CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- POLICE POWER -
WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?
GR No. 130239, April 15, 2005
MMDA vs. GARIN
FACTS:
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and
his drivers license was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin
wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the
return of his license and expressed his preference for his case to
be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman,
Garin filed for a preliminary injunction assailing among others that
Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against
undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix
and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC
rule in his favor, directing MMDA to return his license and for the
authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first
giving the driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate
proceeding. Thus this petition.
ISSUE: WON Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the enforcement
of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
HELD:
The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that
MMDA is not a local government unit of a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community.
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power
vested in the legislature to make, ordain, establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either
with penalties of without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they
shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and
for subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its
council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It
is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies,
Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private sector for the efficient
and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are
administrative in nature.
LAWS
GR. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
BALACUIT vs. CFI
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 640 was passed by the Municipal Board of the City
of Butuan on April 21, 1969 which penalizes any person group of
persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games,
contests or other performances to require children between seven
(7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for tickets
intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said
ticket.
The petitioners Carlos Balacuit, Lamberto Tan, and Sergio Yu
Carcel are managers of the Maya and Dalisay Theaters, the
Crown Theater, and the Diamond Theater, respectively.
Aggrieved by the effect of the said ordinance, they filed a
complaint before the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte
and Butuan City on June 30, 1969 praying that the subject
ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
unenforceable.
Subsequently, the respondent court rendered its decision
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declaring Ordinance No. 640 as constitutional and valid.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
respondent court but was later on denied.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 640 is unconstitutional and an invalid
exercise of police power.
HELD:
(A)s to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid
exercise of police power, the same must be resolved in the
negative. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is
equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of
reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and
its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A
lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation,
be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police
power. police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control
and operation of a business should not encroach upon the
legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property
rights. right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall
be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and,
as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Hence,
the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property
in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most
for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve
could stay away.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation
of a common right.
Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property
rights of petitioners for even if We could assume that, on its face,
the interference was reasonable, from the foregoing
considerations, it has been fully shown that it is an unwarranted
and unlawful curtailment of the property and personal rights of
citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade,
it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, be upheld
as valid.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case
No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is
immediately executory.
146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the
BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the
statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The
petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The
Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to
elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to
quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for
the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
ISSUE: WON BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police
power of the State.
HELD:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and
is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
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The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but
an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit,
under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks
and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because
of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed
and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
GR. No. 88265 December 21, 1989
DEL ROSARIO vs. BENGZON
FACTS:
This is a class suit filed by the officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the
Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of
kindred persuasion, wherein the Supreme Court is asked to
declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some provisions
of the Generics Act of 1988 (Republic Act No. 6675), and of the
implementing Administrative Order No. 62 issued pursuant
thereto.
The said law requires the use of generic terminology or generic
names in writing prescriptions by medical, dental, and veterinary
doctors. Government health agencies and their personnel as well
as other government agencies are likewise obliged to use generic
names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing,
dispensing and administering of drugs and medicines. Certain
penalties are imposed for violation of the said provisions of the
law.
ISSUE: WON the Generics Act of 1998 and its implementing
Administrative Order No. 62 are unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in
the Generics Act. It, on the contrary, implements the constitutional
mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health
of the people" and "to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable
cost"(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987
Constitution).
There is no merit in the petitioners' theory that the Generics Act
impairs the obligation of contract between a physician and his
patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation between
patient and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient,
just as the patient may take or refuse the doctor's advice or
prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no
doctor has ever filed an action for breach of contract against a
patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo
surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor
( p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private contract between doctor
and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to
enact laws that are reasonably necessary to secure the health,
safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of the community.
This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All
contractual and property rights are held subject to its fair exercise.
152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987
TABLARIN VS. JUDGE GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the
Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a)
and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring
the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing
certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with
accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the
future. The trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The
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NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and
5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959" defines its basic
objectives in the following manner:
"SECTION 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and
shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of
medical education; (b) the examination for registration
of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and
regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines."
The statute, among other things, created a Board of
Medical Education. Its functions as specified in Section
5 of the statute include the following:
"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for
admission into a recognized college of medicine;
x x x
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a
medical school and keep a register of those issued said
certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of
the Board of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants
to medical schools:
"Admission requirements. The medical college may
admit any student who has not been convicted by any
court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b)
a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school
from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of
good moral character issued by two former professors
in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be
deemed admissible.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August 1985,
established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance
of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of
the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This
Order goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test,
is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its
calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the
country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on
the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association
of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each
applicant, together with the other admission requirements as
presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for
the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for
admission into the medical colleges.
ISSUE: WON Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
HELD: Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring
certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to medical
schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition.
The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive
and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure
and promote all the important interests and needs in a word,
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the public order of the general community. An important
component of that public order is the health and physical safety
and well being of the population, the securing of which no one can
deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and
regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration
is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health
and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that
the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has
long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation
of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting
admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude
for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need
to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in
our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known. We believe that the government
is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We
are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the
securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this
area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance
in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the
Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORP. vs. DSWD, ET. AL
FACTS:
Petitioners, belonging to domestic corporations and proprietors
operating drugstores in the Philippines, are praying for preliminary
injunction assailing the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003. On February 26, 2004, R.A. No. 9257,
amending R.A. No. 7432, was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and it became effective on March 21, 2004.
Section 4(a) of the Act states:
SEC. 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens. The
senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:
(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from
all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use
or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and
burial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f),
(g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods
sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount
shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That
the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added
tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for
tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to
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the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended.
The DSWD, on May 8, 2004, approved and adopted the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA No. 9275, Rule VI,
Article 8 which contains the proviso that the implementation of the
tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations to be
issued by the BIR and approved by the DOF. With the new law,
the Drug Stores Association of the Philippines wanted a
clarification of the meaning of tax deduction. The DOF clarified
that under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on
discounts was subtracted from Net Sales together with other
deductions which are considered as operating expenses before
the Tax Due was computed based on the Net Taxable Income.
On the other hand, under a tax credit scheme, the amount of
discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from
the tax due amount.
The DOH issued an Administrative Order that the twenty percent
discount shall include both prescription and non-prescription
medicines, whether branded or generic. It stated that such
discount would be provided in the purchase of medicines from all
establishments supplying medicines for the exclusive use of the
senior citizens.
Drug store owners assail the law with the contention that granting
the discount would result to loss of profit and capital especially
that such law failed to provide a scheme to justly compensate the
discount.
ISSUE: WON Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act is
unconstitutional or not violative of Article 3 Section 9 of the Constitution
which provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation and the equal protection clause of Article 3
Section 1.
HELD:
The permanent reduction in their total revenues is a forced
subsidy corresponding to the taking of private property for public
use or benefit. This constitutes compensable taking for which
petitioners would ordinarily become entitled to a just
compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain but the owners
loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation, and to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.
The law grants a twenty percent discount to senior citizens for
medical and dental services, and diagnostic and laboratory fees;
admission fees charged by theaters, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals, and other similar places of culture, leisure and
amusement; fares for domestic land, air and sea travel; utilization
of services in hotels and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers; and purchases of medicines
for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens. As a form of
reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may
claim the discount as a tax deduction.
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been
purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its
comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it
has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs. It is [t]he power vested in the legislature by the
constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
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RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
ZONING & REGULATORY ORDINANCES
20 SCRA 849; G.R. No.L-24693; 31 July 1967
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. VS.
MAYOR OF MANILA
FACTS:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with
one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and
general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition
against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City
of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and
to give the necessary orders for the execution and enforcement of
such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock
corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest
of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels, characterized as
legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13,
1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting City Mayor, Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances against
the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its
being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila
to enact insofar as it regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised
charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made
to motels. it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either
by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is
unconstitutional, therefore, null and void.
HELD:
A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such
a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its
decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has
been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in
both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the
absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity that
attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor
of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the
people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the
people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of
validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the
case here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than
in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through
Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter
thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly
within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it
void on the ground that the specific method of regulation
prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due
process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
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constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual
foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.
123 SCRA 569 (1983)
CRUZ vs. PARAS
FACTS:
Petitioners were night club operators in Bocaue Bulacan, who filed on
November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with preliminary
injunction. They contended that the enforcement of Municipal
Ordinance no. 84, an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs,
cabarets, and dance halls in that municipality or the renewal of
licenses to operate them, should be stopped as the municipal has no
power to prohibit a lawful business and that such ordinance is violative
to their right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the
license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing. The lower court upheld the validity of the ordinance in
the name of police power and dismissed the petition. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented
by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses
HELD:
Supreme Court states that reliance on the police power is insufficient
to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It is to be noted that
the municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law
and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein. However, it is only valid unless it contravenes the
fundamental law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine
Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation
of common right.
A municipal corporation, therefore, cannot prohibit the operation of
nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from
carrying on their business. RA 938, as originally enacted,
granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment,
maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true
that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give
municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the
operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the
same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting
municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs
would be to construe it in a way that it violates
the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the
recently-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate
the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical
performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.
Certiorari granted.
120 SCRA 568 (1983)
VELASCO VS. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 4964 was enacted for a two-fold purpose. (1) To enable
the City of Manila to collect a fee for operating massage clinic
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separately from those operating barber shops and (2) To prevent
immorality which might probably arise from the construction of
separate rooms. However, petitioner argues that such ordinance
amounts to a deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their
means of livelihood without due process of law.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance was unconstitutional.
HELD:
Considering the two-fold purpose of the ordinance, it is clear that such
law is a police power measure. This Court has been most liberal in
sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the lower court is affirmed.
234 SCRA 255 (1994)
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES
FACTS:
On 1992, PAGCOR decided to expand its operation in Cagayan
de Oro City and to this end leased a portion of a building
belonging to Pryce Properties. Upon announcement of the
opening of the casino, several organization in the said area
objected, including Cagayan de Oros sangguniang panglungsod
who later enacted Ordinance no. 3353. Such ordinance was
entitled, AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS
PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND
ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION
THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO. Less than a
month from the passage of such ordinance, the sangguniang
panglusod of Cagayan de Oro adopted a sterner ordinance no.
3375-93 which was an AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION THEREFORE.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where
it was joined by PAGCOR as intervener and supplemental
petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the
writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration of
this decision was denied on July 13, 1993.Cagayan de Oro City
and its mayor are now before the court in this petition for review.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the ordinances enacted by the sangguniang panglusod of
Cagayan de Oro are valid.
2. WON the Local Government Code should prevail over and above
an existing statute (in this case PD1869)
HELD:
First, it should be noted that the morality of gambling is not a
justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there
is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In
the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit
some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient.
Although it is true that local government units are authorized to
prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance, it should be understood that,
obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The apparent flaw in
the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and
the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City.
On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code,
the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to
give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is
possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the
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problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government
Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only
those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869.
Lastly, The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
costs against the petitioners.
GR No. 110249, August 27, 1997
ALFREDOI TANO vs. GOV. SALVADOR P. SOCRATES
FACTS:
15 Dec 1992: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City
enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the shipment of all
live fish and lobster outside the city from 1993-1998.
22 Jan 1993: Acting Mayor Lucero issued Office Order No. 23. It
authorized officers to inspect cargoes containing live fish and
lobster that are shipped out of Puerto Princesa. The purpose of
the inspection is to check if the shipper had the required mayors
permit issued by their office.
19 February 1993: Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catching,
gathering, possession, etc. of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for a period of 5 yrs.
he respondents implemented the ordinances, depriving all the
fishermen, marine merchants, and shippers of the entire province
of their only means of livelihood.
The petitioners directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC
arguing as follows:
1. It deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade,
violating Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of the
1987 Constitution.
2. Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition
under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied;
ie. Mayor had absolute authority in issuing the permit.
3. The Ordinance took away the right of the fishermen to earn
their livelihood in lawful ways.
The respondents contended that it was a valid exercise of the
Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause
(Sec. 16 of the LGC). The Ordinance, they argued, only covered
live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms and excluded those
not dwelling in the coral reefs and that it shall only last for 5 years.
The court must also distinguish between catching live fish and
selling it live and those who have no intention at all of selling it
live.
ISSUE: WON the questioned ordinances enacted in the exercise of
powers under the LGC relative to the protection and preservation of
the environment are a valid exercise of the police power of a municipal
corporation.
HELD: Yes. Laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
Section 5 (c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general
welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberally interpreted to give
more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development
and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community.
The LGC grants municipalities the power to grant fishery
privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees, or
charges for their use.
The sanggunians are directed to enact ordinances for the general
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welfare of the LGU and its inhabitants.
The centerpiece of the LGC is decentralization. Indispensable to
this is devolution. One of these powers is the enforcement of
fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves. The term municipal waters includes not only
streams, lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, but also
marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly
to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of
the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line
parallel with the general coastline and 15 km from it (Sec. 131 [r]
LGC).
Two principal objectives of the Ordinances:
1. Establish a closed season for the species of fish covered
therein for 5 years (This falls within the devolved power to
enforce fishery laws in municipal waters);
2. Protect the coral in the marine waters of the city and the
province from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities (this falls within the general welfare clause of the
LGC and the express mandate there to cities and provinces
to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties
for acts which harm the environment.
G.R. No. 118127 April 12, 2005
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR.
FACTS:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating
hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.
On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a RTC Petition with the lower court
praying that the Ordinance of the City of Manila be declared
invalid and unconstitutional.8
MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly
included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels
and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these
were not establishments for "amusement" or "entertainment" and
they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did
they use women as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they
"disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community."
The Ordinance ordered the removal of motels, inns, massage
parlors, beer houses, nightclubs in the Ermita-Malate area.
MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and
unconstitutional for the following reasons:
1. The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of
motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the
power to regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses and other similar establishments
2. The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 49913 which specifically declared portions of the
Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain
restrictions
3. The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of
police power as the compulsory closure of the motel
business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate
municipal interests sought to be protected
4. The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing
the operation of Victoria Court which was a legitimate
business prior to its enactment
5. The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that:
(a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's
property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as
a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it
have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and
6. The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under
the law as no reasonable basis exists for prohibiting the
operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments, and
for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but
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not outside of this area.
Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City
Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment
in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community"
as provided for in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government
Code.
Petitioners likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by
the City Council of Manila to protect the social and moral welfare
of the community in conjunction with its police power.
Hon. Laguio decided in favor of the private respondents and
declared the Ordinance null and void.
Petitioners filed an appeal with the lower court alleging that the
following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling: (1)
It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance
contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds of
commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in
the exercise of the inherent and plenary power of the State and
the general welfare clause exercised by local government units
provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18 (kk) of the Revised Charter of
Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code. 34
They allege that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power;
it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the
presumption of validity.
ISSUE: WON the Ordinance of the City of Manila shows a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD: No. The Ordinance was nullified barring the operation of motels
and inns within the Ermita-Malate area.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of
the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is
unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation
of a common right.
The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights
and impairs personal privileges.
It is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City
Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and
is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Police power legislation of such character deserves the full
endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But
inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of the Ordinance has
no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local
legislative bodies, in this case, the City Council, cannot prohibit
the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1
thereof or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of
laws not even under the guise of police power.
G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979
ORTIGAS & CO., LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND
TRUST CO.
FACTS:
Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling
lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along
EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto
Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate
agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the
Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their
rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma
Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the
plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of
Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and
the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that:
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1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential
purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove
soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to
the Seller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence)
which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a)
of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with
modern sanitary installations connected either to the public
sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a
distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines.
Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from
Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange,
with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the
beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the
commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began
constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop
it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed,
upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the
appeal.
ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 27 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD: Yes. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power.
EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and
municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless
stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are
hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents
in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare
of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be
stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled
with the legitimate exercise of police power.
201 SCRA 13
PRESLEY vs. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed by respondent
against Teofilo & Rollo Almendras (both deceased and
substituted by petitioner) for violating a Bel-Air Subdivision
restriction that the subject house and lot shall be used only for
residential and not for commercial purposes, and for non-payment
of association dues to BAVA (respondent)
Deceased petitioners were the registered owners of the property
while Presley, as lessee of the property, is the owner and
operator of Hot Pan de Sal Store located in the same address.
The RTC rendered decision in favor of respondent which was
affirmed by the CA
Motion for reconsideration was denied hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON the ruling of respondent CA is in accordance with a recent
consolidated decision of the SC which applies in the case at bar
in favor of the petitioner
2. WON the ruling of the CA adjudging the petitioner solidarily liable
together with the Almendrases (deceased) to pay the alleged
unpaid association dues is patently contrary to the evidence and
facts
3. WON respondent court adjudging petitioner solidarily liable to pay
attorneys fees is without any legal or factual basis
Note: During the pendency of the case with this Court, petitioner
Enedina Fox Presley died on January 4, 1991. She was substituted by
her two daughters as heirs, namely Olivia V. Pizzaro and Consuelo V.
Lacson.
HELD:
The issues raised in the instant petition have already been dealt
with in the consolidated cases decided by this Court promulgated
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on December 22, 1988 Apparently, when the respondent court
promulgated the questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the
Sangalang case had not yet been decided by this Court, etc.
Apparently, when the respondent court promulgated the
questioned decision on November 28, 1988 the Sangalang case
had not yet been decided by this Court.
The respondent court in the case at bar was not at all entirely
wrong in upholding the Deed of Restrictions annotated in the title
of the petitioners. It held that the provisions of the Deed of
Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations freely
entered into by the parties. Undoubtedly, they are valid and can
be enforced against the petitioner.
But they are, like all contracts, subject to the overriding demands,
needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may
determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our
jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the
'law between the contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art.
1159) but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above
all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed
precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the
common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever
necessary.
With respect to the demand for payment of association dues in
the sum of P3,803.55, the records reveal that this issue is now
moot and academic.
The demand for payment of attorney's fees is now without legal or
factual basis.
Petition granted.
GR Nos. 142359 & 142980, May 25, 2004
PASONG BAYABAS FARMERS vs. CA
FACTS:
Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of
land, issued it in the name of its successor, the Credito Asiatic,
Incorporated (CAI) and subsequently subdivided it into two
parcels
LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a
residential and industrial estate
CAI embarked on the development of the housing project into
three phases and secured a locational clearance for the project
from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC
CAI decided to continue with the development of its Hakone
Housing Project but the project was stymied by a Complaint for
Damages with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction
The plaintiffs alleged that they had reached an agreements with
the respondent that they would remain in peaceful possession of
their farmholdings but notwithstanding such, the defendant
ordered the bulldozing of the property
In answer to the complaint, CAI denied that it allowed the plaintiffs
to possess and cultivate the landholding with fixed rentals
Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs entered into a
compromise agreement which eventually led to all of the other
plaintiffs entering into an agreement with CAI
CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for Compulsory Coverage
under Rep. Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) was filed before
the DAR by seventeen (17) individuals who alleged that they are
farmers who have occupied a parcel of public agricultural land
adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River
According to the petitioners, the said illegal bulldozing activities
would convert the land from agricultural to non-agricultural land,
thereby depriving the members of the PBFAI of their tenancy
rights over the property. For this reason, the petitioners prayed
that a temporary restraining order be issued ex-parte to stop the
bulldozing of the property, and that a preliminary injunction or a
status quo order be later issued to enjoin the same.
ISSUES:
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RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
1. Whether the property subject of the suit is covered by Rep. Act
No. 6657, the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL);
2. whether the DARAB had original and appellate jurisdiction over
the complaint of the petitioner PBFAI against the private
respondent;
3. whether the petitioners-members of the PBFAI have a cause of
action against the private respondent for possession and
cultivation of the property in suit;
4. whether the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint in Civil Case
No. BCV-87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the petitioners-
members of the PBFAI; and
5. whether the appellate court committed a reversible error in
dismissing the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
HELD:
The contention of the petitioners has no merit.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on June 15, 1988. But long
before the law took effect, the property subject of the suit had
already been reclassified and converted from agricultural to non-
agricultural or residential land.
With our finding that the property subject of the suit was classified
as residential land since 1976, the DARAB had no original and
appellate jurisdiction over the property subject of the action of the
petitioner PBFAI and its members.
Since the members of the petitioner PBFAI were not the tenants
of the private respondent CAI, the petitioners and its members
had no cause of action against the private respondent for
possession of the landholding to maintain possession thereof and
for damages.
When the complaint was filed, twenty-five (25) of the thirty -seven
(37) members of the petitioners had already executed separate
deeds of quitclaim in favor of the private respondent CAI over the
portions of the landholding they respectively claimed, after
receiving from the private respondent CAI varied sums of money.
In executing the said deeds, the members of the petitioner PBFAI
thereby waived their respective claims over the property. Hence,
they have no right whatsoever to still remain in possession of the
same.
Petition denied.
ADMINISTRATIVE RULES & REGULATIONS
127 SCRA 329, 1984
BAUTISTA vs. JUNIO
FACTS:
This prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary
Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista, for being allegedly
violative of the due process and equal protection guarantees 1 of
the Constitution as it was provided in LOI 869 that the use private
motor vehicles with H and EH plates on week-ends and holidays
was banned from "[12:00] a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m.
Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of the
day after the holiday."
It was then alleged by petitioners that "while the purpose for the
issuance of the LOI 869 is laudable, to wit, energy conservation,
the provision banning the use of H and EH [vehicles] is unfair,
discriminatory, [amounting to an] arbitrary classification" and thus
in contravention of the equal protection clause. 5 Moreover, for
them, such Letter of Instruction is a denial of due process, more
specifically, "of their right to use and enjoy their private property
and of their freedom to travel and hold family gatherings, reunions
and outings on week-ends and holidays," inviting attention to the
fact that others not included in the ban enjoying "unrestricted
freedom."
ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of an energy conservation measure,
Letter of Instruction No. 869, issued on May 31, 1979 the response
to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974 is constitutional
HELD:
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'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on
the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.'
It is true, of course, that there may be instances where a police
power measure may, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or unjust
character, be held offensive to the due process clause and,
therefore, may, when challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of them.
In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police
power, especially so where the assailed governmental action
deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much
leeway. That is settled law. What is more, it is good law. Due
process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke
the equal protection clause only if they can show that the
governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed.
Absent therefore the alleged infringement of constitutional rights,
more precisely the due process and equal protection guarantees,
this Court cannot adjudge Letter of Instruction No. 869 as tainted
by unconstitutionality.
Petition dismissed.
119 SCRA 597, 1982
TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS. BOT
FACTS:
On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued
Memorandum Circular 77-42 phasing out old and dilapidated taxis;
refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol Region
having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT
circular, the Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing the
Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the National Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular,
and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and
accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance
therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phased-out in registration year
1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and
those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators
of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace
Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao, filed a petition with
the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify Memorandum Circular 77-42
or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in
1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as
those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the
time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16
February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the BT a Manifestation and
Urgent Motion, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case
was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, et.
al. filed before the same Board a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to
Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case be resolved or
decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of
denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for
the protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are
phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its President,
allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed
that the records of the case could not be located. On 29 December
1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
with the Supreme Court. declaration of nullity of Department Order (DO) 74, DO 215 and
ISSUE: WON the implementation and enforcement of Memorandum the TRB Regulations contravene RA 2000. Petitioners also
Circular 77-42 violates the petioners constitutional rights to (1) Equal sought to declare Department Order No. 123 (DO 123) and
protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection Administrative Order No. 1 (AO 1) unconstitutional.
against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard. Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH
issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215
HELD: declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as
Regarding the and Substantive Due Process, Presidential Decree limited access facilities. Pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No.
101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and 2000, a limited access facility is defined as "a highway or street
reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, especially designed for through traffic, and over, from, or to which
measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons have no
and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The right or easement or only a limited right or easement of access,
overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular light, air or view by reason of the fact that their property abuts
77-42 is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the upon such limited access facility or for any other reason.
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary
exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire
of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-
and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215. On July
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued Department
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine displacement of
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access facilities (toll ways).
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the DO 123, as petitioner contends, is violative of equal protection
Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous clause of the constitution.
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of general rules Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the
or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is 123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of
impractical to subject every taxicab to constant and recurring their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the June 16, 2003.
fact that it can open the door to the adoption of multiple
standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
ISSUE: WHETHER or not AO 1 AND DO 123 ARE
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years
supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience
HELD:
shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost
Under EO 546, it is the DOTC, not the DPWH, which has
recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They are
authority to regulate, restrict, or prohibit access to limited access
also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
facilities. Thus, DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH
comfortable service to the public specially considering that they
has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access
are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three
facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to
shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of
of transportation and to regulate related activities.
due process has been met. alleged that the Circular in question
Since the DPWH has no authority to regulate activities relative to
violates their right to equal protection of the law because the
transportation, the TRB cannot derive its power from the DPWH
same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely
to issue regulations governing limited access facilities. The
towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out
DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not
that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in
possess in the first place. Since DO 74 and DO 215 are void, it
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. In fact, the same is also
follows that the rules implementing them are likewise void. DPWH
implemented in Cebu City. The Board's reason for enforcing the
has no authority to regulate limited access highways since EO
Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city,
546 has devolved this function to the DOTC. Thus, DO 123 is void
compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic
for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate it.
pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge.
Furthermore, the assailed portion of AO 1 states that on limited
Considering that traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a
access highways, it is unlawful for any person or group of persons
substantial distinction exists so that infringement of the equal
to drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab, motorcycle or any vehicle
protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
not motorized. Petitioners attacked this exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the
as baseless and unwarranted.The use of public highways by
riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis.
motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police
The State, in the exercise, of its police power, can prescribe
power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
is the "most essential, insistent and illimitable" of all government
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things
powers. The tendency is to extend rather than to restrict the use
hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society may also regulate
of police power. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is
property rights the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando
reasonableness. What is "reasonable" is not subject to exact
"the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
definition or scientific formulation. No all-embracing test of
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby
reasonableness exists, for its determination rests upon human
certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
judgment applied to the facts and circumstances of each
disregarded".
particular case.
AO 1 does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely
GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006
outlines several precautionary measures, to which toll way users
MIRASOL VS. DPWH
must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure public safety
and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.
FACTS:
They cover several subjects, from what lanes should be used by a
Petitioners filed before the trial court a petition seeking the
certain vehicle, to maximum vehicle height. The prohibition of
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
certain types of vehicles is but one of these. None of these rules
violates reason. The purpose of these rules and the logic behind
them are quite evident. A toll way is not an ordinary road. The
special purpose for which a toll way is constructed necessitates
the imposition of guidelines in the manner of its use and
operation. Inevitably, such rules will restrict certain rights. But the
mere fact that certain rights are restricted does not invalidate the
rules.
The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the toll
ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that
their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic
considerations. The DPWH points out that the same study the
petitioners rely on cites that the inability of other drivers to detect
motorcycles is the predominant cause of accidents. Arguably,
prohibiting the use of motorcycles in toll ways may not be the
"best" measure to ensure the safety and comfort of those who ply
the toll ways.
However, the means by which the government chooses to act is
not judged in terms of what is "best," rather, on simply whether
the act is reasonable. The validity of a police power measure
does not depend upon the absolute assurance that the purpose
desired can in fact be probably fully accomplished, or upon the
certainty that it will best serve the purpose intended. Reason, not
scientific exactitude, is the measure of the validity of the
governmental regulation. Arguments based on what is "best" are
arguments reserved for the Legislatures discussion. Judicial
intervention in such matters will only be warranted if the assailed
regulation is patently whimsical. We do not find the situation in
this case to be so.
AO 1 is not oppressive. Petitioners are not being deprived of their
right to use the limited access facility. They are merely being
required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the rules on
how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon petitioners
right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles as the mode of
traveling along limited access highways. Several cheap,
accessible and practical alternative modes of transport are open
to petitioners. There is nothing oppressive in being required to
take a bus or drive a car instead of ones scooter, bicycle, calesa,
or motorcycle upon using a toll way.
Petitioners reliance on the studies they gathered is misplaced.
Police power does not rely upon the existence of definitive studies
to support its use. Indeed, no requirement exists that the exercise
of police power must first be conclusively justified by research.
The yardstick has always been simply whether the governments
act is reasonable and not oppressive. The use of "reason" in this
sense is simply meant to guard against arbitrary and capricious
government action. Scientific certainty and conclusiveness,
though desirable, may not be demanded in every situation.
Otherwise, no government will be able to act in situations
demanding the exercise of its residual powers because it will be
tied up conducting studies.
A police power measure may be assailed upon proof that it unduly
violates constitutional limitations like due process and equal
protection of the law. Petitioners attempt to seek redress from the
motorcycle ban under the aegis of equal protection must fail.
Petitioners contention that AO 1 unreasonably singles out
motorcycles is specious. To begin with, classification by itself is
not prohibited.
A classification can only be assailed if it is deemed invidious, that
is, it is not based on real or substantial differences. As explained
by Chief Justice Fernando in Bautista v. Juinio:
x x x To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is
the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to
liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoked the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted
by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that
finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate
equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
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circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical is analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall
within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding the rest.
The real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle
and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all
types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most
obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-
wheeled vehicle. A classification based on practical convenience
and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply because it
may lack purely theoretical or scientific uniformity.
Petitioners complain that the prohibition on the use of motorcycles
in toll ways unduly deprive them of their right to travel.
A toll way is not an ordinary road. As a facility designed to
promote the fastest access to certain destinations, its use,
operation, and maintenance require close regulation. Public
interest and safety require the imposition of certain restrictions on
toll ways that do not apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of
road, it is but reasonable that not all forms of transport could use
it.
The right to travel does not mean the right to choose any vehicle
in traversing a toll way. The right to travel refers to the right to
move from one place to another. Petitioners can traverse the toll
way any time they choose using private or public four-wheeled
vehicles. Petitioners are not denied the right to move from Point A
to Point B along the toll way. Petitioners are free to access the toll
way, much as the rest of the public can. The mode by which
petitioners wish to travel pertains to the manner of using the toll
way, a subject that can be validly limited by regulation.
Petitioners themselves admit that alternative routes are available
to them. Their complaint is that these routes are not the safest
and most convenient. Even if their claim is true, it hardly qualifies
as an undue curtailment of their freedom of movement and travel.
The right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of
transport or to the most convenient route to his destination. The
obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners complain of
(i.e., potholes, manholes, construction barriers, etc.), are not
suffered by them alone. 11/30/09
Finally, petitioners assert that their possession of a drivers
license from the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the fact
that their vehicles are registered with that office entitle them to
use all kinds of roads in the country. Again, petitioners are
mistaken. There exists no absolute right to drive. On the contrary,
this privilege, is heavily regulated. Only a qualified group is
allowed to drive motor vehicles: those who pass the tests
administered by the LTO. A drivers license issued by the LTO
merely allows one to drive a particular mode of transport. It is not
a license to drive or operate any form of transportation on any
type of road. Vehicle registration in the LTO on the other hand
merely signifies the roadworthiness of a vehicle. This does not
preclude the government from prescribing which roads are
accessible to certain vehicles.
Therefore, the petition was partly granted. DOs 74, 215 and 123
of the DPWH and the Revised Rules and Regulations on Limited
Access Facilities of the Toll Regulatory Board were declared void
AO 1 of the DOTC valid.
124 SCRA 494, 1983
ANGLO-FIL TRADING VS. LAZARO
FACTS:
23 contractors, among them the Philippine Integrated Port Services,
Inc. (PIPSI), Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation, Aduana Stevedoring
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Corporation, Anda Stevedoring Corporation, Ben Paz Port Service,
Inc., Manila Stevedoring and Arrastre Services, Inc. (members of the
Philippine Association of Stevedoring Operators and Contractors, Inc.
[PASOC]), competed at the South Harbor for the performance of
stevedoring work. The licenses of these contractors had long expired
when the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA, created by Presidential
Decree 505 [11 July 1974], later superseded by Presidential Decree
857 [23 December 197]5) took over the control and management of
ports but they continued to operate afterwards on the strength of
temporary permits and hold-over authorities issued by PPA. On 4 May
1976, the Board of Directors of PPA passed Resolution 10, approving
and adopting a set of policies on Port Administration, Management and
Operation. The PPA adopted as its own the Bureau of Customs policy
of placing on only one organization the responsibility for the operation
of arrastre and stevedoring services in one port. On 11 April 1980,
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction 1005-A
which, among other things, directed PPA to expeditiously evaluate all
recognized cargo handling contractors and port-related service
operators and to determine the qualified contractor or operator in order
to ensure effective utilization of port facilities, etc. This was followed by
the Presidents memorandum to Col. Eustaquio S. Baclig Jr. dated 18
April 1980, directing submission of a report on the integration of the
stevedoring operations in Manila South Harbor and emphasizing the
need for such integration as well as the strengthening of the PPA in
order to remedy the problems therein. On 28 April 1980, the committee
submitted its report recommending the award of an exclusive contract
for stevedoring services in the South Harbor to Ocean Terminal
Services, Inc. (OTSI) after finding it the best qualified among the
existing contractors. The PPA submitted the committee report to the
President, who, on 24 May 1980, approved the recommendation to
award an exclusive management contract to OTSI. On 27 June 1980,
PPA and OTSI entered into a management contract which provided,
among others, for a 5-year exclusive operation by OTSI of stevedoring
services in the South Harbor, renewable for another 5 years. The
Board of Directors of the PPA gave its approval on 27 June 1980. On
23 July 1980, PIPSI instituted an action before the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila against PPA and OTSI for the nullification of
the contract between the two, the annulment of the 10% of gross
stevedoring revenue being collected by PPA, and injunction with
preliminary injunction. An ex-parte restraining order was issued. On 21
August 1980. with leave of court, Anglo-Fil, et al., filed their complaint
in intervention. The motion was granted and on 22 August 1980, the
CFI issued another ex-parte restraining order in the case to include
Anglo-Fil et. al., under the benefits of such order. On 30 August 1980,
the PPA filed an urgent motion to lift the restraining orders in view of
the long delay in the resolution of the injunction incident and the
countervailing public interest involved. On 1 September 1980, the CFI
dissolved, lifted and set aside the restraining orders without prejudice
to the Courts resolution on the propriety of issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. On 5 September 1980, PPA sent a
letter to the General Manager of PIPSI informing him that due to the
lifting of the temporary restraining order, it was withdrawing PIPSIs
holdover authority to operate or provide stevedoring services at South
Harbor effective 7 September 1980. Anglo-Fil, et al., and PIPSI,
therefore, filed the petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction
alleging that the lifting of the restraining orders ex-parte by the CFI was
clearly effected with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended
on the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations
implemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an
unlawful deprivation of property rights.
HELD:
From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of
discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-parte the
temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte.
Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order, the CFI heard the
parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after
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hearing the parties evidence and arguments, denied the application for
the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves
ex-parte abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte a
restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due
process was violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private
property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al.
were operating merely on hold-over permits, which were based on
PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over permits
were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines
as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have served as
sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSIs and Anglo-Fil et.al.s
authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-Fil, et. al.
would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound
discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and regulations that the
latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of power.
The latter, therefore, cannot be said to have been deprived of property
without due process because, in this respect, what was given them
was not a property right but a mere privilege and they should have
taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to
operate in the South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime
the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case
justifies it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative
matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative
body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go
beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment
or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over
the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the
government. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion, and to findings of fact.
G.R. NO. 145742 JULY 14, 2005
PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY VS. CIPRES STEVEDORING
AND ARRASTRE INC. (CISAI)
FACTS:
Petitioner PPA is a govt. entity created by virtue of P.D. no. 857
and is tasked to implement an integrated program for the
planning, development, financing, and operation of ports and port
districts in the country. Respondent CISAI is a domestic
corporation primarily engaged in stevedoring, arrastre, and
porterage business, including cargo handling and hauling services
in Negros Oriental and Dumaguete and Bais. Since 1976, CISAI
had been granted permits to operate the cargo handling
operations in Dumaguete. In 1991, PPA awarded an 8-year
contract to CISAI to pursue its business endeavor. Upon this time,
PPA Administrative Order No. 03-90 took effect providing for the
awarding of cargo handling services through public bidding.
Following the expiration of its contract, CISAI was able to
continue with its business by virtue of hold-over permits given by
PPA. During this time, another administrative order PPA AO No.
03-2000 took effect which amended PPA AO no. 03-90 expressly
provided that all contract for cargo handling services of more
than 3 years shall be awarded through public bidding. CISAI
initiated an action for specific performance, injunction with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction, contending that
PPAs action was I derogation of their vested right over the
operation of cargo handling enterprise. The lower court granted
CISAIs prayer for a temporary restraining order. PPA filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted by the trial court
setting aside the injunctive writ. CISAI filed a petition for certiorari
before the CA, and the CA granted the petition, ordering PPA to
desist from conducting the scheduled public bidding for cargo
handling operations in the port of Dumaguete. Thus, this instant
appeal.
ISSUE: WON CISAI have acquired a vested right to the cargo handling
operations at the Dumaguete Port.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that CISAI have no vested rights to the cargo
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
handling operations because the continuance of their business
was due to hold over permits given by PPA, and such may be
revoked anytime by the granting authority. As held in the case of
Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation vs. Lazaro, hold over permits are
merely temporary subject to the policy and guidelines as may be
implemented by the authority granting it. Stevedoring services are
imbued with public interest and subject to the states police
power, therefore, whatever proprietary right the CISAI may have
acquired must necessarily give way to valid exercise of police
power. PPA, being created for the purpose of promoting the
growth of regional port bodies, it is empowered to make port
regulations. With this mandate, the decision to bid out cargo
holding services is properly within the province and discretion of
PPA. As for CISAIs claim that PPA AO No. 03-2000 violated the
constitutional provision of non-impairment of contract, suffice it to
state that all contracts are subject to the overriding demands,
needs, interests of the greater number as the State may
determine in the legitimate exercise of its police power.
Wherefore, Petition is granted.
those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and
The means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines
that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and
order in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes,
particularly those committed by NPA, which tends to disturb
the peace of the community, Pres. Arroyo deemed it best to
impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating
factor in the issuance of guidelines is the interest of the
public in general. Such means of revocation is, thus, a valid
exercise of police power.
Petition is hereby dismissed.

G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. HON. ALBERTO ROMULO AS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, PNP CHIEF HERMOGENES EBDANE

FACTS:
Chavez is a gun- owner who filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the Guidelines
in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carying of Firearms
Outside of Residence issued by PNP Chief Hermogenes
Ebdane, Jr. In January 2003, Pres. Arroyo delivered a speech
before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a
nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime
incidents. She directed PNP Chief Ebdane to suspend the
issuance of permits to carry firearms outside of residence
(PTCFOR). Thus, Chief Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines.
Chavez contends that such guidelines was a derogation of his
constitutional right to life and to protect life as he, being a law-
abiding licensed gun-owner is the only class subject to the
implementation while leaving the law-breakers (kidnappers, MILF,
hold-uppers, robbers etc.) untouched. Petitioner also averred that
ownership and carrying of firearms are constitutionally protected
property rights which cannot be taken away without due process
of law.

ISSUES:
1. WON the citizens right to bear arms is a constitutional right
2. WON the revocation of the PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed
Guidelines is a violation of right to property
3. WON the issuance of said Guidelines is a valid exercise of Police
power

HELD:
1. SC ruled that nowhere fond in our Constitution is the provision on
bearing arms as a constitutional right. The right to bear arms,
then, is a mere statutory privilege unlike in the American
Constitution which was the law invoked by petitioner. Right to
bear arms is a mere statutory creation as was observed by the
laws passed to regulate the use, acquisition, transfer, importation
of firearms; it cannot be considered an inalienable or absolute
right.
2. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to
enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. A
license is merely a privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the granting authority and
the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property right nor
does it create a vested right. Such license may be revoked
anytime when the authority deems it fit to do so, and such
revocation does not deprive the holder of any property, or
immunity.
3. The test to determine the validity of police measure , thus:
The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- EMINENT DOMAIN -
WHO EXERCISES THE POWER?
GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY CEMETERY
FACTS:
The City of Manila, in exercising the owner of Eminent Domain,
presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said City
raying that certain lands described therein, be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement, namely, the
extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents contend
that there are other parcels of land offered for such improvement
proposed by the City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel
of land by the City is a cemetery where the dead loved ones of
the Chinese community were buried. Herien respondents also
averred that the City of Manila will have to spend a great deal
amount of money in the relocation and rebuilding of sepulchres,
tombstones and monuments of those affected by the
expropriation should they pursue to use the Chinese Cemetery.
The trial judge, Hon. Del Rosario decided that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question. The City of Manila appealed contending that under the
law, it has the authority to expropriate any land it may desire and
neither the court not the land owners can inquire into the
advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask concerning the
necessities therefore; and that the courts are mere appraisers of
the land involved.
ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity
of the expropriation?
HELD:
Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides that the govt. of the Phil
islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any
municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation
having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public
use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed under Sec.
242( a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented;
that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of
condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be
condemned together with the interest of each defendant
separately.). Section 243 provides that if the court shall find upon
trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall
then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec. 243 means that when
the legislature conferred upon the courts the right to ascertain
upon trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent
domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and hear
proof upon: 1. whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is public; and 2.whether the land is public or
private. Supreme Court also averred that the exercise of the right
of eminent domain is necessary in derogation of private rights,
and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly
construed. Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity existing for
an expropriation, it should not be made for such purposes until it
is fully established that such necessity exist. In the present case,
even granting that a necessity exist for the opening of Rizal St.
through the cemetery, record shows that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of charge which will
answer every purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery, then,
still being under care and maintenance of the living should be
spared from such expropriation where there are other lands
offered for expropriation at a much lesser expense to serve the
same purpose. The judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed.
268 SCRA 368 (1997)
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
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FACTS:
On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89,
"Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4
Along the National Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the
Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports
Facilities."
In due time, Resolution No. 43-89 was approved by then
Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval. On September 11,
1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said
Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is
unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in
Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."
The Municipality of Bunawan, herein public respondent,
subsequently filed a petition for Eminent Domain against
petitioner Percival Moday before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan
del Sur.
On March 6, 1991, public respondent municipality filed a Motion
to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This
Case stating that it had already deposited with the municipal
treasurer the necessary amount in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that it would be in the
government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to
take possession of the property.
Despite petitioners' opposition and after a hearing on the merits,
the RTC granted respondent municipality's motion to take
possession of the land. Petitioners' motion for recon was denied
by the trial court. Petitioners elevated the case in a petition for
certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court, but was dismissed by appellate court. The CA held that the
public purpose for the expropriation is clear from Resolution No.
43-89 and that since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan
del Sur did not declare Resolution No. 43-89 invalid, expropriation
of petitioners' property could proceed. Respondent appellate court
also denied petitioners' motion for recon.
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three
buildings on the subject property: 2 wooden structures, and one
made of concrete.
ISSUE: Whether or not the municipality to exercise the right to eminent
domain, since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution
No. 43-89.
HELD:
On December 8, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge
Evangeline Yuipco from enforcing her and respondent
municipality from using and occupying all the buildings
constructed and from further constructing any building on the land
subject of this petition.
Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of
Restraining Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a
Resolution on March 15, 1995, citing incumbent municipal mayor
Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and
to demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the
restraining order.
Former Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo paid the fine and manifested
that he lost in the May 8, 1995 election. The incumbent Mayor
Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve
"Urgent Motion for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary
Restraining Order" and Memorandum on June 11, 1996 for the
Municipality of Bunawan.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of
the condemnation proceedings initiated by the municipality.
According to petitioners, the expropriation was politically
motivated and Resolution No. 43-89 was correctly disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
The CA declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for
disapproving the resolution "could be baseless, because it failed
to point out which and where are those available lots.'"
Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as
invalid, expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. The
Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the
CA.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan
exercised in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's right to
appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State,
private property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed
by the national legislature, the power of eminent domain may be
validly delegated to local governments, other public entities and
public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and
there must be just compensation.
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of
eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the local Government Code in force at
the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of
said law states:
Sec. 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of its
sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
Sec. 153. Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within
thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances,
resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal
mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the
documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if
there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall examine them
promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing
of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and
make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to
him proper.
(2) If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal
ordinance, resolution or executive order is beyond the power
conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall
declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in
whole or in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and
advising the proper municipal authorities thereof. The effect of
such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or
executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final. xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis
supplied.)
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render
said resolution null and void. The law, as expressed in Section
153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the
power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground
that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the
Mayor to issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to
disapprove Municipal Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of
Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent
domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate
said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid
and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for
the condemnation of petitioners' property.
As regards the accusation of political oppression, it is alleged that
Percival Moday incurred the ire of then Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo
when he refused to support the latter's candidacy for mayor in
previous elections. Petitioners claim that then incumbent Mayor
C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by expropriating their
land even if there were other properties belonging to the
municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they
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allege that the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property
adjacent to petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use
must be public, compensation must be made and due process of
law must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of
such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking,
has ruled that the necessity of exercising eminent domain must
be genuine and of a public character. Government may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find
no evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified
photocopy of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the
municipality does own vacant land adjacent to petitioners'
property suited to the purpose of the expropriation. In the
questioned decision, respondent appellate court similarly held that
the pleadings and documents on record have not pointed out any
of respondent municipality's "other available properties available
for the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are
likewise unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the
Court holds that petitioners' demand that the former municipal
mayor be personally liable for damages is without basis.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Court is LIFTED.
GR No. 136349, January 23, 2006
MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila.
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig,
now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to
expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be
used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to
Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then
Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig.
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to
petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."
On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that
the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional,
invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient
nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor
sectors of our community."
In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the
purpose of the expropriation of petitioners property is "to provide
sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the
trial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No.
873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the
just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the
report of the commissioners.
On April 25, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and on May
7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity to
expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of just
compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be
determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for recon but it was denied by the trial
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court. Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer
of Pasig City as commissioners to ascertain the just
compensation. This prompted petitioner to file with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. On October 31, 1997,
the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners Motion for Recon was denied.
ISSUE: What constitutes a genuine necessity for public use.
HELD:
Where the taking by the State of private property is done for the
benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports
and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a
recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot
be considered to be for public use. Its expropriation is not valid. In
this case, the Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity
for public use.
In the early case of US v. Toribio, this Court defined the power of
eminent domain as "the right of a government to take and
appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of
providing a reasonable compensation therefor." It has also been
described as the power of the State or its instrumentalities to take
private property for public use and is inseparable from sovereignty
and inherent in government.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local
government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local
governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may
exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters
for its exercise, thus:
"SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose
or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon
payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That, the
power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and
such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That, the local
government unit may immediately take possession of the
property upon the filing of expropriation proceedings and upon
making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on
the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the
fair market value at the time of the taking of the property."
Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the
following areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation,
(b) the necessity of the taking, and (c) the public use character of
the purpose of the taking.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to
such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,
we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of
the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law College, we
ruled that "necessity within the rule that the particular property to
be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute
but only a reasonable or practical necessity, such as would
combine the greatest benefit to the public with the least
inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the
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property owner consistent with such benefit."
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has
failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioners property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
basis for the passage of the Ordinance authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-
profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be
gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of
having their own private playground and recreational facility.
Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose
is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity
has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an
alternative facility for sports development and community
recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to
all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the CA are REVERSED.
The complaint for expropriation filed before the trial court by
respondent City of Pasig, is DISMISSED.
GR No. 155746, October 03, 2004
LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA
FACTS:
In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of
Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029, situated in Capitol Hills,
Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965,
petitioners purchased Lot 1029. But then, in late 1965, the 210
lots, reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province
tried to annul the sale of Lot by the City of Cebu to the petitioners.
This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific
performance and damages in the then CFI.
On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and
on June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the
Province of Cebu executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029
in favor of petitioners.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot
only to discover that squatters already occupied it. Thus,
petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the squatters.
The MTCC, rendered a decision on April 1, 1998, ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the
MTCCs decision and issued a writ of execution and order of
demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about to be
implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote two letters to
the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the
ground that the City was still looking for a relocation site for the
squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two
orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from
February 22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during the
suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu
City passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized
housing site pursuant to RA 7279. Then, on June 30, 1999, the
SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772 which included Lot
1029 among the identified sites for socialized housing. On July,
19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by the SP of Cebu
City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation
proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered
in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be
used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale
to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the ordinance
appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the
subject lot. This ordinance was approved by Mayor Garcia on
August 2, 2000.
On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
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unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the complaint filed by
petitioners whose subsequent motion for recon was also denied.
In this appeal, petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation of their property
for the purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavor contrary
to the concept of "public use" contemplated in the Constitution.
They allege that it will benefit only a handful of people. The
ordinance, according to petitioners, was obviously passed for
politicking, the squatters undeniably being a big source of votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu
of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by petitioners
contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws.
HELD:
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the
legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843
was enacted pursuant to Section 19 of RA 7160:
SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or
purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of
petitioners lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu City to provide
socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of
the City.
There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this
power: (1) no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws; and (2) private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Thus, the exercise
by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not
absolute.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine
necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which
private property should be expropriated. In this case, there was
no showing at all why petitioners property was singled out for
expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. Ordinance No. 1843 stated no
reason for the choice of petitioners property as the site of a
socialized housing project.
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property
for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10
thereof provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands for
socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development,
Zonal Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or
BLISS which have not yet been acquired; and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more practicable and
advantageous to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in
this section shall not apply. The local government units shall
give budgetary priority to on-site development of government
lands. (Emphasis supplied).
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes of acquiring
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lands for purposes of this Act shall include, among others,
community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation:
Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to
only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted:
Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels
of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for
purposes of this Act: xxx. (Emphasis supplied).
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice Jose
B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila, we ruled that the above-
quoted provisions are strict limitations on the exercise of the
power of eminent domain by local government units, especially
with respect to (1) the order of priority in acquiring land for
socialized housing and (2) the resort to expropriation proceedings
as a means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings may be resorted to only after the other
modes of acquisition are exhausted. Compliance with these
conditions is mandatory because these are the only safeguards
of oftentimes helpless owners of private property against what
may be a tyrannical violation of due process when their property
is forcibly taken from them allegedly for public use.
We have found nothing in the records indicating that the City of
Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279.
Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property
without any attempt to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of
Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that
the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first
exhausted. Moreover, prior to the passage of Ordinance No.
1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy
petitioners property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160. We
therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally infirm for
being violative of the petitioners right to due process.
It should also be noted that, as early as 1998, petitioners had
already obtained a favorable judgment of eviction against the
illegal occupants of their property. The judgment in this ejectment
case had, in fact, already attained finality, with a writ of execution
and an order of demolition. But Mayor Garcia requested the trial
court to suspend the demolition on the pretext that the City was
still searching for a relocation site for the squatters. However,
instead of looking for a relocation site during the suspension
period, the city council suddenly enacted Ordinance No. 1843 for
the expropriation of petitioners lot. The unconscionable manner in
which the questioned ordinance was passed clearly indicated that
respondent City transgressed the Constitution, RA 7160 and RA
7279.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must
be in accordance with certain well-established basic principles of
a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must
not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must
not be unreasonable.
Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply with the foregoing
substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity
having been thus established, this Court is constrained to nullify
the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:
first, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;
second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was
plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor ordinance;
third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for
expropriation for the purpose of awarding it to no more than a
few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners,
and
fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a
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reasonable relation between the end sought and the means
adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide
adequate housing to slum dwellers, the means it employed in
pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible
and called for by the circumstances.
G.R. No. 152230. August 9, 2005
JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION, INC. vs.
MUNICIPALITY (now CITY) OF PASIG, METRO MANILA
The assailed decision affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the respondent Municipality
(now City) of Pasig as having the right to expropriate and take
possession of the subject property.
FACTS:
The Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E. R.
Santos Street, a municipal road near the Pasig Public Market, to
Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses,
mostly made of light materials, were located. The road had to be
at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so
that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration.
Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and
electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51
square meters out of the 1,791-square meter property of Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco
Kho.
On April 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and
appropriate the fund therefore. The ordinance stated that the
property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to
purchase the property for public use as an access road but they
rejected the offer.On July 21, 1993, the municipality filed a
complaint, amended on August 6, 1993, against the Ching
Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code. The plaintiff alleged that it already notified the
defendants, by letter, of its intention to construct an access road
on a portion of the property but they refused to sell the same
portion.
The plaintiff deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of
the property based on the latest tax declaration covering the
property. On plaintiffs motion, the RTC issued a writ of
possession over the property sought to be expropriated. On
November 26, 1993, the plaintiff caused the annotation of a notice
of lis pendens at the dorsal portion under the name of the Jesus
Is Lord Christian School Foundation, Incorporated (JILCSFI)
which had purchased the property. Thereafter, the plaintiff
constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters;
the road was called Damayan Street.
In their answer, the defendants claimed that, as early as February
1993, they had sold the said property to JILCSFI as evidenced by
a deed of sale bearing the signature of defendant Ernesto Ching
Cuanco Kho and his wife.
JILCSFI averred, by way of special and affirmative defenses, that
the plaintiffs exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular
class and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless. It
alleged that the property sought to be expropriated is not the best
portion for the road and the least burdensome to it.
The intervenor filed a crossclaim against its co-defendants for
reimbursement in case the subject property is expropriated.
The petitioner asserts that the respondent must comply with the
requirements for the establishment of an easement of right-of-
way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point
least prejudicial to the servient state, and that there must be no
adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner asserts that
the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the
middle portion of the petitioners entire parcel of land, thereby
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splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the
petitioner to put up its school building and worship center.
During the trial, the plaintiff presented witnesses, who were
residents of the town, testifying that it was they who requested for
the construction of the road.
The defendant, on the other hand, presented some residents who
counterclaimed that there are other roads leading to E. R. Santos
Street.
On September 3, 1997, the RTC issued an Order in favor of the
plaintiff. The RTC held that there was substantial compliance with
the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No.
7160, and that the expropriated portion is the most convenient
access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.
Dissatisfied, JILCSFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated March 13, 2001, the CA affirmed the order of
the RTC. The appellate court upheld the public necessity for the
subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the
portion of the property sought to be expropriated appears to be,
not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area,
particularly fire trucks.
Moreover, the CA took into consideration the provision of Article
33 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which regards the construction or extension
of roads, streets, sidewalks as public use, purpose or welfare.
ISSUE: WON the subject property which is intended to be used for
public purposes may be expropriated by the respondent.
HELD: No, the subject property, although intended for public cannot be
expropriated by the Municipality of Pasig.
The Supreme Court held that failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and
not elsewhere.
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there is no showing in
the record that an ocular inspection was conducted during the
trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the
subject property during the trial, the petitioner was not notified.
The petitioner was, therefore, deprived of its right to due process.
In this case, the petitioner was not notified of any ocular
inspection of the property, any factual finding of the court based
on the said inspection has no probative weight. The findings of
the trial court based on the conduct of the ocular inspection must,
therefore, be rejected.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The RTC is ordered to dismiss
the complaint of the respondent without prejudice to the refiling
thereof.
G.R. No. 163130, September 7, 2007
SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the Armed Forces of
the Philippines)
FACTS:
The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City and
were part of Lot No. 933. Lot No. 933 was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 11946. It was originally owned by Ismael D.
Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. On 5
September 1938, subject parcels of land, together with seventeen
(17) others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding
initiated by the then Commonwealth of the Philippines docketed
as Civil Case No. 781. On 19 October 1938, Judge Felix Martinez
ordered the initial deposit of P,500.00 as pre-condition for the
entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a
Decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However,
the title of the subject parcel of land was not transferred to the
government.
Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was
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cancelled and new titles were issued by the Register of Deeds of
Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-
B-3) and 128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant-
appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun construction of
townhouses on the subject parcels of land.
On 22 February 1996, plaintiff-appellant filed the present case
alleging that it is the owner of the subject parcels of land by virtue
of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos.
128197 and 128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-
appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties because
it was not its lawful owner.
In its Answer defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in
good faith. It also claimed that there was no valid expropriation
because it was initiated by the executive branch without
legislative approval. It also alleged that the expropriation was
never consummated because the government did not actually
enter the land nor were the owners paid any compensation
On August 25, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the
Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership over the
subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession
thereof and its unqualified title thereto. The RTC ruled that
SRRDC's ownership is borne out by the original owner's title to
Lot No. 933 and the subsequent transferees respective titles all
of which bore no annotation of the fact of expropriation and did
not indicate the Republic's favorable lien. It also found that there
was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a
showing that consideration was paid for the subject properties.
Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting
on its absolute ownership over the subject properties grounded on
the following: (1) the CFI Decision in the expropriation case, Civil
Case No. 781; (2) the ruling of this Court in Valdehueza v.
Republic and (3) the expropriated properties, including Lot No.
933, are devoted to public use.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal
from the CFI Decision in the expropriation case was never
perfected by the original owners of the subject properties and
thus, the expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on
the original owners, and SRRDC, which merely stepped into the
latter's shoes, is similarly bound. The CA further held that laches
and estoppel cannot work against the Republic despite its failure
from 1940 to register Lot No. 933 in its name, or to record the
decree of expropriation on the title. Accordingly, the CA found no
necessity to rule on the applicability of Valdehueza v. Republic in
the case.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent, claiming its right to eminent domain,
was the dutiful owner of the subject property, despite failure
to register it.
2. Whether petitioner was a buyer of good faith
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of petitioner on both issues.
Time and again, the SC declared that eminent domain cases are
to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment of
just compensation for private property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the States sovereign
power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this requirement
renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public
purpose. To disregard this limitation on the exercise of
governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over
private rights.
From the records of this case and our previous findings in the
related cases, the Republic manifestly failed to present clear and
convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and
receipt thereof by the property owners.
Section 251 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the
time of the Commonwealthcase likewise provides for the
recording of the judgment of expropriation in the Registry of
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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Deeds. Said provision reads, to wit:
SEC. 251. Final Judgment, Its Record and Effect. The record of
the final judgment in such action shall state definitely by metes
and bounds and adequate description. The particular land or
interest in land condemned to the public use, and the nature of
the public use. A certified copy of the record of judgment shall
be recorded in the office of the registrar of deeds for the
province in which the estate is situated, and its effect shall
be to vest in the plaintiff for the public use stated the land
and estate so described. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the
Republic to cause the registration of the subject properties in its
name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not
only did the Republic fail to register the subject properties in its
name, it failed to do so for fifty-six (56) years.
Another basic question is whether or not SRRDC is a buyer in
good faith.
The CA found SRRDC wanting in good faith because it should be
imputed with constructive knowledge, or at least, sufficiently
warned that the Republic had claims over the property in view of
indications that the subject land belonged to a military reservation.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the
certificate of title, bought the property from the registered owner,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.
In the instant case, the Republics adverse claim of ownership
over the subject properties may have given SRRDCs
predecessors-in-interest, the sellers, voidable title to the subject
properties. However, we stress that prior to SRRDCs acquisition
of the subject properties, Lot No. 933 had already been
subdivided and covered by separate titles of the subsequent
transferees. These titles, including the titles to the subject
properties, had not been voided at the time of the sale to SRRDC
in 1994. As such, SRRDC acquired good title to the subject
properties, having purchased them in good faith, for value, and
without notice of the sellers defect of title, if any.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The August 15, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSEDand the August 25, 1998 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED. TCT Nos. 128197 and 128198, in
the name of petitioner San Roque Realty and Development
Corporation, are upheld and declared valid.
OBJECTS OF EXPROPRIATION
G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969
RP vs. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY
FACTS:
Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA
Communications, Inc., entered into an agreement whereby
telephone messages, coming from the United States and received
by RCA's domestic station, could automatically be transferred to
the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by the PLDT
for transmission from the Philippines to the United States.
The arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone
messages to and from European and Asiatic countries. Their
contract contained a stipulation that either party could terminate it
on a 24-month notice to the other. On 2 February 1956, PLDT
gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 February
1958.
Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone
System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by
renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to
call private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public since 1948, using the same trunk lines owned by,
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and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the Bureau's) own
schedule of rates. Through these trunk lines, a Government
Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT
subscriber in the same way that the latter could make a call to the
former.
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of
Telecommunications, entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service
whereby the Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls
received by RCA's station to and from local residents.
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, complained to the Bureau of
Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions
under which their Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-
connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented trunk
lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use
of government offices but even to serve private persons or the
general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and
gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of
12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever the telephone connections.
When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines
being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12 April 1958. The
result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone services,
from the rest of the world, except the United States.
The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on
8 January 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting
agreement, with the government paying (on a call basis) for all
calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the
Government Telephone System to the PLDT. The PLDT replied
that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas
telephone service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the
Bureau would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the
Public Service Commission.
On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the
defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No.
35805), praying in its complaint for judgment commanding the
PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau, for
the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system
throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as
the court might consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant company to restrain the
severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore
those severed.
PLDT, on the other hand denied any obligation on its part to
execute a contrary of services with the Bureau of
Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting
agreements, and averred that it was justified to disconnect the
trunk lines heretofore leased to the Bureau of
Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its
facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further
claimed that the Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone
operations in excess of authority, in competition with, and to the
prejudice of, the PLDT, using defendants own telephone poles,
without proper accounting of revenues.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not
compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau
because the parties were not in agreement; that under Executive
Order 94, establishing the Bureau of Telecommunications, said
Bureau was not limited to servicing government offices alone, nor
was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, since the
PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by
the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the
Bureau was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles
of the PLDT; and, in view of serious public prejudice that would
result from the disconnection of the trunk lines, declared the
preliminary injunction permanent, although it dismissed both the
complaint and the counterclaims.
Both parties appealed.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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ISSUE: WON PLDT is compelled to enter into a contract compulsory
rendering the company to provide inter-connectivity services, despite
its objection.
HELD:
The Supreme Court agreed with the court below that parties
cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is
had between them as to the principal terms and conditions of the
contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions is of the
essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of
the statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence,
intimidation, or undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil
Code of the Philippines).
But the court a quohas apparently overlooked that while the
Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it,
the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of
eminent domain, require the telephone company to permit
interconnection of the government telephone system and that of
the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require,
subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by
the court.
While the defendant telephone company is a public utility
corporation whose franchise, equipment and other properties are
under the jurisdiction, supervision and control of the Public
Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public Service Act), yet the
plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public service owned
by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the National
Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public
Service Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now
under appeal, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the
petition of the Republic of the Philippines to compel the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company to continue servicing the
Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a
compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just,
including the period elapsed from the filing of the original
complaint or petition. And for this purpose, the records are
ordered returned to the court of origin for further hearings and
other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No costs.
G.R. No. L-14355, October 31, 1919
THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET
AL.
FACTS:
On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a
petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain
lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The
defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community
of Manila] opposed the expropriation alleging that the Chinese
cemetery has for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the
Chinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation, in
fact, was not necessary as a public improvement for other routes were
available which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less
expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation
of the particular strip of land in question, and absolved each and all of
the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding
as to costs. The City of Manila then appealed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: WON the Chinese Cemetery may be validly expropriated by
the City of Manila.
HELD:
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by
the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation
of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must
be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and
laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants.
When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to
determine the question, they must only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but
(b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance
with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land
must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private.
The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a family,
or a small portion of the community or neighbourhood. Where a
cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part of the
ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and
unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. The
cemetery in question is used by the general community of
Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of
a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. The petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the
reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the
law to expropriate public property. In the present case, even
granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening
the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining
and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge,
which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment of the lower court should be
and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
WHERE EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS FILED
G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000
RGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR
FACTS:
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay,
Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint to expropriate a property of the
respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed
the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned
that "[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private
property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an
action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal cause of action
is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent
domain is therefore within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not with this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it,
holding that an action for eminent domain affected title to real
property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated
would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC
or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed
before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less
than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this Court, raising a
pure question of law.
ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has jurisdiction over cases for
eminent domain or expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is below Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos?
HELD:
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation thus
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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RTCs shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over
expropriation case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP 129,
which states that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over "all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;.
If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the
claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first
instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover
a sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to
have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific
performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the
recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by
the government of its authority and right to take private property
for public useHence, the courts determine the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the
observance of due process. The subject matter of an
expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent
domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
REQUISITES OF TAKING
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
RP vs. CASTELVI
FACTS:
The Castellvi property had been occupied by the Philippine Air
Force since 1947 under a contract of lease. It was stipulated by
the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease is 'similar in terms
and conditions, including the date', with the annual contracts
entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi and
the Republic of the Philippines. It is undisputed, therefore, that
the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by virtue
of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from
July 1 of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year). Before the
expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP
refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the
contract, on July 11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff,
AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had
decided not to continue leasing the property in question because
they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general
public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days
from receipt of the letter, and that the premises be returned in
substantially the same condition as before occupancy .On
January 30, 1957, Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of
Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was difficult
for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent
installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that
were erected and already established on the property, and that,
there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by
means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to
the President. Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga to eject the Philippine Air Force
from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the
Republic instituted these expropriation proceedings.
The Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from
the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease agreement
between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was
granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the
lessor wish to terminate the lease.
Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of
property under the power of eminent domain requires two
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by
condemn or upon the private property for more than a momentary
or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the
first element is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon
provides for a lease from year to year; that the second element is
also wanting, that the contract of lease does not grant the
Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value
at the time of occupancy."
ISSUE: WON the Taking of properties under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the action. (What are the requisites of
Taking of property of eminent domain?)
HELD:
It is clear that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in
1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as
lessee thereof. We find merit in the contention of Castellvi that
two essential elements in the "taking" of property under the power
of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation
by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period,
and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was
ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were
not present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi
property in 1947.
Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the
contract between the parties was one of lease on a year to year
basis, it was "in reality a more or less permanent right to occupy
the premises under the guise of lease with the 'right and privilege'
to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease,"
and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral part of
the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has
been agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of the
time of occupancy". We cannot accept the Republic's contention
that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a permanent
right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for
a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's land in the
instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a
demand (Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the
right of eminent domain may be exercised by simply leasing the
premises to be expropriated (Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court).
To sustain the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice
whereby in order to secure a low price for a land which the
government intends to expropriate (or would eventually
expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the land to
lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the
same when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the
"taking" of the property for the purposes of the expropriation be
reckoned as of the date when the Government started to occupy
the property under the lease, and then assert that the value of the
property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the
lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many
good reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of
the lease.
The lower court did not commit an error when it held that the
"taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with the
filing of the complaint in this case.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,
on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the
purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must,
therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint
for eminent domain was filed.
G.R. No. L-34915 June 24, 1983
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY and CITY COUNCIL OF
QUEZON CITY vs.HON. JUDGE VICENTE G. ERICTA
FACTS:
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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The city government of Quezon tried to enforce Ordinance No. 6118,
S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION
THEREOF" through the passing of a resolution wchich reads:
RESOLVED by the council of Quezon assembled, to request, as it
does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any
further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space
intended for paupers burial. But Respondent Himlayang Pilipino
questioned the validity of the ordinance specifically its sec9 w/c
provides that At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial
park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons
who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed
and should be open for operation not later than six months from the
date of approval of the application. . respondent alleged that this is
contrary to law and further contended that contends that the taking or
confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all
beneficial use of his property and stressed that the general welfare
clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the
property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property. After the examining the facts, respondent court ruled that
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and
declared the ordinance null and void.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in declaring the ordinance null
and void?
HELD:
SC ruled that police power is usually exercised in the form of
mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for
the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking
or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order
to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and
of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation
of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series
of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an
outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at
least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for
charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation
of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DISMISSED. The
decision of the respondent court is affirmed.
TAKING: DEPRIVATION OF USE
104 PHIL 443 (1958)
RP vs. FAJARDO
*no digested case submitted*
193 SCRA 1 (1991)
NAPOCOR vs. GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Plaintiff National Power Corporation, a government owned and
controlled entity, planned to construct 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines but the lines have to pass the lands belonging
to defendants Matias Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit and filed an eminent
domain proceedings against the defendants.
The defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed
provisional value of their land in the sum of P973.00 by the court
after NPC deposited the amount upon filing the complaint. The
only controversy existing between the parties litigants is the
reasonableness and adequacy of the disturbance or
compensation fee of the expropriated properties. the court
appointed three commissioners in determining the fair and just
compensation due the defendants.
With the reports submitted by the three commissioners and on the
evidence adduced by the defendants as well as the plaintiff for the
purpose of proving the fair market value of the property sought to
be expropriated, the lower court rendered a decision that National
Power Corporation has to pay defendant spouses Ricardo Malit
and Misericordia Gutierrez the sum P5.00 per square meter as
the fair and reasonable market value of the 760 square meters
belonging to the said spouses and that decision was affirmed by
the court of appeals.
ISSUE: WHETHER PETITIONER SHOULD BE MADE TO PAY
SIMPLE EASEMENT FEE OR FULL COMPENSATION FOR THE
LAND TRAVERSED BY ITS TRANSMISSION LINES
HELD:
While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff
upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant
higher than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of
the high-tension current conveyed through said transmission
lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff
only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter shall
continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion of their
propertyn the case at bar, the easement of right-of-
way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV
Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC
against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary useFor these reasons, the
owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever
it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent
of said property. Just compensation has always been understood
to be the just and complete equivalent of the loss which the owner
of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 170945, September 26, 2006
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. MARIA MENDOZA SAN
PEDRO
FACTS:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) is a government-owned-
and-controlled corporation created to undertake the development
of hydro-electric generation of power and the production of
electricity from any and all sources; and particularly the
construction, operation, and maintenance of power plants,
auxiliary plants, dams, reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission
lines, power stations and substations, and other works for the
purpose of developing hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek,
spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and supplying such power
to the inhabitants thereof.# Under Republic Act No. 6395, as
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amended, the NPC is authorized to enter private property
provided that the owners thereof shall be indemnified for any
actual damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose 500 KV
Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-389, NPC negotiated with
Maria Mendoza San Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente,
for an easement of right of way over her property, Lot No. 2076.
The property, which was partly agricultural and partly residential
land, was located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray, Bulacan and
covered by Tax Declaration No. 00386. On June 19, 1997, Maria
executed a Right of Way Grant# in favor of NPC over the lot for
P1,277,886.90. The NPC paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged
improvements thereon.
The payment voucher for the residential portion of the lot valued
at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00 per square meter) was then
processed.# However, the NPC Board of Directors approved
Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it would pay only
P230.00 per sq m for the residential portion and P89.00 per sq m
for the agricultural portion.
On July 12, 1999, Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their
report,# recommending as payment for just compensation
P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for
the agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC rendered
judgment,# declaring as well-grounded, fair and reasonable the
compensation for the property as recommended by Atty. Baltazar
and Engr. Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation was achieved with
regards to the fair market value of the residential and agricultural
property?
HELD:
The trial court fixed the just compensation for the property as
follows: (1) P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m agricultural
portion of the subject land; and (2) P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565
sq m residential portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did
not blindly accept the recommendation of majority of the
commissioners of P800.00 per sq m for the residential lot and
P700.00 per sq m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court
took into account the evidence of the parties, in tandem with the
findings and recommendation of the majority of the
commissioners. Considering that such valuation of the trial court
as affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is and supported by the
evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to disturb the
same.
The constant loud buzzing and exploding sounds emanating from
the towers and transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the
constant fear on the part of the landowners that the large
transmission lines looming not far above their land and the huge
tower in front of their lot will affect their safety and health; and the
slim chance that no one would be interested to buy the remaining
portions on each side of the residential lot affected by the project,
to the damage of the landowners, both as to future actual use of
the land and financial gains to be derived therefrom, makes the
instant case fall within the ambit of expropriation.
328 U.S. 256, May 27, 1946
UNITED STATES v. CAUSBY
FACTS:
Military airplanes are subject to rules of Civil Aeronautics Board.
Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and
also various outbuildings which were mainly used for raising
chickens. The end of the airport's northwest-southeast runway is
2,220 feet from respondents' barn and 2,275 feet from their house
United States began operations in May, 1942, its four-motored
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heavy bombers, other planes of the heavier type, and its fighter
planes have frequently passed over respondents' land buildings in
considerable numbers and rather close together. They come
close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the
trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the
old leaves off. The noise is startling. And at night the glare from
the planes brightly lights up the place. As a result of the noise,
respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many as
six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the
walls from fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about
150. Production also fell off. The result was the destruction of the
use of the property as a commercial chicken farm. Respondents
are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become
nervous and frightened. Although there have been no airplane
accidents on respondents' property, there have been several
accidents near the airport and close to respondents' place
The United States relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44
Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. 171 et seq., 49 U.S.C.A. 171 et seq., as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973, 49
U.S.C. 401 et seq., 49 U. S.C.A. 401 et seq. Under those statutes
the United States has 'complete and exclusive national
sovereignty in the air space' over this country. the planes never
touched the surface would be as irrelevant as the absence in this
day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real estate.
The Fifth Amendment provides that 'private property' shall not 'be
taken for public use, without just compensation.' The Court holds
today that the Government has 'taken' respondents' property by
repeatedly flying Army bombers directly above respondents' land
at a height of eighty-three feet where the light and noise from
these planes caused respondents to lose sleep and their chickens
to be killed
ISSUE: Whether respondents' property was taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment by frequent and regular flights of army and
navy aircraft over respondents' land at low altitudes.
HELD:
The Constitution entrusts Congress with full power to control all
navigable airspace. Congress has already acted under that
power. It has by statute, 44 Stat. 568, 52 Stat. 973, provided that
'the United States of America is ... to possess and exercise
complete and exclusive national sovereignty in the [328 U.S. 256,
272] air space (over) the United States.' navigable airspace
which Congress has placed in the public domain is 'airspace
above the minimum safe altitudes of flight prescribed by the Civil
Aeronautics Authority. Airspace, apart from the immediate
reaches above the land, is part of the public domain.
The contribution of courts must be made through the awarding of
damages for injuries suffered from the flying of planes, or by the
granting of injunctions to prohibit their flying
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the Court
of Claims so that it may make the necessary findings in
conformity with this opinion.
244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing
newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-
half page for the common use of political parties and candidates.
The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of
charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their
qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of
government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the
Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772
unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
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prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government
against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the
information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It
held that to compel print media companies to donate Comelec
space amounts to taking of private personal property without
payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases.
Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been
established by respondent Comelec, considering that the
newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The
taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also
Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no
showing of existence of a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. FRANCISCO
FACTS:
The petitioner sought to expropriate the three (3) adjoining land
with and area of 1,847 sq. meter registered under the name of the
defendants namely Francisco, Thelma, Eusebio, Rodulfo,
Antonio, and Virginia wherein they constructed residential houses
several decades ago which they had leased out to tenants until
the present. In 1983, the lots were classified by the Board of the
Housing and Urban Development Council as an Area of Priority
Development for Urban Land Reform under Proclamation Number
of then President Marcos. As a result of this classification, the
tenants and occupants offered to purchase the lots but the
respondents refused to sell. On November 1996, upon petition of
the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and occupants of the
subject land adopted a resolution authorizing Mayor Abalos of the
City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for expropriation of the
subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land. On January 1996, Mayor Abalos
allegedly sent a letter to the respondents offering to purchase the
said property at P3, 000.00 per sq. meter; respondents did not
answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of
the said lots and the fixing of just compensation at the fair market
value of P3, 000.00 per sq. meter.
The respondents except Eusebio Aguilar who died in 1995,
claimed that they did not received a copy of Mayor Abalos letter to
purchase their lots. They alleged that the expropriation of their
land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose;
the subject lots are their only real property and are too small for
expropriation, while petitioner has several properties inventoried
for socialized housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00 per
square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. On
1997, Petitioner filed an amended complaint and named as an
additional defendant Virginia Aguilar and at the same time,
substituted Eusebio Aguilar with his five (5) heirs. Petitioner also
reduced the area sought to be expropriated to 1, 636 square
meters. The Trial Courts decision was in favor of the
respondents, dismiss the amended complaint and declared
respondents as small property owners whose land are exempt
from expropriation under RA 7279. Also found out that the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
expropriation was not for public purpose for petitioners failure to
present evidence that the intended beneficiaries of the
expropriation are landless and homeless.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the respondents are qualified as small property owners and
are thus exempt from expropriation under RA no. 7972.
2. W/N the subject property is the only real property of respondents
for them to comply with the second requisite for small property
owners.
HELD:
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing are governed with
several provisions of the law. Thus, Section 9 and 10 of RA No.
7279 provides for the priorities in the acquisition of lands and
enumerates the type of lands to be acquired and the hierarchy in
their acquisition, and the modes of land acquisition or the process
of acquiring lands for socialized housing, respectively.
Under Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired
in the following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of
the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands;
(4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development
(APD), Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum
Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet
been acquired; (5) BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired; and
(6) privately-owned lands.
There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-
owned and therefore last in the order of priority acquisition.
However, the law also provides that lands within the declared
APD's which have not yet been acquired by the government are
fourth in the order of priority. According to petitioner, since the
subject lots lie within the declared APD, this fact mandates that
the lots be given priority in acquisition.
Also, Lands for socialized housing under Section 10 are to be
acquired in the following modes: (1) community mortgage; (2)
land swapping, (3) land assembly or consolidation; (4) land
banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) joint venture
agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The
mode of expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be
resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners
are exempt from such acquisition.
These means that the types of lands that may be acquired in the
order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes
authorized under Section 10.
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes
of land acquisition for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and
adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for socialized housing
under said law. It, however, did not state with particularity whether
it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of the
law before it decided to expropriate the subject lots. The law
states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one
mode of acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitioner,
through the City Mayor, tried to purchase the lots from
respondents but the latter refused to sell. As to the other modes
of acquisition, no mention has been made. The Resolution of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong
to effect the expropriation of the subject property did not even
state whether the city government tried to acquire the same by
community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or
consolidation, land banking, donation to the government, or joint
venture agreement under Section 10 of the law. The law
expressly exempted "small property owners" from expropriation of
their land for urban land reform.
Under Section 3 of RA 7279, Small-property owners" are defined
by two elements: (1) those owners of real property whose
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property consists of residential lands with an area of not more
than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square
meters in other urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real
property other than the same.
In the case at bar involves two (2) residential lots Mandaluyong
City, a highly urbanized City. The lot totalled 1, 636 square meters
was issued in the names of the herein five (5) respondents. The
respondents are co-owners of the said lot. Under Article 493 of
the Civil Code, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free
to alienate, assign or mortgage his interest, except as to purely
personal rights. He may also validly lease his undivided interest to
a third party independently of the other co-owners. The effect of
any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded
to him upon the partition of the property. The partition in 1998, six
(6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the
co-ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the
respective undivided shares of the co-owners. The rights of the
co-owners to have the property partitioned and their share in the
same delivered to them cannot be questioned for "no co-owner
shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership." The partition was
merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership; and absent any
evidence to the contrary, this partition is presumed to have been
done in good faith. Upon partition, only Eusebio Aguilar was
granted 347 square meters, which is 47 sq. meters more than the
maximum of 300 square meters allowed by law set by RA 7279
for small property owners. However, after Eusebio died, his five
heirs became co-owners of his 347 square meter portion. Dividing
the 347 square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4
square meters of the land subject of litigation. The share of each
co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in R.A.
7279.
The second issue is whether the subject property is the only real
property of respondents for them to comply with the second
requisite for small property owners which Antonio Aguilar testified
that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on the
subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila.
Respondents therefore appear to own real property other than the
lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do not show that the
ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands
are owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not
present any title or proof of this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's
testimony. Respondents claim that the subject lots are their only
real property and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of
Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their houses and therefore do
not own any other real property in Metro Manila.
Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the
possession of respondents. Antonio Aguilar testified that he and
the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against the occupants
of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong.
Orders of eviction were issued and executed on September 17,
1997 which resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other
occupants from the land in question.
GR No. 155746, October 3, 2004
LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA
* repeated case *
GR No. 152230, August 09, 2005
JIL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
* repeated case *
PRIORITY IN EXPROPRIATION
284 SCRA 716 (1998)
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Filstream is the registered owner of the subject land which filed an
ejectment suit against the occupants of the parcels of land on the
grounds of termination of the lease contract and non-payment of
rentals. The MTC rendered decision in favor of the petitioner and
ordered private respondents to vacate the premises and pay back
rentals to the petitioner. The RTC and CA affirmed this decision. It was
at this stage that respondent City of Manila approved an Ordinance
authorizing Mayor Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,
expropriation, purchased and other legal means certain parcels of land
which formed part of the properties of the petitioner then occupied by
private respondents. The said properties were to be sold and to be
distributed to the qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the Land
Use Development Program of the City of Manila. The Trial Court
issued a writ of possession in favor of the City of Manila.
ISSUE: W/N the City of Manila complies with the conditions under RA
No. 7279 when it expropriated petitioner Filstream properties.
HELD:
The court found nothing that would indicate that respondent City
of Manila complied with Section 9 and 10 of RA No. 7279. Under
Section 9, lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the
following order: (1) government lands; (2) alienable lands of the
public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands; (4)
lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD),
Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and
Resettlement (SIR) sites which have not yet been acquired; (5)
BAgong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS
sites which have not yet been acquired; and (6) privately-owned
lands.
The provisions are the limitations with respect to the order of
priority in acquiring private lands and in resorting to expropriation.
Private lands rank the last in the order of priority for purposes of
socialized housing. Expropriation proceedings are to be resorted
to only when the other modes of acquisition have been
exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed
mandatory because these are the only safeguards on securing
the right of owners of private property to due process when their
property is expropriated for public use.
Petitioner Filstreams properties were expropriated and ordered
condemned in favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that
resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Section 9 of
R.A. no. 7279 have proved futile. There was a violation of
Petitioner Filstreams right to due process which must accordingly
be ratified. The state has the paramount interest in exercising his
power of eminent domain for the general welfare considering that
the right of the State to expropriate private property as long as it is
for public use always takes precedence over the interest of
private property owners. But we must not lost sight of the fact that
the individual rights affected by the exercise of such rights are
also entitled for protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of
this right cannot override the guarantee of due process extended
by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated.
PUBLIC USE
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 , October 26, 1983
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA VS. REYES
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction
challenging the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 564,
the Revised Charter of the Philippine Tourism Authority, and
Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the barangays of Sibugay,
Malubog, Babag and Sirao including the proposed Lusaran Dam
in the City of Cebu and in the municipalities of Argao and
Dalaguete in the province of Cebu as tourist zones. The
petitioners ask that we restrain respondent Court of First Instance
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of Cebu and the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) from
enforcing and implementing the writs of possession issued in four
(4) expropriation cases filed by PTA against the petitioners.
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the expropriation of some
282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and
Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any
private land within and without the tourist zones" for the purposes
indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD
564), more specifically, for the development into integrated resort
complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value.
The defendants filed their respective Opposition with Motion to
Dismiss and/or Reconsideration. The defendants, now petitioners,
had a common allegation in that the taking is allegedly not
impressed with public use under the Constitution. They further
alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no
specific constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private
property for tourism purpose.
ISSUE: Whether expropriation of several barangays for provocation of
tourism and construction of sports and hotel complexes constitutes
expropriation for public use.
HELD: YES.
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not
"public use" because private concessioners would be allowed to
maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.
inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less merit. The
expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban
development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is
later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment
and service companies, and other private concerns. Private bus
firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private
businesses using public streets end highways do not diminish in
the least bit the public character of expropriations for roads and
streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built
on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private
purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines
and shipping companies are still for public use.
G.R. No. L-48685, September 30, 1987
SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO
FACTS:
The National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty five
(25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners
Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of
6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The
land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by
the provincial assessor in accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate
possession of the properties. The NHA deposited the amount of
P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the
"total market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land,
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the
policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized
housing upon payment of just compensation."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that
they had been deprived of the possession of their property without
due process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge
and assailing the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes public use for
purposes of expropriation.
HELD: YES.
This Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the
confines of "public use". As long as the purpose of the taking is
public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of lands to
be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. is
accurate to state then that at present whatever may be
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the
subject parcels of land meets the requisites of "public use". The
lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the
expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing
facilities to low-salaried government employees.
G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur
passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property
contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur,
through its Governor, Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate
cases for expropriation against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren
N. San Joaquin.
The Province of Camarines Sur then filed a motion for the
issuance of writ of possession, but the San Joaquins failed to
appear at the hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground
of inadequacy of the price offered for their property. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the
deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the
amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for
damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of
possession.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order,
authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
their property and a motion to admit an amended motion to
dismiss. Both motions were denied.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins
asked: (a) that Resolution No. 129 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the
motion to dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of the property subject of the expropriation and
the order denying the motion to admit the amended motion to
dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order be issued to
restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and
thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur
claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation and
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that the expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the
petition, the Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for
the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.
However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the
Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the
lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court,
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-
agricultural land.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of property intended for the
establishment of a pilot development center and housing project of the
Province of Camarines Sur is in consonance with the public purpose
requirement of the Constitution.
HELD: YES.
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned
resolution is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would insure to the direct benefit and
advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. Once
operational, the center would make available to the community
invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery and
the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing
project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461,
"Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter
of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
252 SCRA 412, 1996
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
A petition for review on certiorari, from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969 (entitled
Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.)
Wherein, Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos
Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four
hundred ninety-two (492) square meters. When the parcel was
ascertained by the NHI to have been the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of
1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring
the land to be a national historical landmark. The resolution was, on 06
January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked on the
legality of the measure. Thus the assailment of this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public use requirement of Eminent
Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a
492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical
Institute (NHI) as a national historical landmark.
HELD:
The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the
constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting
a public need or a public exigency. The validity of the exercise of
the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond
question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public use should
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thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that public
use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has
long been discarded.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: The taking to be valid
must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement.
Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as
in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into
play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to
remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at
cost to individuals. The other is the transfer, through the exercise
of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the
government. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason &
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, has viewed the Constitution
a dynamic instrument and one that is not to be construed
narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it to meet adequately
whatever problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a
noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in
fact, has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is
just as broad as public welfare. Petitioners, finally, would fault
respondent appellate court in sustaining the trial courts order
which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of Manila.
Both courts held correctly. The Republic was not a party to the
alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and
petitioners which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic,
could properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in
accord with law and jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
GR No. 137285, January 15, 2001
ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA
FACTS:
On May 15, 1981, private respondent Philippines Export
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA), initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite expropriation proceedings on three (3) parcels of irrigated
riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of
the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area
of 29,008 square meters, is registered in the name of Salud
Jimenez under TCT No. T-113498 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite.
More than ten (10) years later, the said trial court in an Order
dated July 11, 1991 upheld the right of private respondent PEZA
to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B).
Reconsideration of the said order was sought by petitioner
contending that said lot would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be
utilized for a public purpose.
In an Order dated October 25, 19997, the trial court reconsidered
the Order dated July 11, 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was
maintained. Finding the said order unacceptable, private
respondent PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private respondent offering
two (2) proposals, namely:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal with respect to
Lot 1406-A I consideration of the waiver of claim for
damages and lass of income for the possession of said lot
by private respondent.
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2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered by TCT No.
T-14772 since private respondent has no money yet to pay
for the lot.
Private respondent's Board approved the "proposal" and the
compromise agreement was signed by private respondent
through its then administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted by
Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia. Said
compromise agreement9 dated January 4, 1993 is quoted
hereunder:
1. That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the Order
of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which
released lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On
the other hand, defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to
waive, quit claim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss of
income which it sustained by person of the possession of
said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the present.
2. That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118
square meters which forms part of the lot registered under
TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the
name of the plaintiff and the same shall be swapped and
exchanged with lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square
meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be
transferred to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3. That the swap arrangement recognized the fact that the
lot 1406-B covered by TCT No. T-113498 of the state of
defendant Salud Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor
of the government based on Order of the Honorable Court
dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid the just
compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall
be paid with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide by the terms of
the foregoing agreement in good faith and the Decision to be
rendered based on this Compromise Agreement is
immediately final and executory.
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the
approval of the said compromise agreement entered into between
the parties, consequent with the withdrawal of the appeal with the
Court of Appeals. In the Order dated August 23, 1993, the trial
court approved the compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to transfer the title of Lot 434
to petitioner inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the
covering TCT No. T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc.
Thus, on March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a "Motion to
Partially Annul the Order dated August 23, 1993."
In the Order dated August 4, 1997, the trial court annulled the
said compromise agreement entered into between the parties and
directed private respondent to peacefully turn over Lot 1406-A to
the petitioner. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court,
respondent PEZA moved13 for its reconsideration. The same
proved futile since the trial court denied reconsideration in its
Order14 dated November 3, 1997.
On December 4, 1997, the trial court, at the instance of petitioner,
corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3,
1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and Lot 1406-A that should
be surrendered and returned to petitioner.
On November 27, 1997, respondent interposed before the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify
the Orders dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997 of the
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court. Petitioner filed its Comment17 on January 16, 1998.
ISSUE: The petition anchored on the following assignment of errors:
1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals committed grave and
reversible error in giving due course to the special Civil Action filed by
respondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 46112 when it was made
substitute for lost appeal in clear contravention of the Honorable
Courts ruling in Sempio v. Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) and
Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 703) .
2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special Civil Action of
Certiorari is proper, the Court of Appeals nevertheless wrongly
interpreted the phrase Original Demand contained in Article 2041 of
petitioner estate is the return of the subject lot (Lot 1406-B) which
sought to be expropriated and not the determination of just
compensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if the interpretation of the
court of appeals or the import of the phrase in question is correct, it is
Article 2039 of the Civil Code and not Article 2041 which is applicable
to compromise agreements approved by the courts.
HELD:
This court therefore finds that the Court of Appeals did not err in
interpreting "original demand" to mean the fixing of just
compensation. The authority of respondent and the nature of the
purpose thereof have been put to rest when the Expropriation
Order dated July 11, 1991 became final and was duly admitted by
petitioner in the compromise agreement. The only issue for
consideration is the manner and amount of payment due to
petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of private
respondent's appeal to the Court of Appeals concerning Lot 1406-
A, the matter of payment of just compensation was the only
subject of the compromise agreement dated January 4, 1993.
Under the compromise agreement, petitioner was supposed to
receive respondent's Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot 1406-B.
When respondent failed to fulfill its obligation to deliver Lot 434,
petitioner can again demand for the payment but not the return of
the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This interpretation by the Court of
Appeals is in according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court.
This court holds that respondent has the legal authority to
expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same was for a
valid public purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero41 , this Court has
ruled that, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept
influenced by changing conditions.
We have rules that the concept of just compensation embraces
not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the
property owner is made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss. We find that respondent capriciously evaded
its duty of giving what is due to petitioner. In the case at bar, the
expropriation order was issued by the trial court in 1991. The
compromise agreement between the parties was approved by the
trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to the present,
respondent has failed in its obligation to pay petitioner to the
prejudice of the latter. Respondent caused damage to petitioner in
making the latter to expect that it had a good title to the property
to be swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile, respondent has
been reaping benefits from the lease or rental income of the said
expropriated lot. However, it is high time that the petitioner be
paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is high time that the
petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is
arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate
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expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, allow the
judgment of the court to become final and executory and then
refuse to pay on the ground that there are no appropriations for
the property earlier taken and profitably used. Though the
respondent has committed a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot,
however, grant the petitioner's prayer for the return of the
expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order of expropriation dated
July 11, 1991, has long become final and executory.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and equity dictate that this
case be remanded to the trial court for hearing of the
expropriation proceedings on the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B and for its prompt payment to the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby denied. The
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City is hereby ordered to proceed
with the hearing of the expropriation proceedings, docketed as
Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding the determination of just
compensation for Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT No.
T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the same with dispatch.
GR No. 147511, January 20, 2003
REYES VS. NHA
FACTS:
In 1977, respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed
separate complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane lands,
particularly Lot Nos. 6450, 6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the
cadastral survey of Dasmarias, Cavite belonging to the
petitioners, before the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, and
docketed as Civil Case Nos. T.G.-392, T.G.-396 and T.G.-417.
The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion
of the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to accommodate the
squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of
these lots and the payment of just compensation. This was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision rendered on October
29, 1987 in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero2 and which became
final on November 26, 1987.
On February 24, 1989, the expropriation court (now Branch 18,
Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay City) issued an Order4 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, and resolving thus, let an Alias Writ of Execution
be immediately issued and that:
(1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite is hereby
ordered to transfer, in the name of the plaintiff National Housing
Authority, the following:
(a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing an area of
79,167 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,
Dasmarias, Cavite;
(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55702 containing an
area of 20,872 square meters situated in Barrio Bangkal,
Dasmarias, Cavite;
(c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639 and RT-4641
covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and 6199 with an aggregate area
of 159,985 square meters also situated in Barrio Bangkal,
Dasmarias, Cavite.
(2) Plaintiff National Housing Authority is likewise hereby ordered,
under pain of contempt, to immediately pay the defendants, the
amounts stated in the Writ of Execution as the adjudicated
compensation of their expropriated properties, which process was
received by it according to the records, on September 26, 1988,
segregating therefrom, and in separate check, the lawyer's fees in
favor of Atty. Bobby P. Yuseco, in the amount of P322,123.05, as
sustained by their contract as gleaned from the records, with no
other deduction, paying on its own (NHA) account, the necessary
legal expenses incident to the registration or issuance of new
certificates of title, pursuant to the provisions of the Property
Registration Law (PD 1529);
(3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay the corresponding
capital gains tax on the subject properties, directing them
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
additionally, to coordinate with the plaintiff NHA in this regard, in
order to facilitate the termination of this case, put an end to this
controversy and consign the same to its final rest."
ISSUE: The petitioners raise the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided a question of
substance not in accord with justice and equity when it ruled that,
as the judgment of the expropriation court did not contain a
condition that should the expropriated property be not used for the
intended purpose it would revert to the condemnee, the action to
declare the forfeiture of rights under the expropriation judgment
can not prosper;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of substance
not in accord with jurisprudence, justice and equity when it ruled
that the non-payment is not a ground for forfeiture;
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the
judgment of expropriation forfeited in light of the failure of
respondent to use the expropriated property for the intended
purpose but for a totally different purpose."
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of
just compensation. More specifically, section 9, Article III states
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and
just compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent
domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the
contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public
use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no
longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by
the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now
been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public
benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation
which circumscribes the scope of government activities and public
concerns and which possesses big and correctly located public
lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We
have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which
impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in
areas of scarce public land or limited government resources.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a contract with a real
estate developer for the construction of low cost housing on the
expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low income beneficiaries
cannot be taken to mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it that the expropriation
of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private
homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment and service
companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for
the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and housing which
will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and
resettlement areas.11 The expropriation of private property for
the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in
furtherance of the social justice provision under Section 1, Article
XIII of the Constitution which provides that:
"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably
diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall require the acquisition, ownership, use
and disposition of property and its increments."
THEREFORE, The appealed judgment is modified as follows:
1. Ordering respondent National Housing Authority to pay
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petitioners the amount of P1,218,574.35 with legal interest
thereon at 12% per annum computed from the taking of the
expropriated properties in 1997 until the amount due shall have
been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital gains tax; and
3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to respondent National
Housing Authority the owners' duplicate certificates of title of the
expropriated properties upon full payment of just compensation.
268 SCRA 368
MODAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
*repeated case*
GOVVERNMENT WITHDRAWAL
GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003
NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
FACTS:
On February 23, 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu City,
an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against respondents.
It alleged that defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu was the
claimant of a Lot located in Banilad, Cebu City; that defendant
Engracia Urot was the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the same
area; that defendant Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo were claimants of
lots in Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are in the
urban center which petitioner intends to develop as a socialized
housing project.
On November 12, 1999, the Heirs of Guivelondo filed a
Manifestation waiving their objections to petitioners power to
expropriate their properties. Thus the RTC issued an order to that
effect. Thereafter, the RTC appointed three Commissioners to
ascertain the just compensation of the properties of respondents.
The Commissioners submitted their report recommending the just
compensation be fixed at P11,200.00 per square meter, which
was favored by the RTC.
Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered
impossible because the value of the land sought to be
expropriated was too high, and the intended beneficiaries cannot
afford. The Motion was denied since the prior case was decided
on already.
After petitioners appeal was denied by the CA, the Landbank
executed garnishment proceedings against the funds of NHA.
ISSUES:
1. WON THE STATE CAN BE COMPELLED BY THE COURTS TO
CONTINUE WITH THE EXERCISE OF ITS INHERENT POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN;
2. WON JUDGMENT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
AND IF ESTOPPEL APPLIES TO GOVERNMENT;
3. WON WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY BE
ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE.
HELD:
There are two (2) stages in every action for expropriation. The
first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain. The second is
concerned with the determination by the Court of the just
compensation.
The outcome of the first phase is final since it disposes of the
case. On the other hand, the second phase fixes the amount of
just compensation. Both orders, being final, are however,
appealable. Once the first order becomes final and no appeal
thereto is taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can
no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the RTC,
which declared the lawful right to expropriate the properties hence
the Order became final.
Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for
purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The need to
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RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
provide housing to the urban poor was not lost by fact that the
land cost more than petitioner had expected. The public purpose
of is not diminished by the amount of just compensation the court
has fixed.
On the issue of the garnishment against petitioners funds, there
is a need to determine if it is a government entity. Generally,
funds and properties of the government cannot be the object of
garnishment proceedings.
However, if the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCC
with a personality of its own, then its funds are not exempt from
garnishment.
Hence, it is clear that NHA is not exempt from garnishment.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED.
GR No. 106804, August 12, 2004
NPC & POBRE vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner NPC is a public corporation created to generate
geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to
transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by law to
exercise the right of eminent domain.
Private respondent Pobre is the owner of property located in Tiwi,
Albay.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-
subdivision, which he named as Tiwi Hot Springs Resort
Subdivision.
On August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that
thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the
Property. The commission found it suitable for domestic use and
potentially for commercial or industrial use.
NPC then became involved with Pobres Property in three
instances.
First was on February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one
year eleven lots frof the subdivision. Second was sometime in
1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against
Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property. On
1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon
NPCs payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling operations and
construction of steam wells. While the first case was pending,
NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by
NPC with Pobre. It altered the topography o the Property. No
action was done on Pobres complaints, dumping continued.
Third was on September 1979, when NPC filed its second
expropriation case. NPC needed more lots for the construction
and maintenance of a Well Site. NPC immediately deposited
P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit
represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by
the second expropriation. NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot upon
the trial courts issuance of a writ of possession to NPC.
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint and claimed
that NPC damaged his Property. He prayed for just compensation
of all the lots affected.
On April 1987, the trial court decided in favor of Pobre, ordered
the whole property to be paid off by NPC.
NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision, which was
denied by the trial courts. NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the
trial courts decision and denied NPCs motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: WON, CA erred:
1. In holding that NPC had taken the entire Property of Pobre;
2. In not excluding from the Property portions of which NPC had
previously expropriated and paid for;
3. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial
court at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 1979 until
fully paid, is just and fair;
4. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at
P25/sqm only as what had been previously agreed upon;
HELD:
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Even before the first case, Pobre had established his property as
a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the
property that it made it uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision.
Questions of facts are beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for
review may only raise questions of law. NPC points out that it did
not take Pobres 68,969 sqm property. NPC argues that assuming
that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion that it had
successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been
excluded from the 68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPC
had damaged.
It was clearly established that the property originally had a total
area of 141,300 sqm. Pobre identified the lots forming the 68,969
sqm property that comprised the undeveloped area. NPC had the
opportunity to object to the identification of the lots, but failed to
do so. Thus, the trial and appellate courts finding on the total
land area NPC had damaged cannot be disturbed.
When possession of the land cannot be turned over to the
landowner because it is not anymore convenient or feasible to do
so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to
demand payment of just compensation.
In this case, the property is no longer habitable as a resort-
subdivision. The Property is worthless is now only useful to
NPC. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the
second expropriation on the ground that it had found an
alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC
abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had
already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has
demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights.
Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for
Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared
any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from
NPC. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.
The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent
domain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizens
property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary
power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for
procedural requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit.
RECOVERY OF EXPROPRIATED LAND
GR No. 158563, June 30, 2005
ATO vs. GOPUCO
FACTS:
Respondent was the owner of lots consisting of 995 sqm located
in the vicinity of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. The airport had
been turned over by the U.S. Army to the Philippines sometime in
1947 through the Surplus Property Commission. In 1947, the
Commission was succeeded by the Bureau of Aeronautics, which
was supplanted by the National Airport Corporation (NAC). The
NAC was then dissolved and replaced with the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (CAA).
Sometime in 1949, the NAC informed the various lot-owners
surrounding the Lahug Airport, including respondent, that the
government was acquiring their lands for purposes of expansion.
Some landowners sold their properties on the assurance that they
would be able to repurchase the same when these would no
longer be used by the airport. Others, including respondent,
refused to do so.
Thus, on April 1952, the CAA filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) for the expropriation of the lots, which the CFI
decided in favor of CAA. No appeal was made.
Subsequently, when the Mactan International Airport began
operations, the Lahug Airport was ordered closed by then
President Aquino. On March 1990, respondent wrote the manager
of the Lahug Airport, seeking the return of his lot and offered to
return the money previously paid. This letter was ignored.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
On 08 May 1992, ownership of the Lahug lots were transferred to
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
Respondent filed recovery of ownership of his Lot with the RTC of
Cebu and maintained that since the Lahug Airport has been
closed, the purpose of the property had ceased and title to the
property had therefore reverted to him.
Respondent however failed to present evidence on entering the
previous compromise agreement made.
Lastly, Gopuco asserted that there were several announcements
that the Lahug Airport was soon to be developed into a
commercial complex, which he took to be a scheme of the
Province of Cebu to make permanent the deprivation of his
property.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and directed the respondent to
pay exemplary damages, litigation expenses and costs.
Aggrieved by the decision, respondent appealed to CA, which
overturned the RTC decision, ordered petitioners to reconvey lots
to respondent upon payment of the reasonable price as
determined by it, and deleted the costs of damages.
ISSUES:
1. WON THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT HAS
THE RIGHT TO RECLAIM OWNERSHIP OF THE LOT.
2. WON THE CA ERRED IN DELETING THE AWARD OF
LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONERS.
HELD:
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple,
unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no rights in the land, and the
public use may be abandoned or the land may be devoted to a
different use, without any impairment of the estate or title
acquired, or any reversion to the former owner.
It was ruled that a compromise agreement, when not contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, is a valid
contract which is the law between the parties. Indeed, anyone
who is not a party to a contract or agreement cannot be bound by
its terms, and cannot be affected by it. Since respondent was not
a party to the compromise agreements, he cannot legally invoke
the same.
Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most
exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be
acquired for public purpose through a method in the nature of a
forced purchase by the State. Also often referred to as
expropriation or condemnation, it is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be
clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in
our Constitution on the subject are meant more to regulate, rather
than to grant, the exercise of the power.
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. This prescription is intended to provide a
safeguard against possible abuse. In this case, the judgment on
the propriety of the taking of the compensation received have long
become final. Neither has respondent, in the present case,
adduced any evidence at all concerning a right of repurchase in
his favor.
The trial court was thus correct in denying respondents claim.
However, the petitioners claim of harassment or that the
respondent acted in bad faith is unfounded, the imposition of
litigation expenses and costs has no basis. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED.
GENUINE NECESSITY
G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE G. LIM
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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31
FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted a special civil
action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and
939 of the Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the
purpose of establishing a military reservation for the Philippine
Army. Lot 932 was registered in the name of Gervasia Denzon
under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14921 with an area of
25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164
square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank,
pursuant to the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the
Republic took possession of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14,
1940, the CFI rendered its Decision ordering the Republic to pay
the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it
was dismissed
For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the Denzons
successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and
Josefina Galeos-Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against the Republic and
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in possession of
the property. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering Lots 932 and
939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and
Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the
phrase subject to the priority of the National Airports Corporation
to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous
payment of a reasonable market value.
The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza and
Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their
right as such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics
failure to pay the amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However, in view of the annotation on
their land titles, they were ordered to execute a deed of sale in
favor of the Republic. In view of the differences in money value
from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value
at P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5,
1948, date of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full
payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza
and Panerio appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the
amount in controversy, directly to this Court. The case was
docketed as No. L-21032. On May 19, 1966, this Court rendered
its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that Valdehueza
and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939,
there having been no payment of just compensation by the
Republic. Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to
show that the Republic paid the owners or their successors-in-
interest according to the CFI decision. While it deposited the
amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly disbursed,
however, the payees could not be ascertained.
Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as security for their loans. For
their failure to pay Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage
foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was cancelled, and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his name.
Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against
General Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of
Naval District V of the Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna,
Doroteo Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein petitioners.
Subsequently, he amended the complaint to implead the
Republic.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus declaring
plaintiff Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
932 with all the rights of an absolute owner including the right to
possession. The monetary claims in the complaint and in the
counter claims contained in the answer of defendants are ordered
Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed
therein as CA-G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision dated
September 18, 2003, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC
Decision, thus:
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of
any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is
essential for the plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or
equitable title or interest in the real property, which is the subject
matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiffs title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of
Appeals, 328 SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion,
clearly, the claim of defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a
cloud, doubt or uncertainty on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente
Lim that can be removed by an action to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible
error in the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said
decision is UPHELD AND AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
ISSUE: The basic issue is whether the Republic has retained
ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just compensation
HELD:
From the taking of private property by the government under the
power of eminent domain, there arises an implied promise to
compensate the owner for his loss
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article
III of the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This
limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of
Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to
the detriment of the individuals rights. Given this function, the
provision should therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the property
owner.
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation
proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment
fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnors
title relates back to the date on which the petition under the
Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioners report under the
Local Improvement Act, is filed.
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be
no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator.
Otherwise stated, the Republics acquisition of ownership is
conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a
reasonable time
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED
G.R. No. 72126, January 29, 1988
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution dated
April 24,1985 by the former Intermediate Appellate Court, now
Court of Appeals, setting aside its earlier decision dated January
10, 1985 and dismissing the special civil action for expropriation
filed by the petitioner.
Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
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with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan,
an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land with a width of
26.8 meters and a length of 184.37 meters covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said
property was allegedly to enable the storage of the respondent's
heavy equipment and various finished products such as large
diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and
harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large
diameter concrete pipes, and parts for low cost housing.
The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor
Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975,
manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879.
An opposition to the resolution was filed by the respondent with
the Office of the Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a
special committee of four members to investigate the matter.
The Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board
of Bulacan disapprove or annul the resolution in question because
there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of
Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a
public road.
On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan
passed Resolution No. 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and
annulling Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, of the Municipal
Council of Meycauayan. The respondent, then, reiterated to the
Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to
fence the aforesaid parcels of land.
However, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by
Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of
1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's
land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid
resolution on January 25, 1984.
Thereafter, the petitioner, on February 14, 1984, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special
civil action for expropriation.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00, which is the market
value of the land, with the Philippine National Bank, the trial court
on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the
petitioner.
The trial court issued an order declaring the taking of the property
as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as
court commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the
just compensation for the property.
The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on
petition for review. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision. However, upon motion for reconsideration by the
respondent, the decision was re-examined and reversed. The
appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity to
expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were
several other roads for the same purpose and another more
appropriate lot for the proposed public road. The court, taking into
consideration the location and size of the land, also opined that
the land is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent's
heavy equipment and finished products.
ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Meycauayan was right to exercise
its power of eminent domain to expropriate the respondent's property
for use as a public road?
HELD:
This Court held that the foundation of the right to exercise the
power of eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Condemnation of private property is
justified only if it is for the public good and there is a genuine
necessity of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the
power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of
eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity thereof. There is absolutely no showing in the petition
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
why the more appropriate lot for the proposed road which was
offered for sale has not been the subject of the petitioner's
attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real need for another
connecting road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The questioned resolution of the respondent court is
AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. L-51078, October 30, 1980
CRISTINA DE KNECHT, vs. HON. PEDRO JL. BAUTISTA
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Cristina de
Knecht against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista, as Judge
presiding over Branch III of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasay City), and the Republic of the Philippines pines seeking
that judgment be rendered annulling the order for immediate
possession issued by respondent court in the expropriation
proceedings and commanding respondents to desist from further
proceedings in the expropriation action or the order for immediate
possession issued in said action, with costs.
And that a restraint order or writ of preliminary injunction be
issued ex-parte enjoining respondents, their representative
representative and agents from enforcing the here questioned
order for mediate posession petitioner offering to post a bond
executed to the parties enjoined in an amount to be fixed by the
Court to the effect that she will pay to such parties all damages
which they may sustain by reason of the injunction if the Court
should finally decide she is not entitled there.
Ten years ago, the government through the Department of Public
Workmen's and Communication prepared a to Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard; that the proposed
extension, an adjunct of building program, the project would pass
through Cuneta Avenue up to Roxas Boulevard that this route
would be a straight one taking into account the direction of EDSA.
Then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public
Highways directed the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue
temporary or permanent permits for the construction and/or
improvement of buildings and other structures located within the
proposed extension through Cuneta Avenue.
Department of Public Highways decided to make the proposed
extension go through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which
are lined with old substantial houses; that upon learning of the
changed the owners of the residential houses that would be
affected, the herein petitioner being one of them.
Petitioner filed a formal petition to President Ferdinand E. Marcos
asking him to order the Ministry of Public Highways to adoption,
the original plan of making the extension of EDSA through
Araneta Avenue instead of the new plan going through Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets; that President Marcos directed then
Minister Baltazar Aquino to explain within twenty-four (24) hours
why the proposed project should not be suspended.
Minister Aquino submitted his explanation defending the new
proposed route; that the President then referred the matter to the
Human Settlements Commission for investigation and
recommendation; that after formal hearings to which all the
parties proponents and oppositors were given full opportunity to
ventilate their views and to present their evidence, the
Settlements Commission submitted a report recommending the
reversion of the extension of EDSA to the original plan passing
through Cuneta Avenue; and that notwithstanding the said report
and recommendation, the Ministry of Public Highways insisted on
implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of possession of the property sought to be expropriated on
the ground that said Republic had made the required deposit with
the Philippine National Bank.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
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The respondent judge issued a writ of possession authorizing the
Republic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the possession
of the properties sought be condemned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the plan to make the extension of EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Street be made?
2. Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take
immediate possession of the properties sought to be
expropriated?
HELD:
From all the foregoing, the facts of record and recommendations
of the Human Settlements Commission, it is clear that the choice
of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as the line through which
the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval.
The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take immediate
possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. The
order authorizing the Republic of the Philippines to take or enter
upon the possession of the properties sought to be condemned is
set aside and the respondent Judge is permanently enjoined from
taking any further action except to dismiss said case.
GR No. 87351, February 12, 1990
RP vs. DE KNECHT
*no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006
LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs. HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI
FACTS:
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a
parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at
Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City , Metro Manila. In a letter dated
January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of
Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate
a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the
"sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42,
Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig .
Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to
petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." On
May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the
intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid,
and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor
suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent
reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioners
property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor
residents."
Subsequently, on February 21, 1995, respondent filed with the
trial court a complaint for expropriation, docketed as SCA No.
873. Respondent prayed that the trial court, after due notice and
hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of the property; that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the
just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the
report of the commissioners.
On May 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there is a genuine necessity
to expropriate the property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig . As to the issue of just
compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
determined in accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the trial court in its Order of July 31, 1996. Forthwith, it appointed
the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted
petitioner to file with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for
certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41860. On October 31,
1997, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated November 20, 1998.
ISSUES: THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 1997
(ATTACHMENT "A") AND RESOLUTION DATED 20 NOVEMBER
1998 (ATTACHMENT "B") ARE CONTRARY TO LAW, THE RULES
OF COURT AND JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT:
I The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GENUINE
NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING OF THE PETITIONERS
PROPERTY.
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT THE PUBLIC USE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN HAS BEEN COMPLIED WITH.
C. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT RESPONDENT CITY
OF PASIG HAS COMPLIED WITH ALL CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN.
THE COURT A QUOS ORDER DATED 07 MAY 1996 AND 31 JULY
1996, WHICH WERE AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS,
EFFECTIVELY AMOUNT TO THE TAKING OF PETITIONERS
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW:
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING OF
RULE ON ACTIONABLE DOCUMENTS TO THE DOCUMENTS
ATTACHED TO RESPONDENT CITY OF PASIG S COMPLAINT
DATED 07 APRIL 1995 TO JUSTIFY THE COURT A QUOS DENIAL
OF PETITIONERS RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE COMPLAINT
FOR EXPROPRIATION (THE MOTION TO DISMISS DATED 21
APRIL 1995).
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE
RULE ON HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION OF FACTS ALLEGED IN A
COMPLAINT CONSIDERING THAT THE MOTION TO DISMISS
FILED BY PETITIONER IN THE EXPROPRIATION CASE BELOW
WAS THE RESPONSIVE PLEADING REQUIRED TO BE FILED
UNDER THE THEN RULE 67 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND NOT
AN ORIDNARY MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 16 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
HELD:
On the two main issues one substantive and one procedural
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for
expropriation on April 25, 1995. It was denied by the trial court on
May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on expropriation was governed
by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
"SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in
the summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present
in a single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All
such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A
copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorney of
record and filed with the court with proof of service."
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly
constitutes the responsive pleading which takes the place of an
answer to the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is the
pleading that puts in issue the right of the plaintiff to expropriate
the defendants property for the use specified in the complaint. All
that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served
on plaintiffs attorney of record. It is the court that at its
convenience will set the case for trial after the filing of the said
pleading.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
34
The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint, "specifically that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate petitioners property for public use." What
the trial court should have done was to set the case for the
reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a
genuine necessity for the taking of the property, instead of
summarily making a finding that the taking is for public use and
appointing commissioners to fix just compensation.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an
expropriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer
was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly
mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the
property of a defendant must be set forth in an answer.
G.R. SP No. 41860 on October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It is only fair that the Rule
at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should govern.
The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her
prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive issue.
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch
of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local
government units, other public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local
governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may
exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute. Section 19
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160)
prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent
domain to local government units and lays down the parameters
for its exercise, thus: Judicial review of the exercise of eminent
domain is limited to the following areas of concern: (a) the
adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking,
and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.
In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig
failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the
condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the
intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must
be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes.
Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the
expropriation.
The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily
originates from "the necessity" and the taking must be limited to
such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila,
we held that the very foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has
failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioners property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the
Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated
November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No.
42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners
Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
Association are desirous of having their own private playground
and recreational facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant
space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and
categorically public.
Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the expropriation of
ones property is clearly established, it shall be the duty of the
courts to protect the rights of individuals to their private property.
Important as the power of eminent domain may be, the inviolable
sanctity which the Constitution attaches to the property of the
individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of
private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the
taking, which must be of a public character, must also be shown
to exist.
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RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
The petition for review is GRANTED. The challenged Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860
are REVERSED. The complaint for expropriation filed before the
trial court by respondent City of Pasig , docketed as SCA No. 873,
is ordered DISMISSED.
JUST COMPENSATION: DEFINED
G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. vs. CLARITA VDA. DE ONORIO
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, Surallah, South Cotabato, ordering the National Irrigation
Administration (NIA for brevity) to pay respondent the amount of
P107,517.60 as just compensation for the taking of the latters
property.
Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner of a lot in
Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South Cotabato with an area of
39,512 square meters. On October 6, 1981, Santiago Eslaban,
Jr., Project Manager of the NIA, approved the construction of the
main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot, affecting a 24,660
square meter portion thereof. Respondents husband agreed to
the construction of the NIA canal provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the processing of documents
by the Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement was executed
between respondent and the NIA (Exh. 1). The NIA then paid
respondent the amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages.
Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit of Waiver of
Rights and Fees whereby she waived any compensation for
damages to crops and improvements which she suffered as a
result of the construction of a right-of-way on her property (Exh.
2). The same year, petitioner offered respondent the sum of
P35,000.00 by way of amicable settlement pursuant to Executive
Order No. 1035, 18, which provides in part that
Financial assistance may also be given to owners of lands
acquired under C.A. 141, as amended, for the area or portion
subject to the reservation under Section 12 thereof in such
amounts as may be determined by the implementing
agency/instrumentality concerned in consultation with the
Commission on Audit and the assessors office concerned.
Respondent demanded payment for the taking of her property,
but petitioner refused to pay. Accordingly, respondent filed on
December 10, 1990 a complaint against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the
sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for the portion of her
property used in the construction of the canal constructed by the
NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-General, filed an
Answer, in which he admitted that NIA constructed an irrigation
canal over the property of the plaintiff and that NIA paid a certain
landowner whose property had been taken for irrigation purposes,
but petitioner interposed the defense that: (1) the government had
not consented to be sued; (2) the total area used by the NIA for its
irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600 square meters;
and (3) respondent was not entitled to compensation for the
taking of her property considering that she secured title over the
property by virtue of a homestead patent under C.A. No. 141.
At the pre-trial conference, the following facts were stipulated
upon: (1) that the area taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it
was a portion of the land covered by TCT No. T-22121 in the
name of respondent and her late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that
this area had been taken by the NIA for the construction of an
irrigation canal.
On October 18, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
TRIAL COURT RULING: In view of the foregoing, decision is
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hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant
ordering the defendant, National Irrigation Administration, to pay
to plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Seven Thousand Five
Hundred Seventeen Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P107,517.60) as
just compensation for the questioned area of 24,660 square
meters of land owned by plaintiff and taken by said defendant NIA
which used it for its main canal plus costs.
On November 15, 1993, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals which, on October 31, 2000, affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION IS DISMISSIBLE FOR
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 5,
RULE 7 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT LAND GRANTED BY VIRTUE OF A
HOMESTEAD PATENT AND SUBSEQUENTLY REGISTERED
UNDER PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1529 CEASES TO BE PART OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE VALUE OF JUST COMPENSATION
SHALL BE DETERMINED FROM THE TIME OF THE TAKING OR
FROM THE TIME OF THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION.
4. WHETHER THE AFFIDAVIT OF WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND FEES
EXECUTED BY RESPONDENT EXEMPTS PETITIONER FROM
MAKING PAYMENT TO THE FORMER.
HELD:
First. Rule 7, 5 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure
provides Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff
or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn
certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith:
(a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same
or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report the fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after
hearing . . . .
By reason of Rule 45, 4 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure, in relation to Rule 42, 2 thereof, the requirement of a
certificate of non-forum shopping applies to the filing of petitions
for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Court of Appeals,
such as the one filed by petitioner.
As provided in Rule 45, 5, "The failure of the petitioner to comply
with any of the foregoing requirements regarding . . . the contents
of the document which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."
The requirement in Rule 7, 5 that the certification should be
executed by the plaintiff or the principal means that counsel
cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for
this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else
whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same
case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification
signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause
for dismissal of the petition.
In this case, the petition for review was filed by Santiago Eslaban,
Jr., in his capacity as Project Manager of the NIA. However, the
verification and certification against forum-shopping were signed
by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator of the agency. The real
party-in-interest is the NIA, which is a body corporate. Without
being duly authorized by resolution of the board of the
corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor Cesar E. Gonzales
could sign the certificate against forum-shopping accompanying
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the petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone, the petition
should be dismissed.
Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the land under
litigation, as already stated, is covered by a transfer certificate of
title registered in the Registry Office of Koronadal, South
Cotabato on May 13, 1976. This land was originally covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. (P-25592) P-9800 which was
issued pursuant to a homestead patent granted on February 18,
1960. We have held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or conveyed to
applicants thereof, and the deed grant or instrument of
conveyance [sales patent] registered with the Register of Deeds
and the corresponding certificate and owners duplicate of title
issued, such lands are deemed registered lands under the
Torrens System and the certificate of title thus issued is as
conclusive and indefeasible as any other certificate of title issued
to private lands in ordinary or cadastral registration proceedings.
The Solicitor-General contends, however, that an encumbrance is
imposed on the land in question in view of 39 of the Land
Registration Act (now P.D. No. 1529, 44) which provides:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a
decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of
registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good
faith shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those
noted on said certificate, and any of the following encumbrances
which may be subsisting, namely:
Third. Any public highway, way, private way established by law, or
any government irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the
certificate of title does not state that the boundaries of such
highway, way, irrigation canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.
As this provision says, however, the only servitude which a
private property owner is required to recognize in favor of the
government is the easement of a "public highway, way, private
way established by law, or any government canal or lateral
thereof where the certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries thereof have been pre-determined." This implies that
the same should have been pre-existing at the time of the
registration of the land in order that the registered owner may be
compelled to respect it. Conversely, where the easement is not
pre-existing and is sought to be imposed only after the land has
been registered under the Land Registration Act, proper
expropriation proceedings should be had, and just compensation
paid to the registered owner thereof.6
In this case, the irrigation canal constructed by the NIA on the
contested property was built only on October 6, 1981, several
years after the property had been registered on May 13, 1976.
Accordingly, prior expropriation proceedings should have been
filed and just compensation paid to the owner thereof before it
could be taken for public use.
Indeed, the rule is that where private property is needed for
conversion to some public use, the first thing obviously that the
government should do is to offer to buy it. If the owner is willing to
sell and the parties can agree on the price and the other
conditions of the sale, a voluntary transaction can then be
concluded and the transfer effected without the necessity of a
judicial action. Otherwise, the government will use its power of
eminent domain, subject to the payment of just compensation, to
acquire private property in order to devote it to public use.
Third. With respect to the compensation which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to receive, it is likewise settled
that it is the market value which should be paid or "that sum of
money which a person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an
owner, willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price
to be given and received therefore." Further, just compensation
means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time
from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for then the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving
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the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Nevertheless, as
noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico, Jr., there are instances where the
expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which case just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of taking, not as of the time of filing of
the action of eminent domain.
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4 provided:
Order of condemnation. When such a motion is overruled or when
any party fails to defend as required by this rule, the court may
enter an order of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint. . . .
It is now provided that
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the
defense against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property
are overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by
this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may
be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be
permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on
such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (Emphasis
added)
Thus, the value of the property must be determined either as of
the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
"whichever came first." Even before the new rule, however, it was
already held in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos that
the price of the land at the time of taking, not its value after the
passage of time, represents the true value to be paid as just
compensation. It was, therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to
rule that the just compensation to be paid to respondent should
be determined as of the filing of the complaint in 1990, and not
the time of its taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner was
allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay respondent, and it was
respondent who filed the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it was
also the property owner who brought the action for compensation
against the government after 25 years since the taking of his
property for the construction of a road.
Indeed, the value of the land may be affected by many factors. It
may be enhanced on account of its taking for public use, just as it
may depreciate. As observed in Republic v. Lara:
[W]here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation
proceedings, the value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the
property may have depreciated its value thereby; or there may
have been a natural increase in the value of the property from the
time it is taken to the time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it
is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just, i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose property is
taken, "but to the public, which is to pay for it" . . . .
In this case, the proper valuation for the property in question is
P16,047.61 per hectare, the price level for 1982, based on the
appraisal report submitted by the commission (composed of the
provincial treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South Cotabato)
constituted by the trial court to make an assessment of the
expropriated land and fix the price thereof on a per hectare
basis.14
Fourth. Petitioner finally contends that it is exempt from paying
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
any amount to respondent because the latter executed an
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees of any compensation due in
favor of the Municipal Treasurer of Barangay Sto. Nio, South
Cotabato . However, as the Court of Appeals correctly held:
[I]f NIA intended to bind the appellee to said affidavit, it would not
even have bothered to give her any amount for damages caused
on the improvements/crops within the appellees property. This,
apparently was not the case, as can be gleaned from the
disbursement voucher in the amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the
Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396) issued on September 17,
1983 in favor of the appellee, and the letter from the Office of the
Solicitor General recommending the giving of "financial
assistance in the amount of P35,000.00" to the appellee.
Thus, We are inclined to give more credence to the appellees
explanation that the waiver of rights and fees "pertains only to
improvements and crops and not to the value of the land utilized
by NIA for its main canal."15
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the extent that the just
compensation for the contested property be paid to respondent in
the amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full
payment is made. Costs against petitioner.
GR No. 146062, June 28, 2001
RP VS IAC
FACTS:
A property consisting of 4 parcels of land with a total area of
9,650 square meters was the subject of expropriation. Its previous
owner, Avegon Inc., offered it for sale to the City School Board of
Manila on July 21, 1973 at P2, 300,000. The school board was
willing to buy at P1, 800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila
intervened and volunteered to negotiate with Avegon Inc. for a
better price. On June 3, 1974, Avegon Inc. sold the property and
its improvements to Amerex Electronics Phils. Corporation for P1,
800,000.00. On August 29, 1975, the Solicitor General filed for
the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) a complaint
against Amerex for the expropriation of said property before the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 99190). The
complaint stated that the property was needed by the government
as a permanent site for the Manuel de la Fuente High School. The
fair market value of the property had been declared by Amerex as
P2, 435,000, and the assessor determined the market value as
P2, 432,042. The assessed amount for taxation purposes is P1,
303,470 and was deposited with the PNB on September 30,
1975. The Government was able to take actual possession of the
property on October 13, 1975. Amerex then filed a motion to
dismiss citing the issue on just compensation to be fixed at P2,
432,042, the market value of the property determined by the
assessor which was lower than Amerex's own declaration. The
motion to dismiss was opposed by the plaintiff saying that they
can present evidence of a much lower market value. Amerex then
filed a motion to withdraw the deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB
without the plaintiff opposing provided that an order of
condemnation be issued to allow plaintiff to present evidence on
the matter of just compensation. On March 12, 1976, the plaintiff
filed a motion for leave of court to amend its complaint stating that
after it had filed the same, P.D. No. 464was amended by P.D. No.
794 and that the amended complaint would state that the fair
market value of the property could not be in excess of
P1,800,000, the amount for which defendant's predecessor-in-
interest had offered to sell said properties to the Division of Public
Schools of Manila and which amount was also the purchase price
paid by Amerex to Avegon Inc. This was denied by the lower
court, but after the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, the
lower court admitted the amended complaint on April 27, 1976.
Audited financial statements were submitted by Amerex and the
statements yielded the amount of P2, 258,018.48 as the total
value of the property. On October 18, 1976, the plaintiff filed a
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motion to disqualify Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino as commissioner
on the ground that he could not be expected to be unbiased
inasmuch as in the three appraisal reports submitted by Amerex.
Amerex opposed the motion to disqualify Aquino as
commissioner, and the court, in its order of November 5, 1976,
denied it. The commissioner then filed his appraisal for the fair
market value of the property which is P2, 258,018.57 for purposes
of determining just compensation payable to defendant AMEREX.
The plaintiff objected the report and reiterated that the value
should be only P1, 800, 00.00. Basing it on the evidence, the
court ruled to fix the market value at of P2,258.018.57 for just
compensation, hence the plaintiff elevated the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Court erred in not disqualifying
Commissioner Aurelio B. Aquino from membership in the
Committee of Appraisal.
2. Whether or not respondent Court erred in totally disregarding
petitioner's evidence showing that the award of just compensation
should be only P1, 800,000.00.
HELD:
1. No, the court did not err in not disqualifying Commissioner
Aquino. The report of the commissioners is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character as far as the court is concerned.
The court may choose to take action or to set aside the report or
appoint new commissioners, hence it really does not matter if the
commissioner had a pre conceived and biased valuation of the
property. The determination of just compensation for a
condemned property is basically a judicial function and not bound
by its Commissioners.
2. No, the Court did not err in disregarding 's evidence showing that
the award of just compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that the property is worth
lower than P1, 800,000 basing it on the value when it was first
offered for sale to the City School Board of Manila. The appraisal
made by Ampil Realty and Appraisal Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975,
which date is nearest to that of the actual taking of the property,
should be the basis for the determination of just compensation the
record being bereft of any indications of anomaly appertaining
thereto. Wenceslao Ampil, the president of said appraisal firm,
also had testified at the trial and therefore petitioner had the
opportunity to confront him and to question his report.
WHEREFORE, the just compensation of the property
expropriated for the use of the Manuel de la Fuente High School
Don Mariano Marcos Memorial High School) is hereby fixed at
Two Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P2,400,000.00).
After deducting the amount of P1, 303,470.00 therefrom, the
petitioner shall pay the balance with legal interest from October
13, 1975.
December 19, 2005
RP VS GINGOYON
FACTS:
The construction of the NAIA 3 had spawned controversies that had its
roots with the promulgation of the Courts decision in Agan vs PIATCO
(2003 decision), which nullified the contract between the Government
and the contractor (PIATCO) for being contrary to law and public
policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 decision, the NAIA 3
facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing
completion. and several respondents filed their respective motions for
the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision but were denied by the Court
in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004. However, the Court this time
squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund,
compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of
the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the
NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO. On
December 21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for
expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC).The
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RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Government sought for the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing
it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Government also declared that it had deposited 3 Billion in cash
with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the assessed value
for taxation purposes. This was the case now presided by Honorable
Gingoyon. On the same day that the complaint was filed, the RTC
issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the
Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of
the NAIA 3 facilities. This decision was based on Section 2, Rule 67 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation, however this was amended by Republic Act No.
8974. RA 8974 provides that as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the
improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
On the basis of RA 8974, the RTC directed first, that the Land Bank of
the Philippines, Baclaran Branch, immediately release the amount of
US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed
to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by
authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third,
the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard"
the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation
for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation
proceedings and full payment of just compensation. The Government
was also not allowed to perform acts of ownership like leasing any part
of NAIA 3 to other parties. The Government then filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed January 4, 2005 order. On
7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now
assailed before this Court, which appointed 3 Commissioners to
ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex.
And on the same day the Government issued a Motion for Inhibition of
Hon. Gingoyon. These motions were heard by the RTC but were
denied in an Omnibus Order dated January 10, 2005. Thus the present
petition for Certiorari for the nullification of the RTC orders dated
January 4, 7 and 10, 2005 and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from
taking further action on the expropriation case.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs
the expropriation proceedings in this case
HELD:
Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it
requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least
the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and
provides certain valuation standards or methods for the
determination of just compensation.
Since funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction, for
the to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent
PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must
be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government
cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its
investors.
Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintiff shall have the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states:
Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the
defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of one
hundred percent of the value of the property based on the current
relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined
under Section 7.
If Sec2 Rule 67 applies then PIATCO would be enjoined from
receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the
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Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of
possession.
Hence the Court ruled that just compensation should be made
before the Government may take over the NAIA 3.
GR No. 148512, June 26, 2006
CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS CENTRAL LUZON DRUG
CORPORATION
FACTS:
From January 1995 to December 1995, Central Luzon Drug
Corporation has been granting 20% discount on the sale of
medicines to qualified senior citizens amounting to P219,778.00.
Pursuant to Revenue Regulations No. 2-94 implementing R.A.
No. 7432, which states that the discount given to senior citizens
shall be deducted by the establishment from its gross sales for
value-added tax and other percentage tax purposes, respondent
deducted the total amount of P219, 778.00 from its gross income
for the taxable year 1995. Subsequently on December 27, 1996,
the Central Luzon Drug Corporation claimed for a tax credit
amounting to P150, 193.00 (P219, 778.00 20% sales discount
given to senior citizen P69, 585.00 income tax).
Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was not able to
decide the claim for refund on time, respondent filed a Petition for
Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18, 1998.
However, this was dismissed by CTA declaring that even if the
20% sales discount is granted to senior citizens as a credit, this
cannot be applied when there is no tax liability or the tax credit is
greater than the tax due. The respondent then filed with the CA a
petition for Review on August 3, 2000. The petition for the P 150,
193.00 tax credit was granted and the decision of the CTA set
aside, thus this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount granted by respondent to
qualified senior citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 may be
claimed as a tax credit or as a deduction from gross sales in
accordance with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-94.
HELD:
The 20% sales discount given to senior citizens may be claimed
as a tax credit and not as a deduction from the gross sales.
Wherefore the petition is DENIED and the decision of the CA is
AFFIRMED.
Legal Basis:
Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens. The senior citizens
shall be entitled to the following:
(a) The grant of twenty percent (20%) discount
from all establishments relative to utilization
of transportations services, hotels and similar
lodging establishments, restaurants and
recreation centers and purchase of medicines
anywhere in the country: Provided, that
private establishments may claim the cost as
tax credit.
The above provision explicitly employed the word tax
credit. Nothing in the provision suggests for it to mean a
deduction from gross sales. To construe it otherwise would be a
departure from the clear mandate of the law.
It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that the legislative
intent must be determined from the language of the statute itself
especially when the words and phrases therein are clear and
unequivocal. The statute in such a case must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. Its literal meaning should be followed to
depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
statute.
The tax credit benefit granted to the establishments can be
deemed as their just compensation for private property taken by
the State for public use. The privilege enjoyed by the senior
citizens does not come directly from the State, but rather from the
private establishments concerned.
GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006
CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS BICOLANDIA DRUG CORP.
*no case digest submitted*
JUST COMPENSATION: DETERMINATION OF JUST
COMPENSATION
149 SCRA 305 (1987)
EPZA vs. DULAY
FACTS:
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued
Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the
public domain situated in the city of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan,
Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more
or less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by
petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. it included
four parcel of land registered in the name of private individual.
The petitioner, therefore offered to purchase the parcels of land
from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in
section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The
parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private
respondent, to expropriate the parcel of land in pursuant to P.D.
66, as amended, which empowers the petitioner to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the establishment of
export processing zones in relation to Proclamation No. 1811.
On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of
possession authorizing the petitioner to take immediate
possession of the premises. On December 23, 1980, the private
respondent filed its answer.
At the pre-trial conference, the respondent judge issued an order
stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be
resolved is the just compensation for the properties and that the
pre-trial is thereby terminated and the hearing on the merits is set
on April 2, 1981.
The respondent judge issued the order appointing certain persons
as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated.
Subsequently the three commissioners submitted their
consolidated report recommending a certain amount of P15.00
per square meter as the fair and reasonable value of just
compensation of the properties.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and
objection to commissioners report on the grounds that P.D. No
1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 Rule 67 of the rules of court
on the ascertainment of just compensation must not exceed the
maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533. In addition the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with temporary
restraining order, enjoining the trial court from enjoining the order.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule 67 of the revised rules of
court had been repealed or deemed amended by P.D. NO. 1533
insofar as appointment of commissioners are concerned. Stated in
another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just
compensation in P.D. NO. 1533 valid and constitutional?
HELD:
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
39
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the
aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this court inutile in a matter
which under the constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The courts task would be relegated to simply
stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor and its choice must be limited to the lower
of the two. However, the strict application of the decrees during
the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or a
charade.the court cannot exercise its discretion or independence
in determining what is just or fair. The court is empowered to
appoint commissioners to assess the just compensation of these
properties under eminent domain proceedings in order for the
owner of the property is entitled to recover the fair and full value
of the lot. In fine, the decree only establishes a uniform basis for
determining just compensation which the court may consider as
one of the factors in arriving at just compensation, as envisage in
the constitution. The executive department or the legislature may
make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation
of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights, no statute, decree or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the courts findings. The determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the
courts discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on
February 16, 1982 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
263 SCRA 708
PANES vs. VISAYAS STATE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE
*no case digest submitted
195 SCRA 59
BELEN vs. CA
FACTS:
A small portion of land measuring a hundred (100) square meters,
more or less, belonging to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased
to Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known as Lot No. 10,
Block 18 and is situated at Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. On it
stood a house built by Belen.
Part of the land came to be occupied by Alfredo Juliano and his
family in the early part of 1978; Juliano bought a house standing
thereon, not belonging to Belen, and move in without the latters
knowledge. On learning of this, Belen had a talk with Juliano, and
they came to an agreement that Juliano could continue staying on
the land temporarily and would pay one half of the rental to
Manotoc Reality, inc. Later a fire razed both Belens and Julianos
houses to the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build anything on
the land anymore. However, on julianos pleas, Belen acceded to
Julianos continued stay on the land on the explicit condition that
his occupancy should not be longer than two and a half years.
When Juliano failed to leave the premises after the stipulated
term despite demand, Belen brought suit in the Metropolitan Trial
Court sometime in September, 1982, and succeeded in obtaining
judgment dated September 5, 1984, a order of the MTC to the
defendant to vacate the subject lot and pay plaintiff the amount of
P3,000.00 as a attorneys fees, plus cost of suit.
Juliano appealed to the Regional Trial Court of manila. That court
reversed the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, but the
decision was made to rest on the expropriation of the Manotoc
Estate effected by Presidential Decree No. 1670, where the
Manotoc Reality Incorporated ceased to be the owner of the land.
Belen has perfected an appeal by certiorari to SC and prays for
judgment on the following essential propostions that Manotoc
Reality Services has been denied of its right of just compensation,
not having receive any money as payment for the subject
property, and the NHA not having taken possession thereof in an
appropriate action of eminent domain.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
ISSUE: Is the passage of Presidential Decree No. 1670 constitutional,
whereas it disregarded the right of compensation and due process of
law?
HELD:
Presidential Decree No 1670, together with the companion
decree, numbered 1669 was struck down by this court as
unconstitutional and therefore, null and void. The Court found that
both decrees, being violative of the petitioners (owners) right to
due process of law.
The court said on the determination of just compensation: The
decrees do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or
procedure by which the petitioners can question the propriety of
the expropriation of their properties or the reasonableness of the
just compensation.
Having failed to provide for a hearing, the government should
have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, PD 1670 being void ab initio, all acts done in
reliance thereon and in accordance therewith must also be viod
ab initio, including particularly the taking of possession of property
by the National Housing Authority and its attempts to convert the
same into a housing project and the selection of the beneficiaries
thereof.
The decision of the Court of Appeals of October 2, 1986 and that
of Regional Trial Court thereby affirmed, are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE, and the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court(Branch VII), Manila, rendered on September 5, 1984 in Civil
Case No. 078756-cv is REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED, with cost
against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.
227 SCRA 401
REPUBLIC VS CA
*no case digest submitted*
206 SCRA 196
MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. PINEDA
*no case digest submitted*
263 SCAR 758
DAR VS. CA
*no case digest submitted*
G. R. No. L-57524 January 8, 1986
REPUBLIC VS.,SANTOS
FACTS:
The case is an expropriation case which involved the 66,096 square
meters of land claimed by 44 persons, located in Paranaque and
Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was necessary for the widening
of, and construction of interchanges in the Manila South Diversion
Road. The Appraisal Committee for the province of Rizal fixed at forty
pesos (P40) per square meter, or an amount of P2, 641,190. The
Government deposited that amount with the provincial treasurer who
deposited it in the Philippine National Bank but some of the
respondents withdrew including Maura Santos. The Court of First
Instance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June 19, 1969 granted the
fiscal's motion fixing the provisional value at P2, 641,190. Fourteen
(14) claimants did not object to the valuation of P40 a square meter. As
to those who did not settle at the price of P40 a square meter, the trial
court, pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, appointed
three commissioners to determine the just compensation: Benjamin
Morales for the court as chairman; Pacifico Javier, the provincial
assessor, for the Republic, and Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimants.
The commissioners in their report dated October 2, 1970
recommended that the just compensation for the lands should be P100
a square meter except the land of Maura Santos with an area of
25,909 square meters. The trial court in its decision dated May 13,
1972 modified that recommendation. It fixed P100 a square meter as
the uniform price to be paid to the claimants. The Court of Appeals in
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
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its decision of June 29, 1981 in turn modified the trial court's decision
and adopted the commissioners' report and it added 6% legal rate of
interest.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the just compensation to be paid by the
Government is 40 or 100, as recommended by the
commissioners.
2. Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not holding that the
commissioners should not have relied on the price of P100 for the
land of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in November, 1969 and on
other irrelevant evidence.
3. Whether or not Appellate Court erred in disregarding the fact that
14 out of the 44 claimants already sold their lots to the Republic at
P40 a square meter.
HELD:
We hold that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
relying on the commissioners' report whose recommendation was
not substantiated by trustworthy evidence. As pointed out by the
Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of P100 a square meter
for the land of Alcaraz was made about eight months after the
filing of the instant expropriation case. In Presidential Decree No.
1533 provides that just compensation should be the value of the
land "prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government office to acquire the property." In the case, it should
be noted that the expropriation undeniably increased the value of
the remainder of her land with an area of 121,700 square meters.
She was already paid P1, 036,360 for her expropriated land.
Furthermore, the commissioners should not have glossed over
the undisputed fact that 14 claimants out of 44 had winningly sold
their lands to the Government at P40 a square meter as fixed by
the provincial Appraisal Committee of which the provincial
assessor was a member. Evidently, they were satisfied that that
was a reasonable price. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the
court is not bound by the commissioners' report. It may make
such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff
the property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation,
and to the defendant just compensation for the property
expropriated.
As noted in the Velasquez case, the moment a parcel of land is
sought to be condemned, the price, for some occult reason,
immediately soars far beyond what the owner would think of
asking or receiving in the open market. Owners ask fabulous
prices for it and neighbours look on with an indulgent smile or
even persuade themselves that the land is worth the price for
which the owner holds out in view of the fact that it is wanted by
an entity whose financial resources are supposed to be
inexhaustible. Consequently, the petitioner should pay only P40
per square meter for the expropriated lands. CMC (CMS)
Investments, Inc. was paid P35 a square meter for its 530 square
meters. It is entitled to a deficiency on which 6% legal rate of
interest per annum should be paid from the time the petitioner
took possession of its land up to the date of payment. The
decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are reversed
and set aside. The just compensation for the lands described in
paragraph 2 of petitioner's complaint is forty pesos (P40) per
square meter.
GR No. 170422, March 07, 2008
SPS. LEE VS LBP
*please read full text*
JUST COMPENSATION: WHEN DETERMINED
G. R. No. L-50147 August 3, 1990
ANSALDO VS. TANTUICO
FACTS:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
Two lots of private ownership were taken by the Government and used
for the widening of a road for more than forty-three years, without
benefit of an action of eminent domain or agreement with its owners.
The owners of the land are Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela
Ansaldo, are covered by title in their names and have an aggregate
area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken from the Ansaldos
sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Work Transportation
and Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa
Street and is now Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro
Manila. The said owners did not make any action until twenty six years
later asking for the compensation of their land. The case was referred
to the Secretary of Justice who rendered an opinion that the just
compensation be made in accordance with Presidential Decree 76
which provide that the basis for the payment of just compensation of
property taken for public use should be the current and fair market
value thereof as declared by the owner or administrator, or such
market value as determined by the assessor, whichever was lower.
Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial Assessor
of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos'
property in accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after
which the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways forwarded the
Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the recommendation that
payment be made on the basis of the current and fair market value and
not on the fair market value at the time of taking. The Commission on
Audit declined the recommendation and decided that the
compensation be from the actual time of the taking of the land.
ISSUE: (As to the precise time the just compensation be based)
Whether or not the just compensation be based on the time of the
actual taking of the possession or PD 76.
HELD:
In the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain,
there is a taking when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction
or a material impairment of the value of his property or when he is
deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a taking in this
sense when the expropriator enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a more permanent duration, for the
purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner
as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
thereof. For ownership, after all, "is nothing without the inherent
rights of possession, control and enjoyment. Where the owner is
deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property or of its
value by its being diverted to public use, there is taking within the
Constitutional sense. Under these norms, there was undoubtedly
a taking of the Ansaldos' property when the Government obtained
possession thereof and converted it into a part of a thoroughfare
for public use.
It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat, that the just
compensation for the property is to be established. As stated in
Republic v. Philippine National Bank;
When plaintiff takes possession before the institution of the
condemnation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the
time of the taking of said possession, not of filing of the complaint
and the latter should be the basis for the determination of the
value, when the taking of the property involved coincides with or
is subsequent to, the commencement of the proceedings. Indeed,
otherwise, the provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that
compensation be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint' would never be operative. As intimated in Republic v.
Lara (supra), said provision contemplates normal circumstances,
under which the complaint coincides or even precedes the taking
of the property by the plaintiff.
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Rpublic v. Larae, is that;
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of the
condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may be enchanced
by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff
upon the property may have depreciated its value thereby; or,
there may have been a natural increase in the value of the
property from the time the complaint is filed, due to general
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
41
economic conditions. The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses; it is not intended
that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or injury. And
what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it
is taken. This is the only way that compensation to be paid can be
truly just i.e.,"just; not only to the individual whose property is
taken but, to the public, which is to pay for it.
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be
ascertained as of the year 1947, when it was actually taken, and
not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the
way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the real measure
of their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall
earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected,
conformably with other principles laid down by case law. The
petition is denied and the challenged decision of the Commission
on Audit is affirmed, and the Department of Public Works and
Highways is directed to forthwith institute the appropriate
expropriation action over the land in question so that the just
compensation due its owners may be determined in accordance
with the Rules of Court, with interest at the legal rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the time of taking until full payment
is made.
G.R. No. 170846 February 6, 2007
NAPOCOR, vs. TIANGCO
FACTS:
Respondents are owners of a parcel of land with an area of
152,187 square meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the respondents
aforementioned property, across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San
Jose Transmission Line Project will traverse.
NPCs Segregation Plan# for the purpose shows that the desired
right-of-way will cut through the respondents land. Within the
portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-bearing tress, such
as mango, avocado, jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones
and coconut trees.
After repeated unsuccessful negotiations, NPC filed an
expropriation complaint against the land of the respondent in the
RTC of Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of possession in
favor of NPC after paying the deposit requirement.
The trial court rendered its decision on the value of the property
using the 1984 tax declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in the
decision of the supreme court)
The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it was denied by
RTC. So They filed an appeal and the CA gave merit to the
contention of the respondents and made its revised valuation
using the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the value of the
property). The case went up to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the property should be valued using the 1984
or the 1993 tax declarations.
2. Whether or not Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as amended by
P.D. 938 will apply.
HELD
1. In eminent domain cases, the time of taking is the filing of
the complaint, if there was no actual taking prior thereto.
Hence, in this case, the value of the property at the time of
the filing of the complaint on November 20, 1990 should be
considered in determining the just compensation due the
respondents. Normally, the time of taking coincides with the
filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in the case of
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al.The
expropriation proceedings in this case having been initiated
by NPC on November 20, 1990, property values on such
month and year should lay the basis for the proper
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
determination of just compensation.
2. It should not apply in the case at bar, the acquisition of such
easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the
property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its
owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is
entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be
neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the
land taken.
G.R. No. 142971 May 07, 2002
CITY OF CEBU VS SPOUSES DEDAMO
FACTS:
On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed in Civil Case
No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo. For the
construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief
road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum
Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in
Cebu City. The lots are the most suitable site for the purpose
Deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of
P51,156 representing 15% of the fair market value of the property
to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession of the
property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that their
purpose was not for public purpose but for the benefit of a private
single entity, Cebu Holdings. Also the respondents alleged that
they dont have any other land in Cebu City.
On 23 August 1994, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The
motion was granted by the trial court on 21 September 1994.
14 December 1994, the parties executed and submitted to the
trial court an Agreement4 wherein they declared that they have
partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they agreed
on some certain stipulations. One of the stipulations was:
1. xxx 2.xxx 3.xxx 4.xxx 5.xxx 6.xxx
7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement
shall be followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just
compensation for the property of the SECOND PARTY after the
Commissioners appointed by this Honorable Court to determine
the same shall have rendered their report and approved by the
court.
The RTC rendered its decision on the value of the property
according to the assessed value of the commissioners. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the
assessment of the property was no accurate. The court adjusted
its decision on the value based on the new assessed value.
Petitioner elevated the case to CA. But the petitioner failed to
convince the CA and the latter affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Still unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition for review in
the case at bar.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not just compensation should be determined as of the
date the filing of the complaint.
2. Whether or not the basis of the just compensation is the value on
the actual date the filing of the complaint considering the
agreement entered into by the parties.
HELD:
1. It asserts that it should be which in this case should be 17
September 1993 and not at the time the property was actually
taken in 1994, pursuant to the decision in "National Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."
2. The petitioner has misread our ruling in The National Power Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in that case
that just compensation should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint. We explicitly stated therein that although the general
rule in determining just compensation in eminent domain is the
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)
Marianne Cabacungan
42
value of the property as of the date of the filing of the complaint,
the rule "admits of an exception: where this Court fixed the value
of the property as of the date it was taken and not at the date of
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely
and voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the
report of the commission and approved by the trial court. The
agreement is a contract between the parties. It has the force of
law between them and should be complied with in good faith.
Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code
Furthermore, petitioner did not interpose a serious objection.11 It
is therefore too late for petitioner to question the valuation now
without violating the principle of equitable estoppel. Records show
that petitioner consented to conform with the valuation
recommended by the commissioners. It cannot detract from its
agreement now and assail correctness of the commissioners'
assessment.
JUST COMPENSATION: MANNER OF PAYMENT
175 SCRA 343, 1989
ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. DAR
*no case digest submitted*
249 SCRA 149, 1995
DAR vs. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4 September 1992 the
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally
cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred
in the names of farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the
request of the DAR together with a certification of the Landbank
that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been
earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands
covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in
lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of
listed beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D") without notice to
petitioner Yap and without complying with the requirement of
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash
and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by any of the
respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of
Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at
Laur, NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by
TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in
November and December 1990, without notice to the petitioners,
the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed Actual
tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at least 25%
of the net harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional
Director issued an order directing the Landbank to pay the
landowner directly or through the establishment of a trust fund in
the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992, the
Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano
F. Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the
landowners after they signed the Actual Tiller's Deed of
Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except
that respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR,
not Landbank which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed
of Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that respondent
Landbank, although armed with the ATDU, did not collect any
amount as rental from the substituting beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges with respect to its properties
located in San Francisco, Quezon that the properties of
AMADCOR in San Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares
and another parcel covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of
163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative proceeding to
determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No.
34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without
notice to the landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24
November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing the compensation for the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the Landbank
to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of
P2,768,326.34 fixed in the decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account established on 19
December 1991 (ANNEX "G"). With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the
property of AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No.
T-2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of
1,629.4578 hectares'; that emancipation patents were issued
covering an area of 701.8999 hectares which were registered on
15 February 1988 but no action was taken thereafter by the DAR
to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21 April 1993, a trust
account in the name of AMADCOR was established in the amount
of P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition having been
previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except
that respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to
participate in the DARAB proceedings (land valuation case)
despite due notice to it.
ISSUE: Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring
as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit
in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private respondents are
entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of
the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases
it has filed for just compensation.
HELD:
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the
word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred
merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the
opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for
the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit
through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its
power to promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the
declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides
as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment
or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon
the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. . . . (emphasis supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were
the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes
of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least,
qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be
fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded
construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
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absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or
set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a
grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a
legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the
function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the
law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus
confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary
to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the rule that
administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions
of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed,
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein,
petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54
because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the
clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not
commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for
being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in
trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases
involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert
the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the
deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 21 of
the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner
to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to
the final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and
the LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to
amount deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in
case of rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is
only provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the
property pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention
petitioners cite the following pronouncements in the case of
"Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform". 22
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is
divested of his property even before actual payment to him in full
of just compensation, in contravention of a well-accepted principle
of eminent domain.
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession
and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.
No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due
process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid
for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent
court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that: despite
the "revolutionary" character of the expropriation envisioned
under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the case of
Association of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of
the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in
money" even as the Supreme Court admits in the same case
"that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation
is money and no other" the Supreme Court in said case did not
abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to the property
expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only
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upon full payment of the just compensation." 23 (Emphasis
supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in
the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary nature
of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby
allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did
not, however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full
payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination
of just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To
withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts
already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their
properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and
notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the
possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise
of eminent domain. The irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough for them. But
petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the more by withholding that which
rightfully belongs to private respondents in exchange for the
taking, under an authority (the "Association" case) that is,
however, misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on private
respondents, which the Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is
the same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of
his property for which he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that: within
the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for
the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a
decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary
to cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to
remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way for
the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving
its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts'
dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of
totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be
attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that in the
pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under
our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.
JUST COMPENSATION: TRIAL WITH COMMISSIONERS
206 SCRA 196, 1992
MERALCO vs. PINEDA
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of
Philippines. Respondent Honorable Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is
impleaded in his official capacity as the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Branch
XXI, Pasig, Metro Manila. While private respondents Teofilo
Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman, Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista
are owners in fee simple of the expropriated property situated at
Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
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On October 29, 1974, a complaint for eminent domain was filed
by petitioner MERALCO against forty-two (42) defendants with
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Rizal,
Branch XXII, Pasig, Metro Manila.
The complaint alleges that for the purpose of constructing a 230
KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to Tower No. 220 at
Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs portions of the land of the private
respondents consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321 square
meters. Despite petitioner's offers to pay compensation and
attempts to negotiate with the respondents', the parties failed to
reach an agreement.
Private respondents question in their motion to dismiss dated
December 27, 1974 the petitioner's legal existence and the area
sought to be expropriated as too excessive.
On January 7, 1975, respondents Gil de Guzman and Teresa
Bautista filed a motion for contempt of court alleging, among other
things that petitioner's corporate existence had expired in 1969
and therefore it no longer exists under Philippine Laws.
But despite the opposition of the private respondents, the court
issued an Order dated January 13, 1975 authorizing the petitioner
to take or enter upon the possession of the property sought to be
expropriated.
On July 13, 1976, private respondents filed a motion for
withdrawal of deposit claiming that they are entitled to be paid at
forty pesos (P40.00) per square meter or an approximate sum of
P272,000.00 and prayed that they be allowed to withdraw the
sum of P71,771.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the
Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch. However, respondents
motion was denied in an order dated September 3, 1976.
In the intervening period, Branch XXII became vacant when the
presiding Judge Nelly Valdellon-Solis retired, so respondent
Judge Pineda acted on the motions filed with Branch XXII.
Pursuant to a government policy, the petitioners on October 30,
1979 sold to the National Power Corporation (Napocor) the power
plants and transmission lines, including the transmission lines
traversing private respondents' property.
On February 11, 1980, respondent court issued an Order
appointing the members of the Board of Commissioners to make
an appraisal of the properties.
On June 5, 1980, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that it has lost all its interests over the transmission
lines and properties under expropriation because of their sale to
the Napocor. In view of this motion, the work of the
Commissioners was suspended.
On June 9, 1981, private respondents filed another motion for
payment. But despite the opposition of the petitioner, the
respondent court issued the first of the questioned Orders dated
December 4, 1981 granting the motion for payment of private
respondents, to wit:
As prayed for by defendants Teofilo Arayon, Lucito Santiago,
Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, thru counsel Gil de Guzman,
in their Motion for Payment, for reasons therein stated, this Court
hereby orders the plaintiff to pay the movants the amount of
P20,400.00 for the expropriated area of 6,800 square meters, at
P3.00 per square meter without prejudice to the just
compensation that may be proved in the final adjudication of this
case.
The aforesaid sum of P20,400.00 having been deposited by
plaintiff in the Philippine National Bank (Pasig Branch) under
Savings Account No. 9204, let the Deputy Sheriff of this Branch
Mr. Sofronio Villarin withdraw said amount in the names of Teofilo
Arayon, Lucito Santiago, Teresa Bautista and Gil de Guzman, the
said amount to be delivered to the defendant's counsel Atty. Gil
de Guzman who shall sign for the receipt thereof.
On December 15, 1981, private respondents filed an Omnibus
Motion praying that they be allowed to withdraw an additional sum
of P90,125.50 from petitioner's deposit-account with the
Philippine National Bank.
By order dated December 21, 1981, the respondent court granted
the Omnibus Motion hereunder quoted as follows:
Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated December 15, 1981 filed by
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Atty. Gil de Guzman, counsel for Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito
Santiago, Teresita Bautista and for himself, and it appearing that
there is deposited in the bank in trust for them the amount of
P90,125.50 to guarantee just compensation of P272,000.00,
thereby leaving a balance of P161,475.00 still payable to them,
the same is hereby GRANTED.
Mr. Nazario Nuevo and Marianita Burog, respectively the
Manager and Cashier, Philippine National Bank, Pasig Branch,
Pasig, Metro Manila are hereby ordered to allow Sheriff Sofronio
Villarin to withdraw and collect from the bank the amount of
P90,125.50 under Savings Account No. 9204 and to deliver the
same to Atty. Gil de Guzman upon proper receipt, pending final
determination of just compensation.
Private respondents filed another motion dated January 8, 1982
praying that petitioner be ordered to pay the sum of P169, 200.00.
On January 12, 1982 petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Orders dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981
and to declare private respondents in contempt of court for forging
or causing to be forged the receiving stamp of petitioner's counsel
and falsifying or causing to be falsified the signature of its
receiving clerk in their Omnibus Motion.
In response to private respondents' motion for payment dated
January 8, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition alleging that private
respondents are not entitled to payment of just compensation at
this stage of the proceeding because there is still no appraisal
and valuation of the property.
On February 9, 1982 the respondent court denied the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and motion for contempt, the
dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, this Court hereby adjudges in
favor of defendants Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Lucito Santiago, Teresita
Bautista and Atty. Gil de Guzman the fair market value of their
property taken by MERALCO at P40.00 per square meter for a
total of P369,720.00, this amount to bear legal interest from
February 24, 1975 until fully paid plus consequential damages in
terms of attorney's fees in the sum of P10,000.00, all these sums
to be paid by MERALCO to said defendants with costs of suit,
minus the amount of P102,800.00 already withdrawn by
defendants.
For being moot and academic, the motions for contempt are
DENIED; for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration of the
orders of December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 is also
DENIED.
Furthermore, the respondent court stressed in said order that "at
this stage, the Court starts to appoint commissioners to determine
just compensation or dispenses with them and adopts the
testimony of a credible real estate broker, or the judge himself
would exercise his right to formulate an opinion of his own as to
the value of the land in question. Nevertheless, if he formulates
such an opinion, he must base it upon competent evidence."
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court can dispense with the
assistance of a Board of Commissioners in an expropriation
proceeding and determine for itself the just compensation.
HELD:
The applicable laws in the case at bar are Sections 5 and 8 of
Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The said sections
particularly deal with the ascertainment of compensation and the
court's action upon commissioners' report, to wit:
Sec. 5. Upon the entry of the order of condemnation, the court
shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order
of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the
court.
Sec. 8. Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred
to in the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such
period but after all the interested parties have filed their objections
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to the report or their statement of agreement therewith, the court
may, after hearing, accept the report and render judgment in
accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the
same to the commissioners for further report of facts; or it may set
aside the report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept
the report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order
or render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of condemnation,
and to the defendant just compensation for the property so taken.
We already emphasized in the case of Municipality of Bian v.
Hon. Jose Mar Garcia (G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180
SCRA 576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain, to wit:
There are two (2) stages in every action of expropriation. The first
is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff
to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with
an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". An order
of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course,
since it finally disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to
be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as the Rules
expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial Court, "no
objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the Court of "the just compensation for
the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with
the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The
order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence
before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to
be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact
or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek
reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
Respondent judge, in the case at bar, arrived at the valuation of
P40.00 per square meter on a property declared for real estate
tax purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a "Joint Venture
Agreement on Subdivision and Housing Projects" executed by
A.B.A Homes and private respondents on June 1, 1972. This
agreement was merely attached to the motion to withdraw from
petitioner's deposit. Respondent judge arrived at the amount of
just compensation on its own, without the proper reception of
evidence before the Board of Commissioners. Private
respondents as landowners have not proved by competent
evidence the value of their respective properties at a proper
hearing. Likewise, petitioner has not been given the opportunity to
rebut any evidence that would have been presented by private
respondents. In an expropriation case such as this one where the
principal issue is the determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to
present evidence on the issue of just compensation. Contrary to
the submission of private respondents, the appointment of at least
three (3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be taken is a mandatory
requirement in expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may
substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so
for valid reasons, i.e., where the Commissioners have applied
illegal principles to the evidence submitted to them or where they
have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where
the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive
(Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286). Thus, trial
with the aid of the commissioners is a substantial right that may
not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all.
Moreover, in such instances, where the report of the
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commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its
own estimate of value from competent evidence that may be
gathered from the record. The aforesaid joint venture agreement
relied upon by the respondent judge, in the absence of any other
proof of valuation of said properties, is incompetent to determine
just compensation.
Prior to the determination of just compensation, the property
owners may rightfully demand to withdraw from the deposit made
by the condemnor in eminent domain proceedings. Upon an
award of a smaller amount by the court, the property owners are
subject to a judgment for the excess or upon the award of a larger
sum, they are entitled to a judgment for the amount awarded by
the court. Thus, when the respondent court granted in the Orders
dated December 4, 1981 and December 21, 1981 the motions of
private respondents for withdrawal of certain sums from the
deposit of petitioner, without prejudice to the just compensation
that may be proved in the final adjudication of the case, it
committed no error.
Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale dated October 30,
1979, in favor of Napocor show that the latter agreed to purchase
the parcels of land already acquired by Meralco, the rights,
interests and easements over those parcels of land which are the
subject of the expropriation proceedings under Civil Case No.
20269, (Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXII), as well as
those parcels of land occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of
easements of right-of-way (see Rollo, pp. 341-342). Thus,
Meralco had already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and
interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in favor of Napocor. In
addition, the same contract reveals that the Napocor was
previously advised and actually has knowledge of the pending
litigation and proceedings against Meralco (see Rollo, pp. 342-
343). Hence, We find the contention of the petitioner tenable. It is
therefore proper for the lower court to either implead the Napocor
in substitution of the petitioner or at the very least implead the
former as party plaintiff.
All premises considered, this Court is convinced that the
respondent judge's act of determining and ordering the payment
of just compensation without the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners is a flagrant violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to due process and is a gross violation of the mandated rule
established by the Revised Rules of Court.
GR No. 129998, December 29, 1998
NPC vs. HENSON
FACTS:
On March 21, 1990, the National Power Corporation (NPC)
originally instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial
District, Branch 46, San Fernando, Pampanga, a complaint for
eminent domain, later amended on October 11, 1990, for the
taking for public use of five (5) parcels of land, owned or claimed
by respondents, with a total aggregate area of 58,311 square
meters, for the expansion of the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
Respondents are the registered owners/claimants of the five (5)
parcels of land sought to be expropriated, situated in San Jose
Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga, more particularly described as
follows:
Parcels of rice land, being Lot 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the subdivision
plan Psd-03-017121 (OLT) and being a portion of Lot 212 of
Mexico Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Jose Matulid,
Municipality of Mexico, province of Pampanga, Island of Luzon.
Bounded on the North by Barangay Road Calle San Jose; on the
East by Lot 6, Psd-03-017121 (OLT) owned by the National
Power Corporation; on the South by Lot 101, Psd-03-017121
(OLT) being an irrigation ditch; on the West by Lot 100, Psd-03-
0017121 (OLT) being an irrigation ditch and Barrio road,
containing an aggregate area of FIFTY EIGHT THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED ELEVEN (58,311) square meters, which
parcels of land are broken down as follows with claimants:
1. Lot 1-A=43,532 sq. m.- Henson Family
2. Lot 2-A=6,823 sq. m.- Alfredo Tanchiatco, encumbered with
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Land Bank of the Phil. (LBP)
3. Lot 3-A=3,057 sq. m.-Bienvenido David, encumbered with
LBP
4. Lot 4-A=1,438 sq. m.-Maria Bondoc Capili, encumbered with
LBP
5. Lot 5-A=3,461 sq. m.-Miguel Manoloto and Henson Family
Total A=58,311 sq. m.
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 557 in the name
of Henson, et al.; Transfer Certificate of Title No.
7131/Emancipation Patent No. A-277216 in the name of Alfredo
Tanchiatco; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7111/Emancipation
Patent No. A-278086 in the name of Bienvenido David; Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 7108/Emancipation Patent No. A-278089 in
the name of Maria B. Capili; Certificate of Land Transfer No. 4550
in the name of Miguel C. Manaloto, and Subdivision Plan Psd-03-
017121 (OLT), which is a subdivision of Lot 212, Mexico Cadastre
as surveyed for Josefina Katigbak, et al. Said five (5) parcels of
land are agricultural/riceland covered by Operation Land Transfer
(OLT) of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Petitioner needed the entire area of the five (5) parcels of land,
comprising an aggregate area of 58,311 square meters, for the
expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.
On March 28, 1990, petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the
provisional value of the subject parcels of land.3
On April 20, 1990, respondents filed a motion to dismiss.4 They
did not challenge petitioners right to condemn their property, but
declared that the fair market value of their property was from
P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter.
On July 10, 1990, the trial court denied respondents motion to
dismiss. The court did not declare that petitioner had a lawful right
to take the property sought to be expropriated. However, the court
fixed the provisional value of the land at P100.00 per square
meter, for a total area of 63,220 square meters of respondents
property, to be deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount on August 29, 1990.
On September 5, 1990, the trial court issued a writ of possession
in favor of petitioner, and, on September 11, 1990, the courts
deputy sheriff placed petitioner in possession of the subject land.
On November 22, 1990, and December 20, 1990, the trial court
granted the motions of respondents to withdraw the deposit made
by petitioner of the provisional value of their property amounting
to P5,831,100.00, with a balance of P690,900.00, remaining with
the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.
On April 5, 1991, the trial court issued an order appointing three
(3) commissioners to aid the court in the reception of evidence to
determine just compensation for the taking of the subject
property. After receiving the evidence and conducting an ocular
inspection, the commissioners submitted to the court their
individual reports.
Commisioner Mariano C. Tiglao, in his report dated September
10, 1992, recommended that the fair market value of the entire
63,220 square meters property be fixed at P350.00 per square
meter. Commissioner Arnold P. Atienza, in his report dated
February 24, 1993, recommended that the fair market value be
fixed at P375.00 per square meter. Commissioner Victorino
Orocio, in his report dated April 28, 1993, recommended that the
fair market value be fixed at P170.00 per square meter.
However, the trial court did not conduct a hearing on any of the
reports.
On May 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment fixing the
amount of just compensation to be paid by petitioner for the taking
of the entire area of 63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square
meter, with legal interest thereon computed from September 11,
1990, when petitioner was placed in possession of the land, plus
attorneys fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the proceedings.
In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On July 23, 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, except that the award of
P20,000.00, as attorneys fees was deleted.
ISSUE: The issue presented boils down to what is the just
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compensation for the taking of respondents property for the expansion
of the NPCs Mexico Sub-station, situated in San Jose Matulid, Mexico,
Pampanga.
HELD:
The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably idle,
undeveloped, raw agricultural land, bereft of any improvement.
Except for the Henson family, all the other respondents were
admittedly farmer beneficiaries under operation land transfer of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. However, the land has been
re-classified as residential. The nature and character of the land
at the time of its taking is the principal criterion to determine just
compensation to the landowner.
In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals fixed the
value of the land at P400.00 per square meter, which was the
selling price of lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision, the
Santo Domingo Village Subdivision. The land in question,
however, was an undeveloped, idle land, principally agricultural in
character, though re-classified as residential. Unfortunately, the
trial court, after creating a board of commissioners to help it
determine the market value of the land did not conduct a hearing
on the report of the commissioners. The trial court fixed the fair
market value of subject land in an amount equal to the value of
lots in the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This finds no
support in the evidence. The valuation was even higher than the
recommendation of anyone of the commissioners.
On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza recommended a fair
market value at P375.00 per square meter. This appears to be the
closest valuation to the market value of lots in the adjoining fully
developed subdivision. Considering that the subject parcels of
land are undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per square
meter would appear to the Court as the just compensation for the
taking of such raw land.
Consequently, we agree with Commissioner Atienzas report that
the fair market value of subject parcels of land be fixed at
P375.00 per square meter.
We also agree with petitioner that the area of the communal
irrigation canal consisting of 4,809 square meters must be
excluded from the land to be expropriated. To begin with, it is
excluded in the amended complaint. Hence, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred in including the same in the area to be
taken.
The trial court erroneously ordered double payment for 3,611
square meters of lot 5 (portion) in the dispositive part of its
decision, and, hence, this must be deleted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly required
petitioner to pay legal interest on the compensation awarded from
September 11, 1990, the date petitioner was placed in possession
of the subject land, less the amount respondents had withdrawn
from the deposit that petitioner made with the Provincial
Treasurers Office.
We, however, rule that petitioner is under its charter exempt from
payment of costs of the proceedings.
G.R. No. 156093. February 2, 2007
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. DELA CRUZ
FACTS:
NAPOCOR a government-owned and controlled corporation filed a
complaint for eminent domain and expropriation of an easement of
right of way against Spouses Norberto and Josefina Dela Cruz who are
registered owners of the parcels of land to be expropriated by
NAPOCOR. After respondents filed their respective answers to
petitioners Complaint, petitioner deposited PhP 5,788.50 to cover the
provisional value of the land, petitioner then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which the trial court
granted. The pre-trial was terminated in so far as respondent Ferrer
was concerned, considering that the sole issue was the amount of just
compensation. Based on the analysis of data gathered and making the
proper adjustments with respect to location, area, shape, accessibility,
and the highest and best use of the subject properties, it is the opinion
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of herein commissioners that the fair market value of the subject real
properties is P10,000.00 per square meter, as of this date, October 05,
1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
abovementioned Order, but said motion was denied in the trial courts.
Significantly, petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA November 18, 2002 Decision, but it directly filed a petition for
review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner was denied due process when it was not
allowed to present evidence on the reasonable value of the
expropriated property before the Board of Commissioners.
2. Whether or not the valuation of just compensation herein was not
based from the evidence on record and other authentic
documents.
HELD:
It is beyond question that petitions for review may only raise questions
of law which must be distinctly set forth. Court is mandated to only
consider purely legal questions in this petition, unless called for by
extraordinary circumstances. petitioner raises the issue of denial of
due process because it was allegedly deprived of the opportunity to
present its evidence on the just compensation of properties it wanted
to expropriate, and the sufficiency of the legal basis or bases for the
trial courts Order on the matter of just compensation. because this
case involves the expenditure of public funds for a clear public
purpose, this Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did not file a
Motion for Reconsideration and brush aside this technicality in favor of
resolving this case. Petitioner was deprived of due process when it
was not given the opportunity to present evidence before the
commissioners. It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to afford
the parties the opportunity to introduce evidence in their favor and
petitioner was not notified of the completion or filing of the
commissioners report, and that petitioner was also not given any
opportunity to file its objections to the said report. the fact that no trial
or hearing was conducted to afford the parties the opportunity to
present their own evidence should have impelled the trial court to
disregard the commissioners findings. The legal basis for the
determination of just compensation was insufficient. it is not disputed
that the commissioners recommended that the just compensation be
pegged at PhP 10,000.00 per square meter. For compensation, to be
just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker. it is clear
that in this case, the sole basis for the determination of just
compensation was the commissioners ocular inspection of the
properties in question, as gleaned from the commissioners report.
Clearly, the legal basis for the determination of just compensation in
this case is insufficient as earlier enunciated. This being so, the trial
courts ruling in this respect should be set aside. Petition is granted.
G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006
LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain for the taking of some
portions of their properties. Attached to the complaint is was
Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal Committee of Mandaluyong,
which was created to appraise the properties that would be affected by
the construction of the project in question. Commissioners submitted
their report dated January 8, 1998, and recommended the fair market
value of properties of Leca Realty Corporation and Leeleng Realty Inc.:
P50,000 per sq.m., the Commissioners took into consideration the
following factors: property location, identification[,] neighborhood data,
community facilities and utilities, highest and best use, valuation and
reasonable indication of land values within the vicinity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Republic is bound and put in estoppel by the
gross negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an error of law in affirming
the amount fixed by the trial court based on the report of the
board of commissioners.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
HELD:
There was no reason why the Republic could not have moved to
reconsider the assailed CA Decision or appealed it within the
reglementary period. These procedural devices (reconsideration and
appeal) were not only available; they would have also constituted plain,
speedy and adequate remedies for questioning the alleged errors in
the CA Decision. Petitions must be filed within 60 days. In the present
case, the Petition was filed after over a year. The rule on non-estoppel
of the government is not designed to perpetrate an injustice. The
request was predicated on the conclusion that the "compensation costs
as recommended by the commissioners and fixed by the court in the
above-mentioned Decision are reasonable and acceptable"; and that
the "move will hasten the legal process, thereby shorten the time of the
proceedings and stop the running of interest. The more critical issue is
the determination of the amount of just compensation for the
expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605. The Republic avers that
the values arrived at in the Commissioners' Report were not supported
by sufficient evidence. Leca, alleges that the fair market value ascribed
to its property was not sufficient. As both the Republic and Leca
correctly pointed out, however, the Commissioners' Report relied
heavily on newspaper advertisements of offers of sale of properties in
the vicinity. It must be noted, though, that the interest of Petitioner
Leca is distinct and separate from and will in no way affect the settled
rights and interests of the other parties that did not appeal the
judgment of the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Petition of Leca Realty
Corporation is REMANDED to the trial court for the proper
determination of the amount of just compensation.
JUST COMPENSATION: LEGAL INTEREST FOR
EXPROPRIATION CASES
G.R. No. 60225-26. May 8, 1992
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. ANGAS
FACTS:
National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled
corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes
the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the
country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private
respondents with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Lanao del Sur. The complaint which sought to expropriate certain
specified lots situated at Limogao, Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for
the purpose of the development of hydro-electric power and production
of electricity as well as the erection of such subsidiary works and
constructions as may be necessarily connected therewith. a
consolidated decision was rendered by the lower court, declaring and
confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints
have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the
petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain
sums of money as just compensation. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the lower court's alleging that the main decision had
already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing
the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned,
with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no
longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential
Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of
the Civil Code which applies.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest
on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate
or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at
12% per annum.
HELD:
the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public
purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest,
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and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity
for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of
just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the
form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof.
Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of
the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of
damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code shall apply. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. It was
declared that the computation of legal interest at 6% per annum is the
correct and valid legal interest allowed in payments of just
compensation for lands expropriated for public use to herein private
respondents by the Government through the National Power
Corporation.
G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004
WYCOCO V. JUDGE CASPILLO
FACTS:
Felciano Wycoco owned 94.1690 hectares unirrigated and
untenanted rice land- TCT No. NT.206422 and voluntarily offered
to sell the land to Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in line
with the ( CARP) for P14.9M
A notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares for P1, 342,
667.46 by the DAR sent to him. The amount raised to
P2,594,045.39 and later modified to P2,280,159.82 excluded the
idle areas.
He refused and prompted the DAR to indorse the case to DARAB,
fixing the just compensation.
DARAB requested the LBP to open a trust account for Wycoco
and deposited the compensation offered by the DAR and the
properties were distributed to the beneficiaries.
On April 30, 93 he filed a manifestation in VOS case no. 232 NE
93.
While Cabanatuan Court acting as the Special Agrarian Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the RTC of Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the
case.
2. Whether or not there was a just compensation offered to the
plaintiff.
HELD:
Point out that theres no need for Wycoco to present an evidence
in support of the land valuation in as much as it is in public
knowledge that the prevailing market value of agricultural lands in
Nueva Ecija is from P135,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare. So
the curt fixed the compensation of:
P142,500.00- per hectare
94.1690- hectares (land size)
P13,428,082- total compensation + actual damages
P29,663,235.00 for unrealized profits and P8,475,210.00
legal interest
This must be paid by DAR .
DAR and LBP filed a separate petition before the CA and
dismissed on May 29,97=Final execution June6,07 and Feb. 9,99
respectively. The dismissal prompted Wycoco to file a petition for
mandamus before SC praying the execution of Cabanatuan
courts decision and compelled Judge Caspillon to inhibit himself
from the hearing of the case.
CA modified the decision, deducted the compensation due to
Wycoco the amount corresponding to 3.372 hectares for it was
found to have been previously sold to Republic.
Sec 50and 57 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform law
of 1988)
DAR as an administrative agency cannot be granted jurisdiction
over the cases of eminent domain and over criminal cases. The
valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial
function which is vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and
cannot lodge with administrative agencies.
Rule XIII Sec.II of New Rules of Procedures of DARAB
Sec.II just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
but shall be brought directly to the RTC designated as Special
Agrarian Court
So RTC or Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over the case at bar
because it is the designated as SAC.
RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidences so a
fair compensation shall be determined. There are factors to be
considered such as the cost of acquisition, size, shape, location
and tax declaration, for ignoring the said factors, remand of the
case for determination is necessary.
THIS CASE BE REMANDED TO RTC FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COPENSATION.
JUST COMPENSATION: WRIT OF POSSESSION
G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001
CITY OF MANILA V. OSCAR SERRANO
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 7833, enacted by the City Council of Manila
authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manilas First
District in Tondo: TCT Nos. 70869,105201, 105202, and 138273
of the Register of the Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold to
qualified occupants pursuant to Land Use Development Program
of the City.
Lot 1-C
One of the lots to be expropriated
Consists of 343.10 square meters / 7 = produced 49 square
meters for each person
Covered by TCT No. 138272 from TCT No. 70869
This lot belongs to Feliza De Guia, upon her death, said lot
was transferred to Alberto De Guia and then to Edgardo de
Guia heir of Alberto, after the formers death.
The said lot was again transferred to Lee Kuan Hui-TCT No.
217018 and subsequently sold to Demetria De Guia TCT No.
226048.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the property is proper in
relation to R.A. 7279.
HELD:
On Sept 26, 1997 the petitioner filed an amended complaint for
expropriation (RTC) to the supposed owners of the lots with TCT
Nos. 70869 (including 1-c), 105201,105202 and 138273, the
Serranos, heirs of late Demetria De Guia.
RTC issued an order to the petitioner to deposite P 1,825,241.00
equivalent to the assessed value of the lot and the issuance of a
writ of possession in their favor.
CA reversed RTCs decision and rather favored the respondents,
in the reason that the petitioner failed to do the other modes of
acquisition of property, that is to tried first in the city government
before it can resort to expropriation, under R.A.7279
SC reinstated the decision of RTC, because in this case it is very
early to determine if the petitioner has been granted the right to
expropriate the property, since what has been issued by the RTC
to them is just a writ of possession, which is not a right of an
ownership. Under R.A. 7279 there are requirements that the
petitioners need to complied with before expropriating a property.
To determine whether or not the petitioner complied it and the
expropriation of the property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279,
further proceeding must be made in RTC.
Thus the case was remanded back to RTC.
G. R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005
REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON
FACTS:
A dispute occurred after the contract between the government and
PIATCO has been nullified for its being contrary to law and public
policy. PIATCO and other investors who funded the facilities for NAIA 3
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49
cannot operate it and the government as well cannot took it over, for
doing so the government would enrich itself unjustly by the PIATCO
and other investors expense. The government wanted to expropriate
NAIA 3, but isnt it illogical that a government would expropriate the
property it already owned? So, the expropriation would only be limited
to the facilities and improvement that have been introduced to NAIA 3,
with its equivalent just compensation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether R.A. No.8974 or Rule 67 is applicable in property
expropriation in the case at bar.
2. Whether Judge Gingoyon can be compelled to inhibit himself in
the case
HELD:
Prior to this case a decision to Agan v PIATCO has been
rendered by the court, the 2004 Resolution: the government
should fully paid first the owner of the properties subject for
expropriation before it took the properties in its possession and
ownership. This decision is final and executor.
Rule 67 stated:
SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depository. - Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
real property involved if he deposits with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed
value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such
bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in
money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a
certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
R.A. No. 8974
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings.- Whenever it is
necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or
location for any national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the proper court
under the following guidelines:
a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the
defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1)
one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof; . . .
c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project
is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing
valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property its proffered value
taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5
hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court
shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to
take possession of the property and start the implementation of
the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing
agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of
funds from the proper official concerned. . . .
Clearly that, applying Rule 67 would be a direct rebuke to 2004
Resolution in Agan and the court cannot sanction deviation from
its own final and executor orders. It would violate 2004
Resolution. Thus, it would be R.A.No. 8974 the applicable law for
the expropriation- in which the government must pay first the just
compensation to the property owner before it can took and use it.
R.A. No. 8974 well complemented with 2004 Resolution.
Judge Gingoyon cannot be compelled to inhibit himself, for
incompetency may be ground for administrative sanction but not
for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to
sit on a case.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
JUST COMPENSATION: EXPROPRIATION OF UTILITIES,
LANDED ESTATES, AND MUNICIPAL PROPERTY
G.R. No. L-12032, August 31, 1959
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. THE NATIONAL WATERWORKS AND
SEWERAGE AUTHORITY
FACTS:
On April 25, 1956 a municipal corporation filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio for declaratory relief against
defendant, a public corporation created by Republic Act No. 1383,
which contends that said Act does not include within its preview
the Baguio Workshop System. In which the said Act is
unconstitutional because it has the effect of depriving plaintiff of
the ownership, control and operation of said waterworks system
without compensation and without due process of law, and that it
is oppressive, unreasonable and unjust to plaintiff and other cities,
municipalities and municipal districts similarly situated.
On May 22, 1956, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that Republic Act No. 1383 is a proper exercise of the
police power of the State, that assuming that said Act
contemplates an act of expropriation, it is still a constitutional
exercise of the power of eminent domain, that at any rate the
Baguio Waterworks System is not a private property but a "public
works of public service" over which the Legislature has control
and that the provision of the said Act being clear and
unambiguous, there is no necessity for construction.
On June 21, 1956, the Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as
well as on the answer and rejoinder filed by both parties, denied
the motion and ordered defendant to file its answer to the
complaint. On July 6, 1956, defendant filed its answer reiterating
and amplifying the ground already advanced in this motion to
dismiss, adding thereto that the action for the declaratory relief is
improper for the reason that the Baguio waterworks System has
already been transferred to defendant pursuant to Republic Act
No. 1383 or, if such has not been done, there has already been a
breach of said Act.
ISSUES:
1. Plaintiff's action for Declaratory relief is improper because there
has already been a breach by plaintiff of Republic Act No. 1383
2. Republic Act No. 1383 does not contemplates the exercise of the
power of eliminate domain but the exertion of the police power of
the State; and
3. Assuming arguendo that Republic Act No. 1383 involves the
exercise of the power of eminent domain the same does not
violate our Constitution.
HELD:
The decision maintain that the property held by a municipal
corporation units private capacity is not subject to the unrestricted
control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived
of such property against its will, except by the exercise of eminent
domain with payment of full compensation. (McQuillin Municipal
Corporation, 2nd Ed., Vol. I, pp. 670-681).
In its private capacity a municipal corporation is wholly different.
The people of a compact community usually require certain
conveniences which cannot be furnished without a franchise from
the State and which are either unnecessary in the rural districts,
such as a system of sewers, or parks and open spaces, or which
on account of the expenses it would be financially impossible to
supply except where the population is reasonably dense, such as
water or gas. But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized to
exercise the functions of a private corporation, it is clothed with
the capacities of a private corporation and may claim its rights
and immunities, even as against the sovereign, and is subject to
the liabilities of such a corporation, even as against third parties.
(19 R.C. L. p. 698)
The attempt of appellant in having waterworks considered as
public property subject to the control of Congress or one which
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50
can be regulated by the exercise of police power having failed,
that question that now arises is: Does Republic Act No. 1383
provide for the automatic expropriation of the waterworks in
question in the light of our Constitution? In other words, does said
law comply with the requirements of section 6, Article XIII, in
relation to section 1(2), Article III, of our Constitution?
Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides:
SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of National Welfare and
defense, establish and operate industries and means of
transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other
private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution provides:
(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
It is clear that the State may, in the interest of National welfare,
transfer to public ownership any private enterprise upon payment
of just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in mind
that no person can be deprived of his property except for public
use and upon payment of just compensation. There is an attempt
to observe this requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when in
providing for the transfer of appellee's waterworks system to a
national agency it was directed that the transfer be made upon
payment of an equivalent value of the property. Has this been
implemented? Has appellant actually transferred to appellee any
asset of the NAWASA that may be considered just compensation
for the property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to
show that such was done. Neither is there anything to this effect
in Office Memorandum No. 7 issued by the NAWASA in
implementation of the provision of the Republic Act No. 1383. The
law speaks of assets of the NAWASA by they are not specified.
While the Act empowers the NAWASA to contract indebtedness
and issue bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Finance when necessary for the transaction of its business (sec.
2, par. (L), sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action has been taken
to comply with appellant's commitment in so far as payment of
compensation of appellee is concerned. As to when such action
should be taken no one knows. And unless this aspect of the law
is clarified and appellee is given its due compensation, appellee
cannot be deprived of its property even if appellant desires to take
over its administration in line with the spirit of the law. We are
therefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as it
expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an
effective payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution.
In this respect, the decision of the trial court is correct.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE vs. CITY OF
ZAMBOANGA
FACTS:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then
Zamboanga Province. On 12 October 1936, Commonwealth Act
39 was approved converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also provided that
"buildings and properties which the province shall abandon upon
the transfer of the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the
Auditor General." The properties and buildings referred to
consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon,
located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by
Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province.
The lots are utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3 lots),
Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots), Curuan school (1 lot),
Trade school (1 lot), Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high
school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1 lot), san roque (1
lot), and another 23 vacant lots. In 1945, the capital of
Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16 June
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
1948, RA 286 created the municipality of Molave and making it defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same to plaintiff
the capital of Zamboanga Province. On 26 May 1949, the Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have
Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor General, pursuant to been fully paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute
CA 39, fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question through its proper officials the corresponding public instrument
left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of land
P1,294,244.00. However, on 14 July 1951, a Cabinet Resolution and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title
was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") upon payment by the latter of the
to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945, when the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing the counterclaim
provincial capital of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the
Dipolog. preliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962,
On 6 June 1952, RA 711 was approved dividing the province of pursuant to the order of the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs
Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. are assessed against the defendants.
As to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to It is SO ORDERED.
be divided between the two new ones, Section 6 of the law
provided that upon the approval of the Act, the funds, assets and
other properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga
shall be divided equitably between the Province of Zamboanga
del Norte and the Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General." On 11 January 1955, the Auditor General
apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of
Zamboanga, apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and
45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur. On 17 March 1959, the
Executive Secretary, by order of the President, issued a ruling
holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as owner
(should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in
Section 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable
by Zamboanga City. This effectively revoked the Cabinet
Resolution of 14 July 1951. The Secretary of Finance then
authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct an
amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for
the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March 1960,
then for the quarter ending 30 June 1960, and again for the first
quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all
aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the province of
Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220,05 due
it.
However, on 17 June 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending
Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all buildings, properties
and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and
located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free
of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga." On 12 July
1961, the Secretary of Finance ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to
Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum
of P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment
of Zamboanga del Norte. Zamboanga City admits that since the
enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the P57,373.46 has already
been returned to it.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for
depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and
just compensation
2. Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be ordered to continue
paying the balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of
25% of its internal revenue allotments to Zamboanga del Norte.

HELD:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Republic
Act No. 3039 unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff
Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties, consisting of 50
parcels of land and the improvements thereon under certificates
of title (Exhibits "A" to "A-49") in the name of the defunct province
of Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to
the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05 payment thereof to be
deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue allotment
equivalent to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall
have been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance to
direct defendant Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct
25% from the regular quarterly internal revenue allotment for

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Marianne Cabacungan

51
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- DUE PROCESS -
PURPOSE OF GUARANTY
110 US 516, 1884
HURTADO VS CALIFORNIA
*no case digest submitted*
MEANING OF LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY
431 SCRA 534
CHAVEZ VS. ROMULO
*no case digest submitted*
233 SCRA 163
LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
*no case digest submitted*
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
86 SCRA 275, 1978
VILLEGAS VS. HU CHONG TSAI PAO HO
*no case digest submitted*
39 Phil 660; No. 14078; March 7, 1919
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
FACTS:
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25
wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be
directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan
Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit
homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead
applications are previously recommended by the provincial
governor.
In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including
those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,
were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply
with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in
sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as
necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of
Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not
fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable
to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of
their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be
held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives
a person of his liberty?
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2. Thus, whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917 is constitutional?
HELD:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does
not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to
him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in
reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the
opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a
legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the
advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2)
the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was
to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes;
(4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the
necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines.
Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law
for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due
process of law.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained
of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
VOID FOR VAGUENESS/OVERBREADTH
292 SCRA 141 (1998)
BLAS OPLE VS RUBEN TORRES
FACTS:
On December 12, 1996 President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order 308 entitled Adoption of National and
Computerized Identification Reference System. The purposes of
the said order are: (a) it will provide the Filipino and foreign
residents with the convenience to transact businesses with basic
service and social security providers and other government
instrumentalities (b) it will reduce if not totally eradicate fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations because it will require a
computerized system to properly and efficiently identify person
seeking basic services on social security.
Petitioner Senator Blas Ople prays to invalidate A.O. 308 for two
vital constitutional grounds: (a) it is a usurpation of power of
Congress to legislate (b) it intrudes the citizenrys protected zone
of privacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Administrative Order 308 is unconstitutional for
being overbreadth?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that it is inarguable that the broadness,
vagueness and overbreadth of A.O. 308 will put the peoples right
to privacy in clear and present danger.
Administrative Order 308 does not state: (a) what specific
biological characteristics will be gathered (b) what particular
biometrics technology will be employed (c) whether data is limited
to use for identification purposes only (d) how data will be handled
(e)who shall control and access the data.
Thus A.O 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable
expectation of privacy because, as technology advances, the
level of reasonable expected privacy decreases.
G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman accuses President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada together with Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro Eleuterio Tan,
and Delia Rajsas of the crime of plunder defined and penalized
under R.A. No. 7080 as amended by Sec. 12 R.A. No. 7659.
During the term of President Estrada, he together with the
individuals mentioned above wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
amass, accumulate and acquire by himself, directly or indirectly
ill-gotten wealth amounting to four billion ninety seven million
eight hundred four thousand one hundred seventy three pesos
and seventeen centavos (4,097,804,173.17), thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Under RA 7080 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder as amended by RA 7659 Section 2, the crime of plunder
is defined as an act of any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts
described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (50,000,000) and shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua to death.
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse,
or malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any
other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or
project or by reason of the office or position of the public
office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich
himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Petitioner Estrada questions the validity of the law for it is void for
vagueness. He bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms and combination and series in
the key phrase a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts found in Section 1 par. d, and the word pattern in Section
4.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for it suffers
from the vice of vagueness?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that a statute or act may be said to be
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vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant
to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does
not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard
though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The
first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge
may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from
ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as
long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might
have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
GR No. 171390, May 3, 2006
DAVID VS. ARROYO
*no case digest submitted*
GR No. 126858, September 16, 2005
ONG VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Congressman Bonifacio Gallego executed a complaint against
petitioner Ong, a former Commissioner of the BIR claiming that
petitioner has amassed properties worth disproportionately more than
his lawful income. The Director of the Fact Finding Committee of the
office of the Ombudsman ordered the conduct of investigation on the
matter; of which petitioner was required to submit counter affidavit and
controverting evidence. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit submitting
his Statements of Assets and Liabilities, income tax return, bank
certificates showing that he obtained a loan from Allied Banking
Corporation, certificate from SGV and company and other documents
explaining the sources of funds with which he acquired the questioned
assets. Ombudsman finds and recommend for recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under Ra 1379, in relation to RAs 3019 and 6770 against Ong
and all other persons concerned.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON, the right to preliminary investigation is withheld by RA 1379
from a co-respondent Nelly Ong, who is not herself a public officer
or employee.
2. WON, petitioner is correct in his contention that the office of the
Ombudsman is disqualified to file a petition for forfeiture
considering of the duality of function, as investigator and
prosecutor of the case.
3. WON, petitioner is correct in the contention that RA1379 is
unconstitutional since it violates the presumption of innocence
and the right against self incrimination.
HELD:
1. No, even if RA 1379 appears to be directed only against the
public officer or employee who has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
proportion to his salary and his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, the reality thst the
application of the law is such that the conjugal share of Nelly Ong
stands to be subjective to the penalty of forfeiture grants her the
right, in line with the due process clause of the constitution, to a
preliminary investigation.
2. No, Supreme Court declared that the office of the Ombudsman
has the correlative powers to investigate and initiate the proper
action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth.
3. No, the court ruled that petitioner cannot invoked constitutional
assurance against self incrimination because such right is a
prohibition against the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications to the accused. In this case, petitioners
are not compelled to present themselves as witnesses in rebutting
the presumption established by law. They may present
documents evidencing the purported bank loans, money market
placements and other fund sources in their defense.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PUBLIC REQUIREMENT
146 SCRA 446, 1986
TANADA VS. TUVERA
*no case digest submitted*
263 SCRA 421, 1996
PITC VS. ANGELES
*no case digest submitted*
GR No. 147096, January 15, 2002
REPUBLIC VS. EXTELCOM
*no case digest submitted*
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - IMPARTIAL COURT OR
TRIBUNAL
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - OPPORTUNITY TO BE
HEARD
GR No. 170288, September 22, 2006
BUDIONGAN VS. DE LA CRUZ
*no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 114944. June 19, 2001
ROXAS VS VASQUEZ
FACTS:
A complaint was filed by the then DILG Secretary Rafael Alunan
III before the Ombudsman against certain officers of the
Philippine National Police including herein petitioners Police
General Manuel C. Roxas and Police Colonel Ahmed S. Nacpil
for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). This was after the Commission on
Audit discovered the irregularities in the bidding, awarding and
purchasing of sixty fire trucks.
After a review of the preliminary investigation conducted, an
Information was filed by the Ombudsman before the
Sandiganbayan which excluded herein petitioners and three
others among the accused.
However, upon motion, a reinvestigation was conducted by the
Office of the Special Prosecutor. Without any notice to or
participation of the petitioners, the Office of the Special
Prosecutor issued the first assailed Order, dismissing the charges
against Generals Flores and Tanchanco, and recommending that
the petitioners together with P/Lt. Col. Julian Kairan be likewise
indicted.
Petitioners Roxas and Nacpil, together with Kairan, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, however it was disapproved. Thus, the Office
of the Ombudsman filed an Amended Information with respondent
Sandiganbayan, impleading petitioners as additional accused.

141 SCRA 307, 1986 ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners indictment, on reinvestigation,
TANADA VS. PAEC was without notice nor participation of petitioners, hence, null and void
*no case digest submitted* for being violative of their constitutional right to due process.

HELD:
119 SCRA 353, 1982 Neither do the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners at
ANZALDO VS. CLAVE the reinvestigation render the questioned issuances of respondent
*no case digest submitted* Office of the Ombudsman null and void. This was firmly settled in
the recent case of Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, where
GR No. 159190, June 30, 2005 we held as follows --
TEJANO VS. OMBUDSMAN xxx. And even without such notice, we agree with the
*no case digest submitted* observations of the Sandiganbayan that under the Rules of
Procedures of the Office of the Ombudsman [Administrative Order
No. 07], particularly Sec. 7, in relation to Sec. 4, while
273 US 510, 1997 complainants in preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman
TUMEY VS. OHIO actively participated therein, their participation is no longer
*no case digest submitted* accorded to them as a matter of right in the stage of the
reinvestigation. In administrative proceedings, moreover,
262 SCRA 452, 1996 technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
PEOPLE VS. COURT OF APPEALS administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
*no case digest submitted* process in its strict judicial sense. (underscoring ours)
At any rate, petitioners cannot argue that they have been
deprived of due process. The rule is well established that due
268 SCRA 332, 1997 process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
TABUENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or
*no case digest submitted* an opportunity to move for a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. In the case at bar, the record clearly shows that
petitioners not only filed their respective Counter-Affidavits during
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY the preliminary investigation, they also filed separate Motions for
Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the
Ombudsman impleading them as accused in Criminal Case No.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - NOTICE & HEARING 18956.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674. January 22, 2004
MAROHOMBSAR VS JUDGE ADIONG
FACTS:
Herein complainant Bailinang P. Marohombsar was the defendant
in a civil case for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction
filed by Yasmira Pangandapun questioning the legality of
Marohombsars appointment as provincial social welfare officer V
of the DSWD-ARMM. Prior to Marohombsars appointment,
Pangandapun used to occupy said position as officer in charge.
Judge Adiong issued the temporary restraining order. During the
hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence, respondent
considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary
injunction the following day.
A complaint was thereafter filed against Judge Santos B. Adiong
of the RTC, Branch 8, Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, Marohombsar
for gross ignorance of the law, abuse of discretion and conduct
unbecoming of a judge in connection with his issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a preliminary restraining order in
the civil case involving herein complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complainant was denied due process
because the preliminary injunction was issued without hearing.
HELD:
In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of
prior notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been
relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction
need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a formal
or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process. The essence of due process is that a
party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present any evidence he may have in support of his defense. In
the present case, complainant was able to move for a
reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due
process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a
party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when he
has availed of the opportunity to present his position.
[180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989]
PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation, is engaged in providing for services involving
telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that
were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz
Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission.
The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%)
due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and
hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional because it violates
procedural due process for having been issued without prior notice and
hearing and that the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable
and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due
process.
HELD:
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no
doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to
petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of
fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction
of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of
petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the
benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects
of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate
reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
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contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to
impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not
far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position
to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and
detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant
to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We
are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's
ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would
adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the
public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it
still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably,
petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine
the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its questioned order.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing
order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the
statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well
as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power
is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in
nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule
of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any
other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the
applicable law.
It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no
authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is
immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as
in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of
respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
101 Phil 833 (1957)
SUNTAY VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
On or about June 21, 1954, Emilio Suntay took Alicia Nubla from
St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her
somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and
was then able to have carnal knowledge with her. Alicia Nubla is a
minor of 16 years. Alicias father, Dr. Antonio Nubla, filed a
verified complaint against accused in the Office of the City
Attorney of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed for lack of
merit.
On January 10, 1955, the petitioner applied for and was granted a
passport by the Department of Foreign Affairs. He left the
Philippines for San Francisco, where he enrolled in school.
On 31 January 1955 the offended girl subscribed and swore to a
complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City after preliminary
investigation had been conducted. On 9 February 1955 the
private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an
order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned,
particularly the National Bureau of Investigation and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of having the
accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law."
Hence, this petition to annul the order.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Courts order for the cancellation of the petitioners
passport is illegal.
2. WON the Secretary for Foreign Affairs can exercise his discretion
of cancelling the passport without hearing.
HELD:
The petitioner's contention cannot be sustained. The petitioner is
charged with seduction. And the order of the respondent Court
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
directing the Department of Foreign Affairs "to take proper steps
in order that the accused . . . may be brought back to the
Philippines, so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law,"
is not beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction. In issuing the order
in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a
miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he
issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be
enjoined from carrying it out.
Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for
the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but
doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a
charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal
prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of
his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held
to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and
cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an
officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of
a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing
maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the
cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate
the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the
exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed
whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such
hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with
the due process of law clause of the Constitution, then a writ of
preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the
said clause.
The petition is denied.
8 SCRA 244 (1963)
DE BISSHOP VS GALANG
FACTS:
Petitioner-appellee George de Bisschop, an American citizen,
was allowed to stay in this country for three years as the
prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which
he is president and general manager. He applied for extension of
stay with the Bureau of Immigration, in a letter dated 10 July
1959. In view, however, of confidential and damaging reports of
Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa to the effect that the
Bissmag Production, Inc., is more of a gambling front than the
enterprise for promotion of local and imported shows that it
purports to be, and that de Bisschop is suspect of having evaded
payment of his income tax.
The Commissioner of Immigration advised him that his application
for extension of stay as a prearranged employee has been denied
by the Board of Commissioners, and that he should depart within
5 days.
De Bisshop filed the present case for prohibition to desist from
arresting and detaining him.
ISSUE: WON the Commissioners of Immigration are required by law to
conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of
aliens.
HELD:
The administration of immigration laws is the primary and
exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the
government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on
the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act
No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases,
we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no
jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of
immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain
cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of
practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due
process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case,
the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to
depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and,
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therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of
appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave
before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice
to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be
compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled
rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in
administrative proceedings.
The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an
administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As
Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on Constitutional Law,
has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial
process; much of the process by means of which the Government
is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely
executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law,
as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise
since they rest upon different principles. . . . In certain
proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be
stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and
hearing are not essential to due process of law.
161 SCRA 232 (1988)
VAR ORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC. VS. ACHACOSO
FACTS:
The petitioners filed a complaint with the Workers' Assistance and
Adjudication Office, Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) against the private respondents Edgar T.
Bunyog, Vedasto Navarro, Eugenio Capalad, Raul Tumasis,
Antonio Tanioan, Celestino Cason, Danilo Manela and Roberto
Genesis, crew members of the MPV "Silver Reefer," for having
allegedly violated their Contracts of Employment with the
petitioners which supposedly resulted in damages arising from the
interdiction of the vessel by the International Transport Workers'
Federation (ITF) at Kiel Canal, Germany, in March 1986.
After joinder of the issues, the case was heard on March 4, 1987
where the parties agreed to submit their respective position
papers and thereafter the case would be submitted for decision.
Only the private respondents submitted a position paper.
Public respondent rendered judgment and dismissed the case for
some of the employees; other employees were entitled to
payments by the complainant. A copy of the decision was sent by
registered mail and delivered by the postman to the petitioners'
counsel at his address, through the receptionist. According to
Attorney Figura, he did not receive the envelope containing the
decision
Petitioners allegedly learned about the decision only when the writ
of execution was served. On November 23,1987, petitioners,
through new counsel, filed an 'urgent Motion to Recall Writ of
Execution' on the ground that the decision had not been received
by the petitioners, hence, it was not yet final and executory.
Hence, this petition to annul the judgment by public respondent
and the writ of execution be set aside.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was denied due process of law because
Administrator resolved the case without any formal hearing.
HELD:
Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were
denied due process because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.
The fact is that at the hearing of the case on March 4, 1987, it
was agreed by the parties that they would file their respective
memoranda and thereafter consider the case submitted for
decision. This procedure is authorized by law to expedite the
settlement of labor disputes. However, only the private
respondents submitted memoranda. The petitioners did not. On
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June 10, 1987, the respondents filed a motion to resolve. The
petitioners' counsel did not oppose either the "Motion to Resolve"
or the respondents "Motion for Execution of Decision" dated
October 19, 1987, both of which were furnished them through
counsel. If it were true, as they now contend, that they had been
denied due process in the form of a formal hearing, they should
have opposed both motions.
The petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS - ADMINISTRATIVE DUE
PROCESS
[GR 46496, 27 February 1940]
ANG TIBAY VS CIR
FACTS:
Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the CIR and to the motion for new trial of the
National Labor Union.
The Supreme Court found it not necessary to pass upon the
motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General, as it found no
substantial evidence to indicate that the exclusion of the 89
laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The
Court granted the motion for a new trial and the entire record of
this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it
reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant,
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth.
Principles behind the case:
1. The Court of Industrial Relations; Departure from rigid
concept of separation of powers
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (CA
103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the
integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to
be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court
of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its
jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the
Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of
its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and
extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting,
employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and
tenants or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between
them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
CA 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance for purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any
industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards
wageshares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of
tenancy or employment, between employers and employees
or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or
tenants or farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such
industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by
the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be death with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section A, ibid.) It shall, before
hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing,
endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle
the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4,
ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it
shall investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the
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industry concerned or to the industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determining the necessity
and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or
locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a
maximum canon or rental to be paid by the inquilinos or
tenants or lessees to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it
may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for
that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to
determine specific controversies between labor and capital
in industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a
mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a
departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of
governmental powers.
2. The CIR free from rigidity of certain procedure
requirements, but not free to ignore or disregard
fundamental and essential requirements of due process
involving proceedings of administrative character. The
fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due Process in trials and investigations of
an administrative character.
3. Cardinal primary rights respected in administrative
proceedings; Guidelines
a. Right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. The liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
b. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented, after
the party is given an opportunity to present his case and to
adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts. The right to adduce evidence, without the
corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is
vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration.
c. Wile the duty to deliberate does not impose the
obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to
support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. This
principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that
the genius of constitutional government is contrary to the
vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.
d. Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion but the evidence must be substantial.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.
e. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected.
f. The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
g. The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4. New trial granted under circumstances
The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is
given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which
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created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it
acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue
involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result.
77 SCRA 321, 1977
MONTEMAYOR VS ARANETA UNIVERSITY FOUNDATION
FACTS:
Petitioner was a professor at the Araneta University Foundation. On
7/8/74, he was found guilty of making homosexual advances on one
Leonardo De Lara by a faculty investating committee. On 11/8/74,
another committee was appointed to investigate another charge of a
similar nature against petitioner. Petitioner, through counsel, asked for
the postponement of the hearing set for 11/18 and 19, 1974, but the
motion was denied. The committee then proceeded to hear the
testimony of the complainants and on 12/5/74, submitted its report
recommending the separation of petitioner from the University. On
12/12/74, the University applied w/ the NLRC for clearance to
terminate petitioner's employment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a
complaint w/ the NLRC for reinstatement and backwages. Judgement
was rendered in petitioner's favor, but on appeal to the Sec. of Labor,
the latter found petitioner's dismissal to be justified. Hence, this
petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process.
HELD:
The Constitution assures to workers security of tenure. In the case of
petitioner, this guarantee is reinforced by the provision on academic
freedom. In denying petitioner's motion for postponement of the
hearing, the committee did not accord procedural due process to the
petitioner. This was, however, remedied at the mediation conference
called at the Dept. of Labor during w/c petitioner was heard on his
evidence. There he was given the fullest opportunity to present his
case. Furthermore, with regards to petitioners filing of MFR
contending that the hearing in the NLRC did not conform to their
requirements of due process as the witnesses against him were not
called so that petitioner could cross-examine them, this cannot be
given credit. Petitioner did not object to the presentation of the
testimony of the complainant and the witnesses at the school
investigation and did not assert his right to cross-examine them.
Petitioner waived his right to confront the witnesses, relying solely on
the strength of his evidence. Nor was it incumbent on resp. to present
the witnesses in the NLRC. Petitioner's only right is to be heard
Petition dismissed.
11 SCRA 317, 1964
MERALCO VS PSC
FACTS:
Meralco made several applications for the revision and reduction
of its rate, which were approved by the Commission. On June 9,
1954, upon petition of Dr. Pedro Gil, the Commission requested
the Auditor General to cause an audit and examination of
Meralco's books of accounts. It was then examined and a report
was submitted to the commission.
Hearing was reset from May 30, 1956 to June 22, 1956. On said
date, the parties appeared and Atty. Venancio L. de Peralta,
Technical Assistant and Chief of the Finance and Rate Division of
the Commission, who was duly authorized to receive the evidence
of the parties, announced that the hearing was an "informal
hearing", and its purpose was to hear any remarks or statements
of the parties and to define the issues "so that at the hearing we
know exactly what are disputed at this informal hearing".
After reports had been submitted with regards to the auditing,
Meralco was given by the Commission a period of 30 days within
which to file an answer, specifying its objections to the report of
the GAO.
Without having (1) first reset the said 3 cases for hearing; (2)
Without having given the Meralco an opportunity, as requested by
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it, to cross-examine the officers of the GAO who prepared the
report dated May 11, 1956, on which report the Commission
based its decision; and (3) Without having given the Meralco an
opportunity, as requested by it, to present evidence in support of
its answer to refute the facts alleged in said report and
controverted by Meralco, on December 27, 1957, the said
Commission handed down a decision, wherein Meralco is
required to reduce its present authorized rates effective January
1, 1958 based on the authorized rates.
Hence, the present petition for review with preliminary injunction
which was issued by this Court
ISSUE: Whether or Not there was a violation of due process, thus the
decision of the court is considered void.
HELD: The record shows that no hearing was held.
On June 22, 1956, parties appeared before "Attorney Vivencio L.
Peralta, Technical Assistant, and Chief, Finance and Rate
Division, Public Service Commission, who was duly authorized to
receive the evidence of the parties", and the record shows that
the hearing held before the said Commissioner was merely an
informal hearing because, using his own words, "I said at the
beginning that this is only preliminary because I want that the
parties could come to some kind of understanding.
The record further shows that after the "preliminary hearing" held
on June 22, 1956, no other hearing was held; the cases were
never set for hearing; and Meralco was not given an opportunity
to present evidence to rebut the audit report
The decision therefore was null and void having been
rendered without any hearing; the Commission could not validly
make findings of fact without affording petitioner the right to cross-
examine and confront witnesses, as well as the right to present its
evidence; the decision contained findings contrary to law and at
any event, the decision was based on obsolete allegations of fact,
and since the submission of the audit report of the GAO, on
whose allegations the decision was predicated, there had
occurred recent developments which had substantially altered the
situation of the Meralco and which have to be taken into account
by the Commission, in fixing just and reasonable rates
It should be remembered that there should be no short cuts in the
disposition of the time-honored principle that no one should be
deprived of his life, liberty and property, without due process of
law. Considering the fact that the reduction of rates herein sought
might involve huge amounts of money and the errors, alleged to
have been committed, if true, would affect likewise not only the
right of the petitioner but also public interest, it would have been a
better part of valor and wisdom to have delayed a little bit the final
resolution of the controversy
"Even if the Commission is not bound by the rules of judicial
proceedings, it must how its head to the constitutional mandate
that no person shall be deprived of right without due process of
law", which binds not only the government of the Republic, but
also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. "Due
process of law guarantees notice and opportunities to be heard to
persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.
145 SCRA 100, 1986
ATENEO vs. CA
FACTS:
Carmelita Mateo, a waitress inside the university charged Juan
Ramon Guanzon, a boarder and first year student of the
university with unbecoming conduct committed on December 12,
1967 at about 5:15 in the evening at the Cervini Hall's cafeteria
"Mr. Guanzon, a boarder at Cervini was asking for 'siopao.' I
was at the counter and I told him that the 'siopao' had still to be
heated and asked him to wait for a while. Then Mr. Guanzon
started mumbling bad words directed to me, in the hearing
presence of other boarders. I asked him to stop cursing, and he
told me that was none of my business. Since he seemed
impatient, I was going to give back his money without any
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contempt. He retorted that he did not like to accept the money. He
got madder and started to curse again. Then he threatened to
strike me with his fist. I tried to avoid this. But then he actually
struck me in my left temple. Before he could strike again, his
fellow boarders held him and Dr. Bella and Leyes coaxed him to
stop; I got hold of a bottle so I could dodge him. It was then that
Fr. Campbell arrived. The incident was hidden from Fr. Campbell
by the boarders. I could not tell him myself as I had gone into the
kitchen crying because I was hurt."
The university conducted an investigation of the slapping incident.
Based on the investigation results, Juan Ramon was dismissed
from the university. This triggered the filing of a complaint for
damages by his parents against the university in the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City. The
complaint states that Juan Ramon was expelled from school
without giving him a fair trial in violation of his right to due process
and that they are prominent and well known residents of Bacolod
City, with the unceremonious expulsion of their son causing them
actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In its answer, the university denied the material allegations of the
complaint and justified the dismissal of Juan Ramon on the
ground that his unbecoming behavior is contrary to good morals,
proper decorum, and civility, that such behavior subjected him as
a student to the university's disciplinary regulations' action and
sanction and that the university has the sole prerogative and
authority at any time to drop from the school a student found to be
undesirable in order to preserve and maintain its integrity and
discipline so indispensable for its existence as an institution of
learning.
After due trial, the lower court ruled in favor of the Guanzons and
ordered the university to pay them P92.00 (actual damages);
P50,000.00 (moral damages); P5,000.00 (attorney's fees) and to
pay the costs of the suit
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals by the university, the trial
court's decision was initially reversed and set aside. The
complaint was dismissed.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Guanzons,
the appellate court reversed its decision and set it aside through a
special division of five. In the resolution issued by the appellate
court, the lower court's decision was reinstated. The motion for
reconsideration had to be referred to a special division of five in
view of the failure to reach unanimity on the resolution of the
motion, the vote of the regular division having become 2 to 1.
The petitioner now asks to review and reverse the resolution of
the division of five
ISSUE/S:
1. WON Juan Ramon Guanzon was not accorded due process of
law
2. WON respondents complaint for recovery of damages was
premature because administrative remedies have not yet been
exhausted
3. WON private respondents are entitled to damages
HELD: Petition granted in favor of Ateneo. CA ruling reversed.
1. No, he was accorded due process.
Exceptions to the rule on finality of factual findings of trial
courts and administrative agencies
The appellate court resolution invoked the rule that findings of
facts by administrative officers in matters falling within their
competence will not generally be reviewed by the courts, and the
principle that findings of facts of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and should not be disturbed on appeal.
The court does not agree. The statement regarding the finality
given to factual findings of trial courts and administrative tribunals
is correct as a general principle. However, it is subject to well
established exceptions. Factual findings of trial courts are
disregarded when - (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded on
speculations, surmises, and conjectures; (2) the inferences made
are manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) there is a misapprehension of facts;
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and (5) the court, in arriving at its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of
the parties or the evidence presented.
A similar rule applies to administrative agencies. By reason of
their special knowledge and expertise, we ordinarily accord
respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals.
However, there are exceptions to this rule and judicial power
asserts itself whenever (1) the factual findings are not supported
by evidence; (2) where the findings are vitiated by fraud,
imposition, or collusion; (3) where the procedure which led to the
factual findings is irregular; (4) when palpable errors are
committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest
Why he is deemed to have been accorded due process
When the letter-complaint was read to Juan Ramon, he admitted
the altercation with the waitress and his slapping her on the face.
Rev. Welsh (Dean of men) did not stop with the admission. He
interviewed Eric Tagle, Danny Go, Roberto Beriber, and Jose
Reyes, friends of Juan Ramon who were present during the
incident.
The Board of Discipline was made up of distinguished members
of the faculty -Fr. Francisco Perez, Biology Department Chairman;
Dr. Amando Capawan, a Chemistry professor; Assistant Dean
Piccio of the College; and Dr. Reyes of the same College. There
is nothing in the records to cast any doubt on their competence
and impartiality insofar as this disciplinary investigation is
concerned.
Juan Ramon himself appeared before the Board of Discipline. He
admitted the slapping incident, then begged to be excused so he
could catch the boat for Bacolod City. Juan Ramon, therefore,
was given notice of the proceedings; he actually appeared to
present his side; the investigating board acted fairly and
objectively; and all requisites of administrative due process were
met.
The claim that there was no due process because the private
respondents, the parents of Juan Ramon were not given any
notice of the proceedings will also not stand. Juan Ramon, who at
the time was 18 years of age, was already a college student,
intelligent and mature enough to know his responsibilities. In fact,
in the interview with Rev. Welsh, he even asked if he would be
expelled because of the incident. He was fully cognizant of the
gravity of the offense he committed. When informed about the
December 19, 1967 meeting of the Board of Discipline, he was
asked to seek advice and assistance from his guardian and or
parents. Juan Ramon is assumed to have reported this serious
matter to his parents. The fact that he chose to remain silent and
did not inform them about his case was not the fault of the
petitioner university.
Moreover, notwithstanding the non-participation of the private
respondents, the university, as stated earlier, undertook a fair and
objective investigation of the slapping incident. Due process in
administrative proceedings also requires consideration of the
evidence presented and the existence of evidence to support the
decision (Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 136 SCRA 112).
Carmelita Mateo was not entirely blameless for what happened to
her because she also shouted at Juan Ramon and tried to hit him
with a cardboard box top, but this did not justify Juan Ramon's
slapping her in the face. The evidence clearly shows that the
altercation started with Juan Ramon's utterance of the offensive
language "bilat ni bay," an Ilongo phrase which means sex organ
of a woman. It was but normal on the part of Mateo to react to the
nasty remark. Moreover, Roberto Beriber, a friend of Juan Ramon
who was present during the incident told Rev. Welsh during the
investigation of the case that Juan Ramon made threatening
gestures at Mateo prompting her to pick up a cardboard box top
which she threw at Juan Ramon. The incident was in public thus
adding to the humiliation of Carmelita Mateo. There was
"unbecoming conduct" and pursuant to the Rules of Discipline
and Code of Ethics of the university, specifically under the 1967-
1969 Catalog containing the rules and academic regulation
(Exhibit 19), this offense constituted a ground for dismissal from
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the college. The action of the petitioner is sanctioned by law.
Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
recognizes violation of disciplinary regulations as valid ground for
refusing re-enrollment of a student (Tangonan v. Pao, 137
SCRA 245).
Before Juan Ramon was admitted to enroll, he received (1) the
College of Arts and Sciences Handbook containing the general
regulations of the school and the 1967-1969 catalog of the
College of Arts and Sciences containing the disciplinary rules and
academic regulations and (2) a copy of the Rules and Regulations
of the Cervini-Elizo Halls of the petitioner university one of the
provisions of which is as follows: under the title "Dining Room" -
"The kitchen help and server should always be treated with
civility." Miss Mateo was employed as a waitress and precisely
because of her service to boarders, not to mention her sex, she
deserved more respect and gracious treatment.
The petitioner is correct in stating that there was a serious error of
law in the appellate court's ruling on due process.
2. No, complaint was not premature.
The petitioner raises the issue of "exhaustion of administrative
remedies" in view of its pending appeal from the decision of the
Ministry of Education to the President of the Philippines. It argues
that the private respondents' complaint for recovery of damages
filed in the lower court was premature.
The issue raised in court was whether or not the private
respondents can recover damages as a result of the dismissal of
their son from the petitioner university. This is a purely legal
question and nothing of an administrative nature is to or can be
done. The case was brought pursuant to the law on damages
provided in the Civil Code. The jurisdiction to try the case belongs
to the civil courts.
3. No, there is no basis for recovery of damages.
There is no basis for the recovery of damages. Juan Ramon was
afforded due process of law. The penalty is based on reasonable
rules and regulations applicable to all students guilty of the same
offense. He never was out of school. Before the decision could be
implemented, Juan Ramon asked for an honorable dismissal
which was granted. He then enrolled at the De la Salle University
of Bacolod City and later transferred to another Jesuit school.
Moreover, his full and complete tuition fees for the second
semester were refunded through the representation of Mr. Romeo
Guanzon, Juan Ramon's father.
There was no bad faith on the part of the university. In fact, the
college authorities deferred any undue action until a definitive
decision had been rendered. The whole procedure of the
disciplinary process was get up to protect the privacy of the
student involved. There is absolutely no indication of malice,
fraud, and improper or wilful motives or conduct on the part of the
Ateneo de Manila University in this case.
161 SCRA 7, 1988
ALCUAZ vs. PSBA
FACTS:
Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded the
school because they wanted to admin to hear their grievances
with regards to not being able to participate in the policy-making
of the school, despite the regulations set by the admin with
regards to protest actions
During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other
students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied
admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987.
Court ordered the school authorities to create a special
investigating committee to conduct an investigation, who made
recommendations which the school adopted
A lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents filing and
answering the complaints
Petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due process
when they were barred from re-enrollment and for intervenors
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teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty
members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or
protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a
violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly.
Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due
process which requires that there be due notice and hear hearing
and of substantive due process which requires that the person or
body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide
free from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ?
2. WON there was contempt of Court by the respondents
HELD:
1. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.
There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states that when a
college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is
enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the
Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers
are for 'one semester. after the close of the first semester, the
PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the
students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honored
principle that contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties The contract having been terminated, there
is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be
compelled to enter into another contract with said students
and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the
appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties."
The Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases
involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice.
Standards of procedural due process are:
a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and
cause of any accusation against them;
b. they shall have the right to answer the charges against
them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own
behalf and
e.the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributed
at the beginning of each school
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon
admission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreed
to bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees
that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any
time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School
Administration.
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with
regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was taken by the
school when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction to
accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an
investigating body.
The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the students
and teachers on the one hand and the school on the other,
ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school
authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986.
Findings of the investigating committee:
1. students disrupted classes
2. petitioners involved were found to be academically
deficient & the teachers are found to have committed
various acts of misconduct.
The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has
always been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court has ruled
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid
grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. The opposite view
would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school
and enshrined under the Constitution.
Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of
administrative tribunals, unless :
1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion;
3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings is
irregular;
4. when palpable errors are committed; or
5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
Investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and
adequate.
2. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite
respondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable.
No defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondent
school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated
as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary
mandatory injunction.
Respondent school has fully complied with its duties under
the temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested
that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty
members were teaching and it was only after the investigation,
that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the
school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for
having become moot and academic.
GR No. 89317, May 30, 1990
NON vs. DANES
FACTS:
Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re-
enroll because they participated in student mass actions against
their school the preceding sem
On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini
College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though
without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to
attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and
depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present in
their classes
Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower court
considered that in signing their enrollment forms, they waived the
privilege to be re-enrolled. The Mabini College reserves the right
to deny admission of students xxx whose activities unduly
disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx
In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their
alma matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner that
would not put the college in a bad light.
Judge Dames decision considering these facts said that what the
students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent
Mabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for
re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the
school.
ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it
allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment of students on
the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re-
admission or re-enrollment of students on the ground of termination of
contract should be reversed. YES
RATIO:
In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one
semester and contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is
deemed terminated.
However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing
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re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was
decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a
reaction to student mass action.
This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly
as exercised by students vis--vis the right of school officials to
discipline them.
The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at
the schoolgate. In protesting grievances disorder is more or less
expected because emotions run high. That the protection to the
cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Consti
is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction.
Right to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards.
Citing Malabanan and Villar the court reiterated that the exercise
of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring
students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my be
barred from re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies.
Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights
within the school. Constitutional freedom of free speech and
assembly also not absolute. However, imposition of disciplinary
sanctions requires observance of procedural due process and
penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
(procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right to
ans the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them,
right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be duly
considered)
The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an
ordinary contract but is imbued with public interest. The Consti
allows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to
par 107 and 137 of the respondent schools manual, a student is
enrolled not just for one sem but for the entire period necessary
for the student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232 gives the
students the right to continue their course up to graduation.
Academic freedom not a ground for denying students rights. In
Villar, the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic
standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who
exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection.
School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer
students say they are graduating students and if there are any
deficiencies these do not warrant non-readmission. Also there are
more students with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted. And
some of the petitioners had no failing marks.
The court held that the students were denied due process in that
there was no due investigation. In fact it would appear from the
pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because
of failing grades was a mere afterthought.
Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate to
the offense committed with due process.
But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced.
Moot and academic. Theyve already suffered enough.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- TAXATION -
PURPOSE
G.R. No. L-28896 February 17, 1988
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. ALGUE
FACTS:
The Philippine Sugar Estate Development Company (PSEDC)
appointed Algue Inc. as its agent, authorizing it to sell its land,
factories, and oil manufacturing process. The Vegetable Oil Investment
Corporation (VOICP) purchased PSEDC properties. For the sale,
Algue received a commission of P125,000 and it was from this
commission that it paid Guevara, et. al. organizers of the VOICP,
P75,000 in promotional fees. In 1965, Algue received an assessment
from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the amount of
P83,183.85 as delinquency income tax for years 1958 amd 1959.
Algue filed a protest or request for reconsideration which was not acted
upon by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The counsel for Algue
had to accept the warrant of distrant and levy. Algue, however, filed a
petition for review with the Coourt of Tax Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether the assessment was reasonable.
HELD:
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be
collected without unnecessary hindrance. Every person who is
able to pay must contribute his share in the running of the
government. The Government, for his part, is expected to respond
in the form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve
the lives of the people and enhance their moral and material
values. This symbiotic relationship is the rationale of taxation and
should dispel the erroneous notion that is an arbitrary method of
exaction by those in the seat of power.
Tax collection, however, should be made in accordance with law
as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government
itself. For all the awesome power of the tax collector, he may still
be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate that the
law has not been observed. Herein, the claimed deduction
(pursuant to Section 30 [a] [1] of the Tax Code and Section 70 [1]
of Revenue Regulation 2: as to compensation for personal
services) had been legitimately by Algue Inc. It has further proven
that the payment of fees was reasonable and necessary in light of
the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors (in VOICP)
to involve themselves in an experimental enterprise or a business
requiring millions of pesos.
The assessment was not reasonable.
177 SCRA 27, 1989
COMMISSIONER VS. MAKASIAR
*no case digest submitted*
TAX EXEMPTIONS
33 PHIL 217, 1916
YMCA VS. CIR
*no case digest submitted*
51 PHIL 352, 1927
BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS PROVINCIAL BOARD
*no case digest submitted*
14 SCRA 292, 1965
LLADOC VS CIR
*no case digest submitted*
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107 SCRA 104, 1981
THE PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HONORABLE HAROLD M.
HERNANDO
FACTS:
In this case the provincial city assessor of Abra filed a certiorari
and mandamus against the ruling made by Judge Harold M.
Hernando of the Court of First Instance of Abra, it was because
respondent denied a motion for declaratory relief by Roman
Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from a
real estate tax followed by a summary judgment granting such
exemption without even hearing the side of the petitioner.
Petitioner further argued that clearly the judge ignored the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and disregards the
basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of due process in
the constitution. The important argument made by the petitioner is
that the judge failed to abide by the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 464 which states that" No court shall entertain any
suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code until
the taxpayer, shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessed
against him nor shall any court declare any tax invalid by reason
of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers
charged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to
perform their duties within this time herein specified for their
performance unless such irregularities, informalities or failure
shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor
shall any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the
provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that the
taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as determined by
the court in the pending proceeding."
The judge responded by saying there is no dispute that the
properties including their procedure are actually, directly and
exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.
for religious or charitable purposes."
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition be granted since the
judge would not have made such a grave mistake if he had only
made a clear distinction between the present provisions of the
constitution to the provisions of the 1935 constitution regarding
tax exemptions on land, buildings and improvements. The main
difference is that in order for a land, building, or improvement to
be tax exempt, there must be and exclusive, actual and direct use
of the enumerated for religious or charitable purposes. It is also a
rule that tax exemption is not favored nor presumed so that if
granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.
Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation,
hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi
juris
The petition was also justly invoked on the grounds for the
protection of due process to clearly show if the respondents really
did not violate any constitutional provisions in regards to tax
exemption but instead, what respondent judge did was directly
ruled on the case of declaratory relief on the basis that it was
exclusive, actual, and directly as sources of support of the parish
priest and his helpers and also of private respondent Bishop as
compared to the motion to dismiss the case due to lack of
jurisdiction since the validity of a tax assessment may be
questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and
not with a court. There was also mention of a lack of a cause of
action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not
proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of
government to assess and collect taxes on such property. It
clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to
petitioner Province of Abra and deciding the case immediately in
favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to abide by
the constitutional command of procedural due process.
162 SCRA 106, 1988
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. VS. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
FACTS:
This is a case for a review or certiorari on the decision made by
the defunct Court of First Instance of Abra Branch I, dated June
14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656. In this case the court
decided that the seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of
Bangued, Abra and Provincial Treasurer of the said province of
the lot and building of Abra Valley College, Inc. to be valid since
the said school was not tax exempt. What transpired was the
school was issued a Notice of Seizure of the lot and building of
the school covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly
registered in the name of petitioner for failure to pay the amount
of P5,140.31 back taxes by the respondent The "Notice of Sale"
was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent
treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said
college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date.
Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra,
offered the highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted.
The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued to him.
After the sale Dr. Paterno filled a case for the dismissal of the
case and after exchange of pleadings the court ordered the
respondent treasurers to deliver the proceeds of the auction sale.
Finally the parties involved entered into a Stipulation of Facts
administered by the court dismissing the notice of seizure and
notice of sale in favor of Dr. Paterno and relieving him of all the
back taxes of the school upon the payment of the auction price.
Despite the Stipulation of Facts the trial courts found out that the
school was recognized by the government offering Primary High
School and College courses and has a population of more than
100,000 students all in all; that the school was situated right in the
heart of town of Bangued, Abra a few meters from the plaza and
about 120 meters from the Court of First Instance building; that
the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across
the street; that the high school and college students are housed in
the main building; that the Director with his family is in the second
floor of the main building; and that the annual gross income of the
school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos. In light
of the evidences it was left after the courts to determine whether
the said school was exclusively for educational purposes.
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his
Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z. Montero, filed a Memorandum for
the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental
Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based
on the evidence, the laws applicable, court decisions and
jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for
educational purposes of the Abra Valley College, Inc., are
exempted from the payment of taxes.
The trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor
by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He
thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from
August 6, 1974 within which to perfect its appeal petitioner
instead availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for preliminary injunction before this Court, which petition
was filed on August 17, 1974. In the resolution dated August 16,
1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition
Respondents were required to answer said petition. The
petitioners raised the arguments that the courts a quo: 1. made an
error in sustaining a valid seizure and sale of the college lot and
building used for educational purpose 2. Made an error in
declaring that the college was not exclusively for educational
purposes merely because the college president resides in it 3.
made an error in declaring the college not tax exempt from
property taxes and in ordering petitioner to pay P5,140.31 as
realty taxes. 4. made an error in ordering the confiscation of the
P6,000.00 deposit made in the court by petitioner as payment of
the P5,140.31 realty taxes.
ISSUE: Whether Abra Valley College Inc. subject to tax exemption as
stated in the constitution that a school should be exclusively for
educational purpose despite the proof that there are other purpose
attached to the lot and building such as a residence of the College
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president?
HELD:
In the case at bar the Supreme Court used Section 22, paragraph
3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and
all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes ... Relative thereto,
Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as
amended by Republic Act No. 409, otherwise known as the
Assessment Law, provides that churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific
or educational purposes
The Supreme court ruled that the exemption in favor of property
used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is 'not
limited to property actually indispensable but extends to facilities
which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes and that while this Court allows
a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase
"exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in
Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes.
While the use of the second floor of the main building in the case
at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his family, they
may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is
complimentary to the main or primary purposeeducational, the
lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is
built should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is
being used by the Director and his family for residential purposes,
but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of
commerce, it is only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned
to the school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the
modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the
petitioner
101 PHIL 386, 1957
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA
FACTS:
In this case the plaintiff is a foreign, non-stock, religious,
missionary organization duly registered in the Philippines and
doing business through its agency here in Manila. In the course of
their ministry, their Philippine agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the
Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating
the same into several Philippine dialect Upon knowledge the
acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it
was conducting the business of general merchandise since
November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, requiring the plaintiff to
secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license
fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th
quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of
P5,821.45 To avoid the closing of its business as well as further
fines and penalties in the premises on October 24, 1953, plaintiff
paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license
fees in the aforementioned amount, giving at the same time notice
to the City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question
the legality of the ordinances under which, the said fees were
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
being collected which was done on the same date by filing the defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected
complaint that gave rise to this action. The plaintiff prays that from it. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
judgment be rendered declaring the said Municipal Ordinance No.
3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364
illegal and unconstitutional, and a refund should be made by the
defendant of the payments made and the legal costs. The
DOUBLE TAXATION
defendant replied that, maintaining in turn that said ordinances
were enacted by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila by 95 PHIL 46, 1954
virtue of the power granted to it by section 2444, subsection (m-2) PUNZALAN VS MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA
of the Revised Administrative Code, superseded on June 18, *no case digest submitted*
1949, by section 18, subsection (1) of Republic Act No. 409,
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, and praying
that the complaint be dismissed, with costs against plaintiff. This LICENSE FEES
answer was replied by the plaintiff reiterating the
unconstitutionality of the often-repeated ordinances
Before the trial the party submitted a stipulation of facts stating GR No. 10448, August 30, 1957
the sales made by the petitioner from 1945 to 1953. When the PHYSICAL THERAPY ORG. VS MUNICIPAL BOARD
case was set for hearing the plaintiff argued that it never made *no case digest submitted*
any profit from the sale of its bibles, which are disposed of for as
low as one third of the cost, and that in order to maintain its
operating cost it obtains substantial remittances from its New York
office and voluntary contributions and gifts from certain churches,
both in the United States and in the Philippines, which are
interested in its missionary work. The defendant answered that
due to the cross-examination of the lone witness of plaintiff it was
proven that the claim of plaintiff that if having no profit from the
sales is evidently untenable. This made the judge to dismiss the
case for lack of merit on the grounds thatfrom the repealed
section (m-2) of the Revised Administrative Code and the
repealing portions (o) of section 18 of Republic Act No. 409,
although they seemingly differ in the way the legislative intent is
expressed, yet their meaning is practically the same for the
purpose of taxing the merchandise mentioned in said legal
provisions, and that the taxes to be levied by said ordinances is in
the nature of percentage graduated taxes (Sec. 3 of Ordinance
No. 3000, as amended, and Sec. 1, Group 2, of Ordinance No.
2529, as amended by Ordinance No. 3364).
Not satisfied with the decision, they took up the matter to the
Court of Appeals which was certified to the Supreme Court where
the petitioner argued these points 1. In holding that Ordinances
Nos. 2529 and 3000, as respectively amended, are not
unconstitutional 2. In holding that subsection m-2 of Section 2444
of the Revised Administrative Code under which Ordinances Nos.
2592 and 3000 were promulgated, was not repealed by Section
18 of Republic Act No. 409; 3. In not holding that an ordinance
providing for taxes based on gross sales or receipts, in order to
be valid under the new Charter of the City of Manila, must first be
approved by the President of the Philippines; and 4. In holding
that, as the sales made by the plaintiff-appellant have assumed
commercial proportions, it cannot escape from the operation of
said municipal ordinances under the cloak of religious privilege.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances of the City of Manila, Nos.

3000, as amended, and 2529, 3028 and 3364, are constitutional and
valid; and (2) whether the provisions of said ordinances are applicable
or not to the case at bar.

HELD:
In the case at bar the Supreme court held that that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to
plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila,
as amended, is not applicable to plaintiff-appellant and defendant-
appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff
Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair
plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of
religious beliefs, We find that Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is
also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations,
We hereby reverse the decision appealed from, sentencing

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)

Marianne Cabacungan

64
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- EQUAL PROTECTION -
SEXUAL DISCRIMNINATION
163 SCRA 386, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS vs. DRILON
FACTS:
The Department of Labor and Employment issued Department
Order No. 1, Series of 1988 in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS.
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc.
(PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment
of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement,"
challenges its Constitutional validity.
On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment
informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan,
Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria,
and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged
"guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.
ISSUE:
WON Department Order No. 1 in the nature of a police power measure
is valid under the Constitution, assailing:
"discrimination against males or females;"
that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to
domestic helpers and females with similar skills;"
and that it is violative of the right to travel
it is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking
power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in
character.
HELD:
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the
contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights
among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the
unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. The
sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers,
even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies
of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent
Government action. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional
rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In
fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject, among
other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be
provided by law." Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to
"afford protection to labor," pursuant to the respondent
Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the
Labor Code. The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have
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Marianne Cabacungan
65
stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a
valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No.
1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that
police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean
that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. As we have
mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor
and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof.
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of
employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent,
just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its
sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy
their employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the
Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates
have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an
evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or
inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has
precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the
petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the
Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other
freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction,
where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
Petition dismissed.
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
99 PHIL, 1856
PEOPLE vs. HERNANDEZ
FACTS:
This is a case of kidnapping with murder involving the Huks,
members of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, the military
arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
Counsel for Faustino del Mundo, alias Commander Sumulong,
admits that the said accused ordered the killing of the victim,
Marciano T. Miranda, 41, the barrio captain of Barrio Balitucan,
Magalang, Pampanga, who was an alleged army informer and
who was opposed to the candidacy of Rogelio Tiglao, a provincial
board member.
The kidnapping and killing were politically motivated. Miranda
refused to support Tiglao, the candidate for Congressman of the
Huks. He supported Rafael Lazatin, the Nacionalista candidate.
ISSUE: Del Mundo contends that he should be convicted only of
homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal medium and that the
trial court erred in convicting him of the said complex crime and in
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
HELD:
Del Mundo did not testify in his defense. As already stated, the
trial court convicted him of kidnapping with murder together with
Pangilinan, Macasaquit and Cabrera, sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua and ordered him to pay an indemnity of P17,000 to
Miranda's heirs. Macalino and Meneses were acquitted. Salas
died during the pendency of the case. Only Del Mundo appealed.
His counsel de oficio contends that there was no intention to
deprive Miranda of his liberty and no premeditated plan to kill him.
That contention is not well-taken. The fact is that Miranda was
forcibly removed from his barrio and deprived of his liberty for
several hours and was then brought to another place where he
was killed. While under interrogation, his grave was already being
prepared. The fatal blow, which was inflicted upon him, caused
him to fall into his grave.
We find that there was a conspiracy to liquidate Miranda and that
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the kidnapping was utilized as a means to attain that objective.
From the surrounding circumstances, it maybe inferred that Del
Mundo masterminded the kidnapping or induced it and that, as
observed by the Solicitor General, the killing was intended to
terrorize the supporters of Lazatin.
Miranda was a public officer. His kidnapping is covered by article
267(4) of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for that offense.
The killing of Miranda was murder because his hands were bound
when he was mortally assaulted (U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209
and other cases).
Even without taking into account evident premeditation, the death
penalty has to be imposed because article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code requires that the graver penalty for kidnapping, which
is more serious than murder, has to be meted out to Del Mundo
However, inasmuch as Del Mundo is now seventy-eight (78)
years old, the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified in the sense
that the death penalty imposable on Del Mundo is commuted to
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in article
40. In all other respects, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
85 PHIL 648, 1950
PEOPLE vs. ISNAIN
FACTS:
Accused was caught in the act of stealing coconut while his two
other companions managed to ran away.
Accused admitted to committing the said crime
ISSUE: The only question raised with much earnestness by his
attorney de oficio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal Code
classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconut is unconstitutional,
because it punishes the larceny of such products more heavily than the
taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby
denies him the equal protection of the laws.
HELD:
In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier
penalty is to encourage and protect the development of the
coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.3
Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the range of vision is
unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched
because of the nature of the growth of coconut trees; and without
a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it
has been in the past the favorite resort of thieves.4 There is
therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the
industry; and as it can not be said that the classification is entirely
without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied
The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection
with article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after
the offense, is not applicable.) The penalty is prision correccional
to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, the
appellant should be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4
years and 2 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed
decision will be affirmed, with costs. so ordered.
GR No. 130716, December 09, 1998
CHAVES VS. PCGG
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as "taxpayer, citizen and former
government official who initiated the prosecution of the Marcoses
and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the public
treasury and the systematic subjugation of the country's
economy," alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were
several news reports bannered in a number of broadsheets
sometime in September 1997. These news items referred to (1)
the alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
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deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2) the
reported execution of a compromise, between the government
(through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or share
these assets.
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the
correlative duty of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions
involving the national interest, demands that respondents make
public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to
PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He
claims that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest," since it
has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy" that would be
greatly prejudicial to the national interest of the Filipino people.
ISSUE: WON the government, through the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), be required to reveal the proposed
terms of a compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs as regards
their alleged ill-gotten wealth.
HELD:
In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in
connection with their official functions must be accessible to the
public, consistent with the policy of transparency of governmental
affairs. This principle is aimed at affording the people an
opportunity to determine whether those to whom they have
entrusted the affairs of the government are honesty, faithfully and
competently performing their functions as public servants.
Undeniably, the essence of democracy lies in the free flow of
thought; but thoughts and ideas must be well-informed so that the
public would gain a better perspective of vital issues confronting
them and, thus, be able to criticize as well as participate in the
affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
effective manner.
With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of
the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public
concern and imbued with public interest. We may also add that
"ill-gotten wealth," by its very nature, assumes a public character.
Clearly, the assets and properties referred to supposedly
originated from the government itself. To all intents and purposes,
therefore, they belong to the people. As such, upon reconveyance
they will be returned to the public treasury, subject only to the
satisfaction of positive claims of certain persons as may be
adjudged by competent courts. Another declared overriding
consideration for the expeditious recovery of ill-gotten wealth is
that it may be used for national economic recovery. The foregoing
disquisition settles the question of whether petitioner has a right to
respondents' disclosure of any agreement that may be arrived at
concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-gotten wealth. Petition
granted.
111 SCRA 433, 1982
NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the
validity of the Presidential Decree creating the Sandiganbayan,
He was accused before such respondent Court of estafa through
falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in
several cases. Upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash
on constitutional and jurisdictional grounds. Respondent Court
denied such motion. There was a motion for reconsideration filed
the next day; it met the same fate. Hence this petition for certiorari
and prohibition
ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the
respondent Court is violative of the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
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To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end
of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and
property. Those adversely affected may under such
circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can
show that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired
by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit
of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
in reason. To quote from the Tuason decision anew "that the
laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous.
The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set
forth in his memorandum thus: " 1. The Sandiganbayan
proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection,
because - appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion; - appeal likewise was shrunk and
limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts
and trial evidence; and - there is only one chance to appeal
conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the
traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are
entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts
and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter to the Supreme Court." ,that is hardly convincing,
considering that the classification satisfies the test requiring that it
"must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally
to each member of the class. The Constitution specifically
mentions the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot
be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have
been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the present
Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is
dismissed.
GR No. 142030, April 21, 2005
GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health
Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint charging
herein petitioners Mayor Gallardo, the vice mayor, Sanggunian
Bayan members, all public officers of the Municipality of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in
the municipal budget the amount representing payment of the
mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan
accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary
differential and magna carta benefits.
The information filed with the Sandiganbayan stated that herein
petitioners caused undue injury to the Public Health Workers
(PHWs) of the Municipality of Bansalan, by refusing to perform
their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal budget for
the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the
Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining PHWs in the
nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in
the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan
granted the motion. A special prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the case but Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
disapproved the recommendation. The Sandiganbayan denied
petitioners motion.
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ISSUE: WON the petitioners are denied due process and not accorded
the equal protection of laws.
HELD:
Petitioners claimed that they were denied due process because
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the
recommendation of the special prosecutor.
The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutors
conclusion, was of the conviction that petitioners are probably
guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to
conduct an investigation anew. Whatever course of action that the
Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor, is but an
exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional
mandate.[17] Generally, courts should not interfere in such
exercise.
The equal protection clause requires that the law operates
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. It
allows reasonable classification. If the classification is
characterized by real and substantial differences, one class may
be treated differently from another. Simply because the
respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases allegedly similar
to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or
caprice on his part, absent a clear showing that he gravely
abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The
Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he believed there
were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo
trial. On the other hand, he recommended the filing of
appropriate information against petitioners because there are
ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his
power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional
mandate of his office. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED
for lack of merit
PUBLIC POLICY
[G.R. No. 157279. August 9, 2005.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. GIOVANNI PALMA ET AL.
FACTS:
PNB was formerly a government owned and controlled
corporation but on 26 May 1996, it was already privatized and
incorporated as a private commercial bank.
R.A. 6758, 'An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and
Position Classification System in the Government' took effect on 1
July 1989 covering all government owned corporations. Section
12 thereof provides for the consolidation of allowances and
additional compensation into standardized salary rates, but
certain additional compensation were exempted from
consolidation. In the present case, the Salary Standardization
Law clearly provides that the claimed benefits shall continue to be
granted only to employees who were "incumbents" as of July 1,
1989.
"The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10) to
implement R.A. 6758. On 12 August 1998, the Supreme Court, in
the case of Rodolfo S. de Jesus, et al. of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) vs. Commission on Audit held that DBM-
CCC No. 10 was ineffective due to its non-publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
"In view of the declaration made by the Supreme Court in the
above-mentioned case, a petition for mandamus was filed by
respondents on 20 December 1999. Respondents alleged, that
they are employees hired by PNB on various dates after 30 June
1989; that from the dates of their respective appointments until 1
January 1997 they were unjustly deprived and denied of the
allowances being enjoyed by other employees of PNB. According
to respondents, the declaration that DBM-CCC No. 10 was
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ineffective paved the way to their entitlement to the
allowances/fringe benefits. The withholding of their entitlement to
the same benefits is an unfair discrimination and a violation of
respondents' rights to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution since incumbents or employees of PNB who were
already in the service as of 1 July 1989 received the benefits and
allowances. To rectify the injustice against respondents issued
General Circular No. 1-312/97 on 14 March 1997, extending the
benefits to respondents effective 1 January 1997. But
Respondents contend that extending to them the
allowances/fringe benefits meant that they are entitled to the
payment of the same and, hence, they should be given their
allowances reckoned not only from 1 January 1997 but from the
date of their respective appointment, to which PNB did not accede
to. The trial court ruled in favor of the Respondents, and the Court
of Appeals denied petitioners appeal. Thus, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the questioned
fringe benefits
HELD:
The respondents were not entitled to the benefits because they
were hired only after JUNE 30 1989. An incumbent is a person
who is in present possession of an office.
Finally, to explain what July 1, 1989 pertained to, we held in the
prior cases as follows: The date July 1, 1989 becomes crucial
only to determine that as of said date, the officer was an
incumbent and was receiving the RATA, for purposes of entitling
him to its continued grant." Respondents were not deemed
incumbents as defined by settled jurisprudence. Petitioner was
correct in contending that by extending the assailed benefits to
respondents on January 1, 1997, it was not thereby admitting that
the latter were priorly entitled to them. It contends that its
privatization on May 27, 1996 enabled it to grant benefits as it
deemed fit. It could not have granted them while it was still a
government agency, because RA 6758 barred such grant as an
illegal disbursement of public funds. It allegedly accorded them
those benefits, not because it had finally acceded to their
interpretation of the law, but because it was only then that as a
private entity it could legally do so.
The collateral attack on the constitutionality of RA 6758 due to
alleged violation of the equal protection clause cannot prosper,
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly not
collaterally. Furthermore, the constitutional issue was not raised in
the trial court; hence, it cannot now be availed of on appeal to this
Court. Besides, the arguments of respondents rest upon the
validity of Section 12 of RA 6758. How then can they now
challenge the very basis of their arguments?
A law is deemed valid unless declared null and void by a
competent court; more so when the issue has not been duly
pleaded in the trial court. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity. Respondents not only failed to
challenge the constitutionality of RA 6758; worse, they used it in
seeking compensation from petitioner. The settled rule is that
courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
[G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.]
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and
the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653 or the New
Central Bank Act, petitioner Central Bank Employees Association, Inc.,
filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, to restrain them from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is
unconstitutional because the classification of BSP employees provided
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by law is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The thrust of petitioner's
challenge is that the assailed proviso makes an unconstitutional cut
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers
or those exempted from the coverage of R.A. No. 6758 or the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the
coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner contended that the
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on
the SG of the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner further contended
that the assailed proviso is also violative of the equal protection clause
because after it was enacted, the charters of the Government Service
Insurance System, Land Bank of the Philippines, Development Bank of
the Philippines and Social Security System were also amended, and
their respective personnel were all exempted from the coverage of the
SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of Government
Financial Institutions (GFI), the BSP rank-and-file employees are also
discriminated upon.
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid, can become
subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued
operation would violate the equal protection of the law
HELD:
Supreme Court held that with the passage of the subsequent laws
amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial
institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, constitutes invidious
discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the BSP.
The Supreme Court struck down the assailed proviso and held
that with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the
charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions
(GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section
15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, constitutes
invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The disparity of treatment
between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other
seven GFIs definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination. No one can, with candor and fairness, deny the
discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total
exemption of the seven other GFIs from the SSL when such was
withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as unalikes
without any rational basis. The Court emphasized that the equal
protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not
identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
same fashion; whatever restrictions cast on some in the group is
equally binding on the rest. With the lack of real and substantial
distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between the
rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the
enactment of the seven subsequent charters has rendered the
continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to the
equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as
an outlaw.
Wherefor, the continued operation and implementation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is held
unconstitutional.
[G.R. No. 56515. April 3, 1981.]
UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO), vs. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), in two letter-
requests to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated March 10
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RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
and 17,1981, asked for exactly the same opportunity, the same prime
time and the same number of television and radio stations all over the
country to be used in its campaign for "NO" votes in the plebiscite for
the amendments to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the Batasang
Pambansa as that utilized by President Marcos in his nationwide
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" in campaigning for "YES" votes on the
proposed constitutional amendments. The Commission, in its
Resolution of March 18, 1981 denied petitioner's "demand'' being of
the view that the President's remarks on the proposed amendments in
the forementioned radio-television program carried live by twenty-six
(26) television and two hundred forty-eight (248) radio stations
throughout the country were initiated under his leadership and capacity
as President/prime Minister in the exercise of his constitutional
prerogative to determine the program and guidelines of national policy
pursuant to Article IX, Section 2 of the Constitution and not as the head
of any political party. Petitioner's Motion for reconsideration proved
futile, hence this present action, assailing the Comelec's resolutions as
contrary to the Constitution, unjust, unfair and inequitable for violating
the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play, the same not
conducive to insure a free, orderly and honest elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC violated the equal protection clause
for denying UNIDO the same air time in Media as that of the President
in campaigning for the NO votes in the plebiscite for the amendments
to the 1973 Contstitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that when the
President spoke in the nation-wide program "Pulong-Pulong sa
Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President-
Prime Minister and not as the head of the KBL; and that what petitioner
asks cannot be granted for being beyond what the charter, the laws
and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate, for being more than
what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or
privilege inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the
sovereign people when the occasion demands, for being impractical
under prevailing circumstance, and for its failure to join in the petition
the television and radio stations as indispensable parties, thereby
depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act.
Appeal dismissed.
227 SCRA 703 (1993)
PJA VS PRADO
*no case digest submitted*
248 SCRA 700, 1995
OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
*no case digest submitted*
GR No. 127410, January 20, 1999
TIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS
*no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 132527. July 29, 2005
COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. et al vs. RUBEN
TORRES, as Executive Secretary, et al
FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, RA No. 7227 was enacted, providing for, among
other things, the sound and balanced conversion of the Clark and
Subic military reservations and their extensions into alternative
productive uses in the form of special economic zones in order to
promote the economic and social development of Central Luzon in
particular and the country in general. The law contains provisions on
tax exemptions for importations of raw materials, capital and
equipment. After which the President issued several Executive Orders
as mandated by the law for the implementation of RA 7227. Herein
petitioners contend the validity of the tax exemption provided for in the
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Orders issued by President for
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the implementation of the tax exemptions constitutes executive
legislation.
HELD:
To limit the tax-free importation privilege of enterprises located
inside the special economic zone only to raw materials, capital
and equipment clearly runs counter to the intention of the
Legislature to create a free port where the free flow of goods or
capital within, into, and out of the zones is insured.
The phrase tax and duty-free importations of raw materials,
capital and equipment was merely cited as an example of
incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone.
Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, on which petitioners
impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not
apply when words are mentioned by way of example. It is obvious
from the wording of RA No. 7227, particularly the use of the
phrase such as, that the enumeration only meant to illustrate
incentives that the SSEZ is authorized to grant, in line with its
being a free port zone.
The Court finds that the setting up of such commercial
establishments which are the only ones duly authorized to sell
consumer items tax and duty-free is still well within the policy
enunciated in Section 12 of RA No. 7227 that . . .the Subic
Special Economic Zone shall be developed into a self-sustaining,
industrial, commercial, financial and investment center to
generate employment opportunities in and around the zone and to
attract and promote productive foreign investments. However,
the Court reiterates that the second sentences of paragraphs 1.2
and 1.3 of Executive Order No. 97-A, allowing tax and duty-free
removal of goods to certain individuals, even in a limited amount,
from the Secured Area of the SSEZ, are null and void for being
contrary to Section 12 of RA No. 7227. Said Section clearly
provides that exportation or removal of goods from the territory of
the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the
Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes
under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of
the Philippines.
G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000
ISAE v. Hon. Leonardo A. Quisumbing
FACTS:
Private respondent, International School Inc. is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic
personnel and other temporary residents. The school hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying them as
foreign-hires and local-hires. The local-hire faculty members of said
International School, mostly Filipinos, complained against the better
treatment of their colleagues who have been hired abroad. These
foreign-hires enjoy certain benefits not accorded the local-hires which
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave
travel allowance and a salary rate 25% higher than that of the local-
hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by
the school is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the classification employed by the respondent
school constitutes racial discrimination.
Held: YES.
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment
of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires
every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
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employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code
provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both
the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms
and conditions of employment.
In this case, the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent school to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid classification. There is
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of
according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public
policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this
jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal
work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications,
skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its
"international character" notwithstanding. If an employer accords
employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne
by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one
employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain
why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would
be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against
that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee
is treated unfairly.
GR. No. 143076. June 10, 2003
PHILRECA vs. DILG
FACTS:
On May 23, 2003, a class suit was filed by petitioners in their own
behalf and in behalf of other electric cooperatives organized and
existing under PD 269 which are members of petitioner Philippine
Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA). The other
petitioners, electric cooperatives of Agusan del Norte (ANECO), Iloilo 1
(ILECO 1) and Isabela 1 (ISELCO 1) are non-stock, non-profit electric
cooperatives organized and existing under PD 269, as amended, and
registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA).
Under Sec. 39 of PD 269 electric cooperatives shall be exempt from
the payment of all National Government, local government, and
municipal taxes and fee, including franchise, fling recordation, license
or permit fees or taxes and any fees, charges, or costs involved in any
court or administrative proceedings in which it may be party.
From 1971to 1978, in order to finance the electrification projects
envisioned by PD 269, as amended, the Philippine Government, acting
through the National Economic council and the NEA, entered into six
loan agreements with the government of the United States of America,
through the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) with electric cooperatives as beneficiaries. The loan
agreements contain similarly worded provisions on the tax application
of the loan and any property or commodity acquired through the
proceeds of the loan.
Petitioners allege that with the passage of the Local Government Code
their tax exemptions have been validly withdrawn. Particularly,
petitioners assail the validity of Sec. 193 and 234 of the said code.
Sec. 193 provides for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges
granted to all persons, whether natural or juridical, except cooperatives
duly registered under RA 6938, while Sec. 234 exempts the same
cooperatives from payment of real property tax.
ISSUES:
1. WON the Local Government Code (under Sec. 193 and 234)
violated the equal protection clause since the provisions unduly
discriminate against petitioners who are duly registered
cooperatives under PD 269, as amended, and no under RA 6938
or the Cooperatives Code of the Philippines?
2. Is there an impairment of the obligations of contract under the
loan entered into between the Philippine and the US
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Governments?
HELD:
1. No. The guaranty of the equal protection clause is not violated by
a law based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be
reasonable must (a) rest on substantial classifications; (b)
germane to the purpose of the law; c) not limited to the existing
conditions only; and (d) apply equally to all members of the same
class. We hold that there is reasonable classification under the
Local Government Code to justify the different tax treatment
between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 and electric
cooperatives under RA 6938.
First, substantial distinctions exist between cooperatives under
PD 269 and those under RA 6938. In the former, the government
is the one that funds those so-called electric cooperatives, while
in the latter, the members make equitable contribution as source
of funds.
a. Capital Contributions by Members Nowhere in PD 269 does it
require cooperatives to make equitable contributions to capital.
Petitioners themselves admit that to qualify as a member of an
electric cooperative under PD 269, only the payment of a P5.00
membership fee is required which is even refundable the moment
the member is no longer interested in getting electric service from
the cooperative or will transfer to another place outside the area
covered by the cooperative. However, under the Cooperative
Code, the articles of cooperation of a cooperative applying for
registration must be accompanied with the bonds of the
accountable officers and a sworn statement of the treasurer
elected by the subscribers showing that at least 25% of the
authorized share capital has been subscribed and at least 25% of
the total subscription has been paid and in no case shall the paid-
up share capital be less than P2,000.00.
b. Extent of Government Control over Cooperatives The extent
of government control over electric cooperatives covered by PD
269 is largely a function of the role of the NEA as a primary
source of funds of these electric cooperatives. Amendments were
primarily geared to expand the powers of NEA over the electric
cooperatives to ensure that loans granted to them would be
repaid to the government. In contrast, cooperatives under RA
6938 are envisioned to be self-sufficient and independent
organizations with minimal government intervention or regulation.
Second, the classification of tax-exempt entities in the Local
Government Code is germane to the purpose of the law. The
Constitutional mandate that every local government unit shall
enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of the
power by the local governments is beyond the regulation of
Congress. Sec. 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative
intent to vet broad taxing powers upon the local government units
and to limit exemptions from local taxation to entities specifically
provided therein.
Finally, Sec. 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable
classification as these exemptions are not limited to existing
conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class.
2. No. It is ingrained in jurisprudence that the constitutional
prohibition on the impairment of the obligations of contracts does
not prohibit every change in existing laws. To fall within the
prohibition, the change must not only impair the obligation of the
existing contract, but the impairment must be substantial.
Moreover, to constitute impairment, the law must affect a change
in the rights of the parties with reference to each other and not
with respect to non-parties.
The quoted provision under the loan agreement does not purport
to grant any tax exemption in favor of any party to the contract,
including the beneficiaries thereof. The provisions simply shift the
tax burden, if any, on the transactions under the loan agreements
to the borrower and/or beneficiary of the loan. Thus, the
withdrawal by the Local Government Code under Sec. 193 and
234 of the tax exemptions previously enjoyed by petitioners does
not impair the obligation of the borrower, the lender or the
beneficiary under the loan agreements as, in fact, no tax
exemption is granted therein.
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GR Nos. 133640, 133661 and 139147, 25 November 2005,
RODOLFO S. BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide
an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It was
approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and
was subsequently published in the Official Gazette on August 18,
1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994. On April 28, 1995,
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated
by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH).
Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides, Phase-out of Commercial
Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out
over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act,
extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.
Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall
effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period
of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years
after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be
based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety.
Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of
1994, petitioners have already been operating commercial blood
banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled An Act Regulating
the Collection, Processing and Sale of Human Blood, and the
Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood
Processing Laboratories.
The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the
establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood
banks and blood processing laboratories.
On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to
petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 constitutes undue
delegation of legislative powers
2. Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules
violate the equal protection clause
3. Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power
HELD:
Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are
constitutional and valid.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994
is complete in itself.
It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature
intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has
mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of these
is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country.
The law has sufficiently provided a definite standard for the
guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions,
that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. The
Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719,
broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. In this regard,
the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the
Act when said phase-out period was extended in accordance with
the Act as laid out in Section 2.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will
cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation,
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discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or
capriciously is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which
make real differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the
law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d)
must apply equally to each member of the class.
We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the
following reasons: First, it was based on substantial distinctions.
Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of
commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe
blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating blood
transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a
commodity. Third, the Legislature intended for the general
application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the
peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to
apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the
State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental
concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted
in the exercise of the States police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety.
Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the
constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a
wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by
petitioners, is for Congress to determine.
GR No. 158793, June 8, 2006
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways
FACTS:
On January 10, 2001, petitioners filed before the trial court a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order and Injunction docketed as Civil Case No. 01-
034. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the following
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the provisions
of Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act"
enacted in 1957:
a. DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1968;
b. DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series of 1993;
c. Art. II, Sec. 3(a) of the Revised Rules on Limited Access
Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the DPWH thru the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB).
Previously, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. 2000, DPWH
issued on June 25, 1998 Department Order (DO) No. 215
declaring the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway as
limited access facilities.
Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,
2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the
said administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on
motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon
Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll
Expressway under DO 215.
On June 28, 2001, the trial court, thru then Presiding Judge
Teofilo Guadiz, after due hearing, issued an order granting
petitioners application for preliminary injunction. On July 16,
2001, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the trial court,
conditioned upon petitioners filing of cash bond in the amount of
P100,000.00, which petitioners subsequently complied with.
On July 18, 2001, the DPWH acting thru the TRB, issued
Department Order No. 123 allowing motorcycles with engine
displacement of 400 cubic centimeters inside limited access
facilities (toll ways).
Upon the assumption of Honorable Presiding Judge Ma. Cristina
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Cornejo, both the petitioners and respondents were required to
file their respective Memoranda. Petitioners likewise filed [their]
Supplemental Memorandum. Thereafter, the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
Consequently, on March 10, 2003, the trial court issued the
assailed decision dismissing the petition but declaring invalid DO
123. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal of
their petition; but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
June 16, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether DO 74, DO 215 and the TRB regulations contravene RA
2000
2. Whether AO 1 and DO 123 are unconstitutional
HELD:
The Supreme Court declared constitutional AO 1, issued by the
then Department of Public Works and Communications on
February 19, 1968, that bans the use of bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, motorcycles, or any nonmotorized vehicle on limited
access highways. The Court explained that since the tollway is
not an ordinary road, the same necessitates the imposition of
guidelines in the manner of its use and operation.
On the other hand, the Court declared unconstitutional and in
violation of The Limited Access Highway Act (RA 2000)
Department Orders 74 and 215 released by the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as well as the Revised
Rules and Regulations on Limited Access Facilities of the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB). Department Orders 74 and 215, dated
April 5, 1993 and June 25, 1998, respectively, declared the North
and South Luzon (DO 74), and the Manila-Cavite Toll
Expressways (DO 215) as limited access facilities. The Court
explained that at the time DPWH issued these orders, it no longer
had authority to regulate activities related to transportation.
In contrast, AO 1 was issued in 1968 by the then Department of
Public Works and Communications when it had the authority to
regulate limited access facilities.
Likewise, the Court upheld the decision of the Makati City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 147 declaring DO 123, which limits
access to the above expressways to only 400cc motorcycles, as
unconstitutional for want of authority of the DPWH to promulgate
the said order.
G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
People vs. Jalosjos
FACTS:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed
to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of
popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to
discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives
HELD:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights
arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by
law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members
of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
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special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent
members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a
legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with
a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually
make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his
position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Trillanes vs Pimentel
FACTS:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300
heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation
of the President and key national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state
of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the
rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension
and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the
militant soldiers that evening.
In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood
Incident," petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along
with his comrades, with coup d'etat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in
detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in
the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007.
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007,
petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an
"Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend
Senate Sessions and Related Requests
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his
requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to
three.[7] The trial court just the same denied the motion.
The present petition for certiorari to set aside the two Orders of
the trial court, and for prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be
Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests
constitutional.
HELD:
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken
into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less
than the Constitution provides.
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
It is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the
evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid
curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case
against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released
on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can
not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention.
Petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain
detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-
bailable offenses, like former President Joseph Estrada and
former Governor Nur Misuari who were allowed to attend "social
functions." Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of the more
serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner
harps on an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.
In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment
of detention prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he
intentionally did not seek preferential treatment in the form of
being placed under Senate custody or house arrest, yet he at the
same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.\
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would
be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
USA vs PURGANAN
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,# the United
States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16,
1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary
of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought
and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 25.# The TRO prohibited the Department
of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to
grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment
and supporting evidence.
The Court held that private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United
States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with
the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition
In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for
the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to
Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez
filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,# which
prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial
court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in
case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
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amount of P100,000.
The Court directed the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.#
After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
ISSUE: Whether or not being an elected member of the House of
Representatives is compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail.
HELD:
After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have
the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger
to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or
compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest
court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be
considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special
circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it
is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts
of each case.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all
persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government
may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public
officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly [from]
prison. The duties imposed by the mandate of the people are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate,
charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to
function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members.
A police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the
call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different
classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest[,] wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The
functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to
all those belonging to the same class.
GR No. 147387, December 10, 2003
Farinas vs Executive Secretary
FACTS:
The petitioners come to the Court alleging in the main that
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring
every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in
its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006
constitutes a proscribed rider.
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Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of
the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it
repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving
intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any
person holding a public appointive office or position, including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and
officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates
against appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an
elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom
upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue
in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election
for another elective position. On the other hand, Section 66 has
been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from their offices
upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The respondents petitions contending, preliminarily, that the
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present suit.
Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine. The signatures of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House, appearing on the bill
and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both
houses of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill
was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a
proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is so broad
that it encompasses all the processes involved in an election
exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by
elective officials.
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a
definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions.# On the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing
authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure# while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is
that appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil
service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under
the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees
holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take
part in political and electoral activities.
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two
classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their
tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for
any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not
within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom
of this classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive officials, is anchored
upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons
belonging under the same classification are similarly treated, the
equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not infringed.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve
themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
government. When the validity of a statute is challenged on
constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power.# No such transgression has been
shown in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED
GR No. 1288845, June 01, 2000
INTL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS QUISUMBING
*no case digest submitted*

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

HELD:
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code pertaining to elective officials gives undue
benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not
absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make
real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.# The Court has explained the nature of
the equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by
territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
- THE NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE -
EMERGENCY POWERS
93 PHIL 68, 1953
RUTTER VS ESTEBAN
*no case digest submitted*
ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES
154 SCRA 142, 1987
VILLANUEVA VS CASTANEDA
*no case digest submitted*
G.R. No. 71169 December 22, 1988
SANGALANG VS IAC
FACTS:
Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now
Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block
Bel-Air Village was owned and developed into a residential
subdivision in the 1950s by Makati Development Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as MDC), which in 1968 was merged with
appellant Ayala
The lots which were acquired by appellees Sangalang and
spouse Gaston and spouse and Briones and spouse in 1960,
1957 and 1958, respectively, were all sold by MDC subject to
certain conditions and easements contained in Deed Restrictions
which formed a part of each deed of sale
The owner of this lot/s or his successors in interest is required to
be and is automatically a member of the Bel-Air Association and
must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the
Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the
general welfare
On April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its
ordinance No. 81, providing for the zonification of Makati . Under
this Ordinance, Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary in the south extending to the
center line of Jupiter Street
There is a perimeter wall then standing on the commercial side of
Jupiter Street the destruction of which opened the street to the
public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MMC Ordinance represents a legitmate
exercise of police power?
HELD :
Undoubtedly, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of
police power. The petitioners have not shown why we should hold
otherwise other than for the supposed "non-impairment" guaranty of
the Constitution, which, as we have declared, is secondary to the more
compelling interests of general welfare. The Ordinance has not been
shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant the
reversal of the judgments so appealed.
[G.R. No. 126102. December 4, 2000]
ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
and ISMAEL G. MATHAY III, respondents.
FACTS:
On August 25, 1976, petitioner Ortigas & Company sold to Emilia
Hermoso, a parcel of land known as Lot 1, Block 21, Psd-66759,
with an area of 1,508 square meters, located in Greenhills
Subdivision IV, San Juan, Metro Manila, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 0737. The contract of sale provided that
the lot: be used exclusivelyfor residential purposes only, and
not more than one single-family residential building will be
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constructed thereon, The BUYER shall not erectany sign or
billboard on the rooffor advertising purposes restrictions shall
run with the land and shall be construed as real covenants until
December 31, 2025 when they shall cease and terminateThese
and the other conditions were duly annotated on the certificate of
title issued to Emilia.
In 1981, the Metropolitan Manila Commission (now Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority) enacted MMC Ordinance No. 81-
01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the
National Capital Region. The ordinance reclassified as a
commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue from Madison to
Roosevelt Streets of Greenhills Subdivision where the lot is
located.
On June 8, 1984, private respondent Ismael Mathay III leased the
lot from Emilia Hermoso and J.P. Hermoso Realty Corp.. The
lease contract did not specify the purposes of the lease.
Thereupon, private respondent constructed a single story
commercial building for Greenhills Autohaus, Inc., a car sales
company.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the restrictions must prevail over the ordinance,
specially since these restrictions were agreed upon before the
passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01?
2. Whether or not respondent Mathay III, as a mere lessee of the lot
in question, is a total stranger to the deed of sale and is thus
barred from questioning the conditions of said deed
HELD:
The legal system upholds the sanctity of contract so that a
contract is deemed law between the contracting parties,#
nonetheless, stipulations in a contract cannot contravene law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Non
impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield
to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of police
power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order, safety, and general welfare of the people.# Moreover,
statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every
contract.
A real party in interest is defined as the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. It is noted that the lessee who built the
commercial structure, it is he and he alone who stands to be
either benefited or injured by the results of the judgment in Civil
Case No. 64931. He avers he is the party with real interest in the
subject matter of the action, as it would be his business, not the
Hermosos.
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
AURELIO TIRO vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 11616 of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official
capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears
that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu
City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and
special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect
their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the
Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of
the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated
December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of
attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro
pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the
prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the
ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
21.
ISSUE: The core issue is whether or not Circular No. 21 is valid and
enforceable and the answer is definitely in the affirmative.
HELD:
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a
teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to
him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government.
Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the
payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the
consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands
on firm legal footing.
Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts
with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent
Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the
Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its
competence to do.
ADMIN REG - RENTAL LAWS
G.R. No. 77365 April 7, 1992
Caleon vs. Agus Development Corporation
FACTS:
Respondent is the owner of a parcel of land which it leased to
petitioner Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner
constructed on the lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the
consent of the private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the
four doors of the apartment for a monthly rental of P350.00 each. Upon
learning of the sub-lease, private respondent through counsel
demanded in writing that the petitioner vacate the leased premises. For
failure of petitioner to comply with the demand, private respondent filed
a complaint for ejectment against the petitioner citing as ground
therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, Section 5, which is
the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased premises to third
persons without securing the consent of the lessor within the required
sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law (B.P. 25).
The petitioner argued that the said law cannot be applied because
there is a perfected contract of lease without any express prohibition in
subleasing which had been in effect between the parties long before
the enactment of BP 25.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 25 which is a ground for Ejectment.
2. WON Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 in application to the case at bar, is
unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
3. WON the petitioner can invoke the promotion of social justice
policy of the New Constitution.
HELD:
The issue has already been laid to rest in the case of Duellome
vs. Gotico where the court ruled that the leased of the building
naturally includes the lease of the lot, and the rentals of the
building to the lot. Under our Civil Code, the occupancy of a
building or house not only suggests or implies the tenancy or
possession in fact on the land on which they are constructed. In
the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that petitioner in leasing her
apartment has also subleased the lot on which it is constructed
which lot belongs to private respondent. Consequently, she has
violated the provisions of Section 5, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25
which enumerates the grounds for judicial ejectment, among
which is the subleasing of residential units without the written
consent of the owner/lessor.
Well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt.
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In any event, it is now beyond question that the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by
and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the
interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. This
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the
contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or
protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not militate
against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by
the paramount police power.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is derived from P.D. No. 20 which has
been declared by this Court as a police power legislation,
applicable to leases entered into prior to July 14, 1971 (effectivity
date of RA 6539), so that the applicability thereof to existing
contracts cannot be denied.
Finally, petitioner invokes, among others, the promotion of social
justice policy of the New Constitution. Like P.D. No. 20, the
objective of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 is to remedy the plight of
lessees, but such objective is not subject to exploitation by the
lessees for whose benefit the law was enacted. Thus, the
prohibition provided for in the law against the sublease of the
premises without the consent of the owner. As enunciated by this
Court, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be
invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under
our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The
social justice consecrated in our Constitution was not intended to
take away rights from a person and give them to another who is
not entitled thereto.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
ADMIN REG - TAX EXEMPTIONS
G.R. No. 131359 May 5, 1999
MERALCO vs. Province of Laguna and Benito Balazo
FACTS:
Province of Laguna by virtue of existing laws issued resolutions
through their respective municipal councils granting franchise in
favor of petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the
supply of electric light, heat and power within their concerned
areas.
On 1991, Republic Act No. 7160 was enacted to take effect on
1992 enjoining local government units to create their own sources
of revenue and to levy taxes, fees and charges, subject to the
limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Pursuant to the provisions of the Code,
respondent province enacted an Ordinance imposing a tax on
business enjoying a franchise, at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of
one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include
both cash sales and sales on account realized during the
preceding calendar year within this province, including the
territorial limits on any city located in the province.
Based on the ordinance, respondent Provincial Treasurer sent a
demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment.
Petitioner paid the tax which is under protest. A formal claim for
refund was thereafter sent by MERALCO to the Provincial
Treasurer of Laguna claiming that the franchise tax it had paid
and continued to pay to the National Government pursuant to
P.D. 551 already included the franchise tax imposed by the
Provincial Tax Ordinance. MERALCO contended that the
imposition of a franchise tax under Laguna Provincial Ordinance,
contravened the provisions of Section 1 of P.D. 551 which
provides, Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary
notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of
franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light,
heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts
received from the sale of electric current and from transactions
incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric
current.*** Such franchise tax shall be payablebe in lieu of all
taxes and assessments of whatever nature imposed by any
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and
privilege of generation, distribution and sale of electric current.
The claim was denied; respondents relied on a more recent law,
Republic Act No. 7160 than the old decree invoked by petitioner.
Petitioner MERALCO filed a complaint for refund.
ISSUE: WON Laguna Provincial ordinance is violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution and of PD No. 551.
HELD:
Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except
to the extent that such power might be delegated to them either
by the basic law or by statute. Under the now prevailing
Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by
statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although
Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The
basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and
self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them
general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental
law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and
unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure
that, while the local government units are being strengthened and
made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a)
the taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple
and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will
have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the
national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local
taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.
Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out the Constitutional
mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units,
the Local Government Code has effectively withdrawn under
Section 193 of RA 7160, tax exemptions or incentives enjoyed by
certain entities.
In the recent case the Court has held that the phrase in lieu of all
taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local
Government Code specifically providing for the withdrawal of such
exemptions, privileges, and that upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code all exemptions except only as provided therein
can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim liability for the
local tax. In fine, the Court has viewed its previous rulings as
laying stress more on the legislative intent of the amendatory law
whether the tax exemption privilege is to be withdrawn or not
rather than on whether the law can withdraw, without violating the
Constitution, the tax exemption or not.
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax
exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the nature
of contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the
franchise, these exemptions are far from being strictly contractual
in nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the
term and where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can
rightly be invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in
contracts, such as those contained in government bonds or
debentures, lawfully entered into by them under enabling laws in
which the government, acting in its private capacity, sheds its
cloak of authority and waives its governmental immunity. Truly,
tax exemptions of this kind may not be revoked without impairing
the obligations of contracts.
These contractual tax exemptions are not to be confused
with tax exemptions granted under franchises. A franchise
partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Article XII,
Section 11, of the 1987 Constitution, like its precursor provisions
in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no
franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress as and when the
common good so requires.
Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. L-13307 February 3, 1919
La Insular vs. Machuca
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FACTS:
La Insular is a commercial partnership engaged in the
manufacture of cigars and cigarettes in the city of Manila. On
1913, a contract was entered into between its general agent and
the two defendants, Manuel Nubla Co-Siong and Rafael Machuca
Go-Tauco, whereby the plaintiff became obliged to supply
cigarettes daily to Manuel Nubla. The price was fixed at 172 per
box. Manuel is the principal obligor while Rafael Machuca bound
himself as surety, jointly and severally with Manuel Nubla. It
appears that when the contract was executed cigarettes were
subject to a specific tax of the peso for each thousand cigarettes.
This tax was, under the law then prevailing, paid by the
manufacturer, and the liability for said tax naturally fell upon the
plaintiff. By Act No. 2432, enacted December 23, 1914, the
Philippine Legislature increased the specific tax on cigarettes
from P1 to P1.20 per thousand cigarettes, and by amendatory Act
No. 2445, effective from January 1, 1915, it was declared that, as
regards contracts already made for future delivery, the burden of
the increased tax should, unless the parties should have
otherwise agreed, be borne by the person to whom the article
taxed should be furnished.
After this provision become effective, the plaintiff continued, as
before, to pay the internal-revenue taxes and in order to
reimburse itself to the extent of the outlay incident to the increase
in the tax added the amount of P10 per box to the price of the
cigarettes. The monthly statements thereafter submitted to the
purchaser by the plaintiff showed this increase; and as payments
were from time to time made by Nubla, they were credited by the
plaintiff upon account, with the result that, upon the showing of
the plaintiff's books and assuming that Nubla had been properly
charged with the increased tax, all cigarettes delivered prior to
August 1, 1916, had been fully paid for. During the months of
August and September, however, fifty-six cases of cigarettes
were taken by Nubla, for which no payment has been made; and
for the recovery of the amount alleged to be due for these
cigarettes this action was instituted by the plaintiff in the Court of
First Instance. Judgment having been there rendered in favor of
the plaintiff, both defendants have appealed. The trial court ruled
that as a surety, Machuras liability was limited to the payment of
the price stipulated in the original contract.
ISSUE: WON Legislative Acts mentioned altered the obligation of the
contract in question as to release the surety in his indebtedness.
HELD:
Article 1827 of the Civil Code declares that the liability of a surety
is not to be extended, by implication, beyond the terms of his
contract. Well-recognized rule of jurisprudence, that if any
material alteration or change in the obligation of the principal
obligator is effected by the immediate parties to the contract,
without the asset of the surety, the latter is discharged. In order to
effect a release of the surety, the change in the contract must, as
a general rule, be made by the principal parties to the contract.
Indeed, no valid or effective change in the contract can, generally
speaking, be made by any other person than the actual parties
thereto. A recognized exception more apparent than real is
found in cases where sureties on official bonds have been held to
be released as a result of changes effected by the Legislature in
the duration of the official term or in the duties of the officer whose
fidelity is intended to be secured by the bond. The law is
particularly watchful over the rights of sureties. To permit parties
to alter and modify their contracts as they please, and to hold the
sureties answerable for the performance of such parts as were
not altered, would be transferring their responsibility, without their
consent, from one contract to another. The contract, by the
modification and alternation, becomes a new and different
contract, and one for which the sureties never become
responsible.
Based on the recognized exemption, the Acts of the Legislature
by which the increased tax on cigarettes was imposed neither
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
impaired, in a constitutional sense, the obligation of the contract
which is the basis of this action nor changed that obligation in
such sense as to occasion the discharge of the surety.
The surety is clearly bound by the application of the payments
made by the creditor with the assent of the principal debtor, and
no doubt that when Manuel Nubla from time to time paid the bills
submitted by the plaintiff, and which, after January 1, 1915,
showed an increased of P10 per case in the price of the
cigarettes, he very well knew that this additional amount was due
to the inclusion of the new tax paid by the plaintiff.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
ADMIN REG - POLICE POWER
GR L-63419, 18 December 1986
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
FACTS:
Lozano vs. Martinez (GR L-63419), Lobaton vs. Cruz (GR L-
66839-42), Datuin vs. Pano (GR 71654), Violago vs. Pano (GR
74524-25), Abad vs. Gerochi (GR 75122-49), Aguiliz vs. Presiding
Judge of Branch 154 (GR 75812-13), Hojas vs. Penaranda (GR
75765-67) and People vs. Nitafan (GR 75789) are cases involving
prosecution of offenses under BP 22 which were consolidated
herein as the parties (defendants) thereto question the
constitutionality of the statute, BP 22.
The defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not
constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The
motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one
case, which is the subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial
court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case.
The parties adversely affected asked for relief.
ISSUE: Whether BP 22 is constitutional.
HELD: YES.
The language of BP22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks,
whether present dated or post dated, whether issued in payment of
pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange
for something of value. BP 22 is aimed to put a stop or to curb the
practice of issuing worthless checks, which is proscribed by the State
because of the injury it causes to public interests. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless
check or a check which is dishonored upon its presentation for
payment. it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law publishes the act not as an offense against
property but an offense against public order. The enactment of BP 22
is a valid exercise of police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The statute is
not unconstitutional.
G.R. No. L-20344 May 16, 1966
ILUSORIO VS. CAR
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic
Act No. 1199, as amended, upon the ground that it violates the
freedom of contract and impairs property rights, as well as the
obligation of contracts.
Petitioners herein, Potenciano Ilusorio and Teresa Ilusorio, are
co-owners of a parcel of land situated in the Barrio of Bantug,
Municipality of San Miguel, Province of Bulacan. The main
respondents herein have for years worked on said land under the
share tenancy system. Before the beginning of the agricultural
year 1960-1961, they gave notice to the petitioners, in conformity
with the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, that they (respondents) wanted to change their tenancy
contract from said system to leasehold tenancy. The Ilusorios
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having refused to agree thereto, said respondents and three
other tenants whose claims were dismissed by the Court of
Agrarian Relations instituted this proceedings, in said court, on
November 16, 1960. The main defense set up by petitioners
herein, as respondents in said court, is that the aforementioned
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, is
unconstitutional, which was rejected by the lower court. Hence
this appeal in which the Ilusorios maintain: (1) that said provision
is unconstitutional; and (2) that the lower court had acted
arbitrarily in fixing the rentals collectible by them from
respondents herein at 20% of the average harvest for the
agricultural years 1959-1960, 1960-1961, and 1961-1962.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the prohibition against impairment of contracts is
absolute.
2. Whether R.A. 1199 is constitutional.
HELD:
1. NO. The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against
impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one. Such
provisions are restricted to contracts with respect property, or
some object of value, and confer rights which may be asserted in
a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to
public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers
of the State, and involving the public right and public welfare of
the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent proper
exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals,
comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts
may thereby be affected; for such matter cannot be placed by
contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control
them.
2. YES. Republic Act 1199m including Section 14 thereof, which
permits the tenants to change the nature of their relation with their
landlord from tenancy system to leasehold tenancy, is
constitutional. It is a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to
the social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise
of the police power of the State to promote the common weal. It is
a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the
general legislative powers of the State and involving the public
rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it.
Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy law enacted by our
law-making body, was passed by Congress in compliance with
the constitutional mandate that "the promotion of social justice to
insure the well-being and economic security of all the people
should be the concern of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the
State shall regulate the relations between landlord and tenant ...
in agriculture ... ." (Art. XIV, see. 6).
G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983
TIRO VS. HONTANOSAS
FACTS:
Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official
capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. It appears
that Zafra had extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu
City and the teachers concerned executed promissory notes and
special powers of attorney in favor of Zafra to take and collect
their salary checks from the Division Office in Cebu City of the
Bureau of Public Schools. However, Tiro forbade the collection of
the checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, series 1969, dated
December 5, 1969, of the Director of Public Schools.
Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the special powers of
attorney; to declare Circular No. 21 to be illegal; and to make Tiro
pay attorney's fees and damages. The trial court granted the
prayer of Zafra but the claim for money was disallowed on the
ground that he acted in good faith in implementing Circular No.
21.
Tiro now seeks in this petition for review a reversal of the trial
court's decision.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
RM 410 - CONSOLIDATED DIGESTS
ISSUE: The petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of P.D. No.
ISSUE: Whether Circular No. 21 impairs the obligation of contracts. 1808.

HELD: NO. HELD:

Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts The stated objective of the decree, namely, to resolve the land
with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent tenure problem in the Agno-Leveriza area to allow the
Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the implementation of the comprehensive development plans for this
Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its depressed community, provides the justification for the exercise of
competence to do. the police power of the State. The police power of the State has
The salary check of a government officer or employee such as a been described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
teacher does not belong to him before it is physically delivered to powers.1 It is a power inherent in the State, plenary, "suitably
him. Until that time the check belongs to the Government. vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception
Accordingly, before there is actual delivery of the check, the that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the
payee has no power over it; he cannot assign it without the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not
consent of the Government. On this basis Circular No. 21 stands intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
on firm legal footing. obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measure to
ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare.
207 SCRA 748 The objection raised by petitioners that P.D. No. 1808 impairs the
CANLEON VS AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP. obligations of contract is without merit. The constitutional guaranty
*no case digest submitted* of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by and
subject to the exercise of the police power of the State in the
GR No. 109405, September 11, 1998 interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. For
BLAQUERA VS ALCALA the same reason, petitioners can not complain that they are being
*no case digest submitted* deprived of their property without due process of law.
Nor can petitioners claim that their properties are being
123 SCRA 713 expropriated without just compensation, since Sec. 3 of P.D. No.
GANZON VS INSTERTO 1808 provides for just compensation to lot owners who have fully
*no case digest submitted* paid their obligations to the City of Manila under their respective
contracts before the issuance of the decree. However, in
accordance with our decision in Export Processing Zone Authority
ADMIN REG - EMINENT DOMAIN POWER vs. Hon. Ceferino Dulay, etc., et al., G.R. No. 59603, April 29,
1987, which declared P.D. No. 1533 unconstitutional, those lot
owners who have not yet received compensation under the
156 SCRA 623 decree are entitled to a judicial determination of the just
Kabilang vs. NHA compensation for their lots.
FACTS:
On May 21, 1986, petitioners filed an Amended Petition, accompanied ADMIN REG - FRANCHISES, PRIVILEGES, LICENSES
by a motion to admit said amended petition. In the Amended Petition,
the petitioners (only four of whom are original petitioners, the rest GR No. 162243, November 29, 2006
being newly impleaded) invoke as an additional ground the alleged ALVAREZ VS PICOP RESOURCES
non-publication of P.D. No. 1808. On May 29,1981, the Court admitted *no case digest submitted*
the Amended Petition and required respondents to comment thereon.
The Court further required the Republic of the Philippines to move in
the premises within ten (10) days from notice, considering the
supervening events that had transpired since the filing of the
respective memoranda of the petitioners and the respondent Republic
of the Philippines. Respondent NHA submitted its comment on June
11, 1986, stating that contrary to petitioners' allegation in the Amended
Petition, P.D. No. 1808 was published in the Official Gazette of
October 4, 1982 (Volume 78, No. 40, pp. 5481-4 to 5486-8) and
reiterating its arguments discussed in its comment dated September 4,
1981 on the original petition and its later comment/opposition dated
March 19, 1982. On July 2, 1986, the NHA filed a manifestation by way
of report on the current status of the subject property, stating inter alia
1) that all available workable areas in the subject property, totalling
approximately 3.1 hectares and consisting of 378 lots averaging 50
square meters each, have been substantially developed, except for
some minor repair work still to be undertaken; 2) that the NHA has
already invested P3 million representing the cost of implementing the
development plans in the workable areas of the project site; 3) that in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1808, the N HA has already
deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount equivalent to
the cost of all subdivision lots in the project site; 4) that 76 landowners
have already withdrawn the corresponding compensation for their
respective lots, totalling Pl,919,402.44, while 72 landowners including
the petitioners Robidante L. Kabiling, et al. have not yet claimed the
compensation for their respective lots totalling Pl,581,676.52; and 5)
that all titles to the homelots, except the lost title of Cresencio Deboma,
which is undergoing reconstitution, have already been transferred to
respondent NHA pursuant to the provision of P.D. No. 1808.

UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS / ROOM 410 (2009-2010)

Marianne Cabacungan

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