Escolar Documentos
Profissional Documentos
Cultura Documentos
LABOR STANDARDS
CASE DIGESTS (S. Y. 2014-2015)
SUBMITTED BY:
SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. JEFFERSON M. MARQUEZ
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Basic Principles
1. Singer Sewing Machine vs. NLRC, 193 SCRA 271
2. Manila Golf Club vs. IAC, 237 SCRA 207
3. Encyclopedia Britanica vs. NLRC, 264 SCRA 4 [96]
4. Carungcong vs. Sunlife, 283 SCRA 319
5. Ramos vs. CA, 380 SCRA 467
6. Sonza vs. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 138051, June 10, 2004
7. Lazaro vs. Social Security Commission, 435 SCRA 472 [2004]
8. Phil. Global Communication vs. De Vera, 459 SCRA 260 [2005]
9. ABS-CBN vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. 164156, Sept. 26, 2006
10. Francisco vs. NLRC, 500 SCRA 690 [06]
11. Nogales et al., vs. Capitol Medical Center et al., G.R. No. 142625, December 19, 2006
12. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., vs. Dr. Climaco, G.R. No. 146881, February 15, 2007
13. Calamba Medical Center vs. NLRC et al., G.R. No. 176484, Nov. 25, 2008
14. Escasinas et al., vs. Shangri-las Mactan Island Resort et al., G.R. No. 178827, March 4,
2009
15. Tongko vs. Manufacturer Life Insurance Co. (Phils), Inc., et al., G.R. No. 167622, January
25, 2011
16. Caong, Jr. vs. Begualos, GR No. 179428, Jan. 26, 2011
17. Atok Big Wedge Company vs. Gison, G.R. No. 169510, August 8, 2011
18. Semblante et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 196426, August 15, 2011
19. Bernarte vs. Phil. Basketball Association et al., G.R. No. 192084, September 14, 2011
20. Lirio vs. Genovia, G.r. No. 169757, November 23, 2011
21. Jao vs. BCC Products Sales Inc. G.R. No. 163700, April 18, 2012
22. Legend Hotel (Manila) vs. Realuyo G.R. No. 153511, July 18, 2012
23. The New Philippine Skylanders, Inc., vs. Dakila, G.r. No. 199547, Sept. 24, 2012
24. Tesoro et al., vs. Metro Manila Retreaders Inc., et al., GR No. 171482, March 12, 2014
HIRING OF EMPLOYEE
25. Ollendorf vs. Abrahanson, 38 Phil 585
26. Del Castillo vs. Richmond, 45 Phil. 679
27. PT&T vs. NLRC, 272 SCRA 596 [1997]
28. Duncan Asso. Of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., G.R. No. 162994, Sept. 17,
2004
29. City of Manila vs. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
30. Star Paper Corp., vs. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006
31. Del Monte Phils vs. Velasco, G.R. No. 153477, March 6, 2007
32. Yrasuegui vs. Phil Air Lines, G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008
WAGE & THE WAGE RATIONALITAZION ACT
33. Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa vs. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 [1991]
34. Employers Confederation of the Phils., vs. NWPC, 201 SCRA 759 [1991]
35. Mabeza vs. NLRC, 271 SCRA 670
36. Joy Brothers Inc., vs. NWPC, 273 SCRA 622 [1997]
37. Prubankers Asso. Vs. Prudential Bank, 302 SCRA 74 [1999]
38. Millare vs. NLRC, 305 SCRA 501
39. International School Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing, 333 SCRA 13 [2000]
40. Bankard Employees Union vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 140689, Feb. 17, 2004
41. Odango vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 147420, June 10, 2004
42. C. Planas Commercial vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 144619, Nov. 11, 2005
43. EJR Crafts Corp., vs. CA, G.R. No. 154101, March 10, 2006
44. Pag Asa Steel Works vs. CA, G.R. No. 166647, March 31, 2006
45. Metropolitan Bank vs. NWPC, G.R. No. 144322, Feb. 6, 2007
46. Equitable Bank vs. Sadac, G.R. No. 164772, June 8, 2006, citing Songco vs. NLRC, 183
SCRA 618
47. S.I.P. Food House et al., vs. Batolina, GR No. 192473, Oct 11, 2010
48. SLL International Cables Specialist vs. NLRC, GR No. 172161, March 2, 2011
49. Vergara, Jr. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc. G.R. No. 176985, April 1, 2013
50. Royal Plant Workers Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils Inc. -Cebu Plant, G.R. No. 198783,
April 15, 2013
51. The National Wages & Productivity Commission et al., vs. The Alliance of Progressive
Labor et al., GR No. 150326, March 12, 2014
WAGE ENFORCEMENT AND RECOVERY
52. Rajah Humabon Hotel vs. Trajano, 226 SCRA 332
Facts: Three separate proceedings, all initiated by Llamar and his fellow
caddies gave rise to the present petition for review which was originally filed
with the Social Security Commission (SSC) via petition of 17 persons who
styled themselves "Caddies of Manila Golf and Country Club-PTCCEA" for
coverage and availment of benefits under the Social Security Act as
amended, "PTCCEA" being the acronym of a labor organization, the
"Philippine Technical, Clerical, Commercial Employees Association," with
which the petitioners claimed to be affiliated. The petition alleged in essence
that although the petitioners were employees of the Manila Golf and Country
Club, a domestic corporation, the latter had not registered them as such with
the SSS. At about the same time, two other proceedings bearing on the same
question were filed or were pending.
The respondent Club filed answer praying for the dismissal of the petition,
alleging in substance that the petitioners, caddies by occupation, were
allowed into the Club premises to render services as such to the individual
members and guests playing the Club's golf course and who themselves paid
for such services; that as such caddies, the petitioners were not subject to
the direction and control of the Club as regards the manner in which they
performed their work; and hence, they were not the Club's employees.
The caddies were paid by the players, not by the Club, and that they
observed no definite working hours and earned no fixed income. The Court
does not agree that the facts necessarily or logically point to such an
employer-employee relationship, and to the exclusion of any form of
arrangements, other than of employment that would make the Llamars
services available to the members and guest of the Manila Golf Club. In the
very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their
conduct while enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the
premises and grounds of whatever club they do their work in. For all that is
made to appear, they work for the club to which they attach themselves on
sufference but, on the other hand, also without having to observe any
working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away for as long
they like. It is not pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said
rules, any discipline may be meted them beyond barring them from the
premises which, it may be supposed, the Club may do in any case even
absent any breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on
their part. All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of
employment.
The IAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the rate of fees
payable by the players to the caddies as still another indication of the latter's
status as employees. It seems to the Court, however, that the intendment of
such fact is to the contrary, showing that the Club has not the measure of
The Court agrees with petitioner that the group rotation system so-called, is
less a measure of employer control than an assurance that the work is fairly
distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply
losing his turn to serve and being assigned instead the last number for the
day.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Limjoco was an employee of the company. NLRC
also affirmed the decision and opined that there was no evidence supporting
allegation that Limjoco was an independent contractor or dealer.
Due to some anomaly in the way Susan Carungcong prepared the report so
that she will be reimbursed with her expenses incurred for the purpose of
gaining or producing income such that she made it appear that she paid for
the food of her agents but in fact and in truth she did not. So she was given a
letter advising of the termination of her relationship with Sunlife. So she filed
a complaint before the NLRC and was adjudged to have been illegally
dismissed because there was an employer-employee relationship.
The Supreme Court reasoned that Insurance business is imbibed with public
interest and thus subject to regulation by the State. The State, in order to
protect the public, enacted the Insurance Code, which provided for the rules
and regulations to be followed by the Insurance companies. Thus, as an
inevitable consequence the Insurance Company, like Sunlife, issued rules
and regulations to be followed by Carungcong but this control was latent in
the kind of business which Carungcong was into and these rules and
regulations were mainly aimed at promoting the results the parties so
desired and did not necessarily create any employer-employee relationship,
where the employers controls had to interfere in the methods and means by
which the employee would like to employ to arrive at the desired result.
Facts: Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was advised to undergo an operation for the
removal of her stone in the gall bladder. She was referred to Dr. Hosaka, a
surgeon, who agreed to do the operation. The operation was scheduled on
June 17, 1985 in the De los Santos Medical Center. Erlinda was admitted to
the medical center the day before the operation. On the following day, she
was ready for operation as early as 7:30 am. Around 9:30, Dr. Hosaka has not
yet arrived. By 10 am, Rogelio wanted to pull out his wife from the operating
room. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at 12:10 pm more than 3 hours of the
scheduled operation.
Dr. Guiterrez tried to intubate Erlinda. The nail beds of Erlinda were bluish
and there was a discoloration in her left hand. At 3 pm, Erlinda was being
wheeled to the Intensive care Unit and stayed there for a month. Since the
ill-fated operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until she died.
Private hospitals hire, fire, and exercise real control over their attending and
visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not technically employees, the
control exercised, the hiring and the right to terminate consultants fulfill the
hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship with the exception of
payment of wages. The control test is determining.
The hospital does not hire consultants but it accredits and grants him the
privilege of maintaining a clinic and/or admitting patients. It is the patient
who pays the consultants. The hospital cannot dismiss the consultant but he
may lose his privileges granted by the hospital. The hospitals obligation is
limited to providing the patient with the preferred room accommodation and
other things that will ensure that the doctors orders are carried out.
Facts: In May 1994, ABS-CBN signed an agreement with Mel and Joey
Management and Developments Corporation (MJMDC), a television program.
Referred to in the Agreement as Agent, MJMDC agreed to provide Sonzas
services exclusively to ABS-CBN as talent for radio and television. ABS-CBN
agreed to pay Sonzas services a monthly talent fee of P310, 000 for the first
year and P317,000 for the second and third year of the agreement.
On April 30, 1996, Sonza filed a complaint against ABS-CBN before the
Department of Labor and Employment, NCR alleging that ABS-CBN did not
pay his salary, separation pay, service incentive leave, 13 th month pay ,
signing bonus, travel allowance and amounts due under the Employees
Stock Option Plan (ESOP). ABS-CBN moved for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between
them. ABS-CBN insists that Sonza was an independent contractor.
Ruling: The Court sustained ABS-CBNs contention and hence, dismissed the
petition.
Applying the control test in the case at bar, the Court found that Sonza is not
an employee but an independent contractor. First, ABS-CBN engaged Sonzas
services specifically to co-host the Mel and Jay program. ABS-CBN did not
assign any other work to Sonza. To perform his work, Sonza only needed his
skills and talent. Sonza delivered his lines appeared on the television and
sounded on radio, all outside the control of ABS-CBN. Sonza did not have to
work eight hours a day. The Agreement required Sonza to attend only
rehearsals and tapings. ABS-CBN could not dictate the contents of Sonzas
script. Sonza had a free hand on what to say or discuss in his shows. Clearly,
ABS-CBN did not exercise control over the means and methods of
performance of Sonzas work.
Facts: Private respondent Laudato filed a petition before the SSC for social
security coverage and remittance of unpaid monthly social security
contributions against her three employers. Among the respondents was
herein petitioner Angelito L. Lazaro (Lazaro), proprietor of Royal Star
Marketing (Royal Star), which is engaged in the business of selling home
appliances. Petitioner states that 1) Laudato was not a sales supervisor of
Royal Star, but was a mere sales agent whom he paid purely on commission
basis.2) Laudato was not subjected to definite hours and conditions of work.
As such, Laudato could not be deemed an employee of Royal Star while
respondents contended that despite her employment as sales supervisor of
the sales agents for Royal Star from April of 1979 to March of 1986, Lazaro
had failed during the said period, to report her to the SSC for compulsory
coverage or remit Laudatos social security contributions.
The fact that Laudato was paid by way of commission does not preclude the
establishment of an employer-employee relationship. The relevant factor
remains, as stated earlier, whether the"employer" controls or has reserved
the right to control the "employee" not only as to the result of the work to be
done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be
accomplished.
Neither does it follow that a person who does not observe normal hours of
work cannot be deemed an employee. A supervisor is exempt from the
observance of normal hours of work for his compensation is measured by the
number of sales he makes. Laudato oversaw and supervised the sales
agents of the company, and thus was subject to the control of management
as to how she implements its policies and its end results.
Royal Star exercised control over its sales supervisors or agents such as
Laudato as to the means and methods through which these personnel
performed their work.
In 1981, Dr. de Vera offered his services to petitioner. The parties agreed and
formalized the respondents proposal in a document denominated as
retainership contract which will be for a period of one year, subject to
renewal and clearly stated that respondent will cover the retainership the
company previously with Dr. Eulau. The agreement went until 1994, in the
years 1995-1996, it was renewed verbally. The turning point of the parties
relationship was when petitioner, thru a letter bearing the subject
TERMINATION RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT, informed Dr. de Vera of its
decision to discontinue the latters retainer contract because the
management has decided that it would be more practical to provide medical
services to its employees through accredited hospitals near the company
premises.
On January 1997, de Vera filled a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC, alleging that he had been actually employed by the company as its
company physician since 1991. The commission rendered decision in favor of
Philcom and dismissed the complaint saying that de Vera was an
independent contractor. On appeal to NLRC, it reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter stating that de Vera is a regular employee and directed the
company to reinstate him. Philcom appealed to the CA where it rendered
decision deleting the award but reinstating de Vera. Philcom filed this
petition involving the difference of a job contracting agreements from
employee-employer relationship.
Ruling: SC ruled that there was no such relationship existing between Dr. de
Vera and Phil. Com.
Principle of Law: Any agreement may provide that one party shall render
services for and in behalf of another, no matter how necessary for the
latters business, even without being hired as an employee. There was no
employee-employer relationship in a case where element of control of the
employer over the employee is absent.
Where a person has rendered at least one year of service, regardless of the
nature of the activity performed, or where the work is continuous or
intermittent, the employment is considered regular as long as the activity
exists. The reason being that a customary appointment is not indispensable
before one may be formally declared as having attained regular status.
Article 280 of the Labor Code provides:
REGULAR AND CASUAL EMPLOYMENT.The provisions of written
agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season.
There are two kinds of regular employees under the law: (1) those
engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees
who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or
broken, with respect to the activities in which they are employed.
Third. Petitioner could always discharge respondents should it find their work
unsatisfactory, and respondents are highly dependent on the petitioner for
continued work.
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioners mainly contended that defendant physicians and CMC personnel
were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon's condition.
Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision of
defendant physicians and hospital staff.
Trial court rendered judgment finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages.
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's ruling, finding Dr. Estrada as an
independent contractor-physician. The Court of Appeals applied the
"borrowed servant" doctrine considering that Dr. Estrada was an independent
contractor who was merely exercising hospital privileges. This doctrine
provides that once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge
of the proceedings, the acts or omissions of operating room personnel, and
any negligence associated with such acts or omissions, are imputable to the
surgeon.
Issues: (1.) Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr.
Estrada;
(2.) WON there is employer-employee relationship between Dr. Estrada
and CMC
The Court finds no single evidence pointing to CMC's exercise of control over
Dr. Estrada's treatment and management of Corazon's condition. It is
undisputed that throughout Corazon's pregnancy, she was under the
exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC,
but an independent contractor.
Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority
thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an
employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority. First,
CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. Second, CMC made Rogelio sign
consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. Third, Dr. Estrada's referral of
Corazon's profuse vaginal bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who was then the Head of
the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave the impression that
Dr. Estrada as a member of CMC's medical staff was collaborating with other
CMC-employed specialists in treating Corazon. WHEREFORE, the Court
PARTLY GRANTS the petition. The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical
Center vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada.
The retainer agreement expired after 1 year. However, despite the non-
renewal of the agreement, respondent continued to perform his functions as
company doctor to petitioner until he received a letter dated march 9, 1995
from the company ending their retainership agreement.
In the Decisions dated Nov. 28, 1996 & Feb. 24, 1997, both the instant
complaint was dismissed by the Labor Arbiters and subsequently affirmed by
the NLRC on the ground that no employer-employee relationship
existed between petitioner company and respondent.
However when it was elevated to CA for review, the latter ruled that
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties after applying
the four-fold test: (1) power to hire employee (2) payment of wages (3)
power to dismissal (4) and power to control over the employee with respect
to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.
Ruling: The Court agrees with the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
The Court held that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC correctly found that
petitioner company lacked the power of control over the performance by
respondent of his duties.
The Court citing the case of Neri vs. NLRC said, petitioner company, through
the Comprehensive Medical Plan, provided guidelines merely to ensure
that the end result was achieved. In other words, what was sought to be
controlled by the petitioner company was actually the end result of the
task. The guidelines or the Comprehensive Medical Plan were laid
down merely to ensure that the desired end result was achievedbut
did not control the means and methods by which respondent performed his
assigned tasks.
The Court finds that the requirement to be on call for emergency cases do
not amount to such control, but are necessary incidents to the
Retainership Agreement.
The Supreme Court also notes that the Agreement granted to both parties
the power to terminate their relationship upon giving a 30-day notice. Hence,
petitioner company did not wield the sole power of dismissal or
termination.
Therefore, the petition was GRANTED.
The work schedules of the members of the team of resident physicians were
fixed by petitioner's medical director Dr. Desipeda, and they were issued ID,
enrolled in the SSS and withheld tax from them.
That petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the
undisputed fact that in the emergency room, the operating room, or any
department or ward for that matter, respondents' work is monitored through
its nursing supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the approval or
consent of petitioner or its medical director, no operations can be undertaken
in those areas. For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to
actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, it being
enough that it has the right to wield the power.
With respect to respondents' sharing in some hospital fees, this scheme does
not sever the employment tie between them and petitioner as this merely
mirrors additional form or another form of compensation or incentive similar
to what commission-based employees receive as contemplated in Article 97
(f) of the Labor Code.
In fine, as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be performed by
petitioners, it is not petitioners employer.
The Company may terminate this Agreement for any breach or violation of
any of the provisions hereof by the Agent by giving written notice to the
Agent within fifteen (15) days from the time of the discovery of the breach.
No waiver, extinguishment, abandonment, withdrawal or cancellation of the
right to terminate this Agreement by the Company shall be construed for any
previous failure to exercise its right under any provision of this Agreement.
Either of the parties hereto may likewise terminate his Agreement at any
time without cause, by giving to the other party fifteen (15) days notice in
writing.
Therefrom, Tongko filed a Complaint dated November 25, 2002 with the
NLRC against Manulife for illegal dismissalIn the Complaint. In a Decision
dated April 15, 2004, Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of an
employer-employee relationship.
Ruling: Yes. In the instant case, Manulife had the power of control over
Tongko that would make him its employee.Several factors contribute to this
conclusion.
In the Agreement dated July 1, 1977 executed between Tongko and Manulife,
it is provided that:
The Agent hereby agrees to comply with all regulations and requirements of
the Company as herein provided as well as maintain a standard of
knowledge and competency in the sale of the Company's products which
satisfies those set by the Company and sufficiently meets the volume of new
business required of Production Club membership.Under this provision, an
agent of Manulife must comply with three (3) requirements: (1) compliance
with the regulations and requirements of the company; (2) maintenance of a
level of knowledge of the company's products that is satisfactory to the
company; and (3) compliance with a quota of new businesses.
Among the company regulations of Manulife are the different codes of. The
fact that Tongko was obliged to obey and comply with the codes of conduct
was not disowned by respondents.
Thus, with the company regulations and requirements alone, the fact that
Tongko was an employee of Manulife may already be established. Certainly,
these requirements controlled the means and methods by which Tongko was
to achieve the company's goals.
More importantly, Manulife's evidence establishes the fact that Tongko was
tasked to perform administrative duties that establishes his employment
with Manulife.
Additionally, it must be pointed out that the fact that Tongko was tasked with
recruiting a certain number of agents, in addition to his other administrative
functions, leads to no other conclusion that he was an employee of Manulife.
Apropos thereto, Art. 277, par. (b), of the Labor Code mandates in explicit
terms that the burden of proving the validity of the termination of
employment rests on the employer. Failure to discharge this evidential
burden would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified, and,
therefore, illegal.
The Labor Code provides that an employer may terminate the services of an
employee for just cause and this must be supported by substantial evidence.
The settled rule in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings is that proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required in determining the legality of an
employer's dismissal of an employee, and not even a preponderance of
evidence is necessary as substantial evidence is considered sufficient.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.
The labor arbiter favored the respondents contention, that there was no
illegal dismissal, the respondent was just imposing sanction on the
petitioners for not paying the full amount of boundary, thus resulted to
suspension.
The petitioner appealed the case, however it was denied thus the case went
up to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that in boundary system, it shall not be treated as
lessee and lessor relationship, the existence of boundary does not negate
the employee and employer relationship.
However on the issue of illegal dismissal, the court ruled that there is no
illegal dismissal. Since the respondent was just exercising his prerogative as
an employer, thus he has the right to suspend them due to not paying the
full amount of boundary.
Of these four, the last one is the most important. The so-called "control test"
is commonly regarded as the most crucial and determinative indicator of the
presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship. Under the
control test, an employer-employee relationship exists where the person for
whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the
end achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that
end. Applying the aforementioned test, an employer-employee relationship
is apparently absent in the case at bar. Among other things, respondent was
not required to report everyday during regular office hours of petitioner.
Respondent's monthly retainer fees were paid to him either at his residence
or a local restaurant. More importantly, petitioner did not prescribe the
manner in which respondent would accomplish any of the tasks in which his
expertise as a liaison officer was needed; respondent was left alone and
Facts: Petitioners Marticio Semblante and Dubrick Pilar assert that they were
hired by respondents-spouses Vicente and Maria Luisa Loot, the owners of
Gallera de Mandaue (the cockpit), as the official masiador and sentenciador,
respectively, of the cockpit sometime in 1993.
As the masiador, Semblante calls and takes the bets from the gamecock
owners and other bettors and orders the start of the cockfight. He also
distributes the winnings after deducting the arriba, or the commission for the
cockpit. Meanwhile, as the sentenciador, Pilar oversees the proper gaffing of
fighting cocks, determines the fighting cocks physical condition and
capabilities to continue the cockfight, and eventually declares the result of
the cockfight.
For their services as masiado rand sentenciador, Semblante receives PhP
2,000 per week or a total of PhP 8,000 per month, while Pilar gets PhP 3,500
a week or PhP 14,000 per month. They work every Tuesday, Wednesday,
Saturday, and Sunday every week, excluding monthly derbies and cockfights
held on special holidays. Their working days start at 1:00 p.m. and last until
12:00 midnight, or until the early hours of the morning depending on the
needs of the cockpit. Petitioners had both been issued employees
identification cards that they wear every time they report for duty. They
alleged never having incurred any infraction and/or violation of the cockpit
rules and regulations.
On November 14, 2003, however, petitioners were denied entry into the
cockpit upon the instructions of respondents, and were informed of the
termination of their services effective that date. This prompted petitioners to
file a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents.
Respondents denied that petitioners were their employees and alleged that
they were associates of respondents independent contractor, Tomas Vega.
Respondents claimed that petitioners have no regular working time or day
and they are free to decide for themselves whether to report for work or not
on any cockfighting day. In times when there are few cockfights in Gallera de
Mandaue, petitioners go to other cockpits in the vicinity. Lastly, petitioners,
so respondents assert, were only issued identification cards to indicate that
they were free from the normal entrance fee and to differentiate them from
the general public.
In a Decision dated June 16, 2004, Labor Arbiter Julie C. Rendoque found
petitioners to be regular employees of respondents as they performed work
that was necessary and indispensable to the usual trade or business of
respondents for a number of years. The Labor Arbiter also ruled that
petitioners were illegally dismissed, and so ordered respondents to pay
petitioners their back wages and separation pay.
Respondents counsel received the Labor Arbiters Decision on
September 14, 2004. And within the 10-day appeal period, he filed the
respondents appeal with the NLRC on September 24, 2004, but without
posting a cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award granted by
the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC held in its Resolution of October 18, 2006 that there was no
employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondents,
respondents having no part in the selection and engagement of petitioners,
and that no separate individual contract with respondents was ever executed
by petitioners.
The CA upheld the NLRC decision.
Facts: Complainants, Jose Mel Bernarte and Renato Guevarra, aver that
they were invited to join the PBA as referees. During the leadership of
Commissioner Emilio Bernardino, they were made to sign contracts on a
year-to-year basis. During the term of Commissioner Eala, however, changes
were made on the terms of their employment.
Bernarte, was not made to sign a contract during the first conference of the
All-Filipino Cup which was from February 23, 2003 to June 2003. It was only
during the second conference when he was made to sign a one and a half
month contract for the period July 1 to August 5, 2003.
January 15, 2004, Bernarte received a letter from the Office of the
Commissioner advising him that his contract would not be renewed citing his
unsatisfactory performance on and off the court. It was a total shock
for Bernarte who was awarded Referee of the year in 2003. He felt that the
dismissal was caused by his refusal to fix a game upon order of Ernie De
Leon.
Guevarra alleges that he was invited to join the PBA pool of referees in
February 2001. On March 1, 2001, he signed a contract as trainee. Beginning
2002, he signed a yearly contract as Regular Class C referee. On May 6,
2003, respondent Martinez issued a memorandum to Guevarra expressing
dissatisfaction over his questioning on the assignment of referees officiating
out-of-town games. Beginning February 2004, he was no longer made to sign
a contract.
Complainants entered into two contracts of retainer with the PBA in the year
2003. The first contract was for the period January 1, 2003 to July 15, 2003;
and the second was for September 1 to December 2003. After the lapse of
the latter period, PBA decided not to renew their contracts.
Complainants were not illegally dismissed because they were not employees
of the PBA. Their respective contracts of retainer were simply not renewed.
PBA had the prerogative of whether or not to renew their contracts, which
they knew were fixed.
In its 28 January 2008 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters
judgment. The dispositive portion of the NLRCs decision reads:
Ruling: At any rate, the NLRC declared the issue on the finality of the Labor
Arbiters decision moot as respondents appeal was considered in the
interest of substantial justice. We agree with the NLRC. The ends of justice
will be better served if we resolve the instant case on the merits rather than
allowing the substantial issue of whether petitioner is an independent
contractor or an employee linger and remain unsettled due to procedural
technicalities.
We agree with respondents that once in the playing court, the referees
exercise their own independent judgment, based on the rules of the game,
as to when and how a call or decision is to be made. The referees decide
whether an infraction was committed, and the PBA cannot overrule them
once the decision is made on the playing court. The referees are the only,
absolute, and final authority on the playing court. Respondents or any of the
PBA officers cannot and do not determine which calls to make or not to make
and cannot control the referee when he blows the whistle because such
authority exclusively belongs to the referees. The very nature of petitioners
job of officiating a professional basketball game undoubtedly calls for
freedom of control by respondents.
Lirio vs Genovia
G.R. No. 169757, NOVEMBER 23, 2011
Respondent prayed for his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, or,
in the alternative, that he be paid separation pay, back wages and overtime
pay; and that he be awarded unpaid commission in the amount of P2,000.00
for services rendered as a studio technician as well as moral and exemplary
damages.
Respondents evidence consisted of the Payroll dated July 31, 2001 to March
15, 2002, which was certified correct by petitioner, [2] and Petty Cash
Vouchers[3] evidencing receipt of payroll payments by respondent from
Celkor.
In defense, petitioner stated in his Position Paper[4] that respondent was not
hired as studio manager, composer, technician or as an employee in any
other capacity of Celkor. Respondent could not have been hired as a studio
manager, since the recording studio has no personnel except petitioner.
Petitioner further claimed that his daughter Celine Mei Lirio, a former
contract artist of ABS-CBN Star Records, failed to come up with an album as
the latter aborted its project to produce one. Thus, he decided to produce an
album for his daughter and established a recording studio, which he named
Celkor Ad Sonicmix Recording Studio. He looked for a composer/arranger
who would compose the songs for the said album. In July 2001, Bob
Santiago, his son-in-law, introduced him to respondent, who claimed to be an
amateur composer, an arranger with limited experience and musician
without any formal musical training. According to petitioner, respondent had
Petitioner asserted that from the aforesaid terms and conditions, his
relationship with respondent is one of an informal partnership under Article
1767of the New Civil Code, since they agreed to contribute money, property
or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves. Petitioner had no control over the time and manner by which
respondent composed or arranged the songs, except on the result
thereof. Respondent reported to the recording studio between 10:00 a.m.
and 12:00 noon. Hence, petitioner contended that no employer-employee
relationship existed between him and the respondent, and there was no
illegal dismissal to speak of.
Facts: Petitioner maintained that respondent BCC Product Sales, Inc. (BCC)
and its President, respondent Terrance Ty (Ty), employed him as comptroller
starting from September 1995 with a monthly salary of P20,000.00 to handle
the financial aspect of BCC's business; that on October 19, 1995, the security
guards of BCC, acting upon the instruction of Ty, barred him from entering
the premises of BCC where he then worked; that his attempts to report to
work in November and December 12, 1995 were frustrated because he
continued to be barred from entering the premises of BCC; and that he filed a
complaint dated December 28, 1995 for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with
full backwages, non-payment of wages, damages and attorney's fees.
Respondents countered that petitioner was not their employee but the
employee of Sobien Food Corporation (SFC), the major creditor and supplier
of BCC; and that SFC had posted him as its comptroller in BCC to oversee
BCC's finances and business operations and to look after SFC's interests or
investments in BCC.; that their issuance of the ID to petitioner was only for
the purpose of facilitating his entry into the BCC premises in relation to his
work of overseeing the financial operations of BCC for SFC; that the ID should
not be considered as evidence of petitioner's employment in BCC; that
petitioner executed an affidavit in March 1996, 20 stating, among others, as
follows:
Petitioner counters, however, that the affidavit did not establish the absence
of an employer-employee relationship between him and respondents
because it had been executed in March 1996, or after his employment with
respondents had been terminated on December 12, 1995; and that the
affidavit referred to his subsequent employment by SFC following the
termination of his employment by BCC.
Petitioner's admission that he did not receive his salary for the three months
of his employment by BCC, as his complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of wages and the criminal case for estafa he later filed against the
respondents for non-payment of wages indicated, further raised grave
doubts about his assertion of employment by BCC. If the assertion was true,
we are puzzled how he could have remained in BCC's employ in that period
of time despite not being paid the first salary of P20,000.00/month.
Moreover, his name did not appear in the payroll of BCC despite him having
approved the payroll as comptroller.
Lastly, the confusion about the date of his alleged illegal dismissal provides
another indicium of the insincerity of petitioner's assertion of employment by
BCC. In the petition for review on certiorari, he averred that he had been
barred from entering the premises of BCC on October 19, 1995, 27 and thus
was illegally dismissed. Yet, his complaint for illegal dismissal stated that he
had been illegally dismissed on December 12, 1995 when respondents'
security guards barred him from entering the premises of BCC, 28 causing
him to bring his complaint only on December 29, 1995, and after BCC had
already filed the criminal complaint against him. The wide gap between
October 19, 1995 and December 12, 1995 cannot be dismissed as a trivial
inconsistency considering that the several incidents affecting the veracity of
his assertion of employment by BCC earlier noted herein transpired in that
interval.
With all the grave doubts thus raised against petitioner's claim, we need not
dwell at length on the other proofs he presented, like the affidavits of some
of the employees of BCC, the ID, and the signed checks, bills and receipts.
Suffice it to be stated that such other proofs were easily explainable by
respondents and by the aforestated circumstances showing him to be the
employee of SFC, not of BCC.
Facts: This labor case for illegal dismissal involves a pianist employed to
perform in the restaurant of a hotel. On August 9, 1999, respondent, whose
stage name was Joey R. Roa, filed a complaint for alleged unfair labor
practice, constructive illegal dismissal, and the underpayment/nonpayment
of his premium pay for holidays, separation pay, service incentive leave pay,
and 13111 month pay.
First of all, petitioner actually wielded the power of selection at the time it
entered into the service contract dated September 1, 1992 with respondent.
This is true, notwithstanding petitioners insistence that respondent had only
offered his services to provide live music at petitioners Tanglaw Restaurant,
and despite petitioners position that what had really transpired was a
negotiation of his rate and time of availability. The power of selection was
firmly evidenced by, among others, the express written recommendation
dated January 12, 1998 by Christine Velazco, petitioners restaurant
manager, for the increase of his remuneration.
Thirdly, the power of the employer to control the work of the employee is
considered the most significant determinant of the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. This is the so-called control test, and is premised on
whether the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right
to control both the end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve
that end.
A review of the records shows, however, shows that respondent performed
his work as a Pianist under petitioners supervision and control. Specifically,
petitioners control of both the end achieved and the manner and means
used to achieve that end was demonstrated by the following, to wit:
a) He could not choose the time of his performance, which petitioners had
fixed from 7:00 pm to 10:00 pm, three to six times a week;
b) He could not choose the place of his performance;
c) The restaurants manager required him at certain times to perform
only Tagalog songs or music, or to wear barong Tagalog to conform to
the Filipiniana motif; and
d) He was subjected to the rules on employees representation check and
chits, a privilege granted to other employees.
PAFLU requested for the accounting. PSI through its personnel manager
Francisco Dakila denied the request.
PAFLU through Serafin Ayroso filed a complaint for unfair labor practice
against PSI, its president Mariles Romulo and personnel manager Francisco
Dakila. PAFLU alleged that aside from PSIs refusal to bargain collectively with
its workers, the company through its president and personnel manager, was
also liable for interfering with its employees union activities
Ayroso filed another complaint in behalf of PAFLU for unfair labor practice
against Francisco Dakila. Through Ayroso PAFLU claimed that Dakila was
present in PSEAs organizational meeting thereby confirming his illicit
participation in union activities. Ayroso added that the members of the local
union had unwittingly fallen into the manipulative machinations of PSI and
were lured into endorsing a collective bargaining agreement which was
detrimental to their interests.
Dakila moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the issue
of disaffiliation was an inter-union conflict which lay beyond the jurisdiction
Labor Arbiter declared PSEAs disaffiliation from PAFLU invalid and held PSI,
PSEA-PAFLU and their respective officers guilty of unfair labor practice.
PSI, PSEA and their respective officers appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). But the NLRC upheld the Decision ofthe Labor
Arbiter.
Ruling: Local unions have a right to separate from their mother federation
on the ground that as separate and voluntary associations, local unions do
not owe their creation and existence to the national federation to which they
are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their members. The sole essence of
affiliation is to increase, by collective action, the common bargaining power
of local unions for the effective enhancement and protection of their
interests. Admittedly, there are times when without succor and support local
unions may find it hard, unaided by other support groups, to secure justice
for them. Yet the local unions remain the basic units of association, free to
serve their own interests subject to the restraints imposed by the
constitution and by-laws of the national federation, and free also to renounce
the affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement which brought such
affiliation into existence.
There is nothing shown in the records nor is it claimed by PAFLU that the
local union was expressly forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor
were there any conditions imposed for a valid breakaway. As such, the
pendency of an election protest involving both the mother federation and the
local union did not constitute a bar to a valid disaffiliation. Neither was it
disputed by PAFLU that 111 signatories out of the 120 members of the local
union, or an equivalent of 92.5% of the total union membership supported
the claim of disaffiliation and had in fact disauthorized PAFLU from instituting
any complaint in their behalf.
It was entirely reasonable then for PSI to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with PSEA-NCW. As PSEA had validly severed itself from PAFLU,
there would be no restrictions which could validly hinder it from
subsequently affiliating with NCW and entering into a collective bargaining
agreement in behalf of its members.
The mere act of disaffiliation did not divest PSEA of its own personality;
neither did it give PAFLU the license to act independently of the local union.
This case concerns the effect on the status of employment of employees who
entered into a Service Franchise Agreement with their employer.
Petitioners cannot use the revolving funds feature of the SFAs as evidence of
their employeremployee relationship with Bandag. These funds do not
represent wages. They are more in the nature of capital advances for
operations that Bandag conceptualized to attract prospective franchisees.
Petitioners incomes depended on the profits they make, controlled by their
individual abilities to increase sales and reduce operating costs.
FACTS:
In 2005, Arlene was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. (Fuji) as a news
correspondent/producer. Her employment contract initially provided for a
term of one (1) year but was successively renewed on a yearly basis with
salary adjustment upon every renewal. In 2009, Arlene was diagnosed with
lung cancer. She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn, the Chief of News
Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki, informed Arlene that the company will have a
problem renewing her contract since it would be difficult for her to perform
her job. Then Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract on May 5, 2009
where it was stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed. The
day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, on May 6, 2009, she filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal. She alleged that she was forced to sign the
non-renewal contract when Fuji came to know of her illness and that Fuji
withheld her salaries and other benefits for March and April 2009 when she
refused to sign. She further alleged that claimed that she was left with no
other recourse but to sign the non-renewal contract, and it was only upon
signing that she was given her salaries and bonuses, in addition to
separation pay equivalent to four (4) years.
RULING:
1. ABS-CBN Regional Network Group in Naga City employed Amalia Villafuerte as a manager.
2. 1996: ABS-CBN employed then petitioners Begino and Del Valle as cameramen/Editors for TV
broadcasting, ABS-CBN also employed Sumayao and Monina
3. Petitioners engaged their services thru Talent Contracts which are regularly renewed over three
months to 1 year.
4. Petitioners were also given Project Assignment forms which determined the duration of a
particular project as well as the budget and the technical requirements thereof. Petitioners were
then tasked to work on subsequent daily airings in respondents TV Patrol Bicol Program
5. The Talent contracts specifically provided that there is no employee-employer (ER-EE)
relationship between petitioners and respondents, but it additionally provided for:
a. Creation and performance of work according to ABS-CBNs standards, policies and
guidelines
b. The petitioners should not work for ABS-CBNs competing companies or any of the same
that had an adverse interest to that of ABS-CBN
c. The work they are doing is results oriented, which does not require them to have fixed or
normal hours of work
6. Petitioners remunerations were denominated as talent fees
7. Petitioners, claiming that they are employees of the respondent, filed a complaint against ABS-
CBN in the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Brannch for regularization, underpayment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, Service incentive leave pay, damages and attys fees,
contending that:
a. They performed functions necessary and desirable in ABS-CBN business
b. They are mandated to wear company IDs
c. They are provided all the equipment needed
d. They worked under the direct control and supervision of respondent Villafuerte
e. They were also bound on ABS-CBNs policy on attendance and punctuality
f. That ABS-CBN due to the Contracts, they earn less than what respondents usually pay
their regular rank-and-file employees
8. Respondents refuted the petitioners claim saying that:
a. The petitioners are independent contractors, they employed them due to lack of
manpower to man the business
b. They are known as talents and required to inform ABS-CBN of their availability through
Talent Information Forms to facilitate their appearance on designated project days
c. They cannot afford employing regular workers due to unpredictable viewer preferences
d. That through the talent contracts, petitioners were engaged because of their skills,
knowledge and expertise
e. That the policies were general guidelines only and does not subject petitioners to control
f. They were never subjected to control over the means and methods by which they do their
tasks
9. During the pendency of their case, petitioners were dismissed and they filed a second complaint,
adding illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice to their previous claims
10. 2nd claim of petitioners were dismissed for violation of rules against non-forum shopping because
the issues in the 1st complaint must be resolved first before resolving the 2nd complaint
11. Labor Arbiter resolved the first complaint in favor of petitioners, ordering ABS-CBN to pay a total
of P2,440,908.36 representing salaries/wage differentials, holiday pay, SIL, 13 th month pay and
attys fees. LA also ordered respondents to admit back complainants under the same terms
prevailing prior to their separation. LA said that they are employees because:
a. Petitioners have worked for more than a year
b. Petitioners are bound by exclusivity clause in the talent contracts
c. There was substantial control over them
12. Resp appealed to the NLRC which affirmed the LAs decision
13. Resp then appealed to the CA, CA reversed
14. Petitioners then appealed to SC
15. SC finds the petition impressed with merit
a. SC applied the four-fold test and the control test and found that there is a presence of an
EE-ER relationship
b. Based on article 280 of the Labor Code, petitioners are regular employees of ABS-CBN
due to the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the petitioners and
the business or trade of ABS-CBN
c. Also petitioners were continuously rehired over the years for its long running news
program which indicates that petitioners are regular employees
d. Even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated or continuing performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability of that activity in the business. Indeed, an employment stops being co-
After some months from his departure for the US, Abrahamson returned to
Manila and is now a manager of the Philippine Underwear Co. This
corporation, unlike Ollendorffs, does not maintain a factory in Phil. Islands
but send material and embroidery designs from New York to its local
representative here who employs Filipino needle workers to embroider the
designs and make up the garments in their homes. The only difference
between plaintiff's business and that of the firm by which the defendant is
employed, is the method of doing the finishing work -- the manufacture of
the embroidered material into finished garments. Plaintiff commenced an
action to prevent by injunction, any further breach of that part of defendant's
contract of employment by which he agreed that he would not "enter into or
engage himself directly or indirectly . . . in a similar or competitive business
to that of (plaintiff) anywhere within the Philippine Islands for a period of five
years . . ." from the date of the agreement.
Issue: WON the part of the agreement restraining the defendant from
engaging into similar business of the plaintiff is void?
Following the rule in Mitchel vs. Reynolds, Court adopt the modern rule that
the validity of restraints upon trade or employment is to be determined by
the intrinsinc reasonableness of restriction in each case, rather than by any
fixed rule, and that such restrictions may be upheld when not contrary to
afford a fair and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it is
imposed.
Examining the contract here in question from this stand point, it does not
seem so with respect to an employee whose duties are such as of necessity
to give him an insight into the general scope and details of his employers
business. A business enterprise may and often does depend for its success
upon the owner's relations with other dealers, his skill in establishing
favorable connections, his methods of buying and selling -- a multitude of
Facts: The case was instituted to declare the contract of services entered
into by Alfonso del Castillo as null and void. Del Castillo alleges that the
provisions and conditions contained in the third paragraph of said contract
constitute an illegal and unreasonable restriction upon his liberty to contract,
are contrary to public policy, and are unnecessary in order to constitute a
just and reasonable protection to the defendant; and asked that the same be
declared null and void and of no effect.
Ruling: SC ruled that the restriction is reasonable and not contrary to public
policy.
The law concerning contracts which tend to restrain business or trade has
gone through a long series of changes from time to time with the changing
conditions of trade and commerce. With trifling exceptions, said changes
have been a continuous development of a general rule.
The early cases show plainly a disposition to avoid and annul all contracts
which prohibited or restrained any one from using lawful trade " at any time
or at any place," as being against the benefit of the state. Later, however,
the rule became well established that if the restraint was limited to "a certain
time" and within "a certain place", such contracts were valid and not "against
the benefit of the state." Later cases, and we think the rule is now well
established, have held that a contract in restraint of trade is valid provided
there is a limitation upon either time or place. A contract, however, which
restrains a man entering into a business or trade without either a limitation
as to time or place, will be held invalid.
It now appears that private respondent had made the a representation that
she was single even though she contracted marriage months before, in the
two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and
July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later, its
branch supervisor sent to private respondent a memorandum requiring her
to explain the discrepancy. In that memorandum, she was reminded about
the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment.
Private respondent was dismissed from the company effective January 29,
1992, which she readily contested by initiating a complaint for illegal
dismissal. Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was
illegally dismissed by petitioner. On appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), said public respondent upheld the labor arbiter and it
ruled that private respondent had indeed been the subject of an unjust and
unlawful discrimination by her employer, PT&T.
Ruling: SC ruled that the stipulation is violative of Art. 136 of the Labor
Code.
Respondents act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T
could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was
moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically
forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her
civil status for fear of being disqualified from work.
Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any
agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient, the
same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that
petitioners policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or
common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.
Reminders from Tecsons district manager did not stop him from
marrying.Tecson married Bettsy, an Astras Branch Coordinatior in Albay.
She supervised the district managers and medical representatives of her
company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that area.
Tecson was reassigned to another place and was not given products that the
Astra company has and he was not included in products seminars and
training.
Tecson requested for time in complying said policy by asking for a transfer in
the Glaxos milk division in which the other company had no counterpart.
Thereafter, he bought the matter to Grievance Committee but the parties
failed to resolve such issue, Glaxo offered Tecson a separation pay of one-
half () month pay for every year of service, or a total of P50,000.00 but he
declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision declaring as valid Glaxos
policy on relationships between its employees and persons employed with
competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to transfer Tecson to
another sales territory.
Tecson filed for a petition for review on the CA and the CA promulgated that
the NCMB did not err in rendering its decision. A recon was filed in appellate
court but it was denied, hence this petition for certiorari. Petitioners
contention it was violative of constitutional law which is the equal protection
clause and he was constructively dismissed while the respondents
contention that it is a valid exercise of it s management prerogatives.
Ruling: This petition was denied. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade
secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential
programs and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra
are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests cannot be
denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the right of enterprises to
adopt and enforce such a policy to protect its right to reasonable returns on
investments and to expansion and growth.
The challenged company policy does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution as petitioners erroneously suggest. It is a settled principle
that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the
state or those acting under color of its authority.
From the wordings of the contractual provision and the policy in its employee
handbook, it is clear that Glaxo does not impose an absolute prohibition
against relationships between its employees and those of competitor
companies. Its employees are free to cultivate relationships with and marry
persons of their own choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a
conflict of interest between the employee and the company that may arise
out of such relationships.
In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and
improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels
and inns such as MTDCs Victoria Court considering that these were not
establishments for amusement or entertainment and they were not
services or facilities for entertainment, nor did they use women as tools
for entertainment, and neither did they disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants or adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.
Facts: Simbol was employed by the company on Oct 1993. He met Alma
Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married. Prior to the
marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should they decide to get
married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy to which
Simbol complied.
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a]
relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the
company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another
female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their
employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above.
Issue: WON the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the
same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution
and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of management prerogative?
Ruling: Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to
have two or more of its employees related between the third degree by
affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code
but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact
theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it
is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The
failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from
arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working
together in one company.
Facts: Lolita Velasco was hired by Del Monte as seasonal employee and was
subsequently regularized by Del Monte. On June 1987, petitioner warned
Velasco of its absences and was repeatedly reminded that her absence
without permission may result to forfeiture of her vacation leave.
Another warning was sent due to her absences without permission which
eventually led to the forfeiture of her vacation entitlement. On September
1994, a notice of hearing was sent to Velasco informing her of the charges
filed against her for violating the Absence without leave rule. On January
1995, after the hearing, Del Monte terminated the services of Velasco due to
excessive absence without leave. Feeling aggrieved, Velasco filed a case for
illegal dismissal. She asserted that she was absent since she was suffering
urinary tract infection and she was pregnant.
She sent an application for leave to the supervisor. Upon check up of the
company doctor, Velasco was advised to rest. On the following check-ups,
she was again advised to rest where this time, she was not able to get
secure a leave.
The Labor Arbiter rendered decision that she was an incorrigible absentee.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC vacated the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. It decided that respondent was illegally dismissed and was entitled to
reinstatement. Petitioner appealed to CA where it dismissed its claim and
affirmed NLRC, thus, this petition.
The termination was illegal since it comes within the purview of the
prohibited acts provided in Article 137 of the Labor Code. Based on Article
137, it shall be unlawful for any employer (1) to deny any woman employee
the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any woman
employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the
benefits provided under this Code; (2) to discharge such woman on
account of her pregnancy, or while on leave or in confinement due
to her pregnancy; and (3) to discharge or refuse the admission of such
woman upon returning to her work for fear that she may again be pregnant.
The respondent was illegally dismissed by the petitioner on account of her
pregnancy. The act of the employer is unlawful, it being contrary to law.
Facts: This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward
who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards
of the airline company.
On November 5, 1992, petitioner weighed 205 lbs, way beyond his ideal
weight of 166 lbs. On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL
that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost
leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost
five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately
The Labor Arbiter ruled that he was illegally dismissed. The Labor Arbiter
held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of
the job of petitioner.[15] However, the weight standards need not be complied
with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.[16] Assuming that it did, petitioner could be
transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative
factor. NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, with modifications.
The CA, however, reversed the ruling. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the
weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an
employees position. The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an
analogous cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the
NLRC seemed to suggest.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and
after an employee is hired. They applyprior to employment because these
are the standards a job applicant must initially meet in order to be hired.
They apply after hiring because an employee must continue to meet these
standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a
violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be dismissed
The provision states that the employer and the union shall negotiate to
correct the distortions. Any dispute arising from wage distortions shall be
resolved through the grievance procedure under their collective bargaining
agreement and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary arbitration.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, such dispute shall be
decided by the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators within
ten (10) calendar days from the time said dispute was referred to voluntary
arbitration. In cases where there are no collective agreements or recognized
labor unions, the employers and workers shall endeavor to correct such
distortions. Any dispute arising there from shall be settled through the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board and, if it remains unresolved after
ten (10) calendar days of conciliation, shall be referred to the appropriate
branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). It shall be
mandatory for the NLRC to conduct continuous hearings and decide the
dispute within twenty (20) calendar days from the time said dispute is
submitted for compulsory arbitration. The pendency of a dispute arising from
a wage distortion shall not in any way delay the applicability of any increase
in prescribed wage rates pursuant to the provisions of law or Wage Order.
Facts: The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board of the National
Capital Region issued Wage Order No. NCR-01-A pursuant to the authority
given by RA No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.
Wage Order No.NCR-01-A, amending the formerly issued WO No. NCR-1
increasing the minimum wage by Php 17.00 daily in the National Capital
Region, read as follows:
Sec.1 Upon the effectivity of this wage order, all workers and employees in
the private sector in the NCR already receiving wages above the statutory
minimum wage rates up to Php 125.00 per day shall also receive an increase
of Php 17.00 per day.
The RTWPB,in this case, in issuing WO No. NCR-01-A fixed minimum wages
according to the salary ceiling method.
RA No. 6727 did not intend the boards to set floor wages alone. If such be the
case, the Act would have no need for a board but an accountant to keep
track of the latest consumer price index, or better, would have Congress
Facts: Petitioner Norma Mabeza contends that around the first week of May,
1991, she and her co-employees at the Hotel Supreme in Baguio City were
asked by the hotel's management to sign an instrument attesting to the
latter's compliance with minimum wage and other labor standard provisions
of law.||| The instrument provides among others
4. That we have no complaints against the management of the
Hotel Supreme as we are paid accordingly and that we are
treated well.
5. That we are executing this affidavit voluntarily without any
force or intimidation and for the purpose of informing the
authorities concerned and to dispute the alleged report of the
Labor Inspector of the Department of Labor and Employment
conducted on the said establishment on February 2, 1991.
As gleaned from the affidavit, the same was drawn by management for the
sole purpose of refuting findings of the Labor Inspector of DOLE (in an
inspection of respondent's establishment on February 2, 1991) apparently
adverse to the private respondent.
After she refused to proceed to the City Prosecutor's Office on the same
day the affidavit was submitted to the Cordillera Regional Office of DOLE
petitioner avers that she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over
the keys to her living quarters and to remove her belongings from the hotel
premises.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal by the private respondent of petitioner
constitutes an unfair labor practice.
Ruling: The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the
part of the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted
pressure, in the form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his
employee's right to institute concerted action for better terms and conditions
of employment. Without doubt, the act of compelling employees to sign an
instrument indicating that the employer observed labor standards provisions
of law when he might have not, together with the act of terminating or
coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employer's scheme
constitutes unfair labor practice. The first act clearly preempts the right of
the hotel's workers to seek better terms and conditions of employment
through concerted action.
For refusing to cooperate with the private respondent's scheme, petitioner
was obviously held up as an example to all of the hotel's employees, that
they could only cause trouble to management at great personal
inconvenience. Implicit in the act of petitioner's termination and the
subsequent filing of charges against her was the warning that they would not
only be deprived of their means of livelihood, but also possibly, their
personal liberty.
Facts: A wage order was issued which provided for wage increase for all
private sector workers and employees in the NCR receiving 154 pesos.
Petitioner applied for exemption from said wage order on the ground that it
was a distressed establishment. The RTWPB denied petitioners application
for exemption after holding that the corporation accumulated profits
amounting to 40,000 for the period under review.
Since wage order was published on December 1, 1993 and thus became
effective on December 16, 1993, the coverage of the interim period shall be
the three quarter prior to December 16, 1993, the third quarter ending on
September 30, 1993. The petitioner errs in claiming that said interim period
is up to December 15, 1993 or December 31, 1993.
Hence, petitioner is not exempted.
Facts: The RTWPB Region V issued Wage Order No. RB 05-03 which
provided for a Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) to workers in the private
sector who had rendered service for at least three (3) months before its
effectivity, and for the same period thereafter, in the following categories:
P17.50 in the cities of Naga and Legaspi; P15.50 in the municipalities of
Tabaco, Daraga, Pili and the city of Iriga; and P10.00 for all other areas in
the Bicol Region.
On November 1993, RTWPB Region VII issued Wage Order No. RB VII-03,
which directed the integration of the COLA mandated pursuant to Wage
Order No. RO VII-02-A into the basic pay of all workers. It also established an
increase in the minimum wage rates for all workers and employees in the
private sector as follows: by Ten Pesos (P10.00) in the cities of Cebu,
Mandaue and Lapulapu; Five Pesos (P5.00) in the municipalities of
Compostela, Liloan, Consolacion, Cordova, Talisay, Minglanilla, Naga and the
cities of Davao, Toledo, Dumaguete, Bais, Canlaon, and Tagbilaran. The bank
granted a COLA of P17.50 to its employees at its Naga Branch, the only
branch covered by Wage Order No. RB 5-03, and integrated the P150.00 per
month COLA into the basic pay of its rank-and-file employees at its Cebu,
Mabolo and P. del Rosario branches, the branches covered by Wage Order
No. RB VII-03.
Ruling: The court ruled that there is no wage distortion since the wage order
implementation covers all the branches of the bank.
Applying Art. 97, par. (f), of the Labor Code which defines "wage," the
Executive Labor Arbiter opined that the subject allowances, being
customarily furnished by respondent PICOP and regularly received by
petitioners, formed part of the latter's wages.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) did not view in
favor of the Executive Labor Arbiter. On 7 October 1994 it set aside the
assailed decision by decreeing that the allowances did not form part of the
salary base used in computing separation pay.
Ruling: The Staff/Manager's allowance may fall under "lodging" but the
transportation and Bislig allowances are not embraced in "facilities" on the
main consideration that they are granted as well as the Staff/Manager's
allowance for respondent PICOP's benefit and convenience, i.e., to insure
that petitioners render quality performance. In determining whether a
privilege is a facility, the criterion is not so much its kind but its purpose.
That the assailed allowances were for the benefit and convenience of
respondent company was supported by the circumstance that they were not
subjected to withholding tax.
In addition, the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Sec. 6, Rule VII,
Book III, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code may from time to time fix
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of
its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.
These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave
allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%)
more than that of local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two
significant economic disadvantages that foreign-hires have to endure,
namely: (a) the dislocation factor and (b) limited tenure.
The Acting Secretary of Labor found that the non-Filipino local-hires received
the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires. The parties CBA points to the
conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited
Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differentiation is reflective of the
agreed value of displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as
differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).
Ruling: If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. There is no
evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than
local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar conditions.
Facts: Bankard, Inc. classifies its employees by levels, to wit: Level I, Level
II, Level III, Level IV, Level V. On November 28, 1993, its Board of Directors
approved a New Salary Scale , made retroactive to April 1, 1993, for the
purpose of making its hiring rate competitive in the industrys labor market.
Bankards move drew the Bankard Employees Union_WATU, the duly certified
exclusive bargaining agent of the regular rank and file employees of Bankard
to press for the increase in the salary of its old, regular employees. Its
request remained unheeded. So it filed a Notice of Strike on August 26, 1993
on the ground of discrimination and other acts of Unfair Labor Practice.
It is thus clear that there is no hierarchy of positions between the newly hired
and regular employees of Bankard, hence, the first element of wage
Even assuming that there is a decrease In the wage gap between the pay of
the old employees and the newly hired employees, to the courts mind the
gap is NOT significant as to obliterate or result in severe contraction of the
intentional quantitive differences in the salary rates between the employee
group./
Aside from that the alleged wage distortion as the increase in the wages
and salaries of new-hires was not due to a prescribed law or wage order.
If the compulsory mandate under Article 124 of the Labor Code to correct
wage distortion is applied to voluntary and unilateral increases by the
employer in fixing hiring rates which is inherently a business judgment
prerogative, then the hands of the employer would be completely tied even
in cases where an increase in wages of a particular group is justified.
In fine, absent any indication that the voluntary increase of salary rates by
an employer was done arbitrarily and illegally for the purpose of
circumventing the laws or was devoid of any legitimate purpose other than
to discriminate against the regular employees, this Court will not step in to
interfere with this management prerogative.
The petitioners claim is based on Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the
Implementing Rules and Policy Instructions No. 9 issued by the Secretary of
Labor which was declared null and void since in the guise of clarifying the
Labor Codes provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them by
enlarging the scope of their exclusion.
Even assuming that Section 2, Rule IV of Book III is valid, their claim will still
fail. The basic rule in this jurisdiction is "no work, no pay." The right to be
paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the ten legal holidays in a
year. Petitioners claim is based on a mistaken notion that Section 2, Rule IV
of Book III gave rise to a right to be paid for un-worked days beyond the ten
legal holidays. Petitioners line of reasoning is not only a violation of the "no
work, no pay" principle, it also gives rise to an invidious classification, a
violation of the equal protection clause.
Facts: In September 1993, Morente, Allauigan and Ofialda and others filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, and premium pay for rest day and holiday
and night shift differential against petitioners in the Arbitration Branch of
NLRC. It alleged that Cohu is engaged in the business of wholesale of plastic
products and fruits of different kinds with more than 24 employees.
Respondents were hired on January 1990, May 1990 and July 19991 as
laborers and were paid below the minimum wage for the past 3 years. They
were required to work for more than 8 hours a day and never enjoyed the
minimum benefits. Petitioners filed their comment stating that the
respondents were their helpers.
Ruling: Petitioners have not successfully shown that they had applied for
the exemption.
R.A. No. 6727 known as the Wage Rationalization Act provides for the
statutory minimum wage rate of all workers and employees in the private
sector. Section 4 of the Act provides for exemption from the coverage,
thus: Sec. 4. (c) Exempted from the provisions of this Act are household or
domestic helpers and persons employed in the personal service of another,
including family drivers. Also, retail/service establishments regularly
employing not more than ten (10) workers may be exempted from the
applicability of this Act upon application with and as determined by the
appropriate Regional Board in accordance with the applicable rules and
regulations issued by the Commission. Whenever an application for
exemption has been duly filed with the appropriate Regional Board, action on
any complaint for alleged non-compliance with this Act shall be deferred
pending resolution of the application for exemption by the appropriate
Regional Board.
In the event that applications for exemptions are not granted, employees
shall receive the appropriate compensation due them as provided for by this
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction to hear the
case.
On Nov. 1, 2000, W age Order No. NCR-08 9 took effect. Section 1 thereof
provides: Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, private sector workers and
employees in the National Capital Region receiving the prescribed daily
minimum wage rate of P223.50 shall receive an increase of P26.50 per day,
thereby setting the new minimum wage rate in the National Capital Region at
P250.00 per day.
The Union alleged that it has been the company's practice to grant a wage
increase under a government-issued wage order, aside from the yearly wage
increases in the CBA. It averred that petitioner paid the salary increases
provided under the previous wage orders in full (aside from the yearly CBA
increases), regardless of whether there was a resulting wage distortion, or
whether Union members' salaries were above the minimum wage rate. Wage
Order No. NCR-06, where rank-and-file employees were given different wage
increases ranging from P10.00 to P13.00, was an exception since the
adjustments were the result of the formula agreed upon by the Union and
the employer after negotiations. The Union averred that all of their CBAs with
petitioner had a "collateral agreement" where petitioner was mandated to
pay the equivalent of the wage orders across-the-board, or at least to
negotiate how much will be paid. It pointed out that an established practice
cannot be discontinued without running afoul of Article 100 of the Labor
Code on non-diminution of benefits.
For its part, petitioner alleged that there is no such company practice and
that it complied with the previous wage orders (Wage Order Nos. NCR-01-05)
because some of its employees were receiving wages below the minimum
prescribed under said orders. As for Wage Order No. NCR-07, petitioner
Facts: The Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board, Region II,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, by virtue of RA No. 6727, otherwise known as the
Wage Rationalization Act, issued Wage Order No. R-02-03. Section 1 of the
Order states as follows:
Sec. 1 Upon effectivity of this Wage Order, all employees/workers in
the private sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of the
employment are granted an across the board increase of Php 15.00
daily.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company later filed a petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking for the nullification of the WO
on grounds that RTWPB acted beyond its authority when it issued the WO
without any ceiling or qualification and that the implementation of the WO
will cause the petitioner, and other similarly situated employers, to incur
huge financial losses and suffer labor unrest.
Ruling: There are two ways of fixing the minimum wage: the "floor-wage"
method and the "salary-ceiling" method. The "floor-wage" method involves
the fixing of a determinate amount to be added to the prevailing statutory
minimum wage rates. On the other hand, in the "salary-ceiling" method, the
wage adjustment was to be applied to employees receiving a certain
denominated salary ceiling. In other words, workers already being paid more
than the existing minimum wage (up to a certain amount stated in the Wage
Order) are also to be given a wage increase.
In the present case, the RTWPB did not determine or fix the minimum wage
rate by the "floor-wage method" or the "salary-ceiling method" in issuing the
Wage Order. The RTWPB did not set a wage level nor a range to which a
Garcy Kate D. Go LLB2 EH306 Page 89
wage adjustment or increase shall be added. Instead, it granted an across-
the-board wage increase of P15.00 to all employees and workers of Region 2.
In doing so, the RTWPB exceeded its authority by extending the coverage of
the Wage Order to wage earners receiving more than the prevailing
minimum wage rate, without a denominated salary ceiling. The Wage Order
granted additional benefits not contemplated by R.A. No. 6727.
The WO herein question is null and void insofar as it grants a wage increase
to employees earning more than the minimum wage rate; and pursuant to
the separability clause of the WO, Sec. 1 is declared valid with respect to
employees earning the prevailing minimum wage rate.
Facts: Ricardo Sadac was appointed Vice President of the Legal Department
of petitioner Bank effective 1 August 1981, and subsequently General
Counsel thereof on 8 December 1981. On June 1989, nine lawyers of
petitioner Banks Legal Department, in a letter-petition to the Chairman of
the Board of Directors, accused respondent Sadac of abusive conduct and
ultimately, petitioned for a change in leadership of the department. On the
ground of lack of confidence in Sadac, under the rules of client and lawyer
relationship, petitioner Bank instructed respondent Sadac to deliver all
materials in his custody in all cases in which the latter was appearing as its
counsel of record. In reaction thereto, Sadac requested for a full hearing and
formal investigation but the same remained unheeded. On 9 November
1989, respondent Sadac filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages
against petitioner Bank and individual members of the Board of Directors
thereof. After learning of the filing of the complaint, petitioner Bank
terminated the services of respondent Sadac. Finally, on 10 August 1989,
Sadac was removed from his office
Labor Arbiter rendered decision that Sadacs termination was illegal and
entitled to reinstatement and payment of full back wages. NLRC affirmed
the decision upon appeal by the Bank. Sadac filed for execution of judgment
where it gave its computation which amounted to P 6.03 M representing his
back wages and the increases he should have received during the time he
was illegally dismissed. The Bank opposed to Sadacs computation. The
Labor Arbiter favor Sadacs computation. NLRC, upon appeal by the bank,
reversed the decision. CA reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the computation of back wages shall include the
general increases.
Ruling: To resolve the issue, the court revisits its pronouncements on the
interpretation of the term back wages. Back wages in general are granted on
grounds of equity for earnings which a worker or employee has lost due to
his illegal dismissal. It is not private compensation or damages but is
awarded in furtherance and effectuation of the public objective of the Labor
Code. Nor is it a redress of a private right but rather in the nature of a
command to the employer to make public reparation for dismissing an
employee either due to the formers unlawful act or bad faith.
There is no vested right to salary increases. Sadac may have received salary
increases in the past only proves fact of receipt but does not establish a
degree of assuredness that is inherent in backwages. The conclusion is that
Sadacs computation of his full backwages which includes his prospective
salary increases cannot be permitted.
Issue: Whether or not SIP was liable to them for their statutory benefits,
although it was not made to answer for their lost employment due to the
involuntary nature of the canteens closure
The CA ruled out SIPs claim that it was a labor-only contractor or a mere
agent of GMPC. We agree with the CA; SIP and its proprietors could not be
considered as mere agents of GMPC because they exercised the essential
elements of an employment relationship with the respondents such as hiring,
payment of wages and the power of control, not to mention that SIP operated
the canteen on its own account as it paid a fee for the use of the building
and for the privilege of running the canteen. The fact that the respondents
applied with GMPC in February 2004 when it terminated its contract with SIP,
is another clear indication that the two entities were separate and distinct
from each other. We thus see no reason to disturb the CAs findings.
We likewise affirm the CA ruling on the monetary award to Batolina and the
other complainants. The free board and lodging SIP furnished the employees
cannot operate as a set-off for the underpayment of their wages. We held
in Mabeza v. National Labor Relations Commission that the employer cannot
simply deduct from the employees wages the value of the board and lodging
without satisfying the following requirements: (1) proof that such facilities
are customarily furnished by the trade; (2) voluntary acceptance in writing
by the employees of the deductible facilities; and (3) proof of the fair and
reasonable value of the facilities charged. As the CA aptly noted, it is clear
from the records that SIP failed to comply with these requirements.
Facts: Sometime in 1996, and January 1997, private respondents were hired
by petitioner Lagon as apprentice or trainee cable/lineman. The three were
paid the full minimum wage and other benefits but since they were only
trainees, they did not report for work regularly but came in as substitutes to
the regular workers or in undertakings that needed extra workers to expedite
completion of work. Soon after they were engaged as private employees for
their Islacom project in Bohol. Private respondents started on March 15, 1997
until December 1997. Upon the completion of their project, their
employment was also terminated. Private respondents received the amount
of P145.00, the minimum prescribed daily wage for Region VII. In July 1997,
the amount of P145 was increased to P150.00 and in October of the same
year, the latter was increased to P155.00.
On May 21, 1999, private respondents for the 4th time worked with Lagon's
project in Camarin, Caloocan City with Furukawa Corporation as the general
contractor. Their contract would expire on February 28, 2000, the period of
completion of the project. From May 21, 1997-December 1999, private
respondents received the wage of P145.00. At this time, the minimum
prescribed rate for Manila was P198.00. In January to February 28, the three
received the wage of P165.00. The existing rate at that time was P213.00.
In this case, petitioners, aside from bare allegations that private respondents
received wages higher than the prescribed minimum, failed to present any
evidence, such as payroll or payslips, to support their defense of payment.
Thus, petitioners utterly failed to discharge the onus probandi.
Moreover, before the value of facilities can be deducted from the employees'
wages, the following requisites must all be attendant: first, proof must be
shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade; second, the
provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by
the employee; and finally, facilities must be charged at reasonable value. [20]
Mere availment is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees' wages.
[21]
These requirements, however, have not been met in this case. SLL failed to
present any company policy or guideline showing that provisions for meals
and lodging were part of the employee's salaries. It also failed to provide
proof of the employees' written authorization, much less show how they
arrived at their valuations. At any rate, it is not even clear whether private
respondents actually enjoyed said facilities.
For said reason, the cases of Agabon and Glaxo are inapplicable in this case.
At any rate, these were cases of dismissal with just and authorized causes.
The present case involves the matter of the failure of the petitioners to
comply with the payment of the prescribed minimum wage.
The Court sustains the deletion of the award of differentials with respect to
respondent Roldan Lopez. As correctly pointed out by the CA, he did not work
for the project in Antipolo.
(Apparently, Petitioner argued that the granting of SMI to all retired DSSs
regardless of whether or not they qualify to the same had ripened into
company practice. The only two pieces of evidence that he stubbornly
presented throughout the entirety of this case are the sworn statements of
Renato C. Hidalgo (Hidalgo) and Ramon V. Velazquez (Velasquez), former
DSSs of respondent who retired in 2000 and 1998, respectively. They claimed
that the SMI was included in their retirement package even if they did not
meet the sales and collection qualifiers. Therefore, the failure of employer to
grant him his SMI is a violation on the principle of non-diminution of
benefits.)
Issue: WON the granting of SMI to all retired DSSs regardless of whether or
not they qualify to the same had ripened into company practice
Facts: Under the employ of each bottling plant of Coca-Cola are bottling
operators. In the case of the plant in Cebu City, there are 20 bottling
operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling
operators who man its Bottling Line 2. All of them are male and they are
members of herein respondent Royal Plant Workers Union (ROPWU).
In 1974, the bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with
chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling operators of then Bottling
Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request
was likewise granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for
the operators were removed pursuant to a national directive of petitioner.
This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of
petitioner for bottling operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the
responsibility to keep the machinery and equipment assigned to him clean
and safe. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly
move about in the performance of their duties and responsibilities.
Issue: Whether or not the removal of the bottling operators chairs was a
valid exercise of management prerogative. ---YES
The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes
to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal and
recall of workers. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not
absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the
rights of labor.10
Apparently, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions
as CCBPI wanted to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job while in
the performance of their duties and responsibilities and because of the fact
that the chairs were not necessary considering that the operators constantly
move about while working. In short, the removal of the chairs was designed
to increase work efficiency. Hence, CCBPIs exercise of its management
prerogative was made in good faith without doing any harm to the workers
rights.
The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no
law that requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. There
was no violation either of the Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefit
provisions under Book IV of the Labor Code of the Philippines. As shown in
the foregoing, the removal of the chairs was compensated by the reduction
of the working hours and increase in the rest period. The directive did not
expose the bottling operators to safety and health hazards.
The Court completely agrees with the CA ruling that the removal of the
chairs did not violate the general principles of justice and fair play because
the bottling operators working time was considerably reduced from two and
a half (2 ) hours to just one and a half (1 ) hours and the break period,
when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations.
The bottling operators new work schedule is certainly advantageous to them
because it greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases
their working time. A break time of thirty (30) minutes after working for only
one and a half (1 ) hours is a just and fair work schedule.
This Court has already decided several cases regarding the non-diminution
rule where the benefits or privileges involved in those cases mainly concern
monetary considerations or privileges with monetary equivalents. Without a
doubt, equating the provision of chairs to the bottling operators is something
within the ambit of "benefits'' in the context of Article 100 of the Labor Code
is unduly stretching the coverage of the law. The interpretations of Article
100 of the Labor Code do not show even with the slightest hint that such
provision of chairs for the bottling operators may be sheltered under its
mantle.
Facts: On June 9, 1989, Republic Act No. 6727 was enacted into law. In order
to rationalize wages throughout the Philippines, Republic Act No. 6727
created the NWPC and the RTWPBs of the different regions.
Article 121 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Republic Act No.
6727, empowered the NWPC to formulate policies and guidelines on wages,
incomes and productivity improvement at the enterprise, industry and
national levels; to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of
appropriate minimum wage and productivity measures at the regional,
provincial or industry levels; and to review regional wage levels set by the
RTWPBs to determine whether the levels were in accordance with the
prescribed guidelines and national development plans, among others.
On the other hand, Article 122(b) of the Labor Code, also amended by
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727, tasked the RTWPBs to determine and fix
minimum wage rates applicable in their region, provinces or industries
therein; and to issue the corresponding wage orders, subject to the
guidelines issued by the NWPC.
P16.0
a.2. Cottage/handicraft industry
0
The NWPC upheld the validity of Section 2(A) and Section 9(2) of Wage Order
No. NCR07. It observed that the RTWPBs power to determine exemptible
categories was adjunct to its wage fixing function conferred by Article
122(e) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6727; that
such authority of the RTWPB was also recognized in NWPC Guidelines
No. 01, Series of 1996.
The APL and TNMR assailed the decisions of the NWPC on certiorari in the
CA, contending that the power of the RTWPBNCR to determine exemptible
categories was not an adjunct to its wage fixing function. CA favored the
respondents and granted the petition for certiorari.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari by the NWPC and
RTWPBNCR.
1. Distressed establishments
2. New business enterprises (NBEs)
3. Retail/Service establishments employing not more than ten (10)
workers
4. Establishments adversely affected by natural calamities
Under the guidelines, the RTWPBs could issue exemptions from the
application of the wage orders as long as the exemptions complied with the
rules of the NWPC. In its rules, the NWPC enumerated four exemptible
establishments, but the list was not exclusive. The RTWPBs had the
authority to include in the wage orders establishments that belonged to, or
to exclude from the four enumerated exemptible categories.
If the exemption was outside of the four exemptible categories, like here, the
exemptible category should be: (1) in accord with the rationale for
exemption; (2) reviewed/approved by the NWPC; and (3) upon review, the
RTWPB issuing the wage order must submit a strong and justifiable reason or
reasons for the inclusion of such category. It is the compliance with the
second requisite that is at issue here.
The NWPC, in arriving at its decision, weighed the arguments of the parties
and ruled that the RTWPBNCR had substantial and justifiable reasons in
exempting the sectors and establishments enumerated in Section 2(A) and
Section 9(2) based on the public hearings and consultations, meetings,
socialeconomic data and informations gathered prior to the issuance of
Wage Order No. NCR07. The very fact that the validity of the assailed
sections of Wage Order No. NCR07 had been already passed upon
and upheld by the NWPC meant that the NWPC had already given
the wage order its necessary legal imprimatur. Accordingly, the
requisite approval or review was complied with.
The RTWPBs are the thinking group of men and women guided by statutory
standards and bound by the rules and guidelines prescribed by the NWPC. In
the nature of their functions, the RTWPBs investigate and study all the
pertinent facts to ascertain the conditions in their respective regions. Hence,
they are logically vested with the competence to determine the applicable
minimum wages to be imposed as well as the industries and sectors to
exempt from the coverage of their wage orders.
Issue: Who between the Regional Director of DOLE and the Labor Arbiter has
jurisdictional competence over the complaint of private respondents?
However, with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on
March 21, 1989 or seven days after the complaint at bar was filed on March
14, 1989, Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code were amended, there is no
doubt that the regional directors can try money claims only if the following
requisites concur: (1) the claim is presented by an employee or person
employed in domestic or household service, or house helper under the code;
(2) the claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement;
and (3) the aggregate money claim of the employee or housekeeper does
not exceed five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). Thus, the power to hear and
decide employees' claims arising from employer-employee relations,
exceeding P5,000.00 for each employee should be left to the Labor Arbiter as
the exclusive repository of the power to hear and decide such claims.
Facts: The case started when the Office of the Regional Director,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region I, San Fernando, La
Union, received a letter-complaint dated April 25, 1995, requesting for an
investigation of petitioner's establishment, Copylandia Services & Trading,
for violation of labor standards laws. Pursuant to the visitorial and
enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended,
inspections were conducted at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2,
1995. The inspections yielded the following violations involving twenty-one
(21) employees who are copier operators: (1) underpayment of wages; (2)
underpayment of 13th month pay; and (3) no service incentive leave with
pay.
On October 24, 1997, the respondent Secretary denied the Motion for
Reconsideration. He ruled that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the
case citing Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended. He pointed out
that Republic Act No. 7730 repealed the jurisdictional limitations imposed by
Article 129 on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives. In addition, he
held that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the computation made
by the Regional Director as a result of the compromise agreement he entered
into with the employees. Lastly, he reiterated his ruling that the Receipt,
Waiver and Quitclaim signed by the employees was not valid.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
employment can award claims even more than P5,000.
Held: Yes, the Regional Director can award claims of over P5,000. The
visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance
with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim
exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 7730 amending Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, viz:
Art. 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this
Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders
to give effect to the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor
legislation based on the findings of the labor employment and enforcement
On August 19, 1996, the Director of the Regional Office issued an order in
favor of respondents. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director, which was denied.
Petitioner appealed to the SOLE, which affirmed the Regional Directors
orders. Petitioner appealed to the CA, which dismissed the petition. In the
petition, the petitioners argue that 1) The Regional Director did not acquire
jurisdiction over petitioner because he failed to comply with section 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice of hearing was served at
the Plant, not at petitioners main office, and addressed to its VP. 2) Under
articles 129 and 217(b) of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter, not the
Regional Director, has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case
because the individual monetary claim of respondents exceeds P5000. 3)
The case falls under the exception clause in article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
The Regional Director should have certified the case to the arbitration branch
of the NLRC.
Issue: (1.) Whether or not the SOLE or his duly authorized representatives
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner. (2.) Whether or not the SOE or his duly
authorized representatives have jurisdiction over the money claims which
exceed P5000.
Ruling:
1. YES, THEY HAVE.
The Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices
(rules) specifically state that notices and copies of orders shall be served on
the parties or their duly authorized representatives at their last known
address or, if they are represented by counsel, through the latter. The rules
shall be liberally construedand only in the absence of any applicable
provision will the Rules of Court apply in a suppletory character.
In this case, EBVSAI does not deny having received the notices of hearing. In
fact, on 29 March and 13 June 1996, Danilo Burgos and Edwina Manao,
detachment commander and bookkeeper of EBVSAI, respectively, appeared
before the Regional Director. They claimed that the 22 March 1996 notice of
hearing was received late and manifested that the notices should be sent to
the Manila office. Thereafter, the notices of hearing were sent to the Manila
office. They were also informed of EBVSAIs violations and were asked to
present the employment records of the private respondents for verification.
They were, moreover, asked to submit, within 10 days, proof of compliance
or their position paper. The Regional Director validly acquired jurisdiction
over EBVSAI. EBVSAI can no longer question the jurisdiction of the Regional
Director after receiving the notices of hearing and after appearing before the
Regional Director.
Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code
(as amended by R.A. No. 7730) thus:
Art. 128 Visitorial and enforcement power. --- (b) Notwithstanding the
provisions of Article[s] 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases
where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to issue compliance orders to give effect to [the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other] labor legislation based on the findings of
labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers
made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer
contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and
raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered
in the course of inspection.
The aforequoted provision explicitly excludes from its coverage Articles 129
and 217 of the Labor Code by the phrase (N)otwithstanding the provisions
of Articles 129 and 217of this Code to the contrary x x x thereby retaining
and further strengthening the power of the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives to issue compliance orders to give effect to the
labor standards provisions of said Code and other labor legislation based on
the findings of labor employment and enforcement officer or industrial safety
engineer made in the course of inspection.
The visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Regional Director to order
and enforce compliance with labor standard laws can be exercised even
where the individual claim exceeds P5,000.
However, if the labor standards case is covered by the exception clause in
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code, then the Regional Director will have to
endorse the case to the appropriate Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. In order
to divest the Regional Director or his representatives of jurisdiction, the
following elements must be present: (a) that the employer contests the
findings of the labor regulations officer and raises issues thereon; (b) that in
order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters;
and (c) that such matters are not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection. The rules also provide that the employer shall raise such
objections during the hearing of the case or at any time after receipt of the
notice of inspection results.
In this case, the Regional Director validly assumed jurisdiction over the
money claims of private respondents even if the claims exceeded P5,000
because such jurisdiction was exercised in accordance with Article 128(b) of
the Labor Code and the case does not fall under the exception clause.
The Court notes that EBVSAI did not contest the findings of the labor
regulations officer during the hearing or after receipt of the notice of
inspection results. It was only in its supplemental motion for reconsideration
before the Regional Director that EBVSAI questioned the findings of the labor
regulations officer and presented documentary evidence to controvert the
In his Comment on the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining and/or Preliminary Injunctionfiled with the Court of Appeals on 22
November 2001, petitioner did not raise this procedural issue. Neither did he
do so when he moved for reconsideration of the 8 May 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals. It is only now before this Court that petitioner proffered the
same. This belated submission spells doom for petitioner. More
fundamentally, an examination of the Court of Appeals rollo belies petitioner
as it confirms that the alleged missing documents were in fact attached to
the petition.
Facts: Petitioners Edgardo M. Agapay and Samillano A. Alonso, Jr. were hired
by respondent Panay Veterans Security and Investigation Agency, Inc. as
security guards sometime in 1988. They were stationed at the plant site of
Food Industries, Inc. (FII) in Sta. Rosa, Laguna until FII terminated its contract
with respondent security agency on July 6, 2000. They were not given new
assignments and their benefits (including 13th month pay, overtime pay and
holiday pay as well as wage differentials due to underpayment of wages)
were withheld by respondent security agency. This prompted them to file a
complaint for violation of labor standards in the regional office of the
Department of Labor and Employment in the National Capital Region (DOLE-
NCR).
Respondents elevated the case to the CA, at first the CA dismissed their
appeal and upheld the DOLEs decision. But the CA granted their
reconsideration and modified DOLEs decision, Invoking the case of Star
Angel Handicraft v. National Labor Relations Commission.
Thus, the case was appealed by the petitioner in supreme court.
Ruling: No, the employers motion to reduce the appeal the bond was no in
accordance with the art. 128 of Labor code, the last paragraph of the said
provision provides:an order issued by the duly authorized representative of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this Article may be appealed
to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent
to the monetary award in the order appealed from
Clearly the respondents did not post bail, when they appealed the case at
the DOLE-NCR.
RULING: In the context of the NLRC appeal bond that is directly at issue,
MARCOPPER had every reason to claim in its April 10, 2000 appeal to the
NLRC that it should be excused from filing an appeal bond with respect to the
NAMAWU members who were no longer company employees. The CA
decision decreeing the termination of employment of those involved in the
illegal strike case had already been issued at that time. We subsequently
ruled on the same issue during the time the environmental incident case was
pending before the NLRC. Thus, when the NLRC dismissed MARCOPPER's
appeal for failure to file the requisite appeal bond corresponding to the 615
NAMAWU members, the termination of employment of these NAMAWU
members was already a settled matter that the NLRC was in no position to
disregard. In this light, the CA was correct in reversing the dismissal of
MARCOPPER's appeal for failure to file an appeal bond. Pursued to its logical
end, the CA conclusions should lead to the dismissal of NAMAWU's complaint
with respect to its 615 previously dismissed members.
Jethro appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment (SOLE), faulting the
Regional Director for, among other things, basing the computation of the judgment
award on Garcias affidavit instead of on the data reflected in the payrolls for 2001
to 2004 which was denied.
Issue: Whether or not SOLE or his duly authorized representative has jurisdiction
over money claims that exceed 5,000.
Ruling: In the case at bar, the Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the case as it does not come under the exception clause in Art. 128(b) of the
Labor Code. While petitioner Jethro appealed the inspection results and there is a
need to examine evidentiary matters to resolve the issues raised, the payrolls
presented by it were considered in the ordinary course of inspection. While the
employment records of the employees could not be expected to be found
in Yakults premises in Calamba, as Jethros offices are in Quezon City, the records
show that Jethro was given ample opportunity to present its payrolls and other
pertinent documents during the hearings and to rectify the violations noted during
the ocular inspection. It, however, failed to do so, more particularly to submit
competent proof that it was giving its security guards the wages and benefits
mandated by law.
Jethros failure to keep payrolls and daily time records in Yakults premises was not
the only labor standard violation found to have been committed by it; it likewise
failed to register as a service contractor with the DOLE, pursuant to Department
Order No. 18-02 and, as earlier stated, to pay the wages and benefits in accordance
with the rates prescribed by law.
Facts: Wage Order No. 9, approved by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board (RTWPB) of the National Capital Region (NCR), took effect
on 5 November 2001. It grants P30.00 ECOLA to particular employees and
workers of all private sectors, identified as follows in Section 1 thereof:
Section 1. Upon the effectivity of this Wage Order, all private sector
workers and employees in the National Capital Region receiving daily
wage rates of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P250.00) up to TWO
HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P290.00) shall receive an emergency cost of
living allowance in the amount of THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) per day
payable in two tranches as follows:
Amount of ECOLAEffectivity
P15.00 5 November 2001
P15.00 1 February 2002
On 20 March 2002, respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Industries-Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter (Union), through
its President, Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing), sent a letter 4 to Director Alex
Maraan (Dir. Maraan) of the Department of Labor and Employment-National
Capital Region (DOLE-NCR), reporting the non-compliance of Dusit Hotel with
WO No. 9, while there was an on-going compulsory arbitration before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) due to a bargaining deadlock
between the Union and Dusit Hotel; and requesting immediate assistance on
this matter. On 24 May 2002, Rasing sent Dir. Maraan another letter
following-up his previous request for assistance.
Issues: Whether the 144 hotel employees were still entitled to ECOLA
granted by WO No. 9 despite the increases in their salaries, retroactive to 1
January 2001, ordered by NLRC in the latter's Decision dated 9 October 2002.
Whether Dusit Hotel is liable for the double indemnity for violation of the
wage order.
Ruling: The Court rules in the negative. It must be noted that the hotel
employees have a right to their share in the service charges collected by
Dusit Hotel, pursuant to Article 96 of the Labor Code of 1991, to wit:
The Court, however, finds no basis to hold Dusit Hotel liable for double
indemnity. Under Section 2 (m) of DOLE Department Order No. 10, Series of
1998, 30 the Notice of Inspection Result "shall specify the violations
discovered, if any, together with the officer's recommendation and
computation of the unpaid benefits due each worker with an advice that the
employer shall be liable for double indemnity in case of refusal or failure to
correct the violation within five calendar days from receipt of notice". A
The general rule is that any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be struck down at any time, the party that asserts it must be
in good faith and not evidently availing thereof simply to thwart the
execution of an award that has long become final and executory.
Consistent with Article 129 of the Labor Code of the Philippines in relation to
Article 217 of the same Code, this instant case should be referred back to
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Sub-Arbitration Branch V,
Naga City, on the ground that the aggregate money claim of each worker
exceeds the jurisdictional amount of this Office [which] is (sic) Five Thousand
Pesos Only (P5,000.00).
Before the NLRC could take any action, DOLE Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas
(Secretary Sto. Tomas), in an apparent reversal of Director Manalos
endorsement, issued another inspection authority on August 2, 2002 in the
same case. Pursuant to such authority, DOLE officials conducted another
investigation of petitioners premises and the same violations were
discovered.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can still assail the January 29, 2003
Order of Director Manalo allegedly on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, after
said Order has attained finality and is already in the execution stage.
Ruling: The petition lacks merit. Petitioner admits that it failed to appeal the
January 29, 2003 Order within the period prescribed by law. It likewise admits
that the case was already in the execution process when it resorted to a
belated appeal to the DOLE Secretary. Petitioner, however, excuses itself
from the effects of the finality of the Order by arguing that it was allegedly
issued without jurisdiction and may be assailed at any time.
In view of our ruling above that the January 29, 2003 Order was rendered
with jurisdiction and can no longer be questioned (as it is final and
executory), we can no longer entertain petitioners half-hearted and
unsubstantiated arguments that the said Order was allegedly based on
erroneous computation and included non-employees. Likewise, we find no
more need to address petitioners contention that the CA erred in dismissing
its petition on the ground of its belated compliance with the requirement of
certification against forum-shopping.
Facts: Jandeleon Juezan (Juezan) filed a complaint before the DOLE against
Bombo Radyo Phils. (Bombo Radyo) for illegal deduction, non-payment of
service incentive leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of wages and non-
coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. On the basis of the complaint, the
DOLE conducted a plant level inspection. The Labor Inspector in his report
wrote, Management representative informed that (Juezan) complainant is a
drama talent hired on a per drama participation basis hence no employer-
employer relationship existed between them. As proof of this, management
presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement, employments of
specific undertaking, etc. The management has no control of the talent if he
ventures into another contract with other broadcasting industries.
Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has the power to determine
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Ruling: Yes. No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE
to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. No
procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only make a preliminary
finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not say
that the DOLE would first seek the NLRCs determination of the existence of
an employer-employee relationship, or that should the existence of the
employer-employee relationship be disputed, the DOLE would refer the
matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine whether
or not an employer-employee relationship exists, and from there to decide
whether or not to issue compliance orders in accordance with Art. 128(b) of
the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730.
It must also be remembered that the power of the DOLE to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship need not necessarily result
in an affirmative finding. The DOLE may well make the determination that no
employer-employee relationship exists, thus divesting itself of jurisdiction
over the case. It must not be precluded from being able to reach its own
conclusions, not by the parties, and certainly not by this Court.
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is
fully empowered to make a determination as to the existence of an
employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not review by the NLRC.
On November 17, 2006, the CA affirmed the Secretary of DOLEs orders, with
the modification in that Luz was absolved of any personal liability under the
award.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The DOLE clearly acted within its authority when it determined the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and
respondents as it falls within the purview of its visitorial and enforcement
power under Article 128(b) of the Labor Code. The determination of the
existence of an employer-employee relationship by the DOLE must be
respected.
With regard to the contention that there is no evidence to support the finding
that the respondents rendered overtime work and that they worked on their
rest day, the resolution of this argument requires a review of the factual
findings and the evidence presented, Court said that it is not a trier of facts
and it applies with greater force in labor cases. Hence, where the factual
findings of the labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by,
the CA, the same are accorded respect and finality, and are binding to
Supreme Court.
It was the consistent conclusion of the DOLE and the CA that Lancer was not
an independent contractor but was engaged in "labor-only contracting";
hence, the petitioner was considered an indirect employer of respondents
and liable to the latter for their unpaid money claims.
(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials; and
(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing
activities which are directly related to the principal business or operations
of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.
According to the CA, the totality of the facts and surrounding circumstances
of this case point to such conclusion that Lancer was, indeed, a labor-only
contractor. Aside from these is the undisputed fact that the petitioner failed
to produce any written service contract that might serve as proof of its
alleged agreement with Lancer.
Petitioner therefore, being the principal employer and Lancer, being the
labor-only contractor, are solidarily liable for respondents unpaid money
claims.
Gaa vs. CA
G.R. No. L-44169; December 3, 1985
Ruling: SC held that, We do not think that the legislature intended the
exemption in Article 1708 of the New Civil Code to operate in favor of any
but those who are laboring men or women in the sense that their work is
manual. Persons belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a day's
labor for immediate or present support, and such persons are more in need
of the exemption than any others. Petitioner Rosario A. Gaa is definitely not
within that class.
Ruling: SC held that the amount doled out was paid directly to the person
who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more
to consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context
of the law. Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund
of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was
nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units
themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00.Car washing after a tour of
duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
Facts: Due to financial losses, the Philippine Veterans Bank was placed in
receivership pursuant to the order of the Central Bank of the Philippines.
Consequently, its employees, including private respondent Dr. Jose Teodorico
V. Molina, were terminated from work and given their respective separation
pay and other benefits. Dr. Molina filed a complaint before NLRC. He
demanded the implementation of the Wage Orders No. 1 and 2. Both the
Labor Arbiter and NLRC granted the petition of Molina.
Ruling: SC held that Molinas salary is within the coverage of the said wage
orders. W.O. 1 expressly states that employees having a monthly salary of
not more than P3,802.08 are entitled to receive the mandated wage
increase. Undeniably, MOLINA was receiving a monthly salary of P3,754.60.
This fact alone leaves no doubt that he should benefit from said wage order.
On the other hand, W.O. 2 raised the ceiling for entitlement to the wage
increase. If MOLINA was covered by the earlier wage order, with more reason
should the later wage order apply to him.
Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money
claimsand on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision
declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the
monetary claims.
Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282,
the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be
heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30
days prior to the effectivity of his separation.
From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the
dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an
authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284,
and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized
cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for
just or authorized cause but due process was not observed.
In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural
infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However,
the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process. The present case squarely falls under the
fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established
that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company.
Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and
instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have
been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for
the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates
the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it
The Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay and 13 th month pay without deductions. The evident
intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in
the form of the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same
so as to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-
wide inflation. Clearly, as additional income, the 13 th month pay is included
in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code.
Facts: American Wire and Cable Co., Inc., is a corporation engaged in the
manufacture of wires and cables. There are two unions in this company, the
American Wire and Cable Monthly-Rated Employees Union and the American
Wire and Cable Daily-Rated Employees Union.
On 16 February 2001, an original action was filed before the NCMB of the
Department of Labor and Employment by the two unions for voluntary
arbitration. They alleged that the private respondent, without valid cause,
suddenly and unilaterally withdrew and denied certain benefits and
entitlements which they have long enjoyed. These are Service Award, 35%
premium pay of an employees basic pay for the work rendered during Holy
Monday, Holy Tuesday, Holy Wednesday, December 23, 26, 27, 28 and 29,
Christmas Party and Promotional Increase.
Issue: WON the respondent company violated Article 100 of the Labor Code.
Ruling: The company is not guilty of violating Art. 100 of the Labor Code.
The certain benefits and entitlements are considered bonuses. A bonus can
only be enforceable and demandable if it has ripened into a company
practice. It must also be expressly agreed by the employer and employee or
it must be on a fixed amount.
The assailed benefits were never subjects of any agreement between the
union and the company. It was never incorporated in the CBA. Since all these
benefits are in the form of bonuses, it is neither enforceable nor demandable.
However, when the talk between the parties did not go well, respondent
union filed a Notice to Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock. Honda
then filed a notice of Lockout in which the DOLE ordered the party to cease
and desist from committing acts.
The union filed a second Notice of Strike on ground of unfair labor, in which
they went into pocketing of the premises of Honda. DOLE then assumed
jurisdiction and subjected the issue to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
for which the employees were ordered to return to work.
The management of Honda, on 22 Nov. 1999, then issued a memorandum
announcing its new computation of the 13 th and 14th month pay to be
granted to employees whereby the 31-day strike shall be considered
unworked days for purposes of computing said benefits.
Thus, the union opposed the pro-rated computation of the bonuses and the
matter was brought before the Grievance Machinery. The Labor Arbiter
ordered Honda to compute each provision in full month basic pay. Ca
affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter.
Issue: WON the pro-rated computation of the 13 th month pay and the other
bonuses in question is valid and lawful
It is well noted that the CBA refers to the negotiated contract between a
legitimate labor organization and the employer. It is the law between the
parties and compliance therewith is mandated by express policy of the law.
Honda did not adduce evidence to show that the 13 th month, 14th month and
financial assistance benefits were previously subject to pro-rating. Thus, such
was an implicit acceptance that prior to the strike, a full month basic pay
computation was the present practice intended to be maintained in the
CBA.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the petition. NLRC reversed the findings and
ordered the implementation of the CBA.
Issue: WON the employees who have retired have no personality to file an
action since there is no longer an employer-employee relationship.
Ruling: Employees who have retired still have the personality to file a
complaint.
Retirement of the employee does not in itself affect his employment status
especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, since these
must be protected as though there had been no interruption of service. It
must be borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of the
employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom constituted
as it were a continuing consideration of services rendered as well as an
effective inducement foe remaining with the corporation. It is intended to
help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life.
When the retired employees were requesting that their retirement benefits
be granted, they were not pleading for generosity but merely demanding
that their rights, embodied in the CBA, be recognized. When an employee
has retired but his benefits under the law or CBA have not yet been given, he
still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting his claims, the status of an
employee entitled to the protection of the Labor Code, one of which is the
protection of the labor union.
Facts: Angel Jardin, et. Al. are drivers of Philjama International Inc., a
domestic corporation engaged in the operation of Goodman Taxi. Jardin, et.
al. drive Philjamas taxicabs evry other day on a 24 hour work schedule
under the boaundary system. Philjama admitted that a deduction of Php
30.00 is regularly against Jardin et. al.s daily earnings. Such fee is
supposedly for the washing of the taxi units.
Believing that the imposed deductions of Php 30.00 on their daily wages is
illegal, Jardin et. al formed a labor union to protect their rights and interests.
Learning about the plans of Jardin et. al, Philjama terminated them from
service. Jardin et. al believed that they were dismissed because of the
formed labor union in which they are leaders and active members. Because
of this, Jardin et. al. filed a complaint against Philjama for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal and illegal deduction of washing fees.
The labor arbiter dismissed the case for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the labor arbiters judgment declaring that the dismissal was illegal
and ordered that Jardin et. al. be reinstated. Philjama filed its motion for
reconsideration. On its second motion for reconsideration, NLRC then
reversed its prior decision saying that there exists no employee-employer
relationship between the parties; thus, it has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. It held that the relationship between the parties is that of a
leasehold which is covered by the Civil Code rather than the Labor Code.
Aggrieved, Jardin et. al sought for reconsideration. Such was denied by the
NLRC. Consequently, they raised the case to the Supreme Court.
SC said, to quote:
In a number of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that the relationship
between jeepney owners/operators on one hand and jeepney drivers on the
other under the boundary system is that of employer-employee and not of
lessor-lessee.
The deduction of Php 30.00 that is supposedly for the washing of taxi units is
not illegal in the context of the law. After a tour of duty, it is incumbent upon
the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when
he took it. Car washing after tour of duty is indeed a practice in the taxi
industry and is in fact dictated by fair play. --- Hence, Jardin et.al (drivers) are
not entitled to reimbursement of washing charges.
Issue: Whether or not the change in the work schedule violated Article 100
of the Labor Code on the non-diminution of wages and benefits guaranteed
under the parties CBA.
Ruling: No. It was evident that the change in work schedule was justified, it
being a management prerogative. Respondent, as employer, cited the
change in the program of horse races as reason for the adjustment of the
employees work schedule. It rationalized that when the CBA was signed, the
horse races started at 10:00 a.m. When the races were moved to 2:00 p.m.,
there was no other choice for management but to change the employees'
work schedule as there was no work to be done in the morning. It is true that
Section 1, Article IV of the CBA provides for a 7-hour work schedule from
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. from Mondays to
Saturdays. However, Section 2, Article XI expressly reserves on respondent
the prerogative to change existing methods or facilities to change the
schedules of work.
Moreover, Manila Jockey Club was not obliged to allow all its employees to
render overtime work every day for the whole year, but only those
employees whose services were needed after their regular working hours
and only upon the instructions of management. The overtime pay was not
given to each employee consistently, deliberately and unconditionally, but as
a compensation for additional services rendered. Thus, overtime pay does
not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code
on prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits.
Ruling: Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor
Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial
employees.
The other provisions in the Title include normal hours of work (Article 83),
hours worked (Article 84), meal periods (Article 85), night shift differential
(Article 86), overtime work (Article 87), undertime not offset by overtime
(Article 88), emergency overtime work (Article 89), and computation of
additional compensation (Article 90). It is thus clear that, generally,
managerial employees such as respondents are not entitled to overtime pay
for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. Respondents failed to
show that the circumstances of the present case constitute an exception to
this general rule.
Aside from their allegations, respondents were not able to present anything
to prove that petitioners were obliged to permit respondents to render
overtime work and give them the corresponding overtime pay. Even if
petitioners did not institute a "no time card policy," respondents could not
demand overtime pay from petitioners if respondents did not render
Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioners should grant 13th month pay,
bonus and leave encashment in full regardless of actual service rendered.
2. Whether or not the prorated payment of the said benefits
constitutes diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.
On the second issue, it is a settled rule that any benefit and supplement
being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or
eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is
founded on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare," and "to afford labor full protection." Said mandate in
In the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003, petitioner had adopted
a policy of freely, voluntarily and consistently granting full benefits to its
employees regardless of the length of service rendered.
Petitioner claims that its full payment of benefits regardless of the length of
service to the company does not constitute voluntary employer practice. It
points out that the payments had been erroneously made and they occurred
in isolated cases in the years 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003.
According to petitioner, it was only in 2003 that the accounting department
discovered the error. Petitioner further argues that for a grant of a benefit to
be considered a practice, it should have been practiced over a long period of
time and must be shown to be consistent, deliberate and intentional, which
is not what happened in this case.
True, there were only a total of seven employees who benefited from such a
practice, but it was an established practice nonetheless. Jurisprudence has
not laid down any rule specifying a minimum number of years within which a
company practice must be exercised in order to constitute voluntary
company practice. Petitioner cannot shirk away from its responsibility by
merely claiming that it was a mistake or an error, supported only by an
affidavit of its manufacturing group.
Petition denied.
Sometime in September 1997, the Bismark IV, together with its crew, was
temporarily assigned at the Mariveles Grains Terminal in Mariveles, Bataan.
Then, on October 20, 1997, respondent James Keith issued a memo to the
crew of Bismark IV stating that the barge had been permanently transferred
to the Mariveles Grains terminal beginning October 1, 1997 and because of
that, its crew would no longer be entitled to out of port benefits of 16 hours
overtime and P200 a day out-of port allowance. Due to the said
development, Aguanza questioned the diminution of his benefits. Aguanza
insisted on reporting to work in Manila although his barge, Bismark IV, and its
other crew were already permanently based in Mariveles, Bataan. Aguanza
was not allowed to time in in Manila because his work was in Mariveles,
Bataan. He therefore was not able to render his services, and was
accordingly not paid for doing nothing. Because of private respondents
refusal to give him any work assignment and pay his salary, Aguanza filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents.
ATIs transfer of Bismark IVs base from Manila to Bataan was, contrary to
Aguanzas assertions, a valid exercise of management prerogative. The
transfer of employees has been traditionally among the acts identified as a
management prerogative subject only to limitations found in law, collective
bargaining agreement, and general principles of fair play and justice. Even as
the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also protect the
right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management prerogatives.
The free will of management to conduct its own business affairs to achieve
its purpose cannot be denied. On the other hand, the transfer of an
employee may constitute constructive dismissal "when continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is
a demotion in rank and/or a diminution in pay; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable
to the employee." Aguanzas situation is not within the purview of this
discussion.
When ATI transferred Bismark IVs operations to Bataan, ATI offered Aguanza
similar terms: basic pay for 40 hours of work from Monday to Friday,
overtime pay for work done in excess of eight hours per day, overtime pay
for work done on Saturdays and Sundays, no additional allowance and no
transportation for working in Bataan. The circumstances of the case made
no mention of the salary structure in case Bismark IV being assigned work
Upon appeal, with respect to Taroys claim for refund, the Labor Arbiter ruled
in his favor for if, as contended by Genesis Transport, tollgate fees form part
of overhead expense, why were not expenses for fuel and maintenance also
charged to overhead expense. The Labor Arbiter thus concluded that it
would appear that the tollgate fees are deducted from the gross revenues
and not from the salaries of drivers and conductors, but certainly the
deduction thereof diminishes the take home pay of the employees.
The amounts representing tollgate fees were deducted from gross revenues
and not directly from Taroys commissions, the labor tribunal and the
appellate court correctly held that the withholding of those amounts reduced
the amount from which Taroys 9% commission would be computed. Such a
computation not only marks a change in the method of payment of wages,
resulting in a diminution of Taroys wages in violation of Article 113 vis--vis
Article 100 of the Labor Code, as amended. It need not be underlined that
without Taroys written consent or authorization, the deduction is considered
illegal.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. In compliance with Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 851, petitioner granted its employees the mandatory
thirteenth (13th) - month pay since 1975. The formula used by petitioner in
computing the 13th-month pay was: Total Basic Annual Salary divided by
twelve (12). Included in petitioners computation of the Total Basic Annual
Salary were the following: basic monthly salary; first eight (8) hours overtime
pay on Sunday and legal/special holiday; night premium pay; and vacation
and sick leaves for each year. Throughout the years, petitioner used this
computation until 2006.
On November 6, 2004, respondent staged a strike. During the pendency of
the strike, petitioner declared a temporary cessation of operations.
The suspension of operation was lifted on June 2006, but the rank-and-file
employees were allowed to report for work on a fifteen (15) day-per-month
rotation basis that lasted until September 2006. In December 2006,
petitioner gave the employees their 13th-month pay based on the employees
total earnings during the year divided by 12.
Respondent objected to this computation. It averred that petitioner did not
adhere to the usual computation of the 13 th-month pay. NLRC ruled in favor
of the respondent and CA reversed itd ruling and ruled in favor of the Unyon.
Hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not Azucarera did not adhere to the proper computation
of the 13th-month pay.
Ruling: The 13th-month pay mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 851
represents an additional income based on wage but not part of the wage. It
is equivalent toone-twelfth (1/12) of the total basic salary earned by an
employee within a calendar year. All rank-and-file employees, regardless of
their designation or employment status and irrespective of the method by
which their wages are paid, are entitled to this benefit, provided that they
have worked for at least one month during the calendar year. If the
employee worked for only a portion of the year, the 13th-month pay is
computed pro rata.
Article 100 of the Labor Code, otherwise known as the Non-Diminution Rule,
mandates that benefits given to employees cannot be taken back or reduced
unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the
employment contract, written or unwritten. The rule against diminution of
benefits applies if it is shown that the grant of the benefit is based on an
express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time and
that the practice is consistent and deliberate. Nevertheless, the rule will not
apply if the practice is due to error in the construction or application of a
doubtful or difficult question of law. But even in cases of error, it should be
shown that the correction is done soon after discovery of the error.
Appealing for the release of his salary respondent filed a Complaint against
the petitioners for illegal dismissal; non-payment of salaries/wages and 13th
month pay with prayer for reinstatement and full backwages; exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees, costs of suit, and legal interest.
In this case, the withholding of respondents salary does not fall under any of
the circumstances provided under Article 113. Neither was it established with
certainty that respondent did not work from November 16 to November 30,
2005. Hence, the Court agrees with the LA and the CA that the unlawful
withholding of respondents salary amounts to constructive dismissal.
The petitioner alleged that the goldsmiths were given the option not to post
deposits, but to sign authorizations allowing the former to deduct from the
latter's salaries amounts not exceeding 15% of their take home pay should it
be found that they lost the gold entrusted to them. The deposits shall be
returned upon completion of the goldsmiths' work and after an accounting of
the gold received.
Issues:
1) Whether or not Nia Jewelry Manufacturing of Metal Arts, Inc. may
impose the policy for their goldsmiths requiring them to post cash
bonds or deposits; and
2) Whether or not there is constructive dismissal.
Ruling: 1) NO, the Nia Jewelry may not impose the policy. Articles 113 and
114 of the Labor Code are clear as to what are the exceptions to the general
prohibition against requiring deposits and effecting deductions from the
employees' salaries.
The petitioners should first establish that the making of deductions from the
salaries is authorized by law, or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor.
The petitioners failed to prove that their imposition of the new policy upon
the goldsmiths under Nia Jewelry's employ falls under the exceptions
specified in Articles 113 and 114 of the Labor Code.
The petitioners did not whimsically or arbitrarily impose the policy to post
cash bonds or make deductions from the workers' salaries. As attested to by
the respondents' fellow goldsmiths in their Joint Affidavit, the workers were
convened and informed of the reason behind the implementation of the new
policy. Instead of airing their concerns, the respondents just promptly
stopped reporting for work.
Ruling: Any benefit or privilege enjoyed by petitioner from using the service
vehicle was merely incidental and insignificant, because for the most part
the vehicle was under Mekeni's control and supervision. Free and complete
disposal is given to the petitioner only after the vehicle's cost is covered or
paid in full. Until then, the vehicle remains at the beck and call of Mekeni.
Given the vast territory petitioner had to cover to be able to perform his work
effectively and generate business for his employer, the service vehicle was
an absolute necessity, or else Mekeni's business would suffer adversely.
Thus, it is clear that while petitioner was paying for half of the vehicle's
value, Mekeni was reaping the full benefits from the use thereof.
Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." Article 2142 of the same Code likewise
clarifies that there are certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts which give
rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract, to the end that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. In the absence of
specific terms and conditions governing the car plan arrangement between
the petitioner and Mekeni, a quasi-contractual relation was created between
them. Consequently, Mekeni may not enrich itself by charging petitioner for
the use of its vehicle which is otherwise absolutely necessary to the full and
effective promotion of its business. It may not, under the claim that
petitioner's payments constitute rents for the use of the company vehicle,
refuse to refund what petitioner had paid, for the reasons that the car plan
did not carry such a condition; the subject vehicle is an old car that is
substantially, if not fully, depreciated; the car plan arrangement benefited
Thus, Mekeni Food Corporation should refund petitioner Antonio Locsin II's
payments under the car plan agreement amounting only to the extent of the
contribution Locsin made, totalling to the amount of P112,500.00.
1st CAUSE:
In their desire to improve their working conditions, respondents and other
employees of held their first formal meeting on November 23, 2003 to
discuss the formation of a union. The following day, seventeen (17)
employees were barred from entering petitioners factory premises located in
Castillejos, Zambales, and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters warehouse
at Subic Bay Freeport Zone (SBFZ) purportedly because of its expansion.
Afterwards, the said seventeen (17) employees were repeatedly ordered to
go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.
Respondents contended that the affected employees were not given regular
work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform
their functions. Respondents sought the assistance of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board. Subsequently, an agreement between
petitioners and THS-GQ Union was reached. Petitioners agreed to give
priority to regular employees in the distribution of work assignments.
Respondents averred, however, that petitioners never complied with its
commitment but instead hired contractual workers. Instead, Respondents
claimed that the work weeks of those employees in the SBFZ plant were
drastically reduced to only three (3) days in a month.
2nd CAUSE:
On March 24, 2004, THS-GQ Union filed a petition for certification election
and an order was issued to hold the certification election in both T&H
Shopfitters and Gin Queen.
On October 10, 2004, petitioners sponsored a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for
its employees. The officers and members of the THS-GQ Union were
purportedly excluded from the field trip. On the evening of the field trip, a
certain Angel Madriaga, a sales officer of petitioners, campaigned against the
union in the forthcoming certification election.
When the certification election was scheduled on October 11, 2004, the
employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales
to cast their votes. The remaining employees situated at the SBFZ plant cast
their votes as well. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by petitioners, the
votes for "no union" prevailed.
3rd CAUSE:
A memorandum was issued by petitioner Ben Huang (Huang), Director for
Gin Queen, informed its employees of the expiration of the lease contract
between Gin Queen and its lessor in Castillejos, Zambales and announced
the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan, Zambales.
When the respondents, visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was a
"talahiban" or grassland. The said union officers and members were made to
work as grass cutters in Cabangan, under the supervision of a certain
Barangay Captain Greg Pangan. Due to these circumstances, the employees
PETITIONERS DEFENSE:
In its defense, Petitioners also stress that they cannot be held liable for ULP
for the reason that there is no employer-employee relationship between the
former and respondents. Further, Gin Queen avers that its decision to
implement an enforced rotation of work assignments for respondents was a
management prerogative permitted by law, justified due to the decrease in
orders from its customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to
avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned work on a rotational
basis. It explains that its failure to present concrete proof of its decreasing
orders was due to the impossibility of proving a negative assertion. It also
asserts that the transfer from Castillejos to Cabangan was made in good faith
and solely because of the expiration of its lease contract in Castillejos. It was
of the impression that the employees, who opposed its economic measures,
were merely motivated by spite in filing the complaint for ULP against it.
Petitioners are being accused of violations of paragraphs (a), (c), and (e) of
Article 257 (formerly Article 248) of the Labor Code,13 to wit:
Article 257. Unfair labor practices of employers.It shall be unlawful
for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization;
xxxx
(c) To contract out services or functions being performed by union
members when such will interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
xxxx
(e) To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. x x x
In December 2003, the parties signed a 5-year CBA effective June 1, 2003
until May 31, 2008.
On August 16, 2005, petitioner, through its President, Atty. Maglaya , issued
a Memorandum providing guidelines on the implementation of vacation and
sick leave credits as well as vacation leave commutation which states that
vacation and sick leave credits are not automatic as leave credits would be
earned on a month-to-month and only vacation leave is commuted or
monetized to cash which is effected after the second year of continuous
service of an employee.
Petitioner argues that there is only one retirement plan as the CBA
Retirement Plan and the PERAA Plan are one and the same. It maintains that
there is no established company practice or policy of giving two retirement
benefits to its employees. Respondent belies the claims of petitioner and
asserts that there are two retirement plans as the PERAA Retirement Plan,
which has been implemented for more than 30 years, is different from the
CBA Retirement Plan. Respondent further avers that it has always been a
practice of petitioner to give two retirement benefits and that this practice
was established by substantial evidence as found by both the Voluntary
Arbitrator and the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to two retirement plans.
Ruling: The Non-Diminution Rule found in Article 100 of the Labor Code
explicitly prohibits employers from eliminating or reducing the benefits
The Memorandum dated August 16, 2005 is contrary to the existing CBA. It
limits the available leave credits of an employee at the start of the school
year. The Memorandum dated imposes a limitation not agreed upon by the
parties nor stated in the CBA, so it must be struck down.
Facts: The respondent was employed as a sales clerk and assigned at the
petitioners boutique. Her primary tasks were attending to all customer
needs, ensuring efficient inventory, coordinating orders from clients,
cashiering and reporting to the accounting department. The petitioner
learned that some of their employees had access to their POS system with
the use of a universal password given to them by a certain Elmer Flores, who
in turn learned of the password from the respondent. The petitioner then
conducted an investigation and asked the petitioner to explain why she
should not be disciplinarily dealt with. During the investigation the
respondent was placed under preventive suspension. After investigation the
petitioner terminated the respondent on the grounds of loss of trust or
confidence. This respondent was given her final wage and benefits less the
inventory variance incurred by the store. This urged the respondent to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, holiday pay, rest day and
separation pay. The labor arbiter ruled in her favour awarding her
backwages. The petitioner appealed the decision in the NLRC and the
decision was reversed. However, upon the respondents petition for certiorari
in the court of appeals the decision was reinstated. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the negative sales variance could be validly deducted from
the respondents wage?
Article 113 of the Labor Code provides that no employer, in his own behalf or
in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the wages of his
employees, except in cases where the employer is authorized by law or
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, among others.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides:
In this case, the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was
responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales for the year 2005 to
2006 and that Esteban was given the opportunity to show cause the
deduction from her last salary should not be made.
Petitioner conceded that his payment of wages falls below the minimum
wage law. He averred that NLRC should have considered as forming a
substantial part of private respondents' total wages the cash value of the
tuna liver and intestines private respondents were entitled to retrieve. He
argued that the combined value of the cash wage and monetary value of the
tuna liver and intestines clearly exceeded the minimum wage fixed by law.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ruled in favor of the respondents.
Facts: Due to financial losses, North Davao Mining Corporation laid off
workers. Respondent Wilfredo Guillema is one among several employees of
North Davao who were separated by reason of the companys closure on May
31, 1992. It appears that, during the life of the petitioner corporation, from
the beginning of its operations in 1981 until its closure in 1992, it had been
giving separation pay equivalent to thirty (30) days pay for every year of
service. Moreover, inasmuch as the region where North Davao operated was
plagued by insurgency and other peace and order problems, the employees
had to collect their salaries at a bank in Tagum, Davao del Norte, some 58
kilometers from their workplace and about 2 hours travel time by public
transportation; this arrangement lasted from 1981 up to 1990.
Issue: Whether or not time spent in collecting wages in a place other than
the place of employment is compensable notwithstanding that the same is
done during official time.
Ruling: SC, affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, finds that the hours
spent by complainants in collecting salaries at a bank in Tagum, Davao del
Norte shall be considered compensable hours worked. Considering further
the distance between Amacan, Maco to Tagum which is 2 hours by travel
and the risks in commuting all the time in collecting complainants salaries,
would justify the granting of backwages equivalent to two (2) days in a
month as prayed for. Corollary, we likewise hold respondents liable for the
transportation expenses incurred by complainants at P40.00 round trip fare
during pay days.
Ruling: According to the Supreme Court, Article 283 of the Labor Code
provides that employees who are dismissed due to closures that are not due
to business insolvency should be paid separation pay equivalent to one-
month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. In the case at bar, the petitioners had served the
respondent SDPI for a period longer than six months. Hence, their separation
pay computed at one-half month pay per year of service is more than the
minimum one month pay. Also, the court emphasized that the collective
bargaining agreement should prevail as a contract governing the employer
and the employees respecting the terms of employment, which in this case,
they agreed on the terms of termination pay should be in accordance with
the provisions of the Labor Code. Consequently, Artcle 283 of the Labor
Code, which grants separation pay equivalent to one-month pay or one-half
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, to the employees
retrenched due to business closures, should apply.
Facts: The Heir of Sara Lee is engaged in the direct selling of a variety of
product lines for men and women, including cosmetics, intimate apparels,
perfumes, ready to wear clothes and other novelty items, through its various
outlets nationwide. In the pursuit of its business, the petitioner engages and
contracts with dealers to sell the aforementioned merchandise. These
dealers, known either as Independent Business Managers (IBMs) or
Independent Group Supervisors (IGSs), depending on whether they sell
individually or through their own group, would obtain at discounted rates the
merchandise from the petitioner on credit or then sell the same products to
their own customers at fixed prices also determined by the petitioner.
In turn, the dealers are paid Services Fees, or sales commissions, the
amount of which depends on the volume and value of their sales. Under
existing company policy, the dealers must remit to the petitioner the
proceeds of their sales within a designated credit period, which would either
be 38 days for IGSs or 52 days for IBMs, counted from the day the said
dealers acquired the merchandise from the petitioner. To discourage late
remittances, the petitioner imposes a Credit Administration Charge, or
simply, a penalty charge, on the value of the unremitted payment.
The dealers under this system earn income through a profit margin between
the discounted purchase price they pay on credit to the petitioner and the
fixed selling price their customers will have to pay. On top of this margin, the
dealer is given the Service Fee, a sales commission, based on the volume of
sales generated by him or her. Due to the sheer volume of sales generated
by all of its outlets, the petitioner has found the need to strictly monitor the
38- or 52-day rolling due date of each of its IBMs and IGSs through the
employment of Credit Administration Supervisors (CAS) for each branch.
The primary duty of the CAS is to strictly monitor each of these deadlines, to
supervise the credit and collection of payments and outstanding accounts
due to the petitioner from its independent dealers and various customers,
and to screen prospective IBMs. To discharge these responsibilities, the CAS
is provided with a computer equipped with control systems through which
data is readily generated. Under this organizational setup, the CAS is under
the direct and immediate supervision of the Branch Operations Manager
(BOM).
Cynthia Rey at the time of her dismissal from employment, held the position
of Credit Administration Supervisor or CAS at the Cagayan de Oro City
branch of the petitioner. She was first employed by the petitioner as an
Accounts Receivable Clerk at its Caloocan City branch. In November 1993,
respondent was transferred to the Cagayan de Oro City branch retaining the
same position. In January 1994, respondent was elevated to the position of
CAS. At that time, the Branch Operations Manager or BOM of the Cagayan
de Oro City branch was a certain Mr. Jeremiah Villagracia. In March 1995,
respondent was temporarily assigned to the Butuan City branch.
Sometime in June 1995, while respondent was still working in Butuan City,
she allegedly instructed the Accounts Receivable Clerk of the Cagayan de
Oro outlet to change the credit term of one of the IBMs of the petitioner who
happens to be respondents sister-in-law, from the 52-day limit to an
unauthorized term of 60 days. The respondent made the instruction just
before the computer data for the computation of the Service Fee accruing to
Ms. Rey-Petilla was about to be generated. Ms. Mendoza then reported this
Ruling: The award of 13th month pay must be deleted. Respondent is not a
rank-and-file employee and is, therefore, not entitled to thirteenth-month
pay. However, the NLRC and the CA are correct in refusing to award 14th and
15th month pay as well as the monthly salary increase of 10 percent per
year for two years based on her latest salary rate. The respondent must
show that these benefits are due to her as a matter of right. Mere allegations
by the respondent do not suffice in the absence of proof supporting the
same. With respect to salary increases in particular, the respondent must
likewise show that she has a vested right to the same, such that her salary
increases can be made a component in the computation of back wages.
What is evident is that salary increases are a mere expectancy. They are by
nature volatile and dependent on numerous variables, including the
companys fiscal situation, the employees future performance on the job, or
the employees continued stay in a position. In short, absent any proof,
there is no vested right to salary increases.
San Juan De Dios Hospital vs. NLRC, 282 SCRA 316 [1997]
Issue: Whether or not Policy Instruction No. 54, entitling a full weekly wage
of 7 days upon completion of 40-hour/5-day workweek, is valid based on
existing labor laws.
A perusal of R. A. No. 5901 reveals nothing therein that gives two days off
with pay for health personnel who complete a 40-hour work or 5-day
workweek. In fact, the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 16630 (later
passed into law as Republic Act No. 5901) explicitly states that the bill's sole
purpose is to shorten the working hours of health personnel and not to dole
out a two days off with pay. Petitioners' position is also negated by the very
rules and regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Labor Standards which
implement Republic Act No. 5901. Section 15 of aforementioned
implementing rules grants specific rate of additional compensation for work
performed on Sunday or for work performed in excess of forty hours a week.
Policy Instruction No. 54 unduly extended the statute.
Article 83 merely provides: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day,
five days per week for health personnel, and (2) where the exigencies of
service require that health personnel work for six days or forty-eight hours
then such health personnel shall be entitled to an additional compensation of
at least thirty percent of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. There
is nothing in the law that supports then Secretary of Labor and petitioners
assertion. The Secretary of Labor exceeded his authority by including a two
days off with pay in contravention of the clear mandate of the statute.
Administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, and the
Court will not hesitate to strike down an administrative interpretation that
deviates from the provision of the statute.
Facts: Prior to the present controversy, the factory employees of Sime Darby
Pilipinas, Inc. enjoyed a 30-minute paid on call lunch break in their daily
work schedule of 7:45 am to 3:45 pm. The petitioner company passed a
memorandum dated Aug 12 1992 advising all factory-based workers, except
those in the Warehouse and Quality Assurance Department, of a change in
work schedule that discontinued the 30-minute paid on call lunch break
and set an uninterrupted 1 hour lunch break in lieu thereof.
The OSG recommended the present petition to be granted, alleging that the
new memorandum containing the work schedule was not discriminatory not
did it constitute unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court also reiterated the policy that while social justice and the
protection of the working class is ensured by the Constitution, the same
fundamental law also protects the right of the management to regulate all
aspects of employment as well as to retain the prerogative of changing work
schedules according to the exigencies of the enterprise. So long as this
prerogative is exercised in good faith, the Court upholds such exercise.
On February 17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, private respondent left
the clinic to have his dinner at his residence, which was about five-minute
drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from
the PAL Cargo Services. One of its employees, Mr. Manuel Acosta, had
suffered a heart attack. Upon receiving the call the nurse on duty, Mr.
Merlino Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the
emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and was
rushed by Mr. Eusebio to the hospital. When private respondent reached the
clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the
patient. Mr. Acosta died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director Dr. Godofredo B.
Banzon ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation. The
Chief Flight Surgeon, in turn, required private respondent to explain why no
disciplinary sanction should be taken against him.
Ruling: NO. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the premises as
long as they return to their post on time.
Section 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
further states:
Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods.Every employer shall give his
employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for
regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not
less than twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided
that such shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked
of the employee;
(a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve
strenuous physical exertion;
(b)Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen
hours a day;
(c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work
to be performed on machineries, equipment or installations to avoid
serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and
(d)Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable
goods.
Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20)
minutes shall be considered as compensable working time.
Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere
in the law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the
company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the
premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private respondents
act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute
abandonment.
Issue: WON there was an illegal reduction of work when Linton implemented
a compressed workweek by reducing from six to three the number of working
days with the employees working on a rotation basis.
Records show that Linton continued its business operations during the
effectivity of the compressed workweek, which spanned more than the
maximum period. On the other hand, for retrenchment to be justified, any
claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following
Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 151309, Oct. 15, 2008
On a letter dated March 26, 1997, the Bureau of Animal Industry of the
Department of Agriculture reminded Tryco that its production should be
conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in Caloocan City.
BMT opposed the transfer of its members to San Rafael, Bulacan, contending
that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike on
May 26, 1997.
Considering that the MOA clearly states that the employee waives the
payment of overtime pay in exchange of a five-day workweek, there is no
room for interpretation and its terms should be implemented as they are
written.
Facts: Respondent Filipro, Inc. (now Nestle Philippines, Inc.) filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission a petition for declaratory relief seeking
a ruling on its rights and obligations respecting claims of its monthly paid
employees for holiday pay.
Both Filipro and the Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) agreed to submit the
case for voluntary arbitration and appointed respondent Benigno Vivar, Jr. as
voluntary arbitrator. Arbitrator Vivar rendered a decision directing Filipro to
pay its monthly paid employees holiday pay pursuant to Article 94 of the
Code, subject only to the exclusions and limitations specified in Article 82
and such other legal restrictions as are provided for in the Code. However,
the respondent arbitrator refused to take cognizance of the case reasoning
that he had no more jurisdiction to continue as arbitrator because he had
resigned from service effective May 1, 1986.
Issue: WON sales personnel are excluded in the payment of holiday pay.
Under Article 82, field personnel are not entitled to holiday pay. Said article
defines field personnel as "non-agricultural employees who regularly perform
their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty."
The law requires that the actual hours of work in the field be reasonably
ascertained. The company has no way of determining whether or not these
sales personnel, even if they report to the office before 8:00 a.m. prior to
field work and come back at 4:30 p.m., really spend the hours in between in
actual field work. Moreover, the requirement that "actual hours of work in the
field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty" must be read in
conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules which provides:
The criteria for granting incentive bonus are: (1) attaining or exceeding sales
volume based on sales target; (2) good collection performance; (3) proper
compliance with good market hygiene; (4) good merchandising work; (5)
minimal market returns and (6) proper truck maintenance. The criteria
indicate that these sales personnel are given incentive bonuses precisely
Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court found creditable merit for the petitioner. The
members of the respondent union are supervisory employees as defined in
Article 212(m) of the Labor Code. But for purposes of determining whether
they are entitled to overtime pay, rest day pay and holiday pay, said
employees should be considered as officers and members of the managerial
staff as defined under Article 82, Book III of the Labor Code and amplified in
Section 2 Rule I Book III of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code. Perforce,
they are not entitled to the mentioned benefits.
The distinction made by the NLRC on the basis of whether or not the union
members are managerial employees, to determine the latters entitlement to
the questioned benefits, is misplaced and inappropriate. It is admitted that
that these union members are supervisory employees and this is one
instance where nomenclatures or titles of their jobs conform to the nature of
their functions. Hence, to distinguish them from a managerial employee as
defined in Article 82 or 212(m) of the Labor Code is puerile and inefficacious.
Petitioner:
1) Since he performs his duties in the project site or away from the
principal place of business of his employer (herein private respondent),
he falls under the category of "field personnel." However, his case
constitutes the exception to the exception because his actual working
hours can be determined as evidenced by the disbursement vouchers
containing payments of petitioner's salaries and overtime services.
Field personnel may include managerial employees.
2) Private respondent compensated him for his overtime services as
indicated in the various disbursement vouchers he submitted as
evidence. Thus, he is entitled to the benefits.
3) He is entitled to separation pay.
Ruling:
1. NO, HE MAY NOT.
That petitioner was paid overtime benefits does not automatically and
necessarily denote that petitioner is entitled to such benefits. Art. 82 of the
Labor Code specifically delineates who are entitled to the overtime premiums
and service incentive leave pay provided under Art. 87, 93, 94 and 95 of the
Labor Code and the exemptions thereto. As previously determined, petitioner
falls under the exemptions and therefore has no legal claim to the said
benefits. It is well and good that petitioner was compensated for his overtime
services. However, this does not translate into a right on the part of
petitioner to demand additional payment when, under the law, petitioner is
clearly exempted therefrom.
2. NO, HE IS NOT.
The applicable provision is Article 280 of the Labor Code which defines the
term "project employee," thus:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific period or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work
or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
In the case at bench, it was duly established that private respondent hired
petitioner as project or construction engineer specifically for its Monte de
Piedad building project.
Accordingly, as project employee, petitioner's services are deemed
coterminous with the project, that is, petitioner's services may be terminated
as soon as the project for which he was hired is completed.
Facts: This case originated from a complaint filed on September 20, 1990 by
private respondent Fermin Agao, Jr. against petitioner for illegal dismissal,
violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-payment of five days service incentive
leave for 1990. Private respondent had been employed as a "bodegero" or
ship's quartermaster on February 12, 1998. He complained that he had been
constructively dismissed by the petitioner when the latter refused him
assignments aboard its after he had reported to work on May 28, 1990.
Private respondent alleged that he had been sick and thus allowed to go on
leave without pay for one month from April 28, 1990 but that when he
reported to work at the end of such period with a health clearance, he was
told to come back another time as he could not be reinstated immediately.
Thereafter, petitioner refused to give him work. For this reason, private
respondent asked for a certificate of employment from petitioner on
September 6, 1990. However, when he came back for the certification
September 10, petitioner refused to issue the certificate unless he submitted
his resignation. Since private respondent refused to submit such letter unless
he was given separation pay, petitioner prevented him from entering the
premises.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who
actually abandoned his work.
Issue: Whether or not the fishing crew members are considered field
personnel as classified in Art. 82 of the Labor Code.
In contrast, in the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing
voyage, fishermen employed by petitioner have no choice but to remain on
board its vessel. Although they perform non-agricultural work away from
petitioners business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of
their work they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner
through the vessel's patron or master.
SMC appealed to the DOLE main office in Manila. However, the appeal was
dismissed for lack of merit and the order of Director Macaraya was affirmed.
SMC went to SC for relief via a petition for certiorari, which the Court referred
to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court modified the order with regards
the payment of Muslim holiday pay from 200% to 150% of the employee's
basic salary. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied for lack of
merit, SMC filed a petition for certiorari before the SC
Issues:
(a) Whether or not public respondents seriously erred and committed
grave abuse of discretion when they granted Muslim Holiday Pay to
non-Muslim employees of SMC.
(b)Whether or not SMC was not accorded with due process of law in the
issuance of the compliance order.
(c) Whether or not regional director Macaraya, undersecretary Trajano and
undersecretary Espanol have jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
compliance orders.
Petitioner asserts that Article 3(3) of Presidential Decree No. 1083 provides
that "the provisions of this Code shall be applicable only to Muslims."
However, there should be no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims
as regards payment of benefits for Muslim holidays. Wages and other
emoluments granted by law to the working man are determined on the basis
of the criteria laid down by laws and certainly not on the basis of the
workers faith or religion. In addition, the 1999 Handbook on Workers
Statutory Benefits, categorically stated: Considering that all private
corporations, offices, agencies, and entities or establishments operating
within the designated Muslim provinces and cities are required to observe
Muslim holidays, both Muslim and Christians working within the Muslim areas
may not report for work on the days designated by law as Muslim holidays.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 129 and 217 of this Code
to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-
employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue
compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of
this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor
employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers
made in the course of the inspection. The Secretary or his duly
authorized representative shall issue writs of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in
cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor
employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by
documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of
inspection.
In the case before us, Regional Director Macaraya acted as the duly
authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and it
was within his power to issue the compliance order to SMC. In addition, the
Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the petitioner did not deny that it
was not paying Muslim holiday pay to its non-Muslim employees. Indeed,
petitioner merely contends that its non-Muslim employees are not entitled to
Anent the allegation that petitioner was not accorded due process, the court
finds that SMC was furnished a copy of the inspection order and it was
received by and explained to its Personnel Officer. Further, a series of
summary hearings were conducted by DOLE on 19 November 1992, 28 May
1993 and 4 and 5 October 1993. Thus, SMC could not claim that it was not
given an opportunity to defend itself.
Lagrama denied the charge against him. He claimed that he was not the only
one who entered the drawing area and that, even if the charge was true, it
was a minor infraction to warrant his dismissal. However, everytime he
spoke, Tan shouted "Gawas" ("Get out"), leaving him with no other choice but
to leave the premises. Lagrama filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in Butuan City. He alleged that he had been
illegally dismissed and sought reinvestigation and payment of 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pay, salary differential, and damages.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed and thus
entitled to payment of benefits provided by law.
Ruling: The respondent was illegally dismissed and entitled to benefits. The
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code provide that no worker shall be
dismissed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after
due process. This provision has two aspects: (1) the legality of the act of
dismissal, that is, dismissal under the grounds provided for under Article 282
of the Labor Code and (2) the legality in the manner of dismissal. The
illegality of the act of dismissal constitutes discharge without just cause,
while illegality in the manner of dismissal is dismissal without due process.
In this case, by his refusal to give Lagrama work to do and ordering Lagrama
to get out of his sight as the latter tried to explain his side, petitioner made it
plain that Lagrama was dismissed. Urinating in a work place other than the
one designated for the purpose by the employer constitutes violation of
reasonable regulations intended to promote a healthy environment under
Art. 282(1) of the Labor Code for purposes of terminating employment, but
the same must be shown by evidence. Here there is no evidence that
Lagrama did urinate in a place other than a rest room in the premises of his
work.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the minimum benefits
provided by law.
Facts: Pedro Latag was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi since March
1, 1961. However, he was transferred to the petitioner R & E Transport, Inc.
upon cessation of La Mallorcas business operations. In January 1995, he got
sick and was forced to apply for partial disability with the SSS, which was
then granted. Upon recovery, he reported back to work in September 1998
but was no longer allowed on account of his old age. Latag asked the
petitioner, through its administrative officer for his retirement pay pursuant
to Republic Act 7641 but he was ignored. Latag filed a case for payment of
his retirement pay before the NLRC.
Upon Pedro Latags death on April 30, 1999, he was substituted by his wife,
the respondent Avelina Latag. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favour of
Latag. Petitioner filed the quitclaim and motion to dismiss where the Labor
Arbiter issued an order for Writ of Execution. Petitioners interposed an appeal
before NLRC. Appeal was dismissed for failure to post a cash or surety bond,
as mandated by law.
Undisputably, Pedro M. Latag was credited with 14 years of service with R &
E Transport, Inc. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7641, 30 provides: Retirement. In the absence of a retirement plan or
agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or
more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent
to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of
at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. Unless the
parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half-month salary shall
mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the
cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
The rules implementing the New Retirement Law similarly provide the above-
mentioned formula for computing the one-half month salary. Since Pedro was
paid according to the "boundary" system, he is not entitled to the 13th
month 32 and the service incentive pay; hence, his retirement pay should be
computed on the sole basis of his salary.
It is accepted that taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages, but retain only
those sums in excess of the "boundary" or fee they pay to the owners or
operators of their vehicles. Thus, the basis for computing their benefits
should be the average daily income. In this case, the CA found that Pedro
Said bulletin was reproduced on January 23, 1998, when April 9, 1998 was
both Maundy Thursday and Araw ng Kagitingan.
The Voluntary Arbitrator favored the Bisig ng Asian Transmission Labor Union
(BATLU), and held that Article 94 of the Labor Code provides for holiday pay
for every regular holiday, the computation of which is determined by a legal
formula which is not changed by the fact that there are two holidays falling
on one day, like on April 9, 1998 when it was Araw ng Kagitingan and at the
same time was Maundy Thursday.
In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the
Voluntary Arbitrator.
Issue: Whether or not daily-paid employees are entitled to be paid for two
regular holidays which fall on the same day.
Ruling: The Court dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioners should
pay its employees 200% and not just 100% of their regular daily wages for
the unworked April 9, 1998 which covers two regular holidays, namely, Araw
ng Kagitingan and Maundy Thursday.
On January 2000, while respondent was driving Autobus No. 114 along Sta.
Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, the bus he was driving accidentally bumped the rear
portion of Autobus No. 124, as the latter vehicle suddenly stopped at a sharp
curve without giving any warning. Respondent averred that the accident
happened because he was compelled by the management to go back to
Roxas, Isabela, although he had not slept for almost twenty-four (24) hours,
as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela.
Respondent further alleged that he was not allowed to work until he fully
paid the amount of P75,551.50, representing thirty percent (30%) of the cost
of repair of the damaged buses and that despite respondent's pleas for
reconsideration, the same was ignored by management. After a month,
management sent him a letter of termination. Thus, on 02 February 2000,
respondent instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for
nonpayment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay against
Autobus.
Moreover, Book III, Rule V: SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE also states that this
rule shall apply to all employees except: (d) Field personnel and other
employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer including
those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis,
or those who are paid in a fixed amount for performing work irrespective of
the time consumed in the performance thereof;
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, "field personnel" shall refer to non-
agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
This definition is further elaborated in the Bureau of Working Conditions
(BWC), Advisory Opinion to Philippine Technical-Clerical Commercial
Employees Association 10 which states that:
The clear policy of the Labor Code is to grant service incentive leave pay to
workers in all establishments, subject to a few exceptions. Section 2, Rule V,
Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that "every
Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has
served "within 12 months, whether continuous or broken reckoned from the
date the employee started working, including authorized absences and paid
regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of
practice or policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than
12 months, in which case said period shall be considered as one year." It is
also "commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at the
end of the year." In other words, an employee who has served for one year is
entitled to it. He may use it as leave days or he may collect its monetary
value. To limit the award to three years, as the solicitor general recommends,
is to unduly restrict such right.
In the case at bar, petitioner presented an affidavit of its Sales Manager and
a memorandum of the company both to the effect that there is a need to
redeploy its regular employees and terminate the employment of temporary
employees, in view of an excess in manpower. These documents, however,
do not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
It is evident from the foregoing that the criterion allegedly used by petitioner
in reorganizing its sales unit was the employment status of the employee.
However, in the implementation thereof, petitioner erroneously classified
respondent as a probationary employee, resulting in the dismissal of the
latter. Verily, the absence of criteria and the erroneous implementation of the
Considering that respondent was illegally dismissed, she is entitled not only
to reinstatement but also to payment of full back wages, computed from the
time her compensation was actually withheld from her on March 13, 2001, up
to her actual reinstatement. As a regular employee of petitioner from the
date of her employment on April 17, 2000, she is likewise entitled to other
benefits, i.e., service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay computed
from such date also up to her actual reinstatement.
After the parties failed to settle amicably, the labor arbiter directed the
parties to file their position papers and submit supporting documents.
The labor arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that
petitioner's Complaint was premature because he was still employed by BPC.
Petitioners money claims for illegal dismissal was also weakened by his
quitclaim and admission during the clarificatory conference that he accepted
separation benefits, sick and vacation leave conversions and thirteenth
month pay.
Ruling: The petitioner is not entitled to overtime pay and other monetary
benefits.
The Court disagrees with the NLRC's finding that petitioner was a managerial
employee. However, petitioner was a member of the managerial staff, which
also takes him out of the coverage of labor standards. Like managerial
employees, officers and member of the managerial staff are not entitled to
the provisions of law on labor standards.
Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His
work involved overseeing the operation of the machines and the
performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work necessarily
required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the
proper functioning of the steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is
deemed a member of the managerial staff.
Facts: Reynaldo Chua, herein respondent, was under the employ of Bahia
Shipping Services, Inc., herein petitioner, as a restaurant waiter on board
the M/S Black Watch , a luxury cruise ship liner. His employment is pursuant
to a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) approved
employment contract dated October 9, 1996 for a period of nine (9) months
from October 18, 1996 to July 17, 1997.
On October 18, 1996, respondent, on board the cruise ship, left Manila for
Heathrow, England. About four months into his employment, or on February
15, 1997, responded reported to work an hour and a half (1 ) late. Due to
the incident, respondent was issued a warning-termination form by the
master of the cruise ship, Thor Fleten on February 17, 1997, who likewise
conducted an inquisitorial hearing to investigate the incident on March 8,
1997.
On March 24, 1997, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
other monetary claims. He claims that he was underpaid in the amount of
US$110.00 per month for a period of five (5) months, since he was only paid
US$300.00 per month, instead of US$410.00 per month, which was
stipulated in his contract. Aside from underpayment, he alleged that
US$20.00 per month was also deducted from his salary by petitioner for
union dues.
Petitioners contention that there is no factual or legal basis for the inclusion
of said amount since respondents repatriation is well-taken.
Ruling: Yes. The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and
unambiguous, its meaning should be determined without reference to
extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered from
that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the
language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must
be taken to mean that which, on its face, it purports to mean, unless some
good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be
understood in a different sense.
In the case at bar, the contested provision of the CBA is clear and
unequivocal. Article VIII, Section 1 (b) of the CBA categorically provides that
the scheduling of vacation leave shall be under the option of the employer.
The preference requested by the employees is not controlling because
respondent retains its power and prerogative to consider or to ignore said
request. Thus, if the terms of a CBA are clear and leave no doubt upon the
intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shall
prevail. In fine, the CBA must be strictly adhered to and respected if its ends
have to be achieved, being the law between the parties.
Facts: Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera, Jr. were
hired on June 15, 1977 and June 1, 1983, respectively, by RMN. They
eventually became account managers, soliciting advertisements and
servicing various clients of RMN.
The respondents argued that the release/quitclaim they executed should not
be a bar to the recovery of the full benefits due them; while they admitted
that they signed release documents, they did so due to dire necessity.
The petitioners denied liability, contending that the amounts the respondents
received represented a fair and reasonable settlement of their claims, as
attested to by the release/quitclaim affidavits which they executed freely and
voluntarily. They belied the respondents claimed salary rates, alleging that
they each received a monthly salary of P 9,177.00, as shown by the payrolls.
The Labor Arbiter Patricio Libo-on dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint,
but ordered the payment of additional separation pay to the respondents P
490,066.00 for Ybarola and P 429,517.55 for Rivera.
The CA granted the petition and set aside the assailed NLRC dispositions. It
reinstated the labor arbiters separation pay award, rejecting the NLRCs
ruling that the respondents commissions are not included in the
computation of their separation pay. It pointed out that in the present case,
the respondents earned their commissions through actual market
transactions attributable to them; these commissions, therefore, were part of
their salary.
Facts: Petitioner Elias Villuga was employed as cutter in the Broad Street
Tailoring owned by privaterespondent Rodolfo Zapanta. He was paid a fixed
monthly salary of P840.00 and a monthly transportation allowance of P40.00.
In addition, Villuga was assigned the chore of distributing work to the shop's
tailors or sewers when both the shop's manager and assistant manager
would be absent. The other petitioners were either ironers, repairmen and
sewers. They were paid a fixed amount for every item ironed, repaired or
sewn, regardless of the time consumed in accomplishing the task. Petitioners
did not fill up any time record since they did not observe regular or fixed
hours of work.
From February 17 to 22, 1978, Villuga failed to report for work allegedly due
to illness. For not properly notifying his employer, he was considered to have
abandoned his work. Villuga claimed that he was refused admittance when
he reported for work after his absence, allegedly due to his active
participation in the union organized by private respondent's tailors. He
further claimed that he was not paid overtime pay, holiday pay, premium
pay for work done on rest days and holidays, service incentive leave pay and
13th month pay. Petitioners Abistado, Mendoza, Brizuela and Oro also
claimed that they were dismissed from their employment because they
joined the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU). The other
petitioners claimed that they stopped working because private respondents
gave them few pieces of work to do after learning of their membership with
PSSLU.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering the dismissal of the complaint
for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal and other money claims except
petitioner Villuga's claim for 13th month pay for the years 1976, 1977 and
1980. The NLRC affirmed the questioned decision.
Ruling: Under Rule I, Section 2(c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code, to be a
member of a managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-
exist, to wit: (1) that his primary duty consists of the performance of work
directly related to management policies; (2) that he customarily and
regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance
of his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the management
of the establishment; and (4) that he does not devote twenty per cent of his
time to work other than those described above.
Facts: Private respondents Ricardo Ausan, Jr. and Ernesto Alanan were
employed by petitioner since 1983 and 1978 as truck drivers and were paid
on a "per trip or task basis." They filed separate complaints on against
petitioner CJC Trading, Incorporated and/or Ms. Celia J. Carlos for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of premium pay for holiday and rest day, service
incentive leave pay and thirteenth month pay. These cases were
consolidated.
On 22 July 1993, a decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter dismissing the
complaints and were not entitled to the labor standards benefits claimed by
them because they were paid on a "per trip or per task basis.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to the benefits provided
by law.
Considering that private respondents were close to the age of sixty (60) at
the time they stopped working for petitioner and that they had been in the
employ of petitioner for several years, the Court, considers that this could be
deemed to be in effect a prayer for the grant of retirement benefits.
The pertinent law is Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7641, which reads: Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract.
Facts: Urbano Suiga was hired by Pantranco North Express Inc. in 1964 as
a bus conductor. He eventually joined the Pantranco Employees Association-
PTGWO. He continued in petitioner's employ until August 12, 1989, when he
was retired at the age of fifty-two (52) after having rendered twenty five
years' service. The basis of his retirement was the compulsory retirement
provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and
the aforenamed union. Private respondent received P49,300.00 as
retirement pay.
After hearings were held and position papers submitted, on March 26, 1990,
Labor Arbiter Olairez rendered his decision that the three complainants
illegally and unjustly dismissed and ordered the respondent to reinstate
them to their former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of
seniority rights with full backwages and other benefits with a total of
P31,618.12 plus additional backwages and other benefits but not to exceed 3
years and the corresponding attorney's fees. The amounts already received
by complainants shall be considered as advanced payment of their
retirement pay which shall be deducted when they shall actually retire or
(be) separated from the service. The order of reinstatement is immediately
executory even pending appeal. Petitioner appealed to public respondent,
which issued the questioned Resolution affirming the labor arbiter's decision
in toto. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
(1) The National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its
discretion in holding that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over
the case.
(2) The National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its
discretion in affirming the Labor Arbiter's decision that private
respondent Urbano Zuiga (sic) was illegally dismissed."
Only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to
the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.In the instant case,
both the union and the company are united or have come to an
agreement regarding the dismissal of private respondents. No
grievance between them exists which could be brought to a grievance
machinery. The dispute has to be settled before an impartial body.
The grievance machinery with members designated by the union and
the company cannot be expected to be impartial against the dismissed
employees. Due process demands that the dismissed workers
grievances be ventilated before an impartial body. Since there has
already been an actual termination, the matter falls within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter."
Applying the same rationale to the case at bar, it cannot be said that the
"dispute" is between the union and petitioner company because both have
previously agreed upon the provision on "compulsory retirement" as
embodied in the CBA. Also, it was only private respondent on his own who
questioned the compulsory retirement. Thus, the case is properly
denominated as a "termination dispute" which comes under the jurisdiction
of labor arbiters.
Therefore, public respondent did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter over this case.
Being a product of negotiation, the CBA between the petitioner and the union
intended the provision on compulsory retirement to be beneficial to the
employees-union members, including herein private respondent. When
private respondent ratified the CBA with the union, he not only agreed to the
CBA but also agreed to conform to and abide by its provisions. Thus, it
cannot be said that he was illegally dismissed when the CBA provision on
compulsory retirement was applied to his case.
Incidentally, The Retirement Pay Law," said statute sheds light on the present
discussion when it amended Art. 287 of the Labor Code worded that "Any
employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age establish in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract."
The provision makes clear the intention and spirit of the law to give
employers and employees a free hand to determine and agree upon the
terms and conditions of retirement. Providing in a CBA for compulsory
Facts: Pedro Latag was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi since March
1, 1961. When La Mallorca ceased from business operations, Latag
transferred to R & E Transport, Inc. He was receiving an average daily salary
of five hundred pesos (P500.00) as a taxi driver. Latag got sick in January
1995 and was forced to apply for partial disability with the SSS, which was
granted. When he recovered, he reported for work in September 1998 but
was no longer allowed to continue working on account of his old age. Latag
thus asked Felix Fabros, the administrative officer of [petitioners], for his
retirement pay pursuant to Republic Act 7641 but he was ignored.
On December 21, 1998, Latag filed a case for payment of his retirement pay
before the NLRC. Latag however died on April 30, 1999. Subsequently, his
wife, Avelina Latag, substituted him. On January 10, 2000, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision in favor of Latag.
The Supreme Court upheld that the CA committed no error when it ruled that
the Quitclaim and Waiver was invalid and could not bar respondent Latag
from demanding the benefits legally due her husband despite the former
having signed the document. This is not to say that all quitclaims are invalid
per se. Courts, however, are wary of schemes that frustrate workers' rights
and benefits, and look with disfavor upon quitclaims and waivers that
bargain these away.
Undisputably, Pedro M. Latag was credited with 14 years of service with R &
E Transport, Inc. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7641, 30 provides:
The rules implementing the New Retirement Law similarly provide the above-
mentioned formula for computing the one-half month salary. Since Pedro was
paid according to the "boundary" system, he is not entitled to the 13th
It is accepted that taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages, but retain only
those sums in excess of the "boundary" or fee they pay to the owners or
operators of their vehicles. Thus, the basis for computing their benefits
should be the average daily income.
Ruling: No. R.A. 7641 is a social legislation and may be given retroactive
effect where (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee
of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had
complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such
retirement benefits. It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim
retirement benefits from petitioner, he has to prove that he was its employee
at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. In the case at bar, it was incumbent on
respondent to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and not on February
20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. Respondent failed to prove
that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect.
Thus, his claim for retirement benefits must be disallowed.
Facts: Hilaria was hired as an elementary school teacher at the Sta. Catalina
College (petitioner school) in San Antonio, Bian, Laguna. In 1970, she
applied for and was granted a one year leave of absence without pay on
account of the illness of her mother. After the expiration in 1971 of her leave
of absence, she had not been heard from by petitioner school.
In the meantime, she was employed as a teacher at the San Pedro Parochial
School during school year 1980-1981 and at the Liceo de San Pedro, Bian,
Laguna during school year 1981-1982.
In 1982, she applied anew at petitioner school which hired her with a
monthly salary of Php 6,567.95.
From the Php 59,038.35 retirement benefits was deducted the amount of Php
28,853.09 representing reimbursement of the employers contribution to her
retirement benefits under the Private Education Retirement Annuity
Association (PERAA) which Hilaria had already received.
Issue: Whether or not the separation pay should be computed based on the
length of continuous service or merely years of service not being continuous.
Ruling: Hilaria was considered a new employee when she rejoined petitioner
school upon re-applying in 1982, her retirement benefits should thus be
computed only on the basis of her years of service from 1982 to 1997. The
Court is not unmindful of Hilarias rendition of a total of thirty years of
teaching in petitioner school and should be accorded ample support in her
twilight years. Petitioner school in fact acknowledges her dedicated service
to its students. She can, however, only be awarded with what she is
rightfully entitled to under the law.
The union opposed said computation because it was contrary to the Sections
3 and 6 in their current CBA which mandates that the company shall
maintain the present practice in the implementation of the 13th month pay
and that the 14th month pay shall be computed in the same way as the
former.
The Bureau of Working Conditions (BWC) sided with the company. But the
issue was unresolved by the grievance machinery, so it wassubmitted
for voluntary arbitration. The Voluntary Arbiter invalidated
Hondas computation and ordered the computation of the benefits based on
the full month basic pay.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is ambiguity in the CBA provisions concerning the
13th and 14th month pay
(2) Whether or not the proposed computation of Honda deducting 1/12 of the
employees basic salary from the 13th and 14th month pay and its pro-rata
payment are valid
Ruling:
(1) YES. A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiated contract
between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages,
hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a
bargaining unit. The parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient as long as they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Where the CBA is clear and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the
parties.
However, there are times when the CBA provisions may become contentious.
In this case, Honda wanted to implement a pro-ratedcomputation based on
(2) NO. The ambiguity in the CBA provisions was correctly resolved by the
arbitrator by relying on Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that in
case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed
in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer. CA is also correct in
ruling that the computation of the 13th month pay should be based on the
length of service and not on the actual wage earned by the worker.
PD 851 or the 13th Month Pay Law was issued to protect the level of wages
of workers from worldwide inflation. Under the IRR of said law, the minimum
13th month pay shall not be less than 1/12 of the total basic salary earned
by an employee within a calendar year.The Court has interpreted basic
salary to mean, NOT the amount actually received by an employee, but
1/12 of their standard monthly wage multiplied by their length of service
within a given calendar year.
The IRR also provide for a pro-ration of this benefit ONLY in cases of
resignation or separation from work. In the present case, there being no
resignation/separation, the computation of the 13th month pay should not be
pro-rated but should be given in full.
Moreover, it has not been proven that Honda has been implementing pro-
rating of the 13th month pay before the present case. It is not a company
practice. In fact, there was an implicit acceptance that prior to the strike, a
full month basic pay computation was the present practice intended in the
CBA. It was the second strike that prompted the company to adopt the pro-
rata computation.
The rules and regulations of the plan show that participation therein was not
voluntary at all. Rule III of the plan, on membership, stated:
The Plan is contributory. The University shall set aside an amount equivalent
to 3% of the basic salaries of the faculty and staff. To this shall be added a
5% deduction from the basic salaries of the faculty and staff.
A member on leave with the University approval shall continue paying, based
on his pay while on leave, his leave without pay should pay his contributions
to the Plan. However, a member, who has been on leave without pay should
pay his contributions based on his salary plus the Universitys contributions
while on leave or the full amount within one month immediately after the
date of his reinstatement. Provided, further that if a member has no
sufficient source of income while on leave may pay within six months after
his reinstatement.
It was through no voluntary act of her own that petitioner became a member
of the plan. In fact, the only way she could have ceased to be a member
thereof was if she stopped working for respondent altogether. Furthermore,
in the rule on contributions, the repeated use of the word shall ineluctably
pointed to the conclusion that employees had no choice but to contribute to
the plan (even when they were on leave).
Facts:IrenoPgib(pd)wmlyasAntGeMrgofhIcilBadnstpCr(eo)fmMy1986usilhvntpeoAg2,198s.RdtrnifmheopylSb2,198.
OnApril12,98esodtfivachwRTCfQuzniy,Br93agsetmbofhdAnir(BO)petalg,mohsn-yfiupdco.AmntswaefibylJiSgo,hftdnserulackjio,pndstmwalbreyc,ihudntRTC.saSgoefilpifrchwtCAagnedSsopifrlckjutadehsRTCO.
Isue:WONprondactimlf sherypbd.
Ruling:Yes.podtmachrybsfSep19na.Iodhit,mclvrespfnat,bkwgfidescoijunhmpyltfr1986avebscdi.
Thetrmonyclasiv gfrmnoepyl-atihscfnoerupdaby)(tigfilc,wxnrejudambythio,c)(wnkedglmfthbyor.
Osnthpoie,Curdlagcmntofvishpuergaofctinlms,durvaybnoetpffilhsrxacymeopnitugh dbceatl.Hn,whigfiofCvsdcuaetprhnigof-ysctverd,qunmiahlbyCAoectksfjdrffvianhlgotepscrdwihfilmoneay,vgrspdxtichmeonaugvlsdbfit.Thenrigof-yapscvdthingbeuryfilofCvaspndetcuihylrbsoeSpmt2,19arhfcisnoempyltSbr2,198.Csqunwhepodtfilciamrfgs,eptonyifibadmgeuslJ24,196hicyradbenpsoit.
On July 28, 1999, the NLRC promulgated its Decision dismissing both
appeals. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated June 21, 2000.Petitioner then filed
a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the above-mentioned
NLRC Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner avers that the CA, in concluding that the NLRC Decision was
supported by substantial evidence, failed to specify what constituted said
evidence. Thus, petitioner asserts that the CA acted arbitrarily in affirming
the Decision of the NLRC.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the factual findings of
the NLRC cannot be reviewed in certiorari proceedings.
Ruling: Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that since nowhere in the
petition is there any acceptable demonstration that the LA or the NLRC acted
either with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, the appellate court has no reason to look into the correctness of
the evaluation of evidence which supports the labor tribunals' findings of
fact.
In petitions for review on certiorari like the instant case, the Court invariably
sustains the unanimous factual findings of the LA, the NLRC and the CA,
especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence and
there is no cogent basis to reverse the same, as in this case.
Petitioner contends that the commissions form part of the basic salary, citing
the case of Philippine Duplicators, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, wherein the Court held that commissions earned by salesmen
form part of their basic salary. Private respondent counters that petitioner
knew that the overriding commission is not included in the basic salary
because it had not been considered as such for a long time in the
computation of the 13th month pay, leave commissions, absences and
tardiness.
Issue: Whether or not the average monthly sales commission of thirty one
thousand eight hundred forty six and 97/100 (Php31,846.97) should be
included in the computation of his retirement benefits and 13th month pay.
In fine, whether or not a commission forms part of the basic salary depends
upon the circumstances or conditions for its payment, which indubitably are
factual in nature for they will require a re-examination and calibration of the
evidence on record.
Petitioner filed for optional retirement upon reaching the age of 60. However,
the basis in computing his retirement benefits is his latest salary rate of
P10,919.22 as the commissions he received are in the form of profit-sharing
payments specifically excluded by the foregoing rules. Case law has it that
when these earnings and remuneration are closely akin to fringe benefits,
overtime pay or profit-sharing statements, they are properly excluded in
computing retirement pay. However, sales commissions which are effectively
an integral portion of the basic salary structure of an employee, shall be
included in determining the retirement pay.
Facts: Agripino Caballeda worked as welder for URSUMCO from March 1989
until June 23, 1997 while Alejandro Cadalin worked for URSUMCO as crane
Agripino and Alejandro having reached the age of 60, were allegedly forced
to retire by URSUMCO. They both accepted their retirement benefits. Later
on, Agripino filed a complaint for illegal dismissal because his compulsory
retirement was in violation of the provisions of RA 7641 and, was in effect, a
form of illegal dismissal.
Issues:
Ruling: The issue of retroactivity has long been settled in the case of
Enriquez Security Services, Inc. vs. Cabotaje.
This doctrine has been repeatedly upheld and clarified in several cases.
Pursuant thereto, this Court imposed two (2) essential requisites in order that
R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect: (1) the claimant for retirement
benefits was still in the employ of the employer at the time the statute took
effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the requirements for eligibility
for such retirement benefits under the statute.
When respondents were compulsorily retired from the service, RA 7641 was
already in full force and effect. The petitioners failed to prove that the
respondents did not comply with the requirements for eligibility under the
law for such retirement benefits. In sum, the aforementioned requisites were
adequately satisfied, thus, warranting the retroactive application of R.A. 7641
in this case.
In this case, it may be stressed that the CBA does not per se specifically
provide for the compulsory retirement age nor does it provide for an optional
retirement plan. It merely provides that the retirement benefits accorded to
an employee shall be in accordance with law. Thus, we must apply Art. 287
of the Labor Code which provides for two types of retirement: (a) compulsory
and (b) optional. The first takes place at age 65, while the second is primarily
determined by the collective bargaining agreement or other employment
contract or employer's retirement plan. In the absence of any provision on
optional retirement in a collective bargaining agreement, other employment
contract, or employer's retirement plan, an employee may optionally retire
upon reaching the age of 60 years or more, but not beyond 65 years,
provided he has served at least five years in the establishment concerned.
That prerogative is exclusively lodged in the employee.
Issues:
1. Whether or not UNIPROM has a bona fide retirement plan
2. Whether or not petitioner was validly retired pursuant thereto
Facts: Respondents Domingo Z. Ybarola, Jr. and Alfonso E. Rivera, Jr. were
hired on June 15, 1977 and June 1, 1983, respectively, by Radio Mindanao
Network (RMN). They eventually became account managers, soliciting
advertisements and servicing various clients of RMN.
On September 15, 2002, the respondents' services were terminated as a
result of RMN's reorganization/restructuring; they were given their separation
pay P631,250.00 for Ybarola, and P481,250.00 for Rivera. Sometime in
December 2002, they executed release/quitclaim affidavits.
Ruling: The petitioners insist that the respondents' commissions were not
part of their salaries, because they failed to present proof that they earned
the commission due to actual market transactions attributable to them. They
submit that the commissions are profit-sharing payments which do not form
part of their salaries. We are not convinced. If these commissions had
been really profit-sharing bonuses to the respondents, they should have
received the same amounts, yet, as the NLRC itself noted, Ybarola and Rivera
received P372,173.11 and P586,998.50 commissions, respectively, in
2002. The variance in amounts the respondents received as commissions
supports the CA's finding that the salary structure of the respondents was
such that they only received a minimal amount as guaranteed wage; a
greater part of their income was derived from the commissions they get from
soliciting advertisements; these advertisements are the "products" they sell.
In Talam, the employee received a valuable consideration for his less than
two years of service with the company; he was not shortchanged and no
essential unfairness took place. In this case, as the CA noted, the separation
pay the respondents each received was deficient by at least P400,000.00;
thus, they were given only half of the amount they were legally entitled to. To
be sure, a settlement under these terms is not and cannot be a reasonable
one, given especially the respondents' length of service 25 years for
Ybarola and 19 years for Rivera. The CA was correct when it opined that the
respondents were in dire straits when they executed the release/quitclaim
affidavits. Without jobs and with families to support, they dallied in executing
the quitclaim instrument, but were eventually forced to sign given their
circumstances.
Facts: On October 1, 1977, petitioner, the late Eleazar Padillo (Padillo), was
employed by respondent Rural Bank of Nabunturan, Inc. (Bank) as its SA
Bookkeeper. Due to liquidity problems which arose sometime in 2003, the
Bank took out retirement/insurance plans with Philippine American Life and
General Insurance Company (Philam Life) for all its employees in anticipation
of its possible closure and the concomitant severance of its personnel. In this
regard, the Bank procured Philam Plan Certificate of Full Payment No. 88204,
Plan Type 02FP10SC, Agreement No. PP98013771 (Philam Life Plan) in favor
of Padillo for a benefit amount of P100,000.00 and which was set to mature
on July 11, 2009. .During the latter part of 2007, Padillo suffered a mild
stroke due to hypertension which consequently impaired his ability to
effectively pursue his work. On September 10, 2007, he wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Oropeza, the president of the bank, expressing his
intention to avail of an early retirement package. Despite several follow-ups,
his request remained unheeded. On October 3, 2007, Padillo was separated
from employment due to his poor and failing health as reflected in a
Certification dated December 4, 2007 issued by the Bank. Not having
received his claimed retirement benefits, Padillo filed with the NLRC a
complaint for the recovery of unpaid retirement benefits.
Facts: Petitioner was a member of the United States Air Force (USAF)
assigned to oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga.
On August 10, 1988, 3 AGS terminated the contract for the maintenance and
upkeep of the dormitories with the De Guzman Custodial Services. The
employees thereof, including private respondents, were allowed to continue
working for 3 AGS. It was left to the new contractor, the JAC Maintenance
Services owned by Joselito Cunanan, to decide whether it would retain their
services. Joselito Cunanan, however, chose to bring in his own workers. As a
result, the workers of the De Guzman Custodial Services were requested to
surrender their base passes to Lt. Col. Frankhauser or to petitioner.
It is petitioners contention that the questioned resolutions are null and void
because respondent Labor Arbiter did not acquire jurisdiction to entertain
and decide the case. Petitioner alleges that she never received nor was
served, any summons or copies of the original and amended complaints, and
therefore the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over her person under Article
XIV of the R.P. ? U.S. Military Bases Agreement.
Issue: WON the Labor Arbiter acquires jurisdiction over the respondent.
. . . [N]o process, civil or criminal, shall be served within any base except
with the permission of the commanding officer of such base; but should the
commanding officer refuse to grant such permission he shall forthwith take
the necessary steps . . . . to serve such process, as the case may be, and to
provide the attendance of the server of such process before the appropriate
court in the Philippines or procure such server to make the necessary
affidavit or declaration to prove such service as the case may require.
Petitioner, in the case at bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the
oral argument before the said body. This, however, does not constitute a
waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary submission of her person to
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. (De los Santos v. Montera, 221 SCRA 15
[1993]).
Labor Arbiter Nieves de Castro sustained the private respondents except for
their claim of wage distortion and directed petitioner to pay P17,082,448.56
as salary differentials and P2,000.00 each as exemplary damages. Within the
reglementary period for appeal, the petitioners filed their Notice and
Memorandum of Appeal with a Real Estate Bond consisting of land and
various improvements therein worth P102,345,650.
The private respondents moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that
Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended, requires the posting of a cash or
surety bond. The NLRC directed petitioners to post a cash or surety bond of
P17,082,448.56 with a warning that failure to do so would cause the
dismissal of the appeal.
Ruling: The applicable law is Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6715, which provides:
We have given a liberal interpretation to this provision. In YBL (Your Bus Line)
v. NLRC we ruled:
Nieva filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and demanded for Thirteenth-
Month Pay with the NLRCs National Capital Region Arbitration Branch in
Manila. Philtranco filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue,
stating that the complaint should have been lodged with the NLRCs Regional
Arbitration Branch in Legaspi City, not only because Nieva was a resident
thereof, but also because the latter was hired, assigned, and based in
Legaspi City.
Issue: Whether or not NLRCs NCR Arbitration Branch in Manila was the
proper venue for the filing of Nievas complaint for illegal dismissal?
Ruling: Yes, the NLRCs NCR Arbitration Branch was the proper venue for the
filing of the complaint. The question of venue essentially pertains to the trial
and relates more to the convenience of the parties rather than upon the
substance and merits of the case. Provisions on venue are intended to assure
convenience for the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote the ends of
justice. In fact, Section 1 (a), Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, cited by Philtranco in support of its contention that venue of the illegal
dismissal case filed by Nieva is improperly laid, speaks of the
complainant/petitioner's workplace, evidently showing that the rule is
intended for the exclusive benefit of the worker. This being the case, the
worker may waive said benefit. Furthermore, the aforesaid Section has been
declared by this Court to be merely permissive. Moreover, Nieva, as a driver
of Philtranco, was assigned to the Legazpi City-Pasay City route. Sulpicio
Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC is exactly in point. In said case, we held that: "Section 1,
Rule IV of the 1990 NLRC Rules additionally provides that, for purposes of
venue, workplace shall be understood as the place or locality where the
employer is regularly assigned when the cause of action arose." From the
foregoing, it is obvious that the filing of the complaint with the National
Capital Region Arbitration Branch was proper, Manila being considered as
part of Nieva's workplace by reason of his plying the Legazpi City-Pasay City
route.
Facts: Respondent Aricayos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal to the labor
arbiter. There being no employer-employee relationship between the two,
petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Arcayos appealed to NLRC
contending errors of the labor arbiter.
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over NLRC
appeals?
Subsequently under RA 7902, effective March 1995, the mode for judicial
review over NLRC decisions in that of a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
The same confuses by declaring that the CA has no appellate jurisdiction
over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of SC, including the
NLRC decisions.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court erred when it upheld the award
of benefits which were beyond the terms of submission agreement and that
the arbitrator must confine its adjudication to those issues submitted by the
parties for arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date of
regularization of the workers. Hence, the award of benefits by the arbitrator
was done in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the appellate court gravely erred when it upheld the award of
benefits which were beyond the terms of submission agreement.
Facts: On October 18, 1991 and August 21, 1992, Hanjin and the Philippine
Government, through the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), executed
contracts for the construction of the Malinao Dam at Pilar, Bohol, with a
projected completion period of 1,050 calendar days, including main canal
and lateral projects for 750 days. From August 1995 to August 1996, Hanjin
contracted the services of 712 carpenters, masons, truck drivers, helpers,
laborers, heavy equipment operators, leadmen, engineers, steelmen,
mechanics, electricians and others.
In April 1998, 712 employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal and for
payment of benefits against Hanjin and Nam Hyun Kim, the officer-in-charge
of the project (herein petitioners), before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). The complainants averred that they were regular
employees of Hanjin and that they were separated from employment without
any lawful or just cause. Only 521 of the complainants affixed their
signatures in the complaints.
Petitioners alleged that the complainants were mere project employees in its
Bohol Irrigation Project.
On May 12, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of the 428
complainants, granting separation pay and attorneys fees to each of them.
According to the Labor Arbiter, the complainants were regular employees of
petitioner Hanjin, and their claims for underpayment, holiday pay, premium
pay for holiday and rest day, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave
would be computed after sufficient data were made available.
Petitioners appealed the decision to the NLRC, which affirmed with
modification the Labor Arbiters ruling on January 28, 2000.
Ruling: The CA, for its part, affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC, and held that respondents were regular employees of petitioner
Hanjin:
Moreover, it is required under Policy Instruction No. 20, Series of 1993, that
in case of project employees, the termination of their employment in the
particular project or undertaking must be reported to the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office having jurisdiction over the
workplace within thirty (30) days following the date of his separation from
work. In Ochoco v. National Labor Relations Commission, the failure of the
employer to report to the nearest employment office the termination of
employment of workers everytime it completed a project was considered by
this Court as proof that the dismissed employees were not project employees
but regular employees. On this requirement, petitioners were silent, until the
Decision of the NLRC reminded them. To prove that petitioners allegedly
complied with said requirement, they again belatedly submitted machine
copies of reports allegedly made to the DOLE of Bohol. To explain away their
failure to produce certified true copies of the same, petitioners allege that
The appellate court, the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are thus one in finding
that respondents were not project employees, and in sustaining respondents
claim of illegal dismissal due to petitioners failure to adduce contrary
evidence. Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies, like the NLRC, are accorded not only respect but at times even
finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Such findings
of facts can only be set aside upon showing of grave abuse of discretion,
fraud or error of law,none of which have been shown in this case.
The compromise agreement was submitted to the NLRC for approval. All the
employees mentioned in the agreement and in the NLRC Resolution affixed
their signatures thereon. They likewise signed the Joint Manifesto and
Declaration of Mutual Support and Cooperation which had also been
submitted for the consideration of the labor tribunal. The NLRC forthwith
issued another Resolution on July 25, 2002, which among others declared
that the compromise agreement was approved and NCMB-NCR-NS-03-087-00
was deemed closed and terminated.
In the meantime, however, the Union filed another Notice of Strike on July 1,
2002. In an Order dated September 16, 2002, the DOLE Secretary certified
the case to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. The case was
docketed as NCMB-NCR- NS-07-251-02. In its Resolution dated July 31, 2003,
the NLRC ruled that the complainants were not illegally dismissed. The May
31, 2001 Resolution declaring the retrenchment program illegal did not
attain finality as "it had been academically mooted by the compromise
agreement entered into between both parties on July 9, 2001." The Union
assailed the ruling of the NLRC before the CA via petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. In its Decision dated August 17, 2004, the appellate court held that
the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in ruling for PJI. The compromise
agreement referred only to the award given by the NLRC to the complainants
in the said case, that is, the obligation of the employer to the complainants.
Issue: WON the petitioners petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is a proper remedy in this case.
Ruling: At the outset, we note that this case was brought before us via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The proper remedy, however, was to file a petition under Rule 45. It must be
stressed that certiorari under Rule 65 is "a remedy narrow in scope and
inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop."
Moreover, the special civil action for certiorari will lie only when a court has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Issues:
(1) WON cooperatives are exempted from filing a cash or surety
bond required to perfect an employers appeal under Section 223
of Presidential Decree No. 442 (the Labor Code);
(2) WON a certification issued by the Cooperative Development
Authority constitutes substantial compliance with the
requirement for the posting of a bond.
Ruling:
(1) No. Petitioners argue that there are certain benefits and privileges
expressly granted to cooperative under the Cooperative Code. It
invoked the provision on Article 62 regarding the exemption from
payment of an appeal bond, to wit: (7)All cooperatives shall be exempt
from putting up a bond for bringing an appeal against the decision of
an inferior court or for seeking to set aside any third party claim:
Provided, That a certification of the Authority showing that the net
assets of the cooperative are in excess of the amount of the bond
required by the court in similar cases shall be accepted by the court as
a sufficient bond.
In this case, the obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure,
during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or
diminish recovery by the employee under the judgment if the latter is
subsequently affirmed.
Therefore, no error can be ascribed to the CA for holding that the phrase
inferior courts appearing in Article 62 paragraph (7) of the Cooperative
Code does not extend to quasi-judicial agencies and that, petitioners are
not exempt from posting the appeal bond required under Article 223 of the
Labor Code.
Facts: On September 16, 1998, the Supreme Court rendered the landmark
decision in G.R. No. 130866, holding for the first time that all petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the decisions of the NLRC should
henceforth be filed with the CA, thus all references in the amended section 9
of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are
interpreted and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently,
all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in
strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Thus, the petition was remanded to the CA and redocketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
49183. Subsequently, the CA rendered the assailed September 30, 1999
Decision, dismissing petitioner's appeal for lack of merit with the finding that
respondent NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, in its
pronouncement that the Labor Arbiter did not make any finding on the
alleged employer-employee relationship between the parties, reasoning this
way:
Actually the Labor Arbiter did not determine whether there is an employer-
employee relation between the parties because according to him, such issue
should be resolved by the regular court pursuant to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in De la Salle University vs. NLRC (135 SCRA 674, 677
(1988)).
For its part, respondent NLRC, is remanding the case to the Labor Arbiter,
reminded the latter that he is authorized by the NLRC Rules to determine, in
an appropriate proceeding the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.
Ruling: At the outset, it is clear that the issue submitted for resolution is a
question of fact which is proscribed by the rule disallowing factual issues in
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45. This is explicit in
Rule 45, Section 1 that petitions of this nature "shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth." Petitioner St. Martin would like the
Court to examine the pleadings and documentary evidence extant on the
records of the Labor Arbiter to determine if said official indeed made a
finding on the existence of the alleged employer-employee nexus between
the parties based on the facts contained in said pleadings and evidence.
Evidently this issue is embraced by the circumscription.
Even if we would like to relax the rule and allow the examination of the
documentary evidence as an exception to the general rule, we are precluded
by the abject failure of petitioner to attach to the petition important and
material portions of the records as would support the petition prescribed by
Rule 45, Section 4. St. Martin asks us to find out if the Labor Arbiter was
correct in concluding that respondent Aricayos was not in its employ; but
committed the blunder of not attaching to the petition even the Decision of
the Labor Arbiter sought to be reviewed, the NLRC Decision, the position
papers and memoranda of the parties filed with the Labor Arbiter, the
affidavits of petitioner's employees, and other pieces of evidence that we
DOLE Phils. vs. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, November 30, 2006
The Law cited was Section 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. (pertaining to Labor-only contracting 1. no
substantial capital; 2. work is directly related to the principal business of the
principal b. in such case, the one who alleges as contractor is deemed an
agent of the principal while the latter will latter is considered the indirect
employer for purposes of enforcement of the labor rights.)
Before the NLRC, respondents contended that they have been working more
than one year too petitioner. While some of the respondents were still
working for petitioner, others were put on stay home status on varying
dates in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 and were no longer furnished with
work thereafter. They, then, filed a case before the NLRC for illegal dismissal,
regularization, wage differentials, damages and attorneys fees.
Issues: Whether the lower courts were correct in ruling that Petitioner is the
employer of respondents and that CAMPCO be considered merely as agent of
the company
Second, CAMPCO did not carry out an independent business from petitioner.
It was precisely established to render services to petitioner to augment its
workforce during peak seasons. Petitioner was its only client. Even as
CAMPCO had its own office and office equipment, these were mainly used for
administrative purposes; the tools, machineries, and equipment actually
used by CAMPCO members when rendering services to the petitioner
belonged to the latter.
Fourth, CAMPCO was not engaged to perform a specific and special job or
service. In the Service Contract of 1993, CAMPCO agreed to assist petitioner
in its daily operations, and perform odd jobs as may be assigned. CAMPCO
complied with this venture by assigning members to petitioner. Apart from
that, no other particular job, work or service was required from CAMPCO, and
it is apparent, with such an arrangement, that CAMPCO merely acted as a
recruitment agency for petitioner. Since the undertaking of CAMPCO did not
involve the performance of a specific job, but rather the supply of manpower
only, CAMPCO clearly conducted itself as a labor-only contractor.
Facts:IrenoPgib(pd)wmlyasAntGeMrgofhIcilBadnstpCr(eo)fmMy1986usilhvntpeoAg2,198s.RdtrnifmheopylSb2,198.
OnApril12,98esodtfivachwRTCfQuzniy,Br93agsetmbofhdAnir(BO)petalg,mohsn-yfiupdco.AmntswaefibylJiSgo,hftdnserulackjio,pndstmwalbreyc,ihudntRTC.saSgoefilpifrchwtCAagnedSsopifrlckjutadehsRTCO.
Isue:WONprondactimlf sherypbd.
Ruling:Yes.podtmachrybsfSep19na.Iodhit,mclvrespfnat,bkwgfidescoijunhmpyltfr1986avebscdi.
Thetrmonyclasiv gfrmnoepyl-atihscfnoerupdaby)(tigfilc,wxnrejudambythio,c)(wnkedglmfthbyor.
Osnthpoie,Curdlagcmntofvishpuergaofctinlms,durvaybnoetpffilhsrxacymeopnitugh dbceatl.Hn,whigfiofCvsdcuaetprhnigof-ysctverd,qunmiahlbyCAoectksfjdrffvianhlgotepscrdwihfilmoneay,vgrspdxtichmeonaugvlsdbfit.Thenrigof-yapscvdthingbeuryfilofCvaspndetcuihylrbsoeSpmt2,19arhfcisnoempyltSbr2,198.Csqunwhepodtfilciamrfgs,eptonyifibadmgeuslJ24,196hicyradbenpsoit.
Far East Agricultural Supply, Inc. Vs. Jimmy Lebatique And The
Honorable Court Of Appeals
Facts: On March 4, 1996, Far East hired Jimmy Lebatique as truck driver to
animal feeds to the companys clients. He had a daily wage of P223.50. On
January 24, 2000, Lebatique complained of nonpayment of overtime work
particularly on January 22, 2000, when he was required to make a second
delivery in Novaliches, Quezon City. That same day Lebatique was suspended
apparently for illegal use of company vehicle. Even so, Lebatique reported
for work the next day but he was prohibited from entering the company
premises.
On March 20, 2000, Lebatique filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
nonpayment of overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter found that Lebatique was
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit. The NLRC held that there was no dismissal to speak of since
Lebatique was merely suspended. Further, it found that Lebatique was a field
personnel, hence, not entitled to overtime pay and service incentive leave
pay. Lebatique sought reconsideration but was denied.
Issues
Ruling:
1) YES. It is well settled that in cases of illegal dismissal, the burden is on the
employer to prove that the termination was for a valid cause. In this case,
petitioners failed to discharge such burden. Petitioners aver that
Lebatique was merely suspended for one day but he abandoned his work
thereafter. To constitute abandonment as a just cause for dismissal, there
must be: (a) absence without justifiable reason; and (b) a clear intention,
as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-employee
relationship.
Lebatique timely filed his claim for service incentive leave pay,
considering that in this situation, the prescriptive period commences at
On July 28, 1999, the NLRC promulgated its Decision dismissing both
appeals. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated June 21, 2000.Petitioner then filed
a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the above-mentioned
NLRC Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner avers that the CA, in concluding that the NLRC Decision was
supported by substantial evidence, failed to specify what constituted said
evidence. Thus, petitioner asserts that the CA acted arbitrarily in affirming
the Decision of the NLRC.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the factual findings of
the NLRC cannot be reviewed in certiorari proceedings.
Ruling: Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that since nowhere in the
petition is there any acceptable demonstration that the LA or the NLRC acted
either with grave abuse of discretion or without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, the appellate court has no reason to look into the correctness of
the evaluation of evidence which supports the labor tribunals' findings of
fact.
Settled is the rule that the findings of the LA, when affirmed by the NLRC and
the CA, are binding on the Supreme Court, unless patently erroneous. It is
not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below. In a petition for
review on certiorari, this Courts jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of
law in the absence of any showing that the factual findings complained of are
devoid of support in the records or are glaringly erroneous. Firm is the
doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with greater
force in labor cases. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-
judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect
but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing
of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were
arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. We find
none of these exceptions in the present case.
In petitions for review on certiorari like the instant case, the Court invariably
sustains the unanimous factual findings of the LA, the NLRC and the CA,
specially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence and
there is no cogent basis to reverse the same, as in this case.
Issue: WON petitioner can directly file the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
without filing first a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
non for the filing of a petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an
opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the
case. The rationale of the rule rests upon the presumption that the court or
administrative body which issued the assailed order or resolution may
amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error.
We have held that the "plain," "speedy," and "adequate remedy" referred to
in Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a motion for reconsideration of
the questioned Order or Resolution. As we consistently held in numerous
cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an
opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before
resort to the courts can be had.
We agree in the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioners' case does not fall
under any of the recognized exceptions to the filing of a motion for
reconsideration, to wit: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2) when
public interest is involved; (3) in case of urgency; or when the questions
raised are the same as those that have already been squarely argued and
exhaustively passed upon by the lower court. As the Court of Appeals
reasoned, the issue before the NLRC is both factual and legal at the same
time, involving as it does the requirements of the property bond for the
perfection of the appeal, as well as the finding that petitioners failed to
perfect the same. Evidently, the burden is on petitioners seeking exception
to the rule to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the
requirement.
Facts: On December 3, 1993, the RTWPB of Region IX issued Wage Order No.
3 granting a Cost of Living Allowance to covered workers. J.K. Mercado &
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc., petitioner, filed for an exemption from the
coverage of such order. Said application was denied by the regional wage
board for lack of merit.
Despite denial of such application, private respondents were still not given
benefits due them from said wage order. Private respondents filed a Writ of
Execution and Writ of Garnishment seeking for its enforcement. Petitioner
filed a motion to Quash the Writ of Execution arguing that the rights of the
respondents already prescribed as per stated in Article 291 of the Labor
Code regarding any issue concerning a wage order.
Ruling of the Regional Director: The Motion to Quash was denied and held
that unpaid benefits have not prescribed and that the private respondents
need not file a claim to be entitled thereto. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
alleging that the Regional Director abused his discretion in issuing the writ of
execution in the absence of any motion filed by private respondents. Appeal
was then denied which prompted the petiotioner to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied due to lack of merit. Hence, present
petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an
error in holding that Article 291 of the Labor Code is not
applicable to recovery of benefits under the subject Wage Order
No. RTWPB-XI-03, which entitled respondents to a cost of living
allowance (COLA).
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed an error in
holding that the cost of living allowance (COLA) granted by Wage
Order No. RTWPB-XI-03 can be enforced without the appropriate
case having been filed by herein private respondents within the
three (3) year prescriptive period.
3. Whether or not the claim of the private respondents for cost of
living allowance (COLA) pursuant to Wage Order No. RTWPB-XI-03
has already prescribed because of the failure of the respondents
to make the appropriate claim within the three (3) year
prescriptive period provided by Article 291 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
On the other hand, respondent employees money claims in this case had
been reduced to a judgment, in the form of a Wage Order, which has become
final and executory. The prescription applicable, therefore, is not the general
one that applies to money claims, but the specific one applying to
judgments. Thus, the right to enforce the judgment, having been exercised
within five years, has not yet prescribed.
Facts: The herein respondent, was a cook aboard vessels plying overseas,
filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a pro-forma
complaint against petitioners for unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees and thereafter filed two amended pro forma
complaints praying for the award of overtime pay, vacation leave pay, sick
leave pay, and disability/medical benefits, he having, by his claim,
contracted enlargement of the heart and severe thyroid enlargement in the
discharge of his duties as cook which rendered him disabled.
During the pendency of the case, against the advice of his counsel, entered
into a compromise agreement with petitioners, he thereupon signed a
Quitclaim and Release subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners filed before this Court a Manifestation dated May 7, 2007
informing that, inter alia, they and respondent had forged an amicable
settlement.
That respondent was not assisted by his counsel when he entered into the
compromise does not render it null and void. Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. v.
Go so enlightens:
A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable
and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of
Facts: Ma. Gregorietta Leila C. Sy (Sy) was hired by ALC Industries, Inc.
(ALCII) as a supervisor in its purchasing office. She was thereafter assigned
to ALCII's construction project in Davao City as business manager and
supervisor of the Administrative Division from May 1997 to April 15, 1999. Sy
filed a complaint before the labor arbiter alleging that ALCII refused to pay
her salary beginning August 1998 and allowances beginning June 1998.
Despite several notices and warnings, ALCII did not file a position paper to
controvert Sy's claims.
The labor arbiter ordered ALCII and/or Dexter Ceriales to pay petitioner
P282,560 representing her unpaid salary and allowance. ALCII filed an appeal
with the NLRC without posting any cash or surety bond. NLRC dismissed
respondents' appeal. Thereafter ALCII filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied by NLRC. ALCII questioned the NLRC's denial of their
motion for clarification and reconsideration in the CA via a petition
for certiorari. The CA set aside the resolutions of the NLRC and the decision
of the labor arbiter. Sy filed a Rule 45 petition in the Supreme Court
questioning the CA decision and resolution on the ground that the decision of
the labor arbiter had become final and executory.
Issues: (1) Can the employer file an appeal with the NLRC without posting a
cash bond? (2) Did the CA acquire jurisdiction over the labor case?
Rulings: (1) Article 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards,
or orders In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
As the right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege, it must be exercised
only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.
Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.
The payment of the appeal bond is a jurisdictional requisite for the perfection
of an appeal to the NLRC. The lawmakers intended to make the posting of a
cash or surety bond by the employer the exclusive means by which an
employer's appeal may be perfected. It is intended to assure the workers
that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their
(2) The filing of a joint undertaking/declaration, filed way beyond the ten-day
reglementary period for perfecting an appeal and as a substitute for the cash
or surety bond, did not operate to validate the lost appeal. The decision of
the labor arbiter therefore became final and executory for failure of
respondents to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period. Clearly,
the CA no longer had jurisdiction to entertain respondents' appeal from the
labor arbiter's decision.
Petitioner manifested that while it was ready and willing to prove that said
employees were provided by independent legitimate contractors and that it
was not engaged in labor-only contracting in a position paper yet to be
submitted, petitioner prayed that the Labor Arbiter first resolve the issues
raised in their motion to dismiss.
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on the merits dated October 16, 1998, in
favor of the respondent.
Appeal, the NLRC affirmed with modification the decision of the Labor
Arbiter deleting the awards of damages for lack of sufficient basis.
Appeal, the CA issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition outright
for petitioners failure to attach copies of pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent to the petition. More importantly, the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by Elizabeth Legarda,
President of the petitioner-corporation, without submitting any proof
that she was duly authorized to sign for, and bind the petitioner-corporation
in these proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the president of the PCI Travel was not an authorized
representative of the petitioner to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping, without need of a board resolution.
Ruling: It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25, of the
Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are exercised,
all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the board of
directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its
directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers through the
board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate officer cannot
solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the corporation without
authority from the board of directors. This has been our constant holding in
cases instituted by a corporation.
LopezvsC.QSrutbl,GRN16403a2nJy9
Facts:CnimlhgerdpabotznihecumlvargntofQzCiySpslub(),heKangMwQzoCitysSpurbl(ne)fidacmfoiprtgsQCSn12Nvemb97.
WHERFO,invewhoftUsagdl-rikncoutpvfheCgBaAmrnt,sikedou1298hbyracligndosequt,pAr264hfLabCodenviuspl,tmy:RONILC.EADUVST, NGPROME.ACBDNLXJSTGIO,whoademnitprg1fshaeyffico/mrbftpnilgUeahydcorvstimplenua.
Meanwh,tilNoLbrRsCm()endaciogrhtplsvneLuiadoc.Itr:
sIue:
1.Dothemsulanigfif dcrpealbonstighfumdwnerlaytopifcusbnlamhewAitr23ofLCd?
2.WhetrNLRCdinacglomvstherpynaDioldcswhyffetafmpowruniebs.
Ruling:
Firstue:
UnhdertRus,lapvoigmywercfdtnlupoiahwgmytreqsu,nl:(1)paofh 2;igfietmandruofpl3)(yhetqicasrubond.
Thuse,tnpogifabd lctronpeaisvgmydwfrohtecinabl.TfigofdsnytmaburlijoceqhntamspdlwiorecjuftnhCNL.R-ompliawerquntsdhociflaberfinxuy.tsThqmidoearwkthfypvnilcse,rmoyjudgnhtifavpeslomyra.nItidescugplomfrantdeyvhioblgsaftrempyjundwlci.
Howevr,Sctin6fhNRulsPdeCLaomnt,hgsrieducbonaltpxmeriusgndoth fabiresmlunothyawrd.Hec,CNLRsutlfiongardeyhmuctonfapelbd.
hInetcasofNilv.FyjdurCpnethaboqimsvlngaerytdwhbcoulnxmiersah:(1)twubnlicompeR2sh);(trdagfncumieosrtgdchb3n);(alierptofqumnealbdwshrvtiocjfenlgshtmri4;o)(apenl,yvstxhbdirwgean/ofypstilbdurghemano.Apyistjurdelgn,wfiahotCNLdRiernucgamhoftplbdnsiegrahvfildnwtemryopi.
Thepnosgtifamu0P4,.leyshwtifingofmrducbhatn,sweligfiofmdruap,hwnteglyodri csutabnlmphewiR.
eScondisu:
Weruinlfavopts.
Thoerf,wsitpcnaduffirAlexJ.Sgoti,MCcPnaRELdGeBro,whpynatlbsuidreoTBtan,hDpilsdcegrmvohtipylnusad.
eTocarpitul,hNLRCndsg triaeco,wlndghfbakesporntiy,dhfigaffecomplsdbnuvtryie.
Basedhontrgf,iLuclbephdantforsixgeupn.r
Facts: The petition is for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner
Lockheed entered into a contract of security with the University of the
Philippines. On 1998, several of the guards assigned to UP filed a complaint
for unpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special
holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials,
13th month pay, refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual
Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid wages from December 16-31, 1998,
and attorney's fees.
The Labor Arbiter declared UP solidarily liable. The decision was appealed
but sustained by the NLCR, albeit a few modifications. The parties motion to
reconsider were likewise denied. On July 25, 2005, a Notice of Garnishment
10 was issued to Philippine National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch for the
satisfaction of the award of P12,142,522.69 (inclusive of execution fee).
On August 16, 2005, UP filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Garnishment. UP
contended that the funds being subjected to garnishment at PNB are
government/public funds. However, the execution of the garnishment was
carried out. UP elevated their case to the court of appeals. On
reconsideration, however, the CA issued the assailed Amended Decision. It
held that without departing from its findings that the funds covered in the
savings account sought to be garnished do not fall within the classification of
public funds, it reconsiders the dismissal of the petition in light of the ruling
in the case of National Electrification Administration v. Morales which
mandates that all money claims against the government must first be filed
with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Lockheed appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. Arguing mainly that
the NEA case should not apply and that UP could be both sued and held
liable. And that the quashal of garnishment sought was moot because it had
already become fait accompli.
Issues: Whether or not the NEA Case applies and the funds be garnished
directly bypassing the COA. Whether or not the previous garnishment and
withdrawal of funds was fait accompli.
Ruling: YES. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA case.
Like NEA, UP is a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Thus, also like NEA, it
cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to garnishment or
levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA. (suability does not
immediately mean liability).
NO. As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that
there is nothing that can be done since the funds of UP had already been
garnished, since the garnishment was erroneously carried out and did not go
through the proper procedure (the filing of a claim with the COA), UP is
entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest of 6% per
annum, to be computed from the time of judicial demand to be reckoned
from the time UP filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which occurred
right after the withdrawal of the garnished funds from PNB.
Facts: Potillo was hired by Rudolf in Lietz Co. under the condition that Potillo
will not engage in any other gainful employment by himself or with any other
company either directly or indirectly without written consent of Lietz Inc.,
otherwise Potillo will be liable for liquidated damages.
Three (3) years thereafter, on 6 June 2005, Portillo resigned from Lietz Inc.
During her exit interview, Portillo declared that she intended to engage in
businessa rice dealership, selling rice in wholesale.
On 15 June 2005, Lietz Inc. accepted Portillos resignation and reminded her
of the "Goodwill Clause" in the last letter agreement she had signed.
Subsequently, Lietz Inc. learned that Portillo had been hired by Ed Keller
Philippines, Limited to head its Pharma Raw Material Department. Ed Keller
Limited is purportedly a direct competitor of Lietz Inc.
Meanwhile, Portillos demands from Lietz Inc. for the payment of her
remaining salaries and commissions went unheeded. Lietz Inc. gave Portillo
the run around, on the pretext that her salaries and commissions were still
being computed.
In its position paper, Lietz Inc. admitted liability for Portillos money claims in
the total amount of P110,662.16. However, Lietz Inc. raised the defense of
legal compensation: Portillos money claims should be offset against her
liability to Lietz Inc. for liquidated damages for Portillos alleged breach of the
"Goodwill Clause" in the employment contract when she became employed
with Ed Keller Philippines, Limited.
Issue:
1. Who has jurisdiction over the present controversy?
2. Whether Portillos money claims for unpaid salaries may be offset
against respondents claim for liquidated damages.
Ruling:
1. Jurisdiction belongs to the Civil Courts.
As it is, petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code. It
merely seeks to recover damages based on the parties contract of
employment as redress for respondents breach thereof. Such cause of
action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the
controversy belongs to the regular courts. More so must this be in the
present case, what with the reality that the stipulation refers to the
postemployment relations of the parties.
(a) In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the
employer, and the deduction is to recompense the employer
for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;
(b)For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his
union to check-off has been recognized by the employer or
authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and
On the other hand, petitioners alleged in their position paper that respondent
was relieved from her post as requested by the client because of her habitual
tardiness, persistent borrowing of money from employees and tenants of the
client, and sleeping on the job.
On May 13, 2009, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the
charge of illegal dismissal as wanting in merit but ordering the Respondents
Leopard Security and Investigation Agency and Rupert Protacio to pay
complainant a financial assistance in the amount of P5,000.00.
Respondent then filed a Notice of Appeal with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), but in a Decision dated October 23, 2009, the NLRC
dismissed the appeal for having been filed out of time, thereby declaring that
the Labor Arbiter's Decision had become final and executory on June 16,
2009.
Upon elevating to the CA via a petition for certiorari, the court reversed and
set aside the Decision of the NLRC and in lieu thereof, a new judgment is
entered declaring petitioner to have been illegally dismissed.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in liberally applying the rules of procedure and
ruling that respondent's appeal should be allowed and resolved on the merits
despite having been filed out of time.
It should also be borne in mind that the right of the winning party to enjoy
the finality of the resolution of the case is also an essential part of public
policy and the orderly administration of justice. Hence, such right is just as
weighty or equally important as the right of the losing party to appeal or
seek reconsideration within the prescribed period.25
When the Labor Arbiter's Decision became final, petitioners attained a
vested right to said judgment. They had the right to fully rely on the
immutability of said Decision.