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Share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural

production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land
personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household,
and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to
their respective contributions.

3844
Abolished shared tenancy
Converted it into leasehold
Bill of rights
Established land bank of the Philippines (financial arm of the government with
respect to Agrarian Reform program)

Cayetano and Tiongson vs CA Security Guard who started farming on


residential land of the Manotoks. There is not tenancy relationship.

Facts: Sometime in 1946, the late Severino Manotok donated and transferred to his
eight (8) children and two (2) grandchildren , a thirty-four-hectare (34) lot located in
Payong, Old Balara, Quezon City covered by a certificate of title. Severino Manotok
who was appointed judicial guardian of his minor children 'accepted on their behalf
the aforesaid donation. At that time, there were no tenants or other persons
occupying the said property.

Teodoro Macaya accompanied by Vicente Herrera, the overseer of the property, went
to the house of Manotok in Manila and pleaded that he be allowed to live on the
Balara property so that he could at the same time guard the property and prevent
the entry of squatters and the theft of the fruits and produce of the fruit trees planted
by the owner. Manotok allowed Macaya to stay in the property as a guard (bantay)
but imposed the conditions that at any time that the owners of the property needed
or wanted to take over the property, Macaya and his family should vacate the
property immediately; that while he could raise animals and plant on the property, he
could do so only for his personal needs; that he alone could plant and raise animals
on the property; and that the owners would have no responsibility or liability for said
activities of Macaya. Macaya was allowed to use only three (3) hectares. These
conditions, however, were not put in writing.

the property-owners organized themselves into a corporation engaged primarily in


the real estate business known as the Manotok Realty, Inc. The owners transferred
the 34-hectare lot to the corporation as part of their capital contribution or
subscription to the capital stock of the corporation.

Macaya did not pay, as he was not required to pay anything to the owners or
corporation whether in cash or in kind for his occupancy or use of the property.
However, the corporation noted that the realty taxes on the property had increased
considerably and found it very burdensome to pay the said taxes while on the other
hand, Macaya had contributed nothing nor even helped in the payment of the taxes.
Thus, Macaya upon the request of the owners agreed to help by remitting ten (10)
cavans of palay every year as his contribution for the payment of the realty taxes
beginning 1957.

the corporation requested Macaya to increase his contribution from ten (10) cavans
to twenty (20) cavans of palay effective 1963 because the assessed value of the
property had increased considerably.
Macaya informed the corporation that he could not afford anymore to deliver any
palay because the palay dried up. He further requested that in the ensuring years, he
be allowed to contribute only ten (10) cavans of palay. The corporation said that if
that was the case, he might as well not deliver anymore. Thus, from 1967 up to 1976,
Macaya did not deliver any palay.

, Manotok Realty, Inc. executed a "Unilateral Deed of Conveyance" of the property in


favor of Patricia Tiongson, Pacita Go, Roberto Laperal III, Elisa Manotok, Rosa
Manotok, Perpetua M. Bocanegra, Filomena M. Sison, Severino Manotok, Jr., Jesus
Manotok, Ignacio S. Manotok, Severino Manotok III and Fausto Manotok.

Macaya was informed by the Manotoks that they needed the property to construct
their houses thereon. Macaya agreed but pleaded that he be allowed to harvest first
the planted rice before vacating the property.

he Manotoks once more told Macaya to vacate the entire property including those
portions tilled by him. At this point, Macaya had increased his area from three (3)
hectares to six (6) hectares without the knowledge and consent of the owners. As he
was being compelled to vacate the property, Macaya brought the matter to the
Department (now Ministry) of Agrarian Reforms. The Manotoks, during the conference
before the officials of the Department insisted that Macaya and his family vacate the
property. They threatened to bulldoze Macaya's landholding including his house, thus
prompting Macaya to file an action for peaceful possession, injunction, and damages
with preliminary injunction before the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Court of Agrarian Relations found that Macaya is not and has never been a share or
leasehold tenant of Severino Manotok nor of his successors-in-interest over the
property or any portion or portions thereof but has only been hired as a watchman or
guard (bantay) over the same.

Issue: whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties.

Held: Republic Act No. 1199 as amended by Republic Act No. 2263. Section 3 thereof
defines agricultural tenancy as:

xxx xxx xxx

... the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture


belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former
agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain,
either in produce or in money, or in both.

Thus, the essential requisites of tenancy relationship are: 1) the parties are the
landholder and the tenant; 2) the subject is agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4)
the purpose is agricultural production; and 5) there is consideration (Agustin, Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, 1981, p. 19). As

xxx xxx xxx


All these requisites are necessary in order to create tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more
requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant, as contra-
distinguished from a de jure tenant, This is so because unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to
security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
Government under existing tenancy laws. ...

The key factor in ascertaining whether or not there is a landowner-tenant relationship


in this case is the nature of the disputed property.

From the year 1948 up to the present, the tax declarations of real property and the
annual receipts for real estate taxes paid have always classified the land as
"residential".

The Manotok family is engaged in the business of developing subdivisions in Metro


Manila, not in farming.

The trial court observed that a panoramic view of the property shows that the entire
34 hectares is rolling forestal land without any flat portions except the small area
which could be planted to palay.

Whatever "visions" the owners may have had in 1946, the fact remains that the land
has always been officially classified as "residential" since 1948. The areas
surrounding the disputed six hectares are now dotted with residences and,
apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being developed
together with the rest of the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants
rice or corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart
of a metropolitan area cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into
agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian reform program.

Another requisite is that the parties must be landholder and tenant. Rep. Act No. 11
99 as amended defines a landholder

Sec. 5(b) A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical, who,


either as owner, lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, lets or grants
to another the use or cultivation of his land for a consideration either in
shares under the share tenancy system, or a price certain under the
leasehold tenancy system.

On the other hand, a tenant is defined as

Sec. 5(a) A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid
available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder
under the share tenancy system or paying to the landholder a price
certain in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy
system.

Under these definitions, may Macaya be considered as a tenant and Manotok as a


landholder?
It should be noted, however, that from 1967 to the present, Macaya did not deliver
any cavans of palay to the petitioners as the latter felt that if Macaya could no longer
deliver the twenty (20) cavans of palay, he might as well not deliver any. The decision
of the petitioners not to ask for anymore contributions from Macaya reveals that
there was no tenancy relationship ever agreed upon by the parties. Neither can such
relationship be implied from the facts as there was no agreed system of sharing the
produce of the property. Moreover, from 1946 to 1956 at which time, Macaya was
also planting rice, there was no payment whatsoever. At the most and during the
limited period when it was in force, the arrangement was a civil lease where the
lessee for a fixed price leases the property while the lessor has no responsibility
whatsoever for the problems of production and enters into no agreement as to the
sharing of the costs of fertilizers, irrigation, seedlings, and other items. The private
respondent, however, has long stopped in paying the annual rents and violated the
agreement when he expanded the area he was allowed to use. Moreover, the
duration of the temporary arrangement had expired by its very terms.

Going over the third requisite which is consent, the trial court observed that the
property in question previous to 1946 had never been tenanted. During that year,
Vicente Herrera was the overseer. Under these circumstances, coupled by the fact
that the land is forested and rolling, the lower court could not see its way clear to
sustain Macaya's contention that Manotok had given his consent to enter into a
verbal tenancy contract with him.

The last requisite is consideration. This is the produce to be divided between the
landholder and tenant in proportion to their respective contributions. We agree with
the trial court that this was also absent.

It bears re-emphasizing that from 1946 to 1956, there was no agreement as to any
system of sharing the produce of the land. The petitioners did not get anything from
the harvest and private respondent Macaya was using and cultivating the land free
from any charge or expense. The situation was rather strange had there been a
tenancy agreement between Don Severino and Macaya.

It appears that the payment of the cavans of palay was Macaya's contribution for the
payment of the real estate taxes; that the nature of the work of Macaya is that of a
watchman or guard (bantay); and, that the services of Macaya as such watchman or
guard (bantay) shall continue until the property shall be converted into a subdivision
for residential purposes.

The respondent appellate court disregarded the receipts as self-serving. While it is


true that the receipts were prepared by petitioner Perpetua M. Bocanegra, Macaya
nevertheless signed them voluntarily. Besides, the receipts were written in the
vernacular and do not require knowledge of the law to fully grasp their implications.

Caballes vs DAR Caretaker planting on 60sqm land out of 500 which is in


urban, industrial, commercial area. No tenancy relationship. (sharing does
not automatically create a tenancy relationship. In this case sharing was
merely patikim)

Facts: The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60)
square meters (20 meters x 3 meters) was acquired by the spouses Arturo and
Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No.
3109-C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan
Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No. 3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the
said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes family, thus
consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor of the
petitioner.

In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent
Bienvenido Abajon constructed his house on a portion of the said landholding, paying
a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The landowner likewise
allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof
would be shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn
and bananas on the landholding. In 1978, he stopped planting corn but continued to
plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00 rental for the
lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.

after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon
that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded
him to transfer his dwelling to the opposite or southern portion of the landholding.
Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied by his house, but
his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the
premises, saying that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The
parties had a confrontation before the Barangay Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu
but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the landowners to oust
Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.

the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately


after she reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property
without her knowledge, the latter, with malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana
plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for malicious mischief was
filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously,
all the planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done
by Abajon.

Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification

That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the


complaining witness, which is devoted to bananas;

That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from
his farmholding, which act is prohibited by law; and

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.

From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the
respondent DAR. Acting on said appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then
Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous certification in its Order saying that
"the land involved is a residential lot consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the
house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the town as
evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu.

The respondent DAR, through its new Minister, herein respondent Heherson Alvarez
said criminal case as not proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties, and that the case was designed to harass the
accused into vacating his tillage.
the former landowner, Andrea Millenes, testified that Bienvenido Abajon dutifully
gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation. The grandson of
Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the former, stating
that he received said share from Abajon.

From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea
Millenes, the former owner, who had testified that she shared the produce of the land
with Abajon as truer thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA 3844, as amended, which
provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by
the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding"; and that
"(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of
the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights
and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the
new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their claim
that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide
and twenty (20) meters long, or a total of sixty (60) square meters.

Held: We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by
RA 3844, as amended. To invest him with the status of a tenant is preposterous.

Section 2 of said law provides:

It is the policy of the State:

(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and


work on the land as tillers, owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a
consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial
development;

xxx xxx xxx

RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land
that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will
produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm
family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance for
payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly
fluctuations in income."

The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the
500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and
corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-
size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece
of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to
meet the farm family's basic needs.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;


2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the
parties. The absence of one does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a
cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a
person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under
existing tenancy laws

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy


relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the
produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical
and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing
gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-
sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square
meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial
zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been
given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The
circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is more of a
caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in
the premises and to have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than
a tenant of the said portion.

Also, After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the
aforesaid criminal case against the private respondent be dismissed.

Hilario vs IAC Baltazar claims he has a tenancy relationship by virtue of a


Kasunduan with Socorro de Balagtas. He has been planting corn and
halaman and shared the produce. Socorro died, his daughter did not know
about the planting and did not consent to it, nor did she receive any share.
The hilarios acquired the property through PNB. The lot is residential. Mere
planting of corn does not convert the land into residential.

Facts: Salvador Baltazar filed a verified complaint with the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Branch VI at Baliuag, Bulacan alleging that since January, 1955 he had
been in continuous possession as a share tenant of a parcel of land with an area of
about 2 hectares situated in San Miguel, Bulacan, which was previously owned by
one Socorro Vda. de Balagtas; that on or about December 27, 1980, and thereafter,
the spouses Hilario began to threaten him to desist from entering and cultivating a
portion of the aforesaid land with an area of 4,000 square meters and otherwise
committed acts in violation of his security of tenure; that the Hilarios were
contemplating the putting up of a fence around the said portion of 4,000 square
meters and that unless restrained by the court, they would continue to do so to his
great irreparable injury.

Baltazar claims that he became a tenant of Socorro P. Vda. de Balagtas on the latter's
two-hectare landholding located at San Juan, San Miguel, Bulacan by virtue of a
"Kasunduan" executed between them

He states that he erected his house and planted "halaman," the produce of which
was divided at 70-30 and 50-50 (sic) in his favor. After the death of Socorro P. Vda. de
Balagtas, he allegedly gave the share pertaining to the landowner to her daughter
Corazon Pengzon. It was only in December, 1980 that he came to know that a portion
of the 2 hectares or 4,000 square meters is already owned by the Hilarios.

On the other hand, the petitioners aver that they acquired the landholding of 4,000
square meters from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) after it had been foreclosed
by virtue of a deed of sale executed between Bonifacio Hilario and the PNB. The
former owner Corazon Pengzon testified that she owned only two lots-Lot 427-B with
an area of 841 square meters and Lot 427-C with an area of 899 square meters with
a total area of 1,740 square meters. The other 2 lots were owned by Ruben Ocampo
and Juan Mendoza. She further testified that in 1964 at the time of the partition of
the property, she declared the property for classification purposes as "bakuran"
located in the Poblacion and had no knowledge that there were other things planted
in it except bananas and pomelos.

the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) in determining whether or not respondent


Baltazar is the tenant of the petitioners ruled that the land in question is not an
agricultural landholding but plain "bakuran," hence, Baltazar is not a tenant on the
land.

the Court of Appeals, however, remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings

the CAR found that there was no tenancy relationship existing between Baltazar and
the former owner, Corazon Pengzon.

The IAC, however, reversed the decision of the CAR

Held: From the foregoing, it is clear that Corazon Pengson did not give her consent
to Baltazar to work on her land consisting of only 1,740 square meters. We agree with
the CAR when it said. 'The law accords the landholder the right to initially choose his
tenant to work on his land. For this reason, tenancy relationship can only be created
with the consent of the true and lawful landholder through lawful means and not by
imposition or usurpation. So the mere cultivation of the land by usurper cannot
confer upon him any legal right to work the land as tenant and enjoy the protection
of security of tenure of the law (Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA
482)"

The disputed lots were acquired at a foreclosure sale from the Philippine National
Bank. They were purchased as residential lots and the deed of sale describes them as
"residential." The inspection and appraisal report of the PNB classified the land as
residential. The declaration of real property on the basis of which taxes are paid and
approved by the Acting Provincial Assessor of Bulacan classifies the land as
residential. The tax declarations show that the 841 square meter lot is assessed for
tax purposes at P25,236.00 while the 899 square meter lot is assessed at
P26,920.00. The owner states that the land has only bananas and pomelos on it. But
even if the claim of the private respondent that some corn was planted on the lots is
true, this does not convert residential land into agricultural land.

The presumption assumed by the appellate court, that a parcel of land which is
located in a poblacion is not necessarily devoted to residential purposes, is wrong. It
should be the other way around. A lot inside the poblacion should be presumed
residential, or commercial or non-agricultural unless there is clearly preponderant
evidence to show that it is agricultural.
The respondent court also failed to note that the alleged tenant pays no rental or
share to the landowners. Baltazar made a vague allegation that he shared 70-30 and
50-50 of the produce in his favor. The former owner flatly denied that she ever
received anything from him.

The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: (1)
The parties are the landholder and tenant; (2) The subject is agricultural land; (3) The
purpose is agricultural production; and (4) There is consideration; have not been met
by the private respondent.

Qua vs CA Carillo has a house and auto repair shop inside a parcel of land.
She is not a tenant, despite planting coconut tree. She only planted 7. The
land is not agriculture land, there is personal cultivation, sharing.

Facts: petitioner Lourdes Pea Qua filed a complaint for ejectment with damages
against private respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel of residential
land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao Cadastre, situated at Poblacion, Tinapi, Malinao,
Albay, with an area of 346 square meters, which is registered in her name under TCT
T-70368; that inside the land in question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all
owned by private respondents; and that said respondents' stay in the land was by
mere tolerance and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled on the land
without any agreement between her (sic), paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to
the government.

In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo, surviving spouse of the late
Salvador Carillo (and [respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the other
[private] respondents), alleged that the lot in question is a farm lot [home lot]
because she and her late husband were tenants of the same including the two other
lots adjoining the lot in question, Lots No. 2060 and 2446, which also belong to
petitioner; that as tenants, they could not just be ejected without cause; that it was
not petitioner who instituted them as tenants in the land in question but the former
owner, Leovigildo Pea who permitted the construction of the auto repair shop, the
house of Carmen Carillo and the other two houses.

After trial, the Municipal Court [found private respondents to be mere squatters and]
rendered judgment2ordering . . . [them] to vacate and remove their houses and [the]
auto repair shop from the lot in question and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees and
a monthly rental of P200.00.

On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the judgment was modified by


ordering the case dismissed [insofar as] Carmen Carillo [was concerned being
qualified as an agricultural tenant and] declaring that the home lot and her house
standing thereon should be respected.

The Regional Trial Court6 made the following observations:

The land in question is a measly three hundred forty six (346) square meters
and adjoining another two (2) lots which are separately titled having two
thousand four hundred thirteen (2,413) square meters and eight thousand two
hundred ninety eight (8,298) square meters the three (3) lots having a total
area of eleven thousand fifty seven (11,057) square meters, more or less, or
over a hectare of land owned by the plaintiff or by her predecessors-in-
interest.
In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4) structures, [to wit]: an auto
repair shop, a house of [private respondent] Carmen Carillo and two (2) other
houses owned or occupied by the rest of the [private respondents] . . .; in
other words, the [private respondents] almost converted the entire area as
their home lot for their personal aggrandizement, believing that they are all
tenants of the [petitioner].

Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500) coconut trees and only
fifty (50) coconut trees survived in the land in question and/or in the entire
area of the three lots. Such an evidence (sic) is very untruthful, unless it is a
seed bed for coconut trees as the area is so limited. But found standing in the
area in question or in the entire three (3) lots are only seven (7) coconut
trees, the harvest of which is [allegedly] 2/3 share for the [petitioner] and the
1/3 share for the [private respondents]. The share, if ever there was/were,
could not even suffice [to pay] the amount of taxes of the land (sic) paid
religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.

Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a non-agricultural tenancy relationship,


however, the Regional Trial Court decided in favor of private respondent Carmen
Carillo

Issue: whether or not private respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants
entitled to, among others, the use and possession of a home lot.

Held: Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards relations between
litigants in land cases, the findings and conclusions of the Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, being preliminary in nature, are not in any way binding on the trial courts
which must endeavor to arrive at their own independent conclusions.

Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine, proceeded to so conduct its
own investigation and examined the facts of this case, a contrary conclusion would
have been reached, and the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained,
particularly when the circumstances obtaining in this case are examined in the light
of the essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus:
(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land;
(3) the purpose is agricultural production; and (4) there is consideration. It is also
understood that (5) there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that (6) there
is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the
harvest.

Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the presence of private respondents
on the property as given by petitioners predecessor-in-interest, the situation
obtaining in this case still lacks, as discussed earlier, three of the afore-enumerated
requisites, namely: agricultural production, personal cultivation and sharing of
harvests.

Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo is not entitled to be


considered an agricultural tenant. Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a
home lot, a privilege granted by Section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, in
relation to Section 22 (3) of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, only to persons
satisfying the qualifications of agricultural tenants of coconut lands.
Guerrero vs CA Benitez and family cultivated by smudging or smoking the
plantation, taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and
watering, thereby increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together
with his family, handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the
processing of copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby
cultivating the land and share-tenants not merely farm laborers. The abolition of
shared tenancy does not convert the shared tenant into a farm laborer, but into a
leaseholder.

Facts: spouses Manuel and Maria Guerrero to take care of their 60 heads of cows
which were grazing within their 21-hectare coconut plantation situated at Bo. San
Joaquin, Maria Aurora, Subprovince of Aurora, Quezon. Plaintiff was allowed for that
purpose to put up a hut within the plantation where he and his family stayed. In
addition to attending to the cows, he was made to clean the already fruitbearing
coconut trees, burn dried leaves and grass and to do such other similar chores.
During harvest time which usually comes every three months, he was also made to
pick coconuts and gather the fallen ones from a 16-hectare portion of the 21-hectare
plantation. He had to husk and split the nuts and then process its meat into copra in
defendants copra kiln. For his work related to the coconuts, he shared 1/3 of the
proceeds from the copra he processed and sold in the market. For attending to the
cows he was paid P500 a year.
Sometime in the early part of 1973, plaintiff was refrained from gathering nuts
from the 10-hectare portion of the 16-hectare part of the plantation from where he
used to gather nuts. He felt aggrieved by the acts of defendants and he brought the
matter to the attention of the Office of Special Unit in the Office of the President in
Malacaang, Manila.
. This led to an execution of an agreement, now marked as Exh. D, whereby
defendants agreed, among others, to let plaintiff work on the 16-hectare portion of
the plantation as tenant thereon and that their relationship will be guided by the
provisions of Republic Act No. 1199. The Agricultural Tenancy Act of the Philip-pines.
Then in July, 1973, he was again refrained from gathering nuts from the 10-
hectare portion of the plantation with threats of bodily harm if he persists to gather
fruits therefrom. Defendant spouses, the Guerreros, then assigned defendants
Rogelio and Paulino Latigay to do the gathering of the nuts and the processing
thereof into copra. Defendants Guerreros also caused to be demolished a part of the
cottage where plaintiff and his family lived, thus, making plaintiffs feel that they
(defendants) meant business. Hence, this case for reinstatement with damages.

Held: The law defines agricultural tenancy as the physical possession by a person
of land devoted to agriculture, belonging to or legally possessed by another for the
purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his
immediate farm household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the
harvest with the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or
in money, or in both

With petitioner reference to this case, share tenancy exists whenever two persons
agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes
the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of
the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available
from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be
divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is any agricultural salary or piece
worker but is not limited to a farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this
Code expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor
practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment

On August 8, 1963, Republic Act 3844 abolished and outlawed share tenancy and put
in its stead the agricultural leasehold system. On September 10, 1971, Republic Act
6389 amending Republic Act 3844 declared share tenancy relationships as contrary
to public policy. On the basis of this national policy, the petitioner asserts that no
cause of action exists in the case at bar and the lower courts committed grave error
in upholding the respondents status as share tenant in the petitioners landholding.
The petitioners arguments are regressive and, if followed, would turn back the
advances in agrarian reform law. The repeal of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code mark the movement not only towards the leasehold
system but towards eventual ownership of land by its tillers. The phasing out of share
tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into mere farmhands or
hired laborers with no tenurial rights whatsoever.

It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA 1199) and the
Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have not been entirely repealed by the
Code of Agrarian Reform (RA 6389) even if the same have been substantially
modified by the latter. However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the
rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending under the repealed
statute is a mere general principle. Among the established exceptions are when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired

Cultivation is another important factor in determining the existence of tenancy


relationships. It is admitted that it had been one Conrado Caruruan, with others, who
had originally cleared the land in question and planted the coconut trees, with the
respondent coming to work in the landholding only after the same were already fruit
bearing. The mere fact that it was not respondent Benitez who had actually seeded
the land does not mean that he is not a tenant of the land. The definition of
cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing or harrowing of the land. It
includes the promotion of growth and the care of the plants, or husbanding the
ground to forward the products of the earth by general industry. The raising of
coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice, the planting of coconut
seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes are merely dug on the ground
of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings placed in the holes and the surface
thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees are planted only every thirty to a
hundred years. The major work in raising coconuts begins when the coconut trees are
already fruit-bearing. Then it is cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation,
taking care of the coconut trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby
increasing the produce. The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family,
handles all phases of farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of
copra, although at times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land,
shows that he is a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.

Further indicating the existence of a tenancy relationship between petitioners and


respondent is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on a tercio basis
that is, a 1/3 to 2/3 sharing in favor of the petitioner-landowners. Though not a
positive indication of the existence of tenancy relations per se, the sharing of
harvests, taken together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be
present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondent that indeed, he is a
tenant.

Before we close this case, it is pertinent to reiterate that the respondents right as
share tenant do not end with the abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to
uplift the farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them dignified,
self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens x x x active participants in nation-
building, agricultural share tenants are given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first
step towards the ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be achieved by
the government program of land reform. It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut
lands and sugar lands has not yet been implemented. The policy makers of
government are still studying the feasibility of its application and the consequences
of its implementation. Legislation still has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it
may be implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and independent farmers
working on lands which they own remains. The petitioners arguments which would
use the enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for setting back or
eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have no merit.

Bonifacio vs Dizon ejectment of an agricultural lessee is not personal.


Personal cultivation includes also the immediate family of the land holder.
Writ of execution should be granted.

Facts: The favorable judgment adverted to by petitioners traces its origin to the
complaint filed on July 1, 1968 by Olimpio Bonifacio before the then Court of Agrarian
Relations

seeking the ejectment of private respondent Pastora San Miguel from Bonifacios two-
hectare agricultural land situated at Patubig, Marilao, Bulacan

The ground relied upon therefor was personal cultivation under Section 36 (1) of
R.A. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code

After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered therein on September 18, 1970 by
Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio:
1. 1.Granting authority to plaintiff OLIMPIO BONIFACIO to eject defendant
PASTORA SAN MIGUEL from the landholding in question situated at Patubig,
Marilao, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares, more or less, and
consequently, ordering said defendant to vacate the same landholding and
deliver possession thereof to said plaintiff for the latters personal cultivation,
subject to the provisions of Section 25 of R.A. 3844; and
2. 2.Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims of the parties. 3

On appeal by private respondent Pastora San Miguel, the Court of Appeals 4 modified
said judgment with respect to her counterclaim by ordering Olimpio Bonifacio to pay
her the amount of P1,376.00. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects

During the pendency of her petition, on August 7, 1983, Olimpio Bonifacio died. As
no notice of such death was given to the Court, no order for the substitution of his
heirs was made. On July 31, 1985, the Court En Banc resolved to deny private
respondents petition for lack of merit and to affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals

Subsequently, petitioners Rosalina Bonifacio, as surviving wife, and Gabriel,


Ponciano, Tiburcio, Beatriz, Generosa, Silveria, Leonardo, Felomena, Encarnacion and
Leonila all surnamed Bonifacio, as children and heirs of Olimpio Bonifacio, moved for
the execution of the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B 68 before the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan.

Thereafter, private respondent Pastora San Miguel moved to quash the writ of
execution. This was opposed by petitioners who in turn sought the issuance of a writ
of demolition and an order declaring Pastora San Miguel in contempt of court for
allegedly re-entering the subject land.

Judge Dizon ruled in favor of the respondents.

Petitioners contend that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion


tantamount to lack of jurisdiction in ruling that the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B
68 can no longer be executed as said action is purely personal in character and
therefore cannot, upon Olimpio Bonifacios death, be inherited by his heirs. They
assert that CAR Case No. 2160-B 68, being an ejectment case and not one of those
specifically provided by law to be purely personal, survives the death of a party.
Furthermore, as under Rule 39, Section 49 (b) of the Rules of Court, a judgment is
binding not only upon the parties but also on their successors-in-interest, petitioners
are entitled to enforce the decision in CAR Case No. 2160-B 68.

Private respondent, on the other hand, places stress on the fact that the action under
consideration is not an ordinary ejectment case but an agrarian case for the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee. She theorizes that the right being asserted in the
action is personal to Olimpio Bonifacio, which necessarily died with him. She further
contends that the non-substitution of Olimpio Bonifacio by his heirs rendered the
proceedings taken after his death null and void.

Held: Private respondent is correct in characterizing CAR Case No. 2160-B 68 as


more than an ordinary ejectment case. It is, indeed, an agrarian case for the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee, which in the light of the public policy involved, is
more closely and strictly regulated by the State. This factor, however, does not
operate to bar the application to the instant case of the general rule that an
ejectment case survives the death of a party.

Under this provision, ejectment of an agricultural lessee was authorized not only
when the landowner-lessor desired to cultivate the landholding, but also when a
member of his immediate family so desired. In so providing, the law clearly did not
intend to limit the right of cultivation strictly and personally to the landowner but to
extend the exercise of such right to the members of his immediate family. Clearly
then, the right of cultivation as a ground for ejectment was not a right exclusive and
personal to the landowner-lessor. To say otherwise would be to put to naught the
right of cultivation likewise conferred upon the landowners immediate family
members.

The right of cultivation was extended to the landowners immediate family members
evidently to place the landowner-lessor in parity with the agricultural lessee who was
(and still is) allowed to cultivate the land with the aid of his farm household. In this
regard, it must be observed that an agricultural lessee who cultivates the landholding
with the aid of his immediate farm household is within the contemplation of the law
engaged in personal cultivation. Thus, whether used in reference to the agricultural
lessor or lessee, the term personal cultivation cannot be given a restricted
connotation to mean a right personal and exclusive to either lessor or lessee. In
either case, the right extends to the members of the lessors or lessees immediate
family members.
Rules of procedure make it the duty of the attorney to inform the court promptly of
his clients death, incapacity or incompetency during the pendency of the action and
to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representative. In case of a partys death, the court, if the action survives, shall then
order upon proper notice the legal representatives of the deceased to appear and to
be substituted for the deceased within a period of 30 days or within such time as may
be granted.

Lastimoza vs. Blanco Lastimoza vs. Blanco Gallego is an unlawful


possessor/ intruder, hence, the alleged tenancy relationship between him
and Panada is inexistent. no security of tenure

Facts: On September 22, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Iloilo adjudicated in
favor of Silvino Lastimoza and his wife Honorata Gonzales, herein petitioners, a parcel
of land. Subsequently, an Original Certificate of Title covering the same was issued
by the Register of Deeds and the land was placed in their possession through a writ
of possession, the sheriff of the province ejecting therefrom Perfecto, Rosalina,
Encarnacion, Lucila and Lydia, all surnamed Gallego.

On September 13, 1958, respondent Nestor Paada, claiming to be a tenant since the
start of the 1956 agricultural year of Perfecto Gallego, filed against herein petitioners
a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations praying, among other things, that he
be maintained as tenant on about 2 hectares of the land. The Agrarian Court issued
an interlocutory order directing the JAGO officer or his authorized representative to
supervise the harvest and threshing of the palay crops standing on the landholding,
and to deposit, after deducting the expenses therefor, the net produce in a bonded
warehouse.

Petitioners filed a motion to lift the interlocutory order and moved to dismiss the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being alleged that
there was no tenancy relationship between them and respondent Nestor Paada.
Both motions, however, were denied. Petitioners filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

Held: We find the petition meritorious.

It is not disputed that respondent Nestor Paada worked on a portion of the land in
question by virtue of a so called oral contract of tenancy with Perfecto Gallego who
was then in possession of the land. The latter, however, was ejected from the land
after the same had been adjudicated in a land registration proceeding to herein
petitioners. Snce that court has, in effect, ruled that Perfecto Gallego, the supposed
former landholder, was an unlawful possessor and intruder, respondent Nestor
Paada cannot now invoke the security of tenure guaranteed in section 9 of the
Tenancy Law (Republic Act No. 1199) and claim that petitioners, as the prevailing
party in the land registration proceeding, are duty bound to maintain him as their
tenant.
Said section 9 of the Tenancy Lawin providing that "the sale or alienation of the
land do not of themselves extinguish the tenancy relationship," for in such cases,
"the purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former
landholder in relation to the tenant,"obviously assumes the existence of a valid
tenancy relation between the former landholder and his tenants, and contemplates
privity of contract or alienation of valid title be it of ownership or possession, between
the old landholder and the new.
In the instant case, there can be no question that there is no privity of contract or
alienation between Perfecto Gallego, the alleged former landholder and herein
petitioners. Neither can it be pretended that there was a valid tenancy relation
between said Perfecto Gallego and respondent Paada. Tenancy relationship can only
be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the
"owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land" (sec. 5[b], Rep. Act No.
1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land
subject of the tenancy. Perfecto Gallego, the alleged former landholder, having been
ousted by writ of possession issued by a competent court and virtually declared a
usurper or intruder, respondent Paada, as his tenant, can have no better right and
claim security of tenure, a guarantee afforded only to tenants de jure.

It being evident for the reasons above stated that herein petitioners are not legally
bound to assume the former landholders rights and obligations in relation to his
tenants, it results that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties in this
case, and consequently, the Agrarian Court erred in assuming jurisdiction to hear and
determine respondent Paada's complaint or petition.

Felizardo vs. Fernandez Siegfredo is an implied tenant having taken over


his fathers tenancy for 15 years and the Fernandezs received a share in
the produce. Despite the fact that under Sec. 9 the right to choose it the
Fernandezs they have allowed too long a time to go by, and the one they
chose to succeed was not qualified.

Facts: Respondent, Siegfredo Fernandez filed a complaint for illegal ejectment,


reinstatement, and damages against petitioners Felizardos and Adalids, owners of a
two-hectare agricultural land in Tangub City, Province of Misamis Occidental, of which
1.5 hectares tenanted by Siegfredos father used for planting coconut and corn since
the early 1930s.

In 1981, when Policarpo was already 74 years old, the task of working on the
tenanted land fell on his son, Siegfredo, who was the only member of the household
then living with Policarpo. For close to 15 years, Siegfredo cultivated the land,
harvested the coconuts, and sold the copra to buyers in Tangub City. During those
years, the pesadas were placed in Siegfredos name and the latter observed the
same 1/3-2/3 sharing arrangement of the copra produce with the landowners, as his
father previously did.

After Policarpo passed away, the Felizardos and Adalidschildren of the landowners
and acting as attorneys-in-fact of the Adalids who were then already residing in Los
Angeles, California, U.S.Asought to eject Siegfredo from the land. The Felizardos
refused to recognize Siegfredo as the lawful successor to Policarpos tenancy rights
and instead, appointed Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, Siegfredos 65-year old elder
sister, as tenant.

Subsequently, the Felizardos and Adalids brought criminal charges against Siegfredo
for usurpation and qualified theft. While these cases were pending, the landowners
harvested and sold the coconuts old and excluded Siegfredo in the sharing
arrangement.

Siegfredo then filed this present case before the Regional Adjudication Board of DAR
against the Adalids and Felizardos. Siegfredo alleged that by virtue of successional
tenancy rights, he is the lawful tenant of the land. He pointed out that he substituted
his father and assumed cultivation of the land for 15 long years without objection
from the landowners. Therefore, he became a bona fide tenant and could not be
ejected because he is the lawful tenant.

Siegfredo also claimed that there is no other qualified successor to his fathers
leasehold right because all his eight elder siblings were no longer members of
Policarpos immediate farm household. Asuncion, in particular, was already of
advanced age and could not be expected to work on the land personally.

On the other hand, the Felizardos and Adalids denied Siegfredos tenancy status and
insisted that after Policarpos death, they, as agricultural lessors, had the right to
choose who among the Fernandez siblings would succeed Policarpo in accordance
with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of Siegfredo and held that the landowners
right to choose a lessor under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 is circumscribed by the
requirements that the prospective lessor must be able to cultivate the land
personally and be a member of the original tenants immediate farm household.
Based on these factors, the Adjudicator declared that Asuncion does not qualify to
take over Policarpos leasehold right. Moreover, the Adjudicator noted that the
landowners did not object to Siegfredos tillage of the land and they accepted their
share in the harvest proceeds from Siegfredo for 15 years. According to the
Adjudicator, they impliedly consented to the new tenancy relationship under Section
7 of Republic Act No. 11997 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended.

DARAB and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions. , where the case was
docketed as DARAB Case No. 4983, the Board affirmed the findings of the Regional
Adjudicator.8 The Court of Appeals, to which the case was subsequently elevated,
agreed with the DARAB.9

Issue: Whether or not Siegfredo has acquired the status of agricultural tenant which
would preclude petitioners from exercising their right to choose Asuncion as
Policarpos successor after the latters death.

Held: Petitioners maintain that they did not object to Siegfredos personal
cultivation of the land for 15 years because they believed that during that period,
Siegfredo was merely aiding Policarpo as member of the latters immediate farm
household. They argue that could not be construed as having impliedly consented to
a leasehold relation with Siegfredo. The period of 15 years is too long a time to hold
on to such a thought which appears to be only an unverified assumption.

The undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, Siegfredo completely took over working
on the land since 1981 and did not merely aid his since his father was already very
old and incapable to continue farming. Section 5 (p)11 of R.A. No. 1199 defines
incapacity as any cause or circumstance which prevents the tenant from fulfilling
his contractual obligations.

Petitioners were not unaware of this circumstance since they already dealt with, and
received the lands proceeds from Siegfredo.

A tenancy relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or


impliedly, in accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199.
Although petitioners did not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with
Siegfredo, they consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by allowing him to cultivate
the landholding and receiving from him the landowners share of the harvest over a
considerable length of time.
While it is true that Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 gives the lessor/landowner the right to
choose a tenant successor in case of death or incapacity of the original tenant, in this
case we agree that said right could no longer be exercised by petitioners. Not only
have they allowed the lapse of a long period of time to exercise said right, it was also
found that the successor they had allegedly chosen, Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa,
was not qualified to succeed Policarpo because (a) she was no longer a member of
the latters immediate farm household; and (b) she could not and did not, at any
time, personally cultivate the land as shown by her unexplained absence during the
harvests subsequent to respondents dispossession. Note also that in 1995, she was
already 65 years old.

Accordingly, we find applicable in this instance the equitable principle of estoppel by


laches in Siegfredos favor. In allowing petitioners to dispossess respondent would
clearly prejudice the tiller, who poured time and energy to ensure that his fathers
leasehold remained productive not merely for respondents advantage, but for
petitioners as well.

Endaya vs. Court of Appeals civil lease is not among the causes to
extinguish a leasehold relation

Facts: The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of
agricultural land consisting of 20,200 square meters situated at Malvar, Batangas,
devoted to rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been
cultivating this land as a tenant under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This
fact, petitioners do not dispute.

On May 2, 1974, a lease contract was executed between the Spouses San Diego and
one Regino Cassanova for a period of four years. The lease contract obliged
Cassanova to pay P400.00 per hectare per annum and gave him the authority to
oversee the planting of crops on the land. Fideli signed this lease contract as one of
two witnesses. The lease contract was subsequently renewed but the rental was
raised to P600.00. Fideli signed the contract as witness.

During the entire duration of the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego and
Cassanova, Fideli continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with Cassanova
the net produce of the harvests.

On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners, Endaya for
the sum of P26,000.00 Fideli continued to farm the land although told him to
immediately vacate the land. It is undisputed that Fideli deposited with the Luzon
Development Bank an amount of about P8,000.00 as partial payment of the land-
owners share in the harvests for the years 1980 until 1985.

Due to petitioners persistent demand for private respondent to vacate the land,
Fideli filed a complaint that he be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not Fideli is an agricultural tenant of petitioner, thus has security
of tenure?

Held: Yes. Section 7 of the RA 3844 law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure
by providing the following: The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall
confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding
until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless
authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the subject
landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land, as
was done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the
extinguishment of the agricultural leasehold relation. On the contrary, Section 10 of
the law provides:

Sec.10.Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of


Period, etc.The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the
landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the
legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall
be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.

Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural


leasehold subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal
possession, such as lease, will not terminate the rights of the agricultural lessee who
is given protection by the law by making such rights enforceable against the
transferee or the landowners successor in interest.
The fact that Fideli knew of, and consented to, the said lease contract by signing as
witness to the agreement may not be construed as a waiver of his rights as an
agricultural lessee. On the contrary, it was his right to know about the lease contract
since he had to deal with a new person instead of with the owners directly as he used
to.

The consent given by the original owners to constitute Fideli as the agricultural lessee
of the subject landholding binds private respondents who, as successors-in-interest of
the Spouses San Diego, step into the latters shoes, acquiring not only their rights but
also their obligations.
Fideli has unilaterally decided to pay only 25% of the net harvests to petitioner but
his agreement with the Spouses San Diego, the original owners, was for a fifty-fifty
(50-50) sharing of the net produce of the land. The court held that the same sharing
agreement should be maintained between Endaya and Fideli. Hence, the Court
ordered Fideli to pay the back rentals from 190 -1992 + legal interest at legal rate.

Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals failed to exercise
choice, right of priority follows
Spouses Alfonso Olympia and Carolina Zacarias and Spouses Claro Zacarias and
Cristina Lorenzo were the co-owners of an agricultural land in the Malinta Estate.
Eventually, Carolina became the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement.

Meanwhile, Anacleto Pea who was a tenant of the property and a holder of a
Certificate of Agricultural Leasehold had a house constructed on the lot. He had
several children, among whom are Emilio Pea and Celia Segovia, who also had their
houses constructed on the property.

Anacleto, who was already 78 years old and a widower, married Delia Razon, then
only 29 years old. Anacleto then died intestate and was survived by Delia and his
children in his first marriage, including Emilio.
Emilio and Delia, with the help of Raymond Eugenio, her son-in-law, continue d tilling
and cultivating the property. On January 22, 1992, Emilio signed a handwritten
declaration that he was the tenant in the land and he was returning the landholding
to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of P1,500,000 as disturbance
compensation

In the meantime, petitioner Lims established Milestone as incorporators, in order to


acquire and develop the aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel. Carolina
Zacarias executed a deed of sale transfering the to petitioner Milestone for
P7,110,000. Thus, Milestone became the owner of the adjoining lots.

Respondents Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio filed a complaint against
Emilio Pea, Carolina Zacarias and her brother Francisco Olympia, William Perez, and
Milestone Realty with the PARAD, praying to declare as null and void the sale by
Carolina to Perez and by the latter to Milestone, and to recognize and respect their
tenancy.

In her answer, Carolina Zacarias declared that she chose Emilio Pea as her tenant-
beneficiary on the said property within 30 days after the death of Anacleto,
conformably with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844.

The PARAD rendered a decision dismissing the complaint ruling that the order of
preference cited in Section 9 of Republic Act 3844 is not absolute and may be
disregarded for valid cause. It also took note that Emilios two siblings have openly
recognized Emilio as the legitimate successor to Anacletos tenancy rights.

DARAB reversed the decision, noting that Carolinas affidavit did not show any
categorical admission that she made her choice within the one (1) month period
except to state that when Anacleto died, the right of the deceased was inherited by
Emilio Pea which could only mean that she recognized Emilio Pea by force of
circumstance under a nebulous time frame. The CA affirmed this decision.

Issue: Whether or not Delia Razon Pea has a right of first priority over Emilio Pea
in succeeding to the tenancy rights of Anacleto over the subject landholding.

Held: At the outset, it bears stressing that there appears to be no dispute as to


tenancy relationship between Carolina Zacarias and the late Anacleto Pea. The
controversy centers on who is the rightful and legal successor to Anacletos tenancy
rights. Relevant to the resolution of the first issue is Section 9 of Republic Act No.
3844, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provides as follows:

SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or


Incapacity of the Parties.In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue
between the agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the
landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one month
from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the
surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the
next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided,
That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee
occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end
of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event the agricultural
lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided, the
priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the
leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.

Petitioners contend that Section 9 does not require any form or manner in which the
choice should be made. In support thereof, petitioners invoke Carolinas affidavit and
her Answer where she recognized Emilio Pea as the successor to Anacletos tenancy
rights. Petitioners argued that Delia could not have qualified as a successor-tenant to
Anacleto due to lack of personal cultivation. Further, she had not been paying rent on
the land.

Respondents note that it was only after the lapse of two (2) years from the death of
Anacleto that both Carolina and Emilio claimed in their respective affidavits that
Emilio inherited the rights of Anacleto as a tenant. According to respondents, such
inaction to make a choice within the time frame required by law is equivalent to
waiver on Carolinas part to choose a substitute tenant.
On this score, we agree with private respondents. As found by both the DARAB and
the Court of Appeals, Carolina had failed to exercise her right to choose a substitute
for the deceased tenant, from among those qualified, within the statutory period.

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 is clear and unequivocal in providing for the rules
on succession to tenancy rights. Agricultural leasehold relationship is not
extinguished by the death or incapacity of the parties. In case the agricultural lessee
dies or is incapacitated, the leasehold relation shall continue between the agricultural
lessor and any of the legal heirs of the agricultural lessee who can cultivate the
landholding personally, in the order of preference provided under Section 9 of
Republic Act 3844, as chosen by the lessor within one month from such death or
permanent incapacity.

Applying Section 9 of Republic Act 3844, in the light of prevailing jurisprudence, it is


undeniable that respondent Delia Razon Pea, the surviving spouse of the original
tenant, Anacleto Pea, is the first in the order of preference to succeed to the
tenancy rights of her husband because the lessor, Carolina Zacarias, failed to
exercise her right of choice within the one month period from the time of Anacletos
death.

Villaviza vs. Panganiban


This is a Review of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Cabanatuan City,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Quirino Capalad to


pay the petitioners as follows:

1. Jose Aguilar P297.00


2. Agapito Neuda 264.75
3. Sixto Malarulat 264.25
4. Rafael Alamon 164.00
5. Petronilo Aguilar 335.25
6. Eulogio Samaniego 219.00
7. Castor Rufino 234.00
The following respondents are hereby ordered to vacate their respective landholdings
in favor of the petitioners, subject to the provisions of pars. 3 and 4, Sec. 22, R.A. No.
1199, as amended, the indemnity in the aforestated paragraphs, supra, shall be paid
by respondent Quirino Capalad:

Respondents Petitioners
1. Alejo Pramel 1. Jose Aguilar
2. Severino Padilla 2. Agapito Neuda
3. Domingo Villaviza 3. Rafael Alamon
4. Marcelo Villaviza 4. Petronilo Aguilar
5. Cirilo Ramos 5. Eulogio Samaniego
6. Ciriaco Pizaro 6. Castor Rufino
7. Cesario Villaviza, Morelos, Morelos 7. Sixto Malarulat
SO ORDERED."

The lower court found that the above-named respondents (petitioners below) were
tenants since 1944 in a riceand situated in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and owned by
Domingo Fajardo. Fajardo gave out the land for lease (civil lease) to the petitioner,
-Quirino Capalad, starting with the crop year 1955-56. The said lessee, in June, 1955,
plowed the land by machinery, and installed, as his tenants, his above-named co-
petitioners in this Court, so that when the respondents went back to their respective
landholdings to prepare them for planting they found the land already cultivated. The
respondents-tenants demanded their reinstatement, but every time they did, which
they did yearly until the present suit was filed, Quirino Capalad promised, but never
fulfilled, to reinstate them for the agricultural year following said demands.

As grounds for the petition for review, the petitioners claim grave abuse of discretion
by the Agrarian Court and a lack of substantive evidence to support its findings.

The above claim is wild and reckless and definitely without merit, since the decision
itself contains the recitals of the testimonies of the witnesses upon which the court
based its findings, and the petitioners do not question the existence and adequacy of
these testimonies. That the court believed the evidence for the respondents rather
than those for the petitioners is fee tenancy court's prerogative, and, as a reviewing
court, the Supreme Court will not weigh anew the evidence ; all that this Court is
called upon to do, insofar as the evidence is concerned, is to find out if the conclusion
of the lower court is supported by substantive evidence; and the present case is, as
hereinbefore explained

A tenant's right to be respected in his tenure under Republic Act 1199, as amended,
is an obligation of the landholder created by law, and an action for violation thereof
prescribes in ten years under No. 12 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code The respondents
were ousted from their landholdings in June, 1955, they filed the present action on 31
March 1960; therefore, the period of limitation had not expired.

The tenancy court found that the ejected tenants-respondents have engaged in
gainful -occupations since their illegal ejectment and had delayed the filing of the
case, and for these reasons the court made an award for damages against Quirino
Capalad equivalent to only two harvests based on the landholder's share for the crop
year 1954-1955,
The premises for the award are erroneous. Under section 27(1) of Republic Act 1199,
as amended, a tenant's earnings may not be deducted from the damages because
the said section positively provides that the tenant's freedom to earn elsewhere is to
be added ("in addition") to his right to damages in case of Illegal ejectment. Nor can
it be said that the respondents-tenants are guilty of laches for having unnecessarily
delayed the filing of the case, because the delay was attributable to Capalad's
promises to reinstate them.

The amount of the award to each respondent should not, however, fee disturbed
because the respondents' non-appeal from the decision Indicates their satisfaction
there-with and a waiver of any amounts other than those indicated in the decision,
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision 'under review is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.