A D M I N I S T R AT I V E L AW C A S E D I G E S T S

D E L E G AT I O N OF POWERS T O A D M I N I S T R AT I V E
A G E N C I E S C O M PA N I A G E N E R A L D E TA B A C O S D E F I L I P I N A S
vs.
THE BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERSG.R . No. L-
11216 March 6, 1916 Fa c t s : C O M PA N I A GENERAL DE TA B A C O S
DEFILIPINAS
is a foreign corporationorganized under the laws of Spain
andengaged in business in the PhilippineIslands as a common
carrier of passengers and merchandise by water:On June 7,
1915, the Board of PublicUtility Commissioners issued and
causedto be served an order to show cause whythey should not
be required to presentdetailed annual reports respecting
i t s fi n a n c e s a n d o p e r a t i o n s r e s p e c t i n g t h e v e s s e l s o w n e d a n d
operated by it, in theform and containing the
mattersindicated by the model attached to thepetition.They
a r e o r d e r e d t o p r e s e n t a n n u a l l y o n o r b e f o r e M a r c h fi r s t o f e a c h
year adetailed report of fi n a n c e s andoperations of such
vessels as areoperated by it as a common carrierwithin
the Philippine Islands, in the formand containing the matters
indicated inthe model of annual report whichaccompanied
the order to show cause herein.
C O M PA N I A GENERAL DE TA B A C O S DEFILIPINASdenied the
authority of theboard to require the report asked for onthe
ground that the provision of Act No.2307 relied on by said
board as authorityfor such requirement was, if construed
asconferring such p o w e r, invalid asconstituting an unlawful
attempt on thepart of the Legislature to delegatelegislative
power to the board. It iscumbersome and unnecessarily
prolixand that the preparation of the samewould entail an
immense amount of clerical work."
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is constitutional to require C O M PA N I A
GENERAL D E TA B A C O S D E F I L I P I N A S t o p a s s a d e t a i l e d r e p o r t t o
the Board of PublicUtility Commissioners of the
PhilippineIslands?Whether the power to require thedetailed
report is strictly legislative, oradministrative, or merely
relates to theexecution of the law?
HELD:
The order appealed from is set aside andthe cause is returned
to the Board of Public Utility Commissioners withinstructions
to dismiss the proceeding.
RULING:
The section of Act No. 2307 under whichthe Board of Public
Utility Commissionersrelies for its a u t h o r i t y, so far as
pertinentto the case at hand, reads as follows:Sec. 16. The
Board shall h a v e p o w e r, a f t e r h e a r i n g , u p o n n o t i c e , b y o r d e r i n
w r i t i n g , t o r e q u i r e e v e r y p u b l i c u t i l i t y a s h e r e i n d e fi n e d : ( e ) To
furnish annually a detailedreport of fi n a n c e s and
operations,in such form and containing suchmatters as the
Board may fromtime to time by order prescribe.The statute
which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to
requiredetailed reports from public utilities,leaving the
nature of the report, thecontents thereof, the general lines
w hi ch it s h al l fol lo w, t he p ri nc i p l e u po n w hi ch it s h al l pr oc ee d ,
i n d e e d , a l l o t h e r m a t t e r s w h a t s o e v e r, t o t h e e x c l u s i v e d i s c r e t i o n
of the board, is not expressing its own willor the will of the
State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or setout, or indicate what
information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it
needs in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision
or control, or the facts which the State must have in order to
deal justly and equitably with such public utility es and to
require them to deal justly and equitably with theState. The
Legislature seems simply to have authorized the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners to require whatinformation the
board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by the
provision in question, delegated to theBoard of Public Utility
Commissioners allof its powers over a given subject-matterin a
manner almost absolute, and withoutlaying down a rule or even
making asuggestion by which that power is to bedirected,
guided or applied.The true distinction is between
thedelegation of power to make the l a w, w h i c h necessarily
involves a discretion asto what shall be, and conferring
authorityor discretion as to its execution, to beexercised under
and in pursuance of th el aw. The fi r s t cannot be done; to
thelatter no valid objection can be made.The Supreme Court
held that there wasno delegation of legislative p o w e r, it
said:The Congress may not delegate itspurely legislative
powers to acommission, but, having laid downthe general
rules of action underwhich a commission shall proceed,it may
require of that commissionthe application of such rules
toparticular situations and theinvestigation of facts, with a
viewto making orders in a particularmatter within the rules laid
downby the Congress.In section 20 (of the Commerce
Act),Congress has authorized the commissionto require annual
reports.
The act itself prescribes in detail what those reportsshall
contain
. In other words, Congress has laid down general rules for
the guidance of the Commission, leaving to it merely the
carrying out of detailsin the exercise of the power so
conferred. This,we think, is not a delegation of legislative
a u t h o r i t y. I n the case at bar the provisioncomplained of
does not law "down the general rules of action under which
thecommission shall proceed." nor does ititself prescribe in
detail what thosereports shall contain.
Practicallyeverything is left to the judgment anddiscretion of
the Board of Public UtilityCommissioners, which is unrestrained
asto when it shall act, why it shall act, howit shall act, to what
extent it shall act, orwhat it shall act upon.The Legislature,
by the provision inquestion, has abdicated its powers
andfunctions in favor of the Board of PublicUtility
Commissioners with respect to thematters therein referred
to, and thatsuch Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902. The Legislature,by the provision referred to, has
notasked for the information which the Statewants but has
authorized and board toobtain the information which the
boardwants.

U S v s Ta n g H o ( 1 9 2 2 ) G . R . 1 7 1 2 2 F a c t s :
At its special session of 1919, thePhilippine Legislature
passed Act No.2868, entitled "An Act penalizing
themonopoly and holding of, andspeculation in, p a l ay,
rice, and cornunder extraordinary circumstances,regulating
the distribution and s a le th er e o f, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Councilof State, to
issue the necessary rules andregulations t h e r e f o r, and
making anappropriation for this purpose"
Section 3 defines what shall constitute am o n o p o l y o r h o a r d i n g o f p a l a y , r i c e o r c orn within
the mean ing of th is Ac t, but d o e s n o t s p e c i f y t h e p r i c e o f r i c e o r define any
basic for fixing the price.A u g u s t 1 , 1 9 1 9 , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l issued a proclamation fixing the
price atwhich rice should be sold. Then, onA u g u s t 8 , 1 9 1 9 , a c o m p l a i n t w a s fi l e d a g a i n s t
t h e d e f e n d a n t , A n g Ta n g H o , ch arging h im with the sa le of r ic e a t an e x c e s s i v e
p r i c e . U p o n t h i s c h a r g e , h e was tried, found guilty and sentenced.The official records show that the Act
wasto take effect on its approval; that it wasapp ro ved July 30 , 1 919 ; tha t th eG o v e r n o r -
General issued h i s proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919;a n d t h a t t h e l a w w a s
fi r s t p u b l i s h e d o n t h e 1 3 t h o f A u g u s t , 1 9 1 9 ; a n d t h a t t h e proclamation itself was first
published onthe 20th of August, 1919.
Issue:
WON the delegation of legislative powerto the Governor General was valid.
Held:
By the Organic Law, all Legislative poweri s vested in the Legislature, and
t h e power conferred upon the Legislature tom a k e l a w s cannot be delegated to
t h e Go verno r- Genera l, or an yo ne els e . Th eL e g i s l a t u r e c a n n o t d e l e g a t e t h e legislative
power to enact any law. The ca se of th e Un ited S ta tes Su prem e Court, supra dealt with rules
andreg ulatio ns wh ic h were p rom ulga ted by t h e Secretary of Agriculture
f o r Government land in the forest reserve.These decisions hold that the legislativeonly c an en ac t a law, and
that it c anno t delegate it legislative authority.The line of cleavage between what is andw h a t i s n o t a
d e l e g a t i o n o f l e g i s l a t i v e power is pointed out and clearly defined.As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
says:That no pa rt o f th e leg is la tive power can be delegated by the legislature toa n y other
department of t h e government, executive or judicial, is afundamental principle in
constitutionallaw, essential to the integrity andm ainten an ce of th e s ystem o f go vernm en t
estab lish ed by th econstitution.W h e r e a n a c t i s c l o t h e d w i t h a l l t h e forms of la w, and is
comp lete in and o f i t s e l f , i t m a y b e p r o v i d e d t h a t i t shall become operative only
uponso me c er ta in ac t or event, or , in like m a n n e r , t h a t i t s o p e r a t i o n s h a l l b e
suspended.The legislature cannot delegate itspower to make a law, but it can makea la w to deleg ate a
po wer to determine some fact or state of thingsupon which the law makes, or intendsto make, its own action
to depend.It must be conceded that, after thepassage of act No. 2868, and before anyrules and regulations
were promulgatedby the Governor-General, a dealer in ricec ould s ell it a t a ny price, even at a
p eso per "ganta," and that he would notcommit a crime, because there would ben o l a w fi x i n g t h e
p r i c e o f r i c e , a n d t h e s a l e o f i t a t a n y p r i c e w o u l d n o t b e a crime. That is to
say, in the absence of ap r o c l a m a t i o n , i t w a s n o t a c r i m e t o s e l l r i c e a t a n y p r i c e .
H e n c e , i t m u s t f o l l o w that, if the defendant committed a crime,it was because the Governor-
Generali s s u e d t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n . T h e r e w a s n o a ct of the Leg is la tu re ma king it a
crimeto sell rice a t an y pr ic e, an d witho ut th ep ro clam atio n, the sa le of it a t an y pr ic e was to
a crime.When Act No. 286 8 is an alyz ed , it is th e violation of the proclamation of theGo verno r- G en er al
whic h con stitu tes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In
otherwords , the Legislature left it to th e so le discretion of the Governor-General to saywhat was and
what was not "any cause"for en fo rc ing th e ac t, an d wha t was and w h a t w a s n o t " a n
e x t r a o r d i n a r y r i s e i n t h e p r i c e o f p a l a y , r i c e o r c o r n , " a n d under certain
undefined conditions to fixt h e p r i c e a t w h i c h r i c e s h o u l d b e s o l d , witho ut reg ard to gra de
o r quality, also to say whether a proclamation should beissu ed , if so, wh en , and wheth er or
no tthe law sh ould b e enforced, ho w lon g it s h o u l d b e e n f o r c e d , a n d w h e n t h e
l a w should be suspended. The Legislature didnot specify or define what was "anyc a u s e , " o r w h a t w a s
" a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y r i s e i n t h e p r i c e o f r i c e , p a l a y o r c o r n , " Neither did it specify or define
theconditions upon which the proclamationsh ould b e is sued. In the abs en ce of th ep ro c la ma tio n
no crime was c om mitte d .The alleged sale was made a crime, if atall, because the Governor-General
issuedt h e proclamation. The act o r proclamation does not say anythingabout the
different grades or qualities of r ic e, and the defenda nt is cha rg ed with the sale "of one ganta of rice
at the priceo f e i g h t y c e n t a v o s ( P 0 . 8 0 ) w h i c h i s a price greater than that fixed by Executiveorder
No. 53."W e a r e c l e a r l y o f t h e o p i n i o n a n d h o l d that Act No. 2868, in so far as itund er ta kes to
au th or iz ed th e Go vern o r- General in his discretion to issue aproclamation, fixing the price of rice, andto
make the sale of rice in violation of theprice of rice, and to make the sale of ricein vio la tion of the
p ro clamatio n a cr im e, is unconstitutional and void.
ALEGRE
v.
COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the production of
abaca
and its exportation to foreignm a r k e t s . H e a p p l i e d t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t for a permit to export one
hundred balesof
abaca
to England, but was denied. Hewas ad vised b y the resp ondent tha t h e w o u l d n o t b e
permitted to export the
abaca
in qu es tion with out a certifi c a tefrom the Fiber Standardization Board.So he filed a petition for a writ
of man da mus , a lleg in g th at the pro vis io ns of the Administrative Code for thegr ad ing ,
insp ecti on an d c er tifi ca tion of fi b e r s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , s e c t i o n s 1 7 7 2 a n d 12 44 o f that
C ode, are unco nstitutio na l and void.
ISSUE:
W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e a u t h o r i t y v e s t e d i n the Fiber Standardization Board is adelegation of legislative
power.
HELD:
NO.The Legislature has enacted a law whichp ro vides fo r th e ins pectio n, gr ading and baling of hemp
before they can beexported to other countries and thec r e a t i o n o f a b o a r d f o r t h a t
p u r p o s e , vesting it with the power and authority todo the actual work.S u c h a u t h o r i t y i s n o t a
delegation o f l e g i s l a t i v e p o w e r a n d i s n o t h i n g m o r e than a delegation of
administrativepower in the Fiber Board to carry out thepurpose and intent of the law. In the veryn a t u r e
o f t h i n g s , t h e L e g i s l a t u r e c o u l d n o t i n s p e c t , g r a d e a n d b a l e t h e h e m p , and from
necessity, the power to do that w o u l d h a v e t o b e v e s t e d i n a b o a r d o r commission.Th e
p eti tion er 's c on ten tion wo uld leav eth e la w, which p ro vides fo r th eins pectio n, gr ading
an d balin g of h emp , without any means of its enforcement. If t h e l a w c a n n o t b e e n f o r c e d
b y s u c h a board or commission, how and by whomc ould it be enforced? The c riticism
thatt h e r e i s p a r t i a l i t y o r e v e n f r a u d i n t h e administration of the law is not anargument against
its constitutionality.PEOPLE v. VERA
Calalang vs. Williams
[GR 47800, 2 December 1940]
Facts:

T h e N a t i o n a l Tr a ff i c C o m m i s s i o n , i n i t s r e s o l u t i o n o f 1 7 J u l y 1 9 4 0 , r e s o l v e d
t o recommend to the Director of PublicW o r k s a n d t o t h e S e c r e t a r y o f P u b l i c Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited frompass ing alon g Ros ar io Street
exte nd in gfrom Plaza Calderon de la Barca toD a s m a r i a s S t r e e t , f r o m 7 : 3 0 a . m .
t o 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5 : 3 0 p.m.; an d a lo ng Riza l Aven ue
extend in g f r o m t h e r a i l r o a d c r o s s i n g a t A n t i p o l o Street to Ech agu e S treet, fro m 7 a .m.
to1 1 p .m ., from a p eriod of one yea r fro mthe da te o f the op en ing of th e C olgan te B r i d g e
t o t r a ffi c . T h e C h a i r m a n o f t h e N ati ona l Tra ffi c Co mm iss io n, on 18 Ju ly 1 94 0,
reco mm end ed to th e Dir ec to r o f Pub lic Wo rks th e ado ptio n of them e a s u r e p r o p o s e d
in the resolution, inpursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act
5 4 8 , w h i c h authorizes said Director of Public Works,w i t h the approval of the
S e c r e t a r y o f Public Works and Communications, topromulgate rules and regulations toregulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, theDirector of Public Works, in his
firsti n d o r s e m e n t to the Secretary of Pu blicW o r k s a n d
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s , recommended to the latter the approvalof the recommendation made
by theCh ai rma n of the N atio na l Tr affi c Com mission , with th e mo d ifi c atio n th at th e
clo sing of R iz al Avenu e to tra ffi c to an im al- dra wn veh ic les b e limited to the portion thereof
extending from ther a i l r o a d c r o s s i n g a t A n t i p o l o S t r e e t t o A z c a r r a g a S t r e e t . O n 1 0
August 1 9 4 0 , the Secretary of Public Works andC o m m u n i c a t i o n s , in his
s e c o n d indorsement addressed to the Director of P u b l i c Wo r k s , a p p r o v e d
t h e recommendation of the latter thatRosario Street and Rizal Avenue beclosed to traffic of animal-drawn
vehicles,between the points and during the hoursas in dica ted, for a p er io d o f 1 yea r from th e date
o f the op en ing of th e C olgan te Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila andthe Acting Chief of Police of
Manila haveen fo rc ed an d caus ed to be enforced th e rules and regulations thus
adopted.M a x i m o C a l a l a n g , i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s a private citizen and as a taxpayer
of Manila, brought before the Supremecourt the petition for a writ of prohibitiona g a i n s t A . D .
W i l l i a m s , a s C h a i r m a n o f the National Traffic Commission; VicenteF r a g a n t e , a s D i r e c t o r o f
P u b l i c W o r k s ; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications;Eu log io
Rodr igu ez , as Ma yo r o f the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as ActingChief of Police of Manila
Issues:
Whether or not there is a unduedelegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
There is no undue deleagation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act548 does not confer legislative
powers tothe Director of Public Works. Theauthority conferred upon them and underw h i c h t h e y
p r o m u l g a t e d t h e r u l e s a n d regu la tion s now c om plained of is n ot tod ete rmine wh at
pub lic po licy d em ands b u t m e r e l y t o c a r r y o u t t h e l e g i s l a t i v e policy laid do wn by
the Nation alAssembly in said Act, to wit, to promotesafe transit upon and avoid obstructionson, roads
and streets designated asn a t i o n a l r o a d s b y a c t s o f t h e N a t i o n a l Assemb ly o r b y execu tive
o rd er s o f the President of the Philippines and to closethem temporarily to any or all classes of t r a ffi c
wh en ever the condition of ther o a d or the t r a f fi c makes such
a c t i o n necessary or advisable in the publicconvenience and interest.The delegated power, if at all, therefore,is
not the determination of what the lawshall be, but merely the ascertainment of the fa cts and
circu mstan ces up on which the application of said law is to bepredicated.To promu lg ate rules and
reg ulatio ns on the use of national roads and todetermine when and how long a nationalro ad shou ld
b e clos ed to tr affi c, in view of the condition of the road or the trafficthereon a nd th e
req uirements of pu blic c o n v e n i e n c e a n d i n t e r e s t , i s a n administrative function which
cannot bedirectly discharged by the NationalAssembly.It must depend on the discretion of someother
go vernm en t o ffi c ia l to who m is confided the duty of determining whetherthe p rop er occ as ion exists
for exec utin g t h e l a w. B u t i t c a n n o t b e s a i d t h a t t h e exercise of such discretion is the
makingof the law.
CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL(G.R. No. L-4043, May 26, 1942)
Th is is a petition to review a decision o f Auditor General denying petitionersclaim for quarters
allowance as managero f t h e N a t i o n a l A b a c a a n d o t h e r F i b e r s Corp. (NAFCO).
ISSUES
1. Whether or not Executive Order No.9 3 e x e r c i s i n g c o n t r o l o v e r Government Owned and
ControlledCorporations (GOCC) implementedu n d e r R . A . N o . 5 1 i s v a l i d o r n u l l and void.2.
Wheth er o r no t R.A. No. 51 authorizing presidential controlover GOCCs is Constitutional.
FACTS
- P e t i t i o n e r w a s g e n e r a l m a n a g e r i n 19 49 o f NA FC O with annu al sa la ry of P15,000.00-
N A F C O B o a r d o f D i r e c t o r s g r a n t e d P400/mo. Quarters allowance topetitioner amounting to P1,650
for1949.
-
This allowance was disapproved bythe Central Committee of thegovernment enterprise councilunder
Executive Order No. 93 uponrecommendation by NAFCO auditora n d c o n c u r r e d i n b y t h e
A u d i t o r general on two groundsa) It violates the charter of NAFCO limiting managerssalary to
P15,000/year.b) NAFCO is in precariousfinancial condition.
DECISION
1.
R . A . N o . 5 1 i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I t i s not illegal delegation of legislativepo wer to the exec utive
as argu ed by petitioner but a mandate for thePresident to streamline GOCCsoperation.2. Executive Order
93 is valid becausei t w a s p r o m u l g a t e d w i t h i n t h e 1 year period given.3 . Petitio n fo r
review DISMI SSED with no c os t.

PANGASINAN TRANS. CO. v. PUBLICSERVICE COMLOVINA v. MORENOPELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL

SEPARATION OF POWERS Manila Electric Company v. PasayTransportation Company, Inc.,

Facts:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGESTS

The preliminary and basic questionp resen ted by th e p etitio n o f the Man ilaE lec tric Com pan y,
req ues ti ng them em bers o f th e Sup rem e Co ur t, sitti ng as a board of arbitrators, to fix the
termsupo n which c er tain tr ans por ta ti oncompanies shall be permitted to use thePasig bridge of
the Manila ElectricC o m p a n y a n d t h e c o m p e n s a t i o n t o b e pa id to th e Man ila E lectric
C omp any b ysuch transportation companies, relates tothe validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446and to the
legal right of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition.
Act No.1 4 4 6 a b o v e r e f e r r e d t o i s e n t i t l e d . " A n A c t g r a n t i n g a f r a n c h i s e t o C h a r l e s
M . Swift to construct, maintain, and operatean electric railway, and to construct,m aintain, and op e ra te an
elect ric ligh t, heat, a nd power system fro m a po int in the City of Manila in an easterly directiont o
t h e t o w n o f Pa s i g , i n t h e Pro v i n c e o f R i z a l . " O p p o s i t i o n w a s e n t e r e d t o
t h e p e t i t i o n b y a n u m b e r o f p u b l i c u t i l i t y operators.
Issue:
Validity of SEC. 11 of ACT No. 1446?
Held:
The law calls for arbitration whichrepres en ts a m ethod o f th e pa rties' own c h o i c e . A
submission to arbitration is acontract. The parties to an arbitration agreement
m a y n o t o u s t t h e c o u r t s o f ju risdictio n of th e m atters sub m itted to arbitration. These are
familiar rules whichfind support in articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code.We can also perceive a
distinctionb e t w e e n a private contract fors u b m i s s i o n to arbitration
a n d agreements to arbitrate falling within theterms of a statute enacted for suchp u r p o s e a n d
a ff e c t i n g o t h e r s t h a n t h e p a r t i e s t o a p a r t i c u l a r f r a n c h i s e . H e r e , ho wever,
whatever else ma y be sa id in extenuation, it remains true that thed e c i s i o n o f t h e b o a r d o f
a r b i t r a t o r s i s m a d e fi n a l , w h i c h i f l i t e r a l l y e n f o r c e d would leave a public utility,
not a party tothe contract authorized by Act No. 1446,without recourse to the courts for ajudicial
d etermina tion of th e qu es tion in dispute. We run c oun ter to th is dilemm a. E ither the members
of the Supreme Court,sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercisejudicial functions, or the members of
theSupreme Court, sitting as board of a rbi tra tors , exerc ise adm i nis tra tive or
quasi
judicial fu nc tions . Th e fi rs t c ase would appear not to fall within thejur isd ic tion gra nted the
Sup reme Cou rt. E v e n c o n c e d i n g t h a t i t d o e s , i t w o u l d presuppose the right to bring the
matteri n d i s p u t e b e f o r e t h e c o u r t s , f o r a n y other construction would tend to
oust thecourts of jurisdiction and render theaward a nullity. But if this be the properc o n s t r u c t i o n , w e
w o u l d t h e n h a v e t h e anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courtsan d even tua lly co ming befo re th eSupreme Court,
where the SupremeC o u r t w o u l d r e v i e w t h e d e c i s i o n o f i t s members acting as arbitrators.
taThep r e s e n t p e t i t i o n a l s o f u r n i s h e s a n a p t i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a n o t h e r a n o m a l y ,
f o r w e find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court m a y b e
c o n s t i t u t e d a b o a r d o f arbitrators, which is not a court at all.l The Supreme Court of the PhilippineIslands
represents one of the threed ivis io ns of p ower in our g overnm en t. I tis jud ic ia l p ower and
judicial power on ly which is exercised by the Supreme Court.Just as the Supreme Court, as
thegu ardian of con stitutio na l righ ts , sh ould n o t sanction usurpations by any
o t h e r department of the government, so shouldi t a s s t r i c t l y c o n f i n e i t s o w n s p h e r e
o f infl u en ce to the power s expres sly or by implication conferred on it by the OrganicAct. The Supreme
Court and its memberss h o u l d n o t a n d c a n n o t b e r e q u i r e d t o e x e r c i s e a n y p o w e r
o r t o p e r f o r m a n y trust or to assume any duty notpertaining to or connected with theadministering of
judicial functions. The Organic Act provides that theSup reme Cou rt o f th e Philipp in e Islands shall
possess and exercise jurisdiction asheretofore provided and such additionaljur isd ic tion as shall
h ereafte r b ep r e s c r i b e d b y l a w ( s e c . 2 6 ) . W h e n t h e O r g a n i c A c t s p e a k s o f t h e
e x e r c i s e o f "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court, itcould not only mean the
e x e r c i s e o f "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Courtacting as a court, and could hardly meanthe exercise
of "jurisdiction" by thememb er s o f the Sup reme Co ur t, s itti nga s a b o a r d o f a r b i t r a t o r s .
T h e r e i s a n im po rtan t d istinc tion between theS u p r e m e C o u r t a s a n e n t i t y a n d
t h e members of the Supreme Court.
A boardo f a rbitr ator s is not a " cou rt" in an y

proper sense of the term, and

possesses none of the jurisdiction

which the Organic Act contemplates

s h a l l b e exer c is ed by th e Sup reme Court.

Con fi rm in g th e d ec is io n to the bas ic q u e s t i o n a t i s s u e ,

t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h o l d s t h a t s e c t i o n 1 1 o f A c t N o . 1 4 4 6 contravenes the
maxims which guide theo p e r a t i o n of a democratic g o v e r n m e n t c ons titu tio na lly
esta blish ed , and th at it w o u l d b e i m p r o p e r a n d i l l e g a l f o r t h e m em bers of th e
Sup reme Cou rt, s itti ng as a boa rd of a rbitr ator s, th e d ec is ion o f a ma jo rity o f wh om shall
b e fi nal, to ac t o n t h e p e t i t i o n o f t h e M a n i l a E l e c t r i c C o m p a n y. A s a r e s u l t ,
t h e m e m b e r s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c l i n e t o p r o c e e d further in the matter.NOBLEJAS v.
TEEHANKEE
PAZ M. GARCIA, vs. HON. CATALINOMACARAIG, JR.,Facts:

Administrative complaint filed by one PazM. Garcia against the Honorable CatalinoMacaraig, Jr., formerly
Judge of the Courto f F i r s t I n s t a n c e o f L a g u n a , B r a n c h V I . Respondent took his oath as Judge
of theCourt of First Instance of Laguna and SanPab lo City on June 2 9, 197 0. The c our t w a s a
n e w l y c r e a t e d C F I b r a n c h a n d i t had to be organized from scratch. UnderS e c t i o n 1 9 0
o f t h e R e v i s e d Administrative Code, space for hiscourtroom, other items and suppliesmust
be furnished by the provincialgo vernm ent. Th e provin c ia l o ffi c ia ls o f L a g u n a , however,
i n f o r m e d t h e respo ndent tha t the provin ce was not in a po si tion to do s o. Forces
an dcirc ums ta nc es beyo nd his c ontro lprevented him from discharging hisjudicial duties. When
respondent realizedt h a t it would be sometime before h e c ould ac tu ally
p reside over his co ur t, h e applied for an extended leave. Secretaryof Justice, however, prevailed
uponrespondent to forego his leave andinstead to assist him, without beingextended a formal detail,
wheneverr e s p o n d e n t w a s n o t b u s y a t t e n d i n g t o the needs of his court.

Issue:
W h e t h e r o r n o t r e s p o n d e n t s h o u l d b e cha rg ed fo r dish onesty, vio l a tion o f
h iso ath o f o ffi c e, g ros s in co mpetenc e, and violation of RA 296 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Ruling:
Court is convinced that the complaint

must be dismissed. Complainant's theory is tha t res pond en t co llec ted or received s a l a r i e s a s
j u d g e w h e n i n f a c t h e h a s never acted as such, since the date he t o o k h i s
o a t h u p t o t h e fi l i n g o f t h e co mp la int. In th e sense tha t resp ond en thas
not yet performed any judicialfunction, it may be admitted thatrespondent has not really performed
thed u t i e s o f j u d g e . W h a t i s l o s t s i g h t o f , however, is that after taking his oath and

formally assuming this position as judge,

respondent had a perfect right to earn

the salary of a judge even in the extreme

sup pos itio n th at he did not p er fo rm an y

judicial function

. I n t h i s c a s e , g o v e r n m e n t o ff i c i a l s o r o ff i c e r s i n d u t y a re bound to fu rn ish h im
the n ecess ar yp la ce and fac ilities for his c our t an d th e performance of his functions have failedt o
p r o v i d e h i m t h e r e w i t h w i t h o u t a n y fault on his part.Admittedly respondent has not
preparedand submitted any of the reports of a cc omp lish ments and status o f c as es in h i s s a l a
which are usually required o f judges under existing laws as well as
thec o r r e s p o n d i n g circulars of t h e Department of Justice for the reason thatH e h a s
n o t y e t s t a r t e d p e r f o r m i n g a n y judicial functions. None of those laws andc i r c u l a r s a p p l y
to him for all of them

contemplate judges who are actually

ho ldin g trials a nd h ea rings a nd m aki ng

decisions and others. On the other hand,respondent could not be blamed for

taking his oath as he did, for he had a

valid confirmed appointment in his favor.

T h e l i n e b e t w e e n w h a t a j u d g e m a y d o and what he may not do in collaboratingor wor king

with other o ffi c es or offi cers under the other great departments of thegovern ment mu st always
b e kept clea r and jea l ou sly ob served , lea st th eprinciple of separation of powers onwhich our
government rests by mandateo f t h e p e o p l e t h r u t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n b e gr adu al ly ero ded. I t
is of g ra vei m p o r t a n c e t o t h e j u d i c i a r y u n d e r o u r p resen t c ons titu tion al sch eme
o f g o v e r n m e n t t h a t n o j u d g e o r e v e n t h e lowest court in this Republic should placehimself
in a position where his actuationson matters submitted to him for action orresolution would be subject to review
andpri o r app ro va l and , wor st s till , reve rs al ,before they can have legal effect, by anyauthority other
than the Court of Appealso r th is Sup reme C our t, as the c ase may be. Needless to say, this Court
feels verystrongly that, it is best that this practiceis discontinued.
Macariola v. Asuncion
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
FACTS:
A

c o m p l a i n t f o r p a r t i t i o n w a s fi l e d b y p l a i n t i f f s i n Civil Case No. 3010 in

C F I a g a i n s t B e r n a r d i t a R . M a c a r i o l a concerning the properties left by thedeceased Francisco
Reyes, their commonfather. A decision was rendered byresp ond en t Judg e Asun c io n in said
civi lcase awarding their share on theproperties to both the plaintiffs andMacariolaThe decision became and
subsequently,a p r o j e c t o f p a r t i t i o n w a s s u b m i t t e d t o Jud ge Asunc io n which was
approved byth e la tte r no tw iths ta nd ing the fa ct tha t the project of partition was not signed byt h e
p a r t i e s t h e m s e l v e s b u t o n l y b y t h e respective counsel of plaintiffs anddefend ant.
However , both cou nsels o f th e resp ec tive par ties assu red th at the Project of Partition, had been
made aftera conference and agreement of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 andMacariola approving the
Project of Partition, and that both lawyers hadr e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e y
a r e given full authority to sign by themselvesthe Project of Partition.On e of th e p rop er ties m en tion ed in
theproject of partition was Lot 1184 orra th er one - half th er eo f wh ich ac co rd in gto the decision
was the exclusiveproperty of the deceased FranciscoReyes, was adjudicated in said project
of par titio n to th e plaintiff s Luz , An ac ori ta Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamedR e y e s i n e q u a l
s h a r e s , a n d w h e n t h e project of partition was approved by thetr ia l co ur t, the ad ju d ic atees
caus ed Lo t1184 to be subdivided into five lotsd e n o m i n a t e d a s L o t 1 1 8 4 - A t o 1 1 8 4 - E inclusive.Lot
1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D.A n o t a , a s t e n o g r a p h e r i n J u d g e Asun cion 's c our t, whi le
Lot 11 84 -E was s o l d t o D r . A r c a d i o G a l a p o n w h o w a s issued transfer certificate of
title No.2 3 3 8 . T h e r e a f t e r , D r. A r c a d i o G a l a p o n and his wife sold a portion of Lot 1184-Eto
Jud ge Asun cion an d his wife, Vic to ria S. Asuncion, which particular portion wasdeclared by the
latter for taxationpurposes.Spou ses Asu nc ion a nd spous es G alap on t h e n c o n v e y e d t h e i r
r e s p e c t i v e s h a r e s and interest in Lot 1184-E to "TheTr ad ers Man ufac turing an d
Fis hingIndustries Inc. At the time of said sale thestockholders of the corporation wereDominador Arigpa Tan,
Humilia JalandoniTa n, Jaime Arigp a Ta n, Judge Asunc io n, and the latter's wife, Victoria S.
Asuncion,with Judge Asuncion as the President andMrs. Asuncion as the secretary.Complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola filedthe instant complaint alleging fourcauses of action:

that respondent Judge Asuncionviolated Article 1491, paragraph 5,o f th e New C ivil Co de in acq uiring b y
purchase a portion of Lot No.1 1 8 4 - E which was one of
t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n C i v i l C a s e No. 3010 decided by him

that he likewise violated Article 14,p ara gr aphs I and 5 of th e C ode o f Commerce, Section 3, paragraph
H,o f R . A . 3 0 1 9 , o t h e r w i s e k n o w n a s t h e Anti- Graft and C o r r u p t Practices Act,
Section 12, Rule XVIIIof the Civil Service Rules, andC anon 25 of th e C anons of JudicialEthics , by
as so ciatin g himself with the Traders Manufacturing andFish ing Indu stri es, Inc ., as
a s t o c k h o l d e r a n d a r a n k i n g o ff i c e r wh ile he wa s a jud ge o f th e Cou rt of First Instance of
Leyte;

that respondent was guilty of c odd ling an impo stor and ac ted in d i s r e g a r d o f j u d i c i a l
d e c o r u m b y c lo sely fr ate rn izing with a c er ta in Dominador Arigpa Tan who openlyand publicly
adver tised h ims elf as a practising attorney when in truthand in fact his name does nota p p e a r i n
t h e R o l l s o f A t t o r n e y s and is not a member of thePhilippine Bar; and

that there was a culpable defianceo f t h e l a w a n d u t t e r d i s r e g a r d f o r ethics by respondent Judge.The

case wa s referred to Jus tice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals,
fori n v e s t i g a t i o n , r e p o r t a n d recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her reportrecommending that respondent Judgeshould be reprimanded or warned
inconn ec tion with the fi rs t ca use o f ac tion a l l e g e d i n t h e c o m p l a i n t , a n d f o r
t h e second cause of action, respondents h o u l d b e w a r n e d i n c a s e o f a fi n d i n g t h a t
he is prohibited under the law toengage in business. On the third
a n d f o u r t h c a u s e s o f a c t i o n , J u s t i c e P a l m a recommended that respondent Judge
beexonerated.C o m p l a i n a n t h e r e i n t h e n i n s t i t u t e d a n action before the Court of First which wasdocketed
as Civil Case No. 4234, seekingthe annulment of the project of partitionm a d e p u r s u a n t t o t h e
d e c i s i o n i n C i v i l Case No. 3010 and the two orders issuedby respondent Judge approving
thes a m e , as well as the partition of t h e estate and the subsequent
conveyanceswith damages. The action was dismissed.Hence, this petition

RULING:
THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICEO F T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L S I S H E R E B Y REMINDED TO BE
MORE DISCREET IN HISPRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.1 . There is no m er it in the co nten tion
o f comp la in an t B erna rd ita R. M ac ar io la ,u n d e r her fi r s t cause of action,
t h a t r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e E l i a s B . A s u n c i o n violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of t h e N e w
C i v i l C o d e i n a c q u i r i n g b y pu rch as e a por tion o f Lo t N o. 11 84- E w h i c h w a s o n e
o f t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s involved in Civil Case No. 3010.

In the aforesaid Article applies onlyt o t h e s a l e o r a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e p r o p e r t y w h i c h

is the subject of l i t i g a t i o n to the p e r s o n s d isq ualifi ed th erein. For
thep roh ib itio n to opera te, th e sa le or a s s i g n m e n t o f t h e p r o p e r t y m u s t ta ke p la ce
du ring the pendenc y o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n i n v o l v i n g t h e property.
o
r e s p o n d e n t j u d g e p u r c h a s e d a por tion of Lo t 11 84- E, th edecision in C ivil Cas e N o.
3 010 w h i c h h e r e n d e r e d o n J u n e 8 , 1 9 6 3 w a s a l r e a d y fi n a l , n o t i n litigation anymore.
o
Fur therm o re, resp ond en t judg e d i d n o t b u y t h e l o t i n d i r e c t l y from th e p la in tiff s in
C ivil Case N o . 3 0 1 0 b u t f r o m D r . A r c a d i o G ala pon who ea rlier purcha sed Lot 1184-E from
the plaintiffs.
o
C i v i l C a s e N o . 4 2 3 4 i s o f n o m om ent. I t ca n no lon ger a lter , c h a n g e o r
a ff e c t t h e a f o r e s a i d facts that the questioned sale torespondent Judge, now Court of Appeals
Justice, was effectedand consummated long after thefinality of the aforesaid decisionor orders.

Macar io la co nten ded tha t the sa le of Lot 1184-E to Dr. ArcadioG a l a p o n b y P r i s c i l l a R e y e s ,

A d e l a R e y e s a n d L u z R . B a k u n a w a w a s only a mere scheme to conceal theillegal and unethical
transfer of s a i d l o t t o r e s p o n d e n t J u d g e a s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r t h e a p p r o v a l o f the
project of partition.
o
n o e v i d e n c e s h o w i n g t h a t D r . Arcadio Galapon acted as amere "dummy" of respondent
ina c q u i r i n g L o t 1 1 8 4 - E f r o m t h e Reyeses.

Macariola contended t h a t respondent Judge acted illegally ina ppr oving the projec t of
p artitio n a ltho ugh it wa s n ot sig ned b y the parties.
o
Respondent should h a v e required the signature of theparties more particularly that of Mrs.
Macariola on the project of p a r t i t i o n s u b m i t t e d t o h i m f o r approval; however, whatevere r r o r
w a s c o m m i t t e d b y res pond en t in tha t resp ec t was done in good faith as accordingto Jud ge
Asu ncion h e wa sas sur ed b y Atty . Bon ifac io Ramo , the c ouns el of rec ord o f Mrs. Macariola,
That he wasauthorized by his client tosub mit said p ro ject o f p ar tition . While it is true that such
writtenau th or ity if there was an y, was not p res en ted by respon dent in e v i d e n c e , n o r d i d
A t t y . R a m o a ppear to co rr ob or ate th estatement of respondent, hisaffidavit being the only one
thatw a s presented, c e r t a i n actuations of Mrs. Macariolalead this investigator to
believe t h a t s h e k n e w t h e c o n t e n t s o f the project of partition and thats h e g a v e h e r
c o n f o r m i t y thereto.

W h i l e i t i s . t r u e t h a t r e s p o n d e n t Jud ge did not vio la te pa rag ra ph 5 ,A rtic le 149 1

o f the New Civil Co dein ac quiring b y pu rc has e a por tion of Lot 1 18 4- E wh ic h was
inlitigation in his court, it was,however, improper for him to havea c q u i r e d t h e s a m e . H e
s h o u l d b e reminded of Canon 3 of the Canonsof Judicial Ethics.2. Respondent Judge violated
paragraphs1 and 5, Article 14 of th e Code o f C omm erce wh en he
as so ciate dh i m s e l f w i t h t h e T r a d e r s Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,I n c .
a s a s t o c k h o l d e r a n d a r a n k i n g offi c er , sa id c orp or atio n ha ving been organized to engage in
business.

Article 14
The following cannotengage in commerce, either inp e r s o n o r b y p r o x y , n o r c a n t h e y ho ld an y
o ffi ce o r h ave an y d irec t, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , or fi n a n c i a l intervention in commercial
orindustrial companies within thelimits of the districts, provinces, ortowns in which they discharge
theirduties:1 . J u s t i c e s o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , j u d g e s a n d o ff i c i a l s o f t h e department
of public prosecution ina ctive s er vice. Th is pro vision sha ll not be applicable to mayors,municipal judges,
and municipalprosecuting attorneys nor to thosewho by chance are temporarilyd isc ha rg in g th e fun ctio ns
o f jud ge or prosecuting attorney.xxx xxx xxx5 . T h o s e w h o b y v i r t u e o f l a w s o r special provisions may
not engagein commerce in a determinateterritory.
o
The provision partakes of then a t u re of a political law as
i t regulates the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the government andcerta in pub lic o ffi c er s
an demployees, like justices andjudges.
o
P o l i t i c a l L a w h a s b e e n d e fi n e d as that branch of public laww h i c h d e a l s w i t h
t h e organization and operation of the governmental organs of theState and define the relations of the
state with the inhabitants of its. It may be recalled thatp o l i t i c a l law
e m b r a c e s c ons titu tion al la w, law o f public corporations, administrative lawincluding the law
on publico f fi c e r s and e l e c t i o n s . Specifically, Article 14 of theCode of Commerce
partakesmore of the nature of anadministrative law because itregulates the conduct of certainpublic
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political inessence.
o
I t is signifi ca nt to note tha t th e p r e s e n t C o d e o f C o m m e r c e i s the Sp an ish Co de o f
C ommerce o f 1 8 8 5 , w i t h s o m e mod ifi c atio ns mad e by
the"Commission de Codificacion delas Provincias de Ultramar,"which was extended to thePhilippines
by the Royal Decreeof August 6, 1888, and tookeff ect as law in this jur is dictio n on December 1,
1888.Upon the transfer of sovereigntyfrom Spain to the United Statesa n d l a t e r o n f r o m t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s t o t h e R e p u b l i c o f t h e Philippines, Article 14 of thisCode of Commerce
must bedeemed to have been abrogatedbecau se where th ere is cha nge of sovereignty, the political lawso f
the former s o v e r e i g n , wheth er co mpa tible or not with those of the new sovereign,
areautomatically abrogated, unlesst h e y a r e e x p r e s s l y r e - e n a c t e d b y a f fi r m a t i v e a c t o f
t h e n e w sovereign.
o
N o e n a b l i n g o r a ffi r m a t i v e a c t that continued the effectivity of the afores ta ted provis io n o f
theCode of Commerce after thechange of sovereignty fromS p a i n t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d then
to the Republic of theP h i l i p p i n e s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , Arti c le 1 4 o f the Cod e o f Commerce has
no legal andbinding effect and cannot applyto the respondent.Respondent Judge didnt violatedparagraph H,
Section 3 of Republic ActN o . 3 0 1 9 , o t h e r w i s e k n o w n a s t h e Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

N o sh owing tha t res pond en t p a r t i c i p a t e d o r i n t e r v e n e d i n h i s o ffi c ia l c ap ac ity in th e

bus in ess o rt r a n s a c t i o n s o f t h e Tr a d e r s M a n u f a c t u r i n g and F i s h i n g Industries,
Inc. The business of thecorporation in which respondentparticipated has obviously norelation or connection
with hisjudicial office

N o p ro vision in both th e 19 35 and 1 9 7 3 Constitutions of t h e Philippines, nor is there

an existinglaw expressly prohibiting memberso f t h e J u d i c i a r y f r o m e n g a g i n g o r ha vi ng
inte rest in an y lawfu l business.W e h o l d t h a t t h e C i v i l S e r v i c e A c t o f 1 9 5 9 ( R . A .
No. 2260) and the CivilS e r v i c e Rules p r o m u l g a t e d thereunder,
particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to themembers of the Judiciary.

U n d e r S e c t i o n 6 7 J u d i c i a r y A c t o f 1948, the power to remove ord ism iss judg es was then
ves ted inthe President of the Philippines, notin the C omm iss i oner o f Civil S er vice, and on ly on
two g roun ds, namely, serious misconduct andi n e ffi c i e n c y , a n d u p o n t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n
o f t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t , w h i c h a l o n e i s a u t h o r i z e d , upon its own motion, or uponin fo rm atio n
of th e Secretar y (n owMinister ) of Jus tice to c ondu ct th e c o r r e s p o n d i n g
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Clea r ly, th e afores ai d sectio ndefines the grounds and prescribesthe special
procedure for thediscipline of judges.A n d u n d e r S e c t i o n s 5 , 6 a n d 7 , Ar ticle X of th e
1 973 C onstitutio n,on l y th e Suprem e C our t c and isc i pline judg es o f in ferior c ou r ts a s
w e l l a s o t h e r p e r s o n n e l o f t h e Judiciary.
3.
The 3
rd
and 4
th
c a u s e s o f a c t i o n a r e not related to the subject.
IN RE: RODULFO MANZANO

P O W E R S A N D F U N C T I O N S O F ADMINISTRATIVE BODIESA. RULE-MAKING POWER PHILIPPINE LAWYERS VS

AGRAVAG. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
This is the petition filed by the PhilippineLa wyer s Asso ciatio n fo r prohibition an dinj unc tion
agains t C eled on io Agr ava, in his capacity as Director of the PhilippinesPatent Office.
Facts:
On May 27, 1957, respondent A g r a v a issued a circular announcing that he
hadsch edu led fo r June 2 7, 1 957 an e x a m i n a t i o n f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f determining
who are qualified to practicea s p a t e n t a t t o r n e y s b e f o r e t h e Ph ilip pines Pa tent O ffi ce,
the saidexa m ina tion to co ver pa ten t law an d ju rispr udenc e a nd the rules o f
pr ac tice before said office. According to thecirc ular , memb ers of th e Philipp in e Ba r,en g in eers
an d o th er person s with sufficient scientific and technical traininga r e q u a l i fi e d t o t a k e
t h e s a i d examination. It would appear thatheretofore, respondent Director has beenholding similar
examinations. Petitioner contends that anyone haspassed the bar exams and is licensed bythe Sup reme
C our t to pra ctic e law, has good standing, thus duly qualified top r a c t i c e b e f o r e t h e P a t e n t
O ff i c e , a n d therefore the act of requiring members of t h e B a r i n g o o d s t a n d i n g t o t a k e
a n d pass an examination given by the PatentO f fi c e a s a c o n d i t i o n p r e c e d e n t t o
b e allowed to practice before said office is aclear excess of his jurisdiction andviolation of the law. On the
o th er hand , respo ndent claimed t h a t h e i s e x p r e s s l y a u t h o r i z e d b y t h e law to require
persons desiring topra ctic e or to do business befo re him tosu bm it an exam in atio n, even if
they are already members of the bar. He contendst h a t o u r P a t e n t L a w , R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 165,
is patterned after the United StatesP a t e n t L a w ; a n d o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Pa tent Offi ce
in Patent C ases presc ribesan exa mina tion s im ilar to tha t wh ic h he had prescribed and scheduled.(a)
Attorney at law. An y a ttorney at law in good standing admitted to practiceb e f o r e a n y U n i t e d
S t a t e s C o u r t o r t h e highest court of any State or Territory of th e United S ta tes who
fulfi lls therequirements and complied with thep ro vision s o f th es e rules m ay b ea d m i t t e d t o
p r a c t i c e b e f o r e t h e P a t e n t Office and have his name entered on theregister of attorneys.(c)
Requ irem en t for reg is tr atio n. Nop er son will be adm itted to pr ac tice and regi ster unless
h e shall a pply to th eCom mission er of Pa tents in wr itin g on a pres cr ib ed fo rm sup plied
b y th eCom mission er a nd fu rn ish a ll requested information and material; and shallestablish to
the satisfaction of theC o m m i s s i o n e r t h a t h e i s o f g o o d m o r a l c h a r a c t e r a n d o f
g o o d r e p u t e x x x I n order th at th e Com missi on er m ayd e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a
p e r s o n x x x h a s th e qu al ifi ca tion s specifi ed , sa tisfac to ryproof of good moral character
andr e p u t e , x x x a n e x a m i n a t i o n w h i c h i s h e l d f r o m t i m e t o t i m e m u s t b e
t a k e n and passed. The Respondent states thatthe promulgation of the Rules of Practiceo f t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s P a t e n t O ffi c e i n Patent Cases is authorized by the UnitedStates Patent Law
itself which provides:The Commissioner of Patents, subject tothe app ro va l of th e S ec retar y
o f Commerce may prescribe rules andregulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or
other personsrepres en ting app lica nts o r o ther par ties before his office, and may require of
suchpersons, agents, or attorneys, beforeb eing rec og ni zed as repres en ta tives o f a p p l i c a n t s o r
o t h e r p e r s o n s , t h a t t h e y shall show they are of good moralcharacter and in good repute,
arepossessed of the necessary qualificationsto enable them to render to applicants oro th er p ers ons
valuable s er vice, and a re likewise to competent to advise andas sist a pplic an ts o r other persons in
the presentation or prosecution of theirapplications or other business before the Office. x x
x Respondent Director concludes thatSection 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of
law justreproduced, then he is authorized toprescribe the rules and regulationsrequ ir ing tha t p ers ons
d esiring to practice before him should submit to andpass an examination. We reproduce saidS e c t i o n
78, Republic Act No. 165, f o r purposes of comparison:S E C . 78. Ru les and
r e g u l a t i o n s . T h e D i r e c t o r s u b j e c t t o t h e a p p r o v a l o f t h e Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate thenecessary rules and regulations, notinc onsisten t with law, for th e cond uc t o f all
business in the Patent Office.
Issue/s:
W H E T H E R O R N O T M E M B E R S O F T H E BAR SHOULD FIRS T TA KE AND PA SS
AN EXAMINATION GIVEN BY THE PATENTO FFI CE BEFORE HE COUL D BE ALLOWED TO PRACTICE LAW IS
THE SAID OFFICE.w h e t h e r o r n o t a p p e a r a n c e b e f o r e t h e p a t e n t O ff i c e a n d t h e
p r e p a r a t i o n a n d th e pros ecu tio n of pa tent app lica tion s ,etc., constitute or is included in thepractice
of law.W H E T H E R OR NOT DIRECTOR OF T H E PATENT OFFICE IS AUTHORIZED
TOCONDUCT AN EXAMINATION FOR PATENTATTORNEYS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Decision:
The petition for prohibition is granted andthe resp ond en t D irec to r is hereb yprohibited from requiring members
of theP h i l i p p i n e B a r t o s u b m i t t o a n exam in atio n o r tes ts and pass th e sa me b e f o r e
b e i n g p e r m i t t e d t o a p p e a r a n d practice before the Patent Office.Ratio Decidendi:The Supreme Court has
the exclusiveand constitutional power with respect toa d m i s s i o n t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f l a w i n
t h e P h i l i p p i n e s 1 a n d t o a n y m e m b e r o f t h e Philippine Bar in good standing mayp r a c t i c e l a w
a n y w h e r e a n d b e f o r e a n y entity, whether ju dicial o r qu asi-ju d ic ia l or administrative, in the
Philippines.Th e p ra ctic e of la w is not lim ited to th ec ondu ct o f c ases o r litiga tion in cou rt;
itemb r ac es th e p repa ra tion of plea din gsand other papers incident to actions andso cia l
p ro ceed ing s, th e man a g em en t o f su ch a ctio ns a nd p ro ceed ing s on beh alf of clients befo re
judg es and c our ts , and i n a d d i t i o n , c o n v e y i n g . I n g e n e r a l , a l l advice to clients, and
all action taken forth em in ma tter s conn ec ted with the law corporation services, assessment
andcondemnation services contemplating ana p p e a r a n c e b e f o r e a j u d i c i a l b o d y ,
t h e fo rec lo su re of a mo rtga g e, en fo rc em ento f a c r e d i t o r s c l a i m i n b a n k r u p t c y
a n d insolvency proceedings, and conductingproceedings in attachment, and inmatters of estate and
guardianship havebeen held to cons titu te la w pr ac tice a sdo th e p repa ra tion and dra ftin g of
leg al instruments, where the work doneinvolves the determination by the trainedlegal mind of the legal effect
of facts andconditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263).(Emphasis supplied).Practice of law under modern
conditionsconsists in no small part of workperformed outside of any court andhavi ng no imm ed ia te
relatio n to p ro ceed ings in cou rt. It em br ac es conveyancing, the giving of legal adviceo n a
l a r g e v a r i e t y o f s u b j e c t s , a n d t h e preparation and execution of legalins trum e nts co ve r ing
an exten sive fi eld of business and trust relations and otheraffairs. Although these transactions mayhave
no direct connection with courtproc eedings , they are alwa ys sub ject to become involved in
litigation. Theyrequire in many aspects a high degree of l e g a l s k i l l , a w i d e e x p e r i e n c e w i t h
m e n and affairs, and great capacity foradaptation to difficult and complexsituations. These
customary functions of an a ttorney or c ouns elor a t law b ea r an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forthin the
order, can be drawn between thatpar t wh ic h involves advic e an d dr afting of instruments in his office.
It is of im po rtan ce to th e welfare o f the pub lic that these manifold customary functionsb e
performed by persons possessed of a d e q u a t e l e a r n i n g a n d s k i l l , o f
s o u n d mo ra l ch ar ac ter, and a ctin g a t all times under the heavy trust obligations toc l i e n t s w h i c h
r e s t s u p o n a l l a t t o r n e y s . (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666,
citing In reOp inion of th e Jus tices (M ass .), 1 94 N .E .3 13 , quo ted in Rho de Is. Ba r Ass oc .
vs.Au to mob ile S er vice Ass oc . (R. I . ) 17 9 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours). The practice of law includes
suchappearance before the Patent Office, therepresentation of applicants, oppositors,and other
p ers ons , a nd the prosecu tion of their applications for patent, theiropp osition s thereto , o r the
enforcement of their rights in patent cases. I n c o n c l u s i o n , w e h o l d t h a t u n d e r t h e p resen t
law, mem bers o f the Ph ilip p in eBar authorized by this Tribunal topra ctic e law, an d in goo d
s tan ding, m ay practice their profession before thePatent Office, for the reason that much of t h e b u s i n e s s
i n s a i d o ffi c e i n v o l v e s t h e in ter pr etatio n and dete rmina tion o f the sco pe and
applicatio n of th e Pa tent Law and other laws applicable, as well as thepresentation of evidence to
establishfacts involved; that part of the functionsof the Patent director are judicial orqu as i- jud ic ia l, so
mu ch so th at ap peal sfrom his orders and decisions are, underthe law, taken to the Supreme Court.
FRANCISCO PASCUAL
v
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMSG.R. No. L-10979 June 30, 1959FACTS:
T h e r e a r e t w o c a s e s ( S e i z u r e Identification Nos. 1899 and 1990) whichwere brought on
appeal to the SupremeCou rt fro m the decisions of th erespondent Commissioner of customs,affirming
the decisions of the ActingCollector of Customs for the Port of M a n i l a w h i c h d e c r e e d t h e
f o r f e i t u r e o f two shipments from Hong Kong toManila, one with 42 and the other with 27p a c k a g e s o f
f o r e i g n m a d e c a n d i e s , f o r illegal violations of Central Bank CircularsN o s . 4 4 a n d 4 5 i n
r e l a t i o n t o s e c t i o n 1 3 6 3 (f) o f th e Revis ed Ad m in is tr a tiv eC o d e
( f o r f e i t u r e o f p r o h i b i t e d m e r c h a n d i s e ) w h i c h r e q u i r e s a l i c e n s e from the
Monetary Board or releasecertifi c ates to b e ab le to receive g oods from any foreign country.
Appellants Contentions:1. T
h e i m p o r t e d g o o d s d o n o t i n v o l v e dolla r remittan ces or th e s ale o f foreign exchange (as
was contemplated inc i r c u l a r 4 4 ) a n d t h a t C o n g r e s s h a s n o t authorized the Central Bank to
issueregulations governing imports that do notr e q u i r e t h e s a l e o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e , b ec aus e
according to him, it wou ld notha ve ena cted in to law Repu blic Ac t N o. 1410.
2.
Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 werepromulgated by the Monetary Boardwitho ut the co ncu rren ce o f a t
least fi ve members and without the approval of thePresident
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sixty-nine (69) packages of candies in question aresubject to forfeiture for violation
of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 inrelation to section 1363 (f) of the RevisedAd ministra ti ve
C ode (for feitu re of merchandise prohibited by law).

HELD:

The decision of the Commissioner of Customs decreeing the forfeiture of thecandies is AFFIRMED. The
importations,assumed to involve the sale of foreignexchange, were in violation of circulars44 and 45 for
failure to obtain thecorresponding dollar allocation or foreignexchange license from the Central Bankas
required by Circular No. 44 of saidbank.
S e c t i o n 7 4 , R e p u b l i c A c t N o . 2 6 5 a u t h o r i z e d t h e
M o n e t a r y B o a r d with the approval of the President, totemp orarily
suspend or restrict salesof exchange and to subject alltransactions in gold and
 foreignexchange to license during anexchange crisis in order to protect
theinternational reserve and to give theMonetary Board and the
Governmenttime in to take constructive measurest o c o m b a t s u c h a c r i s i s .
C i r c u l a r N o . 44, prohibiting the release by theCommissioner of Customs of any itemof
import without the presentation of a r e l e a s e c e r t i f i c a t e i s s u e d b y
t h e Central Bank or any authorized agentbank in a form prescribed by theMonetary
Board, and Circular No. 45,r e q u i r i n g " a n y p e r s o n o r e n t i t y w h o i n t e n d s
t o i m p o r t o r r e c e i v e g o o d s from any foreign country for which noforeign
exchange is required or will berequired of the banks, to apply for al i c e n s e f r o m
t h e M o n e t a r y B o a r d t o authorize such import," are measurestaken to check the
unregulated flow of f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e f r o m t h e c o u n t r y and are within the powers
of theMonetary Board.

Contention #1: The contention that The Monetary Board was notauthorized
by congress assumes that thei m p o r t a t i o n s d o n o t r e q u i r e t h e s a l e
of foreign exchange, a fact which appellantFrancisco Pascual failed
t o e s t a b l i s h . I t i s a r e c o g n i z e d g e n e r a l m e r c a n t i l e p r a c t i c e that
importations involve the sale of foreign exchange. This being so,importations
that do not involve the sale o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e m u s t b e s h o w n
orp r o v e d . I n d e f a u l t o f s u c h s h o w i n g o r proof as in fact the
p e t i t i o n e r f a i l e d t o p r o v e i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , i t w o u l d b e safe to
assume that the importations inquestion involve the sale of foreigne x c h a n g e
which is covered by CircularNo. 44 of said bank (which are
measurestaken to check the unregulated flow of foreign exchange,
the authority of whichwas conferred to the Monetary Board
b yC o n g r e s s b y v i r t u e o f S e c t i o n 7 4 , R . A . 265 (see above)
Contention Number 2:
. i s n o t supported by evidence. Circular Nos. 44and 45 have been published in
theO f f i c i a l G a z e t t e . As s u c h , p r e s u m p t i o n that an official duty has been
regularlyperformed, the ordinary course of business followed, and the law
compliedwith.
L u p a n c o v s . C o u r t o f Ap p e a l s
Can the Professional RegulationCommission lawfully prohibit
t h e examiness from attending reviewclasses, receiving handout
materials,tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Facts:
PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as partsof its "Additional Instructions
toExaminess," to all those applying fora d m i s s i o n t o t a k e t h e
l i c e n s u r e examinations in accountancy.Petitioners, all reviewees preparing totake
the licensure examinations inaccountancy, filed with the RTC
ac o m p l a i n t f o r i n j u n c t i o n w i t h a p r a y e r with the issuance of a writ of
apreliminary injunction against respondentPRC to restrain the latter from enforcingthe above-
mentioned resolution and todeclare the same unconstitutional.

Rule:
We realize that the questioned resolutionwas adopted for a commendable purposew h i c h
i s " t o p r e s e r v e t h e i n t e g r i t y a n d purity of the licensure examinations."However, its
good aim cannot be a cloakto conceal its constitutional infirmities.On its face, it can
be readily seen that itis unreasonable in that an examineec a n n o t e v e n a t t e n d a n y
review class,briefing, conference or the like, orreceive any hand-
o u t , r e v i e w m a t e r i a l , o r any tip from any school, college oru n i v e r s i t y, o r a n y
r e v i e w c e n t e r o r t h e l i k e o r a n y r e v i e w e r, l e c t u r e r , i n s t r u c t o r ,o f f i c i a l
o r e m p l o ye e o f a n y o f t h e aforementioned or similar institutions.The
unreasonableness is more obvious int h a t o n e w h o i s c a u g h t c o m m i t t i n g
t h e prohibited acts even without any illmotives will be barred from taking futuree x a m i n a t i o n s
conducted by therespondent PRC. Furthermore, it
i s inconceivable how the Commission canmanage to have a watchful eye on
eacha n d e v e r y e x a m i n e e d u r i n g t h e t h r e e days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not
actarbitrarily and capriciously in theissuance of rules and regulations. To
bevalid, such rules and regulations must bereasonable and fairly adapted to
the endin view. If shown to bear no reasonablerelation to the purposes for
which theya r e a u t h o r i z e d t o b e i s s u e d , t h e n t h e y must be held to be
invalid.R e s o l u t i o n N o . 1 0 5 i s n o t o n l yu n r e a s o n a b l e a n d a r b i t r a r y,
i t a l s o infringes on the examinees' right toliberty guaranteed by the
Constitution.Respondent PRC has no authority todictate on the reviewees as to how
they should prepare themselves for thelicensure examinations. They cannot
berestrained from taking all the lawful stepsneeded to assure the fulfillment of their
ambition to become public accountants.T h e y h a v e e v e r y r i g h t t o m a k e u s e
o f their faculties in attaining success intheir endeavors.

Pp vs. Maceren
This is a case involving the validity of a1967 regulation, penalizing
electrof i s h i n g i n f r e s h w a t e r f i s h e r i e s , promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources andthe Commissioner of
Fisheries under theo l d F i s h e r i e s L a w a n d t h e l a w c r e a t i n g t h e F i s h e r i e s
C o m m i s s i o n . Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes,Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
andC a r l i t o d e l R o s a r i o w e r e c h a r g e d b y a C o n s t a b u l a r y
i n v e s t i g a t o r i n t h e m u n i c i p a l c o u r t o f S t a . C r u z , L a g u n a w i t h having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.The lower court held that electro
fishingcannot be penalize because electriccurrent is not an obnoxious or
poisonoussubstance as contemplated in section I I o f t h e F i s h e r i e s L a w a n d
that it is not as u b s t a n c e a t a l l b u t a f o r m o f e n e r g y c o n d u c t e d
o r t r a n s m i t t e d b y s u b s t a n c e s . The lower court further held that,
sincethe law does not clearly prohibit electrofishing, the executive and
judicialdepartments cannot consider it unlawful. As legal background, it should be
statedthat section 11 of the Fisheries Lawp r o h i b i t s " t h e u s e o f a n y o b n o x i o u s
o r poisonous substance" in fishing.Section 76 of the same law punishes anyperson who uses an
obnoxious orpoisonous substance in fishing with a fineof not more than five hundred pesos normore
than five thousand, and byimprisonment for not less than sixmonths nor
more than five years. I t i s n o t e w o r t h y t h a t t h e F i s h e r i e s L a w does not expressly
 punish .electrofishing." The Secretary of Agriculture and NaturalResources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issuedFisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1, by restricting the bana g a i n s t e l e c t r o f i s h i n g t o f r e s h
water fisheries(63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of
t h e Philippine waters" found in section 2, wasc h a n g e d b y t h e a m e n d a t o r y
o r d e r t o r e a d a s f o l l o w s : i n fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such
as rivers, lakes, ,swamps, dams, irrigation canals andother bodies of fresh water."

ISSUE:W H E T H E R O R N O T T H E S E C R E TARY OF AGRICULTURE

EXCEEDED ITSA U T H O R I T Y I N
I S S U I N G ADMINISTARTIVE ORDERS.
HELD:
The Court is of the opinion that theSecretary of
Agriculture and NaturalResources and the
C o m m i s s i o n e r o f Fisheries exceeded their authority inissuing Fisheries
Administrative OrdersNos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders a r e n o t
w a r r a n t e d u n d e r t h e F i s h e r i e s Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law doesnot expressly prohibit electro fishing. Aselectro
fishing is not banned under thatlaw, the Secretary of Agriculture
andNatural Resources and the Commissionerof Fisheries are powerless to
penalize it.In other words, Administrative OrdersN o s . 8 4 a n d 8 4 - 1 , i n p e n a l i z i n g
e l e c t r o fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
H a d t h e l a w m a k i n g b o d y i n t e n d e d t o punish electro fishing, a penal
provisiont o t h a t e f f e c t c o u l d h a v e b e e n e a s i l y embodied in the old Fisheries
Law.

That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, orexplosive in
fishing; (2) unlawful fishingin deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful takingof
marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed
fisherment o r e p o r t t h e k i n d a n d q u a n t i t y o f f i s h caught, and (6) other violations.

N o w h e r e i n t h a t l a w i s e l e c t r o f i s h i n g specifically punished.
AdministrativeOrder No. 84, in punishing electro fishing,does not contemplate that such
anoffense fails within the category of "otherviolations" because, as already shown,the
penalty for electro fishing is thep e n a l t y n e x t l o w e r t o t h e p e n a l t y
f o r fishing with the use of obnoxious orp o i s o n o u s s u b s t a n c e s , f i x e d i n
s e c t i o n 7 6 , a n d i s n o t t h e s a m e a s t h e p e n a l t y for "other violations" of the law
andr e g u l a t i o n s f i x e d i n s e c t i o n 8 3 o f t h e F i s h e r i e s L a w .

Nowhere in that law is electro fishingspecifically punished.

A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing,does not contemplate that such
anoffense fails within the category of "otherviolations" because, as already shown,the
penalty for electro fishing is thep e n a l t y n e x t l o w e r t o t h e p e n a l t y
f o r fishing with the use of obnoxious orp o i s o n o u s s u b s t a n c e s , f i x e d i n
s e c t i o n 7 6 , a n d i s n o t t h e s a m e a s t h e p e n a l t y for "other violations" of the law
 andr e g u l a t i o n s f i x e d i n s e c t i o n 8 3 o f t h e F i s h e r i e s L a w . T h e
lawmaking body cannot delegate toan executive official the
power to declarewhat acts should constitute an offense. Itcan
authorize the issuance of regulationsand the imposition of
the penaltyprovided for in the law itself. (People
v s . E x c o n d e 1 0 1 P h i l . 11 2 5 , c i t i n g 1 1 A m . Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).

H o w e v e r, a t p r e s e n t , t h e r e i s n o m o r e doubt that electro fishing is

punishableunder the Fisheries Law and that itcannot be penalized merely by
executiverevolution because Presidential DecreeNo. 704, which is a revision
andconsolidation of all laws and decreesaffecting fishing and fisheries and
whichw a s p r o m u l g a t e d o n M a y 1 6 , 1 9 7 5 ( 7 1 O.G. 4269), expressly
punishes electrof i s h i n g i n f r e s h w a t e r a n d s a l t w a t e r areas
n examination of the rule-making powerof executive officials and
administrativeagencies and, in particular, of theSecretary of Agriculture
and NaturalResources (now Secretary of NaturalResources) under the Fisheries
Lawsustains the view that he ex his authorityin penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative
order.

Administrative agent are clothed withr u l e - m a k i n g powers because

thelawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to
a n t i c i p a t e a n d p r o v i d e for the multifarious and complexs i t u a t i o n s t h a t
m a y b e e n c o u n t e r e d i n enforcing the law. All that is required isthat the
regulation should be germane tothe defects and purposes of the law andthat it
should conform to the standardsthat the law prescribes (People vs.Exconde
101 Phil. 1125; Director of F o r e s t r y v s . M u ; o z , L - 2 4 7 9 6 , J u n e 2 8 , 1 9 6 8 , 2 3
S C R A 1 1 8 3 , 11 9 8 ; G e u k e k o v s . Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).

The lawmaking body cannot possiblyprovide for all the details in

theenforcement of a particular statute (U.S. v s . T u p a s i M o l i n a , 2 9
Phil. 119, 125,citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S.
5 0 6 ; I n t e r p r o v i n c i a l A u t o b u s C o . , I n c . v s . C o l l . of Internal Revenue, 98
Phil. 290, 295-6).T h e g r a n t o f t h e r u l e - m a k i n g p o w e r t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
a n d i s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e n o n d e l e p t i o n o f legislative, powers.
Administrativeregulations or "subordinate legislationcalculated to promote the public interestare
necessary because of "the growingc o m p l e x i t y of modem life,
t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t s o f governmental regulations, and
theincreased difficulty of administering thelaw" Calalang vs. Williams, 70
Phil. 726;P e o p l e v s . R o s e n t h a l a n d O s m e ; a , 6 8 Phil. 328).

Administrative regulations adopted underlegislative authority by a particulardepartment must

be in harmony with theprovisions of the law, and should be forthe sole purpose
of carrying into effecti t s g e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n s . B y s u c h regulations, of course,
the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. TupasiMolina, supra). An administrative agencycannot
 amend an act of Congress(Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422;Teoxon vs.
Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970,33 SCRA
585; Manuel vs. GeneralAuditing Office, L-28952, December 29,
1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).The
rule-making power must be confinedt o d e t a i l s f o r r e g u l a t i n g t h e m o d e
o r p r o c e e d i n g t o c a r r y i n t o e f f e c t t h e l a w a s it his been enacted. The power
cannot beextended to amending or expanding thestatutory requirements or to
embracematters not covered by the statute. Rulesthat subvert the statute cannot besanctioned.
(University of Santo Tomas v s . B o a r d o f T a x A 9 3 P h i l . 3 7 6 ,
3 8 2 , c i t i n g 1 2 C . J . 8 4 5 - 4 6 . A s t o i n v a l i d regulations, see
of Internal Revenue vs.Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer,7 8 P h i l . 6 5 5 ,
6 7 6 ; D e l M a r c h v s . P h i l . Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973,
51 SCRA 340, 349).