1)Director of Religious affairs v Bayot
de led the temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy
Fact: The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is
charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13,
1943, which reads that he offers assistance to
secure marriage licenses. Appearing in his own
behalf, respondent at rst denied having published
the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his
attorney, he admitted having caused its
publication and prayed for "the indulgence and
mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide
himself to the strict ethical rules of the law
profession."
Issue: Whether or not advertising constitutes
malpractice
Held: It is undeniable that the advertisement in
question was a flagrant violation by the
respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public.
Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among
other things that "the practice of soliciting cases
at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney
to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant
advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a
trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices
of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the
bar, he de les the temple of justice with
mercenary activities as the money-changers of old
and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and
delity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be
the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise
not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the
opinion and so decides that the respondent should
be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
2) Ledesma v Climaco
Facts: on October 13, 1964, Petitioner was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. As he was
counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case
pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a
motion to withdraw as such. Not only did
respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two
defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the
policy of the Commission on Elections to require
full time service as well as on the volume or
pressure of work of petitioner, which could
prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged
order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A
motion for reconsideration having proved futile,
he instituted this certiorari proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not respondent commited is a
grave abuse of discretion by denying the motion
of the petitioner
Held: No, The Petitioner was less than duly
mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He
ought to have known that membership in the bar
is a privilege burdened with conditions. In People
v. Daban, it was stated that: "There is need anew
in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the
fundamental postulate that membership in the
bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a
trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are
called upon to aid in the performance of one of
the basic purposes of the State, the
administration of justice. To avoid any frustration
thereof, especially in the case of an indigent
defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not
occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the
contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that
other pressing matters do compete for his
attention. After all, he has his practice to attend
to. That circumstance possesses, high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he
cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases.
Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
dismissed.
3) Cui vs Cui
Facts: The Hospicio is a charitable institution
established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doa Benigna Cui, now dead, "for the care and
support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and
incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired
corporate existence by legislation and endowed
with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations. Don Pedro Cui died
in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon
the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and
Dionisio Jakosalem. After they died, Dr. Teodoro
Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the
administrator. Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his
widow continued to administer the Hospicio until
her death in 1929.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma.
Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui,
one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui
and Doa Benigna Cui. incumbent administrator,
Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma.
Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into
between them and embodied in a notarial
document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma.
Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however,
had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of
his brother's assumption of the position. Plaintiff
Jesus wrote a letter to Respondent Antonio
demanding that the office be turned over to him
as he is the elder of the two pursuant to section 2
of the deed of donation. However, before the test
of age may be applied the deed gives preference
to the one, among the legitimate descendants of
the nephews therein named titulo de abogado.
Jesus Ma. Cui holds a law degree from the but is
not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma.
Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar but
was disbarred and subsequently re-instated.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is fit to
administer the hospicio
Held: Yes, We are of the opinion that whether
taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires
passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of
Court, this certificate being his license to practice
the profession. The founders of the Hospicio de
San Jose de Barili must have established the
foregoing test advisedly, and provided in the deed
of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator
should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these,
should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the
plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant,
to the office of administrator
As far as moral character is concerned, when the
defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
4) Villegas v Legaspi
Facts:
A complaint for annulment of bank checks and
damages was led by petitioner against private
respondents before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu. An answer was led by private respondents
through their counsel, Atty. Valentino Legaspi, a
member of the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioner
"challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman
Legaspi" as counsel of record on the around that
he is barred under the Constitution from
appearing before Courts of First Instance of
original jurisdiction. Respondent Judge denied the
disqualification bid, as well as a reconsideration
thereof.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are allowed to
appear as counsel in the courts of first instance
Held: No. It should be borne in mind that Courts of
First Instance have dual "personality." Depending
on the case before it, said Courts can be either of
appellate or original jurisdiction. The question
then to be resolved is whether or not
Assemblymen can appear as counsel before
Courts of First Instance in cases originally filed
with them.
We are of the considered opinion that, to render
effective the Constitutional provision, appearance
by legislators before Courts of First Instance
should be limited to cases wherein said Courts
exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the
time-honored principle that whatever is necessary
to render effective any provision of a Constitution,
whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction,
must be deemed implied and intended in the
provision itself
Although the cases at bar were led prior to the
aforesaid amendment, they should be resolved
under the amended provision. We abide by the
proposition that "as a general rule, the provisions
of a new Constitution take effect immediately and
become operative on pending litigation." 1
Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang
Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel"
"before any Court without appellate jurisdiction."
The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is
clearly to remove any possibility of undue in
uence upon the administration of justice, to
eliminate the possible use of of ce for personal
gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and thus
preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The
possible influence of an Assemblyman on a single
Judge of the Court of First Instance, though not
entirely removed, is definitely diminished where
the latter Court acts in the exercise of its
appellate instead of original jurisdiction.
5) Enriquez v Gimenez
Facts: Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public
corporation and vesting in it the ownership,
jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
territory embraced by the Metropolitan Water
District as well as all areas served by existing
government-owned waterworks and sewerage and
drainage systems within the boundaries of cities,
municipalities, and municipal districts in the
Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks
and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of
Public Works, was passed. the municipal mayor
transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the
Provincial Fiscal requesting him to render an
opinion on the matter treated therein and to
inform the municipal council whether he would
handle and prosecute its case in court should the
council decide to question and test judicially the
legality of Republic Act No. 1383. The provincial
fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic
Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and
declined to represent the municipality of Bauan.
Herein petitoners are the special counsel seeking
reimbursement for initial attorneys fees, which
the Auditor General disallowed the audit citing
that the Municipality of Bauan had no authority to
engage the services of a special counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the municipality had the
authority to engage the services of a special
counsel
Held: No. he Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of
the mayor and counsel of the various
municipalities of a province and it is his duty to
represent the municipality in any court except
when he is disquali ed by law. When he is disquali
ed to represent the municipality, the municipal
council may engage the services of a special
attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disquali ed to
represent in court the municipality if and when
original jurisdiction of the case involving the
municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when
the municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to some other
municipality in the same province; 1 and when in
the case involving the municipality, he, or his
wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise. 2 The fact that the
Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the
opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and
constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a
position to prosecute the case of the municipality
with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the
act of the municipal council in engaging the
services of a special counsel. Bias or prejudice
and animosity or hostility on the part of a scal not
based on any of the conditions enumerated in the
law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a
legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.
The services of the petitioner having been
engaged by the municipal council and mayor
without authority of law, the Auditor General was
correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's
claim for payment of attorney's fees.
6) Salcedo v Hernandez (In re: Vicente Francisco)
Facts: Atty Vicente Francisco, who represents
herein petitioner Felipe Salcedo, filed a motion for
reconsideration after he lost a case entitled
Salcedo v Hernandez. He wrote a letter to the
court, which included the following phrases:
. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of
the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls . . . .
. . . because we should not want that some
citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality
of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial
outrage . . .
we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and
his thousands of voters will necessarily consider
unjust, increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and
make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.
When the court's attention was called to said
paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco to show why he should not be found
guilty of contempt attorney Francisco, far from
regretting having employed the phrases contained
in said paragraph in his motion, reiterated them
several times contending that they did not
constitute contempt because, according to him it
is not contempt to tell the truth.
Issue: Whether or not the act done constitutes
contempt
Held: Yes. The insertion of the phrases in question
in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for
many years a member of the Philippine bar, was
neither justified nor in the least necessary,
because in order to call the attention of the court
in a special way to the essential points relied upon
in his argument and to emphasize the force
thereof, the many reasons stated in his said
motion were sufficient and the phrases in question
were superfluous.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this
court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any
attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
authority and to defend its integrity, not only
because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158
and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492,
669), but also because in so doing, he neither
creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent which,
in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who
are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention
to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of Legal
Ethics, which reads as follows:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards
the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of
the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its importance. Judges, not
being wholly free to defend themselves, are
peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the
bar against unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint of a
judicial officer, it is the right and duty of the
lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper
authorities. In such cases but not otherwise, such
charges should be encouraged and the person
making them should be protected.
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states
that it was not his intention to offend the court or
to be recreant to the respect thereto but,
unfortunately, there are his phrases which need
no further comment. F
his court is of the opinion and so holds that the
act committed by Attorney Vicente J. Francisco
constitutes a contempt
he is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that
the entire paragraph of his motion containing the
phrases which as has been stated, constitute
contempt of court be stricken from the record de
oficio. So ordered.

7) ALAWI vs ALAUYA
Facts: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of
E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a
real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court
of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. T
Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned
firm through Alawi's agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to
the above mentioned firm.
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company n
the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent
which made said contract void ab initio . n his
letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some
detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of
December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint which included
Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only
regular members of the
Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as
"unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his
allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing
his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions,
lies, baseless and coupled with manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting
that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular
and completely transparent.
Issue: Whether or not respondent use of attorney
is legal
Held: As regards Alauya's use of the title of
"Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are
not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts.
21 While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to
the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter
is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved
to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken
the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title,
"counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the
term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is
of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of
"counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title
of attorney.
8) Pangan v Ramos
Facts: This has reference to the motion of
complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the
record that the hearings in this administrative
case were postponed on the basis of respondent's
motions for postponement. These motions were
based on respondent's allegations that on said
dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch
VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
People v. Marieta M. Isip. Upon veri cation, the
attorney of record of the accused in said case is
one "Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos, 306 Doa Salud
Bldg., Dasmarias, Manila." Respondent admits
that he used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" but
avers that he had a right to do so because in his
Birth Certi cate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro
Dionisio Ramos", and his parents are Pedro Ramos
and Carmen Dayaw, and that the "D.D." in "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio
Dayaw", his other given name and maternal
surname.
Issue: Whether or not a lawyer may be authorized
to use another name
Held:T he name appearing in the "Roll of
Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's
roll or register is the of cial record containing the
names and signatures of those who are authorized
to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of
Attorneys in his practice of law.
In using the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before
the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law Dionisio D. Ramos
respondent in effect resorted to deception. He
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the
courts. The circumstance that this is his rst
aberration in this regard precludes Us from
imposing a more severe penalty.
9) PLA v Agrava
Facts: Respondent Director issued a circular
announcing that an examination for the purpose
of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office, the said examination to cover patent law
and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before
said office. According to the circular, members of
the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons
with suffcient scientific and technical training are
qualified to take the said examination. It would
appear that heretofore, respondent Director has
been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine
Lawyer's Association that one of the petitioner
Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by
the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Of ce, and that consequently, the act of the
respondent Director requiring members of the
Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass
an examination given by the Patent Of ce as a
condition precedent to their being allowed to
practice before said office, such as representing
applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the
Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution
of patent cases "does not involve entirely or
purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge
and training, so much so that, as a matter of
actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases
may be handled not only by lawyers, but also by
engineers and other persons with suf cient scienti
c and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the Patent Office.
Issue: WoN members of the Philippine Bar are
required to submit to an examination or before
being permitted to appear and practice before the
Patent Office
Held: No. the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Of ce, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the
first place, although the transaction of business in
the Patent Office involves the use and application
of technical and scientific knowledge and training,
still, all such business has to be conducted and all
orders and decisions of the Director of Patents
have to be rendered in accordance with the Patent
Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Patent Of ce in
accordance with law. Not only this, but practice
before the Patent Of ce involves the interpretation
and application of other laws and legal principles,
as well as the existence of facts to be established
in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure.
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable
to hold that a member of the bar, because of his
legal knowledge and training, should be allowed
to practice before the Patent Of ce, without further
examination or other quali cation.
we hold that under the present law, members of
the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice
their profession before the Patent Of ce, for the
reason that much of the business in said of ce
involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and
other laws applicable, as well as the presentation
of evidence to establish facts involved; that part
of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial
or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his
orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to
the Supreme Court.

10) UI vs BONIFACIO
Facts: This is an is an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for
allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with
Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.
In 1971, complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui
and begot have four (4) children. Sometime in
December 1987, however, complainant found out
that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an
illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio with whom he begot two children
sometime in 1986 and 1988, and that they had
been living together.
In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite
Respondent in Contempt of the Commission
wherein she charged respondent with making
false allegations in her Answer and for submitting
a supporting document which was altered and
intercalated. The duly certified Certificate of
Marriage revealed that the date of marriage
between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris
Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October
22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her anser.
Issue:
Held: The practice of law is a privilege. A bar
candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing
the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be
revoked, subject to the mandate of due process,
once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of
legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the
practice of law are includes that he be person of
good moral character.
Possession of good moral character must be
continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of
the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held:
If good moral character is a sine qua non for
admission to the bar, then the continued
possession of good moral character is also a
requisite for retaining membership in the legal
profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good
moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent
Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she
knew and believed him to be single. Respondent
fell in love with him and they got married and as a
result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2)
children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil
status of Carlos Ui, she left him.
Respondent's act of immediately distancing
herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true
civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention
of flaunting the law and the high moral standard
of the legal profession.
HEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment is
hereby DISMISSED.
However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for
attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her
Marriage Certificate, with an altered or
intercalated date thereof.
11) DELES v ARAGONA
Facts: This is a disbarment proceeding against
Vicente R. Aragona, Jr. 1 upon a verified letter-
complaint of Aurora Soriano Deles charging the
former with having made, under oath, false and
unfounded allegations against her in a motion
filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and
1255-Iloilo, which allegedly caused her great
mental torture and moral suffering.
Aurora Deles (hereinafter referred to as the
complainant) is the administratrix of the intestate
estate of the late Joaquina Ganzon (the deceased
mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano, Sr. who are
heirs of the estate concurrently with other forced
heirs) in special proceeding 128 of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo.
upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and
above the opposition of the complainant, the
intestate court issued an order denying a
proposed lease of ten hectares of the estate by
the complainant to one Carlos Fuentes and
sustaining the possession of Enrique as lessee of
the said land. In effect, the order likewise
sustained the possession by the brothers Federico
and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land
being tenanted by them upon authority of the
lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.
In disregard of the abovementioned order, the
complainant attempted to take possession of the
landholdings by placing thereon her own tenants.
Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect their
rights, countered by filing against the complainant
two petitions with the Court of Agrarian Relations
in Iloilo.
Aglinao brothers, through their counsel, the herein
respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter
referred to as the respondent), to file on June 20,
1962 an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of
Interlocutory Order." However, this did not stop
complainant and her goons from harvesting on
the disputed lands.
Respondent prayed that the complainant and "her
armed goons" be declared in, and punished for,
contempt of court for violating the interlocutory
order
Complainant who moved to strike it out from the
records, claiming that the allegations therein
libelled her, and that it was the respondent who
should be punished for contempt for deliberately
misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not
content with this reply and countermotion for
contempt, the complainant lodged a a criminal
complaint for libel against the respondent with the
City Fiscal of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly
libelous allegations made against her by the
respondent in the latter's motion for contempt
filed in the C.A.R. cases.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be
disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and
filed under oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare
Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases
1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains
false and libelous imputations injurious to the
honor of the complainant.
Held: his Court is loath to uphold the view that the
preparation and the filing of the questioned
motion for contempt, furnish sufficient basis for
disciplinary action against the respondent.
In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the
decisional authority that.
"[S]tatements made in the course of judicial
proceedings are absolutely privileged that is,
privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of
the presence of malice if the same are relevant,
pertinent or material to the cause in hand or
subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the
person who makes them such as a judge,
lawyer, or witness does not thereby incur the
risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal
prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages."
Since there is no doubt that the allegations made
by the respondent in the questioned motion for
contempt are statements made in the course of a
judicial proceeding i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254
and 1255 besides being relevant, pertinent or
material to the subject-matter of the said cases,
they are absolutely privileged, thereby precluding
any liability on the part of the respondent.
However, the object of a disbarment proceeding is
not so much to punish the individual attorney
himself, as to safeguard the administration of
justice by protecting the court and the public from
the misconduct of officers of the court, and to
remove from the profession of law persons whose
disregard for their oath of office have proved them
unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
them as members of the bar. 8 Thus, the power to
disbar attorneys ought always to be exercised
with great caution, and only in clear cases of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and member of the bar. 9
In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever
tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to
continue in the practice of law and remain an
officer of the court.
12) BLANZA v ARCANGEL
Facts: Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria
Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action
against respondent Atty. Agustin Arcangel for
professional non-feasance. They complain that
way back in April, 1955, respondent volunteered
to help them in their respective pension claims in
connection with the deaths of their husbands,
both P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they
handed over to him the pertinent documents and
also af xed their signatures on blank papers. But
subsequently, they noticed that since then,
respondent had lost interest in the progress of
their claims and when they finally asked for the
return of their papers six years later, respondent
refused to surrender them.
Respondent admitted having received the
documents from complainants but explained that
it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to
immediately return them, he said, was due to
complainants' refusal to hand him the money to
pay for the photostating costs which prevented
him from withdrawing said documents from the
photostat service.
Issue: WoN respondent should be reprimanded for
professional non-feasance based on the
Held: No. We find the evidence adduced insuf
cient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action
against respondent attorney. There is no clear
preponderance of evidence substantiating the
accusations against him. 3
Respondent's explanation for the delay in ling the
claims and in returning the documents has not
been controverted by complainants. On the
contrary, they admitted 4 that respondent asked
them to shoulder the photostating expenses but
they did not give him any money therefor.
But while We are constrained to dismiss the
charges against respondent, for being legally insuf
cient, yet, We cannot but counsel against his
actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a
more dynamic and positive role in the community
than merely complying with the minimal
technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up
to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce,
be par excellence
especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers
his professional services. Respondent here has not
lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary
to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long
years on their pension claims. Upon their refusal
to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith
terminated their professional relationship instead
of keeping them hanging inde nitely. And although
We voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal
sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of
what the high standards of his chosen profession
require of him.
13) ZORETA v SIMPLICIANO
Facts: This is a complaint for disbarment filed
against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for
allegedly notarizing several documents during the
year 2002 after his commission as notary public
had expired.
Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02
August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, a complaint
for Breach of Contract and Damages against
Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (SPAC)
dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter's failure to
honor SPAC's Commercial Vehicle Policy No.
94286, where respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano was the latter's counsel. In said cases,
respondent who was not a duly commissioned
Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications 1 issued
by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S.
Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization
The eight (8) notarized documents for the year
2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of
affidavits of merit, certifications and verifications
against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of
service, were used and presented in the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil
Case No. 01-6240, and in respondent's petition for
certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.
Against the evidence presented by complainant,
respondent did not even attempt to present any
evidence. His counsel filed an ex-parte motion for
extension to file answer, which was granted, but
no answer was forthcoming.
Issue: Whether or not illegal notarization done by
respondent constitutes disbarment
Held:
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment
of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has
the privilege and right to practice law only during
good behavior and can only be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded him. Without invading
any constitutional privilege or right, an attorney's
right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct
rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise
the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.
notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries
public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties
These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer
likewise violates Canon 7 of the same
Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at all
times the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.
Respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G.
SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY
from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is
furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years
14) A1 FINANCIAL SERVICES vs VALERIO

Facts: A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a nancing
corporation, granted the loan application of Atty.
Valerio amounting to P50,000.00. To secure the
payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio
issued a postdated check, to wit: Check No.
0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the amount:
P50,000.00. 2 However, upon presentation at the
bank for payment on its maturity date, the check
was dishonored due to insuf cient funds. As of the
ling of the instant case, despite repeated
demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed
to pay the whole amount of her obligation.
on November 10, 2003, complainant led a B.P. 22
case against Atty. Valerio, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 124779. Atty. Valerio's arraignment was
scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she
failed to appear despite due notice. 3
Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest 4 was issued
but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22,
2004, complainant sent a letter 5 to Atty. Valerio
calling her attention to the issuance of the
Warrant of Arrest against her and requested her to
submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting
bail. The said letter was received by Atty. Valerio,
as evidenced by the postal registry return cards. 6
Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio
refused to abide.
Respondents mother and Atty Valerio explained
that her daughter had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to
the complaint against her. Furthermore, Mrs.
Valerio undertook to personally settle her
daughter's obligation.
The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical
certi cate submitted by Atty. Valerio's mother, in
view of the latter's failure to appear before the
IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness
thereof or present the physician who issued the
same.
Issue:
Held:
In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro, 10 we held that:
. . . [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and
the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned
with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers
are instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal pro ciency but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing so that the people's faith and con
dence in the judicial system is ensured. They must
at all times faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of nancial
obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that re ects the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01
explicitly states that:
Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the instant case, there is no denial of the
existence of the loan obligation despite
respondent's failure to cooperate before any
proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to
the ling of the complaint against her, Atty.
Valerio's act of making partial payments of the
loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed
there is an obligation to pay on her part.
The Court, likewise, nds unmeritorious Mrs.
Valerio's justi cation that her daughter, Atty.
Valerio, is suffering from a health condition, i.e.,
schizophrenia, which has prevented her from
properly answering the complaint against her.
Indeed, we cannot take the "medical certi cate" on
its face, considering Mrs. Valerio's failure to prove
the contents of the certificate or present the
physician who issued it. CIaDTE
Atty. Valerio's conduct in the course of the IBP and
court proceedings is also a matter of serious
concern. She failed to answer the complaint
against her. Despite due notice, she failed to
attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP.
She also ignored the proceedings before the court
as she likewise failed to both answer the
complaint against her and appear during her
arraignment, despite orders and notices from the
court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and violates the lawyer's oath which imposes
upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay
no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has
failed to live up to the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, isAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two
(2) years from the practice of law.
15) In re: 2003 BAR examinations
Facts: On 22 September 2003, the day following
the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice
Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations Committee, was apprised of a
rumored leakage in the examination on the
subject. After making his own inquiries, Justice
Vitug reported the matter to Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., and to the other members of the
Court, recommending that the bar examination on
the subject be nullified and that an investigation
be conducted forthwith. On 23 September 2003,
the Court adopted the recommendation of Justice
Vitug, and resolved to nullify the examination in
Mercantile Law and to hold another examination
on 04 October 2003 at eight o'clock in the evening
(being the earliest available time and date) at the
De La Salle University, Taft Avenue, Manila. The
resolution was issued without prejudice to any
action that the Court would further take on the
matter.
Upon investigation, it was found that the person
who leaked the exam was Atty. Danilo De
Guzman, a legal assistant for Atty. Marcial OT
Balgos, the examiner for Mercantile law. He had
faxed the exam to his brothers in the fraternity.
The faxed document was found to have contained
82% of the questions of the bar.
Issue: Whether or not the leaking of bar exam
questions is a ground for disbarment
Held: Attorney Danilo De Guzman's act of
downloading Attorney Balgos' test questions in
mercantile law from the latter's computer, without
his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act
of larceny
It was theft of intellectual property; the test
questions were intellectual property of Attorney
Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal
knowledge.
"Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an
unlawful infraction of Attorney Balgos' right to
privacy of communication, and to security of his
papers and effects against unauthorized search
and seizure rights zealously protected by the
Bill of Rights of our Constitution (Sections 2 and 3,
Article III, 1987 Constitution).
"He transgressed the very first canon of the
lawyers' Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that '[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes.'
"By transmitting and distributing the stolen test
questions to some members of the Beta Sigma
Lambda Fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit
and to given them undue advantage over the
other examiners in the mercantile law
examination, De Guzman abetted cheating or
dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the
examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, as well as Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for members of the
Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct
Canon 7 A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
"De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the
law instead of promoting respect for it and
degraded the noble profession of law instead of
upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations
impaired public respect for the Court, and
damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as
the final measure of a law graduate's academic
preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the
recommendations of the Investigating Committee,
hereby resolves to
DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the
practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
REPRIMAND Atty. MARCIAL O. T. BALGOS and
DISENTITLE him from receiving any honorarium as
an Examiner in Mercantile Law;
Direct the National Bureau of Investigation (a) to
undertake further investigation of Danilo De
Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan
Garvida, Erwin Tan, Randy Iigo, James Bugain,
Ronald Collado and Allan Guiapal with a view to
determining their participation and respective
accountabilities in the bar examination leakage
and to conduct an investigation on how Danilo De
Guzman was able to secure a copy of the
Supreme Court's CALR database.
16) IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS
Facts: Medado graduated from the University of
the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of
Laws in 1979 1 and passed the same year's bar
examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7. 2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney's Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on
13 May 1980, 4 but he failed to do so on his
scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys
5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to
his province for a vacation. 6
Several years later, while rummaging through his
old college les, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what
he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record. 7 TCAScE
By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he
was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief
[that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent,
nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; 8 and
"the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost
its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten." 9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order
for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10 Not
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado led the instant Petition, praying that he
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
Issue: Whether or not petitioner be allowed to sign
the roll of attorneys
Held: While an honest mistake of fact could be
used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts 23 as it negates malice
or evil motive, 24 a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justi cation, because everyone
is presumed to know the law and its
consequences. 25 Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar,
Medado may have at rst operated under an
honest mistake of fact when he thought that what
he had signed at the PICC entrance before the
oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys.
However, the moment he realized that what he
had signed was merely an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as
a valid justi cation. At that point, Medado should
have known that he was not a full- edged member
of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so. Under the
Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by
one's assuming to be an attorney or of cer of the
court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court, 27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
HSTaEC
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law
by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this
provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the
lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice
of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the
Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous
violations of Canon 9 have warranted the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As
Medado is not yet a full- edged lawyer, we cannot
suspend him from the practice of law. However,
we see it t to impose upon him a penalty akin to
suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition
against the unauthorized practice of law, we
likewise see it t to ne him in the amount of
P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the
practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he
has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.
17) In re: David
Facts: respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a
Philippine Bar, is charged with the malpractice for
misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his
client, the complainant Briccio S. Henson.
After the investigation the Solicitor General
rendered his report finding the respondent guilty
of professional misconduct and recommending
disciplinary action.
18) PLA v AGRAVA (see no 9)
19) Cayetano v Monsod
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1),
Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
Issue: Whether or not respondent has fulfilled the
10 year requisite of having engaged in the
practiced law
Held: Black defines "practice of law" as: The
rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is
not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings,
conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. Additionally, in PLA vs AGRAVA,
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct
of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on
behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveying. nterpreted in the light of the
various definitions of the term Practice of law".
particularly the modern concept of law practice,
and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

20) De Leon v CA
21) Soriano v Dizon
Facts:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 for the
disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of
respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude,
together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
3 himself. The totality of the facts unmistakably
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that
respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the
conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide, 7
which involved moral turpitude, should result in
his disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not conviction of crime of
homicide warrants disbarment
Held: Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, conviction for a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is
deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character. 13 In the
instant case, respondent has been found guilty;
and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has
already been established and is no longer open to
question, the only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of
frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and
2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he
pursued and shot complainant when the latter
least expected it We also consider the trial court's
finding of treachery as a further indication of the
skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim
when the latter was not in a position to defend
bears the earmarks of moral turpitude .
Membership in the legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to
admission, but also as a continuing requirement
for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent
has fallen short of the exacting standards
expected of him as a vanguard of the legal
profession. AHcDEI
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated
homicide, the attending circumstances not the
mere fact of their conviction would
demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal
profession. In the present case, the appalling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty
of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is
hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
22.
23. Reyes v GAA
Facts: Complainant reported to the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the
victim of extortion by respondent, an Assistant
City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a
complaint for estafa filed by complainant's
business rival. According to complainant, he had
given respondent P500.00 on March 1, 1971 and a
total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said
that another "payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M.
that day in respondent's office at the City Hall.
An entrapment was set up by the NBI.
Complainant furnished the NBI agents several
peso bills totalling P150.00 for marking. The paper
bills were sent to the Forensic and Chemistry
Division of the NBI and subsequently returned to
complainant for the use in the entrapment. After
the respondent had been apprehended, he was
brought to the NBI Forensic and Chemistry
Division for examination. Respondent's hands
were found positive of the yellow florescent
powder applied earlier to the marked money.
On March 15, 1993, Commissioner Vicente Q.
Roxas of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
recommended that respondent be disbarred
Issue: Whether or not the act of extortion done by
respondent is considered a ground for disbarment
Held: We agree with the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors.
In the case at bench, respondent was caught
in flagrante delicto in the act of receiving the
marked money from complainant during the
entrapment conducted by the NBI agents, which
resulted in his arrest and the subsequent filing of
administrative and criminal cases against him. In
his defense, respondent merely denied the charge
of extortion and retorted that the marked money
was planted by complainant.
The extortion committed by respondent
constitutes misconduct as a public official, which
also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.
The lawyer's oath (Revised Rules of Court, Rule
138, Section 18; People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968
[1958]), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer's
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation
is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or
other disciplinary action.
24. Ting Dumali v Torres
Facts: Complainant Isidra Ting-Dumali is one of
the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante
and Vicente Ting. When Their parents
died intestate and left several parcels of land,
including two parcels of land Lot 1586 and Lot
1603 both in Malabon.
She charges respondent and brother-in-law Atty.
Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure
to advise against, the forgery of complainants
signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court
for the purpose of profiting from such forgery,
thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the
canons of legal and judicial ethics. She alledges
that her sister, also the respondents wife,
Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate wherein
the two made it appear that they were the sole
heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was
false. The records show that Felicisima and
Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate dated 11 November 1986 that they are the
children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated
only between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion
of their other siblings.[7] There was concealment
of the fact that there were other compulsory heirs
to the estate of the deceased. In the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement covering Lot 1603, the
signature of Isidra was forged to make it appear
that she was a party to the Deed prior to selling it
to a corportation. respondent presented that
document to the Register of Deeds of General
Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of
the lot in question in the name of his wife and his
sister-in-law Miriam.
Issue: Whether or not falsification Deeds of
Extrajudicial Settlement is a ground for disbarment
Held: Canon 1, 7 and 10 underscore the role of a
lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When
the respondent took the oath as a member of the
legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so
stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent
miserably failed.
Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral
flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor to
the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be disbarred or
suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary
sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into
account the primary purpose of disciplinary
proceedings, which is to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.
[32] While the assessment of what sanction may
be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound
discretion, the sanction should neither be
arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice. Rather, it should ever be
controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously
guard the purity and independence of the bar.[33]
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted
out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and member of
the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it.[34] Verily,
given the peculiar factual circumstances
prevailing in this case, we find that respondents
gross misconduct calls for the severance of his
privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore
adopt the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner.
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as
well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law, and his name is ordered
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
25. People v Tuanda
Facts: In 1983, respondent received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry,
with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on
a commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds
and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or
before 14 February 1984. I of returning the unsold
pieces of jewelry which then amounted to
approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks:
(a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the
amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23
February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00;
and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the
amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for
payment within ninety (90) days after their
issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of
the notice of dishonor, respondent made no
arrangements with the bank concerning the
honoring of checks which had bounced and made
no effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed
against respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila for one for estafa,; and (b) three (3) for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed upon
her by a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The respondent claims that, she had not violated
her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon
the ground that when she issued the checks which
bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to
complainant Ms. Marquez.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of Atty.
Tuanda be lifted.
Held:
The Court affirms the suspension from the
practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals
upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is
found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should
add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious
criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. Respondent was thus
correctly suspended from the practice of law
because she had been convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. We should
add that the crimes of which respondent was
convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound
to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in
the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not)
relate to the exercise of the profession of a
lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects
the good moral character of a person convicted of
such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court
stressed that:
the nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that she shall be a person of good moral
character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to an admission to the practice of law;
its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.
Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order
of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further
orders from this Court
26. In Re: Abad
Facts: Mr. Elmo S. Abad practiced law without
being admitted to practice. He has
successfully taken the bar examinations and
has paid his fees prior to the oath taking
ceremony and has signed his lawyers oath. He
was then told that Chief Justice Enrique M that he has to
answer the Reply to a complaint filed by Jorge Uy, and for
which reason the taking of his Lawyer's Oath was further
suspended. Upon submitting his reply and his name not being
struck out in the roll of attorneys, herein petitioner believed
that he has been deemed fit to practice law.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to practice law
Held: Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances
which he has narrated do not constitute his admission to the
Philippine Bar and the right to practice law thereafter. He
should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to
be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.) prcd
The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes
contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)
WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five
Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10)
days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-Cve (25)
days imprisonment.

27. Aguirre v Rana
Facts: One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of
successful bar examinees as members of the Philippine Bar in
2011, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of
law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of
the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking, but ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the
resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyer's oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll
of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer,
appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers ("MBEC")
of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading entitled Formal
Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some
Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan.
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant
("OBC"). The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the
OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers and filed various pleadings without license
to do so. Respondent called himself "counsel," knowing fully
well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself
out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of
the Philippine Bar. The Court however, ruled, that the two
other charges of violation of law and grave misconduct were
not supported by evidence
Issue: Whether or not herein respondent is permitted to practice
law
Held: We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC
that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
He had acted as legal counsel to Vice-mayorality candidate
George Bunan and mayoralty candidate Emily Hao before
respondent took the lawyer's oath. Clearly, respondent engaged
in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine
Bar.
respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he
appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed
various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law.
Respondent called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that
he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as
"counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the
Philippine Bar
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and
took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of
Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact
that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial.
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and
his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation,
evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to
represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar
bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
nonetheless had no authority to practice law. WHEREFORE,
respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the
Philippine Bar
28. In re: Atty Marcial Edillion
Facts: he respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
n November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 75-
65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
recommending to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his
membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due
notice
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
recommend to the Supreme Court the removal
of a delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas
the authority of the Court to issue the order
applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court
Rule.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of
membership in the IBP is stated in these
words of the Court Rule is found in section 1.
The obligation to pay membership dues is
couched in the following words of the Court
Rule in sec 9.
The core of the respondent's arguments is
that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-
condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to
which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights
to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court
Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the
jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name
from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the
said matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body."
|||
Issue: Whether or not refusal to pay
membership dues is grounds for disbarment
Held: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized
Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized
by individual lawyers themselves,
membership in which is voluntary. Integration
of the Bar is essentially a process by which
every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear
his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
|||
or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and
adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation
by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment
of the offending member.
Congress enacted Republic Act No.
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to
"adopt rules of court to effect the integration
of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as
it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the
paramount police power of the State. |||
The most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar
integration in the Philippines is the explicit
unequivocal grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of
the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which
reads:
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall
have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
"(5) Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Bar . . .",
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397,
which reads:
"SECTION 1. Within two years from
the approval of this Act, the
 Supreme Court may adopt rules of
Court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility
more effectively."
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the
legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect
the society at large, were (and are) subject to
the power of the body politic to require him to
conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of
interfering with some of his liberties
WHEREFORE, respondent Marcial A. Edillon
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his
name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys of the Court. |||