin vs. Gimenez (1993)
For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case
Facts: must be without the express consent of the accused.
Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with
were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to
the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In
Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion
gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.
security guard for the identity of the owner of the Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an
vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 752
that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case,
guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated calling for an appreciation of the evidence adduced and
the proceedings because no finding was made as to the its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable
guilt or innocence of the petitioners. doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits,
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside tantamount to an acquittal of the accused.
the order of dismissal for the reception of further We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the
evidence by the prosecution because it merely precipitate action taken by Judge Alon in dismissing the
corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and criminal case against the private respondents at that
dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the stage of the trial. A thorough and searching study of the
right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The law, the allegations in the Information, and the evidence
rule on summary procedure was correctly applied. adduced plus a more circumspect and reflective
exercise of judgment, would have prevented a failure of
When the ground for the motion to dismiss is justice in the instant case.
insufficiency of evidence When the proceedings have been
unreasonably prolonged as to violate the rights of the
PEOPLE v. CITY COURT OF SILAY accused to speedy trial
Facts: ESMENA v. POGOY
Respondents were charged with "falsification by private Facts:
individuals and use of falsified document." Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas
rested its case, private respondents moved to dismiss Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from
the charge against them on the ground that the the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a
evidence presented was not sufficient to establish their game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after the
Acting on this motion, respondent court dismissed the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on
case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an
the acts committed by the accused as narrated above order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal
do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged. informed the court that it received a telegram stating
Held: that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed
against the private respondents was erroneous. the case because the trial was already dragging the
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was accused and that the priests telegram did not have a
dismissed on motion of the accused; however, this was medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 753
recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial
to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for postponement
fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the due to his failure to contact the material witnesses. The
medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the case was reset without any objection from the defense
priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991
accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the but the prosecutor was not present. The respondent
case on the ground of double jeopardy. judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as
Held: unjustified, and dismissed the criminal case for failure to
The petitioners were insisting on a trial. They relied on prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
their constitutional right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal reconsideration, claiming that his absence was because
was not ready because his witness was not in court. such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the
Respondent judge on his own volition provisionally Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The
dismissed the case. The petitioners did not expressly motion was denied by respondent judge.
manifest their conformity to the provisional dismissal. Issue: Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of
Hence, the dismissal placed them in jeopardy. the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of their
Even if the petitioners, after invoking their right to a cases.
speedy trial, moved for the dismissal of the case and, Held:
therefore, consented to it, the dismissal would still place In determining the right of an accused to speedy
them in jeopardy. The use of the word "provisional" disposition of their case, courts should do more than a
would not change the legal effect of the dismissal. If the mathematical computation of the number of
defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.
speedy trial, he should ask, not for the dismissal, but for What are violative of the right of the accused to speedy
the trial of the case. After the prosecution's motion for trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial
postponement of the trial is denied and upon order of for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above,
the court the fiscal does not or cannot produce his there was no showing that there was an unjust delay
evidence and, consequently, fails to prove the caused by the prosecution, hence, the respondent judge
defendant's guilt, the court upon defendant's motion should have given the prosecution a fair opportunity to
shall dismiss the case, such dismissal amounting to an prosecute its case.
acquittal of the defendant. The private respondents cannot invoke their right
PEOPLE v. TAMPAL against double jeopardy. In several cases it was held
Facts: that dismissal on the grounds of failure to prosecute is
Tampal et al were charged of robbery with homicide and equivalent to an acquittal that would bar another
multiple serious physical injuries. The case was set for prosecution for the same offense, but in this case, this
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 754
does not apply, considering that the rights of the not be emasculated and reduced by an inordinate
accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided
Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the merely to benefit the accused. To do so would cause an
case is remanded to the court of origin for further injustice of hardship to the state and adversely affect
proceedings. the administration of justice.
Revival of the criminal cases provisionally Appeal by the prosecution
dismissed People v. Maquiling
PEOPLE v. LACSON Doctrine: The rule against double jeopardy proscribes
Facts: as appeal from a judgment of acquittal.
Petitioner asserts that retroactive application of penal Facts:
laws should also cover procedures, and that these According to witnesses, Ramil Maquiling boxed the
should be applied only to the sole benefit of the deceased Pacasum who was compelled to box back.
accused. Petitioner asserts that Sec 8 was meant to When Ramil fell, appellant, elder brother of Ramil
reach back in time to provide relief to the accused in line helped him and tried to pacify. They ran out of the disco
with the constitutional guarantee to the right to speedy but when the deceased and his companions followed
trial. outside, Ramil Maquiling and his companions were
Held: waiting and another fist fight ensued.
Time-bar should not be applied retroactively. Though During the fight, appellant went to his car and got a
procedural rules may be applied retroactively, it should pistol. He fired a warning shot and then shot deceased
not be if to do so would work injustice or would involve twice on the left thigh. Appellant then fired another shot
intricate problems of due process. Statutes should be and hit the deceased on the chest. He died due to the
construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and gun shot wounds. Another person, Jojo Villarimo
the evils to be remedied. This is because to do so would suffered gunshot wounds on his upper right leg which
be prejudicial to the State since, given that the Judge required medical attendance.
dismissed the case on March 29,1999, and the New On June 13, 1988, Iligan City Fiscal Ulysses V. Lagcao
rule took effect on Dec1,2000, it would only in effect charged Respondent Casan Maquiling with homicide
give them 1 year and three months to work instead of 2 and frustrated homicide. Acting on the petition of the
years. At that time, they had no knowledge of the said private complainants, the Department of Justice
rule and therefore they should not be penalized for that. subsequently directed the upgrading of the charge of
Indeed for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; homicide to murder.
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused
alone.The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for To both charges, Respondent Maquiling, assisted by
the benefit of both the State and the accused. It should Counsel de Parte Moises Dalisay Jr., entered a plea of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 755
not guilty upon his arraignment on June 5, 1989. Trial judgment. A direct review by the Supreme Court is the
ensued. The trial court rendered its Decision convicting normal recourse of the accused, where the penalty
private respondent of homicide and serious physical imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or
injuries. life imprisonment.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, prohibits the
The CA reversed and accepted the claim of self- state from appealing or filing a petition for review of
defense. When the accused-appellant tried to pacify a judgment of acquittal that was based on the
and stop Frederick from inflicting further harm on his merits of the case. Thus, Section 2, Rule 122 of the
brother, he was instead boxed on the right cheek by Rules of Court reads:
Frederick. Hence accused had opted to leave the disco "Sec. 2. Who may appeal. -- Any party may appeal
but was followed to his car by Frederick with a shotgun from a final judgment or order, except if the accused
[i]n hand.The deceased Frederick not only aimed the would be placed thereby in double jeopardy."
shotgun [at] him but actually fired at the accused. And This rule stems from the constitutional mandate stating
the accused shot at the deceased only after he was that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
himself injured by the deceased who fired a shotgun at same offense.
him. He likewise shot at Olegario Jojo Villaremo to
disarm him as he likewise took possession of the U.S. v. Kepner: the United States Supreme Court,
shotgun. reviewing a Philippine Supreme Court decision,
declared that an appeal by the prosecution from a
judgment of acquittal would place the defendant in
ISSUE: double jeopardy.
WON the appeal is proper. NO
Elements of Double Jeopardy:
The petition is not meritorious. the accused individuals are charged under a
Ordinarily, the judicial recourse of an aggrieved party is complaint or an information sufficient in form and
to appeal the trial court's judgment to the Court of substance to sustain their conviction;
Appeals and thereafter, to the Supreme Court in a the court has jurisdiction;
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. the accused have been arraigned and have
In such cases, this tribunal is limited to the pleaded; and
determination of whether the lower court committed
reversible errors or, in other words, mistakes of they are convicted or acquitted, or the case is
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 756
dismissed without their express consent. 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Rep. Act No. 7659.
In the case at bar, there are no questions as regards the The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent --
existence of the first, third and fourth elements. Branch 102 of the QC RTC
To question the jurisdiction of the lower court or the
agency exercising judicial or quasi judicial functions, the Accused pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits,
remedy is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule Tirona acquitted private respondent on grounds of
65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner in such cases reasonable doubt.
must clearly show that the public respondent acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion Petitioner now contends that public respondent, in
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. acquitting private respondent, committed GAOD in
ignoring material facts which if considered would lead to
An examination of the 65-page Decision rendered by a finding of guilt. Petitioner posits that the Double
the Court of Appeals shows no patent and gross error Jeopardy Clause does permit a review of acquittals
amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Neither does it decreed by trial magistrates where, as in this case, no
show an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power arising retrial will be required even if the judgment should be
from passion or hostility. overturned. It thus argues that appealing the acquittal
PETITION is DENIED. of private respondent would not be violative of the
constitutional right of the accused against double
jeopardy.
People v. Hon. Perlita Tirona
[G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005] Issue: W/n the decision of the respondent court
acquitting Muyot can be reviewed on a petition for
Facts: review on certiorari?
Petitioner for review on certiorari seeking annulment of
decision of Judge Tirona acquitting accused private Ratio:
respondent Chief Inspector Renato A. Muyot. In PP v. Velasco, the Court ruled that as mandated by
the Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence, an acquittal
The NBI, w/ 2 search warrants, conducted a search of is final and unappealable on the ground of double
Muyots house. They allegedly found 498.1094 grams jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or
of shabu which led to the filing of an information before the Court of Appeals. In general, the rule is that
charging private respondent with Violation of Section a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 757
be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. Only when also charged with frustrated theft.
there is a finding of a sham trial can the doctrine of
double jeopardy be not invoked because the people, as The CFI of Rizal acquitted Jaime Catuday.
represented by the prosecution, were denied due
process. In the hearings after March 25, 1970, it was always the
theft case which was heard. Sometime in December
From the foregoing pronouncements, it is clear in this 1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI,
jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is respondent District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in
immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground the two cases. The theft case was then in the rebuttal
of double jeopardy. The only exception where double stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed,
jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding and upon order of the court, the parties filed their
of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. respective "offer and submission of exhibits", and
submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20, 1973,
The fact that the petition was given due course does not respondent Judge rendered one decision,
necessarily mean we have to look into the sufficiency of acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof
the evidence since the issue to be resolved is the of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
appealability of an acquittal. We have categorically
Notably, the decision also stated that "these (light threat
ruled in People v. Velasco that, except when there is a
case and frustrated theft case) were tried jointly."
finding of mistrial, no appeal will lie in case of an
acquittal. There being no mistrial in the case before us,
we find no need to reexamine the evidence, because if The provincial fiscal, together with the private
we do so, we will be allowing an appeal to be made on prosecutor, filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
an acquittal which would clearly be in violation of the proving that respondent Judge's decision be annulled
accuseds right against double jeopardy. for lack of due process insofar as the light threat case
was concerned. On April 17, 1974, the Court (Second
People v. Navarro Division) issued a resolution to the effect that
G.R. No. L-38453-54 March 25, 1975 "considering the allegations contained, the issues raised
and the arguments adduced in the petition for certiorari,
FACTS: the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit."
Catuday was charged before Municipal Court of Makati
with crime of light threat allegedly committed against ISSUE:
Henry Dioquino. While the case was pending, he was WON this case is proper. YES.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 758
This petition for certiorari is granted. the part of the herein respondent Judge, tantamount
Respondents here have not pointed to any court order to excess or lack of jurisdiction, rendering the
for joint trial, as indeed there is none. Joint trial is not judgment of acquittal of the accused Jaime
called for in the two criminal cases. It is true that the Catuday, in Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat,
accused in the two cases is only one person, but there NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
are two different complainants: Henry Dioquino, in the
threat charge, and Commonwealth Foods, Inc., in the The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases,
theft case. The threat was supposed to have been that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its
made on March 5, 1968; the theft was allegedly evidence in support of the charge. The Court has
committed on January 31, 1969, almost a year always accorded this right to the prosecution, and
thereafter. Also, the charges are different. They do not where the right had been denied, had promptly annulled
even belong to the same class of crimes. Light threat is the offending court action. We have heretofore held that
a crime against personal liberty and security; frustrated a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives
theft is a crime against property. So, We cannot say the the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it
charges are for offenses founded on the same facts or denies the prosecution its day in court.
form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or
similar character. Consequently, the court had no power
to try them jointly. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal)
Going to the matter of the captions in the pleadings, without due process, and, therefore, null and void. Such
subpoenas, court orders, transcript of stenographic dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental
notes, etc., it has been argued that since most of the prerequisite, that is, due process, and,
captions include both Criminal Case No. 20145 (light consequently, will not constitute a proper basis for
threat) and Criminal Case No. 20146 (frustrated theft), the claim of double jeopardy. We have likewise held
there was joint trial of the cases, and the court properly that a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and
treated the hearing as joint and acted accordingly with well-founded motion of the prosecution for
respect to the two cases. It has been held, however, reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and
that a mistake in the caption of an indictment in that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set
designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal aside to give the State its day in court and an
defect, for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the opportunity to prove the offense charged against the
charging part that is the gist of the accusation. accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice,
especially when no substantial right of the accused
Evidently, the State had been deprived of due would be prejudiced thereby.
process, which act was an abuse of discretion on
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 759
In the present case, the respondent Judge, in rendering mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a
his judgment of acquittal of private respondent JAIME writ of certiorari.
CATUDAY in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light Threat - Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present petition for the
which was never tried in the respondent Judge's court reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of ISSUE
discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it
dismissed the case simply because three witnesses of
PEOPLE V TAC-AN its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-
CALLEJO; February 27, 2003 trial of the case
HELD
FACTS YES
- Mario Austria is the Officer-in-Charge Provincial - Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any
Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail. witness for the prosecution listed in the Information,
- He falsified a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment whether or not said witness is the offended party or the
Semi-Expendable and Non-Expendable Property, , a complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the
public/official document, by stating that certain firearms dismissal of a criminal case. Although under the law,
are a property of the provincial; government of pre-trial is mandatory in criminal cases, the presence of
Batangas and issued it to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, a civilian the private complainant or the complaining witness is
agent, for his own use in connection with the however not required. Even the presence of the
performance of his official duties and functions accused is not required unless directed by the trial
- Out of the 11 witnesses listed in the information, only 3 court. It is enough that the accused is represented by
were notified. When the case was called for pre-trial, his counsel. Indeed, even if none of the witnesses
the 3 did not appear and the RTC dismissed the case. listed in the information for the State appeared for the
- The public prosecutor filed a motion for pre-trial, the same can and should proceed. After all,
reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The trial
court acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed
dismissed the case simply because three of its the case merely because none of the witnesses notified
witnesses who were notified failed to appear at the by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial.
initial pre-trial. - The State, like the accused is also entitled to due
- CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court
ground that the errors committed by the trial court were dismissing the criminal case deprived the State of its
right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 760
therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of no effect. 3. Counsel for Gorion, Atty. Bilocura, received a
- The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the copy of this order on 4 October 1990. However,
reinstatement of the case does not place the private he received a copy of the 27 September 1990
respondent in double jeopardy. Order only on 15 June 1992.
Ratio The cardinal precept is that where there is a 4. The pleadings of the parties do not reveal what
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted actually transpired on 4 October 1990. In any
of their jurisdiction. event, the case was called again on 31 May
- to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three 1991, but the Court reset the hearing to 18, 22,
requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must 23 and 25 July 1991 on the ground that it had not
have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy yet received from the Chief Justice of this Court a
must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second reply to the Presiding Judge's request for an
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the extension of the trial dates.
first. 5. On 2 July 1991, Gorion filed a Motion to Dismiss
- Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid alleging therein that the dismissal of the case by
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after the court on 28 September 1990 without his
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and consent amounted to his acquittal; hence, he
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated would be placed in double jeopardy
without the express consent of the accused Issue: W/N there is double jeopardy involved in this
Petition GRANTED case NO
Gorion v RTC of Cebu 1992 1. It is obvious to this Court that the trial court was,
1. an information against Gorion was filed in Court on 28 September 1990, divested of jurisdiction,
for Estafa. However, on the hearing date for Sept pro hac vice, to issue any order, much leas one of
27, Gorion wasnt there thus the prosecutor dismissal, in Criminal Case No. CBU-16727 for
suggested that it be moved to another date for the the simple reason that said case was already
accused to be able to defend himself. Thus the effectively removed from its trial calendar for that
Judge approved the resetting of the Sept 27 date in view of the previous day's order cancelling
hearing as well as the Sept 28 hearing to October the hearing of the case on 27 and 28 September
4. 1990
2. But on the 28th, the case was still called for 2. The Judge, Clerk of Court and the prosecution
hearing as it was included in the calendar. But should shoulder the blame because unless
without any witnesses or evidence presented by amnesia suddenly struck all of them
the prosecutor, the case was dismissed. simultaneously, it cannot be imagined that in a
brief span of about twenty-four hours, they had all
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 761
forgotten about the order dictated in open court issued his Resolution which recalled and set
cancelling the hearing for 27 and 28 September aside the Resolution of Undersecretary Puno, but
1990. without however issuing a ruling on the propriety
3. The erroneous dismissal order of 28 September of the complaint and merely indicated that the
1990 was then issued capriciously and arbitrarily; case would be further reviewed and the
it unquestionably deprived the State of a fair corresponding resolution would be issued.
opportunity to present and prove its case. 5. DOJ then issued a Resolution dismissing both the
4. Thus, its right to due process was violated. The complaint filed by petitioner and the counterclaim
said order is null and void and hence, cannot be filed by private respondents. This was done after
pleaded by Gorion to bar the subsequent the arraignment which the accused refused to
annulment of the dismissal order or a re-opening enter a plea. Feeling aggrieved, Summerville
of the case on the ground of double jeopardy. immediately filed a motion for reconsideration of
Summerville General Merchandise v Eugenio the Secretarys ruling.
August 7, 2007 6. the prosecution filed with the trial court a Motion
1. The president and general manager of to Withdraw Informationon the basis of the
Summerville accused several persons Resolution issued by Secretary Perez. The next
(incorporators of AROTECH Corp) of day, the RTC issued the order dismissing the
unauthorized manufacturing, distribution and sale case. MR filed by Summerville.
and unfair competition of Royal brand playing 7. trial court issued an Orderholding in abeyance all
cards, the design and mark of which are claimed pending incidents to await the final resolution of
to have been duly patented/copyrighted and the motion filed before the DOJ. Respondents
registered. filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that
2. After due investigation, the City Prosecutors the trial court has all the facts necessary to
Office of Manila recommended the prosecution of resolve the pending incidents and also filed a
respondents for unfair competition. Thus an Motion to Dismiss on the ground of double
information for unfair competition was filed jeopardy.
3. Arraignment was scheduled for July 13, 2000; ISSUE: w/n double jeopardy already attached in this
however, on June 22 of the same year, private case NO
respondents filed a petition for review with the 1. First, in Santos v Orda: The trial court is not
Department of Justice assailing the May 31, 2000 bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Resolution of the City Prosecutors Office Justice since it is mandated to independently
4. Undersecretary Puno affirmed the resolution of evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it
the Prosecutor however DOJ Secretary Perez may either agree or disagree with the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 762
said counsel the desired copy, giving the latter discretion he was duty bound to exercise. In
ten days to respond. effect, it was the prosecution, through the
4. The prosecutor didnt comply with the trial court's Department of Justice which decided what to do
order; this notwithstanding, said court, through and not the court which was reduced to a mere
Presiding Judge Roberto A. Barrios, issued an rubber stamp
order dismissing the case. (note: no arraignment 4. The dismissal order having been issued in
was held) violation of private complainant's right to due
5. Laurel appealed arguing that the order of process as well as upon an erroneous exercise of
dismissal was void because it was only based on judicial discretion, the Court of Appeals did not err
the Secretarys Opinion. CA granted the appeal in setting aside said dismissal order.
thus it remanded the case to TC for arraignment. Discharge of co-accused
6. Martinez went up to the SC contending that his Bogo-Medellin Milling v Son
right against double jeopardy has been violated 1. Hermosa, Tuacaowere accused by Bogo-
Issue: W/N double jeopardy attaches in this case NO Medellin of qualified theft. Information was then
1. Appeal against the order of dismissal was not filed in court. However, Bogo-Medellin filed on 14
foreclosed by the rule of double jeopardy, said April 1986 a manifestation informing the trial court
order having issued before arraignment. Legal of petitioner Hermosa's desire and willingness to
jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid act as state witness and to testify against his co-
indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after accused, private respondent Tuacao who,
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, Hermosa claimed, was the most guilty.
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise 2. Initially, Judge Tomol denied the application of
terminated without the express consent of the Bogo-Medellin for discharge of Hermosa. On
accused Bogo-Medellin's motion for reconsideration,
2. Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of however, Judge Tomol issued an order reversing
Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a himself and discharging Hermosa from the
final judgment or order in a criminal case is information for qualified theft.
granted to "any party", except when the accused 3. On the initial scheduled date of hearing, Hermosa
is placed thereby in double jeopardy. failed to appear before the trial court. The hearing
3. As aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor was then rescheduled, first to 20 January and
General, in failing to make an independent finding later to 3 March. By the latter date, respondent
of the merits of the case and merely anchoring Judge Son had become Presiding Judge of
the dismissal on the revised position of the Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 764
4. On the 3 March hearing, counsel for Tuacao is necessarily included in the first offense
manifested to the court that he would be moving charged.
for reconsideration of the order of Judge Tomol 2. the discharge of Hermosa must be considered as
discharging petitioner Hermosa from the qualified valid for present purposes, that is, for
theft information. determination of whether a second and prohibited
5. Bogo-Medellin opposed the motion for jeopardy would attach upon reinstatement of
reconsideration upon the ground that Hermosa as a co-accused in the qualified theft
reinstatement of Hermosa as co-accused in information.
would place him in double jeopardy, considering 3. The general rule is that the discharge of an
that the order of Judge Tomol discharging accused in order that he may turn state witness,
Hermosa had resulted in his acquittal of the crime is expressly left to the discretion of the trial court.
of qualified theft. 4. The effect of the discharge of a defendant is
Issue: W/N there would be double jeopardy if Hermosa specified in Section 10 of Rule 119 in the
would be reinstated YES following manner: The order indicated in the
1. Under Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of preceding section, shall amount to an acquittal of
Court, the following are the requisites for the the accused discharged and shall be a bar to
defense of double jeopardy: future prosecution for the same offense, unless
a. There must be a complaint or information the accused fails or refuses to testify against his
or other formal charge sufficient in form and co-accused in accordance with his sworn
substance to sustain a conviction; statement constituting the basis for his discharge.
b. Filed before a court of competent 5. Once the discharge of an accused from the
jurisdiction; information is effected, the legal consequence of
c. After the accused had been arraigned and acquittal follows and persists unless the accused
pleaded to the charge; so discharged fails or refuses to testify against his
d. Than the accused was convicted or co-defendant, in which case the defense of
acquitted or the case against him was double jeopardy is withdrawn from him and
dismissed or otherwise terminated without becomes unavailable to him. Until it is shown that
his express consent; the discharged accused has in fact failed or
e. The second offense charged is the same refused to testify against his co-defendant,
as the first offense charged, or for an subsequent proof showing that any or all of the
attempt to commit the same or a frustration conditions listed in section 9 of Rule 119 of the
thereof; or Rules of Court had not been actually fulfilled,
f. The second offense necessarily includes or would not affect the legal consequence of the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 765
discharge, i.e., would not wipe away the resulting about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final
acquittal. decision is the law of the case and is immutable
6. In the case at bar, there is no evidence of record and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or
to show that petitioner Hermosa failed or refused incorrectness.
to testify against his co-accused, i.e., that he 2. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is
reneged on his covenant with the prosecution. immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot
7. All the record shows is that petitioner Hermosa be recalled for correction or amendment except in
failed to attend two scheduled hearings, which the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by
does not necessarily show that he had violated another order reconsidering the dismissal of the
his undertaking to testify against his co-accused case since the inherent power of a court to modify
"in accordance with his sworn statement its order or decision does not extend to a
constituting the basis for his discharge." He has judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.
still YET to testify. 3. she could no longer "revise" her decision of
acquittal without violating not only an elementary
rule of procedure but also the constitutional
Argel v Judge Pascua August 20, 2006 proscription against double jeopardy
4. The fact that respondent never had any intention
1. Argel complained against Judge Pascua that he of having complainant incarcerated on the basis
was already acquitted in an earlier decision but of the second decision but only to make him
then she amended her decision and instead answer for the civil liabilities arising from the
convicted him crime, as respondent explained, cannot exculpate
2. Judge said that she erroneously thought that her from administrative liability.
there was no witness who positively identified him
because of the fact that the testimony of the 2. Crimes Covered
eyewitness was not attached to the records at the
time she wrote her decision P/CPL. GUILLERMO SARABIA, PNP, petitioner,
Issue: W/N the amended decision is null and void YES vs.
1. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
final is no longer susceptible to amendment or
alteration except to correct errors which are G.R. No. 142024
clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused July 20, 2001
by an omission or mistake in the dispositive
portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought MENDOZA, J.:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 766
Nature: petition for review of the decision of Court of contends the incident which gave rise to this case is
Appeals also the subject of a criminal case for robbery with
1. June 23, 1991 - Petitioner Sarabia, then a member of violence against or intimidation of person wherein he
the city police force with intimidation, pointed his gun at was convicted, and which is now on appeal with the
complainant Josephine Picos-Mapalad and her then Court of Appeals.
boyfriend, complainant Anastacio Mapalad and forced
them to perform sexual acts against their will. W there is double jeopardy - NO.
2. Three criminal informations against petitioner for To raise the defense of double or second jeopardy, the
grave coercion were filed in the Municipal Trial Court of following elements must be present: (1) a first jeopardy
Tagbilaran City, which resulted in the filing of Criminal must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
Case Nos. 4399, 4400, and 4401 in that court. Court jeopardy must have terminated; and (3) the second
found him guilty in all three cases. jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the
first.
3. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, the
three criminal cases were raffled to two salas of the With respect to the third element, under Rule 117, 7 of
court. Branch 1 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed the the Rules of Court, the test is whether one offense is
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case identical with the other or whether it is an attempt or
Nos. 4399 and 4400. Branch 47 of the RTC of Bohol frustration of the other or whether one offense
ordered the transfer of the records of Criminal Case No. necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
9730 to Branch I of the same court to be consolidated other. On the other hand, Rule 120, 5 provides:
with Criminal Case No. 9729 and 9731. The three cases
were finally raffled off to Branch 48 of the RTC.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. An offense charged necessarily includes that
4. Branch 48 of the RTC of Bohol affirmed in toto the which is proved, when some of the essential elements
decision of the Municipal Trial Court. The Court of or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal and affirmed in complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an
toto the decision of the lower court. offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former
5. Petitioner raises the plea of double jeopardy. He constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 767
absurdity of the two informations. The reason seems requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
obvious. He forgot to raise squarely that issue in the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal
three courts below. In any case, to do so would have of the information under one does not bar prosecution
been a futile exercise. under the other.
2. When he was arraigned, tried, and convicted in the 4. Since the informations were for separate offenses
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. the first against a person and the second against public
2793, he was not yet arraigned in Criminal Case No. peace and order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to
64294 before the Regional Trial Court. As stated above, the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
the judgment of conviction in the former was rendered
on 29 June 1987, while his arraignment in the latter took
place only on 27 April 1989. Among the conditions for The two informations filed against petitioner are clearly
double jeopardy to attach is that the accused must have for separate offenses. Quasi offenses under Article 365
been arraigned in the previous case. are committed by means of culpa. Crimes against
Security are committed by means of dolo. Moreover, in
Article 365, failure to lend help to one's victim is neither
Legal jeopardy attaches only an offense by itself nor an element of the offense
(a) upon a valid indictment, therein penalized. Its presence merely increases the
penalty by one degree. Upon the other hand, failure to
(b) before a competent court, help or render assistance to another whom one has
(c) after arraignment, accidentally wounded or injured is an offense under
paragraph 2 of Article 275 of the same code.
(d) a valid plea having been entered, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity
without the express consent of the accused.
as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Second Branch, and MANUEL
3. Moreover, he is charged for two separate offenses OPULENCIA, respondents.
under the Revised Penal Code. It is a cardinal rule that G.R. No. L-45129
the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
March 6, 1987
only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple
act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 769
FELICIANO, J.: 6. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal
Nature: petition for certiorari and mandamus, the of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance
People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of of Batangas, Branch 11, another information against
the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266 under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph
(1), of the Revised Penal Code.
1. 1 February 1975 - members of the Batangas City
Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric 7. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel
Light System, equipped with a search warrant searched Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the
Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by the offense charged in the second information and that the
private respondent Manuel Opulencia. filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right
against double jeopardy. Judge granted the accused's
2. They discovered that electric wiring, devices and motion to quash.
contraptions had been installed, without the necessary
authority from the city government, and "architecturally 8. Petitioner argues that the constitutional protection
concealed inside the walls of the building" against double jeopardy is protection against a second
or later jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The
3. 24 November 1975 - Assistant City Fiscal of petitioner stresses that the first information filed before
Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
City an information against Manuel Opulencia for unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices,
violation of Ordinance No. 1. acts which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
4. 2 February 1976 - Manuel Opulencia filed motion to Government of Batangas.
dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft
there charged had already prescribed and that the civil under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code filed
indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential
5. Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on elements.
the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense Whether there is double jeopardy - Yes. :|
charged was a light felony which prescribes two months
from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing 1. The first sentence of Article IV (22) 1973 Constitution
further that the information was filed by the fiscal more sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection
than nine months after discovery of the offense. against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 770
from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, another offense under a national statute. If the second
although both the first and second offenses may be sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been
based upon the same act or set of acts. The second written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a
general proposition: the constitutional protection, bar to another prosecution for the same act under a
against double jeopardy is available although the prior national statute. An offense penalized by municipal
offense charged under an ordinance be different from ordinance is, by definition, different from an offense
the offense charged subsequently under a national under a statute. The two offenses would never
statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that constitute the same offense having been promulgated
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. by different rule-making authorities though one be
2. Where the offenses charged are penalized either by subordinate to the other and the plea of double
different sections of the same statute or by different jeopardy would never lie. The discussions during the
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention show that the
offenses charge: the constitutional protection against second sentence was inserted precisely for the purpose
double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is of extending the constitutional protection against double
shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent jeopardy to a situation which would not otherwise be
offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is covered by the first sentence. 13
charged under a municipal ordinance while the 4. The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses
other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is is addressed by examining the essential elements of
to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
have committed and which are alleged to have given set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts
against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which are claimed to have generated liability both under
which constitute or have given rise to the first offense a municipal ordinance and a national statute must be
under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which addressed, in the first instance, by examining the
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged location of such acts in time and space. When the acts
under a statute. of the accused as set out in the two informations are so
3. The question may be raised why one rule should related to each other in time and space as to be
exist where two offenses under two different sections of reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same
the same statute or under different statutes are occasion and where those acts have been moved by
charged, and another rule for the situation where one one and the same, or a continuing, intent or voluntary
offense is charged under a municipal ordinance and design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately
characterized as an integral whole capable of giving rise
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 771
to penal liability simultaneously under different legal though different from one another are nonetheless each
enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of
statute). technical elements.
5. In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within 7. By the same token, acts of a person which physically
the same time frame: from November 1974 to February occur on the same occasion and are infused by a
1975. During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia common intent or design or negligence and therefore
installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced,
and devices in his ice plant without obtaining the as it were, to produce as many different acts as there
necessary permit or authorization from the municipal are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that
authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or an enterprising prosecutor can find.
permitted such unauthorized installation for the very 8. It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's
purpose of reducing electric power bill. This corrupt petition for certiorari and mandamus in this case. It is
intent was thus present from the very moment that such difficult to summon any empathy for a businessman who
unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
effect of the unauthorized installation was the inward community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape
flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without criminal punishment because an Assistant City Fiscal by
the corresponding recording thereof in his electric inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an information
meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current for an offense which he should have known had already
was integral with the unauthorized installation of electric prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the
wiring and devices. fundamental law to hold the protection of the right
6. The Identity of offenses that must be shown need not against double jeopardy available even to the private
be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses may respondent in this case.
be regarded as the "same offense" where the second 3. Act punished by a law or ordinance, conviction
offense necessarily includes the first offense or is or acquittal shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
necessarily included in such first offense or where the for the same act.
second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of 4. Doctrine of Supervening Event
double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
elements constituting the first offense need be present vs.HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME
in the technical definition of the second offense. The law MANUEL, respondents.
here seeks to prevent harrassment of an accused
person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which G.R. No. 99287
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 772
5. However; on March 16, 1982, Batas Pambansa Blg. Pambansa Blg. 195, which includes the crime of Estafa
195 was passed amending, among others, Section 13 thru Falsification of Public Document as among the
of Republic Act No. 3019. crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith
6. Thereafter, in other cases pending before the with suspension from office pending action in court, is a
respondent court in which herein petitioner is one of the penal provision which violates the constitutional
accused, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend all prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law.
the accused-public officers pendente lite from their 2. Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code
respective offices or any other public office which they clearly states that suspension from the employment or
may be occupying pending trial of their cases. public office during the trial or in order to institute
7. On July 22, 1982, respondent court issued an order proceedings shall not be considered as penalty. It is not
directing the suspension of all the accused including a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
herein petitioner from their public positions or from any judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official
other public office that they may be holding x x x concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
8. Herein petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration suspension.
alleging that to apply the provision of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 195 to the herein accused would be violative of the 3. Those mentioned in paragraph Nos. 1, 3 and 4 of
constitutional guarantee of protection against an ex post said Article 24 are merely preventive measures before
facto law. The motion was denied by respondent court final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore,
in a resolution dated September 6, 1982. Hence, this the suspension from office, pending trial of the public
petition for certiorari. officer charged with crimes mentioned in the
amendatory provision committed before its effectivity
9. Petitioner submits that respondent court acted does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction amounting facto law.
to lack of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending petitioner from office as Mayor of Amadeo, 4. Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be
Cavite, pendente lite because in the supposition that suspended because he is presently occupying a
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 is to be applied retroactively, position different from that under which he is charged is
its application would violate the Constitutional provision untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that
against enactment of ex post facto law; any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under Republic
W BP 195 is an ex post facto law - NO. Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the
1. We find no merit in petitioners contention that government or public funds or property whether as a
Section 13 of Republic Act 3019, as amended by Batas simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 775
proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and allegiance to hold elective office.
executory judgment.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual
This assumes that at the time intervention was sought, citizenship is involuntary; it arises out of circumstances
there had already been a proclamation of the election of birth or marriage, where a person is recognized to be
results for the vice-mayoralty elections when in fact, a national by two or more states. Dual allegiance is a
there has not been such a proclamation. Certainly, the result of a persons volition; it is a situation wherein a
petitioner had, and still has an interest in ousting private person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
respondent from the race when he sought to intervene. loyalty to two or more states. Dual citizenship is an
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC only applies when the issue because a person who has this raises a question
election of the respondent is contested, and the of which states law must apply to him/her, therefore
question is WON the second placer may be declared posting a threat to a countrys sovereignty. In Sec.5
winner. If Mamaril was competent to bring action, so Article IV of the Constitution on Citizenship, the concern
was Mercado, being a rival candidate. was not with dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized
citizens who maintain allegiance to their countries of
Petitioner has right to intervene even if he filed the origin even after naturalization. Hence, dual citizenship
motion on May 20, 1998, when it was shown that the in the aforementioned disqualification clause must mean
private respondent had the most votes. Electoral dual allegiance. Therefore, persons with mere dual
Reforms Law of 1987 provides that intervention may citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has been no final judgment It should suffice that upon filing of certificates for
rendered. Failure of COMELEC en banc to resolve candidacy, such persons with dual citizenships have
petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount elected their Philippine citizenship to terminate their
to denial of the motion, justifying this petition for dual citizenship. In private respondents certificate of
certiorari. candidacy, he made these statements under oath on
March 27, 1998: I am a Filipino citizenNatural-
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner born. I am not a permanent resident of , or
contends that through Sec.40(d) of the Local immigrant to , a foreign country. I am eligible for
Government Code (which declares as disqualified from the office I seek to be elected. I will support and
running for elective local position Those with dual- defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
citizenship), Congress has command[ed] in explicit maintain true faith and allegiance thereto The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 779
renounce his American citizenship, effectively Philippine elections, leaves no doubt of his election of
removing any disqualification he might have as a Philippine citizenship.
dual-citizen. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC, it was held that
By laws of the United States Frivaldo lost his DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari,
American citizenship when he took his oath of DISMISSED. *Ineligibility refers to lack of qualifications
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for prescribed.
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of VALLES v COMELEC
allegiance to the Philippine Government. Therefore, GR No. 137000 (August 9, 2000)
petitioner Mercados contention that the oath of FACTS: Petitioner questions the qualification of private
allegiance contained in private respondents certificate respondent RosalindYbasco Lopez to run for governor
of candidacy is insufficient to constitute his renunciation of Davao Oriental on citizenship grounds. Respondent
of his American citizenship. Also, equally without merit was born in 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father and an
is his contention that, to be effective, such renunciation Australian mother. In 1998, she applied for an Alien
should have been made upon reaching the age of Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
majority since no law requires the election of Philippine Certificate of Residence (ICR) and was issued an
citizenship to be made upon majority age. Australian passport.
Plus, the fact that Manzano admitted that he was ISSUE: WON respondent is a Filipino; and if she is,
registered as an American citizen with the Philippine WON she renounced her citizenship by applying for
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he ACR and ICR and being issued an Australian passport.
holds an American passport which he used for his last
travel to the US dated April 22, 1997should not be such RULING: Respondent is a Filipino. In 1934, the
a big deal. At the time of said travel, the use of an controlling laws of the Philippines were the Philippine
American passport was simply an assertion of his Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of
American nationality before the termination of his August 29, 1916 (Jones Law). Under both organic acts,
American citizenship. Admitting that he was a registered all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
alien does not mean that he is not still a Filipino (Aznar subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein, including
v. COMELEC). their children, are considered Philippine citizens.
Respondents father was therefore a Filipino, and
Manzanos oath of allegiance, together with the fact he consequently, her.
has spent his life here, received his education here, and
practiced his profession here, and has taken part in past
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 780
dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the the ground that he is not a natural born citizen, nor was
issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the he a resident of the second district. One of petitioners
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other argument was that respondent's father was not, validly,
citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of
9225. the oath of citizenship.
The HRE ruled for private respondent Ong. Petitioners
Moreover, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Thus the
declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing petition on certiorari with the SC.
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on Issue:
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. WON the issue on the citizenship of respondent Ong
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual can extend to a collateral attack on the citizenship of his
citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized father.
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries Held/Ratio:
of origin even after their naturalization.9 Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific No. The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.10 stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial death just so we can go after the respondent. The
department, including this Court, to rule on issues petitioners questioning of the citizenship of the father
pertaining to dual allegiance. through a collateral approach cannot done. In our
jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only
7. Attack on one's citizenship may be made only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the
through a direct, not a collateral proceeding. Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to
Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the
Co v HRET
principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already
been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity
July 30, 1991
to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak
J. Gutierrez Jr.
8. Res judicata in cases involving citizenship
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, congressional election for the second B. Citizens of the Philippines
district of Northern Samar transpired. Among the 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
candidates were petitioner Balinquit and private time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution
respondent Ong. Ong was proclaimed the winner. a. Re: 1935 Constitution
However, an election protests was filed against him on
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 782
Valles v COMELEC Yes. Lopez was born a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what
August 9, 2000 served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
J. Purisima principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country which were the Philippine Bill of
Facts: July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law. Under both organic
acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, with a their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens.
Filipino father and Australian father. In 1949, at the age
of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the Lopezs father, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet,
Philippines. Camarines Norte, thus under the Philippine Bill of 1902
and the Jones Law he is deemed a Filipino citizen. By
In 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino virtue of the same laws, herein private respondent
citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. Tecson v COMELEC
In 1992, she ran for was elected as governor of Davao
Oriental. This was contested by her opponent Gil Taojo March 3, 2004
in a petition of quo warranto on the ground of her J. Vitug
Australian Citizenship.COMELEC dismissed the
petition. Facts:
When she ran in 1995, she again won against Rabat
which was also contested. Said petition was also On December 31, 2003, Roland Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ)
dismissed. Thus this petition for certiorari. filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
In her reelection in 1998, her citizenship was again President of the Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner
contested by now petitioner Valles. COMELEC again Victorino Fornier filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to
dismissed the case. Petitioners motion for deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy
reconsideration was denied, thus this petition for upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
certiorari. misrepresentation by claiming to be a natural-born
Issue: Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were
WON Lopez was a Filipino citizen. foreigners. Even on the assumption that his father
Lorenzo Pou was a Filipino citizen, such could not have
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 783
been transmitted to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
child of an alien mother. legitimate or illegitimate.
COMELEC dismissed the case. The motiton for Chiongbian v De Leon
rconsideration filed by petitioner was also dismissed.
Thus this petition for certiorari. January 31, 1949
Issue: CJ Moran
WON FPJ was a Filipino citizen
Held/Ratio: Facts:
Yes. The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" This a petition filed by William CHiongbian seeking to
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, permanently prohibit respondent Customs Officials from
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act cancelling the registration certificates of his vessels, and
of 1902 which provided that: respondent Philippine Shipping Administration from
...that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing rescinding the sale of three vessels to him.
to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the The entire case hinges on whether or not petitioner
11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, William Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be Issue:
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine WON petitioner is a Filipino citizen
Islands Held/Ratio:
The only conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Yes. The Article IV of the 1935 Constitution provides
Lorenzo Pou that could be drawn from the presumption that:
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the
have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines:
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution,
could have well been his place of residence before had been elected to public office in the Philippine
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited Islands.
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines
had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou),
if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. In 1925, Victoriano Chiongbian, a Chinese citizen and
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, father of the herein petitioner, was elected to and held
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, the office of municipal councilor of the town of Plaridel,
confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Occidental Misamis. Thus his father became a Filipino
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 784
citizen by virtue of Article IV, section 1, subsection 2 of of the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 625. He
the Constitution. William Chiongbian, the herein stated that he was born of a Chinese father and a
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino Filipina mother. He is married to a Filipina with who he
citizen by reason of subsection 3 (Article IV) of the has four children. He also stated that he had already
Constitution, his father having become a Filipino citizen renounce all allegiance to the Republic of China; that he
upon the adoption of said Constitution. recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the
The argument that subsection 2 is is strictly personal Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith
and does not extend to the children of the grantee . The and allegiance thereto; and that he will obey, support
framers adopted said provision fully cognizant of the and defend the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
transmissive essence of citizenship as provided in The Commissioner of Immigration referred the matter to
subsection 3. Had it been their intention to curtail the the DOJ Sec who opined that hat the alleged Philippine
transmission of citizenship in such a particular case, citizenship of petitioner's mother had not been
they would have so clearly stated. sufficiently established, that said election of Philippine
b. Re: 1973 Constitution citizenship by petitioner herein was legally ineffectual
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of and that he did not thereby become a Filipino citizen
the Philippines. Petitioner sough rehearing and reconsideration and
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, who argued that the delay in electing citizenship was due to
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of the belief that he was a citizen of the Philippines. When
majority. it was referred back to DOJ sec, petition was denied.
a. Procedure for election
b. When to elect Petitioner then instituted in the CFI of Manila this action
for mandamus against the Secretary of Justice and the
Cuenco v Secretary of Justice Commissioner of Immigration, to compel them to
recognize as valid said election of Philippine citizenship
May 26, 1962 by petitioner and to cancel his alien's certificate of
J. Concepcion registration.
Facts: Issue:
Counsel for petitioner Alfonso DyCuenco wrote to the
Commissioner of Immigration a letter requesting the WON delay to elect citizenship was justified in
cancellation of his alien certificate of registration, upon petitioners circumstance
the ground that he had exercised the right to elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Article IV, section I(4) Held/Ratio:
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 785
NO. Petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He said delay or to warrant extension of the period to
became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of elect Philippine citizenship.
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was
over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) In re: Ching.
years after he had reached the age of majority. It is Bar Matter No. 914, 01 October 1999
clear that said election has not been made "upon (citizenship; perfection of Filipino citizenship; age of
reaching the age of majority." majority; reasonable time)
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a Petitioner Ching, an applicant for admission to the
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and Philippine Bar, was born to a Chinese father and a
that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution. As such,
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine his citizenship followed that of his fathers. The 1973
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to and 1987 Constitutions allowed individuals to elect to
above, which period may be extended under certain perfect their Filipino citizenship for which CA 625
circumstances, as when the person concerned has provided the procedure. In all cases, perfection of ones
always considered himself a Filipino. For this reason, citizenship had to be done upon reaching the age of
petitioner introduced evidence to the effect that he is majority which has been taken to mean that it must be
referred to as a Filipino in his birth certificate, in his done within reasonable time from reaching such age.
marriage contract and in the birth certificates of his In turn, within reasonable time has been taken to
children; that he married a Filipina; and that he enlisted mean three (3) years although the Court in Cuenco v
in the Philippine guerrilla forces in December, Justice Secretary said that the three year rule was
1942.1wph1.t not inflexible but warned against over-extending the
time period.
However, he stated that he joined a unit In this case, Ching only elected to become a
of Chinese volunteers and that he registered himself in Filipino citizen at the age of thirty-five (35) years old
the Bureau of Immigration as a Chinese. Moreover, it when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
appears that, as early, at least, as 1947, petitioner knew 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after
that he had to make a formal election, if he wanted to be he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
a citizen of the Philippines, and yet he did not do so until interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of
four (4) years later, or in May 1951. The reasons given majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by
by him for such delay were his alleged financial any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period
difficulties and the illness of members of his family. within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
These reasons are patently insufficient to excuse stated, in this connection, that the special
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 786
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a have reacquired such citizenship. While his Chinese
certified public accountant, a registered voter and a father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was
former elected public official, cannot vest in him not a Filipina; she was Chinese. After the death of such
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down father, Villahermosa continued to be a Chinese, until
the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in April, 1947.
by election. After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his
mother was a Filipina within the meaning of paragraph
Villahermosa v Commissioner of Immigration 4, section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution; but,
80 Phil 541, 31 March 1948 according to that same Organic Act, he had to elect
(citizenship; jus sanguinis; subsequent acquisition of Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until
citizenship by parent) he becomes of age and makes the election, he is the
Chinese citizen that he was at the time of his father's
This is a petition for a Writ of Habea Corpus; the demise. This petition is moreover to be denied on the
petitioner is the mother of Delfin Co, an 18-year-old strength of precedents heretofore established, because
Chinese national who was apprehended with a party of Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and any
his compatriots who entered the Philippines illegally. posterior change of status can not affect the legality of
Delfin and company was adjudged as illegal aliens and his detention for purposes of deportation.
ordered deported back to China. Petitioner, who had Republic v Chule Lim
lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to Delfins G.R. No. 153883, 13 January 2004
father, filed an Oath of Allegiance with the Civil Registry
of Tarlac for which reason, under CA No. 63, she thus Chule Y. Lim, respondent, was an illegitimate child of a
resumed her Philippine citizenship. Chinese father and a Filipino mother. She filed a petition
Petitioner thus came to court arguing that since to the court for correction of four erroneous entries in
she is once again a Philippine citizen and since the her birth certificate, among which was her citizenship
citizenship of a minor follows that of his mother, Delfin which was listed as Chinese when she claims to be a
Co is, for all intents and purposes, a Filipino citizen and Filipino. The petition was granted. However, petitioner
cannot be deported to China. herein filed an appeal specifically on the correction of
her citizenship (from Chinese to Filipino) not having
HELD: Petition denied. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does complied with the legal requirements for election of
not provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her citizenship in that the respondent never elected her
children acquire Philippine citizenship. It would be Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority as
illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his mother,
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 787
provided for in Article IV, Sec 1(3) of the 1935 Initial Hearing in the manner prescribed by law. On the
Constitution and Sec 1, CA No. 625. date of initial hearing, 27 April 1995, the OSG entered
its appearance and manifested its objection on the
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent needs to elect ground that as per Section 10 of CA 473, the initial
Filipino citizenship upon reaching the ageof majority? hearings of petition for naturalization are proscribed
within 30 days preceding the next election (which, in this
HELD: Petition denied; judgment upheld. The case was 08 May 1995). The hearing of the case was
constitutional and statutory requirements of electing reset to 09 June 1995 at which time the OSG again filed
Filipino citizenship applyonly to legitimate children; the a Motion to Dismiss as no publication of this subsequent
case at bar clearly states that respondent is an hearing was made. As such, the court did not obtain
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and alien father. By jurisdiction over the case.
being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. HELD: The Court disagreed with the Republic. A plain
reading of Section 9 of CA 473 shows that for there to
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with be a valid publication, the following requisites must
law. concur: (1) the petition and notice of hearing must be
C. Naturalization published; (2) the publication must be once a week for
1. Modes of Naturalization three (3) consecutive weeks; and, (3) the publication
a. Direct must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of
b. Derivative general circulation in the province where the applicant
2. Doctrine of indelible allegiance. resides. The said provision also requires that copies of
3. Direct naturalization under Philippine laws. the petition and notice of hearing must be posted in the
4. Naturalization under C.A. 473 office of the clerk of court or in the building where the
a. Qualifications office is located. Further, the petition shall not be heard
b. Disqualifications within six (6) months from the date of last publication of
c. Procedure the notice. The fact that, in this case, the initial hearing
was originally set during the prohibited period in Section
Republic v Hamilton Tan Keh 10, but well beyond the six (6) months prohibited period
G.R. No. 144742, 11 November 2004 in Section 9, did not render the publication of the notice
(petition for naturalization; publication requirements) and the petition invalid. Respondent Tan Keh had
strictly complied with all the requirements under Section
Respondent filed a petition for naturalization pursuant to 9. His petition and the notice of hearing were duly
RA 530 and caused the publication of the Notice of published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 788
the Official Gazette during the month of September corresponding certificate of naturalization was issued to
1994 and in a newspaper of general circulation in July him.
1994. Moreover, the original date of hearing, April 27,
1995, was not within six (6) months from the last Subsequently, or on May 10, 1962, the Solicitor General
publication of the notice thereof. There are two filed a petition praying that said decision and certificate
prohibited periods that must be reckoned with under of naturalization be respectively annulled and cancelled,
Sections 9 and 10 of CA 473. Section 9 provides that upon the ground that the notice of the filing of said
the notice must set forth, inter alia, "the date of the petition and of the hearing thereof had been
hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held published in the Official Gazette only once, instead
within six months from the date of last publication of the of once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in
notice." Section 10, on the other hand, provides that "no violation of Section 9 of the Revised Naturalization
petition shall be heard within thirty days preceding any Law. After due hearing said court issued on October 15,
election." The hearing on June 9, 1995 on respondent 1962, the order complained of granting relief sought by
Tan Kehs petition was not within any of these two the Solicitor General. Hence the present appeal.
prohibited periods.
ISSUE: WON publication is necessary to make his
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF GAN naturalization valid? YES
TSITUNG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES. GAN TSITUNG, , -versus-REPUBLIC RATIO:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
The SC decided the case based on the ruling on Ong
G.R. No. L-20819 November 29, 1965 Son Cui Republic which explicitly held that "there being
only one publication of said notice hearing in this
CONCEPCION case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly
incomplete and, therefore, insufficient to confer
FACTS: jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and
grant the petition."
On December 24, 1954, CFI- Manila rendered a
decision granting the petition for naturalization as citizen This doctrine was reiterated in Celestino Co y Quing
of the Philippines, filed on November 14, 1953, by Reyes vs. Republicupon the ground that non-
appellant Gan Tsitung. On the latter's motion, he was, compliance with the provisions of Section 9 of the
on December 26, 1956, allowed to and did take his oath Revised Naturalization Act, relative to the
of allegiance as citizen of the Philippines and the publication of the aforesaid notice once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks affects the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 789
jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, between the applicant and the Solicitor General but a
for it impairs the very root or foundation of the matter impressed with the highest public interest,
authority to decide the case, regardless of whether involving as it does an inquiry as to when an alien
the one to blame is the clerk of court or the should be allowed to enjoy the coveted boon of Filipino
petitioner or his counsel citizenship. It is for this reason that the burden of proof
is upon the applicant to show full and complete
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby compliance with requirements of the law. The
affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so government can at all stages of the proceeding raise the
ordered. issue of such non-compliance even without filing a
formal opposition to the petition.
Sy v Republic
The requirement by Section 9 of Commonwealth Act
MAKASIAR, J. No. 473, as amended, that the copy of the petition to be
posted and published should be a textual or verbatim
Facts: restatement of the petition as filed, is jurisdictional. Non-
compliance therewith, as in the instant case, nullifies the
Juanita Sy filed a petition for naturalization in CFI- proceedings including the decision rendered therein in
Manila, however, the notice of the petition as Published favor of the applicant (
in the Daily Mirror, a newspaper of general circulation,
and as posted on the Court bulletin board, did not WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED DECEMBER
restate verbatim the petition, but merely summarized 11, 1961 AND THE ORDER DATED OCTOBER 23,
some of the averments therein. Thus the Solicitor 1965, ARE HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
General argues that since she was unable to comply WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.
with the requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
she should not be afforded citizenship. ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
ISSUE: WON publication of naturalization is necessary? respondents.
YES
MENDOZA, J.:
RATIO: FACTS:
WE have ruled with undeviating uniformity "that a Ong Chia was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China.
naturalization proceeding is not simply a private contest In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 790
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he It is settled, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
has stayed in the Philippines where he found enforced and strictly construed in favor of the
employment and eventually started his own business, government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by
married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On the State, C.A. No. 473, clearly provides that the
July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition
to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, his present and former places of residence. 23 This
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law. provision and the rule of strict application of the law
in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument
The TC granted his petition for naturalization. However of "substantial compliance" with the requirement
this was reversed by the CA after the OSG noted under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this
several infirmities in his petition: ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
denied.
(1) failed to state all his former placer of residence
in violation of C.A. No. 473 (pertinent defect) WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
(2) failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the SO ORDERED.
Philippines, in violation of 2;
Republic vs. Dela Rosa
(3) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his (sorry couldnt find case online; only found a digest)
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, Facts:
also in contravention of 2; and This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and
(4) failed to support his petition with the appropriate Section 25 of the Interim Rules, filed by the Republic of
documentary evidence.4 the Philippines: (1) to annul the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila, which re-admitted
Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address private respondent as a Filipino citizen under the
in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Revised Naturalization Law and
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully (2) to nullify the oath of allegiance taken by private
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, respondent on February 27, 1992.
such publication constitutes substantial compliance On September 20, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for
naturalization captioned to be re-admitted as citizen of
ISSUE: Won substantial compliance with the law is the Philippines. The respondent Judge set the petition
sufficient to grant him citizenship? NO
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 791
for hearing on March 16, 1992, and directed the The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the
publication of the said order and petition in the Official following irregularities:
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for (1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
three consecutive weeks, the last publication of which scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the
should be at least six months before the said date of order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition
hearing. itself;
On January 14, 1992, private respondent filed a "Motion (2) the petition was heard within six months from the
to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule, that it shall be done last publication of the petition;
on January instead of having it on March, " where he (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance
manifested his intention to run for public office in the before the finality of the judgment; and
May 1992 elections. The motion was granted and the (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without
hearing was moved on February. Six days later, on observing the two-year waiting period
February 27, respondent Judge rendered the assailed
Decision and held that Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO, d. Effects of naturalization
is re-admitted as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines by naturalization, thereby vesting upon him, Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration
all the rights and privileges of a natural born Filipino GR L-21289, 4 October 1971
citizen Facts:
After receiving a copy of the Decision on March 18, On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a
1992, the Solicitor General interposed a timely appeal passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
directly with the Supreme Court. immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Issue: WON the petitioner was duly re-admitted o his Philippines. She was permitted to come into the
citizenship as Filipino. Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her
Held:No. arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau
declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines
DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as on or before the expiration of her authorized period of
GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. stay in this country or within the period as in his
He is ordered to VACATE his office and to discretion the Commissioner of Immigration.
SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January
and executory. 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 792
citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may
and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have
the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962
for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen e. Denaturalization
Yeung appealed. 5. Naturalization by direct legislative action
Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a 6. Administrative Naturalization [R.A. No. 9139]
Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. a. Special Committee on Naturalization
Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an b. Qualifications
alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or c. Disqualifications
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided d. Procedure
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the e. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. f. Cancellation of the Certificate of
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is Naturalization
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his D. Loss and Reacquisition of Philippine
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not Citizenship (C.A. 63)
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said 1. Loss of Citizenship
Section 4. a. By naturalization in a foreign country
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel b. By express renunciation of citizenship
provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC
the proceedings, is not required to go through a (Aug. 1, 1989)
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as Ponente: Cruz, J.
a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of
a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. FACTS:
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is being bigamous.
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 793
Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an rule on the merits of the case, given that the issue is
Australian passport, and obtained an Alien also of considerable importance (a foreign citizen
Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for holding public office in the Philippines), and in the
a change in status from immigrant to returning interest of the speedy administration of justice.
Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation denied his application 1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire
for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not into Labo's citizenship?
applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. 2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?
According to the records of the Australian Embassy 3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?
(as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still 4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can
an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace
no direct evidence was presented to prove that he him?
took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian
citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any HELD/RATIO:
person over the age of 16 years who is granted 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo
Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not
The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC
of all other allegiance. had at first considered the petition as a pre-
Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the proclamation proceeding, which does not require the
local elections held on January 18, 1988. The payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC
second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the
quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-
holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such
asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on
annulled. significant issues, such as the one being decided in this
case.
ISSUES:
*The original issue raised before the Supreme Court 2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his
concerned only the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the
Lardizabal's petition. Labo contended that the petition Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2)
for quo warranto was not filed on time, hence the express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing
COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or
regarding his citizenship. However, the SC decided to laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 794
Petitioner was detained by the CID for obtaining a in official documents even after he had become a
Foreign passport while (at the same time) holding naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
a Filipino citizenship as well reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
Respondents argue that the petitioner was in full inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine
knowledge and legal capacity when he applied for citizenship
A Philippine citizenship through naturalization he
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to While still a citizen of the Philippines who had
the oath taken which states to renounce renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
to any foreign prince, potentate, state or potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to
sovereignty and pledged to maintain true faith "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the
and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese
Philippines,". Hence, petitioner then knows the in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
limitations or restrictions once solemnizing said Companies registry of Tai Shun EstateLtd. filed in
oath and it succeeding consequences should they Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
be violated.
How Philippine Citizenship obtained/reacquired:
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner Mr. Willie Yus acts constitute 1.) By direct act of Congress
a renunciation of his Philippine Citizenship? YES 2.) By naturalization- take the oath of allegiance to
the Republic Act 9225
HELD 3.) By administrative repatriationtake the oath of
Petitioners motion for release from detention is Allegiance to the Republic and register the same
DENIED (along with other motions filed). in the local civil registry or in the place where the
person resides/last resided; original citizenship is
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation acquired
that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left
to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full c. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance
knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced d. By rendering service to or accepting
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a commission in the armed forces of a foreign country
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status e. By cancellation of the certificate of
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his naturalization
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 796
f. By having been declared by competent [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989]
authority a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in
time of war Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
2. Reacquisition of Citizenship governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
a. Taking an oath of allegiance 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October
b. Naturalization 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon
c. Repatriation Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was
also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
ANGAT V. REPUBLIC COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo;
14 SEPT.1999 election and proclamation on the ground that he was not
a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
Facts: Angat was a natural born citizen who lost his States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May
citizenship by naturalization in the US. On March 11, 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in
1996, he filed a petition with the RTC to regain his the United States as alleged but pleaded the special
status as a citizen of the Philippines. The court and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
thereafter repatriated him. citizenship only to protect himself against President
Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over upon himself as a means of survival against the
repatriation cases unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's
agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Held: No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the
the RTC which has no jurisdiction thereover. The courts private respondents reiterated their assertion that
order was thereby null and void. The Special Committee Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not
on Naturalization was reactivated on June 8, 1995, reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
hence, when Angat filed his petition on March 11, 1996, election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
the Committee constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also
under PD No. 725 (a Decree providing for repatriation of argued that their petition in the Commission on
Filipino women who had lost their Philippine citizenship Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section
by marriage to aliens and of natural born Filipinos) was 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
in place. purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as
governor, his candidacy and election being null and void
FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 797
public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his Constitution.
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he
was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19,
election did not cure this defect because the electorate 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born"
of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any
Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows,
also joined in the privaterespondent's argument that however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not United States in 1983 per the following certification from
applicable because what the League and Estuye were the United States District Court, Northern District of
seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado
and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San
asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as Francisco, California, U.S.A.
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a
Filipino. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the
petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos
dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a
Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a consequence thereof he was coerced
citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on into embracing American citizenship. His feeble
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of
his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting
public officials and employeesowe the State and the as provincial governor in this country while owing
Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he
requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse
Code that a candidate for local elective office must be this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public
inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter office and employment only to the citizens of this
of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office
the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 798
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. fundamental law then applicable was the
Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the 1935Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the
his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for underCommonwealth Act No. 63, section
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and among other, "rendering service to or
our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign
treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March
surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine
be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No.
difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative
possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson
children. The returning renegade must show, by an III, who was then running for reelection.
express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty
and love. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional
Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is requirement that "no person shall be a Member of
hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born
and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of citizen.
the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to
vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the
elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this Philippines. Asdistinguished from the lengthy process of
decision becomes final and executory. naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking
BENGZON VS. HRET of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine
[357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001] and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last
Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost
citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 799
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his provided in 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born
status as a natural-born Filipino. citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative
naturalization when he was seven years old due to the
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA V. COURT OF naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. 21
APPEALS
POSTED IN UNCATEGORIZED BY ADMIN ON 27 FEB Held: RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of
2010 Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
G.R. No. 125793 (August 29, 2006) Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born
Filipinos, was enacted on 23 October 1995. It provides
Facts: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons,
citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was viz.:
seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
naturalization,20petitioner also acquired American citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-
citizenship. born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine
citizenship, including their minor children, on
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on 3 August 1995 account of political or economic necessity, may
and was admitted as abalikbayan for one year. reacquire Philippine citizenship through
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained in repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4
Baybay, Malay, Aklan by agent Wilson Soluren of the of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended:
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation on 23 May 1996 Provided, That the applicant is not one of those
(pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72). disqualified, as enumerated in the law:
Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention 1.1 Person opposed to organized
Center in Manila. Petitioner was, eventually, ordered government or affiliated with any
deported to his country of origin. association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing
Petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for organized government;
Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or 2. Person defending or teaching the necessity or
Temporary Restraining Order on 29 May 1996. Tabasa propriety of violence, personal assault, or
alleged, among others, that he is entitled to admission association for the predominance of their ideas;
or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota 3. Person convicted of crimes involving moral
Nachura Political Law Review 2012-2013 800
turpitude; or
4. Person suffering from mental alienation or
incurable contagious diseases.