applies t o real, nonabstract persons!

Like Confucius's jm, Aristotle's eudae-

monia is an end we may fail to see, even after death.

Notes
I, It fcjl,ilc)wstliat tlie only kind of criticism tliat one systern could reasonably direct
at mother with which it conflicts is that its claims are internally logically inconsis-
tent.
2. John Stuart Mill, U~zlitarknkm(Indianapolis, Xnd.: Hackett Publistling Co.,
1478; originally published in 1861), p. 4.
3. Like Kant, the Utilitarians beg the question of whether happiness alone has in-
herent moral value. More specifically, both ethical theones assume that the thing they
rake to have the grcatest rnoral value (free will and happiness, respectively) is the onljj
thing that has intrinsic moral value, Presumably; this assumption is an implication of
a moral precept liaving ranbersdl force; one runs the risk of logicat inconsistcncy
when allowing for more than one universal imperative.
4. Bcrnard Williams, "The Tsutli in Relativism," in Kelativ&m: Cognithe and
Moral, ed. Michael Krausz and Jack MeiIand (Notre Dame, Xnd.: University of Notre
Xlarne Press, 1982), pp. 175-1 85.
S, Notice tillat the confrontations between the various etf~icalsystems could con-
tinue indefinitely for the same reason, since the content of Moral Tmth is nor some-
thing to wliich any sl: us can appeal.
6 , This claim, that moral relativism entails not just moral skepticism but a denial
that Moraf Tmtli exists, i s not just stipulative. This distinction is essential, given that
different conclusions fcjltow from tliesc positions, Again, one can consistcntty be-
lieve that a universal ethic is possible+ven that there zs Moral Tmth-and also be-
lieve that the substance or content of this Tmth cannot be rationally determined. In
fact, it is essential to any universal ethic that its first principle is "unprovable" in jusr
this way, Thus we see why the first principles of ethics are allegedly self-evident or
self-justifying, In short, it is precisely tlie "self-justifying" nature of sucli principles
that leads to the srronger positions held by those who believe in a particular univer-
sal ethic. Indeed, a main point of this discussion is that it is also the strong kind of
claim that a moral relativist must hold to consistcntfy concludc that a universal etliic
is impossible. Xn this way, the moral relativist is distinguished from the moral agnos-
tic wlio at feast believes in die possibility of Moral Truth.
7 . Nor does PE1 follow from the truth ol: relativism; for if it did, true moral
clairns wc)uid amount to logically t'onsistent.claims.
8. Notice that the moral agnostic's view-that Moral Truth map (or may not)
exist-is trivially true. For this reason, it is more easily taken for granted than eitfier
the relativist's view or one committed to some version of Moral Tmtli.
9 . 1 arn suggesting not that Western etf~icsis cuinpletely accounted for by these
two theories but, rattler, that they have set the stage for what has happened in the
discipfine, 'Thus the abstract concept of self that has emerged in the West since
Ilescarces can be made sufficiently- clear in light of their explication atone,