CASE DIGEST: JUAN DULALIA, JR. V. ATTY. PABLO C.

CRUZ

Gr no. 6854

The primary duty of lawyers is to be well-informed of the existing laws, o keep

abreast with legal developments, recent enactments, and jurisprudence, and
be conversantwith basic legal principles.

Susan Soriano Dulalia (Susan), wife of Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal
Government to build a high rise building in Bulacan. The permit was not released
due to the opposition of Atty. Cruz who sent a letter to the Municipal Engineers
office, claiming that the building impedes the airspace of their property which is
adjacent to the Dulalias property. Juan Dulalia (Juan) filed a complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Pablo Cruz (Cruz) for immoral conduct.

Juan also claimed that Cruzs illicit relationship with a woman while still married is in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Cruz invokes good faith, claiming
to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83
of the Civil Code, for while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the
Code shall have retroactive application, there is a qualification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Cruz violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD:

Cruzs claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on
August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he
came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does
not lie, as ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Gross immoral conduct on the other hand
must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to
be reprehensible to a high degree.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with
legaldevelopments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they
beconversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations
as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing
mistakes.
The Court therefore concludes that Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01
and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is suspended from the
practice of law for one year.

De Roy and Ramos vs. CA

Facts: The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and

destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop
in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the
basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch
XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding
petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which
was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last
day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied
by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed
their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution because the same was not filed within the grace period as enscribed in
the present jurisprudence .

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying the denied the motion and let the petitioner be bound by the negligence of
their counsel

Held: The Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration. In the instant case, petitioners' motion for extension of time
was more than a year after the expiration of the grace period. Hence, it is no longer
within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their
counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within
the reglamentary period. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Digest Author: Des Ico

People vs Gacott, Jr.Petition:

Resolution

Petitioner: People of the Phil.Respondent: Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. presiding judge,

RTC, Puerto Princesa City;Arne Strom, and Grace ReyesPonente: J. RegaladoDate: 13
July 1995Facts:

For failure to read the text of the cited LOI No. 2 (abolishing the Anti-Dummy Board)
of theprosecution, the order of the respondent dismissing the criminal case was
annulled by SC.

Respondent was sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of 10,000php for gross
ignorance of law.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration dated 1 April 1995

He also begged with humility that the spreading of the Decision on his personal
recordsbe reconsidered. (spreading of a decision is an official procedure and
requirement in theCourt!)

He also filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated 26 April 1995.Copies

of the basic motion and supplemental motions were furnished by him to the Chief
Justice,JBC, SolGen, DOJ Sec, OMB, among others. (copies should only be furnished
to the adversedparty!)

Pertinent laws/provisions:

ARTICLE VIII SECTION 11 1987 CONSTITUTION

Issues:

1.WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the

motion to quash thecriminal case.2.WON the Second Division of the SC has
competence to administratively discipline respondent judge.
Ruling:

1.Yes2.Yes

Ratio Decidend i:Motions Denied

1.Respondent did not even bother to read the cited LOI of the prosecution.a.He
should be reminded that courts are duty bound to take judicial notice of all the laws
of the land.b.The error could have been entirely avoided were it not for his
irresponsibility in theperformance of duties.2.Court of 2nd Division assured that SC
validly and solemnly raffled the case to Mr. Justice Bidin of the 3rd Division who was
later transferred to the 2nd Division .a.No rule that parties be informed that a case
has been transferred to another division as respondent would want. (Reason:
conceal identity of the ponente)

Canon 6: CANNONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICER.A. 6713, Section

4

Prepared by: Michael Joseph Nogoy, JD 1

CASE No. 31[A.C. No. 3056 August 16, 1991]FERNANDO T. COLLANTES,

complainant

, vs. ATTY. VICENTE C.RENOMERON

respondent

.PONENTE: PER CURIAM

FACTS:

Nature of the Complaint:

Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City

This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel forV& G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the
latters irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for

registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with Assignment (in favorof
GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended

the registration of the documents with certain special conditions between

them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticketfrom
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieuthereo

f, the sale of respondents Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS

representatives.

Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents.

Hehimself elevated the question on the registrability of the said documents
toAdministrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds
RegistrationAdministration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of
theregistrability of the documents.

Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused theregistration

thereof but demanded from the parties interested the submissionof additional
requirements not adverted in his previous denial.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by theCourt

for his malfeasance as a public official.

Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

governmentservice in the discharge of official tasks.
HELD: Yes

to both issues.

RATIO DECIDENDI:On Issue No. 1

lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a vio

lation of his oathas a lawyer.

The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to de

lay no man formoney or malice.

The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his

suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

On Issue No. 2

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in

thedischarge of their official tasks (Canon 6).

The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral ordeceitful

conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any

mans cause for any corrupt motive or interest (Rule 1.03).

RULING:

Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is disbarred from the practice of law in

thePhilippines, and his name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210

20JUL

FACTS:

Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced
in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the
introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer of Title subscribed and
sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Carranza claimed
that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the
said falsehood, whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for
lack of prudence and meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused
unnecessary delays in the administration of justice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood
committed in court.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was reprimanded.

RATIO:

There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the
respondent in introducing the document that turned out to be false. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court reminded that the lawyers oath is one impressed with utmost
seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to issue reprimand, the
respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if the offense of
the same character is repeated again.

Enriquez Sr. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-12817, April 29, 1960]

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Facts: R.A. No. 1383 was passed creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA) as a public corporation and vesting in it the ownership and
control over all existing government-owned waterworks systems. However, Bauan
Batangas passed Res. No. 152 stating that it does not desire to submit their local
waterworks to the provisions of said R.A. No. 1383.

Provincial Fiscal rendered an opinion holding that R.A. No. 1383 is valid and
constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be
brought against the NAWASA to test the validity and constitutionality of the Act.
Given this, the municipality engaged the services of a special counsel to commence
an action challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1383.

The Petitioners are the special counsel seeking reimbursement for initial attorneys
fees, which the Auditor General disallowed citing that the Municipality of Bauan had
no authority to engage theservices of a special counsel
Issue: Whether municipality of Bauan had authority to engage theservices of a
special counsel

Held: No. The Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the
various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in
any court except when he is disqualified by law, which in this case he is not. A fiscal
cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law
without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging theservices of a
special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of
Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had
declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.

The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and
mayor without authority of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in
audit the petitioner's claim for payment of attorney's fees.

Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)

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Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesars
Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the
Manila Metropolitan Police. Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him
from such isolated exercise of his profession. He contends that his appearance
as counsel while holding a government position is not among the grounds provided
by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be
decided in an administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the
Solicitor General. Nonetheless, the court held that while the charges have to be
dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar to
avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could be
entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a public
trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but
the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to
frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also
to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter
that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future actuations as a member of
the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such doubts and misgivings as to
his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for membership in the
bar. He is not worthy of membershipin an honorable profession who does not even
take care that his honor remains unsullied.
CATU VS. RELLOSA (A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008)

FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and

AntonioPastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which
was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila where
respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been summoned for
conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicablesettlement, were issued
by the respondent a certification for the filing of theappropriate action in court.
Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent entered his appearance as
counsel for the defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed
the instant administrative complaint against the respondent on the ground that he
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, respondent
claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task without bias and that he
acceded to Elizabeths request to handle the case for free as she was financially
distressed. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) where after evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of
RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent
committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the latter
prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from the practice of law
for one month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of

respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of the
respondent were proper.

HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 the
Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer who has left
government service and in connection to former government lawyers who are
prohibited from accepting employment in connection with any matter in which
[they] had intervened while in their service. In the case at bar, respondent was an
incumbent punong barangay. Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the
said provision.

Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 which
governs the practice of profession of elective local government officials. While RA
6713 generally applies to all public officials and employees, RA 7160, being a
special law, constitutes an exception to RA 6713 .Moreover, while under RA
7160,certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board
members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription
to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is
made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any prohibition,
the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. Respondent,
therefore, is not forbidden to practice his profession.

Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a prior
permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil
service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to
obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required
written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN

*kalokohan na kaso to, 140++ pages (disclaimer) main decision 28 pages lang**
merong history of Rule 6.03 and other historical stuff sa caseFacts:

1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties.
Central Bank extendedloans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M).
Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover.


1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was
held with the Lucio
TanGroup winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the government,
intervened with theliquidation of Genbank.

1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of
Marcos, his family andcronies.

1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami
sila). In relation to thiscase, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the respondents bytaking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.

Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the
respondents.

1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the
liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that
PCGG is seeking to be sequestered fromthe Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza

did not take an adverseposition to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And
Mendozas appearance as counsel was beyondthe 1 year prohibitory period since he
retired in 1986.Issue:

W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito

MendozaHeld:

No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.

The matter (see 3

rd

note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central Bank on
how toproceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the matter
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matt
er involved in thePCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.

The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and

important. The role of Mendoza inthe liquidation of Genbank is considered
insubstantial.

SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to
disqualify Mendoza.Apparently, PCGG already lost
a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyles interpretation: PCGG gettingdesperate

Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it
harder for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work for them
because of the prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to
ones work as a government counsel.

Santos, Jr. v. Llamas, A.C. No. 4749, January 20, 2000. 322 SCRA 529
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Saturday, January 28, 2012 Posted
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Facts: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of
bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas It appears that
Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP
OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal 259060 but he
has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is
now of age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having
paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in
court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was
his IBP chaptermembership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings
were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that
he believes in good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income
tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior citizen since 1992.

Issues:
(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines.

(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by using
the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for
his actions.

Held:

(1) NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual
dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if
nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year,"
the exemptionhowever does not include payment of membership or association dues.
(2)YES. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting
to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not
do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the
court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he
filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's
advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice
of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

Leda vs. Tabang [A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992]

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Facts: Complainant Evangeline Leda and Respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang
contracted marriage performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional
character. The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after
Respondent had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar examinations, allegedly
to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived
together as husband and wife. Complainant, thereafter, filed a Petition for Disbarment
against respondent alleging, among others, for having misrepresented himself as single
when in truth he is already married in hisapplication to take the bar exam and for being
not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme
Court. Respondent averred that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the
marriage for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence
of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code thus he could not have abandoned
Complainant because they had never lived together ashusband and wife and that when
he applied for the 1981 Barexaminations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the
law, he was single.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent lacks of good moral character and violated the Code
of Professional Responsibility

Held: Yes, Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has
resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also
engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing,
he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001
thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts
are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the
candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the
Court. Hence, respondent is subjected to suspension from the practice of law until
further Orders.
TAN V. SABANDAL (170 SCRA 211 2/10/89FAC T S : R e s p o n d e n t N i c o l a s E l .
S a b a n d a l p a s s e d t h e 1 9 7 8 B a r E x a m i n a t i o n s but because of pending
administrative complaints filed against himregarding instances when he called himself
attorney knowing full wellthat he was not yet admitted to the Bar, he was not allowed
to take thelawyers oath. Oppositors evidence sufficiently show
that respondent hadheld himself out as an attorney in the agrarian, civil and criminal
casesand he was paid for his legal servicesHe then filed a petition to be admitted to
the Philippine Bar andto be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys. In a resolution
promulgatedon November 29, 1983 respondent petition was denied. Respondent asks
forforgiveness, understanding and benevolence and promises that, if given achance to
be a member of the Phil. Bar, he would always be faithful to thelawyers oath and
conduct himself in an upright
manner.H E L D : W h e t h e r o r n o t r e s p o n d
e n t s h a l l b e a d m i t t e d t o t h e Philippin
e Bar rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of theCourt. An applicant must
satisfy the Court that he is a person of goodmoral character, fit and proper to
practice law. Sabandal hereby allowedto take the lawyers oathTan vs. Sabandal, 206
SCRA 473 (1992)DOCTRINES:The practice of law is not a matter of right.No moral
qualification for bar membership is more important thantruthfulness or
candor.FACTS:Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was
denied to takehis oath in view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty
ofunauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitionsfor him to be
allowed to take his lawyer's oath.Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the
executive judge of theprovince where Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on
respondent'smoral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith,
theexecutive judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any actscommitted by
the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission tothe Bar. However, he added
that respondent has a pending civil case beforehis court for cancellation/reversion
proceedings, in which respondent, thenworking as Land Investigator of the Bureau
of Lands, is alleged to havesecured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a
parcel of landwhich, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptibleof acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to thebank.
The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold atpublic auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land since then.The case was however been settled
through amicable settlement. The saidamicable settlement canceled the OCT under
Free Patent in the name of

Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of thecertificate of
title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the massof public domain the
land covered by the aforesaid certificate of titlewith respondent refraining from
exercising acts of possession or ownershipover the said land. Respondent also paid the
bank a certain sum for theloan and interest.ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be
admitted to the practice of lawconsidering that he already submitted three (3)
testimonials regarding hisgood moral character, and his pending civil case has been
terminated.HELD:His petition must be denied.Time and again, it has been held that
practice of law is not a matter ofright. It is a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are
not only learnedin the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.It
should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at theBureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the freepatent title over the property
which he could not but have known was apublic land. This was manipulative on his part
and does not speak well ofhis moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty
while in thepublic service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case
andwhere no determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit hasbeen
compromised. This is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fairdealings.Moreover,
his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil casefor Reversion filed against
him during the period that he was submittingseveral petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack ofcandor and truthfulness.Although, the term "good
moral character" admits of broad dimensions, ithas been defined as "including at least
common dishonesty." It has alsobeen held that no moral qualification for membership is
more important thantruthfulness or candor.
VITUG VS. RONGCAL (A.C. NO. 6313
09/07/2006)

FACTS: Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M.
Rongcal who was introduced to her by her former classmate. Complainant asked
Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going to file against her
former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started
having sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also
gave her sweet inducements such as the promise of a job, financial security for her
daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim for support against
Aquino.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign

anAffidavit of Disclaimer which the latter signed without reading the saidaffidavit.
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave
him P150,000.00 cash and P58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for
the medical expenses of her daughter. Instead of turning them over to her,
respondent handed her his personal check in the amount of P150,000.00 and
promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter. However,
sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her
the said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then
running for the position of Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga

Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a

lawyer. She filed an administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. It was then recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and that he be ordered to
return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The same was
approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Respondent then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the IBP
and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent be disbarred for immorality

(2) Whether or not respondents act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit,
a document disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code.

HELD:
(1) NO. One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that anapplicant must
possess good moral character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition
for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the actcomplained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to
constitute a criminal actor so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a
high degree. On sexual relation and on respondents subsequent marriage, by his
own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. The Court find credence in respondent's assertion that
it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting marriage,
complainants allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant
evidence required in disbarment cases.

(2) NO. It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a
settlement with Aquino after explaining all available options to her. The law
encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of disputes
which might otherwise be filed in court. Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that: A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid,
end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement. As complainant
voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with Aquino, she cannot later
blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Suspicion, no matter
how strong, is not enough in the absence of contrary evidence, what will prevail is
the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal

GUILTY of immorality and impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for
further investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this Decision
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel [G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970]

Ponente: SANCHEZ, J.

FACTS:

The first contempt proceeding arose from third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, on his behalf and purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose
B. Sotto, that the petitioners, who, according to the Solicitor General and based on their submitted and
signed memorandum, alleged that petitioners:

To have made false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International (such efforts could be accurately called scattershot desperation);
To have such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude
of the petitioners, and petitioners opportunistically change their claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case. Atty Santiago further alleged that the
Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the misrepresentation and obfuscation of
the petitioners counsel and

And the Supreme Court in the effect:

Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the right to
reject any and all bids) can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud. Atty. Santiago also filed a motion to inhibit against
Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro.

The second contempt proceeding arose when respondent MacArthur, through new counsel, Atty. Juanito
M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion for reconsideration
without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and included citing the
New Rules of Court Section 1 Rule 51 and that alleged injustice may cut off all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government by invoking the Hickenlooper Amendment after making it known to the World
Court. Meads, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about the portion left
out was anyway marked by XS which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically
states that it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote..

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

a) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto; Graciano C. Regala; and Associates; and Atty.
Erlito R. Uy; are guilty of contempt on the filed Third Motion for Reconsideration;
b) Atty. Vicente L. Santiago; Atty. Juanito M. Caling, and Mr. Morton F. Meads are guilty of contempt on
the filed Fourth Motion for Reconsideration;

HELD:

a) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

For Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto YES. Fine of P100.00.

For Atty. Graciano C. Regala and Associates NO. (Took no part)

For Atty. Erlito R. Uy NO. (Took no part)

b) For Atty. Vicente L. Santiago YES. Additional fine of P1,000.00

For Atty. Juanito M. Caling YES. Fine P200.00.

For Mr. Morton F. Meads YES. Fine of P1,000.00.

RATIO:

a) On the Third Motion for Reconsideration

The Supreme Court finds language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. Atty. Santiago
pictures petitioners as vulturous executives and speaks of this [Supreme] Court as a civilized,
democratic tribunal, but by innuendo would suggest that it is not. Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has
misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and that he too has committed, under
Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice. Atty.
Regala did not even know that his name was included as co-counsel in this case. Finally, borne out by the
record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings subject of
the contempt citation.

b) On the Fourth Motion for Reconsideration

Atty. Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned from his
position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should be
within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have
reminded him that [a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation.
Atty. Caling lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. He has not shown to the satisfaction
of this Court that he should be exempted from the contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an
officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it.
While he has been dragged in only at the last minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that
his name should not be attached to pleadings contemptuous in character.