Chavez v.
Sandiganbayan case filed by the private respondent against
G.R. No. 91391
Facts:
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with
the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco
Chavez filed with the respondent
Sandiganbayan a complaint against Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and
accounting, restitution and damages.
Respondent Enrile filed a counterclaim and
then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan
to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials
as party defendants for lodging this alleged
"harassment suit" against him. Furthermore,
they allege that then PCGG Chairman Jovito
Salonga had already cleared the respondent
and yet, knowing the allegations to be false,
the petitioner still filed the complaint. The
motion was granted. Thereafter, all the PCGG
officials filed their answer to the counterclaims
invoking their immunity from suits as provided
in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead
of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this
Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
The solicitor general on the other hand argues
that since he is simply the lawyer in the case,,
exercising his duty under the law to assist the
government in the filling and prosecution of all
cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive Order
No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in
the same case.
Issue: WON the inclusion of the petitioner as
additional party defendant was proper
Held:
No. The charges pressed by respondent Enrile
for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
arising from the filing of an alleged harassment
suit with malice and evident bad faith do not
constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To
vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a
separate and distinct civil action for damages
against the Solicitor General. The general rule
is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties
where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is a showing of bad faith.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388
[1981]), we ruled that damages claimed to
have been suffered as a consequence of an
action filed against the petitioner must be
pleaded in the same action as a compulsory
counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a
the petitioners or parties in the litigation. In the
present case, the counterclaim was filed
against the lawyer, not against the party
plaintiff itself.
We do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a
special immunity from damage suits. However,
when he acts in the name of a client, he should
not be sued on a counterclaim in the very
same case he has filed only as counsel and not
as a party. Any claim for alleged damages or
other causes of action should be filed in an
entirely separate and distinct civil action.
Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 130872
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the
Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque,
while his son, his co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz,
was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang
Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang and
concurrently a member of its Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of
Kabataang Barangays.
In the 1985 election for the Kabataang
Barangay Jowil Red[2] won as KB Chairman of
Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz.Parenthetically,
Lenlie Lecaroz did not run as candidate in this
electoral exercise as he was no longer qualified
for the position after having already passed the
age limit fixed by law. Sometime in November
1985 Red was appointed by then President
Ferdinand Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing
the KBs of the municipality. Mayor Francisco M.
Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit
as member of the municipal council until his
appointment had been cleared by the Governor
of Marinduque. Nonetheless, the telegram was
included in the agenda as one of the subjects
discussed in the meeting. Red finally received
his appointment papers sometime in January
1986. Despite notice to the mayor, the latter
still refused to allow Red to sit as sectoral
representative.
Meanwhile, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and
approved on different dates the payment to
Lenlie Lecaroz of twenty-six (26) sets of
payrolls for the twenty-six
(26) quincenas covering the period 16 January
1986 to 30 January 1987.
After securing a confirmation of his
appointment as KB sectoral representative 3
years and 9 months later from the date he
received his appointment, Red filed with the
Ombudsman several criminal complaints
against Mayor Lecaroz and Lenlie. The
Ombudsman filed 13 informations for estafa
through falsification of public documents.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding
the two acused guilty on all counts of estafa.
The theory of petitioners is that Red failed to
qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB
since he did not present an authenticated copy
of his appointment papers; neither did he take
a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled
petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as
member of the SB although in a holdover
capacity since his term had already
expired. The Sandiganbayan however rejected
this postulate declaring that the holdover
provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains
only to positions in the KB, clearly implying
that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7
of B.P. Blg. 51, there can be no holdover with
respect to positions in the SB.
Issue: WON the principle of holdover applies to
Lenlie entitling him to receive the salaries
Held:
Yes. The concept of holdover when applied to a
public officer implies that the office has a fixed
term and the incumbent is holding onto the
succeeding term.[6] It is usually provided by law
that officers elected or appointed for a fixed
term shall remain in office not only for that
term but until their successors have been
elected and qualified. Where this provision is
found, the office does not become vacant upon
the expiration of the term if there is no
successor elected and qualified to assume it,
but the present incumbent will carry over until
his successor is elected and qualified, even
though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does
not say that a Sanggunian member can
continue to occupy his post after the expiration
of his term in case his successor fails to qualify,
it does not also say that he is proscribed from
holding over. Absent an express or implied
constitutional or statutory provision to the
contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office
until his successor is appointed or chosen and
has qualified. The legislative intent of not
allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or
at least implied in the legislative enactment,
[9]
otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the
law-making body favors the same.
Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz
G.R. No. 78946
Facts:
On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a
permanent appointment to the position of Chief
of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan
(now East Avenue Medical Center) by then
Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. In
1986, the new organizational structure of the
Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to
Assistant Director for Professional Services.
On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119
known as the "Reorganization Act of the
Ministry of Health" was promulgated. On 29
May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical
Center Chief, designated respondent Dr. Aguila,
who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant
Director for Professional Services while Dr.
Nenita Palma-Fernandez will be transferred to
the Research Office.
Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. 22,
petitioner filed on 1 June 1987 a letter-protest
with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing
copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as
well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service
and the Chairman of the Government
Reorganization Commission. Failing to secure
any action on her protest within a month's
time, petitioner filed on 8 July 1987 the instant
Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary
Injunction against respondents Dr. de la Paz,
Dr. Aguila, and the Secretary of Health.
Issue: WON the transfer of petitioner to the
Research Office is illegal and tantamount to
removal
Held:
Yes. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is
one of the National Health Facilities attached to
the Department of Health, the power to
appoint and remove subordinate officers and
employees, like petitioner, is vested in the
Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center
Chief. The latter's function is confined to
recommendation.
Furthermore, the transfer was without
petitioner's consent, was tantamount to
removal without valid cause, and as such is
invalid and without any legal effect (Garcia, et
al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116). A removal
without cause is violative of the Constitutional
guarantee that "no officer or employee of the
civil service shall be removed or suspended
except for cause provided by law" (Article IX, B,
Section 2(3),1987 Constitution).
Dela Cruz vs CA
G.R. No. 126183
Facts:
Petitioners are public school teachers from
various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively
suspended, and eventually dismissed in
October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariio
of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS). The teachers were alleged to
have participated in the mass action/illegal
strike on September 19-21, 1990 and defied
the return order.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). In 1993 the CSC
found petitioners guilty of conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service" for having
participated in the mass actions and imposed
upon them the reduced penalty of six (6)
months' suspension. Not happy with the
decision, the petitioners therefore ask for
exoneration or, in the alternative, award of
back wages for the period of three (3) years
when they were not allowed to work while
awaiting resolution of their appeals by the
MSPB and CSC, deducting the period of six (6)
months' suspension eventually meted them.
Issue: WON back wages may be awarded to
teachers ordered reinstated to the service after
the dismissal orders of Secretary Cario
Held:
No. Back salaries are not warranted when the
immediate execution of the order of dismissal
is justified. In this case, the CSC found the
petitioners liable only for conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service, not for grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross
violation of CS law, rules and regulations (as
charged by Secretary Carino). Having been
found answerable for a lesser offense,
petitioners could not be considered as being
fully innocent of the charges against them. Not
having been exonerated, petitioners are not
entitled to back salaries.