Saleem Barkeel - Master Thesis

Electrical Mini-grid Systems as an Option for a
Reconstruction Phase in Syria

To Increase the Resilience of the Electrical System after
the War
Master Thesis
Submitted by
Saleem Barkeel
In partial fulfilment of the requirement for the

Degree of Master of Science in
Postgraduate Programme Renewable Energy
Department of Physics
Faculty of Mathematics & Science
Carl von Ossietzky University
Oldenburg /F.R. Germany
Academic Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Jrgen Parisi

Dipl Physiker / MA. Michael Golba
Submission Date: 27th November 2016

Abstract
The electrical sector in Syria will experience a difficult time in the future after
the ceasefire and during the transition phase to peace. The Syrian electrical system is
following the model of the Lebanon and Iraq where electricity comes from a
combination of a weak national grid and several unregulated expensive mini-grid
systems which depend on a traditional source of fuel. If the Syrian electrical system is
strictly following this development, the reconstruction efforts and the socioeconomic
development in the country will be very difficult after the war.
The goal of this paper is to open a discussion about the role of mini-grid systems (MGS)
in reconstruction efforts after the Syrian war to increase the resilience of the electrical
system. This is done through a historical case study reviewing the Lebanese and Iraqi
electrical systems and through a SWOT analysis of the MGS in a Syrian context.
The private unregulated diesel mini-grid market is spreading quickly in all Syrian
regions. This fact should not be ignored in any reconstruction campaign in the future to
avoid the negative experience which has been made in Iraq and Lebanon. Despite the
challenges of MGS, they could increase the resilience of the local electrical system in a
fragile country like Syria. To reach this goal, it is concluded after the analysis to move
from the unregulated mini-grid model to the regulated one which follows certain
standards and can be connected to the national grid in the future, alongside with the
use of hybrid mini-grid systems which use renewable energy.
Keywords
Resilience, Disaster, Electrical mini-grid systems, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, SWOT analysis.
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Declaration
I, Saleem Barkeel, state and declare that this thesis was prepared by me
and that no means or sources have been used, except those, which I cited
and listed in the References section. The thesis is in compliance with the
rules of good practice in scientific research of Carl von Ossietzky Universitt
Oldenburg.
Oldenburg, 27th November 2016 ________________________
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Saleem Barkeel November 2016
Acknowledgement
I would like to dedicate this work for the peace hope and for a better life in Syria. For all
the people around the world who are working for this goal. For Frans van der Lugt, for
Paulo DallOglio and for all the people who belived and worked in a better day.
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor in Oldenburg University Mr.
Michael Golba for his much-appreciated support during my thesis.
The idea of this thesis was born during my internship in GIZ Deutsche Gesellschaft fr
Internationale Zusammenarbeit so I would like to thank all my colleagues there who
supported me to build-up the topic.
I would like to thank Mr. Mohannad Al debs for his support in getting part of the data
which I used in my work. Further, I want to thank my friends Fernando Penaherrera and
Aaron Podmore for their feedback.
I was able to do my Master study in Germany because of DAAD Deutscher
Akademischer Austauschdienst support which I am thankful for. Finally, I would like to
express my love to my family and my friends in Syria for their heartfelt support during
the last two years.
Saleem Barkeel
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Contents
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
2 DEFINITIONS OF THE MAIN TERMS ......................................................................... 3
2.1 DISASTER .................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1.1 Disaster definition .......................................................................................................... 3
2.1.2 Disaster classification....................................................................................................... 4
2.1.3 Disaster management cycle ........................................................................................... 4
2.2 RESILIENCE ............................................................................................................................. 7
2.2.1 Resilience background.................................................................................................. 7
2.2.2 System definition ................................................................................................................ 7
2.2.3 Resilience definition .......................................................................................................... 9
2.2.4 Resilience characteristics............................................................................................. 11
2.3 RESILIENT ELECTRICAL ENERGY SYSTEM ............................................................................ 12
2.3.1 Electrical Energy System definition ..................................................................... 12
2.3.2 Resilient Electrical Energy System definition .................................................. 12
2.4 ELECTRICAL MINI-GRID SYSTEM ........................................................................................... 13
3 CASE STUDY OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS IN LEBANON AND IRAQ ....... 16
3.1 LEBANON .................................................................................................................................. 16
3.1.1 General background about the country ................................................................ 16
3.1.2 Lebanese Electrical System before the 1975 War ............................................. 17
3.1.3 Lebanese Electrical System after 1990 .................................................................. 17
3.1.4 Lebanese Electrical System in 2016 ........................................................................ 17
3.2 IRAQ .......................................................................................................................................... 22
3.2.1 General background about the country ................................................................ 22
3.2.2 Iraqi Electrical System before 1990 ........................................................................ 22
3.2.3 Iraqi Electrical System between 1990 and 2003 ............................................... 23
3.2.4 Iraqi Electrical System after the War in 2003 .................................................... 23
3.2.5 Iraqi Electrical System in 2016 ................................................................................. 24
4 THE SYRIAN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM ........................................................................ 27
4.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND ABOUT THE COUNTRY ................................................................... 27
4.1.1 Overview .............................................................................................................................. 27
4.1.2 Population density .......................................................................................................... 28
4.1.3 Oil and gas resources ..................................................................................................... 29
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4.2 SYRIAN ELECTRICAL SYSTEM IN 2011 ................................................................................. 29
4.3 THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM UNTIL 2014 AND THE CURRENT
SITUATION ............................................................................................................................................. 32
4.3.1 In 2014 ................................................................................................................................. 32
4.3.2 Current situations ........................................................................................................... 34
4.4 SWOT ANALYSIS FOR MINI-GRID SYSTEMS IN THE SYRIAN CONTEXT ............................. 37
4.4.1 Objective definition ......................................................................................................... 37
4.4.2 Guided points..................................................................................................................... 38
4.4.3 Data collection.................................................................................................................. 38
4.4.4 SWOT analysis .................................................................................................................. 39
4.4.5 Desired state ...................................................................................................................... 41
4.4.6 Strategy suggestion ........................................................................................................ 42
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................. 44
6 COMPLEMENTARY STUDIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ................................ 45
7 REFERENCES .................................................................................................................. 46
8 APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 50
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Disaster management cycle ................................................................................. 5
Figure 2: Open System Theory............................................................................................ 8
Figure 3: System operational level ..................................................................................... 8
Figure 4: Lebanon Map ..................................................................................................... 16
Figure 5 The gap between energy production and demand ............................................ 18
Figure 6 : Iraq Map ............................................................................................................ 22
Figure 7 : Iraq electricity demand and supply .................................................................. 24
Figure 8 : Syria map .......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 9 : Militant groups who are fighting in Syria ......................................................... 28
Figure 10 : Syria 2016 ....................................................................................................... 28
Figure 11 : Population density ..................................................................................... 28
Figure 12 : Oil and gas fields in Syria ................................................................................ 29
Figure 13 : Power plant distribution in Syria .................................................................... 31
Figure 14: The main five electrical regions in Syria .......................................................... 31
Figure 15: Syria 2014 ........................................................................................................ 32
Figure 16: Syria 2016 ........................................................................................................ 32
Figure 17: Load flow ......................................................................................................... 33
Figure 18: Syrian electrical grid 2011/2015 ...................................................................... 35
Figure 19: SWOT analysis steps ........................................................................................ 37
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List of Tables
Table 1 Ecological resilience breakdown ............................................................................ 9
Table 2 Mini-grid operator models ................................................................................... 14
Table 3 Tier system for electricity access ......................................................................... 15
Table 4 Generation power plants in Lebanon. ................................................................. 18
Table 5 : Statistics on monthly rent payments for diesel gensets capacity ..................... 21
Table 6 : Generation power plants in Iraq ........................................................................ 24
Table 7 Generation power plants in Syria ........................................................................ 30
Table 8: SWOT Analysis..................................................................................................... 39
Table 9 : Resilience definitions ......................................................................................... 50
Table 10: Resilience definitions ........................................................................................ 51
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List of abbreviations
ABBREVIATION MEANING
$ US dollar
AC Alternative current
Bbl. Oil barrel which is about 159 litres or 42 US gallons.
Bcm. Billion Cubic Metres
BP British Petroleum
EES Electrical energy system
GWh Gigawatt hours
h/day Hour per day
ISIS Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
kV Kilo Volt
kVA Kilo Volt Ampere
kWh Kilowatt hour
MGS Mini-grid systems
MVAR Mega volt amps (reactive)
MW Mega Watt
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats
UK United Kingdom
UN SE4ALL Sustainable Energy for All is a global initiative led by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations
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1 Introduction
The metaphorical map of the earth regarding fragile areas whether for political or
natural origin is full of red color. This is due to several reasons, such as the
mismanagement of limited resources, population increases, the side effects of climate
change and severe natural catastrophes. On average: about 220 natural catastrophes,
70 technological disasters and three new armed conflicts occurred each year in average
(Roland and Quarantelli 2005, p. 25). The bad situations seem to continue affecting
more people in the world than ever despite technological and civilization achievements.
The increase of the number of refugees around the world is a good indicator. It has
increased from 37,5 million in 2005 to 59,5 million in 2014 (UNHRC 2015). This means
that there is a gap occurring between the technological evolution and its effect on the
wellbeing of humanity. Therefore, building resilient systems to minimize this gap is
becoming an essential need, particular in fragile regions.
After a disaster hits a community, many governments, institutions and aid organizations
become involved with the recovery process, often with the stated goal of returning the
community to its pre-disaster situation. In recent years, this goal has evolved into an
approach, termed build back better, which is built on vulnerability research and the
theory that the post-disaster context offers a window of opportunity for disaster risk
reduction and improved re-development (Joakim 2011, p. 1). The question here is what
should be done to build back better and to increase the resilience of the system against
other catastrophes in the future.
Recently the term Resilience has been attractive to policy makers, practitioners and
academics. To apply Resilience correctly in academic research and strategic plans, a
clear understanding of its definition and characteristics is the first point to start with.
The energy system, especially the electrical system is one of the most important
components for a community to recover and for people to continue the activities of
their daily life. In a reconstruction phase a lot of money is paid to restore the system to
the situation in which it was before the disaster. But sometimes this strategy is not
possible and it is at risk to fail like what has happened in Iraq after the U.S invasion
(General Inspector 2009). To move forward and avoid the same mistakes in the future,
lessons from yesterdays failures and successes should be learned.
The Syrian civil war is an ongoing disaster, not only for Syrians who suffer the most but
also for the whole world. Syrian Centre for Policy Research Report (SCPR 2016, pp. 6-8)
described the situation in Syria by the end of 2015 as the following: 11,5% of the
population inside Syria were killed or injured due to the armed-conflict, the overall
poverty rate is 85,2%, about 45% of the population were dislodged internally or
externally. The accumulated total economic loss is estimated at $254,7 billion.
Sooner or later, the war will stop. After the battles debris is cleared up, the real level of
damage will be seen. In the Middle East region, there are not many optimistic examples
of a reconstruction after wars: Lebanon and Iraq as examples became weak states after
their wars despite all the reconstruction efforts.
In this paper the focus will be on the electrical system in Syria, especially on the growth
of the unregulated traditional mini-grid systems. The objective is to understand the
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current situation, and provide some conclusions in which direction the Syrian electrical
system can and should go.
The main objective from this paper is to open a discussion of whether mini-grid systems
could be one of the options to increase the resilience of the Syrian electrical energy
system after the war.
To do so, the results of literature review are presented in order to define the main
terms such as disaster, reconstruction, resilient energy system and electrical
mini-grid system. This is followed by a research for reports about mini-grid systems in
Lebanon and Iraq Syrias neighbor countries. The research is focussing on the start of
the market of mini-grid systems, the current situations, the main problems and the
challenges. After that an overview of the Syrian civil war is presented, especially about
the electrical system damage right now by using some reports and individual
eyewitnesses. A SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis of
the Unregulated traditional mini-grid systems- Lebanon and Iraq model- is presented
for the Syrian context. At the end, conclusions are presented based on the analysis .
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2 Definitions of the Main Terms
2.1 Disaster
The definition of the term disaster, classifications of disasters and the disaster
management cycle will be presented and explained in this section.
2.1.1 Disaster definition
Cambridge dictionary (2003) defines the term disaster as: an event which results in
great harm, damage, death, or serious difficulty.
From this definition: a car accident, the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 or the British
Petroleum (BP) oil spill in the Mexican gulf in 2010 can be considered as a disaster. The
next question which comes to mind is: what are the differences between these events.
Burnham, et al. (2007, p. 26) explained that the main difference comes from who is
using the term and at which level. For example, at a household level a disaster could
be a major illness, death or economic misfortune. At a community level, it could be a
flood, a fire, a collapse of buildings from an earthquake or a displacement through
conflicts.
Burnham et al continue their explanation by discussing the disaster measures, arguing
that there is no single measure of a disaster. The number of people killed or affected is
a very commonly used indicator, particularly in the media. However, it is not the only
indicator for the stakeholders. For example: The individual will consider the impact on
his or her family or livelihood. Disaster managers will assess the speed and success of
the disaster response. Economists will measure the economic loss of buildings and
production. Health workers will consider the resources required to contain the spread
of epidemics. Others may focus on the social damage or an environmental pollution. In
order to evaluate the results of a certain disaster, all affected stakeholders and their
losses -both on the short and the long term- must be considered (Burnham, et al.
2007, p.26).
The United Nations office for disaster risk reduction (UNISDR, 2009) offers the
following definition for the term disaster:
A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts,
which exceeds the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its
own resources.
This definition provides sufficient details to describe the term disaster. First, it is
referring to the events which are related to the community. Second, it adds an
important factor which is the scale of a disaster and the resources which a community
needs to cope with.
It is important to distinguish between the terms crisis and disaster. These two
terms are often mixed up and used synonymously by laypeople, politicians and the
media (Roland and Quarantelli 2005, p. 160). The term crisis is defined by Cambridge
dictionary (2003) as: A situation that has reached an extremely difficult or dangerous
point, a time of disagreement, uncertainty or suffering. It is clear from the definition
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that the term crisis has a wider meaning than a disaster. Roland and Quarantelli (2005,
pp. 160-171) say that for a certain crisis to be labelled in terms of disaster, it should
affect the life-sustaining functions of a system. This result depends on the institutional
crisis management capacity which is available to deal with abnormal situations.
Moreover, Winkworth (2007, p. 16) say that in order to describe an event as an
international disaster, the affected community has to show a need for external
support to cope with the effects of the event.
As a conclusion, a strong event called a crisis can become a disaster if it goes out
of control. This could happen when the available resources are not sufficient to cope
with the bad effects of the crisis.
2.1.2 Disaster classification
For a long time, most disasters were classified as acts of God with only some of them
considered as the acts of man. Nowadays, disaster classification has changed because
there is more understanding of the causes behind them. Disasters are classified mainly
depending on their origin into two main categories: natural or human-made disaster.
The list of natural disasters includes weather phenomena such as tropical storms,
extreme heat or extreme cold, winds, floods, earthquakes, landslides and volcanic
eruptions. Disasters caused by humans include transportation accidents, industrial
accidents, release of hazardous materials, the collapse of buildings and armed conflicts
- which are the worst disaster that can befall populations (Burnham, et al. 2007, pp.
27-28).
Burnham (2007) argue that although humans can not affect the weather events, they
have been increasingly able to reduce the impact of natural disasters on society by the
preparedness for such extreme events. For example, building codes, where enforced,
can protect buildings during an earthquake. Early warning systems can alert coastal
populations of an approaching tsunami and can assist citizens to evacuate the
dangerous areas. Social programs can reduce the vulnerability to uncontrolled
disasters.
Day by day the role of human preparedness is showing an essential role for crisis
mitigation. For instance, Kovacs (2010, pp. 3-7) mentions the role of the building codes
which had a direct effect on the death toll in Chile and Haiti during 2010 earthquake.
On 12 January 2010, a 7,0-magnitude earthquake hit Haiti causing more than 200.000
losses of life. After less than 1.5 months, an 8,8-magnitude earthquake shook Chile
causing 500 deaths. Comparing these two numbers shows that Haiti was not prepared
for a major earthquake and humans take a big responsibility for the impact of these
natural disasters.
2.1.3 Disaster management cycle
Khan and Vasilescu (2008, p. 46) state that Disaster Management cycle includes sum
total of all activities, programs and measures which can be taken up before, during
and after a disaster with the purpose to avoid a disaster, reduce its impact or recover
from its losses. There are five main phases (cf. Figure 1, Wordpress 2011) of the
disaster management cycle which are:
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1. Warning
2. Relief
3. Reconstruction
4. Mitigation
5. Preparedness
Figure 1: Disaster management cycle
Source: Wordpress (2011)
Warning phase
The disaster may occur with or without a warning phase. Certain types of disasters can
be predicted, making a warning phase possible. This phase helps in minimizing the
impact of a disaster. Most disasters can be predicted. Tropical storms are in this
category, where weather satellites follow and track a storms build-up. Droughts and
the potential for famines could be predicted through the timely collection and analysis
of data. Another example is a tsunami. However, there are some disasters which can
still not be predicted such as earthquake (Burnham, et al. 2007, p. 28).
Relief phase
The aim of the emergency response in the relief phase is to provide immediate
assistance to maintain life, improve health and support the moral of the affected
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population. In other words, the focus is on meeting the basic needs of the people until
more permanent and sustainable solutions can be implemented.
Such assistance may range from providing specific but limited aid, such as assisting
refugees with transport, temporary shelters and food, to establishing semi-permanent
settlement in camps and other locations. It also may involve initial repairs to the
damaged critical infrastructure.
Most countries have their own local disaster response organizations which provide
initial relief in emergencies. International humanitarian organizations participate
strongly in this phase but after some time have passed (Burnham, et al. 2007, p. 28).
The duration of this phase is short, in most cases lasting from days to weeks. In some
cases, such as armed conflicts, this period lasts for a longer time: more than months
and possibly some years.
Reconstruction phase
Reconstruction or recovery phase starts as the emergency is brought under control.
During this phase, the affected population is capable of undertaking a growing number
of activities aimed at restoring their lives and infrastructure that supports them. There
is no distinct point at which immediate relief changes into recovery and then into a
long-term sustainable development. Usually these processes overlap with each other
(GDRC, 2015).
The duration of this phase changes depending on the available resources that could be
used. In developed countries, the effects of a disaster may be repaired in a short period
of time, perhaps a couple of months, though the psychological damage among survivors
may last for years. In contrast, in developing countries the reconstruction activities may
take years. Consensus on reconstruction policy may take time to reach, records of
property ownership may be lost and official permission delayed. At the household level
families, may take time to decide whether to return to disaster affected areas or to
rebuild their lives and their houses elsewhere (Burnham, et al. 2007, p. 29).
There will be many opportunities during the recovery period to enhance prevention and
increase preparedness thus reducing vulnerability for the next disaster. Recovery
activities continue until all system return to normal function or better.
Mitigation
Mitigation activities aim to reduce the probability of disasters occurring, or reduce the
effects of unavoidable disasters. Mitigation activities overlap with long term
development programs and share similar goals. Most mitigation activities are also an
integral part of the reconstruction phase such as building codes, zoning and land use
management, vulnerability analyses, safety codes, preventative health care and public
education.
Mitigation efforts may overlap with plans to improve preparedness for the next
disaster. The preparedness for the next disaster usually requires a strong government
with a strong public support to enforce regulations such as building codes and zones.
The mitigation phase, and indeed the whole disaster management cycle, includes the
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shaping of public policies and plans that either modify the causes of disasters or
mitigate their effects on people, property, and infrastructures (GDRC, 2015).
Preparedness
Preparedness is about response planning after a disaster. Preparedness plans include:
emergency training exercises, warning systems, emergency communications systems,
evacuation plans and training, resource inventories, emergency personnel and contact
lists, public information and education (GDRC, 2015).
The disaster management cycle phases are the ideal actions which need to be done
after a disaster. In reality, some of these phases dont happen as they should; especially
in fragile states where there are minimal resources to undertake reconstruction or to
apply effective mitigation strategies. Armed conflicts are the best example of this case
where the weak reconstruction and mitigation efforts are easily overwhelmed by
subsequent disasters. Moreover, long conflicts create populations for whom abuse and
displacement are part of their normal existence.
2.2 Resilience
2.2.1 Resilience background
The word resilience is derived from the Latin verb resalire which means to spring
back or rebound. It was introduced to English in the early 17th century. The first use of
the word in a scholarly work was to describe the property of materials. In 1818
Tredgold introduced the term to describe the property of timber and why some types
of wood were able to accommodate sudden and severe loads without breaking. In the
mid-19th century, the concept was used by Robert Mallet as a mean to measure and
compare the strength of materials used in the construction of the Royal Navys
warships. After that Mansfield Merriman in 1885 defined resilience as a measure of a
material to withstand impact, for if a shock or sudden blow be produced by a falling
body McAslan (2010, p. 2).
As it was mentioned, resilience was used to describe charachteristics of a material.
Nowadays, it has been used in different domains of science such as: ecosystems,
individuals, organizations, society and even in national security. For each field, scientists
try to explain the term in different ways depending on their needs.
To compare and contrast definitions of resilience, we need a tool but before that some
basic knowledge about the generic concept of system orientation should be made
clear such as system boundaries, operational level and the system structure.
2.2.2 System definition
The first issue about understanding any system is to identify its boundaries. Without
identifying the system boundaries, it is not possible to understand how a system is
working. The goal of this process is to determine what is inside a certain system and
what is outside, such as: physical materials, stakeholders and processes. Sometimes the
boundaries are clear and they can be readily recognized. This is not always the case, for
example an energy system has no clear boundaries because it has many components
and stakeholders.
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The second issue is about the system structure. Each open system has an input and an
outcome (cf. Figure 2, System Theory 2016). Between the input and the outcome, many
processes are done inside the system.
Figure 2: Open System Theory
Source: System Theory (2016)
The input can be understood as physical materials, the atmosphere, or the situations
where the system is working. The outcome represents the expected results of the
system. The processes are the systems abilities and feedback loops which are inside its
boundaries. In order to get the expected outcome, a desirable input is needed. In
reality, this nice relation does not exist all the time. There are always changes in the
input and the conditions where a system is working. These changes lead to different
outcomes than the expected ones.
The third issue is about the systems operational level. Operational level is measured
against a certain standard. Under normal situations, a system has to work 100% which
can be recognized as 100% of the expected outcome. If the system is not working, the
operational level is 0% (cf. Figure 3, System operational level)
Figure 3: System operational level
Source: Dynamic system control
Each system can stand a limited amount of variations and still keep working 100%. If the
variations are more than the critical level, the system operation will be disturbed for a
temporary period time until it reaches a new operational level. Figure (3) shows three
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possible new operational levels. The first one is 0% and the system is not working. The
second is between 0 and 100%. In the third case, the system has returned back to the
initial operation level before the disturbance and works 100%.
To compare and contrast definitions of resilience, a tool depending on the system
structure will be used. In this tool, each definition will be divided into: inputs, processes
or abilities, and outcomes. It is important to keep in mind, how each of these aspects
are defined.
2.2.3 Resilience definition
As it was mentioned before, there are different definitions of resilience in different
domains of life. Although they look different, they share the same main characteristics.
In order to reach to a general definition of resilience, the example of ecological
resilience will be studied in more details.
During the last two decades, ecological resilience has been studied by different people
and institutes. Their motivation was fueled by the threats of climate change on the
ecological system.
McAslan (2010, pp. 2-4) in table (8) and CARRI (2013, pp. 2-4) in table (9) in the
appendix present many definitions of ecological resilience. To compare between
them, the suggested tool below will be used (cf. Table 1, Ecological resilience
breakdown).
Table 1 Ecological resilience breakdown

Author Input Process/Ability Outcome
1 Holling, 1973 Changes Absorb change Still exist
2 Pimm, 1984 The speed of a system Return to the system original
shape.
3 Holling et al., Disturbance and The buffer or ability to Prevent a system from changing its
1995 perturbation. absorb perturbation. structure by changing the variables
and processes that control its
behavior.
4 Alwang et al., Change or Resist downward pressures. Prevent a qualitative change in a
2001 a major Recover from a shock. system and stop its rapid
disturbance. Absorb and use and even transformation into another
benefit from change. condition.
5 Alkers et al., The disturbance The potential of a system to Remain in a particular

2002 remain in a particular configuration and maintain the
configuration. The ability to systems feedbacks and functions.
reorganize following the
disturbance driven change.
6 Cardona, 2003 Damaged The capacity to absorb A recovered damaged system.

ecosystem or negative impact and
community. recover.
9
7 Resilience Disturbance. The capacity of an Doesnt collapse into a qualitatively
Alliance, 2005 Shocks ecosystem to tolerate different state that is controlled by
disturbance, withstand a different set of processes.
shocks and rebuild itself
when necessary.
8 Stockholm Perturbations The capacity to withstand Prevent loss of valuable ecosystem
Resilience such as climate perturbations, rebuild and services. Doesnt lead to rapid
Centre, 2009 or economic renew itself. transitions or shifts into
shocks qualitatively different situations
and configurations, evident in, for
instance people, ecosystems,
knowledge systems, or whole
cultures.
9 Abel, 2001 Future Persist The same system.
disturbances
10 Klein, 2003 Stress, Recover, return, absorb Original state
disturbance distortions and self-
organization.
11 Walker, 2004 Disturbance, Absorb, reorganize and The same function, structure,
undergoing retain. identity and feed backs of the
change system.
12 Longstaff, Surprise Adapt and have adverse Continue its existence
2005 resources
Source: Own realization
From the previous chart, it can be observed that most definitions come to an
agreement that the input is a change, but without further explanations. For instance,
the input in Holling (1973), Pimm (1984), Klein (2003) and Stockholm center is Change,
disturbance or perturbation. In Holling (1995) and Resilience Alliance the input is
described more as a major disturbance or a shock. Carodona (2003) introduces an
interesting idea: For him the input is a damaged system. The weakness of the
mentioned inputs is that, they need more information regarding the type, the speed
and the magnitude of a change. The details of these information are important because
all systems on the earth have resilience to a certain level of change as Hollnagel (2015,
p. 1) argued.
The second point on the other side of the equation is about the outcome. A desirable
result of a resilient system for Holling (1973), Longstaff (2005) and Resilience Alliance is
to still exist and dont collapse. Pimm (1984) and Klein (2003) see the outcome as to
return to the original system. Holling (1973), Alwang et al (2001) and Alkers et al
(2002) argue that the resilient system should not have strong qualitative changes
because of the disturbance.
The Stockholm Resilience center (2009) explains the outcome of a resilient system more
precisely by saying a system should not lose the valuable service. For many systems, it
is not so difficult to define the valuable service so it could be a good point to start the
discussion about the accepted outcome and accepted changes.
The internal abilities of a system which improve its resilience are divided into two
categories. The first one is during the disturbance when some instant actions are taken
such as absorbing, resisting, retaining, tolerating and withstanding. The second group
can be done after the change is taking place such as: recovering, reorganizing,
rebuilding, renewing, using and benefiting.
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From the previous discussion, the following definition is developed Resilience is the
group of abilities that a system has for dealing with changed inputs in order to get a
desirable accepted outcome.
This definition leads to many questions, such as: What is a changed input? What are
these abilities which a system has and that make a system more resilient? And what is a
desirable accepted outcome? Is it 100%, at the same operational level before the
change or is it something between 0% and 100%?
To answer these questions, it should be understood that resilience is a dynamic term
which could have different details in its meaning depending on each single case.
Because of that, each stakeholder who speaks about a resilient performance of any
system has to define his targeted system boundaries and then answer the pervious
questions.
2.2.4 Resilience characteristics
Resilience characteristics were summarized in the discussed definitions and they could
be divided into three categories. The first one is related to the input. All resilience
definitions refer to changes and threats which are abnormal in their scale, form and
timing. These changes could be sudden such as earthquakes or could develop gradually
like climate change effects.
The second characteristic is about the outcome. A positive or accepted outcome is the
anticipated result from a system which has a resilience performance. However,
accepted outcome is still a broad term because it ranges from desire and
commitment to survive as McAslan (2010, pp. 9-10) argues and return to the original
state before the change.
The third category refers to the abilities which a system has to improve its resilience
performance. McAslan and Hollnagel tried to name these abilities in different ways.
Starting with McAslan (2010, pp. 9-10), resilience performance characteristics are:
1- Being prepared.
2- Adaptability.
3- Gaining experience.
4- Collective and coordinated response- interdependency.
While Hollnagel (2015) named four different primary abilities which are:
1- The ability to respond. Knowing what to do and having the ability to take
actions.
2- The ability to monitor. Continuing to watch certain indicators inside the system
or outside in order to know when to respond.
3- The ability to learn from good and bad experiences.
4- The ability to anticipate risks or opportunities in the future.
Hollnagels four primary abilities are sufficient if they are compared with McAslans
characteristics. For instance, being prepared could easily be included in the ability to
respond. Adaptability is a combination of abilities to learn, monitor and respond as
Hollnagel discussed. Gaining experience is done by learning. Collective and
coordinated response is considered as an ability to communicate in Hollnagel (2015,
11
p.5). Hollnagel doesnt consider communication as a primary ability. It could be
considered as a secondary ability which connects all the other abilities.
2.3 Resilient Electrical Energy System
2.3.1 Electrical Energy System definition

Clarification of system boundaries is very important for the definition of resilience
performance. Therefore, a clear definition of an electrical energy system (EES) is
needed in order to say what is inside the system and what is outside.
Cambridge dictionary (2016) defines the energy system as a group of things that are
used together to produce energy . Where in Wikipedia (2016) an electrical power
system is a network of electrical components used to supply, transfer and use electric
power. The first definition is very general and simple so it cant serve much, while the
second one considers just the hardware components of the electrical system.
United Kingdom Energy Research Center (UKERC 2011, p. 5) uses an interesting
definition to define the energy system in the United Kingdom (UK). It says that the
energy system in the UK is The set of technologies, physical infrastructure, institutions,
policies and practices located in and associated with the UK which enables energy
service to be delivered to UK consumers
This definition is inclusive. It includes the system hardware alongside the software
components. The system hardware is identified as generation technologies,
transmission, distribution and end use devices. The software is identified in this context
as regulations (technical, economic and environmental), institutions and operating
practices.
This definition is built on the concept of delivering energy services to the customer. This
idea provides a broad way of thinking - more than the traditional security of supply
methodology. That means the system resilience could be increased by increasing the
resilience performance of the consumer who is located at the end of the energy supply
chain. For example, if a house has good insulation, it will be more resilient towards the
loss of a heating service due to a power supply shortage.
2.3.2 Resilient Electrical Energy System definition
The energy system is not limited to technical infrastructure but it is also related to
financial mechanisms, regulations and the international energy market.
The first question which comes to mind is: Does the term resilient electrical energy
system already exist? The answer is yes. It has recently been studied. However, there
are not very clear definitions (2016). Some articles discuss the topic on a general level
focusing on international energy market disturbances (e.g. Lynette 2012). Others define
the term regarding technical problems.
UKERC (2011, p. 5) proposed the following working definition:
Resilience is the capacity of an energy system to tolerate disturbance and to continue
to deliver affordable energy services to consumers. A resilient energy system can
12
speedily recover from shocks and can provide alternative means of satisfying energy
service needs in the event of changed external circumstances.
The input is similar to the other resilience definitions in ecology. It is a disturbance and
a shock.
The expected and accepted outcome is divided into two parts. The first is energy supply
continuity which was studied a lot in energy security throughout the last decades. The
second is the affordability of energy services. This point has not been as highly debated
as the first one. But because of the shocks and instability in the global energy market at
present, affordable energy services have become more and more of an important issue.
Regarding this definition, the resilient energy system should be able to recover quickly
from a shock and it must have backups or alternative means to satisfy energy service
needs.
This definition discusses two operations level (0 or 100%) without mentioning any
priorities for critical loads in the case that the system can not work 100%. Another
unclear point was the idea of satisfying energy service. Which level of energy will
satisfy the consumers and for how many hours per day.
2.4 Electrical Mini-grid System

There are three main ways to provide electricity (GIZ 2014. p. 12) which are:
From the national grid; or
From a mini-grid system; or
By using stand-alone system.
Consumers usually get electricity from one of these sources but in some cases the
consumers depend on a mixture of these options. For instance, in critical loads such as
hospitals, or in areas where the electricity from the national grid is not sufficient and
reliable.
In this part, the definition of the mini-grid system will be presented in addition to its
classifications, pros and cons.
Mini-grids by definition are involving small scale electricity generation (from 10kW to
10 MW) which supply relatively concentrated settlements with electricity. The
distribution of electricity to a limited number of consumers is done via a distribution
grid that can operate in isolation from the national electricity grid (GIZ 2014. p. 12).
Most of the mini-grids worldwide depend on diesel as a fuel for electricity generation.
However, using renewable energy (wind, solar, hydro and biomass) in mini-grids as a
hybrid system reduces the cost (GIZ 2014), increases energy security and reduces
environmental pollution. Because of these reasons, there is a trend to combine more
renewable energy and storage unites with the diesel generators into mini-grid systems.
Mini-grid systems (MGS) can be classified into four main models based on the
organizational structure, implementation and operation. These four mini-grid operator
models are: the utility, private sector, community and hybrid models. They differ in
terms of ownership of the power generation devices and distributions assets, and of
13
operation and maintenance of the system. Table (2) includes more information about
each model and its pros and cons.
Table 2 Mini-grid operator models
Source: GIZ (2014, p. 36)
14
There is no single best practice operator model for mini-grids. The success of each
model depends on its unique context: the local socio-economic situation, the policy and
regulatory environment and the natural environment (e.g. geography, energy resources
and a climate or weather conditions) (Ibid., p. 32).
The main risk for mini-grid operators is when the national grid arrives. The operator is
afraid to lose his money and his job. However, the arrival of the utility grid could be an
opportunity for the mini-grid operator. He may connect his system with the national
grid and keep selling electricity. This positive transition between the mini-grid and the
utility grid needs a positive policy which ensures financial security for the mini-grid
operator. On the other hand, this policy should help and encourage the mini-grid
operators to meet the standards of the national grid in order to enable his mini-grid to
be connected to the grid such as: voltage, frequency, and safety.
The access to electricity is not the same for all customers. It differs depending on the
available peak (W), duration per day, electricity quality, and affordability. The UN
SE4ALL established a tier system (cf. Table 3, Tier system for electricity access) to
measure and to evaluate the electricity access. This tier system could be used as a
global comparison system.
Table 3 Tier system for electricity access
Source: GIZ (2014, p. 24)
15
3 Case Study of the Electrical Systems in Lebanon and Iraq
In this chapter, a general background about Lebanon and Iraq will first be presented.
Then the information about the electrical system before a certain war, after it, and now
will be shown alongside the mini-grid portfolio in both countries. At the end, the
similarities and the current challenges of the electrical system in Lebanon and Iraq will
be discussed.
3.1 Lebanon
Figure 4: Lebanon Map
3.1.1 General background about the country
Lebanon is a small country in the Middle East. Its area
is 10.452km2 with a population of almost 6,1 million -
July 2015 estimation (CIA 2016). The country has
witnessed many conflicts. The most famous one was
the 1975-1990 Civil War which caused extensive
destruction to the country. The war settled down
after the Al Taif agreement in 1990 which reinstated
the sectarian logic in the country. Sectarian logic
means that the power and the government
institutions are divided between different religious
traditional groups who already have their own
political parties, armed militias and social institutions
such as: schools, clinics and charity organizations
(Nora Stel 2012, pp. 3-5)
The post-war era was dominated by the Syrian
occupation until 2005. After that, Lebanese politics
has been dominated by a polarized competition
between two broad coalitions (March 14 and March 8) Source: Chammas (2013)
which have frozen the development of almost all
sectors in the government. This situation is still prevailing up today. In 2006, Lebanon
experienced a 34 day war between Hezbollah and Israel. This war caused a great
damage to the main infrastructure of Lebanon. (Nora Stel 2012, p. 6)
Lebanon is considered a fragile state in the fragile states index 2015 under the category
of High Warning occupying the 138th position out of 178 worldwide (Messener 2015,
p. 7). The meaning of a fragile state can be understood through the four core
characteristics of fragility (Naud, et al., 2012 cited in Nora Stel 2012, p. 6) which are: i)
Legacies of violent conflict and risk of recurrent conflict; ii) Politicization of private life
(civil society and private sector); iii) Limited state capacity and institutional multiplicity;
and iv) Vulnerability to external shocks and donor dependency. From the review of
Lebanons current situation, it could be seen that Lebanon matches most if not all of
these characteristics.
Lebanon is not a producer of oil or natural gas. However, recently substantial reserves
of natural gas and oil were discovered off the Lebanon coast in the Mediterranean Sea.
Up to now it is not exploited due to the political situation in the country.
16
3.1.2 Lebanese Electrical System before the 1975 War
The 1975 Lebanese civil war still has extensive effects from which Lebanon continues to
suffer. Before the civil war, Lebanons population was almost 2,8 million (Lebanon
demographics 2010(. The Lebanese electricity sector was built around Electricit du
Liban (EDL), a state-owned monopoly since the nationalization of the main private
electricity company in 1954. EDL is responsible for electricity production, transmission,
and distribution. Before 1975 the electricity network was extended to reach all parts of
Lebanon during the era of President Fouad Chehab (1958-1964). The citizens were
paying unified tariff schemes across the country as a guarantee for equal access to
electricity for all people (Nora Stel 2012, p. 13). However, the electrical energy
production barely balanced the consumption at that time.
During the war, from 1975 to 1992, all expansion and restructuring plans of the
electrical facilities were halted and only the pre-war ones were maintained (Naser
2000, p. 628)
3.1.3 Lebanese Electrical System after 1990
After the civil war, large parts of the Lebanese infrastructure including the power
system were destroyed. Besides that, the demand increased and exceeded the
production capacity. Consequently, EDL implemented a rationing policy which has been
started during the war era. Black outs reached approximately 12h a day in 1993 (Naser
2000, p. 628). The reconstruction effort was organized by the National Emergency
Reconstruction Program (NERP) which has rehabilitated the utilities of power
generation, transmission and distribution. Moreover, new facilities like two combined-
cycle power plants with a total capacity of 900 MW and two gas turbines of 140 MW
have been installed. Thus, the installed capacity has increased from 1.087 MW in 1994
to 2.309 MW in 1998. Although the peak demand is estimated to be 1.570 MW,
customers suffered from shortages and outfalls due to a lack of transmission capacity
(Georgia and Mounir 2000, p. 40).
3.1.4 Lebanese Electrical System in 2016
In Lebanon, the electrical system could be divided into two parts: the national grid
where electricity is provided 14-20 h/day, and the private mini-grid generators which
compensate the deficit. Most consumers have connections to both systems and pay
two different tariffs.
3.1.4.1 National grid

The electrical sector in Lebanon is still a state-owned monopoly. The Lebanese national
electrical system data from 2009 are presented by the Ministry of Energy and Water
(Bassil 2010, pp. 3-4). These data have not changed significantly during the last seven
years due to the political problem in Lebanon.
Electrical energy production from the national grid is presented in table (4) as the
following:
17
Table 4 Generation power plants in Lebanon.
Generation Installed Actual Percentage

Type Capacity Capacity
Hydraulic 274 MW 190 MW 4,50%
power plants
Thermal power 2.038 MW 1.685 MW 88%
plants
Total 2.312 MW 1.875 MW 92,50%
Source: Bassil (2010, p. 3)
Lebanon produces almost 92,5% of its energy locally. The remaining 7,5% is purchased
from Syria (589 GWh) and Egypt (527 GWh). Although Lebanon is not an oil producing
country, almost 88% of the electricity generation comes from oil products. Hydraulic
power plants cover 4,5% of the total production today while in 1974, this percentage
was 41,5% (Ibrahim et al. 2013, p. 311). There are many reasons for this degradation of
the hydraulic share of energy production such as: the increase in demand, degradation
of water resources and the aging of the hydraulic power plant.
There is a difference between the installed and the actual generation capacity in
Lebanon. This issue will be seen also in Iraq. There are many reasons behind that such
as: aging factor, lack of maintenance, lack of fuel and the weakness of the transmission
grid.
The Lebanese Ministry of Electricity reported the total energy demand in 2009 as
15.000 GWh (7% increase from 2008) whereas the total production and purchases was
11.522 GWh which resulted in energy not supplied of 3.478 GWh (23%). The averaged
energy supply from the national grid is almost 18 hours per day. 21,2 hours for the
greater Beirut area and 15,8 hours for the other regions (Bassil 2010, pp. 3-4).
In 2011, EDL (cf. Figure 5, 2012) presented an estimation of the gap between energy
production and demand.
Figure 5 The gap between energy production and demand
Source: Fardoun et al. (2012, p. 315)
This estimation was before the Syrian conflict and the refugees who escaped from the
war. Almost 1,5 million Syrian refugees are in Lebanon in 2015 (3RP 2016, p. 9). That is
18
equivalent of more than 25% of the Lebanese population. This fact has increased the
electricity demand and has worsened the situation.
Problems and challenges to the national grid

The electricity sector is heavily subsidized and costs the country a lot of money each
year. The annual deficit on the public budget is almost $1,5 billion where 62% - 75%
comes from the fuel bill. Consider that 88% of the electricity comes from fuel which is
imported. Moreover, the failure of the national electrical sector causes not less than
$2,5 billion per year which is divided between $1,3 billion for private generation and
$1,2 billion for direct consumer losses (Bassil 2010, p. 4). The sum of the estimated
losses due to the electrical sector in general is almost $4 billion (30.7% of the GDP)
which is a lot for a small country like Lebanon where the public budget was almost $13
billion in 2009 (Alwasat 2010).
The total losses in the electrical system are about 40% which are divided to: 15%
technical losses; 20% non-technical losses due to electricity theft and 5% uncollected
bills in the regions where the government is un-able to collect money because of
political and security issues.
There are weak allocated financial resources to implement new power plants and
upgrade the transmission system in general. Moreover, there is high corruption in
spending public money.
Electricity demand is much higher than production. Almost 40% of the demand is not
met. The indices say that the demand will continue to increase between 5-7% each
year.
The generation power plant and the transmission grid are not sufficient and old. There
are only few and not sufficient number of professional staff to run and maintain the
electrical system because of the corruption process to hire qualified personnel for the
Ministery of Electricity. The Ministry of Electricity mentioned that the tariff structure
has deficiencies and it has low average. Lebanon suffers from convoluted legal and
organizational frameworks (Bassil 2010, p. 4)
3.1.4.2 Private mini-grid generators

History
During the civil war, Lebanese people experienced many power shortages due to the
destruction of the electrical infrastructure. At that time, they used car batteries to
overcome the blackout periods. These batteries were charged when there was
electricity to be used later. As power shortages started to last longer and longer, people
shifted to private electrical generators - either small units using gasoline or larger units
using fuel oil (diesel) - to maintain a minimum supply of electricity in homes, schools,
and hospitals. These generators were only used on an individual level and were not for
commercial purpose. However, by the time these generators became a buisness and by
the end of the war, diesel generators had spread across the country despite their high
costs. Consecuently, a secondary electricity network had developed in parallel to the
Electricite du Liban national grid. This arrangement at that time allowed customers to
have the flexibility of getting electricity supply from the national grid during hours of
19
supply while relying on their private generators during hours of shortages (El Khoury
2012).
As the power shortage continued after the civil war as mentioned before, the market
for private generators has expanded. The situation considered temporary and
abnormal, became part of everyday life, mainly because EDLs plan to reconstruct the
power sector between 1990 and 2000 did not reach its goal completely. The World
Bank Group (2009, pp. 9-12) report mentioned that more than half of the generator
users began using them since 2000. The report estimates that one third of all electricity
generated in Lebanon, comes from private generators. Almost 58% of all households
were using some form of self-generation in 2008. The majority of these households
(70%) have a subscription with a private generator business, although it is not legally
recognized. The remaining households owned their own generators (22%), use a
generator owned by the building (7%) or use a community-run generator (1%) (World
Bank Group 2009, pp. 9-12)
The cost
Cost is the major challenge for consumers alongside with a good supply of energy.
Households who want electricity from the private generators are charged a fixed
monthly fee based on a maximum electrical current (ampere) level in contrast to EDL
which charge customers on the kWh usage (the normal way of purchasing electricity).
The monthly fees varied depending on the ampere level at which customers subscribe
and on the fuel used by the private generator. The vast majority of households
subscribe at 5 amperes, which enables them to keep the lights, television and
refrigerator on. If a consumer does not use electricity during the blackout, the private
generator gains by saving fuel costs (World Bank Group 2009, p. 10).
Electricity from the private generators is more expensive than the electricity from EDL.
It is twic the price although the electricity capacity from the private subscription is
limited- less than half as many amperes on average and it is not enough to cover all the
load of the households. Moreover, the private generators provide just half the number
of hours per day on average compared with EDL (World Bank Group 2009, p. 10). For
instance, the average price of electricity delivered by private generators in 2009 was
0,4643 $/kWh, knowing that the average electricity tariff by EDL was 0,0958 $/kWh
which is below the cost of production (Joseph A.A 2014, p. 4).
Table 5 shows statistics of the monthly payment for the private generators in Lebanon:
20
Table 5 : Statistics on monthly rent payments for diesel gensets capacity
Source: UNDP- CEDRO (2015, p. 20)
The table presents different fees for the private subscriptions which depend on the
region and owner of the generator. These large differences in monthly fees reflect
inequality of the energy access cost. Taking into consideration that the consumer does
not have the choice to choose between the private providers because there is just one
private generator in each region, the only choice the consumer has is to have electricity
during the blackout time if it is affordable.
Problems and challenges of the private mini-grid generators

The consumers pay very high tariffs which impede their ability to start new businesses.
The tariffs also differ from one private generator to another. On average Lebanese pay
$1,3 billion for private generation each year (Bassil 2010, p. 4).
There are no strong regulations or a willingness from the government to control the
private mini-grids. This fact allows the generators to work without standards, especially
for frequency and safety. There are big difficulties to integrate these private generators
into future plans for the national energy system because they do not use standards and
they are not prepared to be connected with the national grid.
Private mini-grid generators which are located between houses cause a lot of pollution
and noise to the surrounding environment. Add to that the discomfort and
psychological problems in getting the fuel and constant concern about electricity supply
especially if the household has his own generator and if the family has members with
health complications.
21
3.2 Iraq
3.2.1 General background about the country Figure 6 : Iraq Map

Iraq is a country in the Middle East. Its area is
437.367 km2 with a population of almost 37
million, July 2015 estimation (CIA 2016). Iraq
has experienced three major wars, civil unrest,
and economic sanctions during the last four
decades. The first war is the Iran-Iraq War
from 1980 to 1988. It caused 1 million death
toll and more than $400 billion losses for the
economy (Iran-Iraq War 2016). The second is
called the First Gulf War. It was from August
1990 until January 1991. It was between Iraq
and a coalition forces from 34 nations led by
the United States in response to Iraqs invasion
of Kuwait (First Gulf War 2016).
In August 1990, after Iraqs invasion of Kuwait,
the UN Security Council applied economic
sanctions on Iraq which lasted until 2003. The
effect of Iraqs government policies and Source: CIA (2016)
sanctions against the regime led to
catastrophic results in all sectors across the country (Iraq sanctions 2016).
The third war is the Invasion of Iraq from 20th March until 1st May 2003. After the
invasion, the country experienced a huge theft action which caused losses in billions of
dollars to Iraqs economy (Iraqs invasion 2016). After the invasion, a large-scale
reconstruction has started in Iraq led by the US and the international community.
The current political system in Iraq is based on sectarian logic where the important
governmental institutions are divided between the major ethnic and religious groups in
the country, similar to Lebanese case. This regime put the mentioned groups in a
negative competition against each other. The direct result of the sectarian system
presented itself in a civil war which lasted from 2006 until 2008. The secondary result is
the instability of the political situations which increases the corruption and deactivates
all of the development attempts in almost all vital institutions across the country.
Like Lebanon, Iraq is considered as a fragile state in the fragile states index 2015 under
the category of High Alert occupying the 167 position out of 178 worldwide (Messner
2015, p. 7).
Iraq has a huge oil reserve of almost 150 billion bbl. which put it at the fifth positions
worldwide (IEA 2013, p. 37). The Iraqi economy depends heavily on oil exporting and
the government gets 95% of its revenues from the oil sector (Al-Khatteeb 2015)
3.2.2 Iraqi Electrical System before 1990
Before 1990, Iraqs population was almost 17,5 million (Population Pyramid 2016). The
electrical sector was a state-owned monopoly. At that time and despite the Iraq-Iran
22
war which lasted for 8 years, electricity reached almost all Iraqis houses with seldom
blackouts. The installed working capacity was almost 9.300 MW. At that time, Iraq was
selling electricity to Turkey as the first country in the Middle East which exports
electricity (Istepanian 2014, p. 51).
3.2.3 Iraqi Electrical System between 1990 and 2003
The electrical power plants, transmission lines and electrical substations were a direct
target during the First Gulf War in 1990. Around 75% of Iraqs 9.300 MW of installed
capacity was damaged or destroyed, leaving only 2.300 MW at the end of the conflict in
1991 (Global security 2016). Due to the international sanctions on Iraq, it was not
possible to fix the damage and return to the pre-war electricity production level. By the
end of 2002, a daily average of 4.000 MW (only 43% of the pre-war generation level)
was reached by fixing some of the damaged facilities using the revenue from the Oil-
for-Food program.
Between 1990 and 2003 most areas of the country struggled with little power supply
with the exception of the capital, Baghdad. While most of the country received less
than 10 hours per day, Baghdad had between 10-24 hours per day. During this time,
almost 80% of country used a private generator for electricity production (Global
security 2016).
3.2.4 Iraqi Electrical System after the War in 2003
After the 2003 invasion, Iraqs population was 25,6 million (Population Pyramid). The
US General Inspector (2009, pp. 195-200) described what happened to the electrical
sector during and after the invasion as the following: during the invasion, the power
grid crashed taking down all other infrastructure systems with it including hospitals
service, water and sewage systems. Some attempts were made to restore critical
services. By the end of April 2003, Iraqs power plants were generating 1.275 MW but it
was only about a quarter of the pre-invasion power level of 4.000 MW. At that time the
estimated demand was 9.000 MW. Soon after Baghdad fell, gangs of looters started
stripping substations and control centers of copper, computers and communications
equipment. This kind of theft lasted for months without any control. In addition to the
looting problem, the new insurgency began attacking key electricity infrastructure
nodes and repair crews. By the end of June 2003, attacks on Iraqi electrical engineers
and facilities in and around Baghdad occurred daily.
Although there were attempts to increase the generation capacity between 2003 and
2010, there was a constant 40% of unmet demand (cf. Figure 7, Iraq electricity demand
and supply 2010) because the demand grew faster than the supply.
23
Figure 7 : Iraq electricity demand and supply
Source: UNDP (2010)
The reconstruction of the electrical sector in Iraq was one of the biggest failures despite
the high spending from Iraqi governments and international funds allocated to improve
the faltering power system.
3.2.5 Iraqi Electrical System in 2016
The population has increased dramatically in Iraq from 25.6 million in 2003 to 37.5 in
2016 (Population Pyramid). The structure of the Iraqs electrical system is similar to the
Lebanese system. It can be divided into a national grid system and private mini-grid
generators. Most of the consumers have connection to both systems and pay two
different tariffs.
3.2.5.1 National grid

The electrical sector in Iraq, as for the other Middle Eastern countries, is a state-owned
monopoly. The national electrical system in Iraq is described in the latest statistical
report of the Ministry of Electricity (Ministry of Electricity 2014) as the following.
Starting with the generation power plants (cf. Table 6, Generation power plants in Iraq
2014).
Table 6 : Generation power plants in Iraq
Generation Type Installed Actual Percentage of the

Capacity MW Capacity MW total production
Hydraulic power plants 1.862 335 3,70%
Thermal steam Power 6.475 2.379 26%
Plants
Gas power plants 10.067 4.229 46%
Diesel power plants 1.870 756 8,30%
Imported 15%
Total 20.274 7.699 99%
Source: Ministry of Electricity (2014)
24
The total percentage of energy generation in table 6 is 99% and not 100% because 1%
of the generated electricity is used for oil extraction and it is not included in the
calculations. The imported energy comes from Iran and some from Turkey. Power
plants fueled by gas are 46% of the total capacity although Iraq does not produce
enough gas to be self-sufficient. Mainly these power plants depend on Iranian gas.
The difference between the installed and the actual generated capacity in Iraq is very
big. Just 38% of the total installed capacity is operating because of many reasons such
as: aging, lack of maintenance, lack of fuel, security issues, degradation of hydro
resources and weaknesses of the transmission grid.
Almost 40% of the demand is unmet in Iraq and that forces the Ministry of Electricity to
apply hours of rationing which range between 10-16 hours/day depending on the
region.
Problems and challenges of the national grid

The weaknesses of the Iraqs electrical sector cost the Iraqi economy around $40 billion
yearly (World Bank 2014). Iraqi national electrical system suffers from similar problems
to the Lebanese system in addition to security problems and terrorist attacks.
The electrical sector costs the state a lot of money each year and it is highly subsidized
(12,5 times). Tariffs have been frozen at 0.008 $/kWh since 2003 (RCREEE 2013, p. 1),
where the same kilowatt-hour costs the Ministry of Electricity more than 0.10 $/kWh.
The total losses of the electrical system are about 40%: technical losses, electricity
theft and unpaid bills from the states institutions. Financial resources are weak. The
Ministry of Electricity faces difficulties to get the money from the Ministry of Finance.
For instance, 6% of the needed money in 2015 was transferred to the Ministry of
Electricity from the Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Electricity 2015, p. 45). Add to this
point, the high corruption level in spending the public money. Iraq is also one of the
most corrupt countries in the world. It has the position 161 out of 168 in the corruption
index (Transparency 2015)
Unqualified staff and over capacity of employees is another problem in the Ministry of
Electricity. Good planning seems to be missing, for instance there is no clear vision
about the necessary energy needs in Iraq for the coming 15 years. The focus during the
last years was on generation, ignoring transmission grid improvement. Furthermore,
Iraq lacks a clear institutional regulatory framework for investors.
Fuel supply is another problem. Iraq does not produce enough gas for the new gas
power stations, so it has to import the rest. And the Oil Ministry does not provide the
Ministry of Electricity with enough fuel to run the power stations.
Security issues in Iraq are a major challenge for the electrical sector. For instance, the
effect of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) control on the northern part of Iraq in
2014 was: 2.285 MW went out of the grid, 1.802 MW were finished as new projects but
were not connected to the grid and 2.340 MW projects which were planned to put in
operation in 2015 were delayed or frozen (Ministry of Electricity 2015, p. 3). Moreover,
gas and fuel pipe-lines beside the transmission lines were always an easy target for
terrorist attacks.
25
Political instability and international interference affected the imported electricity from
the neighbors countries. For example, on 29th July 2016, Iran stopped 800 MW of the
exported electricity to Iraq without any warning (Energy news 2016).
3.2.5.2 Private mini-grid generators

History
Private generators were used after the First Gulf War in 1990, where the electrical
grid suffered devastating damage. The rehabilitation of the system was not possible
because of the sanctions so the use of the private generators continued to develop until
the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. Despite the big allocated money and effort for developing the
electrical sector in the reconstruction phase, the Iraqis can not enjoy a continuous
supply of electricity. The war against ISIS in the north and the west of the country has
worsened Iraqs electrical sector problems. 90% of the households complement their
public grid access with private generators, and 35% of households believe that
electricity should be the top priority for improvement a higher proportion than any
other service UNDP (2016).
Private mini-grid generators are unregulated. They do not have to follow certain
operation standards. However, the government does try to control the price of
electricity by supporting the private generators with subsidized fuel. Fuel subsidy does
not reach all the private generators and it is not always available so Iraqis have to buy
expensive fuel from the black market (Almaalomah 2016).
The cost
The average cost for a household is between $50-200 per month depending on the
energy use (Jallo 2013, p. 906), which is very high considering that eight million citizens
(21% of the population) are still living below the poverty line, on less than $2,20 per day
(Power Engineering 2016).
Problems and challenges of private mini-grid generators

Iraqis are suffering from the same problems as the Lebanese such as: high cost of
electricity from the private generators, pollution, noise, extensive heat from the
generators which is added to unbearable heat in summer, discomfort, psychological
problems, fires and accidents which happen so often because the generators do not
follow safety standards. Getting and storing refined fuel is also one of the main
problems.
26
4 The Syrian electrical system
4.1 General Background about the Country
4.1.1 Overview Figure 8 : Syria map
Syria is located between Iraq and Lebanon at a

strategic position in the Middle East. Its area is
185.180 km2 with a population of almost 17
million, July 2014 estimation (CIA 2016).
The political power in the country is
dominated by the Al-Bath party as the only
political monopoly since 1963. Influenced by
major Arab uprisings that began elsewhere in
the region, and compounded by social and
economic factors, antigovernment protests
first broke out in the southern province of
Dara in March 2011. Protesters called for the
legalization of political parties, the removal of
corrupt local officials and the repeal of the
restrictive Emergency Law which allowed
arresting people without charge. After that,
the demonstrations spread across the country.
The government responded to the unrest with
a mix of concessions which failed later and
Source: CIA (2016)
with military force. Eventully, this military
force pushed the country into a civil war
which is still ongoing (2016).
SCPR report (2016, pp. 6-8) described the situation in Syria by the end of 2015 as the
following: 11,5% of the population inside Syria were killed or injured due to the armed
conflict, the overall poverty rate is 85,2%, about 45 % of the population is dislodged
internally or externally. The accumulated total economic loss is estimated at $254,7
billion.
In the middle of 2016, Syria was unofficially divided between 4 major militant groups
(cf. Figure 9, Syria 2016) which are: Al-Assad regime (Red color), Kurdish militants
(Yellow), rebels (Green) and ISIS (Black).
27
The conflict has been very complex due to the high direct and indirect interests of many
countries which made it difficult to be solved. The following map in figure (10) shows
how many militant groups are fighting on the ground in Syria.
Figure 9 : Militant groups who are fighting in Syria
Figure 10 : Syria 2016
Source: Livemap (2016)
Source: Maps on the Web (2016)
Syria, like Lebanon and Iraq, is considered a fragile state in the fragile states index
(2015) under the category of High Alert occupying position 170 out of 178 worldwide
(Messner 2015, p. 7).
Figure 11 : Population density
4.1.2 Population density

Figure (11) shows the population density
in Syria. Most of the populations live in
the western part of the country and
around the Euphrates River. The majority
of people live in or near big cities,
especially Aleppo and Damascus.
Population density distribution is very
important for the energy demand
estimation. High population density areas
in Syria are still under the control of the
Al-Assad regime (2016).
Source: Wikipedia (2016)
28
4.1.3 Oil and gas resources
Syria is a small oil and gas producer in the Middle East. The proven oil reserve is 2,5
billion bbl., in addition to 10,6 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (2014 estimation). Most
of the oil and gas fields are located in the northeastern and eastern parts of Syria (cf.
Figure 12, Oil and gas fields in Syria 2016). Before the conflict in 2010, the average daily
crude oil production was approximately 400.000 bbl/day. A recent estimation in 2016
say this production has fallen to 25.000 b/d. That means production dropped about
93% since the conflict began in March 2011.
Figure 12 : Oil and gas fields in Syria
Source: Almohamad (2016)
Natural gas production has suffered little damage compared with the oil sector. Syria
produced 8 bcm natural gas in 2010. This amount has dropped to 4.4 bcm in 2014. The
reason is that during the course of 2012 the regime decided to focus its forces to
protect gas fields, because they are critical for electricity generation.
According to a map issued by the Ministry of Communications, Transport, and Industry
in the Syrian Interim Government (cf. Figure 12, Oil and gas fields in Syria 2016) in 2015,
ISIS controls 80% of the oil and gas fields in the country, Kurdish forces dominate 12%,
and the Syrian regime retains control of only 8%. Rebels are not controlling any fields of
oil or gas. An unexpected development is that the four main militant groups which are
fighting against each other on the ground, trade oil and gas between each other using
indirect brokers (Almohamad 2016, pp. 1-7).
4.2 Syrian Electrical System in 2011

The electrical sector is a state-owned monopoly. The Ministry of Electricity is
responsible for the electricity production, transmission, and distribution all over Syria.
Before 2011, the electrification level was 96,3% (World Bank 2016) which means that
the electrical service had reached almost all the population except some Bedouin in the
29
eastern part of Syria. Electricity was a highly-subsidized service and the customers used
to pay segment tariffs depending on their consumption (RCREEE 2013, p. 1).
The Ministry of Electricity has described the situation of the Syrian electrical system
before the conflict in its 2011 annual report (Ministry of Electricity 2011). Most of the
information in this section is from this report.
The balance between electricity production and demand was always at the barrier level.
When the demand exceeded the generation, rationing hours used to be applied. But in
general, energy production was covering the demand. The maximum recorded peak in
2011 was 9.034 MW, exceeding the total installed capacity of 8.500 MW. The
population of Syria was almost 20,7 million in March 2011 (Population Pyramid).
The growth percentage in demand from 2010 to 2011 was 7,4% and is predicted to
continue at the same rate for the following years.
The electrical system in Syria is divided geographically by the Ministry of Electricity into
5 main regions (cf. Figure 13, Power plant distribution in Syria 2011) which are: South,
middle, west, north and northeast areas. Technically, the electrical system is divided
into 3 main components: Generation, transmission and distribution.
Starting with generation, Table (7) shows the electrical energy production from the
national grid.
Table 7 Generation power plants in Syria
Generation Type Installed Percentage Energy Percentage

Capacity (MW) % Production %
(GWh)
Hydraulic power 1.250 14,71% 2.947 6%
plants
Steam power 3.285 38,65% 19.514 43%
plants
Gas power plants 905 9,76% 4.195 10%
Combined cycle 3.060 36% 19.573 41%
power plants
Total 8.500 100% 46.229 100%
Source: Ministry of Electricity (2011)
Although hydraulic power plants have 14,7% of the total installed capacity, they
produce just 6% of the electrical energy. That is due to the instability of the water
sources, aging factor of the plants and drought conditions. 64.5% of used fuel for
electricity generation is natural gas, while 35.5% is covered by heavy fuel which is used
mainly in the steam power plants. The trend in Syria was to depend on natural gas
because of its availability and its high efficiency in electricity generation.
Natural gas for power plants comes from two sources: the first one is the local national
gas fields and the second is the Arabic gas pipeline which crosses Syria. Heavy fuel is
produced locally.
Figure (14) shows the geographical distribution of the power plants in Syria.
30
Figure 13 : Power plant distribution in Syria Figure 14: The main five electrical regions in Syria
Source: Ministry of Electricity (2011, p. 13) Source: Ministry of Electricity (2011)

The power plants are in red colored whereas
the transmission substations are in blue.
Most of the power plants are located in the western part of Syria where most of the
people live. The eastern part used to get some of its supply from the western part
despite that the natural gas and oil resources are located in the east.
The majority of the transmission substations are around Damascus and Aleppo (cf.
Figure 13, Power plant distribution in Syria 2011). The share of renewable energy for
electricity generation in 2011 was almost 0%. However, there was a plan to install 100
MW of wind energy in 2010 and the government opened a PV factory with 15 MW
production capacity per year in 2010 in order to push the market of PV. The only
renewable energy use was solar energy for domestic hot water and it was growing fast
in the countryside.
Transmission
High voltage transmission lines were used to transport the generated electricity to the
customers. The used transmission lines are 400 kV, 230 kV and 66 kV. Many
transmission substations were used to connect between the different voltages levels.
The Syrian electrical grid was connected with neighboring countries to increase the
balance of the grid as well as other benefits which the connections are supposed to
fulfill. From the South, a 400 kV line connects Syria with Jordan, Egypt and Libya. Turkey
is connected with Syria from the north with a 400 kV also. From the west, a 230 kV line
connects Lebanon with Syria. From the east, the connection line with Iraq was under
construction (Ministry of Electricity 2011).
Syria was exporting electricity to Lebanon through a 230 kV line in 2011. The
connection in the south with Jordan was active. The northern connection was ready but
not working due to some issues from the Turkish side. The reason was that Syrias
electrical grid frequency was lower than European standards.
31
Distribution
The distribution part of the electrical grid consisted of low voltage 20 kV and 0,4 kV
power lines, small transformers and their protection.
4.3 The Destruction of the Electrical System until 2014 and the Current
Situation
4.3.1 In 2014
After 4 years of the war, the electrical system has suffered a lot from direct destruction,
lack of fuel, lack of maintenance and overload. Moreover, electricity was used as a
weapon in the war.
The year 2014 is chosen as a milestone because the available data of the destruction of
the electrical sector is found in December 2014. The damage level of the electrical
components was taken from the Ministry of Electricity. Other information came from
discussion with experts. At the end of 2014, most Syrian territories were under the
control of the Syrian regime along with the most important electrical infrastructures in
the country. Other groups such as rebels, Kurds and ISIS controlled less territory and
resources (cf. Figure 15, Syria 2014). This situation was not stable and it is changing
from one month to another (cf. Figure 16, Syria 2016).
Figure 15: Syria 2014 Figure 16: Syria 2016
Source: US message board (2016) Source: livemap (2016)
To describe the damage to the electrical system, it is divided into its main components:
generation, transmission and distribution.
4.3.1.1 Generation
As of 2014, 67% of the installed generation capacity was not working although most of
the power stations were not damaged. The main reason for the high drop of generation
percentage is the lack of fuel (see 4.1.3). The local Syrian natural gas was not enough
because ISIS controlled some of its fields. On the other hand, the Arabic gas pipeline
32
was not working because of political and technical reasons. The 35,5% of the power
plants which works on heavy fuel are also affected because of the sharp drop of the
local oil production due to the ISIS and Kurds control of the oil fields in the northeast of
the country.
Because of the war and the international sanctions, all the power plants present lack of
maintenance.The effects of this fact are expected to be seen in the future.
A comparsion of the load flow between the five main regions in Syria during 2011 and
2014 is presented in figure (17)
Figure 17: Load flow
Source: Ministry of Electricity
Y axis and X axis are the same in the figures above and they refer to the main five
electrical regions in Syria (cf. Figure 14). There are two numbers over each other such as
(-599 and -417). These numbers refer to the exchanged electrical power between
regions. The first number indicates the actual power (P in MW), where the second
number indicates the reactive power (Q in MVAR). The negative signal means that the
region is taking electricity from another area while the positive signal means the
opposite.
From 2011 data, the balance level between electricity demand and supply before the
war can be observed (cf. Figure 17, Load flow). For example: western area had the best
while the northeastern area had the worst balance. Northeastern area got most of its
energy from the middle and western area. The middle area has over capacity of
generation and it supplies to all other regions.
Figure 17 shows also the significant drop in generated electricity exchange between
regions from 2011 to 2014
4.3.1.2 Transmission grid

The Syrian electrical grid before 2011 was one of the most reliable operating electrical
grids in the Middle East region but because of the war almost 56% of it was out of
service by the end of 2014. Many components of the transmission system were
33
damaged such as: transmission lines, transformers, protection and control devices. The
dispatch center was not working as it should be. 22% of the substations (high voltage
transformers) and 28,5% of the high voltage lines were out of service due to different
reasons. The main reason was physical damage, whether totally or partly due to direct
conflict. Some of the substations and transmission lines were instrumentalised in the
war and they were intentionally switched off or attacked.
With regard to the international inter-connections which were working before the
conflict, Syria was selling electricity to Lebanon in 2014 but the electricity exchange
between Syria and Jordan was not working.
The general black out has happened more often during the last five years. It is
considered as a serious problem due to the security situation in the country.
4.3.1.3 Distribution grid

The electrical distribution system suffered most from the war because most battles
were in cities between houses. The distribution system can be divided into three
categories depending on the level of destruction:
Totally destroyed parts which have to be rebuilt from the scratch.
Out of-service parts due to: partial damage, need of maintenance and purposely
disconnected lines.
The overloaded working parts.
The working distribution grid is overloaded most of the time and because of this, it has
failed several times. The distribution infrastructure in the slum areas suffers most since
most battles are there.
4.3.2 Current situation

In 2015, there was just one line going to the northern area (Aleppo) , out of 36 lines in
2011 (cf. Figure 18, Syrian electrical grid 2011/2015). There are no connections to the
northeastern area. High voltage electrical grid in the south, west and middle areas is
still not very damaged.
Figure (18) shows the Syrian electrical grid in December 2011 and 2015 with it main
coumponents such as: generation power plants, high voltage substations and high
voltage transsmision lines.
34
Figure 18: Syrian electrical grid 2011/2015
Source: The ministry of electricity
Electricity supply situation in 2016

The whole population of Syria suffers from the lack of electricity but to different levels
depending on who is controlling each region. The information in this part is taken from
the internet and from a small questionnaire, 11 cases, mainly for the Kurdish and the
regime area (Barkeel, 2016).
Regime area
The regime is controlling most of the south, middle, west, and part of the northern area
(cf. Figure 16, Syria 2016). The average electricity supply period in Damascus is 12 h/day
where in other cities and on the countryside this period is between 6 to 12 h/day.
Aleppo suffers the most from the long blackouts. Sometimes the blackout lasts for
weeks. Because of that many people started to use small diesel mini-grid generators
and they pay high prices compared to their income and electricity price from the
government (An-nour 2016). Away from Aleppo, the people are compensating the
electricity blackout by using candles, small batteries and small private generators.
Getting fuel for these generators from the black market is a daily challenge which
increases the suffering of the people.
35
Rebel area
Rebel areas have been disconnected from the national grid for 5 years. Citizens try to
use diesel generators in order to get electricity for a few hours per day and solve the
problem. But getting the fuel is always extremely difficult and expensive under the
siege and war situation.
Recently, in some regions the people started to use PV solar panels in a limited size to
get electricity and overcome the fuel problem. For instance, PV was used for street
lights in the northern city (Idlib) by a local initiative to reduce theft and to increase
security. The main problem for solar PV is its cost for a large scale. For a small scale PV,
the capacity is not enough to power important devices in the house such as fridges,
water pumps, etc. (Souriat, 2016).
ISIS area
ISIS is using the electricity sector to get financial support for its war expenses by selling
electricity for high prices to the people who are living under its control. The average
electricity supply is not stable. It varies between 2 to 12 hours per day depending on
the region and the decision of its leaders. The electricity comes from two sources. The
first one is from the Euphrates dam and the second is from diesel mini-grid generators
(Al modon 2016).
Kurds area
The northeast area used to get most of its electricity from the north and the middle
areas before the conflict. Since 2013, this area is isolated from all directions and the
people suffer from long blackout periods. On average, the electricity supply is 4-8
h/day. Many people in this region depend on private mini-grids. The fuel supply for
electricity is better in this region because they extract and refine oil localy using simple
methods (Aranews 2016)
Summary
All regions are suffering from the poor supply of electricity. The national grid is
damaged in many parts of the country. Fuel is the main problem for generating
electricity, either from the national grid or from the private generators.
The unregulated market for private mini-grid generators (Lebanon and Iraq model) is
growing in almost all regions. Despite that Syria is still under the war, it is suffering from
the same problems as Iraq and Lebanon. The future of the electricity sector is predicted
to continue on this situation as there are many interests and challenges on the ground.
36
4.4 SWOT Analysis for Mini-grid Systems in the Syrian Context
The purpose of this section is to present a good understanding of the unregulated mini
grid system (Lebanon and Iraq model) which is expected to happen in Syria. After that,
a proposal for what can be done to increase the resilience and the sustainability of such
a model is developed. The methodology in use is based on a SWOT analysis of the
unregulated traditional mini-grid systems in a Syrian context.
SWOT analysis is a qualitative self-assessment methodology. It is used for strategic
planning as one of the basic starting tools. SWOT analysis depends on a critical
assessment of a certain system or organization to find its Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities, and Threats (Chermack 2007, p. 386). Strengths and weaknesses are
considered as internal factors inside the system boundaries where opportunities and
threats are related to the external environment.
The following steps will be used as a guideline (Keeley, p. 30) to do the SWOT analysis:
Figure 19: SWOT analysis steps
Objective Guiding Data SWOT Strategy

definition analysis Desired state
points collection suggestion
Source: Keeley, p. 30 and own realization

In (Keeley, p. 30) steps number one and five were not mentioned. They were added to
the work because of their importance in strategy development.
4.4.1 Objective definition
The main question in this SWOT analysis is: what are the characteristics of the Mini Grid
Systems (MGS) in Iraq and Lebanon and how can it be adapted to develop a resilient
Electrical System for Syria.
The traditional unregulated mini-grid system Iraq and Lebanon model consists of big
diesel generators in the range of 20 to 1.000 kVA. They are located in district areas
between houses and connected to the consumers nearby. No transformers are used
and the electricity is distributed to houses via small cables using the local national grid
towers in a messy way without any legal confirmation.
The consumers buy the service in a fixed capacity and price. For example, 5 ampere
costs $50-100 a month. 5 ampere means 1.100 W maximum of power at a rate of 220V
AC. The consumer can use less current capacity but not more. This amount of power is
enough to operate some lights, TV, a fan and a fridge but it is not enough to cover all
the household power demand.
In doing this analysis, the role is taken of an outside observer or a development
organization who would like to achieve socioeconomic reconstruction and development
after the war.
37
4.4.2 Guided points
From the literature review and the challenges of the Lebanese, Iraqi and Syrian
electrical systems in chapters three and four, the following points are developed to
guide the SWOT analysis:
The cost (CO)
A) Available capital and funds.
B) Cost level of: capital cost, running cost and the service cost.
Service quality (SQ)
A) Supply the demand %.
B) Voltage & frequency.
C) Blackout ( recurrence, length and anticipation)
Implementation and operation (I&O)
A) The required human resources for implementation and operation of the system.
B) Required time for implementation.
C) Ability to scale up.
D) Ability to control and monitor service quality and cost.
E) Life time.
F) Strength of the direct operator of the system.
G) Available technology.
H) Regulations and laws for private investment in energy sector.
Side effects (SE)
A) Human health and pollution.
B) Noise.
C) Area usage.
D) Environmental side effects (water, soil,etc)
Dependencies (DE)
A) Fuel dependency (price and availability).
B) Political decision and international interference dependency.
C) System flexibility regarding ownership, operation and structure.
D) Geographic location dependency / Movement ability.
E) Regulation and legal dependency.
F) Security dependency.
Others / Future (O&F)
A) Ability of the system to be more resilient towards future conflicts (political
instability/ internal or external war)
B) Flexibility to be part of future vision and plans like national grid, etc.
C) Competition (other investors, new technology, national grid, etc.)
D) Political issues like the encouragement of division of the country because of
dependency reduction.
E) Corruption (investors with or without the local government).
4.4.3 Data collection
SWOT analysis depends on a critical assessment of the studied system, so a good
understanding of the Iraq and Lebanon model and the Syrian situation is necessary. This
38
step was done in chapters three and four. The used information came from literature
review, the internship in GIZ (Deutsch Gesellschaft frInternationale Zusammenarbeit),
discussion with colleagues and own realizations.
4.4.4 SWOT analysis
SWOT analysis can be done by asking the question of: what are the strengths,
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the MGS regarding the guiding points.
Table 8: SWOT Analysis
Beneficial Harmful
Strengths Weaknesses
A) Available capital from local entrepreneur. A) Missing financial institutions (banks)
to support these projects.
B) Different capital costs depending on the
system size, starting from a few hundred B) Very expensive service costs .
dollars to some thousands. The service cost
CO
CO
Different running costs depending on:
differs depending on the subscription level.
the fuel price, maintenance and the
specialty of each operator.
A) Supply the essential demand quickly. B) C) Depending on the technology and

SQ
SQ
the project operator

A) Does not need high expertise for the D) It is very difficult to control and
system implementation and operation. monitor the service quality and the cost.
H) There are no clear and strong
B) The implementation process is very fast.
regulations for private investment in the
Internal
C) There is possibility to scale up and expand energy sector.

easily in the future.
I&O
I&O
F) The local operators are strong and they

have high flexibility in the implementation
and operation of the system alongside with
collecting money.
G) The technology is available and well
known in the local market.
C) Small space is needed. A) High pollution and toxic emissions in
residential areas.
B) Unacceptable noise pollution.
SE
SE
C) It occupies space in public venues

(streets).
D) It has side effects on the local
environment (soil, trees, animals,etc)
39
B) It is isolated from the international A) Fuel dependency (price and
interference. availability)
C) System flexibility regarding ownership and
operation.
DE
DE
D) Transportable.
F) Overcome security problem because it is a
small private project between houses.
A) High resilience performance during B) Difficult to be part of any plan in the
conflicts/wars. future.
O&F
O&F
E) Limited corruption in spending the money
C) It is a monopoly in each region.
and choosing employees.
Opportunities Threats
A) Available fund for a reconstruction. A) High risk environment for investment.
CO
CO
B) The consumers are not able to afford
the energy service.
A) High demand. B) Voltage and frequency problems if a

bad technology quality is used especially
for industrial uses.
SQ
SQ
C) The blackout depends on the

operational quality and fuel availability.
G) Using new technologies such as renewable E) Short life time (less than 10 years) in
I&O
I&O
energy. general.
External
H) There is a new law for energy investment.

SE
SE
A) Lack of fuel.
B) Depending on political decisions.
DE
DE
E) Regulation and legal dependency.

C) Competition from another investor,
technology and the national grid.
E) Corruption between the operators and
O&F
O&F
the local government.

F) Encourage the independency from
some political groups.
Source: Own realization
40
4.4.5 Desired state
After the SWOT analysis of the unregulated mini-grid system Iraq and Lebanon model
in a Syrian context, a desired state of the mini-grid systems in Syria is presented as the
following vision:
Modern regulated mini-grid systems which use traditional diesel generators in
combination with renewable energy technology in the form of hybrid systems. These
systems are connected to a centralized independent centre which is responsible for the
monitoring of all parts of the electrical system. They have fewer dependencies on
external factors and they have the least side effects on their surrounding environment
such as pollution and noise.
These systems are:
1- Able to provide enough electricity with a good energy quality for a reasonable
price for the consumers.
2- Able to work alone as small islands and are able to be connected together with
the national grid in the future.
3- Flexible in terms of their abilities: to scale-up, to move to another place, to offer
flexible service, to change ownership, to change their model structure.
4- Transparent and follow certain reasonable standards to avoid corruption.
In general, these mini grid systems are able to operate in a sustainable way and to play
a positive role in reconstruction efforts in Syria. Furthermore, they increase the
resilience of the electrical system in general.
The desired state presents two main characteristics which are: Resilient performance
and sustainability.
Resilient performance is defined in (2.2.3) as: the group of abilities that a system has
for dealing with changed inputs in order to get a desirable accepted outcome.
Resilience characteristics were presented in (2.2.4) in the resilience evaluation
methodology from Hollnagel (2015) which is: the ability to respond, monitor, learn and
anticipate.
In addition to the following points which are derived from the Resilient Electrical
Energy System definition in (2.3.2) and from the SWOT analysis:
1- Energy supply continuity: To keep working and supply the essential needs.
2- Adaptation to future plans and change in demand.
3- Flexibility of the electrical system by allowing the mini grids to work alone when
there are problems or with the national grid when everything is going well.
4- Reduce dependencies and increase the diversity of generation.
Resilient performance is the first desired criteria because Syria, like the rest of the
Middle East region, is threatened by conflicts in the future, in addition to the political
instability which characterizes the transition period after a civil war.
41
Sustainability is the second criteria. It is defined (Thwink 2016) as:
The ability to continue a defined behavior indefinitely
Sustainbility are built on three pillers: Environmental, economic and social
sustainability.
Environmental sustainability is the ability to maintain rates of renewable
resource harvest, pollution creation, and non-renewable resource depletion that
can be continued indefinitely.
Economic sustainability is the ability to support a defined level of economic
production indefinitely.
Social sustainability is the ability of a social system, such as a country, to
function at a defined level of social well being indefinitely (Thwink 2016).
Sustainability discussed indicators in this paper are: affordable service for the
consumers, capital cost, levelized cost and all kinds of pollutions.
Sustainability is chosen for the desired MGS because these systems affect the daily life
of the people through pollution and noise. Moreover, the high price of electricity drains
the development potential of the locals and it impedes their ability to start new
businesses.
Another important characteristic of the desired MGS is the realization time because
time is a very essential factor in the reconstruction phase after a disaster. People want
to restore their life and activities as it was before the war as soon as possible.
4.4.6 Strategy suggestion
In order to achieve resilient and sustainable MGS, two suggestions are derived from the
SWOT analysis with the goal of maximize strengths, minimize threats, take
opportunities, and avoid threats:
1- Put some regulations and reasonable standards and couple them with
incentives.
2- Use hybrid technologies such as solar/wind/biomass/hydro energy in
combination with traditional diesel generators.
These two suggestions will be discussed regarding resilient performance, sustainability
and realization time. It is preferred to porvide measurable indices for the three chosen
characteristics of the desired MGS because measurable indices help a lot in a decision-
making process. However, due to the limited allocated time to this paper, the
mentioned characteristics will be discussed in general.
Resilience
Regulations could increase the adaptation of minigrid systems to future plans and
changes in demand. They could also increase the flexibility of the electrical system
by allowing the mini grids to work alone when there are problems or with the
national grid when everything is going well. Regulations could increase the primary
resilience abilities of the whole system which are the ability to respond, monitor,
anticipate, and learn.
42
Hybrid systems could help the system to reduce dependencies and keep working to
supply the essential needs when there is a lack of fuel. In addition, they could
increase the diversity of generation.
Sustainability
Regulations help to control a fair revenue for MGS operators and affordable price
for consumers of the energy service. Moreover, regulations and hybrid systems
could minimize the bad side effects of: air, environment and noise pollution.
Realization Time
If the regulations are not designed very carefully, they could increase the realization
time which is very important in a reconstruction phase after a disaster.
Hybrid systems could not be easy to implement and operate very smoothly due to
the lack of experience to deal with such a technology.
43
5 Conclusion and Recommendations
The Syrian electrical sector will experience a difficult time in the future after the
ceasefire and during the transition phase as it happened in Lebanon and Iraq, or even
worse. The Syrian electrical system is predicted to be a mixture of a weak national grid
and several unregulated mini-grid systems which depend mainly on traditional sources
of fuel. If this scenario is going to happen, the reconstruction efforts and the
socioeconomic development in the country will be very difficult after the war.
The review of the current situation shows that the Syrian electrical system is suffering
from similar challenges as the system in Iraq and Lebanon. These challenges are
predicted to increase in the future especially with the rise of international interference,
multiple armed groups, demographic change, economic losses, prevalence of
destruction, etc.
The private market of unregulated diesel generators (Lebanese and Iraqi mini-grid
system model) is spreading quickly in all Syrian regions. This fact should not be ignored
in any reconstruction campaign in the future to avoid the negative experience in the
analyzed countries. The ignorance of the private mini-grid systems and their role in the
national electrical grid in Lebanon and Iraq, added to the political instability, have led to
the current problematic situation of the electrical system in both countries despite the
huge amount of money which has been used to fix the electrical system and restore the
pre-war level.
The private unregulated diesel mini-grids are very flexible and could supply the urgent
demand for electricity but they can not be a long term sustainable solution because of
high cost, technical limitation and their environmental harmful effects. However, these
mini-grids could bring a great chance to increase the resilience of the local electrical
system in a fragile country like Syria if it is done in a conscious way.
From the different definitions of resilience, for the case of this study it is defined as
the group of abilities that a system has for dealing with changed inputs in order to get
a desirable accepted outcome. Resilience is a dynamic term which can have different
details in its meaning depending on each case. Although the resilience performance of
an electrical system or any other system is difficult to measure, it can be described in a
defined context under chosen standards. To describe it, four basic abilities are used
which are the ability to respond, monitor, learn and anticipate.
To increase the resilience and the sustainability of the electrical system, it is
recommended to move from the unregulated mini-grid model to the regulated one
which follows certain standards and can be connected to the national grid in the future.
It is also advised to use renewable energy technologies in these systems to reduce the
traditional fuel dependency, pollution and noise.
44
6 Complementary studies for further research
For the Syrian electrical system:
Further research is needed about the required technical, economic and
environmental regulations and standards for mini-grid systems. Considering the
necessity of keeping their flexibility and increasing their sustainability and
resilience.
Who is going to apply these regulations and how?
What should be done for the new mini-grid system to be able to connect to the
national grid when the situation is improved or keep operating as an isolated
unit when there are troubles?
To integrate renewable energy into the electrical Syrian system especially in
mini-grid systems, what should be done? Where to start with? Which
technology? How much and who is going to do it?
SWOT analysis deserves more discussion and contribution from all stakeholders
of the mini-grid systems.
A strategic road map for actions on the long and short-term is recommended
starting from the SWOT analysis results, as time is passing and the unregulated
mini-grids are flourishing in Syria.
For the Iraqi and Lebaese electrical systems:
Further research is needed about the role of the already-existing diesel mini-grid
system in the future plans of the national electrical system.
For resilience
A measurable methodology to evaluate the resilience performance of the
electrical system in general and mini-grids in particular needs further
development to define basic indicators in order to compare different scenarios.
Hollnagel (2015) four abilities of resilience can be a starting point.
45
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8 Appendix
Table 9 : Resilience definitions
Author Definition
Holling, 1973 Resilience of an ecosystem is the measure of the ability of an ecosystem to absorb
changes and still exist.
Pimm, 1984 Resilience is the speed with which a system returns to its original shape
Holling et al., Resilience is the buffer capacity or ability to absorb perturbation, or the magnitude
1995 of the disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its structure by
changing the variables and processes that control behavior.
Alwang et al., Resilience is the ability to resist downward pressures and to recover from shock.
2001 From the ecological literature property that allows a system to absorb and use
and even benefit from change. Where resilience is high, it requires a major
disturbance to overcome the limits to qualitative change in a system and allow it to
be transformed rapidly into another condition.
Alkers et al., 2002 Resilience is the potential of a system to remain in a particular configuration and to
maintain its feedbacks and functions, and involves the ability of the system to
reorganize following the disturbance driven change.
Cardona, 2003 The capacity of the damaged ecosystem or community to absorb negative impacts
and recover from these.
Resilience Ecosystem resilience is the capacity of an ecosystem to tolerate disturbance without

Alliance, 2005 collapsing into a qualitatively different state that is controlled by a different set of
processes. Thus, a resilient ecosystem can withstand shocks and rebuild itself when
necessary.
Stockholm Resilience refers to the capacity of a social-ecological system both to withstand

Resilience Centre, perturbations from for instance climate or economic shocks and to rebuild and
2009 renew itself afterwards. Loss of resilience can cause loss of valuable ecosystem
services, and may even lead to rapid transitions or shifts into qualitatively different
situations and configurations, evident in, for instance people, ecosystems,
knowledge systems, or whole cultures.
Source: McAslan (2010, pp. 2-4)
50
Table 10: Resilience definitions
Author Definition
Abel, 2001 The ability to persist through future disturbances
Klein, 2003 The ability of a system that has undergone stress to recover and return to its
original state; more precisely (i) the amount of disturbance a system can absorb and
still remain within the same state or domain of attraction and (ii) the degree to
which the system is capable of self-organization
Walker, 2004 The capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, and
feedbacks.
Longstaff, 2005 The ability by an individual, group, or organization to continue its existence (or
remain more or less stable) in the face of some sort of surprise.
Resilience is found in systems that are highly adaptable (not locked into specific
strategies) and have diverse resources.
Source: CARRI (2013, pp. 2-4)
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Electrical Mini-grid Systems as an Option for a

Reconstruction Phase in Syria

In partial fulfilment of the requirement for the

Academic Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Jrgen Parisi

Submission Date: 27th November 2016

Oldenburg, 27th November 2016 ________________________

Source: Wordpress (2011)

Source: System Theory (2016)

Figure 3: System operational level

Source: Dynamic system control

Table 1 Ecological resilience breakdown

5 Alkers et al., The disturbance The potential of a system to Remain in a particular

6 Cardona, 2003 Damaged The capacity to absorb A recovered damaged system.

Source: Own realization

2.3 Resilient Electrical Energy System

2.3.1 Electrical Energy System definition

2.4 Electrical Mini-grid System

Source: GIZ (2014, p. 36)

Source: GIZ (2014, p. 24)

3.1.4.1 National grid

Generation Installed Actual Percentage

Source: Fardoun et al. (2012, p. 315)

Problems and challenges to the national grid

3.1.4.2 Private mini-grid generators

Source: UNDP- CEDRO (2015, p. 20)

Problems and challenges of the private mini-grid generators

3.2.1 General background about the country Figure 6 : Iraq Map

Source: UNDP (2010)

3.2.5.1 National grid

Generation Type Installed Actual Percentage of the

Source: Ministry of Electricity (2014)

Problems and challenges of the national grid

3.2.5.2 Private mini-grid generators

Problems and challenges of private mini-grid generators

Syria is located between Iraq and Lebanon at a

Source: Livemap (2016)

Source: Maps on the Web (2016)

Figure 11 : Population density

4.1.2 Population density

Source: Wikipedia (2016)

Figure 12 : Oil and gas fields in Syria

Source: Almohamad (2016)

4.2 Syrian Electrical System in 2011

Generation Type Installed Percentage Energy Percentage

Source: Ministry of Electricity (2011, p. 13) Source: Ministry of Electricity (2011)

Figure 15: Syria 2014 Figure 16: Syria 2016

Source: US message board (2016) Source: livemap (2016)

Source: Ministry of Electricity

4.3.1.2 Transmission grid

4.3.1.3 Distribution grid

4.3.2 Current situation

Source: The ministry of electricity

Electricity supply situation in 2016

Figure 19: SWOT analysis steps

Objective Guiding Data SWOT Strategy

Source: Keeley, p. 30 and own realization

Table 8: SWOT Analysis

A) Supply the essential demand quickly. B) C) Depending on the technology and

the project operator

C) There is possibility to scale up and expand energy sector.

F) The local operators are strong and they

C) It occupies space in public venues

A) High demand. B) Voltage and frequency problems if a

C) The blackout depends on the