Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
Scott C. Abel
Malaysia in the late 20th century remained remarkably stable for a state with great
ethnic diversity in contrast to many of its neighbors in Southeast Asia. The strength of
the region was considerable. Yet, the creation of an independent Malaya in 1957 came
about during a period of political instability that required the central government to focus
on military and security expenditures rather than economic development. The prolonged
national development, despite the potentially crippling years of violence and destruction.
What was the impact of colonial security policy in relation to the central governments
ability to obtain such strength? The Malayan Emergency provided scholars and
Malaysia. The strength of the response to the insurgency during the Emergency by the
Commonwealth and the Malayan governments security forces, policymakers, and civil
service provided for a significant factor in the strength of the Federal government in
World War II devastated Malaya, like much of Southeast Asia in the years after
1945, with much of society and the political system in disarray. During the fall of
Malaya to Japan, British forces destruction much of the tin industrys equipment in
combination with insufficient demand from Japans domestic market for both the tin and
1
rubber industries devastated production levels. The war left many former workers
unemployed and living on lands without the title or squatters. The Japanese occupiers
of Malaya exploited ethnic tensions in favor of the ethnic Malays over the Chinese and
other communities. Malays received higher positions in the civil service, like those
formerly held by British administrators such as the district officer and received
administrative training and rights to form associations. The Malay education system also
continued.1 The government in Malaya during the Japanese occupation heavily favored
the Malay population, fomenting ethnic tensions while attempting to restructure the entire
During the war, the British military helped organizations like the Malayan
Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) fight the Imperial Japanese Army despite its
domination by the largely Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP). The Anti-Japanese
Union supported the MPAJA as its civilian wing and later evolved into Min Yuen, an
important faction during the Emergency. The resistance of the Chinese community
unified it in spite of its multiple linguistic dialects and further divided the populace,
particularly against the Malay-dominated police. The MPAJA gained valuable military
experience during their guerrilla warfare against Japanese and established a relationship
with the native Orang Asli in the jungle.2 After the war, the MPAJA disbanded and
returned most of the weapons supplied by British forces, but guerrillas retained roughly
20% of those weapons, along with weapons seized from the Japanese during the war.
1
Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Andaya, A History of Malaysia, (Honolulu, University of Hawaii
Press, 2001), 258-259.
2
Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 260-262.
2
The MCP largely recovered from the losses during the war in regard to labor
movements.3 Malaya after World War II was similar to many other territories throughout
the world in that years of brutal occupation and warfare left populations divided and the
the Malayan Communist Party and its reputation among the Chinese community placed
itself for a strong position after the war in the exploitation of the weak economy and
government in Malaya.
The alliance between the British government and the Malayan communists lasted
only a short while as once their mutual opponent, the Empire of Japan dissolved and
therefore lacked sufficient reason for cooperation. Despite the momentum of the spread
of communism in the post-war era, the Malayan Communist Party had an uphill battle for
interested the ideology. The British colonial authority retained the loyalty of the Muslim-
Malay majority as they were sufficiently content with the colonial government and
suspicious of communism. Social divisions along ethnic lines in Malaya prevented the
MCP from expanding out of the Chinese minority and into the Indian and Malay
government more difficult and therefore the presence of a colonial government seemed
more palatable for most Malayans at the time, particularly with the devastation and
mutual suspicion after the war, than a risky attempt at a united and independent
government.
3
John Coates, Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954, (San
Francisco: Westview Press, 1992), 13.
4
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 8.
3
The aftermath of Japanese occupation left a severely weakened British colonial
The power of the government, particularly in rural areas threatened the strength and
stability of British power in the colony. Often a maximum of seven policemen guarded
insurmountable challenges and force them out of office. Furthermore, survivors of the
disaster during the war often mixed poorly with newcomers unfamiliar with Malaya and
their terrible experiences during the war. By the beginning of the Emergency, there were
too few policemen with inadequate supplies of arms, uniforms, vehicles, and equipment.5
The lack of law enforcement made the option of creating an insurgency by the MCP more
viable as the states power was extraordinarily weak with the colonial government busy
The Malayan police faced serious image problems with the general population
and a general level of ineffectiveness before the Emergency, which impeded their ability
to perform their duties effectively. The Malayan police force in 1947 had 130 European
gazetted officers, while the other ethnicities possessed less representation with nineteen
Malays, three Indians, and two Chinese. Malays, however, represented a majority of the
rank-and-file policemen with 7,999 in comparison to only 402 Chinese policemen. The
police represented the Indian community fairly well particularly in regard to police
inspectors with forty-one compared to 115 Malays and only twenty-four Chinese
inspectors.6 The police proved overall ineffective in the postwar years with an inability to
5
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 30-31.
6
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 43.
4
prevent or solve brutal crimes made more common by easily available firearms.
reputation.7 The Malayan polices obstacles such as poor representation of the Chinese
community within its ranks in comparison to other ethnicities and its overall
The MCP integrated itself closely within the Chinese community throughout
MCP as they composed roughly 95% of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA),
while Malays, composed only around 5% by February 1949. The Malay unit, Pahang
10th Regiment, was mainly for propaganda purposes and disappeared within a year.8 The
MCPs Masses Executives expropriated funds from the Chinese community with
particular attention toward landowners and small businessmen. The political structure
proved resilient because the complete destruction of a MCP district required the
simultaneous elimination of all its branches. The party found support within the
disaffected squatter population, while the global advances of their ideological allies
boosted morale. Insurgent operations had fewer than 300 troops and directed quarter of
their assaults on economic assets like tin mines and rubber plantations between 1948 and
1951.9 The MCP simultaneously integrated itself within the economic structure to a
degree by extracting resources from the business community while waging economic
warfare on the government. The connection between the MCP and businesses required
7
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 28.
8
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 49.
9
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 58-62.
5
the government to split the MCP from its funding source and its recruitment from
squatters.
The strength of Malayas government resided in what gave the colony such
prosperity in previous years, the strong export sector that funded the government. Tin
mining supported the strength of Malaya, particularly toward Chinese and European
firms as an overall important part of its economy. Rubber was the main export of Malaya
since 1916, at the time of the Emergency, and remained so until 1980 with its plantations
particularly concentrated along the west coast. Rubber trees offered even small
landholders an income from trees productive lives of around thirty years throughout
much of Malaya. The product, like the country, thrived with the automobile industry.
During the Emergency, the Korean War buoyed the price of rubber and tin, which
strengthened the rubber producers and weakened the strength of the MCP.10 The conflict
was particularly useful to the Malayan governments budget because the rubber crop had
bad years during 1951 and 1952.11 By the time of the Emergency in 1948, Malaya was
the largest producer of rubber with the United States importing 371,000 tons of rubber
and 155,000 tons of tin, which earned Great Britain $US 170 million in times of budget
woes.12 The global importance of the industries permitted the relative economic stability
of Malaya and the strength of its government. Revenue from these strong industries
offered to support the Malayan colonial and British governments as important factors in
the preservation of the state and political incentive for the defense of Malaya.
Malaya, within and outside the government, in Malaya in the pre-war era no longer
10
Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 214, 215, 218, 219, 273.
11
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 93.
12
Leone Comber, Malayas Secret Police 1945-1960, (Victoria: Monash University Press, 2008), 14.
6
became viable if the populations support was to remain acceptable. During the initial
stages of the Emergency, overall government procedure lacked formality and a highly
centralized structure. Its structure was conducive to departmental infighting, which led to
complacency in the fight against the MCP. The Europeans needed a changing of culture
racism threatened the support of mainly Asian intellectuals and perhaps other members of
the Asian elite as European clubs banned their entrance. The government recommended
such clubs either eliminate or at least loosen restrictions by allowing Asians into clubs at
Europeans represented aspects of elite culture with Malaya requiring reform as either
aspect damaged the overall effectiveness and reputation of the government and the
important concept in Malaya because of its diverse population and proportionately high
The civil service in Malaya also required revitalization in the postwar period
because of its complicity in the occupation, the general mistrust of it, and the overall
administration of the government was out-of-touch with the general population. The
machinery of the state spun ineffectively as the MCP prepared for its uprising against the
for the Emergencys containment and the protection of vital economic assets like the tin
mines and rubber plantations in large part because of the efforts of Commissioner-
7
protected the economic assets to a sufficient extent, while the Frontier Force and Royal
Navy patrolled for the interception of incoming supplies for the insurgents. During the
Regulations finished in 1953 permitted a states Mentri Besar the power to seize
from a relatively weak institution to a gradually stronger one that more heavily involved
instability throughout the peninsula and the overall strength of the state. High
Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney, in part to reassure the planters and maintain the new
Malayan Federation formed the Director of Operations, a civilian post, as the commander
in of charge of the armed forces in Malaya. Under the recommendation of Field Marshal
Slim, Gurney selected retired Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Rawdon Briggs, a veteran of
conflicts throughout Asia with extensive experience in Burma, who arrived in Malaya in
April 1950. Briggs formulated a plan for removing the insurgency by the creation of an
effective government that removed the reasons for people supporting the MCP and the
Min Yuen. Briggs recognized that the MCP and Min Yuens extortion and violence
required an overarching plan for the development of the federal and state governments
that convinced or even allowed peoples resistance of the insurgents.15 The Briggs Plan
offered solutions for the suppression of the insurgency with greater capability for
14
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 35-36.
15
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 80-82.
8
implementation by a centralized command. However, the results of Briggs policies
extended far beyond the Emergency period as an overall mechanism for state power,
Briggs, the civil service, and the security forces strengthen the power of the
ultimately weakened the communist insurgents. Briggs plan relocated roughly 500,000
inhabitants near the edge of the jungle to settlements called New Villages, which
removed Min Yuens support from their grasp. The construction resettlement villages in
June 1950 placed people under civil administration and the watchful eyes of policemen.16
The Chinese squatters, who Briggs wanted under government control, lived by their rules
with their own justice system, which meant the government needed the restructuring of
local governance. Even if the government forcibly removed populations, little prevented
them from moving back at first. Furthermore, the government realized a majority of the
displaced were women, children, and the elderly.17 Strengthening the government
semi-fortified villages, which deprived the MCP and Min Yuen of their support structure.
The relocation of squatters integrated them into the states power structure,
strengthened the government in the long-term through tracking, and allowed the
governments control of its citizens. The new communities under construction by the
government required the necessary personnel and infrastructure designed for the winning
over the Chinese population to the state and away from the insurgents. The villages
required adequate protection from MCP assault with guards and fortifications, along with
16
Karl Hack, Iron Claws on Malaya: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency, 30 No. 1 (1999),
102.
17
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 86-88.
9
radio communications to report back to central command and possibly request
administration and reception that also gathered information from its inhabitants. The
villages also employed propaganda through cinema and local schools to win over the
population. The administrators rewarded good behavior through the granting of land
titles and punished unacceptable behavior through the cessation of trade. The
government balanced the needs of Chinese and Malay villages to avoid the appearance of
unfairness, while allowing a sustainable existence by placing the settlements near arable
lands.18 By late 1951, the government relocated 350,000 inhabitants to the New Villages,
government regrouped employees of tin mines and plantations who eventually reached
600,000 in number. The MCP admitted the supply troubles caused by the removal of
their economic support such as relocation of the squatters within its own directives by
October 1951, which forced their change of tactics within a year.19 The development of
New Villages isolated the Chinese population from the insurgents in the jungle
and deprived the insurgency of its essential support. Often the resettlement villages,
particularly in the earlier years of the Emergency, operated similar to the imprisonment of
government provided rather poor treatment with communities too far from fields or
lacking sufficient farming land. Conditions were rather poor as in at least one instance
18
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 88-89.
19
Hack, Iron Claws on Malaya, 103, 106.
10
where the villagers had no easy access to clean water. The New Villages offered
unsanitary conditions for some as late as 1954. The government even imposed a twenty-
two hour curfew on the village of Tanjong Malim for the villagers unwillingness or
inability in providing information on local ambushes.20 The area around Tanjong Malim
had an exceptionally violent record with five successful ambushes and fifteen murders,
along with the burning of eight buses and trucks. Insurgents sabotaged of water pipes
and 6,000 rubber trees. The situation there became particularly bloody on March 25,
1952 when insurgents killed the district officer and eleven other men. The government
punished the town collectively with rice ration reductions, school closures, and the
removal of its status as district capital.21 The villagers best option for departing from the
New Villages was voluntary emigration to the Peoples Republic of China, which many
Chinese-Malayans chose as a means to escape.22 Squatters had few options as they chose
between living in confining conditions the early days of the camps or the option of sailing
for China to start a completely new life there. Either way, the government consolidated
Malaya. The government built 500 resettlement villages between 1950 and 1960, losing
only six during the Emergency. Procedurally, the army surrounded squatter villages and
rounded up the population, taking the people and all their moveable possessions to a new
settlement. Army forces destroyed anything left behind and compensated the squatters
for the items destroyed. Aside from the emotional trauma of being forcibly moved, the
20
Hack, Iron Claws on Malaya, 115, 116, 117.
21
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 128.
22
Hack, Iron Claws on Malaya, 117.
11
regrouping of communities angered mining and plantation interests, but ultimately the
with only forty Malay villages relocated closer to roads and police stations, but the
Malays returned to their old sites later whereas the Chinese urban population exploded
with increased between 163% and 400% from 1947 to 1957.23 Ultimately, the relocation
of the Chinese population into urban environments accelerated their economic status with
society, while remaining under a degree of state control brought on by the British reaction
to the insurgency.
and their apparatus for removal while rewarding inhabitants loyal to the state. Basically,
the states policies were tantamount to the selection of Malayas citizenry. Some
Chinese-Malayans and Malays formed Home Guard units in coordination with the state
that armed them with batons. Once a Home Guard unit proved its loyalty to the
government, the district officer provided shotguns as he deemed appropriate. The units
acted under the supervision of the local police. Furthermore, the government repatriated
individuals suspected of supporting the MCP to the land of their birth, which usually
supporting the communists.25 Through policies of organizing Home Guard units, the
security forces brought communities closer to the government by giving them a place
within and supplementing the overall security apparatus. The deportation of suspected
insurgent supporters permitted the removal of threats to society without the burdensome
23
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 89-93.
24
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 95-97.
25
Hack, Iron Claws on Malaya,123.
12
The British government eventually realized the seriousness of the insurgency in
Malaya and decided that the weakness of the colonial government in the maintenance of
order required greater attention. The ambush and killing of High Commissioner Sir
Henry Gurney on October 6, 1951 north of Kuala Lumpur by MRLA forces on Fraser
Hill Road sent a shockwave throughout the empire. Briggs resigned because of ill health
and died shortly thereafter in October 1952. Royal Federation Police Commissioner
Colonel W. Gray also resigned. Gray was instrumental in the expansion of the police
force with more people and equipment, including a new radio communication system, but
caused too much displeasure with influential people in Malaya. General Sir Gerald
February 5, 1952. Aside from his fighting on the battlefield, Templer possessed
received more power as the civilian and military executive than any other British
Britains commitment to defeat the communist insurgents.26 The rapid change in ranks in
Malaya centralized vast authority to a single individual who played a critical role in the
improving colonial security and the preservation of the governments power. He directed
the Chief Secretary as the person responsible for the welfare and development of the New
Villages.27 The relocated villagers received electric generators and improved defenses,
along with medical facilities in an effort to improve their lives. The creation of the Local
26
Robert Jackson, The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealths wars 1948-1966, (New York:
Routledge, 1991, 23-24.
27
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 115.
13
Councils Ordinance in August 1952 called for elections of local councils, which became
extensions of the state by collecting taxes and developing structures like community
halls. By May, the formation of such councils through elections commenced and by May
of 1954, 209 Chinese local councils took session. In the governments schools, students
learned about civics as to make them acceptable citizens. In Operation Ginger, the
government sent teams from administrative departments, police, and the military to areas
for the improvement of social services and security.28 Templer considered the social
programs so critical that once tin and rubber prices fell in 1953 leaving a deficit of 146
million Malayan dollars, he cut security forces over cutting social services.29 The
shopkeepers and farmers to prevent their support of the insurgents.30 Templer and his
administration employed civil services and local democratic principles for Chinese-
the populace by giving individuals more rights while employing propaganda to win over
the population. Government institutions such as the Malayan Broadcasting Service, the
Emergency Information Services, the Malayan Film Unit, and the Department of
from the communists. On September 14, 1952, the colonial government granted federal
citizenship with suffrage for all levels of government. The government brought modern
28
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 119-120.
29
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 123, 124.
30
Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 116.
14
conveniences to citizens when possible while allowing them to own garden plots and
businesses. Increased regulation fought usurious interest rates levels and firms that
information about insurgents and their locations.31 The development of reforms brought
more people on the side of the government by attacking their grievances and dissuading
agency for its own strength, particularly during a vicious insurgency. Cooperation
between the British government and Malayans of various ethnicities strengthened the
gathering proved an important part of Malayas effort against the MCP as an effective
intelligence agency was an important part of the modern state that continued in
strengthening Malaya after colonialism.32 The Malayan Secret Service was the
governments intelligence agency after the war and collected information on subversives
within the Malay Peninsula, along with disseminating intelligence and advising the
government. The Special Branch mostly replaced the old agency but found difficulties
However, reforms within the Special Branch elevated it as the Malayan Federal
collected, analyzed, and disseminated intelligence as a vital part of the war effort, but the
formation of the Special Branch took years of development before it became an effective
intelligence agency.
31
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 125, 126.
32
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 1.
33
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 25, 59.
34
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 98.
15
The Special Branch reorganized in adaptation to the conditions in Malaya as to
more effectively strengthen the governments understanding of the population. The main
problem remained too few translators, particularly for the Chinese language as once the
Special Branch expanded throughout the state and federal levels of government it
possessed too few Chinese translators and no Chinese high-ranking officials. At the
federal level, the Special Branch divided into ethnic groups such Chinese, Malay, and
another group that accounted for the other minorities. Given the importance of the
Chinese to the insurgency, the head of the Chinese section was also an assistant
superintendant of police. The Malayan police force received Britons from other services
including 495 British sergeants who served in Palestine as policemen, along with the
attachment of a British Army Intelligence captain.35 The efforts of the Special Branch
focused mostly on developing human intelligence through planting agents not only with
Min Yuen, but also in New Villages and courier systems. With such information, the
Special Branch gained an understanding of how the insurgency operated and its
understanding of the MCP, MRLA, and Min Yuen by revealing their operational and
sustained.
35
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 60-61.
36
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 79.
16
William Jenkin reorganized the Special Branch into a more effective intelligence
agency.37 Jenkin opened two training schools for the Special Branch and the Criminal
Investigation Department in January 1951 that trained detectives and gazetted police
officers. Jenkin worked with Briggs and the Security Liaison Officer from MI5 in
To face the problems regarding a lack of Chinese language speakers, the government set
up schools in the summer of 1951 for the teaching of Cantonese and Hokkien for five and
a half months for the training of officers in basic Chinese.39 In his final days in office,
Briggs recognized the improved gathering of intelligence and its dissemination to the
army and police. Jenkins restructuring of the Special Branch helped strengthen the
government and defeat the insurgency. Although Briggs departed his office on December
intelligence system.40 During the Emergency, the government set up schools as structural
and his compatriots within the Malayan government set up a strategic framework for the
development of an intelligence system that vastly strengthened the power of the Malayan
state.
The strengthening of the Malayan state also required better representation of the
Chinese community within the investigative and intelligence wings of the government.
Both Tan Cheng Lock of the Malayan Chinese Association and Oliver Lyttelton of the
37
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 141.
38
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 141.
39
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 115-116.
40
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 99; Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 25.
17
government, including the training of Chinese intelligence officers and law
enforcement.41 Jenkin realized the importance of training more Chinese in the Special
Branch and Criminal Investigation Department in 1950 and increased their numbers as
inspectors and gazetted officers. The candidates possessed excellent Chinese language
skills and became valuable people within the government once they became operational.
Under the Special Branch interrogators visited detention camps for obtaining information
Early in the Emergency, interrogators employed coercive means and truth serums for
obtaining information, but the government realized softer treatment of prisoners as less
offensive to the civilian population and made insurgents less resistant to surrender.43
Chinese officers from the Special Branch interrogated people with their knowledge of
Chinese languages and customs to greater effect.44 The inclusion of ethnic Chinese
within the police investigative forces strengthened the governments ability to control the
Chinese population in Malaya during the Emergency and for long after independence
with the structural formation of the Special Branch under British authorities.
The vicious nature of the insurgency and heroism by Malayan security forces
strengthened the resolve of Malayans loyal to the state, while the brutality of the MCP
isolated the organization from much of the public. The valiant defense of Bukit Kepong
in Johor in February 1950 by thirteen policemen, six kampong guards, and their wives
exemplified the bravery of security forces fighting the MCP and the willingness to die for
the cause of Malaya. The defenders held off the assault by around one hundred eighty to
41
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 118-122.
42
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 131-134.
43
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 83.
44
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 137.
18
two hundred MCP insurgents for approximately four or five hours. Once the defenders of
Bukit Kepong fell, their wives continued fighting and even a marine policeman who
could have sped away in his boat but fought until his death. The MCP insurgents shot
one woman who surrendered and killed two children after they overran the police
position.45 Bravery in the face of battle consolidated the national Malayan consciousness
sacrifice of Malayan soldiers in wartime.46 The bravery of security forces in fighting the
insurgents consolidated the Malayan national consciousness and solidified the resolve of
Malayans in continuing the fight particularly when women and children died at the hands
troops as the forces within Malaya were far too small for a counterinsurgency campaign
at the beginning. At the beginning of the conflict, the military presence in Malaya was
small with the Malay Regiments two battalions and a brigade of Gurkhas spread
throughout the peninsula and Singapore. Of the British military units the 26th Field
Regiment Royal Artillery was on the mainland while Singapore had the 1st Battalion of
the Field Regiment and the 1st Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders and the Kings Own
Yorkshire Light Infantry defended Penang. The British units were not at full strength and
had little if no experience in jungle combat and generally defended estates and mines in
the early part of the conflict. The military set up training facilities at the Far East Land
Forces Training Centre in Kota Tinggi in 1949 and developed counterinsurgency tactics
45
Brian Stewart, Smashing Terrorism in the Malayan Emergency: The Vital Contribution of the Police,
(Selangor Darul Ehsan, Malaysia: Pelanduk, 2004), 1-5; Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 80.
46
National Monument, Tourism Malaysia, http://www.tourism.gov.my/destinations/detail.php?
theme=CH&map_code=nationalmonument&state=kl.
19
in the Anti Terrorist Operations in Malaya field manual or ATOM.47 Malaya required the
assistance of Commonwealth forces as native units comprised too small of the overall
proportion of the armed forces in the colony. For the stabilization of the state, Malaya
needed time for the development of government power, of which the military played a
vital role.
The Malayan military also vastly expanded during the Emergency with
Commonwealth troops deploying for combat with the insurgents. Even as more units like
the 2nd Battalion Scots Guards and 2nd Guards Brigade arrived in Malaya, the military
required time for counter-insurgency training, along with understanding locals and
gaining their confidence.48 During the Emergency, the British government financed the
Malayan Federation Army with a grant of 8 million even though the enlistment of
Indians and Chinese proved slow.49 Military units focused on gathering intelligence in
addition to combat through unit diaries and notes.50 Malaya received assistance from six
Gurkha and six British battalions, along with an Australian and African battalion, the
latter of which had a high kill rate of 1.13 enemies per contact. Despite the presence of
the Commonwealth troops, the seven battalions of the Royal Malay Regiment bore the
brunt of the fighting. In addition, a New Zealand squadron of Special Air Service
members contributed to the fighting, along with various armored and supporting units
that contributed to the security forces in Malaya.51 However, the most effective unit was
the Fijian battalion that hunted down insurgents with great skills in tracking, shooting,
47
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 32-33.
48
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 33-34.
49
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 121-122.
50
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 125.
51
Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 19, 117.
20
and speeds through the jungles.52 Six navy destroyers patrolled for supply interdiction,
searching 1,000 coastal vessels in May 1952 alone, and navy helicopters carried troops
into and out of battle.53 The Commonwealth military supported the government, which
centralized Malayan as the native forces learned the art of jungle combat and gave the
Having strong bureaucracies within the government alone was insufficient for the
development of a truly united nation as people needed a personal connection to the cause
of the government, either directly or indirectly through a political party. Importantly, the
British government promised full independence to Malaya and held elections, which gave
the people of Malaya a reason for siding with the government against the communists for
the nationalists to fight the MCP and its supporters.54 With independence, the Malays of
the United Malayan National Organisation (UMNO) allied with the Malayan Chinese
Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress in formation of the Malayan
National Alliance. Furthermore, the government moved closer toward complete Malayan
control of the civil service as British servants retired or relocated.55 The Malayan
National Alliance offered the possibility of a government that no single ethnicity would
completely dominate the others. Regardless of whether that was the case; it legitimized
toward the new government and weakened the MCP as the fight against colonialism no
traditional human intelligence arose from the violence of the Emergency and the help,
financial and the experiences of British intelligence officials, which held Malaya together.
52
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 166.
53
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 169-170.
54
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 283-284.
55
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 269.
21
Prior to the insurrection, the British colonial machinery, particularly the intelligence
apparatus failed in appreciating the threat of the MCP as the Malayan Secret Service
operated mainly in urban areas and therefore the government failed in preventing the
the power of the intelligence and its law enforcement agencies it inherited from colonial
rule. The Malayan civil service experienced an overall shift from having a large number
of Europeans to being staffed by Malayans, but the police retired or moved elsewhere
slower because of the ongoing insurgency.57 The Special Branch identified insurgents
because its employees who possessed knowledge of local languages, various cultures,
and a professional training. Asian officers in the Special Branch provided a valuable
Emergency, Malaya possessed the finest police intelligence agency in Southeast Asia, the
Special Bureau, in Southeast Asia with the ability to understand the languages, cultures,
Despite the odds and against historical trends, Malaya centralized the power of its
state to remarkable degree in large part because of the reaction to the MCP-led
Brian Taylor and Roxana Botea, ethnic diversity or fractionalization inhibited state
strength, but Malaysia countered such an argument as it was the strongest state of the
56
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 23-24.
57
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 269, 271.
58
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 283-285.
59
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 289.
22
nations examined and yet possessed a diverse population.60 Furthermore, tracking
insurgents in the hilly jungles of Malaya proved exceedingly difficult for the armed
forces.61 Such factors inclined Malaysia to a history of decentralized governance and yet
the nation defied the odds and united under a strong central government. Although other
reasons existed for the development of a centralized state, the Emergency brought the
nation under the power of the government with its military, law enforcement,
previously possessed weak or scant control over the Chinese and the Orang Asli. The
MCP employed the Orang Asli jungle inhabitants as suppliers and intelligence providers,
requiring the governments construction of eleven forts by 1953 for the separation of the
Orang Asli from the MCP. The numbers of Orang Asli under MCP sway fell from 60,000
to 400 by 1956.62 The MCA accommodated the interests of the UMNO as represented by
the small group of educated professional Chinese who reached out to small Chinese
businesses and guilds for support.63 The policies of the government during the
Emergency brought the ethnic Chinese population of Malaya under greater control as it
possessed the ability to tax, police, observe, and administer people formerly outside of its
authority. As the wealth of the people grew, the state already possessed the bureaucratic
instruments for extraction, while business classes stayed relatively separate from the state
60
Brian D. Taylor and Roxana Botea, Tilly Tally: War-making and State-making in the Contemporary
Third World, International Studies Review 10 (2008), 35-37.
61
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 31, 143, 145.
62
Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 21.
63
Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 278-279.
23
The institutions of the state became powerful because of the Emergency and the
assistance from the Commonwealth nations, but Malaya avoided dependency on foreign
powers for its stability. The balancing-out and empowerment of the police force came
about through the increased presence of Indians and Chinese as part of the governments
strategy during the Emergency. In 1952, Chinese and Indian gazetted officers rose to
inspectors who rose to 281 and 170 respectively with a total of 264 Malay inspectors.64
The police force grew to 22,187 men with 900 armored vehicles that same year.65 The
Yang di-Pertuan Agong of Malaysia, the head of state, announced the end of the
Emergency on July 31, 1960.66 One estimate placed the total cost of the counter-
insurgency before independence at 700 million with the British government paying 525
million, while Harry Miller placed the cost at 5.15 billion Malayan dollars.67 The cost in
lives of government security forces reached 1,346 killed and 1,601 wounded, whereas the
army lost 519 killed and 959 wounded.68 Although the Malayan government bore less of
the financial cost, the government established enough of a bureaucratic infrastructure for
the preservation of the state. Offsetting of the financial and human costs of the conflict
along with the expensive relocation of people to the Malayan government was assistance
Emergency from 1948 to 1960 enabled the strength of the Malayan Federal government
to a large extent. With the large amount of military and financial assistance from abroad,
64
Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 43.
65
Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 17; Coates, Suppressing Insurgency, 166.
66
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 281.
67
Jackson, The Malayan Emergency, 115; Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 70.
68
Comber, Malayas Secret Police, 70.
24
the Malayan government eliminated an insurgency that threatened the political stability
and the economic well-being of the country of the peninsula. The establishment of an
effective police force with its own intelligence agency strengthened the governments
power over its populace from virtually nothing in fifteen years was remarkable. The
planning and brutal effectiveness of British officers like Briggs and Templer turned the
ineffective and weak government of Malaya into a strong and centralized government
that better represented Malayas ethnic diversity than the pre-Emergency years in law
enforcement, civil administration and the military. The strength of the government and
the overall effectiveness of the state improved vastly because the Malayan people
ultimately supported the government over the insurgents. Once the insurgency ended, the
state still possessed the strength it developed including the powers of coercion and
incentives.
25
Works Cited:
Press, 2008.
http://www.tourism.gov.my/destinations/detail.php?
theme=CH&map_code=nationalmonument&state=kl.
Taylor, Brian D. and Botea, Roxana. Tilly Tally: War-making and State-making
Tilly, Charles. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Bringing
the State Back In edited by Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol.
26