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Editorial
Of all things, communication is the most wonderful.
(John Dewey, 1939)
With this first issue of Empedocles, the editors hope to have created a
place and a process for the exploration of the interactions between phi-
losophy, communication as a phenomenon and a practice, and the
study of communication in the humanities and in science. Philosophy
has always been a love of speech, of voicing, of ‘saying what is’ or
‘making it explicit’ and has shown it can be a love of other forms of
communication too: writing, printing and electronic communication.
The ties between philosophy and communication are deep and linked
to the place language-use, communication, has in human life, in the
idea of shared humanity – either confirmed or contested – in the analy-
sis of the true, the good and the beautiful, in the who and what of relat-
edness. But (as Eli Dresner argues in this issue) the philosophy of
communication is not simply a sub-discipline of the philosophy of lan-
guage; the relation between the theory of language and the theory of
communication is a contested matter.
As with several forms of the ‘philosophy of …’, it is the historical and
cultural context that defines the urgency of philosophical reflection.
Philosophy of nature, religion, law, science and language reflected the
efficaciousness – as well as the problematical aspects – of certain and
they established themselves as philosophical disciplines in their own
right in this process. The philosophy of communication, reflectively
identified, is a new field – and its emergence today shows the vitality of
philosophy as it turns reflection on the phenomena of mediation and
communication, which are taking up an ever more important place in a
variety of strata of social and cultural life, the human and natural sci-
ences and art. Frankly, its emergence also shows, or is tainted by, the
institutionalized fragmentation of intellectual life – this tension is one I
wish to neither cover up nor assign a ready interpretation. But it appears,
I would say, in practice, for the academic researcher, that it is only in
this fragmentation that philosophy can, perhaps, retain its promise of a
thinking of the whole – in which, surely, its critical function must lie. To
the extent that this is true, the philosophy of communication would,
also, have to develop its own form of a ‘negative dialectic’ – of the
endeavour of thought, recommended by Hegel, to keep representation
at bay and thought open. The practices of communication offer, perhaps,
a particularly rich field for such an endeavour.
All of this is, of course, not to say that there has been no philosophy
of communication before. Several scholarly publications in the last dec-
ades carry these words in their titles; from Nietzsche’s speeches of
6 Editorial
Johan Siebers
Editor
Reference
Badiou, A. (2004), Infinite Thought, London: Continuum.
Editorial 7
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EJPC_1.1_Editorial_05-08.indd 8 11/19/09 4:42:06 PM
Empedocles European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication
Volume 1 Number 1 © 2009 Intellect Ltd
Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/ejpc.1.1.9/1
Abstract Keywords
Bergson’s views on communication can be deduced from his theory of selfhood, Bergson
in which he identifies the human self as heterogeneous duration – a complex Ontology
process that can only be adequately understood from within, when we intuit Intuition
our own inner life. Another person, accessing us from outside, inevitably dis- Duration
torts and misunderstands our nature because duration is incommunicable. Heterogeneity
Does Bergsonism assert the failure of communication in principle? No, if we French philosophy
develop Bergson’s theory further and identify the process of communication as
heterogeneous duration. As such, it is intuited from within by its participants
who engage with each other in the process of dealing with the same object.
They intuit the process of which they are part and thus intuit each other’s
involvement in it as well. To appreciate the importance of this implicit mutual
communicative engagement we only need to imagine an empty airport with
just one passenger or a deserted pleasure beach.
Bergson does not have a theory of communication per se but his views on
communication can be extracted from his ontology and epistemology. These
views may account for some apparent failures of communication – conflicts,
loneliness, hostility – and Bergson uses them to suggest a way out towards
better and more harmonious intersubjective relations.
Bergson claims that we misunderstand reality in general and each other
in particular. Instead of trying to grasp human nature directly in intui-
tion we analyse its being and create a distorted view of one another. If we
were able to conceive the human self as it is, we would see it as duration
and might be able to reach the state of an open society where people’s love
towards one another is ontologically backed up by their openness towards
each other’s being.
However, the Bergsonian theory of duration and intuition, promising to
resolve the difficulties of communication, reasserts these difficulties meta-
physically. The idea of duration entails the impossibility of accessing it from
outside, as the genuine view of it is only possible from within. This paper,
instead of trying to salvage a model of communication where people strive to
intuit each other’s uniqueness, locates intuition in the very act of communi-
cation. Bergson himself finds intuition in artistic creation where the artist
and spectators communicate by intuiting a common object without learning
any personal details about each other. We find that communication is itself
duration and that the communicating participants are heterogeneous elements
of that duration. As such they are subservient to the act of communication
that displays features of autonomous existence. Our model of communication,
10 Elena Fell
Then, casting a glance on the handsome young man, who was barely
twenty-five years old, and whom he left lying there, insensible and perhaps
dead, he heaved a sigh over the strange destiny that leads men to destroy
each other for the interests of people who are strangers to them and who
often do not even know that they exist.
(Dumas 2006: 216–217)
Before Comminges could draw back his sword, Mergy struck him with
his dagger on the head so violently that he himself lost his balance and fell
to the ground. Comminges dropped at the same time, so that the seconds
thought them both dead.
Mergy was soon on his feet, and his first motion was to pick up his
sword which he had let slip in his fall. Comminges did not stir. Béville
lifted him up, and wiping with a handkerchief his face, which was
drenched in blood, saw that the dagger had entered the eye, and that
his friend had been killed on the spot, the steel having beyond all doubt
pierced the brain.
(Mérimée 1906: 144–145)
When you have killed a man, and when this man is the first you have
killed, you are haunted for some time, and especially at nightfall, by the
memory and the look of the last struggle that ushered in his death. The
mind is so full of gloomy thoughts, that it is hard to take part even in
the most trivial conversation; all talk wearies and annoys; while, on the
other hand, solitude is dreaded because it strengthens the oppression
of fancy. Despite the frequent visits of Béville and the captain, Mergy
spent the days immediately succeeding his duel in the deepest sadness.
A sharp touch of fever, brought on by his wound, kept him sleepless at
night, and this was his worst time.
(Mérimée 1906: 151–152)
Whilst reading Dumas’s hilarious tale, we tend to skim the surface of the
events. Reading Mérimée, we tend to become immersed in what is hap-
pening, sharing the characters’ moods and feelings as they may have
taken place. Neither narrative is a perfect example of either simplification
of reality or intuitive grasp, but each indicates a tendency towards one of
the epistemological standpoints proposed by Bergson. Of course,
Mérimée’s story is also written with a certain purpose, and imaginary
reality is selected and manipulated to produce a certain effect on the
reader, but the author aims at giving a realistic account of Mergy’s experi-
ences and tries to initiate the reader into the mind of a duellist and let him
or her learn how one really may feel after a successful contest. Whereas
Dumas analyses, simplifies and distorts facts, Mérimée tries to follow
them accurately in their complexity and originality, to intuit them.
Dumas’s attention-grabbing narrative, where a series of crimes is
skilfully presented as a string of breathtaking and enviable experiences,
shows to what extent we can manipulate reality in our minds; this,
according to Bergson, happens in our interactions with reality all the
time. Whilst perceiving something or someone, we present them to our-
selves in the way that it fits with our wants, simplifying their nature,
creating a one-sided picture of them and constructing an image exceed-
ingly removed from the truth.
Are the problems in our communications due to the fact that we
treat each other like Dumas treats d’Artagnan and comte de Wardes,
12 Elena Fell
14 Elena Fell
16 Elena Fell
18 Elena Fell
20 Elena Fell
Intuition in communication
Communication is duration in its own right, with its own internal
structure, with strong ties between its phases, so the people involved
in the process of communication are not the full masters of this proc-
ess but are subservient to this process and are driven to sustain and
22 Elena Fell
References
Bergson, Henri (1896), Matière et mémoire, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
Bergson, Henri (1889), Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
Bergson, Henri (1903), ‘Introduction à la métaphysique’, Revue. de Métaphysique
et de Morale, January.
Bergson, Henri (1907), L’évolution créatrice, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
Bergson, Henri (1910), Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of
Consciousness, (F.L. Pogson trans.), London: George Allen and Unwin.
Bergson, Henri (1932), Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion, Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France.
24 Elena Fell
Suggested citation
Fell, E. (2009), ‘Beyond Bergson: the ontology of togetherness’, Empedocles
European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 1: 1, pp. 9–25, doi: 10.1386/
ejpc.1.1.9/1
Contributor details
For Elena, the problem of communication is not just a matter of a purely aca-
demic interest. Thanks to her own experiences, she is aware of real issues
that affect communication between people, especially if they belong to differ-
ent cultural and communicative settings or if such settings change. Born in
Leningrad and brought up as a Soviet child, in her mid teens she lived through
the collapse of the USSR and was involved in the breaking-and-making proc-
ess of a societal value changing. She obtained her first degree in philosophy
from St. Petersburg State University and a Doctorate in philosophy from The
University of Central Lancashire in Britain, thus experiencing an exposure to
two very distinct educational traditions. Also a professional linguist, Elena has
taught languages both in Russia and in England, as well as interpreting and
doing translations. She is currently working on an ontology of communication
that uses Bergson’s philosophy as a foundation.
Contact:
E-mail: elena.fell@ntlworld.com
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Abstract Keywords
One kind of successful communication involves the transmission of knowledge Testimony
from speaker to hearer. Such testimonial knowledge transmission is usually Partiality
seen as conforming to three widely held epistemological approaches: reliabilism, Evidentialism
impartialism and evidentialism. First, a speaker must be a reliable testifier in Reliabilism
order that she transmits knowledge, and reliability is cashed out in terms of epistemology
her likelihood of speaking the truth. Second, if a certain speaker’s testimony
has sufficient epistemic weight to be believed by hearer1, then it should also
be believed by hearer2. Third, the normative constraint here is evidentially
grounded: whether or not a hearer should believe a speaker depends on the evi-
dence the hearer has that the speaker is telling the truth. I argue that there are
cases of testimonial knowledge transmission that are incompatible with these
three claims. This is when one accepts the testimony of an intimate friend.
[I]t takes two to tango: the justificatory work of testimonial beliefs can
be shouldered neither exclusively by the hearer nor by the speaker.…
the speaker-condition ensures reliability while the hearer-condition
ensures rationality for testimonial justification.
(Lackey 2006: 16)
28 Dan O’Brien
2. Unreliable friends
In the following scenarios I would like to say, first, that testimonial
knowledge is acquired, and second, that a reliabilist reading cannot be
given of this knowledge. In order to make my examples more plausible
(and to avoid possible problems concerning self-deception), it shall
always be the case that H does not know of S’s unreliability: S might
be a new friend, or one who has not spoken about p to H before, or one
whose previous statements about p have not been verified by H.
Dylan, a friend of mine, is very unreliable when it comes to testi-
mony concerning what he has eaten, when and where he had his last
meal, and where his food comes from. Today, however, he claims not
to have stolen the missing sticky toffee pudding from the fridge –
although I know that someone has – and, as it happens, he did not take
it (p), he knows he did not (S knows that p), and he tells me that he did
not. Having no reason not to, I believe him (H believes that p). The
claim that I shall defend in this paper is that it is correct to say, not that
I have a lucky true belief that p, but that I have learnt that p from Dylan,
that I have acquired knowledge from him.
Here is another example. Paul, formerly a Seventh-Day Adventist,
is not a reliable testifier about his religious views (unbeknownst to his
close friend Elizabeth). Elizabeth is a devout Catholic and Paul tells
her that he has converted to Catholicism. And he has – and I would
like to claim that Elizabeth can now know this as well, even though
Paul is usually unreliable about such things.
These examples have certain key features. First, they concern topics
of conversation that are ‘constitutive of the friendship’ between S and
H. Part of being someone’s friend often involves believing well of that
person, believing, for example, that in certain circumstances they have
not performed actions that are morally suspect, such as stealing the
sticky toffee pudding. Such trust is not absolute, but friendship
involves at least some resistance to thinking badly of one’s friends. My
second example focuses on another aspect of a certain type of friend-
ship, that is, that one should be open and honest about one’s deeply
held views and respect those views in one’s friends; not, for example,
kidding about religion to one who is devoutly religious. My account
does not apply to casual friends, or to what might be called Facebook
friends (Facebook is an Internet social site where friends can be made
by clicking the ‘Add to Friends’ button); rather, my claims concern
what I shall call ‘intimate friends’, those friendships that would seem
to be threatened by lack of trust in testimony. You can doubt the written
testimony of a ‘friend’s’ Facebook profile, but you should not doubt
30 Dan O’Brien
32 Dan O’Brien
34 Dan O’Brien
36 Dan O’Brien
[I]n testimony a speaker transmits to her audience not only the content
attested, but also the reasons that the speaker has in support of that
content – or, if not the reasons themselves, then at least the support
provided by those reasons.
(Goldberg 2007: 17)
7. Epistemic luck
To conclude let us return to the relation between luck and knowledge,
which we touched upon in section 1. In this paper I have discussed
whether there is a reliabilist constraint on testimonial knowledge
38 Dan O’Brien
References
Aristotle (1925), Nicomachean Ethics (D. Ross trans.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Baron, M. (1991), ‘Impartiality and Friendship’, Ethics, 101, pp. 836–857.
Clifford, W. (2003), ‘The Ethics of Belief’, in L. Pojman (ed.), The Theory of
Knowledge: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Belmont: Wadsworth.
Cottingham, J. (1986), ‘Partiality, Favouritism and Morality’, The Philosophical
Quarterly, 36, p. 144.
Goldberg, S. (2007), ‘Testimony As Evidence’, forthcoming in Philosophica, 75.
Hardwig, J. (1985), ‘Epistemic Dependence’, Journal of Philosophy, 82: 12,
pp. 335–349.
Holton, R. (1994), ‘Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe’, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 72, pp. 63–76.
Lackey, J. (2006), ‘It Takes Two to Tango: Beyond Reductionism and Non-
Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony’, in J. Lackey and E. Sosa
(eds), The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lackey, J. and Sosa, E. (eds) (2006), The Epistemology of Testimony, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mackie, J. (1977), Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books.
Millgram, E. (1997), Practical Induction, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Nozick, R. (1981), Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge: The Belknap Press.
Pritchard, D. (2005), Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pritchard, D. (2007), ‘A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of
Testimony’, forthcoming in Philosophica, 75.
Reynolds, S. (2002), ‘Testimony, Knowledge and Epistemic Goals’, Philosophical
Studies, 110, pp. 139–161.
Schmitt, F. (2006) ‘Transindividual Reasons’, in J. Lackey and E. Sosa (eds),
2006.
Sosa, E. (1999), ‘How to Defeat Opposition to Moore’, Philosophical Perspectives,
13, pp. 141–54.
Strawson, P. (1962), ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 47, pp. 187–211.
Stroud, S. (2006), ‘Epistemic Partiality in Friendship’, Ethics, 116: 3, pp. 498–524.
Welbourne, M. (1994), ‘Testimony, Knowledge and Belief’ in B. Matilal and A.
Chakrabarti (eds), Knowing from Words, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Williams, B. (1981), ‘Persons, Character, and Morality’, in Moral Luck,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
40 Dan O’Brien
Contributor details
Dan is a Research Fellow at Oxford Brookes University, an Honorary Research
Fellow at Birmingham University and an Associate Lecturer with the Open
University. He has published widely on epistemology and the philosophy of
mind. Recent books include An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Polity,
2006) and Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: Reader’s Guide
(Continuum, 2006; with A. Bailey). His current research interests include the
epistemology of testimony, and David Hume’s philosophy of religion.
Contact:
E-mail: dobrien@brookes.ac.uk
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Communication or Confrontation –
Heidegger and Philosophical
Method
Vincent Blok Louis Bolk Institute, Netherlands
Abstract Keywords
In this essay, we consider the philosophical method of reading and writing, of communication
communication. Normally, we interpret the works of the great philosophers and Heidegger
explain them in papers and presentations. The thinking of Martin Heidegger Nietzsche
has given us an indication of an entirely different method of philosophical think- philosophical method
ing. In the 1930s, he gave a series of lectures on Nietzsche. In them, he calls Will
his own way of reading and writing a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung)
with Nietzsche. We consider the specific character of confrontation, and in
what ways it is different from communication. First, we develop an answer
to the question of how Heidegger reads Nietzsche. Does he give a charitable
or a violent interpretation of Nietzsche and, if neither, how can his confronta-
tion with Nietzsche be characterized? With this, we obtain an indication of the
way we have to read Heidegger, indeed, of philosophical reading and writing
as such.
Introduction
In Also sprach Zarathustra Nietzsche writes:
Wille zur Wahrheit heiβt ihr’s, ihr Weisesten, was euch treibt und brün-
stig macht? Wille zur Denkbarkeit alles Seienden: also heiβe ich euren
Willen! Alles Seiende wollt ihr erst denkbar machen: denn ihr zweifelt
mit gutem Miβtrauen, ob es schon denkbar ist.
(KSA 4: 146)
44 Vincent Blok
46 Vincent Blok
48 Vincent Blok
50 Vincent Blok
52 Vincent Blok
54 Vincent Blok
56 Vincent Blok
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Self-observation, self-reference
and operational coupling in social
systems: steps towards a coherent
epistemology of mass media
Juan Miguel Aguado Universidad de Murcia
Abstract Keywords
This paper is concerned with the role of self-observation in managing complex- mass media system
ity in meaning systems. Revising Niklas Luhmann’s theory of mass media, we self-reference
approach the mass media system as a social sub-system functionally specialized self-observation
in the coupling of psychic systems’ (individuals) self-observation and social epistemology
systems’ self-observation (including, respectively, themselves as each other’s operational coupling
internalized environment).
According to Autopoietic Systems Theory and von Foerster’s second order
cybernetics, self-observation presupposes a capability for meta-observation (to
observe the observation) that demands a specific distinction between observer
and actor. This distinction seems especially relevant in those social contexts
where a separation between the action of observation and other social actions is
required (in politics, for instance). However, in those social contexts (such as
mass-media meaning production) where the defining action is precisely obser-
vation (in terms of the differentiation that constitutes the system), the border
between observer and actor is blurred.
We shall consider the significant divergence between the implicit and the
explicit epistemologies of the mass media system, which appears to be char-
acterized by the explicit assumption of a classic objectivist epistemology, on
one side, and a relativist epistemology on the other, posing a hybrid epistemic
status somewhere in between science and arts.
preceding sections must ‘take into account the reciprocal role MMS,
politics, economy and individuals play in public opinion, consump-
tion and identity’.
As we have stated, in our view a specific complement of two
codes (interest/non-interest and relevance/opacity) guides MMS
operations. The result of the system’s selections operated under
these codes constitutes themes (or situated meaning structures) that,
in their turn, function as a means for the operational couplings with
other social systems.
Through the organization of access and dissemination, interest
and relevance coordinate the operational coupling of the MMS with
the economic system. Access is the primary value of consumption
practices (which, in their turn involve the operational coupling of
the economic system and psychic systems). Dissemination is a pre-
requisite for access, and involves the operational relevance of adver-
tising and lifestyle patterns in the coupling of MMS and economy
through consumption. It is important here to underline the self-ref-
erential nature of this operational coupling, as far as mass media
contents are also products addressed to consumers via dissemina-
tion and access. In a schematic form: interest guarantees dissemina-
tion, dissemination guarantees access, and dissemination and access
feed interest. From a collateral view, it may be relevant in any case
to mention that the current shape of consumption practices in glo-
balized modern societies cannot be explained without referring to
the mass media.
Through the organization of frames via thematization, interest and
relevance coordinate the operational coupling of the MMS with the
system of politics. Themes and meaning frames operate here as selec-
tions that guide the communicative interactions with and through the
system of mass media, constituting a privileged space for the configu-
ration of public opinion. Mass media are not only a society’s self-
observation system, but a system derived from the self-observation of
social systems. In other words (and again in self-referential terms), the
system of politics observes itself through MMS observations, but also
the MMS observes itself (in hetero-referential terms) through those
observations of political and other social actors that are specifically
References
Aguado, J. M. (2003a), Comunicación y cognición. Las bases de la complejidad,
Sevilla: Comunicación Social Ediciones.
Aguado, J. M. (2003b), ‘The technological mediation of experience: a systemic
approach to media and contemporary culture’, paper presented at the 4th
International Conference on Sociocybernetics: Sociocybernetics – The Future of
the Social Sciences, Corfu, Greece, 30 June– 5 July.
Aguado, J. M. (2004), ‘Media, meta-experiences and modernity’, paper pre-
sented at the 5th International Conference on Sociocybernetics: Social Knowledge
for the Contemporary World, Lisbon, Portugal, 26–31 July.
Aguado, J. M. (2005), ‘La información como problema observacional’, in
Cuadernos de Información y Comunicación, Madrid: Universidad Complutense
de Madrid, pp. 197–218.
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in the Context of Societal Complexity Reduction’, Kybernetes, 35: 3–4,
pp. 567–582.
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von Foerster, H. (1991), Las Semillas de la Cibernética, Barcelona: Gedisa.
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A Systems Approach’, Kybernetes, 20: 2, pp. 10–28.
Laermans, R. (2005), ‘Mass Media in Contemporary Society: A Critical
Appraisal of Niklas Luhmann’s Systems View’, Cybernetics & Human
Knowing, 4: 12, pp. 51–70.
Lazarsfeld, P. F. and Merton, R. K. (1954), ‘Mass Communication, Popular
Taste and Organized Social Action’, in L. Bryson, (ed.), The Communication
of Ideas, New York: Harper & Row.
Luhmann, N. (1992), Social Systems, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Luhmann, N. (1996), The Reality of Mass Media, Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Martí, E. (1997), Construir una mente, Barcelona: Paidós.
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McCulloch, W. (1965), Embodiments of Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Mead, G. H. (1992), Mind, self and society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Morin, E. (1993), El método I. La naturaleza de la Naturaleza, Madrid: Cátedra.
Morin, E. (1994), El método III. El conocimiento del conocimiento, Madrid:
Cátedra.
Suggested citation
Aguado, J. M. (2009), ‘Self-observation, self-reference and operational
coupling in social systems: steps towards a coherent epistemology of mass
media’, Empedocles European Journal for the Philosophy of Communication 1: 1,
pp. 59–74, doi: 10.1386/ejpc.1.1.59/1
Contributor details
Juan Miguel Aguado is PhD on Communication Studies at the Complutense
University of Madrid (Spain) and Postgraduate in Social Research by the
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences
(Warsaw). He is member of the International Research Committee on Sociology
of Communication, Culture and Knowledge (RC14) at the International
Sociological Association (ISA). Actually he is professor of Communication
Theory in the School of Communication and Information Studies at the
University of Murcia (Spain). Research and publications on Epistemology of
Communication and Social Impact of Technology.
Contact: Universidad de Murcia, Facultad de Comunicación y Documentación,
Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Murcia, Spain.
Fax: +34 968367141
E-mail: jmaguado@um.es
Abstract Keywords
In this paper we position ourselves against idealist presuppositions so frequent Idealism
in the humanities and social sciences, and, particularly, in communication the- realism
ory. We argue that a realist approach to the study of communication avoiding communication
such implausible assumptions is not only possible, but has already been exem- sense
plified in proposals that take communication to be a phenomenon with a bio- truth
logical origin. We argue that this sort of perspective can account for the variety
of communicative functions we encounter in human experience, including the
ones involving senses.
One of the most frequently discussed issues in communication theory 1. We would like to
concerns the nature of communication, and even, beyond that, whether thank Dr Johan
Siebers for his sup-
there is a unique phenomenon behind this label. A common view on port, insightful
the subject commits to the idea that communication involves the trans- comments and help
mission of content between interlocutors. Some authors refer to this with the language.
This essay has
perspective as ‘the transmission view’ of communication.2 One of the been financed,
problems usually associated with this view concerns the notion of con- in part, through
tent. What are contents? How should we account for them? In this grant FFI2008-
06164-C02-02 of the
paper we will elaborate this notion and will discuss the shortcomings Spanish Ministerio de
that have traditionally been attributed to it. We will distinguish two Ciencia e Innovación.
aspects to these deficiencies: a semantic one, concerning the nature of 2. The ‘transmission
these objects of our thoughts and statements and their role in explain- view’ can be traced
ing cognitive significance, and an ontological one, concerning the rela- back as far as Locke,
and has gained
tion between contents and reality. We will finally suggest a possible support with its
realist approach for solving some of these deficiencies. manifestations
There is, however, another possible family of approaches to the through Shannon
and Weaver’s theory
issue of the nature of communication, which actually seem to be quite of information
popular in the area of communication theory: for instance, to consider (1963), psychological
that any theory we might build on the nature of communication will functionalism, the
computational
not be anything but another narration (Carey 1989), to which we are analogy for compu-
not entitled to attribute any better claim to truth than to any other, or tational processes
that any theory of communication is equally acceptable in principle, and cybernetics.
The basic elements
independently of its epistemological and ontological presuppositions of communication,
(Craig 1999). In this paper we position ourselves against this sort of according to this
idealist perspective, and propose that a realist empirical approach view, include a
broadcasting agent
should be applied to the topic. We think that whether there is a phe- with a message
nomenon we could be entitled to call ‘communication’ or not, we will
Conclusion
In sum, in this article we position ourselves against idealist presup-
positions so frequent in the humanities and social sciences, and, par-
ticularly, in communication theory. We have tried to argue that a
realist approach to the study of communication is not only possible,
but also that it does not commit us to some implausible philosophi-
cal assumptions. We think that what the phenomenon we call ‘com-
munication’ consists in, we will only know through the conjecturing
of hypotheses that are maximally coherent with the evidence we
References
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XXII/1–2.
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McQuail’s Reader in Mass Communication Theory, London: Sage Publications.
pp. 37–45.
Craig, R. (1999), ‘Communication theory as a field’, Communication Theory, 9,
pp. 119–161.
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Suggested citation
Sánchez, L. and Campos, M. ‘Content and sense’, Empedocles European Journal for
the Philosophy of Communication 1: 1, pp. 75–90, doi: 10.1386/ejpc.1.1.75/1
Abstract Keywords
This study compares the codes of media ethics adopted by the PCC–Press Hebrew Law
Complaints Commission, the IFJ–International Federation of Journalists and Right to know
the SPJ–Society of Professional Journalists based on the claim that it is the pub- Media Ethics
lic’s right to know, and examines the origins of this concept. A new approach Communication
is presented here which falls between the liberal-democratic approach on the ethics
one hand and on the other, the extreme ultra-Orthodox approach that claims Mass communication
that it is the public’s duty not to know. This new approach which indicates
that it is the public’s duty to know has evolved from the analysis of Jewish
texts from Biblical times and from the study of events in Jewish community
life throughout the world. This novel approach is likely to effect a change in
the contents of broadcasts and in the boundaries of media ethics.
This article compares various attitudes in regard to the people’s right 1. This article is part
to know. We try to reveal the philosophical roots of this right and to of a doctoral dis-
sertation that deals
show its application in three leading western codes of ethics. We fol- with mass com-
low this with a discussion of the Jewish ultra-orthodox attitude, which munication, media
holds that it is the people’s ‘obligation not to know’. We then describe ethics, and Jewish
law. This article was
the approach of Hebrew law, which takes a stand between the two and originally presented
says that it is sometimes the people’s ‘obligation to know’. at the National
Communication
Association (NCA)
1. The public’s right to know in Chicago, IL in
It is customary among journalists to say that the right of the public to November 2007.
know provides the moral foundation for the freedom given to journal-
ists to gather information and disseminate it freely. Since this expression
was coined – by Kent Cooper, former editor of the news agency
Associated Press (A.P) (Goodwin 1983: 9) – it has been used to justify a
wide range of media activities, from covering deliberations in the law
courts and election campaigns to investigative journalism that often
involves impersonation and intrusion on privacy. There are those who
tend to assume that this right gives journalists unlimited access to events,
information, and the lives of ordinary citizens (Gauthier 1999: 197).
92 Tsuriel Rashi
94 Tsuriel Rashi
In other words, by their very acts, journalists will promote justice and
democracy, and for this reason, they must chase the truth and expose
it so it is of the people, by the people, and for the people.
In an ideal democratic world, people form their own opinions and
their own worldview, and lead their lives accordingly, using them to
change the world. Tabloid-style media, which is entertainment based,
biased, negative, in love with itself, unrestrained, and irresponsible,
does not help an individual to build a life and live it as a good citizen
(Levi-Barzilai 2005: 345).
This ultra-orthodox worldview flows toward rabbis who are not ultra-
orthodox, and often appears in wider forums. In an article entitled
‘The Public’s Right Not to Know,’ the rabbi of the city of Ramat Gan,
Rabbi Yaakov Ariel, claims, somewhat radically, that human ethics are
in dire straits, caught between two proponents who are holding them
captive. One is ‘the public’s right to know,’ in which everything must
be open and known; nothing is hidden from this right, like a plague of
frogs croaking away loudly, making a sound that penetrates every
empty space in the room where you lay.4 On the other hand, we have
the proponent who claims the opposite: the ‘right to privacy,’ which
claims that everything must be played down, even if this endangers
the public. Further, when someone does finally decide to reveal him-
self, he will be known as a hero and they will tell him he is holy.5
The Halacha (Jewish Law) provides definitions that are more accu-
rate. In either circumstance, if it endangers the public, downplaying
privacy is a grave transgression; if there is no danger, then nothing,
not even the smallest matter, should be revealed. Moreover, one must
not repeat gossip about oneself. The public’s right is not only to not
know but also to downplay what has been revealed that should have
been concealed (Ariel 1998: 167).
Who is a gossiper? One who collects information and then goes from
person to person, saying: ‘This is what so and so said’; ‘This is what
96 Tsuriel Rashi
The Sages say that this prohibition also covers the case when one with-
holds evidence, since he sees his friend’s money being lost and is in a
position to restore it to him by telling the truth.
(Maimonides (1963))
98 Tsuriel Rashi
The Talmud describes how members of the Garmu and Abtinas fami-
lies tried to explain to the Sages why they refused. Despite this, it was
decided to continue mentioning their disgrace for generations to
come. In light of this, the Chafetz Chaim concludes that it is essential
to publish the names of those who have transgressed in the eyes of
the masses: ‘For this reason it is certainly a command to admonish
them [publicly], revealing their transgressions for all to see, thereby
tainting in the eyes of others the names of those who have trans-
gressed’ (HaCohen 1999: D 16).
If one sees a person who has done something unjust to a friend, such
as stealing from him, exploiting or hurting him, and even if the victim
does or does not know about such acts; or if the perpetrator humiliated
his friend, made him sad or cheated him; and the person who sees him
knows for sure that the perpetrator has neither returned the stolen item,
paid for the damage, nor apologized or atoned for his actions, even if
he is the only one that saw the perpetrator, he is permitted to tell others
in order to help the victim and publicly censure the perpetrator.
(General Rules of Defamation, Ch. 10, Section A)
The explanation for this move is, ‘so that he will be different and all
people will keep away’ (loc. cit.).
Adulterers were also denounced publicly, as indicated in a ruling
issued by Rabbi Hai Gaon, Head of the Pumbedita Academy in
Babylonia during the transition period from the tenth to the eleventh
century. The ruling refers to a pregnant woman who claimed that a
particular man fathered her child – the same man who had been sus-
pected of such acts a number of times in the past. Rabbi Hai Gaon
declared, ‘And that man must be flogged and chastised, and his dis-
grace announced to all’ (Teshuvot HaGaonim, p. 4A, Section 16).
The rabbis usually reserved such severe punishment for individuals
who broke the cardinal rules of the community; in less serious instances
they were generally satisfied with an announcement made locally in
the synagogue where the transgressor prayed. For example, in the
Altona-Hamburg community in Germany, in the year 1786, they ruled
that:
No man or woman shall go to the Opera House, and those that transgress
and go – if he is a member of the community, he will not be employed
in any position within the community … and their sins will be publicly
denounced.
(Asaf 1922: 116)
Have I conceived all this people? Have I begotten them, that thou
shouldst say to me, carry them in thy bosom, as a nursing father carries
the sucking child, to the land which thou hast sworn to their fathers?
(Num. 11: 12)
These thoughts were echoed in the first century in the Land of Israel in
the writings of Raban Gamliel to his disciples Rabbi Elazar Hassama
and Rabbi Yochanan Ben Gudgeida, who refused to accept his offer of
a nomination to public office: ‘Do you imagine that I offer you ruler-
ship? It is servitude that I offer you!’ (The Babylonian Talmud, Horayoth,
1938: 10a–10b).
The perception of the ruler as a servant of the people helps us to
understand the reality in which the prophets dared to criticize the
monarchy and the different elite groups in the society harshly and
publicly. Their criticism of the kings of Israel and Judea throughout
the generations is based on the Torah. When the king does not heed
the prophet, he is transgressing the biblical prohibition: ‘The Lord thy
God will raise up to thee a prophet from the midst of thee, of thy breth-
ren, like me; to him you shall hearken’ (Deu. 17: 15). Maimonides even
considers this prohibition to one of the commandments in the Torah
(Book of Commandments, Commandment 172) and was ruled as
Halachah by Maimonides (Laws which are the Foundations of the Torah,
Ch. 7, Par. 7; Ch. 8, Par. 2). For this reason, one can find many prophets
who have publicly criticized injustices against the weak and deviations
from ethical norms, despite the heavy personal price that they paid
(Jeremiah 26; Amos 12: 10–17).
9. Conclusion
The same ideological foundations that form the basis of conscious
awareness about the right of the public to know were given voice in
the principal ethical standards set around the world. However, reality
dictates a different type of journalistic activity, which frequently results
in the public’s right to know being overshadowed by the public’s right
to be entertained.
In contrast to the two extremes – the liberal-democratic view that it
is the public’s right to know and the belief that it is the public’s obliga-
tion not to know – a new approach has emerged based on the analysis
of Jewish texts beginning with those from biblical times. From these
studies, we can conclude that according to Judaism there is informa-
tion that is supposed to come to the public’s attention because of the
public’s obligation to know about it. It is the public’s obligation to
know about those who need assistance and to help them, to condemn
the criminals and charlatans who live among us, and to investigate
candidates running for public office and those currently holding such
positions.
This worldview insists that rather than having the right to know, it
is, in these cases, the public’s duty to know; this is a powerful concept
that can well affect media content, as well as the way in which the
boundaries of journalistic ethics are defined.
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Suggested citation
Rashi, T. (2009), ‘The public’s right to know in liberal-democratic thought vs. The
people’s ‘obligation to know’ in Hebrew law’, Empedocles European Journal for
the Philosophy of Communication 1: 1, pp. 91–105, doi: 10.1386/ejpc.1.1.91/1
afl]dd][lbgmjfYdk ooo&afl]dd][lZggck&[ge
Abstract Keywords
There are many ways of interpreting the so-called ‘new technologies’. One of social imaginary
the most interesting is that which stems from defining them as a social new technologies
imaginary, and therefore, as collective beliefs, fears and hopes. It is common to fear
attribute to technologies all manner of threats that, founded or not, are real in monstrosity
the measure that the society makes decisions and acts in a way consistent with limits
this conviction.
The fears and anxieties of society lead to a consideration of the limits of the
human that technologies transgress. Among the figures with which one speaks
about these limits there is Frankenstein, the modern Prometheus, which threat-
ens modern fantasies with its deformity. There is, however, another man-made
creature that can serve to orient our reflection, the Golem.
In 1609, 400 years ago, Rabbi Loew died. He is credited with the creation
of a homunculus by combining of secret codes. The problem of the Golem was
its imperfect soul made manifest in its lack of speech. Its silent presence was
a source of great fear in the community that finally asked to get rid of the
creature.
These figures of monstrosity, Frankenstein and above all Golem, will help
us to make technologies understand from the fear that society projects onto
them, and this will lead us to the question concerning the imaginary fears of
the technological system.
Man makes man in his own image. This seems to be the echo or the pro-
totype of the act of creation, by which God is supposed to have made
man in His image. Can something similar occur in the kind less compli-
cated (and perhaps more understandable) case of the nonliving systems
that we call machines?
(Wiener 1964: 29)
For the idea that God’s supposed creation of man and the animals, the
begetting of living beings according to their king, and the possible repro-
duction of machines are all part of the same order of phenomena, is
emotionally disturbing […] If it is an offense against our self-pride to be
compared to an ape, we have now got pretty well over it; and it an even
greater offense to be compared to a machine.
(Wiener 1964: 57)
Herein lays the problem of Creation, putting man in the place of God,
as creator of a creative creature – an activity comparable only to magic,
the alchemy of transmutations, or even sorcery. More than forty years
later, Wiener’s essay is still even more accurate in its limits and pos-
sibilities. Nevertheless, in terms of social imaginary, the creative
machine – in man’s own image – is alive and kicking, haunting the
dreams and insomnia of society.
As long as automata can be made […] the study of their making and
their theory is a legitimate phase of human curiosity, and human intel-
ligence is stultified when man sets fixed bounds to the curiosity.
(Wiener 1964: 53).
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Bauman, Zigmunt ([1989] 1998), Modernidad y Holocausto, España: Sequitur.
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Beriain, Josetxo (2004), Modernidades en disputa, Barcelona: Anthropos.
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modernidad, Barcelona: Anthropos.
Borges, Jorge Luis (1984), ‘El Golem’, in El otro, el mismo, Obras Completas,
Buenos Aires: Círculo de Lectores-Emecé, , Tomo 2, pp. 261–263.
Cabrera, Daniel H. (2006a), Lo tecnológico y lo imaginario. Las nuevas tecnologías
como creencias y esperanzas colectivas, Buenos Aires: Biblos.
Cabrera, Daniel H. (2006b), ’Movimiento y conexión’, Política y Sociedad Revista
Cuatrimestral de Ciencias Sociales de la Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología
de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 43:2. pp. 91–105.
Cabrera, Daniel H. (2007a), ‘Reflexiones sobre el ‘sin límite’ tecnológico’, in
Revista Artefacto. Pensamientos sobre la técnica, Número 7, Artefacto, Buenos
Aires, pp. 28–32.
Cabrera, Daniel H. (2007b), ‘Lo imaginario o la centralidad subterránea’, in
Revista Anthropos. Huellas del conocimiento, 215: abril–junio, pp. 92–103.
Cabrera, Daniel H. (2008) (coord.), Fragmentos del caos. Filosofía, sujeto y sociedad
en Cornelius Castoriadis, Buenos Aires: Editorial Biblos.
Castoriadis, Cornelius ([1975] 1993), La institución imaginaria de la Sociedad, 2
Vols., Buenos Aires: Tusquets Editores.
Davis, Martín ([2000] 2002), La computadora universal. De Leibniz a Turing,
Barcelona: Debate.
Echeverría, Javier (2003), La revolución tecnocientífica, Madrid: Fondo de Cultura
Económica.
Ellul, Jacques ([1954] 1960), El siglo XX y la técnica. (Análisis de las conquistas y
peligros de la técnica de nuestro tiempo), Barcelona: Editorial Labor.
Flichy, Patrice ([2001] 2003), Lo imaginario de Internet, Madrid: Tecnos.
Gonzalez, Jorge A. (2007), Cibercultura e iniciación en la investigación, México:
Conaculta.
Suggested citation
Cabrera, D. H. (2009), ‘The Soul of the Golem’, Empedocles European Journal for the
Philosophy of Communication 1: 1, pp. 107–121, doi: 10.1386/ejpc.1.1.107/1
Contributor details
Daniel H. Cabrera has published numerous articles in scientific magazines, and
is the author of Lo tecnológico y lo imaginario. Las nuevas tecnologías como creen-
cias y esperanzas colectivas (Biblos, 2006). He has also coordinated Fragmentos
de caos. Filosofía, sujeto y sociedad en Cornelius Castoriadis (Biblos, 2008) and
Anthropos Magazine, number 225, ‘Walter Benjamin, la modernidad como
ensoñación colectiva’ (2009).
Contact: Periodismo – Facultad de Filosofía y Letras – Universidad de Zaragoza,
C/Pedro Cerbuna 12, Zaragoza – 50009, Spain.
E-mail: danhcab@unizar.es
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Abstract Keywords
In the first section of this paper I review the notion of ‘Radical Interpretation’, Davidson
introduced by Donald Davidson in order to account for linguistic meaning philosophy of
and propositional thought. It is then argued that this concept, as embedded in communication
Davidson’s whole philosophical system, gives rise to a view of communication interpretation
as a key explanatory concept in the social sciences. In the second section of the
paper it is shown how this view bears upon the question as to what the bounds
of linguistic behaviour are. As opposed to major psychological and sociological
perspectives on language, Davidson’s communication-centred position gives
rise to an inclusive, context-dependent answer to this question.
Donald Davidson was one of the main figures in twentieth century ana-
lytic philosophy. In a long series of articles, collected in several volumes
(Davidson 1980, 1984, 2001, 2004), Davidson develops a far-reaching
yet unified philosophical system, with implications for numerous phil-
osophical domains. Thus Davidson made significant contributions to
such diverse philosophical areas as the philosophy of rationality and
action, the metaphysics of events, and the analysis of metaphor.
However, at the heart of Davidson’s philosophy stands his view of lan-
guage – in particular, his anchoring both linguistic meaning and propo-
sitional thought in communicative interaction (Dresner 2006).
The concept that best expresses this aspect of Davidson’s views is
‘Radical Interpretation’, introduced in (Davidson 1984a) and discussed
in many places since its formulation. The notion is a descendent of
Quine’s ‘Radical Translation’ (Quine 1960) – a term coined to designate
a hypothetical situation in which a linguist approaches a completely
isolated linguistic community. In such a situation, all the linguist has to
go on in breaking into the foreigners’ language is their behaviour, and
thus the translation manual that the linguist ends up constructing cap-
tures only such behavioural data. A key tenet of Quine’s is that this
scenario exhausts the essentials not only of this arcane situation, but
rather of linguistic interaction in general. His view is that when under-
standing each other’s speech we correlate linguistic behaviour with our
experience of the world around us, and that there is nothing to linguis-
tic meaning beyond such correlation. Thus Quine is both an empiricist
References
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Suggested citation
Dresner, E. (2009), ‘Radical Interpretation, the primacy of communication, and
the bounds of language’, Empedocles European Journal for the Philosophy of
Communication 1: 1, pp. 123–134, doi: 10.1386/ejpc.1.1.123/1
Contributor details
Eli Dresner received his Ph.D. in logic and methodology of science from the
University of California at Berkeley (1998), and is currently a senior lecturer in
philosophy and communication at Tel Aviv University. His research interests
are in the philosophy of language, philosophy of communication, logic and the
philosophy of computing.
Contact: Department of Philosophy, P.O. Box 39040, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv
69978, Israel.
E-mail: dresner@post.tau.ac.il
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