Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
African Studies Review
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
THE AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
10 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
The first model, which stresses non-economic aspects of the slave supply process,
called the "political warfare" model. While there are several variations of this model, th
all share the view that African participation in the slave trade was not stimulated by th
desire to be integrated into the world economic order or to import European-ma
consumer items. Rather, slave supplies were a result of internal political events unrelat
to the economic influences of profits and prices. For example, an African group migh
sell slaves to obtain the guns and gunpowder important to its political survival. Unde
such circumstances, slave exports would be determined by warfare requirements and no
by slave prices.
Another variation of this model, suggested by Curtin (1971) (see, also, Engerman's
"Comments" in Engerman and Genovese, 1974) points out that large numbers of capti
were always being acquired as a result of politically motivated warfare. Such captives
were a "joint" product of war in much the same way that cowhides are a joint product
beef production; one occurs with the other whether desired or not. Because of t
endemic nature of warfare, a large reserve of captives, of little value to their captor
except as slave exports, existed to provide a ready supply of slaves to the coast at
times. Economic incentives played a comparatively small role, since any positive price
would be sufficient to induce Africans to supply these slaves who otherwise had very
little value.
In order to derive hypotheses concerning the slave supply response from the politica
warfare model which differ from those derived from the economic model, two sets of
conditions must be met. First, there must be a clear differentiation between political and
economic causes for war and little relationship between the two types of causes.
Proponents of the political warfare model define economic wars as those waged for the
explicit purpose of acquiring slaves for profit. However, it is possible that economic
factors indirectly influenced political decisions to make war for a variety of reasons. For
example, changing economic conditions associated, at least partially, with fluctuations in
the coastal slave trade may have changed the potential economic rewards from controlling
trade routes which could have affected the willingness of different groups to attempt to
defend or extend their spheres of influence. Likewise, higher (or lower) slave prices,
which made the implements of warfare more (or less) accessible, had a direct impact on
the costs of warfare, which may have altered incentives to wage war at different times.
Changing slave prices could also have influenced the manner in which wars were waged.
The decision to take war captives, as compared with other methods of controlling a
defeated enemy, may well have involved greater costs and risks which would not have
been incurred if the profits from selling war captives were low. From all these considera-
tions, it is clear that separating political from economic explanations is difficult. Wars
fought for political reasons not explicitly related to the economic conditions of the slave
trade may have been indirectly related to the economic conditions of the slave trade.
Those who argue that the enslavement of Africans was not significantly affected by slave
trade profits must be willing to make the additional argument that the above types of
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 11
The implications of this model for the relationship between coastal prices and
exports of slaves can be specified as follows: since the price paid on the coast had n
impact on slave exports, its sole function was to ration the existing supply brought to th
coast between competing slave buyers. If conditions affecting the European demand for
slaves did not change over time, a negative relationship between prices and exports would
be expected, with low prices occurring during periods of large supply and vice versa. In
Figure 1 this situation is demonstrated along demand curve D1 where the fluctuating
slave supplies, represented by Q1, Q2, and Q3, are rationed by prices P1, P2, and P3
However, if demand conditions shifted, causing an increase, a decrease or uncertai
fluctuations in the demand for slaves, then, at any given point in time, the price-quantity
observation would be contained in space ABCD. In short, assuming random fluctuations
in supply with respect to prices, no systematic relationship can be expected betwee
prices and exports when a regression line is fitted to time series data; that is, an a priori
hypothesis about the sign of the price coefficient cannot be made, and a small an
insignificant R2 is expected. These assertions are only true for the extreme case in which
none of the slave trade activity in Africa was economically motivated. Later in the
analysis some of the possible statistical implications of a political warfare model
modified to include some economic behavior, will be shown.
The other model of the slave supply process is premised on the neo-classical
economic assumptions of "rational" behavior, for which there is ample supporting
evidence, even in the case of traditional societies (Behrman, 1968; Hill, 1970; Green and
Hymer, 1966; Tax, 1963), and utilizes an international trade "excess supply" model.2
This model permits the consideration of the economic costs of the production, transpor-
tation, and distribution of slaves in the Atlantic trade, and it recognizes that the coasta
trade was only one of at least three outlets for slaves. Slaves could also be supplied to the
domestic African market and to the trans-Saharan market. This model, therefore, allows
for a wide range of options for African slave traders. If they participated in the trade,
they could supply several markets, depending on the profitability of each market; and if
profits in these markets fell below a certain point, the traders might use their slaves t
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
12 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 13
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
The choice of models need not be based solely on a statistical test, for the
deal of historical evidence on the conduct of the slave trade which has direc
several of the issues discussed in the previous section. The following section
attempt to survey all this literature (Curtin, 1971 and 1972; Bean, 1971; LeV
Gemery and Hogendorn, 1973; Sundstrom, 1965; Bean and Thomas, 19
1970); rather, it attempts to illustrate, through the use of a few examples, ho
data can be structured and analyzed to clarify the issues raised by this debate
Slave Procurement
The majority of slaves exported appear to have been war captives.4 Whether these
wars were fought in order to obtain slaves for export and hence were motivated by
economic interests, or whether they were fought over domestic political matters, cannot
be determined without more detailed investigation of each major war. This research has
not yet been conducted. For example, the Yoruba wars of the early nineteenth century,
which created many slaves for the Atlantic market, were partially stimulated by competi-
tion for control of trade routes to the coast and partially by internal political events
(Ajayi and Smith, 1964). It is improbable that the particular price of slaves at Lagos
directly caused these conflicts.
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
14 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
There is some evidence that the initial procurement costs were a small part of t
total supply costs;5 and the resource costs associated with the transportation, feedi
and the holding of slaves, constituted a large fraction of the final sale price of slaves a
coast. Slaves were often captured far from the coast and had to be marched-in som
cases 1,000 miles-to their port of export (Vansina, 1962; Fisher and Fisher, 1971
77-82). An elaborate system of middlemen operations grew up around the impo
slave routes to facilitate the trade. Tolls were imposed on traders as they passed thro
different political territories (Sundstrom, 1965: chapters 1 and 2). These tolls may h
been considerable in areas where politicalpower was consolidated.6 Slaves had to be f
and guarded, which required additional resources; and, while they might be forced
carry commodities to the coast to partially offset their maintenance costs, traders
faced the very real possibility of additional loss from slave mortality en route.7 Finall
the coast, slaves were held in some form of storage facility while sufficiently
numbers were assembled to make up a cargo and while awaiting the arrival of a ship
which added further costs for food and guard labor as well as the risk of mortality.
of these coastal functions might be shared with European traders who established f
along the coast (Rottenberg, 1967).
This description of internal trade in Africa has two implications for our theore
models. First, even if slaves did not cost their captors anything initially, they would
be supplied to the Atlantic trade unless the other costs were covered by the price rec
at the coast; there was a minimum price below which slave supplies would fall to ze
Second, it is probable that supply costs increased with the level of exports. This res
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 15
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
16 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
Assumptions
On the supply side, the direction and magnitude of supply curve shifts are far less
certain. It is possible that trading costs fell during the eighteenth century because of such
factors as improvement in the techniques of trading, better market information, or more
stable political and institutional factors affecting the trade, which caused the supply curve
to shift down and to the right. On the other hand, supply costs to the Atlantic market
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 17
The Data
In the past five years, several important contributions have been made to the s
of prices and slave export volumes. Table 1 contains the data used in this paper
volume data reflect slave exports to the Atlantic trade from the entire African co
including West, Central, and Southeast Africa (column 1). The primary implication o
aggregation is that one is estimating a supply response elasticity of the entire marke
opposed to that of a particular market.
Price data is similarly aggregated into decade intervals in an attempt to o
reasonable estimates of the prevailing price along the entire coast for each of the pe
for which we have export data (column 2). As in the case of the quantity data, ther
considerable variation in prices between exporting regions, although prices at diffe
markets tended to move together. These price differentials ere caused by such factor
the availability of services at the exporting port, the cost of sea travel for more d
ports, and the general preferences of West Indian and Brazilian growers for slaves
different regions. Columns 3 and 4 list prices at two specific markets along the W
African coast; these can be compared with the aggregate price series (column 2) wh
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
18 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
Q = a + bP
Ln Q = a + b Ln P
where Q equals average annual exports for ten-year intervals and P equals average annual
prices for ten-year intervals. The form of the first equation implies a simple linear
relationship between prices and exports and that of the second equation implies a non-
linear, constant elasticity form of the relationship. The results of fitting these regressions
are as follows:
Given the nature of the data and the limited number of observations, these results are
extremely good not only because of the high R2 but also because all of the coefficients
(including the R2) are significant at the 99 percent confidence level. The figures in
parentheses are standard error estimates of the "b" coefficients.
The interpretation of equation (1), which has the better "fit" of the two,is that a ?1
increase in slave prices in Africa caused an increase in slave exports of 3,234 per year.
This translates into a supply elasticity of .81 (using mean price and export values), which
means that a 10 percent increase in prices increased exports by about 8.1 percent.
The R2 of .99 means that roughly 99 percent of the variation in exports is accounted for
by variations in prices. The second equation does not fit the data as well according to the
lower R2. It indicates an export supply elasticity of .8 1, the same as the other equation.
The "a" coefficients also have interesting implications for the models being tested.
For the first equation, the "a" value of 11,048 implies that if prices were to fall to zero,
the annual export of slaves during the eighteenth century would have fallen to about
11,000 per year. The second equation implies that 6,700 would have been exported
under the same assumption. These results contradict the expectation of a zero export for
very low prices. The validity of extrapolating the regression equation to extreme values,
such as a zero price, is highly questionable, especially in view of the lack of observations
in the low range of prices and exports. However, while these estimates may well
overstate the number of slaves which might be exported at low prices, they do suggest the
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 19
Regarding the short-term supply elasticities, there were two major periods of war
during the eighteenth century which had a major impact on European slave demand. The
first took place between 1756 and 1763; the second between 1777 and 1783. The periods
following these wars were also unusual, since there was a sudden release of stored-up
demand. It is to be expected that, owing to the sudden and temporary nature of these
impacts, elasticity estimates for these years might be significantly lower than those o
more stable periods. But in examining the data it was found that the responsiveness of
suppliers during these war periods and their aftermaths was identical to that of the rest o
the period. Evidently, African suppliers were able to adjust their market expectations
quickly and act accordingly.
Results--Nineteenth Century
The last test compares late eighteenth century prices and quantities with those of th
1840s, the last decade of major African exports to the Atlantic trade. Before proceedin
to the elasticity calculation, however, some consideration of the possible changing supply
cost conditions which may have prevailed during the nineteenth century and the impac
of these on the estimate must be given. There are a variety of reasons for believing that
the African supply costs rose during the nineteenth century; therefore, by the simple
statistical procedure, the elasticity measure will be below the true elasticity. Perhaps the
most important factor affecting costs was the British Navy, which attempted to suppres
the trade and became increasingly effective in doing so during the first half of th
century. One consequence of this activity was the increase in the importance of th
institution of factoring. Because of the necessity of adopting various methods to avoid
detection and prosecution, slave factors began to assume duties unknown in the
eighteenth century. For example, it became important to have a full cargo of slaves on
hand and ready for immediate delivery in order to minimize the time spent near the coast
with slaves on board. In the past, ships could cruise from port to port looking for a carg
at a good price. Factors also provided skilled carpenters and other artisans who could
quickly provide the articles associated with the slave trade and which would be grounds
for condemnation if they were discovered on board. Finally, the factor provided help i
obtaining illegal registration papers and served as a storehouse of legal barter goods (slave
ships usually paid in gold rather than spend the time needed to unload goods). Because of
these new duties, the factor's share of the price of a slave increased during the nineteenth
century;12 therefore, one would expect that fewer slaves would have been supplied for
the same price in the nineteenth century than in the eighteenth. An attempt has been
made to eliminate this by subtracting the factoring costs from the total price for both
periods, on the assumption that other supply costs remained the same.
It is unlikely, however, that non-factor-related supply costs did stay the same during
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
20 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 21
other hand, the strong temporal relationship between prices and export
plained without reference to an economic model of supply such as the on
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
22 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
Perhaps the most controversial issue-one which has intrigued slave trade histo
concerns the distribution of the trade's profits. Until recently, many historians ac
the notion that the trade's profits were extensive and even sufficient to fuel Bri
industrial revolution (Williams, 1944). Profits were supposed to have accrued larg
British financiers who invested either in the trade itself or in sugar. While severa
studies have shown that the profits of the sugar system and the trade were not ex
(Engerman, 1972; Thomas, 1968), the question of the ultimate distribution o
income of the trade has not been answered. It has been pointed out elsewhere tha
resolution of this issue requires a better understanding of the relative flexibility of
the subsectors of the total slave supply (Engerman, 1974; Bean and Thomas, 1
overall African slave supplies were inelastic, then those fortunate African groups
abundant local slave sources would extract "Ricardian rents" from the trade
increasing demand for slaves forced slave prices higher. These African suppliers wi
access to slaves resembled Ricardo's owner of the fertile land whose profits incre
new demand pushed the margin of cultivation to less fertile regions, thereby drivi
land values. The finding of a somewhat inelastic supply response for Africa, ther
indicates the possibility that more of the profits created by the slave-sugar system
captured by fortunate African suppliers at the expense of European traders, West I
landowners, and British sugar consumers than would have been the case had the s
response been elastic. However, a complete analysis of these gains requires f
consideration of the elasticity of alternative labor supplies available to the Caribb
(Curtin, 1968) and an examination of the alternative non-Caribbean/Brazilian sour
sugar available to Europe. If, for example, there were alternative and cheap labor
tutes or if there were alternative competitive sources of sugar, then African supplier
not have exercised much monopoly power without reducing the number of
exported and, hence, their income. The more inelastic the European demand for s
the greater the chance for Africa to capture monopoly rents from the trade.16
A second aspect of the distribution question is the unevenness of the profits wi
Africa. As discussed above, there is evidence of differing supply responses for the
slave markets along the African Coast. It is unlikely that these response variation
stimulated by different slave prices, since European competition tended to eliminat
fluctuating major discrepancies. It is likely that these response variations were the
of changing "production" conditions within each market, brought about by such
as the availability of slave sources and changing political institutions affecting all a
of the slave supply process. Low-cost regions thus could have extracted fairly large p
from the trade, while other regions might have had little economic benefit. In this
the slave trade probably helped to foster differences in economic and political po
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 23
This analysis indicates that the elasticity was neither very inelastic nor very elastic; it
follows that the Naval suppression policies did reduce the volume of the trade substan-
tially and did cause African slave suppliers economic loss, and probably introduced a new
source of political instability as those groups dependent on the trade gradually lost some
of the advantages they had enjoyed over other non-slave-trade participating groups.
Finally, the elasticity measure may be used as an indicator of productive conditions
within Africa. For example, if an inelastic response is found, it can be inferred that some
element of the supply process was raising the cost of increasing the output of slaves. High
costs could result from a variety of factors, including the necessity of searching further
inland for additional slaves, or the possibility that the resources used in the various
subsectors of the trade were relatively scarce and/or difficult to attract into this activity.
If one could examine the changes in the elasticity over time, then indirect evidence might
be found of the changing conditions which affected costs. For example, if the slave trade
had depopulated large regions of Africa, it is likely that supply costs would have begun to
rise as the search for new slaves became more and more difficult. This would have been
reflected in greater inelasticity of the supply response.18 Alternatively, political
developments which increased the stability of trade routes might have reduced the cost
of finding additional slaves and thereby have increased the elasticity of supply. In short,
given the problems of inadequate direct historical data, which plague the study of African
history, the supply elasticity measure can serve as a useful tool (assuming the price and
quantity data are available in the first place!) in providing indirect evidence for the
analysis of a variety of problems.
Unfortunately, the data used in this study are not very useful for such purposes,
because they relate to the entire coast of Africa and have been estimated for the entire
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ideally, one should have annual data for individual
markets in order to have sufficient observations to make statistically valid estimates of
the appropriate elasticities and possible changes in elasticity. These data may exist for
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
24 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
NOTES
1. For readers unfamiliar with the concept of an elasticity: the "supply price elastic
defined as the ratio of the percentage change in volume of slaves supplied to the percentage c
the slave price. A supply response is "inelastic" if the percent change in price implies a smaller
change in volume; a response characterized by no change in supply when the price changes i
"perfectly inelastic," and the value of the ratio is zero. A supply response is "elastic" wh
percentage change in volume exceeds the percent change in price; a response which floods the
for a small price increase is called "perfectly elastic," and the value of the ratio approaches infini
2. For an alternative economic model of the trade, see Gemery and Hogendorn (1973). Ge
and Hogendorn use a traditional "vent for surplus" trade model which is frequently app
underdevelopment contexts. The excess supply model gives the same general results
conceptually more complete and permits a more detailed examination of the possible force
affected the export of slaves.
3. The following algebraic relationship indicates the relationship among the four var
involved in Figure 1:
EA 1 ET( 1-Q) ES
S QS Q D
where
From this, the following generalizations can be made: the elasticity of the excess supply curve SBC
varied directly with the elasticity of the slave production curve SS and directly with the elasticity of
the demand of competing users (ES is negative). It varies inversely with the proportion of the trade
going into the Atlantic trade so that, in the limit, if Q equals 1 (all of the slaves go to the Atlantic
trade), then the elasticity of SS and SBC is the same.
4. Fage estimates that 75 percent of the slaves were obtained in wars and raids; see Fage (1969:
94); see also Gemery and Hogendorn (1973: 11).
5. There are a variety of citations giving slave prices in the interior. For example, see Fisher and
Fisher (1971: 61-62, 77) which indicates that the transportation from the interior to the export point
may have increased the slave price by 500 percent. Slaves might be bought for as little as a few old
buttons in some areas. One observer noted that slaves were initially selling for the cost of an old
musket; another states that, when the coastal price of a slave was ?8, the interior price was ?1.5; see
Great Britain (1852-53: 37).
6. On the economic rationale for tolls, see Great Britain (1852-53: 51) and Bean and Thomas
(1973: 18). Sundstrom notes that the number of middlemen monopolies tended to be inversely
related to the size of the political unit-the weaker the state, the greater the number of middlemen
who would attempt to extract some of the profits of the trade. Both Bean and Thomas and Sundstrom
suggest that the consolidation of political power eliminated many of these operations and thereby
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 25
reduced the costs of the trade. Larger units, which reduced the n
could extract greater tolls than small units.
7. There is no direct evidence on the number of slave who mig
For the Saharan crossing, which was obviously much more difficu
forty percent died en route; see Fage (1969a: 81).
8. Curtin provides evidence that among the slaves captured by
century and restored at Sierra Leone, there were several individu
supplied the Saharan trade; see Curtin (1969: 253-54) and David
9. Karasch (1967: 53) describes an instance of the utilization of
trade as porters of more valuable commodities. Only the weak
retained for the transportation of ivory to the Angolan markets,
more income.
10. The major market development costs had been undertaken long before the beginning of the
eighteenth century along the West African coast-which had seen extensive slaving for the previous
two centuries. Bean suggests that cost reductions due to market development, ceased after 1700; see
Bean (1971: 69).
11. It should be emphasized that this discussion of shifting supply relationships concerns shifts
which occur because of fundamental changes in the costs of production. There are also supply-curv
shifts which become visible as the period of analysis moves from short- to long-term. In the short-term
almost no adjustment is expected in the quantity supplied in response to a change in price; in th
long-term, as the price change becomes better than had been expected, production conditions can b
adjusted so that supplies will be affected-that is, the supply response to a specific change in th
demand condition becomes more pronounced with the passage of time. This effect is eliminated from
our analysis by the use of ten-year intervals in aggregating price and quantity data.
12. Because the nineteenth century trade was illegal, a certain amount of monopoly power also
undoubtedly developed in factoring. For a more detailed look at factoring, see Turnbull (1840:
403-6): his description is based upon captured slaver papers. Also see Karasch (1967: 38 ff.) for
another view of the complexity surrounding the illegal trade in the nineteenth century.
13. Data on factoring in the nineteenth century are difficult to find. High profits were estimated
for one factor: see Ross (1965: 85-86). Martinez had an annual gross business of $200,000, on which
he cleared $80,000 in one year. Another piece of evidence is suggested by some of the slave pric
references. One observer quoted slave prices of between ?3 and ?15 "depending upon the facility they
have for getting slaves away." Another indicated that, upon destruction of the slave baracoons a
Callinas in the 1840s, the price of a slave dropped from ?6 to ?2; see Great Britain (1850: 147).
14. An example of the increase in the purchasing power of the pound is that in 1848 a pound
purchased about five times as much cotton cloth and about twice as much iron and sugar: see LeVee
(1971: 151-53).
15. These export data refer to the English and French trades. There is no comparable breakdown
for the Portuguese trade, though it is unlikely that its distribution changed sufficiently during the
eighteenth century to upset our conclusions.
16. There has been one attempt made to estimate the elasticity of the demand for slaves on the
part of producers in the Caribbean and Brazil during the nineteenth century. The demand was found
relatively elastic-values in the range of -1.5 to -2.0-which suggests that higher slave prices would hav
driven up the price of sugar and would therefore have shifted the demand for Caribbean and Brazilia
sugar to other producers in the non-slave-using parts of the world. This implies that British consumers
could effectively keep sugar prices low no matter what the slave price was in Africa. Whether thes
conditions were true for the eighteenth century is debatable: see LeVeen (1971: 44-61).
17. We can distinguish two causes for the uneven distribution of profits within Africa. The firs
is given in the text: some groups had lower trade costs, and they were, therefore, beneficiaries in much
the same way as the very efficient firm too small significantly to affect the total market can earn high
profits even in a competitive industry. The second source of differentiation derives from the
functional relationships in the trade. In general, we expect that those parts of the trade which were
competitive earned lower profits than those which had monopolistic power. It might be hypothesize
that the component of the slave trade most likely to have monopolistic power was the initial enslave
ment activity. If supplies of slaves were scarce, then those who owned them earned rents in the sam
way that landowners receive the benefit of owning a fixed asset in great demand. If high profits di
accrue to Africans, they were most likely captured by those who conducted the slave-raiding opera
tions. For an interesting argument as to why these excess profits may never have been realized by slave
raiders, see Bean and Thomas (1973).
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
26 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
REFERENCES
Ajayi, J.F.A. and R. Smith. (1964) Yoruba Warfare in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge:
University Press.
Anstey, R. (1974) "The volume and profitability of the slave trade," pp. 3-31 in S. Engerm
Genovese (eds.) Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere: Quantitive Studies. P
Princeton University Press.
Bean, R. (1971) "The British trans-Atlantic slave trade, 1650-1775." Unpublished Ph.D. diss
sity of Washington.
and R.P. Thomas. (1973) "The fishers of men-the profits of the slave trade." Seatt
ment of Economics, University of Washington.
Behrman, J.R. (1968) Supply Response in Underdeveloped Agriculture. Amsterdam, The N
North Holland Publishing Company.
Curtin, P.D. (1969) The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census. Madison: University of Wisconsin
. (1972) "The Atlantic slave trade, 1600-1800," pp. 240-68 in J.F.A. Ajayi and M
(eds.) History of West Africa. Volume 1. New York: Columbia University Press.
. (1968) "Epidemiology and the slave trade." Political Science Quarterly, 83 (June): 190
(1971) "The slave trade and the Atlantic Basin: inter-continental perspectives," pp. 7
Huggins, M. Kelson, and D. Fox (eds.) Key Issues in the Afro-American Experience. Ne
Harcourt Brace Javanovich.
Davidson, B. (1961) Black Mother. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Dike, K.O. (1956) Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta. London: Clarendon Press.
Engerman, S. (1972) "The slave trade and British capital formation in the eighteenth
comment on the Williams thesis." The Business History Review, 46 (Winter): 430-43.
and E. Genovese (eds.). (1974) Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere: Qua
Studies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fage, J.D. (1969a) History of West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
-. (1969b) "Slavery and the slave trades in the context of West African history." J
African History, 10 (No. 3): 393-404.
Fisher, A., and H. Fisher. (1971) Slavery and Muslim Society in Africa. New York: Doub
Company.
Gemery, H.A., and J.S. Hogendorn. (1973) "The Atlantic slave trade: a tentative economic model."
Unpublished paper presented at the African Studies Association Annual Meeting, Syracuse, New
York (November); also, Waterville, Maine: Department of Economics, Colby College.
Great Britain. (1847-48) Parliamentary Papers, 1847-48. Volume XXII.
. (1850) Parliamentary Papers, 1850. Volume IX.
. (1852-53) Parliamentary Papers, 1852-53. Volume XXXIX.
Hill, P. (1970) Rural Capitalism in West Africa. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Johnson, M. (1966) "The ounce in eighteenth-century West African trade." Journal of African
History, 7 (No. 2): 197-214.
Karasch, M. (1967) "The Brazilian slavers and the illegal slave trade, 1836-1851." Unpublished
Master's thesis. University of Wisconsin.
Klein, N. (1969) "West African unfree labor before and after the rise of the Atlantic slave trade," pp.
87-95
Hall.
in L. Foner and E. Genovese (eds.) Slavery in the New World. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
AFRICAN SLAVE SUPPLY RESPONSE 27
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
28 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW
PRICES S
C
Sc
PRICES Dz
A
DD
Do
NB
N02
EXPORTS
QI Q2 Q3
Dc EXPORTS
FIGURE I
FIGURE 2
SLAVE SUPPLY AND DEMAND CHARACTERISTICS
UNDER THE "POLITICAL WELFARE" MODEL GRAPHIC RESPRESENTATION OF THE "EXCESS SUPPLY MODEL"
PRICE
x X
TYPICAL SCATTER OF TIME
x
xX
EXPORTS
PRICE S
PRICE-EXPORT OBSERVATIONS
UNDER STABLE SUPPLY
ASSUMPTION.
b/
D
D D
EXPORTS
PRICE S
PRICE-EXPORT
D OBSERVATIONS
S UNDER ASSUMPTION
THAT BOTH SUPPLY
S AND DEMAND SHIFT
OVER TIME.
c/
D
D D
EXPORTS
FIGURE 3
This content downloaded from 143.107.8.25 on Thu, 23 Feb 2017 12:51:28 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms