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Reluctant Justice: Government Legal
Interventionon Behalf of Jews in Imperial
Germany
Barnet Hartston
Eckerd College
Abstract:In 1900, Prussiangovernmentofficialssent special police commissarsto
intervene in a sensational ritualmurderinvestigationin the West Prussiantown
of Konitz.Despiteoccasionaldisplaysof incompetence,these specialinvestigators
generally held themselves aloof from popularanti-Semiticpressureand worked
diligentlyto secure an acquittalfor the Jewishdefendant. But was this interven-
tion by outside investigatorsan isolated case in ImperialGermany?Did it repre-
sent a trend of "responsible"government behavior in dealing with anti-Semitic
incidents? This article will attempt to answer these questions by examining
government actions in four additional anti-Semiticcauses c6elbres in the early
Kaiserreich.
Helmut Walser Smith's recent book, The Butcher's Tale: Murder and Anti-
Semitismin a GermanTown,is a chilling accountof ritualmurderaccusationsin
the small West Prussian town of Konitz at the turn of the twentieth century.1
Through detailed research into investigative records and court proceedings,
Smith describeshow a complex web of interpersonalconflicts, a familiaritywith
old anti-Semitic stories and stereotypes, and the influence of outside agitators
could turna simple murdermysteryinto sensationalallegationsof ritualslaugh-
ter against a local Jewish butcher.These accusationsmotivatedordinarytowns-
people in Konitz to isolate and exclude Jews from daily village life, and also
threatenedto engulf the regions of West Prussia and Pomeraniain anti-Semitic
violence. Clearly, as Smith suggests in his epilogue, the Konitz Affair not only
sheds light on the nature and extent of popular anti-Semitism in Imperial
Germany,but also hints at the readiness with which many Germansand Poles
would turnon their Jewish neighborsagain more than 40 years later.
TheButcher'sTale,however, is not simply a story aboutthose who invented,
corroborated,and believed in the allegationsagainst Jewish defendants.At least
indirectly,it is also the story of those who resisted or rejectedsuch accusations.
Admittedly,the numberof those from Konitz who were willing to standpublicly
againstthe tide of anti-Semitismwas small.2This is perhapsunderstandablecon-
sideringthe almost constantthreatof violence in the region thattargetedboth the
Jews and anyone who daredside with them. There were, however, a small num-
ber of conspicuousoutsiderswho did tend to resist the flood of prejudiceagainst
local Jews-these were the special detectives and prosecutors sent by Berlin
authoritiesto take charge of the local investigation. In Smith's account, these
84 German Studies Review 27/1 (2004)
Arson in Neustettin
On February 18, 1881, the synagogue in the small Pomeranianvillage of
Neustettinburnedto the ground.10 At first, many Germansdismissedthe burning
of the synagogue as an isolated incident. But, during the following summer,a
wave of anti-Jewishviolence began in Neustettin and spread throughoutthe
PomeranianandWest Prussiancountryside.Althoughthis violence was less seri-
ous than that of the concurrentRussianpogroms,the suddennessand ferocity of
the riotsneverthelessshockedmost Germanobservers.Duringthe firstfew weeks
of the violence, most governmentofficials tendedto sharethe opinionof the con-
servativeand anti-Semiticpress andattributethe unrestto a patternof Jewisheco-
nomic exploitation.But as the violence continued,the attitudeof governmentoffi-
cials began to change.The Berlin Police-President,Guido von Madai,for exam-
ple, was at first quite sympathetictowardthe riotersand held the Jews directly
responsiblefor provokingthe violence. After riotingcontinuedto spreadthrough
the Pomeraniancountryside,however,Madaibegan to criticize anti-Semiticagi-
tatorsfor whippingup anti-Jewishsentiment.11 As a result,the governmentsoon
promised to take a hard line againstany anti-Semitic agitatorwhose rhetoricpro-
voked or encouragedviolent action.12
In the months after the outbreakof violence, both local groups and national
politicians engaged in a public battle to assign blame for the riots. Liberaland
Jewish newspaperstendedto blame the fire (andthe rashof violence) on an anti-
Semitic agitatornamedErnstHenrici,who had given a speech in Neustettinonly
five days before the fire. Anti-Semiticnewspapers,however, suggested that the
fire had been set by the Jews themselvesin orderto gain insurancemoney and to
discreditHenrici.This latterconclusionwas strengthenedby a streamof local wit-
nesses who came forwardwith eyewitness testimonythat targetedseveral local
Jews as the culprits.It is unclearif the local investigatorsactedbecause of popu-
larpressureor out of theirown convictions,but eventuallythey arrestedfive local
Jewishmen as suspects.The accusedwere 76-year-oldHirschHeidemannandhis
adultson Gustav,41-year-oldHirschLesheimandhis teenageson Leo, anda local
Jewish merchantnamed Adolf L6wenberg.Because of the seriousness of the
Barnet Hartston 87
verdict, however, were short-lived.Just a few months later, the verdict in the
Neustettincase was overturnedbecause of a proceduralerror,and the case was
sent for retrialto anotherSchwurgerichtin the West Prussiantown of Konitz.15
This retrialbegan in Februaryof 1884.
If public attentionhad been greatfor the first trial,for the second it was over-
whelming.All public and privatelodging in Konitz was full, and two directtele-
graphlines were laid all the way to Berlin to aid Germanand internationaljour-
nalists in relayingthe latest trialdetails.While the first trialhad includeddozens
of witnesses from Neustettin,the second broughtover 150 witnesses along with
theirfamily and friends.'6But this time, a new participantin the case would dra-
maticallyalterthe proceedings.After renewedrequestsby the local Jewish com-
munity,the InteriorMinister,Robertvon Puttkamer,finally decided to send an
investigatornamedCriminalCommissarHoft to look into the case. This conces-
sion by Puttkamerwas undoubtedlymotivatedby more than a simple desire to
redressan injusticedone to Jews or by a generalabhorrenceof anti-Semitism;his
decision was almostcertainlya responseto the fearthata new Neustettintrial,left
to local authorities,might serve to incite renewedunrestin the region.As in the
case of the original Pomeranianand West Prussianviolence, it was not anti-
Semitism per se that finally provokedgovernmentreaction,but the threatto the
civil order posed by radical agitation. It must be added, however, that once
involved in the Neustettincase, the CriminalCommissar'sactionshelpedto serve
the cause of justice as much as they served to reinforceorder;that is, much like
the governmentinvestigatorsin the later Konitz case, CriminalCommissarHoft
would work diligently against significantpopularpressureto ascertainthe true
course of events.
In the weeks before the startof the second trial, CriminalCommissarHoft
re-interviewed hundreds of witnesses. Through his comments and actions,
Neustettin residents quickly came to realize that Hoft believed the charges
against the Jewish defendantshad no basis in fact. CommissarH6ft, however,
was not the only outside figure to influence the investigation.A shadowy figure
named Landratvon Bonin, a local official with anti-Semiticleanings, had also
been active in "uncovering"new witnesses in the monthsafterthe first trial.Not
surprisingly,Bonin's witnesses always testified for the prosecutionand against
the Jews. Both CriminalCommissarHoft and Landratvon Bonin would be pres-
ent in the courtroomthroughoutthe entire second trial.
In additionto Bonin's new witnesses, many of the old ones appearedin the
secondtrialwith revisedversionsof theirtestimony.Forexample,the witnesswho
earliertestifiedto seeing one Jewishdefendantwith a petrolcan now also testified
that he found fuses inside anotherdefendant'shouse. But this time his testimony
was attackednot only by the defense attorneys,but also by CriminalCommissar
Hoft, who arguedthat this new more detailedversion of the story emergedonly
after serious doubts were raised abouthis credibility.For each witness who was
discreditedby H6ft and the defense attorneys,however, several more came for-
Barnet Hartston 89
ward claiming to have direct eyewitness accounts. Most of these witnesses had
been "discovered"and encouragedto testify by Landratvon Bonin. For instance,
16-year-oldEmilie Ratznercame forwardfor the first time to claim that she had
seen the defendantGustavHeidemannsqueezing througha gap in the fence and
Leo Lesheim runningout of the burningtemple with a petrol can in his hand.
Another new witness named Girtner testified that he heard the wives of two
defendantssay on a local trainthat their husbandswere just pawns, and that the
real mastermindof the scheme was Rabbi Lowe, the leader of the local Jewish
community.All of these new witnesses were vigorously attackedby Criminal
CommissarHoft, who confrontedthem with theirconflictingstatementsor ulteri-
or motives. In Girtner'scase, Hoft checkedthe ticketrecordsand provedthatnei-
ther he nor the defendants'wives had been on that train.Gartnerwas forced to
admitthat he was "in error"about the conversation.Thus, despite the additional
eyewitness testimonyfor the prosecution,thanksto CriminalCommissarH6ft, the
trial seemed to be heading in a directionfavorableto the defendants.17 After the
prosecutor delivered a lackluster closing argumentthat admitted the flaws in his
case, the jury retiredto considerthe verdict.This time, afteronly 45 minutes,the
defendantswere acquittedon all charges.
As one mightexpect, the second verdictprovokeda very differentpublic reac-
tion than the first. Rioting and looting of Jewish businesses were reportedin
Neustettin,and anti-Semiticagitatorsrespondedwith outrageto the fact that the
Jews had been able to corruptthe Germanlegal system. Anti-Semitic,ultracon-
servative,and severalCatholicnewspapersalso expressedtheirshock and dismay
at what appearedto be not only a miscarriageof justice, but also a demonstration
of the unreliabilityof the justice system.18
Liberal newspapers,however, were equally critical, and blamed the Interior
Ministerfor once again not takingsufficientprecautionsto preventpost-trialvio-
lence.19On March 14, 1884, a liberalLandtagdeputynamedZelle made an inter-
pellationto challenge the InteriorMinisteron the issue. Ministervon Puttkamer,
the same man who had originally sent CriminalCommissarHoft to Neustettin,
respondedto Zelle's challengeby suggestingthatlocal Jews may have themselves
startedthe unrestby throwingstones into a crowd. Puttkamerclaimed to want to
withholdjudgementon the believabilityof these local reports,but he went on to
suggest that whetherthe anti-Jewishviolence was provokedor not, liberaljour-
nalists and politicianswere clearly exaggeratingthe disorderfor theirown propa-
gandapurposes.20
Skurcz
Even before the Neustettintrials had come to an end, a new anti-Semiticcause
celebre began to emerge in the small town of Skurcznear Danzig.21On January
22, 1884, the dismemberedbody of the young boy, OnophiriusCybulla, was
found in a marshoutside of Skurcz.An autopsyperformedby local doctorsfixed
the cause of deathas loss of blood, reportingseven long wounds on the neck and
90 German Studies Review 27/1 (2004)
But this time, Hoft himself was also a target.Two formerassociates of the main
witness, Mankowski,testifiedthatit was CriminalCommissarHoft, not Behrendt,
who hadbeen guilty of bribingwitnessesto changetheirtestimony.AlthoughHoft
ferventlydenied the accusations,Behrendt'sdefense lawyers used this testimony
to suggest the presenceof a powerfulconspiracybehind Mankowski'schange of
heart. The weight of the general witness testimony, the lack of credibility of
Mankowski,and the public hostility towardCommissarHoft all made a convic-
tion very unlikely.At the end of a brief trial,the jury deliberatedfor less thanhalf
an hourbefore acquittingBehrendtof all charges.
The acquittalof the ChristianbutcherBehrendtmarkedthe practicalend of
Commissar Hoft's involvement in the Skurcz case. Prosecutorsnever reintro-
duced charges against the two Jewish former defendants,a fact that provoked
angry criticism in the anti-Semiticpress. Otto Glagau's Der Kultur-kampfer,for
example, devoted a long article to the Skurcz case that demandedthat the gov-
ernmentcontinue its investigations:
The bestial murderat Skurzcries out to heaven, and it must be redressed.
Otherwise it will result in a deep shock to public perceptionsof the jus-
tice system.... The murderat Skurzshould also be a warningto the gov-
ernmentthatit must employ native Germanscholarsto thoroughlyexam-
ine rabbinicaltexts in orderto gauge if these teachings pose a dangerto
the general public.24
The Christlich-SozialesCorrespondenzblattechoed Glagau's concerns and also
expressed its incredulitythat governmentofficials still refused to consider any
Jews as suspects in the murder.After voicing its frustrationwith the behavior
of the investigators, the prosecutors, and the judge in the Skurcz trial, the
Correspondenzblatt concludedin exasperation:"Beyond a fallible earthlyjustice
thereis still an infallibleeternaljustice; thatis our consolation."2
Breslau
The actionsof CommissarHoft in the Skurczcase do not necessarilysuggest that
all governmentofficials were equally skepticalaboutritualmurderaccusations.In
fact, another blood ritual case in Breslau in 1888 motivated the new Kaiser,
WilhelmII, to follow the wishes of men like Otto Glagauand orderhis ministers
to collect scholarlytestimonyon the natureof Jewish religiousteachings.
In July of 1888, the rabbinicalcandidate Max Bernstein allegedly lured a
Catholicboy namedSeverinHacke to his apartmentwith the promiseof cherries,
andpersuadedhim to remove his clothes. Bernsteinthen gave him a slight wound
on the genitals,andcollected a little blood on a blotter.The boy at firsttold no one
about the incident, but he later told his father, who reportedit immediatelyto
police. Bernsteinadmittedsome kind of involvementwith the boy, but his testi-
mony to the investigatorswas confused and contradictory.Nonetheless,the pros-
ecutorbelieved therewas enough evidence to chargeBernstein,and he was even-
tuallybroughtto trialin February1889. The courtfoundthattherewas compelling
92 German Studies Review 27/1 (2004)
Xanten
The furorsurroundingthe blood ritualaccusationsat Skurczand Breslaupaled in
comparisonto the infamousXantenAffair of 1891-1892. Xantenin Westfalen,a
small town on the Rhine River near the Dutch border,was in a region that had
experienced sporadic anti-Jewishviolence throughoutthe nineteenth century.35
94 German Studies Review 27/1 (2004)
Conclusions
A long record of historicalscholarshiphas left no doubt that anti-Semitismwas
prevalentthroughoutthe highest levels of the ImperialGermangovernment.In
additionto Otto von Bismarck'sown record of anti-Semiticstatements,several
different InteriorMinisters, Justice Ministers, and police officials also openly
expressed sympathy for anti-Jewishsentiment.This was especially true of the
InteriorMinister,Robertvon Puttkamer,whom Fritz Ster has characterizedas
"less fastidiousin discriminatingamong [conservativeand liberal]Jews; he liked
no varietyof them and found license for his prejudicein Treitschke'sjudgment."52
The motives of otherhigh officials involved in these four cases were also less
than pure. Kaiser Wilhelm II's desire to commission outside expert testimony
aboutthe Breslaucase might be interpretedas an impartialinquiryinto scholarly
opinionsaboutJewishteachings.But this would be a distortion.His inquirieswere
98 German Studies Review 27/1 (2004)
MacDonough, The Last Kaiser: The Life of Wilhelm II. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000);
and John C.G. Rohl, Kaiser and His Court: WilhelmII and the Government of Germany, trans.
TerenceF. Cole (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress,1994).
29 See
WernerMosse, "WilhelmII andthe Kaiserjuden:
a Problematical in Jehuda
Encounter,"
Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg, eds., The Jewish Response to German Culture: From the
Enlightenment to the Second WorldWar.(Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985).
30Levy, 136.
31 LetterSchellingto Gossler,8 March1889.GStAPK, I. HA Rep. 84a Nr.56464:25.
32 On Lagarde see Fritz Ster, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress,1961).
33Unfortunately, the originaltestimonyof the threeexpertwitnessesis not presentin the case
file, only the reflectionsof Gossler.See GStAPK, I. Rep. 84a Nr.56464.
34LetterGosslerto Schelling,Berlin,4 May 1889.GStAPK, I.
Rep. 84a Nr.56464:70.
35StephanRohrbacher
andMichaelSchmidtdiscusscases of ritualmurderaccusationsin 1808,
1819, 1834, 1835, 1840, 1862, all of whichoccurredwithina 40 kilometerradiusnorthwestof
Cologne.Rohrbacherand Schmidtuse this patternto arguethatit was not social or economic
tensionsthatservedas the primarymotivefor suchaccusations,buta regionaltraditionof ritu-
al murder stereotypes. See Stephan Rohrbacherand Michael Schmidt, Judenbilder:
Kulturgeschichte antijiidischer Mythen und antisemitischer Vorurteile (Reinbek bei Hamburg:
RowohltTaschenbuch Verlag,1991).
36
LetterErsterStaatsanwalt Baumgardto Justizminister
Dr.von Schelling,Cleve, 7 July 1891.
GStAPK, I. HA Rep. 84a Justizministerium, Nr.57459:3.
37 LetterErsterStaatsanwalt Baumgardto Justizminister
Dr.von Schelling,Cleve, 16 July 1891.
GStAPK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, Nr.57459: 10.
38 LetterErsterStaatsanwalt
Baumgardto JustizministerDr. von Schelling,Cleve, 7 October
1891.GStAPK, I. HA Rep.84a Justizministerium, Nr.57459: 33.
39Rohrbacher et al., 337.
40Ibid.
41 Der Fall Buschhoff. Die Untersuchung iber den Xantener Knabenmord. Von einem
Eingeweihten (Berlin: Verlag der Vaterlandischen Verlags-Anstalt, 1892). The
made an even more directcomparisonwith Skurcz.It alleged that the
Staatsbiirgerzeitung
Jewish Communityof Xantenpaid 700 Marksto get CommissarHoft, the investigatorwho
"helpedto dismiss"thechargesin NeustettinandSkurcz,sentfromBerlin.Unfortunately
forthe
Jews,thepaperclaimed,theygot CommissarWolffinstead.See Staatsbiirgerzeitung,
20 January
1892,Abend.
42
Staatsbiirgerzeitung, 10 January 1892, Morgen.
debateson ritualmurderaccusationswere also commonin Austria-Hungary,
43 Parliamentary
especiallyin 1883 (Tisza-Eszlar),1890,and 1899 (Polna).See AlbertLichtblau,"DieDebatten
iiberdie Ritualmordbeschuldigungen im 6sterreichischen
Abgeordnetenhaus am Ende des 19.
Jahrhunderts,"in Die Legende vom Ritualmord: Zur Geschichte der Blutbeschuldigung gegen
Juden,ed. RainerErb(Berlin:Metropol-Verlag, 1993),267-92.
44
Transcriptprintedin JiidischePresse, 11 February1892.
5 Schellingvigorouslydefendedthe independence andobjectivityof thejudiciaryandthe legal
process:"Thereis thereforeno reasonfor anykindof anxietyin thepublicperceptionof law and
102 German Studies Review 27/1 (2004)
on "Jewishpressandjusticeprivilege,"Germania,14 August1892,ErstesBlatt,ff.
50One of thesepost-XantenslandertrialsturnedHeinrichOberwinder, editorof the St6ckerite
paper,Das Volk,intoa celebrity.Todefendhimselfagainstchargesof slander,Oberwinder called
witnessesfromthe Xantentrialin the hopeof showingthatthe chargeof ritualmurderagainst
BuschhoffwastrueandtheXantenprosecutors hadhandledthecaseincompetently. Oberwinder
was convictedandsentencedto two monthsin jail. Soon after,Das Volkadvertisedpamphlets
thatlionizedOberwinder. Das Volk,21 December1892.
51Letterfrom
Baumgardto Schelling,Cleve, 29 November1893. GStAPK, I. HA Rep. 84a
Justizministerium, Nr.57461:76.
52 FritzSter, GoldandIron,516-17.
53 HelmutWalserSmithrejectsthe notionthatin thesecasesthePrussianarmypreventedwhat
wouldinevitablyhave been a large-scalemassacre:"Theriots[in Konitz]wereno doubtterri-
As enmitydeepenedandtempers
fying,butthey did not descendinto a tempestof destruction.
flared,insteadof wantoncarnage,a familiarroutineof ominousthreatsandsymbolicgestures
mediatedthe voices of hatred...for the Germansof Konitzit sufficedto rituallyenact vio-
lence..." Smith,166. This may be correct.But therewas no way for local Jewsor police offi-
cials to knowthatthe violencewouldnot continueto escalate.
54 Ismar Schorsch, Jewish Reactions to German Anti-Semitism, 1870-1914 (New York:
Columbia Univ. Press, 1972); Marjorie Lamberti, Jewish Activism in Imperial Germany: The
Strugglefor CivilEquality(New Haven:YaleUniversityPress,1978);SanfordRagins,Jewish
Response to Anti-Semitism in Germany (1870-1914) (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press,
1980).