A.C. No. 10952 the principal amount plus interests.

All checks were drawn from

PSBank Account number 040331-00087-9, fully described as follows:
ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent. Check Number
Date Issued Amount
DECISION

PER CURIAM: 0060144

August 14, 2011 P657 ,000.00
This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution 1 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation 2 of the 0060147
Investigating Commissioner suspending Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado (Atty. September 29, 2011 P 530,000.00
Salvado) from the practice of law.

The Complaint: 0060190

September 29, 2011 P60,000.00
On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint 3 for
disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). 0060194
October 16, 2011 P90,000.00
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met
Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood
friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a 0060206
businessman engaged in several businesses including but not limited October 17, 2011 P2, 120,000.00
to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado
enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that
he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and
that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as 0060191
the latter had various clients and investors. October 29, 2011 P1,060,000.00

Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty.

Salvado that he would not place his reputation as a lawyer on the line, 0060195
complainant made an initial investment in his business. This initial November 16, 2011 P1,590,000.00
investment yielded an amount corresponding to the principal plus the
promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant
claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with
promises of high rates of return.
Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that
the aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several insufficient funds or a closed account.
post-dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing
Complainant made several verbal and written demands upon Atty.
Salvado, who at first, openly communicated with him, assuring him
that he would not abscond from his obligations and that he was just
having difficulty liquidating his assets and collecting from his own
creditors. Complainant was even informed by Atty. Salvado that he
owned real properties that could serve as payment for his obligations.
As time went by, however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant's
calls and text messages. Attempts to meet up with him through
common friends also proved futile. This prompted complainant to refer
the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for appropriate legal action.
On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of
Dishonor on Atty. Salvado, directing him to settle his total obligation in
the amount of P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash value of the first
two (2) PSBank checks, within seven (7) days from receipt of the said
notice.6 Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to receive the said notice
when Atty. Divina's messenger attempted to serve it on him.
Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again engaged the services
of Atty. Divina, who, with his filing clerk and the complainant's family,
went to Atty. Salvado's house to personally serve the demand letter. A
certain "Mark" who opened the gate told the filing clerk that Atty.
Salvado was no longer residing there and had been staying in the
province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing Atty.
Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted from his vehicle and confronted
him as he was about to enter the gate of the house. Obviously startled,
Atty. Salvado told him that he had not forgotten his debt and invited
complainant to enter the house so they could talk. Complainant
refused the invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that they should
talk inside his vehicle where his companions were.
During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he
was working on "something" to pay his obligations. He still refused to
personally receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his obligations.
For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing worthless checks not
only constituted a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or
the "Anti-Bouncing Checks Law," but also reflected his depraved
character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not only refused to comply with his
obligation, but also used his knowledge of the law to evade criminal
prosecution. He had obviously instructed his household staff to lie as to
his whereabouts and to reject any correspondence sent to him. This
resort to deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not fit to remain
as a member of the Bar.
The Defense of the Respondent
On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his Answer, 7 denying that he told
complainant that he had previously entered into various government
contracts and that he was previously engaged in some other
businesses prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting
business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed complainant to
invest in his business, but it was Atty. Divina's earnings of good interest
that attracted him into making an investment. He further stated that
during their initial meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still
needed additional investments; that it was Atty. Divina who assured
complainant of high returns; and that complainant was fully aware that
the money invested in his businesses constituted a loan to his clients
and/or borrowers. Thus, from time to time, the return of investment
and accrued interest when due as reflected in the maturity dates of
the checks issued to complainant- could be delayed, whenever Atty.
Salvado' s clients requested for an extension or renewal of their
respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued were merely
intended as security or evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were instances when
he would request complainant not to deposit a check knowing that it
was not backed up by sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked
until the dishonor of the checks, for which he readily offered his house
and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.
The Reply of Complainant
On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply, 8 pointing out that
Atty. Salvado did not deny receiving money from him by way of
investment. Thus, he must be deemed to have admitted that he had
issued several postdated checks which were eventually dishonored.
Atty. Salvado 's claim that it was complainant himself who prodded him
about making investments must be brushed aside for being self-
serving and baseless. Assuming arguendo, that complainant indeed
made offers of investment, Atty. Salvado should have easily refused
knowing fully well that he could not fund the checks that he would be
issuing when they become due. If it were true that the checks were
issued for complainant's security, Atty. Salvado could have drafted a
document evidencing such agreement. His failure to present such
document, if one existed at all, only proved that the subject checks
were issued as payment for complainant's investment. 9
Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty. Salvado was
never meant to harass him. Despite the dishonor of the checks, he still
tried to settle the dispute with Atty. Salvado who left him with no
choice after he refused to communicate with him properly.
Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective mandatory
conference briefs and position papers.1wphi1 Atty. Salvado insisted
that he had acted in all honesty and good faith in his dealings with the
complainant. He also emphasized that the title to his house and lot in
Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, had been transferred in the
name of complainant after he executed a deed of sale as an expression
of his "desire and willingness to settle whatever is due to the
complainant."10
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for six ( 6) months for engaging in a conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law and for behaving in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of
issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public
confidence in the legal profession.
The IBP-BOG Resolution
On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved the
recommendation with modification as to the period of suspension. The
IBP-BOG increased the period of Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6)
months to two (2) years.
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-BOG nor a petition
for review before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to
this Court the entire records of the case for appropriate action with the
IBP Resolution being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not
attain finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules
of Court.11
The Court's Ruling
The parties gave conflicting versions of the controversy. Complainant,
claimed to have been lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his
businesses with the promise of yielding high interests, which he
believed because he was a lawyer who was expected to protect his
public image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand, denied
having enticed the complainant, whom he claimed had invested by
virtue of his own desire to gain profits. He insisted that the checks that
he issued in favor of complainant were in the form of security or
evidence of investment. It followed, according to Atty. Salvado, that he
must be considered to have never ensured the payment of the checks
upon maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly added that the dishonor of the
subject checks was "purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence,
with the unfortunate result that he himself was a victim of failed
lending transactions xxx."12
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its
recommendation in part.
First. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version
deserves credence, not only due to the unambiguous manner by which
the narrative of events was laid down, but also by the coherent
reasoning the narrative has employed. The public is, indeed, inclined to
rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model
citizen.13 A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to
make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or
otherwise. For the Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed,
complainant's being beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty.
Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical human behavior
worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to believe that a person like the
complainant would not find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to consider. Simply put, Atty.
Salvado's stature as a member of the Bar had, in one way or another,
influenced complainant's decision to invest.
Second. It must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty.
Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of the checks. His strained
explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be
countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully comprehend
the legal import of bouncing checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,14 the Court
ruled that the gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of
worthless checks. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant
consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience
to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of
lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks, he discredited the legal Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personal records of the
profession and created the public impression that laws were mere tools respondent.
of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy
personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel,15 the Court wrote that the SO ORDERED.
issuance of worthless checks constituted gross misconduct, and put
the erring lawyer's moral character in serious doubt, though it was not
related to his professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by
this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship with complainant.
His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an
officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the
CPR.

Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado's

deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations.1wphi1 Instead of displaying a committed attitude to his
creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer complainant's demands. He
even tried to make the complainant believe that he was no longer
residing at his given address. These acts demonstrate lack of moral
character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers
as professionals and as officers of the court. The subsequent offers he
had made and the eventual sale of his properties to the complainant,
unfortunately cannot overturn his acts unbecoming of a member of the
Bar.

Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of the

Investigating Commissioner's reliance on jurisprudence stating that
administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own and
may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases, including
violations of B.P. 22.

Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers

is the respondent's fitness to remain as a member of the Bar. The
Court's findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions
which the parties may choose to file against each other. 16

All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible conduct
warrants a penalty commensurate to his violation of the CPR and the
Lawyer's Oath.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P. Salvado GUILTY of

violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country.
JIMENEZ VS FRANCISCO
Facts:
Atty. Edgar Francisco was the legal counsel of Mark Jimenez. What
happened was Mark Jimenez filed a complaint for estafa against
Caroline Jimenez (complainant) and several others. Jimenez alleged
that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in
Clarion Realty and Development Corporation, which was incorporated
specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in
Forbes Park, Makati. In order to achieve its purpose of purchasing the
Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes
property in the amount of P117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To
effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which was
funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the
deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was
purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the
purchase price was not reflected in the books of Clarion.
Caroline (complainant) was shocked with the complaint. More so,
she felt betrayed by Atty. Francisco who helped Jimenez filed the estafa
case. So, Caroline filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco for multiple
violations of the Code of Professional responsibility before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Caroline claimed that Atty. F
represented conflicting interests. According to her, she usually
conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of
Clarions transactions. More significantly, the principal documents
relative to the sale and transfer of Clarions property were all prepared
and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law office.
In his defense, Atty. F denied that he was ever the personal lawyer
of Caroline. He admitted that he acted as legal counsel of Clarion, but
then again, the corporation has a personality separate from that of
Caroline. He also said that he helped Caroline under the impression
that it was what Jimenez would have wanted.
The CBD sided with Caroline and recommended that Atty. F be
suspended from the practice of law for one year. This was upheld by
the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. F was guilty of violations of the CPR.
Held: Canon 1 and Rule 1.0 was violated, but he was not guilty of
representing conflicting interests.
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated
the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest
and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having allowed his
corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the
significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently,
its corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC,
such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his
professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares,
making it appear that these were done for consideration when, in fact,
the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders of
Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out
that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is
indeed safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law
on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As
corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register
valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the
interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into
by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of the effected
sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat
the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco
participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was content to
have granted the requests of the persons involved.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support
for the cause of their clients should never be attained at the expense
of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause
of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of
the law.
The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. But here, there was no proof of such lawyer-client
relationship.
Elements of lawyer-client privilege: (1) There exists an attorney-
client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it
is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication; (2) The client made the communication in confidence.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.
 Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that
the evidence on record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant.
As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional
relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further
bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was
there a demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty.
Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential
communication was relayed. All that complaint alleged in her
complainant was that "she sought legal advice from respondent in
various occasions." Considering that complainant failed to attend the
hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific
confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without
her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to determine if
there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As
held in Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-
client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who
has the burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this
regard.
Foster vs Agtang (2014)
Facts:
Complainant Erlinda Foster had a legal problem over a deed of sale
she entered with Tierra Realty. Atty. Jaime Agtang agreed to represent
her as her counsel for the filing of the appropriate case in court, even
though he was the one who notarized the deed of sale.
In the course of being Fosters lawyer, Agtang committed the
following acts: (1) Borrowed money from Foster in the amount of
P100,000 anp P220,000; (2) Misrepresented the amount (P150,000) of
filing fee; (3) Asked for P50,000 purportedly to be given to the judge as
a bribe; and (4) Failed to notify Foster that the case was dismissed in
September 2010. Foster found out when he checked it herself in
December of that same year. Also, it turned out that Agtang had legal
relationships with Tierrar Realty.
Hence, Foster filed a complaint against Agtang with the
Commission of Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Agtang guilty of
ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for one (1) year. The IBP-BOG reduced the one-year suspension
to three months.
Issue: Whether or not Agtang violated the CPR.
Held: Yes. Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It is
well-established that a lawyers conduct is not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity.
The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. In this case,
respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly
misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were
worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned
reasons such as the high value of the land involved and the extra
expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee,
when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense
that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota
of credence. For one, it is highly improbable that complainant, who was
then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such amount
that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the
complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount
just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent
should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not
only expected to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he
is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual amount due,
consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all
members of the legal profession.
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not
stop here. Records reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon
16 of the CPR, which states that [a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client. In his private capacity, he requested from his client, not just
one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited
his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his
car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency
but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of
which was never questioned by respondent. These acts were
committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated
to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced
to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him
as a lawyer.
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is
substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for representing
conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra
Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services in the past.
The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being
questioned in complainants case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did
not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the
intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were
challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for which the
proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the
dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the allegations
lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission
of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed
document. Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some of its provisions
raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted
complainants case, knowing fully that he was involved in the
execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid
notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would
excuse him from such indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was
retained by clients who had close dealings with each other. More
significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the
parties involved. The representation of conflicting interests is
prohibited not only because the relation of attorney and client is one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the
principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to
deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire
profession suffers.

Agtang was disbarred by the Supreme Court.

Navarro vs Solidum Jr (2014)
FACTS
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement with
Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for the latters 2.7-
hectare property located in Bacolod which was the subject of a
Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). The agreement also included the payment of the debts of
Presbiteros late husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the
sale of the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It appeared
that the DAR was supposed to payP700,000 for the property but it was
mortgaged by Presbitero and her late husband to PNB for P1,200,000.
Presbitero alleged that PNBs claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent her in the matter.
Respondent proposed the filing of a case for quieting of title against
PNB. Respondent and Presbitero agreed to an attorneys fee of 10% of
the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the property, with the
expenses to be advanced by Presbitero but deductible from
respondents fees. Respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero,
supposedly for the expenses of the case, but nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbiteros daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo (Yulo), also
engaged respondents services to handle the registration of her 18.85-
hectare lot located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan, Negros.
Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to finance the expenses for the
registration of the property. Respondent undertook to register the
property in consideration of 30% of the value of the property once it is
registered. Respondent obtained P200,000 from Navarro for the
registration expenses. Navarro later learned that the registration
decree over the property was already issued in the name of one
Teodoro Yulo. Navarro alleged that she would not have spent for the
registration of the property if respondent only apprised her of the real
situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from
Navarro to finance his sugar trading business. Respondent and Navarro
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and agreed that the
loan (a) shall be for a period of one year; (b) shall earn interest at the
rate of 10% per month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate
mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis, Bacolod City,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 304688. They also agreed
that respondent shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal
amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon. Respondent
delivered the checks to Navarro, drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch, and signed them in the presence of
Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional loan of P1,000,000
from Navarro, covered by a second MOA with the same terms and
conditions as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro, through a
messenger, postdated checks drawn against an account in Bank of
Commerce, Bacolod City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with
Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with Victorias Milling
Company, Inc. but no agreement was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of P1,000,000 from
Presbitero covered by a third MOA, except that the real estate
mortgage was over a 263-square-meter property located in Barangay
Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero postdated checks
drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the 263-square-meter
property mortgaged under the third MOA, and respondent promised to
execute a real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter parcel of
land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter property he mortgaged to
Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the additional
security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months. He was able
to pay complainants a total of P900,000. Thereafter, he failed to pay
either the principal amount or the interest thereon. In September 2006,
the checks issued by respondent to complainants could no longer be
negotiated because the accounts against which they were drawn were
already closed. When complainants called respondents attention, he
promised to pay the agreed interest for September and October 2006
but asked for a reduction of the interest to 7% for the succeeding
months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo. On the
other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of respondent as
counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for the judicial foreclosure of
the mortgages executed by respondent in their favor. Respondent
countered that the 10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and
illegal. Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant him loans
by offering very high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the
checks which turned out to be drawn against his sons accounts.
Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them regarding
the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he
showed them a different property from that which he owned. Presbitero
further alleged that respondent mortgaged his 263-square-meter
property to her for P1,000,000 but he later sold it for only P150,000.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR?
RULING
The records show that respondent violated at least four provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that
respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he obtained
from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his
loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he drafted on the ground that
the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero
for P1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only P150,000,
showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondents allegation that the sale was
eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that he did not
apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client
Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III
whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed that complainants
knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that
they even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him.
However, we are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBDs finding that he
made complainants believe that the account belonged to him. In fact,
respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks
he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to
Navarro and the third batch of checks to Presbitero through a
messenger, and complainants believed that the checks belonged to
accounts in respondents name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as used in the
Rule, is not confined to the performance of a lawyers professional
duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and
good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in
respondents private capacity. Although Navarro financed the
registration of Yulos lot, respondent and Navarro had no lawyer-client
relationship. However, respondent was Presbiteros counsel at the time
she granted him a loan. It was established that respondent misled
Presbitero on the value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for
his loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even made a
Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another 1,000-square-
meter lot as additional collateral but he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct, both in his professional capacity with respect to his client,
Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect to complainant
Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed respondent to draft the
terms of the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the MOAs knowing
that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of
the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. He
issued checks that were drawn from his sons account whose name
was similar to his without informing complainants. Further, there is
nothing in the records that will show that respondent paid or undertook
to pay the loans he obtained from complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected
or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his
client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or
property collected or received for or from his client. We agree with the
IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In this case, the IBP-
CBD pointed out that respondent received various amounts from
complainants but he could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulos 18.85-hectare lot,
claimed that respondent received P265,000 from her. Respondent
countered that P105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he could
not present any receipt to prove his claim. Respondent also claimed
that he paid P70,000 to the surveyor but the receipt was only
for P15,000. Respondent claimed that he paid P50,000 for filing fee,
publication fee, and other expenses but again, he could not
substantiate his claims with any receipt. As pointed out by the IBP-
CBD, respondent had been less than diligent in accounting for the
funds he received from Navarro for the registration of Yulos property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether respondent rendered
an accounting to Yulo who had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the clarificatory
hearing that respondent received P50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-
CBD pointed out, the records do not show how respondent spent the
funds because he was not transparent in liquidating the money he
received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the
money he received from his client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to
return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the
prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, the client.
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless
the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary
expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed P1,000,000 from his
client Presbitero. At the time he secured the loan, respondent was
already the retained counsel of Presbitero.
While respondents loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA,
postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned out that
respondent misrepresented the value of the property he mortgaged
and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but
from that of his son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of
the MOA that he himself prepared on the ground that the interest rate
imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were
already closed. The interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this
case, was not fully protected. Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyers ability to use all the legal maneuverings
to renege on his obligation. In his dealings with his client Presbitero,
respondent took advantage of his knowledge of the law as well as the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
imposing on respondent the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for two years. Given the facts of the case, we see no reason to
deviate from the recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on
respondent the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to
the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and took
advantage of his client to secure undue gains for himself that warrants
his removal from the practice of law. Likewise, we cannot sustain the
IBP Board of Governors recommendation ordering respondent to return
his unpaid obligation to complainants, except for advances for the
expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were not
accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
determination of respondents administrative liability.

Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which

the parties may choose to file against each other. Nevertheless, when
a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose
involving the client-attorney relationship, he is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that
particular purpose. If the lawyer does not use the money for the
intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to his
client. Respondent was given an opportunity to render an accounting,
and he failed. He must return the full amount of the advances given
him by Presbitero, amounting to P50,000.
 EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657. February 23, 2004]
HEINZ R. HECK, complainant, vs. JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
CITY,[1] respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO SR., J.:
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents without
the requisite notary commission more than twenty years ago be
disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue presented for resolution
before this Court.
The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint dated
March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the disbarment of Judge
Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro
City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the notarial
law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX A, was not duly
commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but
still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis)
notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting
January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January
1984.
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th 1986
to December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to December
31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at the
Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December
31st 1989.
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after
the expiration of his commission in December 1989. [2]
...
WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to order
respondent:
1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him from
all future public service.
2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.
4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept
any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and
or public servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this
administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity and fairness based
on the premises.[3]
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of Court,
Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which
contained the following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the records found and
available in this office, the following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly
commissioned notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial reports,
Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his notarial reports in
the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6, 1980
b. February to April 1980 report - was submitted on June 6,
1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July 29,
1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no date of
submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date of
submission
 h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no date of
submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5, 1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on January 20,
1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on January 20,
1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of notarial
documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos after
December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial commission
issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on January 6, 1988
until December 31, 1989.[4]
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge
categorically denied the charges against him. He also submitted a
certification[5] from Clerk of Court, Atty. Sabio-Beja, to prove that there
was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City of
Cagayan de Oro as well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial
register. The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents notarized
and submitted by the respondent before the Office of the Clerk of Court
of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced
on account of the said notarized documents and therefore not the
proper party to raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 94-
334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al. versus Lugait Aqua
Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck, for Specific Performance &
Sum of Money, filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City, wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The
undersigned resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs. [6]
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator
recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation to
determine the veracity of the parties assertions, the Court, in a
Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter
as a regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals (CA) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[7]
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1, 2002, the
complainant requested that the hearing be held at Cagayan de Oro
City. Justice Cruz initially denied the request but upon the complainants
insistence, the matter was forwarded to the Court, which favorably
acted thereon in a Resolution dated July 8, 2002. [8] The complainant
presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of
Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo. [9]
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating Justice
Edgardo P. Cruz made the following recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22, 2002)
be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a) notarizing
documents without commission; (b) tardiness in submission of notarial
reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his notarial register to the Clerk of
Court upon expiration of his commission; and [ii] that for these
infractions, he be suspended from the practice of law and barred from
being commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his
present commission, if any, be revoked.[10]
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not
adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant presented
documentary evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim that he
was commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983 nor
deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely alleged that
there was no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City
of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial
Register. And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983
(assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of notarial reports
and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that there were only
two Record Books available in the notarial section of the RTC of
Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and that the (f)irst book titled
Petitions for Notarial Commission contains items on the Name, Date
Commission was issued and Expiration of Commission of the notary
public. First entry appearing was made on December 1982.
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983, then the first book
would disclose so (at least, for the years 1982 and 1983). However, he
did not present said book. Neither did he present a certification from
the Clerk of Court, RTC of Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files
showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983. Similarly, he did
not submit a certificate of appointment for all those years. Under
Section 238 of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be prepared and
forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC, to the Office of the Solicitor
General, together with the oath of office of the notary public. [11]
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the evidence
presented by the complainant, that the respondent notarized
documents in 1980 and 1983 without being commissioned as a notary
public therefor, considering that his earliest commission of record was
on January 9, 1984.[12]
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the instant complaint,
a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of
Resolution A.M. No. 02-
9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC,[13] to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court
officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation
of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of
conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be
considered a disciplinary action against the respondent justice, judge
or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent
may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show
cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both
respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution, administrative and
disbarment cases against members of the bar who were likewise
members of the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the
new rule, administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took
effect on October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative cases
already filed where the respondents have not yet been required to
comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing
resolution, since the respondent filed his Answer/Comment on June 13,
2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed
In Disbarment Cases Involving
A Retired Judge For Acts
Committed While He Was Still
A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a retired
judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment; and (3) the acts
constituting the ground for disbarment were committed when the
respondent was still a practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the
judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for acts committed
as a judge; he is charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing
documents without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment and
Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state clearly, and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the
Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of
any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in the government service: Provided,
however, That all charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals
and lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them, shall
be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That charges filed
against Justices and Judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment to the Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to
the Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication. [14]
The investigation may thereafter commence either before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance with Sections 2 to
Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the Supreme Court in accordance
with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings
when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer
the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of
the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in which case the
investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6
to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted
directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court designated
Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced at the investigation,
the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by the Supreme
Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his
findings of fact and recommendations together with the record and all
the evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of the
Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment is
cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the IBP is not
mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for investigation, report
and recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of the court
or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court will thereafter base its
final action.[15]
Although the respondent has already retired from the judiciary, he
is still considered as a member of the bar and as such, is not immune
to the disciplining arm of the Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 6[16]of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the
complaint was cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates
that in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals or
the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with the Supreme Court. [17]
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation
Of A Judge Will Not Preclude
The Filing Thereafter Of An
Administrative Charge Against
Him For Which He Shall Still
Be Held Answerable If Found
Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been separated
from the service does not necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction
to determine the veracity of the allegations of the complaint, pursuant
to its disciplinary authority over members of the bench. As we held
in Gallos v. Cordero:[18]
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the
administrative complaint was not lost by the mere fact that the
respondent, had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The
Court retains jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public
official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary
rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and
dangerous implications... If innocent, respondent public official merits
vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government
which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive
the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under
the situation.[19]
However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious
administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for
purposes of harassment, we issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC [20] which took
effect on November 3, 2003. It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the Office of the Court
Administrator, an administrative complaint against any Justice of the
Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the lower courts
filed in connection with a case in court is shown to be clearly
unfounded and baseless and intended to harass the respondent, such a
finding should be included in the report and recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator. If the recommendation is approved or
affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be required to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court. If the complainant is a
lawyer, he may further be required to show cause why he or she
should not be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and
as an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months before the compulsory
retirement of a Justice or Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that
occurred at least a year before such filing and (c) shown prima facie
that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be
recommended for dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment
within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the
Court a report and recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt
of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation before the
date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible
to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the
release of the retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may
order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring or
retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been filed within
six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice; (2)
the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such
filing; and, (3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to
harass the respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21, 2001
was received by the Office of the Court Administrator on March 26,
2001.[21] The respondent retired compulsorily from the service more
than a year later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for
disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been committed by
the respondent did not occur a year before the respondents separation
from the service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and intended
merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore, the instant case
does not fall within the ambit of the foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined
For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts committed
prior to his appointment to the judiciary. [22] In fact, even the new Rule
itself recognizes this, as it provides for the immediate forwarding to the
Supreme Court for disposition and adjudication of charges
against justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to
their appointment to the judiciary.[23] It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts complained of; it is
sufficient that the evidence on record supports the charge on the
respondent, considering the gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent judge to
be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,[24] the respondent judge
was charged with violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for acts committed while he was still a practicing
lawyer. The respondent therein refused to turn over the funds of his
client despite demands, and persisted in his refusal even after he was
appointed as a judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that
the respondents subsequent appointment as a judge will not exculpate
him from taking responsibility for the consequences of his acts as an
officer of the court.[25]
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,[26] we held that proof of prior
immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline
against a judge if he is not charged with immorality prior to his
appointment. We ratiocinated, thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that since he had
wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace
his steps and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond
information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted
position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a
high price for that honor - his private and official conduct must at all
times be free from the appearance of impropriety. ...[27]
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to prove
the charges by substantial evidence.[28] The complainant therein
presented evidence pertaining to the respondents previous indiscretion
while still a practicing lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to
prove that the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was exonerated in this
case because the complainant failed to present evidence that the
indiscretion continued even after the respondent was appointed to the
judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to promote the public welfare. The Constitution
vests this power of control and regulation in this Court. [29] The Supreme
Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right but a bounden
duty as well. This is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded
of its members.[30]
Notarizing Documents Without
The Requisite Commission
Therefore Constitutes
Malpractice, If Not The Crime
Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested with
substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. [31] Notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public one, making it
admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.[32]
The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary
public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. [33] The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does
not only malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
documents.[34] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting
as such, and even disbarment.[35]
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[36] the Court had the occasion to
state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to
do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of
the lawyers oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath similarly proscribes.
These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.[37]
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot,
therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public faith in the
integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that
function.[38]
The Charge Against The
Respondent Is Supported By
The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainants formal offer of
evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to decide the case on the
basis of the pleadings filed. [39] Neither did he claim that he was
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny
the accuracy of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in
his answer that there was no proper recording of the commissioned
lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register. Furthermore, as found by the
Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no evidence of his
commission as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as
proof of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register. [40]
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to answer
the charges and to controvert the evidence against him in a formal
investigation. When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged,
it is not enough that he deny the charges; he must meet the issue and
overcome the evidence against him.[41]
The respondents allegation that the complainant was not a party
in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was not prejudiced
thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for
any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor
which include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 138 [42] of
the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the court motu
proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings. There can be no doubt as
to the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority
acts and doings of public officers which citizens feel are incompatible
with the duties of the office and from which conduct the citizen or the
public might or does suffer undesirable consequences. [43]
An Administrative Complaint
Against A Member Of The Bar
Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement which
is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones
good standing in the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the
practice of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning ones
mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because his
admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable presumption that he
has all the qualifications to become a lawyer. [44] The rule is settled that
a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar
but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law. [45]
 Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own, distinct from and may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.[46] As we held in the leading case of In re Almacen:
[47]
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action
or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are]
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise
of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. ....[48]
In a case involving a mere court employee [49] the Court
disregarded the Court Administrators recommendation that the charge
for immorality against the respondent be dismissed on the ground that
the complainants failed to adduce evidence that the respondents
immoral conduct was still ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of
illicit conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of dishonesty for
falsifying her childrens certificates of live birth to show that her
paramour was the father. The complaint in this case was filed on
August 5, 1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair ended. [50] The
Court held that administrative offenses do not prescribe. [51]
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than
that an administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was
thereafter appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four
years after the offending act was committed, is not barred by
prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers,
prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer
for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of
law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of
and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the
bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case, considering
the seriousness of the matter involved - the respondents dishonesty
and the sanctity of notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the commission of
the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint, will
not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes
documents without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The
Institution Of The
Administrative Case Would
Merely Mitigate The
Respondents Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess the qualifications required by law for
the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair
dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar. [52] By his
actuations, the respondent failed to live up to such standards; [53] he
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and
thereby breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. The
respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
[54]
In representing that he was possessed of the requisite notarial
commission when he was, in fact, not so authorized, the respondent
also violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers
where the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
[55]
Furthermore, a tempering of justice is mandated in this case,
considering that the complaint against the respondent was filed
twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained of;
[56]
that there was no private offended party who came forward and
claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents so
notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the respondent is a
retired judge who deserves to enjoy the full measure of his well-earned
retirement benefits.[57] The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is
justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is found
GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite notarial
commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay a fine in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Tabang vs Gacott (2013)
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant
Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent
Atty. Glenn Gacotts father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of
thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan,
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging
to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the governments
agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast
tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus,
Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the
names of fictitious persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and
obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under
the names of fictitious persons.
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the
seven parcels as they were in need of funds for their medication and
other expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering
the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed
from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to
negotiate any sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent
then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles. 5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent
advised them to file petitions in court for re-issuance of titles.
Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious
owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance
of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed
similarities in the signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed
on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor
of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked
the court to have the supposed owners summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions
voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their being re-filed. 8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she
changed the fictitious owners signatures in the hope of making them
look more varied.9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions,
respondent executed several documents that included revocations of
SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the
parcels (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of
these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he
represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that
these were for sale. 11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven
parcels.
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and
deceit, complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels
were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels.
He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven
parcels and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of
twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven
parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a
"balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his
disbarment.13
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment?
RULING
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and
adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco
and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed
gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of
the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of
recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7)
subject parcels.

While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in

illicit activities, the complainants own complicity does not negate, or
even mitigate, the repugnancy of respondents offense. Quite the
contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to
the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.
Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took
advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and
torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he
instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it.
Thus, We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.
De Jesus vs Sanchez-Malit (2014)
FACTS
In the Affidavit-Complaint filed by complainant before the Office of the
Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged that on 1 March 2002,
respondent had drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a
public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued complainant for
perjury and for collection of sum of money. She claimed that
respondent was a consultant of the local government unit of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall
was government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized
two contracts that caused complainant legal and financial problems.
One contract was a lease agreement notarized by respondent
sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees.
However, complainant only found out that the agreement had not been
signed by the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into with a certain
Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998. Respondent drafted and
notarized said agreement, but did not advise complainant that the
property was still covered by the period within which it could not be
alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint, complainant
subsequently submitted three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs)
notarized by respondent and an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino),
complainants secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the named
attorney in-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentinos Affidavit
corroborated complainants allegations against respondent.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered that the
document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She
gave the courts copy of the agreement to complainant to
accommodate the latters request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent
prepared and notarized a new one, relying on complainants assurance
that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned in lieu of
the original copy for the court. Complainant, however, reneged on her
promise.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 1 and Rules
1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
RULING
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that notarization is
not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law,
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be
undermined.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge of a false
statement or information contained in the instrument to be notarized,
yet proceeds to affix the notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate
to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public confidence in
notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent fully knew that
complainant was not the owner of the mortgaged market stall. That
complainant comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it only
heightens the latters liability for tolerating a wrongful act. Clearly,
respondents conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 and Rules
1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondents explanation about the unsigned lease agreement
executed by complainant sometime in September 1999 is incredulous.
If, indeed, her file copy of the agreement bore the lessees signatures,
she could have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It
even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in respondents
practice as a notary public. Records show that on various occasions
from 2002 to 2004, respondent has notarized 22 documents that were
either unsigned or lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a
notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence.

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed it are the very same ones who executed it and who personally
appeared before the said notary public to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that the
parties personally came and appeared before her, respondent also
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and her
oath as a lawyer that she shall do no falsehood. Certainly, respondent
is unfit to continue enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In
several instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who
were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their oath as
notaries public. Even so, the rule is that disbarment is meted out only
in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not
disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. The blatant disregard by respondent of her basic duties as
a notary public warrants the less severe punishment of suspension
from the practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.
Perez vs Catindig (2015)
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been
friends since the mid-1960s when they were both students at the
University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr.
Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily
Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at
the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by
a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City. Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would
make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her,
which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a
divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and
that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree
was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to
their marriage.
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of
Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed
with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig
is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the
Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter
allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he
obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to
legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of
Gomez to the said petition.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous
letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair
with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April
25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty.
Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed.
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested
Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able
to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son;
he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City
where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married Gomez on
May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the
wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and
that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven
(Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and
live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple
adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She
likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may
provide them.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a
Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court
of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise
admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the
Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and
Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was
granted on June 23, 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including
the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does
not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew
that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez
demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married
Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not
valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and
that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was
afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum
of legitimacy to their relationship.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour.
Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony
from developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez,
claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as
early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo
did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out
that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty.
Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she
was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindigs
romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his
feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said
that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which
was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents committed gross immorality, which
would warrant their disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and
the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import,
as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal
learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for
admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in
order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad
character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong. This must be so because vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his
all.
A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing
any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the
upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct
is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the communitys sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous
one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and,
ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own admission, indeed establish a
pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the
Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a
Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez
when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first
marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first
marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez serious
intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation
from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a
divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr.
Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted
with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away a marriage that has at least a semblance
of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he
obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized
in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that
time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he
cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared
a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense of social propriety
and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws
on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that
his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he
wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding
any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it
matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact
still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr.
Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the
various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their union a
semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only
at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his
first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced
with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by
his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to
pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral
conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity
towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Courts finding
of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindigs desertion of
Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar
to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage. In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is
warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an
illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.
Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity
of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his
legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant
the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this
case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its
power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not
credible since they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings
that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage
with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample
basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the
respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that
there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous
relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed
having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in
suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr.
Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her
of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter,
if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed
in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

Ecraela vs Pangalangan (2015)
FACTS
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated
from the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990,
where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their
classmates. After passing the bar examinations and being admitted as
members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP
Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with
whom he has three (3) children. Complainant avers that while married
to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations
with married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007.
These alleged illicit relations involved:
a. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from
1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit
relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to
1996, despite being already married to Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being
romantically involved with DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still
being married to Jardiolin and while still being romantically .involved
with CCC; '
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from
May 2004 until the filing of the Petition, while still being romantically
involved with CCC.
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse,
deceived CCC and DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor,
thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when
in. truth, he was then still married to Jardiolin.
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during
the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation
proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation
(KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government
counsel, respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal
counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging
MIAA's case, and, m effect, that of the Philippine Government.
Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe
then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the
cancellation proceedings in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest
efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded
with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo.
The vehicle was seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home
and in the OGCC premises itself.
Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an
educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College,
College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where respondent
induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and
entertained the romantic gestures of his female students in exchange
for passing grades.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent committed gross immoral conduct,
which would warrant his disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the
Board of Governors' resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly
immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
PROCESSES.
In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
or deceitful conduct. Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore
under oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Article XV,
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. State.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private Villadolid' s findings that respondent violated Canon 1 0 of the Code of
life. behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03
profession. thereof.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. Good THE COURT.
moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must
also be retained in order to maintain one's good standing in this Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
exclusive and honored fraternity. doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or
suspension proceedings against a member of the Bar. Thus, the Comi Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not
has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
to justify the imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of
Bar.
a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft and corruption
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the against him with the Sandiganbayan.
grounds by which respondent has been found committing gross
immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs.
In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on
several adulterous and illicit relations with both married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own
wife. Through documentary evidences in the form of email messages,
as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with
DOD and CCC by preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that
the same were not sufficiently established. In his answer, respondent
simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving
averments not supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically
deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the
admissibility of the/ suppoting documents. Due to respondent's own
failure to attend the hearings and even submit his own position paper,
the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain
uncontroverted.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia
(Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases,
docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in
the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreo before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was
docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married
Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria Margarita and
Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a dentist
and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that
in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage,
which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo,
representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for
support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time
of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while
Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia
returned from Japan. When Sesbreo and Garcias children learned
abouthis return, Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against
him. Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in
Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo is only on
parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral turpitude;
and thus, Sesbreo should not be allowed to continue his practice of
law.
In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed
a similar complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC
Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreo alleged that Garcias complaint was
motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as
pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Courts Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred
A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia
filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD.
He alleged that Sesbreo is practicing law despite his previous
conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite
the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his
sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law
despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the
directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint
against Sesbreo alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C.
No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was
commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties
provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreo argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only
during the term of the sentence. Sesbreo further alleged that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that
Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and
desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcias daughters in
court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273.
The parties agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral
turpitude is involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD ruled
that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreo guilty of murder
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
appeal, this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced
Sesbreo to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day
of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that Sesbreo was released
from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance of the
conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice
Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, 1 the IBPCBD
further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the
decision of this Court convicting Sesbreo for the crime of homicide,
and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim
involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion Christopher
Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had the
victim Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to have wronged
the respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong place and
time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by
respondent, bear the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what
the Supreme Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the
respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme arrogance and feeling
of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to
be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the stillness
of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud
bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondents
inordinate over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not
even directed at respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a
member of the legal profession. Respondent was not only vindictive
without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority. 2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon 3 where the
respondent was disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated
homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreo be disbarred and
his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation
of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreo filed a motion for reconsideration before the
IBP-CBD. Sesbreo alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and
misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the attendant
circumstances in Sorianoare disparate, distinct, and different from his
case. He further alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of
executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full civil
and political rights. Finally, Sesbreo alleged that after his wife died in
an ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the
case for bigamy against Garcia and that he already advised his clients
to settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia already withdrew the
complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreos motion for reconsideration. The
IBPCBD transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the Bar
Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as
A.C. No. 10457. In the Courts Resolution dated 30 September 2014,
the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of
homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and
approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and
Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has
ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an
act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral
turpitude was discussed by this Court in International Rice Research
Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not
involve moral turpitude.1wphi1 Homicide may or may not involve
moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude
is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known
and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x
generally but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime
as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which
are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It
follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of
judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. 7
In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide
and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreois hereby found GUILTY of
HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and
1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of
reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided
by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in
the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBPCBD
that the circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado)
and his companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking
and just passed by Sesbreos house when the latter, without any
provocation from the former, went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and
started firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere about five
meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreo when they heard the
screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, they saw
Sesbreo aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away
but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes),
recalled that he heard shots and opened the window of his house. He
saw Yapchangco and Amparado running away while Sesbreo was
firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Rabanes house in the process.
Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being
shot, then saw Sesbreo in the middle of the street, carrying a long
firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD
correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong
place and time. They did not do anything that justified the
indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreo that eventually led to the death
of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency
restored his full civil and political rights. Sesbreo cited In re Atty.
Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was
granted "an absolute and unconditional pardon"11 which restored his
"full civil and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present inthese
cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13 did not state that the pardon
was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not
mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of
Commutation and they were also not mentioned in stating the
commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the authority conferred
upon me by the Constitution and upon the recommendation of the
Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL
SESBREO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of
from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to
pay an indemnity of P50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute
and unconditional and restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political
rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can
extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. 15 In this
case, the executive clemency merely "commuted to an indeterminate
prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment" the
penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty.16 Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
liability.17 The penalty for Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He
served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was
released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release and
Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x accessory
penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall
subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if
Sesbrefio has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that
shows that it was a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege.19 It is granted only to those
possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high moral
standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the
appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of
disbarment.21
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is DISBARRED effective
immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES (PACE),
represented by its President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C.
RAFAEL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment filed by the
Philippine Association of Court Employees (PACE) through its president,
Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty. Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty.
Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of PACE,
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court employees in
the Judiciary held its 11th National Convention/Seminar in Davao City
from October 6 to 8, 2005. As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty.
Diaz was entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th PACE national
convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only on March 29, 2007, during
the 12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City 2; that during the 12th
convention, an election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for
the position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that on the
last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the outgoing Board of
Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and approved Resolution No. 1-
2007 appropriating the amount of 30,000.00as term-end bonus for
each PACE official qualified thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a
liquidation report for the 12th convention; that there was no turn over
of monies belonging to the association as a matter of procedure
despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty. Diaz; 3 and
that the new set of PACE officers issued Board Resolution No. 00-07
directing past president, Rosita D. Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty.
Diaz, to explain why they failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for
the Davao and Iloilo conventions.4
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the Statement of
Liquidation for the 11th national convention in Davao in less than a
week after the said convention; that it was duly audited by the national
auditor, Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that convention
was "fully accounted, liquidated and entirely deposited to PACE
accounts;"5 that she also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th
national convention on May 22, 2007; that the report, together with the
cash, checks and original receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola
and witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she denied running for re-
election as PACE national treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she
had already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board Member of the
First District of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay;7 that the approval of
the P30,000.00 term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it
was approved by the previous board of directors; and that she never
sponsored the bonus, as it was initiated by Aliven Maderaza and
seconded by Atty. Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not privy to the
disbursement of the said term-end bonus.8
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano.
After an exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference was held.
Afterwards, the protagonists were directed to submit their respective
position papers. Thereafter, the case was re-assigned to IBP
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner Fernandez). 9
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz violated Chapter 1,
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28, 2010,
Commissioner Fernandez recommended the dismissal of the case
against Atty. Diaz for lack of merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary
evidence to show that she was able to submit the liquidation reports
for the two aforementioned conventions of PACE. He also took note
that Atty. Rafael herself acknowledged the liquidation report made by
Atty. Diaz with respect to the Davao City convention.10As to the
sufficiency and completeness of these reports, this would be better
resolvedthrough an audit rather than in disbarment
proceedings.1wphi1 Besides, Commissioner Fernandez did not
consider the position of Atty. Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have
any connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus, according to him, she
should be sanctioned in accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of
a disbarment case.11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for re-election in the PACE
elections even though she was no longer connected with the Judiciary
and therefore disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez opined that the
best evidence, which was the "certificate of candidacy," was never
offered,12 and that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer, knew that her bid for re-
election would be a useless exercise since she would not beable to
assume office if she won.13
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty. Diazs assertion that
she never sponsored the appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end
bonus and that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a collegial
action among the Board of Directors. Again, Commissioner Fernandez
was of the view that her participation in the passage of the questioned
board resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer. 14
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) passed a
resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Fernandez, and dismissed the complaint against Atty.
Diaz.15
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended Resolution,16
dated June 21, 2013, granting the complainants motion for
reconsideration. It reversedand set asideits earlier resolution and
suspended Atty. Diaz from the practice of law for one (1) year. 17
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty. Diaz
liquidation of PACE funds;(ii) her running for re-election when she was
no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her entitlement to the term-end
bonus when she was no longer working in the Judiciary, constituted a
"triple -whammy" of questionable actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in
contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21, 2013
Extended Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind that the practice
of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a right. Inorder to enjoy this
privilege, one must show that he possesses, and continues to possess,
the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner's
honorable membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to
act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in
the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the
opposing parties, the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by
their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the
courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court has held that the
practice of law is granted only to those of good moral character. The
Bar maintains a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Thus,
lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times,
whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and
disbarment.20
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and belongs to
that profession which society entrusts with the administration of law
and the dispensation of justice. For this, he or she is an exemplar for
others to emulate and should not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting
in its demand for integrity and good moral character from members of
the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession and to refrain from any act or omission which
might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of this noble profession. 21

Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE; her running
for re-election, including her non-admission that she ran for said
election as shown not by her certificate of candidacy but by the
affidavits of former PACE officers; and her involvement in the approval
or passage of the questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers,
including herself even though she was no longer working in the
Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of. There was
much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/ inactions.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found GUILTY of violating

Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months.

This decision shall be immediately executory.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court Administrator for its
distribution to all courts of the land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be entered into respondent's personal records as a
member of the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C.
LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin
against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false
General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief
Operating Officer and thereafter as President of OneCard Company,
Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from
his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Lukes Medical
Center as the Vice President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of
Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group,
filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for updating purposes. The
GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and
President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and
practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied for voluntary dissolution
with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that
Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly
listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of
LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and had never held
any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been
President of LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or
agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He
has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of
LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as
a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI. She
argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements.
It would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed
for voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the GIS
was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served
to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March
3, 2008.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin
said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and
asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and
said that he would meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin,
however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarins positive
reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin
presented Secretarys Certificates dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067,
and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal
complaints against the directors and officers of LCI, where she and
Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los
Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings,
Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was
spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that when
the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending
in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act
must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings.11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however,
both parties stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was
dismissed as to Guarin.12chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient
evidence to warrant disbarment. She stated that merely presenting
the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct,
harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1,
Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of the CPR and thus recommended that she be
suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that
based on the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a
stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to be a member
of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President
of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCIs bank accounts. This made the
verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue.15chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the
authority to appoint or designate directors or officers of Legacy. Atty.
Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible.
Despite knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated
upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and
president of the company. The Secretarys Certificates with Guarins
signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these
Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of bank accounts and
these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution 16 adopted in
toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin moved for reconsideration17 but was
denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has
violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with
the rules of procedure, rather than seek exceptions as loopholes. 19 A
lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. As Justice Malcolm stated
[t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow
only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the
charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the
court in accordance with his oath.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found
in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Among these are (1)
the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we
agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any
share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a
seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. 23 It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the
same in good faith, her certification also contained a stipulation that
she made a due verification of the statements contained therein. That
Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is
inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. We also note that
there was no submission which would support the allegation that
Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that
contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction which
did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the
business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of
the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in
the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty.
Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action in
submitting a false document we see it fit to increase the recommended
penalty to six months suspension from the practice of
law.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C.
Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for
disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan
(complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent),
charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
and the lawyers oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order,
and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate
son of the late Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to
pursue a case for partition of property against the heirs of the late
spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the
engagement, respondent filed the corresponding complaint 3before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the
RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and
insufficiency of evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such
dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,6complainant learned of the
same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers office. 7 On
such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount
of P10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but
since complainant could not produce the said amount at that time,
respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00
purportedly as payment of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice
of appeal before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the
amount of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice
of appeal9 before the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed
complainants appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose such
fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated November 9,
2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order)
directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his
filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing,
complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested for an extension of
the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the
November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTCs Clerk
of Court.13Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint
for disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent
alleged that it was complainants failure to timely produce the amount
of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of
his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing
the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for
money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
courts unfavorable decision.16
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly
recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1)
year be meted out against him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations
against respondent to be well-founded, observing that instead of
meeting complainants allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of
the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent
sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the
issues at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in
respondents accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order
originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent who
was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that
brought about the dismissal of complainants appeal and make it
appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan. 20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
unanimously adopted and approved the aforesaid report and
recommendation.21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the
IBPs findings, subject to the modification of the recommended penalty
to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyers duty to keep
his client constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is
crucial in maintaining the latters confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to clients request for
information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his
client of whatever important information he may have acquired
affecting his clients case. He should notify his client of any adverse
decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate
review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the developments of the
case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and confidence
in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the clients interests. 22 In this connection,
the lawyer must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or
nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the
lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and
legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to
expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause. 23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007,
respondent already knew of the dismissal of complainants partition
case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to inform
complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on
August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers office. To add insult to
injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainants
appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary
period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly,
respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of
the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of
complainants appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order
which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainants appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the
same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice
and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly,
respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which
provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity,
and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or private
capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law. 26 A
lawyers inexcusable neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost
diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect
should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked
and deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his
cases true status through the use of a falsified court order evidently
constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they
reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to practice law. 28 In this
regard, the Courts pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive,
viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and
dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1wphi1 They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor.
This is the essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld
and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires
that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is
not only a condition precedent to the admission to the practice of law,
its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral
character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him
unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to
inform their clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court
suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares v.
Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his
failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of
their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr., 32 the same
penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update
his client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty
of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi, 33 the
Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in
order to mortgage and sell his clients property. Also, in Embido v.
Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who
falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in
order to misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had
an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had long
been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue
prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondents acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting
his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of
the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of
the legal profession. Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations,
as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client, respondent
deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for
Gross Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S.
Diamante's record in this Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT OF AMA LAND,
INC. (REPRESENTED BY JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON. DANTON Q. BUESER, HON.
SESINANDO E. VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting judges truly degrade
their judicial office, and interfere with the due performance of their
work for the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable for indirect
contempt of court as a means of vindicating the integrity and
reputation of the judges and the Judiciary.
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative complaint against
Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E.
Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the
Court of Appeals (CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on
account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc. v. The
Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264, Assigned in
San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium
project located along Epifanio Delos Santos Avenue corner Fordham
Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the projects location,
AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access road and
staging area for the construction activities. In that regard, AMALI
needed the consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.
(WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which ignored
the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a field office along
Fordham Street that it enclosed with a temporary fence. WWRAI
allegedly tried to demolish the field office and set up a fence to deny
access to AMALIs construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a
petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition, which included an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case
No. 65668.2 On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted AMALIs prayer for the
WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project into a 34-
storey building of mixed use (to be known as the AMA Residences)
after AMALIs petition for corporate rehabilitation was approved. 4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668 an urgent
motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for
injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari
with an application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in
the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668. 5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI to file an
Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order and
later on a Compliance and Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and required
AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI complied and filed a Comment which
also served as its motion for partial reconsideration of the July 28, 2011
Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to
Resolve and to Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were
left unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included Associate
Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the CA
promulgated a decision granting the petition of WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 202342, entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack
Wack Residents Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging that
respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels of WWRAI,
namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-
Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the
decision of the CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious
and deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to
AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, respondent
Justices were guilty of gross misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment and violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations of the complaint by substantial
evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the dismissal of the complaint
for its lack of merit. This is because an administrative charge against
any official of the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence.10 But when the charge equates to a criminal offense, such
that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy sanctions of dismissal
from the service, the showing of culpability on the part of the judicial
officer should be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
especially because the charge is penal in character. 11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its charge of
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a serious criminal
offense. Article 204, Revised Penal Code, provides that any judge who
"knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him
for decision" is punished with prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender must be a judge
who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not
one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the
unpopular side of a controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly
means "sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an
injustice."13 Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate
intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice,
corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that
will shield a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust decision. 14 In
other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or
some other similar motive in issuing the judgment. 15 Bad faith is,
therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure of the judge to correctly
interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented
does not necessarily render him administratively liable. 17
But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or final order
that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May
such determination and declaration be made in administrative
investigations and proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the
public prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious only a
superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the judicial actions involved may make such
determination and declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or
administrative hearing officer may be usurping a basic judicial power of
review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by law elsewhere in
the appellate court.
Moreover, AMALIs allegations directly attacked the validity of the
proceedings in the CA through an administrative complaint. The attack
in this manner reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants
and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges against sitting
judges instead of exhausting all their available remedies. We do not
tolerate the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.
Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and
Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon.
Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices,
Court of Appeals,18 we emphatically held that the filing of
administrative complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and
undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjocos objective in filing the administrative
complaint was to take respondent Justices to task for the regular
performance of their sworn duty of upholding the rule of law. He would
thereby lay the groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring
his unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all, for
even a mere threat of administrative investigation and prosecution
made against a judge to influence or intimidate him in his regular
performance of the judicial office always subverts and undermines the
independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions brought against any judge in relation
to the performance of his official functions are neither complementary
to nor suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for
such remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to
these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to disciplinary
proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against judicial
officers who rule against it in its cases. That impression is not at all
devoid of basis.1wphi1 The complaint herein is actually the second
one that AMALI has brought against respondent Justices in relation to
the performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first
complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc. against
Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R.
Rosario, Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals, 19 AMALI accused
respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No.
3019, gross misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
or order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) violating provisions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court
dismissed the first complaint upon finding that it centered on the
propriety of the interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties respective
allegations disclosed that the acts complained of relate to the validity
of the proceedings before the respondent CA Justices and the propriety
of their orders in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the
exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the exercise of his
adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative
proceedings, but should instead be assailed through available judicial
remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against justices do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus,
cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded
to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for review on certiorari
challenging the questioned order of the respondent CA justices which
is still pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a decision on
the validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of the
respondent CA Justices in this administrative proceeding would be
premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or portions thereof
turn out to be erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon
proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were motivated by
bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended by fraud or corruption,
which were not sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was bias
as well as partiality established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown before he
can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial. In the same
vein, bad faith or malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALIs bare
and self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired with
WWRAIs counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an unjust
judgment and in committing xxx other misconduct," no act clearly
indicative of bias and partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus, the
presumption that the respondent judge has regularly performed his
duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised are best addressed to
the evaluation of the Court in the resolution of AMALIs petition for
review on certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior to the final
resolution of the judicial issues involved constitutes an abuse of court
processes that serves to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice and further clog the courts dockets. Those
who seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore basic
legal rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to vindicate
their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first. They are
identical, with the complaint herein containing only a few but
insignificant changes in relation to the first. Both were intended to
intimidate or to disparage respondent Justices in the performance of
their judicial functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by AMALI was not
only repulsive, but also an outright disrespect of the authority of the
CA and of this Court. Unfounded administrative charges against judges
truly degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the Court did not
then deem fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or its
representative personally responsible for the unfounded charges
brought against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and
imperative to do so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of
respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest of the Judiciary.
AMALI and its representatives have thereby demonstrated their
penchant for harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding, and
they have not stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges.
To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its representatives would be to
reward them with undeserved impunity for an obviously wrong attitude
towards the Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend being held
to account or to answer for performing his judicial functions and office
because such performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility.
The office and duty to render and administer justice area function of
sovereignty, and should not be simply taken for granted. As a
recognized commentator on public offices and public officers has
written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason,
that no civil action can be sustained against a judicial officer for the
recovery of damages by one claiming to have been injured by the
officers judicial action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of
the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in
the matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be
performed when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous
in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced
in support of this rule. Thus it is said of the judge: "His doing justice as
between particular individuals, when they have a controversy before
him, is not the end and object which were in view when his court was
created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are
created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to
the end that peace and order may prevail in the political society, and
that rights may be protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the
end to be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or loss
results from the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect
performance of a duty for which his controversy is only the occasion.
The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between
individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may
be called to account by the State in such form and before such tribunal
as the law may have provided. But as the duty neglected is not a duty
to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not
admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALIs authorized representative,
Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice President, and the Members of
the Board of Directors of AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the
present complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be
held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded and
baseless charges against respondent Justices not only once but twice.
To be clear, the filing of unfounded and baseless administrative
charges against sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to
the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
 property by the judgment or process of any court of competent
jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into
or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of
ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in
the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court
from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from holding
him in custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo Shipping
Corporation v. Distribution Management Association of the
Philippines:22
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or
judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly
behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to
disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In
its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a
despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase
contempt of court is generic, embracing within its legal signification a
variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need
not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the
administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to
impose silence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to
their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for
contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due administration
of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution;
without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the administrative complaint
against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice
Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter
lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice
President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of
Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized Usita to bring the
administrative complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court for degrading the judicial office
of respondent Associate Justices, and for interfering with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.