American Sociological Association

Critical Human Ecology: Historical Materialism and Natural Laws
Author(s): Richard York and Philip Mancus

Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Jun., 2009), pp. 122-149
Published by: American Sociological Association
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CriticalHuman Ecology:HistoricalMaterialismand NaturalLaws*
Richard York and Philip Mancus

of Oregon
University
We lay thefoundationsfor a criticalhumanecology (CHE) that combinesthe

strengthsof the biophysicalhumanecology traditionin environmental sociology
withthoseof historicalmaterialism.We showthestrengths of a criticallyinformed
humanecologyby addressingfour key meta-theoretical issues: materialistversus
idealistapproachesin the social sciences,dialecticalversusreductionist analyses,
the respectiveimportance of historicaland ahistoricalcausal explanations, and the
differencebetweenstructuraland functionalinterpretations of phenomena.CHE
breaks with the idealismof WesternMarxism, whichdominatedacademic neo-
Marxist thoughtin the latterhalf of the 20th century, and advocatesinsteadthe
pursuitof a materialist,scientificmethodology in dialecticalperspective for the
explanationof social and ecological change.In turn,thisprojectalso involvesa
critiqueof theahistoricalandfunctionalisttendencies of traditional
humanecology,
whilesharinghumanecology's basic starting point: theecologicalembeddedness of
humansocieties.
Human ecologyis a venerableresearchtraditionin theenvironmental social sciences,

providingan importanttheoreticalbasis forunderstanding human interactions with
thenaturalenvironment. Althoughits formulation in theChicago School in theearly
20th centuryneglectedthe naturalenvironment, a trulyecological human ecology
began to emergemid-century in the works of Duncan (1959, 1961, 1964), Harris
(1968, 1971, 1979), Lenski (1970), Rappaport (1968), and others.Despite its early
prominence, humanecologyhas historically been miredin controversy due to its sci-
entificand materialist commitments - criticizedfromits beginningsand marginalized
withinsociologybecause of the discipline'stendencyto equate naturalisticexplana-
tionsof social phenomenawithbiologicalor geographicdeterminism. Such criticisms
weresometimesleveledby thoseassociatedwiththe Marxistcriticaltradition,which
over the 20th centurymoved increasingly away frommaterialism.Still,humanecol-
ogy and some variantsof the criticaltraditionhold much in common,and each
traditionprovidesclear strengths forhelpingus to understandhuman societiesand
theirrelationship to thenaturalworld.Therefore, an explicitintegrationof thesetwo
- and, thus,the developmentof a criticalhuman
perspectives ecology- could benefit
the disciplineof sociology,environmental sociologyin particular,and the quest to
understandhuman interactions withthe naturalenvironment.
Our purpose here is to examine the relationshipbetweenhuman ecology and
criticaltraditionsand lay thefoundationsfora criticalhumanecologythatcombines
the strengths of biophysicalhumanecologywiththose of historicalmaterialism.We
develop our case for the importanceof refininghuman ecology by reviewingits
developmentand comparingits similaritiesand differences withcriticaltheoretical
*Addresscorrespondenceto: Richard York, Departmentof Sociology,Universityof Oregon,Eugene,

OR 97403-1291.Tel.: 541-346-5064.Fax: 541-346-5026.E-mail: rfyork@uoregon.edu.
Sociological Theory27:2 June2009

AmericanSociologicalAssociation.1430 K StreetNW, Washington,
DC 20005

CRITICALHUMAN ECOLOGY 123
work.We do thisbyexamining thepositionof humanecologyand criticaltheories
withrespectto fourkeymeta-theoretical issues:(1) thedividebetweenmaterialism
and idealismin thesocialsciences, (2) dialectical versusreductionist analyses, (3) the
importance of both historical and ahistorical (i.e.,spatiotemporally invariant) causal
explanations, and (4) thedifference between structural and functional interpretations
of socialand biologicalphenomena.
Environmental sociologyis the subdiscipline thatmostexplicitly grappleswith
thehumanrelationship to thenaturalenvironment, buttheissueswe examinehere
haveimplications wellbeyondthisspecialtyarea. The forcesthatinfluence social
evolutionhave long been a broad concernin sociology, as have epistemological
questionsabouttheappropriate wayto studysociallifein a rigorous manner. Since
bothhumanecologyand Marxismare wellestablished and continueto flourish in
environmental sociology, we focusmuchof our attention on debatesin thisfield.
However, thisshouldnot be takento meanthattheissueswe addressare not of
substantial importance to thelargerdiscipline.
Whileenvironmental sociology to datehas beento a largeextent materialist in ap-
proach,we hopeto extendand refine itstheoretical legacy.Forinstance, thefounda-
tionalworkin environmental sociology ofWilliamCattonand RileyDunlap(Catton
1980;Cattonand Dunlap1978;Dunlapand Catton1979,1983)demonstrated a clear
commitment to realismand materialism, criticizing thelargerdiscipline of sociology
forneglecting therolethatthebiophysical environment playsin shapinghumanso-
cietiesand theimpactthatsocieties haveon ecosystems. Thesefoundational scholars,
although nothostileto thecritical tradition, didnotunambiguously embraceit,and
includedthe Marxisttradition along withmoremainstream strandsof sociology
in theiroverallcritiqueof thediscipline (Cattonand Dunlap 1978).Despitethese
earlyobjections, theneo-Marxist tradition has beenwellrepresented in environmen-
tal sociology, as is demonstrated in theTreadmill of Production program(Gould,
Pellow,and Schnaiberg 2004;Schnaiberg 1980;Schnaiberg and Gould 1994),in the
worksurrounding JamesO'Connor'stheory ofthesecondcontradiction ofcapitalism
(O'Connor1988,1991,1994;see also thejournalCapitalism, Nature,Socialism), in
JohnBellamyFoster'sworkon Marx'stheoryof metabolic rift(Foster1999,2000),
and in theworksof JoelKovel(1995,2002),PeterDickens(2001,2002,2005),and
Ted Benton(1989,2002),amongotherscholars. The earlyhumanecologists in envi-
ronmental sociologyand theirneo-Marxist counterparts bothrejected thedominant
cultural (andmid-century sociological)narrative ofmodernization, buttheTreadmill
and SecondContradiction theoriesfocusedalmostexclusively on industrial capitalist
societiesand tendedto lack macrohistorical generality, whereashumanecologists
did not providenuancedtheoretical conceptualizations of theprocessesgenerating
environmental crisesin differenteras.Criticalscholarship in environmental sociology
has typically beenmoreconcerned withthesocialcausesof environmental impacts
and has givenonlysecondary importance to theroleof theenvironment in shaping
societiesand spurring socialchange.
We arguethatthestrength of criticalhumanecology(CHE), as we willoutline
it here,is itsscientific and dialectical approach,combining thefundamental insights
of historical materialism withthoseof biophysical humanecology.We emphasize
historical materialism becauseofthedynamic conditions thatformthebasisforthe
development, sustainability,and transformation of societies.Criticalhumanecology
has thepotentialforgenerating an analytical strategy withbothan ecologicaland
historical focus,whichcan aid in theconstruction ofa rationalunderstanding ofthe
variouswayshumancultures meetthebiophysical needsof theirpopulations. Our

124 SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
scope is broad, includingbut not limitedto the analysis of subsistencestrategies,

social relationsof production,anthropogenicimpactson the environment, environ-
mental constraintson social processes,the requirements for ecological and social
sustainability, and socioecologicalcrisis.
The classical Marxian traditionis particularlyappropriatefor infusinghuman
ecologywithcriticalinsightsbecause human ecologyand historicalmaterialismare
both interestedin the full sweep of human historyand share a fundamentalcom-
mitmentto materialism.Historicalmaterialismtempersthe programmatic searchfor
causal forcesoperatingacross eras with a directivetowardexaminingthe chain of
relationsspecificto particularcontexts.Hence, the revitalization of Marxian histor-
ical ecologyprovidesthe intellectualvanguardforour work(Burkett1999; Burkett
and Foster 2006; Foster 1994, 1999, 2000; Foster and Burkett2000; Moore 2000,
2002, 2003; O'Connor 1998). Historicalmaterialists have made seriousefforts to link
up with human ecology(although not alwaysexplicitly), as can be seen most clearly
in the worksof Burkett(1999), Browswimmer (2002), Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997),
Chew (2001), Dickens (2005), Foster (1999, 2000), Moore (2003), and O'Connor
(1998, 1999). We,then,are attempting to completethislinkfromthehumanecology
the
side, emphasizing strengths particularto an ecological approach to sociological
analyses. CHE can be broadlyconceived approachto social science
of as a materialist
that seeks to understanddivergenceand convergenceacross and withinsocietiesas
well as throughouthuman history,to identifyand analyze the impactsthat human
beingshave on theecosystemsthatsustainthem,and to integrateenvironmental fac-
tors (e.g., climate,geography, and resourceavailability)into the analysesof human
societies.
HUMAN ECOLOGY AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION- MATERIALISM

VERSUS IDEALISM
It is ironicthatmuch of the environmental movementand manyacademic analyses
of ecological crises have taken a philosophicalposition that is explicitlyat odds
withmaterialism.Prominentecologicallyfocusedperspectives, such as deep ecology
(Devall and Sessions 1985),whatO'Connor (1998:21-22) identifies as Romanticecol-
ogy,and whatFoster(2000) refersto as "greentheory,"are foundedon philosophical
idealism,spiritualism,or postmodernism. These perspectivessharea commontheme
in identifyingthe scientificworldviewand materialismas responsibleforthe mod-
ern environmental crisis(e.g., Griffin1988). Similarly,
criticalsocial theorists,while
concernedwith issues pertainingto naturethat could be construedas materialist,
sharea view of societythatis focusedpredominantly on culturalfactors,a tendency
apparentin the worksof scholarssuch as Luke (1997, 1999), Merchant(1980, 1992,
1994), and Mies and Shiva (1993; Shiva 1989). In theseand similarworks,one can
findthe thesisthatWesternculture,the Enlightenment, and scientificepistemology
constitutethe dominantforcesbehindecological destruction.This line of criticism
tendsto downplaythe universality of materialconstraintson societies,idealize "pre-
modern"culturesand societies,and insiston the cultural"reenchantment" of nature
and science(Griffin1988). Such a view is at odds withthe materialistorientationof
human ecology,whichinsiststhatchangingmaterialconditionsof societiesare the
basis fortheirinteraction withtheenvironment, and thatall societiesare constrained
and shaped by theirconcreteecologicalcontexts.
Using a human ecology frameworktypicallyinvolvesanalysis of the material
exchangesbetween societies and their environments, as materialproductionand

reproduction formthefoundationofall societies.

Thismaterialist
focusis notunique
to humanecology, havingbeenthecore of Marx's -
work althoughMarxshoweda
greaterunderstandingofthehistorical
variationin concrete relations
productive than
is typicalofmosthumanecologists(Foster2000;Hughes2000). Aftergivinga brief
explanation of thedevelopmentof thehumanecologytradition and the Marxian
overthe20thcentury,
tradition we developthepotential connectionbetween Marx's
historical and humanecology.
materialism
TheHumanEcologyTradition
Sinceat leastthepublication of Darwin'sOriginof Species,variousattempts have
beenmadeto engagetheimplications of evolutionary and ecologicaltheory forthe
humansciences. Whilethehumanecologytradition withinU.S. sociology wasoneof
thefirstto explicitlytakeup evolutionary and ecologicalthought, it sufferedinitially
fromsomemajorconceptualdifficulties, including a tendency towardorganicism
and socialDarwinism (Allihan1938;Buttel1986;Gross2004;Haines 1985).Other
disciplines,anthropology and geography forexample,also struggled earlyon to
developan ecologicalapproachto sociallife,withsimilarchallenges (Harris1968).
Althoughthe term"humanecology"and earlydisciplinary formulations of it
emerged froma dialogueamongbiology, geography, and sociology, McKenzie(1924)
and Parkand Burgess(1921;Park1936)are oftencredited withtheoriginsofa so-
ciologicalhumanecology(Buttel1986;Quinn1939).In an introductory textto soci-
ology,Parkand Burgess(1921)explicitly drewon theecologyofplantcommunities
to comparethedistribution of organisms in theirhabitatand thedistribution and
coordination of production and consumption in industrial societies(Gettys1940).
However, theseconceptualfoundations wereintended simplyas an analogy,notas
an explanation of social phenomenaby reference to biophysical processes(Gross
2004).
Eventually, humanecologybecamesubsumedintourbanecologyspecializing in
theanalysisofurbanindustrial production and demographics withlittleresemblance
to thecross-disciplinarydialoguewithbiologyandecologythathadinfluenced earlier
conceptions (Catton 1994). Exemplifying this bifurcation,the ecological concept of
- thatis,thatspeciescan transform
succession theirenvironments in a mannerthat
changeswhichspeciescan inhabitthem - morphedintoa conception of succession
thatnaturalized struggle between firmsovermarket share(Catton1994).
Humanecology'sambiguousrelationship withthebiologicalscienceswas further
qualifiedwith the adoption of Durkheim's (1933) social morphology by Hawley
(1950).Durkheim's influence on humanecology's legacyis complex.In TheDivision
of Laborin Society,Durkheim positedpopulationdensity and theattendant com-
petitionfor scarce resources as a major determinative factor in the development of
complex industrial societies (Buttel1986). On the one hand, his focus on the division
oflabor- theorized as a functional adaptation forsocialintegration - spurred human
to
ecologists examine the relationshipsamong economic, political,and socialorgani-
zation,and hencedirected analysestowardsubstantive issuesin labor,energy usage,
and materialflows(Catton1994;Duncan 1959).On theotherhand,by demarcat-
ing as sociologicaltheexplanation of socialfactsby othersocial facts,Durkheim
reinforcedthetendency in sociologyto generally ignorebiophysical factors(Dunlap
2002).
However, fromaboutthemid20thcentury, notablywithDuncan's(1959,1961,
1964) work, human ecologydeveloped into a studyof humansocietiesin their

natural environments, taking as a basic fact that societies exist as part of, and
because of, the ecological processesthatcontributeto the dynamicstabilityof food
webs and biogeochemicalcycles (Catton 1994; Duncan 1964; Hawley 1950, 1986).
Catton and Dunlap's (1978) presentationof a new ecological paradigmconfronted
the mainstreamfield of sociology with a call for researchthat would bring the
insightsof biologicalecologyback into the studyof society.ChallengingDurkheim's
directiveon sui generisexplanation,environmental sociologylaunchedthe integrated
of
study biophysical and social facts in one field of study (Dunlap and Catton
1979). This revitalization of human ecology was noted in Buttel's(1986) reviewof
environmental sociology, where he referred to thiswork as the "new humanecology"
(1986:338).
One of the keyaspectsof earlyenvironmental sociology(the new humanecology)
came fromCatton and Dunlap's (1978) criticalreactionto what they saw as an
anthropocentric bias in sociology.This bias, theyargued,tendedto view culture -
the human propensityfor social learningand problem solving,the capacity for
language,and theepigenetictransmission of knowledge - as a featurethatestablished
human beings as distinctand separate fromall of the earth's other inhabitants.
This anthropocentric bias involvedthe expectationthathumanculturescan outpace
or transcendaltogetherthe ecological consequences of theiractivities.Central to
such optimismis the assumptionthatsince sociallylearnedbehaviordevelopsmore
rapidlythan environmental change,accumulationof culturalknowledgeensuresthe
perpetuity technologicalmasteryover nature,makinghumans exemptfromthe
of
biophysicalconstraintsthatlimitotheranimals (Catton and Dunlap 1978).
Whileacknowledging theobviousuniquenessof humanbeings,Cattonand Dunlap
contrastedthisdominantworldviewof mid-century "exuberant"sociology,whatthey
called the Human Exemptionalist(originallyHuman Exceptionalist)Paradigm,with
whatwas termedtheNew Ecological (originallyNew Environmental) Paradigm(this
became well knownamong environmental sociologistsas the HEP/NEP distinction).
The NEP highlightedfunctionalsimilaritiesbetweenhumans and otherorganisms,
emphasizingthat humans are dependenton ecosystemsand otherspecies,are not
exemptfrombiophysicalconstraints,and must exertenergy-requiring effortto re-
produce theirpopulations. Even as human populations transform the naturalworld,
featuresof theenvironment irreducible to cultureinfluencethesepopulations.Natural
limitscannot be overcomeby the mere accumulationof culturalknowledge.Ulti-
mately,since human beings are biological entities,human societiesare constrained
by many of the same ecological and thermodynamic principlesthat moderatethe
growth and of
reproduction populations of other species(Catton and Dunlap 1978:
43-45).
The return of sociological human ecology had already been anticipated in
ecological-evolutionary theory(EET) (Lenski 1970,2005). Lenski'sworkrepresented
an attemptto establisha macrosociological,comprehensivesystemfor categoriz-
ing and explainingvariationsin human societies.EET focuseson the relationships
among different componentsof societiesand on the interactionbetweensocieties
and theirenvironments. Accordingly,human societies are to be understoodfirst
and foremostin theirenvironmental contexts(ultimately, the biosphereitself),where
social organizationand cultureallow humanpopulationsto maintaintheirsocial in-
tegritywhiletrackingenvironmental change.The environment does not act alone in
Lenski'sview.Socioculturalhistoryand geneticheritageinteractwithbiophysicaland
social environments, and all are seen as basic determinants of extantsociocultural
characteristics (Lenski,Nolan, and Lenski 1995).

CRITICAL HUMAN ECOLOGY 127
It is due to its early and continuedfocus on subsistencestrategiesthat the dis-

cipline of anthropologyhas oftenled the social sciencesin developingan ecolog-
ical human science (Lavenda and Schultz 2000). Ecological anthropologists(e.g.,
Rappaport 1968; Steward1969) focusedon how small groupsrespondto variations
in resourcebase, offering a microlevelcomplementto macrosociology. Althoughthey
rejectedbiologicaldeterminism, as well as lineartheoriesof development,ecological
anthropologists nevertheless includedthe environment, in addition to the symbolic
domain of culture,in orderto understandultimatecausation of long-termpatterns
and variationwithinand betweenhumansocieties(Harris 1979). Later trendswithin
anthropology, as well as geography, have been towarda synthesisof ecological and
evolutionaryapproaches. Boyd and Richerson(1985), Harrison (1992), Diamond
(1991, 1997, 2005), and Fagan (2004) all exemplifythis researchperspective, illus-
trating in theirworks ways in which the environment influences culture in
and, turn,
how cultureaffectsthe environment.
The CriticalTradition
The termcritical,when applied to sociologicaltheory,encompassesmanydifferent
streamsof thoughtand typesof work.In its broadestsense,it may be used to refer
to approachesassociated with or derivedfromthe work of Marx and Engels,the
FrankfurtSchool (the InstituteforSocial Research)in particular,or even to leftist
sociologyin general,includingfeminismand postmodernism (Agger 1992; Simmons
2004). Withinphilosophythecriticaltraditioncan be tracedback to Hegel and Kant
(Held 1980). Althoughwe acknowledgethis broad set of meaningswhen using the
termcritical,in our developmentof CHE we draw specifically on a streamof scien-
tific,dialectical,and materialistresearchthat over the 20th centurywas conducted
mainlywithinthe ecological and biologicalsciencesand thatis groundedin Marx's
historicalmaterialism. Common to thisworkis an emphasison conductingscientific
inquirywithina broad, historically mindedframework (Lewontinand Levins 2007).
However,because the idealistapproach of criticaltheoryhas had a lastingeffect
withinthe social scienceson what it means to do criticalwork,and we findit nec-
essaryto overcomethis idealism,1we brieflyaddress the FrankfurtSchool, one of
the most influential theoreticalprojectsto redefine(Western)Marxism(Agger 1979;
Vogel 1996). Formed in dialogue with early 20th-century Marxist theory,psycho-
analysis,Weberianand Nietzscheansocial theory,and the antipositivist writingsof
the Lebensphilosophen, the Institutefor Social Research representedwithincritical
worka shiftin analyticalfocusfromlabor to ideology.This was contemporaneous
witha methodologicaland philosophicalshiftin WesternMarxismfrommaterialism
to idealism,exemplified by the transitionfromthe class-basedanalysisof productive
relationscentralto Marx and Engels'smethodto a discursiveanalysisthatfocused
on the ethos of capitalism,especiallyas it played out in mass ideology and the
cultureindustry(Bronner2002:27; Held 1980; Simmons2004). This transitionwas
drivenin large part by an attemptto counterthe influenceof mechanism,naive
1It is
importantto note,however,thatwe recognizetherewereclearlyvalid reasonswhycriticalscholars
took an idealistturn,and in so doing, theywere not necessarilyrejectinga materialistapproach to the
naturalworld,but ratherthe applicationof mechanisticand reductionistic methodsto analysisof social
relationships.Thus, theywerenot necessarilydenyingthe importanceof understanding humanimpactson
thenaturalenvironment. Nonetheless,developmentssubsequentto theworkof Frankfurt School theorists,
particularly the rise of postmodernism,led to a more wide-rangingrejectionof scientificprinciples,even
as applied to naturalphenomena.

empiricism,and logical positivismwithinthe social sciences.Althougha full dis-

cussion of these developmentsis beyond the scope of this article,we nevertheless
brieflyaddress the tendencyin criticalwork,even withinenvironmental sociology,
to associate scientificprocedures,particularlythoseinvolvingquantification- an im-
portantpart of macrosociological human ecology- with mechanistic determinism
and crudepositivism.We thenoutlinea materialistapproachto criticalworkin the
environmental social sciencesthatdrawsfromhistoricalmaterialism.
Positionedin explicitoppositionto thenaive methodological(positivistic)assump-
tions common to mid-century U.S. sociology,Frankfurttheoristscriticized"atheo-
retical" sociology for claimingthat facts speak for themselvesand for conflating
historicallyspecificsocial relationsunder capitalismwith universallaws of human
behavior(Bronner2002). Naive empiricismfailedto recognizehistoryand structure
in the formationof social attributesand behaviors.For instance,under capitalism
"the prevalenceof the law of exchangeand the regimentation of opinion by the
mass media etc." made sure that "nearlyeveryone'sbehaviourbecame regularized
and compulsive"such that"if individualswishto survivetheymustadapt theirlives
to these processesand become agents and bearersof commodityexchange.Under
theseconditionssocial interactiondoes appear to be governedby 'rigid'laws" (Held
1980:168).Hence, the errorof the naive empiricists could be foundin the way their
methodshypostatizedthe regularities of human interactionundercapitalism,failing
to recognizethat "the laws of historycannot simplybe equated with the laws of
nature"because historicallaws are tied to "specificmodes of human organization"
(Held 1980:168).
Logical positivismsuggestedthat methodsconcernedwithmeaningand purpose
wereirrelevant to scienceand, thence,outsidethe domain of authoritative objective
knowledge(Held 1980). The influenceof such a view could be seen in behaviorism,
whereonly observableeventswere consideredin the formulationof a "scientific"
psychology.However,criticaltheorists,drawingon the long-standingdistinctionin
German sociology betweennatural and human sciences,rejectedthis view. While
res naturanshas no internal,interpretive dimensionto it, human social action does,
indicating that the positivistmethod distortsthe domain characteristics of social
lifethroughthe operationaldemand to definesocial qualitiesin termsof measured
variation.2Since naturalsciencedevelopedfromthe desireto dominatenature,so it
was claimed,its applicationto social lifefacilitatedthe controlof human beingsby
otherhuman beings(Harding 1991; Kovel 2002; Merchant1980, 1992, 1994).
For criticaltheorists,as forthe German idealisttraditionfromwhichtheydrew,
this controlis in part ideological,as the ascendancyof formalrationalityin West-
ern science signifieda foreclosureon ways of knowingotherthan how to exploit
somethingor someone.Modern science,accordingto thisview:
abstractsfromthe infiniteworlda formof knowledgecapable of technicalex-

ploitation.It conceivesits object domain in termsof geometricshapes and cal-
culatesthe relationshipsbetweenobjectsin mathematicalformulaewhichallow
precisemeasurementof motionand causality.. . . [T]he concernwithexactness,
2An exclusivefocus on the world of

meaningwas not in and of itselfthe major impetusof critical
theory.Marxistcriticismunderstandsthesocial productionof meaningin lightof thetotalityof productive
relations(Agger 1992; Rush 2004). Criticaltheorywas therefore
morethan anotherstrandof interpretive
sociology,raisingdeeperissuesin termsof how naive methodscan ignorethe waysin whichsocial action
can be configuredby social structure.

calculabilityand foresight
predisposesscienceto seek knowledgeof a particular
type and form,namelyknowledgesuitableforpredictionand, therefore, tech-
nical control.Legitimatedby a positivistphilosophy,it constitutesthe world
solelyfromthisstandpoint.(Held 1980:166-67)
Regardingthis instrumentalrationalityand its relationto scientificepistemology,

Horkheimerand Adorno (1972), in Dialectic of Enlightenment, identifyrationality
withCartesianratio and measure,declaringthat:
Formal logic was the major school of unifiedscience.It providedthe enlight-

enmentthinkerswith the schema of the calculabilityof the world. ... To the
Enlightenment, that whichdoes not reduce to numbers,and ultimatelyto the
one, becomesillusion;modernpositivismwritesit offas literature.(1972:5)
From thiscritiqueof subjectivereason,criticaltheoristsconcludedthatthe techno-
logical worldviewinvolvesa particular,sociallyconstructedattitudetowardnature:
"scientific,calculatedand calculatingmastery"(Wehling2002:151). The resultwas
that"the orthodoxMarxistnotionof theneutrality of technologyor evenof technol-
ogy as a vehicleof emancipation [was] radicallycalled into question" (Wehling
. . .
2002:151). "Rationalitythus appears as a cultural,societal project of technology,
as a social construction"beggingthe question of whetheror not a new science
and technologycould be emancipatoryand sustainableat the same time (Wehling
2002:151).
In the latterpart of the 20th century,as Soviet-style"scientific"socialism be-
came increasingly dogmatic,elicitingMarxist humanismin response,the influence
of criticaltheorydisseminatedinto various strands of social theory.Humanistic
Marxism'senduringinfluencecan be seen in feministand postmodernisttheory,
both of whichrepresentchallengesto, as well as integrationof, FrankfurtSchool
ideas (Vogel 1996). The initialimpetusfortheorizingscienceas a formof domination
evolvedthereinto a generalcritiqueof modernity, turningupon the notionthatsci-
entificmethodology - withits explicitideal of impartial,universal,and authoritative
knowledge - veilsa meansby whichsocial dominationis legitimated throughthepro-
ductionof power/knowledge regimesprivileging particular(hegemonic)conceptions
of societyand nature(Escobar 1999; Goldman and Schurman2000; Harding 1991;
Kovel 2002; Rogers 1998). Human ecologyhas been associatedwithsuch unreflexive
maneuvers,gainingthe reputationof beingnaivelyempiricist.However,as should be
clear by now,our point in elaboratingCHE is to make room fora historicalsocial
sciencethatrecognizesthe impossibility of a God's eye view whileat the same time
allowing forthe of
credibility methods thataim to achievea realistunderstandingof
theworld.In orderto show thata humanecologicalapproachto social organization
and lifecan be both reflexiveand realist,we brieflyoutlinea Marxian materialist
theoryof knowledge.3
The Roots of HistoricalMaterialism
Whereaspositivismrejectedfromthedomain of valid knowledgeanythingthatcould
not be verifiedvia observation,the materialistapproach of Marx and Engels,which
3Criticalrealismin the traditionof Roy Bhaskar'searlierworkis certainlyan importantinfluencethat

otherenvironmental sociologistshave been rightto take up (Carolan 2005a). While Bhaskar'sobjective
is to philosophicallyestablishthat science is possible, we are more interestedin the methodological
orientationof environmental the efficacyof a materialistapproach.We briefly
social scienceand therefore
discusscriticalrealismin a latersectionbelow.

drewon but inverted,Hegel, emphasizedthatnot all processesare directlyavailable

to naive impression(Amato 2001). However,ratherthan embracingthe alienated
subjectof Hegel's phenomenology - whereknowledgeis producedin the successive
movementfromdenotativeutteranceto universalsignification to idea, and therefore
alienation is inherentlya problem of consciousness,a movementaway fromthe
body,and representations become the main object of analyticalconcern - Marx and
Engels's materialismcan be seen as an attemptto come to termswiththe human
propensityto transformthe world throughsocial labor, an activityin dialectical
motion with thinkingand representation (Fracchia 1991). Mediation,in this view,
is not primarilya relationby representations (Hegel's alienation),but throughsocial
labor (Timpanaro 1975). Emphasizingthe bodily relationsof labor highlightshow
embodimentprefigures the (anticipatory)aspect of consciousness,whichin turnis
an emergentpropertyof the species-specific cognitivestructureof historicalhuman
kind (Foster2008).
Unlike idealistepistemology,in whichthe problemof knowledgeis its representa-
tionalcharacter, materialist
epistemology involvestherecognitionof thepotentialfor
thedevelopmentof theapprehensionof objectswithrespectto particularsocial ends
(Leiss 1974). Concerningthe materialrelationbetweensubjectand object,Marx put
forththat:
To be objective,natural and sensuous,and at the same time to have object,

natureand sense outside oneself,or oneselfto be object,natureand sense for
a thirdparty,is one and the same thing.Hungeris a naturalneed; it therefore
needs a natureoutsideitself,an objectoutsideitself,in orderto satisfyitself,to
be stilled.Hunger is an acknowledgedneed of my body foran objectexisting
outsideit, indispensableto its integrationand to the expressionof its essential
being.(1978:115-16)
Marx's later expressionsof a materialistand ecological science of this mediation

weremore nuanced in termsof how he conceivedhuman labor: as one forcein the
bioticnetworkof relationsbetweenhumansand the restof the naturalworld.
Labor became for Marx not simplythe extensionof human powers over in-
organicnaturebut rathera process of the transformationof energyin which
human beingsweredependenton largermaterialand/or ecological conditions.
This took his analysisevenfurther
awayfrompurelyinstrumentalistperspectives
in whichnature'srole was merelypassive.(Fosterand Burkett2000:419)
Thus, criticalreflexivity,
recognizinghuman agency,and an ecological, material-
ist, scientific
worldview,emphasizingthe objectivecharacterof social labor in co-
evolutionwith the changingdynamicsof corporeal existence,lay at the heart of
Marx and Engel's method.
From thisperspective, quantificationand formalization do not inherently
involve
an impositionupon theworldor a departurefromtheworldso muchas theyrequire
abstractionin the world.Mathematicalformulaethat seek to describevariationare
possible because a patterned,transientformemergesfrominteractionand can be
observedand analyzed,evenifitsapprehensionis a gestaltphenomenon(Grene 1990;
Levins and Lewontin1985). We expressthispoint in our rephrasingof Korzybski's
(1933) maxim;themap is not theterritory,butneitheris a good map simplyarbitrary.
Ratherthan sciencebeingthe productof reason alone, or the sensesalone, it is the

resultof the dialecticalinterplaybetweenthe two. Therefore,whereasHorkheimer

argued that "what in each case is given depends not solely upon naturebut also
upon what men wish to make of it" (quoted in Frisby 1972:107), we stressthat
whenit comes to sensuousactivity, and therefore the materialreproduction of social
structure, whatis givencannot be solelydependentupon what we wish to make of
it.
From thisunderstanding, to rejectempiricalmeasurement, operationaldefinitions,
and quantitativeanalysis would perpetuatean extremelynarrowview of what it
means to do criticalwork, since these activitiescan all be guided by theoretical
insight.Privilegingnarrativeinterpretation over causal analysesof materialfactors
underminesthe dialectical approach to science and to society.While qualitative
understandingof the ways in which facts exist in theirsocial totalityis of vital
importance,quantitativeanalysisof that verypatterningis also a usefultool in a
criticalhuman ecology,since one crucial question for any science is how to select
appropriatematerialforthe adjudicationof claims,not simplythe methodchosen
to do so. The developmentof science,whichentails an ongoingstruggleforintel-
lectualemancipationand understanding, should not lightlybe abandoned underthe
influenceof relativism.
With that said, it is also equally importantto recognizethe historicalcontextof
the emergenceof criticaltheoryin thatit came about in responseto systematicef-
fortsto purgefromthe domain of valid knowledgeanythingthatwas not subjectto
directempiricalverification. We acknowledgethe importantrole criticaltheoryhas
in
played correcting the biases of capitalistscience.However,in seekingto correct
the idealist bias in WesternMarxism we point not only to dynamicsendogenous
to historicallyproducedsocial structurebut also those dynamicsexogenousto such
structure as found in the basic resource,climate,population,and technologicalfac-
torsthat form the material conditionsforco-evolution.To overcomethisidealistbias
requiresdrawing on what Marx and Engels called the "firstfact" of historicalmate-
rialism,the "corporealorganization"of the labor process,specifically withregardto
the various social-ecological metabolic requirements in various ecohistorical
periods
and regionalcontexts(Foster2000; Fracchia2005; Haila and Levins 1992; O'Connor
1998). Criticalwork,in thisalternateformulation, is not limitedto textualand dis-
cursiveanalysis, but centers on the investigation how human beingsproduceand
of
reproducetheirmaterial lives and the constraintsand possibilitiestheseproductive
relationsgenerate.Combined with human ecological methods(broadlyconstrued),
which include the investigation of the effectsof dynamicnatural conditions(cli-
mate, biogeography, hydrogeology, etc.) on human societies,CHE can establisha
sound meta-theoretical basis for the ongoingprojectof environmental sociologyby
combiningthe strengths of two of its most powerfultheoreticaltraditions.
CriticalMaterialismin theEcological Sciences

Althoughthe mainstreamof academic Marxismshiftedfrommaterialistto cultural
analysisas the 20thcenturyunfolded,a solidlymaterialistMarxismwas maintained
and advanced by a varietyof scholars,many of whom were practicingscientists
(Foster 2000). Works by prominentevolutionarytheoristsRichard Levins and
RichardLewontin(1985; Lewontinand Levins 2007), Yrjo Haila (Haila and Levins
1992), and StephenJayGould (1977, 1989, 2002, 2003) are the best recentrepre-
sentativesof this perspectivein the natural sciences,wherematerialist,dialectical,
and historicalanalysestake centerstage.Foster(1999, 2000) builds on thistradition

by highlighting Marx's own ecological insightsin orderto illustratethe theoretical

power of analysis.Clark and York (2005a, 2005b), followingFoster,draw
materialist
on the dialecticalbiologytradition(Gould 1977, 2002; Levins and Lewontin1985;
Lewontinand Levins 2007) to articulatea materialistecologythatmaintainsan eco-
centricfocuswithoutstrayinginto idealismor spiritualism.It is this approach that
providesa bridgebetweenhistoricalmaterialismand human ecology.CHE, there-
fore,relieson thistraditionas well as therelatedworkof otherhistoricalmaterialists
(e.g., Dickens 2005; Moore 2003; O'Connor 1998, 1999) who have shown the abil-
ity of historicalmaterialismto advance our understandingof human-environment
interactions.
Centralto a materialistecologyis the observationthatall livingorganismschange
the veryconditionsforliving.Hence, the humanpropensityto do the same suggests
social continuitywith the natural world. Seen froma co-evolutionaryview, the
dynamicinteractionsbetweenhuman societies,their built environments, and the
biophysicalprocesses of the earth requiretheoryand method with which one can
in
engage analysis of material We in
practice. explore slightly more detail the sources
of thisecologicalmaterialismin the nextsection
REDUCTIONISM, HUMANISM, AND DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS

It is ironicthatover 100 yearsago, Engels,who has oftenbeen labeled a mechanist
foreshadowed
and positivistby criticaltheorists, criticaltheory'scritiqueof capitalist
science,making a distinction between reductionism as a sometimesusefulmethod-
ological approach and its inflatedstatusas the exclusiveroad to truth.In doing so
he recognizedand accepted the historicaldevelopmentof science as a potentially
liberatingprocess,but one that nevertheless can be limitedby social constructs.In
Anti-Duhring, Engels wrote:
The analysis of natureinto its individualparts,the groupingof the different

naturalprocessesand naturalobjects into definiteclasses, the investigationof
the internalanatomyof organicbodies,in theirmanifoldanatomicalforms,was
the basic conditionforthe giganticprogressin the knowledgeof nature,made
duringthe last fourhundredyears.But it has likewisebequeathedthe habit of
regardingnaturalobjectsand naturalprocessesin theirisolation,detachedfrom
theirconnectionwith the vast whole; therefore, not in theirmovements,but
in theirstate of rest;not as essentiallychangeablebut as fixedand constant;
not in theirlife,but in theirdeath. And when this way of looking at things
was transmitted fromnaturalscienceto philosophy,as was done by Bacon and
it
Locke, produced the specificnarrow-mindedness of the last centuries,the
metaphysical mode of thought.(Engels 1935:18)
Engels is insightfulin his recognitionthat the reductionistproject as a method

of investigationhas its strengthsbut as a "metaphysical"view of the worlderringly
posits natureand society as staticand unchanging,"in whichtheworldis a collection
of things,isolated fromone another" (Foster 2008:21; see also Hughes 2000:75).
Engels emphasizedthe totalityof social relationsand naturalprocesses,connected
in a complexof historicalproductionthatcannotbe understoodfullyby theanalysis
of isolatedstaticunits.
Like Engels,criticaltheoristshave emphasizedthe relationshipbetweenthe prop-
ertiesof the whole (of social relations)and the elementsof everydayactivity.Held
(1980) graspsthe essentialfeaturesof thisapproach:

Everyfacetof social realitycan onlybe understoodas an outcomeof the con-

tinualinterplaybetween"moment"(phase of,aspect of,totality)and "totality."
The structureof the social process conditionsand determinesboth the place
and functionof everyparticular"thing"and the formin whichit appears as
an object of experience.Any givenobject can only be understoodin the con-
text(and in the light)of its conditionsand relations.These do not appear in
immediateexperiencebut are importantin the understanding and explanation
of "things."(Held 1980:164-65)
Thus,criticisminvolvestracingtherelationsbetweenthingsratherthanviewingthem
in theirisolation,and understanding theserelationsin termsof social structure, an
intrinsicallyhistoricalactivity.
Clearly,a centralfeatureof criticaltheoriesis a critiqueof reductionismand an
emphasis on dialectics.4Yet, like the termpositivism,reductionismis a complex
termwithvariousmeanings(Hughes 2000). One can referto reductionism in terms
of a deterministic explanationof dynamicsoccurring at one level of organization
(e.g., the social) by dynamicsat anothermore "basic" level (e.g., the biological).
Anothermeaningof reductioncan referto the explanationof complexwholes(e.g.,
theeconomy)by reference to simplerparts(e.g.,individualsmaximizingutility)while
workingwithinthe same level(the social). In thislatterinstance,reductionism is not
simplya determination betweenlevels but also a specificationof the relationship
betweenindividualand structure.
Crude reductionism is no doubt a flawedapproachto analysisof theworld.Gould
(2003) clearlyidentifiesthe limitationsof reductionism:
I believethat reductionism- a powerfulmethodthat should be used whenever

appropriate,and that has been employedtriumphantly throughoutthe history
of modernscience- mustfailas a generality (both logicallyand empirically)-
I do not believethatreductionism can come even close to fullsuccessas a style
of explanationforlevelsof complexity(includingseveralaspectsof evolutionary
biology,and thenproceeding"upward" in intricacytowardcognitiveand social
systemsof even greaterintegrationand interaction)fortwo basic reasons -
First,emergence,or the entryof novel explanatoryrules in complex systems,
laws arisingfrom"nonlinear"or "nonadditive"interactionsamong constituent
partsthattherefore, in principle,cannot be discoveredfrompropertiesof parts
consideredseparately Second, contingency, or the growingimportanceof
unique historical"accidents" that cannot, in principle,be predicted,but that
remainfullyaccessibleto factualexplanationaftertheiroccurrence.The role of
contingencyas a componentof explanationincreasesin the same sciencesof
complexitythat also become more and more inaccessibleto reductionismfor
the firstreason of emergentprinciples.(2003:201-02)
He describesdialecticsas:
4KovePs(2002) discussionof dialecticsis informative.
thebringingtogetherof different pointsof viewforthepurposesof argument,and in theinterests of
arrivingat truth.Dialectic was not a merepluralismbut a consciousnessof the radicalunfulfillment
of the merelyindividualmind or ego, and of the hiddenrelationshipsof differing points of view.
Dialectics recognizesboth the limitsand powersof the mind: that we are limitedin our knowing,
owingto the unfathomablereachesof naturewhichcan be graspedintuitively at best,and owing,
also, to the peculiaritiesof human selfhood,withits "dialectic" of separationand attachment. . .
but thatwe are also powerfulbecause of thecapacityof the imaginationto becomevisionary,seeing
beyondthe givenand transforming the real. Hence dialecticsas practiceis the bringingtogetherof
mindsin a dialogicalspiritof open discourse- (2002:139-40)

A narrowfocus on reductionism, as criticaltheoristsrightlyassert,will impoverish

the social sciences and leave us unable to comprehendthe world. However,the
starklimitationsinherentin reductionism do not mean thatreductionist approaches
have not yielded considerableinsightsinto society and nature,as Gould (2003)
notes whileemphasizingthe importanceof contingency (discussedmore below) and
as
emergence concepts. The to our
key furthering understanding of the worldlies in
the
appreciating knowledgegained through reductionist
science, without succumbing
to the intellectualblindersthatcome withreductionism.
It is an errorto rejectsciencebecause one rejectsreductionism. AlthoughWestern
sciencehas had a deep commitmentto reductionism, the two are not inextricably
linked. Dialectical traditionsare establishedin the sciences,particularlyin biol-
ogy (Gould 1977, 2002, 2003; Haila and Levins 1992; Levins and Lewontin1985;
Lewontinand Levins 2007), that transcendthe divide betweenscience and critical
analysis.In developinga dialecticalscience,we must steera cautious path between
the Scylla of reductionismand the Charybdisof holism.As reductionismfails be-
cause of its focus on parts,holism withoutdialecticsfails because of its inability
to recognizedivisions,tensions,and internalcontradictions, and its tendencytoward
functionalism (a topic we address below).
Because the social sciencesoftentriedto emulatethe 19th-century physicalsci-
ences in a crudemanner,it has been assumedby manycriticalscholarsthatattempts
to integratethe naturalenvironment into sociologicaltheorymustessentiallyforfeit
whatis unique about the social domain and as a resultgivein to determinism. This
assumption is based in part on the misconception that to do science is to focus
singularlyon the discoveryof eternaland universalnaturallaws and on the related
idea that the emphasison objectivebehaviorprecludesthe inclusionof intentional
action into analyses (Rogers 1998). In fact, the developmentof scientificknowl-
edge requiresexaminingcontingency and necessity,historicalprocesses,and complex
emergentphenomena (York and Clark 2006a, 2006b, 2007). Moreover,analyzing
the contradictionsbetweenagency and constraint,individualfreedomand social
structure, involvesexaminingobjectivelychangingrelations.In this vein,ecological
sciencemustoftenuse historicaland comparativemethodsto assess divergenceand
convergencein the historiesof organismsas the subjectsand objects of evolution
(Levins and Lewontin1985).
The philosophicaldebatesswirlingaround the conceptof emergenceattestto the
difficulty of determiningwhen explanationby referenceto parts is sufficient and
whenexplanationby reference to wholesis necessary(Clayton2006). Methodologi-
cal reductionism has been a usefultool in thehistoryof thenaturalsciences.It is the
unreflexive applicationof Bacon and Newton'smethodto everylast aspect of the
social thatbecomes a problem(Dickens 2005). Carolan (2005a, 2005b), drawingon
the workof Roy Bhaskar,has elaborateda criticalrealistapproach to environmen-
tal sociology.Bhaskar'sconceptof a rootedand emergent(irreducible)stratification
of the world suggeststhe possibilityfor causation that is "multidirectional, going
both 'upward' and 'downward'" (Carolan 2005b:2). Althoughthe social is rooted
in and emergentfromthe biological,the social also has causal efficacyupon the
biological. Hence, tryingto establishunidirectionalcausal relationsbetweenele-
ments at one level and another level can miss the reciprocalinfluencesbetween
the two.
Our position,drawingfromthe dialecticalbiologytradition,is thatwhenit comes
to social behaviorand human development,therecan be substantialvariation,both
individuallyand culturally, withgreaterpossibilitiesthan sociobiologistsand many

CRITICALHUMANECOLOGY 135
traditionalhumanecologists wouldallow,including thepossibilityoftheself-making

ofbothhumanculture and humannature. Ratherthanemphasizing inherent -
traits
a veritable - we holdthatgreater
blackbox of causation sociologicalrelevanceand
explanatory powercan be foundin thedialecticalinteraction betweennatureand
culture.For example,we contendthatrecognizing how landscape,technology, and
resourcebase on the one hand,and structures of ownership, rights of use and
access,and customsof inheritanceon theother,provides insightsinto how structural
limitationsempower somesocialactorsand disempower others.However, we do not
deny the insightsthat have been gainedby some reductionistanalyses.Thus,we
propose a middle way between a humanistic holismthat lacks analyticrigoranddoes
notseekto understand and
causality thereductionism characteristicof sociobiology
and someworkin humanecologythatfailsto recognize emergence acrossscales.A
dialecticalapproachallowsfora scientificprogram ofsocialanalysis, without giving
in to theultimatelyflawed philosophy of reductionism.
HISTORICAL AND AHISTORICAL CAUSAL FORCES

Whilerecognizing theimportance of history, humanecologyhas oftenfocusedon
ahistorical
explanations ofthecharacteristics ofhumansocieties, suchas geographic
factorsand culturaluniversals stemming fromgenes(Boyd and Richerson1985;
Lenski2005). Muchof thecontroversy abouthumanecologyhas centered on this
issue.Dunlap and Catton(1983) note thatoftenwhenbiologicalor geographic
factorsareinvoked to explainsocialfacts,an accusationofbiologicalor geographic
determinism is soonto follow. Theyarguethatthisis frequently inappropriate,since
assertingthatbiologicalor geographical factorsinfluence societyis not the same
as claimingthesefactorsdetermine social outcomes.Dunlap and Catton(1983),
in theircall fora morepluralistic viewof factorsinfluencing go on to
societies,
argue thatby rejecting and
biological geographic explanations of socialphenomena
and admitting onlysocial explanations, manyin the social scienceshavebecome
sociocultural determinists.
Clearly,froma materialist perspective,all material forcesneedto be considered in
understanding the human condition and the natural world. Transcending the divide
overbiologicaland geographic explanations of socialfactsversussociocultural ex-
planations,CHE does not denythe effectsof spatiotemporally invariant(ahistorical)
causalforcesstemming fromnaturallawsand conditions in thebiophysical environ-
mentbut seeksto contextualize theseforcesin historically specificconditions. We
hold thathistorical materialism,withits emphasison contingency, and
dialectics,
emergence, helpspointthewayto an environmental sociologythatdoes not reject
theimportance oftheeffects ofbiology, geography, andphysical processeson society,
butat thesametimerecognizes thepotential mutability ofmanyfeatures ofnatural
and socialsystems.
Understanding thenatureof historical contingency is necessary forappreciating
how particularistic eventscan lead to large-scale changesin the social or natural
worlddespitetheoperationof spatiotemporally invariant laws.Gould's(1989)pre-
sentationof how thehistory of metazoan(multicellular animal)lifeon Earthhas
been dominated by contingency in additionto necessity is particularlywellartic-
ulatedand illustrates the natureof historical processes. Gould (1989, 2002) notes
thatwhilenaturalselectionis themostfundamental forcein thebiologicalworld,
it does not lead to deterministic outcomes.Naturalselection, as a purelymateri-
alistforce,is of course"blind,"havingno higherpurposeand no foresight. Thus,

selectionadapts species to theirimmediateenvironments, but does not generatea

largertrajectorytowarda "greater"goal, such as complexityor intelligence.How
species adapt to theirenvironments is a piecemealprocess,wherenaturalselection
tinkerswithexistingfeaturesof organismsto constructworkablesolutionsto external
pressures.
Emphasizingthe role of contingencyin history,Gould (1989) argues that there
are no obvious adaptivefeaturesthat distinguishthe animal lineagespresentin the
Cambrian Period- the geologic period that lasted fromapproximately 540 million
years ago to 490 million years ago in which a wide varietyof animal species first
appeared in the fossilrecord- that would go on to evolutionary success fromthose
that would ultimatelybecome extinct.The representative of our own phylum(the
taxonomicrankjust below kingdom),cordata, in the Cambrian seas was a small,
uncommonworm-likecreaturethat was in no way markedforsuccess,althoughit
went on to leave many descendants,while other animals that were common and
apparentlydominantin the Cambrian seas became extinctover the geologicallong
haul. More recently, thedinosaurscoexistedwith,and generallyout-competed, mam-
mals foralmost 100 millionyearsbeforean asteroidor cometcollidedwiththeearth
65 millionyearsago- a cosmicaccident- wipingout the dinosaursand openingthe
way for the subsequentexpansion of mammals.Gould (1989, 2002) argues,based
on the historyof life on earth,that naturalselectionis the dominantforcesculpt-
ing organismsto fittheirenvironments, but contingentevents,such as the impact
of an extraterrestrial object on earth, can radicallyalter patterns,makinghistory
ultimatelyunpredictable,despite the operationof spatiotemporally invariantlaws.
Unique events can change the course of history,setting lifeon a differentpath.
This insightabout the natureof historicalprocesses,particularlythe interaction
of spatiotemporally invariantlaws and contingency, informstheperspectiveof CHE.
CHE is groundedin the dialecticalbiologytraditionof Gould, and the extensionof
thistraditionto sociology(York and Clark 2006a, 2006b, 2007), wherenaturallaws
are recognizedas fundamentalforcesshaping human societies,while contingency
is similarlyrecognizedas, to some degreeat least, liberatingsocietiesfromsimple
deterministic outcomes.
A key example of how human ecology can benefitfromhistoricalmaterialism
concernsquestions of population and carryingcapacity.It is a common practice
for uncritical(Mol and Spaargaren 2005) and criticalscholars (Mies and Shiva
1993) alike to pejorativelyapply the Malthusian label to human ecological argu-
mentsbecause human ecology admitspopulationpressuresand otherdemographic
considerationsinto its analyses.However,CHE, whilerecognizing the importantrole
in
populationgrowthplays generating environmental has
problems, the advantageof
holding a more nuanced view of population-environment connectionsthan what is
receivedfromMalthus.
The debate about Malthus has in many ways inhibited,ratherthan facilitated,
the developmentof a sophisticatedunderstandingof population-environment con-
nections.The Malthusianargumentand the argumentsof so-calledneo-Malthusians
have been attackedfromboth the politicalLeftand Right,and the subsequentcon-
troversy has too oftengeneratedmore heat than light.We believethatthe focuson
Malthusis misdirected. Foster(2002), in an assessmentof Malthus'sargument, notes
severalproblemswithhis assumptionsabout populationgrowthand food produc-
tion. Malthus'smodel was based on the assumptionthatfertility ratescould not be
substantially reduced, food supply could not be geometrically expanded,and, thus,
that population,which if unfetteredtended to grow geometrically, would always

press on food supply,ensuringthat miserywould be the lot of humanity.In this

formulation, thereis a perpetualmovingequilibriumbetweenpopulation and the
environment, because negativechecks,such as starvation(due to the lack of food),
would alwaysrestrainpopulationand preventit fromrealizingits potentialto grow
geometrically.
It is obviouslythe case that population growthcannot continueunabated on a
finiteplanet,and Malthusdimlyglimpsedthisverity.However,thereweresubstantial
flawsin his argument.One of themainflawswas his assumptionthatmortality would
always and necessarilybe the factor limitingpopulationgrowth. Since his time we
haveseen thedevelopmentof safeand effective birthcontrolmethodsand thedecline
of populationgrowthratesin a vast majorityof nations,typicallynot due to rising
mortalitybut, rather,largelydue to voluntaryfertility reductions.Improvements in
women'srights,risingeducation,and declininginfantmortalityplayed key roles in
fertilitydeclinesaround the world,obviatingMalthus'sassumptionthatpopulation
growth could only by limitedby risinghuman misery.Thus, changinghistorical
conditions(e.g., the developmentof effective and widelyavailablebirthcontroland
altered social conditions that made low fertilitydesirableto manypeople) made it
so thatmortality was not the factor that constrained populationgrowth.A second
flaw of Malthus's argument stemmed from his inaccurate assumptionsabout the
potentialto rapidlyexpand food production. The exponentialgrowthof agricultural
productionover the 20th century belies Malthus's claim that food productioncan
onlygrowin an arithmetic (i.e., linear) fashion. Historical changesin foodproduction
methodsmade it possible,at least for a limited time, expandfoodproductionmore
to
rapidlythan the rate at which the human populationgrew.
In recognizingthe flawsof Malthus'sargument,we mustnot, however,fail to rec-
ognize the realityof naturallimitsand the importantrole populationgrowthplays
in expandinganthropogenic environmental impacts.The exponentialgrowthin agri-
culturalproductionover the past two centuries occurredat the expense of natural
ecosystemsand the species that depend on them,as more land was put under the
plow.Since thearea and theproductivity of the biosphereobviouslydid not growex-
ponentially, as domestic(agricultural)species consumed a largershareof the Earth's
surfaceand solar input,wild species were displaced. Thus, althoughhumans did,
counterto what Malthus assumed possible,dramaticallyexpand food production,
thiscame withextraordinary ecological costs. In recognizingthis,CHE emphasizes
the complexityof the human-environment interaction.Counterto Malthus'sviews,
food productionin some contextscan growexponentially (althoughnot indefinitely).
However,consistentwiththe argumentsof so-called neo-Malthusians (e.g., Catton
1980), this typicallycomes at the expense of alteration of natural ecosystemsand
loss of biodiversity.There is, thus,a dance here between the ahistoricalconstraints
of nature(e.g., solar inputand its connectionto net primaryproductivity) and the
historicallydynamicnatureof social change.
Fromthe CHE perspective, addressingpopulationgrowthis a necessary,yetinsuf-
ficient,conditionforachievingsustainability. The existenceof ahistoricalforces,such
as the laws of thermodynamics and the realityof finiteland area and solar input,
means that human societiescannot growindefinitely and are therefore constrained
by the conditionsof the natural environment. Humans, like all other organisms,
depend on availablenutrientsand the integrity of ecosystemsfortheirsurvivaland
are not exemptfromthe consequencesof underminingthe biotic network,either
by overharvesting biomass or by disruptingthe metabolicactivityof the web of life
throughfloodingatmospheric, terrestrial,and aquatic reservoirs withextra-metabolic

toxinsor excessnutrients (Catton and Dunlap 1978; Clark and York 2005a; Dunlap
and Catton 1979; Mancus 2007). Yet, even given these ahistoricalconstraints,the
institutionsthat structuresocial mediationof ecological factorscan existin various
formations.Since societiesvarywidelyin theirlevels of resourceconsumptionand
the distributionamong theirpopulationsof resources,it is not possible to assign a
singlespecificlimit to the numberof people a particularregioncan support(Cohen
1995). The human-carrying capacityof a region,therefore,depends on the histor-
ically particularmodes of productionused in the region and the social processes
through which food and other resourcesare distributed.
Marx (1973) recognizedthe interplayof historicaland ahistoricalforcesin human
societies,writingin the Grundrisse:
All epochs of productionhave certaincommon traits,common characteristics.

Productionin generalis an abstraction,but a rationalabstractionin so far as
it reallybringsout and fixesthe commonelementand thus saves us repetition.
Still, this general category,this common elementsiftedout by comparison,
is itselfsegmentedmany times over and splits into different determinations.
Some determinations belong to all epochs,othersonlyto a few.
(Marx 1973:85,
emphasesin the original)
By using dialecticaland materialistscienceengagedin rationalabstraction,we can

see the coexistenceof historicaland ahistoricalforcesin the course of changes
in food production.For example,the conditionof the biophysicalenvironment no
doubt is the fundamentalfeatureunderlyingfood production,yet the technologies
used in productionand the systemof distribution of food are featuresof historically
specificsocial relations(Moore 2003). The materialand energeticrequirements for
an agrariansocietydo not entail,by necessity, class divisions.Therefore,
theexistence
of inequality,social stratification,
and human miseryis not necessarilythe resultof
absolute scarcity,or task specialization,but emergesin the historicalstruggleover
theallocationof labor and resources,and thesocial priorities(e.g.,privilegingcertain
groups)reflectedin thisstruggle.
In its focuson both historicaland ahistoricalforces,CHE emphasizesthatenvi-
ronmentalchallengesare not unique to modernityor to capitalism,but ratherare
fundamentalissues that all societieshave faced in varyingways throughouthuman
history.A substantialbody of researchhas shownthatmanypremodernand indige-
nous societies,fromNativeAmericansto Polynesiansto AustralianAborigines,have
had severeimpactson theirenvironments, oftenunderminingthe sustainability of
theirpopulations(Browswimmer 2002; Chew 2001; Diamond 2005; Flannery1994;
Krech 1999; Ponting 1993; Turneret al. 1991). Thus, althoughmoderncapitalist
societieshave theirown particulardynamicsthathave led to a global environmental
crisis,theyare not alone in generatingenvironmental problems.Criticalscholarshave
mainlyfocusedtheirecological criticismon capitalistindustrialsocieties(O'Connor
1994; Schnaiberg1980), whichis not inappropriategiventhatthis is the contextin
whichwe presentlystruggle.However,a singularfocuson the critiqueof capitalism
has oftenobscuredthe factthatenvironmental problemsare not simplythe product
of the dominantsystemof the presentand, thus,political-economicchange is a
necessarybut not a sufficient criterionforsustainability.
Human ecologistshave generallybeen more willingthan criticaltheoriststo rec-
ognize the breadthof challengessocietiesface, ratherthan focusingnarrowlyon
politicaleconomyalone. Duncan (1959, 1961, 1964) has exemplifiedthispluralistic

approach in his recognitionthat all societiesmust address the dynamicinteraction

of population,social organization,technology,and the natural environment. The
modernecological crisisis surelygeneratedby various forces,some unique to cap-
italism,some to industrialism, some to agriculture,and some common across all
types of societies.
It is, thus,importantto examineboth the social-ecologicalinterac-
tionsparticularto each typeof society(Moore 2000, 2002, 2003) and the ecological
challengescommon across societies(Diamond 1997; Lenski 2005). The importance
of combininga recognitionof the equal importanceof humanecologyand political
economyforexplainingenvironmental degradationhas provenpowerfulin explain-
ing national-levelenvironmental impacts (York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003) and likely
holds promiseforfurthering our understandingof human-environment interactions.
Criticalhumanecology,by drawingon bothcriticaland humanecologicaltraditions,
need not succumbto monocausal explanations,but rathercan recognizethe multi-
plicityof ecological challengeshuman societiesface and the potentialto radically
changemanyfeaturesof the human-environment relationship.
STRUCTURALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

The intellectualtensionbetweenstructuralism and functionalismhas existedin many
disciplinesover an extendedperiod of time.As well as in the social sciences,it has
been a particularlyprominenttensionin the biological sciences since well before
Darwin, and is a key issue in contemporary debates in evolutionarytheory(Gould
2002). Thus, the work of dialecticalbiologistsaimed at understandingthe limita-
tionsof ultra-Darwinianfunctionalism (althoughnot aimed at critiquingDarwinism
in general) and the meritsof structuralism can informCHE. We, therefore, high-
lightsome importantconceptualizationsfromstructuralbiology that allow us to
understandthe limitationsof functionalist analyses.
Gould and Lewontin(1979) presenteda widelyrecognizedcritiqueof what they
called the "Panglossian Paradigm,"the ultra-Darwinianview in the biological sci-
ences that virtuallyeveryfeatureof all organismsexists to serve a function.The
PanglossianParadigmtakes its name fromthe fictionalDoctor Pangloss (a satirical
representation of the philosopherGottfriedLeibniz), fromVoltaire'snovel Candide.
Pangloss took the hyperfunctionalist view that everything existedfor the purpose
to which it was put- for example,shouldersexist to hold up suspendersand the
bridgeof thenose foreyeglassesto reston. Gould and Lewontinmade thecase that
ultra-Darwiniansin Panglossianfashionall too frequently relyon "just so" stories
forexplainingcharacteristics of organisms,weavingtales of how any particulartrait
servesa function,regardlessof whetherthereis reliableevidencesupportingsuch
claims.
Gould and Lewontin,whilefirmly supportingDarwinism,arguedthatnot all char-
acteristicsof organismsare adaptations,rathersome are merelyside consequences
of structuralforces,such as those stemmingfromthe natureof the growthprocess.
They referredto these structuralfeaturesas spandrels - the architecturaltermfor
spaces left betweenstructuralelementsof a building,typicallybetweena curved
featureand a rectangularboundary.They explainedthat,forexample,the construc-
tion of a dome on roundedarches necessitatesthe constructionof fourtriangular
spandrelswherethe archesmeetthe dome (Gould and Lewontin1979:147-48).The
spandrelsare an incidentalconsequence of the structuraldemand for a dome on
roundedarches;theyare not constructedfora purpose of theirown- that is, they
do not existforfunctionalreasons.

Analogously,thestructural natureof ontogeneticdevelopment(growththroughthe

lifecourse) of organismstypicallyproducesnonadaptivestructuralelements(span-
drels)in virtuallyall creatures.Gould (2002) presentsa particularly clear illustration
of this.He explainsthat"snails thatgrowby coilinga tube aroundan axis mustgen-
eratea cylindricalspace, called an umbilicus,along the axis" (2002:1259). Although
a "fewspeciesuse the open umbilicusas a broodingchamberto protecttheireggs"
(2002:1259), most do not. Historical evidence indicatesthat "umbilical brooders
occupy only a few tips on distinctand late-arisingtwigsof the [snail] cladogram
[evolutionary tree],not a centralpositionnear the root of the tree" (2002:1260). It,
therefore,is clear thatthe umbilicusis not producedforadaptivereasons,although
it has been made use of in some lineages.Rather,the umbilicusis a spandrel - a
nonadaptive structural side effect of a process of growth where a tube is coiled
around an axis. One of Gould and Lewontin'skeypoints is thatstructuralfeatures
existforclear materialreasons,and in some cases maybe of utility, but theirorigins
are not necessarilyexplainedby functionaldemands.
Gould and Lewontin'sconceptualizationof structuralforcesand theircontrast
with functionalism can help enrichhuman ecological analyses.As we will discuss
more specificallybelow,the human ecology traditionhas ofteninappropriately fo-
cused on functionalist explanations of social phenomena, where featuresof societies
are assumed to be adaptations to the environment.Structuralconceptualizations
allow us to see that many of the social phenomenaexplainedby functionalists as
adaptationsmay be betterunderstood as nonadaptiveconsequences of structural
forces,stemmingeitherfromthe environment or frominternalsocial characteristics,
such as demographics.
The assumptionthat societiesare functionallyadapted to theirenvironments is
centralto the thinkingof many renownedsocial scientists.In sociology,Talcott
Parsons (1967) explicitlytook a functionalist stance in explaininga wide sweep of
social characteristics.Similarly,anthropologist culturalmaterialistMarvinHarris
and
(1979) clearlyaccepted functionalism in his assertionthat culturalinventionsarise
to ensure survivalof the group in its particularhistoricaland ecological context.
Both Harris'sand Parsons'sapproachesto explainingculturaldiversity assumedthat
culturalpatterns, norms,customs, and so forth exist because they confer reproductive
successto the group.
The functionalist viewhas oftendistortedour understanding of boththesocial and
naturalworlds.CHE agrees with Harris and otherhuman ecologiststhat societies
are clearlyaffectedby theirenvironments, but it rejectsthe notion thatmost social
featurescan be understoodas adaptationsto the environment. Cultural practices
and institutions can just as well be maladaptive.Functionalistexplanationstend to
be imposedad hoc on social phenomenaand frequently do not reflectthe complex
historicalroutes that led up to social practices.Social structurescan come into
existenceand be perpetuatedfornonfunctional reasons.
Functionalismis notjust a problemforhumanecology.Ironically,it is also found
in supposedlycriticaltheoriesthat idealize indigenouspeople and ancientsocieties.
For instance,Devall and Sessions (1985) and Mies and Shiva (1993) appear to op-
erate on the assumptionthat prior to the emergenceof the "modern" scientific
worldviewin the 16thcentury,for the most part thereexistedculturalconstraints
on overexploiting the environment - that is, functionalistculturalmechanismsfor
ensuringsustainability. Accordingly, because theyviewedthe earthas a livingbeing,
"premodern" societies were supposedlyless inclinedto commitecocide. This line of
argumentsuggests that the replacementof the premodernorganicworldviewwith

thematerialist scientific paradigmundermined thesenormative constraints, paving

thewayforcolonialism, capitalism, and the destruction of the earth. Thus,idealist
ecologists,whilerecognizing dysfunction in modernsocieties, oftenassume(some-
timesonlyimplicitly) thatpremodern societiesare generally functional and adapted
to theirenvironments.
However, as discussedabove,empiricalevidencesuggeststhatsocietiesexisting
prior to the development of mechanistic philosophy and reductionist sciencehad
substantial impacts on the natural environment, the
undermining assumption that
societiesfreeof themodernworldview livein harmony withnature.Furthermore,
evenif suchnormative taboosexisted,theirsuccessin guidinga group'slong-term
subsistence activities is an issueto be answered via historical evidence. The general
problem with cultural functionalism is that it ignores the fact that ecologicalcrises
havecutacrossvirtually all cultures, bothcontemporary and historical. It wouldbe
difficultto identify a culturethatheldnaturein esteemand yetdid not,at least
occasionally, havea substantial impacton itsnaturalresourcebase.Thus,it is not
the case that indigenous communities would"naturally" livein harmony withtheir
environments if left alone by modern societies (Botkin1990).
Nevertheless, to arguethatsocialorganization has nothing to do withsolvingat
leastsome problems that stem from the struggle forexistence is clearlyproblematic.
Obviously, someminimallevelof functional restructuring is requiredin a society
forit to survive. Furthermore, sincehumansare thinking agents,theyare obviously
the
capableof recognizing challenges of survival posedby theirenvironmental con-
textsand ofadjusting their behavior accordingly. Thus, societies no doubt have some
features thathelpthemsurvivein theirenvironmental context, butthisshouldnot
be takento mean that they are free of other features that are nonadaptive or even
maladaptive. What is needed is a that
perspective recognizes that human societies
are embeddedin thenaturalenvironment, affect it,and are affected byit,butthat
doesnottakethecrudefunctionalist view that social features are simply adaptations
to thebiophysical context.In providing sucha perspective, CHE takesthestruc-
turalviewthatinternal and external aspectsof societiesshapeand constrain their
evolution, butthatthisdynamic does not necessarily lead to adaptation.
To illustrate thispoint,we highlight JaredDiamond's(1991,1997,2005)approach
to biogeographical history. We focuson Diamondbecausehe has constructed a
perspective withpowerful explanatory potential, which incorporates fundamental
humanecologicalinsights. However, in focusing on Diamondwe do not wishto
suggest thathisperspective is without limitations or shortcomings. Diamond'swork,
although generally wellreasoned, is still often constrained by functionalist and ahis-
toricalthinking (Davis 1997;Laibman2003; York and Mancus 2007).Nonetheless,
Diamondhas keystructural insights. Weexaminethestrengths ofhisarguments and
showtheirvalueforinforming CHE, but also point to where CHE departs from Di-
amond.Wefirstoutlinehisbasicarguments about the riseof complexsocieties, and
thennotethat,althoughhe oftenpresents thesearguments in functionalist terms,
theycan be moreconvincingly interpreted in structuralist terms.
Diamond's(1991, 1997,2005) focusis on how features of thebiophysical envi-
ronment influence social development. and
Ecology,climate, geography contribute
to theformation of different modesof social,political,and economicorganization
(Diamond1997).In thespecificinstanceof theriseof agriculture, thefeatures of
thenaturalenvironment go a longwayto explaining why different societies took
differenttrajectories. Someregions, liketheFertileCrescent, had a diversity ofwild
plantsand animalsamenableto domestication, like
whileotherregions, Australia,

did not. The developmentof agriculturecreatednew potentialsforpopulationsize,

and hence densityof interaction, and contributedto changesin social relationsand
the developmentand diffusionof writing,metallurgy, mass epidemics,statepolitical
organization, and large-scaleconquest. Agriculture complex social orga-
facilitates
nization because it can allow for surplusproductionand because seasonal pulses
of labor leave time available for work not dedicatedentirelyto directsubsistence.
The productionof an economic surplusfacilitatesthe feedingof craftspecialists,
settlements,the accumulationof possessions,and an increasein population.
In discussingthesedevelopments, Diamond's pointis thatthe biophysicalenviron-
mentpresentssocietieswithopportunitiesand constraints. However,he is carefulto
avoid a deterministicview.Diamond's workincludescontingency as well as necessity
in its explanationsof macrohistorical change,although his focus is typicallyon the
latter.In tryingto explain the nearlyuniversalphenomenonof complexspecializa-
tion and the replacementof tribalorganizationwithcentralizedmonarchiesin the
Diamond (1997) writes:
historyof civilizations,
[F]ood production,whichincreasespopulationsize, also acts in manyways to

make featuresof complex societiespossible. But that doesn't prove that food
productionand large populationsmake complexsocietiesinevitable.(Diamond
1997:286,emphasesin original)
Then, he poses an importantcorollaryquestion:
How can we account forthe empiricalobservationthat band or tribalorgani-

zationjust does not workforsocietiesof hundredsof thousandsof people,and
thatall existinglargesocietieshavecomplexcentralizedorganization?(Diamond
1997:286)
To answer this question, Diamond argues that the mathematicsof conflictand

exchange - in the contextof populationdensity- influencesthe structureof political
He
organization. argues that unrelated strangersare more likely to settleconflicts
withviolencethan are relatedand/or acquaintedindividuals.Hence, as the popula-
tion of a societygrows,thereis a greatertendencytowardviolence- because there
are an increasingnumberof interactions betweenunrelatedindividuals - unlesssome
novel formof conflictmediationis produced. Some way other than face-to-face
interactionmay emergethat servesto mediatenot only conflict,but also to reach
decisionsthataffectentiregroups.
"The same mathematics thatmakesdirectpairwiseconflictresolutioninefficient in
large societiesmakes directpairwise economic transfers
also inefficient"(Diamond
1997:287).Whereasbands and even tribescan operateon theprincipleof reciprocity
(mutuallybeneficialdirecttradebetweenparties),
[l]arge societies can functioneconomicallyonly if they have a redistributive

economyin additionto a reciprocaleconomy.Goods in excessof an individual's
needs mustbe transferred fromthe individualto a centralizedauthority,
which
thenredistributes the goods to individualswithdeficits.(Diamond 1997:287)
However,theconcentration of politicalpower"opens the door" forthosein the role

- holdingand wieldingpower,withaccess to exclusiveinforma-
of centralauthority
tion,makingdecisionsforthe group,and responsibleforredistribution- to exploit

the systemand rewardthemselvesand theirrelatives,or others sharingin-group

status(Diamond 1997:288).
In his explanationof the rise of complex societies with centralizedauthority,
as outlinedabove,Diamond mixestogetherfunctionalist and structuralist
interpreta-
tions.However,his interpretations are to a certaindegreead hoc,and thephenomena
explainedby themcan be betterunderstoodin structuralterms.For example,the
growthof populationshas structuralconsequencesfor social organization,necessi-
tatingchange,but this change does not necessarilylead to functionalsocial forms.
Diamond is indeedcorrectwhenhe arguesthatas the populationin an area grows,
it makes it more difficult forindividualsto have face-to-facerelationshipswithall
other people in that area. Thus, social structuresbased on all people in a soci-
etyknowingeach other are undermined,whileotherformsof organizationbecome
possible. This argument is similar to Durkheim's(1933) position that population
growthis a key forceleading to labor marketdiversification and specializedsocial
roles. The errorof Durkheim,and more ambiguously Diamond, is interpreting
of
changes in the labor marketas functional.It is perhapsmore appropriateto note
that in societieswith small populations - for example,several hundredor only a
-
fewthousandpeople it is simplynot possibleto have an extraordinary diversity of
social positions.In largesocieties,of say millions,thepossibilityof highlyspecialized
social roles emerges,althoughsuch specializationis not inevitable.Thus, changesin
social structureas populationsgrowcan be seen as structuralconsequencesof this
growth,wheregrowthunderminessome social forms - forexample,by makingim-
possible face-to-face interactionamong all membersof a societywitha population
in the millions- and openingup a varietyof different potentialpathwaysforsocial
evolution.However,it is an errorto see the new formsof social organizationthat
become possible withlargersocietiesas improvingthe functionof the society,and
particularly to see themas emergingbecause of a functionalneed. Many featuresof
societiesmay,therefore, be betterunderstoodas spandrelsratherthan adaptations.
Diamond certainlyrecognizesthe limitsof relyingon functionalism, althoughhe
uses its terminology on occasions.In fact,he characterizesmanyof the hierarchical
societies that emergedfollowingthe developmentof agricultureas kleptocracies,
wherethe availabilityof surplusmakes the emergenceof an eliteclass possible and
providesthe elite with somethingto steal and opportunitiesfor exploitingothers.
Thus, Diamond does recognizetheexistenceof internalconflictin societiesand does
not necessarilyassumethathierarchy emergesforthe greatersocial good, in contrast
to Parsons (1967).
Yet,some criticalcommentary on Diamond's viewsis warranted.Thinkingin terms
of populationsas entitieshas its advantages,forexample,in understanding the scale
of energeticand materialthroughputs delineationsbased
thatsocietiesuse. Similarly,
on differences in technologyand politicalorganizationhelp us to understandlarge-
scale macrohistorical change.CHE, however,mustalso burrowbeneaththisunitary
analysisbecause of importantcontradictionswithintheseunitsthatcan be masked
by lookingat the whole of the population.
Politicalunits oftenare the resultof active decisionsmade by particulargroups
withcommoninterests. Thus, the institutional frameworks thatconstrainand direct
the productionof goods and servicesmay meet basic subsistenceneeds,but never-
thelesshave serious internalcontradictions. These contradictionsincludeinequality
in the distributionof costs and benefitsof economic production,both in termsof
economicvalue and environmental risk,includingthedegradationof nature'scontri-
butionto the productionof use-values and hencelong-termsustainability of peoples

who depend on directsubsistencemediationin proximateland-based production.

Thus, an ever-expanding sphereof productioncannot accuratelybe called a func-
tionaladaptation,as it is not clearlyfunctionalforthosewhoselabor is appropriated
forthe enjoymentof elitesor those who are displaced by its predations.Aggregate
increasesin productivitywillnot necessarilybenefitthedirectproducersand can even
decreasethe standardof livingof many,due to inequalityand exploitation.Focusing
on total populationat various levelsof analysiscan mask thesecontradictions.
CHE does not assume population dynamicsas a drivingforcein isolation,nor
does it assume some collectionof typicalpsychologicalhuman tendenciesin the
competitionforscarceresources,nor does it accept societyas the object of studyas
if it is an undifferentiated
whole,just as it rejectsthe reductionto partsas the only
valid methodof enquiry.The historicalmaterialistapproach to the questionof the
effectsof social structureon social metabolismcan be summedup by the statement
thatmaterialconditionsset the stage forsubsequentmaterialconditions,but not in
a teleologicalor functionalist fashion.
CONCLUSION
Human ecology is a venerabletraditionin sociology that claimed as its domain
the analysisof structuralrelationshipsamong variousaspects of societies.A revised
versionof human ecology was at the core of foundationalwork in environmental
sociology,helpingto focussocial scientific attentionon environmental crisesand the
of societies.Environmental
ecological sustainability sociology was also infusedearly
on withneo-Marxiantheorythat,whileacceptinghumandependence thenatural on
environment, focusednearlyexclusivelyon moderncapitalistsocietiesand tended
to rejectnaturalisticexplanationsof society-environment interactions.In the social
sciencesmoregenerally, criticaltheoreticaltraditionshave been influential, but these
approacheshave oftentakenan antimaterialist stance,focusinganalysison ideology
and cultureto the exclusionof materialfactorsotherthan humanproductivecapac-
ities.The dominanceof idealistviews in contemporary environmentalism illustrates
the need fora reorientation of ecological analyses.
Althoughconcernsabout the interactionbetweensocietiesand the environment
have been centralto environmental sociologyfromits inception,the largerdiscipline
of sociology,like the social sciencesin general,has yet to incorporateecologyas a
core concern.This has been due in part to concernsamong many scholarsabout
naturalizingsocial inequalitiesand capitalistdynamicsby emphasizinggeographic
and biological explanationsof social phenomena.We, thus,develop CHE both to
revitalizeenvironmental sociologyby integrating two of its most prominenttradi-
tions,humanecologyand neo-Marxianhistoricalmaterialism, whichoftenhavebeen
at odds withone another,and to help expand the appreciationof environmental is-
sues in the largerdisciplineby integrating ecological insightsinto the conceptual
structureof the criticaltraditionwithoutmovingaway fromthe criticaltradition's
concernwithhumanliberation.By recognizing not onlythe tensionsbetweencritical
and ecological traditions,but also connectionsand synergies, CHE providesa way
to refinesocioecologicaland socioevolutionary theory,withoutjettisoningfounda-
tional conceptsof human ecology or ignoringthe insightsof Marxian scholarship.
Thus, two of the greattraditionsin sociologythat stretchback to the originof the
disciplinecan help us to understandanthropogenicenvironmental transformations,
demonstrating the importanceof sociologyto the environmental sciencesand the
importanceof environmental science to sociology.Additionally,the integrationof

criticaltheoryand ecologybecomesincreasingly importantas we face the challenges

of addressingglobal environmental crisessuch as anthropogenic climatechangethat
pose severe threatsto both ecosystems and societies,particularlytheirleast pow-
erfulmembers.The fact that environmental degradationraises many social justice
concernspoints to the need for a human ecology that is informedby the critical
tradition.
For these reasons,we have attemptedto refocusattentionon the key virtuesof
the human ecology perspective,while criticallyanalyzingand refiningit with in-
sightsfromthe Marxian tradition.Through this assessment,we developed CHE,
whichcombinesthe strengths of traditionalhuman ecologywiththose of historical
materialism.We examinedfourmeta-theoreticaldistinctions:between(1) material-
ist and idealistphilosophicalorientations, (2) dialecticaland reductionistanalyses,
(3) historicaland ahistoricalexplanations,and (4) structuralist and functionalist
interpretations.
First, CHE stays grounded in the materialismof biophysicalhuman ecology,
counterto the antimaterialist turn in WesternMarxism,but resonantwith classi-
cal Marxism'shistoricalmaterialism.In this,CHE maintainsa scientificworldview
consistentwith the epistemologyof criticaland embodied realism,simultaneously
recognizingthe sociallyembeddednatureof knowledge.Second, CHE embracesthe
dialecticalperspectiveof the Marxian tradition,recognizingthat humans and the
natural environment are continuallyin a process of co-evolution,where societies
both influenceenvironmental conditionsand are influencedby the environment.
This dialecticalorientationovercomesthe limitationsof crudereductionism, without
rejectingscientificepistemology. Third,CHE recognizesthe pluralityof forcesthat
influencesocietiesand nature,admittingboth historically specificforces,such as the
structuresof moderncapitalism,and ahistorical(spatiotemporally invariant)ones,
such as basic biophysicallaws and processes,into its analyses.Thus,counterto criti-
cal theory,CHE does not assume thatideologicaltransformation and the overthrow
of capitalismwill be sufficient to assure ecological sustainability,since all societies
mustlive withinthe constraintsof naturallaws and ecological conditions.However,
CHE also does not assume thatone framework can explainall environmental inter-
actionsthroughout humanhistory, recognizing thatthereare specificforcesemergent
in each typeof society.In this,CHE overcomesmuch of the fruitless conflictin the
Malthusian/anti-Malthusian debate. Fourth,and finally,CHE rejectsthe function-
alism common in classical human ecology in favorof a structuralorientation.In
this, CHE recognizesthat societies are influencedby the environmentand must
come to termswith ecological forces,but that all, or even most, featuresof soci-
eties are not necessarilyfunctionalin the sense of adaptingthemto environmental
conditions.
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Critical Human Ecology: Historical Materialism and Natural Laws

Author(s): Richard York and Philip Mancus

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Richard York and Philip Mancus

We lay thefoundationsfor a criticalhumanecology (CHE) that combinesthe

Human ecologyis a venerableresearchtraditionin theenvironmental social sciences,

*Addresscorrespondenceto: Richard York, Departmentof Sociology,Universityof Oregon,Eugene,

Sociological Theory27:2 June2009

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scope is broad, includingbut not limitedto the analysis of subsistencestrategies,

HUMAN ECOLOGY AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION- MATERIALISM

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reproduction formthefoundationofall societies.

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This content downloaded from 193.142.30.167 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:53 PM

It is due to its early and continuedfocus on subsistencestrategiesthat the dis-

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empiricism,and logical positivismwithinthe social sciences.Althougha full dis-

abstractsfromthe infiniteworlda formof knowledgecapable of technicalex-

2An exclusivefocus on the world of

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Regardingthis instrumentalrationalityand its relationto scientificepistemology,

Formal logic was the major school of unifiedscience.It providedthe enlight-

3Criticalrealismin the traditionof Roy Bhaskar'searlierworkis certainlyan importantinfluencethat

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drewon but inverted,Hegel, emphasizedthatnot all processesare directlyavailable

To be objective,natural and sensuous,and at the same time to have object,

Marx's later expressionsof a materialistand ecological science of this mediation

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resultof the dialecticalinterplaybetweenthe two. Therefore,whereasHorkheimer

CriticalMaterialismin theEcological Sciences

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by highlighting Marx's own ecological insightsin orderto illustratethe theoretical

REDUCTIONISM, HUMANISM, AND DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS

The analysis of natureinto its individualparts,the groupingof the different

Engels is insightfulin his recognitionthat the reductionistproject as a method

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Everyfacetof social realitycan onlybe understoodas an outcomeof the con-

I believethat reductionism- a powerfulmethodthat should be used whenever

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A narrowfocus on reductionism, as criticaltheoristsrightlyassert,will impoverish

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traditionalhumanecologists wouldallow,including thepossibilityoftheself-making

HISTORICAL AND AHISTORICAL CAUSAL FORCES

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selectionadapts species to theirimmediateenvironments, but does not generatea

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press on food supply,ensuringthat miserywould be the lot of humanity.In this

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All epochs of productionhave certaincommon traits,common characteristics.

By using dialecticaland materialistscienceengagedin rationalabstraction,we can

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approach in his recognitionthat all societiesmust address the dynamicinteraction

STRUCTURALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM

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Analogously,thestructural natureof ontogeneticdevelopment(growththroughthe

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thematerialist scientific paradigmundermined thesenormative constraints, paving

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did not. The developmentof agriculturecreatednew potentialsforpopulationsize,

[F]ood production,whichincreasespopulationsize, also acts in manyways to

Then, he poses an importantcorollaryquestion: