Replies To The Contributors

University of Arkansas Press
Replies to the Contributors

Author(s): Alvin Goldman
Source: Philosophical Topics, Vol. 29, No. 1/2, The Philosophy of Alvin Goldman (SPRING AND
FALL 2001), pp. 461-511
Published by: University of Arkansas Press
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PHILOSOPHICALTOPICS
ANDFALL2001
VOL.29, NOS.1 & 2, SPRING
Replies to the Contributors
Alvin Goldman
RutgersUniversity
Nothing couldbe a betterrewardforphilosophical workthancriticisms and

commentson thatwork,or relatedprojects,by someof thebestphiloso-
phersin therelevant Hillforinitiating
fields.I thankChristopher andguid-
ingthisspecialissue,HilaryKornblith andThomasSenorfortheireditorial
roles,andthecontributors fortheirsplendidandchallenging articles.My
repliesareorganizedintofivecategories:(1) justification,
internalism,and
externalism;(2) epistemology andpsychology;(3) socialepistemology; (4)
philosophy ofmind;and(5) law anddemocracy. Thesecategories comprise
almostall of thetopicsthathave engrossedme overthelasttwenty-five
years.
I. JUSTIFICATION, INTERNALISM, AND EXTERNALISM
BONJOUR
Theintemalism-externalism hasbeenatthecenterofthedebate
controversy
overepistemic justification the
during lasttwodecades.RecentlyI subjected
theinternalist to a
approach generalcritique,1 and LaurenceBonJour now
responds to that I
critique. hadcharacterized
the "guidance-deontological"
ormostpopular,rationaleforinternalism.
rationaleas thecentral, BonJour
acknowledges hisown previousadvocacy of thedeontological
conception,
461
withitsemphasison dutyor responsibility, buthe now offersa different
rationaleforinternalism. The conceptionarises,he says,whenone asks a
certain"globalepistemological" questionaboutone's ownbeliefs.BonJour
actuallyformulates the in
question tworather different ways,though he does
notseemto noticethedifference. The first formulation highlights , or
truth
Here he characterizes
reliability. thequestionas a "first-person question
aboutthetruth (or reliability) of myownbeliefs"(53). A secondformula-
tionhighlights reasons.HereBonJour writes:"theissueis whether I have
any reason to think that of
any my beliefs are true (or that of
any myways
of arriving at beliefsare reliable)"(54, italicsadded,and originalitalics
omitted).Thisdifference is notinsignificant. Internalist methods might iden-
tifyreasons for my beliefs but remain neutral about their truth.I do not
meantoendorsethisclaim.Butitseemsimportant todistinguish BonJour's
two formulations, because thecase forinternalism mightbe stronger or
weakerdepending on whichis chosen.
BonJoursaysthatinternalism, on his current view,is dictatedby the
traditionalepistemological situation, in which I ask globalepistemological
questionsaboutmyown beliefsratherthansomebodyelse's. Giventhis
first-personconcern,whatmustbe appealedtoin answering thetraditional
questionarethingsthatare "internal to theindividual's first-person cogni-
tiveperspective , thatis, something thatis unproblematically availablefrom
thatperspective" (54). Itis notclearhowthefirst-person questionimpliesa
restrictionon whatmustbe used to answerthatquestion;in particular, it
isn'tclearhowthe"unproblematic availability" restrictionis derived.A bit
laterBonJour saysthatthethings towhichthejustification mayappealmust
be "directandunproblematic" (54), so directness andunproblematicness are
crucialtohisconception oftheinternal. Theinternal, he explains,shouldnot
be restrictedto consciousmentalstatesandtheirproperties. Othersortsof
-
facts e.g., factsaboutlogical and probabilistic relations- mayalso be
internaliftheyaredirectly and unproblematically availableor accessible
froma first-person cognitive perspective.
To fixwhatBonJourmeansby "internal," then,we mustfixwhathe
meansby"directandunproblematic" accessoravailability. Claimstowhich
a personhas directand unproblematic access,he says,are claimsthatdo
"notdependon otherclaimsthatwouldthemselves haveto be justifiedin
somemoreindirectway" (54). How shouldwe interpret thisdefinition?
First,thisexplanationuses theterm"indirect," and it isn'tclearwhatis
meantby"indirect" untilwe aretoldwhatis meantby"direct."Butdirect-
ness (along with unproblematicness) is preciselywhat is here being
explained.So we seemto havea definitional circularity. Second,whatdoes
BonJour meanwhenhe talksaboutclaimsdependingon otherclaimsthat
would"have"tobejustified in another way?"Have to"forwhatreason?In
ordertomeeta skeptical challenge?Is he sayingthatexternal factsareones
462
thatrequirefurther justification tomeetskepticalchallenges, whereasinter-
nalfactsareonesaboutwhichno skeptical challenges canbe raised?Thisis
a tempting interpretation, butitcannotbe whatBonJour means.He himself
concedesthat"skepticalquestionscan be raised. . . aboutessentially any-
thing"(57). Andsurelyhe is righthere.Skepticalquestions(forexample,
questionsaboutreliability) can be askedaboutintrospection andso-called
rational insight as muchas theycanbe askedaboutperception andmemory.
So we cannotdistinguish internal factsandexternal factsbysayingthatthe
former, unlikethe latter,aie immuneto skepticalchallenges.So what
exactlydoes BonJour's criterion of"directandunproblematic access"come
to?I am notsure.
Thematter getsmoreperplexing whenwe lookat someofthepossibil-
itiesBonJour seriously contemplates. According to standard formsofinter-
nalism,factsthatmakeperceptual beliefstrueareexternal facts.Becauseof
this,suchfactscould notqualifyas justifiers underorthodoxvarietiesof
internalism. One expectsBonJour to maintain thatintrospection andratio-
nal insightyielddirectandunproblematic access to certainfacts,andthat
thesetypesoffactsaie theinternal ones.Perception, on theotherhand,is a
resourcethatpresumably disclosesexternal facts.So perception hadbetter
be a resourcethatyieldsat mostindirectandproblematic access to facts.
Butthisis notwhatBonJour says.Whathe actuallysaysis: "ifa directreal-
istview[ofperception] shouldturnouttobe correct, then,atleaston some
versions,perceptual beliefsmightbe directly justifiedin a waythatwould
satisfy thebasicrationalefortheinternalist view"(56). In otherwords,ifI
understand him,BonJour allowsthatfactslike"Therearetwohandsbefore
me" couldturnoutto be internal facts.This strikesme as a rather bizarre
conceptionofinternalism, sharplyat variancewithmostepistemologists'
uses oftheterm.
PerhapsBonJour arrivesat thispositionbecausehe wantsinternalism
to turnoutto be correctno matter whichtypesoffacts,in theend,mustbe
countenanced as internal.However,eventhisunorthodox approachtointer-
nalismdoesn'tguarantee itscorrectness.It couldturnoutthatall proposi-
tions and all cognitiveresourcesdepend on otherclaims for their
justification. Isn't thispreciselythepositionof coherentism, a position
BonJour onceoccupied?Ifthiswereright, therewouldbe no internal facts
at all underBonJour'scharacterization, and thedoctrineof internalism
wouldcollapse.
So, myfirstfundamental problemwithBonJour'sproposalis insuffi-
cientclarity inwhathe meansbycallinga fact"internal." A secondproblem
is insufficientclarity inthedoctrine he associateswithinternalism. Typically
internalism is presented as thedoctrine thatall justifiers
areinternal states
ofaffairs, howeverexactly"internal" getsdefined. ButBonJour, apparently,
disagreeswiththis.Considerthefollowing passage:
463
Perhaps a moreimmediately urgentquestionis whatelse,if
anything,theinternalist
caninitiallyappealto.I say"initially,"
becauseitis ofcourseentirely withinternalism
compatible that
ifa goodcasecanbe madefrom theresources thatarelegiti-
matelyavailableata givenpointforthelikely truthorreliabil-
ityof beliefsarrived at in somefurther way,suchas, for
example, byaccepting testimony ofvarioussorts,thensuch
additionalcognitiveresources becomeon thatbasisentirely
acceptabletotheinternalist.Thusthestraightforward response
to Goldman's puzzlement as to whyonlyfactsthatcan be
known
directly qualifyas "justifiers"
fortheinternalistis that
thisrestriction
is concerned withtheinitialstageofinquiry:
factsthatareonlyindirectly knowablebecomeavailableonly
whenandifanappropriate casecanbe madeforthemonthe
basisofwhatis directlyknowable Thisis whytheprimary
concernoftheinternalistis toidentify
thoseresources forjusti-
fication
thatareavailable before further
arguments, arguments
thatcanonlystart fromthoseinitialresources, areinvoked.
(55-56)
Thispassageseemsto allow thepossibility thatan itemoftestimony
mightqualifyas a justifierfora beliefin thatitemof testimony. This is
allowable,of course,onlyif testimony is firstjustifiedas a cognitive
resourcebyappealto someother,moreinternalist, cognitiveresource.So
BonJourseems to endorsea kindof "resourcefoundationalism." Basic
resourcesforjustification do notdependon "further" arguments; these are
"internal"resources.Nonbasicresourcesdo dependon further arguments;
theseare "external"resources.But externalresourcescan, nonetheless,
Thisis a peculiarpositionto advanceundertheheading
serveas justifiers.
of"internalism."Itis entirelyatvariancewithstandard waysofdrawing the
internalism/externalism contrast.
As indicated, standard approaches tointer-
nalismmaintain thatall justifiers
areinternal, in somesuitablesenseofthat
term.I am notsayingthatresourcefoundationalism is necessarilya bad
epistemologicalview;anditwouldconstitute a novelreconciliation between
internalismandexternalism, whichBonJour preachesin hisprefatory and
finalsections.
Butreconciling internalism andexternalism hardly constitutes
a vindicationofinternalism, andwe shouldnotletBonJour' s novelconcep-
tionofinternalism be thought ofas suchvindication. It is notinternalism,
buta newkindofhybrid view.
In sum,thenotionoftheinternal is an important sticking-point in the
entireinternalism/externalism debate.Thiswas,indeed,a principal moralof
my"Internalism Exposed,"whichsurveyed manydifferent waysofcashing
out"internal."I concedeBonJour'srightto optfora different approachto
thismatter thananysurveyedin "Internalism Exposed."Unfortunately, I
don'tsee thatBonJour's proposaloffers a satisfactorycharacterization. First,
thereis theproblemofcircular definition.Second,thereis a distinct danger
464
that,on hisapproach,nothing - no factsandno resources.
is internal Third,
of theinternalturnsout,on close inspection,
his characterization to be
widely at variance
withstandard of
understandings whatinternalfacts
might
be andwhatthedoctrine ofinternalismmaintains.
SOSA
"A littlehelpfrom[our]friends," as theBeatlessaid,is something all ofus
can use. In thiscase, I appreciatethefriendly help from Ernest Sosa. He
points out, quiterightly, thatthe account of beingreallyjustified that I
offeredin "A PrioriWarrantand Naturalistic Epistemology"3 does not
squarewiththeaccountoffered there(andelsewhere)ofjustification attri-
bution.On revisiting thatpaper,I see thatwhatI briefly (and too hastily)
wroteconcerning "real"justifiedness was a definite error, outof syncwith
thespiritof themaintheoryadvancedthere:two-stagereliabilism.I am
pleasedtohavethisopportunity tocorrect thaterror. Themodeofcorrection
is veryclose to whatSosa proposes,butthereremainsa slightnuanceof
continuing difference betweenus on thequestionofrelativization.
"A PrioriWarrant andNaturalistic Epistemology" (APWNE) proposed
a two-stage reconstruction ofthepracticeofjustification attribution,based
heavily on an earlier reconstruction.4 The firststage - thestandard-selection
stage- involvesthechoiceofjustificational standards. (Standardscorre-
spond to what Sosa and I elsewhere call epistemic "virtues" and"vices.")It
is communities thattypically selectstandards; individuals absorbthesestan-
dardsfromtheircommunities ratherthancreatingstandards oftheirown.
The basisorcriterion forchoosingstandards is reliability.A typeofprocess
ormethodis deemedepistemically appropriate orproper - hencejustifica-
- ifthe
tion-conferring community judges itto be (sufficiently)reliable.The
secondstageoftheepistemological story is the standard-deployment stage.
Individualsattribute justifiedness to beliefswhen,accordingtotheirinfor-
mation,thetargeted beliefshavebeenacquired(or sustained)byprocesses
and/or methods thatmeetacceptedstandards. Individuals arenotinthebusi-
nessofrevisingthesestandards on thefly.Thus,ifpresented witha hypo-
theticalbeliefthatis saidtooccurin a systematically deceptive environment
(an evil-demon world),theydo notproceedtorevisethestandards forthe
of
purpose dealing with this example.Theysimply use the entrenched stan-
dards,whichin thiscase wouldincludethepropriety oftakingexperience
at facevalue.To use thefamiliar technicalvocabularyofphilosophy, they
the
apply accepted standards "rigidly."
The foregoingis thestoryofjustification attribution. It givesus an
accountofjudgments ofjustification. Whatdoesthisimplyabout"real"jus-
tifiedness? Whenis a beliefreallyjustified, as opposedto beingjudgedor
believedtobe justified? In APWNE,I said thata beliefis reallyjustified if
andonlyifitresultsfromprocesses(ormethods) thatarereallyreliable,not
465
merely judgedreliablebysomecommunity. A naturalinterpretation ofthis
formula, however, is that a beliefis reallyjustified just in case itresults from
processes or methods that arereliable in the environment , or world , ofthe
believer.This givesthewrongresultin thedemon-world cases, wrongas
mostepistemologists intuitively view it at any rate. Sosa says thatthis
accountclasheswiththe(two-stage) of
story justification attribution, which
is notexactlyright.One couldconsistently maintain that people's inclina-
tionto rigidify standards ofjustifiedness, takingthemto applyin all possi-
ble worlds, is simplya mistake. "Real"justification, onemightsay,isn'tlike
that.Butalthough this is a consistent line, it is not one I intended to adopt.
I wantedto say,agreeingwiththe epistemologicalconsensus,thatthe
demon'svictimsarereallyjustified whentheyformbeliefsbytakingexpe-
rienceatfacevalue.Thatis nottheobvious,ormostnatural, interpretation
ofthesimplereliability formula offered inAPWNE.Moreover, thataccount
alignspoorlywiththetwo-stage storyofjustification attribution, whereasI
meanttoproducean accountofrealjustification thatis wellalignedwiththe
two-stage story. Some slippageunfortunately occurred.
A better accountis essentially whatSosa nowoffers in hisV-ADROIT,
exceptthatV-ADROIT does notneatlyparallelthedual structure of my
selection-plus-deployment So letmeformulate
story. a two-part accountthat
features thedesiredparallel.
(1) A standard is "really"correct (in anypossibleworld)ifand
only ifthe process or method itlicenses is genuinely reliable in
theactualworld.
(2) Foranyworld B inw is "really"
w,a belief ifandonly
justified
ifitsacquisition orconforms
(inw) instantiates, to,correct
stan-
dards(i.e.,correct
standardsas determined
byactual-worldreli-
ability).
Thisshouldappealto Sosa, becauseitis almostindistinguishable fromV-
ADROIT, anditfeatures exactlythepossible-world thathe
relativizations
favors.Butthisis whereI stillhavereservations, and whyI am less than
fullycontentwiththeconjunction of(1) and(2).5
A principalsource of my discontentis thatthe possible-worlds
approachimpliedby (1) and (2)- especiallyas Sosa interprets it- pre-
supposesan egalitarian viewof possibleworlds.The actualworlddiffers
fromotherpossibleworldsin no essentialway.In fact,'actual' is merely
an indexicalterm.It can be legitimately appliedto any possibleworld
whatever,at least whenappliedby an inhabitant of thatworld.(Sosa's
endorsement oftheindexicalaccountof 'actual' appearsin note11 of his
paper.)However,I don'tthinkthiscapturesthecommonsense understand-
ingof 'actual','real',or anyoftheircognateterms.It fitsbetterwithcom-
monopinionto holdthatthereis just one real world,and hencejust one
466
worldwhosestructure makesbelief-forming reliableorunreliable.
patterns
(There are of
also, course,hypothetical cases and scenarios,butthese
shouldultimately be understood in termsofproperties oftherealworld,as
metaphysical actualism A
maintains.) fictional demonworlddoes notqual-
ifyas an actualworld,so "real"justification shouldnotbe relativizedto
victimsofsucha possibleworld,as Sosa seemstoimplyattheendofsec-
tion7. "Justified" is notan indexicalterm,and does nothave thesame
sortsofcontextual properties as "here"and"now."Atleastthisis theview
I prefer.
Sosa makesa good case forholdingthatpeoplefrequently relativize
"unawares."He pointstoplausibleexamplesofunconscious relativizations
thatgo alongwithcontextual factors. Butitis onethingtopostulate uncon-
sciousrelativizations whenthedomainsin questionare places,times,or
groupsofpeoplewithvaryingaverageheights(suchas pygmiesandpro-
fessionalbasketballplayers).Itis lessplausibletopostulate unconscious rel-
ativizationsto possibleworlds,especiallyconstrued in an egalitarian,
or
modalrealist,sense.Moreover, I thinkwe can avoidsuchrelativization by
substituting(1*) and(2*) for(1) and(2), respectively:
(1*) A standard is ("really")correct ifandonlyiftheprocessor
method thatitlicensesis genuinely reliable.
(2*) A beliefis ("really")justified if andonlyifitsacquisition
orconforms
instantiates, to,correct standards.
When(1*) refersto "genuine"reliability, it meansreliability in the
actualworld.Sincethereis onlyone actualworld,thereis no needtoquan-
tifyover possibleworldsor relativizeto them.What,then,is theterm
"really"doingin (1*)? Whatcontrast doesitspecify, a questionthatworries
Sosa in section4? The answeris straightforward. Reallycorrectcontrasts
withbelievedto be correct.This is thecontrast thatlaunchedthecurrent
inquiry.The originalattribution
storytoldbytwo-stage reliabilism invoked
standards believedtobe correct.So thequestionwas: whatqualifiesa stan-
dard as reallycorrect?That seems to be adequatelyansweredby (1*),
understood in thefashionindicated.
Somewhatparallelremarks applyto (2*). Despiteno explicitreference
to possibleworlds,(2*) tacitly
impliesthatcorrect standards(as defined by
(1*)) governhypothetical or fictional
cases of belief as well as realcases.
Thestandards don'tchangeevenifthosefictional casesbelongtolargersce-
nariosin whichprocessesormethodshavedifferent reliabilityproperties
thantheydo in therealworld.Thus,(2*) yieldsthesamejustificational ver-
dicts in (hypothetical)evil-demoncases as do Sosa' s V-ADROIT and
(2) above.Thesearethesortsof verdicts thatmostpeople,or at leastmost
find
epistemologists, intuitively satisfying.Thisresultis obtained, however,
without thesortofrelativization
thatSosa advocates. Thisis a smalldifference,
467
perhaps,butI think So I prefer
itis oneworthretaining. thecombination
of
(1*) and(2*) tothecombinationof(1) and(2).
STROUD
I couldnothopefora moresympathetic or generally accuratereconstruc-
tionofmyearlyepistemological writings than Barry Stroud hasoffered. He
nicelydistillsthe centralthemes developed in those writings andtheir grad-
ual modification overtime.He rightly highlights theproposalsforcausal
conditionson knowledgeandjustifiedbelief,theimportance of reliable
belief-forming processes,andthehistoricity ofjustifiedness. He is also right
to emphasizetheunity-of-cognition theme.As he indicates,myproposals
concerning beliefandknowledgedrewno fundamental
justified distinction
betweena priorianda posteriori speciesofjustification orknowledge.(At
leastthisholdsforEpistemology and Cognition , Goldman1986.)Justification
and knowledgeof all typesof propositions requirereliableprocesses,or
conformity withepistemic rulesthatlicensereliableprocessesandmethods.
Truthsoflogicandmathematics maybe a distinct classoftruths, butitdoes
notfollowthattheconditions forknowledgeorjustified beliefin themath-
ematicaldomainarefundamentally differentfromtheconditions forknowl-
edge orjustifiedbeliefconcerning contingent matters. I am pleased that
Stroudappreciates thesignificance ofthesepointsforepistemology in gen-
eralandtheepistemology ofmathematics inparticular.I didindeedmeanto
opposea basicbifurcation inepistemology, whichhas notbeengood,in my
opinion,forthehistorical development ofthesubject.
In a recentarticle,7 however,I introducean important caveat,which
markssomething ofa departure frommybrieftreatment ofthissubjectin
Epistemology and Cognition . The recentarticlemakesa (provisional) case
fora prioriwarrant as a distincttypeof warrant froma posteriori warrant.
Althoughthesetypesof warrantsharerequirements at themostabstract
level,thetwotypesof warrantcan be distinguished at a lowerlevel,in
termsofdifferent psychological processesthatgiverisetothem.Ifthereare
suitablydifferent kindsofpsychological processes,thismaysupport a dis-
tinctionin typesof warrant.(I am not enamoredof the traditional
dichotomy ; butI do endorsesomedistinctions in typesofwarrant.) Thus,I
amnotquiteso ardenta unitarian as Epistemology and Cognition mayhave
suggested.
My positionvis--vis mathematical knowledge,however,causes
Stroudsomeconcernforotherreasons.In thelastsectionof hispaperhe
expressesunhappiness aboutmydemandthata theoryofjustifiedness be
formulated innon-justificational,ornon-epistemic, terms. He hopesthatthis
isn'tmerelya "holdover"fromtheold idea thatthepropertaskofphiloso-
phyis analysis."Is thereperhapsa lingering definitional orreductionistic
aspiration in Goldman'sepistemology" (426)? he asks. If so, he thinksit
conflictswithmyexplanatory aims,whichhe findsmorecongenial.
468
I didn'tthinkI madea mystery ofthesematters. In "WhatIs Justified
Belief?"81 proposedthata theory ofjustified beliefshouldbe castin non-
epistemicterms,notbecausesucha theoryaimsto providea definition of
justifiedness, but because evaluativestatesof affairslike justifiedness
should,wherever possible,be "grounded"in substantive orfactualcondi-
tions.(The term"grounded"was notused on thatoccasion.)Stroudfinds
this"reductionist" demandquitedubious,andwantsto knowwhatreasons
I haveforit.I wouldofferthefollowing reasons.
All evaluativenotions,iftheyare notarbitrary, mustbe groundedin
factualor substantive conditions. If athleticperformances areto be ranked
orgraded,thereshouldbe determinate factualconditions fortheserankings.
Forexample,basketballplayerA is a "betterscorer"thanplayerB ifand
onlyifA's averagepointspergameduringa givenseasonexceedthoseof
B; orifA's points-per-minute-played exceedthoseofB. Ifthereareno such
factualconditions forscoringsuperiority, thentheevaluativestatus,"being
a better scorerthan,"is nota well-behaved evaluativestatus.Now,itremains
tobe seenwhether theevaluativeepistemic term"justified" is wellbehaved
in thissense,whether justifiedness depends,orsupervenes, on somefactual
conditions. Butthisis thenatural hopeoftheepistemologist, andthesesorts
offactualconditions arewhatsheshouldseek,evenifthereis no guarantee
thatthedesideratum willbe met.So theproposalthatepistemological theory
shouldseeksuchconditions is perfectly understandable,andifreliabilism is
anywhere in therightgeneralterritory, thedesideratum maywellbe satisfi-
able. (Thisis notto say thatonlytheoriesin thevicinity ofreliabilism can
meetthedesideratum. In principle,itcouldbe metas readilybyinternalist
theories as byexternalist theories.)
Stroudappearsto thinkthatif we are guidedbythisdesideratum, or
"constraint," we shallrunintotrouble. Although he doesnotputitthisway,
he seemstothinkthata grounding or supervenience principle is committed
to thethesisthatthebeliefconceptis "prior"to epistemic concepts,andhe
takesissuewiththispriority thesis:"Couldwe ascribebeliefstoourfellow
humanbeings. . . withoutalso ascribingto themsomeunderstanding of
whatis orwouldbe a reasontobelievea certainthing(427)?" A first point
is thatmysortofgrounding thesisdoes notentailStroud'spriority thesis.
Epistemicstatesof affairsmightbe groundedin non-epistemic statesof
affairs evenifan understanding ofbeliefcouldnotprecedean understand-
ingof(epistemic) "reasons."A secondpointis thatthepriority thesisStroud
rejectscertainly looksplausible.Surelywe can ascribebeliefstoveryyoung
(e.g.,prelinguistic) children without ascribingto thema graspofepistemic
concepts.Theyhavebeliefsaboutmanytopics- e.g.,wheretheirfavorite
teddybearis andwhattheirpussycatlookslike- despitethefactthatthey
havenotyetacquiredanyepistemic concepts,suchconceptsas "justified"
or "goodreason."
469
As Stroudcontinueson thistopic,his discussionmigratesa bit.The
passage continues:"It looks as if we ourselvesmustat leasttakecertain
things tobe goodreasontobelievesomething in ordertoascribeknowledge
to othersand so to explainhowtheycometo havetheknowledgewe rec-
ognizethemto have" (427). Here he is talkingof knowledgeratherthan
belief; he is sayingthatwe mustourselveshavea graspon goodreasonsin
orderto makeknowledge attributions.
Thispoint,however, is quiteuncon-
troversial- as longas one takes"goodreasons"to be a genericexpression
of an epistemicconditionconstitutive of theconceptofknowledge.Once
thepassageswitchestoknowledge, though, howcanthelineofargumenta-
tionundercut eitherthesupervenience thesisortheprioritythesis?Granted
thatknowledge attributorsmustthemselves havetheconceptofa goodrea-
sonor otherepistemicnotions,howdoes thatpose anythreatto thethesis
thatepistemicconditionsare (ultimately) groundedin factualconditions?
Similarly, that
granting knowledge attributorsmustpossesstheconceptofa
goodreason, itcould still
be truethat ofthebeliefcon-
people'sacquisition
cept(ontogenetically) precedes their of
acquisition epistemic concepts.So I
failtosee howStroudraisesanyserious difficulties
hereeitherforthesuper-
veniencethesis(whichI havetentatively endorsed)or theprioritythesis,
whichhe himself placeson thetable.
AUDI
RobertAudidefendsa moderateformofinternalism, appealingto consid-
erations in
he has explored earlierworksas well. Like otherinternalists, he
regards internalismas a constrainton thesortsoffactorsthatjustify a belief,
factors thataregenerally Thecrucialcondition
called"justifiers." is thatjus-
tifiesmustbe internal tothesubject,in thesensethatthesubjectmusthave
"access" to justifiers, eitherby introspection Whatmakes
or reflection.
Audi's internalism "moderate"is his comparativepermissiveness about
whatqualifiesas accessoran accessiblestate.A state(orfact)is accessible
if it is eitherin consciousnessor it is something the subjectis able to
becomeawareof,whether byintrospection orbydirecting themindtoward
it.If theelementis notin consciousness, saysAudi,as manyjustificatory
elementsarenot,one can getitbeforethemind(thoughperhapsnotwith-
outeffort). I wanttoexaminethedetailsofhissenseof"accessible,"butit
willhelpto havean examplebeforeus, an examplethatis at leasta prima
facie difficultyforinternalism.
Considerbeliefsto theeffectthatsuch-and-such a sentencein one's
nativelanguageis grammatical. It is notclearthatpeopleregularly form
beliefsaboutthegrammaticality of thesentencestheyread.Butconsider
someoneservingas a subjectin a psycholinguistics experiment, wherethe
taskis to classifyvariouswordstringsas eithergrammatical or ungram-
470
matical.Certainly in sucha case thepersonwillformmanybeliefsto the
effectthata particular wordstringis grammatical. Presumably manyof
thesebeliefswillbe justified, butwhatmakesthemjustified?
An internalistmightfirstrespondby sayingthatthepersonprobably
has an "intuition"ofgrammatically, andthisintuition wouldbe thejustifier.
Since suchan intuition wouldbe a consciousevent,itcertainly qualifiesas
accessibleandhenceinternal. One problemwiththisresponseis thatsuch
an intuitionmaybe no morethana felttemptation to believein thesen-
tence'sgrammaticality. Can sucha belieftemptation constitute evidencefor
thebelief?Thatwould be akinto justifying a beliefby appeal to itself.
Second,oursubjectmighthavean intuition abouta wordstring's grammat-
icalityevenifhe doesn'tknowthelanguageto whichitbelongs.Suppose
thatall the word stringson whichhe is being testedare sentencesof
Turkish,and oursubjectknowsno Turkish.Still,he mightbelievethata
givenTurkishwordstring is a grammatical sentence, andthisbeliefmight
be basedon an intuition.Surelythiswouldnotsuffice tomakehimjustified.
Indeed,theintuition wouldnotqualifyas a justifier at all. Thisis themain
consideration I wouldemployto argueagainstthenotionthatjustifiedness
is conferredin thissortof case by a consciousintuition. In an alternative
case in whichthesubjectdoes knowTurkish, we wouldregardhisbeliefas
Buttheintuition
justified. alonecouldnotbe whatconstitutes therelevant
justifier(s).
Audimightrespondbysuggesting thatoursubjectcouldhavea belief
R totheeffect thatwhenhe hasintuitions ofgrammaticality, theseintuitions
areusuallyright(as judged,forexample,byassessments ofexperts). Belief
R, togetherwiththeintuition wouldconstitute
itself, internal for
justification
his grammaticality belief,G. But supposeour subjecthas no reflective
beliefslikeR. Supposeheis an unreflective butperfectly competent speaker
of Turkish(perhapsa childof,say,eleven).We wouldstillconsiderhis
beliefG tobejustified, especiallyifitis an easycase,buttherewouldbe no
generalization belieflikeR thatwouldserveas justifier. Noticethatin an
unproblematic case, witha perfectly competent speaker,we wouldunhesi-
tatinglyattributeknowledge ofthewordstring's grammaticality tohim.And
knowledgesupposedlyimpliesjustifiedness. So whatconfers justifiedness
on G, andis itssourcereallyinternal inAudi'ssense?
According intheChomskyan
tolinguists tradition,a competent speaker
ofa languagehas somesortofcognitive graspofgrammatical principles of
thatlanguage.Thedetailsofthoseprinciples neednotconcernus here.They
arethesortsofprinciples, however, bywhicha competent userofEnglish
coulddetermine thecorrect interrogativeformsthatcorrespond to specified
declarativesentences.For example,someprinciplewouldimplythatthe
questioncorresponding to thedeclarative"The manwhois hereis tall"is
471
"Is themanwhois heretall?",not"Is themanwhohereis tall?".Therele-
vantpointforpresent purposesis thatno suchprinciple is accessibleto the
ordinary competent speaker. Thus,thecognitive statein virtueofwhichthe
competent speaker'sbeliefG wouldqualifyas knowledge, andas justified,
does notqualifyas a justifier undertheinternalist's constraint.
Why?First,no cognitivestaterepresenting the principleis intro-
spectibleforan ordinary speaker.Second,theordinary competent speaker
is notableto citetheprinciple. According toAudi,however, someonewho
has a justification fora beliefmust"have"itin thesenseof beingable to
citeit.Thisis his"process-property integrationthesis."Yetthesortofcog-
nitivegraspoflinguistic principles thatmustbe postulated as underpinning
grammatical competence is unavailabletoverbalreport. The principles lin-
guistspostulatearetypically complexandabstract. Theyarenotprinciples
thatwouldoccurspontaneously topeopleat theconsciouslevelevenafter
themoststrenuous reflection.It has takena majorscientific revolution to
bringtheoretical to a pointwhereitcanformulate
linguistics plausibleprin-
ciplesoftherightkind.Theseprinciples aie notlikelytobe arrivedat bya
processofmere"reflection" byan ordinary, untutored userof a language,
despitethefactthatat somedeeper,inaccessiblelevelofcognition theuser
doeshavea graspofthem.Itis thisgrasp,moreover, thatseemstounderlie
theirknowledgeandjustifiedness. Thus,evenAudi'smoderate internalism,
withits"wide"conceptionof access,is unableto handlesuchcases ade-
quately.Of course,a competent userof a languagecouldbecomeawareof
therelevantprinciplesif he weretaughtsuchprinciplesin a linguistics
course.Butthiswouldequallyholdofanyotherfactaboutthebodyorthe
brain.A personcouldlearnaboutsucha factin an appropriate scientificset-
ting.Butthatwouldnotsuffice to makesucha fact"internal" in anysense
thatwouldappealtoepistemological internalistslikeAudi.
The exampleI have chosenis fromlanguagecognition, but similar
examplesfromotherdomainscouldreadilybe multiplied. Considera center-
fielder'sconviction, formed a splitsecondafterthecrackofthebat,thatthe
ball is goingoverhishead.Fora suitablyskilledathlete, thisbeliefwillbe
justified.Butthestatesthatmakeitjustified, whichunderpin histrajectory-
tracking performance, arenotall accessiblestates.True,hisvisualperception
oftheball'sposition atanyonemoment is an accessiblestate.Butothercog-
nitiveeventsthatcomputetheball's trajectory, andhencearecrucialto his
knowledge andjustifiedness abouttheball'strajectory, areinaccessible.
These sortsof cases are notdissimilarto ones externalists have long
usedtomotivate externalistaccountsofknowledge andjustification. One of
theoldestof thesecases is thechicken-sexing case. This generalclass of
cases is stillon thetable.Audi'sbrandofinternalism, withits"wide"con-
ceptionof access,mayhavethebestchanceofhandlingthesecases,butI
stilldon'tsee thatitpassesthetest.
472
ALSTON
Alstonwantsus to do without. I guesswe arein a recession,a philosophi-
cal recession.So we havetodo without thingswe usedtohaveinthehouse
and used to enjoy.Alstonwantsto add justification to thelist. Maybe
poverty is not his reason;maybe he is a
just pacifist. Internalists andexter-
nalistshaveenjoyedbeatingup on oneanother's theories ofjustification, but
Alstonwon'tpermit fighting anymore. Peace will be enforced. In theinter-
estofterminating thebattle,we willjustscratch justification offthelistof
problems.To paraphrase Nixon,nobodywillhavea theory ofjustification
tokick around anymore.
Is thisa goodidea?Andwhatis the(serious)rationale forit?Sometimes
I gettheimpression thatbecause there are standoffs in
(5) thecontroversy
overjustification, thequestfora theoryofjustification shouldbe aban-
doned.If we followedthisadvicein otherbranchesofphilosophy, where
wouldwe be? Ethicswouldno longer offer theoriesof morallightness;
therearetoomanydisagreements. Politicalphilosophy wouldabandonthe
topicofjustice;competing theorists cannotcometoa consensus. Metaphysics
wouldturnitsbackon suchtopicsas causation, universais, andthereality of
time;itwould"relieveus oftheburdensome taskofdecidingwhichofthe
competing accounts"is tellingitlikeitis (7). Ifwe go downthisroad,will
anything be leftofphilosophy?
Perhaps themainproblem is notunceasing controversy. Alstonsometimes
suggests that the with
problem justification is that there is no uniquesenseof
theterm.9 Each theorist can choosehisownsensetofocuson. Buttheterm
"know"alsohasmorethanonesense:a weaksenseinwhichitmeanstopos-
sessinformation (withorwithout justification), anda strong sensethatis the
target of most epistemological treatments of knowledge. Does theavailability
of twosenses mean that we should do epistemology without knowledgeas
wellas without justification? Another rationale for Alston's proposalis that
therearemultiple desiderata associatedwithjustifiedness, anddifferent theo-
ristsseemintenton emphasizing different desiderata. So whynotjusttalk
aboutthedesiderata themselves andforget aboutjustification?
The reason,I submit, is thatwe becomeawareofpertinent desiderata
to
byattending justification. Had we never studied justification, we might
neverhavenoticed,orpaid sufficient heedto,someofthedesiderata. The
sameholdsofknowledge. Ifepistemologists didn'tstudyknowledge, some
elementsof the conceptof knowledgemighthave escaped our notice.
Philosophers ofscience,whogenerally payscantattention totheconceptof
knowledge, givealso little
weight to truth. Rationalitygivenprideofplace,
is
andthisoftenmeanspurelysubjective Bayesianism. By contrast, ifonetakes
knowledge seriously, one is struck by the central role of truth. First,thetruth
ofp is a necessary condition forknowingthatp. Second,post-Gettier theo-
riesofknowledgeshow,orstrongly that
suggest, knowledge is a matter of
473
forming truebeliefthrough a generally reliablemethod, so thatthetruth of
thebeliefisn'tjust a matter of luckor accident.Nonaccidentality may be
spelledoutin termsofgetting itrightin thealternative situations closestto
theactualone,or getting itrightin all ofthe"relevant"alternatives to the
actualsituation. Whicheverpermutation is preferred,knowing has some-
thingtodo withgetting thetruth (ornotfallingintoerror)in counterfactual
situationsas well as theactualone. Thus,truth-getting is central,notof
peripheral importance. Thisis obvioustomostepistemologists, butitis not
a truism foreverybody; anditmighthavebeena lotless obviousifepiste-
mologists hadn'tworkedas hardas theyhaveon theconceptofknowledge.
I turnnowtoanother themeinAlston'spaper.Whatwouldepistemol-
ogy look like ifitwon itsdivorce fromthetopicofjustification? How should
itstudythedifferent desiderata thatareto replacethetopicofjustification?
Alstonmentions fourtypesofinvestigation thatcouldbe undertaken con-
cerning thedesiderata: elucidation, viability, importance, andinterrelations.
He does notexplorethetopicofinterrelations, neither in thispapernorin
"Epistemic Desiderata."10 Butitstrikes meas a veryimportant topic,oneto
whichI have devotedsome attention in "The Unityof the Epistemic
Virtues."11
Assuming thattruebeliefis one epistemic value,I inquireintotheway
thisvaluerelatesto others,suchas justifiedbelief.Possiblerelationships
mightbe dividedintotwosorts:instrumental andnon-instrumental. Under
reliabilism,justifiedbeliefis so analyzedthatthereis clearlyan instrumen-
talrelationbetweenitandtruebelief.A justified beliefis one producedby
truth-conducive processes,so anyjustified beliefis also likelyto be true(at
leastwheretheprobability is fixedbythebelief'sgenesis).Evennon-relia-
bilisttheories ofjustification oftenmaintain thatjustifiedness is conducive
to truth.Forexample,evenin hiscoherentist periodBonJourwrote:"The
basicroleofjustification is thatofa meansto truth."12 Noteveryone would
agree,however,thatjustifiedness is instrumentally relatedto truth. Some
conceptions ofjustifiedness wouldproposea non-instrumental relationship.13
I agreewithAlstonthattheinterrelationships amongtheepistemic
desiderata arewellworthexploring. However, we do notneedtojettisonthe
projectofelucidating theconcept(s)ofjustification torationalize thisother
epistemological project.
II. EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY
WEINBERG, ANDSTICH
NICHOLS,
Jonathan Shaun
Weinberg, Nichols,andStephenStichraisequestionsabout
intuitions,
epistemic andthepracticeofanalyticepistemology.
normativity,
474
Theseworriesarecontinuous withonesraisedbyStichin earlierwritings.14
Heretheyreporttheresultsof actualexperiments, which,theyclaim,pro-
vide substantialsupportforStich's earlierspeculationsaboutcognitive
diversity.The current findings arealso saidto support hisworriesaboutthe
legitimacy of usingintuitions to derivenormative epistemicconclusions.
The experiments are clearinstancesof social scientific research.Which
branchofsocialsciencetheybelongtois hardto say;perhapssociolinguis-
ticsor anthropology. I classifythispaperundertheheadingof "Epistem-
ologyandPsychology" becausetheexperiments beara familyresemblance
to ones in social psychology, and are partlyinspiredby hypotheses and
experiments of Nisbett and Haidt, who are social psychologists.
The first questionI wishtoraiseaboutthepaperbyWeinberg, Nichols,
and Stich(henceforth: WNS) is whether itreallybearsmuchon epistemic
normativity. Near theoutsetof theirpapertheydistinguish fourtypesof
epistemicprojects, including the Normative Project. This projectis saidto
havea twofoldaim: (1) to articulate regulative norms that aresupposedto
our
guide epistemic efforts, and (2) to our
identify epistemic "good,"orthe
propertarget of the regulative principles.WNS tellus that analytic episte-
mology has embraced "Intuition Driven Romanticism" (IDR), which
assumes,orposits,thatwe can discoverortestepistemicnormsbyappeal
to ourepistemicintuitions. It is thisclaimbyIDR thattheirexperimental
resultspurportedly undermine. Once we recognizethatpeopleofdifferent
cultures or socioeconomicstatusesexperience diverseepistemic intuitions,
why should we place any trust in "our" intuitions?
However,noneof theexperiments reported byWNS has a clearand
unambiguous bearing on normative epistemic matters as identified above.
Theexperiments all involveintuitions aboutknowledge , andknowledge (on
almostall goingtheories)is a compoundconcept.According to orthodoxy,
knowledge involvestruejustified beliefthatmeetssomesortofanti-Gettier
condition, forexample,itis nottruemerely byluck.So on thisview,knowl-
edge has four conditions. Of these four,onlyjustification is unambiguously
normative inWNS's sense.(The requirement ofjustification does notitself
spell out anyregulative of
principles epistemic conduct. Nonetheless, hav-
a
ing justified belief with
impliesconformity appropriate of
principles epis-
temic conduct,whateverthese may be.) Now if someone believes
something thatfailsto be knowledge, itis nota straightforward matterto
concludethatthejustification conditionhas beenviolated.Perhapssome
different condition,e.g., the anti-Gettier provision,has been violated.
Similarly, when WNS's experiments reveal thatinformants fromdifferent
cultureshavedifferent intuitions aboutwhether someonein a hypothetical
situationreallyknows , itis an openquestionwhether thisreflects differences
injudgments aboutproperepistemic conduct. A judgment thatJonesfailsto
475
acquire"realknowledge"in a givencase mayreflecta (tacit)judgment
aboutthefourth conditionforknowledge,theanti-Gettier condition,not
aboutthe(normative) justification condition.
It is interesting thatthelargestdifferences betweenWesternandEast
Asiansubjectsin WNS's experiments came in theGettiercases. On their
face,thesecases haveno obviousconnection to epistemicnorms.Turning
to theTruetemp-inspired cases,itcouldwellbe thatwhataccountsforthe
differences betweenWesternand East Asian subjectsin thesecases also
turns on whatis oftenregarded as a "fourth condition,"namely,theanti-luck
ornon-accidentality condition. It is ofinterest herethattheEastAsiansub-
jects'judgments of"reallyknows"werehigherin thesecondandthirdver-
sionsof theTruetemp case thanin thefirstversion.The secondand third
caseswereonesinwhicha community playssomeroleinthereliablebelief
formation. In the secondversionthecommunity elderscause thebrain
rewiring. In thethirdversionan entirecommunity undergoesbrainalter-
ations,notjust a singleindividual.Now theseresultscomportwell with
WNS's storyaboutEastAsianshavinga communitarian ratherthanindi-
vidualisticoutlook.Butthisfactmightbe foldedintotheknowledgeana-
lyst'sstoryaboutnon-accidentality. PerhapsEastAsiansaremoreproneto
thinkthatwhenan entirecommunity is involvedin producing orundergo-
inga cognitiveepisode,it's notso clearlyan accidentthattruebeliefsare
formed. Westerners areless likelyto see thecommunitarian factoras rele-
vanttonon-accidentality. On thishypothesis, althoughtherearecultural dif-
ferences, thosedifferences havean impacton knowledgejudgmentsonly
through theirbearingon a factorthatis commontothegraspoftheknowl-
edgeconceptacrosscultures, viz.,thenon-accidentality factor.
Furthermore,
returning to myearliertheme,thedifferences haveno straightforward rele-
vancetoepistemic norms.
SupposeWNS obtainedsimilarresultsinexperiments aboutnormative
epistemic matters. How seriousa blowwouldthatbe totheIDR strategy? If
therewereintuitional differences, wouldn'ttheIDR strategy be incapableof
choosinganyparticular epistemicnorms?Afterall,howcoulda non-arbi-
trarychoicebe madeofone subsetofintuitions overanyother?Whyprivi-
lege someintuitions overothers?
The strategy I advocatecan readilydeal withmanyoftheseproblems.
As reviewedaboveinmyresponsetoSosa, the"descriptive" theory I advo-
cate of people's judgments,or intuitions, of justifiednessis a layered
theory.15 First,thereis somesetofstandards orprototypesofgood andbad
epistemicconductthatpeopletypically inheritfromtheircultureor com-
munity. I sometimes call theseepistemic"virtues" and"vices."Thesestan-
dardsorprototypes arebelief-forming processesandmethods, identifiedas
good waysor bad waysof forming beliefs.A community picksoutthese
virtues andvicesbyconsiderations ofthereliability, ortruth-conduciveness,
476
ofthemethods.Methodsaredeemed"virtuous" iftheyarejudgedto have
highreliability, "vicious"iftheyarejudgedto havelow reliability. To say
thattheyarejudgedreliableorunreliableis notto say,ofcourse,thatthey
reallyare such.These assessmentsof thecommunity mayor maynotbe
accurate.Individualstypically inherit listsof virtuesandvicesfromtheir
community. Ifindividuals areaskedto evaluatepeople'sdoxasticconduct,
theycomparethetargetconductto thevirtuesand vices on theirmental
"lists"andjudge theresulting beliefsjustifiedor unjustified accordingly.
Thus,mycurrent accountleavesampleroomto accommodate variations in
intuition as a function ofculture.16
If thisexplanatory accountofthesourcesofpeople'snormative intu-
itionsis correct, whatshouldphilosophers do withthoseintuitions? Ifpeo-
ple's intuitions conflict,how do we choose whichones to endorse(or
"privilege," as WNS mightputit)?Thoughcommunities maydiffer about
approvedmethods, I contend thattherationale fortheirchoicesis essentially
thesame.Theyall sharethesamefundamental epistemicvalues,viz.,true
beliefanderroravoidance.17 Thus,to decidewhichintuitions we ourselves
shouldendorse,we needto decidewhichmethodsare truth-conducive. I
haveno terribly noveladviceto giveabouthowto go aboutthattask.We
muststartfromourmostbasic processesand methodsand proceedfrom
there.WNS themselves seemcommitted to certainmethodsoftruth deter-
mination andtotheassumption thatthesemethods produce justifiedbelief.18
Specifically, as theirarticleamplyindicates, theyarecommitted to experi-
mentalscience.Theirphilosophical denialsnotwithstanding, theypresum-
ably have thiscommitment because theybelieve in the (comparative)
truth-conduciveness oftheexperimental method.Whatthisbeliefrestson
is, no doubt,a delicatematter. ButI daresaythattheywouldnotcharacter-
ize thisbeliefas purelyarbitrary or capricious,forthisconcessionwould
undermine theprobity oftheirentirelineofargumentation. Whyshouldwe
heedtheirexperiments aboutpeople'sintuitions ifexperiments arefunda-
mentally unreliable waysofdetermining thetruth ofanything?
It mightseemthatmypresent responseconstitutes a majordisengage-
mentfroman erstwhile commitment to IDR. IfI don'tregardintuitions as
reliableguidesto epistemicnorms,whydid I previouslyspendso much
timemuckingaroundwithintuitions? Whatareintuitions goodforin epis-
temology ifyoucan'trelyon themtodeliverinsights intogenuineepistemic
norms? Myanswertothisappearsinanearlier Intuitions
paper.19 areevidence
forthecontent of an intuitor'sconcept,orconception, ofthetermin ques-
tion.Ifpeople'sintuitions especiallyiftheydiffer
differ, markedly, thismay
indicatethatthecontentsof theirrespectiveconceptsare notidentical.
Epistemologists oftenproceedon theassumption of a universally shared
conceptofknowledge, a universallysharedconceptofjustification, andso
forth. Thismaynotbe a solidassumption, as WNS's experiments suggest.
477
ButI havepreviouslydisavowedthiscommonassumption of"greatunifor-
in
mity epistemicsubjects'"judgments about cases,notingthatuniformity
in intuitions
may resultfrom thefactthatanalyticphilosophers comefrom
a "fairly
homogeneous subculture."20However, though thereaie some inter-
in
personaldifferences intuitions I
aboutknowledgeandjustifiedness,con-
tinuetothinkthatthereis sufficient
uniformityto support
agreement on the
fundamental epistemicvalues and disvalues.This sufficesto establisha
commongroundforepistemicnormativity, ifnotto establishspecificcon-
sensualnorms.
CHURCHLAND
Paul Churchland likesreliabilism in epistemology ; I commendhis sound
epistemological As we all know,however,Churchland
instincts. is notso
keenon thepropositional attitudes.So he wouldliketo chartan epistemo-
logicalcoursethatdispenseswiththeattitudes andclassicaltruth, butretains
somesortoftruth-like notion,whichreliabilism, ofcourse,dependsupon.
Is thisprogram wellmotivated, anddoes itsucceed,as faras can bejudged
fromthepresent paper?
Churchland contends thatneuroscience increasingly showsthathuman
knowledgeand cognitionhave "nothingwhateverto do withanything
remotely likethepropositional attitudes"(92). Buthe also maintains that
commonsensealreadyacknowledges important varieties ofknowledge that
are non-propositional. His openingexamplesareinstancesof knowledge
how.Weknowhowtocrawl,towalk,torun,tohita baseball,toridea bicy-
cle, and to flyan airplane.These and a hundredthousandotherskillsare
largelyinarticulable;theyaie notcases,saysChurchland, ofknowingthat.
Beyondpurelymotorskills,thereis a broadarrayofperceptual skills:know-
inghowtodiscriminate andrecognizefaces,colors,smells,voices,musical
compositions, locomotor gaits,andso forth. Theseareall learnedcognitive
skills,saysChurchland, andmustbe integrated intoanyaccountofknowl-
edge.Buttheyarenottreatable as piecesofpropositional knowledge.
Whynot?Churchland assumeswithout argument thatknowinghowis
nota speciesofknowing that,butthisassumption is questionable. A strong
case is made by JasonStanleyand TimothyWilliamson21 forreducing
knowinghowtoknowingthat.Briefly androughly, forsomebodytoknow
howtoX is forthatpersonto knowsomeproposition thatis a trueanswer
to thequestion,"How does one X?" For example,to knowhow to ridea
bicycle,one mustknowsomeproposition thatanswersthequestion,"How
does one (or shouldone) ridea bicycle?"Basically,thisinvolvesknowing,
forsomewayw,thatw is a waytoridea bicycle(orfortheknowerto ride
a bicycle).How thatwayis mentally represented is a separatequestion.But
ifonehassomewayofmentally representing sucha way,thenonecanhave
478
therelevant propositional knowledge, andthispropositional knowledge can
constitute thepertinent knowledge how.
Churchland also assumesthatpropositional knowledge, andthepropo-
sitionalattitudes are
generally, intimately connected with linguistic formsof
representation. Manypassages in the presentpaper - as well as elsewhere
in Churchland'scorpus- manifestthis assumption.In discussingskill
knowledge, forexample,he saysthatthelistedskillsare"whollyinarticu-
lable" (93), whichis apparently supposedto showthattheyaren'tproposi-
tional."Inarticulable" means"notexpressible in language,"so Churchland
is relyingon a putativeproposition-language connection. Laterhe is even
moreexplicit.He writesofthehostofothercognitivecreatures in theani-
malkingdom "noneofwhomuse languageandall ofwhomareproblematic
candidatesforthemanipulation and fixationof specifically propositional
attitudes" (93). The thought of these non-human animals,saysChurchland,
is unlikelyto includetheuse of a Fodorian-style languageofthought. He
implies that because these animals lack both publiclanguage and a language
ofthought theyareincapableofpossessingpropositional attitudes.
Butitis wrongtoassumethatpropositional attitudes requirelanguage.
Noneofthecurrent philosophical accounts of propositional attitudes makes
thisrequirement. Thereareessentially threestandard theoriesofproposi-
tionalattitudes. According tothefirst two,propositional attitudesrelateper-
sons and propositions, buttheydiffer on thenatureof propositions. The
Russelliantheory saysthatpropositions areorderedsequencesofproperties
and objects.The Fregeantheorysays thatpropositions containmodesof
presentations ofproperties andobjects,rather thantheproperties andobjects
themselves. The thirdtheorysaysthatpropositional attitudes arerelations
betweenpersons, Russellianpropositions, andwaysofthinking ofRussellian
propositions. Noneofthesetheories is committed toa relationship between
and
propositions language.Thus, even if animals have no language,either
publicor private,theymightstillhave propositional attitudes. Whenit
comesto humans,evenifcognitionis implemented via connectionist net-
worksrather thana languageofthought, thisdoes notprecludetheposses-
sionofpropositional attitudes.
Standardtheoriesaside,I woulddescribethecorenotionofbeliefas
cognitiveassentto a proposition-sized content, where,in thesimplest case,
thisconsistsofapplying a conceptto an identified object."Recognizing" or
"identifying" an object"as" an F,foranyconceptF,wouldbe aninstance of
belief.Churchland seemsentirely athomewithsuchscenarios.His paperis
awashin talkofconceptsandtheirapplication.Indeed,manyofhisillus-
trations ofwhatconnectionist networks can do areonesinwhicha network
"recognizes"or "identifies" something as an F, forexample,recognizesa
submarine rockor a femaleface,oridentifies a specificindividual facein a
479
photograph. By mylights,theseactivities arespeciesofpropositional atti-
tudes,despitethefactthatno internal languageis deployed.Muchof the
middlepartof Churchland's paperis devotedto conceptsand conceptual
frameworks, as thesearerealizedin connectionist networks. Farfromdis-
tancinghimself fromtheterritoryofpropositional I wouldsaythat
attitudes,
thismaterialsimplyarticulates one possiblewayin whichtheelementsof
propositional viz.,concepts,mightbe constructed
attitudes, anddeployed.
He himself describeshisaccountofneuralactivation-spaces as an account
of"whata conceptual framework is" (107).
Finally,letmeturnverybriefly tohisdiscussionoftruth. Although his
announcedagendais to steerclearof "classical"truth, whatChurchland
offersus seemshardlydistinguishable fromtruth. Atleastthisis whatis on
offer,
though othersmayquestionwhether hisaccountofrepresentation will
reallywork.My pointis thatifitdoes work,thenrepresentational success
willbe virtuallyindistinguishablefromtruth. In sum,ifChurchland's frame-
workdoes thejob he wantsit to (a big "if,"to be sure),thenit mightsuit
reliabilismverynicelyindeed.Butthatis becauseitdoesnotsucceedin get-
tingridof eitherpropositional attitudes or representationalaccuracy,i.e.,
truth.
HENDERSON ANDHORGAN
The paperby David Hendersonand TerryHorganinvitesan exercisein
"compareand contrast." Thereis a largeswathof agreement betweenus
aboutthea priori, butalso somenon-negligible All oftheseare
differences.
wellworthexploring. My positionon theissuestreatedbyHendersonand
Horgan(henceforth: HH) mainlyappearsin twopapers:"A PrioriWarrant
andNaturalistic Epistemology" and"PhilosophicalTheoryandIntuitional
Evidence."
Herearesomeprincipal pointsofagreement. First,HH tendergeneral
support forthea priori,andso do I. Second,in eachcase therearesubstan-
tialqualificationsin thelevel of support.HH havedoubtsabouttheexis-
tenceof"high-grade" a priorijustification,
thetraditional
conception.The
centralcase theydiscussonlyreachesthelevelof "low-grade"a priori,a
species ofjustification thatcontainsan admixture of theempirical.My
acceptanceof a prioriwarrant is mellowedbytherejectionof severalele-
mentsthatfire-breathing rationalists
ofyorebestowedon it.Threeproper-
ties frequently associatedwiththe a priori - infallibility, and
certainty,
-
unrevisabilityarepurgedfrommyconception, and I remaincautiously
non-committal aboutitsassociationwithabstract, eternalobjects.
On thesubjectofconceptual HH present
analysis, a two-stageapproach,
andthismirrors theapproachI haveadvocated.23 Underthisagreed-upon
approach,thefirststageof conceptualanalysisinvolvestheelicitationof
intuitions
aboutindividual cases thatexemplify orfailtoexemplify thetar-
480
getconcept.The secondstageadvancesgeneralizations abouttheconcept
basedon single-case intuitions.In additiontoagreeing on thetwostages,we
also agreethatthesecondstageofconceptual analysisis a speciesofabduc-
tiveinference. One seeksto explaintheintuitional databypositinga con-
ceptwithspecifiedproperties. Finally,we agreethatthereis a substantial
roleforempirical psychology in theprojectofconceptual analysis.In infer-
ringa generalizationabouta target conceptfromintuitional data,oneshould
be sensitiveto psychological evidenceaboutconceptpossessionandcon-
ceptdeployment.
Wheredo HH and I disagree?One majortopicof disagreement is
whether conceptualanalysisis a bonafideexampleofthea priori, evenlow-
gradea priori.In mypaperon a prioriwarrant, I explicitlydistancemyself
fromtheviewthat(evenwarranted) beliefsarisingfromconceptualanaly-
sis areinstancesofa prioriwarrant. The traditionalexamplesofmathemat-
ics and logic areregardedas good candidatesfora prioriwarrant, butnot
conceptualanalysis.So, on theparticular examplethatHH treatat length in
theirpaper,I am inclinedtodissent.
Whatis thesourceofthisdissent?Is itatthefirst orthesecondstageof
conceptualanalysisthatI findreasonsto withhold the"a priori"classifica-
tion?Both,actually,butit is thefirststageon whichI shallconcentrate.
Whatmakesa beliefwarranted or unwarranted is thecausal processthat
producesorsustains it.Similarly,ifwe aregoingtodividewarranted beliefs
intotwoor morecategories,suchas thea prioriand thea posteriori, the
principleofdivisionshouldbe theprocessof acquisition(or sustenance).
One andthesameproposition can be believedwitha prioriwarrant byone
personandwitha posteriori warrant byanother. Forexample,one person
might believea certainmathematical
justifiably proposition as theresultof
pure,abstractthought - a paradigmcase ofthea priori - whereasanother
personmight justifiablybelievethesameproposition on testimony - which,
sinceitinvolvestheperception of somebody'sspeech,is an instanceof a
posterioriwarrant.So, whenwe askaboutthefirst stageofconceptual anal-
ysis,whichyieldsintuitions aboutindividual cases,we needtoinquireinto
the(typical)causal processthatproducesintuitions aboutcases. We also
haveto askexactlywhichcharacteristics ofa causalprocessmakeita good
candidateforan a prioriwarranter.
A possiblereasonforregarding theintuition-producing causalprocess
as a candidateforan a prioriwarranter is theassumption thatall intuitions
belongin thea prioricategory. On thisview,intuition is themarkofthea
priori.HH do notseemto takethisline,noris itone thatattracts me.Their
conception ofthea prioriseemstobe expressedinthefollowing statement:
"Centralto theconceptofa priorijustification is theidea ofan epistemic
justificationby reflection- justification thatcan be obtained'fromthe
agent'sarmchair,' without'goingout' and collectingempiricalevidence
481
regarding whattheactualworldis like"(221). Partofthischaracterization
ofthea prioriseemsto be negative:a priorijustification is non-empirical
justification. The otherpartofthecharacterization is positive:a priori justi-
fication involvesreflection.
The positivepartleaves muchto be desired,because thenotionof
"reflection" is notcrystalclear.Reflectionseemstoconsistin castingabout
in themind,mullingthingsover.Is thissufficient fora prioristatus?I think
not.Reflectionoftenconsistsin tryingto remember relevantthings,in
searchingthecontents of one's mindforpertinent information. Does this
mentaloperation fitthemoldoftraditional conceptions ofthea priori?No.
Traditional epistemology focusedon theoperation ofreasonas themarkof
thea priori;and it isn't clearthatreflection necessarilyengagesreason.
Engagingsomeconceptin one's headto see whether itappliestoa particu-
larcase is notan unambiguous exampleofreason.By wayofcomparison,
supposewe presentsomebodywitha (partly)perceptualtaskof deciding
whether a presented objectis an F. One phaseof thistaskis to engageor
"consult"theirconceptofan F, andto decidewhether thepresented object
qualifies.Does thepersonuse reasonin thisoperation? Again,thematter is
notso clear.
If we turnto thenegativecharacterization of thea priorimentioned
above,we findthatifa procedure thatconfers justification is notempirical,
thenitmustbe a priori.Is thisan acceptableprinciple? Surelynot.Mental
operations likememory andintrospection arenotempirical,at leastifthe
empiricalis closelytiedto theperceptual. Buttraditional treatments ofthe
a priorido notsuggestthateithermemory orintrospection confersa priori
warrant. IfI forma memorialbeliefthatyesterday I experienced a terrible
fright,thisbeliefmaybe fullywarranted, butitstypeofwarrant is notofthe
a prioritype.IfI nowintrospect a stateoffearin myself, thebeliefthatI am
in thisstatemayalso be fullywarranted, butagainitswarrant is notofthe
a prioritype.I suggestthatforming classificationalbeliefsabouthypotheti-
cal cases is moresimilarto belief-formation by introspection thanit is to
belief-formation bytheexerciseoflogicalormathematical reasoning. This
is whyI am skepticalofregarding thefirst stageofconceptualanalysisas
partaking ofthea priori(whether highgradeorlow grade).
In discussing theirexamples(1) through (4), HH drawcontrasts among
themin termsof whether theyexpress"internally accessible"truths. The
truths thatareinternally accessiblearesaid to be stronger candidatesfora
prioristatus.My problemwiththisis thatnotall internal cognitiveopera-
tionsareassociatedwiththea priori, as memory andintrospection illustrate.
So although theengagement ofconceptsor conceptualinformation is cer-
tainlyinternal, thisis notenough,bymylights,to certify a prioristatus.
Letmecomment morebriefly on thesecondstageofconceptual analy-
sis,theabductiveinference stage.First,HH seemto regardall abductive
482
inferenceas empirical,and thisseemswrong.If I believesome singular
propositionsaboutprimenumbersvia mentalcomputation, and I abduc-
tivelyinferfromthesepropositions like"Thereareno even
a generalization
primesotherthantwo,"thereis nothing"empirical"aboutthatinference.
Second,I heartily
agreewithHH abouttheroleofpsychology inthesecond
stage of conceptualanalysis; similarconsiderationsare advanced in
Goldmanand Pust ("PhilosophicalTheoryand IntuitionalEvidence").
However,to theextentthatempiricalevidenceis used,thisseemsto cut
So I havedoubtsaboutHH's idea ofthe
againstthea prioriclassification.
"low-grade"a priori.Nonetheless,I agreewithHH thatthereareprobably
fewbeliefswithexclusivelya priorisources.So therearefewbeliefsthat
theuse of a priori-style
qualifyas a priori,fullstop.Nonetheless, opera-
- roughly,
tions reasoning - maybe rampant.
operations
SCHMITT
FrederickSchmitthas writtena richpaperon a much-neglected topic.
Although hismethodology fitsa fairlyorthodox philosophical mold,many
of his substantive ideas seemto be inspired,at leastin part,bypsycholo-
gists' workon intelligence.This is whyhis paperis placed underthe
"Epistemology andPsychology" heading.
If papersweregradedbythenumberofusefuldistinctions theydraw,
Schmitt' s paperwouldcertainly be attheheadoftheclass.Obviously, there
is insufficient spaceheretoexamineall ofhisdistinctions orthechoicesto
whichtheylead. Instead,let me zero in on a few of thebasic choices
Schmittmakesin developinghisapproachto intelligence. Although these
choicespave thewayto someintriguing developments, I do notfindthem
entirely compelling.
ConsiderSchmitt's choiceofa performance format overa capacityfor-
matforanalyzingagentintelligence. He feelsthatforan agenttobe intelli-
gent,intelligent actionsmustbe performed withhighfrequency. Thismakes
intelligence resemble character traitslikegenerosity andcouragerather than
capacitieslikestrength or skill.This strikesme,bycontrast, as thewrong
waytogo. Considerthefollowing statement: "Georgehaswastedhisgreat-
esttalentwithhisdulllifeofluxury. He is so intelligent,
buthe has hardly
exercisedthisintelligence at all." This is a readilycomprehensible com-
plaint,but in optingfora performance formatover a capacityformat,
Schmittrendersitnonsensical.If Georgerarelyperforms intelligentacts,
thenaccordingto Schmitt'saccounthe is notin factintelligent. He pos-
sesses no highdegreeofintelligence thatcouldhavebeenwasted.Thisis
surelywrong.A properaccountofintelligence mustaccommodate thepos-
sibility ofunderutilization,andthatcalls fora capacityformat.
Schmitt defendshispreference fora performance format withthefol-
lowingargument: "Havinga capacityforintelligent actionis valuableonly
483
becauseintelligent actionsarevaluable,andhavingthecapacityenablesone
to perform actions.Performing
intelligent intelligent actionsis thusmore
valuablethanmerelyhavingthecapacityforintelligent action"(348). But
whyshoulditbe assumedthatpsychological traitsofinterest arealwaysthe
mostvaluableones?Evenwhenitcomestotraits ofepistemic interest,
why
shouldourclassificatory schemesregister a preference forthemostvaluable
ones?Schmitt himselfacknowledges thattherearesometraitconceptsthat
designatecapacities.Whyshouldn'tintelligence be one ofthese?Strength
is one ofhisownexamplesofa capacity.Shouldwe arguethat"strength"
doesnotreallydesignate a capacitybecausestrength as a capacitywouldbe
less valuablethanstrength as a frequent performance? Thatwouldsurelybe
an unpersuasive argument. Whyshoulditbe moreforceful forintelligence?
AnotherchoiceSchmittmakesin developinghis approachto intelli-
genceis to emphasizeefficiency. Hereis a passagethatarticulates theeffi-
ciency,orresourceconservation, angle.
Anintelligentactionrelative toa goalis onethattakesgood
advantage oftheresources itemploys, ormakesgooduseof
theseresources.
... Intheexample ofthecipher, makes
insight
betteruseofresources thantrialanderror doesbecauseitis as
effectivetowardsolution as trialanderroris,butinvolves less
effort(fewerselection trials).Thissuggests thatan actiona
makesbetter useofresources thanactionb does(relative toa
goal)whena is as effectivetoward thegoalas b isbutinvolves
a smallerexpenditureofeffort orresources.(353-354)
Schmittcites an exampleof RobertSternberg to supporthis efficiency
account.In thisexampletrashcollectors theirtrash-collecting
simplify rou-
tine,andSchmitt writes:
Theoldroutine ofhaulingthegarbage tothegoalof
(relative
thecity'scollecting
thegarbage)waslessintelligent
thanthe
newroutine. Thesalientdifference
wasthatthenewroutine
involved
lesswork forthesameachievementandwasthusmore
efficient
thantheoldroutine.(354)
The efficiency accountrunsintotrouble, in myopinion,whenit says
thattheuse offewerresourcesto achievethesamegoal constitutes greater
intelligence.Schmitt initiallysaysthattherelevantresourcesareof many
sorts:intellectual,
bodily,environmental, andso forth.
He immediately con-
cedes, however,that"forcertainspecial goals, relevantresourcesare
restrictedas to sort"(356). In intellectualproblemsolving,forexample,
"we do notcounttheconservation ofbodilyandenvironmental resources"
as marking greater intelligence. "we giveno credittowardintel-
Similarly,
ligence(relativeto thegoal of solvingtheproblems)foravoidinggestures
andfacialcontortions, orforusingverylittlepencilandpaper"(356). He is
exactlyrighton thesepoints.Buttheneedforthesequalifications registers
484
morethana localproblem; itis symptomatic ofa moregeneralone.Itis not
generally truethatconserving a resourceis a markofgreater intelligence.
It all dependson whether one caresaboutconserving thatresource.Ifone
does careaboutconserving resourcein achievinga certain
a certain goalG,
thenthetaskconfronting theagentis notsimplyto bringaboutG; itis the
compoundtaskofbringing-about-G-while-conserving-resource-R. If one
can figureouthow to achievebothgoals concurrently, thatwouldindeed
reflectgreaterintelligence thanfiguring outhow to achievethefirstone
alone.
It won'tsurpriseSchmittifI nowuse theforegoing consideration to
support myold accountofintelligence intermsofproblem-solving, orques-
tion-answering,power.Therelevanceofefficiency orresourceconservation
can be understood fromthevantagepointofthataccount.Resourceconser-
vationis relevanttointelligence onlywhentheagentseeksto accomplish a
givengoal subjectto a resource-conservation constraint.But a selected
resourceconstraint can be expressedas theproblemofachievinga broader
goal. A new intellectual problemthenconfronts the agent:"How can I
achievegoal G whileconservingresourceR?" An abilityto answerthis
questioncorrectly is a markof intelligence, and a greatermarkofintelli-
gencethantheabilitytoanswertheembedded question,"How canI achieve
goal G?" Thus,totheextentthatefficiency hasa properplacein a theory of
theproblem-solving
intelligence, (orquestion-answering) approachprovides
a rationaleforthatplace.
III. SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
KITCHER
PhilipKitcherprovidesanotherinstallment ofhisfascinating approachto
epistemology, which mightbe called "epistemology historicized."Earlier
installments includehis important books The Natureof Mathematical
KnowledgeandTheAdvancement ofScience?4In thepresent installmenthe
showshowthisapproachcanbe motivated fromstartingpointspresented in
my reliabilist
theories of and
knowledge justification, especiallyEpistemology
and Cognition . DespitethevividnesswithwhichKitchertellshis story,
however,it strikesme thatthereare severalloose ends.Perhapstheties
betweentheseendsareapparent toothers(andtoPhiliphimself), butnotto
me, so I shall
justlay outmyproblems.
In earlysectionsofthepaperKitcherpresents corefeatures ofmyreli-
abilistanalysisofknowledge andfocuseson a matter raisedinEpistemology
and Cognition , viz.,whetherthereshouldbe a recursive element
reliability
in the analysisof knowledge(Kitcher's(RR1)). Should an analysisof
485
knowledgenotonlyrequirethatS's beliefthatp be formedby a reliable
method,butalso thatS's acquisitionof thatmethoditselfhave beenpro-
ducedbya "meta-reliable" method? Andshouldfurther clausesbe addedon
top of this? Notice thatsuch additions bythemselves would notnecessarily
bring S's intellectual ancestors into thepicture, because the meta-methods
that(RR1) invokesareonesthatthesubjectS himself uses.But,byanalogy,
one couldintroduce requirements concerning thosewho socializedS - in
Kitcher' s example,Euphemia,Eurydice, Eunice,orEuropa.
As I readKitcher, he means(at leastinitially) to setasidethequestion
of whether to imposeanyrecursivereliability conditions.He declinesto
indulgein thepracticeoftrading in ordertocapturethefolkcon-
intuitions
of He
cept knowledge. expressesskepticism thatsettling epistemological
issuesis likelyto be advancedbyintuition mongering. He sideswiththose
whodoubtwhether ourfolkconception ofknowledge is determinate inper-
tinent respects, andwiththosewhoquestion whether we should even care
aboutthenotionof knowledgewe happento have. These positions seem
clearenough.I am caughtup short,however,by a subsequentdiscussion
(section3) in whichhe advancesa clusterofthesesaboutknowledge, relia-
bility,and transmissional shortcuts. Thesis(B) says that S knows that p just
incase S believesthatp andS's beliefthatp was generated bya reliablepro-
cess.25(B) seemsto commithimto a particular accountofknowledge, one
thatlacksanyrecursive reliability conditions.Thissuggests thatthe earlier
uncertainty aboutwhether to includea recursivereliability conditionhas
nowbeenresolved.How was thataccomplishedwithoutconsulting intu-
itions?Forthatmatter, howwas theinclusionofthemainreliability condi-
tionarrivedatwithout consulting intuitions?In general,howcan one reject
thedeterminacy andtherelevanceofthefolknotionofknowledgeandyet
appealto a specificanalysis(ornotion)ofknowledge? How is thisparticu-
lar analysischosen?And isn'tKitcherassumingthatthechosenanalysis
captures,at leastto somedegree,thenotionof knowledgewe happento
have?26
PerhapsI am mistakenaboutthestatusof thesis(B). I am certainly
unclearaboutitsrelationship tothefollowing passage:"To identify a propo-
sitionas an itemofknowledge is toindicatetoothersthattheycan buildon
it" (255). Thispassagesuggestsan alternative analysisofknowledge, viz.,
"S knowsthat
p justin case S believesthatp andothersareentitled tobuild
on S's beliefthatp."27Buthowis thisrelatedto (B)? Evidently, thetwoare
farfromequivalent;theycan't bothbe correctanalysesof knowledge.
Perhapstherecently quotedprinciple does notpurport to providean analy-
sis,butmerely identifiesthesocialroleorfunction ofknowledge (morepre-
cisely,ofknowledge talk).On thisinterpretation of(B), itgivesthemeaning
of"knowledge" - a reliability meaning - whereastherecently quotedpas-
486
sage explainswhyit is usefulto have a termwiththatmeaning.This is
roughly whatthesis(A), concerning supplierauthoritativeness, asserts.But
if (B) does givethemeaningof "knowledge,"how does thatsquarewith
Kitcher'srejection(in earlierpassages)oftheprojectofanalysis?
My nextgroupof puzzlementsconcernsthe notionof reliability.
Kitcherimaginesthearchitect ofhiscooperativecognitiveprojecturging
peopleto formtheirbeliefsbyreliableprocesses.He complains, however,
thatthenotionofreliability is toovague,thatitneedstobe given"content."
Whyis this?Kitcherlaunchesthepaperwithmytreatment ofreliability,
so
one naturally assumesthatmysenseof"reliability" is in play.Thereis not
muchvaguenessinthatnotion, however. I definea reliableprocessas a pro-
cess witha hightruth ratio:theratiooftruebeliefsto all beliefsitproduces
exceedssomespecifiedthreshold (greaterthan0.50). No doubt,without a
specifiedthreshold, thereis vagueness;butthisisn'ta typeof vagueness
Kitchermentions.My perplexity growswhenKitchertells us thatthe
"contentof thenotionof reliability is fixedthrough thepromotion ofour
epistemic goals,as encapsulated in (C)" (257). Thesis(C) talksabouttrans-
missionalshortcuts fromauthoritative suppliers.How is thissupposedto
givecontent tothenotionofreliability?
Kitcherdefinestransmissional shortcuts as follows:"A transmissional
shortcut willbe an episodein whichtherecipient acquiresa beliefheldby
thesupplierin virtueofrecognizing thatthesupplier holdsthatbelief,with-
out attending to the causal originsof thebeliefin the supplier"(257).
Returning to theend of thepreviousparagraph, I can see how transmis-
sionalshortcuts couldbe examplesof,orpartsof,reliableprocesses.If a
receiverchoosestransmissional shortcuts thatturnouttobe predominantly
fromauthoritative suppliers(whereauthoritativeness impliesa hightruth
ratio),thereceiverhas thereby employeda reliablebelief-forming process.
But thisconclusionfollowsonlyifwe alreadyknowwhatit meansto be
reliable.How couldspecifying someshortcuts "givecontent" toreliability
in the absence of a priorspecification of the meaningof "reliability"?
Kitchertellsus (258) thattheoptimalclass oftransmissional shortcutswill
determine a setof authoritative suppliers,whichin turnwill fix(or con-
strain)thenotionof reliability. I presumethathe imaginesoptimaltrans-
missionalshortcuts to be specifiedby generalfeatures(forexample,a
supplier'shavinga certainprofessional credential orreputation). The idea,
then,might be thatpeoplepossessinga relevant feature willbe authoritative.
(Unfortunately, matters aie morecomplicated. Generalfeatures mightattach
to speechepisodesrather thanthesupplierperse. An article'sappearing in
a certainjournalmightbe a goodtransmissional shortcut independentofthe
supplier'sidentity.I setthisproblemaside,however.)Butdoes specifying a
setofauthoritative suppliersfixthenotionofreliability? Anygivensetof
487
individualsis likelyto be characterized by many - perhapsinfinitely
-
many truth-linked properties.If we don'talreadyknowwhichproperty
is, howwillspecifying
reliability theindividuals helpus?
Stallingwithsection4, Kitcher makessomeintriguing proposalsabout
waysto thinkaboutepistemictraditions. Traditions, we are told,can be
open,closed,or corrupt.Open traditions have mechanismsto decertify
establishedpieces of lore.Closed traditionslack any such mechanisms.
Corrupt traditions
areones thatallow or encouragechangesby (roughly)
"political"considerations
ratherthanonesthatconcerntruth acquisitionor
erroravoidance.Now considera specificproposalKitchermakesconcern-
ingsuchtraditions.
Anysubjectacquires from earlychildhood ona collection
of
methods
beliefs,
concepts, forappraisingcandidatebeliefs
and
standards
forclaiming knowledge, a collection
thathasbeen
passeddownbytradition. Ifthetradition
isclosed,
orifitiscor-
then,
rupt, I claim,theepistemicstatusofsomeofthesubject's
beliefs
canbeaffected. (266)
WhenKitcher speaksof"epistemic status,"whatdoeshe mean?Presumably
he does notmeantruth. Nobodywouldquarrelwiththeclaimunderthe
truthinterpretation, butitis uninteresting.
I thinkhe meanstoreturn to the
internalist
thesis(I). Thesis(I) impliesthatoncewe fixthetruth valueofthe
contentof thebelief-state, thedistinction betweenknowledgeand mere
beliefsupervenes onfactsaboutthesubjectfromtheskinin.In otherwords,
thetraditionto whicha subjectbelongscan haveno effect on whether any
truebeliefattainstheepistemic statusofknowledge. In thequotedpassage,
Kitcherdisputesthisclaim,andbyimplication denies(I). Thisis whatone
expectedfromhimall along.Butdoesn'tthispositiondependon so defin-
ing"knowledge" thatitrequires morethanreliably producedtruebelief(the
definitiongivenin (B))? Doesn'tthepositionimplicitly commitKitcherto
somesortofrecursive condition,
reliability orsomeotherhistoricist condi-
tionofthattype?How can he defendthiscommitment, however,without
engaginginprecisely thesortofconceptualanalysishe earlierrenounced?
I haveso muchsympathy withthegeneralthemesofKitcher'ssocial-
historicalepistemology thatI hateto cavil at details.Butthoseofus com-
mitted tothedevelopment ofa social-historicist
epistemology wanttoknow
thetheoretical foundations forsuch a project.In Knowledgein a Social
World, thefoundation I layfora similarprojectincludesan appealto a folk
conceptofknowledge (andtoa folkinterest intruth).Kitcher claimsthatthe
projectcan be rationalized without anysuchfoundation. It is thedetailsof
thatclaimthatI havebeenexamining, andhavefoundperplexing.
488
SPERBER
Thejumping-off pointforDan Sperber'spaperis mydiscussionof testi-
and
mony argumentation in Knowledgeina Social WorldPTestimony and
argumentation are communication practices that bear on the spreadof
or
knowledge, possibly of error.I specify forms of thesecommunicational
processes,whether at thespeakerendor thehearerend,thatwouldaffect
knowledgeproduction (or dissemination). Sperbercomplains(briefly) that
I saya lotabouthowtestimony andargumentation brighten theprospect for
and
knowledge, very little about how they threaten it. This is not exactly
right.Thereis, admittedly, an explicitfocuson howsalutary effects could
be produced.I listconditionsor constraints on argumentation thatwould
conducetoknowledgeon thepartofhearersifspeakerscomplywiththem.
However,violationof theseconditions or constraints can threaten knowl-
edgeproduction andcanreadilyinduceerror. So I ammindful ofthedanger
as wellas thepromisein communicational practices. Additional dangersare
spelledout in later chapters.
Sperberproceedsto exploreevolutionary andgame-theoretic perspec-
tiveson testimony and argumentation. Therearetwocentralthemesin his
paper.First,he emphasizes thefrequently opposinginterests ofspeakersand
hearers. Fromthepointof view ofreceivers, communication is onlybenefi-
cial totheextent thatitis a sourceofgenuine(true)information. Whatben-
efitsproducers, on theotherhand,aie desirableeffects on receivers, either
on their attitudes or their behavior. If a speaker can cause desired action in
a
a receivervia certainmessage, the truth value of the messagedoes not
matter to thespeaker.Deceptionpossibilities musttherefore be takenvery
seriously in an evolutionary approach to communication. Sperber'ssecond
themeflowsfromthefirst. Sincespeakersaresometimes deceptive, hearers
mustdecidewhento trustordistrust them.Speakerscan helpinduceaudi-
ence membersto accepttheirassertionsby includingreasonsfortheir
acceptance.Hearerscan decidewhether to accepttheassertions byassess-
ing the internal coherence (logical and evidential) of the speaker'sreasons
as well as theirexternalcoherencewithwhathearersalreadybelieve.
Sperberspeculatesthatcoherencechecking - orreasoning, morebroadly
- evolved"as a meansofreapingthebenefits ofcommunication whilelim-
iting itscosts" (410). Coherence checking did not arise within general,aso-
cial cognition. Rather, the use of logical terms such as "if,""and,""or,"and
"therefore" emerged as tools of persuasion, in an evolutionary armsrace
betweencommunicators and audiences.An argumentation mechanism
emergedofrhetorical construction andepistemic evaluation ofmessages.
I have a briefcommenton each of thesethemes.Sperberwritesas if
speakershave onlyegoisticmotives,so thatdecisionsaboutwhether to
speak and what to say are driven whollyegoistically. as
But, Sperber knows,
489
evolutionary theorists
arenowadaysveryinterested in altruism, andaltruis-
ticbehavioris thought to be amenableto evolutionary treatment, although
thespecificsarecontroversial.29 Communication maybe a primearenain
whichaltruistic motivesoperate.Certainly thereare altruistic motivesat
workin thecommunication relationship between and
parent infant, orpar-
entandchild,in whichtheformer instructs or informs thelatter.It is also
tempting tospeculatethatpeople'scommunicative motivesarepartly driven
by a fundamental desire to share one's thoughts with others.30 This mightbe
an evolutionary product akin to emotional contagion, in which the same
emotionalstatesin one personare automatically transmitted to others.
EgoisticmotivesofthekindinvokedbySperberareundoubtedly prevalent,
andcertainly canleadtodeceptive communication. Buta fullpictureshould
notomittheothertypesofmotivation.
Sperber'ssecondmainthemeis thatlogicalreasoning - whathe calls,
in shorthand, "coherencechecking" - is notevolvedforgeneral-purpose
cognition.Instead,he postulates a domain-specific andtask-specific module
(his termis for
"mechanism") argumentation, suggests and this as thesole
sourceof logical cognition.Contrary to evolutionary psychologists like
CosmidesandTooby,whosaythatthereis no generallogicalabilityat all
in thehumanpsychological make-up,Sperberarguesthatthereis suchan
ability,butone thatis "specializedforprocessing communicated orto-be-
communicated information" (409). My problem with this is in purelypsy-
chologicalterms.Thereseemsto be something like coherencechecking
goingon evenin simplecognitive tasksthatinfants perform, wellbeforethe
adventof language.ConsiderKarenWynn's31 experiments on arithmetic
calculationbyfive-month-old infants. Judging bytheirlookingtime,these
infantscantellthatsomething is "wrong"whentheyfirst see twoitemssuc-
cessivelyplacedina displayarea,andthen,whena curtain is removed, only
one is thereto be seen. Theydetectthe"incoherence"betweenthetwo
observations, andmanifest surprise bytheirlookingtime.Sincethisappar-
entact of coherencecheckinghas nothingto do withargumentation, it
seemsto undermine Sperber'shypothesis. I suspectthatmanyotherpieces
ofcognition, also unrelated tolanguage,coulddeliverthesamemoral.
LAUDAN
LarryLaudanoffersan illuminating of changingmethodsofguilt
history
inEuropeanlegalsystems.
determination However,contrary towhathe sug-
gestsin theprefaceto hispaper,thishistory
poses verylittlechallengeto
myconception ofthemethodology ofepistemology,eitherinEpistemology
and Cognition( E&C ) orin morerecenttreatments.
In fact,hishistory
pro-
videsexcellentmaterialsforillustrating
andsupporting importantelements
ofmyconception.
490
Laudan expressesinterestin thephilosophicalquestionof how we
determine a lightnesscriterion forJ-rules(to phrasemattersas I did in
E&C). A J-rule is a ruleforjustified belief,anda criterion ofJ-rule lightness
is a standardforchoosingrightJ-rules. The criterion proposedin E&C is a
reliabilist
criterion. It saysthata right J-ruleis onethatauthorizes a reliable
psychologicalprocessof belief-formation, a processthatproducesa high
ratiooftruebeliefs.32 Laudandoes notdiscussthisparticular criterion, but
onlythemethodology I advocatethereforarriving atthis(oranyother)cri-
terion.The advocatedmethodology is thefamiliar method ofreflective equi-
librium, championed byGoodmanandRawls.Laudanasks:"Whenthinkers
do findthemselves in a situation wherethereis a challengeto a prevailing
J-rule,do theyproceedin anything like thisGoodman-Rawls-Goldman
fashion?" (273). His answeris in thenegative, andhe thinks thisshowshow
farwe differ on a crucialepistemological matter.
Laudanfailsto noticethatwhenthinkers confront a challengeto a pre-
vailingJ-rule, thenaccordingtoE&C theyshouldconsultthechosencrite-
rionofJ-rulerightness to see whether theJ-ruleconforms to it. It is not
appropriate, in general,to challengethecriterion itself.Now,in determin-
ingwhether theprevailing J-rule conforms to thecriterion, E&C does not
saythatthemethod ofreflective equilibrium shouldbe used,orthatthemat-
tershouldbe approached in someother"purelyphilosophical" fashion.On
thecontrary, E&C saysthatitmaybe entirely appropriate to use empirical
methods. Giventhespecificpsychological content ofthejustifiedness crite-
rionproposedin E&C , I explicitly indicatethatempirical psychology must
be consulted in decidingwhichpossibleJ-rules wouldconform tothecrite-
rion.If we now applythisapproachto Laudan's current topic,we would
obtaina similarresult.Supposethatthecriterion forgoodlegalprocedures
ofguiltdetermination is a reliabilist criterion. It maytakeempiricalmeth-
ods todecidea procedure's reliability.Empirical information mayrevealthe
unreliabilityoftheprevailing legalprocedure, andhenceitsfailureto con-
formto the criterion.This is exactlywhathappenedin the historical
episodesLaudanrecounts. Whathishistory revealsdoes notconflict at all
withtheconceptualreconstruction I haveoffered. Indeed,itnicelycorrob-
oratesit.
Laudan'shistory comesevencloserto somecentralthesesofmymore
recentbook,Knowledgeina Social World.33 In chapter9 ofKnowledgein
a Social World(KSW), I arguethattheprimary aim of legal adjudication
systemsis to producetrue,or accurate,verdicts. Trialprocedures aregood
to theextentthattheygenerate true,oraccurate,verdicts. Laudan'shistory
providesamplesupport forthecontention thatthissamegoal,orcriterion,
was inplaythroughout theperiodsandtraditions heexamines. Whenpeople
in chargeof a legalsystembecameconvincedthatitsacceptedmethods of
491
"proof'werepoorat truth determination,as occurredwithtrialbyordeal
andtorture,theyabandonedthoseprocedures ormethods. Thisis justwhat
thetruth-basedcriterion
I haveadvocatedprescribes. Farfromundermining
mytruth-based approach,Laudan's historystrongly supportsit. I myself
citedthehistory oftorturein supportofthetruth-based criterion.34
My diagnosis,then,is thatLaudan's disputewithme, insofaras it
appliestothesubjectof"epistemic crises,"reallystemsfroma levelconfu-
sion. He confusesthelevel of thecriterion withthelevel of rules.More
he confusesthequestionofthemethodology
specifically, ofcriterion selec-
tionwiththequestionof themethodology of rule(or practice)selection.
Admittedly, on thequestionof themethodology of criterionselection,he
wouldcontinueto takeissuewiththereflective equilibriummethodology,
or anyother"purelyphilosophical"methodology. He wouldplumpfora
moreempirical methodology. I myself
But,actually, wouldnowwanttodis-
tancemyselfa bitfrommyearlierendorsement of reflectiveequilibrium
methodology. aboveinmyresponse
As indicated toHenderson andHorgan,35
I wouldwishto claimthatconceptualanalysisneedsto havesomeempiri-
cal components. Thisappliesevenwhenwe inquireintoourowncriterion
associatedwitha givennormative concept.Ifwe inquireintothecriterion
usedbysomehistorical individual orcommunity, someadditional kindsof
evidencewouldhavetobe used.
historical-empirical
IV. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
LYCAN
I haveneverencountered a discussionbyWilliamLycanin whichhe has
failedtodisplayan impressively comprehensive graspoftherelevant liter-
ature.My ownworkon consciousness constitutesno exceptionto thisrule
(thoughitssize wouldhardlypose muchofa challenge).As is hiscustom,
Lycanhasmastered whatI havewritten on consciousness andoffers highly
pertinent rejoinders.
The mainmaterial he addressesis thetreatment ofself-knowledge and
qualia, as discussed in "Consciousness, Folk and
Psychology, Cognitive
Science"and"ThePsychology ofFolkPsychology."36 1don'twanttotryto
defendtheaccountofself-knowledge giventhere.I agreethatitneedssome
reworking, and thatLycan offersgood reasonsfor it,at least
reconsidering
many of itsdetails.
I am cheered,however, thateven Lycanfindsplausible
theproffered accountofhowwe knowandclassifyourownsensorystates,
namely,thatwe knowthembydetecting their(Lewis-Goodman)qualia. I
shallcomment furtheron hisclaimofambiguity in theterm"qualia,"and
on hisgeneralview,reemphasized in thepresentpaper,that"consciousness"
is multiplyambiguous.
492
I have troubleunderstanding Lycan'sdistinction betweentheLewis-
Goodmansenseof theterm"qualia" and the"whatit's like,"or "higher-
order,"sense of "qualia." I understand, of course,thatthefirstsenseis
restricted to sensorystates,whereasthesecondsenseis not.Ifittakestwo
sensesto persuadephilosophers to giveseriousconsideration to thepossi-
bilitythatnon-sensory statesliketheattitudes havea "whatit'slike"char-
acter,thenI'll cheerfully go alongwithtwosenses.ButI thinkthat"what
it's like"character shouldbe comprehensible andgeneralenoughthatthe
plausibility ofsuchcharacter attachingtotheattitudes does notrequiretwo
senses.
I recognizethatifqualia in theLewis-Goodmansensecan be present
evenina nonconscious sensory state,thenphilosophers couldbe wellmoti-
vatedinintroducing anothersenseof"qualia"thatdoes nothavethisprop-
erty.Thiswouldbe an understandable rationaleforintroducing the"what
it'slike"sense,on topoftheLewis-Goodman sense.ButI wouldprefer to
denythatnonconscious sensorystateshavequalia.
Let me turnnowto Lycan'sfascination withmultiplesensesof"con-
sciousness."37 This maneuveris essentialto his critiqueof myproposals
(and theproposalsof manyotherphilosophers), because he can dismiss
themas beingrelevantonlyto "G-consciousness," butnotrelevantto his
own,higher-order senseof"consciousness." As an antidote toLycan'spro-
fusionof sensesof "consciousness,"I recommend an articleby Michael
Antony.38 Antonyacknowledges thatsomelinguistsargueforwidespread
polysemy (ambiguity). Forexample,in thesentences "Marybrokethebot-
tle"and"The babyfinished thebottle,"theword"bottle"mightbe said to
havetwosenses,one indicating a container andtheotherindicating some
contents.Similarly, in thesentences"The windowis rotting" and "Mary
crawledthrough thewindow,"theword"window"mightbe said to have
twosenses,one indicating a frameandtheotherindicating an opening.On
theotherhand,thereis goodreasontodoubtthattheseoccurrences of"bot-
tle"and"window"involvegenuineambiguity. Antony endorsestheviewof
thelexicalsemanticist D. A. Cruse,whodescribesa phenomenon he calls
modulation ?9 A singlesense,saysCruse,can be modified bydifferent con-
textsin an unlimited numberofways,emphasizing certainsemantictraits
andobscuringor suppressing others.Forexample,"The carneedsservic-
ing" and "The car needs washing"highlight different partsof the car,
namely, theengineandtheexterior, Thisexamplecanbe sup-
respectively.
plemented withfurthercases,showingthatdifferent partsoraspectsofa car
canbe highlighted bydifferent sententialcontexts."Thecarneedspainting"
highlights theexterior;"The car needsvacuuming"highlights thefloor,
mats,seats,etc.;"Thecarneedsloading"highlights thetrunk; and"Thecar
needsfilling" highlightsthegas tank.Surelywe don'twantto saythatthese
occurrences of"car"all beai*differentsenses.Fai*better to saythatthereis
a univocalsenseof"car"thatgetsmodulated acrosscontexts. Antony builds
493
an analogouscase fortheunivocality of"consciousness":thereis a single
generalsense ofthe term thatgetsmodulated acrosscontexts.
Lycan will resistthisclaim,of course.He cherishesa senseoftheterm
"conscious"thatis theproperexplanandum fora self-monitoring his
theory,
ownfavoredtheory.
The"self-monitoring" theories ofconscious
aretheories aware-
inthesenseofawareness
ness, specifically ofone'sowncurrent
mental state.
Correlatively,
they aretheories
of"conscious
states,"
inthespecific senseofstates
whosesubjects areawareofbeing
inthem. (341)
I would offera two-pronged argument againstthis.If a subject'sbeing
"aware"ofa mentalstatemeansthatthesubjectmerelyhas somecognitive
orrepresentational statedirectedatthefirst-ordermentalstate,thenthereis
no suchsenseof"conscious."Havinga cognitivestatedirectedat another
current mentalstate(of one's own) does notguaranteethatthefirst-order
stateis conscious,inanysenseoftheterm"conscious."Nonconscious states
can be monitored by othernonconscious stateswithout thereby transform-
ingtheformer intoconsciousstates.On theotherhand,ifa subject'sbeing
"aware"ofa mentalstateimports thenotionofphenomenality orwhat-it's-
like-nessintothepicture,thentheself-monitoring theory might be right.
Whenever thereis awareness, state,perhapsthe
in thissense,ofa first-order
lattermustbe conscious.Butthatmaybe so onlybecausetheterm"aware-
ness"carriesthecrucialelementof phenomenality or what-it's-like-ness.
Self-monitoring, then, would not be an entirely
independent senseof"con-
sciousness,"as Lycanmaintains, butonlya modulation ofthesinglesense
ofthetermthatis bestconveyedbyphenomenality orwhat-it's-like-ness.
DAVIES ANDSTONE
MartinDavies andTonyStone(DS) present a verycarefuldiscussionofan
important challenge to simulation theory(ST): theprospect thatitmay"col-
lapse" intoitsarch-rival,theory theory(TT). Jane Heal has linkedthethreat
ofcollapseto thepreciseformulation of ST. Heal claimsthatifST is for-
mulatedas an empiricalthesisaboutcognitiveoperationsoccurring at a
subpersonal level,then thethreat of is
collapse particularly severe.Herargu-
mentproceedsfromcertainassumptionsabouttacittheory-possession,
assumptions drawnfromearlierworkof Davies himself.In thepresent
paper, argueagainsttheseassumptions,
DS andconcludethattheempirical
versionofST, whichI favor,is safefromthethreatened collapse.Theyalso
argue thatif Heal's threatwere well founded, it would threaten herown,a
priori,version ofST as well as mine.
I agreewithmostofDS's arguments, andcertainly theirconclusions.
ButI wouldgo further thantheydo in a fewplaces.First,therequirements
494
fora tacittheoryneedto be tightened stillfurther thantheyshowsignsof
doing.Second,I wouldliketoproposea newwayofformulating theST/TT
debatethatwould circumvent thethreatof collapse and wouldbe more
fruitful
in theend.Thesearethepointsthatwilloccupymyresponse.
Heal's argument forcollapsewas builton Davies's earlierworkon the
notionof a tacittheoryand its applicationto the mindreading debate.
Accordingto Davies's account,"a componentprocessingmechanism
embodiestacitknowledgeofa particular ruleoraxiomifitplaysa rolein
mediating causallybetweenrepresentational statesthatis structurallyanal-
ogoustotherolethattheruleoraxiomitselfplaysin mediating derivation-
allybetweenpremisesandconclusions."40 Heal producedherheartexample
to showthatsimulation wouldmeetthisrequirement, andhencesimulation
wouldqualifyas an instanceofTT. In theirpresentresponseto Heal, DS
firstswitchto thegas cylinder exampleratherthanHeal's heartexample.
TheythenreplytoHeal bysayingthattheputative stateoftacitknowledge,
namely, thepresencein (thesimulating cylinder) C ofa particularquantity
ofgas,does notplay"theright causal-explanatory role."Although thepres-
ence of thegas does causallyexplaina certaintemperature-pressure rela-
tionshipthatoccursin thecylinder (whichis usedbya cognizerto predict
thepressure in a secondcylinder), thepresenceofthegas in thefirst cylin-
derdoes notexplainthecrucialtransition inthecognizerfroma representa-
tionofthesimulating cylinder'sinitialtemperature to hisprediction ofthe
secondcylinder'schangein pressure.In DS's notation, thepresenceof a
quantity of gas in C does explainthetransition fromS2 to S3, butnotthe
transitionfromSI to S4. A secondpointtheymakeis thatitwouldbe ille-
gitimate totrytoreinstate thecollapseargument byrelabeling thestatesof
temperature andpressureas representations oftemperature andpressure.
Thesestatesare,atmost,"as if' representations, and"as if' representations
are notgenuinerepresentations. Similarly, "as if' tacitknowledgeis not
genuinetacitknowledge.
Bothresponses aie pertinent andhelpful responses to Heal.ButI would
go further andraisedoubtsabouttheunderlying approachto tacittheories
thatDavies had introduced in thefirstplace (drawingon a suggestion of
Evans).A state'splayinga causalexplanatory role- evenonethatminorsa
suitablederivational structure - does notseemto containtheright"seeds"
or "germs"to capturethenotionof tacitknowledge.For one thing,tacit
knowledgeofa certainproposition shouldat leastinvolvea (tacit)graspof
theappropriate concepts . Thatdoesnotseemtobe guaranteed bythecausal-
explanatory requirement thatDavies proposed.The originalrequirement is
somesortof"local"functional requirement, whichisn'tstringent enoughto
guarantee thepossessionofpertinent concepts, evenwhenaccompanied by
theformal system component. In a way,thispointrevisits thesecondobjection
495
thatDS raise,namely, that"as if' representation isn'tgenuinerepresenta-
tion.My suggestion is thatthissignalsthefutility oftrying to explaintacit
knowledge,or tacittheory-possession, in termsof causal structure that
derivationally "mirrors" a formalsystem.
NextI wantto advancea proposalforchanging thetermsofthedebate
betweenST andTT. The standard wayofexplainingST involvestwoele-
ments, onenegative andonepositive. According tothenegative element, ST
rejectsthethesisthatfolkmentalizers use (folk-)psychological theoriesin
makingmentalattributions. Accordingto thepositiveelement,ST claims
thatfolkmentalizers makementalattributions bytrying to go through the
samementalstepsas theirtargets. The threat ofcollapseis onlyassociated
withthefirst, negative element. I proposetorelieveST oftheburdenofthat
element.DS themselvesgive one reasonforthismove,by pointingto a
"minimal theoretical
background" formentalsimulation. Thisconsideration
suggeststhata plausibleversionof ST shouldnotdepictmentalizers as
devoidofrelevant knowledge, orevenas radically"knowledge poor."So I
proposetoregardonlythepositiveelementas criticalto,orcriterial of,ST.
Thisproposalwouldhavetheaddedadvantageofcircumventing thethreat
ofcollapse.Underthenewdefinition, ST does notdenytheuse of a folk-
psychologicaltheory, or of psychological"knowledge."So ST wouldno
longerbe undercut shouldit tumoutthatsimulation is, in somefashion,
underpinned bya tacittheory. Simulational mindreading couldstillbe a core
feature ofmentalattribution, whether ornotithas a theoretical basis.Andit
wouldstillbe an important andinteresting topicforempirical investigation
whether simulationis indeedsucha corefeature ofmentalattribution.
If thenegativeelementis dropped,doesn'tthatdramatically alterthe
landscape?Doesn'tit,forexample,obliterate therivalrybetweenST and
TT? Not if we also makea smallchangein TT's formulation. Although
defenders ofTT occasionallytoleratetheprospectofa rareuse of simula-
tion,theyusuallypay it onlythemostcursoryand dismissiveattention.
Defendersof TT tendto eitherignoreST, or to holdthattheevidenceis
againstit,orto saythatitjustcouldn'twork.Letus therefore formulate TT
as a positionembodying a positiveanda negativecomponent. The positive
component saysthatthird-person mindreading is executedvia folkpsycho-
logicaltheories. Thenegative component saysthatsimulation is notused(or
onlyminimally used)formindreading. Underthischaracterization, specifi-
callythenegativecomponent, TT wouldstillstandin opposition to ST; but
thedangerofST collapsingintoTT wouldbe offthetable.I wouldregard
thisas a salutary revisionin theold termsofthedebate.
GORDON
RobertGordonidentifies
someintriguing
differencesbetweenreasonexpla-
nationsandcausalexplanations,
andcleverlyuses thesedifferences
to pro-
496
posebotha newaccountofreasonexplanations anda provisional argument
forthesimulation theory (ST) ofmindreading. The mostsalientdifference
he notesbetweenreasonexplanations and causal explanations is thatthe
counterfactuals associatedwiththeformer, unlikethoseassociatedwiththe
latter,
implicitly smugglein a factorlikebelieforknowledge (at leastin the
procedureused to assess them).In thecausal explanationof thesmoke
alarmgoingoff,thereis theassociatedcounterfactual "Iftherehadn'tbeen
smokein thekitchen,thealarmwouldnothave gone off."This implies
nothingabouta belief.In thereasonexplanationof myrunning intothe
kitchen, we havetheassociatedcounterfactual "Iftherehadn'tbeensmoke
in thekitchen, I wouldnothaverunintothekitchen."The lattercounter-
factual,saysGordon,is interpreted as excludingthepossibility thatthere
wasn'tanysmokein thekitchenbutI mistakenly believedtherewas. In
assessingthiscounterfactual, I notonlyassumethatthereisn'tanysmoke
in thekitchen butI also assumethatI believethatthereisn'tany- oratany
ratethatI don'tbelievethatthereis any.
Gordonarguesthatwhenone assessesthereason-related counterfac-
tual,one appliesa simulative procedure in whichonepretend-believes that
thereisn'tsmokeinthekitchen. In otherwords,oneusesthecounterfactual
antecedent as a premiseofsimulated reasoning. In thesmokykitchen case,
thereasoningis a bitofpracticalreasoning, also featuring existingdesires
andexistingbeliefs,andtheoutputis a decisionabouttheactionspecified
in thecounterfactual's consequent. Withtheoutputofthissimulated deci-
sion in hand,one thenpredictswhatone would do if the antecedent
obtained, andthereby assesseswhether thecounterfactual anditsassociated
reason-explanation aretrue.A similarprocedure is usedin assessinga coun-
terfactualandreasonexplanation foranother person.Thus,a certain typeof
simulationis at theheartof assessingreason-related counterfactuals and
explanations. Simulation is also usedin assessingcausalcounterfactuals and
explanations, saysGordon;butthetwotypesof simulation procedures do
notmatch.
In thelatersectionsofhispaper,Gordonsuggeststhattheprocedural
difference betweencausalandreasoncounterfactuals explainstheimplicitly
cognitiveinterpretation of the reason counterfactuals. Althoughthe
antecedent oftheconditional makesno mentionofbeliefs,itis "procedu-
rallyinconsistent" withthestatement thatI do notbelievethatthereis no
smoke.Gordonhastensto add thatthesimulativeinteipretation does not
demandthatthesimulator possesstheconceptsofbelieforknowledge.It
onlyassumesthathe is capableof pretend-believing. Gordonannounces
towardtheendofhispaperthathe hopesto showelsewherethatthesimu-
lativeprocedure is our"bootstrap" intocognitive concepts. Ifuse ofthepro-
cedurealreadymakesimplicitattributions of knowledgeor belief,andif
children use sucha procedure beforetheyhavetheseconcepts, thenthiswill
497
lendsupport to ST as overagainstTT,presumably becausesimulation will
be children's to an
steppingstone explicitgrasp cognitiveof concepts.
Thereis muchherethatis attractive toa simulationistlikemyself. As a
commentator, though, I should play thedevil's advocate (i.e., simulate the
devil) and indicatesome a
responses theory theorist might make. A philo-
sophicallyknowledgeable theorytheorist mightstartby askingaboutthe
truth-conditions ofreasoncounterfactuals andexplanations as opposedto
theverification procedure Gordon discusses. Gordon does not tellus what
thetruth-conditions aie. Itlooksas ifthetruth-conditions mustincludea ref-
erencetoknowledgeorbelief.Forthesmokykitchencounterfactual, they
would runalong thefollowinglines: "In theclosestpossibleworldsin
whichthereisn'tsmokein thekitchenand I know(or believe)thisfact,I
don'trunintothekitchen." Thismakesexplicitthecognitivefactorthatis
onlyimplicit in the counterfactual itself.A theorytheorist couldthensay
thattheway a personassesses thetruth-value of thecounterfactual is by
a
using folk-psychological theory about desires,beliefs,and decisions to
predict a decisionabout running into the kitchen, holdingfixed the agent's
actual-worlddesires.Thequestionwouldthenarisewhether thesimulation-
basedprocedure orthetheory-based procedure is correctas a description of
I
whatpeopleactuallydo. haveoffered counterfactual reasoning as one of
thedomainsinwhichsimulation-based reasoning looksextremely plausible,41
so I am partialto Gordon'sproposal.ButI don'tthinkthatall therelevant
evidenceis yetin.
Apparently, Gordonwantstoarguethatchildren engageinpretend play
and give reasonexplanationsearlierthantheyshow explicitmasteryof
belief.Thiswouldbe used in supportofhisidea thatsimulation exercises
reflectan implicitconceptofbeliefbeforeitbecomesexplicit.Thus,early
simulation wouldexplainthedevelopment ofexplicitbeliefat a laterstage.
However, modular developmentalists hold thatthe beliefconcept
also
emergeswithpretend play,whenthetheory-of-mind modulematures42; and
modularists are notcommitted to a simulationalstory.Moreover,other
developmentalists givecomplexstoriesofwhattypesofreasonexplanations
43
aregiven(andunderstood) bychildren atdifferent stages So itremainsto
be seen precisely what developmental arguments forsimulation can be
madealongtheUnesGordonsketches. Nonetheless, possibilities cer-
the are
tainlyintriguing.
HEAL
JaneHeal's generalapproachto psychologicalcontentis quiteattractive,
and nicelyextendsideas she has advancedelsewhere.Her notionsof
indexicalconceptsand Lagadoniankindscouldproveusefulforexplain-
ing our understandingof thepsychological,at leaston thecontentside.
Nonetheless, andI wonderabouttherelationship
I havea fewreservations,
ofherproposalstoothersin theliterature,
especiallythatofBrianLoar.
498
Loar developsa rathersimilarsetof ideas,althoughhis topicis phe-
nomenalkindconceptsrather thanattitude conceptsortheircontents.44 The
principal respectofsimilarity is thatLoarcharacterizes certainpsychologi-
cal conceptsas ones thatpickouttypesbymeansofdemonstratives. The
difference betweenLoar's demonstratives andHeal's indexicalsmaynotbe
insignificant,as I shallsuggestbelow.On thesurface, however, thepropos-
als arein thesameneckofthewoods.Loar saysthatphenomenal concepts
are"type-demonstratives," andtheybelongto a widerclass ofconceptshe
calls "recognitional concepts."Theyhavetheform"x is one ofthatkind,"
andaregrounded in dispositions toclassify, bywayofperceptual discrimi-
nations,certainobjects,events,andsituations. Recognitional conceptsare
conceptsone has whenone has gaineda recognitional commandof their
kind withouta name forit. The dispositionsto identifyor recognize
instancesaretypically linkedwithcapacitiestoformimagesaboutan iden-
tifiable kindin theabsenceofcurrently perceivedinstances.
One important difference betweenLoar's recognitional conceptsand
Heal's Lagadonianconceptslies in thepresenceor absenceof a recogni-
tionalability.In Heal's case,whatshecallsa "narrowly indexicalpredicate"
requiresthepresenceof a specimenof theproperty whichis indexically
ascribed.Choosingtheexampleofsubtly different shades,shewrites:"[N]o
amountofpracticewiththeselabelsorattempted analysisofthecolorswill
enableus to holdthedifferences steadywhenthespecimensarenotthere.
Lackinga specimenof dustyrose we cannottellof a newlyencountered
objectwhether itis ofthatexactshadeornot"(205). Lagadoniankindsare
defined as "kinds. . . which,fornontrivial reasons,we centrally andusually
thinkofbyusingnarrowly indexicalconcepts"(205). Heal thenproceedsto
identify ourconceptsofattitudinal contents as speciesofLagadoniankinds.
UnlikeLoar's phenomenalkinds,Lagadoniankindsare conceivedof as
kindsthatwe needa present instancetoidentify.
It seemsdoubtful to me thatall of ourcontentkindsare Lagadonian
underHeal's definition(s), becauseI think thatmanyofourcontent kindsare
oneswe can pickoutby(whatshecalls) broadlyindexicalconceptsrather
thannarrowly indexical concepts. Broadlyindexical conceptsareoneswe can
graspbyusingmemory tothink oftheconceptagain,forexample, "thatcolor
(viz.,theone I saw in thatfabricsamplelastweek)."Thiskindofconcept,
saysHeal,is something we canbringto a newencounter wherea specimen
of theproperty is notpresent. This soundsmuchmorelikeone of Loar's
recognitional concepts.It seemstome,however, thatwe oftenthink ofcon-
tentconceptsinjustthisway.Havingrehearsed tomyself thismorning a cer-
tainphilosophical content thatI plantouse in a lecture, I nowthinkofthat
content againin theafternoon. Andmyfirst thought ofthatcontent is ofthe
form, "thatcontent, viz.,theoneI was rehearsing thismorning."
Anotherreservation I haveaboutHeal's Lagadonianaccountofcon-
tentis herproposalthatcontentkindsare essentiallyLagadonian,in the
499
sensethatnarrowly indexicalconceptsare theones mostappropriate to
theirnatureand cannotbe replacedby a non-indexicalconcept(215).
Althoughshe deniesthatessentiallyLagadoniankindsare suchthatone
cannotaccumulateinformation aboutthenon-indexicalfeaturesof the
kind,she thinksthatone cannotrelateto such a kindby subsumingit
solelyundernon-indexical concepts.Thisclaimseemstorelateto herear-
lierstatement "thattheexistenceofmindsandmentalstatesrequiresmore
thannaturalsciencecan offer"(214). Thisostensibly contrasts withLoar's
position that the properties out
picked byphenomenal conceptsarephysi-
cal properties, whichare preciselywhatnaturalsciencestudies.I think
Heal introduces a comparablemoveforessentially Lagadoniankindspre-
to
cisely preserve the a priori status of the psychological(at leasttheatti-
tudinal),whichshehas defendedelsewhere.Thisfeatureofherproposals
does notattract me.
A finalproblemwithHeal's setofproposalsconcernshercharacteri-
zationof narrowly indexicalconcepts.Heal says of herapproachthatit
"does notrequiretheidea thatpsychological statesaretheobjectofinner
ostension orinnerdirected quasi-perceptual attention" (209). Thatwouldbe
she
implied, says, if she had used the term 'demonstrative', butshe has
advisedly used 'indexical' instead. She tellsus thatshe uses "indexical"in
thenow standardsenseof a particular kindof dependenceof contenton
context,whichdoes notrequireany inner-directed demonstration. The
worry I have is that it seems to
impossible pick out any definiteitem of
mentalcontent unlessone uses somesortofinner-directed demonstration.
Exactlywhatformshoulda narrowly indexicalconcepttakethatpicksout
a mentalcontent? Woulditbe "Thecontent ofthis(current) belief,"orper-
haps "The content of this (current) thought"? Since peopletypically have
many beliefs at the same time, thefirstphrase will not pick out thecontent
of anyparticular one of thosebeliefs,unlessitis supplemented by some-
thing like inner ostension (perhaps an act of attention). Perhaps diffi-
this
culty for beliefs doesn't extend to thoughts, because (arguably)one can
thinkonlyone completethought at a time.If Heal makesthismove,how-
ever,I suspectshe will be in trouble,becauseit seemsthatwe can think
morethanone thought at a time.I wouldbe happierifHeal madethefol-
lowing move: "I only said thatnarrowly indexicalconceptsdo notrequire
innerostensionto pick out mentalcontents;I did notsay thatnarrowly
indexicalconceptsneverdeployorrelyon innerostension. On thecontrary,
indexicalsto mentalcontents oftendo involveinnerostension." Although I
wouldbe happyifHeal agreedwiththis,I don'tregarditas verylikely.But
thenshefacestheproblemI havejustbeenposing.
500
V. LAW AND DEMOCRACY
COLEMAN
JulesColemanexplorestherelationship betweennaturalistic epistemology
andnaturalistic jurisprudence. He firstpointsoutthatseveraldifferent con-
ceptions of naturalisticepistemologyare abroad, includingQuine's
"replacement" conception, Stich's"pragmatist" conception, andmy"ana-
lytic"conception.As Coleman correctlyindicates,analyticnaturalism
acceptstheclassicalformulation of (partof) theepistemological projectas
seekinga conceptualanalysisof epistemicconceptslikejustification and
knowledge. At leastin Epistemology and Cognition, I regarded conceptual
analysisas an a prioriproject.45However,I havemodified thatpositiona bit
sinceEpistemology and Cognition , so thatI no longerviewconceptual anal-
ysisas a priori(see myresponseabove to Hendersonand Horgan).But I
continueto maintain thattheconceptualportionofepistemology is a criti-
cal portionand cannotbe dispensedwith(see the responseabove to
Kitcher).
Otherdistinctions also needtobe drawnamongnaturalizing projects.46
Forexample,we shoulddistinguish metaphysical andmethodological con-
ceptionsofnaturalism. The methodological approachthinksofnaturalism
as advocatinga certaintypeofmethodology, viz.,empiricalmethodology.
Naturalism ofthemetaphysical kindis a viewabouttheontologicalstatus
ofthesubjectmatter in question.Metaphysical naturalism in epistemology
wouldtakea position onthe"constitution" ofepistemic factssuchas knowing
orbeingjustified. A mildformofmetaphysical naturalism in epistemology
mightsay,forexample,thatfactsofjustifiedness reduceto,orsupervene on,
some sortof non-epistemic, non-normative facts.The "mildness"of this
varietyofnaturalism consistsin itsopennessconcerning thespecificnature
of thesefacts,so longas theyare non-epistemic. A stricterformofmeta-
physicalnaturalism in epistemology wouldsay thatthesenon-epistemic
factsmustinvolvenarrowly naturalistic
properties, suchas causalrelations.
The properties ortraitsin questionmustbe onesthatphysicalorbiological
sciencewouldcheerfully countenance. Colemanplausiblylocatesmyepis-
temologicalnaturalismin this metaphysicalterritory, because I have
defendedcausal reliabilism aboutknowledgeandjustifiedness. However,
causalreliabilism also lendsitselfto methodological as wellas metaphysi-
cal naturalism aboutepistemology. Once thefirststageof epistemology
linksjustifiednesswithbeliefformation via reliablepsychological processes
ormethods, thenextstageofepistemology is to determine precisely which
processesormethodsarein factreliable.Thisrequiresempirical investiga-
tion,at leastin thecase ofbasicpsychological processes.47 So BrianLeiter
501
is also rightto portray me as a methodological naturalist, at leastat one
(veryimportant) stage ofthe totalepistemological project.
One sideofColeman'sjurisprudential interestsconcernsmetaphysical
matters. Forexample,he discussesthemetaphysical naturalism oflegalpos-
itivism, bestrepresented byJohnAustin's view thatlegality reducibleto
is
natural factsaboutthreats ofsanctionandhabitsofobedience.Thiskindof
metaphysical thesisaboutthelaw has no obviousepistemological implica-
tions,although itcouldtumoutthatepistemological issuesin thelaw will
be clearerandsimplerifa suitableformofmetaphysical naturalism about
thelaw (e.g.,a positivisticnaturalism) is correct.
Colemansoonturns, however,to an apparently epistemological topic
in analyticjurisprudence. "Analyticjurisprudence," he writes,"aims to
uncovertherulesofadjudicatory orlegalreasoning - miesthatifproperly
followedwillyielduniquelywarranted outcomes, giventhesetofavailable
inputs"(119,italicsadded)."A theoryofadjudication aimsto identify the
function . . . thattakesas inputsthesetof authoritative . . . standards and
yieldsas itsoutputtherightanswerto each legaldisputeforwhichthereis
a rightansweras a matter oflaw" (119). Sincethisenterprise is concerned
withquestionsofwarrant , an ostensibly epistemicnotion,itappearsto be
an epistemological enterprise.Colemanproceedsto arguethatthistheoret-
ical enterprise is fundamentally an analyticorconceptualenterprise rather
thanan empiricalone.Hence,itis appropriate to use a prioriprocedures in
pursuing theproject.48
Let me pursuetheexactnatureof analyticjurisprudence as Coleman
describesit,thoughI shalladd a fewwrinklesColemandoes notbroach.
Exactlywhichpropositions are associatedwiththe"outcomes"Coleman
refers to?I proposetoconceptualize thesepropositions as descriptive propo-
sitionsaboutthelegalsystem beingstudied. Theywouldhavethefollowing
form:"According tothelegalreasoning principles ofsystemL, theauthor-
itativestandards ofL, and theevidencepresented in thisdispute,theout-
comeshouldbe X," where"X" maybe either"plaintiff wins,""defendant
wins,"or "indeterminate." A proposition of thissortis "warranted by the
law,"in Coleman'sphrase, justincase thelegalproperties ofL andtheevi-
dencepresented in thecase do indeedimplythespecifiedoutcome.When
theproposition is spelledoutin thisfashion,however,itseemsto me that
theoperative term, fromthevantagepointofepistemology, wouldbe "true"
rather than"warranted." Nowadays,"warrant" and"justified"areusually
appliedtobeliefsofparticular epistemic agents, whichis nothowColeman
usestheterm.Although a certainoutcome(judgment) mightactuallybe the
rightoutcomein lightofall thepertinent legalconsiderations applicableto
thecase,no agentmaybe warranted (justified)in believingtheproposition
thatit is therightoutcomebecause nobodyhas done therequisitelegal
research to substantiate theproposition's Thus,theproposition
truth. is true
502
butnobodyis warranted in believingit.Thus,whatColemanis reallytalk-
ingaboutis tmth(aboutlegalsystemL) rather thanwarrant. Ofcourse,we
can also talkaboutan agent'swarrant in believingsucha proposition. What
determines thewarrant orjustifiedness ofan agent'sbelief in a descriptive
legalproposition is essentiallythesame(at a suitably abstractlevel)as what
determines warrant orjustifiedness foranyothertypeofproposition. The
agentis warranted in believingsucha proposition ifhe uses reliablemeth-
ods forbeliefformation, whichin thiscase wouldrequireappropriately
thoroughresearchinto the legal principlesand authoritative standards
(statutes,case law,etc.)relevant tothecase.
Ifwe conceptualize thetarget propositions in theindicated fashion, the
truth ofanysuchproposition obviouslydependson thecharacteristics ofthe
legalsystemin question - itsstatutes,itsprinciples of"reasoning," etc.- as
wellas thecharacteristics oftheparticular disputein question.Thus,appro-
priatemethods offorming beliefsin thesetypesofpropositions aremethods
appropriate toresearchintosystem-specific facts,i.e.,factsconcerning the
legalsystemin question.49 1 am inclinedto agreewithColeman,as against
Leiter,thatthemethodsappropriate tothistypeofresearcharenot"empir-
ical" methods intheusualsense.Theyarenotthemethods ofpsychology or
thesocialsciences,forexample.Thereare,however, otherepistemological
questionsconcerning law thatdo inviteempiricalinvestigation, as Leiter
correctly notes.Let me briefly sketchthetypeofquestionsI havein mind.
(My responsetoLeiter,whichfollowsnext,willsupplymoredetails.)
To theextentthata legal philosopher (orjudge) is interested in what
decisionsare requiredundera givenlegal system,he or she shouldthor-
oughlyinvestigate thelegalmaterials within thatsystem.Thereis no need
togo outsidethesystem, ortoevaluateitsadequacy.Forexample,suppose
we arestudying a systemthatutilizestrialbyordeal,andthecase in ques-
tionwas in facttriedunderthatprocedure. To decidewhether thedefendant
was properlyconvictedor acquittedunderthissystem,one need only
inquireinto the proceduralrequirements of the systemand determine
whethertheseprocedureswere duly followedin the case in question.
Pursuing a different typeofquestion, however, a philosopher orothertheo-
ristmightchallengetheadequacyoftrialbyordealin general.The theorist
mightsay thattrialbyordealis a terrible methodof determining guiltor
innocence becauseitis highly theoutcomeoftheordealjustisn't
unreliable:
reliablyalignedwiththedefendant's guiltor innocence.Because of this
unreliability,no individual andno societycouldbejustified inbelievingthe
defendant was orwas notguiltyofthecrimeinquestionsimplybecausethe
outcomeof theordeal"pointed"towardguiltor innocence.One couldbe
justifiedin believingthattheprevailing systemdeclaredhisguilt;butone
could notbe justifiedin believingthathe was reallyguilty.For this,one
wouldneeda morereliable,truth-conducive, systemofguiltdetermination.
503
Thedesignofsucha system couldbe consideredonetypeofprojectinlegal
epistemology.
Thiskindofprojectinlegalepistemology is precisely
whatI pursuein
chapter9 ofKnowledgeina Social World.It is a projectthatcouldeasily
seekhelpfromtheempirical sciences,including
psychology, andthatis pre-
ciselywhatBrianLeiteradvocatesinhiscontribution tothepresentvolume.
So although I fullyagreewithColemanthattheenterprise he pinpointsas
crucialtoanalytic is notcongenialtotheapplication
jurisprudence ofempir-
ical science,thereis another
partoflegaltheory towhichempiricalscience
has a verynaturalapplication.
LEITER
In theintroduction to his paper,Brian Leiterprovidesa veryaccurate
accountofrelevantaspectsofmyapproachesto naturalistic epistemology
and social epistemology. As he indicates,Epistemology and Cognition
{E&C) is devotedto individualepistemology, whichfocuseson thecogni-
tivepractices ofindividuals takensingly.ThefirsthalfofE&C features con-
ceptualanalysesofjustification and knowledge(in the"strong"senseof
"knowledge"usuallydiscussedbyepistemologists), analyseswhichmake
causalprocessesofbeliefformation verycentralto epistemology. The sec-
ond halfofE&C is therefore devotedto thestudyof belief-forming pro-
cesses,an extendedexcursusintocognitivepsychology. So thisportionof
epistemology is highlynaturalistic,
in themethodological senseofenlisting
helpfromempiricalscience,especiallycognitivescience.
Knowledgein a Social World(KSW) deals withsocial epistemology
rather thanindividualepistemology. It focuseson theintellectual practices
ofgroupsofindividuals, where"groups"can be as smallas twooras large
as all ofhumanity. Thepracticesinquestionrangefromcasualconversation
toformalized institutional
arrangements suchas legaladjudication systems.
Social epistemology studiessocialpracticesfroma veryspecificperspec-
tive:howeffectively theypromote knowledge(in the"weak"senseoftrue
belief)in theirparticipants.
This"veritistic"angleis notdefended (as itwas
in E&C ) byappealto analysesofjustification or knowledgein thestrong
sense.Itis defended byappealtopeople'sinterests in acquiringtruebelief
on manysubjects.In contrast withE&Cf thereis no intensive orsystematic
incorporation ofthesocialsciencesintoKSW,although thereareoccasional
borrowings fromeconomictheory andothersocialandbehavioral sciences,
includingpsychology. The absenceof anysystematic incorporation ofthe
scienceswas notdeliberate, however. I simplydidnotknowofanyparticu-
lar social sciencethatsystematically investigatestruth-relatedaspectsof
socialinfluence. (Theeconomicsofinformation comesclosest,perhaps, but
its preoccupations are somewhatdifferent fromthoseof veritistic social
epistemology.) Chapter9, on legal adjudicationsystems,devotessome
504
space to thetopicofevidencerulesin theAnglo-American systemoflaw.
Littlementionis made thereof psychology'srole in thedesignand/or
reform ofevidencerules,butLeiteris unquestionably rightthatempirical
psychology has an important roleto playin thisterritory. AlthoughKSW
does notemphasizepsychology's role,thisis an entirely appropriate empha-
sis,whichnicelybringsthe"naturalistic" sideofmygeneralmethodologi-
cal stanceintosharper focus.
Leiteroffersthreewell-chosen onespertaining
illustrations, todemeanor
evidence,probabilistic evidence,and characterevidence,respectively. I
shallcomment briefly on each ofthese.In histreatment of demeanorevi-
dence,Leiterdrawsextensively on an influential articlebyWellborn. The
psychological evidence Wellborn surveysstrongly indicates thatpeopleare
notverygood at inferring genuinecredibility from demeanor. One modest
reform suggestedby these empirical studiesis thatappellate courts should
give less deference to the factual findings oftrialcourts as they bearon wit-
nesscredibility,sincea transcript is actuallyas good a basisfora credibil-
itydetermination as live testimony. This,I suggest,is a somewhathasty
conclusion.Transcripts omitinformation aboutmajordimensions oftesti-
monyavailableto observers, includingpausesandgestures.One wonders
whether psychological experiments haveexcludedtheobservers'abilityto
use eventhisinformation in an accuracy-promoting fashion.
The mainissue concerning probabilistic evidenceis thedangerthat
jurorswilloverweight information aboutextreme probabilities, suchas ran-
dommatchprobabilities derivedfromDNA evidence.Granted theproblems
thatoverweighting maycreate,it remainsunclearwhether suchevidence
shouldbe excludedentirely. Aren'tjurorswho are deprivedof suchevi-
dencelikelyto makeeven moresevereerrorsin theirfinalprobabilistic
judgmentsthanjurorswho are giventheseprobabilities butoverweight
them?In addition, itis notso clearthatoverweighting is necessarily delete-
rious.Analyzing inflated probabilities intermsofan approachI havedevel-
oped called "quasi-objective Bayesianism,"itturnsoutthateveninflated
likelihoods can havepositiveconsequencesfortruth determination.50
The threatof overweighting is theusualreasoncitedforpreserving,
or evenstrengthening, theexclusionofcharacter evidence.Psychological
researchseemsto supportthispositioninsofaras itprovidesevidencefor
"situationalism." However,two legal scholars,Davies and Park,have
adducedscientific evidenceagainstsituationalism.51 Theyarguethatnone
ofthepsychological research debunking personality traits hasbeendoneon
behaviorpertinent to crime,especiallyviolentcrime.Theyalso pointout
thatone of thepioneersof situationalism, WalterMischel,subsequently
insistedthathis earlierworkhadbeenmisinteipreted andmisunderstood,
thathe didnotmeantodenyall predictive valuetodispositions. In a recent
paperMischelmaintains thatthereaie "consistencies thatcharacterize the
505
individual'ssocialbehavioracrosssituationsandovertime."52 He saysthat
"an important locus of personalitycoherencecan be found in people's
'behavioralsignatures': characteristic
theirdistinctive, patternsofif-then,
situation-behaviorrelations."
Fromthelegalperspective, however, thereis
another reasontoworry aboutcharacterevidence.Whenjurorslearnofpast
crimesoracts,thereis a dangerthattheywilluse theseeventsnotmerelyas
evidenceforthedefendant's commissionofthepresentcrime,butas rea-
sonsforpunishing thedefendant whether or nothe committed thepresent
crime.Thisraisesentirely issues,on whichpsychological
different research
concerning situationalismhas no bearing.Nonetheless, Leiteris entirely
rightin showinghowpsychological researchis highlyrelevantto evidence
law and,byimplication, socialepistemology.
toveritistic
CHRISTIANO
Whatrolecan socialepistemology playinthetheory andpractice ofdemoc-
racy?I makesomeproposalsaboutthisin chapter10 of Knowledgein a
Social World(KSW).ThomasChristiano raisesproblemsforthesepropos-
als againstthebackdropof his own complexand sophisticated theoryof
democracy. Thereisn'tspacehereformetocomment on Christiano's posi-
tivetheory, so I shallconfinemyselfto comments on hisworriesaboutmy
chapter.
Chapter10 was intended tofitintotheunifying framework andthemes
ofKSW.Twoofthesepervasive themeswere(1) thevalueandimportance of
knowledge - ina truth-entailing sense- tomanyarenasofsociallife,and(2)
thewaysthatalternative socialpracticescandifferentially
promote orimpede
theacquisition ofsuchknowledge. Giventhebook'soverarching emphasis
on truthas an important desideratum, I wantedtofocuson thisdesideratum
in connection withdemocracy. Thiswas whyjustification (ora justification-
entailingsenseofknowledge) makesno appearance inthediscussion. Itis not
becauseI denythegeneralepistemicvalueofjustified belief,norbecauseI
denyitsvaluefordemocratic citizens.I don'tdealwithitsimplybecauseitis
notpartoftheguidingthemeofthebook,andthenovelpointsI haddiscov-
eredaboutdemocracyand truth do notdependon justification. Giventhe
book'sframework, I also wantedtoexplorewaysthatpractices andpolicies
ofelectoralpolitics- andthemedia'smodesofcoverageofsuchpractices -
canpromote orhindertherelevant typesoftruth-acquisition. Ifjustification
hadbeenintroduced intothepicture,an alreadycomplexmatter wouldhave
becomevastlymorecomplexandprobably unmanageable (especiallygiven
thecontentious issuessurrounding thenotionofjustification). Therewas,
therefore,an interest inkeepingthings simple.Forthisreasonalso
relatively
I framed thediscussionintermsofa "simplemodeloftheaimandstructure
ofrepresentative democracy."53 Christiano hasnotyetconvinced methatmy
"simplemodel"resultsin anyseriousdistortions on thetopicsI address,but
506
I didnotintend thetreatmenttobe as comprehensive andrichas a fulltheory
ofdemocracy mightbe. Thatcouldhardly havebeenaccomplished in a sin-
glechapter. Thus,whenChristiano talksabouttheneedto"expand"theclass
oftruebeliefsthatcitizensoughttohave,I don'tsee thisas a challengetoany
thesisI meanttoadvance.
As Christianoindicates,thechapterfocuseson whatI dub"corevoter
knowledge." Corevoterknowledge is truebeliefthatanswersa voter'score
voterquestion, wherethespecific(typeof)corevoterquestionI pinpoint is:
"Whichofthetwocandidates, C or C', would,ifelected,producea better
outcomesetfrommypointof view?"I showthatif each memberof the
electoratebelievesthetrueanswertotheircorevoterquestion(fora partic-
ularelectoralcontest),and thereis majority rule,thisguarantees thatthe
candidatewhowouldproducea betteroutcomesetfromthepointofview
ofa majority ofthevoterswillbe elected.Ifthereisn'tfullcoreknowledge,
thereis no suchguarantee.
Christiano metobe assuming
inteiprets thatexactlyonequestionis the
corevoterquestion,butthatis notquiteright. WhatI wrotewas:
In whatfollows,
then,I trytospecifya coretypeofpolitical
ina representative
onethatvoters
question, democracyshould
answer ifthedemocracy
correctly is tofunction
optimally.54
Thisdoes notcommitme to thethesisthatthereis exactlyone suchques-
tion(ortypeofquestion), onlytothethesisthatthereis at leastone.Ifthere
aremanyquestionsthatneedto be answeredcorrectly fora democracy to
function optimally, thatwould be fine.I onlytry to show thatthere is atleast
one typeof questionof thissortand to specifywhatitis. (Actually,each
voterconfronts manyinstancesofthecorevoterquestionI specify, one for
each officeforwhichhe casts a ballot.)It is truethatmanyquestionsit
mightbe valuableforvotersto answercorrectly areonesI claimtobe sub-
sidiary and instrumental to the specified core question.But,contrary to
Christiano,I don't claim for
uniqueness mytype of core question. fact,in
In
thediscussionofpolicyknowledgethatChristiano cites,I indicatethatif
officialsareswayedbyvoters'policypreferences in placeoftheiroutcome
preferences, then"policy- relatedknowledgeon thepartofcitizenscan be
moreimportant thanI havehitherto asserted. UntilnowI haveonlyinsisted
thatcitizensmusthavecoreknowledge[outcomeknowledge] ifdemocracy
is to succeed.. . . Butifofficials aredisposedto accedetothepublic'spol-
icy preferences, outcomesuccesswill be contingent on thepublic'spos-
sessingpolicyknowledge as well."55This shows that I do notrestrict the
class ofquestionsto whichvotersshouldhavecorrectanswers(ifdemoc-
racyis to function well) tocorequestions.
Christiano findssomeunclarity in myaccountof a voter's"pointof
view."Is ittobe understood, heasks,interms ofthevoter'scurrent preference
507
ranking overoutcomesets,regardless ofthebasisormeritofthepreference
ranking? Oris ittobe understood intermsofsomewell-founded preference
ranking attributable tothevoter?My intention was certainly fortheformer
interpretation. In characterizing theoutcomepreferences as "fundamental"
or"intrinsically valued,"I meanttobe excludingquestionsoftherational-
ityorjustification ofthesepreferences, at leastforpuiposesofthepresent
analysis.56
Another problem thatworries Christiano is preferenceinstability.Ifcit-
izens' preferences change,theymayvoteon bases thattheysubsequently
disagreewith.Societywillthenbe governed in accordancewithvaluesthat
are at variancewiththewishesof thevoters,evenifcitizensknowat the
timeofvotingwhatoutcomesthecandidates willadvance.I agreethatpref-
erencechangeswould be a problemformy analysis.For thatreasonI
includedthestipulation thatthereis no changein voters'preference order-
ingsduringtheinterval fromchoiceto outcome.57 Unfortunately, thispro-
viso occursin a footnote thatis easy to miss.It shouldhave been stated
moreprominently.
It shouldbe evidentthatmyconcentration on core voterknowledge
(whichChristiano calls "candidate-outcome knowledge")is linkedspecifi-
callyto the"simplemodel"ofrepresentative democracy thatI positat the
outset.Ifoneadvancesa moreambitious modelofdemocracy, as Christiano
does,additional typesofknowledgewillbe centralas well.Forexample,if
optimaldemocratic functioning requirescitizensto have knowledgethat
theyarebeingtreatedas equals,as Christiano claims,thenthisknowledge
will assumea centralposition.Obviouslythistranscends thescope of the
chapter I was writing. I largelyrestrictedmyself forthepurposesat handto
questionsthatconcernvotersqua voters , anddiscussedtheimportance of
theirgetting trueanswerstothosequestions.Christiano adducesquestions
or topicsthatconcerncitizens , butnotcitizensqua voters.If Christiano's
complaint is thatI haven'tsaideverything thatcouldbe said abouttherole
ofknowledge in democracy, thenI certainly pleadguiltytothischarge.But
giventhecontextin whichmyproposalsappear- one chapterof a long
booknototherwise addressedto democracy - itis unreasonable to expect
thatlargerprojectto havebeenundertaken.
NOTES
1.AlvinGoldman, "Internalism Journal

Exposed," ofPhilosophy96 (1999):271-93.
inAlvin
Reprinted Goldman, toKnowledge:
Pathways Private
andPublic(NewYork:
Oxford Press,
University 2002).
2. Hereafter,
pagenumbers
inparentheses
refer inthis
tothearticles issueofPhilosophical
Topics.
508
3. AlvinGoldman, "APriori Warrant andNaturalistic Epistemologa" inJames Tomberlin,
ed.,Philosophical Perspectives , vol.13,Epistemology (Boston:Blackwell, 1999).
ReprintedinAlvin Goldman, Pathways toKnowledge: PrivateandPublic (NewYork:
OxfordUniversity Press, 2002).
4. AlvinGoldman, "Epistemic Folkways andScientific Epistemology,"inAlvin Goldman,
Liaisons:
Philosophy Meets theCognitive andSocialSciences (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT
Press,
1992).
5. Henderson andHorgan areother epistemologists whoexpress reservations
about Sosa's
ofjudgments
relativization ofjustificationtoworlds (seeDavidHenderson andTerence
Horgan,"Practicing SafeEpistemology," Philosophical Studies102,3 [2001]: 227-58,
256n.23).They develop yeta different reliabilism-basedapproach thatalsocomes to
termswith evildemon counterexamples.
6. Atleast
this holds forAlvin Goldman, Epistemology andCognition (Cambridge, Mass.:
HarvardUniversity Press, 1986).
7. Goldman, "APriori Warrant andNaturalistic Epistemology."
8. AlvinGoldman, "What Is Justified Belief?" inGeorge Pappas, ed.,Justification and
Knowledge (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).
9. A pointemphasized in William Alston,"Epistemic Desiderata," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53(1993):527-51, sec.3.
10.Ibid.
11. AlvinGoldman, "TheUnity oftheEpistemic Virtues," inAbrol Fairweather andLinda
Zagzebski, eds.,Virtue Epistemology (NewYork:Oxford University Press, 2001).
ReprintedinGoldman, Pathways toKnowledge .
12.Laurence BonJour, TheStructure ofEmpirical Knowledge (Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard
UniversityPress, 1985), 7.
13.SeeGoldman, "TheUnity oftheEpistemic Virtues," fordetails.
14.Stephen Stich, "Reflective Equilibrium, Analytic Epistemology, andtheProblem of
Cognitive Diversity," Synthse 74 (1988):391-413;and Stephen Stich,The
Fragmentation ofReason (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, 1990).
15.Seeespecially Goldman, "Epistemic Folkways andScientificEpistemology," and"A
Priori
Warrant andNaturalistic Epistemology." Goldman, Epistemology andCognition ,
ch.4-5,alsocontains a layered approach.
16.Seeespecially Goldman, "APriori Warrant andNaturalistic Epistemology."
17.Anargument fortheapparently universal valueoftruebelief is offered inAlvin
Goldman, Knowledge ina SocialWorld (Oxford: Oxford Press,
University 1999).
18.Much thesamepoint wasmade byJoelPustina commentary ontheWNSpaper ata
conferenceattheUniversity ofArizona, inJanuary 2001.That conference featured a pre-
liminaryairing ofsome ofthepapers inthis issue.
19.AlvinGoldman andJoelPust, "Philosophical Theory andIntuitional Evidence," in
Michael DePaulandWilliam Ramsey, eds.,Rethinking Intuition:
ThePsychology of
Intuition
andItsRoleinPhilosophical Inquiry (Lanham, Md.:Rowman andLittlefield,
1998).
Reprinted inGoldman, Pathways toKnowledge.
20.Thanks toJoel Pustforreminding meofthis passage. Goldman, "Epistemic Folkways
andScientific Epistemology," 160.
21.Jason Stanley andTimothy Williamson, "Knowing How," Journal ofPhilosophy 98
(2001):411-44.
22.Goldman, "APriori Warrant andNaturalistic Epistemology," andGoldman andPust,
"Philosophical Theory andIntuitional Evidence."
23.I writehere inthefirst-person singulardespite thefact thattherelevant
paper wasjointly
authored(Goldman andPust, "Philosophical Theory andIntuitional
Evidence"). Thisis
becausethere aresome theses inthatpaper that Pustnolonger endorses.
24.PhilipKitcher, TheNature ofMathematical Knowledge (NewYork: Oxford University
509
Press,1983); Philip Kitcher,TheAdvancement ofScience (NewYork: Oxford University
Press,1993).
25.I assume that lackofa truth condition isjustaninadvertent oversight.
26.Thissame point worried HilaryKornblith inhiscommentary onKitcher's paper asdeliv-
eredattheTucson conference. Kitcher attemptstodefuse thisworry innote15ofthe
finalversion, butI don'tunderstand howhedefuses it.
27.Something closetothis isproposed byEdward Craig, Knowledge andtheState ofNature
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
28.Goldman, Knowledge ina SocialWorld , ch.4-5.
29.See,forexample, ElliottSoberandDavidWilson, Unto Others (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1998).
30.SeeAlvin Goldman, "Social Routes toBelief andKnowledge," TheMonist 84(2001):
346-68. Reprinted inGoldman, Pathways toKnowledge .
31.Karen Wynn, "Addition andSubtraction inHuman Infants,"Nature 358(1992): 749-50.
32.Goldman, Epistemology andCognition, 106.
33.Goldman, Knowledge ina SocialWorld.
34.Ibid.,31.
35.Andmore fully inGoldman andPust, "Philosophical Theory andIntuitionalEvidence."
36.AlvinGoldman, "Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science"
Consciousness andCognition 2 (1993):364-82; Alvin Goldman, "ThePsychology of
FolkPsychology," Behavioral andBrain Sciences 16(1993):15-28.
37.William Lycan, Consciousness andExperience (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, 1996),
ch.1.
38.Michael Antony, "Is'Consciousness' Ambiguous?" Journal ofConsciousness Studies 8,
2 (2001):19-44.
39.D.A.Cruse, Lexical Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1986).
40.Martin Davies,"TheMental Simulation Debate," in Christopher Peacocke, ed.,
Objectivity, Simulation andtheUnity ofConsciousness (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1994), 115.
41.Alvin Goldman, Psychologized,"
"Interpretation Mind andLanguage 4 (1989):161-85.
42.AlanLeslie,"Pretense andRepresentation: TheOrigins of 'Theory of Mind,"'
Psychological Review 94(1987):412-26.
43.Karen Bartsch andHenry Wellman, Children Talkabout theMind (NewYork: Oxford
University Press, 1995).
44.Brian Loar, "Phenomenal States,"inNedBlock, Owen Flanagan, andGuven Giizeldere,
eds.,TheNature ofConsciousness (Cambridge, Mass.:MITPress, 1997).
45.Goldman, Epistemology andCognition.
46.Forfurther seeAlvin
details, Goldman, "Naturalistic
Epistemology andReliabilism," in
Peter French, Theodore Uehling, andHoward Wettstein, eds.,Midwest Studies in
Philosophy ,vol.19,Philosophical Naturalism (Notre Dame:University ofNotre Dame
Press, 1994).
47.SeeGoldman, Epistemology andCognition.
48.Inthecontext ofColeman's debate with thequestion
Leiter, ansesastowhether thereis
anyuniquely correctsetofinterpretive orreasoning Thisstrikes
principles. measa tan-
gential issue,notdirectly concerned with ofana priori
thesuitability versus anempiri-
calmethodology. Thechoice ofmethodology should besettled andthen
first, itremains
tobeseenwhether that methodology willuncover determinacy orindeterminacy inthe
principles ofreasoning.
49.Theprecise natureofthese factsisa centralissueinphilosophicaljurisprudence, anissue
onwhich I remain silent.
510
50.SeeAlvin Goldman,
"Quasi-ObjectiveBayesianism Jurimetrics
andLegalEvidence,"
42(2002):237-60.
51. SusanDavies,"Evidence
ofCharactertoProve AReassessment
Conduct: ofRelevancy,"
Criminal Law Bulletin27 (1991): 504; RogerPark,"Character at the
Crossroads LawJournal
"Hastings 49(1998):717-79.
52.Walter Mischel, Personality."
"Reconceptualizing Paper
presented of
totheDepartment
Psychology, ofArizona,
University December7,2001.
53.Goldman, Knowledgeina SocialWorld,
320.
54.Ibid.;italics andoriginal
added, italics
deleted.
55.Ibid.,
348.
56.Ibid.,
321,322.
57.Ibid.,
331,n.13.
511

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University of Arkansas Press

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Nothing couldbe a betterrewardforphilosophical workthancriticisms and

I. JUSTIFICATION, INTERNALISM, AND EXTERNALISM

II. EPISTEMOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY

III. SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

IV. PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

1.AlvinGoldman, "Internalism Journal

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