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Petitioner Pelizloy Realty Corporation owns Palm Grove Resort in Tuba, Benguet,
which has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and function halls.
In 2005, the Provincial Board of Benguet approved its Revenue Code of 2005.
Section 59, the tax ordinance levied a 10% amusement tax on gross receipts from
admissions to "resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist
Pelizloy's posits that amusement tax is an ultra vires act. Thus, it filed an
appeal/petition before the Secretary of Justice. Upon the Secretarys failure to
decide on the appeal within sixty days, Pelizloy filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief
and Injunction before the RTC.
Pelizloy argued that the imposition was in violation of the limitation on the taxing
powers of local government units under Section 133 (i) of the Local Government
Code, which provides that the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of percentage or value-
added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods or
services except as otherwise provided.
The Province of Benguet assailed the that the phrase other places of amusement
in Section 140 (a) of the LGC encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs, and tourist spots since Article 131 (b) of the LGC defines "amusement"
as "pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
pastime, or fun."
RTC rendered a Decision assailed Decision dismissing the Petition for Declaratory
Relief and Injunction for lack of merit. Procedurally, the RTC ruled that Declaratory
Relief was a proper remedy. However, it gave credence to the Province of Benguet's
assertion that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots
are encompassed by the phrase other places of amusement in Section 140 of the

ISSUE: W/N provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission

fees to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots for
being "amusement places" under the LGC.


Amusement taxes are percentage taxes. However, provinces are not barred from
levying amusement taxes even if amusement taxes are a form of percentage taxes.
The levying of percentage taxes is prohibited "except as otherwise provided" by the
LGC. Section 140 provides such exception.

Section 140 expressly allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on
"the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses,
boxing stadia, and other places of amusement."

However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs, and tourist spots are
not among those places expressly mentioned by Section 140 of the LGC as being
subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement taxes
may be levied on admissions to these places hinges on whether the phrase other
places of amusement encompasses resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot
springs, and tourist spots.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "where a general word or phrase follows an
enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be
restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned."
Section 131 (c) of the LGC already provides a clear definition: "Amusement Places"
include theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement
where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
As defined in The New Oxford American Dictionary, show means "a spectacle or
display of something, typically an impressive one"; while performance means "an
act of staging or presenting a play, a concert, or other form of entertainment." As
such, the ordinary definitions of the words show and performance denote not only
visual engagement (i.e., the seeing or viewing of things) but also active doing (e.g.,
displaying, staging or presenting) such that actions are manifested to, and
(correspondingly) perceived by an audience.
Considering these, it is clear that resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs
and tourist spots cannot be considered venues primarily "where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances".
While it is true that they may be venues where people are visually engaged, they
are not primarily venues for their proprietors or operators to actively display, stage
or present shows and/or performances.
#2 GR No. 176579 GAMBOA vs. TEVES

Wilson Gamboa, a stockholder of PLDT, seeks to annul the sale of 111,415 common
shares (representing 46.125 percent) of PTIC by the Philippine Government to Metro
The majority shares of PTIC (representing about 54 percent) are owned by First
Pacific, a Bermuda company. Notably, First Pacific is a stockholder of Metro Pacific,
the entity that acquired the other 46% from the Philippine Government.
PTIC owns 13.847 percent of PLDT. Hence, the sale by the Philippine Government of
46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of about 6.3 percent of the
outstanding common shares of PLDT. (13.847 percent of 46.125 is 6.38)
Japan's NTT DoCoMo owns 51.56 percent of PLDT common equity. With the sale,
First Pacific's common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37
percent (30.7 plus 6.3).
In effect, the total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT has violated Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of
the capital of a public utility to not more than 40 percent.
Foreign ownership of common shares of PLDT:
51.56 percent owned by DoCoMo (Japan), 37 percent owned by PTIC, which is 100
percent owned by First Pacific (Bermuda)
The question posed to the court is whether the term "capital" in Section 11, Article
XII of the Constitution refers to the total common shares only or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combination of common and non-voting preferred shares)
of PLDT, a public utility.
Definition of the word capital
4. Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility must meet the
minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority to operate a public
utility, at least 60 percent of its "capital" must be owned by Filipino citizens.
5. The term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors.
6. In the present case, capital refers only to common shares and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
7. This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public
utilities. As revealed in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, "capital"
refers to the voting stock or controlling interest of a corporation.

8. Thus, 60 percent of the "capital" assumes, or should result in, 'controlling

interest' in the corporation. Reinforcing this interpretation of the term "capital," as
referring to controlling interest or shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a
"Philippine national" under Section 3(a) of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991,
which states:
The term "Philippine national" shall mean a citizen of the Philippines; or a domestic
partnership or association wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; or a
corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty
percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and
held by citizens of the Philippines.
9. Furthermore, under the Implementing Rules of the Foreign Investments Act of
1991, it is stated that:
Compliance with the required Filipino ownership of a corporation shall be
determined on the basis of outstanding capital stock whether fully paid or
not, but only such stocks which are generally entitled to vote are considered.
For stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine
nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity.
Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights
is essential. Thus, stocks, the voting rights of which have been assigned or
transferred to aliens cannot be considered held by Philippine citizens or
Philippine nationals.
10. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is considered as non-Philippine
11. To construe broadly the term "capital" as the total outstanding capital stock,
including both common and non-voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the
intent and letter of the Constitution that the "State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos."

12. Under PLDT's Articles of Incorporation, only holders of common shares have
voting rights for all purposes, while holders of preferred shares have no voting right
for any purpose whatsoever.

13. In PLDTs case, foreigners hold a majority of the common shares. Since holding
a majority of the common shares equates to control, it is clear that foreigners
exercise control over PLDT. Such amount of control unmistakably exceeds the
allowable 40 percent limit on foreign ownership of public utilities expressly
mandated in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.



Former President Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law), as
amended by RA 7659. He challenges the law as unconstitutional for (a) it suffers
from the vice of vagueness; (b) it violates the right of due process of the accused as
it dispenses with the reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c)
by defining Plunder as ?malum prohibitum?, it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.
Estrada also points to the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of
the terms "combination" and series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word pattern"
in Sec. 4. These omissions supposedly render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad.
Void for Vagueness Doctrine
1. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law." It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either
by a saving clause or by construction.
2. A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
Constitution in two (2) respects?
i. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and,
ii. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
3. But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched
in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain
types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no
challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
4. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties,
its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application;
the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.
5. The Plunder Law does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness
a. It contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would
enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation-- what the Plunder Law
punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth
of at least P50,000,000.00through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law
6. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are
used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them.
7. Words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.
8. When the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least 2 acts
falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1(d)
9. To constitute a series" there must be 2 or more overt or criminal acts falling
under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1(d)
Procedural due process
13. The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of
the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What
the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused
in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in
an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient
to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided
only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.
14. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any
substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of remedy.
Even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated, it may simply
be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the
demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more
than enough.

#4 GR No. 193237 JALOSJOS vs COMELEC


These are two special civil actions for certiorari. In the first, Dominador G. Jalosjos,
Jr. (Jalosjos) seeks to annul the COMELEC Resolutions which ordered the cancellation
of his certificate of candidacy on the ground of false material representation. In the
second, Agapito J. Cardino (Cardino) challenges the COMELEC Resolution which
applied the rule on succession under the Local Government Code in filling the
vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte created by
the cancellation of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy.

Both Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga
del Norte in the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code to deny due course and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Jalosjos on the ground that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he
was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino asserts that Jalosjos had been convicted by final judgment for robbery and
sentenced to prisin mayor by the RTC in Cebu City . Jalosjos admitted his
conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino
countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos probation. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and
stated that the RTC issued an Order in 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly
complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the 2004
elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the
same grounds.

This prompted Cardino to call the attention of the COMELEC on the decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 29, 2008 finding Gregorio Bacolod, former
Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration, guilty of violating Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification that Jalosjos had fully complied
with the terms and conditions of his probation.

The COMELEC First Division granted Cardinos petition and cancelled Jalosjos
certificate of candidacy for having committed material misrepresentation therein.
The COMELEC First Division found that Jalosjos certificate of compliance of
probation was fraudulently issued, thus, Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence.

The COMELEC En Banc denied Jalosjos motion for reconsideration. it declared that
Having been convicted by final judgment, Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an
elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as the elected mayor in
the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission of its authority to
resolve the present petition to its finality, and to oust him from the office he now
wrongfully holds. It likewise ordered that Let the provisions of the Local
Government Code on succession apply.

Both Jalosjos and Cardino filed separate petitions questioning the COMELEC En Banc
Resolution. Meanwhile, Jalosjos manifested that he has resigned from the position of
Mayor of the City of Dapitan in view of his candidacy as Provincial Governor of
Zamboanga del Sur in the May 2013 elections.


Criminal Conviction by Final Judgment as a ground for Disqualification for

Public Office under Sec 78, Omnibus Election Code

2. The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal
conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to
run for any public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.

Votes Cast in favor of an Ineligible Candidate

3. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for Jalosjos were stray
votes. As a result of Jalosjos certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino,
as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position of Mayor.
False statement regarding eligibility of candidate is considered a false
material representation which is a ground for cancellation of a
certificate of candidacy

4. A false statement in a certificate of candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run

for public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a petition
under Section 74 in relation 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

5. Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his certificate of

candidacy "that he is eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right
to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is
barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he
still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that
is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

Section 68 (Disqualifications) refers only to election offenses under the

Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code

10. Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prision mayor, to
which perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a
ground for a petition under Section 68 because robbery is not one of the offenses
enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers only
to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the
Revised Penal Code.

11. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 that will justify
including the crime of robbery as one of the offenses enumerated in this Section. All
the offenses enumerated in Section 68 refer to offenses under the Omnibus Election
Code. Offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be
a ground for a petition under Section 68.

12. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those

enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses
are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. (see Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia)

A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at

the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a
valid candidacy

13. A sentence of prision mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification

under Section 40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility of a
candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, petitioner
has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code, or on Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law
expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to adopt
belongs to the petitioner.

14. The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy. A void

certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the
filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.

15. Jalosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from
the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or
after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he
was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy
being void ab initio. Jalosjos ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of
candidacy, and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day
he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one qualified candidate for
Mayor in the May 2010 elections Cardino who received the highest number of

#5 (SAME SA # 15)

#6 Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita G.R. No. 168056 | 2005-09-01

Subject: Rule-making power of each House, Enrolled Bill, No-amendment

Rule, Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills, Undue Delegation of Legislative Power


RA 9337 (VAT Reform Act), which took effect on July 1, 2005, is a consolidation of
several House and Senate bills. As mandated by the rules of both houses of
Congress, the Bicameral Conference Committee acted on the disagreeing provisions
of both the House and Senate bills.

The challenged provisions in RA 9337 are the result of insertions made by the
Bicameral Conference Committee, consisting of: (1) grant of stand-by authority to
the President to increase the VAT rate from 10% to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance and upon the happening of
specified conditions under the law; (2) deletion of the no pass-on provision, which
would have prohibited VAT entities from passing-on the VAT cost to their consumers;
(3) imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the
output tax.

Petitioners assail the law as unconstitutional as it amounts to undue delegation of

legislative powers and for being oppressive and confiscatory.
Note: The VAT system came into place under E.O. No. 273, followed by RA 7716
(Expanded VAT Law), RA 8241 (Improved VAT Law), RA 8424 (Tax Reform Act of
1997) and finally, RA 9337 (VAT Reform Act)

Held: RA No. 9337 is constitutional

Article VI, Sec 16(3) power of each House to make its own rules

1. Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that 'each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings.'

2. The respective rules of each house of Congress provided for the creation of a
Bicameral Conference Committee. The creation of such conference committee was
in response to a problem, not addressed by any constitutional provision, where the
two houses of Congress are in disagreement over changes or amendments
introduced by the other house in a legislative bill.

3. The issue is not whether the creation of the bicameral conference committee is
unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral conference committee has strictly
complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by Congress.

4. Petitioners allege irregularities committed by the conference committee in

introducing changes or deleting provisions in the House and Senate bills.
Irregularities alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance the
courts have no concern. The courts have no power to inquire into allegations that, in
enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals.

5. It is the sole concern of Congress to instill discipline among the members of its
conference committee if it believes that said members violated any of its rules of
proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of the Court cannot apply to questions
regarding only the internal operation of a co-equal branch of government.

Bicameral Conference Committee

6. Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and
Senate Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the
differences between the disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill.

7. The term 'settle' is synonymous to 'reconcile' and 'harmonize. To reconcile or

harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference Committee may then
(a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b) decide
that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be
carried into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise
between the disagreeing provisions.
8. In the present case, the changes introduced by the Bicameral Conference
Committee on disagreeing provisions were meant only to reconcile and harmonize
the disagreeing provisions for it did not inject any idea or intent that is wholly
foreign to the subject embraced by the original provisions.

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

9. Under the 'enrolled bill doctrine,' the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House
and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment.

No-amendment Rule

10. Petitioners' argument is that the practice where a bicameral conference

committee is allowed to add or delete provisions in the House bill and the Senate
bill after these had passed three readings is in effect a circumvention of the 'no
amendment rule' under Sec. 26 (2), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

11. The 'no-amendment rule' refers only to the procedure to be followed by each
house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses,
before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment .
To construe otherwise would mean that the other house of Congress would be
deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill.

12. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the
introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and
modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both
houses of Congress is prohibited.

Exclusive Origination of Revenue Bills

13. RA 9337 originated from two House Bills which proposed amendments to the
NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills
to the Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing
amendments not only to NIRC provisions on the value-added tax but also
amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes (corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes).

14. It is not the law but the revenue bill' which is required by the Constitution to
'originate exclusively' in the House of Representatives. A bill originating in the
House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole, and as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be

15. To insist that a revenue statute 'and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law' must substantially be
the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to 'concur
with amendments' but also to 'propose amendments.' It would be to violate the
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the
House superior to the Senate.

16. The Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

17. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue,
tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand,
the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.

#7 Commissioner of Customs v. Relunia G.R. No. L-11860. May 29, 1959

RPS Misamis Oriental, a unit of the Philippine Navy, was dispatched to Japan to
transport contingents bound for Puson, Korea, and carry Christmas gifts for our
soldiers there. It was used for transportation purposes and it made trips between
Korea and Japan. While RPS Misamis Oriental was in Japan, it loaded 180 cases
containing various articles which are subject to customs duties. Upon arrival in the
Philippines, these articles were forfeited because of violations of Customs Law.
Commissioner of Customs argued that RPS Misamis Oriental is subject to
Administrative Code Sec. 1363 which says that unmanifested merchandise found in
the vessel shall be forfeited.
Issue: Are Navy vessels, like RPS Misamis Oriental, required to have a manifest?
Held: Yes.
Ratio: Even if Sec. 1221 of the Administrative Code is entitled Entrance of Vessels
in Foreign Trade, Sec. 1228 states that it is required that every vessel from a
foreign port or place must have on board complete written or typewritten manifests
of all her cargoes. Also, RPS Misamis Oriental claimed to have submitted one to a
certain Mr. Ysla, but was denied by the latter.
StatCon maxim: The title can be resorted to as an aid where there is doubt
as to the meaning of the law or as to the intention of the legislature in
enacting it, and not otherwise.

#8 Civil Service Commission vs. CA (2012) G.R. No. 176162 and G.R. No. 178845 |

Subject: CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who
initiated the complaint; CSC has concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board of
Regents over administrative cases; R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O. No. 292

Respondents Dante Guevarra and Augustus Cezar were the Officer-in-

Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP).

Petitioner Honesto Cueva then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case
against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of
official documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being
notoriously undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713.

Cueva charged Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the

Application for Bond of Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the
Philippines (General Form No. 58-A), in which the latter denied the existence of his
pending criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the school, Guevarra was
required to be bonded in order to be able to engage in financial transactions on
behalf of PUP. In his Application for Bond, he said he did not have any criminal or
administrative records despite the fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar
admittedly had 17 pending cases for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019
before the Sandiganbayan. Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had
existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval
of the application.

The respondents explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records"

to mean final conviction in a criminal or administrative case. Thus, because their
cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra
responded to General Form No. 58-A correctly and in good faith.

The Civil Service Commission (CSC) formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and
Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service after a prima facie
finding that they had committed acts punishable under the Civil Service Law and

On appeal, the CA set aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. According to the CA, Section 47, Chapter 7, Subtitle A,
Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), the
second paragraph of which states that heads of agencies and instrumentalities
"shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction," bestows upon the
Board of Regents the jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against respondents Guevarra and Cezar. In addition, the CA
noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out
that the latter should have exhausted all administrative remedies by first bringing
his grievances to the attention of the PUP Board of Regents.


CSC has jurisdiction over cases filed directly with it, regardless of who
initiated the complaint
1. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to
appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.

2. The Court is not unaware of the use of the words "private citizen" in Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292.

3. The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the
absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they should be given their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a statute
is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the
evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole. After all, statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as
to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words
meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. (See Secretary
of Justice vs. Koruga)

4. There is no cogent reason to differentiate between a complaint filed by a private

citizen and one filed by a member of the civil service, especially in light of Section
12(11), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the same E.O. No. 292 which confers
upon the CSC the power to "hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or
brought before it directly or on appeal" without any qualification.

5. Under E.O. No. 292, a complaint against a state university official may be filed
with either the universitys Board of Regents or directly with the Civil Service
Commission. It is important to note that the Court did not interpret the
Administrative Code as limiting such authority to exclude complaints filed directly
with it by a member of the civil service. (See Camacho vs. Gloria)

6. The identity of the complainant is immaterial to the acquisition of jurisdiction

over an administrative case by the CSC. The law is quite clear that the CSC may
hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases brought directly before it or it may
deputize any department or agency to conduct an investigation.

R.A. No. 8292 is not in conflict with E.O. No. 292

11. Basic is the principle in statutory construction that interpreting and harmonizing
laws is the best method of interpretation in order to form a uniform, complete,
coherent, and intelligible system of jurisprudence, in accordance with the legal
maxim interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi
modus. Simply because a later statute relates to a similar subject matter as that of
an earlier statute does not result in an implied repeal of the latter.

12. A perusal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 clearly reveals that the same does not
indicate any intention to remove employees and officials of state universities and
colleges from the ambit of the CSC. What it merely states is that the governing
board of a school has the authority to discipline and remove faculty members and
administrative officials and employees for cause. It neither supersedes nor conflicts
with E.O. No. 292 which allows the CSC to hear and decide administrative cases
filed directly with it or on appeal.

13. When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same
jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless
otherwise provided by law. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove
respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official
or employee is within the jurisdiction of the CSC. (See Civil Service Commission vs.

14. There is no incongruity between R.A. No. 8292 and E.O. No. 292, as previously
explained in Sojor. Moreover, the Court fails to see how a complaint filed by a
private citizen is any different from one filed by a government employee. If the
grant to the CSC of concurrent original jurisdiction over administrative cases filed by
private citizens against public officials would not deprive the governing bodies of
the power to discipline their own officials and employees and would not be violative
of R.A. No. 8292, it is inconceivable that a similar case filed by a government
employee would do so. Such a distinction between cases filed by private citizens
and those by civil servants is simply illogical and unreasonable. To accede to such a
mistaken interpretation of the Administrative Code would be a great disservice to
our developing jurisprudence.

15. Despite the enactment of R.A. No. 8292 giving the board of regents or board of
trustees of a state school the authority to discipline its employees, the CSC still
retains jurisdiction over the school and its employees and has concurrent original
jurisdiction, together with the board of regents of a state university, over
administrative cases against state university officials and employees.

16. Firstly, it should be emphasized that the CSC has original concurrent jurisdiction
shared with the governing body in question, in this case, the Board of Regents of
PUP. This means that if the Board of Regents first takes cognizance of the complaint,
then it shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the CSC. Thus, not all
administrative cases will fall directly under the CSC. Secondly, Section 47, Chapter
7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code affords the CSC the option of
whether to decide the case or to deputize some other department, agency or official
to conduct an investigation into the matter, thereby considerably easing the burden
placed upon the CSC.

#9 Ang vs Ang G.R. No. 186993 August 22, 2012

Facts: On September 2, 1992, spouses Alan and EmAng (respondents) obtained a
loan in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$300,000.00) from
Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners). On even date, the respondents executed a
promissory note in favor of the petitioners wherein they promised to pay the latter
the said amount, with interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, upon
demand. However, despite repeated demands, the respondents failed to pay the
petitioners. Thus, on August 28, 2006, the petitioners sent the respondents a
demand letter asking them to pay their outstanding debt which, at that time,
already amounted to Seven Hundred Nineteen Thousand, Six Hundred Seventy-One
U.S. Dollars and Twenty-Three Cents (US$719,671.23), inclusive of the ten percent
(10%) annual interest that had accumulated over the years. Notwithstanding the
receipt of the said demand letter, the respondents still failed to settle their loan
obligation. On August 6, 2006, the petitioners, who were then residing in Los
Angeles, California, United States of America (USA), executed their respective
Special Powers of Attorney6 in favor of Attorney Eldrige Marvin B. Aceron (Atty.
Aceron) for the purpose of filing an action in court against the respondents. On
September 15, 2006, Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the petitioners, filed a Complaint7 for
collection of sum of money with the RTC of Quezon City against the respondents.
Issues: WON Atty. Aceron, being merely a representative of the petitioners, is not
the real party in interest in the case.
Held: Atty. Aceron, despite being the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners, is not a real
party in interest in the case below. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 2.Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the
meaning of the Rules of Court means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved. A real party in interest is the party who, by
the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest in the case below as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any
judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the petitioners as their attorney-in-
fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint against the
respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into
the rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest. Being
merely a representative of the petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal capacity does
not have the right to file the complaint below against the respondents. He may only
do so, as what he did, in behalf of the petitioners the real parties in interest. To
stress, the right sought to be enforced in the case below belongs to the petitioners
and not to Atty. Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest.
#10 Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No.
196271, October 18, 2011
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM
regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September
2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA
No. 9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of
August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held
on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had
accepted certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to be
elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting the next ARMM
regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
1. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days
rule under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of
RA No. 10153 in toto.]
1. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-
separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can
become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to
the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity of the bills immediate
enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, explained the effect of
the Presidents certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i]
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its
final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a
law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.
Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents certification exempted both the House
and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
Petitioners are registered individual owners of condominium units in Phoenix
Heights Condominium Pasig City, Metro Manila. Respondent Distinction Properties
Development and Construction, Inc. (DPDCI) is the real estate developer of Phoenix
Heights Condominium, with principal office at Binondo, Manila. One of
the petitioners executed a Master Deed and Declaration of Restrictions (MDDR) of
Phoenix Heights Condominium, which was filed with the Registry of Deeds. As the
developer, DPDCI undertook, among others, the marketing aspect of the project, the
sale of the units and the release of flyers and brochures. Thereafter, Phoenix
Heights Condominium Corporation (PHCC) was formally organized and incorporated.
Sometime in 2000, DPDCI turned over to PHCC the ownership and possession of the
condominium units, except for the two saleable commercial units/spaces. Petitioner
Lim filed an Application for Alteration of Plan pertaining to the construction of 22
storage units in the spaces adjunct to the parking area of the building, but was
disapproved as such would obstruct light and ventilation.
HLURB -filed a complaint against DPDCI for unsound business practices and
violation of the MDDR, alleging that the latter committed misrepresentation in their
circulated flyers and brochures as to the facilities or amenities that would be
available in the condominium and failed to perform its obligation to comply with the
MDDR. However, it ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding as invalid the
agreement entered into between DPDCI and PHCC, as to the alteration or
conversion of the subject units into common areas, which
it previously approved, for the reason that it was not approved by the majority of th
e members of PHCC asrequired under Section 13 of the MDDR.
CA - Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on the ground that the HLURB decision
was a patent nullity constituting an act without or beyond its jurisdiction and that it
had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. Favored
DPDCI, setting aside HLURBs decision and holds that HLURB had
no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by petitioners as the controversy did not fall
within the scope of theadministrative agencys authority under P.D. No. 957. The
HLURB not only relied heavily on the brochures which, according to the CA, did not
set out an enforceable obligation on the part of DPDCI, but also erroneously cited
Section 13 of the MDDR to support its finding of contractual violation.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of
the claims asserted therein. Thus, it was ruled that the jurisdiction of the HLURB to
hear and decide cases is determined by the nature of the cause of action, the
subject matter or property involved and the parties. To determine if HLURB has
jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action, an examination of the laws defining
HLURBs jurisdiction and authority becomes imperative. P.D. No. 957, specifically Se
ction 3, granted the NationalHousing Authority (NHA) the "exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate the real estate trade and business." Then came P.D. No. 134421 expanding
the jurisdiction of the NHA.
#12 Agcaoili v. Suguitan G.R. No. 24806. February 13, 1926
Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag,
Ilocos Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold
the said office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereinto of right
appertaining into him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received
a letter from Luis Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should cease to
be a justice because he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a protest
through a letter addressed to the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will
not cease from the office because he was appointed as justice of peace before the
enactment of Act 3107, and he has the right to hold office during good behaviour.
Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but
nothing came. So, he filed for a petition for writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the
Province of Ilocos Norte.
Issue: Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard
to his petition for quo warranto
Held: No.
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise.
Section 216 provides Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a
corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five
years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be
brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after
the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose. The Supreme Court
held that this provision is applicable only to private officials. Hence, it has no
applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of the peace. The second point the
court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory Construction, given that the said
provision is applicable to public officials, the sentence after the word committed;
should not be treated as a separate thought from the preceding phrase. In the end,
the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.
StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the
English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a
degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that
semicolon must have relation to the same matter which precedes it. A
semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. A
semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a
thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is
never used for the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and
semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, to divide
sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the
semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the comma.
(GR 192908)


Two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain properties in the
name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent): (1) to expropriate 1,992
square meters out of a total area of 6,068 square meters of land for the
construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway Project (MCTEP). (2) to expropriate
2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039 square meters, also belonging to
St. Vincent. Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint
alleging that the subject land originated from a free patent title and should be
adjudicated to it without payment of just compensation pursuant to Section 112 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141. In 2005, the Republic filed a motion for the issuance of
an order of expropriation and was granted in both two cases. The trial court denied
St. Vincents motion for reconsideration granting expropriation. The lower court,
however, modified its Order and required the Republic to immediately pay St.
Vincent in an amount equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the
property sought to be expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it
was denied. Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of
fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its
Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and the Republic was given a non-extensible
period of fifteen (15) days within which to file its petition for certiorari. The Republic
filed its petition for certiorari for having been issued an order with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. The CA, motu proprio,
issued a Resolution ordering the Republic to show cause why its petition for
certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time, pursuant to A.M. No.
07-7-12- SC. The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation pleading for the
relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in the case and in consideration of substantial justice. The CA rendered the
assailed resolution dismissing the Republics petition for certiorari on the ground
that the petition was filed out of time. The CA denied the Republics motion for
reconsideration. Hence,this petition.

ISSUE: WON, the CA erred in denying the petition of certiorari for being filed out of

YES. The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially
granted the Republics motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion
that the petition filed by the latter was one for petition for review as a mode of
appeal. The CA granted extension inasmuch as motions for this purpose are allowed
by the rules. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the
extension sought and, at all events, given its merits. What seems to be a conflict
is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing rulings leads to the
simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict application of the
general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty (60) days
from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty
(60)-day period subject to the Courts sound discretion. Labao v. Flores
subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the rule:
The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1)
most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good
faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5)
the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12)
importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the
judge guided by all the attendant circumstances.

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna
Metts Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed
within sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be
assailed. Under exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound
discretion of the Court, said period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao
and Mid-Islands Power cases. Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the
Republics petition: first, due to its own lapse when it granted the extension sought
by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009; second, because of the public
interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for public use (MCTEP); and
finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party in admitting the

DECISION: Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated October 30, 2009 and July
15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are NULLIFIED. The Court
of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the petition for certiorari
filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

#15 Gulf Air Company, Philippines Branch Vs. Commissioner of Internal

Petitioner Gulf Air Company Philippine Branch (GF) is a branch of Gulf Air Company,
a foreign corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Kingdom of
GF made a claim for refund of percentage taxes for the first, second and fourth
quarters of 2000. In connection with this, a letter of authority was issued by the BIR
authorizing its revenue officers to examine GFs books of accounts and other
records to verify its claim. After its submission of several documents and an informal
conference with BIR representatives, GF received its Preliminary Assessment Notice
on November 4, 2003 for deficiency percentage tax amounting to P 32,745,141.93.
On the same day, GF also received a letter denying its claim for tax credit or refund
of excess percentage tax remittance for the first, second and fourth quarters of
2000, and requesting the immediate settlement of the deficiency tax assessment.
GF then received the Formal Letter of Demand, for the payment of the total amount
of P 33,864,186.62. In response, it filed a letter to protest the assessment and to
reiterate its request for reconsideration on the denial of its claim for refund. On June
30, 2004, the Deputy Commissioner, Officer-in-Charge of the Large Taxpayers
Service of the BIR, denied GFs written protest for lack of factual and legal basis and
requested the immediate payment of the P 33,864,186.62 deficiency percentage
tax assessment. With CTA (2nd Division) GF filed a petition for review. CTA (2nd
Division) - dismissed the petition, finding that Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 was the
applicable rule providing that gross receipts should be computed based on the cost
of the single one- way fare as approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). In
addition, it noted that GF failed to include in its gross receipts the special
commissions on passengers and cargo. Finally, it ruled that Revenue Regulations
No. 15-2002, allowing the use of the net net rate in determining the gross receipts,
could not be given any or a retroactive effect. Thus, the CTA affirmed the decision of
the BIR and ordered the payment of P 41,117,734.01 plus 20% delinquency interest.
CTA En Banc affirms.
Whether the definition of "gross receipts," for purposes of computing the 3%
Percentage Tax under Section 118(A) of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), should include special commissions on passengers and special commissions
on cargo based on the rates approved by the CAB.
No. 1. Section 118(A) of the NIRC states that: Sec. 118. Percentage Tax on
International Carriers. (A) International air carriers doing business in the
Philippines shall pay a tax of three percent (3%) of their quarterly gross receipts.
Pursuant to this, the Secretary of Finance promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 15-
2002, which prescribes that "gross receipts" for the purpose of determining
Common Carriers Tax shall be the same as the tax base for calculating Gross
Philippine Billings Tax. Section 5 of the same provides for the computation of "Gross
Philippine Billings": Sec. 5. Determination of Gross Philippine Billings. (a) In
computing for "Gross Philippine Billings," there shall be included the total amount of
gross revenue derived from passage of persons, excess baggage, cargo and/or mail,
originating from the Philippines in a continuous and uninterrupted flight, irrespective
of the place of sale or issue and the place of payment of the passage documents.
The gross revenue for passengers whose tickets are sold in the Philippines shall be
the actual amount derived for transportation services, for a first class, business
class or economy class passage, as the case may be, on its continuous and
uninterrupted flight from any port or point in the Philippines to its final destination in
any port or point of a foreign country, as reflected in the remittance area of the tax
coupon forming an integral part of the plane ticket. For this purpose, the Gross
Philippine Billings shall be determined by computing the monthly average net fare
of all the tax coupons of plane tickets issued for the month per point of final
destination, per class of passage (i.e., first class, business class, or economy class)
and per classification of passenger (i.e., adult, child or infant) and multiplied by the
corresponding total number of passengers flown for the month as declared in the
flight manifest. For tickets sold outside the Philippines, the gross revenue for
passengers for first class, business class or economy class passage, as the case
may be, on a continuous and uninterrupted flight from any port of point in the
Philippines to final destination in any port or point of a foreign country shall be
determined using the locally available net fares applicable to such flight taking into
consideration the seasonal fare rate established at the time of the flight, the class of
passage (whether first class, business class, economy class or non-revenue), the
classification of passenger (whether adult, child or infant), the date of embarkation,
and the place of final destination. Correspondingly, the Gross Philippine Billing for
tickets sold outside the Philippines shall be determined in the manner as provided in
the preceding paragraph. Passage documents revalidated, exchanged and/or
endorsed to another on-line international airline shall be included in the taxable
base of the carrying airline and shall be subject to Gross Philippine Billings tax if the
passenger is lifted/boarded on an aircraft from any port or point in the Philippines
towards a foreign destination. The gross revenue on excess baggage which
originated from any port or point in the Philippines and destined to any part of a
foreign country shall be computed based on the actual revenue derived as
appearing on the official receipt or any similar document for the said transaction.
The gross revenue for freight or cargo and mail shall be determined based on the
revenue realized from the carriage thereof. The amount realized for freight or cargo
shall be based on the amount appearing on the airway bill after deducting
therefrom the amount of discounts granted which shall be validated using the
monthly cargo sales reports generated by the IATA Cargo Accounts Settlement
System (IATA CASS) for airway bills issued through their cargo agents or the
monthly reports prepared by the airline themselves or by their general sales agents
for direct issues made. The amount realized for mails shall, on the other hand, be
determined based on the amount as reflected in the cargo manifest of the carrier.
This expressly repealed Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 that stipulates a different
manner of calculating the gross receipts: Sec. 5. Gross Receipts, how determined.
The total amount of gross receipts derived from passage of persons, excess
baggage, freight or cargo, including, mail cargo, originating from the Philippines in a
continuous and uninterrupted flight, irrespective of the place of sale or issue and
the place of payment of the ticket, shall be subject to the common carriers
percentage tax (Sec. 192, Tax Code). The gross receipts shall be computed on the
cost of the single one way fare as approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board on the
continuous and uninterrupted flight of passengers, excess baggage, freight or
cargo, including mail, as reflected on the plane manifest of the carrier. Tickets
revalidated, exchanged and/or indorsed to another international airline are subject
to percentage tax if lifted from a passenger boarding a plane in a port or point in the
Philippines. In case of a flight that originates from the Philippines but transhipment
of passenger takes place elsewhere on another airline, the gross receipts reportable
for Philippine tax purposes shall be the portion of the cost of the ticket
corresponding to the leg of the flight from port of origin to the point of
transhipment. In case of passengers, the taxable base shall be gross receipts less
25% thereof.
2. There is no doubt that prior to the issuance of Revenue Regulations No. 15-
2002 which became effective on October 26, 2002, the prevailing rule then for the
purpose of computing common carriers tax was Revenue Regulations No. 6-66.
While the petitioners interpretation has been vindicated by the new rules which
compute gross revenues based on the actual amount received by the airline
company as reflected on the plane ticket, this does not change the fact that during
the relevant taxable period involved in this case, it was Revenue Regulations No. 6-
66 that was in effect. GF itself is adamant that it does not seek the retroactive
application of Revenue Regulations No. 15- 2002. Even if it were inclined to do so, it
cannot insist on the application of the said rules because tax laws, including rules
and regulations, operate prospectively unless otherwise legislatively intended by
express terms or by necessary implication. Although GF does not dispute that
Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 was the applicable rule covering the taxable period
involved, it puts in issue the wisdom of the said rule as it pertains to the definition
of gross receipts. GF is reminded that rules and regulations interpreting the tax
code and promulgated by the Secretary of Finance, who has been granted the
authority to do so by Section 244 of the NIRC, "deserve to be given weight and
respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who
formulate them and their specific expertise in their respective fields." As such,
absent any showing that Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 is inconsistent with the
provisions of the NIRC, its stipulations shall be upheld and applied accordingly. This
is in keeping with our primary duty of interpreting and applying the law. Regardless
of our reservations as to the wisdom or the perceived ill-effects of a particular
legislative enactment, the court is without authority to modify the same as it is the
exclusive province of the law-making body to do so. As aptly stated in Saguiguit v.
People, xxx Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply
the law and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of
justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has
not been shown that they have acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the
judiciary may interpret laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to
strike them down if they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty does
not include the discretion to correct by reading into the law what is not written
3. Moreover, the validity of the questioned rules can be sustained by
the application of the principle of legislative approval by re-enactment.
Under the aforementioned legal concept, "where a statute is susceptible
of the meaning placed upon it by a ruling of the government agency
charged with its enforcement and the Legislature thereafter re-enacts the
provisions without substantial change, such action is to some extent
confirmatory that the ruling carries out the legislative purpose." Thus, there
is tacit approval of a prior executive construction of a statute which was re-enacted
with no substantial changes. In this case, Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 was
promulgated to enforce the provisions of Title V, Chapter I (Tax on Business) of
Commonwealth Act No. 466 (National Internal Revenue Code of 1939), under which
Section 192, pertaining to the common carriers tax, can be found: Sec. 192.
Percentage tax on carriers and keepers of garages. Keepers of garages,
transportation contractors, persons who transport passenger or freight for hire, and
common carriers by land, air, or water, except owners of bancas, and owners of
animal-drawn two- wheeled vehicles, shall pay a tax equivalent to two per centum
of their monthly gross receipts. This provision has, over the decades, been
substantially reproduced with every amendment of the NIRC, up until its recent
reincarnation in Section 118 of the NIRC. The legislature is presumed to have full
knowledge of the existing revenue regulations interpreting the aforequoted
provision of law and, with its subsequent substantial re-enactment, there is a
presumption that the lawmakers have approved and confirmed the rules in question
as carrying out the legislative purpose. Hence, it can be concluded that with the
continued duplication of the NIRC provision on common carriers tax, the law-
making body was aware of the existence of Revenue Regulations No. 6-66 and
impliedly endorsed its interpretation of the NIRC and its definition of gross receipts.

#16 Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, G.R. No. 182722, January 22, 2010
Dumaguete Cathedral Credit Cooperative (the Cooperative) was assessed by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) on deficiency withholding taxes for taxable
years 1999 and 2000 which it protested on July 23, 2002. Thereafter, on October 16,
2002, the Cooperative received two (2) other Pre-Assessment Notices for deficiency
withholding taxes also for taxable years 1999 and 2000. The deficiency withholding
taxes cover the payments of the honorarium of the Board of Directors, security and
janitorial services, legal and professional fees, and interest on savings and time
deposits of its members. In another letter dated November 8, 2002, the Cooperative
informed the CIR, that it would pay the withholding taxes due on the honorarium
and per diems of the Board of Directors, security and janitorial services,
commissions and legal and professional fees for the year 2000 excluding penalties
and interest, and that it would avail of the Voluntary Assessment and Abatement
Program (VAAP) of the BIR under Revenue Regulations No. 17-2002. On November
29, 2002, the Cooperative availed of the VAAP and paid the amounts corresponding
to the withholding taxes on the payments for the compensation, honorarium of the
Board of Directors, security and janitorial services, and legal and professional
services, for the years 1999 and 2000. On April 24, 2003, the Cooperative received
from the BIR Regional Director, Sonia L. Flores, Letters of Demand Nos. 00027-2003
and 00026-2003, with attached Transcripts of Assessment and Audit
Results/Assessment Notices, ordering it to pay the deficiency withholding taxes,
inclusive of penalties, for the years 1999 and 2000 in the amounts of P1,489,065.30
and P1,462,644.90, respectively. On May 9, 2003, the Cooperative protested the
Letters of Demand and Assessment Notices with the CIR. However, the latter failed
to act on the protest within the prescribed 180-day period. Hence, on December 3,
2003, the Cooperative filed a Petition for Review before the CTA. The Court of Tax
Appeals First Division partially granted the petition and cancelled the deficiency
assessment against the Cooperative for deficiency withholding taxes on the
honorarium and per diems of the Cooperatives Board of Directors, security and
janitorial services, commissions and legal and professional fees in view of its VAAP
application. However, The CTA ordered the Cooperative to pay the amounts
representing deficiency withholding taxes on interests from savings and time
deposits of its members for the taxable years 1999 and 2000 plus the 20%
delinquency interest from May 26, 2003 until the amount of deficiency withholding
taxes are fully paid pursuant to Section 249 (C) of the Tax Code. Aggrieved, the
Cooperative filed an appeal before the CTA En Banc. However, the CTA En Banc
denied its appeal. The Cooperative elevated its case before the Supreme Court.
Is the Cooperative liable to pay the deficiency withholding taxes on interest from
savings and time deposits of its members, as well as the delinquency interest of
20% per annum.
The Supreme Court held that the Cooperative is not liable. The Supreme
Court found that the BIR has previously issued rulings dealing with the subject
matter. In BIR Ruling No. 551-888, the BIR stated that cooperatives are not required
to withhold taxes on interest from savings and time deposits of their members
which ruling was reiterated in BIR Ruling [DA- 591-2006] dated October 5, 2006. The
Court found that both BIR Ruling No. 551-888 and BIR Ruling [DA-591-2006] are in
perfect harmony with the Constitution and the laws they seek to implement. Also,
given that the Cooperative is duly registered with the Cooperative Development
Authority (CDA), Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC must be read together with RA 6938,
as amended by RA 9520.
Under Article 2 of RA 6938, as amended by RA 9520, it is a declared policy of
the State to foster the creation and growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for
promoting self-reliance and harnessing people power towards the attainment of
economic development and social justice. Thus, to encourage the formation of
cooperatives and to create an atmosphere conducive to their growth and
development, the State extends all forms of assistance to them, one of which is
providing cooperatives a preferential tax treatment.
The legislative intent to give cooperatives a preferential tax treatment is
apparent in Articles 61 and 62 of RA 6938, which read:
ART. 61. Tax Treatment of Cooperatives. Duly registered cooperatives under
this Code which do not transact any business with non-members or the general
public shall not be subject to any government taxes and fees imposed under the
Internal Revenue Laws and other tax laws. Cooperatives not falling under this article
shall be governed by the succeeding section.
ART. 62. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with
both members and nonmembers shall not be subject to tax on their transactions to
members. Notwithstanding the provision of any law or regulation to the contrary,
such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall enjoy the following tax
exemptions; x x x.
This exemption extends to members of cooperatives. It must be emphasized
that cooperatives exist for the benefit of their members. In fact, the primary
objective of every cooperative is to provide goods and services to its members to
enable them to attain increased income, savings, investments, and productivity.
Therefore, limiting the application of the tax exemption to cooperatives would go
against the very purpose of a credit cooperative. Extending the exemption to
members of cooperatives, on the other hand, would be consistent with the intent of
the legislature. Thus, although the tax exemption only mentions cooperatives, this
should be construed to include the members, pursuant to Article 126 of RA 6938,
which provides:
ART. 126. Interpretation and Construction. In case of doubt as to the
meaning of any provision of this Code or the regulations issued in pursuance
thereof, the same shall be resolved liberally in favor of the cooperatives and their
The Supreme Court likewise noted that the tax exemption in RA 6938 was
retained in RA 9520. The only difference is that Article 61 of RA 9520 (formerly
Section 62 of RA 6938) now expressly states that transactions of members with the
cooperatives are not subject to any taxes and fees.
ART. 61. Tax and Other Exemptions. Cooperatives transacting business with
both members and non-members shall not be subjected to tax on their transactions
with members. In relation to this, the transactions of members with the cooperative
shall not be subject to any taxes and fees, including but not limited to final taxes on
members deposits and documentary tax. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law
or regulation to the contrary, such cooperatives dealing with nonmembers shall
enjoy the following tax exemptions: (Underscoring Supplied)
This amendment in Article 61 of RA 9520, specifically providing that members
of cooperatives are not subject to final taxes on their deposits, affirms the
interpretation of the BIR that Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC does not apply to
cooperatives and confirms that such ruling carries out the legislative intent. Under
the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment,
the reenactment of a statute substantially unchanged is persuasive indication of the
adoption by Congress of a prior executive construction.
Moreover, no less than the Constitution guarantees the protection of
cooperatives. Section 15, Article XII of the Constitution considers cooperatives as
instruments for social justice and economic development. At the same time, Section
10 of Article II of the Constitution declares that it is a policy of the State to promote
social justice in all phases of national development. In relation thereto, Section 2 of
Article XIII of the Constitution states that the promotion of social justice shall include
the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative
and self-reliance. Bearing in mind the foregoing provisions, the Court found that an
interpretation exempting the members of cooperatives from the imposition of the
final tax under Section 24(B)(1) of the NIRC is more in keeping with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.

#17 Revaldo v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 170589 April 16, 2009

Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood
lumber in violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day
of June 1992, Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously possess 96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value
of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any legal document as required under
existing forest laws and regulations from proper government authorities, to the
damage and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997
convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals
ruled that motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of
the lumber without the legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this
petition for certiorari. Petitioner contends that the warrantless search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was illegal and thus the items seized should not
have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner argues that the police
officers were not armed with a search warrant when they went to his house to verify
the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the corresponding
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying
around the vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the
plain view doctrine, objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. When asked whether he had the necessary permit to possess the lumber,
petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely replied that the lumber in his
possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his furniture shop. There
was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber. There was,
therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the
lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In
open court, petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the
confiscated lumber as well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents
therefor and that he merely intended to use the lumber for the repair of his
dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be harsh but
that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of
Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.
#18 Lahom vs. Sibulo (2003) G.R. No. 143989 | 2003-07-14
The Concept of Vested Right is a Consequence of the Guaranty of Due Process; The
Action to Rescind a Decree of Adoption Filed After the Effectivity of RA 8552 Cannot
be Pursued; Vested Rights cannot be acquired over Mere Privileges granted under
the law (i.e. Right to Adopt is a Statutory privilege)

Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom, a childless couple, took into their
care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and brought him up as his own. In 1971,
the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. Thereafter, an order granting the
petition was issued and as an effect, the Civil Registrar changed Joses surname
from Sibulo to Lahom.
In December of 1999, Isabellita commenced a petition to rescind the decree of
adoption before the Regional Trial Court. She averred that Jose refused to change his
surname to Lahom to the utter disregard of the feelings of the petitioner. Further, it
was said that Jose remained indifferent to her and would only visit her once a year
and that Jose was just after his alleged rights over the properties of the petitioner
and her late husband.
Prior to the institution of the case, Republic Act No. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption
Act went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption. The adopters may only disinherit the adoptee for valid
causes provided by the law. Banking on the new law, Jose moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the petitioner had no cause of action against him in view
of the enactment of RA 8552.
The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action because of the
deletion of the right to rescind an adoption by the new law. Assuming arguendo that
the petitioners right to rescind under the Family Code should be respected, the
action still had already prescribed for being filed more than 5 years from the time
the legal ground had been discovered.
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter
after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the
adopters action prescribed.
The Concept of Vested Right is a Consequence of the Guaranty of Due
1. Petitioner insists that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul
the adoption decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case,
both being vested under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
2. The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of
due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action.
3. It includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but
also exemptions from new obligations created after the right has become vested.
4. Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable.
The Action to Rescind a Decree of Adoption Filed After the Effectivity of RA
8552 Cannot be Pursued
5. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that petitioner filed an action
to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law, had already
abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family
Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
6. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court held that the action for
rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No.
8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.
7. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of
the law governing at the time the petition was filed. (Republic vs. CA and Bobiles)
Vested Rights cannot be acquired over Mere Privileges granted under the
law (i.e. Right to Adopt is a Statutory privilege)
8. Even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five-year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
9. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not
fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection.
10. A person has no vested right in statutory privileges. While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally
innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.
11. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter
to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at any time
before it has been exercised.
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but
were childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents
were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the
children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998,
Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA
8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she filed separate
petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months
old. Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to
the adoption executed in an affidavit.
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed,
petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court's decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is
explicit. Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The
requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or
is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
of the Philippines, that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains
such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified
by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for
the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth
(4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the
spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept
of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to
be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require
the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario,
the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section
7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of
her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of
petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

#20 G.R. No. 140563 DANTE M. POLLOSO, petitioner, vs. HON. CELSO D.
Facts: The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1994, the National Power Corporation (NPC), represented by its President Dr.
Francisco L. Viray entered into a service contract with Atty. Benemerito A. Satorre.
Under said contract, Satorre was to perform the following services for the Leyte-
Cebu and Leyte-Luzon Interconnection Projects of the NPC:
On 12 January 1995, Unit Auditor Alexander A. Tan, NPC-VRC, Cebu
City issued Notice of Disallowance No. 95-0001-135-94 for the payment of the
services rendered by Atty. Satorre for the period covering March to December 1995
in the total amount of P283,763.39. The following reasons were cited for said
1)....The contract for services did not have the written conformity and
acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Corporate Counsel and concurrence of
the Commission on Audit as required under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2,
2)....The contract was not supported with Certificate of Availability of Funds
as required under Sec. 86 of P.D. 1445.
3)....The contract was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for final
review and was not forwarded to the Compensation and Position Confirmation and
Classification Bureau, DBM for appropriate action as required in CSC MC # 5 Series
of 1985.
Whether or not that the circular requiring the approval of the SOLICITOR GENERAL
was UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it restricted to practice LAW.
Ruling: The circular was merely a safeguard to prevent irregular, unnecessary,
excessive, and extravagant or unconscionable expenditures. We cannot grant the
prayer of the petitioner that Atty. Satorre should be compensated based on the
principle of quantum meruit, on the ground that the government will be unjustly
enriched at the expense of another. We do not deny that Atty. Satorre has indeed
rendered legal services to the government. However to allow the disbursement of
public funds to pay for his services, despite the absence of requisite consent to his
hiring from the OSG or OGCC would precisely allow circumvention of COA Circular
No. 86-255.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of showing that
the respondents committed a reversible error.

#21 G.R. No. 129764 March 12, 2002 GEOFFREY F. GRIFFITH, vs. HON.
1) Phelps Dodge Philippines, Inc. leased its lot and factory building to Lincoln
Gerard, Inc. for a term of two years.
2) Geoffrey F. Griffith, in his capacity as president of Lincoln Gerard, Inc., issued
two checks amounting to215, 442,65 to Phelps Dodge Phils.
3) Before the due date of the check, Griffith wrote Phelps Dodge not to present
the said checks for payment on May 30, 1986 because they could not be
funded due to a four-week labor strike that affected their company.
4) On June 2, 1986, when no further communication was received from Lincoln
Gerard, Phelps Dodge presented the two checks for payment but these were
dishonored by the bank for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Three days later, Phelps Dodge sent a demand letter to Lincoln Gerard.
5) on June 19, 1986, Phelps Dodge notified Lincoln Gerard that its properties
would be foreclosed. Phelps Dodge went ahead with the foreclosure and
auction sale on June 20, 1986.
6) On May 10, 1988, two informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed against
the petitioner. The motion for reconsideration filed by Griffith was dismissed,
and so were his petition for review filed before the Department of Justice and
later on his motion to quash filed before the RTC. Griffith then filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals that was likewise denied.
7) Lincoln Gerard lodged a complaint for damages before the RTC of
Pasig, against Phelps Dodge and the notary public who conducted the auction
sale. On July 19, 1991, the trial court ruled that the foreclosure and auction
sale were invalid, but applied the proceeds thereof to Lincoln Gerard's
arrearages. It also ordered Phelps Dodge to return to Lincoln Gerard
the P1,072,586.88 as excess.
8) On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, and this became
final and executory.
9) On August 25, 1994, the criminal cases against Griffith pending before the
RTC were remanded to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
10) On July 25, 1995, the MeTC, in Criminal Cases Nos. 41678 and 41679,
found Griffith guilty on both counts for violation of B.P. 22.11)
On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. Petitioner then
appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals which was denied. An MR was
also denied.
Whether or not Geoffrey F. Griffith, has been erroneously convicted and sentenced
for violation of the BP22.
We should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the
law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law. The creditor having
collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for
payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to
answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no
longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

#22 GR No. 104712 MANUEL T. DE GUIA vs. HON. COMELEC

Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on November
26, 1991. It is An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and
for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 2313,
adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of
elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1)
legislative district and the Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area for the preparation of the Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial
Election Supervisors and Election Registrars, Resolution No. 2379, approving the
Project of District Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and
Resolution UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of
par. (d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner
imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating the aforementioned
resolutions, and maintained that election of Sanggunian members be at large
instead of by district.
Whether or not the petitioners interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in
assailing the aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.
NO. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit
Spirit and purpose of the law The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is
shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill No. 1861, and that respondent
COMELEC is cognizant of its legislative intent.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We
must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for
being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature
intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or
the reason which induced it to enact the statute.
The true import of Par. (d) is that Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district
cities and the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which
remained single-districts not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A.
7166 will have to continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections,
although starting 1995 they shall all be elected by district to effect the full
implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166.


LPGMA is a non-stock, non-profit association of consumers and small industry
players in the LPG and energy sector. It sought to register as a party-list
organization for the May 10, 2010 elections and was approved by the COMELEC.
Petitioners filed a complaint and petition before the COMELEC for the cancellation of
LPGMAs registration as a party
-list organization, arguing that LPGMA does not represent a marginalized sector of
the society because its incorporators, officers and members are not marginalized or
underrepresented citizens. In response, LPGMA countered that Section 5(2), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution does not require that party-list representatives must be
members of the marginalized and/or underrepresented sector of the society. It also
averred that the ground cited by the petitioners is not one of those mentioned in
Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 and that petitioners are just trying to resurrect their lost
chance to oppose the petition for registration. The COMELEC dismissed the
complaint for two reasons. First, the ground for cancellation cited by the petitioners
is not among the exclusive enumeration in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. Second, the
complaint is actually a belated opposition to
LPGMAs petition for registration which has long been approved with finality
.Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied.
Issues: 1) Whether or not a belated opposition to a petition for registration bars the
action of complainants.
2) Whether or not the Constitution and the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) require
that incorporators, officers and members of a party-list must be marginalized or
underrepresented citizens.
Ruling of the Court:
There was no valid justification for the dismissal of the complaint for cancellation.
However, in light of COMELEC Resolution dated December 13, 2012, the present
petitions ought to be dismissed.
1) An opposition to a petition for registration is not a condition
precedent to the filing of a complaint for cancellation. Section 6, R.A. No.
7941 lays down the grounds and procedure for the cancellation of party-list
accreditation, viz: Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may, motu propio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for
religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8)It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
For the COMELEC to validly exercise its statutory power to cancel
the registration of a party-list group, the law imposes only two (2) conditions: (1)
due notice and hearing is afforded to the party-list group concerned; and (2) any of
the enumerated grounds for disqualification in Section 6 exists.
2) In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, the Court
explained that the "laws, rules or regulations relating to elections" referred to in
paragraph 5 include Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, which declares the underlying policy
for the law that marginalized and underrepresented Filipino citizens become
members of the House of Representatives. A party or an organization therefore that
does not comply with this policy must be disqualified. The party-list system of
representation was crafted for the marginalized and underrepresented and their
alleviation is the ultimate policy of the law. In fact, there is no need to categorically
mention that those who are not marginalized and underrepresented are
#24 GR No.145156-57 Solid homes, Inc. vs. Spouses Ancheta Tan
On April 7, 1980, petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna Uy a
subdivision lot with an area of 1,069 square meters, more particularly identified as Lot 18,
Block 2, located at petitioners Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision, Quezon City. Under
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 280963/T-1409 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, the lot was registered in the name of the Uys.
In February, 1985, the lot was sold to respondents, the spouses Ancheta K. Tan and
Corazon de Jesus-Tan, by reason of which the former title covering the lot was cancelled
and replaced by TCT No. RT-14465 (327754) in respondents name.
From then on, respondents visited their property a number of times, only to find out
the sad state of development thereat. There was no infrastructure and utility systems for
water, sewerage, of the subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot and its surrounding
areas. In short, there has been no development at all.
After several visits, the respondents found out the poor state of the development in
the subdivision. The utility service for water, sewerage, electricity and telephone, as
announced in the approved plans and advertisements were lacking and squatters occupy.
Afterwards, respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility systems
and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions by the end of January, 1996 to
enable them to start the construction of their house thereon and to allow other lot owners
in the area a full access to and peaceful possession of their respective lots, conformably
with P.D. No. 957. Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field
Office of the HLURB, NCR a complaint for specific performance and damages therein
praying, that petitioner be ordered to provide the needed facilities in the premises and rid
the same of squatters; or, in the alternative, for petitioner to replace respondents
property with another lot in the same subdivision where there are facilities
and sans squatters.
After due proceedings, the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, in a decision dated
September 17, 1996,3 rendered judgment for the respondents by directing petitioner to
perform its obligations to residents and pay complainants P20,000.00. Trial court affirmed
said prayers and petitioner then filed a motion for partial reconsideration. Such appeal was
denied and afterwards petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied as
well. Its next recourse was the filing of its petition claiming that the court erred in its
(1) whether or not respondents right to bring the instant case against petitioner
has already prescribed; and
(2) In the event respondents opt to rescind the contract, should petitioner pay
them merely the price they paid for the lot plus interest or the current market
value thereof.

1) There can be no debate at all on the legal postulate that the prescriptive
period for bringing action for specific performance, as here, prescribes in ten
(10) years. This is so provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code. respondents
made their written demand upon petitioner to perform what is incumbent
upon it only on December 18, 1995, it was only from that date when the 10-
year prescriptive period under Article 1144 commenced to run. And since
respondents complaint for specific performance was filed with the Field
Office of the HLURB only on April 1, 1996, or less than four (4) months after
the date of their demand, petitioners reliance on prescription of action is
simply without any leg to stand on.

2) Indeed, there would be unjust enrichment if respondents Solid Homes, Inc. & Purita
Soliven are made to pay only the purchase price plus interest. It is definite that the
value of the subject property already escalated after almost two decades from the
time the petitioner paid for it. Equity and justice dictate that the injured party
should be paid the market value of the lot, otherwise, respondents Solid Homes, Inc.
& Purita Soliven would enrich themselves at the expense of herein lot owners when
they sell the same lot at the present market value. unconscionable.
: A writ of attachment shall not issue to enjoin tax collection.
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of cement manufacturing, production and
importation. On 22 May 2001, respondent Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
accepted an application from Philcemcor (PCMC), alleging that the importation of
gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic
production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as
caused depressed local prices. Accordingly, Philcemcor sought the imposition at first
of provisional, then later, definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement
pursuant to the SMA (Rep. Act No. 8800, also known as the Safeguard Measures
Act. After preliminary investigation, the Bureau of Import Services of the DTI, deter
minedthat critical circumstances existed justifying the imposition of provisional
measures. The DTI then issued an Order, imposing a provisional measure equivalent
to Twenty Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P20.60) per forty (40) kilogram bag on all
importations of gray Portland cement for a period not exceeding two hundred (200)
days from the date of issuance by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) of the
implementing Customs Memorandum Order. The corresponding Customs
Memorandum Order was issued on 10 December 2001, to take effect that same day
and to remain in force for two hundred (200) days
Due to DTIs imposition of the provisional measure, Southern Cross filed with the
Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ
of Preliminary Injunction
(TRO Application), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing his
Petitioner Ann Brigit Leonardo was born in Manila to common-law spouses Eddie
Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo. In her Birth Certificate Leonardo was her surname.
Wanting to change her surname to that of her father, they sent a letter to the Local
Civil Registrar on August 1, 1994. The Local Civil Registrar denied their request
citing FC 176 which states that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry the
surname of the mother.
Whether or not Ann Brigit Leonardo could use her fathers surname.
No. The Family Code has repealed NCC 366 which allows natural children to use the
surname of the father if the child is recognized by BOTH parents. Now, in the Family
Code, an illegitimate child should use the surname of the mother even if the father
acknowledges him/her. Hence, Ann Brigit has NO right to use the surname of the
father. Ubi jus, ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a remedy .
Conversely, if there is no right, there is no remedy as every remedial right is based
on a substantive right.

#27 BPI V. CA; G.R. No. 127624 November 18, 2003

For the calendar year 1986, BPI Leasing Corporation, Inc. (BLC) paid the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) a total of P1,139,041.49 representing 4%
"contractors percentage tax" then imposed by Section 205 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), based on its gross rentals from equipment leasing for the said
year amounting to P27,783,725.42.

On November 10, 1986, the CIR issued RR 19-86. Section 6.2 thereof provided that
finance and leasing companies registered under Republic Act 5980 shall be subject
to gross receipt tax of 5%-3%-1% on actual income earned. This means that
companies registered under Republic Act 5980, such as BLC, are not liable for
"contractors percentage tax" under Section 205 but are, instead, subject to "gross
receipts tax" under Section 260 (now Section 122) of the NIRC. Since BLC had
earlier paid the aforementioned "contractors percentage tax," it re-computed its
tax liabilities under the "gross receipts tax" and arrived at the amount of
P361,924.44. BLC filed a claim for a refund with the CIR for the amount of
P777,117.05, representing the difference between the P1,139,041.49 it had paid as
"contractors percentage tax" and P361,924.44 it should have paid for "gross
receipts tax."

The CTA dismissed the petition and denied BLCs claim of refund and held that RR
19-86, may only be applied prospectively such that it only covers all leases written
on or after January 1, 1987. The CTA ruled that, since BLCs rental income was all
received prior to 1986, it follows that this was derived from lease transactions prior
to January 1, 1987, and hence, not covered by the RR.

A motion for reconsideration of the CTAs decision was filed, but was denied. BLC
then appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. BLC submits that the Court of
Appeals and the CTA erred in not ruling that RR 19-86 may be applied retroactively
so as to allow BLCs claim for a refund of P777,117.05.

Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the provision on the date of
effectivity of RR 19-86 is clear and unequivocal, leaving no room for interpretation
on its prospective application.


WON RR 19-86 is legislative or interpretative in nature.

WON RR 19-86 is prospective or retroactive in nature.

WON BPI failed to meet the quantum of evidence required in refund cases.


1ST ISSUE BLC attempts to convince the Court that RR 19-86 is legislative
rather than interpretative in character and hence, should retroact to the date
of effectivity of the law it seeks to interpret. A legislative rule is in the matter
of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the other hand, is
designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is
in charge of enforcing. The Court finds the questioned RR to be legislative in
nature. Section 1 of RR 19-86 plainly states that it was promulgated pursuant
to Section 277 of the NIRC (now Section 244), an express grant of authority to
the Secretary of Finance to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for
the effective enforcement of the provisions of the NIRC. Verily, it cannot be
disputed that RR 19-86 was issued pursuant to the rule-making power of the
Secretary of Finance, thus making it legislative, and not interpretative as
alleged by BLC.

BLC further posits that, it is invalid for want of due process as no prior notice,
publication and public hearing attended the issuance thereof. To support its
view, BLC cited CIR v. Fortune Tobacco, et al., wherein the Court nullified a
revenue memorandum circular which reclassified certain cigarettes and
subjected them to a higher tax rate, holding it invalid for lack of notice,
publication and public hearing. In this case, RR 19-86 would be beneficial to
the taxpayers as they are subjected to lesser taxes. Petitioner, in fact, is
invoking RR 19-86 as the very basis of its claim for refund. If it were invalid,
then petitioner all the more has no right to a refund.

2ND ISSUE The Court now resolves whether its application should be
prospective or retroactive. Statutes, including administrative rules and
regulations, operate prospectively only, unless the legislative intent to the
contrary is manifest by express terms or by necessary implication. In the
present case, there is no indication that the RR may operate retroactively.
Furthermore, there is an express provision stating that it "shall take effect on
January 1, 1987," and that it "shall be applicable to all leases written on or
after the said date." Thus, BLC is not in a position to invoke the provisions of
RR 19-86 for lease rentals it received prior to January 1, 1987.

3RD ISSUE Tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions. As such, these
are to be strictly construed against the person or entity claiming the
exemption. The burden of proof is upon him who claims the exemption and
he must be able to justify his claim by the clearest grant under Constitutional
or statutory law, and he cannot be permitted to rely upon vague
implications. Nothing that BLC has raised justifies a tax refund.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, and the assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.


PRINCIPLES INVOLVED: Legislative or Interpretive nature of Statute

Prospective or Retroactive effect of Ordinances