INRE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION
OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION
OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
February 11, 2010
FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of
the ROC. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. The Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt
from paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local
government corporations and government-owned or
controlled corporations with or without independent charter
are not exempt from paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA
8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the
actuarial solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be
preserved and maintained at all times and that contribution
rates necessary to sustain the benefits under this Act shall
be kept as low as possible in order not to burden the
members of the GSIS and their employers. Taxes imposed on
the GSIS tend to impair the actuarial solvency of its funds
and increase the contribution rate necessary to sustain the
benefits of this Act. Accordingly, notwithstanding any laws to
the contrary, the GSIS, its assets, revenues including
accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be exempt from all
taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds.
These exemptions shall continue unless expressly and
specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS as
of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances,
opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and
rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx
Required to comment on the GSIS petition, the OSG
maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Courts
order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a
report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and
the comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT,
the claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of
legal fees has no legal basis.
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government
units?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition of the GSIS for
recognition of its exemption from the payment of legal fees
imposed under Sec 22 of Rule 141 of the ROC on GOCCs
and LGUs is hereby DENIED .
NO
Rule 141 (on Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by
this Court in the exercise of its rule-making powers under
Sec 5(5), Art VIII of the Constitution:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged.
xxxxxxxx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under Rule 141
of the ROC is an integral part of the rules promulgated by
this Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part
of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a
jurisdictional requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading,
practice and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled,
changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards
of this Courts institutional independence, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
the Courts exclusive domain. That power is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Executive.
NOTES:
-The GSIS cannot successfully invoke the right to social
security of government employees in support of its petition.
It is a corporate entity whose personality is separate and
distinct from that of its individual members. The rights of its
members are not its rights; its rights, powers and functions
pertain to it solely and are not shared by its members.
-Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the
GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing
another equally important institutional safeguard of the
Courts independence fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy
recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy,
assess and collect fees, including legal fees. Moreover, legal
fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws which
established the JDF and the SAJF[33] expressly declare the
identical purpose of these funds to guarantee the
independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the
Constitution and public policy. Legal fees therefore do not
only constitute a vital source of the Courts financial
resources but also comprise an essential element of the
Courts fiscal independence. Any exemption from the
payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-
owned or controlled corporations and local government
units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF.
Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Courts guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes
its independence.
-Speaking for the Court, then Associate Justice (now Chief
Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the rule-
making power of this Court and highlighted its evolution and
development in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice:
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent
with legislative power for it was subject to the power of
Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section
13, Article VIII provides:
Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the
power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it
may appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan, Congress in the
exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court
regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar
Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade,
the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar
examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held
that x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment a judgment promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and
although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question. The
venerable jurist further ruled: It is obvious, therefore, that
the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions
for the license. By its ruling, this Court qualified the
absolutist tone of the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed
by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x
x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x. More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxxxxxxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further
strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving to
it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the
integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule
making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII
provides:
xxxxxxxxx
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This
Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the
1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to
repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer
shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.
Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner
Facts:
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and
an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao
La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in
the Philippines
He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July
1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar
if he submit to the Court the following documents as proof of
his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy
that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath
taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he
was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine
Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen
and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the
compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
265 "an act providing for the manner in which the option to
elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person
whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected
Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already
be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present
jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within
"a reasonable time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to
elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The
reasonable time means that the election should be made
within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of majority",
which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which
the court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching
offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required is
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the
same with the nearest civil registry.
In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)
IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-
TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO
DOCTRINES:
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to
citizens of good moral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of greater
importance so far as the general public and proper
administration of justice is concerned.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired
into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.
Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
those who would seek admission to the bar must be a
necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected
from members of the general public.
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated at the time of the application for
permission to take the bar examinations and more
importantly at the time of application for admission to the
bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was
charged with the crime of homicide in connection with the
death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan
stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries upon
him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university
fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused
were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed
an application for probation with the lower court. The
application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned
to supervise him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the
bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but was
not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to
take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of
law. He averred that his probation period had been
terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last
for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath
of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may
now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good
moral character imposed upon those who are seeking
admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he
is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names of the parents or
brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath
taking of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino was previously involved with hazing which caused
the death of Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity
initiation rites but he was convicted for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. He was sentenced with
2 years and 4 months of imprisonment where he applied a
probation thereafter which was approved and granted by the
court. He took the bar exam and passed but was not allowed
to take the oath. He filed for a petition to allow him to take
the lawyers oath of office and to admit him to the practice
of law averring that his probation was already terminated.
The court note that he spent only 10 months of the probation
period before it was terminated.
Philippine Bar Now Open to Filipinos with Foreign Law
Degrees
March 23, 2010
By Anna Katrina M. Martinez
The Supreme Court En Banc has recently approved the
proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, allowing Filipino graduates of foreign law
schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to certain
conditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyers

oath office and admit him to the practice of law. Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being
admitted to the examination, all applicants for admission to
the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have successfully
completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree in a law school or
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to
university officially recognized by the Philippine Government
those who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL
or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments
the degree has been granted.
in the effective and efficient administration of justice. The
court upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral
character of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is
Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen who
of greater importance so far as the general public and the
graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the
proper administration of justice are concerned. Hence he
bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court
was asked by the court to produce evidence that would
of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses
certify that he has reformed and has become a responsible
leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
member of the community through sworn statements of
degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by
individuals who have a good reputation for truth and who
the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year
have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law
time to certify that he is morally fit to the admission of the
school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.
law profession. The petitioner is then allowed to take the
lawyers oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and thereafter to
practice the legal profession.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. An applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall present a certificate issued by the proper
government agency that, before commencing the study of
BAR MATTER 1153
law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year
high school course, the course of study prescribed therein
for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her
degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a foreign law
school must also present proof of completion of a separate
bachelors degree.
The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk of Court, through
the Office of the Bar Confidant, to circularize its resolution
approving the said amendments among all law schools in the
country. (Bar Matter No. 1153, Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
March 9, 2010)
RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore
duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted
as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to
the bar. Every applicant for admission as a member of the
bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the
Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of
the United States of America. Citizens of the United
States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly
licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in active practice in
the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular
standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts
before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such
practice after taking the following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of
the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself
as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other
jurisdictions. Applicants for admission who, being Filipino
citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the
Supreme Court of the United States or in any circuit court of
appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of
any State or Territory of the United States, and who can
show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at
least five years in any of said courts, that such practice
began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been
suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court,
be admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants.
All applicants for admission other than those referred to in
the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to
the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly
studied law for four years, and successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The
affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from
the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of
such facts, and further evidence may be required by the
court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations
unless he has satisfactorily completed the following courses
in a law school or university duly recognized by the
government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law,
criminal law, public and private international law, political
law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. No applicant for admission to the
bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a
certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education
that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of
study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field
of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history and economics.
Consti II case digest: IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE
THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,
EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner.
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES Keywords:
(Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship) Petitioner Ep
lawyer in 1966 but
B.M. No. 2112
citizenship in 1981
Restored citi
RA 9225
A Filipino law
citizenship remains
Philippine Bar but
permit to engage in
On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted
the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his
privilege to practice law when he became a American citizen
in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003 by taking his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines and
if granted, to resume the practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a
continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss
thereof means termination of the petitioners membership in
the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to
have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-
acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225,
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is
not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who
intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice.
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the
Court for the practice of law, the OBC required, and
incompliance thereof, petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine
Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of
the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his
updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd
compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria
Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his
compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his
compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
that the petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his
practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses
is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall
re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court
and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.