file:///C|/JPSP/index.

txt

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Volume: 94, Issue: 5
May, 2008

Table of Contents:

1) Hedonic Tone and Activation Level in the Mood-Creativity Link: Toward a Dual Pathway to Creativity Model
De Dreu, C.K.W.; Baas, M.; Nijstad, B.A. pp. 739-756
(184 KB)

2) Judgments of the Lucky Across Development and Culture

Olson, K.R.; Dunham, Y.; Dweck, C.S.; Spelke, E.S.; Banaji, M.R. pp. 757-776
(348 KB)

3) How to Heat Up From the Cold: Examining the Preconditions for (Unconscious) Mood Effects
Ruys, K.I.; Stapel, D.A. pp. 777-791
(129 KB)

4) Forming Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Individuals: Social Group Association Cues
McConnell, A.R.; Rydell, R.J.; Strain, L.M.; Mackie, D.M. pp. 792-807
(308 KB)

5) Maintaining Sexual Desire in Intimate Relationships: The Importance of Approach Goals

Impett, E.A.; Strachman, A.; Finkel, E.J.; Gable, S.L. pp. 808-823
(298 KB)

6) Receiving Support as a Mixed Blessing: Evidence for Dual Effects of Support on Psychological Outcomes
Gleason, M.E.J.; Iida, M.; Shrout, P.E.; Bolger, N. pp. 824-838
(255 KB)

7) Nomina Sunt Omina: On the Inductive Potential of Nouns and Adjectives in Person Perception
Carnaghi, A.; Maass, A.; Gresta, S.; Bianchi, M.; Cadinu, M.; Arcuri, L. pp. 839-859
(173 KB)

8) Taking the Easy Way Out: Preference Diversity, Decision Strategies, and Decision Refusal in Groups
Nijstad, B.A.; Kaps, S.C. pp. 860-870
(102 KB)

9) Distinguishing Between Silent and Vocal Minorities: Not All Deviants Feel Marginal
Morrison, K.R.; Miller, D.T. pp. 871-882
(113 KB)

10) Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative
Vohs, K.D.; Baumeister, R.F.; Schmeichel, B.J.; Twenge, J.M.; Nelson, N.M.; Tice, D.M. pp. 883-898
(138 KB)

11) Adolescent Personality Moderates Genetic and Environmental Influences on Relationships With Parents
South, S.C.; Krueger, R.F.; Johnson, W.; Iacono, W.G. pp. 899-912
(138 KB)

12) Societal Threat, Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and U.S. State Death Penalty Sentencing (1977-2004)
McCann, S.J.H. pp. 913-923
(269 KB)

file:///C|/JPSP/index.txt [25/05/2008 5:49:12 PM]

 ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION

Hedonic Tone and Activation Level in the MoodCreativity Link:

Toward a Dual Pathway to Creativity Model
Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Matthijs Baas, and Bernard A. Nijstad
University of Amsterdam

To understand when and why mood states influence creativity, the authors developed and tested a dual
pathway to creativity model; creative fluency (number of ideas or insights) and originality (novelty) are
functions of cognitive flexibility, persistence, or some combination thereof. Invoking work on arousal,
psychophysiological processes, and working memory capacity, the authors argue that activating moods
(e.g., angry, fearful, happy, elated) lead to more creative fluency and originality than do deactivating
moods (e.g., sad, depressed, relaxed, serene). Furthermore, activating moods influence creative fluency
and originality because of enhanced cognitive flexibility when tone is positive and because of enhanced
persistence when tone is negative. Four studies with different mood manipulations and operationaliza-
tions of creativity (e.g., brainstorming, category inclusion tasks, gestalt completion tests) support the
model.

Keywords: mood, creativity, cognitive flexibility, emotions, arousal

What enables scientists to make notable contributions, engineers
to develop innovative products, and work teams to creatively solve
their problems? What hinders stand-up comedians from being
funny and refrains poets from being original? When are people
creative, and why? What hinders creativity, and when? Partly
because of the importance of creativity for human progress and
adaptation, these questions are as old as the human sciences
(Simonton, 2003). Apart from its obvious, problem-solving func-
tion (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988), creative ideation allows indi-
viduals to remain flexible (Flach, 1990), giving them the capacity
to cope with the advantages, opportunities, technologies, and
changes that are a part of their day-to-day lives (Runco, 2004).
Accordingly, creativity is studied in a variety of disciplines, in-
cluding psychology, organizational behavior, and communication
sciences.
Creativity is usually defined as the generation of ideas, insights,
or problem solutions that are new and meant to be useful (Amabile,
1983; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Sternberg & Lubart, 1999). Among
the many variables that have been shown to predict creativity,
Carsten K. W. De Dreu, Matthijs Baas, and Bernard A. Nijstad, De-
partment of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Neth-
erlands.
We thank Joyce Jacobs for help in coding the data of Study 4 and
Gerben van Kleef, Mark Rotteveel, and Richard Ridderinkhof for com-
ments and suggestions.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Carsten
K. W. De Dreu, Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam,
Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands. E-mail:
c.k.w.dedreu@uva.nl
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 739 756
Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association 0022-3514/08/$12.00
mood stands out as one of the most widely studied and least
disputed predictors (e.g., George & Brief, 1996; Isen & Baron,
1991; Mumford, 2003). For example, Ashby, Isen, and Turken
(1999) noted that
It is now well recognized that positive affect leads to greater cognitive
flexibility and facilitates creative problem solving across a broad
range of settings. These effects have been noted not only with college
samples but also in organizational settings, in consumer contexts, in
negotiation situations . . . and in the literature on coping and stress. (p.
530)
In a similar vein, Lyubomirksy, King, and Diener (2005) con-
cluded that people in a positive mood are more likely to have
richer associations within existing knowledge structures, and thus
are likely to be more flexible and original. Those in a good mood
will excel either when the task is complex and past learning can be
used in a heuristic way to more efficiently solve the task or when
creativity and flexibility are required. (p. 840)
Although many studies support the idea that positive mood
states trigger more creative responses than do neutral mood control
conditions, studies in which positive and negative mood states
were compared appear to be less conclusive: There is also a large
literature on negative affect, which indicates that the impact of
negative affect is more complex and difficult to predict than is the
case for positive affect (Ashby et al., 1999, p. 532). Indeed,
whereas some studies suggest that positive mood states trigger
more creativity than do negative mood states (e.g., Grawitch,
Munz, & Kramer, 2003; Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, &
Martin, 1997; Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996),
other studies report similar levels of creativity (Bartolic, Basso,
Schefft, Glauser, & Titanic Schefft, 1999), and still other studies
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.739

739
740 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD
report that negative moods promote creative performance more
than do positive or neutral moods (e.g., Carlsson, 2002; Gasper,
2003; Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997; Madjar & Oldham, 2002).
This has led some to call into question the general conclusion that
positive mood states produce more creativity than do negative
mood states (Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004) or that negative
mood states undermine creative performance (Gasper, 2003;
George & Zhou, 2007).
In this article, we reconsider the link between mood and cre-
ativity and try to reconcile the seemingly contradictory findings
and conclusions reviewed above. First, we argue that creativity can
be a function of cognitive flexibility and of cognitive perseverance
and persistence. Second, we argue that mood states can be con-
ceptualized in terms of two underlying dimensions hedonic tone
(positive vs. negative) and activation (activating vs. deactivating).
Whereas past work on mood states and creativity has predomi-
nantly focused on hedonic tone dimension and on cognitive flex-
ibility, we argue that the extent to which mood states activate or
deactivate and the tendency toward cognitive perseverance and
persistence need to be taken into account also. More specifically,
we propose that cognitive activation is a necessary precondition
for creativity to come about and that hedonic tone determines the
route the flexibility route or the perseverance routethrough
which creative fluency and originality is achieved. In four studies,
we tested (aspects of) the general idea that activating moods with
positive tone are linked to cognitive flexibility and thereby pro-
mote creative performance, whereas the creativity enhancing ef-
fects of activating moods with negative tone are due to persever-
ance.
A Dual Pathway to Creative Performance
Creativity researchers often operationalize creativity with mea-
sures of fluency, originality, and flexibility (Guilford, 1967; Tor-
rance, 1966). Because we will also use these measures in our
studies, it is important to conceptually relate them to each other as
well as to the general concept of creativity. Fluency is a measure
of creative production and refers to the number of nonredundant
ideas, insights, problem solutions, or products that are being gen-
erated. Originality is one of the defining characteristics of creativ-
ity and refers to the uncommonness or infrequency of the ideas,
insights, problem solutions, or products that are being generated
(Amabile, 1983; Guilford, 1967; Paulus & Nijstad, 2003; Stern-
berg & Lubart, 1999; Torrance, 1966). Fluency and originality
may be correlated (e.g., quantity breeds quality; Diehl & Stroebe,
1987; Osborn, 1953), but they need not be. For example, creative
fluency may manifest itself in a relatively large number of solved
insight or perception problems, with the solutions themselves not
being particularly new or uncommon (cf. Forster, Friedman, &
Liberman, 2004). Moreover, states or traits that influence creative
fluency do not necessarily also influence originality and vice versa.
Flexibility as a measure of creativity manifests itself in the
use of different cognitive categories and perspectives and of
broad and inclusive cognitive categories (Amabile, 1983; Med-
nick, 1962). Generating ideas in many different categories will,
all other things being equal, be associated with more ideas
overall (i.e., increased fluency; cf. Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewi-
jkx, 2002) as well as with the generation of ideas in categories
that are not usually thought of (i.e., originality; cf. Murray,
Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990; also see Isen & Daubman, 1984;
Mikulincer, Paz, & Kedem, 1990; Rietzschel, De Dreu, &
Nijstad, 2007). It is important to note that besides being a
measure of creative performance, flexibility also refers to a
cognitive process. Many researchers have argued that in order
to be creative (i.e., produce novel and appropriate products)
people must think flexibly, must break set (e.g., Duncker, 1945;
Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Smith, Ward, & Schumacher,
1993), and need flat associative hierarchies (e.g., Eysenck,
1993; Mednick, 1962; Simonton, 1999) to arrive at uncommon
and disparate (and thus original) associations. Cognitive flexi-
bility can thus not only be seen as a measure of creativity but
also as a precursor of the production of many (fluency) and
original responses.
However, in addition to cognitive flexibility, it is also possible
to achieve creative fluency and originality through hard work,
perseverance, and more or less deliberate, persistent, and in-depth
exploration of a few cognitive categories or perspectives (Boden,
1998; Dietrich, 2004; Finke, 1996; Schooler, Ohlsson & Brooks,
1993; Simonton, 1997). Perseverance will manifest itself not in the
use of many or broad cognitive categories but rather in the gen-
eration of many ideas within a few categories or in longer time-
on-task. All other things being equal, generating many ideas in a
few categories will also lead to more ideas overall (i.e., fluency;
Nijstad et al., 2002). Furthermore, recent work suggests that flu-
ency within categories is associated with originality of ideas within
these categories: Because only a limited number of conventional
and unoriginal ideas are possible in each category, perseverance
within categories eventually leads to original ideas (Rietzschel,
Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2007). Such within-category fluency (e.g.,
Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006; Nijstad et al., 2002; Nijstad, Stroebe, &
Lodewijkx, 2003) can be illustrated with the example of an indi-
vidual who generates ideas as to how to improve health. This
person may think about physical exercise and sport and may start
out with common ideas like, people should spend more time
doing physical exercise. However, provided he or she continues
generating ideas within this category, he or she might proceed to
more unusual ideas within that category, like, putting a strong
string in your computer keyboard to make typing very hard work.
In previous work in which both flexibility (number of used cate-
gories) and within-category fluency were established, no system-
atic correlation between the two was observed (Nijstad et al., 2002,
2003).
Taken together, creativity can be achieved through enhanced
cognitive flexibility, set-breaking, and cognitive restructuring,
which manifests itself in the use of many, broad, and inclusive
cognitive categories. It can equally well be achieved through
enhanced persistence and perseverance, which manifests itself in a
higher number of ideas and insights within a relatively low number
of cognitive categories, prolonged effort, and relatively long time-
on-task. This may apply to idea generation and divergent thinking
tasks, as well as to insight tasks that are typically characterized by
being ultimately soluble by the average problem solver. Such
insight tasks are likely to produce an impasse and a state of high
uncertainty as to how to proceed and to produce a kind of aha
experience when the impasse is suddenly overcome and the solu-
tion is discovered after prolonged efforts at solution (Forster et al.,
2004; Schooler et al., 1993).
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED
Discrete Moods, Creative Fluency, and Originality
A critical implication of the dual pathway model is that any trait
or state influencing cognitive flexibility or cognitive persistence
and perseverance may lead to novel yet appropriate insights and
ideas. With regard to the influence of mood on creative fluency
and originality, it may thus be that mood states influence creativity
to the extent that they enhance cognitive flexibility, perseverance,
or both; perhaps both positive and negative mood states lead to
creative fluency and originality, but through different routes.
When thinking about mood states, valence, or hedonic tone,
most readily comes to mind. Discrete moods such as anger, anx-
iety, sadness, and depression all have negative valence, or tone.
Discrete mood states such as happiness, elation, and feeling re-
laxed and calm all have positive valence, or tone. However, in
addition to hedonic tone, discrete moods differ in the extent to
which they activate or deactivate (Barrett & Russell, 1998; Gray,
1982; Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993; Posner, Russell, &
Peterson, 2005; Thayer, 1989; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).
Some mood states are positive in tone and deactivating (calm,
relaxed), whereas others are positive in tone and activating (happy,
elated). Likewise, some mood states are negative in tone and
deactivating (sad, depressed), whereas others are negative in tone
and activating (angry, fearful). This applies to temporarily acti-
vated and experimentally manipulated mood states (Russell &
Barrett, 1999; Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegen, 1999), as well
as to trait-related differences in mood (Filipowicz, 2006). For
example, trait extraversion is often equated with positive affectiv-
ity (positive, activating), and trait neuroticism is equated with
negative affectivity (negative, activating; Cropanzano, Weiss,
Hale, & Reb, 2003; Eysenck, 1993).
Activation, Hedonic Tone, and Creativity
Whether mood states are activating or deactivating may have
important effects on creative performance. According to both
classic and contemporary work on threat rigidity (Carnevale &
Probst, 1998; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) and stress-per-
formance linkage (Broadbent, 1972; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), an
individuals capacity for complex thinking is altered in a curvilin-
ear fashion as arousal and activation increases. Low levels of
arousal lead to inactivity and avoidance, neglect of information,
and low cognitive and motor performance. Extremely high levels
of arousal reduce the capacity to perceive, process, and evaluate
information. However, at moderate levels of arousal, individuals
will be motivated to seek and integrate information and to consider
multiple alternatives. Provided they are not associated with intense
arousal, activating moods are thus more likely than deactivating
mood states to increase attention to and integration of information.
That activating mood states may foster creativity also follows
from work on the interrelations among arousal, release of specific
neurotransmitters such as dopamine and noradrenalin, and working
memory capacity (cf., Ashby, Valentin, & Turken, 2002; Flaherty,
2005; Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005; Usher, Cohen,
Servan Schreiber, Rajkowski, & Aston Jones, 1999). Working
memory capacity refers to the ability to hold information tran-
siently in mind in the service of comprehension, thinking, and
planning (Baddeley, 2000). Activation and arousal associate with
the release of dopamine and noradrenalin, which in turn play a
741
major role in regulating the excitability of the cortical circuitry on
which the working memory function of the prefrontal cortex
depends (Dreisbach et al., 2005; Goldman-Rakic, 1996). Moderate
levels of dopamine associate with improved working memory
performance (Floresco & Phillips, 2001; Kimberg, DEsposito, &
Farah, 1997), more efficient processing of task-relevant informa-
tion (Drabant et al., 2006), increased maintenance of task-relevant
information (Colzato, Van Wouwe, & Hommel, 2007), and better
switching between tasks (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Moderate
(but not extremely high) levels of noradrenalin enhance prefrontal
cortex control of behavior, including (short-term) working mem-
ory (Robbins, 1984; Usher et al., 1999) and sustained selective
attention on task-relevant information (Chamberlain, Muller,
Blackwell, Robbins, & Sahakian, 2006).
Apart from a simple motivating effect of activation, the above
indicates that activating mood states rather than deactivating mood
states come together with higher levels of dopamine and noradren-
alin and greater working memory capacity. Working memory
capacity is often taken as a prerequisite for cognitive flexibility,
abstract thinking, strategic planning, processing speed, access to
long-term memory, and sentience (Baddeley, 2000; Damasio,
2001; Dietrich, 2004). In terms of the dual pathway model outlined
in the previous section, it thus appears that both for the cognitive
flexibility route and for the persistence route, working memory
capacity is required and beneficial. Activating rather than deacti-
vating moods increase working memory capacity, thereby facili-
tating cognitive flexibility and restructuring, as well as more
deliberate, analytical, and focused processing and combining of
information. Indeed, affect intensity, measured with both negative
and positive high arousing terms, relates to higher levels of cre-
ativity in children (Russ & Grossman-McKee, 1990) as well as
employees (George & Zhou, 2007).
Whether activating mood states produce creative fluency and
originality through enhanced cognitive flexibility or perseverance
may depend on that mood states hedonic tone. According to the
cognitive tuning model (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994;
Schwarz & Bless, 1991), a positive affective state leads individuals
to experience their situation as safe and problem free, to feel
relatively unconstrained, to take risks, and to explore novel path-
ways and new possibilities in a relatively loose way, relying on
heuristic processing styles (Fiedler, 2000; George & Zhou, 2007;
Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Positive affect facilitates primary process
cognition in the right hemisphere, which is holistic and analogical
(Martindale & Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, &
Covello, 1984; also see Derryberry, 1989; Faust & Mashal, 2007;
Fink & Neubauer, 2006). Consistent with this is a classic study on
positive affect and creativity (Isen & Daubman, 1984). Participants
in a state of mild happiness were asked to rate how prototypical
several exemplars (e.g., bus, camel) were for a particular category
(e.g., vehicle), with higher ratings for the weak exemplar (camel)
indicating broad cognitive categories (Amabile, 1983; Eysenck,
1993). Results showed that compared with the control condition,
happy participants had higher prototypicality ratings, that is, had
broader and more inclusive cognitive categories (also see Isen,
Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992; Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000; Murray et
al., 1990). Other work showed that individuals in happy moods
choose a global rather than a local visual configuration and per-
form faster on visual insight tasks that require set-breaking
742 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD
Positive
Activation Motivation; Working Tone
Memory Capacity
Negative
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the roles of activation and tone in the dual pathway to creativity model.
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Gasper, 2003; Wadlinger & Isaa-
cowitz, 2006).
The cognitive tuning model, and related accounts, thus posits
that positive affect allows individuals to be inclusive in their
thinking, to switch cognitive categories, and to explore uncommon
perspectives; positive affect, in other words, increases cognitive
flexibility (cf., Ashby et al., 1999). Negative affect, in contrast,
informs the individual that his or her situation is problematic,
threatening, and troublesome. Specific action must be taken to
remedy the current situation, and this calls for a more constrained,
systematic, and analytical approach (Ambady & Gray, 2002;
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Schwarz & Bless, 1991).
Negative affect enhances risk aversion and bolsters detail-oriented
processing. It facilitates left hemispherical, secondary process cog-
nition, which is more verbal, sequential, and analytical (Martindale
& Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale, Hines, Mitchell, & Covello, 1984;
also see Derryberry, 1989; Faust & Mashal, 2007; Fink &
Neubauer, 2006). Negative mood states such as anxiety promote
narrow perceptual processing, resulting in impaired detection of
peripheral (but not central) visual information and impaired per-
formance on secondary (but not primary) tasks; provided it does
not become too extreme, such narrowed processing accompanying
negative mood states may be adaptive in that it helps prevent
distraction while focusing attention on the most important infor-
mation (Derryberry & Reed (1998). Indeed, negative activating
moods such as fear and anxiety lead to narrow cognitive categories
(Mikulincer et al., 1990), lowered ability to shift attention (Der-
ryberry & Reed, 1998), and reduced cognitive flexibility (e.g.,
Carnevale & Probst, 1998). It is important to note that negative
activating moods also increase persistence and perseverance
(Gasper & Clore, 2002; Gray & Braver, 2002; Strauss, Hadar,
Shavit, & Itskowitz, 1981; but see Baumann & Kuhl, 2005). For
example, Verhaeghen, Joormann, and Khan (2005) showed that
rumination (persisting, conscious, and negatively valenced self-
related thoughts) correlated with creative fluency and originality
and that this relationship appeared to be due to greater seriousness
about and more time spent on creative activities.
According to our dual pathway model, creative fluency and
originality may be achieved through enhanced cognitive flexibil-
ity, increased persistence and perseverance, or some combination
thereof. On the basis of stress-performance literature and psycho-
physiological and neuroimaging work on arousal and working
memory capacity, we argued that activating moods enhance cre-
ative fluency and originality more than do deactivating moods.
From a combination of this with the cognitive tuning model
Cognitive Flexibility;
Inclusiveness
Creative Fluency
and Originality
Cognitive Persistence;
Perseverance
(Schwarz & Bless, 1991), the broaden-and-build perspective
(Fredrickson, 1998), and the work on visual and conceptual fo-
cusing (e.g., Derryberry, 1989), it follows that activating moods
that are positive in tone increase creative fluency and originality
primarily through enhanced cognitive flexibility, whereas activat-
ing moods that are negative in tone increase creative fluency and
originality primarily through enhanced persistence and persever-
ance. Put differently, whereas we would not necessarily expect
differences in creative fluency and originality between activating
positive (e.g., happy, elated) moods and activating negative (angry,
fearful) moods, we would expect activating positive moods to
associate with broader and more inclusive cognitive categories,
with greater diversity in the cognitive categories used to generate
ideas, and with fast completion times in creative insight tasks. Vice
versa, we would expect activating negative moods to associate
with more ideas within specific cognitive categories and with
relatively long completion times in creative insight tasks.1
Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of the way activation
and hedonic tone influence the two routes toward creative fluency
and originality. As can be seen, the level of activation associated
with a particular mood state serves as the critical entry point, with
higher activation leading to greater fluency and originality. How-
ever, which pathway is used depends on a mood states hedonic
tone, with positive tone facilitating the cognitive flexibility route
and negative tone facilitating the cognitive perseverance route.
Some indirect evidence for our model is available, albeit outside
the domain of creative performance. In their review of the psy-
chological, neurochemical, and functional neuroanatomical medi-
ators of the effects of positive and negative mood on executive
1
Activation not only varies as a function of mood but also, for example,
as a function of physical exercise (see also Kaufmann & Vosburg, 1997).
Work on physical exercise and creativity is somewhat inconclusive, how-
ever, with some finding no differences between exercise and baseline
conditions (Isen et al., 1987; Vosburg, 1998), and others finding physical
exercises to lead to more divergent thinking (Blanchette, Ramocki, ODel
& Casey, 2005; Steinberg, Sykes, Moss, Lowery, & LeBoutillier, 1997).
Unfortunately, in most of these studies, no manipulation checks for
exercise-induced arousal or activation and no controls for participants
physical condition were included, and it is unclear whether the exercise
induced low, moderate, or high physical arousal. Furthermore, the tasks
used in these experiments capitalized on cognitive flexibility (e.g., func-
tional fixedness, remote associations), which may explain why, in a few
cases (e.g., Isen et al., 1987; Vosburg, 1998), happiness (activating positive
mood) produced more creativity than did exercise-induced arousal. We
return to this in the Conclusions and General Discussion section.
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED
functions, Mitchell and Phillips (2007) concluded that negative
mood effects on executive functioning are mediated by serotonin,
whereas positive mood effects may be mediated by dopamine, with
serotonin being particularly involved in effortful processes asso-
ciated with goal-directed activity and dopamine being particularly
involved in switching flexibly between categories and tasks (e.g.,
Ashby et al., 1999). Spering, Wagener, and Funke (2005) found no
overall differences in complex problem solving between positive
and negative mood states but did find that negative mood states
produced a stronger focus on seeking and using information.
Brand, Reimer, and Opwis (2007), finally, showed that partici-
pants in a negative mood solved transfer tasks less efficiently than
did those in a positive mood; negative mood participants needed
more repetitions to reach a mastery level but did not differ from
those in a positive mood in their ultimate problem-solving ability.
Thus, indeed, there is some evidence that a mood states hedonic
tone alters the processes by which individuals perform cognitive
tasks and solve problems.
The Present Study: Overview and Hypotheses
To test our model on creative fluency and originality as a
function of a mood states activation and tone, we conducted four
studies. In the first three studies, we used self-generated imagery to
induce different mood states (cf., DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wege-
ner, & Braverman, 2004; Strack, Schwarz, & Gschneidinger,
1985), some of which were negative in tone (anger, fear, sadness,
depression) and some of which were positive in tone (happiness,
elation, calm, relaxation). Apart from a hedonic tone contrast, this
design allowed us to compute an activation contrast (activating
moods [angry, fearful, happy, elated] versus deactivating moods
[sad, depressed, calm, relaxed]) that is orthogonal to the hedonic
tone contrast or their interaction. In Study 4, we surveyed individ-
uals self-reported mood states negative activating, positive
activating, negative deactivating, or positive deactivatingand
used regression analyses to relate these mood dimensions to cre-
ative performance. We also used, across studies, different tasks to
assess creative performance. In Studies 1 and 4, we engaged
participants in a brainstorming task. Apart from creative fluency
and originality, from coded ideas we also derived indices of
cognitive flexibility (i.e., the number of cognitive categories from
which ideas were sampled) and perseverance (i.e., the number of
ideas within a particular cognitive category; cf., Rietzschel, De
Dreu, & Nijstad, 2007). In Study 2, we focused on cognitive
inclusiveness and breadth of cognitive categories that people use,
and in Study 3, we assessed performance on a Gestalt Completion
Test (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976; Friedman &
Forster, 2000; Schooler & Melcher, 1995), a classical insight
problem in which participants view a series of fragmented pictures
of familiar objects and attempt to perceptually integrate and rec-
ognize them, to close each gestalt. According to Forster et al.
(2004), this task may also be seen as requiring visual insight
inasmuch as each item is ultimately soluble by the average prob-
lem solver and is likely to produce an impasse that may be
suddenly overcome after continued efforts at solution (p. 179).
Study 1
In Study 1, we induced one of four different mood states
anger, sadness, happiness, and relaxationand subsequently asked
743
participants to brainstorm on ways to improve teaching at their
university. We predicted that both positive and negative activating
moods (happy, angry) would be related to greater creative fluency
and originality than would both positive and negative deactivating
moods (sad, relaxed; Hypothesis 1), that activating positive moods
(happy) would be related to greater category diversity than would
any other mood state (Hypothesis 2), and that activating negative
moods (angry) would be related to greater within-category fluency
than would any other mood state (Hypothesis 3).
Method
Design and participants. Undergraduate students (N 58,
73% women, 27% men) at the University of Amsterdam partici-
pated for 5 (approximately U.S. $6.50), and participants were
randomly assigned to one of four different mood conditions (anger,
sadness, happiness, relaxation). Gender had no effects, and it is not
discussed further. Dependent variables were self-reported activa-
tion and hedonic tone, as checks for the mood manipulation, and
creative performance during brainstorming as reflected in number
of unique ideas, originality of the ideas, number of cognitive
categories used (cf. cognitive flexibility), and within-category flu-
ency (cf. cognitive persistence).
Procedure and manipulation of discrete moods. Participants
came to the laboratory, and they were seated in individual cubicles
equipped with a chair, a desk, and a computer with keyboard.
Participants were told that they would be asked to participate in
two different and independent studies; one was an autobiograph-
ical memory task (the task used to manipulate discrete moods) and
the other was a brainstorming task about possible ways to improve
the quality of teaching in the psychology department (the task to
assess creativity). Participants were then asked to write down their
gender and age and to write a short essay about a situation that
happened to them and that made them feel really _____ (depend-
ing on discrete mood condition: angry, sad, happy, relaxed). They
were given an entire page to report their situation and were asked,
after finishing their autobiographical story, to report those key-
words or (parts of) phrases they considered vital in making them
feel _____ (depending on discrete mood condition: angry, sad,
happy, relaxed; In this experiment, and subsequent ones, the con-
tent of the stories participants wrote always adhered to instruc-
tions. Furthermore, we were unable to discern systematic differ-
ences between conditions in length of stories or particular topics
participants wrote about.)
Upon completion of the mood manipulation task, participants
were asked to brainstorm about possible ways to improve the
quality of teaching in the psychology department. Participants
were reminded that the department attracted more and more new
students each year and that this put some pressure on the quality of
teaching, as some of you may have already experienced. They
were further told that the departmental teaching staff was inter-
ested in their problem solutions and that they would be given 8 min
to type in as many ideas, solutions, or suggestions as they could
think of. We emphasized that idea generation would be anonymous
and that no one would ever be able to link ideas to names or
student identification numbers. Hereafter, participants were asked
to start generating ideas. They could type in an idea, and by hitting
the Enter key, they could submit this idea and receive a new
opportunity to type in an idea. This procedure continued for 8 min,
744 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD
after which participants were informed that the brainstorming
session was over, and they were asked to answer a few questions.
Then, they were told that the experiment was over, and they were
debriefed, paid, and dismissed.
Dependent variables. The ideas, problem solutions, and sug-
gestions generated by the participants were coded and/or trans-
formed into four different components of creativity. First, inde-
pendent coders counted the number of unique ideas generated per
participant (Cohens K .98). This was our measure of creative
fluency. To obtain a measure of originality, independent coders
rated each unique idea for originality, defined as an idea or
suggestion that is infrequent, novel, and original (1 not original
at all to 5 very original). Interrater agreement was satisfactory
following criteria as per Cicchetti & Sparrow (1981; intraclass
correlation, ICC[1] .69) and we used the aggregation across
raters as an indicator of originality.
To get at cognitive flexibility, we assigned each unique idea to
one of the following seven categories: Ideas having to do with (a)
university environment, such as (architecture of) lecture halls,
seminar rooms, and opening hours; (b) student facilities, such as
extracurricular activities, library access, and classroom interiors;
(c) student quality, including selecting better students and increas-
ing cooperation and contact among students; (d) teaching materi-
als, such as readers, textbooks, handouts of PowerPoint presenta-
tions, examination issues, and grading systems; (e) teachers, such
as teacher training and selection, use of teaching evaluations, and
use of mentors and coaches; (f) policy, such as scholarships and
other financial issues, information distribution, and reduced bu-
reaucracy; and (g) other issues. The higher the number of catego-
ries used, the greater the participants cognitive flexibility (e.g.,
Nijstad et al., 2002, 2003). Interrater agreement was good (Co-
hens K .71), and differences were solved through discussion.
To get at perseverance, we assessed within-category fluency: the
number of unique ideas divided by the number of categories from
which these ideas were sampled.
To check the manipulation of hedonic tone and level of activa-
tion, we asked participants how positive they felt (1 not positive
at all to 5 very positive) and how activated they felt (1 not
very activated to 5 very activated).
Results
Manipulation checks. A 2 (activating vs. deactivating) 2
(negative tone vs. positive tone) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on
self-reported activation revealed only that activating moods (anger,
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Fluency, Originality, Flexibility, and Perseverance as a Function of Mood (Study 1)
Angry
Variable M SD M SD
Creative fluency 13.32 5.11 10.16
Originality 2.73a 0.71 2.06b
Flexibility 3.65 1.11 3.56
Perseverance 3.64a 1.09 2.85b
Note. Means within a row not sharing the same subscript differ significantly at p .05.
happiness) produced somewhat higher activation than deactivating
moods (sadness, relaxation; M 3.62 vs. M 3.12), F(1, 54)
3.78, p .06 (marginal). Such a 2 2 ANOVA on self-reported
tone revealed only that positive moods (happiness, relaxation)
produced more positive feelings than did negative moods (anger,
sadness; M 2.43 vs. M 1.94), F(1, 54) 4.12, p .05. We
conclude that our manipulations were successful.
Creative fluency and originality. We submitted the number of
unique ideas to a four level (angry, sad, happy, relaxed) one-way
ANOVA. No effects were significant, but a directional test of
Hypothesis 1 with planned comparisons showed that more ideas
were generated when participants were in an activating mood
rather than in a deactivating mood, t(54) 1.65, p .05, 2 .05
(see also Table 1) Hedonic tone had no effects (ts 1). We
conclude that creative fluency is a function of the extent to which
a mood activates or deactivates (cf., Hypothesis 1).
We submitted the averaged originality of ideas to a four level
(angry, sad, happy, relaxed) one-way ANOVA. As predicted,
mood influenced originality, F(3, 54) 3.42, p .025. A
follow-up comparison showed that activating moods (happy, an-
gry) produced more original ideas than did deactivating moods
(sad, relaxed), t(54) 3.12, p .003, 2 .15 (for cell means,
see Table 1). Hedonic tone did not matter: The planned compari-
son of positive states (happy, relaxed) with negative states (angry,
sad) was not significant (M 2.52 vs. M 2.39), t(54) 1, ns,
nor was the interaction between tone and activation, F(1, 54) 1,
ns. From these results, we conclude that originality of produced
ideas is a function of the extent to which a mood activates or
deactivates. This supports Hypothesis 1.
Cognitive flexibility. We submitted the number of categories
from which ideas were sampled to a four level (angry, sad, happy,
relaxed) one-way ANOVA. Means were in the predicted direction
(also see Table 1), but there were no significant effects to support
the hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) that cognitive flexibility is highest
among activating, positive moods.
Persistence. A four level ANOVA on persistence showed a
trend for mood, F(3, 54) 2.44, p .075. Planned contrasts were
computed to examine effects of activation, effects of hedonic tone,
and their interaction on persistence. Neither the simple activation
contrast nor the simple hedonic tone contrast was significant,
t(54) 1.52, p .14, 2 .04, and t(54) 1.05, p .43, 2
.01, respectively. However, the Tone Activation contrast was
significant, t(54) 2.66, p .025, 2 .06, showing that anger
Mood state
Sad Happy Relaxed
M SD M SD
5.67 11.88 5.32 10.42 5.27
0.79 2.77a 0.66 2.26b 0.74
1.19 4.01 1.52 3.46 1.77
0.71 2.96b 0.69 3.01b 0.90
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED
produced greater persistence than did the other three mood states
(see also Table 1). This supports Hypothesis 3.
Discussion and Introduction to Study 2
The results support the hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that activating
mood states produce greater creative fluency and originality than
do deactivating mood states, and the results support the hypothesis
(Hypothesis 3) that activating negative moods produce greater
persistence than does any other mood state. One potential limita-
tion of this support, which pertains to the persistence effect in
particular, is that effects are tied to one specific mood state (anger).
In the next studies, we deal with this by inducing multiple mood
states that are similar in tone and activation (e.g., anger and anxiety
vs. sadness and depression; elation and happiness vs. relaxation
and calm). Replicating support for Hypothesis 1 and 3 would
reduce the concern that effects are tied to aspects of a specific
mood state other than activation and tone.
Although means were in the predicted direction, Study 1 did not
support the hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) that activating positive
moods produce greater cognitive flexibility than does any other
mood state. Given the strong support in the literature that positive
mood states foster cognitive flexibility (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999),
the current failure may reflect a Type II error, and a conceptual
replication is needed before concluding anything with regard to
Hypothesis 2. Accordingly, in Study 2, we asked participants to
complete the category inclusion task previously used by Isen and
Daubman (1984). We predicted greater category inclusiveness for
activating than for deactivating moods when tone is positive (cf.,
Hypothesis 2). Given that negative tone has been related to narrow
perceptual focus (e.g., Derryberry, 1988; Mikulincer et al., 1990),
it may be that activating moods produce reduced category inclu-
siveness when tone is negative. In other words, we expected
greater category inclusiveness among activating moods than
among deactivating moods when tone is positive rather than neg-
ative. We included a mood-neutral control condition in which
participants did not do the self-generated imagery and only per-
formed the category inclusion task. This permitted us to explore
whether (de)activation and positive (negative) tone promote (in-
hibit) category inclusiveness.
Method
Design and participants. Undergraduate students (N 179,
73% women, 27% men) participated for 5 (approximately U.S.
$6.50), and they were randomly assigned to one of eight different
mood conditions (anger, fear, sadness, depression, happiness, ela-
tion, relaxation, calm) or to the mood-neutral control condition.
Gender had no effects, and it is not discussed further. Dependent
variables were self-reported activation, hedonic tone, and category
inclusiveness.
Procedure and manipulation of discrete moods. Participants
were seated in individual cubicles and told that they would par-
ticipate in two independent studies: one about autobiographical
memory (the task used to manipulate discrete moods) and one
about object recognition (the task used to assess cognitive flexi-
bility). Participants were then given a booklet with instructions
about the autobiographical memory study. Discrete moods were
manipulated as before, except that participants wrote their essays
745
in separate booklets. In the control condition, the self-generated
imagery task was not included, and participants immediately went
on with the study about object perception.
Upon completion of the mood manipulation task, participants
handed in their booklet, and they were asked to turn to their
computer to continue with the next experiment about object per-
ception. First, they once again filled in their gender and age (to
increase the suggestion that indeed a new and independent exper-
iment had started), and participants were given the category inclu-
sion task to assess their cognitive flexibility (see below). There-
after, they completed several manipulation checks, and
participants were fully debriefed, paid for participation, and dis-
missed.
Dependent variables. To assess cognitive inclusiveness, par-
ticipants were asked to rate how prototypical exemplars were of a
particular category (1 not at all to 10 very prototypical). For
each of the four categories we used, three exemplars were pre-
sented, one being strongly, one being moderately, and one being
weakly prototypical (see Rosch, 1975). Specifically, the four cat-
egories (with strong, intermediate, and weak exemplars) were
vehicle (bus, airplane, camel), vegetable (carrot, potato, garlic),
clothes (skirt, shoes, handbag), and furniture (couch, lamp, tele-
phone). Inclusion ratings across the four categories were aggre-
gated into separate indices for strong, moderate, and weak exem-
plars ( .78, .82, and .74, respectively). Cognitive flexibility
usually shows up in prototypicality ratings for the weak exemplars
more than in ratings for the moderate or strong exemplars (Isen,
Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Rosch, 1975).
Upon completion of the category inclusion task (and because of
an administrative error in the mood conditions, only), we measured
hedonic tone by asking participants to rate their affective state on
three items (how do you feel: very positivevery negative; very
pleasantvery unpleasant; very nicenot at all nice). Ratings were
aggregated ( .89) and coded so that higher scores indicated
more positive (and less negative) tone. In addition, we included a
measure of activation level. Specifically, we asked participants to
rate the following: (a) how energetic do you feel, (b) how engaged
are you, and (c) how active are you presently? (1 not at all to
5 very much). Ratings were averaged into one activation level
index ( .79).
Results
Manipulation checks. Ratings for the activation level measure
were tested in two planned comparisons, one testing all four
negative mood states (anger, fear, sadness, depression) against all
four positive mood states (happiness, elation, relaxation, calm) and
one testing all four deactivating mood states (sadness, depression,
relaxation, calm) against all four activating mood states (anger,
fear, happiness, elation). Results were as expected: Whereas the
hedonic tone contrast was not significant, t(155) 1, ns, the
activation contrast was, t(155) 1.97, p .05. Participants
reported more activation when activating moods had been induced
(M 4.73) than when deactivating moods had been induced (M
4.53).
Ratings for the tone measure were tested in the same two
planned comparisons. Results were as expected: Whereas the
activation contrast was not significant, t(155) 1, ns, hedonic tone
contrast was, t(155) 4.03, p .01. Participants reported more
746 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD
positive tone when positive moods had been induced (M 4.23)
than when negative moods had been induced (M 2.53). We
conclude that our manipulations were successful.
Cognitive flexibility. Table 2 gives the mean prototypicality of
strong, intermediate, and weak exemplars per condition. Hypoth-
esis 1 was tested in a planned contrast grouping all activating
moods versus all deactivating moods. This contrast was not sig-
nificant for the strong and intermediate exemplars, ts(170) 1, ns,
but was significant for weak exemplars, t(170) 2.10, p .037,
2 .03. Prototypicality ratings for weak exemplars were higher
in activating mood conditions (M 6.43) than in deactivating
mood conditions (M 5.98).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that activating mood states lead to
greater inclusiveness, especially when tone is positive. A direc-
tional contrast showed that positive activating moods produced
higher inclusiveness (M 6.51) than did all of the negative mood
states and the two deactivating positive mood states (M 6.10),
t(170) 1.82, p .035, 2 .025. Furthermore, among the
positive moods, the two activating moods produced greater cate-
gory inclusiveness than did the two deactivating conditions and the
control condition, t(170) 1.98, p .05, 2 .033, whereas both
of the negative activating moods did not produce greater category
inclusiveness than did the two deactivating moods and the control
condition, t(170) 1.48, p .14, 2 .016. However, these
patterns notwithstanding, the Tone Activation contrast was not
significant, and Hypothesis 2 received no support; the trend for
negative activating moods to produce greater inclusiveness is
weaker but is otherwise in the same direction as the trend for
positive activating moods.
Comparisons involving the mood-neutral baseline. The con-
clusions emerging from the above analyses are further supported
by specific contrasts involving the mood-neutral control condition
(for cell means, see Table 2). First, activating moods (positive and
negatives together) produced higher inclusiveness ratings for weak
exemplars than did mood-neutral control condition (M 6.43 vs.
M 5.71), t(170) 1.98, p .05, 2 .04. It is interesting to
note that deactivating moods (positives and negatives together) did
not produce lower inclusiveness ratings for weak exemplars than
did mood-neutral control condition (M 5.98 vs. M 5.71),
t(170) 1, ns.
Second, consistent with past work (e.g., Isen & Daubman,
1984), we found that happy participants had higher prototypicality
ratings for weak exemplars than did control participants, t(170)
2.03, p .044, 2 .051. Positive activating moods (happy and
elated) produced higher inclusiveness ratings than did the mood-
neutral control condition, t(170) 1.96, p .05, 2 .031,
whereas positive deactivating moods did not produce higher or
Table 2
Mean Prototypicality Ratings as a Function of Experimental Manipulations (Study 2)
Exemplars Angry Fearful Depressed Sad
Strong 9.64 9.42 9.57 9.68
Intermediate 7.53 7.71 7.86 7.76
Weak 6.51 6.22 5.95 5.88
Note. Higher numbers indicate greater category inclusiveness.
lower inclusiveness ratings, t(170) 1, ns. This supports the idea
that activating moods promote cognitive flexibility and inclusive-
ness when tone is positive. However, as mentioned, because the
same (nonsignificant) trend emerged for negative activating moods
versus deactivating moods, we cannot conclude that Hypothesis 2
received support.
Discussion and Introduction to Study 3
Study 2 shows that activating moods increase category inclu-
siveness. Together with Study 1, we thus have reasonable support
for the dual pathway model, which indicates that activating mood
states promote creative fluency and originality more than do de-
activating mood states and that perseverance is higher among
activating moods that are negative in tone (cf. Study 1). Although
trends in the data suggested that cognitive flexibility was higher
among activating moods that are positive in tone (cf. Study 2),
these tendencies for cognitive flexibility were fairly weakin
Study 1, means were as predicted but were not statistically reliable;
in Study 2, the critical Activation Tone interaction was not
significant.
At present, it cannot be excluded that category diversity (Study
1) and category breadth and inclusiveness (Study 2) reflect not
only cognitive flexibility but also persistence and perseverance.
Those in an activating positive mood may be cognitively flexible
and may, therefore, include peripheral exemplars (e.g., camel) in a
particular category (e.g., vehicle). Those in an activating negative
mood may persevere and systematically explore possibilities, ul-
timately concluding that peripheral exemplars fit into a particular
category. This possibility implies that those in an activating pos-
itive mood are faster than those in an activating negative mood,
which indeed fits the results of Isen et al. (1987). In Study 2, we
did not track time-on-task and cannot examine this possibility. In
Study 3, however, we included time-on-task as a key variable.
The evidence for our model thus far pertains to cognitive and
conceptual material (idea generation, cognitive category inclusive-
ness), and an issue is whether our dual pathway model also
predicts perceptual insights and creativity. Creative insight prob-
lems differ from the tasks used thus far in that they are soluble, are
likely to produce an impasse and a state of high uncertainty as to
how to proceed, and are likely to produce a kind of aha expe-
rience when the impasse is suddenly overcome and the solution is
discovered after prolonged efforts at solution (Forster et al., 2004;
Schooler et al., 1993). Such tasks can be solved heuristically,
through loose and detached processing, which is relatively effort-
less and fast (Brand et al., 2007). Alternatively, they can also be
solved through persevering and analytical probing of a series of
Experimental condition
Happy Elated Relaxed Calm Control
9.48 9.56 9.56 9.75 9.62
7.36 6.93 6.90 7.17 7.25
6.63 6.38 6.13 5.88 5.71
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED
hypotheses. This is a relatively effortful and time-consuming pro-
cess.
From our dual pathway model it follows that activating moods,
more than deactivating moods, lead to greater creative fluency and,
accordingly, that individuals in activating moods perform better on
creative insight tasksthey close more gestalts (see below) than
do those in deactivating moods (cf. Hypothesis 1). Because posi-
tive affective tone increases cognitive flexibility and restructuring
and pairs with a broader visual field, we further expected that
individuals in positive activating moods would be able to perform
creative insight tasks in relatively short time and would not benefit
from longer time-on-task. But, because negative affective tone
increases persistence and more effortful processing and pairs with
attentional focus, we expected that individuals in negative activat-
ing moods benefit from longer time-on-task when performing
creative insight tasks. Put differently, whereas we did not expect
differences in creative fluency between positive and negative
mood states, we did expect longer time-on-task to associate with
creative fluency among (activating) negative mood states more
than among (activating) positive mood states.
Method
Design and participants. Undergraduate students (N 90,
66% women, 34% men) participated for 5 (approximately U.S.
$6.50) and were randomly assigned to one of eight different mood
conditions (anger, fear, sadness, depression, happiness, elation,
relaxation, calm) or to the mood-neutral control condition. Gender
had no effects, and it is not discussed further. Dependent variables
were manipulations checks, number of correctly closed Gestalts,
and time-on-task.
Procedures, mood manipulations, and creativity task. These
were the same as in Study 2, except that all materials were provided
through computers, and responses had to be given using a keyboard
and a computer mouse. Furthermore, to enhance comparability be-
tween mood conditions, we also asked participants in the mood-
neutral control condition to perform a task about autobiographical
memory. Participants were asked to write a short essay about the route
they took to the psychology department. They were specifically asked
to pay attention to the buildings they passed and to write their essay
in such a way that another person could imagine the route they took.
After finishing their autobiographical story, they were asked to report
the major building that they passed. Third and finally, we replaced the
category inclusion task with the gestalt completion task, adapted from
Forster et al. (2004), which involves recognizing fragmented pictures
of familiar objects. After the gestalt completion task, participants
answered a short questionnaire, were debriefed, and were paid for
participation.
Dependent variables. The hedonic tone and activation manip-
ulations were checked, as in Study 2. We coded the number of
closed gestalts as correct, incorrect, or missed. Although we had 10
gestalts, initial analyses revealed one picture to be unsolvable (less
than 30% correctly closed, and over 50% missed). We decided to
base analyses on the remaining 9 pictures (including the tenth
gestalt produced similar results and identical conclusions). For
each gestalt, we tracked the time in seconds between the appear-
ance of the gestalt on the computer screen and the response (either
a word or a hard return indicating a miss). The total time across the
nine gestalts served as our second dependent measure.
747
Results
Manipulation checks. Ratings for the activation level measure
were tested in two directional comparisons. The first tested all four
negative mood states (anger, fear, sadness, depression) against all
four positive mood states (happiness, elation, relaxation, calm),
and the second tested all four deactivating mood states (sadness,
depression, relaxation, calm) against all four activating mood
states (anger, fear, happiness, elation). Results were as expected:
Whereas the hedonic tone contrast was not significant, t(81) 1,
ns, the activation contrast showed a trend in the predicted direc-
tion: Participants reported more activation when activating moods
had been induced (M 3.35) than when deactivating moods had
been induced (M 2.69), t(81) 1.53, p .06. The control
condition fell in between (M 3.11) and did not differ from the
activating or deactivating mood conditions, ts(81) 1, ns.
For the tone measure, results were also as expected: Whereas the
activation contrast was not significant, t(81) 1, ns, the hedonic
tone contrast was, t(81) 2.04, p .025. Participants reported
more positive tone when positive moods had been induced (M
2.89) than when negative moods had been induced (M 2.53).
The control condition fell in between (M 2.69) and did not differ
from both the positive and the negative mood conditions, both
t(81) 1.20, ns.
Creative fluency. The number of correctly closed gestalts was
analyzed using the same set of a priori contrasts as used in Study
2. Means and standard deviations, broken down for experimental
condition, are given in Table 3.
The planned comparison grouping all positive mood states ver-
sus all negative mood states was not significant, t(81) 1, ns.
However, consistent with Hypothesis 1, a planned contrast group-
ing all activating moods versus all deactivating moods was signif-
icant, t(81) 2.13, p .036. Participants in activating mood
conditions had more correctly closed gestalts (M 7.02) than did
those in deactivating mood conditions (M 6.25). Directional
tests within the negative mood states showed that activating moods
produced more correct responses than did deactivating moods,
t(81) 1.85, p .05. Likewise, within the positive mood states,
activating moods produced more correct responses than did deac-
tivating moods, t(81) 1.75, p .05.2
Cognitive flexibility and persistence. The time participants
needed to correctly close the gestalts was log-transformed to deal
with skewness. A 2 2 (Tone Activation) ANOVA on log-
transformed time revealed the expected interaction between tone
2
Differences in correctly closed gestalts may be due to differences in
incorrectly closed gestalts, and/or differences in number of nonresponses.
For incorrect responses, no a priori contrasts were significant, ts(81) 1,
but participants in the activating mood conditions tended to miss fewer
than did those in the deactivating mood conditions (M 1.10 vs. M
1.73), t(81) 1.84, p .07. This suggests that the lower number of
correct closures in the deactivating mood conditions is due to a higher
number of missed responses. Furthermore, inspection of Table 3 may
suggest that anger and fear differ in terms of correctly closed gestalts and
in number of misses. Statistically, however, this is not the case, ts(81)
0.92 and 1.32, ps .22, respectively.
748 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD

Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Creative Performance and Time-on-Task as a Function of Experimental Manipulations (Study 3)

Experimental condition

Angry Fearful Depressed Sad Happy Elated Relaxed Calm Control

Dependent
variable M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD

Correct 7.36 1.20 6.70 0.94 6.11 1.73 6.37 1.19 7.00 1.00 7.00 1.41 6.00 2.01 6.55 1.58 6.67 0.89
Missed 0.90 0.90 1.40 0.69 1.67 1.50 2.00 1.85 1.34 1.13 1.25 1.04 1.90 1.37 1.58 1.48 1.53 0.99
Time-on-task 1.80 0.13 1.79 0.12 1.74 0.16 1.78 0.08 1.73 0.12 1.78 0.18 1.79 0.18 1.76 0.14 1.80 0.17
Time for
correctly
closed
gestalts 1.68 0.21 1.64 0.15 1.54 0.17 1.53 0.21 1.57 0.12 1.58 0.13 1.58 0.14 1.57 0.15 1.57 0.15

Note. Data for time-on-task and time on correctly closed gestalts are log-transformations of seconds across nine trials.

and activation, F(1, 71) 2.69, p .10 (marginal).3 Participants
spent a significantly longer time on the task in the negative
activating mood conditions than in the negative deactivating mood
conditions (M 4.01 min vs. M 3.11 min), F(1, 71) 3.98, p
.05, and a nonsignificantly shorter time in the positive activating
mood conditions than in the positive deactivating mood conditions
(M 3.01 vs. M 3.22, F 1). It thus appears that longer
time-on-task benefits participants in activating negative moods,
who tend to persist, but not those in activating positive moods (see
Table 3 for log-transformed overall time-on-task, and time needed
to correctly close).
A complementary perspective is obtained by regressing creative
fluency (number of correct responses) on level of activation,
hedonic tone, time-on-task, and their interactions. This produced a
significant regression model, R2 .16, F(6, 68) 2.23, p .05.
Consistent with the contrast analyses reported before, the main
effects for hedonic tone ( .039, t 1) and for time-on-task
( .11, t 1) were not significant, whereas the activation
main effect was ( .21, t 1.98, p .05). Furthermore, the
interaction between hedonic tone and time-on-task was significant
in the activating mood conditions ( .52, t 3.72, p
.001) and not in the deactivating mood conditions ( .15, t
1). Among activating negative mood states, longer time-on-task
associated with more correct responses ( .32, p .05); among
activating positive mood states, shorter time-on-task associated
with more correct responses ( .76, p .01). This pattern of
results strongly suggests that cognitive processes underlying cre-
ative performance qualitatively differ between positive and nega-
tive activating mood states. This is consistent with our notion that
positive tone impacts creative performance because it allows for
cognitive flexibility and set-breaking (cf. Hypothesis 2), whereas
negative tone impacts creative performance because it engenders
cognitive persistence and perseverance (cf. Hypothesis 3). Further-
more, results suggest that participants in a negative activating
mood profited from longer time-on-task, whereas those in a pos-
itive activating mood or those in a (positive or negative) deacti-
vating mood did not.
Discussion and Introduction to Study 4
Across a variety of tasks, results showed that activating moods
produce more creative fluency and originality than do deactivating
moods. We also found that higher creativity associated with en-
hanced perseverance in the case of negative tone. However, with
regard to the idea that cognitive flexibility is enhanced in the case
of activating positive moods, evidence was less strong and, in
Study 1, statistically not reliable. Furthermore, we did not test the
idea that cognitive flexibility (persistence) mediates between pos-
itive (negative) activating moods on the one hand and creative
fluency and originality on the other. In Study 4, we used the
brainstorming task of Study 1 and, to enable formal tests of
mediation, engaged a much larger number of participants. We
expected higher creative fluency and originality among activating
moods than among deactivating moods to be due to greater cog-
nitive flexibility when mood states are positive in tone (Hypothesis
4) and to greater persistence when mood states are negative in tone
(Hypothesis 5).
Another goal of Study 4 was to replicate results with a different
assessment of mood states. Whereas the first three studies provided
good evidence for the causal effects of discrete moods, we cannot
exclude a monomethod/operation biasthe possibility that our
findings are limited to the specific ways we manipulated mood
states in Studies 13. In Study 4, we therefore used a different
method: Participants rated their current mood state on a number of
adjectives that were grouped according to their being positive in
tone or negative in tone and, independently, activating or deacti-
vating. These four dimensions were correlated with creativity
indices.
Method
Design and participants. We used a correlational design with
measures of discrete moods as predictor variables and brainstorm-
ing performance creative fluency, originality, cognitive flexibil-
ity, and within-category fluencyas dependent variables. Partic-
ipants were 546 first year psychology students (74% women, 26%
3
An alternative approach would be to compute planned comparisons
and to use the overall error terms and degrees of freedom (i.e., those of the
control condition as well). Doing so yields a highly significant contrast of
negative activating moods against all others, t(81) 2.28, p .025, or
against the negative deactivating moods, t(81) 2.27, p .03. No such
effects were obtained when activating positive moods were contrasted
against all others or against positive deactivating mood, ts(81) 1, ns.
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED 749

men) at the University of Amsterdam. They participated for partial Table 4

fulfillment of a course requirement. Factor Solution and Loadings for Mood Items (Study 4)
Procedure and independent variables. The study was included
in mass testing sessions (approximately 50 participants per ses- Mood item Factor I Factor II Factor III Factor IV
sion). Participants were seated in large lecture halls behind per- Disgusted .76 .31 .29 .22
sonal computers, which displayed all materials. Responses to Fearful .75 .31 .34 .57
questions could be typed in using the computer keyboard. Partic- Ashamed .74 .22 .48 .22
ipants were not allowed to talk and were required to work indi- Disdainful .73 .26 .33 .12
Worried .71 .20 .28 .43
vidually, at their own pace, and without consulting others. Exper- Afraid .71 .28 .33 .59
imenters supervised testing sessions and, when necessary, helped Guilty .68 .21 .46 .27
participants or enforced the above rules (this happened rarely). Angry .63 .17 .38 .37
Discrete moods were assessed by asking participants to com- Upset .62 .28 .57 .54
Happy .40 .83 .39 .40
plete a series of items that we derived from the PANAS (Watson Elated .21 .79 .17 .21
et al., 1988) or generated for the specific purpose of this study. In Excited .14 .75 .18 .08
total, participants indicated for each of 29 mood items how much Drained .36 .30 .85 .27
of the mood they had experienced since they got up that morning Lifeless .27 .40 .79 .24
(1 not at all to 5 very much so). Thereafter, supposedly as part Fatigued .26 .14 .78 .23
Depressed .36 .37 .72 .37
of a new and unrelated testing session, we introduced the brain- Discouraged .48 .35 .64 .35
storming task (for further detail, see the Method section of Study Failed .46 .24 .62 .53
1). When time was over, participants were informed that the test Sad .58 .33 .62 .51
was completed, and they continued with another, unrelated test. At Calm .37 .24 .37 .86
Relaxed .34 .54 .36 .77
the end of the semester, all participants received a written debrief- At ease .51 .36 .37 .65
ing along with a mailing address for further questions, and a
complaint form to be submitted when they did not want their data Eigenvalue 9.59 1.97 1.57 1.10
to be used (no additional questions or complaints were received). % variance 41.68 8.59 6.77 4.76
Independent variables. Initial factor analysis of the mood rat- Note. Numbers are factor loadings. Factor loadings in bold within one
ings revealed a six-factor solution, with four factors being readily column are grouped together in subsequent analyses. Factor I negative
interpretable and two factors grouping 5 items that had high activating moods; Factor II positive activating moods; Factor III
cross-loadings with other factors. These 5 items were dropped, and negative deactivating moods; Factor IV positive deactivating moods.
the remaining 24 items were submitted to a principal component
analysis. Because, in theory, dimensions could be correlated, we
applied oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization. As expected, Creative fluency and originality. To test Hypothesis 1, we
we found a four-factor solution, explaining a total of 62% of the regressed creative fluency and originality on the four mood di-
variance. Table 4 summarizes the factor loadings and cross- mensions. Results are summarized in Table 6 and showed that first
loadings for all items on all four factors. The first factor groups of all, both negative and positive activating moods predicted
negative activating moods (e.g., angry, guilty), the second factor creative fluency. Second, inspection of the regression weights
groups positive activating moods (e.g., happy, elated), the third further reveals that positive activating moods significantly pre-
factor groups negative deactivating moods (e.g., depressed, dis- dicted originality. Because neither positive nor negative deactivat-
couraged), and the fourth factor groups positive deactivating ing mood states were related to creative fluency and originality,
moods (e.g., calm, relaxed). Ratings within each factor were av- these results provide new support for the hypothesis (Hypothesis
eraged to form one index. Internal reliabilities (Cronbachs alphas) 1) that activating mood states associate with more fluency and
were acceptable to good (see the Results section). originality than do deactivating mood states.
Dependent variables. The ideas, problem solutions, and sug- Cognitive flexibility and perseverance. For cognitive flexibil-
gestions generated by the participants were coded and/or trans- ity (i.e., category diversity), regression weights in Table 6 revealed
formed into the same components of creativity as used in Study 1 that only positive activating moods predicted flexibility; no other
(i.e., creative fluency, originality, cognitive flexibility, and perse- predictor was significant. This supports the hypothesis (Hypothesis
verance; .76 Cohens K .98). For originality, interrater 2) that activating moods promote cognitive flexibility, especially
agreement was satisfactory, ICC(1) .67, and we used the aggre- when tone is positive. Regression weights in Table 6 also reveal
gation across raters as an indicator of originality. that only negative activating moods predicted within-category
fluency. This supports the hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) that activat-
ing moods lead to greater persistence, especially when tone is
Results negative.
Mediation tests. To test for mediation (i.e., Hypothesis 4 and
Table 5 gives the descriptive statistics for all study variables. As 5) we computed a series of regression along the criteria set forth by
can be seen, we found moderate to strong correlations between the Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998). We first tested whether cogni-
four mood dimensions and strong correlation between our four tive flexibility mediates the effects of positive activating moods on
indicators of creativity. Zero-order correlations between mood- creative fluency and originality (Hypothesis 4). When we re-
dimensions and indicators of creativity were low and generally gressed originality on positive activating moods after controlling
nonsignificant. for flexibility, the originally significant effect of positive activating
750 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD

Table 5
Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables (Study 4)

Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

1. Negative activating moods 2.03 0.69 .88 .45 ***

.71 ***
.59 ***
.06 .01 ***
.11 ***
.01
2. Positive activating moods 3.57 0.72 .80 .49*** .61*** .07 .09* .01 .07
3. Negative deactivating
moods 2.58 0.81 .88 .56*** .02 .01 .03 .01
4. Positive deactivating moods 3.67 0.78 .81 .02 .02 .06 .02
5. Creative fluency 5.06 3.66 .75*** .63*** .56***
6. Flexibility 2.30 1.49 .08 .76***
7. Within-category fluency 1.80 0.97 .05
8. Originality 2.68 0.77

Note. N 546. Scale reliabilities (Cronbachs ) are on the diagonal. Dashes indicate that there is no scale reliability to report.

p .10. * p .05. ** p .01.

moods dropped to a nonsignificant level ( .01, t 1), whereas
flexibility was highly significant ( .76, t 26.90, p .001).
A Sobel test confirmed that the mediation was significant, z
2.45, p .015. In other words, consistent with Hypothesis 4,
flexibility fully mediated the effect of positive activating moods on
originality (see also Figure 2a; We explored whether positive
activating moods relate to higher fluency because of greater cog-
nitive flexibility. This was not the case.)
We also examined whether persistence (i.e., within-category
fluency) mediated effects of negative activating moods on creative
fluency. When we regressed creative fluency on negative activat-
ing moods after controlling for within-category fluency, the ini-
tially significant effect of negative activating moods dropped to a
nonsignificant level ( .02, t 1), whereas the effect of
within-category fluency was highly significant ( .63, t
18.93, p .001). A Sobel test confirmed that the mediation was
significant (z 2.46, p .015). In other words, consistent with
Hypothesis 5, perseverance fully mediated the effect of negative
activating moods on creative fluency (see also Figure 2b).
Discussion
Activating mood states related to a greater overall number of
unique ideas and, when mood states were positive, to higher levels
of originality. In the case of negative tone, results further showed
that activating moods have their effects on creative performance
(i.e., creative fluency) because they enhance within-category per-
sistence. It should be noted though that fluency necessarily corre-
lates with both within-category persistence and category diversity
(i.e., multiplying these results in creative fluency). However, neg-
ative activating moods only affected creative fluency through
increased within-category fluency, and neither effect of negative
activating moods on category diversity nor mediation of category
diversity was found. In the case of positive tone, results showed
that activating moods have their effects on originality because of
greater cognitive flexibility. These findings fit well with those of
the previous studies and support our theoretical framework. Fur-
ther, Study 4 showed that creativity was related to activating
moods and not to deactivating moods. This suggests that activation
stimulates creative performance rather than that deactivation un-
dermines creative performance.
Conclusions and General Discussion
In their Annual Review of Psychology article, Brief and Weiss
(2002, p. 297) stated,
It is apparent that discrete emotions are important, frequently occur-
ring elements of everyday experience. Even at workperhaps espe-
cially at workpeople feel angry, happy, guilty, jealous, proud,
etcetera. Neither the experiences themselves, nor their consequences,
can be subsumed easily under a simple structure of positive or
negative states.
Quite consistent with this observation, the current study indeed
showed that positive and negative mood states differentiate in
terms of activating or deactivating nature (cf. Russell & Barrett,

Table 6
Regression of Cognitive Flexibility, Creative Fluency, Within-Category Fluency, and Originality on Positive Activating, Positive
Deactivating, Negative Activating, and Negative Deactivating Moods (Study 4)

Creative fluency Flexibility Within-category fluency Originality

Predictor variable t R2 t R2 t R2 t R2

Negative activating moods .12 2.00* .02 1 .16 2.48** .01 1

Positive activating moods .13 2.29** .14 2.47** .04 1 .11 1.98**
Negative deactivating
moods .02 1 .04 1 .08 1.30 .06 1
Positive deactivating moods .03 1 .02* 0.2 1 .015 .65 1 .02* .02 1 .01

Note. N 545.
*
p .05. ** p .025.
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED 751

A
Cognitive
Flexibility
= .14* = .75***

Positive Originality
Activating
Moods
= .11 * (.01)

B Within-Category
Fluency
= .16 * = .63***

Negative Number of
Activating Unique Ideas
Moods (Fluency)
= .12* (.02)

Figure 2. A: Path of positive activating mood states on originality mediated by cognitive flexibility (category
diversity). B: Path of negative activating mood states on creative fluency mediated by cognitive perseverance
(within-category fluency). Numbers in brackets are regressions weights after the mediator has been controlled
for. *p .05; ***p .01.

1999), and our results indicate that when it comes to creative
performance, both activation and hedonic tone are important.
Across four studies, findings were consistent with our dual path-
way to creativity model, which indicates that only activating, and
not deactivating, mood states lead to higher levels of creative
fluency and originality, that activating positive mood states lead to
creativity through higher levels of cognitive flexibility, and that
activating negative mood states lead to higher creativity through
increased perseverance within thought categories and longer time-
on-task. Below, we discuss implications of these findings for
research on mood and on creativity. We also discuss some limi-
tations to our findings and highlight avenues for future research.
Summary of Results and Theoretical Implications
From our dual pathway to creativity model, we derived five
hypotheses about the effects of mood states on particular facets of
creativity. Hypothesis 1, predicting higher levels of creativity
when moods are activating rather than deactivating, received
strong supportwith regard to creative fluency it was supported in
all three tests (i.e., Study 1, 3, and 4), and with regard to original-
ity, it was supported in two out of two tests (i.e., in Study 1 and 4).
Hypothesis 3, that negative activating moods positively associate
with cognitive persistence, also received good support; direct
evidence was obtained in Study 1 and 4, and indirect evidence was
obtained in Study 3. Hypothesis 2, that activating positive moods
primarily associate with higher levels of cognitive flexibility,
received less support; no evidence was obtained in Study 1 and 2,
indirect evidence was obtained in Study 3, and only in Study 4
were statistical tests were supportive. This notwithstanding, Study
4 provided good evidence for mediation Hypotheses 4 and 5:
Negative activating moods related to higher fluency because of
increased persistence, whereas positive activating moods related to
higher originality because of increased flexibility. We thus take
these results as quite supportive of our dual pathway to creativity
model and its specific application to the mood creativity link.
All in all, results support four conclusions. First, activating
moods lead to more creativity than do deactivating moods, most
likely because activation stimulates creativity rather than because
deactivation undermines it. Second, activating moods with positive
tone lead to creative performance through enhanced cognitive
flexibility and inclusiveness. Third, activating moods with nega-
tive tone lead to creative performance through enhanced cognitive
perseverance and persistence. Fourth, and finally, the effects of
mood on creativity cannot solely be understood in terms of acti-
vation or in terms of hedonic tone; both dimensions are needed to
understand how mood states influence creative performance. As
discussed below, these conclusions imply that different dimensions
of creative performance, such as cognitive flexibility, inclusive-
ness, or perseverance, cannot and should not be used interchange-
ably. Further, these conclusions imply that the task used to study
creativity may determine the likelihood that some traits or states
do, and others do not, appear to successfully predict creativity.
Mood States and Creativity
We began this research with the observation that there seems to
be general consensus that positive affect leads to more creativity.
Contemporaries tend to explain this effect in terms of hedonic
tone. For example, Ashby et al. (1999) noted,
752 DE DREU, BAAS, AND NIJSTAD
There is substantial reason to believe that affect and arousal are not
synonymous . . . and that the increases in cognitive flexibility and
creative problem solving reported in so many articles are indeed due
to positive affect, not simply to increases in arousal. (p. 532)
Current findings qualify these conclusions. When it comes to
discrete mood states, we noted that not only hedonic tone but also
activation matters and that tone and activation may take on differ-
ent roles in the creativity processactivation determines the like-
lihood of creative performance, and tone determines whether cre-
ative performance comes about because of enhanced cognitive
flexibility (in the case of positive tone) or because of enhanced
perseverance and persistence (in the case of negative tone).
As mentioned in footnote 2, this is not the first study to examine
the role of activation in the mood creativity link. Indeed, a num-
ber of other studies focused on the role of arousal, typically
induced through some form of physical exercise. This past work
produced inconsistent results, sometimes showing that physical
exercise produces more creativity than no exercise and sometimes
showing that it has no effects. Obviously, there are important
differences between activation induced through physical exercise
and activation associated with a particular mood state. This not-
withstanding, it is important to note that past work on physical
exercise and creativity did not differentiate between cognitive
flexibility and persistence and did not examine possible interac-
tions with hedonic tonefor some participants, physical exercise
may have been a pleasant task, putting them in a good mood
(happy, upbeat, relaxed) and thus, at best, facilitating cognitive
flexibility. For some participants, however, physical exercise may
have been an unpleasant task that put them in a negative mood
(upset, frustrated, worried, depressed) and thus, at best, facilitating
cognitive perseverance. Seen this way, it is not surprising that past
work on physical exercise produced inconsistent results. Future
work on (physical) activation needs to take into account the
possible side effects that manipulations have on participants mood
as well as the dependent variables assessed (flexibility and/or
persistence).
Related to this is that past work has revealed an inverted
U-shape relationship between level of activation and arousal on the
one hand and cognitive and motor performance on the other. Thus,
at very low or extremely high levels of activation and arousal,
working memory capacity is much lower and relevant brain re-
gions function less effectively than at moderate levels of activation
and arousal (cf., Yerkes & Dobson, 1908). An implicit assumption
in our work thus far has been that the variation in activation related
to particular mood states is in the lower range of this inverted
U-shape relation; only intense emotions may temporarily produce
the level of activation and arousal that shuts down the system and
prohibits people from performing cognitive and motor tasks.
Clearly, research is needed to further examine this issue. It would
be particularly interesting to see whether exceedingly high levels
of activation and arousal undermine cognitive flexibility and per-
sistence to the same degree or to different degrees. Intuitively, it
seems that flexibility is more vulnerable than persistence but, once
again, research is needed to examine this further.
That mood states impact creativity through different routes
cognitive flexibility or perseverance has an important method-
ological implication. Some tasks used in creativity research, such
as Roschs category inclusion task, capitalize on cognitive flexi-
bility, divergent thinking, and the use of broad and inclusive
cognitive categories (cf., Murray et al., 1990). The present work
shows that in such tasks positive moods have an advantage over
negative moods in producing creative ideas, insights, and problem
solutions. Other work has relied on tasks such as brainstorming
that allow creativity through persistence and perseverance to come
about. The present analysis shows that in such tasks negative
moods have an equal or perhaps even better chance than positive
moods of predicting creative performance. In short, an important
insight that derives from our research is that the creativity task
used may be a critical moderator of the relationship between mood
(or any other trait or state for that matter) and creativity.
The currently proposed dual pathway to creativity model cap-
tures past and current findings on the effects of positive moods on
creativity quite well. However, things are less clear cut when
considering the effects of negative moods, most notably those for
sadness. Although current findings are supportive of the idea that
sadnessa negative and deactivating mood stateneither pro-
duces nor inhibits creative performance, past work has revealed
that sadness can actually stimulate creativity. For example, when
the task is being framed as serious, important, and extrinsically
rewarding, sadness leads to more creativity than do mood-neutral
control conditions (Gasper, 2003; Hirt et al., 1997; also see, Martin
& Stoner, 1996). One could argue that such task framing is
motivating and activating and, as such, is doing what sad people
needthey need to be activated to perform because their mood
state in and by itself will not drive them toward (creative) perfor-
mance.
Although we believe that the dual pathway to creativity model
has promise, we readily accept that invoking moderators may be
needed to understand how particular (mood) states influence cre-
ative performance. Important moderators may include task framing
and, as we elaborate on below, specific creativity task used. And
although the current analysis focused on hedonic tone and activa-
tion as critical dimensions underlying discrete mood states, mood
states differ on other dimensions as well, and these may meaning-
fully relate to creativity. For example, Higgins (2006) has argued
that some mood states, such as happiness and anger, associate with
approach motivation and promotion focus, whereas other moods,
such as fear and feeling relaxed, associate with avoidance moti-
vation and prevention focus (also see Amodio, Shah, Sigelman,
Brazy, & Harmon Jones, 2004; Carver, 2004; Higgins, Shah, &
Friedman, 1997). Promotion focus relates to more creativity than
prevention focus (Friedman & Forster, 2001), and this together
may suggest that mood states associated with promotion focus
produce more creativity than do mood states associated with
prevention focus. Future research may delve further into these
possibilities, keeping in mind that a combination of hedonic tone,
activation, and, perhaps also, regulatory focus better explains
creative performance than do any of these dimensions alone.
Study Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Before concluding, a few limitations of our study design need
comment. First of all, our evidence for mediation is based on
correlational designs, and future work is needed to unequivocally
establish the causal links. Second, the support for our dual pathway
model was stronger and more consistent for the negative activating
moodpersistence creativity pathway, than for the positive acti-
 MOODCREATIVITY LINK REVISITED
vating moodflexibility creativity pathway. To some, this may be
surprising because quite some evidence has been gathered showing
that positive tone relates to cognitive flexibility. Recent work by
Hirt, Devers, and McCrea (2008) invoked hedonic contingency
theory (Wegener & Petty, 1994), which posits that individuals in a
positive mood use greater scrutiny in activity choice than do those
in neutral or negative moods because fewer activities will be able
to maintain or improve their current mood. Hirt, Devers, and
McCrea showed that positive mood is indeed related to cognitive
flexibility to the extent that it allowed mood maintenance, and their
results thus suggest that positive mood effects may be limited to
tasks that allow participants to maintain their positive feeling.
In a way, this work is consistent with the more general idea
underlying the current work that specific tasks may facilitate or
inhibit mood effects on creativity because some tasks provide
more room for persistence and other tasks, for cognitive flexibility
to come about. Future research could more systematically explore
the role of task environment (also see Kaufmann, 2003). For
example, some studies on visual perception and set-breaking tend
to provide limited time (e.g., 3 min; e.g., Forster et al., 2004) to
complete the task. Our Study 3 revealed that participants in an
activating negative mood benefited from longer time-on-task (and
spent, on average more than 3 min) whereas those in an activating
positive mood did not. An implication of our work thus is that
setting time limits may lead to misguided conclusions about the
creative potential of particular states or traits.
A final avenue for future research is to analyze creative fluency
and originality as a function of variables other than mood. We
already discussed regulatory focus and global versus local infor-
mation processing tendencies (cf., Forster et al., 2004; Friedman &
Forster, 2001). Other candidates for such analyses are the role of
intrinsic motivation versus extrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1983),
achievement motivation, and traits such as openness to experience
and conscientiousness (e.g., McCrae, 1987). It would be interest-
ing to examine to what extent these and other variables known to
affect creative fluency and originality do so because of enhanced
flexibility, greater persistence, or some combination.
Concluding Thoughts
Creativity researchers have long argued that positive mood
increases creative performance and have implicitly or explicitly
assumed this to be due to enhanced cognitive flexibility and
reliance on broad, inclusive cognitive categories. Our results sup-
ported this idea and provided first time evidence for the notion that
effects of positive mood states are limited to activating moods.
Creativity researchers have long struggled with the effects of
negative moods on creativity, with some arguing and finding that
negative moods undermine creativity and others arguing that it
enhances creative performance. The present work clarified, first of
all, that negative moods enhance creative performance when mood
states are activating rather than deactivating. Second, our results
permit the conclusion that negative activating moods lead to cre-
ative performance because of enhanced cognitive perseverance
and persistence more than because of cognitive flexibility and
inclusiveness. Thus, provided some activation, both positive and
negative moods engender creative performance, but through cog-
nitive flexibility and cognitive perseverance, respectively. As such,
our work suggests that Edisons famous quote that creativity is
753
99% perspiration and 1% inspiration may reflect not only that
Edison had apt intuition about the psychology of creativity but also
that Edison resembled an angry young man more than a happy
camper.
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 757776 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.757

Judgments of the Lucky Across Development and Culture

Kristina R. Olson Yarrow Dunham

Harvard University University of California, Merced

Carol S. Dweck Elizabeth S. Spelke and Mahzarin R. Banaji

Stanford University Harvard University

For millennia, human beings have believed that it is morally wrong to judge others by the fortuitous or
unfortunate events that befall them or by the actions of another person. Rather, an individuals own
intended, deliberate actions should be the basis of his or her evaluation, reward, and punishment. In a
series of studies, the authors investigated whether such rules guide the judgments of children. The first
3 studies demonstrated that children view lucky others as more likely than unlucky others to perform
intentional good actions. Children similarly assess the siblings of lucky others as more likely to perform
intentional good actions than the siblings of unlucky others. The next 3 studies demonstrated that children
as young as 3 years believe that lucky people are nicer than unlucky people. The final 2 studies found
that Japanese children also demonstrate a robust preference for the lucky and their associates. These
findings are discussed in relation to M. J. Lerners (1980) just-world theory and J. Piagets (1932/1965)
immanent-justice research and in relation to the development of intergroup attitudes.

Keywords: preference for the lucky, immanent justice, evaluative contagion, social cognitive develop-
ment, cross-cultural psychology

In many societies and legal systems across time, one moral tenet
has reigned supreme: Individuals are to be judged by the purpose-
ful actions they commit and not by the random events that befall
them. This understanding has been broad and deep, evident across
Kristina R. Olson, Elizabeth S. Spelke, and Mahzarin R. Banaji, De-
partment of Psychology, Harvard University; Yarrow Dunham, Depart-
ment of Psychology, University of California, Merced; Carol S. Dweck,
Department of Psychology, Stanford University.
This research was supported by funding from the Beinecke Fellowship
and National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship to Kris-
tina R. Olson, National Science Foundation Grant BCS-02-1725 to Carol S.
Dweck, National Institute of Health Grant HD23103 to Elizabeth S.
Spelke, funding from the Reischauer Institute for Japanese Studies to
Yarrow Dunham, and funding from the Third Millennium Foundation to
Mahzarin R. Banaji. This research was conducted as part of Kristina R.
Olsons doctoral dissertation.
A full list of items and supplementary statistics for all eight studies are
available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/banaji/research/
olson_luck.htm
We thank Alexa Reynolds for the drawings used in Study 8; the Harvard
Museum of Natural History, Highland Park Elementary School, and the
Bing Nursery School for providing spaces for conducting research; and
Ann Marie Russell, Carla Borras, Rohini Rau-Murthy, Roy Ruhling,
Marion Mahone, Valerie Loehr, Patrick Hayden, Lauren Hay, Rachel
Montana, Kimihiro Shiomura, Christopher Dial, Katie Lancaster, and
Marin Tanaka for assistance in data collection. We also thank the parents,
teachers, administrators, and children who participated and assisted in this
research and Paul Jose for sending us the immanent-justice stories used in
Study 2.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kristina
R. Olson, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 33 Kirkland
Street, Cambridge, MA 02138. E-mail: krolson@wjh.harvard.edu
time and place, from Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, Roman law
(e.g., animus nocendi), and English law (e.g., mens rea) to the
modern penal law in the United States and the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (United Nations, 2003). This funda-
mental moral dictum was most clearly described in the 13th
century by Henry Bracton (13th century/1968 1977): A crime is
not committed unless an intention to injure exists. From it we
have the practice that volitional and premeditated behaviors, such
as stealing and cheating, are punished, just as hard work and
helping others are rewardedthese actions speak to the character
of the person performing them. On the other hand, we treat
differently those behaviors that involve accidental, unintentional,
and random causes. Whether the outcomes themselves are good or
bad, such as winning a lottery or being hit by a tornado, we are not
to attribute these to the character of the actor.
Even when it comes to intentional behavior, we hold that it is
those who are involved in producing it who should be held re-
sponsible or praised, not those who happen to be associated with
the perpetrators via group membership. The Bible supports this
belief clearly: The fathers shall not be put to death for the
children, neither shall the children be put to death for the fathers:
Every man shall be put to death for his own sin (Deuteronomy
24:16, King James Version). The belief that deems guilt by asso-
ciation to be immoral is also broad and deep, being upheld by the
oldest moral codes from Ptahotep and the Assize of Clarendon to
most modern legal doctrine (Banaji & Bhaskar, 2000).
Our research concerns the dissociation between these ratified
codes of conduct and the behavior of ordinary humans. It seeks to
understand the disparity between belief and action, between ab-
stractly held ideals and everyday moral judgments of good and
bad. In these studies, we investigated the developmental aspects of

757
758 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
such dissociations by analyzing the relatively early manifestation
of such discrepancies in childhood. Do children recognize that the
random bad events that befall others do not make them blamewor-
thy? Do they understand that other people who are associated with
an unlucky individual are not blameworthy? Observing children as
they grapple with such questions can provide an understanding of
the developmental origins of adult minds that routinely offer such
judgments with consequence.
We explored this question in the context of two empirical
phenomena: preference for the lucky (over the unlucky) and the
evaluation of an individual based on his or her association with
another actorwhat we call evaluative contagion. Preference for
the lucky is simply the greater liking, greater preference, or more
positive attitude toward those who experience randomly occurring
good or lucky events (e.g., finding $5 on the sidewalk) than toward
those who experience random bad or unlucky events (e.g., getting
splashed by a passing car). More complex evaluations, which we
call judgments of the lucky, involve thinking, for example, that
lucky people are more likely to perform good actions than are
unlucky people. We use the term random as the overarching
term for lucky and unlucky events, standing in clear contrast with
actions that we term intentional. Whereas intentional actions
tend to be deliberate and foreseen, random events, for our pur-
poses, are those that are not intended or foreseen by the targets of
those actions.
Evaluative contagion refers to the extension of evaluations of
one actor to his or her associates, such as family or social-group
members. Disliking the sibling of someone who was splashed by
a passing car would be an example of evaluative contagion, be-
cause the negative evaluation of the target of the action (the person
splashed) has spread to the sibling of that target. Such evaluations
are not only theoretically important but also may have important
implications for work on the development of prejudice toward
disadvantaged groups. That is, insofar as members of disadvan-
taged groups tend to experience more unlucky events, a dislike of
people associated with others who experience unlucky events
could lead to prejudice against members of families or social
groups who themselves have not experienced bad or unlucky
events.
We seek to establish the generality and breadth of these phe-
nomena across age and culture. As we discuss below, there are
several theories relevant to a preference for the lucky. One way to
evaluate how well these theories explain the preference for the
lucky is to examine the developmental predictions of these theories
and to look for convergence or divergence between these theories
and the preference for the lucky across development. Therefore,
one goal of this article is to investigate how the evaluations of the
lucky and evaluative contagion might increase or decrease across
development and what these changes imply for alternative expla-
nations of these effects.
In addition, we seek to understand whether these phenomena are
cross-culturally invariant or whether something about American or
Western culture might lead young children to prefer the lucky and
their associates. Previous research (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004;
Morris & Peng, 1994) has demonstrated that Westerners tend to
use dispositional attributions to explain behavior (e.g., he tripped
because he was clumsy), whereas Easterners tend to use situational
explanations (e.g., he tripped because there was a cord on the
floor). One possible explanation for childrens preference for the
lucky could be that children are making dispositional explanations
for the lucky events. Such an explanation leads to the prediction
that children growing up in a country that tends to use situational
explanations for behavior will not show this preference. Therefore,
in an initial exploration of the universality of the preference for the
lucky and its contagious nature, we presented young Japanese
children with the same tasks we presented to American children.
Immanent Justice and Belief in a Just World
As early as 6 months of age, children appear to have a basic
understanding of differences between intentional action and unin-
tentional action (Woodward, 1998), and by 3 years of age, children
are able to distinguish intentional from unintentional actions in
linguistic tasks (Shultz & Wells, 1985; Shultz, Wells, & Sarda,
1980). Nevertheless, considerable evidence suggests that this dis-
tinction is not the only guide to childrens evaluations of others.
Childrens tendency to evaluate others on the basis of uninten-
tional acts has been stated or implied by several prominent theo-
ries, most notably in work on immanent justice (Piaget, 1932/
1965) and belief in a just world (BJW; Lerner, 1980).
Immanent Justice
In his groundbreaking work on moral development, Piaget
(1932/1965) described the belief that a fault will automatically
bring about its own punishment (p. 256). A classic example is
evident in childrens responses to the following story: After steal-
ing apples from an orchard, a boy rides his bike over a rotting
bridge and falls into the water. Piaget asked 6- to 12-year-old
children why the boy fell into the water and whether the boy would
have fallen into the water had he not stolen the apples. A sizeable
number of young children reported that the perpetrator fell into the
water because he stole the apples. In other words, the random bad
event (falling into the water) was viewed as a direct consequence
of an intentional bad action (stealing the apples). Other research
extended Piagets findings to positive events, showing that chil-
dren believe that a positive random event will occur as the con-
sequence of an intentional good action (Fein & Stein, 1977).
It is important to note that immanent-justice reasoning is a
mistaken belief about the nature of causation. That is, people who
endorse immanent-justice reasoning are arguing that a good or bad
action can cause a lucky or unlucky event and, consequently, that
the lucky or unlucky event would not have occurred if the good or
bad action had not occurred. For our purposes, the most important
result is the developmental trend of this belief. Piaget (1932/1965)
found a decline in immanent-justice reasoning across the elemen-
tary school years. Subsequently, other researchers have confirmed
the general decline of immanent-justice reasoning throughout
childhood (Jahoda, 1958; Jose, 1991; Percival & Haviland, 1978;
Suls & Kalle, 1979; but cf. Karniol, 1980; Najarian-Svajian, 1966).
This work has been extended more recently into samples of older
teens, generally finding that immanent-justice reasoning further
decreases in middle and high school (Johnson, 1962; Najarian-
Svarian, 1966), although there is new evidence suggesting that
immanent-justice reasoning may reemerge in adulthood (Callan,
Ellard, & Nicol, 2006; Raman & Winer, 2004).
In our current research, we examined whether young children
prefer lucky to unlucky individuals and whether they use evidence
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
of lucky or unlucky events to predict an actors future good or bad
behavior. That is, do children think a lucky child is more likely
than an unlucky child to perform a good action in the future?
Although this question is clearly related to immanent justice, there
are differences between these procedures. Immanent-justice re-
search focuses on how children reason about the causal conse-
quences of intentional good and bad actions. It shows a general
decline in immanent justice with age, presumably because children
integrate and articulate a more diverse set of causal principles
governing the behavior of agents (Schult & Wellman, 1997). In
contrast, judgments of the lucky concern the evaluative conse-
quences of having viewed anothers experience of a lucky or
unlucky event. In Study 2, we investigated the relationship be-
tween judgments of the lucky and immanent justice by testing the
developmental trajectories of both patterns of reasoning in the
same participants.
BJW
The idea that people get what they deserve is at the heart of
Lerners BJW theory (Furnham, 2003; Lerner, 1980; Montada &
Lerner, 1998). One classic demonstration of BJW involved asking
participants about the blameworthiness of a rape victim (Jones &
Aronson, 1973). Experimenters manipulated whether the police
report revealed that the victim was a virgin, a married woman, or
a divorcee and then asked participants how much the victim was to
blame for the rape. Counterintuitively, the finding was that partic-
ipants blamed the virgin and married woman the most and the
divorcee the least, though they still blamed the latter. The authors
interpreted this finding and many others in terms of their self-
protective function: If we believe the world to be a just and fair
place, we can reinterpret or explain good and bad events that seem
to befall individuals for no reason at all and, as a result, still feel
personally safe. In this case, the authors argued that the idea of an
innocent virgin or married woman being raped was simply so
inconsistent with participants view of a just world that they
derogated the victim, whereas a divorcee being raped is not as
inconsistent with a view of the world as just, and therefore, less
blame was necessary to maintain a sense of the world as just.
BJW colors not only peoples beliefs about others but also their
attitudes. In another study, participants liked a person who was
randomly assigned to be electrically shocked with no compensa-
tion less than a person who was randomly assigned to be shocked
for a payment of $30 (Lerner, 1971). The logic of BJW predicts
that the victim of uncompensated shocks was denigrated because
of the underlying belief that a truly blameless person would not be
so treated.
Traditionally, BJW researchers have tested these questions by
examining adults responses to extreme events that were presum-
ably strong violations of a sense of justice (e.g., rape, electric
shock, etc.). Less is known about whether more everyday events
(e.g., seeing someone get splashed by a passing car) would trigger
just-world beliefs.
In addition, the developmental origins of BJW have not been
closely studied, as most developmental research has either focused
on older children and teens (Furnham, 1985; Furnham & Raja-
manickam, 1992) or has involved tasks that have an uncertain
relationship to just-world beliefs themselves, such as distribution
of resources (Lerner, 1974; Long & Lerner, 1974), rather than
759
blame and evaluation (but see Fein, 1976). Although little research
has been conducted on younger children, Lerner (1977) articulated
a theoretical argument about the development of just-world think-
ing. Most notable, he argued that children move from a focus on
getting what they want immediately to understanding that their
actions at Time A can be rewarded or punished at Time B. Lerner
related this transition to the development of delay of gratification
(Long & Lerner, 1974), arguing that once this action now
consequence later rule is understood, children begin to apply this
understanding to other people, recognizing that a persons actions
now will produce consequences for him or her later. These argu-
ments suggest that children may begin showing just-world beliefs
in mid childhood, somewhere around age 6 or 7 years. Lending
further credence to this approximate age prediction, Lerners own
research tended to involve children in middle to late elementary
school, although he demonstrated related principles, such as an
understanding of parity and equity, in kindergarteners and first
graders (Lerner, 1974).
The current work is aimed at testing the core proposition that
children, starting early in childhood, prefer the lucky over the
unlucky. If BJW is indeed the mechanism by which preference for
the lucky emerges, then preference for the lucky should emerge
sometime after BJW reasoning has developed. However, an alter-
native possibility is that the tendency to prefer the lucky precedes
the more elaborate sort of reasoning described in BJW; if so, it
should emerge earlier in development. Indeed, preference for the
lucky might be a core, early-developing tendency that is later
justified via just-world beliefs. The present studies tested the
development of the preference for the lucky and assess its origin in
relation to just-world beliefs.
The Current Work
One of the most important tasks children face in navigating their
social world is determining who to approach and who to avoid,
who is a friend and who is a foe. Therefore, we were interested in
whether children would assume that lucky people are more likely
to engage in intentional good behaviors and unlucky people are
more likely to engage in intentional bad behaviors. In an initial set
of studies, we demonstrated that 5- to 7-year-olds prefer lucky to
unlucky people and prefer members of a lucky group to members
of an unlucky group (Olson, Banaji, Dweck, & Spelke, 2006).
Here, we pursued these findings by asking whether children make
deeper inferences about lucky and unlucky individuals, such as
whether they believe lucky people are more likely to perform
intentional good actions, whether the preference for the lucky is
observed across cultures, and when this preference begins in
childhood.
In the first two studies, we examined whether children judge
lucky people as more likely to perform intentional good actions
than unlucky people and unlucky people as more likely to perform
intentional bad actions than lucky people. In both studies, we
examined the developmental trajectory of these evaluations, and in
the second study, we compared this trajectory with performance on
an immanent-justice task.
In the third study, we investigated whether young children show
evaluative contagion for behavioral predictions, asking whether
children believe that the siblings of lucky individuals are more
likely to engage in intentional good actions than the siblings of
760 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
unlucky individuals. This study, along with the final study, which
examines evaluative contagion in novel social groups, suggests
that evaluative contagion exists and is not limited to the American
context. Placed alongside the work on preference for the lucky,
these data suggest that the development of prejudice against mem-
bers of disadvantaged groups may be fueled by (a) the presence of
negative evaluations of individuals who experience unlucky events
and (b) the presence of negative evaluations of people merely
associated with those who experience misfortune, together result-
ing in prejudice against the disadvantaged either because they
themselves experienced bad luck or because they are associated
with others who have.
The second emphasis of the current article is an investigation of
the developmental course of preferences and judgments favoring
the lucky. In the first three studies, we tested children aged 4 to 12
years to assess the developmental trajectory of judgments of the
lucky. Previously, this question has only been addressed using an
attitude measure in children aged 5 to 7 years (Olson et al., 2006).
In Studies 4, 5, and 6, we investigated the basic preference for the
lucky in preschool-aged children. Testing such young children
allowed us to investigate whether the developmental predictions of
Lerner (1977), and therefore just-world beliefs, might explain such
a preference.
A final question this work seeks to examine is whether our
initial discoveries of preference for the lucky are the result of some
culture-specific teaching or whether this preference might be in-
variant across cultures. A cross-cultural test, coupled with work
with very young children, can indicate whether a tendency or
evaluation might be universal or whether it is the result of specific
experiences or antecedents. Thus, in Studies 7 and 8, we investi-
gated whether preference for the lucky and evaluative contagion
are seen cross-culturally or whether they are the result of a cul-
turally specific experience or process.
Taken together, these studies have the potential to deepen our
understanding of preference for the lucky, judgments of the lucky,
and evaluative contagion effects. They can inform our understand-
ing of whether children merely prefer lucky people or whether they
make corresponding behavioral predictions about lucky and un-
lucky targets. These studies also clarify the relationship between
preference for the lucky, immanent justice, and just-world beliefs.
Finally, these studies allow a new understanding of the develop-
mental trajectory and cross-cultural generality of these effects.
Study 1: Behavioral Predictions of the Lucky and
Unlucky
Learning to decide who is good and who is bad is a major
component of successful functioning in the social world. Previous
research suggests that even 6-month-old infants can distinguish an
agent that helps from an agent that harms and can use this infor-
mation to form preferences for the former (Hamlin, Wynn, &
Bloom, 2007). In addition, by the age of 18 months, children prefer
to accept a toy from a helpful rather than a harmful actor (Nurock,
Jacob, Margules, & Dupoux, 2008). This evidence suggests that
very young children evaluate agents on the basis of their helpful or
harmful behavior.
What do children think when they observe something good or
bad befalling someone? Do they form expectations about that
persons future behavior? For example, do children believe that a
person who found $5 on the sidewalk (random good event) is more
likely to read a story to her little brother (intentional good event)
than a person who was rained on while walking home (random bad
event)? Similarly, is the person who was rained on seen as more
likely to lie to his mother (intentional bad event) than the person
who found $5? We tested this hypothesis and included comparison
items in which actors were described as having previously per-
formed intentional good or bad actions. Because such actions
invite dispositional attributions and so should motivate consistent
predictions about future actions, these items served as a standard
against which to compare the impact of random events.
In addition, this study investigated whether there are develop-
mental changes in the behavioral predictions of the lucky and
unlucky across middle childhood.1 Previous research has sug-
gested that childrens moral reasoning changes considerably be-
tween the ages of 4 and 12 years and, most relevant, that
immanent-justice reasoning declines across this age range (Jose,
1991; Piaget, 1932/1965). Therefore, we investigated possible age
differences in childrens judgments of lucky and unlucky targets.
Although we provided conceptual arguments for why these two
phenomena are different, we sought to bolster this contention with
a direct test. If behavioral predictions following observation of
random events stem from the same underlying process as imma-
nent justice, we would expect to see an age-related decrease in
childrens tendency to think that lucky people perform good ac-
tions and unlucky people perform bad actions.
Method
Participants and recruitment. Participants included 57 chil-
dren (18 female) aged 4 to 12 years (M 7, SD 2) who
participated while visiting the Harvard Museum of Natural History
in Cambridge, Massachusetts, with their parents or guardians. For
complete age breakdowns for this and subsequent studies, see
Table 1. One additional participant began the study but quit after
completing less than half of the study and is therefore excluded
from analyses. Participants were approached by an experimenter
who asked if they would be interested in participating in a study
lasting 5 to 10 min. Interested parents were asked to complete a
short consent form, any questions from the child or parent were
answered by the experimenter, and the child and parent were
escorted to the testing area. The experimenter then explained to the
child that he or she was free to stop participation at any time and
asked the child if he or she was ready to begin. Although race
information was not asked of participants in this study, experi-
menters observed that the sample was predominately White and
middle to upper-middle class.
1
Social cognition research with adult participants has found that adults
overestimate their ability to predict the behavior of individuals, for exam-
ple, thinking that they can predict ones year-long performance in the Peace
Corps from a single interview when in fact, interviews are poor predictors
of actual performance (participants estimated r .59 between interview
performance and Peace Corps performance, when in fact, r .10; Kunda
& Nisbett, 1986). The above-mentioned work differs from the work pro-
posed here. Those authors were concerned with accuracy of predictions
compared with reality, whereas the current work is focused on whether
children make systematic predictions in a particular direction to reveal an
underlying belief that lucky people perform good actions.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
Table 1
Sample Size Broken Down by Age for Each Study (After
Exclusions)
Age (years)
Experiment 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 N Table 2. Finally, we made two examples of each type of item (e.g.,
1 6 9 6 10 6 10 6 3 1 57
2 8 25 23 19 14 17 14 7 127
3 14 11 19 7 8 4 7 6 2 78
4 12 31 29 27 16 115
5 23 17 9 49
6 25 25
7 7 9 4 3 23
8 21 30 28 8 87
Materials. Thirty-two pictures of White children were se-
lected from the Internet and were arranged into 16 same-sex pairs.
Pictures were paired such that both pictures had been rated by
several adult raters as equal in attractiveness and approximate age.
Of the 16 pairs, eight were pairs of boys and eight were pairs of
girls. Adults estimates of age ranged from 4 to 12 years. These 16
pairs were then arranged into four same-sex sets of four pairs (two
all male, two all female). Four different versions of the task were
created, one beginning with each set of four pairs, alternating
between four pairs of boys and four pairs of girls. The side of
presentation of each picture was orthogonally counterbalanced
across participants, yielding eight versions of the task to which
participants were sequentially assigned.
Procedure. Participants were presented with 16 trials. In each
trial, they were first shown two photographs of children and were
told their names and one fact about them (e.g., This is John. John
stole a cookie from his brother). As each person was mentioned,
a picture of a child appeared on the screen. Pictures were approx-
imately 2 in. 3 in. and appeared on either the right or left side
of the screen. This part of the trial is called the learning phase
and always consisted of a learning pair (one fact about each of two
children). After the learning phase, participants were asked to
guess which of the two children engaged in another action (e.g.,
On Sunday, one of these children got into a fight. Which child got
into a fight?). Henceforth, this part of the trial is called the test
phase. Participants were instructed to point to the child that they
believed engaged in the action in question, and their responses
were recorded.
The facts used in the learning phase were all either intentionally
caused (by the actor) or randomly caused (not by the actor) and
were either good or bad. For example, getting rained on or turning
on the television to discover that no cartoons were on are examples
of random bad events, whereas finding $5 on the sidewalk or
getting to eat cake in school because it was a classmates birthday
are examples of random good events.2 In contrast, pulling a
classmates hair or cheating on a test were examples of intentional
bad actions, and helping to bake cookies for ones grandmother or
sharing toys with ones little brother were considered intentional
good actions. Each pair of learning items was created to be as
parallel as possible (e.g., accidentally hitting someone vs. inten-
tionally hitting someone). Across the 16 trials, four kinds of
pairings were made in the learning phase: intentional bad versus
intentional good, random bad (unlucky) versus random good
761
(lucky), intentional good versus random good, and intentional bad
versus random bad. These four types of learning pairings were
crossed with each of the two possible types of test items (inten-
tional good, intentional bad) in the test phase, resulting in eight
types of items. A tabular representation of the design is depicted in
two items that were random good vs. random bad learning trials
with an intentional bad question item), resulting in 16 unique
questions. The order of mention of the targets (e.g., mentioning
lucky vs. unlucky first) was counterbalanced across items.
Experimenters in this study and all subsequent studies were
trained to state each item in a neutral or slightly positive tone, even
when the item was negative in valence. Although this was a less
natural way to state the items, this allowed us to be certain that
children were not using the experimenters tone as information in
their responses, so it provided a more conservative test of our
hypotheses.
Data preparation and analyses. For each item, participants
were given a one if they selected the predicted choice (e.g., the
lucky target in the lucky vs. unlucky target predicting an inten-
tional good action item) and a zero if they selected the other choice
(e.g., the unlucky target). The four items involving the same
learning pairs (e.g., lucky vs. unlucky) were combined such that
each participant then had a prediction score between 0 (never
picked the predicted answer) to 4 (always selected the predicted
answer). Thus, if a participant said that a child who turned on the
television and found no cartoons on was more likely to cheat on a
test than a child who turned on the television and found an extra
hour of cartoons on, the participant was given one point for the
lucky versus unlucky prediction score. Similarly, if the participant
said that the child who walked to school while it was sunny was
more likely to bake a cake for his grandma than the child who
walked to school while it was rainy, that participant scored one
point for the lucky versus unlucky prediction score. Each child
ended up with four prediction scores (lucky vs. unlucky, inten-
2
An anonymous reviewer raised an important concern that perhaps
children saw lucky items as good, rather than lucky, converting what is a
preference for the good into a preference for the lucky. For example, this
reviewer pointed out that getting to eat cake for a classmates birthday
might be seen as good by children and not as lucky. Similarly, one could
argue that children perhaps see unlucky events as bad, rather than unlucky.
One piece of evidence against this argument is the finding throughout this
article that children differentially evaluated lucky and good actors and that
they distinguished unlucky and bad actors. However, as a more direct test
of this concern, we conducted a small-scale pilot study. We presented a
new group of 26 children aged 510 years with each of the lucky and
intentional good items from Study 1 and asked them to state whether each
item was something lucky that happened to the target or whether the actor
meant to do good (we used this phrase because intentional good is
confusing for 5-year-olds). A partially overlapping group of 26 children
aged 510 years completed the parallel task for unlucky and intentional bad
actions. Overall, the pilot participants identified 75.5% of the lucky targets
as lucky, 74.0% of the intentional good targets as intentional good, 88.5%
of the unlucky targets as unlucky, and 83.3% of the intentional bad targets
as intentional bad. Chance responding would have been 50%, and the
reviewers predictions would have suggested results significantly lower
than 50% for the lucky and unlucky items, which we did not find. We are
therefore confident that children did understand that the lucky events were
lucky and that the unlucky events were unlucky.
762 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI

tional good vs. intentional bad, intentional good vs. lucky, and
intentional bad vs. unlucky) unless that child failed to complete
one or more questions required to complete a score. At most, one
participant was excluded from each prediction score. We analyzed
prediction scores using one-sample t tests, comparing childrens
prediction scores with chance (2.0). Finally, to examine possible
age changes in predictions, we correlated prediction scores with
age.

Results
Lucky versus unlucky. The comparison between lucky and
unlucky targets was the primary result of interest. Our hypothesis
Figure 1. Mean proportion of responses in which participants selected the
was that children would believe that the unlucky target was more predicted response in Study 1. The predicted response was selecting the
likely to perform an intentional bad action and less likely to lucky or intentional good actor to perform a good action and selecting the
perform an intentional good action than the lucky target, consistent unlucky or intentional bad actor to perform a bad action. The proportion of
with predictions of judgments of the lucky. A one-sample t test unpredicted responses is simply 1 the proportion of predicted responses.
comparing childrens mean prediction score (M 2.47) with Because including both the predicted and unpredicted bars is redundant, we
chance (2.0) supported this hypothesis, t(56) 3.57, p .001. only included the predicted responses in the graph.
Figure 1 shows the proportion of predicted responses made for
lucky versus unlucky items and intentional good versus bad items.
Using a paired t test, we found no effect of the valence of the that a person who did something intentionally good one time
question; that is, participants were just as likely to think a lucky would do so a second time and that someone who did an inten-
target would perform a good action as they were to think an tional bad action would do another. Previous work has suggested
unlucky target would perform a bad action, t(56) 1.53, p .13. that young children do not tend to believe that a person will
In addition, there was a nonsignificant but positive relationship necessarily do the same intentional action a second time (Kalish,
between age and prediction score (r .18, p .18), indicating 2002), but here we asked whether the individual would do a
that this was not likely to be related to immanent-justice reasoning, different intentional action of the same valence. We predicted that
which typically shows a decline with age (Jose, 1991; Piaget, they would expect valence consistency, and indeed, children
1932/1965). In addition, although previous work has suggested viewed an actor who had committed an intentional bad action as
that young children have a poorer understanding of randomness in more likely to perform a different intentional bad action and an
general than do older children (Weisz, 1980), the increase in actor who had committed an intentional good action as more likely
predictions based on lucky and unlucky events with age suggests to perform a different intentional good action as indicated by a
that our result is not due to limitations in childrens understanding one-sample t test comparing childrens average prediction score
of randomness. (M 3.19) with chance (2.0), t(56) 9.27, p .001 (see Figure 1
Intentional good versus intentional bad. We were interested for proportion of predicted responses). Children were equally
in whether children believed in behavioral consistency, thinking likely to think an intentional good actor would do another good
action as to think that an intentional bad actor would do another
bad action, as indicated by a paired t test in which responses did
Table 2 not differ by valence, t(56) 1.18, p .24. Prediction scores were
A Schematic Representing the Items Presented in Studies 1 and 3 correlated with age (r .45, p .001), suggesting that older
children were more likely to predict consistency in the behavior of
Test phase (Who intentional good and bad actors. Also as expected, childrens
Learning would perform Predicted
phase an. . . ?) response prediction scores were higher for the intentional good versus bad
comparison (M 3.19) than for the lucky versus unlucky com-
Intentional good vs. parison (M 2.47), at least indirectly indicating that children
intentional bad* Intentional good action Intentional good understand a distinction between intentional and random behavior,
Intentional good vs.
intentional bad* Intentional bad action Intentional bad
t(56) 4.45, p .001, although the next two comparisons test this
Lucky vs. unlucky* Intentional good action Lucky question more directly.
Lucky vs. unlucky* Intentional bad action Unlucky Intentional good versus lucky. To examine whether children
Intentional good vs. lucky Intentional good action Intentional good distinguish intentional behavior from random behavior, we asked
Intentional good vs. lucky Intentional bad action Lucky whether children would select an intentional good actor as more
Unlucky vs. intentional bad Intentional good action Unlucky
Unlucky vs. intentional bad Intentional bad action Intentional bad likely to perform a different intentional good action than a lucky
target and whether they would select a lucky target as more likely
Note. In the learning phase, participants were introduced to two charac- to perform an intentional bad action than an intentional good actor.
ters (and their siblings, in the case of Study 3). Participants were then asked We found that children make these selections, as evidenced by a
which of the two characters (or their siblings in Study 3) would perform a
different intentional good or bad action in the test phase. We have also
one-sample t test comparing participants average prediction score
listed the predicted response used to conduct analyses. The types of items (M 2.51) with chance (2.0), t(56) 3.90, p .001. Participants
with asterisks were included in Study 2. were equally likely to think that an intentional good actor would
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
perform a good action as they were to think that a lucky target
would perform a bad action, t(56) 0.14, p .89. Age was not
significantly correlated with prediction score (r .14, p .31),
suggesting that children of all ages distinguished intentional good
and lucky actors.
Intentional bad versus unlucky. In the final set of compari-
sons, we paired intentional bad actors with unlucky targets and had
children report which of these targets would commit other inten-
tional good or intentional bad tasks. We asked whether children
would select an intentional good actor as more likely to engage in
a different intentional good action than a lucky target and whether
they would select a lucky target as more likely to perform an
intentional bad action than an intentional good actor. We found
support for this prediction, as evidenced by a one-sample t test
comparing the average prediction score (M 2.69) with chance
(2.0), t(55) 5.17, p .001, suggesting that children do in fact
distinguish between actors who perform intentional bad actions
and those who experience unlucky events, seeing the former as
more likely to perform an additional bad action and the latter as
more likely to perform an additional good action. There was no
significant effect of the valence of the question asked, indicating
that children were equally likely to think that an intentional bad
actor would perform other bad actions as to think that an unlucky
target would perform more good actions, as indicated by a one-
sample t test, t(56) 0.65, p .52. In addition, older children
were more likely to demonstrate this prediction, as evidenced by a
significant correlation between age and prediction score (r .49,
p .001), a somewhat surprising finding given that the previous
comparison of intentional good with random good demonstrated
no significant relationship between an intentional and random
distinction and age. Because this finding was unexpected and did
not replicate across these conceptually similar comparisons, we do
not address this issue further.
Nonparametric analyses. Because of possible concerns about
the use of parametric statistics throughout this and subsequent
studies, we also conducted analyses throughout this article using
nonparametric statistics. However, because it is more common to
use parametric responses and because of limited space, parametric
tests are always reported in this article. The relevant nonparametric
tests are available at Mahzarin R. Banajis Web site (see the URL
in the author note). The findings reported in the text are identical,
regardless of our use of parametric versus nonparametric statistics.
Discussion
This study provided evidence that children make behavioral
predictions for lucky and unlucky targets. Children judged unlucky
targets as more likely to commit intentional bad actions and less
likely to commit intentional good actions than lucky targets. Thus,
children do not simply prefer lucky to unlucky targets but make
different predictions about lucky and unlucky targets. These dif-
fering predictions may suggest that children make enduring dis-
positional inferences about actors and may rely on these inferences
to motivate future predictions, although alternative accounts could
explain these findings.
Study 1 also provided assurance that our basic method was valid
in that our clearest case, comparisons between intentional good
and bad actors, showed the expected results. Participants judged
intentional good actors as more likely to perform other intentional
763
good actions compared with intentional bad actors. Indeed, the
trends for these cases were even stronger than in the case of
random events, demonstrating that children recognize a difference
between intentional and random actions.
One possible concern regarding these results is that our partic-
ipants in this study, as well as those in previous studies examining
a preference for the lucky (Olson et al., 2006), came from largely
advantaged populations (i.e., White, middle- to upper-middle-class
children with parents willing and able to take them to a museum,
etc.). Perhaps it is because they themselves are lucky or fortunate
that they show these effects. To test this possibility, we conducted
a pilot study with a sample of 23 participants (aged 6 12 years)
who were all Black and all of low socioeconomic status, many
living at or below the poverty line. We found that these children,
like the children in Study 1, predicted that a lucky target would
perform a good action more than an unlucky target and, similarly,
that an unlucky target would perform a bad action more than a
lucky target, suggesting that one does not need to be a member of
a lucky group to make these evaluations.3
As previously mentioned, Piaget (1932/1965) found a decrease
in immanent-justice reasoning across childhood. In contrast, we
did not find such a pattern. If anything, the general trend was for
older children to show behavior more in line with preference for
the lucky than younger children showed. At the very least, these
results suggest a developmental dissociation between immanent
justice and preference for the lucky, militating against the idea that
these phenomena arise from the same mental process or belief.
However, to test the relationship between immanent justice and
predictions about lucky and unlucky targets behavior more di-
rectly, in Study 2, we tested both phenomena in the same sample,
allowing us to empirically evaluate the relationship between im-
manent justice and judgments of the lucky.
Study 2: The Dissociation of Immanent Justice and
Behavioral Predictions of the Lucky
Researchers since Piaget (1932/1965) have found that children
believe that intentional bad actions can cause unlucky events to
occur, and this thinking has been applied to intentional good
actions and lucky events (Fein & Stein, 1977). In these studies,
children are often told about a person who has performed, for
example, a bad action and who has then experienced an unlucky
event (e.g., a boy who stole apples from an orchard and then fell
through a bridge on his way home). Children are then asked why
the unlucky event happened and/or whether the unlucky event
would have happened if the child had not performed the intentional
3
These participants were presented with only two items comparing
lucky and unlucky targets. In one item, they were asked which target would
perform an intentional good action, and in the other item, they were asked
which target would perform an intentional bad action. Participants were
given one point if they selected the lucky target to perform the intentional
good action and one point if they selected the unlucky target to perform the
intentional bad action, resulting in scores of 0, 1, or 2 for each subject. The
distribution of these scores was compared with a binomial distribution
(25% chance of 0, 50% chance of 1, 25% chance of 2). We found that this
pilot sample selected the predicted responses more often than chance, as
indicated by a chi-square goodness-of-fit test, 2(2, N 23) 7.09, p
.029.
764 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
bad action. The main result is that young children often say that the
unlucky event happened because of the intentional bad action and
that it would not have happened had the target not performed the
intentional bad action. This type of reasoning is referred to as
immanent-justice reasoning. Studies have largely shown that as
children get older, their immanent-justice reasoning declines (Ja-
hoda, 1958; Jose, 1991; Percival & Haviland, 1978; Suls & Kalle,
1979).
As we have discussed, there is a similarity, although more
superficial than it might seem, between the procedures that test the
idea of immanent justice and the present work. Whereas immanent
justice concerns reasoning about causation, the present research is
not interested in causal relations. If anything, the causal pathway in
our studies must be reversed, as children are told about lucky and
unlucky events and then infer intentional good and bad behavior.
Although we have argued that these are conceptually distinct
phenomena, in Study 2, we tested this dissociation directly by
asking the same children to perform both an immanent-justice task
and a judgment of the lucky task. Although age should be nega-
tively correlated with immanent-justice reasoning, as previous
research suggests, age should be uncorrelated or even slightly
positively correlated with behavioral predictions of the lucky, as
demonstrated in Study 1.
Method
Participants. Participants included 127 children (63 male, 64
female; 118 White, 3 Asian, 2 Hispanic, 1 Middle Eastern, and 1
Black/White biracial; 2 were not identified by parents and race or
ethnicity could not be identified by experimenters) between the
ages of 5 and 12 years (M 8.7, SD 2.0) in a suburban
elementary school in Utah from a mostly middle-class background.
Materials. Participants completed two tasks, including an
immanent-justice task taken from Jose (1990) and the judgments
of the lucky task from Study 1. Across participants, there were a
total of eight immanent-justice stories: In four stories, the protag-
onist performed a bad action and then experienced a negative
event, and in four parallel stories, the protagonist performed a
good action and then experienced a positive event. For example, in
the orchard stories, the negative version involved a boy stealing
apples from an orchard and then falling through a board on a
bridge and into a river on his way home, whereas the positive
version involved a boy helping a farmer to pick apples and then
finding a wristwatch on a bridge on his way home. Four scripts
were created, each consisting of one version of each of the four
base stories. Each script contained two positive and two negative
stories. Participants were randomly assigned a script.
The second task involved eight of the judgments of the lucky
prediction items from Study 1. These included the four items from
the intentional good versus intentional bad set and the four items
from the lucky versus unlucky set. The other eight items from
Study 1 (the intentional good vs. lucky and intentional bad vs.
unlucky items) were not used, as they made the task too long for
the youngest children and were unrelated to the question of inter-
est. The items were randomized into three scripts, each containing
all eight items. Participants were randomly assigned a script.
Across items, the order of mention of lucky and unlucky targets
and the order of mention of intentional good and bad targets was
counterbalanced.
Procedure. Participants were brought into a conference room
in the school and were greeted by an experimenter. They were told
they would be playing two games and that in both games there
were no right or wrong answers. They were also informed they
could quit at any time (although none of the children did). Partic-
ipants were sequentially assigned to complete either the immanent-
justice task and then the preference for the lucky task or vice versa.
For the immanent-justice items, children were read a story while
being shown a photograph of a boy (the protagonist) and were then
asked to recall as much as they could about the story. They were
then asked why the good or bad action from the end of the story
happened (e.g., Why did Joey fall into the river?). Finally, they
were asked if the final action would have happened if the initial
action had not (e.g., Would Joey have fallen into the river if he
hadnt stolen the apples?). For the luck-prediction items, a picture
was presented to represent each of the two targets mentioned, and
on the test trials, participants were asked to indicate their answers
by pointing to the target who they believed had performed the
action, as they did in Study 1. After completion of both tasks,
participants were thanked for their time and returned to class.
Results
Data preparation. Responses to the why question (e.g., Why
did Joey fall into the river?) were coded by two judges, using
predetermined categories from Jose (1991). The categories in-
cluded immanent-justice reasoning (e.g., He fell into the water
because he stole the apples); mediated causality, including phys-
ical mediation (e.g., He fell through the bridge because he was
carrying so many apples) and psychological mediation (e.g., He
fell because he was feeling badly about stealing the apples and did
not see the old board); chance contiguity (e.g., He fell into the
river because the bridge was old and the boards on the bridge were
falling apart); dont-know responses (e.g., I have no idea); and
uncodable responses (e.g., The boy didnt fall in the water).
Overall, raters agreed on categorization 96% of the time, and in
those cases in which they disagreed, the coders discussed their
responses and came to an agreement on a final categorization.
Participants answers to the why and yes or no (i.e., would x
have happened if y had not?) immanent-justice questions were
used for statistical analyses only if they had correctly answered the
memory question. A correct memory answer required the partici-
pant to accurately recall the initial action and the final action in a
given story (e.g., remembering that the boy stole apples and fell
into the river). Overall, children passed the memory requirement
89% of the time.
For the luck-prediction items, prediction scores were computed
for each category (lucky vs. unlucky and intentional good vs. bad)
as was done in Study 1, resulting in a total score ranging from 0
(never selected the expected response) to 4 (always selected the
expected response) for each participant. Children who completed
all eight items (n 126) were included in all analyses.
Immanent justice. On the why question, children gave
immanent-justice responses 47% of the time, mediated-causality
responses 3% of the time, chance-contiguity responses 43% of the
time, dont-know responses 4% of the time, and uncodable re-
sponses 3% of the time. On the yes or no questions, participants
said yes 37% of the time and no (the immanent-justice re-
sponse) 63% of the time.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY 765

The proportion of immanent-justice responses to the why ques- Table 3

tion was negatively correlated with age (r .19, p .033), Proportion of Responses on the Immanent Justice Task by Type
indicating that younger children gave more immanent-justice re- and Mean Prediction Score on Lucky/Unlucky and Intentional
sponses than did older children. Dont-know responses and uncod- Good/Bad Behavioral Prediction Items by Participant Age for
able responses were also negatively correlated with age (dont Study 2
know, r .22, p .018; uncodable, r .16, p .078). In
contrast, mediated-causality and chance-contiguity responses were Age (years)
positively correlated with age, indicating that older children were 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
more likely to use these explanations (mediated causality, r .26,
p .004; chance contiguity, r .25, p .004). Age was n 7, 8 24, 25 22, 23 19 14 16, 17 13, 14
negatively correlated with no answers on the yes or no question, No responses 0.44 0.79 0.71 0.67 0.61 0.60 0.54
Whyimmanent 0.49 0.44 0.69 0.47 0.42 0.42 0.30
again suggesting that younger children supplied more immanent-
justice
justice responses than did older children (r .22, p .016). Whymediation 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.09
Judgments of the lucky. Overall, children were more likely to Whychance 0.36 0.39 0.27 0.41 0.47 0.54 0.59
believe that an intentional good actor would perform an intentional Whydont know 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00
good action and an intentional bad actor would perform an inten- Whyuncodable 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02
Lucky/unlucky 2.75 2.28 3.22 3.05 3.36 3.06 2.85
tional bad action (M 3.39) than expected by chance, t(125) Intentional good/bad 2.62 3.08 3.22 3.47 3.64 3.88 3.54
19.74, p .001, one-sample t test. Children were also more likely
to believe a lucky target would perform a good action and that an Note. When two numbers are present, the valid sample size varied
unlucky target would perform a bad action (M 2.94) than depending on the dependent variable. No responses indicated proportion
of participants saying no on the yes/no immanent-justice question. The
expected by chance, t(125) 10.33, p .001, one-sample t test.
rows starting with why include the proportion of participants at each age
Performance on the intentional good versus bad items was corre- giving each of the possible responses to these items. The lucky/unlucky and
lated with performance on the lucky versus unlucky items (r .24, intentional good/bad rows indicate the average number of times (out of
p .007), although overall, children selected the predicted re- four) that participants at each age selected the good/lucky does good or
sponses more for the intentional good or bad items than for the bad/unlucky does bad responses.
lucky or unlucky items, t(125) 4.50, p .001, paired-samples
t test, as was the case in Study 1. In addition, age was positively Whereas immanent-justice reasoning relies on a misunderstanding
correlated with both composites (intentional good or bad, r .37, about causation (believing that performing a good or bad action
p .001; lucky or unlucky, r .19, p .032), suggesting that can cause a lucky or unlucky event to occur), predictions of the
older children were more consistent in their responses. It is im- behavior of lucky and unlucky people are not claims about cau-
portant to note that although the latter correlation was not signif- sality. One could imagine, for example, a person who does not
icant in Study 1 and is significant here, the effect sizes in both believe in immanent-justice reasoning but does believe that an
cases were nearly identical (r .18 in Study 1, and r .19 in unlucky person is more likely to perform a bad action.
Study 2), suggesting that the sample size explains this difference. With this effect established, we moved on to ask whether
Thus, age was negatively correlated with immanent-justice re- childrens inferences about the actions of lucky and unlucky tar-
sponses and positively correlated with judgments about the lucky gets are confined to the targets as isolated individuals or whether
and unlucky. associates of lucky and unlucky targets are also affected by the
The relationship between immanent justice and judgments of the targets circumstances. In other words, are those who are related to
lucky. Immanent justice was not related to predictions about the unlucky people seen as more likely to engage in bad actions? And
lucky and unlucky, as indicated by nonsignificant correlations is the converse true of someone who is the relative of a lucky
between the why and yes or no immanent-justice questions and the individual?
lucky or unlucky prediction composite (immanent-justice re-
sponses on the why question, r .06, p .50; no answers on
Study 3: Evaluative Contagion
yes or no question, r .05, p .5). Indeed, as noted, the age
trends for immanent justice and judgments of the lucky were in Although most people would argue that it is acceptable to judge
opposite directions (see Table 3 for all means by age). Thus, both someone on the basis of his or her intentions, almost nobody
conceptual and empirical arguments strongly suggest a distinct believes it to be fair to judge another by the random events that
basis for each phenomenon. befall him or her. Similarly, some believe it is undesirable to judge
an actors associate by the actions of the actor, even if the actor has
Discussion performed a premeditated crime but especially if the actor has been
the victim of a random negative or positive event. That is, making
Despite surface similarities between the judgments of the lucky negative inferences about the sibling of a known thief is not
task and immanent-justice reasoning, these two underlying phe- deemed right by some people, but making negative inferences
nomena are quite distinct. We found no significant relationship about the sibling of someone who was the victim of a robbery
between these measures. In addition, whereas immanent-justice seems even less permissible.
reasoning decreased with age, predictions about the lucky in- In Study 3, we tested whether this is indeed the case in the
creased with age, providing further evidence that the mechanism actions of children. We asked whether childrens behavioral pre-
responsible for these effects is not the same. In addition to an dictions of the lucky extend beyond evaluations of individuals to
empirical dissociation, we see a theoretical dissociation as well. evaluations of the associates of lucky and unlucky targets. That is,
766 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
if Jan found $5 on the sidewalk, would children believe that Jans
sister is more likely to perform a good action than Susans sister if
Susan was splashed by a passing car? We compared these evalu-
ations with evaluations of the siblings of individuals who perform
intentional good and bad behaviors. Such a study can provide
initial information about whether evaluative contagion occurs in
the prediction of behavior. If children evaluate people on the basis
of the events that their associates experience, consistent with
predictions of evaluative contagion, this may illuminate how ste-
reotypes and prejudice toward social groups, some of whom ex-
perience more unlucky events, develop.
Method
Participants. Ninety-four participants (48 female) between
the ages of 4 and 12 years (M 7, SD 2) were recruited to
participate in this study, in the same manner as in Study 1.
Participant race and socioeconomic status were not requested, but
experimenters reported that participants were largely White and,
because of location (campus museum), largely middle and upper-
middle class.
Stimuli. The exact items and pictures from Study 1 were used
in Study 3 with a few additions: We doubled the number of
pictures because a sibling was added for each actor. These pictures
were drawn from the same database of pictures used in Study 1. As
in Study 1, the side of presentation of pictures was counterbal-
anced across participants, and the mention of targets (e.g., lucky
first vs. unlucky first) was counterbalanced across items.
Procedure. Participants were read a script that included 16
items. On each trial, participants were told the names of two
children and a fact about each of them that was classified as either
intentional good, intentional bad, lucky, or unlucky (identical to
Study 1). Participants were also shown pictures of the siblings of
each of the children. They were then told about another action
(intentional good or bad) and were told that the sibling of one of
the two initial actors had performed that action. Participants were
asked to point to the sibling who they believed performed the
action. As in the previous studies, when a child or his or her sibling
was mentioned, a picture of that child appeared on the screen.
Below is a complete example of an intentional comparison: Inten-
tional good: This is Ross [picture appears] and his brother [picture
appears]. Ross shared his toys with his neighbor. Intentional bad:
This is Liam [picture appears] and his brother [picture appears].
Liam stole a toy from his neighbor. Intentional bad: The brother of
either Ross or Liam punched a classmate. Which brother punched
his classmate?
Below is a complete example of a random comparison: Unlucky:
This is Jeff [picture appears] and his brother [picture appears]. On
Saturday, Jeff turned on the television and found that there were no
cartoons on. Lucky: This is Todd [picture appears] and his brother
[picture appears]. On Saturday, Todd turned on the television and
found that there was an extra hour of cartoons on. Intentional good:
Either Jeffs or Todds brother helped the teacher clean up after art.
Which brother helped his teacher?
This study took slightly longer than previous studies, and there-
fore, halfway through the script (after eight items), we routinely
asked participants if they wanted to keep playing. Often children,
especially the younger ones, wanted to stop. We always allowed
children to stop whenever they asked, and the majority, if they
stopped, stopped after eight items. Therefore, we also alternated
whether children started at Item 1 or Item 9 to maximize the
number of children completing each item. In total, 20 participants
did not complete all 16 items; however, all participants, except the
ones described below, completed at least six items.
Data preparation and analyses. Several participants were
dropped from analyses for the following reasons: Participants
always picked the same side of the screen or picked the same side
of the screen on 15 of 16 trials (n 10), the parent interfered
during the task (n 2), the participant quit after one item (n 1),
or the child clearly did not understand the task (n 3). After these
exclusions, our sample included 78 participants (41 female), aged
4 to 12 years (M 7, SD 2).
We then computed prediction scores in the same manner as in
Study 1; however, because 20 participants did not complete all of
the items, we had to exclude these participants from any prediction
score in which they did not answer all four items, which resulted
in a sample of 58 63 participants for each prediction score (com-
parable to the number of subjects in Study 1).4
Data were prepared and analyzed using the methods described
in Study 1.
Results
Lucky versus unlucky. In our main comparison of interest, we
found that participants were significantly more likely to pick the
sibling of the unlucky target to perform an intentional bad action
than the sibling of a lucky target, who was in turn selected to be
more likely to perform a good action, as indicated by a one-sample
t test comparing the mean prediction score (M 2.48) with chance
(M 2.0), t(57) 3.51, p .001 (see Figure 2 for proportion of
predicted responses). That is, children generalized evaluations of
an actor to the moral behavior of his or her siblings. It was possible
that this significant effect was driven largely by children believing
either that the siblings of lucky people would do more good things
or that the siblings of unlucky people would do more bad things;
however, a paired-samples t test indicated that there was no sig-
nificant difference on the basis of the valence of the prediction
question, t(57) 0.90, p .37. As in Study 1, we found that age
did not correlate significantly with prediction score for the lucky
versus unlucky comparison, although it was in the positive direc-
tion (r .15, p .25).
Intentional good versus bad. The sibling of the intentional
bad actor was judged as more likely to perform another intentional
bad action than was the sibling of the intentional good actor (and
vice versa for a different intentional good action), as indicated by
4
Because of concerns about the number of participants excluded in these
analyses, we reanalyzed the data using proportions, so that a child who
completed only two lucky versus unlucky items but selected the predicted
response on both items would get a score of 1.0, the same as a child who
completed four items and always selected the predicted response. Note,
however, that a child who was distracted for one item would look very
different when he or she had answered two questions than when he or she
had answered four questions. In the former case, the child would get a
score of .5 (chance), whereas in the latter case, the child would get a score
of .75 (better than chance). This is why we did not analyze the data using
this strategy in the text; this limitation not withstanding, the results of these
proportion-based analyses were almost identical to those reported in the
text using overall scores.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
Figure 2. Mean proportion of responses in which participants selected the
predicted response in Study 3. The predicted response was selecting the
sibling of the lucky or intentional good actor to perform a good action and
selecting the sibling of the unlucky or intentional bad actor to perform a
bad action. The proportion of unpredicted responses is simply 1 the
proportion of predicted responses. Because including both the predicted
and unpredicted bars is redundant, we only included the predicted re-
sponses in the graph.
a one-sample t test comparing the average prediction score (M
2.66) with chance, t(58) 4.52, p .001 (see Figure 2 for
proportion of predicted vs. unpredicted responses). This result
suggests that, barring the presence of other information, children
use the purposeful behavior of one sibling to predict the purposeful
behavior of another sibling. A nonsignificant paired-sample t test
indicated that this effect was equally driven by participants ten-
dency to see the sibling of an intentional good actor as likely to
perform a good action and by participants tendency to see the
sibling of an intentional bad actor as likely to perform a bad action,
t(58) 0.15, p .89. As in Study 1, age was correlated with
performance on the intentional good versus bad comparison (r
.44, p .001), again suggesting that older children show more
consistency across trials than do younger children.
Intentional good versus lucky. Surprisingly, given the previ-
ous results, participants did not distinguish between the siblings of
intentionally good and lucky targets in predicting behavior of
siblings, as indicated by a one-sample t test comparing the mean
prediction score (M 2.15) with chance (2.0; p .30). Thus,
children did not make a significant distinction between whether a
targets sibling performed an intentional good action or experi-
enced a lucky event in evaluating that targets future behavior.
There was no significant difference between predictions of good
versus bad actions, as indicated by a paired-samples t test, t(59)
0.74, p .46. Just as in Study 1, the correlation between perfor-
mance on this comparison and age was not significant (r .06,
p .63).
Intentional bad versus unlucky. In a similar vein, across all
participants, children did not distinguish between intentional bad
actors and unlucky targets in predicting sibling behavior (M
2.17, p .15). They did not evaluate the sibling of an intentional
bad actor to be any more or less likely to perform a different
intentional bad action than the sibling of an unlucky target. In
addition, there was a correlation between age and this comparison
(r .31, p .013), suggesting that older children tended to show
this expectation more than did younger children (as they did in
767
Study 1). Again, there was no significant difference between
prediction scores for good and bad prediction items, t(62) 0.11,
p .91.
Discussion
Study 3 demonstrated that children are willing to evaluate
people on the basis of the actions and experiences of their siblings.
The negative evaluation of unlucky people observed in Studies 1
and 2 rubs off on childrens evaluations of their siblingsthey
are seen as more likely to perform other bad actions. In the same
vein, siblings of lucky people are viewed as more likely to perform
intentional good actions. These findings provide evidence that
evaluative contagion exists and that childrens preference extends
to the associates of lucky and unlucky people.
Surprisingly, children seemed to lose the distinction they made
in Study 1 between intentional and random events when evaluating
the siblings of targets. Although children view siblings of inten-
tional good actors as likely to engage in intentional good actions
when compared with intentional bad actors, they do not believe
that siblings of intentional good actors are more likely to do so
than siblings of lucky targets. Similarly, although siblings of
intentional bad actors are seen as likely to engage in intentional
bad actions themselves when compared with siblings of intentional
good actors, they are not seen as more likely to do so than the
siblings of their unlucky counterparts. Lending further evidence to
this claim is the fact that, unlike in Study 1, there is no significant
difference between the mean scores on the intentional good versus
bad items and the mean scores on the lucky versus unlucky items,
t(56) 0.67, p .51. In other words, whether a child was robbed
or was a robber, the sibling was viewed equally negatively despite
the fact that the evaluations of the actual robbed child or robber
child may have differed. A possible explanation for this pattern is
that siblings merely get tagged with a valence (good vs. bad), and
the nature of the original source event is not involved in the
subsequent evaluation. We return to this affective tagging hypoth-
esis in the General Discussion, but given past findings (e.g., Olson
et al., 2006), one could see how being a member of an unlucky or
otherwise disadvantaged group could lead to being negatively
evaluated, even if the member being evaluated was not the person
involved in the original negative event (such as the siblings in this
study).
These first three studies stand as evidence of the breadth of the
preference for the lucky and evaluative contagion effects. These
phenomena extend beyond judgments of preference to beliefs
about the likelihood of future action, including predictions of both
a targets actions and the actions of a targets sibling.
All three studies also demonstrated a small increase in the
consistency of behavioral predictions for lucky and unlucky targets
over development, from roughly age 5 through age 12. In the next
three studies we further investigated the development of prefer-
ence for the lucky by testing whether even younger, preschool-
aged children showed a preference for the lucky.
Study 4: Preference for the Lucky in Preschoolers
The question of how early this preference emerges has not been
broached. In the current research, we tested this question directly
by creating a simple task that very young children could perform.
768 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
Namely, we presented children with pairs of targets and asked
them simply whos nicer? As in Study 1, we compared chil-
drens evaluations of lucky and unlucky targets but also compared
intentional good with intentional bad actors, intentional good with
lucky targets, and intentional bad with unlucky targets.
Thus, we explored the emergence of these distinctions in 2.5- to
4.5-year-old children. Evidence of a failure (random performance)
at one age and a success at the following age would suggest that
either a distinction begins to be made during this period or the task
is too hard for children below this age. To differentiate between
these two possibilities, we compared performance on the compar-
ison of interest (lucky vs. unlucky) with the other three compari-
sons (intentional good vs. bad, intentional good vs. lucky, inten-
tional bad vs. lucky). If children performed above chance in an
expected direction on at least one comparison, this would suggest
that children understood the task and simply failed to make the
lucky versus unlucky distinction. If they failed at all tests, it would
either mean that young children fail to make all distinctions or,
more likely, that the children failed to understand the task.
Because so many cognitive and social psychological changes
occur in children during this time (e.g., emergence of reasoning
about false beliefs; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001), we placed children into narrower 6-month age
ranges to determine exactly how they perform at each age. For ease
of discussion, we label each age group by its lower bound (e.g.,
children aged 36 41 months are called 3.0-year-olds). This sam-
ple included not only younger children than the first three samples
but also more racial and ethnic diversity. This allowed us to test
(beyond the pilot study mentioned in the discussion of Study 1)
whether our results are limited to majority group participants.
Finally, by using such young children in this study, we shed
light on whether BJW is a likely explanation for childrens pref-
erence for the lucky. As was described in our introduction, Lerner
(1977) predicted that the origins of just-world beliefs are tied to
learning to delay gratification and a transition away from egocen-
trism. In addition, his theory postulated that children must under-
stand the relationship between their behavior and the consequences
that occur later and then must apply this understanding to the
behavior of others. All of these abilities are beyond the scope of
young preschoolers (Harris, 1992; Kurdek, 1979; Kurdek & Rod-
gon, 1975; Mischel & Mischel, 1983), so evidence of a preference
for the lucky in young preschoolers would call into question BJW
theory as an explanation for preference for the lucky in young
children.
Method
Participants. Twelve 2.5-year-olds (5 female; 33.236.9
months, M 35.1, SD 0.77), thirty-one 3.0-year-olds (16
female; 36.3 41.9 months, M 39.0, SD 1.8), twenty-nine
3.5-year-olds (16 female; 42.0 47.8 months, M 45.2, SD
1.6), twenty-seven 4.0-year-olds (18 female; 48.0 53.6 months,
M 50.4, SD 1.9), and sixteen 4.5-year-olds (8 female; 54.1
59.9 months, M 56.7, SD 2.1) participated. This sample was
considerably more diverse than those in the previous studies, as it
included 44 White, 11 Black, 19 Asian, 10 Hispanic, 2 Native
American, and 17 biracial participants and 12 participants whose
parents did not specify race or ethnicity. All participants were
recruited while attending a university preschool in California.
Stimuli. Twenty-four pictures of children (12 male, 12 fe-
male) were selected from a larger database of photographs and
made into 12 same-sex pairs, matched on adult ratings of attrac-
tiveness and age. Twenty-four statements were also created such
that six involved intentional good events, six involved intentional
bad events, six involved random good experiences, and six in-
volved random bad experiences. An object was used to represent
each statement (to minimize memory demands), and a photograph
of a child was included to represent the target. For example, for the
item [John] helped his parents with the chores, a vacuum cleaner
icon was presented along with a unique picture of a boy. Each
statement/object/photograph set was paired with another on a page
of a flipbook. In total, participants saw three intentional good
intentional bad pairs, three random goodrandom bad pairs, three
intentional goodrandom good pairs, and three intentional bad
random bad pairs.
In total, we created eight versions of the task to counterbalance
for gender of targets, item effects, and the side of the flipbook on
which each photograph appeared. The order of mention of targets
(e.g., lucky vs. unlucky) varied across items. All subjects com-
pleted items in the following order, although the exact items
differed across version: IG (intentional good)IB (intentional bad),
RG (random good)RB (random bad), IGIB, RGRB, IGIB,
RGRB, IGRG, IBRB, IGRG, IBRB, IGRG, IBRB. This
order was selected because the first six items were the primary
ones of interest, and we were initially concerned that the younger
children might not sit through 12 items (although they did). Par-
ticipants were sequentially assigned to one of the eight versions.
Procedure. Participants were brought to a small room and
were seated next to the experimenter. Children were told Were
going to play a game. This game is called the whos nicer? game.
I will tell you about some people and then Ill ask you whos
nicer? Does that make sense? Are you ready to play? Once
children indicated that they were ready, the experimenter began
reading the pairs one at a time until participants completed all 12
items or something caused the participant to finish early (e.g., a
fire alarm). Five participants (4%) participated but were excluded
because they failed to complete all 12 items. Failure to complete
the study was the result of accidents, such as fire drills, or a child
needing to use the bathroom during the task.
Results
Data preparation. For each type of comparison, we computed
a separate score, giving children one point each time they selected
the predicted response (intentional good for the IGIB comparison,
random good for RGRB comparison, intentional good for IGRG
comparison, and random bad for IBRB comparison). Each child
therefore had a score that ranged from 0 (never picked the pre-
dicted response) to 3 (always picked the predicted response) for
each type of comparison. Scores were always compared with
chance (1.5) using a one-sample t test.
Overall results. Across all participants, responses for all
composites differed from chance in the predicted direction: inten-
tional good versus intentional bad (M 2.06, SD 0.88),
t(114) 6.82, p .001; lucky versus unlucky (M 1.87, SD
0.88), t(114) 4.48, p .001; intentional good versus lucky (M
1.86, SD 0.94), t(114) 4.10, p .001; intentional bad versus
unlucky (M 1.81, SD 0.90), t(114) 3.69, p .001.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
Having a range of ages also allowed us to look for correlations
between age and performance. Age was correlated with all of the
composites such that older children had higher scores on all
composites (intentional good vs. intentional bad, r .46, p
.001; lucky vs. unlucky, r .31, p .001; intentional good vs.
lucky, r .46, p .001; intentional bad vs. unlucky, r .35, p
.001). See Figure 3 for a breakdown of responses by age. We found
no significant effect of gender on any of the four composites ( ps
.10).
2.5-year-olds and 3.0-year-olds. None of the indices differed
significantly from chance for 2.5-year-olds ( ps .35) or for
3.0-year-olds ( ps .15).
3.5-year-olds. Participants who were 3.5 years old judged the
intentional good actors to be nicer than the intentional bad actors
(M 1.93, SD 0.88), t(28) 2.63, p .014; the lucky targets
to be nicer than the unlucky targets (M 2.03, SD 0.78),
t(28) 3.70, p .001; the intentional good actors to be nicer than
the lucky targets (M 1.86, SD 0.88), t(28) 2.23, p .034;
and the unlucky targets to be marginally nicer than the intentional
bad actors (M 1.79, SD 0.82), t(28) 1.93, p .064.
4.0-year-olds. Four-year-old participants judged the inten-
tional good actors to be nicer than the intentional bad actors (M
2.52, SD 0.75), t(26) 7.03, p .001; the lucky targets to be
nicer than the unlucky targets (M 2.15, SD 0.91), t(26)
3.71, p .001; the intentional good actors to be nicer than the
lucky targets (M 2.52, SD 0.64), t(26) 8.23, p .001; and
the unlucky targets to be nicer than the intentional bad actors (M
2.07, SD 1.00), t(26) 3.40, p .002.
4.5-year-olds. The 4.5-year-old participants also viewed the
intentional good actors as nicer than the intentional bad actors
(M 2.63, SD 0.72), t(15) 6.26, p .001; the lucky targets
as nicer than the unlucky targets (M 2.13, SD 0.81), t(15)
3.10, p .007; the intentional good actors as nicer than the lucky
targets (M 2.19, SD 0.91), t(15) 3.02, p .009; and the
unlucky targets as nicer than the intentional bad actors (M 2.25,
SD 0.77), t(15) 3.87, p .002.
Discussion
Across ages, a consistent pattern emerged such that around the
age of 3.5 years, children were able to make distinctions between
those who performed intentional good versus bad actions and
Figure 3. Mean number of times in Study 4 that children at each age
selected the lucky or intentional good actor as nicer than the unlucky or
intentional bad actor. A score of 1.5 equals chance. Asterisks indicate that
the mean differed significantly from chance. Intent intentional.
769
between those who experienced lucky versus unlucky events, and
they made further distinctions between those involved in inten-
tional versus random actions. In particular, it is interesting that
these distinctions seem to emerge at approximately the same age.
Of course, one possible explanation remains that the task was
simply too difficult for younger children. In Study 6, we addressed
this possibility by testing children in an even simpler task.
Our previous study of attitudes toward the lucky and unlucky
looked exclusively at children over the age of 5.0 years. The
current study allowed us to see that 4-year-olds do in fact demon-
strate this preference and that even 3.5-year-olds do. In addition,
this study newly examined the age at which children begin to
distinguish between evaluations of intentional actors and random
targets. Most of the studies that have compared intentional with
accidental events have examined older children (Elkind & Dabek,
1977; Surber, 1982) or collapsed over large age ranges and there-
fore have not conclusively demonstrated that 3.5-year-olds show
this distinction between the intentional and accidental (e.g., Shultz
& Wells, 1985; Shultz et al., 1980; Yuill & Perner, 1988). We have
demonstrated that the distinction between intentional and random
is made reliably around age 3.5 years. At this age, children
recognize that an individual is more good or more bad if he or
she acted with intent than if he or she happened to be a mere
recipient of such events.
Another explanation for this effect needs to be addressed. It is
possible that these studies created a preference for the lucky by
forcing such a response. That is, perhaps young children actually
preferred the lucky and unlucky targets equally but merely dem-
onstrated this bias because they had to select an answer, a judg-
ment they would not have offered if left alone. Such a result is still
interesting, and this possibility is worth testing, so we did so in
Study 5.
Study 5: Do Young Children Actually Think the Lucky
and Unlucky Are Equally Nice?
In Study 5, we examined the possibility that our findings in
Study 4 were the result of an experimental demand. To test this
possibility, in Study 5, we presented children with a forced-choice
task that included a third alternative: Theyre exactly the same.
Children were presented with the same stimuli as in Study 4, but
were instead asked Whos nicer, [Johnny], [Jimmy], or theyre
exactly the same? If anything, this option should have created a
new demand: to employ use of the exactly the same response,
given its neutral stance and presence as an option. If childrens
natural inclination is not to differentiate between lucky and un-
lucky targets, then we should have seen children providing more
exactly the same responses than lucky responses, and we should have
seen the difference between lucky and unlucky disappear. In contrast,
if children believe that lucky is better than unlucky, we should
have continued to see the lucky targets selected more often than
the unlucky, in spite of the presence of an exactly the same
response.
Method
Participants. Participants included 49 children (33 female)
between the ages of 4.0 and 5.5 years (M 54.7 months, SD 5.1
months) attending the same university preschool as those in Study
770 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
4. Two subjects were excluded from analyses because they did not
understand the task, resulting in 47 children (33 female; M 55.0
months, SD 5.1 months). This study also employed a diverse
sample (racial/ethnic breakdown: 19 White, 4 Black, 7 Asian, 7
Hispanic, 5 biracial or multiracial, and 5 did not specify). We
included children in this age group because they had most clearly
demonstrated the effects in Study 4.
Stimuli and design. The stimuli were identical to those pre-
sented in Study 4, although the exact items were randomized. This
time, the 12 items included six that compared lucky to unlucky and
six that compared intentional good to bad (because these were the
primary questions of interest, and we wanted to collect more data
on these items from each participant). The items of most interest
(lucky vs. unlucky) were presented first. We included the inten-
tional good versus intentional bad items to test whether the new
option, exactly the same, changed performance on the clearest
type of comparison and to test whether children understood the
task. We reasoned that if a child always responded exactly the
same for each lucky versus unlucky item, this could be either
because he or she thought that random events were not indicative
of niceness or because he or she did not understand the task. We
therefore included intentional good versus intentional bad to dis-
tinguish between these two cases. If a child used the exactly the
same response for every random comparison but stopped using the
exactly the same response for any of the intentional good versus
intentional bad items, as a few children did, then we kept the child
in the data set because it seemed clear that he or she understood the
task. If a child used the exactly the same response for all 12 items
(including intentional and random), we hypothesized that the child
did not understand the task, because it seemed unlikely that a child
would believe that in all cases an intentional bad actor was just as
nice as an intentional good actor. The latter situation occurred only
one time, and this child was excluded from the dataset (one of the
two excluded above). In total, four versions of the task were
created, consisting of two different scripts, each with the order
described above. We then counterbalanced the scripts to control
for the side of the page on which a given photograph appeared. In
all scripts, the order of mention was varied across items.
Procedure. First, children were given three training trials for
what we described as the first game, the whos taller game. The
experimenter explained that two people would appear and the task
would be to say which one was taller: the first one, the second one,
or they are exactly the same. In these trials, two stick figures were
presented. In the first two trials, one was clearly larger than the
other, and the experimenter indicated which one she would select
if asked who is taller. In the third trial, two stick figures of the
same size were presented, differing in color, and the experimenter
indicated that she would say Theyre exactly the same. Data
were not recorded for this task, but anecdotally, children seemed to
understand and often shouted their (always correct) responses
before the experimenter had a chance to say her opinion. Finally
the experimenter said that the subject would get to play a game but
that it was a little different from the whos taller game. Instead, the
game would be the whos nicer game, and children could select
either person or say theyre exactly the same. All children said
they understood, and the experimenter began. Children were read
each of the 12 pairs of items and were then asked, Whos nicer,
[Alex], [Andrew], or theyre exactly the same? As a conservative
test, we added exactly the same as the final response, as anec-
dotally, we have observed that children have a tendency to pick the
last option given. Children indicated their responses by either
pointing or stating their response.
Data preparation. For the six items of each type (random or
intentional), we computed a score, tallying the number of times the
good, bad, or exactly the same response was given. We then
compared each score with chance using a one-sample t test.
Results and Discussion
Contrary to a task-demand explanation, we found that children
continued to select the lucky targets (M 3.14 out of 6) as nicer
more often than chance (2.0), t(48) 4.11, p .00l (see Figure 4).
Because these responses were interdependent, it is not surprising
that the unlucky targets were selected less often than chance (M
1.14), t(48) 4.83, p .001, and the exactly the same response
did not differ from chance (M 1.71), t(48) 0.97, p .34. It
is not surprising that children also selected the intentional good
actor most often for the intentional items (M 4.59) and that this
was selected more often than chance (M 2.0), t(48) 10.48,
p .001 (see Figure 4). The intentional bad actors were selected
less often than chance would predict (M 0.63), t(48) 10.07,
p .001, and the exactly the same response was also selected less
than chance (M 0.78), t(48) 5.92, p .001. A summary of
the results can be seen in Figure 4.
One possible explanation for these results is that children were
simply reluctant to use the exactly the same response and that this
may therefore have been an unfair test. However, 55% of children
used this response at least once during the task. For these partic-
ipants, we computed a preference for the lucky score by subtract-
ing the number of times they selected the unlucky as nice com-
pared with the number of times they selected the lucky as nice. We
compared this value with zero using a one-sample t test and found
that even those participants who used the exactly the same re-
sponse at least once selected the lucky more than the unlucky,
t(26) 2.06, p .05.
These results suggest that the findings in Study 4 were not
simply the result of a forced-choice task. Instead, we found that
young children continued to articulate that the lucky target was
nicer than the unlucky target. Of course, children did use the
exactly the same response from time to time, but they did not do
so more often than they selected the lucky target, and the addition
Figure 4. Mean proportion of times in Study 5 that each actor was
selected as the nicer one across six lucky versus unlucky items and across
six intentional good versus intentional bad items in which the option
exactly the same was also given. Int. intentional.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
of this option did not undermine the preference for the lucky over
the unlucky.
Study 6: Preference for the Lucky in a Simplified Task
A remaining concern from Study 4 is the difficulty of the task
for children younger than 3.5 years of age. This possibility is
suggested by evidence that 2.5- and 3.0-year-old children were no
more likely to select the intentional good actor than the intentional
bad actor as nicer. Despite our attempts to make Study 5 simple,
perhaps the memory and attention load (learning and then remem-
bering what two different people did before making a response)
was simply too great for our youngest participants. Thus, in Study
6, rather than presenting pairs of targets and asking children to
remember both before selecting an answer, we presented one target
at a time and simply asked children whether each target was nice
or not nice. Because Study 4 demonstrated a preference for the
lucky in children beginning at age 3.5, in this study, we tested
3.0-year-old children.
Method
Participants. Participants included twenty-five 3.0-year-old
children (11 female, aged 36.7 41.8 months, M 39.3, SD 1.5)
recruited from either the same campus nursery school in California
as the children in Studies 4 and 5 (n 12) or from a lab database
in Massachusetts (n 13). Participant race was not recorded, but
we estimated that the final sample was approximately 60% White
and that the remaining 40% were evenly distributed among Black,
Asian and multiracial participants.
Procedure. Participants were brought to a small testing room
and were seated next to the experimenter. The experimenter told
the child that he or she was going to see some other kids and be
asked whether each target was nice or not nice. Participants were
presented with a total of 24 targets, six of each type (lucky,
unlucky, intentional good, intentional bad) in one of four possible
scripts (2 randomized orders 2 gender orders).
Results and Discussion
Data preparation and analyses. In general, children were
more like to say nice than expected by chance (50%), t(24)
2.27, p .032, and this was true for some participants more than
others. We were not concerned with this fact, however, given that
this bias should have been equally prevalent across item types and
that our analyses were within subject. A composite score was
created for each type of item such that the total number of nice
judgments (out of six possible) was computed for each subject. We
then compared these means using paired-sample t tests.
Participants most often designated the intentional good actors as
nice (M 5.0, SD 2.1), followed by the lucky targets (M 4.2,
SD 2.0), then the unlucky targets (M 3.4, SD 2.1), and then
the intentional bad actors (M 2.4, SD 2.2); this pattern was
demonstrated by a significant linear trend, F(1, 24) 24.12, p
.001. In addition, all paired t tests indicated differences. Most
notable, the lucky targets were more often labeled as nice com-
pared with the unlucky targets, t(24) 2.16, p .041, and the
intentional good actors were labeled as nice more often than the
intentional bad actors, t(24) 5.17, p .001. Children also
771
selected the intentional good actors as nice more often than the
lucky targets, t(24) 2.22, p .036, and the unlucky targets as
nice more often than the intentional bad actors, t(24) 3.69, p
.001. Thus, by simplifying the attentional and memory demands of
the task, we demonstrated that even children aged 3.0 years prefer
lucky to unlucky individuals.
In a pilot version of this study with 2.5-year-olds, we found that
this task was too difficult for them. Children at this age either said
nice for every item or simply refused to provide an answer,
suggesting that to ask whether children younger than 3.0 years
show a preference for the lucky, a completely new, perhaps non-
verbal task needs to be created.
Across Studies 4 6, our results indicated that even very young
preschoolers demonstrate a preference for the lucky over the
unlucky. This preference appears when lucky and unlucky indi-
viduals are pitted against each other in a forced choice, when
children have an explicit option to like lucky and unlucky targets
equally, and when the targets are presented serially. Such a finding
causes some problems for the fullest just-world explanation.
Lerners (1977) hypotheses about the emergence of just-world
thinking suggests that children need to be many months if not
years older to show the earliest evidence of just-world thinking.
His explanation requires that children move beyond the pleasure
principle to the reality principle, which is expected to occur around
the age of 6 or 7 years. Even with the most generous definition, 3
years of age is clearly too young for such a transition. It seems
highly unlikely, given other results in cognitive development, that
3.5-year-olds have the cognitive capacities and awareness, such as
perspective taking and delay of gratification, required for just-
world types of reasoning (Kurdek, 1979; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975;
Mischel & Mischel, 1983).
These results provide clear support for the hypothesis that a
preference for the lucky is in place by age 3.0 and that it may be
present prior to that age. It is possible that in future research with
new procedures, such a preference may be detected even earlier. It
is also possible that a simpler version of the just-world belief (e.g.,
a basic belief that good things happen to good people and bad
things happen to bad people, without a deeper understanding of the
complexity of the world or an ability to inhibit their actions) is held
by very young children, although establishing that such a theory is
in place would require additional work.
One of the major undertakings of the current article was to
investigate how widespread the preference for the lucky is. We
have now demonstrated that it is seen in children ranging in age
from 3 to 12 years, that older children extend this preference to
predictions of the intentional behavior of lucky and unlucky tar-
gets, and that they extend the preference to the siblings of the
targets. In the final two studies, we investigated whether prefer-
ence for the lucky and evaluative contagion appear cross cultur-
ally.
Study 7: Cross-Cultural Evidence of the Preference for
the Lucky
In two final studies, we asked whether the preference for the
lucky is constrained to the minds of young children from Western
cultures or whether it might instead be a preference held by young
children across very different cultures. As our first test of this
question, we investigated whether young children who were raised
772 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI

in a culture that appears to promote fewer trait inferences than that

of the United States show this same preference. Research on causal
attributions has examined cross-cultural differences in adults ten-
dency to use situational versus dispositional (trait) explanations of
human behavior (Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Morris & Peng,
1994).5 Although sometimes the findings have been mixed, when
differences have been found, they have tended to fall along Eastern
(Japan, India, etc.) versus Western (United States, England, etc.)
lines, with Easterners tending to use more situational explanations
for behavior and Westerners using more dispositional explanations
(Krull et al., 1999; Masuda & Kitayama, 2004; Morris & Peng,
1994). As noted, it is possible that dispositional attributions are at
the heart of childrens preference for the lucky. That is, perhaps
because American children live in a culture that values disposi-
tional attributions, they tend to blame unlucky targets and credit
lucky targets, essentially overextending dispositional explanations
to random events. Therefore, Japan stands as an interesting test
case for examining cultural variability in the preference for the
lucky over the unlucky. If children in both cultures show a pref-
erence for the lucky over the unlucky, then cultural differences in
attributions likely do not explain the preference-for-the-lucky ef-
fect.
For this study, we employed a simple test of preference for the
lucky in the form of liking judgments of lucky and unlucky targets.
Such a test allowed us to examine whether Japanese children
differentially evaluated lucky and unlucky targets, rather than
asking them to predict behavior (a task that we reasoned required
a more elaborated judgment, so if differences occurred, they could
be explained by several factors). In addition, by employing the
selected method, we could compare the results with published
findings with an equivalent American sample (Olson et al., 2006).
Method
Participants. Twenty-six children from rural Japan partici-
pated; 3 were excluded because of poor participation (e.g., giving
the same response to every item), resulting in 23 participants (10
female; aged 4 7 years; M 5). We selected these ages to
approximately match those used in Olson et al. (2006), which
employed an identical method. In actuality, this sample was ap-
proximately 6 months younger than the Olson et al. sample.
Stimuli. In total, 40 vignettes were created, 10 of each type
(intentional good, intentional bad, lucky, unlucky). These items
were scrambled and divided into lists of 10 items each. The items
were then scrambled again, and four more lists were created,
making a total of eight lists. Each list contained at least one item
of each type, with the gender of the targets alternating by item.
Participants were sequentially assigned to a list. All items were
taken from Olson et al. (2006) and were translated into Japanese by
Yarrow Dunham and then checked and back translated by two
native Japanese speakers to ensure accuracy. The only changes
made were those necessary to maintain understanding (e.g., in the
American version, the target found $5 on the sidewalk, whereas in
the Japanese version, the target found 500 yen, and names were
changed from Mike to Minoru).
Procedure. First, children were trained to use a 6-point
smiley-to-frowny-face scale that they were to use later in the study.
The experimenter gave examples of how he would evaluate dif-
ferent people (e.g., his mother vs. his neighbor) using the scale and
Figure 5. Mean liking rating for intentional good, lucky, unlucky, and
intentional bad actors in Study 7, as rated by Japanese children. Higher
scores indicate greater liking, and error bars indicate standard error of the
mean.
asked the child if he or she understood how to use the scale.
Children were then read one of the scripts that included 10 items
describing the actions of an individual or an event experienced by
an individual (e.g., Tarou helped his teacher). After reading each
vignette, the experimenter asked children to indicate how much
they liked each actor using the 6-point smiley-to-frowny-face
scale. These scores were then converted to a 6-point numeric scale.
Data preparation. Following the procedure of Olson et al.
(2006), the average rating for each type of target (intentional good,
intentional bad, lucky, unlucky) for each participant was com-
puted. We used paired t tests to compare ratings of targets.
Results and Discussion
Ratings. Japanese children preferred intentional good targets
(M 4.68) to intentional bad targets (M 3.06), t(22) 3.61,
p .002, and lucky targets (M 4.24) to unlucky targets (M
3.12), t(22) 2.87, p .009 (see Figure 5). These results support
the claim that Japanese children have a preference for the lucky
over the unlucky, despite living in a culture that tends to use fewer
dispositional attributions and despite our use of a non-forced-
choice method. It is interesting that the difference between inten-
tional bad actors and unlucky targets was not significant ( p .75)
and that the difference between intentional good actors and lucky
targets was only marginally significant, t(22) 1.85, p .08. In
addition, we computed the difference between evaluations of in-
tentional good and bad actors and the difference between evalua-
tions of lucky and unlucky targets. We then compared these
differences and found that there was no significant difference,
t(22) 1.32, p .20. That is, Japanese children made almost no
5
The few studies that have directly examined cross-cultural causal
attributions in children have been conducted by Miller (1984, 1986). In
those studies, she asked children to spontaneously name examples of
intentional good and bad actions from their lives, and she tested whether
their explanations for these actions were more situational or dispositional.
Her studies differed in several significant ways from the current work:
There was no investigation of random events; the events were produced by
the subjects, not the experimenters; the children were older than those
examined here; and her sample was Indian, not Japanese. She found no
significant differences across Indian and American cultures in childrens
tendency to use situational versus dispositional explanations.
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
distinction between whether targets engaged in intentional behav-
ior or experienced random events.
It is important to note that the effect size of the preference for
the lucky in this sample is very similar to the equivalent effect size
in the U.S. sample reported in Olson et al. (2006), which used the
same task and a comparable age range (d 1.07 in United States,
d 0.93 in Japan). However, the comparison of intentional good
and intentional bad actors suggests a large difference between the
Japanese and American samples. Although both groups preferred
the intentional good to intentional bad targets, the effect size in the
American sample is more than twice as large as the effect size in
the Japanese sample (d 3.04 in United States, d 1.30 in
Japan), a result perhaps related to past findings of differences
between American and Japanese peoples use of dispositional and
situational explanations. In addition, in this sample, participants
made no significant distinction between the intentional bad and
unlucky targets and only a marginal distinction between the inten-
tional good and lucky targets. In comparison, American children
made a large distinction between intentional bad and unlucky
targets and also a marginal distinction between intentional good
and lucky targets.
These results suggest that young children in cultures that vary in
evaluations of intentional acts nonetheless blame victims of bad
fortune and reward recipients of good fortune in similar ways.
Both show a preference for the lucky. In this result, we have initial
evidence of cross-cultural generalizability of the preference for the
lucky from a country with a culture that provides a meaningful test.
In our final study, we took this initial result one step further and
asked whether Japanese children also show evaluative contagion.
Study 8: Cross-Cultural Similarity in Evaluative
Contagion
We asked whether Japanese children extend their preference for
the lucky to entire social groups. Children were presented with
members of two novel groups, one group that contained some
members who had experienced lucky events and one group that
contained some members who had experienced unlucky events. It
is critical to note that both groups had some members who had
experienced neither lucky nor unlucky events (see Levy & Dweck,
1999, for a similar procedure). Children were then introduced to
these new members of each group and were asked to indicate
which group member they preferred.
Method
Participants. Eighty-seven participants (49 female, aged 4 7
years, M 5.8, SD 1) from rural Japan completed the study.
One other participant completed the study but had to be removed
from the sample because of experimenter error.
Stimuli. An artist drew cartoons of six children, three boys
and three girls. The same six pictures were used to represent
members of each of the groups; the only difference across groups
was the color of their shirts. The lucky and unlucky events were
taken from Study 7, and the neutral items were either described as
something the actor liked to eat (e.g., Yuko likes oatmeal) or an
activity in which the actor engaged (e.g., Ayumi rides her bike).
Procedure. Participants were presented with four trials. On
each trial, they were told about members of two groups. The
773
groups were never explicitly labeled and were distinct only be-
cause of shirt color and the side of the screen on which they
appeared (e.g., cartoons in blue shirts were always on the right side
of the screen, and cartoons in green shirts were always on the left
side of the screen). Cartoon children appeared on the screen one at
a time, alternating groups (e.g., first a child in a blue shirt ap-
peared, followed by a child in a green shirt). As each picture
appeared, participants were told one fact about that child. For
Group A, three of the five children were described as experiencing
lucky events and two were associated with neutral facts. In Group
B, three of five children were described as experiencing unlucky
events and two were associated with neutral facts. After the 10
group members had appeared on the screen, two final children
appeared, one from each group. These two children, the targets,
were identical except for shirt color, and each appeared on the
same side of the screen as had the other members of their group.
Participants were asked which of these two targets they liked
better. Two unique trials like the ones described above were
created, and two additional trials were created substituting inten-
tional good actions for lucky events and intentional bad actions for
unlucky events, resulting in four final trials. The lucky group, the
unlucky group, the intentional good group, and the intentional bad
group each appeared on the left once and on the right once.
Data preparation. Data preparation and analysis was identical
to that used in Study 2 of Olson et al (2006). The two lucky versus
unlucky items were combined into a composite, and the two
intentional good versus bad items were combined into a separate
composite. Each composite was computed by giving the subject
one point each time they picked the good or lucky actor, resulting
in an index score between 0 (never picked the good or lucky actor)
to 2 (always picked the good or lucky actor). Because only three
scores were possible (0, 1, or 2), nonparametric tests were neces-
sary. Overall results were analyzed using chi-square goodness-of-
fit tests (chance was computed to be 25% for 0, 50% for 1, and
25% for 2).
Results and Discussion
Findings. Childrens preferences differed significantly from
chance for both the intentional good versus bad comparison, 2(2,
N 87) 6.45, p .040, and the lucky versus unlucky com-
parison, 2(2, N 87) 16.22, p .001 (see Figure 6). Inspec-
Figure 6. Proportion of Japanese childrens responses across items in
which they preferred the new member of the intentional good or intentional
bad group in the intentional good versus intentional bad comparisons (left
side) and the member of the lucky or unlucky group in the lucky versus
unlucky comparisons (right side) in Study 8.
774 OLSON, DUNHAM, DWECK, SPELKE, AND BANAJI
tion of the data indicated that children were more likely to prefer
the member of the intentional good group than the member of the
intentional bad group and, consistent with evaluative contagion,
also preferred the new member of the lucky group to the new
member of the unlucky group.
These results demonstrate that Japanese children evaluate indi-
viduals on the basis of the actions and experiences of others who
are socially associated with them. Again, a comparison with the
corresponding U.S. sample is in order. As in Study 7, the effect
sizes for these two samples are nearly identical for evaluations of
people associated with those experiencing random good and bad
events (w .45 in United States, from Olson et al., 2006; w .43
in Japan). Also as in Study 7, American children showed three
times as large an effect size for intentional good versus bad items
compared with Japanese children (w .83 for United States, w
.27 for Japan). Once again, we found that Japanese children
showed less of a bias against intentional bad groups than did
American children, just as they showed less of a bias against
intentional bad individuals.
In sum, children growing up in Japan, where dispositional
attributions have been observed to be weaker than in Western
cultures, showed a preference for the lucky over the unlucky as
well as evaluative contagion in the first cross-cultural tests of these
phenomena. These results suggest that evaluative contagion is
generalizable across cultures. Japanese children performed nearly
identically to American children on this task, preferring members
of predominantly lucky groups to members of predominantly
unlucky groups.
General Discussion
Across eight studies, we have demonstrated that children show
a robust tendency to judge the lucky positively. This preference
was revealed by a variety of methods and is present in children
from a wide range of ethnicities, races, towns, states, countries,
and social classes, including predominantly White middle- to
upper-middle-class elementary school children in Utah and Mas-
sachusetts, low-income Black children in Massachusetts, pre-
school children from a wide range of ethnicities in California, and
rural Japanese children. Across these many samples and tasks,
several results emerged clearly. Young children prefer lucky indi-
viduals to unlucky ones, children predict that the lucky are more
likely to perform intentional good actions and that the unlucky are
more likely to perform intentional bad actions, and children extend
these predictions and evaluations to the siblings and group mem-
bers of lucky and unlucky individuals.
Another major finding of these studies was that the preference
for the lucky appeared at a very young age. We cannot conclude
that children below the age of 3 years do not prefer the lucky, only
that they did not do so in our task, which may simply have been too
hard for them. Measures such as looking time and reaching be-
havior have been used successfully with young infants and even
nonhuman primates in other cognitive and social cognitive tasks
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985; Nurock et al., 2007;
Santos & Hauser, 1999), and perhaps creative researchers can
design studies to test whether children (or even other species)
prefer the lucky. If evidence for this effect in young infants or
other primates were found, it would suggest that either this pref-
erence is innate or it grows readily out of early cognition, perhaps
in conjunction with early socialization.
The current studies also provided initial evidence that the pref-
erence for the lucky is not constrained to Western societies by
showing the same tendencies in Japanese school children as in
their American counterparts. Although our results are suggestive
of cultural invariance, this preference should be examined in
countries that differ from the United States and Japan in meaning-
ful ways, such as in beliefs about or experience with luck to test
further for cultural invariance. For example, do children who live
in surroundings in which they have very little control over their
environments and therefore experience unlucky events frequently
(e.g., children in refugee camps in Sudan) prefer those who expe-
rience lucky events to those who experience unlucky events, or
does their own experience attenuate or even reverse this prefer-
ence?
The value of these results is based both on the empirical dem-
onstrations themselves as well as on the theoretical questions they
resolve. Two theories stood out as deserving a test alongside the
phenomena of preference for the lucky and evaluative contagion:
immanent justice and BJW. Despite a similarity in the structure of
the test of immanent justice and the present studies, the results
demonstrated a clear dissociation between the two. Whereas im-
manent justice decreased across age, judgments of the lucky did
not and, if anything, increased across childhood. In addition, by
demonstrating a preference for the lucky in very young children,
we minimized the likelihood that just-world beliefs, as they have
been previously described (Lerner, 1977), drive the preference for
the lucky in young children.
In a set of related studies in progress, we are now investigating
the hypothesis that the preference for the lucky is not driven by
justice-related concerns at all but, rather, that a simpler mechanism
may be responsible for these effects (Olson, Heberlein, Kensinger,
Spelke, Dweck, & Banaji, 2008). In particular, we are investigat-
ing the possibility that the affect associated with a good or bad
event (whether intended or not) rubs off on the individuals expe-
riencing those events, resulting in evaluations of the individuals
that are consistent in valence with the events, a process we call
affective tagging. It is important to note that this hypothesis is
more parsimonious than many of the justice theories and makes
some differing predictions. For example, whereas just-world the-
ory predicts that a preference for the lucky should primarily occur
when the events described are extreme and threaten a persons
sense of justice, the affective-tagging hypothesis predicts that
lucky individuals will always be associated with some positivity
and unlucky individuals will always be associated with some
negativity (although in some cases, other factors, such as empathy
or impression formation, may work in opposition to these evalu-
ations). This prediction is relevant to the current studies because
the items we selected in these studies are trivial events, hardly the
events likely to violate ones sense that the world is just. There-
fore, the fact that we see a preference for the lucky even for these
events provides some initial evidence in favor of the affective-
tagging hypothesis.
One may wonder whether children grow out of the preference
for the lucky or, alternatively, whether this preference continues
across childhood into adulthood, increasing as the trajectory of the
data in this article might suggest. One could imagine that after the
age of 12 years, the developmental trajectory shifts and adoles-
 JUDGMENTS OF THE LUCKY
cents grow out of this belief. Even if this were the case, a dislike
of particular unlucky groups may nonetheless become entrenched
in childhood and continue into adulthood, long after the mecha-
nism that formed them has ceased to operate. Another possibility
is that adults continue to hold these judgments or even increase
them, leading to a continuation of prejudice toward unlucky and
disadvantaged people and groups. Our research in progress, in
which we use a similar paradigm, suggests that these preferences
seem to continue through adulthood, although they abate consid-
erably; this apparent abatement may be due to adults becoming
more reluctant to express the preference publicly. In a simple
replication of Study 1, we found that adults show the same pattern
of believing that lucky targets are more likely to perform good
actions and that unlucky targets are more likely to perform bad
actions. A preference for the lucky was also found in American
adults in a conceptual replication of Study 7, showing that they
prefer people who experience lucky events to those who experi-
ence unlucky events, even when we used a non-forced-choice
design.
As discussed above, this liking of the lucky and disliking of the
unlucky is similar to many related findings that suggest that people
and things are evaluatively tagged on the basis of the valence of
other information associated with that individual or thing. For
example, research has shown that adults tend to dislike the bearer
of information with which they disagree, even when the bearer of
the information disagrees with the information being shared (Ma-
nis, Cornell, & Moore, 1974), and that adults see an individual as,
for example, more angry if that individual has described another
person as angry (Skowronski, Carlston, Mae, & Crawford, 1998).
In addition, even novel objects elicit rapid evaluation (Duckworth,
Bargh, Garcia, & Chaiken, 2002), and it is therefore not unrea-
sonable to think that quick evaluations occur when humans ob-
serve other humans, a prediction at the heart of the affective-
tagging hypothesis (Olson et al., 2008).
Although the preference for the lucky may seem to be an
innocent bias, it is possible that it has important and insidious
repercussions, in particular because those expressing it are young
children. In the real world, random events are, by definition, out of
the control of the individuals experiencing them, but they are not
completely random in whom they affect. Rather, some groups
(those who are disadvantaged) tend to experience these types of
events more than do others. Hurricane Katrina, which hit the
United States Gulf Coast in August of 2005, stands as a striking
example of the unequal impact of random events on members of
advantaged and disadvantaged groups. A disproportionate number
of those who were stranded in New Orleans were disadvantaged,
a disproportionate number of those who died were disadvantaged,
and the impact on the lives of those who survived was greater for
the victims who were members of disadvantaged groups. There-
fore, what at first appears to be an innocuous beliefthat lucky
people are better than unlucky peoplemay actually lead to a
systematic bias against disadvantaged people and groups, resulting
in both inculcation and perpetuation of prejudice in children.
If it is true that the preference for the lucky and the contagion of
these judgments play a role in the development and maintenance of
prejudice, then this would suggest that to fight prejudice and its
development, it is not enough to censor racist remarks, do sensi-
tivity training in schools, and read politically correct stories. As
long as negative outcomes continue to fall disproportionately on
775
some groups, we may be unwittingly providing our children with
the evidence they use to infer that groups inferiority. This means
that parents, teachers, and society must not only come to under-
stand the preferences young children hold but also must under-
stand that if they wish to change the impact of these preferences,
society needs to rectify the injustices that cause disadvantage
and/or develop strategies to counteract young childrens early
preferences.
Thus, these preferences may be one of the origins of or contrib-
uting factors to the development of stereotyping, prejudice, and
discrimination, perhaps via the development and maintenance of
group hierarchies. Such a conclusion is relevant to social psycho-
logical discourse on system-justification theory (Jost & Banaji,
1994) and social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).
Both theories suggest that people are motivated to maintain the
status quo in which some social groups have a higher status than
others; a preference for the lucky may be one such attitude that
contributes to the maintenance of group hierarchies. It is possible
that the preference for the lucky is a mechanism for the develop-
ment and maintenance of system-justifying and social dominance
beliefs as well as more specific social-group attitudes. We believe
this to be a promising avenue of future research.
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Received June 21, 2007
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Accepted December 16, 2007
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 777791 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.777

How to Heat Up From the Cold: Examining the Preconditions for

(Unconscious) Mood Effects
Kirsten I. Ruys and Diederik A. Stapel
Tilburg University

What are the necessary preconditions to make people feel good or bad? In this research, the authors aimed
to uncover the bare essentials of mood induction. Several induction techniques exist, and most of these
techniques demand a relatively high amount of cognitive capacity. Moreover, to be effective, most
techniques require conscious awareness. The authors proposed that the common and defining element in
all effective mood induction techniques is the dominating salience of evaluative tone over descriptive
meaning. This evaluative-tone hypothesis was tested in two paradigms in which the evaluative meaning
of the primed concept was more salient than its descriptive meaning (i.e., when subliminal stimulus
exposure was so short that mainly the evaluative meaning was activated [see D. A. Stapel, W. Koomen,
& K. I. Ruys, 2002] and when the primed concepts were sufficiently extreme such that evaluative
meaning always dominated descriptive meaning). Explicit and implicit mood measures showed that the
activation of a dominating evaluative tone affected peoples mood states. Implications of these findings
for theories on unconscious mood induction are discussed.

Keywords: subliminal perception, priming, mood, affect, need for cognition

What makes people feel good or bad? What is needed to put
someone in a positive or a negative mood? What does it take to
influence peoples affective states? A quick look at the relevant
literature does not really suggest a simple answer to these ques-
tions. Past research has shown that there is a myriad of successful
techniques to induce positive or negative mood states in people.
Recollecting pleasant or unpleasant memories, listening to uplift-
ing or depressing music, reading reports of happy or sad events,
watching funny or sad film clips, receiving positive or negative
performance feedback, imagining wonderful or horrible life
eventsall these manipulations can be and have been used suc-
cessfully to influence how positive or negative individuals feel
(Fiedler, 2001; Forgas, 1992; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990).
But what do these techniques have in common? What makes
them successful mood induction methods? First, it should be noted
that all these techniques demand a relatively high amount of
cognitive capacity. Furthermore, all these techniques require con-
scious awareness to be effective. It is the conscious recalling,
listening, reading, watching, or imagining that induces a positive
or negative mood. But are these characteristics really necessary to
elicit an affective state in an individual? Can ones mood be
Kirsten I. Ruys and Diederik A. Stapel,Tilburg Institute for Behavioral
Economics Research (TIBER), Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg
University, Tilburg, the Netherlands.
This research was supported by a Pionier grant from the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research awarded to Diederik A. Stapel. We
thank Katie Lancaster for her insightful comments on an earlier version of
this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kirsten I.
Ruys, Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research (TIBER),
Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153,
Tilburg 5000 LE, the Netherlands. E-mail: k.i.ruys@uvt.nl
affected only through the intensive and conscious experience (or
recall) of real (or imagined) mood-eliciting stimuli? Are those the
essential ingredients of the mood induction recipe? We think not.
We propose that the common and defining element in all effec-
tive mood induction techniques is a dominating salience of eval-
uative tone.1 Thus, watching a fragment from When Harry Met
Sally and looking at the local weather report forecasting sunny
spells are similarly successful ways to induce a positive mood
state, even though the descriptive content (i.e., falling in love vs.
predicted hours of sun) of these mood inducers is very different.
What these mood induction methods have in common is their
strong, positive evaluative tone. What differs between these tech-
niques is their specific descriptive content. Thus, the crucial in-
gredient for effective mood induction seems to be a strong eval-
uative meaning, rather than specific descriptive meaning.
One could argue in more technical terms that successful mood
induction techniques cognitively activate (prime) positive or
negative evaluative meaning more strongly than specific descrip-
tive information. It is not necessarily the specific descriptive
content of the memories one recalls, the movie one watches, or the
music one listens to that makes one feel good or bad. After all, a
memory, movie, or piece of music cannot affect ones mood.
Specific content does not matter: It is the global, diffuse, nonspe-
cific, overall evaluative tone that is primed while one is recalling
memories that produces mood effects. Taking this notion to its
extreme, one could argue that whenever the evaluative features of
cognitively activated (primed) information strongly dominate
the descriptive meaning, mood states are likely to be affected.
When the evaluative meaning of primed information dominates the
descriptive information, then mood states are likely to be affected.
1
See Hugenberg (2005) and Stapel and Koomen (2005) for a similar use
of the term evaluative tone.

777
778 RUYS AND STAPEL
All that is needed to induce a mood state is the dominating
activation of diffuse, nondescriptive, evaluative information. In
short, all you need is evaluative tone. Thus, although intense, long,
conscious exposure to or experience of mood-relevant stimuli may
be a sufficient precondition for the production of mood effects, it
is not a necessary precondition.
A Cold Recipe for Hot Mood Effects
A highly relevant question for defining the essential ingredients
for producing mood effects is whether it is necessary to expose
people to hot emotional material like music and movies or whether
it is possible to elicit mood states by exposing people to cold
semantic concepts. Some mood effects are easy to explain in terms
of the activation of declarative knowledge (i.e., semantic priming).
For instance, the retrieval of a positive experience can encourage
the recollection of other positive autobiographical memories by
semantic association. However, content-free mood effects such as
the influence of Barbers Adagio for Strings on peoples pro- exposure result in a relatively strong activation of evaluative
cessing style are more difficult to explain without the assumption
of a hot mood state.
To investigate the influence of hot states versus cold concepts,
Innes-Ker and Niedenthal (2002) directly compared the effects of
hot emotional states (I feel happy vs. I feel sad) versus cold of the stimulus) occur prior to nonaffective reactions (i.e., reac-
emotion concepts (happy vs. sad) on subsequent social judgments.
In one study, those researchers showed that priming cold emotion
concepts increased the cognitive accessibility of congruent emo-
tion concepts but had no impact on the emotional state of the
participants. Another study showed that priming an emotional state
(induced by music) influenced self-reported feelings and produced
emotion-congruent judgments of an ambiguous target person
whose feelings could either be interpreted in terms of happiness or
sadness. The priming of emotional concepts had no such effects.
Innes-Ker and Niedenthal (2002) took their results to mean that
the mere activation of cold concepts is not sufficient to produce hot
emotional states in the perceiver and that the presence of a hot
emotional state is necessary to produce emotion-congruent judg-
ments (see also Maringer & Stapel, 2007). Such an interpretation
of their results is definitely warranted as well as intuitively ap-
pealing. It makes sense that mere priming of emotional concepts
like happy and uplifting versus sad and melancholy is less female face is primed subliminally, evaluative reactions (posi-
likely to affect peoples mood states than listening to happy,
uplifting music or sad, depressing music.
The question remains, however, what exactly it is then that
makes this hot mood induction procedure, in fact, hot? Applying
the present evaluative-tone perspective, we propose that it is the
global evaluative tone of information activated through so-called
hot induction procedures versus activation of specific descriptive
meaning of so-called cold induction procedures that makes the
difference. We thus argue that movies or music are often more
effectively used to induce mood effects because, with these tech-
niques, global nonspecific evaluative information is more strongly
activated than its concrete specific descriptive counterpart. Prim-
ing specific emotion concepts is probably less successful because
it is likely that the descriptive meaning of the primed concepts will
overshadow their evaluative tone. Thus, we argue, when evaluative
as well as descriptive information is activated, mood effects are
less likely than when merely or mainly evaluative information is
activated. When evaluative as well as descriptive information is
activated, the evaluative tone is no longer diffuse because in that
case it becomes bound to the descriptive information.
Although one can use this all-you-need-is-evaluative-tone logic
to explain the variable successfulness of hot versus cold priming
techniques to produce actual changes in mood states, one should
not take this to mean that it is impossible for cold priming tech-
niques to produce mood effects. Rather, our logic suggests that it
should be possible for cold concept priming to produce mood
effects, given that the evaluative side of a stimulus or concept can
be primed without activating its descriptive features. In other
words, when exposure to cold concepts activates information that
is cognitively unconstrained (i.e., without descriptive meaning,
Clore & Colcombe, 2003), mood effects should be possible. Thus,
when priming honest versus dishonest activates merely or mainly
the cognitively unconstrained, evaluative meaning of these words
(positive vs. negative) rather than their evaluative descriptive
meaning (friendly vs. aggressive), mood effects should occur.
The question is then, under what circumstances, does stimulus
(rather than evaluative descriptive) information? Affective pri-
macy theory (Zajonc, 1980) provides a possible answer to this
question because it holds that when people are exposed to a
stimulus, affective reactions (i.e., reactions based on an evaluation
tions based on descriptive stimulus features). This theory has
received support from neurological research showing that indepen-
dent systems exist for coarse evaluative processing and detailed
perceptual processing (e.g., Adolphs, 2003; LeDoux, 1989;
Zajonc, 2000). The primacy of affective processing was recently
corroborated by researchers studying event-related brain potentials
in response to emotional faces (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). This
work shows that crude affective categorization can often occur
rapidly, whereas fine-grained processes necessary for recognition
of the identity of a face or for discriminatation between basic
emotional expressions typically need more time.
This suggests, as Stapel et al. (2002) have recently shown that
even in the realm of subliminal perception, it is indeed possible to
separate evaluation-based and description-based reactions to stim-
uli (see also Ruys & Stapel, in pressa, in press b). Stapel and
colleagues (2002) demonstrated that when a picture of a happy
tive) are typically triggered earlier than descriptive reactions
(female), but neither type of reaction needs awareness to occur.
Similarly, when primed with the words honest versus dishonest,
people pick up the evaluative meaning of these words (positive vs.
negative) prior to their descriptive meaning (honest vs. dishonest;
see also Bargh, Litt, Pratto, & Spielman, 1989; Stapel & Koomen,
2005). Thus, both evaluative and descriptive stimulus cues can be
detected without awareness, but evaluative cues are often detected
earlier (Stapel, 2003).
The notion that descriptive meaning is picked up later than
evaluative meaning has important consequences for the question of
whether (unconsciously) primed cold concepts such as happy,
friendly, and honest or sad, aggressive, and dishonest
can affect mood states. As Zajoncs (1980) affective primacy
hypothesis suggests and recent work on unconscious affect prim-
ing (Ruys & Stapel, in pressa, in press b; Stapel et al., 2002;
Stapel & Koomen, 2005, 2006) demonstrates, when one is sub-
liminally priming concepts (e.g., honest vs. dishonest), exposure
 PRECONDITIONS FOR (UNCONSCIOUS) MOOD EFFECTS
time may determine what type of information is actually activated.
At very short exposures, the evaluative meaning or tone of these
concepts is activated (positive vs. negative). At longer exposures,
however, both the descriptive and the evaluative meaning may
become available (e.g., honest vs. dishonest). This implies that not
only subliminally presented, emotionally charged primes (e.g.,
happy faces vs. sad faces) but also less emotional, colder primes
(e.g., honest vs. dishonest) may affect mood judgments, given that
these primes are flashed sufficiently quickly to activate mainly
their evaluative tone (see Stapel et al., 2002).
In sum then, cold concept priming may produce mood effects
when the evaluative meaning of these concepts is more salient and
more strongly activated than their descriptive meaning. Zajoncs
(1980) affective primacy theory suggests that one way to achieve
this is by flashing concepts sufficiently quickly such that mainly
their evaluative tone is activated (see Stapel & Koomen, 2005;
Stapel et al., 2002). The increased activation of information that is
merely or mainly evaluative and thus diffuse and cognitively
unbounded may then spill over to peoples moods (Zajonc, 1980,
2000). In the words of Clore and Colcombe (2003), [R]epeated
suboptimal presentation of positive or negative stimuli activates
evaluative meaning. Being objectless, it may become attached to
whatever comes to mind next (p. 343). Thus, objectless evaluative
meaning may also become attached to a persons mood. On a more
general level, Bargh (1997, 2006) has noted and demonstrated
repeatedly that the cognitive activation of semantic concepts is
likely to simultaneously impact all kinds of psychological systems.
Priming aggressive or old may influence perception, motiva- the priming episode by asking people how positive or negative
tion, behavior, and evaluation. Interaction and exchange between
the different psychological systems (Treisman, 1996) may further
explain why the cognitive activation of evaluatively toned infor-
mation may affect and color a persons mood state.
The Present Studies
In the present studies, we tested our all-you-need-is-evaluative-
tone hypothesis, using the same subliminal priming paradigm that
we have used in prior work (Stapel & Koomen, 2005, 2006; Stapel
et al., 2002). As these recent studies on the affective primacy
hypothesis have suggested, nondescriptive, nonspecific evaluative
stimulus features are especially likely to be picked up when
stimulus exposure is very short. Our logic thus suggestsperhaps
somewhat counterintuitivelythat mood effects from cold con-
cept priming are especially likely when priming occurs uncon-
sciously. However, the aim of the present research was not only to
show that subliminally presented information may produce mood
effects but also to test some of the boundary conditions of these
effects. In accordance with Clore and Colcombe (2003) and Zajonc
(1980; see also Stapel et al., 2002), we hypothesized that when
priming activates information that has a strong evaluative tone and
is cognitively unconstrained, peoples moods may be affected.
Because of this influence, even cold concept priming may induce
mood effects, as long as the evaluative tone is sufficiently strong
and salient.
We investigated our evaluative-tone hypothesis with a variety of
mood measures: We examined several indicators of peoples ex-
plicit mood judgments and information-processing styles. A mul-
titude of mood measures is crucial to revealing the bare essentials
of mood induction. However, central for the occurrence of a
779
positive or negative affective state is the conscious experience of
positive or negative feelings (e.g., Clore, Storbeck, Robinson, &
Centerbar, 2005). Thus, in Study 1a and Study 1b, we started by
examining explicit mood judgments and asking people how posi-
tive or negative their mood was at the current moment. In Studies
2-4, we turned to more indirect measures of mood, in addition to
our explicit mood measure. A well-known indirect consequence of
moods is that they may influence peoples processing styles: When
people feel good, they are more likely to rely on heuristic, easy,
and global processing strategies, whereas when people feel bad,
they tend to use more demanding, systematic, and local processing
strategies (Fiedler, 1990, 1991; Forgas, 1995; Gaspar & Clore,
2002). Thus, in the present research, we also focused on peoples
processing styles as a measure of peoples mood states.
Study 1
Study 1a
We started the investigation of our all-you-need-is-evaluative-
tone hypothesis with a study of the impact of subliminally primed
trait concepts on explicit mood judgments. We expected that when
prime exposures were short, explicit mood judgments might be
affected by the evaluative tone of the primes. However, when
prime exposures were long, explicit mood judgments might not be
affected because the activation of descriptive meaning could over-
shadow the evaluative tone. We measured mood immediately after
their mood was at that moment.
Method
Participants, design, priming stimuli, and measures. Partici-
pants (N 98) were undergraduates who took part in exchange for
partial course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to
the conditions of a 2 (prime exposure: long or short) 2 (prime
valence: positive or negative) between-participant design or to a
control condition, in which participants were subliminally primed
with neutral traits.
Overview. Upon arrival, participants were shown into one of
eight cubicles in the experimental room and seated in front of a
computer. They were then told that they would be involved in a
series of unrelated studies. First, participants performed a parafo-
veal vigilance task (modeled after a task used by Stapel et al.,
2002) in which trait concepts were presented outside of partici-
pants awareness. Participants were told that very short flashes
would appear on the screen at unpredictable places and times and
that their task was to decide as quickly and accurately as possible
whether the flash appeared on the left or right side of the screen.
After having completed the vigilance task, participants were
thanked for their participation and given the next task. The exper-
imenter told participants, A colleague of mine, from another
university, would like you to complete this simple questionnaire.
Participants were then given a one-page one-question (Rate how
positive or negative your mood is at this moment) questionnaire
that measured mood; they responded using a scale ranging from 1
(negative) to 7 ( positive). Next, participants received a funnel
debriefing procedure, in which they were probed for awareness of
the priming stimuli, awareness of the influence of the priming task
780 RUYS AND STAPEL
on later judgments, and general suspicion concerning the goal of
the study (see Stapel et al., 2002). Finally, participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Priming. The priming task was modeled after Stapel et al.s
(2002) parafoveal priming task. Once participants were seated in
front of their computer, the experimenter explained the vigilance
task. Participants were seated so that the distance between their
eyes and the computer screen was 80 100 cm. This distance
ensured that the priming stimuli were presented outside of partic-
ipants perceptual field. The experimenter then instructed partici-
pants to place their index fingers on two keys of the keyboard and
to press the left key, labeled L, if a flash appeared on the left side
of the screen and the right key, labeled R, if a flash appeared on
the right side of the screen. A fixation point consisting of one X
was presented continually in the center of the screen. Participants
were given 10 practice trials to become familiar with the procedure
and to ensure that they understood it. After answering any ques-
tions, the experimenter began the 60 experimental trials of the
vigilance task, which took participants approximately 10 min to
complete.
Priming stimuli were trait concepts that were printed in black
Times New Roman letters (12 point) printed on a white screen.
The words that were flashed in the 10 practice trials and in 40 of
the experimental trials were neutral words (e.g., table, chair,
tree). In the remaining 20 experimental trials, in the positive
priming conditions, the following words were each flashed five
times: confident, persistent, honest, pleasant. In the neg- negative, and control conditions), a weight of 4 to the cell in which
ative priming conditions, the following words were each flashed
five times: arrogant, stubborn, dishonest, wrong. The or- and a weight of 7 to the cell in which we expected the most
der in which these words were flashed was random. In the long
conditions, words were flashed for 120 ms. In the short conditions,
words were flashed for 40 ms. In all conditions, these words were
immediately followed by a 120-ms mask (for details, see Stapel et
al., 2002).
Awareness and suspicion. Previous subliminal priming studies
have shown that the paradigm used here provides sufficient safe-
guards to prevent participants from becoming aware of the priming
stimuli (see Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Erdley & DAgostino,
1988; Stapel et al., 2002). However, to ensure that participants
were not aware of the priming stimuli, we used an extensive funnel
debriefing procedure in which participants were asked increasingly
specific questions about the study (see Stapel et al., 2002). Partic-
ipants were asked what they thought the purpose of the study had
been, whether they thought any of the tasks they had performed
had been related, whether they thought their performance on one
task might have affected their performance on a next task, whether
anything about the study seemed strange or suspicious to them, and
what they thought the content of the flashes had been during the
task. If participants indicated knowledge that the flashes consisted
of words, they were further probed for general or specific meaning
of these words. Next, in several multiple-choice trials, participants
were given the priming stimuli used in this experiment (the posi-
tive words or the negative words) and were told that at some of the
trials, one of those words was flashed. Participants were then asked
to choose (guess) which word was flashed. All participants re-
ported that they had seen flashes. Although some reported seeing
words, no participant could report on the contents of the primes.
Furthermore, participants guesses of which of the two words they
had seen did not exceed chance, nor did they differ between
conditions (Fs 1). Finally, there were no participants who
thought the vigilance and evaluation tasks were related. Thus, we
can safely conclude that we were successful in presenting our
priming stimuli outside of awareness and in not alerting partici-
pants to the actual relation between the vigilance and judgment
tasks. This was also true for the other studies presented here, in
which we used the same paradigm as in the present study.
Results
A Prime Valence Prime Exposure analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the mood measurement revealed the predicted in-
teraction, F(1, 76) 3.94, p .05, 2 .05. The two main effects
did not reach significance (Fs 1). As can be seen in Table 1, the
interaction effect reflects that, as expected, in the short exposure
conditions, participants in the positive priming condition reported
feeling more positive (M 5.60, SD 1.05) than participants in
the negative priming condition (M 4.90, SD 1.02), F(1, 76)
4.43, p .05, 2 .06, whereas in the long exposure conditions,
priming had no effect on experienced affect (F 1). In those
conditions, participants mood judgments were similar to those in
the control condition (M 5.28, SD 1.13).
In addition, to provide an overall test of the predicted pattern of
results including the control condition, we performed a contrast
analysis. On the basis of the predictions, we assigned weights of 1
to the cells that we expected not to differ (the long positive, long
we expected the most positive mood (the short positive condition),
negative mood (the short negative condition). It should be noted
that this a priori contrast reached significance, t(93) 2.01, p
.05. We also performed two contrast analyses to directly compare
the short exposure conditions with the control condition. Unfortu-
nately, neither contrast one comparing positive with control,
t(93) 0.91, p .37, and one comparing negative with control,
t(93) 1.08, p .29 reached significance. To test whether the
conditions in which we did not expect mood changes to occur (the
long exposure conditions) differed from the control condition, we
performed two additional contrast analyses. As expected, neither
contrast one comparing positive with control, t(93) 0.48, p
.64, and one comparing negative with control, t(93) 0.21, p
.84 was significant.
The results of Study 1a showed that short subliminal exposures
to valenced concepts are more likely to influence peoples mood
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Mood Judgments as a
Function of Prime Exposure and Prime Valence (Study 1a)
Prime exposure
Long Short
Prime valence M SD M SD
Positive 5.10 1.17 5.60 1.05
Negative 5.35 1.04 4.90 1.02
Note. Scale range is from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate more positive
judgments. Mean mood judgment in control condition was 5.28 (SD
1.13).
 PRECONDITIONS FOR (UNCONSCIOUS) MOOD EFFECTS
states than long subliminal exposures to these concepts. This
finding supported our hypothesis that a dominating positive or
negative evaluative tone is sufficient to elicit a corresponding
mood state. However, compared with our control condition, the
obtained mood effects were not very strong. Therefore, we con-
ducted Study 1b.
Study 1b
This study replicated Study 1a with a more extensive explicit
mood measure, the Brief Mood Inspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer &
Gaschke, 1988). In addition, we investigated whether our mood
effects could be explained in terms of response mode effects.
Therefore, participants also rated themselves and a good friend on
specific trait dimensions. We expected that in contrast to the mood
judgments, these self and other trait ratings would be unaffected by
the subliminally presented trait terms because the judgments
would be relatively specific and descriptive (see Keltner, Locke, &
Audrain, 1993).
Method
Participants (N 65) were undergraduates who took part in
exchange for partial course credit. The participants were randomly
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (prime exposure: long or short)
2 (prime valence: positive or negative) between-participant design
or to a control condition, in which participants were subliminally
primed with neutral traits.
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1a. However,
different dependent measures were used. Immediately after the
priming procedure, participants completed a self-report measure of
emotional state that consisted of selected items from the BMIS.
This scale listed nine feeling states: five positive states (happy,
content, preppy, lively, active) and four negative states trait information, the less likely it is that such traits may affect
(sad, gloomy, tired, drowsy). Participants indicated how ones mood. The results of Study 1b suggest that such carryover
much they were feeling each state using a scale ranging from 1
(definitely do not feel) to 9 (definitely do feel). After participants
had completed this mood inspection scale, we asked them to rate
themselves and a good (same sex) friend on the rating dimen-
sions of friendly, smart, physically attractive, and athletic, into conscious judgment when the target of this judgment is
using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all applicable) to 7 (very
applicable). The order of the mood inspection scale on the one
hand and the self and good friend ratings on the other hand were
counterbalanced to control for possible order effects.
Results and Discussion
ANOVAs showed no main or interaction effects of the order of
measures variable on any of the dependent measures (Fs 1).
ANOVAs also showed that there were no main or interaction
effects of the primed information on participants self-ratings or
ratings of participants friends (Fs 1), indicating that self-ratings
or other-ratings on specific trait dimensions (friendly, smart, phys-
ically attractive, athletic) were not affected by subliminally primed
trait concepts, independent of whether prime exposure time was
relatively short or long.
Reliability analyses of the nine items on the mood inspection
scale were conducted (after reverse scoring the four negative
items) to form a composite scale (Cronbachs .82). A Prime
781
Valence Prime Exposure ANOVA on this measure revealed the
predicted interaction, F(1, 45) 4.21, p .05, 2 .09. The two
main effects did not reach significance ( ps .17). As can be seen
in Table 2, the interaction effect reflects that, as expected, in the
short exposure conditions, participants in the positive condition
reported feeling more positive (M 7.00, SD 0.74) than
participants in the negative condition (M 6.15, SD 0.98), F(1,
47) 6.18, p .05, 2 .12, whereas in the long exposure
conditions, priming had no effect on experienced affect (F 1). In
those conditions, participants mood judgments were similar to
those of in the control condition (M 6.61, SD 1.01).
We performed a contrast analysis to provide an overall test of
the predicted pattern of results. Using the same weights as in Study
1a, we found that the a priori contrast was significant, t(60)
2.13, p .05. In addition, we performed two contrast analyses to
directly compare the short exposure conditions to the control
condition. However, both contrasts one comparing positive with
control, t(60) 1.11, p .27, and one comparing negative with
control, t(60) 1.36, p .18 did not reach significance. We
also conducted two additional contrasts, testing the control condi-
tion against the long exposure conditions. As predicted these
contrasts one comparing positive with control, t(60) .56, p
.58, and one comparing negative with control, t(60) 0.07, p
.94 were not significant.
Together, the findings of Study 1a and Study 1b support the idea
that a dominating positive or negative evaluative tone may elicit a
corresponding mood state. Specifically, subliminal exposure to
valenced (trait) information is most likely to affect mood judg-
ments when prime exposures are sufficiently short to activate
evaluative reactions that have no specific descriptive content.
Thus, these two studies suggest that not all subliminal priming
effects are created equal. They show that sometimes longer primes
have less impact. The longer one is exposed to evaluatively toned
effects are most likely to occur on relatively general and evaluative
mood judgments but not on relatively specific descriptive self-
judgments and other-person judgments. This suggests that sublim-
inally activated affective information is most likely to spill over
evaluatively ambiguous (see also Stapel et al., 2002).
In sum, Study 1a and Study 1b provide the first evidence for our
all-you-need-is-evaluative-tone hypothesis. We showed that eval-
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items on Brief
Mood Inspection Scale as a Function of Prime Exposure and
Prime Valence (Study 1b)
Prime exposure
Long Short
Prime valence M SD M SD
Positive 6.42 0.90 7.00 0.74
Negative 6.58 0.79 6.15 0.98
Note. Scale range is from 1 to 9. Higher scores indicate more positive
judgments. Mean mood judgment in control condition was 6.61 (SD
1.01).
782 RUYS AND STAPEL
uative tone was critical in influencing peoples explicit mood
judgments. However, we needed additional evidence for several
reasons: First, the mood effects were not very strong (compared
with control conditions) in either study. Second, to increase the
generalizability of our hypothesis, we also needed to demonstrate
these effects on indirect mood measures. Third, our mood effects
could be explained in terms of semantic priming. The exposure to
positive (or negative) concepts during the priming episode could
have activated other related positive (or negative) concepts in
memory, for instance, concepts representing positive (or negative)
affective states. This might have increased the tendency for par-
ticipants to agree with experiencing these positive (or negative)
states. To address these three issues, we performed Study 2.
Study 2
An interesting consequence of moods is their impact on peoples
processing styles. Several studies have shown that people who feel
good tend to rely on heuristic, easy, and global processing strate-
gies, whereas people who feel bad are more likely to use demand-
ing, systematic, and local processing strategies (Fiedler, 1990,
1991; Forgas, 1995; Gaspar & Clore, 2002). Thus, for example,
people dining out in a restaurant tend to choose the surprise of the
chef when they are in a good mood but tend to scrutinize the
menu and analyze the ingredients of each course in detail before
making a choice when they are in a bad mood. Fiedler (2001) has
aptly explained the differences between the two processing styles
in his adaptive learning viewpoint, which assumes that the pro-
cessing styles associated with positive and negative moods have
respectively evolved in appetitive and aversive situations to cope
most effectively with the demands of the situation.2 A friendly,
appetitive situation demands exploratory and knowledge-driven
processing. A threatening, aversive situation requires careful and
more systematic processing strategies.
Although semantic priming could serve as alternative explana-
tion for the results in Study 1, semantic priming cannot easily
explain mood effects on peoples information-processing styles.
For this reason, we mainly focused on mood effects related to
information processing to advance our evaluative-tone hypothesis.
In Study 2, we explored and further tested the effects of mood on
peoples need for cognition. Previous research has assumed that
individuals high in need for cognition naturally tend to seek,
acquire, think about, and reflect back on information to make sense
of stimuli, relationships, and events in their world; individuals low
in need for cognition, in contrast, are more likely to rely on others
(e.g., experts), cognitive heuristics, or social comparisons to pro-
vide this structure (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996, p.
243).
Although need for cognition has often been shown to be a stable
personality trait that one can measure reliably with a personality
scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1981; Cacioppo et al., 1996), there are no
indications that need for cognition is also (at least to a certain
extent) context dependent. The features that characterize how
people process information as a function of their need for cogni-
tion remind us of the two processing styles between which, ac-
cording to most dual-process models, people alternate depending
on the situation: a systematic, effortful information-processing
style and a heuristic, easy information-processing style (e.g.,
Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Caccioppo, 1986). In a similar vein, we
expected that peoples need for cognition could depend on situa-
tional factors. We proposed that analogous to the effect of mood on
peoples information-processing styles (i.e., more systematic in-
formation processing in a negative mood and more heuristic pro-
cessing in a positive mood), people may experience a higher need
for cognition when they feel bad than when they feel good. Thus,
need for cognition may indirectly reflect peoples mood states.
In Study 2, we used need for cognition to show that a dominat-
ing evaluative tone is also essential in evoking effects on indirect
mood measures. Before turning to this main objective, we con-
ducted a pretest to demonstrate that a well-known conscious mood
induction technique (recalling positive or negative life events)
indeed affects individuals need for cognition. The aim of this
pretest was thus to show that peoples mood states affect their need
for cognition.
Pretest
Participants, Design, Mood Induction, and Measures
Participants (N 38) were undergraduates who took part for
partial course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to
the conditions of a three-factor (mood induction: positive, nega-
tive, or neutral) between-participant design.
Participants received a booklet consisting of the mood induc-
tion, the need-for-cognition items, and a mood question. We asked
them, dependent on the mood induction condition, to remember a
positive, a negative, or a neutral event from the past and to try to
relive this experience (see, for instance, Bless et al., 1996; Fiedler
& Stroehm, 1986, who have successfully used a similar procedure
to induce mood). Then, participants completed the following four
need-for-cognition items (selected from the Need for Cognition
Scale, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), using a scale ranging from 1
(completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree): The idea of relying
on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me; I would
prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that
is somewhat important but does not require much thought;
Thinking is not my idea of fun (reverse coded); and Learning
new ways to think doesnt excite me very much (reverse coded).
We selected four representative items because of time concerns.
Next, participants received the same mood question as in Study 1a.
Results
A mood induction ANOVA performed on the mood question
demonstrated that our mood induction method was indeed suc-
cessful, F(2, 57) 6.33, p .01, 2 .27. A further contrast
analysis showed that participants who remembered and relived a
positive life event indicated that they felt more positive (M 5.00,
SD 0.89) than participants who remembered and relived a
negative event (M 3.46, SD 1.20), with mood rating of the
2
Note that although the typical finding is that people in a good mood
rely more on heuristic, global processing strategies and people in a bad
mood rely more on systematic, detailed ways of processing, researchers
also have reported more complex findings. For example, mood can have
motivational consequences because of mood management pressures during
positive, negative, and neutral mood states (Gervey, Igou, & Trope, 2005;
Isen, 1987; Wegener & Petty, 1994).
 PRECONDITIONS FOR (UNCONSCIOUS) MOOD EFFECTS
participants in the neutral condition lying between these two
extremes (M 4.43, SD 1.09), t(35) 3.53, p .05.
Reliability analyses of the four need-for-cognition items were
conducted to form a composite scale (Cronbachs .87). A
mood induction ANOVA on this measure revealed the predicted
main effect, F(2, 57) 4.62, p .05, 2 .21. A contrast
analysis showed that, as expected, in the negative mood condition,
participants reported a higher need for cognition (M 4.23, SD
0.97) than participants from the positive mood condition (M
3.21, SD 0.99), with the neutral condition lying between these
two extremes (M 3.59, SD 0.53), t(35) 3.02, p .05).
Further analyses showed that the partial correlation (controlling for
experimental condition) for these two dependent measures was
high, r .80 ( p .01).
Method
Participants (N 60) were undergraduates who took part in the
study for partial course credit. The participants were randomly
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (prime exposure: long or short)
2 (prime valence: positive or negative) between-participant design
or to a control condition, in which participants were subliminally
primed with neutral traits.
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1a. However,
different dependent measures were used. Immediately after the
priming procedure, participants completed the four need-for-
cognition items that were used in the pretest. We again included a
mood question to determine whether our mood induction worked.
Results and Discussion
A Prime Valence Prime Exposure ANOVA on the need-for-
cognition composite scale (Cronbachs .85) revealed the
predicted interaction, F(1, 44) 4.80, p .05, 2 .10, and a
main effect of prime valence, F(1, 44) 6.97, p .05, 2 .14.
There was no effect of prime exposure (F 1). As can be seen in
Table 3, the interaction effect reflects that, as expected, in the short
exposure conditions, participants in the positive condition reported
a lower need for cognition (M 3.13, SD 0.49) than partici-
pants in the negative condition (M 4.27, SD 1.07), F(1, 46)
12.04, p .01, 2 .21, whereas in the long exposure conditions,
priming had no effect on reported need for cognition (F 1). In
those conditions, participants need for cognition judgments were
similar (Fs 1) to those in the control condition (M 3.63, SD
0.53). To provide an overall test of the predicted pattern of results,
we additionally performed a contrast analysis. On the basis of the
predictions, we assigned weights of 1 to the cells that we expected
not to differ (the long positive, long negative, and control condi-
tions), a weight of 4 to the cell in which we expected the highest
need for cognition (the short negative condition), and a weight of
7 to the cell in which we expected the lowest need for cognition
(the short positive condition). This a priori contrast was highly
significant, t(55) 3.58, p .05. In addition, we performed two
contrast analyses to directly compare the short exposure conditions
with the control condition. The contrast comparing positive with
control reached significance, t(55) 2.40, p .05, whereas the
contrast comparing negative with control was marginal, t(55)
1.87, p .08. We also tested whether the long exposure conditions
differed from the control condition. As predicted, these two con-
783
Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items on Need for
Cognition Scale and for Mood Judgments as a Function of
Prime Exposure and Prime Valence (Study 2)
Prime exposure
Long Short
Prime valence M SD M SD
Need for cognition score
Positive 3.46 0.59 3.13 0.49
Negative 3.57 1.00 4.27 1.07
Mood judgment
Positive 4.85 0.90 5.42 0.79
Negative 4.73 1.01 3.83 0.94
Note. The Need for Cognition Scale ranges from 1 to 5. Higher scores
indicate a higher need for cognition. Mean need for cognition score in
control condition was 3.63 (SD 0.53). The mood judgment scale ranges
from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate more positive judgments. Mean mood
judgment in control condition was 4.67 (SD 0.78).
trasts one comparing positive with control, t(55) 0.53, p
.60, and one comparing negative with control, t(55) 0.18, p
.86 were not significant.
A Prime Valence Prime Exposure ANOVA on the mood
judgments also revealed the predicted interaction, F(1, 44) 7.74,
p .01, 2 .15, and a main effect of prime valence, F(1, 44)
10.45, p .01, 2 .19. There was no effect of prime exposure
(F 1). The means and standard deviations are depicted in Table
3. Equivalent to the pattern of results for need for cognition, the
interaction effect indicated that for the short exposure conditions,
participants in the positive condition reported feeling more posi-
tive (M 5.42, SD 0.79) than participants in the negative
condition (M 3.83, SD 0.94), F(1, 46) 18.76, p .01, 2
.29, whereas for the long exposure conditions, priming had no
effect on experienced affect (F 1). Again in those conditions,
participants mood judgments were similar (Fs 1) to those in the
control condition (M 4.67, SD 0.78). To provide an overall
test of the predicted pattern of results, we performed a contrast
analysis (with the same weights as in Study 1a) that was signifi-
cant, t(55) 4.22, p .05. Contrast analyses comparing the
control condition with the short positive condition, t(55) 2.08,
p .05, and comparing the control condition with the short
negative condition, t(55) 2.31, p .05, were also significant.
Additional contrast analyses showed that in line with our hypoth-
eses, neither the long positive condition, t(55) 0.51, p .62, nor
the long negative condition, t(55) 0.16, p .87, differed from
the control condition.
Further analyses showed that the partial correlation (controlling
for experimental condition) for our two dependent measures was
high, r .62 ( p .01). This allowed us to test the robustness of
our findings by computing a composite scale of the z-transformed
need-for-cognition scores and the recoded and then z-transformed
mood judgments. We performed the same contrast analyses as
described earlier on our composite scale. A contrast analysis
testing the expected overall pattern of results was highly signifi-
784 RUYS AND STAPEL
cant, t(55) 4.24, p .05. Contrast analyses performed to
compare the short positive conditions with control and the short
negative conditions with control were also significant, t(55)
2.17, p .05, and t(55) 2.58, p .05, respectively. Again as previous studies, we expected that the relatively longer exposures
expected, additional contrast analyses showed that neither the long
positive condition, t(55) 0.62, p .54, nor the long negative
condition, t(55) 0.20, p .84, differed from the control condi-
tion.
The results thus show that when prime exposures are short, the
evaluative tone of the primes affects peoples reported need for
cognition, whereas when prime exposures are long, the evaluative
tone of the primes does not affect peoples reported need for
cognition. The same pattern of results was obtained on the mood
question. These findings indicate that need for cognition is a stable
personality trait that also depends on situational factors like mood.
More important for the present purposes, people may experience a
higher need for cognition when they feel bad than when they feel
good. This finding is equivalent to mood effects on peoples
information-processing styles.
In sum, Study 2 provides support for our evaluative-tone hy-
pothesis on an indirect mood measure. Thus far, we have demon-
strated mood effects when prime exposure is relatively short. The
results of Studies 1a, 1b, and 2 strongly suggest that under short
exposure conditions, primarily the evaluative tone of the primed
information is activated. However, the evaluative-tone logic also
suggests another possible method of testing our hypothesis. An
alternate way to manipulate the dominance of evaluative tone
would be to use primed concepts that are sufficiently extreme in
evaluative tone to dominate descriptive meaning, independent of
whether prime exposure is extremely or moderately short. Thus, to
expand our evidence, we tested this implication of our line of
reasoning in Study 3.
Study 3
In this study, we demonstrated in a different way that evaluative
tone is essential to induce a mood state. What is crucial in our
all-you-need-is-evaluative-tone hypothesis is that evaluative cues
of a concept are more salient, or more strongly activated, than are
its descriptive cues. One way to achieve this state is to present the
information for a sufficiently short duration that primarily the
evaluative features are activated (Stapel et al., 2002), which we did
in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2. Another way to achieve this is to use
concepts that are extreme in their valence and thus strong in their
(un)desirability (see Stapel & Koomen, 2000). Such concepts have
a strong evaluative meaning that could dominate their specific
descriptive meaning. Extremely valenced concepts, such as won-
derful versus horrific, for example, have a strong evaluative (F 1). In those conditions, participants need-for-cognition
tone (i.e., positive vs. negative), whereas moderately valenced
concepts, such as pleasant versus unpleasant, although per- (M 3.56, SD 0.59). To provide an overall test of the predicted
haps similarly specific in their descriptive meaning (see Hampson,
John, & Goldberg, 1986; Stapel & Koomen, 2000), have a weaker
evaluative tone. We therefore expected that when extremely va-
lenced concepts were primed (i.e., with short and long exposures),
their evaluative tone would be more likely to dominate their
descriptive meaning and thus yield mood effects than when mod-
erately valenced concepts were primed.
In the present study, we primed participants with trait concepts
of extreme valence or with trait concepts of moderate valence, both
under relatively long but subliminal exposure. Prime exposure
duration was the same in all conditions and was similar to the long
exposure conditions of Study 1a, 1b, and 2. In contrast to these
to trait concepts might affect peoples moods but only when the
evaluative tone was sufficiently dominant. Therefore, this priming
should only work with extreme traits.
Method
Participants (N 57) were undergraduates who took part for
partial course credit. The participants were randomly assigned to
the conditions of a 2 (prime extremity: moderate or extreme) 2
(prime valence: positive or negative) between-participant design or
to a control condition in which participants were subliminally
primed with neutral traits.
The priming stimuli presented in the experimental trials were
trait concepts with a moderate or extreme valence, taken from (and
pretested by) Stapel and Koomen (2000). In the moderately pos-
itive priming condition, the following words were each flashed on
the computer screen five times: thrifty, reasonable, agree-
able, pleasant. In the extremely positive priming condition, the
following words were each flashed five times: wonderful,
sweet, good, positive. In the moderately negative priming
condition, the following words were each flashed five times:
stingy, weak, plain, unpleasant. In the extremely negative
priming condition, the following words were each flashed five
times: horrific, cruel, bad, negative.
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1a, except that
the time participants were exposed to the primes was always long
(120 ms). The dependent measures were similar to those in Study
2: Participants reported their need for cognition and indicated to
what extent they felt positive or negative.
Results
A Prime Valence Prime Extremity ANOVA on the need-for-
cognition composite scale (Cronbachs .83) revealed the
predicted interaction, F(1, 41) 5.28, p .05, 2 .11, and a
main effect of prime valence, F(1, 41) 6.62, p .05, 2 .14.
There was no effect of extremity (F 1). As can be seen in Table
4, the interaction effect reflects that, as expected, when the prime
words were extreme, participants in the positive condition reported
a lower need for cognition (M 3.07, SD 0.56) than partici-
pants in the negative condition (M 4.27, SD 1.07), F(1, 43)
12.66, p .01, 2 .23, whereas when the prime words were
moderate, priming had no effect on reported need for cognition
judgments were similar (Fs 1) to those in the control condition
pattern of results, we also performed a contrast analysis. On the
basis of the predictions, we assigned weights of 1 to the cells that
we expected not to differ (the moderate positive, moderate nega-
tive, and control conditions), a weight of 4 to the cell in which we
expected the highest need for cognition (the extreme negative
condition), and a weight of 7 to the cell in which we expected the
lowest need for cognition (the extreme positive condition). This a
priori contrast reached significance, t(52) 3.76, p .05. Con-
trast analyses performed to compare the extreme positive condition
 PRECONDITIONS FOR (UNCONSCIOUS) MOOD EFFECTS
Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of Scores for Items on Need for
Cognition Scale and for Mood Judgments as a Function of
Prime Extremity and Prime Valence (Study 3)
Prime extremity
Moderate Extreme
Prime valence M SD M SD
Need for cognition score
Positive 3.86 0.64 3.07
Negative 3.75 0.90 4.27
Mood judgment
Positive 4.55 0.82 5.27
Negative 4.64 0.92 4.08
Note. The Need for Cognition Scale ranges from 1 to 5. Higher scores
indicate a higher need for cognition. Mean need for cognition score in
control condition was 3.56 (SD 0.59). The mood judgment scale ranges
from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate more positive judgments. Mean mood
judgment in control condition was 4.58 (SD 0.79).
with control and the extreme negative condition with control were
respectively significant, t(52) 2.07, p .05, and marginal,
t(52) 2.01, p .06. As expected, additional contrast analyses
testing the moderate positive condition against control and the
moderate negative condition against control were not significant,
t(52) 0.37, p .72 and t(52) 0.57, p .57 respectively.
A Prime Valence Prime Extremity ANOVA on the mood
judgments also revealed the predicted interaction, F(1, 41) 4.68,
p .05, 2 .10, and a marginal effect of prime valence, F(1,
41) 3.44, p .07, 2 .08. There was no effect of prime
extremity (F 1). The means and standard deviations are depicted
in Table 4. Equivalent to the pattern of results for need for
cognition, the interaction effect indicates that when the prime
words were extreme, participants in the positive condition reported
feeling more positive (M 5.27, SD 1.01) than participants in
the negative condition (M 4.08, SD 1.17), F(1, 43) 8.57,
p .01, 2 .17, whereas when the prime words were moderate,
priming had no effect on experienced affect (F 1). Again in
those conditions, participants mood judgments were similar (Fs
1) to those in the control condition (M 4.58, SD .79). We then
performed a contrast analysis to provide an overall test of the
predicted pattern of results. On the basis of the predictions, we
assigned weights of 1 to the cells that we expected not to differ (the
moderate positive, moderate negative, and control conditions), a
weight of 4 to the cell in which we expected the most positive
mood (the extreme positive condition), and a weight of 7 to the
cell in which we expected the most negative mood (the extreme
negative condition). This a priori contrast reached significance,
t(52) 2.73, p .05. Contrast analyses performed to compare the
extreme positive condition with control and the extreme negative
condition with control were respectively marginal, t(52) 1.73,
p .09, and nonsignificant, t(52) 1.28, p .21. We then
conducted two additional contrasts, comparing the control condi-
tion with conditions in which we did not expect mood changes to
occur. As expected, neither analysis one contrasting moderate
785
positive with control and one contrasting moderate negative with
controlwas significant, t(52) 0.10, p .93, and t(52) 0.13,
p .90, respectively.
Further analyses showed that the partial correlation (controlling
for experimental condition) for our two dependent measures (i.e.,
need for cognition and mood judgment) was high, r .62 ( p
.01). This allowed us to test the robustness of our findings by
computing a composite scale of the z-transformed need-for-
cognition scores and the recoded and then z-transformed mood
judgments. Next, we performed the same contrast analyses as
described earlier on our composite scale. The contrast analysis
0.56 testing the expected overall pattern of results was highly signifi-
1.07 cant, t(52) 3.83, p .05. Contrast analyses performed to
compare the extreme positive conditions with control and the
extreme negative conditions with control were also significant,
1.01 t(52) 1.97, p .05, and t(52) 2.11, p .05 respectively. As
1.17 expected, two additional contrasts comparing moderate positive
with control and comparing moderate negative with control were
not significant, t(52) 0.28, p .78, and t(52) 0.26, p .80.
The results of this study are important for two reasons: First, the
findings replicate the effect of mood on peoples reported need for
cognition. Second, the results support our evaluative-tone hypoth-
esis because mood was only affected when the evaluative meaning
of the primed trait concepts dominated their descriptive meaning.
Thus, participants who were primed with extreme positive trait
concepts reported a lower need for cognition and indicated they
felt better than participants who were primed with extreme nega-
tive trait concepts. As expected, reported need for cognition and
mood were not affected in participants who were primed with
moderate trait concepts.
Together, the first three studies demonstrate that a dominating
evaluative tone is essential for influencing peoples mood states.
We have provided evidence on explicit mood measures and on
peoples motivations (i.e., need for cognition). To complete the
picture, we set as our final goal providing support for our all-you-
need-is-evaluative-tone hypothesis using a different processing-
style measure than need for cognition. It was in this spirit that we
conducted Study 4.
Study 4
As mentioned previously, moods may influence peoples pro-
cessing styles. People are more likely to rely on heuristic, easy, and
global processing strategies when they feel good and tend to use
more demanding, systematic, and local processing strategies when
they feel bad. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack (1990) showed
the effects of mood on processing style in the realm of persuasion
(see also Petty, DeSteno, & Rucker, 2001). The persuasion liter-
ature informs us that the impact of argument strength may differ
depending on peoples processing styles. Strong arguments are
more convincing than weak arguments for people who use sys-
tematic processing strategies, whereas strong and weak arguments
are equally convincing for people who use heuristic processing
strategies. Building on these findings, Bless and colleagues (1990)
showed that for participants who felt good, argument strength was
not important in convincing them. For people in a negative mood,
however, argument strength was important: People who felt bad
were more influenced by strong rather than weak arguments.
786 RUYS AND STAPEL
The aim of the current research was to provide support for our
evaluative-tone hypothesis on a processing-style measure. We
used the impact of argument quality on persuasion to show that a
dominating positive evaluative tone leads to a good mood, whereas
a dominating negative evaluative tone leads to a bad mood. Thus,
because people in a positive mood process information heuristi-
cally, they are equally likely to be convinced by weak or strong
arguments. People in a negative mood tend to process information
systematically and therefore are more likely to be convinced by
strong rather than weak arguments. We primed participants with
positive or negative trait concepts using long or short subliminal
exposures, similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2. After the
priming episode, participants were presented with several strong
and weak arguments in favor of an attitude object and were then
asked to indicate their attitude.
Method
Participants (N 108) were undergraduates who took part in
exchange for partial course credit. The participants were randomly
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (prime exposure: long or short)
2 (prime valence: positive or negative) 2 (argument strength:
weak or strong) between-participant design or to a control condi-
tion, in which participants were subliminally primed with neutral
traits and read strong and weak arguments.
The procedure was similar to that used in Study 1a, but we relied
on a different measure of processing style. Immediately after the
priming procedure, participants read two arguments in favor of
using English as the official language of the Dutch university at
which this experiment was conducted. This would mean that all
classes would be conducted in English rather than in Dutch. The
arguments were pretested to be either strong or weak. The strong
arguments were as follows: If English is the official language, the
university can attract more international students, which will in-
crease its status and make it easier to improve facilities and
teaching resources and The international employability of uni-
versity graduates will increase if English is the official language.
The weak arguments were as follows: Improving the English of
the universitys students may be helpful to them on holidays and
If English is the official language at our university, it will be
easier to understand Anglo-Saxon movies and television series.
After reading the strong or weak arguments, participants were
asked to indicate their attitude (1 completely disagree, 7
completely agree) toward the statement that it is a good idea to
make English the official language at our university and have all
teaching in English. Similar to the procedure in our previous
studies, we included a mood question to assess the successfulness
of our mood induction. Finally, to check the successfulness of our
argument strength manipulation, we asked participants to indicate
the strength of the arguments they had read on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
Results
First, a Prime Valence Prime Exposure Argument Strength
ANOVA on the argument strength manipulation check revealed
that the predicted main effect of argument strength, F(1, 88)
55.67, p .01, 2 .39 (other Fs 1), indicating that the strong
arguments were indeed judged as stronger (M 5.00, SD 0.83)
than the weak arguments (M 3.80, SD .079).
Next, a Prime Valence Prime Exposure Argument Strength
ANOVA on the attitude judgment revealed a marginal three-way
predicted interaction, F(1, 88) 3.32, p .07, 2 .04, a
marginal Prime Valence Argument Strength effect, F(1, 88)
2.82, p .10, 2 .04, a Prime Valence Prime Exposure effect,
F(1, 88) 6.61, p .05, 2 .07, a prime valence effect, F(1,
88) 10.21, p .01, 2 .10, and an argument strength effect,
F(1, 88) 21.71, p .01, 2 .20. As can be seen in Table 5,
the pattern of means behind these effects strongly supports our
predictions. As expected, in the short exposure conditions, partic-
ipants attitudes were similarly positive in the strong (M 5.14,
SD 0.66) and weak (M 4.86, SD 0.86) conditions (F 1),
whereas in the long exposure conditions, participants attitudes
were more positive in the strong condition (M 4.75, SD 0.87)
than in the weak condition (M 3.25, SD 0.75), F(1, 94)
15.39, p .01, 2 .14. In other words, after short negative
priming, argument strength mattered (suggesting a negative mood
was induced), whereas it did not matter after short positive priming
(suggesting that a positive mood was induced). In the long expo-
sure conditions, prime valence had, as predicted, no (main or
interaction) effect (Fs 1). Here, strong arguments led to more
positive attitudes (M 4.78, SD 0.87) than weak arguments
(M 4.05, SD 0.90), F(1, 94) 6.07, p .05, 2 .06.
Participants attitudes in the long exposureweak arguments con-
ditions were similar (F 1) to participants attitudes in the control
condition (M 4.08, SD 0.52). However, to provide an overall
test of the predicted pattern of results, we again performed a
contrast analysis. On the basis of the predictions, we assigned
weights of 1 to the cells that we expected to have a positive attitude
(all strong argument conditions and the short weak positive con-
dition), weights of 1 to the cells in which we expected a rela-
tively negative attitude (the long weak conditions and the control
condition), and a weight of 2 to the cell in which we expected the
most negative attitude (the short weak negative condition). This a
priori contrast was highly significant, t(99) 6.87, p .05.
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Attitude as a Function of
Prime Exposure, Argument Strength, and Prime Valence
(Study 4)
Prime exposure
Long Short
Prime valence M SD M SD
Strong arguments
Positive 4.82 0.87 5.14 0.66
Negative 4.70 0.95 4.75 0.87
Weak arguments
Positive 4.08 0.90 4.86 0.86
Negative 4.00 0.94 3.25 0.75
Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate a more positive
attitude. Mean attitude judgment in the control condition was 4.08 (SD
0.52).
 PRECONDITIONS FOR (UNCONSCIOUS) MOOD EFFECTS
A Prime Valence Prime Exposure Argument Strength
ANOVA on the mood judgments revealed the predicted Prime
Valence Prime Exposure interaction, F(1, 88) 19.06, p .01,
2 .18, and a main effect of prime valence, F(1, 88) 15.13,
p .01, 2 .15 (other Fs 1). As can be seen in Table 6, the
interaction effect reflects that, as expected (as in the other exper-
iments), in the short exposure conditions, participants in the pos-
itive condition reported feeling more positive (M 5.57, SD
0.69) than participants in the negative condition (M 4.13, SD
0.90), F(1, 94) 39.68, p .01, 2 .30, whereas in the long
exposure conditions, priming had no effect on experienced affect
(F 1) and participants moods were similar (F 1) to those in
the control condition (M 4.75, SD 0.87). Again, we performed
a contrast analysis to provide an overall test of the predicted
pattern of results. Using the same weights as in Study 1a, we found
that the a priori contrast was significant, t(103) 5.40, p .05.
Contrast analyses performed to compare the short positive condi-
tions with control and the short negative conditions with control
were also significant, t(103) 2.83, p .05, and t(103) 2.10,
p .05, respectively. However as expected, contrast analyses
performed to compare the long positive conditions with control
and the long negative conditions with control were not significant,
t(103) 0.28, p .78, and t(103) 0, p 1, respectively.
In a nutshell, this study provides additional support for our
all-you-need-is-evaluative-tone hypothesis. The results show that
in the long prime exposure conditions, participants were influ-
enced more by the strong than by the weak arguments. Their
moods were unaffected. More important, in the short prime expo-
sure conditions, participants primed with positive trait concepts
were influenced by both strong and weak arguments, whereas
participants primed with negative trait concepts were influenced
only by strong arguments. Those participants in the short exposure
conditions also reported the expected mood states. Thus, a domi-
nating evaluative tone influenced peoples moods and, therefore,
peoples processing styles.
Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Mood Judgments as a
Function of Prime Exposure, Argument Strength, and Prime
Valence (Study 4)
Prime exposure
Long Short
Prime valence M SD M SD
Strong arguments
Positive 4.67 1.16 5.50 0.52
Negative 4.90 0.88 4.08 0.87
Weak arguments
Positive 4.67 0.65 5.64 0.84
Negative 4.60 0.84 4.17 0.84
Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 7. Higher scores indicate a more positive
mood. Mean mood judgment in the control condition was 4.75 (.87).
787
Summary of Findings
A critical reader could, perhaps, argue that in some of our
studies, direct comparisons between the control condition and the
conditions in which we expected mood changes to occur were not
always significant. However, we presented multiple studies and
replicated our main finding across measures (two types of mood
measures, need-for-cognition scale, argument strength logic) and
across a large number of studies (Study 1a, Study 1b, Study 2,
Study 3, and Study 4). This clearly and convincingly shows that
our effect is real and robust. To provide concrete statistical support
for this claim, we performed additional contrast analyses across
Studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3, and 4 on the z-transformed mood judgments
and across Studies 2 and 3 on the z-transformed need-for-cognition
scores.
First, we performed an overall test of the predicted pattern on
the mood judgments. Using the same weights as in Study 1a, we
found that the a priori contrast was highly reliable, t(383) 7.48,
p .05. In addition, we performed two contrast analyses to
directly compare the control condition with the conditions in
which we expected mood changes to occur (the short exposure and
extreme conditions). Both contrasts one comparing positive with
control, t(383) 4.04, p .05, and one comparing negative with
control, t(383) 3.76, p .05were highly significant. To make
sure that the conditions in which we did not expect mood changes
to occur (the long exposure and moderate conditions) did not differ
from the control condition, we performed two additional contrast
analyses. In line with our hypotheses, neither of the contrasts
one comparing positive with control, t(383) 0.57, p .57, and
one comparing negative with control, t(383) 0.14, p .89
was significant.
Second, we performed similar contrast analyses on the need-
for-cognition scores, starting with an overall test of the predicted
pattern. Using the same weights as in Study 2, we found that the
a priori contrast was highly reliable, t(112) 4.76, p .05. Next,
we performed the two contrast analyses to directly compare the
conditions in which we expected mood changes to occur with the
control condition. Both contrasts one comparing positive with
control, t(112) 2.23, p .05, and one comparing negative with
control, t(112) 3.08, p .05were highly significant. As
expected, neither of the contrasts testing the control condition
against the conditions in which we did not expect mood changes to
occur one comparing positive with control, t(112) 0.18, p
.86, and one comparing negative with control, t(112) 0.28, p
.78 was significant.
Together, these contrast analyses provide strong support for our
claim that only very brief presentations of evaluative information
or presentations of very extreme evaluative information may in-
fluence mood and cognition. The fact that in some of our studies,
single low-power comparisons between individual cells did not
reach ordinary levels of significance is thus completely surpassed
by the robustness and reliability of our hypothesized effect across
a large number of studies and measures.
General Discussion
Most successful mood induction techniques rely on the con-
scious experience or recall of real or imagined mood-eliciting
stimuli and demand a relatively high amount of cognitive capacity.
788 RUYS AND STAPEL
But what exactly are the necessary preconditions to influence
peoples mood states? What are the ingredients of a minimal mood
induction paradigm? That is the central question of the present
research. Together, the results of four studies indicate that suc-
cessful mood induction is much more basic and simple than
previous mood research would suggest. First, our mood induction
paradigm does not demand a high amount of cognitive capacity,
considering that participants only responded to the location of our
masked priming materials. Second, the present studies indicate that
moods can be induced without participants awareness of the
mood-eliciting stimuli. Thus, participants were not conscious that
mood states were being elicited. Third, we used valenced trait
concepts as mood-eliciting stimuli, which most researchers regard
as cold priming materials (see e.g., Clore & Colcombe, 2003;
Niedenthal, Rohman, & Dalle, 2003).
Recently, it has been argued that the activation of cold semantic
concepts is insufficient to induce mood states and thus hot stimulus
materials are required to produce mood effects (Clore & Col-
combe, 2003; Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002; Niedenthal et al.,
2003). At first glance, the results of the present research seem to
contradict this idea that hot materials are necessary because our
findings show that the activation of semantic concepts can produce
affective experiences. However, a closer look supports the view
that hot materials are crucial. Our results clearly reveal that mood
effects occur when mainly the hot features of these cold concepts
are activated. Our results support the notion that the essential hot
ingredient in mood-induction procedures is a dominating evalua-
tive tone.
The present studies illustrate two ways in which evaluative tone
may dominate descriptive cues. According to the affective primacy
hypothesis, nondescriptive, nonspecific evaluative stimulus cues
are especially likely to be picked up when stimulus exposure is
very short. Thus, we can separate the activation of evaluative and
descriptive meaning with subliminal, very short stimulus expo-
sures, activating mainly the evaluative tone of the stimulus (see
also Stapel et al., 2002). The evaluative tone of a stimulus also
dominates descriptive meaning when the stimulus is sufficiently
extreme. Evaluative meaning is generally more salient in ex-
tremely valenced trait concepts than descriptive meaning is.
We conclude from our studies that what all successful mood-
induction techniques have in common is that they prime positively
or negatively toned information at the expense of specific mean-
ing. All you need to produce a mood state is a dominating activa-
tion of global, diffuse, nonspecific evaluative information. The
activation of mainly evaluative, and thus diffuse, information may
then spill over to peoples moods (Zajonc, 2000; see also Forgas,
1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). However, mood effects become
less likely when evaluative as well as descriptive information is
activated, cognitively constraining the evaluative tone.
Summary of Results
In Studies 1a and 1b, we tested our evaluative-tone hypothesis
using very short versus relatively long subliminal exposures to
positive and negative trait concepts. Both studies demonstrate that
subliminal exposure to valenced information is most likely to
affect explicit mood judgments when prime exposures are short
enough to activate evaluative reactions that have no specific de-
scriptive content. Thus, when subliminal exposure to the valenced
trait concepts was short, then the activated evaluative tone spilled
over into participants explicit mood reports. In contrast, when
subliminal exposure to the valenced trait concepts was relatively
long, no effects were found in the participants explicit mood
reports. Thus, mood changes only took place in the case in which
the evaluative tone dominated the descriptive meaning of the
prime. The results of Study 1b suggest that such carryover effects
are most likely to occur on relatively general and evaluative mood
judgments but not on relatively specific, descriptive self-
judgments and person judgments.
Study 2 extends the findings of Study 1 to an indirect mood
measure: The results illustrate that subliminally primed trait con-
cepts affected the participants reported need for cognition when
the evaluative tone dominated the descriptive meaning of the
primes. Thus, the activation of a positive evaluative tone resulted
in a more positive mood than the activation of a dominating,
negative evaluative tone. Similar to our findings in Study 1, we
obtained no mood effects when the descriptive meaning was
sufficiently activated (i.e., under relatively long stimulus expo-
sures). Besides supporting our evaluative-tone hypothesis, Study 2
is the first study to demonstrate that need for cognition can
fluctuate due to situational factors. Specifically, people experi-
enced a higher need for cognition when they felt bad than when
they felt good. This finding demonstrates that need for cognition
may serve as an indirect mood measure, equivalent to peoples
information-processing styles. Moreover, this finding shows for
the first time that need for cognition can be used as a dependent
measure. In previous studies, need for cognition always served as
a mediating or moderating variable. Thus, the present findings
show that it makes sense to distinguish between state and trait
need for cognition in future research.
Study 3 provides additional evidence for our evaluative-tone
hypothesis. In the previous studies, we separated the activation of
evaluative and descriptive meaning by presenting the information
for a sufficiently short duration that primarily the evaluative fea-
tures were activated. In Study 3, we used trait concepts with an
evaluative meaning that always dominated their descriptive mean-
ing. Thus, we primed participants with trait concepts of extreme
valence or with trait concepts of moderate valence, both under
relatively long, but subliminal, exposure durations. Consistent
with our evaluative-tone hypothesis, reported need for cognition
and explicit mood judgments indicated that participants who were
primed with extreme positive trait concepts felt more positive than
participants who were primed with extreme negative trait concepts.
As expected, the mood states of participants who were primed with
moderate trait concepts were unaffected.
Studies 1, 2, and 3 provided evidence for our evaluative-tone
hypothesis on explicit mood measures and on peoples motiva-
tional states (i.e., need for cognition). To complete the picture, we
conducted Study 4, which directly measured processing style.
After the priming episode, we offered participants at a Dutch
university either strong or weak arguments in favor of using
English as the official university language. In line with our pre-
diction, strong arguments were more persuasive than weak argu-
ments for participants who were exposed for a very short time to
negative trait concepts, whereas strong and weak arguments were
equally persuasive for participants who were exposed for a very
short time to positive concepts. However, when prime exposure
was relatively long, strong arguments were more persuasive than
 PRECONDITIONS FOR (UNCONSCIOUS) MOOD EFFECTS
weak arguments for all participants. Together, these findings in-
dicate that participants in a good mood used heuristic, global
processing styles to process the arguments, and participants in a
bad mood used systematic, detailed processing styles. Thus, the
results expand our evaluative-tone hypothesis to yet another indi-
rect mood measure: information-processing style.
Affective or Semantic Primacy?
In sum, the results of our studies strongly support the all-you-
need-is-evaluative-tone hypothesis. Our findings also provide ad-
ditional support for affective primacy, the hypothesis that people
extract the evaluative meaning of a stimulus before its descriptive
meaning. We showed several times, using explicit and implicit
mood indicators, that subliminal presentations of valenced trait
concepts only affect peoples mood states when exposure is very
short. Subliminal presentations of these trait concepts do not affect
peoples mood states when exposure is relatively long but still
subliminal. We can only conclude from our findings that people
extracted evaluative meaning before descriptive meaning. It seems
very unlikely that specific content or descriptive information in-
duced good and bad moods in the participants.
Recently, researchers have argued that it is a sin (Clore et al.,
2005, p. 394) to assume that affect may precede semantic analysis
and that the evidence for affective primacy is weak (see also
Storbeck & Robinson, 2004). These conclusions were based on (a
subset of) previous affective priming studies and research that
compared semantic priming and affective priming (Storbeck &
Robinson, 2004). Storbeck and Robinson (2004) showed that
semantic priming was consistent and more robust than affective
priming. They took their results to mean that semantic analysis is
more obligatory at encoding than affective analysis is. However,
another (and less sectarian) way to interpret these results is that
(automatic) information processing is flexible (see also Stapel &
Koomen, 2006): Sometimes, people extract evaluative meaning
before descriptive meaning, whereas at other times, people extract
descriptive meaning before evaluative meaning. Sometimes it
makes sense to see immediately whether an animal is a snake or a
spider (by extracting descriptive information), whereas at other
times it is more functional to see immediately whether an animal
is cute or threatening (by extracting evaluative information). In the
specific, minimal mood induction paradigm we used in the current
studies, people were more likely to extract evaluative meaning
before descriptive meaning when subliminal exposure to the
primed information was extremely short. However, we emphasize
that even though we expected affective primacy to occur in our
current studies, we do not argue that affect always precedes cog-
nition. Rather, we applied the affective primacy logic to create the
circumstances to test our evaluative-tone hypothesis.
Unconscious Moods
Our findings show that mood effects are especially likely when
we expose people for a very short time to the subliminal primes.
Put differently, shorter flashes lead to stronger feelings. Although
some emotion researchers have posited that it is indeed possible to
elicit mood effects outside of conscious awareness (Chartrand,
Van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006; Kihlstrom, Mulvaney, Tobias, &
Tobis, 2000, O hman & Soares, 1994; Robles, Smith, Carver, &
789
Wellens, 1987; Winkielman & Berridge, 2004; Winkielman, Ber-
ridge, & Wilbarger, 2005b), until the present studies hardly any
reliable empirical evidence explained how and when moods could
be unconsciously induced. Theoretically, it makes sense to assume
that people can be aware of their emotional states without being
aware of the antecedents that evoked these states. Often, people do
not have conscious access to the antecedents that evoked their
feelings, thoughts, motivations, and behaviors (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977).
Nevertheless, most previous research has pointed out that un-
consciously presented stimuli do not affect peoples mood states.
Subliminal priming may have an impact on the preference for and
liking of neutral target stimuli, without having an impact on
peoples affective state (e.g., Banse, 2001; Clore & Colcombe,
2003; Edwards, 1990; Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, & Lynn, 1992;
Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Winkielman, Berridge, & Wilbarger,
2005a). These null findings on mood measures probably led
Schwarz and Clore (1996) to conclude that in general, affective
priming studies are irrelevant to the study of mood effects. Such
studies demonstrate effects of subliminal priming on judgments of
words, people, or Chinese characters, but they do not show sub-
liminal priming effects on experienced moods. Thus, Schwarz and
Clore (1996) concluded, In the absence of experienced feelings,
affective priming studies may indeed be better conceptualized as
reflecting automatic evaluation processes . . . , which have been
observed with materials unlikely to elicit any feelings . . . , rather
than feeling-based inferences (p. 440).
We posit that Schwarz and Clore (1996) may have been right in
their conclusion that to date, there is no consistent evidence that
subliminal priming may affect peoples affective feelings. How-
ever, this should not be taken to mean that it is impossible for
subliminally presented information to influence peoples mood
(see e.g., Chartrand et al., 2006). There does not seem to be an a
priori reason to assume that peoples moods cannot be affected by
subliminally primed information. Why should the subliminally
primed information only be capable of affecting a perceivers
judgments of Chinese characters (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993;
Winkielman, Zajonc, & Schwarz, 1997) or other peoples behav-
iors (e.g., Stapel et al., 2002) but not also affect the perceiver him-
or herself? We think that spreading activation, the mechanism
presumed to underlie evaluative priming (Bargh, 1997; Ferguson
& Bargh, 2003; Wentura, 2000), may equally relate to peoples
moods as to peoples liking judgments. However, mood effects
need a stronger evaluative tone, one that dominates the descriptive
cues.
Thus, we explain the lack of mood effects in previous subliminal
affective priming research by our hypothesis that evaluative tone
needs to overrule the descriptive cues. It seems likely that in
previous research, the activation of evaluative cues was sufficient
to produce affective priming but insufficient to affect peoples
moods because descriptive cues were also activated. In most of the
studies that have shown dissociation between effects on liking
judgments and mood, researchers used facial expressions as affec-
tive primes. Participants were subliminally primed with happy,
neutral, or angry faces, which resulted in evaluatively congruent
liking judgments of Chinese ideograms or an unfamiliar beverage
(e.g., Winkielman et al., 2005a). We think that a possible expla-
nation for the null findings on mood measures might lie in the fact
that people are very efficient at face perception (Farah, Wilson,
790 RUYS AND STAPEL
Drain, & Tanaka, 1998, p. 482). Some researchers have even
assumed a specialized module for the perception of faces. Other
research has demonstrated, for example, that even the social cat-
egory of a subliminally presented face may have an impact on
subsequent judgments (Ruys, Spears, Gordijn, & De Vries, 2007;
Stapel et al., 2002). Thus, activation of specific descriptive face
information is likely to occur early in the information-processing
chain. When evaluative cues face information are activated,
effects on liking judgment might still occur. It seems functional to
assume that something is pleasant when other people enjoy it.
However, it seems less functional that mood states would be
affected in this way. Evaluative cues only influence mood when
the activation of evaluative cues is cognitively unbound.
In sum then, the current studies clearly demonstratevia a
minimal mood induction paradigmthat all you need to influence
peoples mood states is evaluative tone. The essential ingredient
for the genesis of mood effects is a dominance of evaluative
meaning over descriptive meaning. Whereas most previous re-
search findings may be interpreted as suggesting that hot,
cognitive-capacity-demanding, and conscious experience of
mood-eliciting stimuli are necessary for successful mood induc-
tion, the results of the present studies support the notion that
peoples mood states can be influenced without their awareness of
the mood-eliciting stimuli. Thus, relatively cold concepts can
induce hot mental states.
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Received January 8, 2007
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Accepted December 18, 2007
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 792 807 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.792

Forming Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Individuals:

Social Group Association Cues

Allen R. McConnell Robert J. Rydell

Miami University University of MissouriColumbia

Laura M. Strain Diane M. Mackie

Miami University University of California, Santa Barbara

The authors explored how social group cues (e.g., obesity, physical attractiveness) strongly associated
with valence affect the formation of attitudes toward individuals. Although explicit attitude formation has
been examined in much past research (e.g., S. T. Fiske & S. L. Neuberg, 1990), in the current work, the
authors considered how implicit as well as explicit attitudes toward individuals are influenced by these
cues. On the basis of a systems of evaluation perspective (e.g., R. J. Rydell & A. R. McConnell, 2006;
R. J. Rydell, A. R. McConnell, D. M. Mackie, & L. M. Strain, 2006), the authors anticipated and found
that social group cues had a strong impact on implicit attitude formation in all cases and on explicit
attitude formation when behavioral information about the target was ambiguous. These findings obtained
for cues related to obesity (Experiments 1 and 4) and physical attractiveness (Experiment 2). In
Experiment 3, parallel findings were observed for race, and participants holding greater implicit racial
prejudice against African Americans formed more negative implicit attitudes toward a novel African
American target person than did participants with less implicit racial prejudice. Implications for research
on attitudes, impression formation, and stigma are discussed.

Keywords: attitudes, implicit attitudes, impression formation, prejudice, stigma

People would like to believe that their attitudes toward others
reflect their careful evaluation of others unique and individual
merits. Although this undoubtedly occurs in some cases, social
psychology research raises questions about the pervasiveness of
such a reasoned approach to understanding others (Bargh, 1999;
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990;
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). At times,
people are evaluated by the content of their character, but in other
situations, this content can seem largely irrelevant. For example,
individuating information about a person can often be relatively
inconsequential when perceivers base their evaluations of a person
on information associated with the individuals social group
(Fiske, 1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).
Indeed, research has demonstrated that cues providing informa-
tion about social groups (e.g., obesity, physical attractiveness,
race) can impact social perceptions. For example, target people can
Allen R. McConnell and Laura M. Strain, Department of Psychology,
Miami University; Robert J. Rydell, Department of Psychological Sci-
ences, University of MissouriColumbia; Diane M. Mackie, Department
of Psychology, University of California, Santa Barbara.
These studies were completed while Allen R. McConnell and Laura M.
Strain were supported by National Institute of Mental Health Grant
MH068279 and National Science Foundation Grant BCS 0601148 and
Robert J. Rydell and Diane M. Mackie were supported by National Insti-
tute of Mental Health Grant MH63762. We thank John Cacioppo and
Penny Visser for their comments on this work.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Allen R.
McConnell, Department of Psychology, Miami University, Oxford, OH
45056. E-mail: mcconnar@muohio.edu
be viewed differently when their race or ethnicity influences
perceptions and interpretations of ambiguous behaviors and events
(e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985; Duncan, 1976; Sagar &
Schofield, 1980). Although these cues typically do not influence
perceptions retroactively, they can influence interpretations of
ambiguous acts during encoding (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer,
1985). However, when a targets actions are clear-cut instead of
ambiguous, accessible social group categories produce little biased
assimilation, reducing the influence of groups on perceptions of
target individuals (Bruner, 1957; Higgins, 1989; Srull & Wyer,
1979).
Of course, the degree to which a targets actions can shape ones
attitude is determined, in part, by the extent to which perceivers
process individuated information about the target. In fact, Fiske
and Neubergs (1990) continuum model of impression formation
considers the extent to which a targets behaviors guide social
perception instead of information associated with a targets social
group. They proposed that people rely on piecemeal integration
(e.g., the behaviors performed by an individual) instead of cate-
gorization (e.g., knowledge associated with the group as a whole)
under conditions where perceivers are able and willing to devote
cognitive resources to understanding target individuals. For exam-
ple, when motivated and presented with a number of behaviors, a
perceiver may come to hold a positive attitude toward a target
person who is obese (i.e., a member of a social group associated
with negativity) whose behaviors are predominantly positive in
nature. Indeed, there is considerable support for the continuum
model (for an overview, see Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999).
However, one interesting feature of this work is its focus on how
people use categorization and piecemeal integration in the forma-

792
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
tion of explicit attitudes (i.e., evaluations that people can report
and for which expression can be consciously controlled) toward
individual group members. Yet, it is an open question as to how an
individuals social group and individuated behaviors contribute to
the formation of implicit attitudes (i.e., evaluations for which
people may not initially have conscious access and for which
activation cannot be controlled) toward individuals. Within the
context of the continuum model, the impact of social group knowl-
edge has been assumed to result from less effortful consideration
of individuated information (Fiske et al., 1999). But in the current
work, we suggest that group knowledge may impact implicit
attitude formation even when perceivers devote considerable cog-
nitive resources to understanding social targets. Specifically, we
propose that many social groups are strongly associated with
valence and that the nature of this knowledge (i.e., its associative
basis) may also have important implications for attitude formation,
especially for implicit attitudes. In the current work, we examine
how group association cues affect attitude formation (implicit and
explicit) toward individuals. Although these cues may have impli-
cations for other aspects of impression formation (e.g., stereotypes,
attributions), here we focus exclusively on how these social group
cues shape attitude formation toward novel individuals.
Systems of Evaluation
Recent work has established that the processes underlying the
formation and change of implicit attitudes differ considerably from
those involved in explicit attitudes (e.g., Rydell & McConnell,
2006; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Rydell, Mc-
Connell, Strain, Claypool, & Hugenberg, 2007). Specifically, we
(Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006) have advanced a
systems of evaluation approach to attitudes, proposing that there
are two independent systems of evaluation that differ in both what
information they use and how they act on it (see also Greenwald &
Banaji, 1995; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack &
Deutsch, 2004). The first system of evaluation, the associative
system, operates using paired associations based on similarity and
contiguity. In this case, learning is based on the accumulation of
information over time to form and strengthen associations in
memory. The second system of evaluation, the rule-based system,
relies on logic and symbolic representations at a relatively higher
order level of cognitive processing.
On the basis of a systems of evaluation account, one can
delineate evaluations that tap into the associative and rule-based
systems of evaluation: implicit and explicit attitudes, respectively
(Rydell et al., 2006). This approach is congruent with current
conceptualizations of how implicit and explicit attitudes operate,
allowing one to generate novel predictions about how evaluations
are formed and changed in memory (cf. Gawronski & Boden-
hausen, 2006). The associative system of evaluation is relevant to
the understanding of how implicit attitudes form and function
because implicit attitudes are posited to follow the basic principles
of similarity and association (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). The
rule-based system, however, fits with a conceptualization of ex-
plicit attitudes as evaluations based on conscious deliberation or
syllogistic reasoning, which can reveal quick changes in expres-
sion (Fazio, 1995) but require cognitive resources in their forma-
tion and change (Petty & Wegener, 1998).
This systems of evaluation approach has proven useful in un-
derstanding how implicit and explicit attitudes toward individuals
793
form differently. As an example, Rydell et al. (2006) showed that
implicit attitudes were formed in response to the valence of sub-
liminal primes presented prior to the visual appearance of a target
individual, whereas explicit attitudes were formed in response to
consciously available descriptions of that targets behaviors. For
instance, when concurrently presented with a series of negative
subliminal primes and positive behavioral statements performed
by a target person, participants implicit attitudes toward the target
person were negative but explicit attitudes toward the same person
were positive. Consistent with a systems of evaluation account,
implicit and explicit attitudes were formed relatively indepen-
dently of each other, with each responding to the type of informa-
tion assumed to influence the associative and rule-based systems,
respectively. Although implicit attitudes can, given a sufficient
amount of information, be responsive to verbal information about
a target person (Rydell & McConnell, 2006), implicit attitudes are
more responsive to information that is associative in nature (in the
case of Rydell et al., 2006, associations that were subliminally
paired with the target individual). In the current work, we again
focus on how implicit and explicit attitudes (based on different
systems of evaluation) can be differentially sensitive to distinct
forms of social information.
These demonstrations of differences in implicit and explicit
attitude change notwithstanding, much remains to be determined
about the nature of implicit and explicit attitudes (see Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2006). For example, in our previous work, we
have only explored attitude formation and change for relatively
impoverished targets (e.g., a nondescript White man named Bob).
However, when perceivers encounter social targets, many group
association cues such as skin color may be available. Although
Bob could potentially be viewed as a member of several social
categories, it is likely that such categorizations are not especially
salient to our participants for several reasons. First, because they
only meet one person instead of a target person in a context of
differentiated others, Bobs race, sex, or other possible categories
(e.g., his age, his hairstyle) should not be distinctive. Indeed, social
categorization is inherently contextual (e.g., an overweight person
may be categorized differently in a group of morbidly obese
others), which means encountering a White male target in isolation
reduces the number of salient social categories available to a
perceiver. Further, a college-age, White male target is not likely to
be viewed as deviant or as a member of a minority social group
category (e.g., Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991), especially to
college-age participants who themselves are predominantly Euro-
pean American (e.g., McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka, 1978).
However, the introduction of a target individual with more dis-
tinctive social group association cues (e.g., an African American
Bob) could presumably have a considerable effect on attitude
formation.
If so, might these group association cues have different impli-
cations for implicit and explicit attitude formation? On the basis of
a systems of evaluation analysis, we believe the answer is yes. As
Rydell et al. (2006) showed, implicit attitudes were primarily
affected by associative information rather than by detailed state-
ments about the targets behaviors, whereas explicit attitudes were
shaped by the valence of the behavioral information instead of the
valence of subliminal primes. Because of the sensitivity exhibited by
implicit attitudes to information based on associations (see also Slo-
man, 1996), we reasoned that when group association cues are pre-
sented about a target person, such as being overweight, being physi-
794 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
cally attractive, or being African American, these cues, because they
are association based in nature, would be used more strongly by the
associative system of evaluation and thus influence implicit attitudes
toward the target in proportion to how strongly they are associated
with positivity or negativity (i.e., stronger cues should have a greater
impact). However, in the absence of such group association cues,
implicit attitudes toward the person should eventually reflect the
valence of target-relevant behavioral information (Rydell & McCon-
nell, 2006). That is, implicit attitudes are sensitive to verbally con-
veyed information about a targets behavior, but they will be more
strongly influenced by group cues that have strong valence associa-
tions. Indeed, Castelli, Zogmaister, Smith, and Arcuri (2004) showed
that implicit attitudes can be formed simply by linking a person with
a group very strongly associated with valence (e.g., child molesters) in
the absence of behavioral information. However, if a person is a
member of a social group more weakly associated with valence (or if
no group association cues are available at all), implicit attitudes
toward the target will reflect the individuals behaviors (e.g., Rydell &
McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2007).
In contrast, we expected that the valence of the verbal state-
ments presented about the target persons behaviors would deter-
mine explicit attitudes toward the individual (Rydell & McCon-
nell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006) regardless of the group association
cues presented. That is, when unambiguous statements clearly
describe a target person who performs positive or negative behav-
iors, the likelihood that a group association cue can assimilate such
clear-cut behaviors is exceedingly low (Higgins, 1989; Srull &
Wyer, 1979). However, if a target persons individual behaviors
are ambiguous with respect to valence, a targets group association
cue may serve to disambiguate each behavior, exerting an assim-
ilative effect and thus influencing explicit attitude formation to-
ward the individual in these cases.
Group Association Cues
It has been shown that people have strong negative evaluations
with groups ranging from the obese and the unattractive (e.g., Nosek,
2005; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002) to racial outgroups (e.g.,
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; McConnell & Leibold,
2001). But in the current work, we were interested in whether these
negative group associations would impact attitude formation about
individual targets and, in particular, implicit attitudes toward them.
Clearly, obesity (e.g., Crandall et al., 2001), attractiveness (e.g., Dion,
Berscheid, & Walster, 1972), and race (e.g., Sagar & Schofield, 1980)
can impact deliberate evaluations and judgments. Yet, it is important
to note that many studies showing the impact of groups on perceptions
and judgments involve situations engineered to be equivocal (e.g., an
ambiguous shove in the hallway between two students, student court
cases that present a mixture of guilt-suggestive and guilt-exonerating
details about defendants) to maximize the likelihood that the cue (e.g.,
a sketch involving an African American child) will influence percep-
tions.
Thus, in the current study, we expected that group association cues
would have a far greater impact on implicit attitudes than on explicit
attitudes when a substantial amount of unambiguous verbal informa-
tion was presented about the target persons behaviors. However, in
cases where the behavioral information about the target person was
ambiguous with respect to valence, we anticipated that group associ-
ation cues would also influence explicit attitudes toward the target
person, consistent with many existent findings showing that social
groups can bias judgments in ambiguous situations.
In the current work, we examined visual cues strongly associ-
ated with positivity or negativity. Specifically, we explored obe-
sity, physical attractiveness, and race. We were drawn to these
cues because obesity and race have been studied extensively in
research on stigma. For example, people avoid stigmatized group
members (e.g., Pryor, Reeder, Yeadon, & Hesson-McInnis, 2004),
devalue items associated with them (e.g., Neuberg, Smith, Hoff-
man, & Russell, 1994; Rozin, Markwith, & Nemeroff, 1992), and
evaluate them negatively on implicit (e.g., Castelli et al., 2004;
Fazio, Jackson, Dutton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998;
Nosek, 2005; Nosek & Banaji, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park,
1997) and explicit (e.g., Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Dovidio,
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Plant & Devine, 1998) measures.
Thus, being a member of a stigmatized group provides a strong,
negative group association cue.
Physical attractiveness can also serve as a strong group associ-
ation cue (for many of the same reasons as stigmatized group
membership), but, unlike stigma, a persons physical attractiveness
can serve as either a positive or a negative cue. For instance,
people who are physically attractive are assumed to be competent
and positive in domains unrelated to their looks (e.g., Chaiken,
1979; Dion et al., 1972; Eagly, Ashmore, Makhijani, & Longo,
1991), whereas those who are physically unattractive are viewed
quite negatively (e.g., Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993; Berscheid &
Walster, 1974), even by infants (e.g., Dion, 1973). Thus, whereas
obesity and race provide ways to instantiate negative group asso-
ciation cues about target individuals, variability in attractiveness
can provide positive and negative group association cues.1
Overview of the Current Work
We conducted four experiments to evaluate whether group
association cues would, in general, have a stronger impact on
implicit attitudes than on explicit attitudes when forming attitudes
toward a group member, as anticipated by a systems of evaluation
account. The basic paradigm and the attitudes measures used were
the same as those applied in previous research (e.g., Rydell &
McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). Specifically, participants
received detailed, verbal information about the behaviors of a
novel target person (Bob or Bobbie, depending on the experiment)
prior to reporting their implicit and explicit attitudes toward the
target. Initially, a number of trials were presented featuring a target
photo and behavioral statements about the person to induce either
a positive or a negative initial attitude toward the target. New to the
current work were manipulations of target photos (see Figure 1 for
examples) that allowed us to present a target with negative or
positive group association cues (or no salient group association cue
1
In the current work, we use the term group association cue because
participants are never directly told anything about the target persons
membership in a social category (e.g., physical attractiveness is inferred
from a visual image of the target person, who, on the basis of pretesting,
was reliably viewed as normatively attractive). Also, we do not propose
that these cues cannot affect explicit attitudes. For instance, group associ-
ation cues are especially likely to affect deliberate evaluations in circum-
stances where the cue is perceived to be germane to ones impression (e.g.,
physical attractiveness is likely to influence explicit attitudes toward a
potential dating partner; Petty & Wegener, 1998).
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
Figure 1. Sample stimuli used to manipulate obesity (Experiments 1 and
4, top row) and race (Experiment 3, bottom row). Top-row photos are from
Nosek et al. (2004) and bottow-row photos are from Minear and Park
(2004).
in some conditions). Next, participants received either additional
neutral (control) statements about the target or additional counter-
attitudinal (CA) statements about the target (i.e., the valence as-
sociated with these subsequent statements was the opposite of the
valence of the behavioral statements in the initial learning trials).
The CA conditions allowed us to examine how attitudes would
change in the face of new and conflicting behavioral information
about the target. Past research has shown that presenting a con-
siderable number of CA behaviors (such as in the current work)
results in a much more moderated attitude toward the target person
(e.g., Kerpelman & Himmelfarb, 1971; Rydell & McConnell,
2006). Whether such revised attitudes toward the individual reflect
relatively neutral or relatively ambivalent attitudes toward the
target person is less important for the present concerns than is the
fact that the introduction of CA information should produce mean-
ingful shifts in attitudes toward the target. More important, we
predicted that the introduction of CA information about a target
presented with strong group association cues would have a differ-
ential impact on explicit and implicit attitudes toward the target
person.
In general, we expected that explicit attitudes toward the target
person would respond to the valence described in the behavioral
statements and that they would change after the presentation of CA
information. Also, when no salient group association cue was
present or when the cue was weakly associated with valence, we
expected that implicit attitudes toward the target person would
show a pattern similar to the pattern of explicit attitudes. That is,
similar to Rydell and McConnell (2006), when large amounts of
CA information are presented, implicit attitudes should eventually
change in the absence of group association cues. However, when
795
strong group association cues were present, we expected implicit
attitudes to primarily reflect the valence associated with the social
group and thus not be strongly moderated by the CA information.
We tested these predictions by manipulating group association
cues related to obesity (Experiments 1 and 4), physical attractive-
ness (Experiment 2), and race (Experiment 3).
Finally, we anticipated that the group association cue would
impact explicit attitudes toward the target when the behavioral
statements describing the person were relatively uninformative
with respect to valence. Thus, in Experiment 4, we manipulated
whether the target individual was or was not obese, and we crossed
this factor with another manipulation that varied whether the
behavioral statements were clear-cut or ambiguous in terms of
valence. As in the previous studies, we expected implicit attitudes
to be influenced by the presence of a strong group association cue.
However, we also anticipated that the group association cue would
impact explicit attitudes toward the target under conditions where
the individuals behaviors were ambiguous (but not when they
were unambiguous). As noted previously, group membership
should have an impact on explicit attitudes toward the target only
when each behavior encountered is ambiguous with respect to
valence and, thus, the cue can influence how each behavior is
encoded at the time of encounter (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer,
1985). However, group cues should not affect explicit attitudes
toward the target when each behavior is clear-cut in terms of
valence (because each action is not subject to interpretation) even
if, ultimately, the final attitude toward the individual is relatively
mixed in nature (which is more likely in the CA conditions).
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we examined how implicit and explicit atti-
tudes formed and changed for members of a stigmatized group
(i.e., those who are overweight) relative to targets who are not
stigmatized (i.e., those who are not overweight). This study repli-
cated the basic experimental design of Rydell and McConnell
(2006), but it also manipulated a group association cue for the
target. Specifically, on a between-subjects basis, participants
formed attitudes toward a person, Bob, who appeared to be either
overweight or not overweight. In addition to seeing a photo of
Bob, participants were presented with a number of positive and
negative verbal behavioral statements about him and asked to
determine whether each statement was characteristic of him. All
participants received the same behavioral statements; however,
whether a behavior was characteristic or uncharacteristic of Bob
was manipulated systematically to indicate that Bob acted posi-
tively (positive behaviors were characteristic and negative behav-
iors were uncharacteristic of him) or negatively (negative behav-
iors were characteristic and positive behaviors were
uncharacteristic of him). Finally, participants implicit and explicit
attitudes were assessed using the exact same measures as were
used in past research (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et
al., 2006).
In line with the prediction that the associative system would
reflect the negativity associated with a group association cue and
the rule-based system would be sensitive to the valence of the
behavioral information provided when forming an attitude toward
an individual, it was expected that (a) explicit attitudes toward Bob
would reflect the valence suggested by the verbal statements
presented, (b) implicit attitudes would reflect the valence of the
796 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
group association cue that was salient (i.e., the overweight condi-
tion would lead to negative implicit attitudes toward Bob regard-
less of the valence of his behaviors), and (c) implicit attitudes
would be based on the behavioral information when no group
association cue was salient (i.e., in the not-overweight condition;
Rydell & McConnell, 2006).
Method
Participants. A sample of 133 undergraduates at Miami Uni-
versity participated in return for research credit in their introduc-
tory psychology courses. They were randomly assigned to a 2
(Bobs weight: not overweight, overweight) 2 (valence of the
initial verbal behaviors: positive, negative) 2 (CA condition:
control [0 CA], CA conditioning [100 CA]) between-subjects
factorial.
Learning task. A modified version of Kerpelman and Him-
melfarbs (1971) attitude learning paradigm was used (see Rydell
& McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). In this learning task,
participants received information about Bob on a computer over
the course of 200 trials. On the basis of random assignment, one of
four different White men served as the target Bob.2 On each trial,
participants were concurrently presented with a picture of Bob and
verbal statements of behavior that might be characteristic of him.
After reading each behavior, participants indicated whether they
believed that behavior was characteristic or uncharacteristic of
Bob by pressing the c key or the u key, respectively. After each
response, participants were given feedback about whether each
behavior was characteristic of Bob. Specifically, feedback con-
sisted of the word correct (in blue text) or incorrect (in red text)
positioned in the center of the computer monitor and, at the same
time, the behavior was stated correctly, on the basis of the assigned
condition, at the bottom of the monitor (e.g., Helping the neigh-
borhood children is characteristic of Bob or Helping the neigh-
borhood children is uncharacteristic of Bob). Thus, through sys-
tematically differing feedback (to be described), participants were
exposed to the same behaviors, but the reinforcement was designed
to indicate that Bob performed positive or negative acts.
Manipulation of Bobs weight. To manipulate whether Bob
was perceived as overweight or not overweight, the picture of Bob
differed as a function of condition. Half of the participants saw a
picture of Bob during each trial that showed he was not over-
weight, but the rest saw a picture of Bob during each learning trial
where the photo of Bob had been morphed from the original (i.e.,
the picture in which Bob was not overweight) so that Bob appeared
to be overweight (see Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2004). Thus,
each not-overweight face was used to create an overweight face
that was almost identical except for apparent weight.
Manipulation of valence of the initial verbal information. Dur-
ing the first 100 trials, half of the participants received feedback
that positive behaviors were characteristic of Bob and negative
behaviors were uncharacteristic of Bob (positive initial verbal
information). The remaining participants received feedback that
negative behaviors were characteristic of Bob and positive behav-
iors were uncharacteristic of Bob (negative initial verbal informa-
tion).
Manipulation of CA condition. After the first 100 trials, par-
ticipants in the control condition received 100 neutral trials (i.e.,
the behavior characteristic of Bob was neither positive nor nega-
tive; e.g., Bob waited at the street corner). However, participants
in the CA condition (100 CA) received CA feedback about Bob on
100 trials (i.e., the behaviors that were described as characteristic
or uncharacteristic of Bob were opposite of the valence presented
during the initial learning trials).3 After completing the second
block of 100 trials, participants completed measures assessing their
attitudes toward Bob.4
Explicit attitude measure. To assess explicit attitudes, we had
participants judge how likable Bob was on a scale ranging from 1
(very unlikable) to 9 (very likable). In addition, the participants com-
pleted five semantic differential scales, each using a 9-point scale to
describe Bob with anchors of good bad, pleasantmean, agreeable
disagreeable, caring uncaring, and kind cruel. Further, participants
provided their evaluation of Bob on a feeling thermometer that ranged
in temperature from 0o to 100o. Following past research (e.g., Rydell
& McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006), we standardized the re-
sponses for each explicit measure and computed an overall mean (in
all experiments, s .90). Thus, higher scores indicated more pos-
itive explicit attitudes toward Bob.
Implicit attitude measure. The Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald et al., 1998) was used to assess implicit attitudes toward
Bob, as implicit attitudes have been studied in previous research (e.g.,
Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). In this study, the IAT
had 25 stimuli: 1 picture of Bob (Bob was either overweight or not
overweight), 4 different pictures of White men who were not Bob (2
were overweight and 2 were not), 10 positive adjectives (e.g., won-
derful), and 10 negative adjectives (e.g., disgusting). All stimuli were
presented in the center of the monitor and the adjectives were always
presented in lowercase letters.
As in past work (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al.,
2006), the IAT task featured seven blocks with 20 trials per block.
Participants were informed that the task involved making category
judgments using one of two responses (the d or k keys on the
keyboard) for a variety of stimuli (photos or words) presented on
a computer monitor. During each block, verbal category label
reminders appeared on the left and right sides of the display
(assignment of particular labels to the d and k keys was counter-
balanced across participants and produced no effects). Participants
were instructed to complete that task quickly while also minimiz-
ing errors, and they were told to keep their index fingers on the d
and k keys throughout the experiment to minimize delays in
responding. There was a 250-ms intertrial interval.
2
This counterbalancing procedure produced no effects on any of the
results. Similar counterbalancing was used in the other experiments and
produced no effects as well.
3
In the current work, we contrasted the 0 CA control condition (where
no CA information was presented) with the 100 CA condition (where 100
CA items were presented). We selected 100 CA for our comparison
because past research (Rydell & McConnell, 2006) has shown that even
slow-changing implicit attitudes change after such a large number of CA
behaviors. Thus, if implicit attitudes continue to reflect group association
cue evaluations under conditions where, without the cue, they would be
significantly moderated, it would be an especially compelling demonstra-
tion of the unresponsiveness of implicit attitudes to changing behavioral
information that has been shown, in the absence of such cues, to produce
markedly changed implicit attitudes.
4
In all experiments reported in the current work, the order of attitude
measure (i.e., implicit before explicit vs. explicit before implicit) was
counterbalanced, and this factor did not qualify any of the results.
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
Explicit Attitudes
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
6.8 4.1 1.9 4.4 6.6 4.7 2.3 3.5
-1.5 Positive Negative Positive Negative
Not overweight Overweight
Figure 2. Explicit and implicit attitudes as a function of Bobs weight, valence of the initial verbal behaviors,
and counterattitudinal condition in Experiment 1. Standardized means are presented on the y-axis, and non-
standardized means are listed along the abscissa. CA counterattitudinal statements.
In Block 1, participants judged photos of Bob or not Bob, and in
Block 2, they judged whether the adjectives were negative or positive.
In Blocks 3 and 4 (Combination 1), participants judged whether the
stimuli were Bob or negative or not Bob or positive. In Block 5,
participants performed the same judgment task as they did in Block 2
except the assignment of response keys to the two valence categories
was reversed. Finally, in Blocks 6 and 7 (Combination 2), participants
judged whether the stimuli were Bob or positive or not Bob or
negative. As in past IAT research, half of the participants performed
Combination 1 in Blocks 3 4 and Combination 2 in Blocks 6 7,
whereas the rest performed Combination 2 in Blocks 3 4 and Com-
bination 1 in Blocks 6 7 (this counterbalancing manipulation pro-
duced no effects).5
To assess implicit attitudes toward Bob, we subtracted the mean
response latencies of Combination 2 from the mean response
latencies of Combination 1 (see Greenwald et al., 1998, for de-
tailed scoring information).6 As in past work (e.g., Rydell &
McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006, 2007), these difference
scores were standardized, with greater values indicating relatively
more positive implicit attitudes toward Bob. Because IAT scores
have long been viewed as relative (rather than absolute) measures
of attitudes (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998; Nosek, Greenwald, &
Banaji, 2006), standardization maintains their relativistic nature.
Moreover, by standardizing the implicit and explicit attitude mea-
sures and treating the type of attitude (implicit vs. explicit) as a
within-subjects factor, we can evaluate how implicit and explicit
attitudes respond differently to the between-subjects manipula-
tions, testing the central predictions that group association cues
have differential effects on implicit and explicit attitudes. Thus, the
discussion of the results focuses on analyses of these data. How-
ever, to provide readers with a better sense of how measures varied
within and across experiments (where standardization makes com-
parisons more difficult), each figure in the current study displays
both the means for the standardized explicit and implicit attitude
measures along the y-axis (because the inferential statistics were
conducted on these values) and the means for nonstandardized
explicit (the means of the liking and semantic differential re-
sponses, each assessed on 9-point scales) and implicit (the IAT
difference score, in milliseconds) attitude measures along the base
797
Implicit Attitudes
0 CA
1.5 0 CA
100 CA 100 CA
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
221 -56 -24 118 -150 -179 -107 -141
-1.5 Positive Negative Positive Negative
Not overweight Overweight
of each figure. Because the standardized measures provide the
most direct tests of the theoretical predictions in the current work,
in the Results and Discussion section, we focus on these data.7
Results and Discussion
The attitude measures were examined with a 2 (Bobs weight)
2 (valence of the initial verbal information) 2 (CA condition)
2 (standardized attitude measure: implicit vs. explicit) mixed-
model analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the latter factor within
subjects. Several results obtained, but of greatest importance was
the four-way interaction that approached significance (see Figure
2), F(1, 125) 3.01, p .08.8 To better understand these data, we
examined the three-way interactions of Bobs Weight Valence
of the Initial Verbal Information CA Condition separately for
implicit and explicit attitudes.
Explicit attitudes. For explicit attitudes, a main effect of va-
lence of the initial verbal information was found, F(1, 125)
89.51, p .001. Specifically, for those initially receiving positive
verbal information, participants reported more positive attitudes
5
Within each block, an equal number of relevant stimuli were presented,
with the particular order of presentation being randomly determined for
each participant. Thus, in Blocks 1, 2, and 5, ten stimuli from the relevant
two categories were presented. In Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7, five stimuli from
the relevant four categories (i.e., Bob, not Bob, positive, negative) were
presented. With the exception of the inclusion of group association cues,
the current IAT is identical to that used in past research (e.g., Rydell &
McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006).
6
Alternative IAT scoring approaches (e.g., Greenwald, Nosek, & Ba-
naji, 2003) produced identical results in the current work.
7
Parallel analyses conducted on the nonstandardized measures produced
similar results.
8
Although only marginal in this study, the same group association cue
manipulation (i.e., obesity) was used again in Experiment 4 and revealed the
predicted significant interaction. Also, this four-way interaction (using other
group association cues) was significant at conventional levels in both Exper-
iments 2 and 3. However, because the current four-way interaction was
marginal, some degree of caution should be exercised in its interpretation.
798 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
toward Bob (M 0.54) than did those initially receiving negative
verbal information (M 0.51). In addition, this effect was
qualified by the expected interaction with CA condition, F(1,
125) 59.08, p .001. Simple effect analyses showed that for
participants initially receiving positive verbal information, those in
the 0 CA condition had more positive attitudes toward Bob (M
1.01) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.06), F(1,
125) 22.27, p .001. For those initially receiving negative
verbal information, the exact opposite pattern emerged, with those
in the 0 CA condition evaluating Bob more negatively (M
0.88) than those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.13), F(1,
125) 44.10, p .001. The three-way interaction was not
significant, F(1, 125) 2.30, ns (see Figure 2, left panel). Thus,
the CA information reversed the explicit attitudes that were
strongly reflective of the initial verbal information. Also, note that
Bobs weight did not play any role in explicit attitudes toward him
whatsoever.
Implicit attitudes. In contrast, implicit attitudes showed a main
effect of Bobs weight, F(1, 125) 32.43, p .001. That is,
participants had more negative implicit attitudes toward the over-
weight Bob (M 0.42) than toward the not-overweight Bob
(M 0.43). Thus, the group association cue had a direct impact on
implicit attitudes. Also, the two-way interaction between the va-
lence of the initial verbal information and CA condition was
significant, F(1, 125) 8.30, p .001. For those who initially
received positive verbal information, participants in the 0 CA
condition had more positive implicit attitudes toward Bob (M
0.30) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.30), F(1,
125) 6.01, p .02. For those who initially received negative
verbal information, the opposite pattern emerged, as those in the 0
CA condition held more negative implicit attitudes toward Bob
(M 0.13) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.12),
although this difference was not significant, F(1, 125) 1.98, ns.
Although this two-way interaction suggests that implicit atti-
tudes followed the valence of the initial verbal information and
subsequently were changed by the CA information just like ex-
plicit attitudes were, this two-way interaction was qualified by the
predicted three-way interaction with Bobs weight, F(1, 125)
8.38, p .005 (see Figure 2, right panel). Specifically, the two-
way interaction between initial valence of the behavioral informa-
tion and CA information held for the not-overweight Bob, F(1,
125) 16.40, p .001, but was absent for the overweight Bob,
F(1, 125) 0.00, ns. In other words, for the not-overweight Bob,
those initially receiving positive verbal information about Bob had
more positive implicit attitudes toward him in the 0 CA condition
(M 1.06) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.03),
F(1, 125) 7.65, p .01. In the condition where initial verbal
information was negative, the opposite pattern emerged, with those
in the 0 CA condition having more negative implicit attitudes
toward Bob (M 0.02) than those in the 100 CA condition (M
0.66), F(1, 125) 8.22, p .01.
As expected, when no salient group association cue was present
(i.e., not-overweight Bob), implicit attitudes toward Bob followed
the same pattern as explicit attitudes, tracking the valence of the
large amount of behavioral information provided (Rydell & Mc-
Connell, 2006). That is, attitudes reflected the valence of the initial
verbal information, and these attitudes reversed after the presen-
tation of a considerable amount of CA information. However,
when the group association cue of Bobs being overweight was
displayed, implicit attitudes toward him reflected the well-
established association between obesity and negativity and were
unaffected by the valence of the verbal information (initial or CA)
about him. Thus, when the group association cue was present,
implicit attitudes toward the target reflected the valence of the
group association cue instead of the valence of the behavioral
information provided.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 supported the systems of evaluation prediction
that strong group association cues (in this case, being overweight),
when present, would influence implicit attitudes toward a novel
target. On the one hand, the valence of the behavioral statements
determined explicit attitudes (in all cases) and implicit attitudes
when no salient group association cue was provided. This work
expands our earlier research (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006;
Rydell et al., 2006) by showing that social groups with a strong
association value (e.g., obesity is negative) are used by the asso-
ciative system when available. In other words, the negativity
associated with Bob being overweight led to negative implicit
attitudes toward him even when the statements about his actions
conveyed exclusively positive behavioral information. On the
other hand, because the behavioral statements were unambiguous
with respect to valence, the group association cue had no impact on
explicit attitudes toward the target person.
Although this provides strong support for our predictions de-
rived from a systems of evaluation perspective, we anticipate that
positive group association cues should produce similar outcomes
for implicit attitudes as well, leading people to hold positive
implicit attitudes toward a target described as performing numer-
ous negative behaviors. Thus, in Experiment 2, we examined a
different group association cue, physical attractiveness, which can
provide positive (attractive) and negative (unattractive) associa-
tions. Indeed, a considerable amount of research on persuasion
(Chaiken, 1979) and the what is beautiful is good effect (Dion et
al., 1972) shows that attractive people are evaluated more posi-
tively than average individuals are and that unattractive people are
evaluated more negatively than average or attractive individuals
are.
In Experiment 2, participants learned about either an attractive
female, an average female, or an unattractive female named Bob-
bie. On the basis of our reasoning about which types of informa-
tion the associative and rule-based systems of evaluation would
use, we expected that explicit attitudes toward Bobbie would
reflect the valence of the behavioral statements provided about her
and that implicit attitudes toward her in the absence of a distinctive
group association cue (i.e., when Bobbie was of average attrac-
tiveness) would do the same. However, when strong salient group
association cues were present (i.e., her physical attractiveness is
salient), we expected that implicit attitudes toward Bobbie would
reflect the valence associated with the cue instead of the valence of
her behaviors, leading to relatively positive implicit attitudes to-
ward her when she was presented as being very attractive and
relatively negative implicit attitudes toward her when she was
presented as being very unattractive.
Method
Participants. A sample of 185 undergraduates at Miami Uni-
versity participated in return for research credit. They were ran-
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
Explicit Attitudes
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
7.2 4.7 1.9 4.9 7.6 3.8 2.0 5.1 7.8 4.4
-1.5 Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Attractive Average Unattractive
Figure 3. Explicit and implicit attitudes as a function of Bobbies attractiveness, valence of the initial verbal
behaviors, and counterattitudinal condition in Experiment 2. Standardized means are presented on the y-axis, and
nonstandardized means are listed along the abscissa. CA counterattitudinal statements.
domly assigned to a 3 (Bobbies attractiveness: attractive, average,
unattractive) 2 (valence of the initial verbal information: posi-
tive, negative) 2 (CA condition: 0 CA, 100 CA) between-
subjects factorial.
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as
the procedure in Experiment 1 with three exceptions. First, a
female target person, Bobbie, was used. Second, the not-Bobbie
pictures used in the Bobbie IAT were a mixture of other attractive,
average, and unattractive women. Third, to manipulate whether
Bobbie was attractive, average, or unattractive, we chose images of
Bobbie that differed in their level of physical attractiveness. Spe-
cifically, pictures were taken from an Internet dating Web site and
a face database (Minear & Park, 2004) and rated by a separate
group of 40 participants from the same university (none of whom
participated in the current study). On the basis of these ratings, on
a scale ranging from 1 (extremely unattractive) to 9 (extremely
attractive), two images were selected to be attractive Bobbies
(M 7.61), two images were selected to be average Bobbies (M
5.38), and two images were selected to be unattractive Bobbies
(M 3.15).9 The attractiveness of these pictures differed signif-
icantly, F(2, 76) 205.68, p .001, with all three levels of
attractiveness being significantly different, ps .001.
Results and Discussion
The attitude measures were examined with a 3 (Bobbies phys-
ical attractiveness) 2 (valence of the initial verbal informa-
tion) 2 (CA condition) 2 (standardized attitude measure:
implicit vs. explicit) mixed-model ANOVA, with the latter factor
being within subjects. Several results obtained, but of greatest
importance was the predicted four-way interaction, F(2, 173)
4.52, p .02, which is presented in Figure 3. To examine this
effect, we examined the three-way interactions of Bobbies Phys-
ical Attractiveness Valence of the Initial Verbal Information
CA Condition separately for implicit and explicit attitudes.
Explicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes once again showed a main
effect of valence of the initial verbal information, F(1, 173)
169.99, p .001. Similar to the results of Experiment 1, those who
initially received positive verbal information evaluated Bobbie
799
Implicit Attitudes
0 CA
1.5 0 CA
100 CA 100 CA
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
1.7 4.4 208 241 208 194 201 30 -29 149 12 4 -74 -2
-1.5 Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Attractive Average Unattractive
more positively (M 0.50) than did those initially receiving
negative verbal information about her (M 0.51). Also repli-
cating the results of Experiment 1, this effect was qualified by CA
condition, F(1, 173) 236.80, p .001. For those who initially
received positive verbal information about Bobbie, participants in
the 0 CA condition had more positive explicit attitudes toward her
(M 1.14) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.13),
F(1, 173) 108.77, p .001. For those who initially received
negative verbal information about her, the exact opposite pattern
emerged, with those in the 0 CA condition evaluating Bobbie more
negatively (M 1.06) than those in the 100 CA condition (M
0.05), F(1, 173) 136.92, p .001. The three-way interaction
was not significant, F(2, 173) 0.80, ns (see Figure 3, left panel).
These analyses revealed two effects that paralleled those of Ex-
periment 1. First, explicit attitudes were very responsive to the
valence of the initial verbal information and changed dramatically
after participants received the CA information. Second, the group
association cue manipulation (i.e., Bobbies physical attractive-
ness) did not qualify any of these effects.
Implicit attitudes. However, implicit attitudes showed a main
effect of Bobbies attractiveness, F(2, 173) 46.04, p .001.
Specifically, participants had more positive implicit attitudes to-
ward the attractive Bobbie (M 0.71) than toward the unattractive
Bobbie (M 0.66) or the average Bobbie (M 0.05), with the
latter two also differing significantly. In addition, there was a
Valence of the Initial Verbal Information CA Condition inter-
action, F(2, 173) 8.61, p .005. This interaction showed that a
simple effect of CA condition was not significant for those in the
positive condition (0 CA M 0.25, 100 CA M 0.04), F(1,
173) 1.92, ns, but it was significant in the negative condition (0
CA M 0.33, 100 CA M 0.11), F(1, 173) 4.63, p .04.
Most important, this effect was qualified by the predicted three-
way interaction, F(2, 173) 8.87, p .001 (see Figure 3, right
panel). To explore this effect, we examined the interaction be-
9
There was one blonde and one brunette Bobbie for each of the three
levels of attractiveness. The choice of target Bobbie (blonde vs. brunette)
was randomly determined, and this factor did not qualify any of the results.
800 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
tween valence of the initial verbal information and CA information
for the attractive, average, and unattractive Bobbie conditions
separately. For the attractive and the unattractive Bobbies, the
two-way interactions were not significant, Fs 1, ns. Instead,
implicit attitudes toward the attractive Bobbie were positive re-
gardless of the valence of the verbal information, and implicit
attitudes toward the unattractive Bobbie were negative regardless
of the valence of the verbal information. However, the two-way
interaction was significant for the average Bobbie, F(1, 173)
33.34, p .001. For those who received positive verbal informa-
tion initially, those in the 0 CA condition had more positive
implicit attitudes toward the average Bobbie (M 0.55) than did
those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.47), F(1, 173) 18.08,
p .001. For those who received negative verbal information
initially, the opposite pattern was found, with those in the 0 CA
condition having more negative implicit attitudes toward the av-
erage Bobbie (M 0.64) than those in the 100 CA condition
(M 0.34), F(1, 173) 15.50, p .001.
Thus, Experiment 2 replicated the findings of Experiment 1.
First, explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes (in the absence of a
salient group association cue) followed the valence of the verbal
information. Yet, when a distinctive group association cue was
present, implicit attitudes reflected the evaluation associated with
that cue and not the behaviors performed by the target person.
Similar to Experiment 1, when the group association cue was
negative (in this case, when the cue was the unattractive Bobbie),
implicit attitudes toward her were negative even when the behav-
ioral statements conveyed positivity. Moreover, Experiment 2
showed that when the group association cue was positive (i.e.,
when the cue was the attractive Bobbie), implicit attitudes toward
her were positive, even in cases when the behavior statements
suggested negativity. Once again, implicit attitudes reflected the
valence of the salient group association cue when present, whereas
explicit attitudes toward the target were unaffected by this group
association cue and instead reflected the valence of the unambig-
uous actions performed by the individual.
Experiment 3
So far, we have shown that implicit attitudes can be unrespon-
sive to behavioral information when strong group association cues
are available. We contend that the evaluations associated with
these cues dominate implicit attitudes because those attitudes are
determined by a system of evaluation that is especially sensitive to
associative information (Rydell et al., 2006). If this reasoning is
correct, the extent to which implicit attitudes are driven by these
group association cues should be related to the strength of the
association between the cue and evaluations of it. For example, the
overweight Bob in Study 1 revealed negative implicit attitudes
even in circumstances when he performed many positive behav-
iors, presumably because most participants had strong associations
between obesity and negativity in memory (Nosek, 2005). Yet,
group association cues can be linked with valence to varying
degrees. For example, although many individuals in American
culture exhibit strong automatic associations between African
Americans and negativity (Devine, 1989; Greenwald et al., 1998),
there is meaningful variability in the extent to which people hold
such associations (Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001).
Thus, we would anticipate that group association cues influence
implicit attitudes more strongly for those with stronger cue-
evaluation associations in memory. In other words, as the cue-to-
valence association grows weaker, implicit attitudes toward the
individual should be increasingly reflective of the behavioral state-
ments about the person.
With this logic in mind, in Experiment 3, we examined another
group association cue, a targets race. Specifically, we replicated
Experiment 1 but manipulated target race to either provide a
distinctive group association cue (i.e., an African American Bob)
or not provide a distinctive group association cue (i.e., a White
Bob). In addition, we also assessed participants evaluative asso-
ciations with the cue (i.e., their implicit attitudes toward African
Americans in general) to examine the relation between their im-
plicit evaluations of the social group cue and their attitudes toward
a group target member in particular. We expected to replicate the
findings of Study 1 using race as the group association cue, and we
anticipated that implicit prejudice against African Americans
would account for the magnitude of negative implicit attitudes
toward Bob when he was African American. In other words,
participants with stronger racial prejudice should be less influ-
enced than those with less prejudice by the behavioral statements
about an African American target when forming implicit attitudes
toward him. Therefore, we predicted an inverse relation between
implicit racial prejudice and implicit (but not explicit) attitudes
toward Bob, but only when he was African American and not
when he was White.
Method
Participants. A sample of 94 White undergraduates at the
University of California, Santa Barbara, participated in return for
research credit in their introductory psychology courses. They
were randomly assigned to a 2 (Bobs race: African American,
White) 2 (valence of the initial verbal information: positive,
negative) 2 (CA condition: 0 CA, 100 CA) between-subjects
factorial.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to the procedure of
Experiment 1 with a few exceptions. First, in the current experi-
ment, we examined the group association cue of race by presenting
an African American Bob to half of the participants or a White
Bob (as in Experiment 1) to the rest. Several minutes before
engaging in the learning task, participants completed a racial IAT
where African American and White names were presented with
positive and negative adjectives using the same trial and block
structure as was used with the IAT in Experiment 1 (see also
McConnell & Leibold, 2001). Thus, in one set of critical blocks of
this racial IAT, participants judged whether the stimuli were Af-
rican American or negative or White or positive. In the other set
of critical blocks, they judged whether the stimuli were African
American or positive or White or negative. The difference in
mean response latencies for the critical blocks was computed, with
higher scores indicating relatively greater implicit prejudice
against African Americans (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). After
the learning task (involving either an African American or a White
Bob target), participants completed the same implicit and explicit
attitude measures used in Experiment 1, with the exception that the
IAT presented non-Bob targets of the same race as the Bob target
(to ensure it assessed implicit attitudes toward Bob specifically and
not racial prejudice more generally).
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
Results and Discussion
Attitudes toward Bob were examined with a 2 (Bobs race) 2
(valence of the initial verbal information) 2 (CA condition) 2
(standardized attitude measure: implicit, explicit) mixed-model
ANOVA, with the latter factor being within subjects. Several
results obtained, but of greatest importance was the predicted
four-way interaction, F(1, 86) 4.13, p .05, which is presented
in Figure 4. To explore this outcome, we examined the three-way
interactions of Bobs Race Valence of the Initial Verbal Infor-
mation CA Condition separately for implicit and explicit atti-
tudes.
Explicit attitudes toward Bob. Replicating the results of Ex-
periments 12, explicit attitudes showed a main effect of valence
of the initial verbal information, F(1, 86) 24.83, p .001. Once
again, those who initially received positive verbal information
about Bob reported more favorable attitudes toward him (M
0.40) than did those who initially received negative verbal infor-
mation about him (M 0.43). In addition, this main effect was
qualified by the interaction with CA condition, F(1, 86) 10.24,
p .005. Specifically, when initially receiving positive verbal
information about Bob, those in the 0 CA condition had more
positive attitudes toward him (M 0.77) than did those in the 100
CA condition (M 0.02), F(1, 86) 10.24, p .005. However,
when initially receiving negative behavioral statements about Bob,
those in the 0 CA condition had more negative attitudes toward
Bob (M 1.06) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M
0.21), F(1, 86) 28.31, p .001. The three-way interaction was
not significant, F(1, 86) 0.04, ns (see Figure 4, left panel). Thus,
the two-way interaction revealed that CA information reversed the
attitudes that reflected the valence of the initial information about
Bob. Yet, similar to the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, Bobs
race did not play a role in any of these outcomes.
Implicit attitudes toward Bob. In stark contrast, implicit atti-
tudes toward Bob revealed a main effect of Bobs race, F(1, 86)
6.07, p .02. That is, participants had more negative implicit
attitudes toward Bob when he was African American (M 0.19)
than when he was White (M 0.23). Thus, as in Experiments 1 and
2, the group association cue had a direct effect on implicit attitudes
Explicit Attitudes
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
5.9 4.4 1.7 5.4 7.0 4.7 1.8 4.5
-1.5 Positive Negative Positive Negative
White African-American
Figure 4. Explicit and implicit attitudes as a function of Bobs race, valence of the initial verbal behaviors, and
counterattitudinal condition in Experiment 3. Standardized means are presented on the y-axis, and nonstand-
ardized means are listed along the abscissa. CA counterattitudinal statements.
801
toward the target. Also, an interaction between the valence of the
initial verbal information and CA condition was found, F(1, 86)
15.49, p .001. To examine this interaction, we analyzed the
simple effects of CA condition as a function of the valence of the
initial verbal information. When the valence of the initial verbal
information was positive, participants in the 0 CA condition had
more positive implicit attitudes toward Bob (M 0.51) than did
those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.21), F(1, 86) 9.28, p
.01. For those receiving initially negative verbal information, the
opposite pattern emerged, with those in the 0 CA condition re-
vealing more negative implicit attitudes toward Bob (M 0.40)
than those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.24), F(1, 86) 7.12,
p .02. Thus, overall, implicit attitudes toward Bob reflected the
valence of the verbal information (i.e., the valence of the initial
behavioral information, which was undercut by the CA informa-
tion), similar to the explicit attitudes toward Bob.
But, unlike the explicit attitudes, this two-way interaction was
qualified by Bobs race in the predicted three-way interaction, F(1,
86) 9.54, p .005 (see Figure 4, right panel). To explore this
effect, we examined the interaction between the valence of the
initial verbal information and CA condition for the White and
African American Bobs separately. For the White Bob, the two-
way interaction was significant, F(1, 86) 16.20, p .001;
however, it was not significant for the African American Bob, F(1,
86) 0.01, ns. To examine this interaction for the White Bob, we
analyzed the simple effects of the CA condition as a function of the
valence of the initial verbal information. For those initially receiv-
ing positive verbal information about the White Bob, those in the
0 CA condition had more positive implicit attitudes toward him
(M 0.95) than did those in the 100 CA condition (M 0.20),
F(1, 86) 12.45, p .005. For those initially receiving negative
verbal information about the White Bob, the opposite pattern
emerged, with those in the 0 CA condition having more negative
implicit attitudes toward him (M 0.53) than those in the 100
CA condition (M 0.68), F(1, 86) 12.24, p .005.
In sum, these effects revealed that implicit attitudes toward a
target without a distinctive group association cue (i.e., the White
Bob) reflected the valence of the verbal behaviors presented about
Implicit Attitudes
0 CA
1.5 0 CA
100 CA 100 CA
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
229 9 -25 175 73 18 -9 32
-1.5 Positive Negative Positive Negative
White African-American
802 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
him, replicating the results of Experiments 1 and 2 and past work
involving nondescript targets (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). How-
ever, when a group association cue was present (i.e., the African
American Bob), the implicit attitudes toward him were reflective
of the valence of the group association cue, as found in Experi-
ments 1 and 2.
Prejudice against African Americans. To examine if negative
associations with the cue (i.e., prejudice against African Ameri-
cans) can account for the implicit attitudes toward the African
American Bob being negative, we explored the extent to which
participants implicit prejudice toward African Americans pre-
dicted their attitudes toward Bob. In our sample, the average
participant revealed relatively strong implicit racial prejudice
against African Americans (M 207.88 ms IAT effect, d 1.35).
In essence, this effect reaffirms the relative negativity participants
associated with the group association cue (i.e., being African
American). Next, we examined the correlations among partici-
pants racial prejudice, explicit attitudes toward Bob, and implicit
attitudes toward Bob separately as a function of the race condition.
As expected, when Bob was White, there were no relations be-
tween implicit racial prejudice and implicit attitudes toward Bob
(r .05, ns) or explicit attitudes toward him (r .07, ns).
However, as predicted, a different pattern emerged when Bob was
African American. Although participants implicit racial prejudice
was unrelated to their explicit attitudes toward Bob (r .14, ns),
implicit racial prejudice was significantly negatively correlated to
their implicit attitudes toward him (r .50, p .001). That is,
the more negativity they associated with African Americans, the
less positive their feelings toward Bob were on implicit (but not
explicit) attitude measures, but only when he was Black. As
expected, the relation between racial prejudice and implicit atti-
tudes toward Bob differed as a function of race, z 2.81, p .01,
but there were no race condition differences in the relation be-
tween racial prejudice and explicit attitudes toward Bob, z 1.
These data indicate that the magnitude of the valence associated
with the group association cue can account for how Bobs race led
to relatively negative implicit attitudes toward him when he was a
member of that social group.
Experiment 4
To this point, we have shown in three different experiments
using three different group association cues that implicit attitudes
toward an individual reflect the valence (and, in Experiment 3, the
extremity of valence) of a salient group association cue when such
cues are present but that they are responsive to the valence of the
behaviors describing the target when such cues are absent or when
the cues have relatively weaker associations with valence. Yet, in
each of these studies, explicit attitudes were unaffected by the
group association cues. At first blush, these results may seem
difficult to reconcile with findings in the literature showing that
group membership can impact judgments. We have argued that
because the behavioral statements ascribed to the target individuals
in the current experiments were both numerous and clear-cut with
respect to valence, the ability of the group association cue to
induce assimilation effects on explicit attitudes was effectively
curtailed. However, we would anticipate that if the target-relevant
behaviors were more ambiguous with respect to valence instead of
being clear-cut, group association cues would have an impact on
explicit attitudes toward the individual by providing a means to
bias the encoding of ambiguous actions (e.g., Bodenhausen &
Wyer, 1985).
In Experiment 4, we revisited the group association cue used in
Experiment 1 by manipulating Bobs apparent weight in a more
simplified experimental design. Specifically, participants were
only presented with 100 statements about Bob (whose weight was
manipulated between subjects) and were told that each statement
was characteristic of him. As part of another between-subjects
factor, half of the participants read statements indicating that Bob
performed unambiguous positive acts whereas the rest read state-
ments that were relatively ambiguous (i.e., not strongly valenced).
In the latter case, we predicted that the group association cue
would have an assimilative effect, resulting in a relatively negative
explicit attitude toward Bob when he was obese. Such a finding
would not only be valuable to test the importance of behavioral
ambiguity in how group association cues affect explicit attitudes,
but it would also demonstrate that participants in our studies are
not reticent to report negative explicit attitudes toward members of
stigmatized groups (i.e., perhaps the lack of effect of cues in
previous studies reflects engaging in positive impression manage-
ment). However, when Bobs behaviors were unambiguously pos-
itive, we expected relatively positive explicit attitudes toward Bob
regardless of his weight, replicating the results of Experiment 1.
We chose positive unambiguous behaviors in this study to provide
the best opportunity for Bobs stigma to impact attitudes toward
him (i.e., avoid floor effects).
In addition to testing our reasoning that group association cues
could impact explicit attitudes toward an individual whose behav-
ior was relatively ambiguous, we also modified our IAT task in the
current experiment. In the previous three experiments, we used
images of people as IAT stimuli to render Bob (or Bobbie) versus
not-Bob (or not-Bobbie) categorizations. It is possible that when
making these judgments, participants could have been led by each
presentation of Bob (or Bobbie) in conditions involving a group
association cue to strengthen their association between the target
person and the targets stigma. For example, for participants ex-
posed to an overweight Bob, the IAT task continually re-presents
images of an obese Bob throughout the IAT task, which may have
served to further reinforce negativity toward Bob. Also, the alter-
native targets (e.g., the not Bobs) provided distractors that some-
times did and sometimes did not present the group association cue
as well, which could introduce unwanted context effects. To any
extent that the group association cue was re-presented during the
IAT task, the possibility that the implicit attitude measure toward
Bob (or Bobbie) reflects a confound of attitudes toward the target
and attitudes toward the group association cue itself exists. To
eliminate this possibility, in the current experiment, we used an
IAT task that presented names and not images of the target and
five nontargets. Because the current IAT task did not present visual
images of people, we avoided the possibility that the implicit
attitude measure was assessing a blend of attitudes toward the
target and attitudes toward the group association cue.
To summarize, the overall design of the study crossed Bobs
weight (overweight vs. not overweight) with type of behavioral
information (100 positive vs. 100 ambiguous) in a more simplified
experimental paradigm and with a modified IAT task. For implicit
attitudes, a main effect of Bobs weight was expected, revealing
more negative implicit attitudes toward Bob when he was over-
weight than when he was not (thus replicating the results of
Experiment 1). However, for explicit attitudes, we predicted an
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
interaction, such that the group association cue (i.e., overweight
Bob) would reduce the positivity of explicit attitudes toward Bob
when his behaviors were ambiguous with respect to valence.
Method
Participants. A sample of 47 undergraduates at Miami Uni-
versity participated in return for research credit in their introduc-
tory psychology courses. They were randomly assigned to a 2
(Bobs weight: not overweight, overweight) 2 (statement type:
positive, ambiguous) between-subjects factorial.
Procedure. Participants were presented with 100 behavior
statements about Bob and told that they were all characteristic of
him. Each statement was presented on the monitor for 8 s. On the
basis of pretested norms, participants assigned to the positive
statement condition read 100 statements that implied positivity
(e.g., Bob helped friends move into a new house), whereas those
in the ambiguous statement condition read 100 statements that
were relatively valence neutral (e.g., Bob watched TV with
friends). The image of Bob presented on the monitor and asso-
ciated with each statement was either overweight or not over-
weight, depending on condition assignment (using the same stim-
uli as Experiment 1).
Next, participants completed implicit and explicit attitude mea-
sures toward Bob (once again counterbalanced). The explicit mea-
sures were identical to those used in Experiment 1. However, the
implicit measure was a slightly modified version of the IAT.
Specifically, it was identical to the IAT used in Experiment 1
except that rather than the presented images being Bob and not-
Bob targets, the person-related stimuli were names presented in
uppercase font (positive and negative adjectives were presented in
lowercase), either BOB or five not-Bob names that began with the
same letter (e.g., BEN). There were an equal number of presenta-
tions of Bob and non-Bob names in each block.
Results and Discussion
Attitudes toward Bob were examined with a 2 (Bobs weight)
2 (statement type) 2 (standardized attitude measure: implicit,
explicit) mixed-model ANOVA, with the latter factor being within
Explicit Attitudes
1.5 Positive
Ambiguous
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
7.5 6.5 7.4 5.0
-1.5
Not overweight Overweight
Figure 5. Explicit and implicit attitudes as a function of Bobs weight and statement type in Experiment 4.
Standardized means are presented on the y-axis, and nonstandardized means are listed along the abscissa. CA
counterattitudinal statements.
803
subjects. As expected, we observed the predicted three-way inter-
action, F(1, 43) 4.16, p .05, which is illustrated in Figure 5.
To explore this effect, the two-way interaction of Bobs weight and
statement type were examined separately for implicit and explicit
attitudes.
Explicit attitudes. The Bobs Weight Statement Type
ANOVA yielded three effects. First, not surprisingly, there was a
main effect of statement type, F(1, 43) 15.45, p .001,
revealing that explicit attitudes toward Bob were more positive
when the 100 statements suggested positivity (M 0.55) than
when they were ambiguous with respect to valence (M 0.57).
Also, there was a main effect of Bobs weight, F(1, 43) 10.65,
p .01, indicating that explicit attitudes toward Bob were more
negative when he was overweight (M 0.29) than when he was
not (M 0.30). It is important to note that this effect was qualified
by an interaction with statement type, F(1, 43) 6.53, p .02
(see Figure 5, left panel). Although explicit attitudes toward the
Bob described by unambiguous positive behaviors did not differ as
a function of his weight, F(1, 22) 0.75, ns, the same was not true
when his behaviors were ambiguous, F(1, 21) 9.84, p .01,
with Bob being viewed more negatively when he was overweight
(M 1.19) than when he was not (M 0.01). Thus, as
hypothesized, the group association cue did impact explicit atti-
tudes toward the target individual, but only when his behaviors
were not clear-cut with respect to valence.
Implicit attitudes. In contrast to the explicit attitudes data, the
Bobs Weight Statement Type ANOVA for implicit attitudes
toward Bob revealed only a main effect of Bobs weight, F(1,
43) 13.86, p .001. Figure 5 (right panel) shows that partici-
pants had more negative implicit attitudes when Bob was over-
weight (M 0.49) than when he was not (M 0.48). Thus,
impact of the group association cue was strong in all conditions.
In sum, these findings show that a group association cue (i.e.,
Bobs weight) can affect explicit attitudes, but only when the
targets actions are relatively ambiguous and thus capable of being
assimilated by the group association cue. However, when the
targets behaviors were unequivocal, the group association had no
impact on explicit attitudes, replicating the results of Experiments
13. These findings obtained using a more simplified attitude-
Implicit Attitudes
1.5 Positive
Ambiguous
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
207 189 36 25
-1.5
Not overweight Overweight
804 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
learning paradigm and using a modified IAT designed to circum-
vent possible confounds that might exist with presenting target
stimuli with the group association cue. It is interesting to note that
there was no evidence that the type of statement (unambiguously
positive vs. ambiguous) qualified the main effect of Bobs weight
on implicit attitudes. Although the type of statement did impact
explicit attitudes toward Bob, it appears that the strong group
association cue (i.e., Bobs obesity) had a greater impact on
implicit attitudes toward him. These data may, at first glance, seem
at odds with the earlier studies showing that the valence of the
behaviors impacted implicit attitudes toward targets when group
association cues were absent. However, it should be noted that the
current study differed from the first three experiments in that the
valence manipulations in the former studies pitted two starkly
different valence conditions (i.e., 100 positive vs. 100 negative)
against each other, whereas the current manipulation (designed to
introduce ambiguity rather than polar-opposite valences) was far
more modest. Thus, it appears that information (i.e., group asso-
ciation cues) that is especially attuned to the system of evaluation
underlying implicit attitudes (i.e., the associative system) has a
greater impact on the attitudes produced.
In a similar vein, readers comparing the outcomes for explicit
attitudes toward the not-overweight Bob between Experiments 1
and 4 might conclude that similar explicit attitudes resulted despite
very different behavior presentations (i.e., 0 CA vs. 100 CA in
Experiment 1 when positive information was initially presented,
positive vs. ambiguous information in Experiment 4). However,
this apparent similarity actually reflects a by-product of the stan-
dardization process. That is, although the standardized explicit
attitudes between the two studies were nearly identical for the
not-overweight Bob in Experiment 1 (i.e., initially positive behav-
ioral characteristics followed by the 100 CA condition) and the
not-overweight Bob in Experiment 4 (i.e., the ambiguous behavior
condition), mean nonstandardized explicit attitudes were much
more positive in the latter case (M 6.5) than the former case
(M 4.1), t(26) 4.49, p .001, reflecting the absence of ciation cues that are widely held in society in the current research,
negative behavioral information about Bob in Experiment 4. In
other words, although the standardization process appears to sug-
gest similar explicit attitudes when comparing between studies
(which is not what one would expect from such markedly different
behavioral presentations), inspection of the nonstandardized values
(see the bottom of Figures 2 and 5) indicates that, indeed, attitudes
toward the not-overweight Bob who performed ambiguous behav-
iors in Experiment 4 were far more positive than were attitudes
toward the not-overweight Bob in Experiment 1 who performed
100 positive behaviors followed by 100 negative behaviors. Al-
though the focus on the standardized data in the current analyses
can make comparisons between studies somewhat more difficult,
the value they provide within studies to directly test the key
theoretical questions of interest (i.e., how group association cues
differentially impact implicit and explicit attitudes) is substantial.
General Discussion
In the current work, we explored how a targets social group that
is strongly associated with valence affects the formation of atti-
tudes toward the individual. Whereas a considerable amount of
research has focused on the impact of social categorization on
explicit attitudes toward people (Fiske et al., 1999), the current
study is the first to consider how the formation of implicit attitudes
toward targets is influenced by them. On the basis of a systems of
evaluation perspective on attitudes (e.g., Rydell & McConnell,
2006; Rydell et al., 2006), a number of novel hypotheses were
advanced. For example, because many social group cues have
strong associations with valence (e.g., being physically attractive is
desirable, being obese is undesirable), we anticipated that such
cues would have an especially strong impact on implicit attitude
formation for individuals because such attitudes rely on associative
knowledge.
Indeed, across four experiments, we found strong and consistent
support for this prediction. For example, implicit attitudes toward
members of stigmatized groups were negative regardless of the
valence of the behaviors attributed to these individuals. These
outcomes were observed for a wide variety of stigmas, including
being overweight (Experiments 1 and 4), being physically unat-
tractive (Experiment 2), and being African American (Experiment
3). However, when groups were associated with positivity (i.e.,
being physically attractive in Experiment 2), implicit attitudes
toward the target were positive, again regardless of the nature of
the individuals actions. Overall, these data suggest that group
association cues have an especially strong impact on implicit
attitudes because such evaluations are based on a system of eval-
uation that uses associative knowledge (Rydell & McConnell,
2006; Sloman, 1996; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
Further, these group association cues did not have much impact
on explicit attitudes when the targets behavioral descriptions were
clear-cut with respect to valence. However, when the targets
actions were ambiguous, group association cues influenced ex-
plicit attitudes toward targets as well (Experiment 4). Thus, in
cases where ambiguity exists, social groups can serve as an acces-
sible construct to promote assimilation effects (Bruner, 1957;
Higgins, 1989; Srull & Wyer, 1979). Yet, when a targets actions
were unequivocal in their implications, group cues did not play a
role in explicit evaluations.
It is also important to note that although we used group asso-
there will be meaningful variability in the extent to which these
cues are associated with valence. Accordingly, in Experiment 3,
we saw that individual differences in the extent to which African
Americans as a group were associated with negativity directly
predicted the degree to which implicit attitudes toward a novel
African American target were negative as well. This finding fur-
ther reaffirms that it is the overarching association between group
cues and valence that determines how a targets group identity
shapes the formation of implicit attitudes toward the individual.
Stronger cue-to-valence associations should result in more extreme
implicit attitudes being formed more quickly. Further, meaningful
differences in ones past history of group associations will play an
important role in how implicit attitudes are affected by group
association cues. Moreover, this outcome indicates that implicit
attitudes toward an individual should be more sensitive to the
valence of a targets behavioral information when cue-to-valence
associations are relatively weak (just like they are in the absence of
salient group association cues).
The current work sheds light on a number of important issues
involved in understanding others. For instance, most research
exploring group prejudice has focused on its pervasiveness, ex-
pression, and assessment (e.g., Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 2002;
Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & Leibold, 2001) rather than
on its specific impact when people are forming attitudes toward
 IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT ATTITUDE FORMATION
individuals. And although some important work, both empirical
and theoretical, has been directed at considering the impact of
social groups on attitude formation (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske &
Neuberg, 1990), past work has not considered the implications of
social groups for the formation of implicit attitudes toward indi-
viduals. Given many striking demonstrations of how implicit atti-
tudes uniquely predict behavior toward members of social groups
(e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; McConnell & Leibold, 2001) and toward
individuals without any distinctive group identification (Rydell &
McConnell, 2006), in the current work, we engaged an underex-
amined intersection of important issues with a framework for
considering how particular types of information (i.e., associative
vs. rule based) are especially likely to impact particular types of
attitudes (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2006). In
general, the systems of evaluation perspective anticipated how
group association cues would impact implicit and explicit attitude
formation toward a novel individual quite well.
More generally, the current work points to the need to further
develop models of impression formation to include implicit atti-
tudes toward individuals, and we believe the systems of evaluation
approach provides a compelling framework for doing so. In addi-
tion to considering the extent to which perceivers expend cognitive
resources in attitude formation (e.g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), the
systems of evaluation perspective suggests that the fit between
information type and attitude type matters too. That is, correspon-
dence between the type of knowledge (i.e., associative vs. rule
based) and the type of attitude (i.e., implicit vs. explicit) is an
important dimension to consider in the attitude formation process.
Although in the current work we focused on social group cues as
one form of associative knowledge, we would anticipate that many
other types of cues strongly associated with valence (e.g., experts
are good) would be especially influential in implicit attitude for-
mation as well.
Extending this point, we believe that the current work can shed
new light on processes involved in attitudes and persuasion. For
example, several models of attitudes propose that heuristic and
peripheral cues influence attitudes and behavior more strongly
when ones motivation to process detailed information is low (e.g.,
Chaiken, 1979; Petty & Wegener, 1998). But what underlies this
outcome? When one considers that nonconscious associations (Ry-
dell et al., 2006) and association-based cues (the current work)
play critical roles in determining implicit attitudes and that recent
work reveals that implicit attitudes are more likely than explicit
attitudes to determine spontaneous behaviors that do not involve
deliberation and planning (e.g., Dovidio et al., 2002; Jellison,
McConnell, & Gabriel, 2004; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Rydell
& McConnell, 2006), a mechanism to account for how these
association-based cues influence behavior in low-effort situations
becomes apparent. That is, cues such as physical attractiveness or
others not considered in the current work (e.g., expertise) will
shape implicit attitudes, which, in turn, are more likely to guide
behavior in situations where the rule-based system does not (e.g.,
no verbal information is available for central route persuasion) or
cannot (e.g., limited cognitive resources) operate. Thus, a systems
of evaluation perspective suggests that implicit attitudes may serve
as a mechanism to explain how association-based cues impact
behavior in some situations. Moreover, as the current Experiment
3 suggests, the impact of these cues in shaping implicit attitudes
varies on the basis of idiosyncratic associations with the target-
805
relevant cue. Thus, not all cues will have the same impact across
individuals.
In addition to these important conceptual issues, the current
findings suggest a number of sizable roadblocks in reducing prej-
udice and discrimination. First, to the extent that stigmas impact
implicit attitudes more strongly than they do explicit attitudes, it
may often be the case that people will be unaware of their stigma-
related biases because the biases are associative in nature, which,
in turn, makes it less likely that correction processes will be used
(Wegener & Petty, 1995). Further, such nonconscious biases may
elicit behavioral confirmation from targets (e.g., Chen & Bargh,
1997), perpetuating such evaluations. Also, situational factors that
reduce the impact of the rule-based system of evaluation (e.g.,
distraction, off-peak circadian rhythms) should exacerbate the
influence of the associative system in directing behavior, increas-
ing the likelihood that negative implicit attitudes will guide actions
toward stigmatized targets (especially negative, nonverbal behav-
iors; see McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Richeson & Shelton, 2003).
It is interesting that these group association cues had little effect
on explicit attitudes except under conditions where behavioral
information was ambiguous. This suggests that although group
association cues may play an important role in deliberate judg-
ments and evaluations, their impact may be reduced in situations
that are less ambiguous in nature. Does this mean that the conse-
quences of stigma are less important than the literature suggests?
We believe the answer to this question is no. First, although most
of the behavioral statements presented about the targets in the
current study were clear-cut, most social interactions contain con-
siderable ambiguity, increasing the likelihood of biased assimila-
tion (see Experiment 4). Further, in the current work, participants
were compelled to process a large number of statements about the
target individuals. However, in real life, people may be far less
attentive to individuating information, especially for members of
stigmatized groups (Kurzban & Leary, 2001). Thus, in many cases,
stigmas may dissuade perceivers from encountering information
that could present targets in a much more positive light. Moreover,
even if such behaviors are encountered, the extent to which people
effortfully individuate such information in such cases may be
limited (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). At any rate, it is clear that
additional work is needed to examine how these trade-offs operate
in more complex social interaction situations.
To conclude, the current work shows that the formation of
implicit attitudes toward members of social groups may often
reflect the valence of group association cues instead of the behav-
ioral data available to the perceiver. Explicit attitudes, however,
were less influenced by these cues and more determined by de-
scriptions of the target persons behaviors, unless the available
behavioral information was ambiguous with respect to evaluations.
This research shows that stigmatized people may face challenges
in changing others implicit attitudes toward them, even when they
perform good deeds, whereas members of highly valued groups
can behave badly and still enjoy others implicit approbation.
Although knowledge of the impression formation process with
respect to explicit attitudes is well-developed, the current study
reveals that the formation of implicit attitudes toward individuals
can operate quite differently (see also Rydell & McConnell, 2006;
Rydell et al., 2006). In sum, we believe that a systems of evalu-
ation perspective offers a very insightful theory and useful tools
for building an understanding of implicit attitude formation pro-
806 MCCONNELL, RYDELL, STRAIN, AND MACKIE
cesses, and it demonstrates the importance of appreciating the
consequences of these nonconscious evaluations as well.
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 INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES

Maintaining Sexual Desire in Intimate Relationships: The Importance of

Approach Goals
Emily A. Impett Amy Strachman
University of California, Berkeley University of Southern California

Eli J. Finkel Shelly L. Gable

Northwestern University University of California, Santa Barbara

Three studies tested whether adopting strong (relative to weak) approach goals in relationships (i.e., goals focused
on the pursuit of positive experiences in ones relationship such as fun, growth, and development) predict greater
sexual desire. Study 1 was a 6-month longitudinal study with biweekly assessments of sexual desire. Studies 2 and
3 were 2-week daily experience studies with daily assessments of sexual desire. Results showed that approach
relationship goals buffered against declines in sexual desire over time and predicted elevated sexual desire during
daily sexual interactions. Approach sexual goals mediated the association between approach relationship goals and
daily sexual desire. Individuals with strong approach goals experienced even greater desire on days with positive
relationship events and experienced less of a decrease in desire on days with negative relationships events than
individuals who were low in approach goals. In two of the three studies, the association between approach
relationship goals and sexual desire was stronger for women than for men. Implications of these findings for
maintaining sexual desire in long-term relationships are discussed.

Keywords: sexual desire, motivation, close relationships, gender differences, daily experience methods

I know nothing about sex, because I was always married.Zsa Zsa Gabor
With this statement, Zsa Zsa highlights a common belief about the
decline of sexual interest and activity in long-term relationships. Lack of
sexual desire is the most common presenting problem at sex therapy
clinics (e.g., Beck, 1995; Hawton, Catalan & Fagg, 1991). In the Amer-
ican survey conducted by Laumann and his colleagues, a lack of sexual
desire was reported by 32% of women and 15% of men between the ages
of 18 and 29 years (Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, & Michaels, 1994).
Recent books by sex therapists and clinicians with such titles as Rekin-
dling Desire: A Step-by-Step Program to Help Low-Sex and No-Sex
Marriages (McCarthy & McCarthy, 2003) and Reclaiming Desire: Four
Keys to Finding Your Lost Libido (Goldstein & Brandon, 2004) target
couples who seek to rekindle sexual intimacy and passion in their rela-
tionships. In this article, we introduce and test approach relationship
goals (i.e., goals focused on the pursuit of positive experiences in ones
relationship such as fun, growth, and development) as a factor that may
help couples to maintain sexual desire over the course of their relation-
ships.
Sexual Desire and Relationship Quality
Although there is no widely accepted definition of sexual desire among
researchers and theorists (Levine, 2003), central to many definitions is the
need, drive, or motivation to engage in sexual activities (Brezsnyak &
Whisman, 2004; Clayton et al., 2006; Diamond, 2004).1 Several large-
scale surveys have shown that sexual desire as well as the related con-
structs of sexual satisfaction and sexual frequency decline with the length
of time that partners have been in a relationship (e.g., Johnson, Wads-
worth, Wellings, & Field, 1994; Klusmann, 2002). One large survey of
German college students revealed that as duration of partnership in-
creased, the frequency of sexual intercourse and sexual satisfaction de-
clined in both women and men. Further, whereas mens sexual desire
remained relatively stable over the course of a relationship, womens
sexual desire dropped steadily after about 1 year of dating (Klusmann,

Emily A. Impett, Institute of Personality and Social Research, University of
California, Berkeley; Amy Strachman, Institute for Health Promotion & Disease
Prevention Research, University of Southern California, and eHarmony Labs,
Pasadena, California; Eli J. Finkel, Department of Psychology, Northwestern
University; Shelly L. Gable, Department of Psychology, University of California,
Santa Barbara.
Preparation of this article was supported by a fellowship awarded to Emily A.
Impett from the Sexuality Research Fellowship Program of the Social Science
Research Council and by a Ruth L. Kirschstein National Research Service Award
to Amy Strachman. We thank Amie Gordon, Anne Peplau, and Deborah Schooler
for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Emily A. Impett,
Institute of Personality and Social Research, 4143 Tolman Hall, 5050, University
of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-5050. E-mail: eimpett@gmail.com
1
Although we were centrally concerned with the motivational component of
sexuality (i.e., sexual desire), there is substantial overlap between sexual desire and
the related constructs of sexual arousal and enjoyment. The traditional human sex
response cycle of Masters and Johnson (1966) and Kaplan (1979) depicts sexual
desire as a spontaneous force that itself triggers sexual arousal. In more recent
years, however, therapists and researchers have begun to challenge this model,
particularly Basson and colleagues (Basson et al., 2004) who have suggested that
sexual arousal, desire, and enjoyment co-occur and can reinforce each other. Many
people report that their sexual desire increases during sexual intercourse; that is, as
they begin to be aroused and enjoy the sexual experience, they recognize that their
sexual desire increases, and they become motivated to become even more aroused
(Levine, 2002). For these reasons, in some of the studies in the current article, we
assessed sexual arousal and enjoyment in addition to sexual desire in order to more
fully capture the interrelated components of sexual desire.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 808 823
Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.808

808
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE
2002). Another study documented that the association between relation-
ship duration and reduced frequency of intercourse was stronger than the
association between age and sexual frequency (Johnson et al., 1994). In
short, sexual desire typically peaks at the beginning of relationships when
partners are just getting to know each other and often decreases over the
course of relationships (Basson, 2002; Levine, 2003).
Because both sexual desire and sexual satisfaction play key
roles in determining the quality of intimate relationships, relation-
ship scholars and therapists should care about the decline of sexual
desire. Many studies of couples who voluntarily attend sex therapy
clinics provide support for the idea that low sexual desire is
associated with decreased levels of relationship satisfaction, both
for individuals with low desire and for their partners (e.g., Mc-
Cabe, 1997; Trudel, Landry, & Larose, 1997). More recent studies
have also documented similar associations between sexual desire
and relationship satisfaction in community samples of married
couples (Brezsnyak & Whisman, 2004) and dating couples
(Regan, 2000; Sprecher, 2002). Further, many empirical studies
have documented a significant positive association between sexual
satisfaction and dating and marital quality (Yeh, Lorenz, Wick-
rama, Conger, & Elder, 2006; see review by Sprecher & Cate,
2004). Sex therapists have similarly noted that when sexuality
functions well in a marriage, it contributes substantially to the
marital bond. However, dysfunctional or nonexistent sexuality
robs the marriage of intimacy, satisfaction, and stability (Mc-
Carthy, 1999).
While a wealth of research has shown that sexual desire con-
tributes to relationship quality and stability, less research has
investigated the factors that help promote and sustain sexual desire
in relationships. In this article, we suggest that the adoption of
approach relationship goals may help couples to maintain sexual
desire over the course of their relationships. We first introduce the
approachavoidance theoretical perspective guiding this research
and apply this theory to the study of sexuality in intimate relation-
ships. We then present the results of three studies designed to test
our hypotheses concerning the link between approach relationship
goals and sexual desire. Finally, we discuss the implications of this
research for couples and sex therapists who wish to promote
healthy sexual functioning in long-term relationships.
ApproachAvoidance Motivational Framework
Several theories of motivational processes postulate the exis-
tence of distinct approach (also called appetitive) and avoidance
(also called aversive) motivational systems (see reviews in Carver,
Sutton, & Scheier, 2000; Elliot & Covington, 2001). For instance,
Grays (1987) neuropsychological model of motivation posits ap-
petitive and aversive motivational systems, referred to as the
behavioral approach system (BAS) and the behavioral inhibition
system (BIS; see also Carver & White, 1994). Specifically, the
BAS is an appetitive system that is primarily sensitive to positive
stimuli or signals of reward, whereas the BIS is an aversive system
that is primarily sensitive to negative stimuli or signals of punish-
ment. Gray (1990) has shown that the BAS is associated with
feelings of hope, whereas the BIS is associated with feelings of
anxiety. In a study of motivational dispositions and daily events,
Gable, Reis, and Elliot (2000) found that participants with higher
BAS sensitivity reported experiencing more daily positive affect
than those with lower BAS sensitivity, while participants with
809
higher BIS sensitivity reported experiencing more daily negative
affect than those with lower BIS sensitivity.
The approachavoidance motivational distinction has been par-
ticularly helpful in understanding motivation in interpersonal re-
lationships. Basing their work on that of early social motivation
theorists (e.g., Boyatzis, 1973; Mehrabian, 1976), Gable and col-
leagues have recently distinguished between approach and avoid-
ance social goals (Elliot, Gable, & Mapes, 2006; Gable, 2006b).
Whereas approach social goals direct individuals toward potential
positive outcomes such as intimacy or growth in their relation-
ships, avoidance social goals direct individuals away from poten-
tial negative outcomes such as conflict or rejection. For example,
in a discussion about child care, a husband who has strong ap-
proach goals may be concerned with wanting the discussion to go
smoothly and wanting both partners to be happy with the outcome.
In contrast, a husband with strong avoidance goals may be more
concerned with avoiding conflict about child care and preventing
both partners from being unhappy with the outcome (Gable,
2006b). These goals are flexible forms of regulation that may take
on diverse manifestations; they may focus on a specific relation-
ship or relationships in general, they may focus on close relation-
ships or acquaintances, and they may focus on a variety of rela-
tional concerns such as sexuality, intimacy, and parenting
(Dowson & McInerney, 2003; Sorkin & Rook, 2004). In this
article, we are specifically concerned with individuals goals in
their romantic relationships (in Studies 1 and 2) and in their
interpersonal relationships more generally (in Study 3).
Just as BAS and BIS are associated with distinct emotional
outcomes, research has also shown that approach and avoidance
social goals predict different social outcomes (Gable, 2006b; Im-
pett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005). In three short-term longitudinal
studies, approach goals were associated with more positive social
attitudes, more satisfaction with social bonds, and less loneliness,
whereas avoidance goals were associated with more negative so-
cial attitudes, relationship insecurity, and more loneliness (Gable,
2006b). In a daily experience study of dating couples, on days
when individuals made sacrifices for approach motives, they ex-
perienced greater positive affect and relationship satisfaction; on
days when they sacrificed for avoidance motives, they experienced
greater negative affect, less relationship satisfaction, and more
conflict (Impett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005). In short, the approach
system (but not the avoidance system) is associated with positive
emotional and social outcomes.
Applying the Approach-Avoidance Motivational
Framework to Sexuality
Central to many definitions of sexual desire is the need or
motivation to engage in sexual activities or the pleasurable antic-
ipation of such activities in the future (Brezsnyak & Whisman,
2004; Clayton et al., 2006; Diamond, 2004). In short, sexual desire
involves the potential rewards and the positive emotional experi-
ence that are characteristic of the approach motivational system. In
addition to predicting positive affect and relationship satisfaction
(Gable, 2006b; Gable et al., 2000; Impett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005),
approach relationship goals may also be associated with daily
sexual desire and the maintenance of sexual desire over time. One
possible reason why approach relationship goals may promote
sexual desire concerns peoples motives or reasons for engaging in
810 IMPETT, STRACHMAN, FINKEL, AND GABLE
sexual activity with a partner (Cooper, Shapiro, & Powers, 1998;
Impett, Peplau, & Gable, 2005). People who pursue positive ex-
periences, such as growth and development, in their relationships
may view sexual activity as one way to create positive, intimate
experiences with a partner. Therefore, compared with people with
weak approach relationship goals, those with strong approach
relationship goals may think more about sex, be more sensitive to
their partners cues, create environments that promote intimate
interaction, and act more readily upon potential sexual encounters.
Previous research has shown that approach motives and goals are
primarily linked to outcomes through an exposure process (Elliot
et al., 2006; Gable, 2006b; Gable et al., 2000). That is, individuals
with strong approach goals or motives tend to report experiencing
a greater number of positive events (but not fewer negative
events). Therefore, individuals with strong approach goals are
likely to experience a greater number of positive events and
positive emotions (including desire) with their partners. Because of
these previous findings, we believe that approach goals in close
relationships will be more strongly related to sexual desire than
will avoidance goals because approach goals are primarily asso-
ciated with positive events (likely through processes that lead to
increased exposure) and avoidance goals have not been linked
reliably to positive events.
It is also likely that people with strong approach goals for their
relationships in general may also engage in daily sexual activity
for approach reasons such as pleasing a partner or enhancing
intimacy in the relationship. Repeatedly engaging in sex for ap-
proach reasons, in turn, may promote greater sexual desire. A
recent cross-sectional study of late adolescent girls showed that
engaging in sex for approach goals (e.g., to express love, for
physical attraction) was positively associated with sexual satisfac-
tion (Impett & Tolman, 2006). Based on this research, we pre-
dicted that individuals with strong approach relationship goals
would report engaging in sexual activity for approach reasons, in
turn, promoting greater sexual desire.
Gender and Sexual Desire
Many lines of research demonstrate that men show more interest
in sex than do women (see review by Baumeister, Catanese &
Vohs, 2001). For example, men think about sex more often than
women do (Laumann et al., 1994), report more frequent sexual
fantasies (Beck, Bozman, & Qualtrough, 1991), and report greater
feelings of sexual desire (Leitenberg & Henning, 1995). Further,
men and women differ in their preferred frequency of sex; when
dating and marriage partners disagree about sexual frequency, men
usually want to have sex more often than women (Julien, Bou-
chard, Gagnon, & Pomerleau, 1992; Sprecher & Regan, 1996).
Complementing these descriptive gender differences is research
demonstrating that womens sexual desire may be more closely
tied to the interpersonal aspects of the relationships than is mens
desire (see review by Peplau, 2003). For instance, when Regan and
Berscheid (1999) asked young adults to define sexual desire, men
were more likely than women to emphasize physical pleasure and
sexual intercourse, whereas women were more likely than men to
emphasize the emotional or relational side of sexual desire.
Women are more likely than men to engage in sex to enhance
commitment and express love for their partners (Basson, 2002;
Impett, Peplau, & Gable, 2005). Taken together, these lines of
research suggest that womens sexual desire may be more sensitive
than mens to relationship dynamics, and in particular, to womens
goals for the relationship. For this reason, a secondary goal of the
current research was to explore whether the association between
approach relationship goals and sexual desire is stronger for
women than for men.
Hypotheses and Research Overview
We conducted three studies of individuals in dating relation-
ships to test several predictions from approachavoidance motiva-
tional theory about the maintenance of sexual desire in dating
relationships. Study 1 was a 6-month longitudinal study of indi-
viduals in dating relationships that included biweekly assessments
of sexual desire. In this study, we tested the hypothesis that the
adoption of approach relationship goals would buffer against de-
clines in sexual desire over time. Study 2 was a 2-week daily
experience study of individuals in dating relationships designed to
extend the findings from Study 1 by testing whether approach
sexual goals would mediate the link between approach relationship
goals and sexual desire. Study 3 was an additional 2-week daily
experience study that included (a) a more general measure of
social (as opposed to relationship-specific) approach goals, (b) a
more detailed measure of sexual goals that distinguished between
self-focused and other-focused goals, and (c) measures of positive
and negative relationship events. These last measures enabled us to
examine how perceptions of the daily relationship climate influ-
ence sexual desire and whether relationship events moderate the
association of approach goals with sexual desire. In all three
studies, we conducted additional analyses to examine the effects of
approach goals on sexual desire beyond the influence of how long
people have been involved in their relationships, how satisfied they
are with their partners, and how frequently they engage in sexual
activity. Finally, in all three studies, we examined gender as a
moderator of the link between approach goals and sexual desire,
exploring the possibility that the association may be stronger for
women than for men as womens sexual desire may be particularly
sensitive to womens goals for their relationships.
Study 1
We tested three main predictions in a 6-month longitudinal
study of college students in dating relationships: (a) Individuals
with strong approach goals would report higher sexual desire at
study entry than individuals with weak approach goals; (b) indi-
viduals who began the study with weak approach relationship
goals would experience decreases in sexual desire over the course
of the study, whereas individuals who began the study with strong
approach relationship goals would not experience such decreases;
and (c) avoidance relationship goals would not be significantly
associated with sexual desire. Finally, we explored gender as a
moderator of the association between approach relationship goals
and sexual desire.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Sixty-nine Northwestern University undergraduate students (34
men, 35 women) were recruited via flyers posted around campus
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE
to participate in a 6-month longitudinal study of dating processes.
Eligibility criteria required that each participant be: (a) a first-year
undergraduate at Northwestern University, (b) involved in a dating
relationship of at least 2 months duration, (c) between 17 and 19
years old, (d) a native English speaker, and (e) the only member of
a given couple to participate in the study. Participants who com-
pleted all components of the study were paid $100; those who
missed some were paid a prorated amount. At the beginning of the
study, most participants were 18 years old (7% were 17, 81% were
18, and 12% were 19) and White (74% White, 12% Asian Amer-
ican, 3% Hispanic, 1% African American, and 10% other). On
average, participants had been dating their partner for a little over
1 year (M 13 months; range 2 42 months). During the
6-month study, 26 participants (38%) broke up with their romantic
partner; they were included in the analyses until the breakup.2
This study was part of a larger investigation of dating processes that
was divided into four parts: (a) an initial 60-min questionnaire sent via
campus mail, (b) a 90-min lab-based session involving additional
questionnaires and training for the online sessions, (c) a 10- to-15-min
online questionnaire every other week for 6 months (14 in total), and
(d) a 60-min lab-based session at the end of the 6-month period.
During the training for the online sessions, a researcher reviewed the
procedures for the completion of the biweekly surveys, specifically
emphasizing that participants should complete their surveys every
other Wednesday evening and that their responses were confidential
(i.e., they used a password to log onto the server). To bolster and
verify compliance, we sent participants reminder e-mails if they
forgot to complete a survey on time, and financial incentives were
linked to completing each survey. Only surveys received within 48 hr
of when they were due were retained in the data set. Participant
retention was excellent: All 69 participants completed the study, and
67 of them completed at least 12 of the 14 online measures on time.
Fourteen participants failed to complete the measure of approach and
avoidance relationship goals correctly, leaving the final sample at 55
participants.3
Measures
Approach and avoidance relationship goals. As part of the
initial questionnaire, participants completed a 4-item measure as-
sessing approach relationship goals (e.g., I will be trying to
deepen my relationship with my romantic partner and I will be
trying to move toward growth and development in my romantic
relationship; .86) and another assessing avoidance relation-
ship goals (e.g., I will be trying to avoid disagreements and
conflicts with my romantic partner and I will be trying to make
sure that nothing bad happens in my romantic relationship;
.66; Gable, 2006a). All questions were answered on 7-point scales
(1 strongly disagree, 7 strongly agree), and each scale was
calculated as an average score of the ratings on the 4 items. In the
current study, a two-factor-solution principal components analysis
with varimax rotation explained 60% of the scale variance. The
first factor (35% of explained variance) included the four approach
relationship goals items, and the second factor (25% of explained
variance) included the four avoidance goals items. The correlation
between the two subscales was .21, p .12.
Sexual desire. As part of the 14 biweekly online questionnaires,
participants answered questions about their sexual desire for and
participation in sexual activities with their dating partner. (These
811
activities were not limited to sexual intercourse.) Participants com-
pleted a two-item partner-specific measure of sexual desire, answer-
ing the questions I feel a great deal of sexual desire for my partner
and When my partner and I have sexual contact, I enjoy it a great
deal on 7-point scales (1 strongly disagree, 7 strongly agree).
Within each of the 14 waves of online data collection, the correlations
between these two items were quite high (rs .69 .98, ps .001,
with an average correlation across these waves of .91). We also
assessed frequency of sexual contact with ones partner. Participants
answered the question How many times did you have sexual contact
with your partner over the last 2 weeks? by typing in a number rather
than answering on a response scale.
Relationship satisfaction. Participants answered one question
designed to measure relationship satisfaction as part of the 14
biweekly online questionnaires. Specifically, they responded to the
statement I am satisfied with my relationship on 7-point scales
(1 strongly disagree, 7 strongly agree).
Results
Participants reported an average of 3.16 (SD 3.92) acts of
sexual contact with their partner per 2-week time period of the
study. The central hypotheses guiding this study were that ap-
proach relationship goals would predict elevated sexual desire at
study entry and buffer against declines in sexual desire over time.
The two-level data structure included measures assessed on each
of the online questionnaires (Level 1) nested within each partici-
pant (Level 2). For example, participants who completed all waves
of online data collection reported their level of sexual desire on 14
different occasions. Traditional ordinary least squares regression
methods assume independence of observations, a criterion that is
typically violated when the same individual completes the same
measures repeatedly. Therefore, we analyzed the data using mul-
tilevel modeling techniques (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) with the
MIXED procedure in SAS (Littell, Milliken, Stroup, & Wolfinger,
1996). Multilevel modeling approaches provide unbiased hypoth-
esis tests by simultaneously examining variance associated with
each level of nesting. A strength of multilevel modeling techniques
is that they can readily handle an unbalanced number of cases per
person (i.e., number of surveys completed), giving greater weight-
ing to participants who provide more data (Snijders & Bosker,
1999). Following Singer and Willett (2003), we permitted the
intercept and slope terms for approach relationship goals to vary
randomly; the slope terms for the other predictors were treated as
fixed. Finally, all variables were standardized prior to analyses;
consequently the coefficients represented changes in standard de-
viation units of the dependent variable (i.e., sexual desire) associ-
ated with a standard deviation unit of the predictor variable. Thus,
the coefficients are a convenient measure of effect size.
2
Participant sexual orientation was not assessed in Studies 1 and 3.
3
These 14 participants responded to the approach relationship goals
questionnaire items with check marks rather than with the 17 rating scale,
which meant that we were not able to calculate a score for them. The 55
participants who completed the goals measure correctly did not differ
significantly from the 14 who did not on the initial measures of relationship
duration, relationship satisfaction, or sexual desire. This problem with the
goals measure was subsequently rectified in Studies 2 and 3.
812 IMPETT, STRACHMAN, FINKEL, AND GABLE
Figure 1. Approach relationship goals as a moderator of the intercept and slope of sexual desire (Study 1).
Note: The means were estimated with 1 standard deviation on approach goals.
Before testing our specific hypotheses concerning approach and
avoidance relationship goals and sexual desire, we conducted a pre-
liminary analysis to determine if, on average, participants experienced
a decline in sexual desire over the course of the study. This analysis
included time as a predictor of the intercept and the slope of sexual
desire. In this and all subsequent analyses, time was coded such that
the first wave of data collection was 0 and the final wave was 13. A
significant effect of time on sexual desire, .02, t(66) 2.52,
p .02, showed that sexual desire decreased significantly over time
at a rate of .02 standard deviation units every 2 weeks; this rate of
biweekly decline would lead to an annual decline in sexual desire of
approximately half a standard deviation (.52 standard deviation units,
to be precise). This decline over time in sexual desire mirrors a similar
decline in desire in samples of married couples (e.g., Johnson et al.,
1994; Klusmann, 2002).
Next, we tested the hypothesis that approach relationship goals
would moderate the intercept and slope of sexual desire. We predicted
that participants with strong approach goals would begin the study
higher in sexual desire and would not experience the decline in sexual
desire that characterized the sample as a whole. To test this hypoth-
esis, we simultaneously entered time, approach goals, and avoidance
goals to predict both the intercept and the slope of sexual desire. The
results showed that approach goals predicted the intercept of sexual
desire, .35, t(625) 3.17, p .01, providing support for the
hypothesis that participants with strong approach goals would report
greater sexual desire at study entry relative to those with weak
approach goals. Approach goals also (marginally) moderated the
effect of time on sexual desire, .014, t(625) 1.87, p .06. The
results showed that whereas participants with low approach relation-
ship goals experienced declines in sexual desire over the course of the
study, participants with strong approach goals retained relatively high
levels of sexual desire over the course of the study. Figure 1 depicts
both of these effects. Consistent with our hypotheses, avoidance goals
predicted neither the intercept, .17, p .13, nor the slope,
.01, p .42, of sexual desire. We then conducted two sets of
follow-up analyses. In the first analysis, we controlled for relationship
satisfaction and duration (both the intercept and slope terms), and
approach relationship goals remained significant predictors of both
the intercept, .28, t(470) 2.64, p .01, and slope of sexual
desire, .015, t(470) 2.16, p .05. In the second analysis, we
controlled for the frequency with which participants engaged in sex-
ual intercourse across the 14-day study, and approach relationship
goals remained significant predictors of both the intercept, .34,
t(469) 3.03, p .01, and slope of sexual desire, .02, t(469)
2.34, p .01, pointing to the robust nature of these findings.4,5
The final goal of this study was to explore whether the
association between approach relationship goals and sexual
desire is stronger for women than for men. To examine this
possibility, we included six additional terms involving gender
(coded as 1 men and 1 women) to the primary analysis
described above. Specifically, we examined whether gender
moderated the intercept and slope effects for sexual desire and
whether gender moderated any of the associations of approach
or avoidance relationship goals with the intercept and slope of
sexual desire. This analysis revealed a significant gender effect
on the sexual desire intercept, .18, t(591) 2.04, p .04,
indicating that men reported greater sexual desire than did
women at the beginning of the study. There was no significant
4
We conducted additional analyses in which we analyzed both of the
individual-item dependent measures of sexual desire separately (i.e., sexual
desire and enjoyment). When we included both approach and avoidance goals
in an equation simultaneously, approach goals significantly predicted the
intercepts of both sexual desire, .33, t(469) 3.05, p .01, and
enjoyment, .24, t(467 2.17), p .05; further, approach goals margin-
ally predicted the slope of sexual desire, .013, t(469) 1.77, p .077,
and significantly predicted the slope of sexual enjoyment, .02, t(467)
2.96, p .003, when both the intercept and the slope of relationship satisfac-
tion and duration were controlled. There were no significant associations
between avoidance relationship goals and either of the individual item-
dependent measures of sexual desire.
5
In all of the studies reported in this article, we tested for interactions
between approach and avoidance goals, and none of these effects was
significant. Furthermore, once the interaction terms were added, the effects
for the intercept and the slope of approach goals (in Study 1) and the effects
for approach goals in Studies 2 and 3 remained significant.
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE
gender effect on the sexual desire slope, however, .01,
t(591) 0.67, p .51. Gender also moderated the effect of
approach goals on the intercept of sexual desire, .33,
t(591) 3.63, p .001, suggesting that the association be-
tween approach goals and sexual desire at study entry was
stronger for women than for men. Finally, gender did not
significantly moderate the effect of approach goals on the
slope of sexual desire, .012, t(591) 1.43, p .15. exchange for participation. To be eligible, participants had to:
This result suggests that men and women with weak ap-
proach goals did not significantly differ in the tendency to
experience decreased sexual desire over time, although this
nonsignificant effect trended in the direction of approach goals
more positively predicting the slope of sexual desire for women
than for men.
Brief Discussion
Study 1 provided evidence for the two hypotheses linking
approach relationship goals and sexual desire. Not only did
approach relationship goals predict greater sexual desire at
study entry, but having strong approach relationship goals buff-
ered against declines in sexual desire over a 6-month period.
Avoidance goals were not significantly associated with sexual
desire at the beginning of the study or trajectories of sexual
desire over time. Finally, the association between approach
relationship goals and sexual desire at the beginning of the
study was stronger for women than for men, pointing to the
particular importance of goals focused on obtaining positive
outcomes in romantic relationships for enhancing womens
sexual desire. Why do approach relationship goals buffer
against declines in sexual desire over time? Study 2 tested the
hypothesis that approach relationship goals promote increased
sexual desire during daily sexual interactions, given that people
who typically pursue approach goals in their relationships may
also be highly motivated to pursue shorter term approach goals,
such as enhancing intimacy and closeness, during their sexual
interactions with a partner (Gable, 2006b). In addition, Study 2
tested approach sexual goals as a possible mediator of the
association between approach relationship goals and sexual
desire.
Study 2
We tested three main predictions in a 2-week daily experi-
ence study of college students in dating relationships: (a) Ap-
proach relationship goals would be associated with increased
sexual desire in day-to-day sexual interactions, (b) approach
sexual goals would mediate the association between ap-
proach relationship goals and sexual desire; and (c) avoidance
relationship goals would not be significantly associated with
daily sexual desire. In addition, as in Study 1, we examined
gender as a possible moderator of the association between
approach relationship goals and sexual desire, exploring the
possibility that the association would be stronger for women
than for men.
813
Method
Participants and Procedure
The study was advertised as an examination of dating rela-
tionships, and participants received credit toward psychology
coursework at the University of California, Los Angeles, in
(a) be currently involved in a dating (not a marital) relationship,
(b) see their partner at least 5 days per week (i.e., no long-
distance relationships), and (c) be the only member of a given
couple to participate in the study. Of the 121 participants (55
men, 66 women) who completed the study, 2 were engaged to
be married, and 18 were cohabitating; the mean relationship
length for all participants was 18 months (range 1 month 8
years). Participants ranged in age from 18 to 38 years (M
20.2, SD 2.6). The sample was ethnically diverse: 5% were
African American, 36% were Asian or Pacific Islander, 15%
were Hispanic, 37% were White, and 7% self-identified as
multi-ethnic or other. In addition, all participants identified as
heterosexual except one gay man, and he was included in the
study.
During an initial session, each participant was given 14
surveys, each containing the daily measures, one for each night
of the week. A researcher then reviewed the procedures for
completion of the daily surveys, specifically emphasizing that
participants should begin completing their surveys that evening,
that they should complete one survey each night before going to
bed (even if they did not engage in sex on that particular day),
that their responses were confidential, that they should not
discuss their surveys with their partner, and that if they missed
a day, they should leave that particular survey blank. To bolster
and verify compliance with the daily schedule, we asked par-
ticipants to return completed surveys every 23 days to a locked
mailbox located outside the laboratory. As an incentive, each
time participants handed in a set of surveys on time, they
received a lottery ticket for one of several cash prizes ($100,
$50, $25) to be awarded after the study. Participants who did
not return a particular set of surveys on time were reminded by
phone or e-mail. Only daily surveys returned on time were
treated as valid and retained in the data set. In total, participants
completed 1,549 daily surveys on time, an average of 12.8 days
per person. Ninety percent of the participants completed all 14
daily reports on time.
Background Measures
In their initial session in the laboratory, participants com-
pleted a questionnaire with basic demographic information
(i.e., gender, age, ethnicity, relationship duration), as well as
the same measure of approach and avoidance relationship
goals used in Study 1 (Gable, 2006a). They were instructed to
answer the questions about their goals for their relationships
over the next few months. In the present study, .78 for
approach social goals and .79 for avoidance social goals.
The correlation between the two subscales was .57, p .001.
In addition, participants completed a standard 5-item measure
814 IMPETT, STRACHMAN, FINKEL, AND GABLE
of relationship satisfaction (Rusbult, Martz, & Agnew,
1998). Participants responded to such statements as Our
relationship makes me happy on 9-point scales (0 do not
agree at all, 8 agree completely). In this sample, .89.
Daily Measures
If participants had engaged in sexual intercourse since they had
completed the previous days survey, they completed measures of
sexual desire and sexual goals.6
Sexual desire. Each time that they engaged in sexual inter-
course, participants answered two questions designed to measure
their sexual desire on 7-point scales (1 very low, 7 very high).
More specifically, they responded to the following two items:
Rate your own level of sexual desire just prior to engaging in
sex, and Rate your own level of sexual desire during sex. A
composite sexual desire variable was created by averaging the
responses to these two questions ( .64).
Sexual goals. Each time they engaged in sexual intercourse,
participants responded to a nine-item measure of sexual goals
adapted from Cooper et al. (1998) and used by Impett, Peplau,
& Gable (2005). Participants rated the importance of five ap-
proach and four avoidance goals in influencing their decision to
engage in sex on 7-point scales (1 not at all important, 7
extremely important). The approach items were to pursue
my own sexual pleasure, to feel good about myself, to
please my partner, to promote intimacy in my relationship,
and to express love for my partner. The avoidance items were
to avoid conflict in my relationship, to prevent my partner
from becoming upset, to prevent my partner from getting
angry at me, and to prevent my partner from losing interest in
me. The within-person correlation between approach and
avoidance sexual goals was .03, p .49. The reliability coef-
ficients were .71 for approach goals and .90 for avoidance
goals.
Results
Participants reported a total of 480 sexual interactions. On
average, participants reported engaging in sexual intercourse on
4 days during the 2-week study (SD 2.3; range 110
days). A central goal of this study was to test predictions
about the associations between approach and avoidance rela-
tionship goals and sexual desire. To address the data noninde-
pendence, analyses were performed using multilevel modeling
techniques in the hierarchical linear models (HLM) com-
puter program (HLMwin, Version 5.02; Raudenbush, Bryk,
Cheong, & Congdon, 2000). Level-1 (i.e., daily) predictors
were centered around each individuals mean across the 14-day
study. This technique, known as group-mean centering, ac-
counts for differences between-persons in the sample and as-
sesses whether day-to-day changes from a participants own
mean are associated with changes in the outcome variable,
consequently unconfounding between- and within-person ef-
fects. As in Study 1, all variables were standardized prior to
analyses.
Relationship Goals and Daily Sexual Desire
The first major hypothesis guiding this study was that ap-
proach relationship goals would predict increased daily sexual
desire. To test this hypothesis, we entered approach and avoid-
ance relationship goals as simultaneous predictors of daily
sexual desire. The results showed that approach relationship
goals were positively associated with sexual desire, .20,
t(117) 2.84, p .01. In contrast, avoidance goals were not
significantly associated with sexual desire, .07, p .31.7
As in Study 1, we then conducted two sets of follow-up anal-
yses. In the first analysis, we controlled for relationship satis-
faction and duration, and the association between approach
relationship goals and sexual desire remained significant,
.17, t(115) 2.23, p .05. In the second analysis, we con-
trolled for the frequency with which participants engaged in
sexual intercourse across the 14-day study, and the association
between approach goals and desire also remained significant,
.20, t(116) 2.79, p .01, pointing to the robust nature
of these findings.
We also explored gender as a moderator of the association
between approach relationship goals and sexual desire. Similar
to the way we conducted analyses in Study 1, we simulta-
neously entered approach relationship goals, avoidance rela-
tionship goals, gender, and two interaction terms (Approach
Relationship Goals Gender; Avoidance Relationship Goals
Gender) to predict daily sexual desire. Although there was no
main effect of gender, .06, p .28, the interaction
between gender and approach relationship goals significantly
predicted sexual desire, .21, t(114) 2.08, p .05. As
shown in Figure 2, the association between approach relation-
ship goals and sexual desire was stronger for women than for
6
Although people certainly experience sexual desire in the absence
of having sexual contact with their partner, we focused only on days on
which participants reported engaging in sexual contact with the partner
for several reasons. First, we focused on desire just before a concrete
event (e.g., sexual activity) to improve recall and lessen retrospective
biases (Reis & Gable, 2000). Second, because there are multiple reasons
that partners may not have engaged in sexual activities, some benign or
related to circumstance (e.g., schedule, proximity of partner) and some
related to self or partner desire (e.g., rebuffed sexual advances), it
would be extremely difficult to compare event days to nonevent days.
Finally, we wanted to examine goals for each sexual event to capture
the full range of goals that participants experienced across days, and we
suspected that asking participants to report sexual goals in the absence
of sexual activity would have been difficult and would have produced
unreliable data.
7
We conducted analyses in which we analyzed both of the
individual-item dependent measures of sexual desire separately (i.e.,
sexual desire just prior to engaging in sex and sexual desire during sex).
When we included both approach and avoidance goals in an equation
simultaneously, approach relationship goals significantly predicted sex-
ual desire just prior to engaging in sex, .20, t(117) 3.23, p .01,
and marginally predicted sexual desire during sex, .14, t(117)
1.69, p .10. There were no significant associations between avoid-
ance relationship goals and either of the individual item-dependent
measures of sexual desire.
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE
Figure 2. Gender as a moderator of the association between approach relationship goals and sexual desire
(Study 2).
men.8 Neither avoidance relationship goals, .04, p .68,
nor the interaction between gender and avoidance goals,
.06, p .56, significantly predicted daily sexual desire.
Approach Sexual Goals as a Mediator
Another hypothesis was that approach sexual goals would me-
diate the association between approach relationship goals and
sexual desire (see Figure 3). Standard (ordinary least squares
[OLS]) hierarchical regression analysis based on the principles of
Baron and Kenny (1986) was used to test mediation. Data were
aggregated across days such that each person received summary
scores for approach sexual goals and sexual desire. The first
requirement in demonstrating mediation is that the predictor vari-
able be associated with the outcome variable. Indeed, approach
relationship goals were significantly associated with sexual desire
(r .24, p .01). The second requirement is to show that
approach relationship goals predict the putative mediator, ap-
proach sexual goals; indeed they did (r .45, p .001). The third
requirement is that the mediator predicts the outcome variable (i.e.,
sexual desire) after the predictor variable is controlled and that this
effect could plausibly account for the direct effects between the
predictor and the outcome variable. Approach sexual goals signif-
icantly predicted sexual desire, .33, p .01, and the direct
effect from approach relationship goals to sexual desire dropped to
nonsignificance, .09, p .36). A significant Sobel (1982) test
indicated that the drop in the value of the latter beta was significant
Figure 3. Approach sexual goals as a mediator between approach rela-
tionship goals and sexual desire (Study 2). Note: All numbers are ordinary
least squares regression coefficients. *p .05. **p .01. ***p .001.
815
(z 2.90, p .01), providing evidence for mediation. In other
words, participants with strong approach relationship goals also
tended to engage in sexual activity to pursue positive outcomes, in
turn promoting greater daily sexual desire.
Brief Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended the findings from Study 1 in
several important ways. First, the results showed that approach
relationship goals promoted greater sexual desire during day-to-
day sexual interactions. Second, Study 2 demonstrated that ap-
proach sexual goals may be an important mechanism by which
approach relationship goals promote sexual desire. That is, indi-
viduals who are generally oriented toward promoting positive
experiences in their relationships also engage in sex to pursue
positive outcomes such as a partners happiness or increased
intimacy. Approach sexual goals were, in turn, associated with
sexual desire. Third, this study showed that the association be-
tween approach relationship goals and sexual desire was stronger
for women than for men, providing further evidence that womens
sexual desire is more closely tied to relationship dynamics than is
mens sexual desire. Fourth, this study showed that avoidance
goals were not significantly associated with daily sexual desire.
Study 3
Study 3 was another daily experience study of college students
in dating relationships, but Study 3 differed from Study 2 in three
8
In addition to testing for interactions with participant gender, we also
tested for interactions with ethnicity by creating two dummy-coded vari-
ables: 1 White versus not White, and 2 Asian versus not Asian. When
each of these dummy-coded variables was (separately) added as a covari-
ate, approach relationship goals remained a significant predictor of daily
sexual desire. More important, we also created interaction terms between
approach goals and both of the dummy-coded variables. Neither of these
interaction terms was associated with daily sexual desire. We also tested
for interactions with ethnicity in Study 3 using the same strategy; none of
the interactions was significant.
816 IMPETT, STRACHMAN, FINKEL, AND GABLE
important ways. First, the approach relationship goals measure was
replaced with a more general measure of approach social goals,
allowing us to determine whether the effects were specific to a
measure of romantic relationships. Second, Study 3 included a
longer, more refined measure of sexual goals that enabled us to
determine the relative contributions of both self-focused sexual
goals (e.g., to pursue my own sexual pleasure) and other-focused
sexual goals (e.g., to please my partner) to daily sexual desire.
Third, Study 3 also included measures of positive and negative
relationship events to enable us to examine how peoples percep-
tions of the daily relationship climate relate to their levels of sexual
desire. Each day poses an opportunity for positive events (e.g.,
partners compliment each other, express their love, or do fun
things together) as well as negative events (e.g., they criticize,
disagree, or give each other the silent treatment). On the basis of
previous research showing a link between relationship satisfaction
and increased sexual desire (e.g., Brezsnyak & Whisman, 2004;
Sprecher, 2002), we predicted that individuals would experience
greater sexual desire on days with more frequent positive events
and also on days with less frequent negative events in their
relationships. We also predicted that approach social goals would
moderate these associations, such that people with strong approach
goals would experience even greater sexual desire on days with
many positive events because the approach system is sensitive to
the presence and absence of positive goal-relevant events (Gable et
al., 2000). This prediction is also consistent with work on the
upward spiral effect of positive emotions (Fredrickson & Joiner,
2002) and on the role of positive-arousing activities in relationship
satisfaction and passionate love (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna,
& Heyman, 2000). Finally, as in Studies 1 and 2, we explored
gender as a moderator of the association between approach social
goals and sexual desire.
Method
Participants and Procedure
The study was advertised as an examination of relationships,
sexuality, and health, and participants received credit toward
psychology coursework at the University of California, Los An-
geles, in exchange for participation. Participants were told that the
study was about daily events in relationships, including sexual
interactions. To be eligible, participants had to be: (a) currently
involved in a dating relationship, (b) sexually active with their
partner, (c) see their partner at least 5 days per week (i.e., no
long-distance relationships), and (d) the only member of a given
couple to participate in the study. Ninety participants (60 women,
29 men, 1 did not report gender) completed the study. Twelve of
the participants did not engage in sexual intercourse during the
study; therefore, the final sample consisted of the remaining 77
participants (55 women, 22 men). Two of the participants were
married, and 8 were cohabitating; the mean relationship length for
all participants was 21 months. Participants ranged in age from 17
to 44 years (M 20.3, SD 3.6).9 The sample was ethnically
diverse: 4% were African American, 32% were Asian or Pacific
Islander, 35% were White, 26% identified as multi-ethnic or other,
and 3% did not report their ethnicity.
During an initial session, participants were given instructions
about how to complete an online survey by logging onto a secure
server each day. The daily survey was posted on a Web site, and
participants were given a login name and password to use each
time they entered the site. Participants were asked to complete the
survey at the beginning of each day for 14 consecutive days. The
survey asked about the previous days relationship and sexual
activities. Participants were instructed to complete the survey by
1 p.m. each day. The date and time of survey completion were
automatically recorded by the Web site, and research assistants
checked this log each morning and e-mailed reminders to partic-
ipants who had not yet completed their daily surveys. Only surveys
completed on time were accepted and included in the data analy-
ses. As an incentive for on-time completion of surveys, partici-
pants who completed between 11 and 14 diaries (N 71) were
entered into a lottery drawing for $100. Participants completed a
total of 1,182 daily surveys on time, an average of 13 days per
person. Ninety percent of participants completed all their surveys
on time.
Background Measures
In their initial session in the laboratory, participants completed
a questionnaire with basic demographic information (i.e., gender,
age, ethnicity, relationship duration), as well as a measure of
approach and avoidance social goals (Elliot et al., 2006). Partici-
pants responded to four approach statements (e.g., I will be trying
to move toward growth and development in my friendships, and
I will be trying to deepen my relationship with my friends) and
four avoidance statements (e.g., I will be trying to make sure
nothing bad happens to my close relationships, and I will be
trying to avoid getting embarrassed, betrayed, or hurt by any of my
friends) on 7-point scales (1 not at all true of me, 7 very true
of me). They were instructed to answer the questions about their
goals for their relationships over the next few months. In the
present study, .78 for approach social goals and .79 for
avoidance social goals. The correlation between the two subscales
was .36, p .05. Relationship satisfaction was also assessed using
the same measure as in Study 2 (Rusbult et al., 1998; .94).
Daily Measures
If participants had engaged in sexual intercourse since they had
completed their previous days survey, they completed measures
of sexual desire and sexual goals.
Sexual desire. Each time that they engaged in sexual inter-
course, participants answered three questions designed to measure
their sexual desire on 5-point scales (1 not at all, 5 very
much). The questions were: How much did you want to have
sex? How much did you enjoy the sexual experience? and
How sexually aroused were you during this sexual experience?
A composite variable called sexual desire was created by averag-
ing the responses to these three questions ( .95).
Sexual goals. Cooper et al.s (1998) sexual motivation scale
was used to measure approach and avoidance sexual goals. The
scale consists of 29 items and was modified to assess the partici-
pants most recent sexual experience. This measure categorizes
9
The 44 year-old participant was an outlier in terms of age. All analyses
yielded identical conclusions when this person was excluded.
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE
sexual goals using the approach/avoidance distinction as well as a
self-focused/other-focused distinction. These two dimensions are
crossed to yield four categories of goals (six discrete goals) for
engaging in sex: (a) approach self-focused goals (e.g., I have sex
because it feels good [Enhancement]), (b) approach other-focused
goals (e.g., I have sex to feel emotionally close to my partner
[Intimacy]), (c) avoidance self-focused goals (e.g., I have sex to
reassure myself that I am attractive [Self-Affirmation], and I
have sex to help me deal with disappointments in my life [Cop-
ing]), and (d) avoidance other-focused goals, I have sex because
I dont want my partner to be angry with me [Partner Approval]),
and I have sex just because all of my friends are having sex [Peer
Approval]). The reliability coefficients for Enhancement, Inti-
macy, Self-Affirmation, Coping, Partner Approval, and Peer Ap-
proval were .90, .93, .84, .91, .84, and .78, respectively.
Positive and negative relationship events. Participants com-
pleted measures of positive and negative events adapted from
previous research (Gable, Reis, & Downey, 2003). Each day,
participants indicated whether they experienced each of nine pos-
itive relationship events and nine negative relationship events.
Positive event items included: My partner told me that he/she
loves me, My partner and I participated in an activity that I really
enjoy, During a discussion, I felt understood and appreciated by
my partner, My partner did something that made me feel
wanted, My partner and I did something fun, My partner did
something special for me, My partner complimented me, My
partner made me laugh, and My partner and I talked about
making our relationship more serious or committed. Negative
event items included: My partner and I had a minor disagree-
ment, My partner was inattentive and unresponsive to me, My
partner tried to control what I did, We had a major disagree-
ment, My partners behavior made me question his or her
commitment to me, My partner criticized me, My partner went
out with his/her friends instead of spending time with me, My
partner did something that made me feel irritated or angry, and
My partner gave me the silent treatment. Responses to these
questions were summed to create separate indices of the total
number of positive events and the total number of negative events
that participants experienced in their relationships each day.
Results
Participants reported a total of 283 sexual interactions. On
average, participants reported engaging in sexual intercourse on
3.4 days during the 2-week study (SD 2.0; range 114 days).
As in Study 2, the data set was hierarchically nested, with days
nested within persons. Multilevel modeling in the HLM computer
program (HLMwin, Version. 5.02; Raudenbush et al., 2000) was
used to examine the hypotheses linking social goals, sexual goals,
relationship events, and sexual desire. Level-1 (i.e., daily) predic-
tors were centered around each individuals mean across the 14-
day study, enabling us to determine whether day-to-day changes
from a participants own mean were associated with changes in the
outcome variable. As in Studies 1 and 2, all variables were stan-
dardized prior to analyses.
Social Goals and Daily Sexual Desire
As in Studies 1 and 2, we predicted that approach social goals
would predict increased daily sexual desire. To test this hypothe-
817
sis, we entered approach and avoidance social goals as simulta-
neous predictors of daily sexual desire. The results showed that
approach social goals were positively associated with sexual de-
sire, .19, t(69) 2.50, p .05. In contrast, avoidance goals
were not associated with sexual desire, .01, t(69) .71, p
.84.10 As in Studies 1 and 2, we then conducted two sets of
follow-up analyses. In the first analysis, we controlled for rela-
tionship satisfaction and duration, and the association between
approach relationship goals and sexual desire remained significant,
.17, t(67) 2.08, p .05. In the second analysis, we
controlled for the frequency with which participants engaged in
sexual intercourse across the 14-day study, and the association
between approach goals and desire also remained significant,
.19, t(67) 2.22, p .05, pointing to the robust nature of these
findings.
As in Studies 1 and 2, we explored gender as a moderator of the
association between approach social goals and sexual desire. As in
Studies 2 and 3, approach social goals, avoidance social goals,
gender, and two interaction terms (Approach Goals Gender;
Avoidance Goals Gender) were used to predict sexual desire.
Neither interaction term reached significance (Approach Gen-
der: .05, p .76; Avoidance Gender: .14, p .65).
This result suggests that the gender effects found in Studies 1 and
2 may be specific to approach goals in romantic relationships, not
in social relationships in general.
Sexual Goals and Daily Sexual Desire
The second major goal of this study was to determine which
specific sexual goals were associated with daily sexual desire.
Although we were primarily interested in the distinction between
self-focused and other-focused approach sexual goals, we also
examined the four different measures of avoidance sexual goals.
Therefore, we simultaneously entered all six types of sexual goals
(Enhancement, Intimacy, Self-Affirmation, Coping, Partner Ap-
proval, and Peer Approval) as well as the control variables (rela-
tionship duration, relationship satisfaction, and sexual frequency)
to predict daily sexual desire. Table 1 displays the results of this
analysis. When all six sexual goals were entered simultaneously,
both of the measures of approach sexual goals (i.e., Enhancement
and Intimacy) significantly predicted daily sexual desire. On days
when participants engaged in sexual intercourse more often to
pursue positive outcomes either for themselves (i.e., for enhance-
ment goals) or for their relationships (i.e., for intimacy goals), they
reported increased sexual desire. Furthermore, these associations
remained significant even after we controlled for relationship
satisfaction, relationship duration, and frequency of sexual inter-
course over the course of the 14-day study. In contrast, two of the
measures of avoidance sexual goals (i.e., Self-Affirmation and
Coping) were not significantly associated with sexual desire, and
10
We conducted additional analyses in which we analyzed each of the
three sexual desire items separately (i.e., wanting sex, enjoying sex, being
sexually aroused). When we included both approach and avoidance goals
simultaneously, approach social goals significantly predicted daily arousal,
.18, t(69) 2.39, p .05, and desire for sex, .15, t(69) 2.04,
p .05, and marginally predicted daily enjoyment, .15, t(69) 1.91,
p .10. There were no significant associations between avoidance social
goals and any of the individual-item dependent measures of sexual desire.
818 IMPETT, STRACHMAN, FINKEL, AND GABLE

Table 1 Relationship Events and Daily Sexual Desire

Associations Between Sexual Goals and Daily Sexual Desire in
Study 3 A third aim of this study was to examine whether daily rela-
tionship events predicted daily sexual desire and whether approach
Outcome: daily social goals moderated these associations. Participants reported an
sexual desire average of 4.23 positive events and 1.25 negative events each day.
Variable t
The most common positive events included my partner told me
that he/she loves me and my partner made me laugh. The most
Approach sexual goals common negative events included my partner did something that
Enhancement goals .65*** 7.87a made me feel irritated or angry and my partner and I had a minor
Intimacy goals .21** 2.95a
disagreement. As predicted, on days when participants reported
Avoidance sexual goals
Self-affirmation goals .12 1.74a more frequent positive events (than their own average across the
Coping goals .04 0.86a 14-day study), they reported significantly greater sexual desire,
Partner approval goals .11 1.24a .26, t(249) 2.69, p .01. On days when participants
Peer approval goals .02 0.11a reported more frequent negative events, they reported significantly
Control variables
Relationship duration .01 0.08b less sexual desire, .12, t(249) 2.34, p .05.
Relationship satisfaction .12* 1.88b We further predicted that approach social goals would moderate
Sexual frequency .17* 1.85b the association between daily positive relationship events and
sexual desire. To test this hypothesis, we predicted daily sexual
Note. All numbers are standardized hierarchial linear model coefficients.
desire from positive events at Level 1. At Level 2, we included
a
df 244. b df 68.

p .10. * p .05. ** p .01. *** p .001.
the other two measures of avoidance sexual goals (i.e., Self-
Affirmation and Partner Approval) were marginally negatively
associated with sexual desire.
Approach Sexual Goals as a Mediator
Another hypothesis, supported in Study 2, was that approach
sexual goals would mediate the association between approach
social goals and sexual desire. Study 3 used a more detailed
measure of sexual goals than that included in Study 2, with many
items distinguishing between self-focused (i.e., Enhancement) and
other-focused (i.e., Intimacy) approach sexual goals. Before test-
ing for mediation, we examined associations between approach
social goals and both types of approach sexual goals. Approach
social goals were not associated with enhancement sexual goals,
.04, p .72, but were associated with intimacy sexual goals,
.40, t(69) 4.43, p .001. Therefore, in the following
analyses, we examined intimacy sexual goals as a mediator of the
association between approach social goals and sexual desire. We
used the aggregated data and the composite measure of sexual
desire.
As in Study 2, standard (OLS) hierarchical regression analysis
based on the principles of Baron and Kenny (1986) was used to
test mediation. Approach social goals were marginally associated
with sexual desire (r .20, p .08). Approach social goals were
significantly associated with intimacy sexual goals (r .42, p
.001). Finally, intimacy sexual goals significantly predicted sexual
desire after we controlled for approach social goals, .39, p
.01, and the marginally significant direct effect from approach
social goals to sexual desire dropped to nonsignificance, .04,
p .76. A significant Sobel (1982) test indicated that the drop in
the value of the betas was significant (z 2.36, p .05),
providing evidence for mediation. The pattern of results is similar
to the one found in Study 2, which is displayed in Figure 3.
approach social goals (grand mean centered) as a predictor of both
the intercept of sexual desire and the slope of positive events with
sexual desire. A similar model was used for negative events.
For positive events, approach social goals were a marginally
significant predictor of the slope between sexual desire and posi-
tive events, .18, t(247) 1.83, p .07, such that compared
with those with weak approach goals, individuals with strong
approach goals experienced a marginally greater increase in sexual
desire on days when they reported more positive events (see Figure
4). When relationship duration, sexual frequency, and relationship
satisfaction were added as covariates to Level 2, this effect re-
mained marginally significant, .16, t(244) 1.65, p .10.
We also tested whether approach social goals moderated the as-
sociation between negative events and desire. Approach social
goals were a significant predictor of the slope between sexual
desire and negative events, .12, t(247) 2.14, p .05, such
that compared with those with weak approach goals, individuals
with strong approach goals experienced less of a decrease in sexual
desire on days when they reported more negative events (see
Figure 5). When relationship duration, sexual frequency, and re-
lationship satisfaction were added as covariates to Level 2, this
effect remained significant, .12, t(244) 2.08, p .05.
Additional analyses conducted to determine whether the interac-
tions between approach goals and positive and negative events
were further moderated by gender revealed no significant effects.
Brief Discussion
Study 3 extended the results of the previous two studies in
several important ways. First, it showed that approach social goals
measured more generally predict daily sexual desire. Second, it
extended the findings from Study 2 by showing that approach
sexual goals that focus on the self (e.g., to pursue ones own sexual
pleasure) and approach sexual goals that focus on the partner/
relationship (e.g., to please ones partner or enhance intimacy)
were both associated with increased sexual desire. Third, it re-
vealed that other-focused approach sexual goals (intimacy goals)
mediated the association between approach social goals and daily
sexual desire. Fourth, it replicated the results of Studies 2 and 3
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE 819

Figure 4. Approach social goals as a moderator of the association between positive events and sexual desire
(Study 3).

showing that avoidance social and sexual goals were not signifi-
cantly associated with daily sexual desire. Finally, it showed that
relationship events are an important moderator of the link between
approach social goals and daily sexual desire. More specifically,
people with strong approach goals experienced even greater sexual
desire on days that they reported many positive events and less of
a decrease in sexual desire on days that they reported many
negative events than individuals with weak approach social goals.
General Discussion
Numerous studies have documented the importance of sexual
desire in promoting satisfaction and stability in long-term relation-
ships (e.g., Yeh et al., 2006). Many individuals report that their
own or a partners low sexual desire creates problems for their
relationships (Laumann et al., 1994), and some couples seek sex
therapy in order to deal with one or both partners lack of sexual
desire (McCarthy, 1999). The three studies described in this article
provide converging support for the importance of approach goals
in enabling dating couples to maintain high levels of sexual desire.
Study 1 showed that the adoption of approach relationship goals
buffered against declines in sexual desire over a 6-month period in
relationships. Whereas people with weak approach goals (i.e.,
those possessing a lack of interest in pursuing growth, fun, and
development in their relationships) experienced declines in sexual
desire over the course of the 6-month study, people with strong
approach goals (i.e., those who possessed a great deal of interest in
pursuing positive outcomes in their relationships) maintained high
levels of sexual desire over the course of the study.
Study 2 showed that approach relationship goals predicted ele-
vated sexual desire during daily sexual interactions and that this
association was mediated by approach sexual goals. That is, people
who are generally oriented toward creating positive outcomes in
their relationships may view sexual interactions as one way to
create closeness and intimacy, and their approach sexual goals
may, in turn, predict greater desire during daily sexual interactions.
Finally, Study 3 showed that approach sexual goals that focus on

Figure 5. Approach social goals as a moderator of the association between negative events and sexual desire
(Study 3).
820 IMPETT, STRACHMAN, FINKEL, AND GABLE
the self (e.g., to pursue ones own sexual pleasure) and approach
sexual goals that focus on others (e.g., to please ones partner or to
enhance intimacy) were both associated with daily sexual desire.
Moreover, Study 3 showed that people with strong approach goals
experienced even greater sexual desire on days that they reported
many positive events. This effect is consistent with previous re-
search that has shown that strong approach tendencies are associ-
ated with even greater increases in approach behaviors when
signals of movement toward the goal (i.e., gains) are experienced
(Forster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998). Finally, approach goals seemed
to buffer against the deleterious effect that negative relationship
events had on sexual desire, such that individuals with strong
approach goals reported less of a decrease in desire on days that
they reported many negative events than individuals with weak
approach goals. Although we did not specifically predict this
finding, it is consistent with previous work that has found that
approach goals are associated with interpreting ambiguous or
neutral information in a positive manner (Strachman & Gable,
2006). Thus, those with strong approach goals may have reframed
negative events more positively, which may have attenuated the
association between negative events and sexual desire.
The current studies used a combination of longitudinal and daily
experience methods to examine the link between approach goals
and sexual desire. In Study 1, participants provided biweekly
assessments of sexual desire, enabling us to examine the influence
of approach goals measured early in relationships on the mainte-
nance of sexual desire over a 6-month period. In Studies 2 and 3,
participants provided daily accounts of their sexual desire, en-
abling us to obtain accurate, daily accounts of sexual desire. The
use of a daily experience method enabled us to study relationship
processes within the context of daily life in a way that is not
possible with more traditional, cross-sectional designs (Bolger,
Davis, & Rafaeli, 2003).
These studies contribute to a growing body of research demon-
strating the utility of approachavoidance models of motivation in
understanding a broad range of phenomena in everyday life (e.g.,
Elliot & Sheldon, 1997; Gable et al., 2000). More specifically, the
current studies are part of an emerging area of research that
focuses on motivation and close relationships (Gable, 2006b; Ga-
ble & Strachman, 2007; Impett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005). Previous
research guided by Gables (2006b) model of social motivation has
shown that approach (but not avoidance) motives and goals are
associated with positive outcomes including positive emotions and
relationship satisfaction (Gable, 2006a, 2006b; Impett, Gable, &
Peplau, 2005). Our results show that sensitivity to positive rela-
tionships processes, such as intimacy, growth, and fun, has impor-
tant implications for close relationships that are independent and
separate from sensitivity to negative processes, such as conflict
and rejection. It is particularly important to note that there are far
fewer studies focusing on the role of positive processes than those
focused on negative processes in the field of close relationships,
reflecting possible empirical and theoretical oversights (Gable &
Haidt, 2005; Reis & Gable, 2003).
Limitations and Future Directions
The results of these studies provide several interesting directions
for future research. First, similar to most of the available research
on sexual desire, the current research focused on only one member
of the couple. Oftentimes, the assessment of sexual desire in
couples is relative; that is, people perceive that their sexual desire
is either too low or too high only after comparing their own desire
with their partners desire (Davies, Katz, & Jackson, 1999; Ellison,
2001). Future research should obtain sexual desire reports from
both members of dating or married couples. We also measured the
relationship and sexual goals of only one member of the couple;
however, goals in relationships are different than goals in other
domains such as achievement or other life tasks in that they
involve coordinating with another person who has his or her own
goals. For example, what are the implications for sexual function-
ing in a relationship if one partner has strong approach goals and
the other partner has weak approach goals? Future research should
examine the joint contribution of both partners goals to both
partners sexual desire, sampling the partners feelings at specific
moments in their daily lives as well as over longer periods of time.
Most of the participants in these studies were college students in
relatively new relationships in which sexual desire may have been
near its peak. It is possible that the effect of relationship goals on
desire might be even more magnified in relationships of greater
duration and commitment, such as in married couples. It is also
possible that approach goals fail to promote sexual desire in
long-term couples who have already experienced steep declines in
sexual desire. Future research focusing on relationships of greater
duration and commitment is needed to examine these ideas. An-
other important direction for future research to examine is the
benefits of adopting approach goals for other aspects of relation-
ships in addition to sexuality. Desires to pursue growth and de-
velopment in relationships may also be associated with other
positive behaviors and processes such as relationship commitment
(Strachman & Gable, 2006), willingness to sacrifice (Impett, Ga-
ble, & Peplau, 2005), and willingness to forgive a partners wrong-
doings (Finkel, Rusbult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002).
Another limitation stemmed from the fact that participants
sexual desire was only assessed on days when they engaged in
sexual intercourse (in Studies 2 and 3). Individuals sometimes
choose to engage in sexual activity in order to please the partner or
to avoid conflict rather to out of personal sexual interest (Levine,
2002). Indeed, research has shown that both men and women
report having engaged in sexual behavior in the absence of desire
(see review by Impett & Peplau, 2003), suggesting that the expe-
rience of sexual desire does not entirely overlap with sexual
behavior. An interesting direction for future research would be to
assess sexual desire both on days that couples engage in sexual
activity and on days that sexual activity does not occur. Future
research would also benefit from the use of a measure of sexual
desire that distinguishes between desire in solitary and dyadic
contexts (e.g., Spector, Carey, & Steinberg, 1996). Finally, this
research was centrally concerned with the motivational component
of the human sexual response (i.e., sexual desire), but the measures
used in each of the studies included related sexual constructs such
as sexual enjoyment and arousal. Although auxiliary analyses
using individual items (i.e., sexual arousal, desire, and enjoyment)
did not change the pattern of results, it will be important for future
research to include more nuanced measures to capture possibly
meaningful distinctions among these interrelated sexual constructs.
Although our theoretical framework proposes that motivation
influences sexual desire, our data do not provide a definitive test of
this direction of causality. It is also possible that experiencing high
 APPROACH GOALS AND SEXUAL DESIRE
levels of sexual desire may also cause people to pursue approach
goals in their relationships. Future research in which both approach
and avoidance goals are experimentally manipulated (Strachman
& Gable, 2006) would provide a more refined explanation of the
findings reported in the current studies. Finally, while the results of
the two daily experience studies suggest that the association be-
tween approach goals and sexual desire applies equally well to
White and Asian participants, it will be important for future
research to replicate these effects in a sample of greater racial/
ethnic diversity and in non-Western cultures.
Implications
The results from three studies document the importance of
approach goals for predicting elevated levels of sexual desire on a
daily basis and maintaining desire over time. Unfortunately, the
current study cannot address the question of whether it is possible
for people with chronically low levels of approach goals to learn to
focus on the positive things to be experienced in their relation-
ships. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, by definition, goals
are short-term cognitive representations of wants and fears that
should be malleable and sensitive to situational cues (Gable,
2006b). Moreover, previous research has shown that goals can be
experimentally manipulated in the achievement domain (e.g., El-
liot & Harackiewicz, 1996) and in the highly similar area of
regulatory focus research (e.g., Shah, Higgins, & Friedman, 1998).
Experimental evidence for changing relationship goals in situ has
yet to be conducted, but on the basis of theory and previous
experimental research, we expect that it is possible for peoples
goals in their relationships to change over time.
This research also points to the central importance of consider-
ing the role of gender in understanding sexual desire in intimate
relationships. Approach goals were a stronger predictor of sexual
desire for women than for men in the two studies that used a
measure of approach goals in romantic relationships. Thus, the
results of this study support a growing body of research that
demonstrates the importance of relationship dynamics for wom-
ens sexual desire relative to mens (e.g., Basson, 2002, 2006;
Peplau, 2003). In recent years, publicity about treatments for
mens erection problems focused attention on womens sexuality
and provoked a competitive commercial hunt for the female
Viagra (Tiefer, 2002). This hunt reflects a general medicalization
of sexuality; many people are trying to find pharmaceutical so-
lutions to what in some cases may be relationship problems.
Because womens sexual desire is much more closely tied to their
goals in relationships than mens sexual desire, attempts to boost
womens sexual desire through pharmacological intervention may
be misguided. The results of this research highlight the importance
of considering the interpersonal aspects of relationships when
thinking about how to treat problems of low sexual desirefor
women but also for men.
Concluding Comments
While a wealth of research has documented important links
between sexual desire and relationship quality in intimate relation-
ships (e.g., Regan, 2000; Sprecher, 2002; Yeh et al., 2006), much
less research has investigated factors that may help promote and
sustain sexual desire in relationships over time. In this article, three
821
studies documented the utility of approachavoidance motiva-
tional theory as well as the important roles of both approach
relationship and sexual goals in helping individuals to maintain
high levels of sexual desire.
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Received April 3, 2007
Revision received August 7, 2007
Accepted August 23, 2007
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 824 838 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.824

Receiving Support as a Mixed Blessing: Evidence for Dual Effects of

Support on Psychological Outcomes

Marci E. J. Gleason Masumi Iida and Patrick E. Shrout

Wayne State University New York University

Niall Bolger
Columbia University

Although social support is thought to boost feelings of closeness in dyadic relationships, recent findings
have suggested that support receipt can increase distress in recipients. The authors investigated these
apparently contrary findings in a large daily diary study of couples over 31 days leading up to a major
stressor. Results confirm that daily support receipt was associated with greater feelings of closeness and
greater negative mood. These average effects, however, masked substantial heterogeneity. In particular,
those recipients showing greater benefits on closeness tended to show lesser cost on negative mood, and
vice versa. Self-esteem was examined as a possible moderator of support effects, but its role was evident
in only a subset of recipients. These results imply that models of dyadic support processes must accord
a central role to between-individual heterogeneity.

Keywords: close relationships, daily diaries, social support, reciprocity, multilevel models

Perceived availability of social support (the belief that social
support has been available to one in the past and will be in the
future) has been linked to a variety of beneficial outcomes (Sara-
son, Sarason, & Pierce, 1994). However, the beneficial effects of
perceived support stand in contrast to those for concrete acts of
support (Lakey & Lutz, 1996). Although a few studies have shown
that support receipt is related to some positive outcomes (Feeney
& Collins, 2001, 2003), many studies of actual support transac-
tions find that support receipt is associated with negative outcomes
and in particular with increased negative mood (Barrera, 1981;
Bolger, Zuckerman, & Kessler, 2000; Liang, Krause, & Bennett,
2001; Shrout, Herman, & Bolger, 2006).
Studies of support transactions also have a tendency to focus on
individual emotions and well-being and are less likely to measure
relationship-level variables such as closeness and felt intimacy.
Given that negative affect is inversely associated with relationship
satisfaction (Bradbury & Fincham, 1989; Edwards, Nazroo, &
Brown, 1998; Gottman, 1979; Uebelacker, Courtnage, & Whis-
man, 2003) and feelings of closeness and intimacy within relation-
Marci E. J. Gleason, Communication and Behavioral Oncology, Kar-
manos Cancer Institute, Wayne State University; Masumi Iida and Patrick
E. Shrout, Department of Psychology, New York University; Niall Bolger,
Department of Psychology, Columbia University.
This research was supported by National Institute of Mental Health
Grant MH60366 to Niall Bolger. We gratefully acknowledge the invalu-
able contributions of Amie Rapaport, Diane Ruble, Hiro Yoshikawa, Tom
Tyler, Gwen Seidman, Christopher Burke, and the Couples Lab of New
York University.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Marci
E. J. Gleason, Karmanos Cancer Institute, 4100 John R Street, ROC
Room 336, Detroit, MI 48201; email: marci.gleason@gmail.com. Further
information can also be found at http://www.psych.nyu.edu/couples.
ships are positively associated with relationship satisfaction (Reis
& Patrick, 1996; Sanderson & Cantor, 1997), it would seem that
instances of support receipt could lead to lowered relationship
closeness as a secondary outcome.
We review the strength of the evidence that support receipt has
adverse effects on individual well-being, then review the possible
effects of support receipt on relationship closeness and intimacy,
and finally outline the strengths of considering both negative mood
and relationship closeness outcomes in a single study of social
support receipt.
How Strong Is the Evidence That Support Receipt Can
Lead to Increased Distress?
As discussed above, there is an established literature linking
generalized perceived support to better outcomes, including re-
duced distress (e.g., Cohen, 2004), but daily support receipt is
frequently linked to negative outcomes. Given the seemingly con-
tradictory nature of these findings, the association between daily
support and negative mood has been questioned. Specifically, it
has been suggested that the apparent negative effects of support
receipt could be due to (a) reverse causation, that is, distress
leading to support provision, or (b) a common third cause, such as
stress leading to both distress and support, which would create a
spurious association
Two kinds of evidence argue against reverse causation. One is
the use of lagged variables so that the association of distress on one
day is related to support on the previous day (e.g. Bolger et al.,
2000; Shrout et al., 2006). In these lagged models, yesterdays
negative mood is adjusted for statistically such that the adverse
effects of yesterdays support on todays mood cannot be due to
simple build-up of negative mood. Bolger et al. (2000; and also
Shrout et al., 2006, in a somewhat more elaborate model) found

824
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES
that the negative effects of yesterdays support remain after ad-
justment. The second source of evidence is from an examination of
simulated data that were constructed to conform to a pattern in
which distress elicits support (Seidman, Shrout, & Bolger, 2006).
Seidman et al. (2006) constructed the fictitious data using a sim-
ulation strategy that was first outlined by Abelson (1968) and then
analyzed this reverse causation data with Bolger et al.s analytic
approach. They concluded that the effects obtained empirically by
Bolger et al. could not have been obtained with data that were
constructed under the reverse causation model.
The other alternative model is that of a third variable that leads
to both distress and support provisiona spurious association
model. An example of this alternative model is the support-
seekingtriage model, which posits that the negative outcomes
from receiving support are due not to the support itself, but instead
to support and psychological distress being simultaneously caused
by a precipitating stressful event (Barrera, 1986). According to this
model, it is not receiving support that causes distress, but the
stressor that simultaneously evokes both psychological distress
and increased support from others. Support and negative mood
coincide because both are responses to negative events, not be-
cause they are causally linked to negative mood.
However, the association between support and negative out-
comes typically remains even after adjustment for relevant third
variables. Krause (1997), in a nationwide study of 60-year-olds in
Great Britain, found that even when adjusting for health status,
individuals who received support had an increased mortality risk,
and those who had high perceived availability of support had
decreased mortality risk. Experimental studies have also demon-
strated that support receipt and not just the precipitating stressor
can have deleterious effects on mood. Bolger and Amarel (2007)
found that students asked to give an impromptu speech were more
anxious when they received explicit, visible support from a con-
federate than were students who did not receive support. Further-
more, the Seidman et al. (2006) simulation study discussed above
also investigated the third-variable explanation. They created fic-
titious data in which the level of distress today was caused by
yesterdays distress, as well as adversity experienced today and
yesterday. Similarly, the support transactions today were modeled
to be more likely when support was provided yesterday and when
adversity was experienced either today or yesterday. Unlike the
results of the reverse causation simulation study, Seidman et al.
found that when Bolger et al.s (2000) analysis strategy was used,
some spurious association was created by the omitted third vari-
able (adversity). However, the size of the bias was very small, even
when the magnitude of the effect of adversity was made to be
unrealistically large. Seidman et al. concluded that Bolger et al.s
effect sizes were unlikely to be due to an omitted third variable.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the association between
psychological distress and support receipt is not spurious.
Support Receipt and Increased Distress
Equity theory and reciprocity research have also been invoked
to explain why the receipt of support can be negative (Uehara,
1995; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973). Both approaches
suggest that people will be most satisfied when they perceive their
supportive relationships as being equitable or reciprocal. Equity
and reciprocity theories posit that both overbenefit (receiving more
825
support than one has provided) and underbenefit (providing more
support than one has received) are psychologically distressing and
that individuals are motivated to restore equity either behaviorally
by providing or eliciting aid from caregivers or cognitively by
psychologically justifying the inequity (Buunk & Schaufeli, 1999;
Uehara, 1995; Walster et al., 1973). Buunk and Schaufeli (1999)
took an evolutionary approach to reciprocity, suggesting that it is
a basic psychological mechanism that developed to maintain social
relationships and indicate individuals importance in their social
groups. Research on couples in which one member is seriously ill
has shown that both the ill spouse and the caregiving spouse suffer
from frustration, anger, depression, and resentment when the re-
lationship is not judged to be reciprocal (Thompson, Medvene, &
Freedman, 1995).
From the perspective of reciprocity theory, Uehara (1995) spe-
cifically argued that it is being overbenefitedreceiving support
without returning itthat is particularly psychologically distress-
ing. In this case, recipients are likely to feel obligated to repay
what was given to them, and when they cannot, they begin to doubt
their status and usefulness in the relationship (see also Roberto &
Scott, 1986). In a daily diary study of committed couples, we
found that individuals reported increased negative affect and de-
creased positive affect on days on which they reported receiving
support from, but not providing support to, their partners (over-
benefit) as compared with days when they only provided support
to their partners (underbenefit) or both provided support to and
received support from their partner (equitable or reciprocal ex-
changes; Gleason, Iida, Bolger, & Shrout, 2003).
A different explanation for a tendency for distress to increase
with received support is one that focuses on possible effects of
support on the recipients self-esteem. Several studies have re-
ported that being helped is associated with decreased self-esteem
and depressed mood in the recipient (Nadler, 1987; Nadler &
Fisher, 1976). There is some evidence that this explanation is
especially relevant in close relationships (Nadler, Fisher, & Itzhak,
1983). Fisher, Nadler, and Whitcher-Alagna (1982) proposed the
threat-to-self-esteem model of aid or support receipt that posits
that helping consists of both self-threatening and supportive com-
ponents. The self-threatening components can undermine the re-
cipients evaluation of their self-efficacy, competence, and coping
abilities, which can in turn lead to increased psychological distress.
On the other hand, Fisher et al. theorized that the supportive
components could provide comfort and a sense of being cared for
by the support provider.
Social Support as Relationship Enhancer
It is perhaps this potential sense of being cared for by ones
partner bolstered by the positivity of the perceived availability of
support that gives social support its positive reputation. Reis,
Clark, and Holmes (2004) and Cutrona (1996) have related the
positive findings associated with perceived availability of social
support to a global construct called perceived responsiveness of the
partner to the self. This perception of partner responsiveness is the
central path to the development and maintenance of closeness and
intimacy in relationships. Like perceived responsiveness to the
self, perceived availability of support seems to be based on both
personality characteristics of the perceiver and actual supportive
interactions. People who judge themselves as being highly sup-
826 GLEASON, IIDA, SHROUT, AND BOLGER
ported are also judged by observers as being more supported, but
support recipients who perceived their relationships as more pos-
itive also judge the support they receive more positively than
observers (Collins & Feeney, 2000).
Given the research indicating that support receipt increases
negative mood, it is surprising that it is judged as positive by the
recipient at all. One possible explanation for this contradiction is
that support receipt makes one feel closer to the provider of that
support because it makes one feel cared for or responded to (Reis
et al., 2004) even while increasing personal distress. Gable,
Gonzago, and Strachman (2006) found that when individuals were
supportive when talking with their partners about their partners
successes, the partners (i.e., the support recipients) rated the rela-
tionship as more satisfying. Although a positive association be-
tween receipt of support and positive relationship variables such as
satisfaction, closeness, and intimacy has been found in a few
studies (Acitelli & Antonucci, 1994; Hagedoorn et al., 2000), it is
unclear whether the support being assessed was actual support
received, perceived support, or some combination of both. Regard-
less, this research on support receipt and relationship variables
raises the question of whether support has differential effects on
individual-level variables (e.g., personal distress) when compared
with relationship-level variables (e.g., relationship closeness).
Understanding Dual Effects of Support on Personal
Distress and Relationship Closeness
The idea that support or aid can produce both increased psy-
chological distress and a sense of being cared for by the provider
is particularly intriguing. There are at least two possible models of
this pattern of effects: an individual differences model and a
within-person differential effects model. An individual differences
model would mean that support increases personal distress for
some people but increases relationship closeness for others. A
differential effects model would mean that support receipt leads to
both increased personal distress and increased relationship close-
ness in the same person. Model 1 in Figure 1 shows a represen-
tation of an individual differences model of support receipt. In one
group (Group A), there is no effect of support on individual
distress, but there is a strong and positive effect on relationship
closeness. In the other group (Group B), there may be a strong
effect of support on individual distress, but no improvement in
relationship closeness. If data from these two groups are combined
without a formal model of the nature of the moderation (individual
differences), then one might conclude from the mixed analysis that
couples are likely to experience both relationship exhilaration and
individual distress.
An individual differences model of the effects of support receipt
is consistent with aspects of the relationship enhancement model
of social support (Cutrona, Russell, & Gardner, 2005). This model
explains the association between actual support receipt, perceived
availability of support, relationship satisfaction, and health. It
suggests that the perceived availability of support is directly re-
lated to instances of received support, particularly when the pro-
vider is seen as a caring and committed partner, and that this
process is cyclical: People who receive consistent beneficial sup-
port will trust their partners, and people who trust their partners
will benefit from support. Perhaps the negative effects of the
receipt of support can be explained by individual differences:
Specifically, people who trust their partners may benefit from
support (Group A in Figure 1), whereas people who lack that trust
may experience costs that have been described above (Group B in
Figure 1).
In contrast to the individual differences model, Model 2 in
Figure 1 represents a differential effects model, whereby a single
support event leads to improved relationship closeness and in-
creased individual distress. We might imagine a stressed worker
who comes home to a well-intending partner who attempts to
provide him or her with a break. The worker might appreciate the
good intentions and feel closer to his or her partner but be dis-
tressed by the loss of an evening of productivity. If this were the
typical pattern of support provision in the couple, then one would
witness simultaneous positive and negative effects of support acts.
Although the individual differences model and the differential
effects model appear to be discrete alternatives, they can actually
be viewed as examples of a range of processes that might vary
from couple to couple. For some pairs of partners, support events
could lead to closeness but not to distress; for other partners,
support events could lead to distress but no closeness; and for still
others, there could be dual effects. In the population, some patterns
of these relations might be more common than others.
Only three studies that we know of have reported on these two
processes in the same samples of partners. The Bolger and Amarel
(2007) study cited earlier did find evidence for mixed effects of
support receipt. Students who received visible support experienced
larger increases in negative emotion than those in the nonsupport
condition, and they also felt that their partners were more con-
cerned, considerate, and supportive than those in the invisible
support condition. However, this study had only a single support
event and was not designed to examine individual differences in
response to support events. Gable, Reis, and Downey (2003) were
able to study repeated support events among dating couples. They
found that support events that were reported by both partners and
recipients (called hits) were related to both relationship well-
being and recipient distress. Even though the data were based on
diary reports that allow the study of individual differences, the
authors did not include these individual differences (which are
called random effects in the multilevel statistics literature) in their
statistical model.
Gleason, Iida, Bolger, and Shrout (2003) examined the effect of
imbalance in support provision and receipt on recipients negative
mood, and Gleason (2005) analyzed data from the same daily diary
study with a focus on relationship closeness outcomes. In both of
these analyses (i.e., for both outcomes), Gleason and her col-
leagues found evidence that the effects of unreciprocated support
events varied from couple to couple, but on average unreciprocated
support was associated with an increase in negative mood and in a
separate analysis with an increase in relationship closeness. How-
ever, it was not possible to determine from these two analyses how
often the pattern in Model 2 (differential effects model) occurred
in the sample.
The Current Study
To tease apart the effects of support receipt on negative mood
and relationship closeness, we analyzed data from a large daily
diary study of nearly 300 cohabitating couples in which one
partner was approaching a stressful event, the bar examination (a
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES 827

Model 1: Individual Differences (Moderation) Relationship

Closeness
+

Group A Support
Event

Individual
Distress

Relationship
Closeness

Support
Group B Event
+
Individual
Distress

Model 2: Differential Effects

Relationship
Closeness
+
Support
Event
+
Individual
Distress

Figure 1. Possible models for understanding the effects of support receipt on individual distress and relation-
ship closeness. In Model 1, support receipt increases relationship closeness in some individuals (Group A) and
increases distress in others (Group B). In Model 2, support receipt increases both distress and closeness in all
individuals. The weak or missing effect is represented by a dashed arrow; the strong effect is represented by a
solid arrow.

difficult-to-pass licensing examination for lawyers that they must
pass to practice). Using a dataset in which one member of the
couple is approaching a significant stressor allowed us to investi-
gate whether responses to support receipt are affected by overall
stress level and ensured that we captured couples at a time when
support exchanges should have occurred frequently.
A typical analysis would involve estimating and interpreting
only the fixed or average effects. Although the fixed effects give
valuable information about the predominant pattern of the data,
fixed effects alone are unable to distinguish between models like
those discussed above. Estimating the random effects of the receipt
of support on negative mood and relationship closeness will pro-
vide evidence as to whether the effects of receipt of support on the
outcomes differ between individuals. If receipt of support in-
creased negative mood on average (a significant fixed effect) and
there was significant variation around it (a significant random
effect), we would know that individuals negative mood was
differentially affected by receipt of support. Furthermore, we could
obtain estimates of each individuals receipt of support effect,
which would reveal whether for some people receipt of support
decreased negative mood despite the average effect being an
increase in negative mood or whether receipt of support increased
negative mood in all individuals but to lesser and greater degrees.
In the current study, we took such an analysis one step further
and built a model in which we simultaneously modeled the effects
of support receipt on negative mood and relationship closeness.
This special multilevel model is what Raudenbush and Bryk (2002,
pp. 185199) called a multivariate repeated measures model. The
model and the large sample size allowed us to estimate the random
effects of support receipt on both negative mood and closeness and
828 GLEASON, IIDA, SHROUT, AND BOLGER
then estimate the correlation between them. A significant correla-
tion between the random effects of support receipt on negative
mood and relationship closeness would suggest that the effects are
systematically linked across individuals, whereas a null correlation
would suggest that the association between the effects of support
receipt on negative mood and relationship closeness vary by indi-
vidual but are not linked. This analysis is particularly powerful for
two reasons: (a) It allowed us to model the effects of receipt of
support on negative mood and closeness simultaneously, thereby
allowing us to investigate how these effects are associated within
individuals, and (b) it allowed us to see whether and how people
systematically differ in their reactions to support receipt without
having to identify an explanatory moderator.
This second strength is particularly important. Conceptually, we
tend to think about the heterogeneity of the responses to support
events as possible moderation, as illustrated in Model 1 of Fig-
ure 1, but, as stated above, in practice the multilevel models do not
require that we specify the variables that distinguish Group A from
Group B. Given the difficulty of measuring all possible moderators
and the fact that moderation is often difficult to find, it is partic-
ularly useful that we can identify systematic variation without
having to identify its specific source.
In the current study, we first determined the average response to
support receipt, then whether there was reliable variation in those
responses; as a third step, we attempted to identify the variables
that can account for such variation. The literature suggests two
important candidates for moderating variables that we could ex-
amine. One is derived from the Cutrona et al. (2005) theory that
suggests that support receivers who are in more trusting and
satisfying relationships will find support to be more effective in
reducing personal distress. Another is the proposition by Fisher et
al. (1982) that support can be a threat to self-esteempersons who
have compromised self-esteem might be more vulnerable to a
threat associated with support acts.
Method
Design and Participants
The data were collected in the summers of 2001, 2002, and 2003
by contacting more than 100 law schools in the continental United
States. In 2001, 14 schools agreed to participate by allowing their
graduating students to be contacted; in 2002, 27 schools partici-
pated; and in 2003, 30 schools participated. Because access to
students marital or cohabitation status was unavailable before
recruitment, the school representatives were asked to distribute
either a letter or an e-mail to their entire graduating class. Across
the 3 years, more than 15,000 students were contacted. To be
eligible for participation, couples had to be married or cohabiting
for at least 6 months at the time of the recruitment, and only 1
member of the couple could be planning on taking the July bar
exam. There were 765 eligible couples who contacted us to par-
ticipate, and of those 552 were assigned to the diary condition.1 Of
those, 472 couples agreed to participate, resulting in an 86%
agreement rate.
The average age of the examinee was 28.9 years (SD 6.4), and
the average age of the partner was 28.4 (SD 7.8). Of the
examinees, 46% were male. Sixty-four percent of the participants
were married, and the average length of cohabitation was 4.2 years
(SD 4.9). The composition of the sample was 76.8% White,
7.1% Asian, 4.4% Latino, 2.1% Black, 0.6% American Indian,
5.1% other, and 3.9% not specified for examinees; 78.8% White,
5.2% Asian, 4.8% Latino, 3.8% Black, 0.9% American Indian,
3.0% other, and 3.5% not specified for partners. Couples over-
whelmingly agreed on how long they had been romantically in-
volved (mean difference between estimates 0.03 years), with the
average length of relationship being 6.5 years (SD 5.5), the
minimum 8 months, and the maximum 48.8 years. This is a highly
educated sample, and therefore is not representative of the popu-
lation as a whole.
Couples were paid $150 for participation, and each couple was
given a chance to win $1,000 on the completion of the study.
Couples received an initial payment of $10, two consent forms,
two background questionnaires, and two return envelopes when
they agreed to participate in the study. They returned the com-
pleted background questionnaires an average of 3 weeks before the
start of the diary period. The diary period consisted of the 5 weeks
before the bar exam, the 2 days on which the exam took place, and
the week after the exam. Between 1 and 2 weeks before the start
of the diary period, both members of each couple received an
initial packet containing a batch of daily diary questionnaires, a
return envelope, and instructions regarding the diary question-
naires. Packets were mailed to each participant on a weekly basis
(six packets over the 6 weeks of the study). Each batch consisted
of seven identically structured daily diaries with the exception of
the last batch, which consisted of nine daily diaries. The diary form
included questions regarding mood, relationship closeness, daily
troubles or difficulties, relationship conflicts, and support transac-
tions. Participants were asked to complete the questionnaires sep-
arately and not to share or discuss their answers with their partners.
Participants were also asked to complete the diaries on the days
assigned and to indicate whether each diary had been completed on
the correct day. Only entries that indicated that they had been
completed on the correct day were included in the analyses (88%
of completed diaries).
Of those who agreed to participate, 89% returned their back-
ground questionnaire (372 couples in which both members re-
turned the background and 16 in which only one member did).
Two hundred eighteen couples returned all materials (476 partic-
ipants2). The final sample consisted of 293 examinees and 290
partners who completed at least 1 week of the daily diaries.
Measures: Dependent Variables
Closeness. Each evening, participants indicated separately
how emotionally close and how physically intimate they were with
their partner on a scale ranging from 0 to 4 with midpoints. High
numbers indicated more emotional closeness and increased phys-
ical closeness, and low numbers indicated emotional distance and
1
Because this sample is part of a larger study that focused on method-
ology, interested couples were randomly assigned to different conditions.
Only 72% of interested couples were assigned to the diary design, and our
analyses use only those couples.
2
In some couples, only 1 member returned materials, so the participant
numbers reflect how many individual participants returned the materials,
and couple numbers reflect the number of couples in which both members
returned the materials.
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES
lack of physical closeness. Cronbachs alphas for the two items
were .71 for examinees and .68 for partners.3 Items were averaged
to create the closeness scale (examinee: M 2.27, SD 1.07;
partner: M 2.25, SD 1.06). We adjusted for yesterdays The variable representing duration of time in the study was created
relationship closeness by including lagged relationship closeness
as a predictor in the model. Controlling for lagged closeness results
in the outcome variable being residualized change in relationship
closeness (todays relationship closeness adjusting for yesterdays
relationship closeness). This strengthens the claim that any change
in relationship closeness is due to the events of the day in question
rather than lingering effects from the day before.
Negative mood. Anger, depressed mood, and anxiety were
measured using items from the Profile of Mood States (Lorr &
McNair, 1971). For each mood, at least three high-loading items
from a factor analysis conducted by Lorr and McNair (1971) were
used. Anger and anxiety consisted of three items, and depressed
mood consisted of four items. For each of these items, participants
rated how they felt right now on a 5-point scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 5 (extremely). The scores were rescaled to a 0 4
interval, and a mean for each mood was obtained by averaging the
rescaled values of the relevant items. Anger, depressed mood, and
anxiety were highly related (between-person reliability estimate
.60; within-person reliability estimate .624) and were therefore
averaged to form a single negative mood scale that was then
centered on the respective overall means (partners: M 0.31
before centering, SD 0.52; examinees: M 0.72 before center-
ing, SD 0.74). It can be seen that on average, examinees as
compared with partners reported more than twice as much negative
mood. Negative mood was measured twice each day, once in the
morning and once at night. Therefore, we adjusted for morning
negative mood, and again our outcome variable was residualized
change in negative mood, again strengthening the claim that any
change in negative mood was due to events of the day in question
rather than lingering effects from the day before.5
Measures: Predictor Variables
Support provision and receipt. Participants provision of emo-
tional support to their partner and receipt of emotional support
from their partner was assessed in the evening each day. Each
measure consisted of a single item in which participants reported
whether they had provided emotional support to their partner and,
separately, whether they had received emotional support from their
partner. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate, by cir-
cling yes or no, whether they had received (provided) any help
from (to) their partner for a worry, problem, or difficulty in the
past 24 hr. Examples of support such as listening and comforting
were given to clarify the question. Support receipt was coded 1 and
a lack of receipt was coded 0; similarly, support provision was
coded 1 and a lack of provision was coded 0.6
Covariates
Time. Temporal effects of being in the study were adjusted for
by including time in the study as a predictor of both outcomes. It
has been shown that the first 3 days of diary studies generally have
elevated levels of negative reports, but not of positive reports
(Gleason, Bolger, & Shrout, 2003). Given this potentially bias-
inducing tendency in our analyses, we eliminated the first 3 days
829
of data, but analyses including these days did not differ from the
findings presented. The 4th day of the study was also dropped to
account for the use of lagged variables (relationship closeness).
such that Day 5 was coded 0, Day 6 was coded 1, and so on up to
Day 35 (coded 31), resulting in values from 0 to 31 being included
in the analyses. Hereinafter, we refer to the days by their code
number. Day 31 was the day before the bar examination. We did
not include the days of or the days following the examination in
the study to limit the sample to persons approaching a stressor.
However, additional analyses revealed that the days following the
bar examination did not differentiate in important or dramatic
ways from the data reported below.
Weekend. We have found closeness to be systematically
higher on weekends than on weekdays, and we therefore adjusted
for the effects of the weekend. We represented weekend with a
variable that was coded 1 for Saturday and Sunday and 0 for
Monday through Friday.
Daily stressors. As discussed above, the support-seeking
triage model has suggested that negative effects of support receipt
are due to the fact that stress and support co-occur (stress-eliciting
support), and therefore when distress increases after support, it is
not because of the support, but because of the stressor that
prompted that support. This same potential confound exists for
relationship closeness and stressors, given that stressful life events
are associated with declines in relationship satisfaction (Tesser &
Beach, 1998) and an increase in social support. To rule out these
alternative hypotheses, a count of participants daily stressors was
included in the model. Each day, participants were asked to indi-
cate whether any of 21 possible stressful events had occurred and
to indicate any stressful event that occurred that did not correspond
to one on the list. The number of events indicated was summed and
3
In an effort to lessen the burden of taking the daily diaries, we
shortened a closeness scale used in previous studies by one item. We chose
to eliminate an item that asked how connected one felt to their partner that
day because it appeared redundant with the emotional closeness item
(Cronbachs .92). By doing so, we lowered the alpha of the scale, but
this is to be expected because Cronbachs alpha underestimates reliability
when items tap different aspects of a construct (Raykov, 1998).
4
The between-person reliability is interpreted as the between-person
reliability of the average of the measures taken on the same day; the
within-person reliability is interpreted as the reliability of change within
person throughout the study (see Cranford et al., 2006).
5
Positive mood was also measured using the Profile of Mood States
(Lorr & McNair, 1971), but as positive and negative mood have been
shown to operate independently of each other we did not condense them
into one scale. We did conduct separate analyses looking at positive mood
and the effect of receipt of support and found that in both partners and
examinees positive mood was not negatively affected by support receipt
and was positively affected by giving support. Gleason, Iida, et al. (2003),
on the other hand, found that positive and negative mood behaved similarly
(support-only days resulted in an increase in negative mood and a decrease
in positive mood).
6
Practical support was also measured and behaved very similarly to
emotional support (smaller beta coefficients, but in the same direction) in
both bar examinees and their partners; however, when both emotional and
practical support were entered into the models, practical support no longer
had any explanatory power, but the results for emotional support remained.
Given this pattern, we report only the effects of emotional support.
830 GLEASON, IIDA, SHROUT, AND BOLGER
centered on the grand mean (partner M 1.61 before centering,
SD 1.55; examinee M 1.76 before centering, SD 1.65).
Gender. Gender (coded .5 for men and .5 for women) was
originally included as a covariate, but because it did not affect the
variables of interest (receiving and providing support) and to
simplify the model presented, it was not included in the analyses
reported below.
Moderating Variables
Both potential moderating variables were measured in the back-
ground questionnaire, which both members of the couple com-
pleted approximately 3 weeks before starting the diary portion of
the study (see above for more details about the background ques-
tionnaire administration).
Relationship satisfaction. Overall relationship satisfaction was
measured with one item taken from the Dyadic Adjustment Scale
(Spanier, 1976), on which 0 extremely unhappy, 3 happy, and
6 perfectly happy. Relationship satisfaction was generally high
among these couples (examinees: M 4.45, SD 1.04; partners:
M 4.56, SD 1.03).
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg
Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965), a 7-item Likert scale ranging
from 0 (low self-esteem) to 4 (high self-esteem; examinees: M
3.17, SD 0.59; partners: M 3.16, SD 0.60). Alpha reliability
was .86 for examinees and .88 for partners.
Analytic Approach
The goal of the current analysis was to examine the effects of
receiving support from and providing support to ones partner on
both an individuals evaluation of the degree of closeness in the
relationship and simultaneously on an individuals level of nega-
tive mood. We used a multilevel statistical model to investigate
these relationships separately for partners (less stressed) and ex-
aminees (highly stressed). The models had two levels: a within-
individual level (over time) and a between-individuals level. The
model also took into account the fact that outcomes, negative
mood and closeness, were clustered within individuals.7 Using the
multivariate approach described by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002),
we included both closeness and negative mood in a single multi-
level analysis. The multivariate approach allowed us to estimate
the correlation between the random effects for negative mood and
closeness and to examine the frequencies of participants showing
a moderated pattern (see Figure 1, Model 1) and a differential
effects pattern (see Figure 1, Model 2). All analyses were con-
ducted using the MIXED procedure in SAS (SAS Institute, 2003).
The within-individual level of the analysis allowed each indi-
viduals relationship closeness and negative mood to be modeled
as a function of receipt of support. We predicted a given days
closeness and negative mood for a particular individual; we ad-
justed for either yesterdays closeness or same-day morning neg-
ative mood, respectively; number of days in the study; and week-
end effects. Given that support transactions may be more likely to
take place on days when an individual experiences stressful events,
a count of daily stressors was included to adjust for the effects of
stressful events as a third variable. The equation was as follows:
Yijk Nijk b0ni b1nYijk1 b2nDik b3nWik b4nSik mended.
b5nGik b6niRik b7nGik Rik eijk]
Cijk b0ci b1cYijk1 b2cDik b3cWik b4cSik
b5cGik b6ciRik b7c(Gik Rik) eijk]. (1)
The dependent variable, Yijk, is the outcome for participant i for
outcome j (when j 1 it is negative mood; when j 2 it is
closeness) on day k. Thus, there were two records for each day
within participant, so the maximum number of records that a
participant contributed was 62. When the outcome is negative
mood, Nijk 1 and Cijk 0, and the first part of the model is
selected and all of the b coefficients have the subscript n. When the
outcome is closeness, Nijk 0 and Cijk 1, and the second part
of the model is selected and each of the b coefficients have a
subscript c. Yijk 1 is morning negative mood for individual i when
j is equal to 1; Yijk 1 is yesterdays closeness for the same
individual i when j is equal to 2; Dik is the number of days in the
study; Wik indicates whether it is a weekend day or not; Sik adjusts
for the number of stressors experienced; Gik is the individuals
report of providing (giving) support; Rik is the individuals report
of receiving support; Gik Rik is the interaction term for providing
and receiving support, and the residual components are represented
by eijk. The coefficient b0ni is the regression intercept for negative
mood for individual i and represents negative mood on the first
weekday of the study when the individual has neither given nor
received support and all other variables are at their projected
average level (as morning mood and daily stressors are grand mean
centered). The coefficient b0ci is the regression intercept for close-
ness for individual i and represents closeness on the first weekday
of the study when the individual has neither given nor received
support and all other variables are at their projected average level
(as yesterdays closeness and daily stressors are grand mean cen-
tered).
As Bolger and Shrout (2007) discussed, the mixed-model ap-
proach can be specified to acknowledge that the residuals on
adjacent days are likely to be correlated, and we used this speci-
fication in the analysis we report here. This specification allowed
us to account for dependency between outcomes in individuals and
within individuals across time.
The between-individual level of the analysis allows us to model
possible individual differences in the coefficients specified in
Equation 1. We fit a model that considered intercepts for both
closeness and negative mood to be random (i.e., to vary across
persons) and the effect of support receipt on each of the two
outcomes. The formal specification of these models involves the
inclusion of random effects in the Level 2 equation. These have a
mean of zero but variance that is assumed to be nonzero. For
example, the between-individuals level of the model for the inter-
cepts involves the sum of overall means () and random effects
(u). Our analytic model also allowed the random effects for the
intercepts and the support receipt effects to be correlated across
7
Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) provided a general description of
multilevel statistical models. Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) showed that
these models can be influenced by both within- and between-individuals
variation. When within-person and between-person effects are predicted to
be the same, the multilevel analysis that combines the effects is recom-
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES 831

both effect type and outcome variable. For those interested in the Table 1
details of this analysis, the syntax used is available from Marci Multilevel Analysis Results Relating Daily Support to Negative
E. J. Gleason. The Level 2 equations were Mood and Closeness for Partners and Examinees: Fixed Effects

b0ni 0n u0ni Partners Examinees

(n 290) (n 293)
b0ci 0c u0ci
Variable SE SE
b6ni 6n u6ni
Negative mood
b6ci 6c u6ci. (2) Intercept 0.343** 0.016 0.589** 0.021
Day 10 0.015* 0.005 0.102** 0.007
Weekend 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.011
In addition, we tested the moderation hypothesis in two separate Daily stressors 0.027** 0.003 0.064** 0.004
multivariate, multilevel analyses. The same Level 1 equation de- Morning negative mood 0.428** 0.012 0.472** 0.011
scribed in Equation 1 was used for each analysis. The Level 2 Receiving emotional support 0.075* 0.021 0.037* 0.018
equations were modified when testing for moderation to include Giving emotional support 0.001 0.014 0.048* 0.021
Receiving Emotional
the moderators (self-esteem or relationship satisfaction), resulting
Support Giving
in an additional predictor in each of the four equations. We did not Emotional Support 0.093* 0.023 0.080* 0.027
alter the specifications of the random effects for the moderation Closeness
tests. Intercept 1.989** 0.037 1.971** 0.046
Day 10 0.057** 0.010 0.048** 0.001
Weekend 0.113** 0.019 0.135** 0.019
Results Daily stressors 0.043** 0.007 0.065** 0.007
Yesterdays closeness 0.318** 0.011 0.140** 0.011
Support Patterns Receiving emotional support 0.248** 0.039 0.411** 0.034
Giving emotional support 0.245** 0.028 0.319** 0.037
Receiving Emotional
Examinees reported receiving support on 50% of days, whereas Support Giving
partners reported receiving support on only 40% of days. Exam- Emotional Support 0.080 0.046 0.011 0.046
inees reported giving support on 37% of days, whereas partners
reported giving support on 53% of days. Examinees support

p .10. *
p .05. **
p .001.
receipt increased over time (r .09, p .01), and their reports of
giving support decreased (r .03, p .01). The opposite
Figure 3 shows the results for closeness. Support receipts
pattern is observed for partners, that is, partners received less and
positive effects on closeness were evident despite its also being
provided more support as the bar exam approached (receiving, r
associated with an increase in negative mood. Although there was
.03, p .05; giving, r .11, p .01).
a marginal interaction between receipt and provision on closeness
for partners, suggesting that supportive equity days were particu-
Fixed Effects larly positive for partners, the interaction does not diminish the
beneficial effects of support receipt on closeness.
Table 1 presents the fixed-effect results for both outcomes for Partners effects of receiving and giving support on relationship
partners and examinees. Only the variables of interest are reported closeness did not differ (difference between estimates 0.002),
here. The main effect of support receipt was significant for both t(289) 0.10, ns. However, examinees effect of receiving sup-
negative mood, partners: b6n 0.075, t(289) 3.54, p .001; port was greater than the effect of giving support (difference
examinees: b6n 0.037, t(292) 2.04, p .05, and closeness, between estimates 0.09), t(292) 2.09, p .05. Days on which
partners: b6c 0.248, t(289) 6.37, p .001; examinees: b6c support was received and not given were significantly more neg-
0.411, t(292) 12.19, p .001. The main effect of giving support on ative when compared with the other three types of days for both
negative mood was significant for examinees, but not for partners, partners (difference between estimates 0.08), t(289) 4.45, p
partners: b5n 0.001, t(289) 0.10, ns; examinees: b5n .001, and examinees (difference between estimates 0.08),
0.048, t(292) 2.24, p .05. The main effect for giving support t(292) 5.19, p .001.
was significant for both partners and examinees on closeness, part-
ners: b5c 0.245, t(289) 8.73, p .001; examinees: b5c 0.319,
Random Effects
t(292) 8.63, p .001. For negative mood, these effects have to be
interpreted in the context of a significant interaction between receipt The random effects covariance matrix for both partners and
and provision (see Table 1). When one takes the interaction into examinees is displayed in Table 2. The model generated random
account, the current findings replicate those of Gleason, Iida, et al. effects for the intercepts of closeness and negative mood both
(2003), in which it was found that supportive equity days (days in between and within level. The within-level random effects provide
which support is both received and provided) are associated with the information about what is occurring in individuals lives that
lowest levels of negative mood and that receipt-only days are asso- affects their levels of negative mood and closeness that was not
ciated with the highest levels of negative mood (see Figure 2). As the captured by our models. As can be seen, the variances for both the
figure shows, the receipt of support is detrimental to negative mood, intercept for negative mood and closeness are significant, suggest-
but only on days in which the recipient of support did not also provide ing that the model does not account for all the variation in these
support to his or her partner. variables. In addition, the evidence for a negative covariance
832 GLEASON, IIDA, SHROUT, AND BOLGER
0.65
Examinees
0.60
0.55
Negative Mood
0.50
0.45
0.40
Partners
0.35
0.30
No Receiving
Figure 2. The effects of support receipt and provision on evening negative mood for both partners and
examinees.
between these intercepts suggests that whatever is causing that
within-level daily variation affects closeness and negative mood in
opposite ways. On a given day, when negative mood is increased,
closeness is decreased and vice versa.
The between-person random effects for the intercepts of close-
ness and negative mood provide information about how negative
mood and closeness behave across individuals. By generating
random effects, we were able to obtain estimates of each individ-
uals intercepts for negative mood and closeness. If the random
effects are positively correlated, it suggests that individuals who
have generally higher levels of closeness also have higher levels of
negative mood; if the correlation between them is negative, it
suggests that individuals who have generally higher levels of
closeness have lower levels of negative mood and vice versa.
There are also between-person random effects for the slopes (the
effect of receipt on both negative mood and closeness for each
individual), and their correlation will give us information as to
whether these effects are systematically linked across individuals.
Using the random effects variances and covariances, we calcu-
lated the correlations between the intercepts for negative mood and
closeness and the effects of receipt on negative mood and close-
ness (the slopes) at the within level. As can be seen in Table 2,
partners covariance between the random effect for the intercept of
negative mood (0n .035) and the intercept for closeness (0c
.212) is 0.027. This results in a correlation of .31 ( p .05) for
partners, and similarly the correlation for examinees is .25 ( p
.05). These correlations suggest that people who are higher in
negative mood tend to be lower in closeness. The correlation
between the random effects of support receipt on both outcomes is
.36 ( p .05) for partners and .31 ( p .05) for examinees,
suggesting systematic differences across individuals.
No Giving
Giving
Receiving
A representation of these negative correlations of the slopes can
be found in Figure 4. Each point on the scatterplots represents the
estimated random effect of receipt on negative mood (x-axis) and
on closeness (y-axis) for a single individualin other words, each
point represents how support receipt typically affects a particular
individuals negative mood and feelings of closeness. As can be
seen, there are individuals in three of the four quadrants of the
scatterplots. Most individuals fall in the upper right quadrant
(examinees 209 individuals; partners 245 individuals); mem-
bers in this quadrant experience something akin to the fixed
effects: an increase in both closeness and negative mood. How-
ever, a sizable portion of individuals also fall into the upper left
quadrant (examinees 80; partners 40); support receipt is only
positive for members of this quadrant: It decreases negative mood
and increases closeness. Finally, a few individuals fall into the
lower right quadrant (examinees 4; partners 5); support
receipt is only negative for members of this quadrant: It increases
negative mood and decreases closeness.
Selecting individuals at both the positive and the negative ends
of the scatterplots and plotting their individual data allows us to
see how support differentially affects different people. Figure 5
displays the data for 2 partners and 2 examinees. The top two
graphs display data for a partner and examinee for whom the
receipt of support is negative. Notice that on days on which they
receive support, their closeness ratings are low and their negative
mood ratings are high. The bottom two graphs show a strikingly
different patternthese are of individuals who are positively af-
fected by the receipt of support. Notice that on days on which they
receive support, their closeness ratings are high and their negative
mood ratings are low. These extreme individuals are good ex-
amples of how people differentially react to the receipt of support,
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES 833

Examinees
3.0

Relationship Closeness 2.5

2.0
No Giving

Giving
1.5

1.0
No Receiving Receiving

Partners
3.0

2.5
Relationship Closeness

2.0

No Giving

1.5 Giving

1.0
No Receiving Receiving

Figure 3. The effects of support receipt and provision on relationship closeness for both partners and
examinees.

but it is important to note that most individuals fall in the middle
of the distribution and experience something more akin to the fixed
effects results when they receive support: an increase in negative
mood and an increase in feelings of closeness.
Moderation
The moderators included in the analyses did not explain why
individuals react differently to support receipt. Relationship satis-
faction failed to moderate the effects of support receipt on negative
mood and closeness for both examinees and partners. Self-esteem
did not moderate the receipt of support for examinees on either
negative mood (bn .024, SE .027, ns) or closeness (bc
.056, SE .049, ns). It did moderate the effect of support receipt
on negative mood for partners (bn 0.067, SE .026), t(289)
2.58, p .05, but not the effect of support receipt on closeness
for partners (bc .005, SE .045, ns). These results suggest that
when one is not approaching a large stressor, the negative effects
of support receipt may be tempered for those with above-average
self-esteem (self-esteem was group-mean centered). However,
834 GLEASON, IIDA, SHROUT, AND BOLGER

Table 2 individuals who experience a larger increase in closeness when

Multilevel Analysis Results Relating Daily Support to Negative they receive support experience less of an increase in negative
Mood and Closeness for Partners and Examinees: Random mood. Although this does not eliminate support receipts average
Effects effect on outcomes across people, it does indicate that the duality
observed for an average individual is limited. The majority of
Partners Examinees participants were in the middle of the spectrum of support reac-
(n 290) (n 293)
tivity and reported experiencing increases in both outcomes fol-
Level and variable SE SE lowing support receipt, whereas those on the ends of the spectrum
either benefited from support or suffered from support. It seems
Level 1
that support not only differentially affects closeness and negative
Variance of negative mood (NM) 0.128** 0.002 0.176** 0.003
Variance of closeness (CL) 0.538** 0.010 0.508** 0.009 mood, but also operates differently across individuals.
Covariance of NM and CL 0.054** 0.003 0.057** 0.004 Several possible explanations for the overall finding that support
Level 2 increases both negative mood and relationship closeness seem likely,
Variances
including characteristics of the recipient, characteristics of the pro-
NM 0.035** 0.004 0.074** 0.009
CL 0.212** 0.023 0.444** 0.045 vider, and characteristics of the relationship. The characteristics of the
Receipt Negative Mood recipients that we tested here, self-esteem and relationship satisfac-
(RNM) 0.030** 0.006 0.021** 0.005 tion, did not explain our pattern of findings. However, there are many
Receipt Closeness (RCL) 0.053** 0.016 0.097** 0.020 other individual difference constructs, such as attachment style, that
Covariances
NMCL 0.027** 0.007 0.045** 0.014 are plausible moderators but were not included in this study. An
NMRNM 0.007* 0.004 0.007* 0.005 intriguing candidate for moderation, which has intuitive ties to Nadler
NMRCL 0.010 0.010 0.019* 0.009 and colleagues work on self-esteem (Fisher et al, 1982; Nadler, 1987;
CLRNM 0.004 0.008 0.027** 0.012 Nadler & Fisher, 1976), is perceived respect from ones partner or the
CLRCL 0.052** 0.015 0.128** 0.025
RNMRCL 0.014* 0.007 0.014* 0.008 extent to which one feels respected and self-efficacious in ones
relationship. This construct may be more directly implicated than
Note. Significance tests of Level 1 effects are constricted ratio Wald self-esteem when considering support exchanges between partners.
tests; significance tests of Level 2 variances are chi-squares (df 4); For instance, work on self-efficacy has demonstrated that judging
significance tests of Level 2 covariances are chi-squares (df 1).
*
p .05. ** p .001. oneself as being inefficacious can impair coping and goal achieve-
ment (Bandura, 1982), and the receipt of support may lead some
individuals to doubt their ability to accomplish goals on their own.
Although we were not able to test this idea in the current study, it is
given that the effect of receipt of support on negative mood is bn bolstered by the current findings that providing support is beneficial,
.075 and there are no participants who are more than 0.90 units particularly when one has received support. Demonstrating ones
above the mean in self-esteem (the mean self-esteem for partners efficacy through the provision of support may allow one to accept
was 3.16 and the maximum score was 4.0), this moderation makes support from ones partner without experiencing efficacy declines.
receipt of support less detrimental to negative mood, but not on Should this be the case, we would then want to determine why
average positive, for those high in self-esteem. receiving support signals lack of efficacy for some individuals but not
others.
Discussion A second explanation for the differential effect documented in
The results support Model 2 (differential effects) from Figure 1 this study could be characteristics of the provider. Characteristics
in that receiving support simultaneously increased relationship such as being a high self-monitor might result in an individuals
closeness and negative mood. However, this was only true on days being a particularly skilled support provider (Flynn, Reagans,
when support was not provided (22% of days for partners and 21% Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006), one whose support may be less
of days for examinees). On days when support was both received detrimental to recipients moods and feelings of efficacy. Work by
and providedsupportive equity days (31% of days for partners, Lakey, Lutz, and Scoboria (2004; Lakey & Scoboria, 2005) on
29% of days for examinees)support receipt increased relation- perceived support suggests that the benefits of perceived social
ship closeness and decreased negative mood. This was true for support may be derived not only through personality characteris-
individuals who were approaching a major stressor (examinees) tics of the perceiver, but also through relationship factors such as
and for their less stressed partners. The varying stress level did not the perceived similarity of the provider to the recipient. Perhaps
substantially affect the influence of support receipt or provision on the same is true in actual support transactionsthe more a recip-
relationship closeness and negative mood. ient feels similar to a provider, the more positive the support given
Although this pattern is evident on average, it is not the whole by that provider would be. Other relationship characteristics, such
story. Evidence from the random effects analysis suggests that as the match or mismatch of communication styles (see Swann,
support also differentially affects individuals, and this is in line Rentfrow, & Gosling, 2003), could also lead to the effects docu-
with Model 1 (individual differences) from Figure 1. Namely, the mented here. Although we cannot offer definitive evidence sup-
negative correlations between the random effects of receipt on porting a particular explanation for these patterns, given that
negative mood and on closeness suggest that individuals who support is an exchange between at least two individuals it seems
experience a larger increase in negative mood when they receive likely that at least part of the explanation for these effects will
support experience less of an increase in closeness; conversely, come from dyad-level variables or processes.
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES 835

Partners
1.4

1.2

Closeness X Receipt of Support

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

-0.2

-0.4
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Negative Mood X Receipt of Support

Examinees
1.4

1.2
Closeness X Receipt of Support

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

-0.2

-0.4
-0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Negative Mood X Receipt of Support

Figure 4. Scatterplots of the random effects of Receipt Closeness and Receipt Negative Mood for each
partner and examinee. Individuals whose point lies in the upper left-hand quadrant are those for whom support
receipt decreases negative mood and increases closeness; those in the upper right-hand quadrant are those for
whom support receipt increases negative mood and also increases closeness; and those in the lower right-hand
quadrant are those for whom support receipt increases negative mood and decreases closeness.

Also worth noting was the benefit of support provision for
providers, which, regardless of support receipt, improved mood
(for examinees) and relationship closeness. Considering provi-
sions beneficial qualities, it is important that social support re-
searchers include it in their studies to understand why giving
appears to be better than receiving. Reciprocity research would
suggest that giving is positive because it repays our debts or puts
others in our debt (Uehara, 1995) and that it is a tool that individ-
uals use to prove their worth in their social group (Buunk &
Schaufeli, 1999). It may also be that giving support boosts self-
esteem by making one feel more competent and needed (Fisher et
al., 1982). Provisions benefits need to be explored more thor-
oughly, particularly in the context of close relationships.
These results speak directly to two recently proposed theories in
the close relationships literature: Cutrona et al.s (2005) relation-
ship enhancement model of social support and Reis et al.s (2004)
836 GLEASON, IIDA, SHROUT, AND BOLGER

Partner Examinee
4
Closeness 3
2
1
0
Yes
Receipt of
Support
No
4
Negative 3
Mood 2
1
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
4
Closeness 3
2
1
0
Yes
Receipt of
Support
No
4
Negative 3
Mood 2
1
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Day in Study Day in Study

Figure 5. Top: Partner and examinee for whom support decreases closeness and increases negative mood.
Bottom: Partner and examinee for whom support increases closeness and decreases negative mood

perceived partner responsiveness model. The relationship enhance-
ment model of social support suggests that consistent supportive
responses can lead to higher perceived partner support, which
leads to greater trust, relationship satisfaction, and ultimately bet-
ter health. Although this model is widely supported by research on
perceived support availability, it has been less clear how to rec-
oncile findings regarding the negativity of social support receipt
with these ideas. The current research suggests that supportive
acts, despite causing personal distress for some individuals, en-
hance relationship closeness. Perhaps it is this positive effect of
support that leads to the positive effects of perceived support and
ultimately to relationship satisfaction and health.
Reis et al. (2004) also referred to the benefits of perceived avail-
ability of support in their discussion of perceived partner responsive-
ness and also noted that the research on support receipt itself has
questioned its benefit. They suggested that the field needs to examine
how the effects of social support differentially affect outcomes and
individuals. The current research does both of these and suggests that
the benefits of support are largely due to relationship enhancement
(i.e., increased closeness), although it is important to note that this
association itself varies by individual. Actual instances of support,
despite some negative side effects, may be one of the more impor-
tant ways that partners establish responsiveness.
The lack of gender effects on the variables of interest in both
studies may seem surprising, but it is consistent with the support
literature that has found similarities in support processes for men and
women (Neff & Karney, 2004; Porter et al., 2000). However, a few
studies have shown that men and women react differently to support
receipt (see Antonucci & Akiyama, 1987; Cutrona, 1996). It is im-
portant to note that we did find some gender effectsfor instance,
men tended to experience more negative mood and to be less nega-
tively affected by troublesome events but not on the variables of
interest (support receipt and provision). Perhaps gender differences in
support processes would have emerged if we had investigated the
amount of support requested or received by men and women.
Limitations
This study had several limitations, some of which have been
discussed above. The sample was not randomly chosen and con-
sisted of well-educated individuals. It is possible that this pattern
of results would not be present in a less privileged population. In
future studies, more diverse samples should be sought to determine
the generalizability of these findings.
In addition, given that this was a nonexperimental study we
were unable to completely adjust for the level of stress participants
experienced and to definitively establish that support increased
negative mood instead of just co-occurring with it. We took steps
to limit this concern: We included a count of stressful events in all
analyses and adjusted for morning negative mood. In addition, by
demonstrating the effects in both highly stressed individuals (ex-
aminees) and less stressed individuals (partners), we feel confident
that support receipt can have these mixed effects regardless of
overall stress level. Furthermore, the simulation study by Seidman
et al. (2006) concluded that the negative effects associated with
support receipt in naturalistic studies could not reasonably be
 DUAL EFFECTS OF SUPPORT ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OUTCOMES
caused by co-occurring negative eventsthe parameter values
needed for such an association were unrealistic. Finally, a recent
experimental study demonstrated the negative effects of support
receipt on mood (Bolger & Amarel, 2007). Given these previous
findings and the precautions we took to minimize this concern, we
feel confident that support is causally linked to negative mood in
this study. In the future, however, we hope to demonstrate this
pattern of findings in an experimental setting.
Our analyses of support receipt and provision included only
emotional support. Although we also asked about practical and
instrumental support, we found that emotional support was the
driving force behind our findings and therefore included only
emotional support in our models. However, research by other
individuals has shown that emotional support can be further ex-
panded into such things as esteem support, companionship, and
caring (Kang & Rafaeli, 2007). Perhaps such finer distinctions in
the type of support received would shed some light on the current
findings. For instance, it may be that esteem support is both
common and unhelpful, whereas companionship is less common
but beneficial. Also, we had participants indicate whether they had
received support or not, but did not obtain information on the
amount of support they received. Future studies should include a
more detailed collection of support that may shed light on both
differential effects of support receipt and individual differences in
the effects of support receipt.
Finally, although we did include theoretically important con-
structs as moderators, there are several others that would be of
interest that were not included. These include not only character-
istics of the recipient (i.e., perceived competence), but also of the
provider (i.e., empathy or responsiveness) and of the relationship
itself (i.e., communication style). Future studies would do well to
examine such possible moderators.
Concluding Thoughts and Implications
The effects of support receipt in this study were consistent and
compelling. Although actual support receipt has been linked to neg-
ative outcomes (Barrera, 1981; Bolger et al., 2000; Gleason, Iida, et
al., 2003), this study demonstrated that this does not appear to be true
for relationship closeness. These findings highlight how a single act
(receiving support) can make one feel better in one domain (relation-
ship closeness) but worse in another (personal mood). Perhaps it is
this duality that allows social support to be considered positive by
laypersons even though psychologists have documented that it can be
ineffective and even detrimental. Furthermore, evidence of random
effects showed that this duality itself showed substantial between-
individual heterogeneity, which implies that models of support pro-
cesses need to accord a more central role to heterogeneity than they
have done heretofore. At this time, we have not identified moderators
of this heterogeneity and therefore cannot explain why people react
differently to support, but understanding that individuals react differ-
ently is an important step toward understanding social support pro-
cesses in close relationships.
In conclusion, it is worth considering that the implications of our
heterogeneity findings may not be limited to the social support
literature. Although many of the constructs studied in psychology
are likely to have differential effects across individuals, dyads, and
social contexts, rarely are studies designed in ways that allow such
heterogeneity to be reliably distinguished. Potential moderators
837
can be included in studies, of course, but the intensive longitudinal
approach taken here allows one to quantify the extent of hetero-
geneity without having identified moderators a priori. Thus, these
intensive designs have the possibility to demonstrate that many of
the findings in the field reflect average effects, averages that can
obscure important, consequential variability.
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 839 859 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.839

Nomina Sunt Omina: On the Inductive Potential of Nouns and Adjectives

in Person Perception

Andrea Carnaghi Anne Maass and Sara Gresta

University of Trieste University of Padova

Mauro Bianchi Mara Cadinu and Luciano Arcuri

University of Jena University of Padova

Six studies (N 491) investigated the inductive potential of nouns versus adjectives in person
perception. In the first 5 studies, targets were either described by an adjective (e.g., Mark is homosexual)
or by the corresponding noun (e.g., Mark is a homosexual) or by both (Study 3). The authors predicted
and found that nouns, more so than adjectives, (a) facilitate descriptor-congruent inferences but inhibit
incongruent inferences (Studies 13), (b) inhibit alternative classifications (Study 4), and (c) imply
essentialism of congruent but not of incongruent preferences (Study 5). This was supported for different
group memberships and inclinations (athletics, arts, religion, sexual preference, drinking behavior, etc.),
languages (Italian and German), and response formats, suggesting that despite the surface similarity of
nouns and adjectives, nouns have a more powerful impact on person perception. Study 6 investigated the
inverse relationship, showing that more essentialist beliefs (in terms of a genetic predisposition rather
than training) lead speakers to use more nouns and fewer adjectives. Possible extensions of G. R. Semin
and K. Fiedlers (1988) linguistic category model and potential applications for language use in
intergroup contexts are discussed.

Keywords: language, essentialism, stereotyping

In his seminal work, The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954)
argued that social category labels such as Jew, Black, or gay, are
unusually potent both as cognitive organizing principles and as
evaluative reference points. In a similar vein, Rothbart and Taylor
(1992) have argued that social categories (such as Jew) are often
perceived much like natural kinds (such as birds or fish) rather
than cultural constructions. People tend to attribute a deep under-
lying essence to social categories, analogous to biological species
that are genetically defined. Perceiving social categories as quasi-
biological concepts has a number of important implications, in-
cluding the inexorability and exclusiveness of group membership.
Indeed, thinking of social categories as natural kinds implies not
only that membership remains stable over time but that it practi-
cally excludes simultaneous membership in other categories con-
sidering that each object has only a single essence. Furthermore,
such natural kind categories also tend to have great inductive
potential, allowing inferences about a wealth of related attributes.
Andrea Carnaghi, Department of Psychology, University of Trieste,
Trieste, Italy; Anne Maass, Sara Gresta, Mara Cadinu, and Luciano Arcuri,
Department of Psychology, University of Padova, Padova, Italy; Mauro
Bianchi, International Graduate College, University of Jena, Jena, Ger-
many.
We are grateful to L. Castelli, G. B. Flores DArcais, R. Job, L. Lotto,
and V. Yzerbyt for their helpful comments on our studies.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Andrea
Carnaghi, University of Trieste, Via S. Anastasio 12, 34134, Trieste, Italy.
E-mail: acarnaghi@units.it
As for labels that are associated with categories in general and
social categories in particular, there is little doubt that they provide
perceivers with important and useful information as they indicate
to which class of objects a given instance belongs (Krueger &
Clement, 1994; Putnam, 1975; Rothbart, Davis-Stitt, & Hill,
1997). Moreover, even when labels, by virtue of their absolute
meaning (e.g., nominal categories such as A and B), are totally
irrelevant to the classified objects (e.g., lines that differ in their
length), they functionally represent some underlying property of
the objects in question (e.g., ordinal categories such as shorter and
longer; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963).
There is, indeed, evidence that social labels carry additional
information that the object itself does not convey (Bruner, Good-
now, & Austin, 1956). For instance, observers who have to guess
the weight of visually presented target persons are greatly influ-
enced by the labels attached to the targets (such as obese vs. above
average; see Foroni & Rothbart, 2006). Along the same line,
derogatory group labels (e.g., fag, nigger) carry affective informa-
tion that goes beyond the mere description of the group and that
produces distinctly negative associations, quite different from the
corresponding neutral group labels (e.g., gay, Afro-American; Car-
naghi & Maass, in press; Carnaghi, Maass, Bianchi, Castelli, &
Brentel, 2005; Simon & Greenberg, 1996). In summary, there is
evidence for Allports (1954) claim that noun labels serve both
as organizing devices and as carriers of affective information.
However, do they fulfill these functions to a greater extent than
other linguistic forms? In particular, how do they compare with
adjectives, the word form that is dominant in spontaneous

839
840 CARNAGHI ET AL.
person description as well as in personality research in Western
languages?1
Note that despite Allports (1954) early intuition regarding the
distinct role of nouns, they have remained a neglected word class
in social and personality psychology. Although extensively inves-
tigated by linguists, nouns (unlike adjectives) have attracted sur-
prisingly little attention in research on person perception and
personality. To cite but two examples, practically all Big Five
research conducted in different countries and on different lan-
guages has relied exclusively on adjectives, with only a few
researchers considering the possibility that people may also be
described by nouns (e.g., De Raad & Hoskens, 1990; Saucier,
2003; see also Angleitner, Ostendorf, & John, 1990). In a similar
vein, Semin and Fiedlers (1988) influential linguistic category
model (LCM) distinguishes four word classes (including three
types of verbs and adjectives) relevant to the interpersonal domain,
without considering nouns. The scope of the present research is to
start filling this lacuna by investigating the distinct role that nouns
play, compared with adjectives, in person description. We first
briefly review some of the linguistic literature concerning differ-
ences between nouns and adjectives and then speculate about the
implications for the domain of person perception.
Nouns Versus Adjectives: Similarities and Differences
At the surface, nouns and adjectives appear functionally similar,
as in the case of statements like Shira is a Jew versus Shira is
Jewish. In many IndoEuropean languages, nouns and adjectives
may share the same word stem and differ only in suffix (athlete
athletic, drunkdrunkard), implying, among other things, consid-
erable phonetic similarity. At times, they are distinguishable only
by the article (e.g., Marco is an Italian vs. Marco is Italian; Laurie
is an anorexic vs. Laurie is anorexic). At least in IndoEuropean
languages, they also seem to play a similar role in personality
description (Saucier, 2003).
Despite the striking functional, phonetic, and semantic similar-
ities between nouns and adjectives, there are reasons to believe that
nouns have a greater inductive potential and exert a greater effect
on impression formation than adjectives. Indeed, linguists have
identified a number of ways in which nouns differ from adjectives
(e.g., Jespersen, 1986; Lyons, 1977; Wierzbicka, 1986). The first
basic difference is that nouns represent a universal word class,
whereas adjectives are rare or entirely absent in some languages
(Dixon, 1977).
Second, and most important for the aims of our research, nouns
identify the class to which a given object belongs whereas adjec-
tives denote a quality or property of the object. That is, nouns
categorize people by assigning them to a specific group or type or
kind of person, which is quite different from adjectives that denote
one of many qualities that a person may possess. It is interesting to
note that children are sensitive to this difference between nouns
and adjectives as early as 2 years of age (Gelman & Coley, 1990).
For instance, Hall and Moore (1997) exposed preschoolers along
with adults to a target (i.e., a blue creature) that was defined either
by an adjective (e.g., This is a blue one) or by a noun (e.g., This is
a blue). Participants were then presented with two additional
pictures, one depicting a target-kind matching object (i.e., the same
creature but with a different color) and the other depicting a
property-matching object (i.e., a novel creature, different from the
target, but with the same color). Depending on experimental con-
dition, participants were asked to point either to the blue (i.e., the
noun form) or to the blue one (i.e., the adjectival form). Results
indicated that in the adjective condition, participants chose the
property-matching object whereas in the noun condition partici-
pants typically pointed to the target-kind matching object. In other
words, Hall and Moore (1997) showed that preschoolers used noun
labels as event-organizing devices based on category membership,
whereas they used attributes to indicate a contingent property of
the object.
Third, whereas adjectives tend to refer to a single property,
nouns imply a complex cluster of characteristics, although the
noun is generally considered more than the sum of these properties
(Wierzbicka, 1986; see also Jespersen, 1968). An example cited by
Wierzbicka (1986) may illustrate this point: Whereas blond refers
to a single property of the target person, namely his or her hair
color, the noun blonde implies multiple properties (including being
female and probably a host of additional characteristics including
sexy, glamorous, and not particularly intelligent). It is therefore
not surprising that nouns elicit richer associations than adjectives.
Indeed, Loftus (1972) found that participants listed more associ-
ated items when cued by a noun (e.g., fish, clam, etc., when
prompted by seafood) than when cued by an adjective (e.g., brick,
cement, etc., when prompted by hard).
Fourth, and closely related to the above points, adjectives tend
to allow distinctions of degree (e.g., a person may be more or less
athletic), whereas nouns tend to have an either or quality (e.g., a
person either is or is not an athlete). This difference is clearly
demonstrated by the fact that adjectives, but not nouns, allow
comparative and superlative forms (e.g., athletic, more athletic,
and most athletic).
Fifth, adjectives are parts of speech that modify nouns, suggest-
ing that nouns are primary in information processing and that
adjectives can be fully understood only after the noun has been
processed. As argued by Wierzbicka (1986), the noun is semanti-
cally superordinate, whereas the modifying adjective plays a sub-
ordinate role. For instance, talking about a Catholic woman or a
female Catholic is not the same, as the focus in the former is on
gender (qualified by religion) and the focus in the latter is on
religious affiliation (qualified by gender). Indeed, the former
phrase directs attention to the subportion of all females that is also
Catholic, whereas the opposite holds for the latter phrase. That the
adjective is subordinated with respect to the noun is also exem-
plified by the fact that in languages that have nominal gender (such
as German or Italian), the adjective adapts to the gender of the
noun rather than vice versa. In line with the idea of superordination
versus subordination in sentence processing, existing research
generally shows that nouns, compared with adjectives, have pri-
macy in speech production and are more potent memory cues. In
speech production, nouns are chosen before adjectives simply
because the object has to be defined before its properties can be
1
Throughout this article, we use the terms nouns and adjectives in a less
generic sense than is usually done. We are referring only to the subset of
nouns and adjectives that can be applied to human beings and that gener-
ally denote humans social membership (including intimacy groups, social
categories, and loose associations, such as professions, see Lickel et al.,
2000) as well as their personal qualities (inclinations or personality types).
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
delineated, regardless of whether adjectives precede or follow
nouns in a given language (e.g., a red automobile vs. un automo-
bile rossa; see Martin, 1969). Also, there is evidence that nouns are
generally more available for recall than adjectives (Lockhart,
1969; Lockhart & Martin, 1969). For instance, in Lockhart and
Martins (1969) study, participants were first asked to memorize a
series of adjectivenoun pairs, followed by a cued recall test in
which either the noun or the adjective served as the cue on the
basis of which participants were to recall the missing word. Results
supported the idea that nouns are more effective cues than adjec-
tives.
In summary, nouns differ from adjectives in important ways.
They (a) categorize events, rather than describing event properties;
(b) imply multiple qualities, rather than specifying a single prop-
erty; (c) have an either or quality, rather than allowing distinctions
of degree; and (d) have a superordinate status in speech production
and sentence comprehension. Thus, nouns are more efficient mem-
ory cues.
The main thesis of this article is that the above differences
between nouns and adjectives, identified by research in linguistics,
may have important implications for impression formation. We
argue that people will form quite different impressions of and
make different inferences about others when nouns rather than
adjectives are used to describe them. First, we hypothesize that
nouns, compared with adjectives, lead people to draw richer in-
ferences about the target and that these inferences will be largely
in line with stereotypical expectancies associated with the label.
Put simply, nouns will induce greater stereotyping than adjectives.
Second, we believe that nouns are more likely than adjectives to
inhibit alternative classifications of the same person. Thus, once a
person has been identified as X (e.g., an athlete), it becomes
subjectively difficult to believe that the same person may also be
Y (e.g., an artist). In contrast, one adjectival quality is unlikely to
preclude another, unless there is a logical (semantic) contradiction.
For example, the same person may be athletic as well as artistic.
Finally, we predict that nouns will convey greater essentialism
than adjectives, thus implying a more profound characteristic of
the person. We explain the reasons for each of these predictions
below and then provide a brief overview of the present research
project.
Stereotypical Inferences
The first question to be addressed is whether nouns will induce
stronger inferences about the target person than adjectives and
whether these inferences will mirror the stereotypes that are asso-
ciated with the label. For instance, will people infer typical Jewish
habits more strongly when the target person is described as a Jew
than when he or she is described as a Jewish person? The fact that
nouns assign targets to types and generally delineate multiple
properties would indeed suggest that they provide a richer source
for subsequent inferences.
To our knowledge, there are few studies that have investigated
inferences elicited by nouns and adjectives, and most of them have
taken a developmental (Gelman & Coley; 1990; Gelman, Collman,
& Maccoby, 1986; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987) rather than
social psychological or cognitive perspective (Markman, 1989;
Markman & Smith as cited in Markman, 1989). Gelman and Coley
(1990) reported that preschoolers inferred that two animals with
841
the same noun label (e.g., bird), but not with the same adjective
label (e.g., wide awake), share the same nonobvious properties
(e.g., lives in a nest) even when the two animals were perceptually
dissimilar (i.e., a dodo). Thus, nouns, compared with adjectives,
led preschoolers to go beyond the perceptual exemplar and draw
novel inferences on the basis of the animal category membership
(see also, Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987). Along similar lines,
Gelman et al. (1986) found that gender nouns, such as boy,
triggered richer inferences than gender-matching properties,
namely will grow up to be a daddy. Preschoolers appropriately
inferred sex-related properties from a category-defining label (i.e.,
a boy) but their performance decreased when they accomplished a
gender-categorization task in which they had to focus on sex-
related properties (i.e., will grow up to be a daddy). In other words,
Gelman et al. (1986) observed an asymmetry between inferring
properties from a given category (i.e., deduction) and inferring the
category from properties (i.e., induction), with the deductive pro-
cess being more viable than the inductive one.
Turning to the adult literature, few studies have contrasted the
use of and the consequences produced by nouns and adjectives.
Among the few exceptions is Markmans (1989) work demonstrat-
ing that nouns, compared with adjectives, trigger a richer repre-
sentation of the object that they define. Markman (1989) asked
participants to read a series of labels and to list, for each label, their
defining properties. Note that labels were either adjectives (e.g.,
intellectual) or nouns (e.g., an intellectual). Quantitative analyses
revealed that participants listed many more properties for nouns
than for adjectives. In a similar study by Markman and Smith (as
cited in Markman, 1989), participants were provided with sentence
pairs depicting a person with an adjective (e.g., Alexander is
intellectual) and with a corresponding noun (e.g., Alexander is an
intellectual). Participants were asked to list what else might be
typically expected of this person. Again, results indicated that
participants listed more attributes in response to the noun than to
the adjective label. In addition, when asked which sentence of each
pair seemed to be more informative, participants systematically
chose the noun label and justified their choices by claiming that
nouns were more lasting and central to the targets identity.
Together, the above research suggests that nouns, more than
adjectives, lead perceivers to draw inferences that go beyond the
information given. At least in adulthood, perceivers also judge the
event in question as more stable and enduring when nouns are
used, suggesting that the identity of an object is communicated
more forcefully when expressed by nouns than by adjectives.
Although previous research on both children and adults clearly
shows that nouns stimulate more inferential processing than ad-
jectives, none of the above studies has investigated the degree to
which these inferences follow stereotypical beliefs. We predict that
nouns elicit only inferences that are congruent with what is ste-
reotypically associated with the label, but they may actually inhibit
inferences about aspects that are incongruent. Because nouns rep-
resent category-defining labels whereas adjectives stand for
category-related properties (Hall & Moore, 1997), we argue that
nouns (e.g., Jew) will make category-related contents more salient
than the corresponding adjectives (e.g., Jewish). Moreover, im-
pression formation research has consistently shown that to the
extent to which a given category is salient, an individual target will
be assimilated to the category-related contents (Fiske & Neuberg,
1990). On the basis of these premises, we hypothesized stronger
842 CARNAGHI ET AL.
stereotypical inferences (e.g., He always goes to the Synagogue),
but weaker counterstereotypical inferences (e.g., He always goes
to the Church), when an individual target is described by a noun
(e.g., Mark is a Jew) than when the same individual target is
described by the corresponding adjective (e.g., Mark is Jewish).
Thus, unlike prior research, our studies investigate both facilitative
and inhibitory effects of nouns (vs. adjectives) on inferential
processing. If confirmed, this would have important implications
for the perpetuation of social beliefs, considering that the facilita-
tion of stereotypical inferences and inhibition of counterstereotypi-
cal inferences, typical of nouns, would render stereotype change
rather difficult. The first aim of our research was therefore to
investigate this issue.
Inhibition of Alternative Classifications
The second issue to be addressed in this article is whether nouns
are likely to inhibit alternative classifications more so than other
word forms. At a theoretical level, this idea was originally pro-
posed by Allport in 1954 when he argued that nouns inhibit
alternative classification or even cross-classification (p. 179) of
the same object (or person). In other words, the fact that nouns
assign the object (in our case, the person) to a specific, all encom-
passing class and that this assignment has the quality of an all-or-
none statement makes alternative classifications less likely. Al-
though this hypothesis is interesting and intuitively appealing, we
are not aware of any empirical proof (or disconfirmation) reported
in the literature.
Although individuals can theoretically be classified according to
many different dimensions (age, sex, ethnic group membership,
profession, religion, nationality, etc.), once a specific classification
has occurred, alternative classifications tend to be inhibited. For
instance, Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995) have demon-
strated such inhibitory mechanisms in their well-known research
involving a target classifiable either as a woman or as Chinese.
When one of the two categories (either woman or Chinese) became
highly accessible, the competing category was inhibited. Although
the role of inhibitory processes in social categorization is well
documented in the social psychological literature, little is known
about the role that language plays in this process. Despite the lack
of research on this issue, there are reasons to give credence to
Allports (1954) intuition, considering than nouns delineate a
single, all-encompassing type of person, which is less likely to
allow competitors than are adjectives describing one out of many
possible qualities. Testing this conjecture was one of the main aims
of this research.
Essentialism
The third question addressed in this research program is whether
nouns imply greater essentialism than adjectives. For example,
art-related activities such as painting or visiting art exhibitions are
certainly typical of both artistic people and artists, but when
performed by an artist, these behaviors are likely to be interpreted
as a more profound and enduring behavior tendency than when
performed by an artistic person. Indeed, Wierzbicka (1986) has
speculated that human characteristics tend to be designated by
nouns rather than adjectives if they are seen as permanent and/or
conspicuous and/or important (p. 357). Inverting this logic, we
predict that human characteristics that are designated by nouns
(rather than adjectives) will be perceived as more permanent
and/or important.
To our knowledge, this hypothesis has not been tested in the
past, but indirect evidence for the high degree of essentialism
implied by nouns comes from studies comparing nouns with verbs
(rather than adjectives). As a matter of fact, Walton and Banaji
(2004) found that the same behavioral preference was perceived as
a much deeper seated and more central characteristic when the
person was described by a noun (e.g., carrot eater) rather than by
a verb (e.g., eating carrots). In our studies, we aimed to extend this
line of research by focusing on the (much more subtle) difference
between adjectives and nouns, hypothesizing that nouns entail
greater essentialism than adjectives. Indeed, we varied the label
(i.e., noun, such as artist, vs. adjective, such as artistic) with which
the target was described and then assessed the inferences about the
targets behavioral preferences (such as likes to draw paintings).
If nouns were indeed shown to imply greater essentialism, then
it becomes legitimate to ask whether the inverse relationship may
also be true. Not only may nouns induce essentialist perceptions in
the listener, but it is also possible that speakers who do hold
essentialist beliefs find nouns particularly useful for revealing this
conviction. Therefore, the fourth and final aim of this research
project was to investigate how a speakers beliefs may guide his or
her linguistic choices and, more specifically, whether nouns would
be considered particularly useful for expressing essentialist beliefs.
Overview of the Studies and Hypotheses
To address the above questions, we present the following studies
addressing the four interrelated issues. First, in Studies 1 and 2, we
tested the hypothesis that nouns (e.g., athlete) trigger more stereo-
typical inferences and fewer counterstereotypical inferences than
the corresponding adjectives (e.g., athletic). In other words, com-
pared with adjectives, nouns were expected to facilitate stereotyp-
ical inferences but to prevent counterstereotypical inferences. In an
additional experiment (Study 3), we investigated whether this
would hold even in the case in which the same person was
described both by a noun and by an adjective. Thus, we tested the
relative weight of nouns and adjectives in combined noun
adjective descriptions such as Marco is an artistic athlete or
Marco is an athletic artist, again hypothesizing a greater impact of
nouns in eliciting stereotype-congruent inferences. This study also
allowed us to test whether the descriptor encountered first exerts a
greater influence on the perception of the target person than the
one encountered later.
The second question we investigated was whether nouns would
inhibit alternative classifications more so than adjectives. Because
every person has multiple category membership (e.g., Jew,
woman, academic, Italian, environmentalist), he or she may legit-
imately be described in many different ways. However, following
Allports (1954) argument, once targets with multiple member-
ships have been assigned to one particular social category (e.g.,
Jew), other classifications (e.g., woman, Italian) should become
difficult. Following Allports reasoning, we argue that the inhibi-
tion of alternative classifications should be much stronger when
nouns (Jew), rather than adjectives (Jewish), are used, for the
simple reason that nouns already define a category membership
whereas adjectives delineate a quality that is compatible with
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
many different categories. This issue was investigated in Study 4,
in which a target person was described either by a noun or by the
corresponding adjective. Participants were asked to estimate the
likelihood that the target would also belong to another, unrelated
category (noun) or possess another, unrelated trait (adjective).
The third issue, addressed in Study 5, concerned the differential
likelihood of nouns versus adjectives to elicit essentialist percep-
tions of the target. If nouns are more abstract than adjectives, then
the behavioral preferences of a target described by a noun should
be perceived as intrinsically linked to the person. In line with
previous empirical evidence on the issue under consideration
(Walton & Banaji, 2004; but see also Gelman & Heyman, 1999;
Markman, 1989), we hypothesized that a target described by a
noun (Mark is an athlete), rather than by the corresponding adjec-
tive (Mark is athletic), would allow perceivers to appraise the
targets preference as stronger, more persistent, and less prone to
be modified under situational constraints. This was expected for
the case in which the targets preference was congruent with the
labels meaning (e.g., he runs three times per week). In contrast,
behavioral preferences that are incongruent with the labels mean-
ing (e.g., he drinks a lot of wine each day) should lead perceivers
to consider the targets preference as less essential, that is as
weaker, less enduring, and more likely to vary under situational
constraints, when the target is described by a noun rather than by
an adjective. Thus, noun (compared with adjective) labels will
foster the perception of essence in cases of fit but will undermine
the attribution of essence for characteristics that do not concord
with the label.
Finally, in our last experiment (Study 6), we inverted the logic
of the above experiments. Rather than investigating the effects that
nouns and adjectives have on the attribution of essence, we tested
what words people would use in interpersonal communication,
depending on whether they do or do not have essentialist beliefs.
Thus, our last experiment focused on the speaker rather than on the
receiver of the communication. The main prediction was that
people would show a greater preference for nouns when they
perceive a given characteristic as fundamental, lasting, deep-
seated, and/or innate. In contrast, when the same characteristic is
perceived as transient or less essential, people should prefer to use
adjectives. We induced the belief that athletic abilities (Study 6A)
or intelligence (Study 6B) is either genetically determined or
mainly a result of training. We expected that participants, when
asked to describe a specific target person engaging in athletic (or
intelligent) behaviors, would use more nouns and fewer adjectives
when they had a genetic theory of athletic (or intellectual) abilities.
The nouns and adjectives used in the different studies of this
research project cover the main types of social groups identified by
Lickel et al. (2000) in their seminal work on intuitive theories of
groups, namely intimacy groups (e.g., father, mother), social cat-
egories (e.g., homosexuals, Catholics), and loose associations
(e.g., professional groups such as artists or athletes). The only type
of group not considered in this research is task groups (e.g.,
students studying for an exam, employees of a local restaurant)
that can be defined only in context and hence cannot easily be
described by a single noun or adjective. Instead, we added a type
of category not considered by Lickel et al., namely nouns and
adjectives describing personality characteristics (e.g., individual-
ist, drunkard, genius), because such personality types are particu-
larly common in person descriptions.
843
Together, we hoped that this research would provide convergent
evidence for the powerful effect of lexicalization (Gelman &
Heyman, 1999) in the process of impression formation. More than
adjectives, we expected nouns (a) to bolster category-congruent
expectations and to reduce the expectancy of incongruent behav-
iors (Studies 1 3), (b) to inhibit possible alternative classifications
(Study 4), and (c) to suggest greater essence (Study 5). Finally, in
a complementary vein, the essentialist views of speakers were
expected to lead them to use more nouns and fewer adjectives
(Study 6).
Study 1: Stereotype-Congruent Inferences
Study 1 aimed at testing whether the linguistic form (i.e., ad-
jectives vs. nouns) in which an individual target is described can
affect perceivers estimates of the frequency of descriptor-
congruent behaviors. Participants were provided with a short de-
scription of a target person by way of either an adjective (i.e.,
athletic) or a noun (i.e., athlete). Participants were then required to
estimate the frequency of a descriptor-congruent behavior as a
measure of stereotype application. We expected that participants
would make stronger inferences from nouns than from adjectives.
This hypothesis was tested on professions and personality types in
Study 1A, on intimacy groups in Study 1B, and on a random
sample of adjectivenoun pairs in Study 1C.
Study 1A
Method
Participants. Forty-eight students enrolled at the University of
Padova participated in the experiment (30 women and 18 men).
Participants were recruited at the university library and completed
the questionnaire individually.
Procedure and materials. Participants were told that we were
interested in the way people form an impression about a target
about which they had only a restricted amount of information
available. This cover story was used in all studies, unless otherwise
noted. Participants were provided with a questionnaire containing
three sentences each portraying an individual target. Each sentence
contained the name of the target (Paolo, Marco, or Fabio), his age
(21, 22, or 23 years), and a short description. Depending on the
experimental manipulation, the description was given by means of
either a noun (e.g., Paul, 22 years old, is an artist) or an adjective
(e.g., Paul, 22 years old, is artistic). Each participant received
three descriptors either in noun form (i.e., artista [artist], atleta
[athlete], and genio [genius]) or in the corresponding adjective
form sharing the same word stem to assure a maximum degree of
phonetic and semantic similarity (i.e., artistico [artistic], atletico
[athletic], and geniale [brilliant]).
Participants then had to estimate the frequency of the corre-
sponding descriptor-congruent behavior (respectively, How many
paintings does he draw each week? How many kilometers does
he run per week? and How many problems does he solve in a
week?) on 11-point scales ranging from 1 (few) to 11 (many).
These behaviors were selected on the basis of a small pretest (N
9) showing that each behavior was judged typical of one category
label but at the same time unrelated to the remaining two catego-
ries. To decrease the risk of participants selecting behaviors that
844 CARNAGHI ET AL.
were more typical of nouns than of adjectives, we had participants
in the pretest judge each behavior with respect to category labels
comprising both the noun and the adjective descriptor (e.g., How
typical is it for an athlete/for an athletic person to run?).
The order of the presentation of the sentences was counterbal-
anced. We expected participants estimations of the descriptor-
congruent behaviors to be stronger in the noun condition than in
the adjective condition.
Results and Discussion
First, in order to equate the two dependent variables, we stan-
dardized participants ratings for each descriptor-congruent behav-
ior into z scores and then analyzed these scores by means of a 3
(type of behavior: draw vs. run vs. solve) 2 (condition: adjective
vs. noun) 2 (version: Order 1 vs. Order 2) analysis of variance
(ANOVA). An almost significant main effect of condition was
found, F(1, 44) 3.81, p .057, 2p .08. Inspection of the
means2 revealed that participants ratings tended to be higher in
the noun (M 7.23, SE 0.33) than in the adjective condition
(M 6.25, SE 0.36), suggesting that nouns were more likely to
elicit stereotypical inferences than adjectives. No other effects
were found.
Study 1B
This study aimed to extend the results of Study 1A to a different
semantic as well as social domain, namely kinship or intimacy
groups (see Lickel et al., 2000).
Method
Participants. Twenty participants (11 women and 9 men) en-
rolled at the University of Padova participated in the experiment.
Procedure. The experimental procedure was same as in Study
1A, except for the experimental material. Participants, in a within-
participants design, were given two nouns (mother, father) and two
corresponding adjectives (maternal, paternal) as the target de-
scriptors. They were then asked to rate the frequency of descriptor-
congruent behaviors (i.e., To what degree is the target interested
in food-related issues?; To what degree is the target engaged in
financial matters? respectively, for the mothermaternal and for
the fatherpaternal pairs) on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (not
at all) to 7 (very much). We counterbalanced the order of presen-
tation of the targets. Again, we expected that participants would
estimate the frequency of a congruent behavior higher when ex-
posed to a noun rather than to an adjective as the target descriptor.
Results and Discussion
Participants ratings were first averaged to create two indices of
participants estimations, one for the nouns ( .61) and the other
for the adjectives ( .56). In line with our a priori hypothesis, a
paired-sample t test revealed that participants ratings were higher
in the noun (M 5.88, SE 0.22) than in the adjective condition
(M 5.35, SE 0.22), t(19) 1.71, p .05, one-tailed, d .53.
These results clearly show that participants were more prone to
draw descriptor-congruent inferences when they received a noun
rather than an adjective as the target descriptor, thus expanding
previous results to the realm of kinship or intimacy groups.
However, a potential limit of the above findings is that both
Studies1A and 1B deal with restricted samples of the adjective
noun pairs that may not be representative. As a matter of fact, one
may argue that our results reflected the peculiarity of the experi-
mental material rather than representing a robust phenomenon that
can be generalized to any other matched nounadjective pair. In
order to bolster the external validity of our results, we therefore
decided to run a new experiment using a larger and randomly
selected list of adjectivenoun pairs.
Study 1C
Participants. Thirty-seven students at the University of
Padova were recruited at the university library and completed the
questionnaire individually. Six participants did not entirely fill out
the questionnaire and were discarded from the analysis, reducing
the sample to 31 students (24 women and 7 men).
Procedure and materials. The procedure was the same as that
in Study 1A, except for the stimulus material and for the fact that
a within-participants design was used. Participants read 24 sen-
tences each portraying an individual target. Each sentence con-
tained the name of the target (e.g., Paolo) and a short description.
Twelve sentences included nouns as target descriptors and twelve
sentences included adjectives as target descriptors.
As for the selection of the adjectivenoun pairs, we used a
random number table to identify pages of the Zingarelli (1988)
dictionary, one of the most widely used Italian dictionaries. Start-
ing from each randomly selected page, we selected the first noun
adjective pair that satisfied the following six criteria:
1. Noun and adjective shared the same word stem and
appeared in close proximity (generally as a part of the
same paragraph).
2. Neither noun nor adjective was reported in the dictionary
as rare or archaic.
3. Nouns and adjectives were judged as semantically similar
according to two independent judges as well as to the
definitions provided by both the Zingarelli (1988) and the
Devoto and Oli (1971) dictionaries. Note that semantic
similarity of the adjectivenoun pairs was essential to
assure that the same congruent (or incongruent) behav-
iors could serve as dependent measures. Unpaired sam-
ples of nouns and adjectives would necessarily require
that different and hence no longer comparable behaviors
be used as the dependent measures.
4. Nouns and adjectives were applicable to human beings
according to the judgments of two independent raters.
For instance, the word pair archeologistarcheological
was excluded because the adjective is not easily applica-
ble to human beings.
5. Nouns and adjectives were distinguishable by suffix. We
did not allow any entries in which the exact same word
2
Note that all the statistical analyses of Study 1 (but not of Study 1B),
Study 2, and Study 3 were computed on z-transformed scores, whereas, for
the sake of clarity, all means are reported as raw scores.
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
was identifiable as noun and as adjective (such as Ab-
original, Panamese), because, in such cases, the two
linguistic forms are undistinguishable, unless the article
is added.
6. Finally, if no appropriate pairs were found, applying the
above criteria, on three consecutive pages, we moved on
to the next random number.
Following these criteria, we selected 12 adjectivenoun pairs
(see the Appendix). A focus group identified a descriptor-
congruent behavior considered diagnostic of both noun and adjec-
tive of each pair. Participants were asked to estimate the occur-
rence of the corresponding descriptor-congruent behavior on a
7-point scale ranging from 1 (few) to 7 (many). In order to avoid
any effect due to the order of presentation, we counterbalanced the
list of the target descriptions.
Results and Discussion
Participants ratings were first standardized into z scores and
averaged, thus creating two indices of target stereotyping, one
related to adjectives and one related to nouns. Because the order of
presentation did not produce any significant effect, we discarded
this factor from the current analyses. We analyzed the data first
using the participants and subsequently the stimuli as the unit of
analysis. In line with our a priori hypotheses, participants ratings
were higher in the noun (M 4.64, SE 0.11) than in the
adjective condition (M 4.43, SE 0.12), F(1, 30) 7.34, p played a critical role in our findings. In other words, the fact that
.011, 2p .20. Furthermore, we repeated the analysis using the
nounadjectives pairs as random independent variables. Again,
findings revealed that nouns (M 4.64, SE 0.14) elicited higher
ratings than adjectives (M 4.36, SE 0.21), F(1, 11) 6.74, p
.025, 2p .38. Taken together, these results jointly confirmed
that nouns were more likely than adjectives to trigger stereotypical
inferences. Note that the stronger inductive power of nouns versus
adjectives has been found using both participants and stimuli as
random variables.3
Moreover, the use of an extended and randomly generated list of
adjectivenoun pairs rules out the possibility that the findings may
simply be a function of biased or unrepresentative stimulus material.
The fact that an identical result pattern was obtained when randomly
selected adjectivenoun pairs were used suggests that the findings of
Study 1A can be generalized across different linguistic labels within
the larger word classes of nouns and adjectives.
There is one potential confound that may create problems for the
interpretation of our results, namely that nouns and adjectives may
differ in implicit valence. Studies on the LCM have shown that
with increasing abstraction (e.g., passing from verbs to adjectives),
words carry more evaluative information, which, in turn, may
affect stereotypical inferences. For instance, if nouns were to carry
more evaluative meaning than adjectives, then greater inductive
power for nouns may simply be a function of the fact that this
category of words describes more extreme (positive or negative)
characteristics than adjectives. To test this possibility, we had 40
volunteers rate the valence of our stimulus material on a 9-point
scale from 1 (very negative) to 9 (very positive), half of whom
rated the 12 adjectives and the other half the 12 nouns. On average,
adjectives (M 5.49) were rated as positive as nouns (M 5.23),
845
t(38) 1.18, p .25, d .37. However, the difference between
nouns and adjectives may not lie so much in the average positivity
of the word but rather in the degree of polarization. Thus, nouns
may imply a more extreme evaluation than adjectives both in the
positive and negative direction. To test this possibility, we also
looked at the absolute distance of each rating from the neutral scale
midpoint (5). The degree of polarization was practically identical
for adjectives (M 1.95) and nouns (M 1.98), t(38) 0.12, p
.90, d .04, suggesting that there was no difference in the degree
to which the two types of words carried implicit evaluative (pos-
itive or negative) content.
Although there were no reliable differences in valence or in
evaluative polarization between nouns and adjective, we calculated
the relative valence and the relative evaluative polarization of
nouns compared with adjectives by subtracting the mean ratings of
each adjective from that of the corresponding noun. Thus, the
higher the value, the more positive the noun compared with the
adjective, or the greater the evaluative polarization of the noun
compared with the adjective. We then added relative valence and,
subsequently, relative evaluative polarization to our main analysis
involving the stereotypical inferences. Remember that we had
found that nouns elicit stronger stereotypic inferences than adjec-
tives, F(1, 11) 6.74, p .025, 2p .38. This effect continued
to be reliable when adding relative valence as a covariate, F(1,
10) 9.31, p .012, 2p .48, and it approached significance
when using relative evaluative polarization as a covariate, F(1,
10) 4.29, p .066, 2p .30. It is therefore unlikely that the
differential implicit valence of nouns versus adjectives may have
nouns elicit greater descriptor-congruent inferences than adjectives
does not seem to be attributable to differences in evaluative content.
Study 2: Congruent and Incongruent Inferences
So far our studies show that compared with adjectives, nouns
facilitate congruent inferences, but they do not test the related
prediction that nouns also inhibit inferences about behaviors or
habits that are incongruent with the descriptor. Study 2 aimed to
investigate this issue.
Study 2A
Method
Participants. Sixty-four students (39 women and 25 men)
enrolled at the University of Padova were recruited in the univer-
sity library and asked to fill out the questionnaire individually.
Two participants were excluded from the analyses because they
completed questionnaires collectively, resulting in a final sample
of 62 participants (38 women and 24 men).
Procedure and materials. Half of the participants received
information about the two targets in adjective form (i.e., Paolo, 27
3
Although several authors argued that minF-test (Clark, 1973) is
needlessly complicated and highly conservative (Baayen, Feldman, &
Schreuder, 2006; Brysbaert, 2007), we decided to further compute a
minF-test that turned out to be marginally significant, F(1, 31) 3.51, p
.07, confirming, at least in part, the generalizability of our findings to
other sets of adjectivenoun matching pairs.
846 CARNAGHI ET AL.
years old, is artistic; Marco, 27 years old, is drunk), and the other
half received information about the two targets in noun form (i.e.,
Paolo, 27 years old, is an artist; Marco, 27 years old, is a
drunkard). The order of presentation of the targets was counter-
balanced across participants.
For each individual description, participants were asked to es-
timate the frequency of occurrence of two behaviors (i.e., How
many kilometers does he run per week? and How many glasses
of wine does he drink per week?) on an 11-point scale ranging
from 1 (few) to 11 (many). On the basis of a pretest (N 9),
behaviors were selected so that what was congruent with one
category was incongruent with the other, and vice versa. The order
of the behaviors to be estimated was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants. We expected participants to judge descriptor-congruent
behaviors more frequent in the noun condition but incongruent
behaviors more frequent in the adjective condition.
Results and Discussion
Participants ratings on the two items were first z transformed,
thus combining them into two indices of participants ratings, one
for descriptor-congruent behaviors and the other for descriptor-
incongruent behaviors. As the order of presentation of the targets
and the order of presentation of the to-be-estimated behaviors did
not produce any significant effects, we discarded these two factors
from the current analyses. A 2 (condition: adjective vs. noun) 2
(domain: athletics vs. drinking) 2 (behavior: congruent vs.
incongruent) ANOVA was carried out on participants ratings,
with the former factor as a between-participants variable and the
latter factors as within-participants variables. In line with our
predictions, the Condition Behavior interaction was significant,
F(1, 58) 14.14, p .001, 2p .20. As Table 1 shows,
participants rated descriptor-congruent behaviors more frequent in
the noun than in the adjective condition, F(1, 58) 9.52, p .003,
2p .14. By contrast, they rated descriptor-incongruent behaviors
less frequent in the noun than in the adjective condition, F(1,
58) 4.12, p .05, 2p .07.
Conceptually replicating the results of our previous studies,
participants expected the target to show more category-congruent
and fewer category-incongruent behaviors when the target was
labeled by a noun rather than by an adjective. Please note that in
contrast to Study 1, this study included a positive label (i.e.,
athlete) and a negative label (i.e., drunkard). Because we found
greater target stereotyping for nouns than for adjectives regardless
Table 1
Participants Frequency Estimates as a Function of Behavior
and Condition (Study 2A)
Behavior
Congruent Incongruent
Condition M SE M SE
Adjective 9.37a 0.22 3.83a 0.32
Noun 10.27b 0.22 2.77b 0.32
Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly within columns
(t test, ps .05).
of valence, these results provided additional evidence of the inde-
pendence of the effect under consideration from the valence of the
characteristic that is being described.4
Together, this study confirms the idea that nouns have a greater
likelihood than adjectives to induce stereotype-congruent expect-
ancies and to inhibit incongruent ones. However, one potential
problem is that the specific nouns selected for the above study may
have differed semantically from the respective adjectives. Espe-
cially in the case of athlete, the noun seems to imply a higher
(professional) level of involvement in the activity and may, indeed,
evoke different exemplars than the respective adjectives. They
may also differ in degree of mutual inclusiveness such that all
athletes are athletic but not all athletic people are athletes. If so, the
above results could be interpreted in light of the theoretical con-
jectures and the empirical evidence that fall under the banner of
correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1990;
Jones & Harris, 1967; Ross, Amabile, & Steinmetz, 1977). In line
with the literature on the correspondence bias, one may conclude
that higher levels of target stereotyping in reaction to athleteartist
than to athleticartistic may not occur by virtue of the differential
linguistic properties of these labels but as a function of the higher
dispositional attribution that the professional role entails. Although
this alternative explanation seems to hold mainly for those stim-
ulus words that refer to professions but less so for intimacy groups
(madre-materno [mothermaternal], padrepaterno [father
paternal]) and personality types (ubriaco-ubriacone [drunk
drunkard], geniogeniale[genius brilliant], individualista
individualistic [individualistindividualistic]), we decided to conduct
an additional study in which this potential confound was removed.
Study 2B
In Study 2B, we therefore tested the same general hypothesis,
but this was done (a) using semantically very similar nouns and
adjectives; (b) extending the investigation to a different language
community; and (c) relying on labels referring to social groups,
rather than professional roles, personality characteristics, or inti-
macy groups. We chose two pairs (homosexuala homosexual and
Catholica Catholic) that did not make any reference to a profes-
sion and for which nouns and adjectives implied each other in a
symmetrical fashion (a homosexual person is very likely to be a
homosexual and vice versa).
Moreover, the extension to a different language, in this case
German, was important to understand whether the systematic
differences between adjectives and nouns observed in our first two
studies can be generalized to other IndoEuropean languages. Note
that Italian and German differ in the order in which nouns and
adjectives generally appear. In German, just like in English, the
adjective generally precedes the noun, whereas the canonical order
4
Note that the z transformation does not allow differences between the
two domains, drunkard and athlete, to emerge. We therefore repeated the
ANOVA on the raw scores. Besides replicating the Condition Behavior
interaction, F(1, 58) 12.76, p .001, 2p . 94, we did not find a main
effect of domain. Congruent behaviors were judged more frequent than
incongruent behaviors, both in the athletics domain (respectively, M
9.68 and M 3.93) and in the drinking domain (respectively, M 9.95
and M 2.77). More important, the Condition Behavior Domain
interaction was not significant, F(1, 58) 0.63, ns, 2p .01.
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
in Italian is inverse, although both orders are possible in principle
(we come back to this issue in Study 3). Theoretically, it is
therefore possible that the greater inferential potential of nouns in
Italian is, at least in part, a function of the fact that nouns tend to
precede adjectives. This would be in line with findings showing
that the recall advantage of nouns over adjectives is particularly
pronounced when nouns precede adjectives (Kusyszyn & Paivio,
1966; Paivio, 1963). Thus, it was important to test whether nouns
would allow stronger inferences than adjectives even in languages
(such as German or English) in which they generally have a less
favorable (second) position in relation to adjectives.
Method
Participants. Seventy-one students enrolled at the University
of Jena participated in this experiment. We selected participants
that were neither Catholic nor homosexual. Our final sample then
included 65 participants (31 women and 33 men). One additional
participant was excluded from the current analyses because his
ratings on two items were four standard deviations above the
mean5 (for a similar procedure, see Walton & Banaji, 2004).
Procedure and materials. Similar to the experimental proce-
dures outlined above, participants read a brief description of two
male targets. In one condition, varied between participants, the
noun referred to sexual preference and the adjective to religion (a
homosexual, Catholic), and in the other, the inverse was true (a
Catholic, homosexual). Note that, unlike English, German adjec-
tives and nouns differ not only in terms of the presence or absence
of the article but also with respect to the uppercase versus lower-
case initial letter and the suffix (noun: ein Homosexueller, ein
Katholik; adjective: homosexuell, katholisch). The order in which
the targets were presented was varied between participants. Fol-
lowing each target description, participants had to estimate the
frequency with which the target person engaged in two behaviors,
namely How often does he attend church in a year? and How
often does he have one-night stands in a year? In contrast to our
previous studies, an open response format was chosen ( __ times
per year). A pretest session of a small sample of students (N 8)
indicated that to attend church was considered as more typical of
a Catholic personCatholic (M 5.63, SE 0.50) than of a
homosexual person homosexual (M 2.13, SE 0.35), F(1,
7) 38.11, p .001, 2p .85, whereas to have one-night which participants report their estimates. Indeed, the current study
stands was judged to be more typical of a homosexual person
homosexual (M 5.50, SE 0.42) than of a Catholic person
Catholic (M 1.89, SE 0.40), F(1, 7) 41.17, p .001, 2p Together, these results suggest that we are dealing with a robust and
.86. Therefore behaviors were selected so that what was congruent
with one descriptor was incongruent with the other, and vice versa.
Results and Discussion
Because the order of presentation of the targets and the order of
presentation of the to-be-estimated behaviors did not produce any
significant effects, these two factors were not considered in the
analyses. A 2 (condition: adjective vs. noun) 2(domain: homo-
sexuality vs. Catholicism) 2 (behavior: congruent vs. incongru-
ent) ANOVA was conducted on participants z-transformed rat-
ings, with the former factor as a between-participants variable and
the latter as a within-participants variable. The Condition Be-
havior interaction was significant, F(1, 61) 8.34, p .005, 2p
847
.12. On the basis of the results of Study 1 and Study 2A and in line
with our theoretical conjectures, we expected that nouns would
trigger more descriptor-congruent inferences but fewer descriptor-
incongruent inferences than adjectives. In keeping with these a
priori hypotheses, an inspection of the means revealed that partic-
ipants frequency ratings for the descriptor-congruent behaviors
were higher in the noun condition (M 30.74, SE 4.74) than in
the adjective condition (M 19.02, SE 4.67), t(61) 1.75, p
.04, one-tailed, d .31. By contrast, participants ratings for the
descriptor-incongruent behaviors were lower in the noun (M
4.89, SE 1.67) than in the adjective condition (M 8.77, SE
0.15), t(61) 1.76, p .04, one-tailed, d .31.
Again, replicating the results of our previous studies, partici-
pants reported stronger target stereotyping when the target was
described by a noun rather than by an adjective. Moreover, and in
line with results of Study 2A, participants expected the same target
to display incongruent behaviors with lower frequency when a
noun rather than the corresponding adjective was used as the target
descriptor. In summary, these results provide further support for
our hypothesis that nouns facilitate congruent, but inhibit incon-
gruent inferences more so than adjectives. It is important to note
that the findings of this study also suggest that this is true even in
languages in which adjectives have a primacy advantage as they
generally precede nouns. Also, in contrast to our previous studies,
the adjectivenoun pairs of this study did not refer to professional
roles, to personality characteristics, or to intimacy groups but
instead referred to social categories (see Lickel et al., 2000),
suggesting that the same processes that were found for assumed
categories in our first studies are also at work when ascribed
categories are involved (Mae & Carlston, 2005).
Moreover, and in line with the results of Study 2A, it is inter-
esting to note that facilitation and inhibition were practically
identical for the category that is positively valued in society
(Catholic) as for the category that is often subject of discrimination
(homosexual).6 Thus, valence of the characteristic and/or the cor-
responding behavior (going to church vs. having one-night
stands) does not seem to moderate the lexicalization effect. Fi-
nally, the robustness of the lexicalization effect is also corrobo-
rated by the observation that it emerges independently of the way in
shows that our previous findings, based on rating scales, extend to a
situation in which estimates are generated in a free response format.
pervasive phenomenon that holds across languages, nounadjective
pairs, categories, valence, and types of measurement.
5
The Condition Behavior interaction was still significant, F(1, 62)
5.87, p .02, 2p .09, even when the outlier was not discarded from the
analysis.
6
A 2 (condition: adjective vs. noun) 2 (target: homosexual vs.
Catholic) 2 (behavior: congruent vs. incongruent) ANOVA on the raw
data confirmed the Condition Behavior interaction, F(1, 61) 5.92, p
.02, 2p .67, and also showed that this interaction was not moderated by
type of target, F(1, 61) 0.17, ns, 2p .07. Corroborating, albeit in a
different manner, the results of Study 1C, this pattern shows that higher
levels of target stereotyping occur in reaction to nouns rather than to
adjectives, regardless of valence.
848 CARNAGHI ET AL.
Study 3: Inferences When Nouns and Adjectives Co-
Occur
The first two studies, conducted in two different languages,
mainly focused on perceivers inferences about an individual tar-
get who was identified by a single label, either a noun or an
adjective. However, in natural language, adjectives and nouns
frequently co-occur, with adjectives qualifying nouns. For exam-
ple, we may refer to a person as an athletic woman or as a female
athlete. This offers the possibility for a direct comparative test of
our hypothesis, as the relative weight of nouns and adjectives in
eliciting stereotype-congruent (and inhibiting incongruent) infer-
ences about the target person can be determined within a single
minimal sentence. We know from previous research in which both
word forms were presented that adjectives are generally less avail-
able for recall than nouns (Lockhart, 1969: Lockhart & Martin,
1969). Indeed, if nouns serve as primary conceptual pegs to
which adjectival modifiers are attached (Kusyszyn & Paivio, 1966;
Paivio, 1963), it is not surprising that they play a more important
role in information processing and memory. By extension nouns
can also be expected to preserve their unique ability to induce
congruent (and inhibit incongruent) inferences even in the copres-
ence of an adjective. Thus, our main aim was to test whether nouns
would induce more stereotypic inferences than adjectives even
when the two were presented together.
The combination of nouns and adjectives within a single de-
scription also allowed us to test whether word order would affect
the inferences that people draw about the target. Although nouns
are superior to adjectives both in facilitating memory (Martin,
1969) and in guiding inferences, as shown by our Studies 1 and 2,
regardless of whether they precede or follow adjectives, it is
conceivable that this difference is further enhanced when nouns
also enjoy a primacy advantage. This is in line with classical
research showing that recall for adjectivenoun pairs is better
when nouns precede, rather than follow, adjectives (e.g., Kusyszyn
& Paivio, 1966; Paivio, 1963). Extending this reasoning, we ar-
gued that (a) nouns would induce greater inferences regarding
congruent behaviors than adjectives (replicating Studies 1 and 2)
and (b) that this advantage of nouns over adjectives would be
enhanced when nouns precede adjectives. Note that we expected
nouns, but not adjectives, to profit from the primacy position. The
reason for this asymmetrical order effect lies in the fact that nouns
constitute the primary element to which qualifying adjectives are
subsequently attached. Indeed, various authors have argued that
speakers habitually choose adjectives after choosing the modified
nouns (Martin, 1969, p. 472; for similar arguments regarding the
listener, see Ehrlich, 1977). Thus, nouns may induce stronger
stereotype-congruent inferences when they are encountered first,
whereas the position of adjectives should be largely irrelevant
because, regardless of order, the qualifier will become informative
only after the to-be-qualified noun has been identified.
Method
Participants. Forty students (23 women and 17 men) enrolled
at the University of Padova were recruited in the library and
completed the questionnaire individually.
Procedure and materials. Participants read minimal descrip-
tions of eight distinct individual targets each defined by a common
Italian male name, age, and a short description that in contrast to
the above studies, contained two descriptors, one referring to the
athletic and the other to the artistic inclination of the same person.
Target persons were described by two nouns (e.g., athlete and
artist), by two adjectives (e.g., athletic and artistic), by an adjec-
tive followed by a noun (e.g., an athletic artist), or by a noun
followed by an adjective. Note that although nouns generally
precede adjectives, the word order can be inverted in Italian. Also,
the material was organized so that the artistic inclination either
preceded or followed the athletic one (e.g., an athletic artist or an
artistic athlete).
Participants rated each of the eight target individuals with re-
spect to the frequency of two behaviors (i.e., How many kilome-
ters does he run per week? and How many exhibitions does he
visit per week?) using an 11-point scale ranging from 1 (few) to
11 (many). Note that in a pretest, a small sample of students (N
7) indicated that to run was considered as more typical of an
athletic personathlete (M 6.43, SE 0.57) than of an artistic
personartist (M 2.86, SE 0.60), F(1, 6) 38.11, p .005,
2p .75, whereas to visit exhibitions was considered as more
typical of an artistic personartist (M 6.00, SE 0.44) than of
an athletic personathlete (M 2.86, SE 0.60), F(1, 6) 37.08,
p .001, 2p .86. Therefore, behaviors were selected so that
what was congruent with one descriptor was incongruent with the
other, and vice versa. In addition, we varied the order of the
stimulus sentences and of the dependent variables between partic-
ipants.
Results and Discussion
Data were first z transformed and then combined into two
indices of participants ratings, one for the behaviors that were
congruent with the first descriptor (and incongruent with the
second descriptor) and one for the behaviors that were congruent
with the second descriptor (and incongruent with the first descrip-
tor). Because the order of presentation of the descriptions as well
as the order of presentation of the to-be-estimated behaviors did
not produce any significant effects, we discarded these factors
from the analyses. A 4 (stimulus pairs: nounadjective, adjective
noun, nounnoun, adjectiveadjective) 2 (behavioral congru-
ency: congruent with first vs. congruent with second) ANOVA
was carried out on participants ratings, with all factors as within-
participants variables.
To facilitate interpretation of the findings, we first report effects
pertaining to our main hypothesis, namely that nouns elicit more
stereotypical inferences than adjectives, and discuss order effects
only subsequently. Looking first at the upper portion of Table 2,
we can see that our main results of Studies 1 and 2 were perfectly
replicated. In fact, the noun always elicited stronger congruent
inferences than the adjective of each pair, regardless of whether it
preceded or followed the adjective. In our design, this was re-
flected in a reliable interaction between stimulus pairs and behav-
ior congruency, F(1, 39) 48.07, p .001, 2p .55, when
analyzing the upper portion of Table 2 separately.
The lower portion of Table 2 shows that on the average, noun
noun pairs (M 4.99) elicited greater behavioral inferences than
adjectiveadjective pairs (M 3.88), F(1, 39) 26.33, p .001,
2p .40. This replicates our findings obtained on single nouns and
adjectives, showing that the inductive potential of nouns greatly
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA 849

Table 2 congruent behaviors from nouns than from adjectives also holds
Participants Frequency Estimates as a Function of Behavior when nouns and adjectives co-occur in the same minimal phrase.
Congruency and Stimulus Pair (Study 3) Second, the information encountered first appears to have a greater
weight as it induces a higher expectancy that the target person will
Behavior congruency engage in behaviors congruent with the descriptor. For example, a
Congruent with Congruent with
person described as an athlete and an artist is believed to engage
first descriptor second descriptor in more fitness and fewer art-related behaviors than a person
described as an artist and an athlete. Third, this primacy effect in
Stimulus pair M SE M SE which the first information affects impression formation more than
information encountered later only holds for nouns but not for
Nounadjective 5.51 0.19 3.59 0.22
Adjectivenoun 3.80 0.22 4.89 0.24 adjectives. This is in line with the idea that in nounadjective pairs,
Nounnoun 5.31 0.21 4.68 0.25 adjectives will acquire their meaning only after nouns have been
Adjectiveadjective 3.91 0.22 3.85 0.20 processed, so it is less important whether they precede or follow
the noun.

exceeds that of adjectives. Together, this suggests that the greater Study 4: Inhibition of Alternative Classifications
inductive potential of nouns compared with adjectives was con-
firmed, regardless of whether mixed pairs (upper portion of Table Whereas Studies 13 focused on stereotypical inferences, the
2) or uniform pairs (lower portion of Table 2) were presented. aim of Study 4 was to corroborate a different hypothesis, namely
In addition, a number of order effects emerged that are in line that nouns, much more than adjectives, would prevent perceivers
with our predictions. First, a main effect of behavioral congruency, from alternative classifications of a given social target. In line with
F(1, 39) 4.53, p .04, 2p .10, indicated that behaviors Allports (1954) suggestions, we hypothesized that nouns are more
congruent with the first descriptor (M 4.63, SE 0.16) were likely than adjectives to reify the individual target into the contents
rated more frequent than those congruent with the second descrip- that they describe, thus impeding alternative classifications. In
tor (M 4.25, SE 0.16). This reflects an order effect, demon- order to test this hypothesis, we conducted a study in which
strating that the first descriptor is primary as an information- participants were presented with a target description either in noun
organizing device. This effect was reliably modified by an form (e.g., athlete) or in adjective form (e.g., athletic). Then
interaction with stimulus pair, F(3, 37) 15.72, p .001, 2p participants had to estimate the likelihood that the target may also
.56, represented in Table 2. The upper portion of Table 2 shows possess another, unrelated characteristic. Please note that this
that the advantage of nouns over adjectives was stronger in the additional characteristic was, again, provided either in noun form
nounadjective condition (M 5.51 vs. M 3.59), F(1, 39) (e.g., artist) or in adjective form (e.g., artistic).
66.31, p .001, 2p .63, than in the adjectivenoun condition We hypothesized that nouns, compared with adjectives, would
(M 4.89 vs. M 3.80), F(1, 39) 22.64, p .001, 2p .37, block alternative classifications of the target, hence making it less
indicative of a strong order effect. likely that the target would also possess the additional, unrelated
Moreover, and as shown in the upper portion of Table 2, we had characteristic. Furthermore, we suspected that this would be
argued that word order would mainly be relevant for nouns but less mainly true in the case in which the alternative classification was
so for adjectives, considering that the noun (regardless of position) provided by a noun rather than an adjective. The reason for this
has to be processed before the adjective becomes meaningful. prediction is straightforward. Assigning a target initially to one
Crossover comparisons confirmed this prediction. Behaviors con- class (e.g., dog) makes it difficult to also assign it to another class,
gruent with the noun were judged much more frequent when the but because every target can have a variety of qualities (tall, dark,
noun appeared in the first (M 5.51) than in the second position fast, etc.), nothing argues against assigning a number of additional
(M 4.89), F(1, 39) 40.50, p .001, 2p .51. In contrast, for qualities to the same object. Indeed, in most IndoEuropean lan-
the adjective, the position was practically irrelevant considering guages, multiple adjectives can legitimately be associated with a
that inferences about congruent behaviors were very similar for the single noun (e.g., a large old house), but not vice versa (e.g., a
adjective in the first (M 3.80) and in the second position (M large house and tree).
3.59), F(1, 39) 0.76, ns, 2p .02.
If the order of presentation was relevant to nouns but not to
Method
adjectives, then this should also emerge for nounnoun and
adjectiveadjective pairs. The lower portion of Table 2 illustrates Participants. Forty students (23 women and 17 men) enrolled
that for the nounnoun pair, behaviors congruent with the first at the University of Padova were recruited in the library and
noun (M 5.31) were judged more frequent than those congruent completed the questionnaire individually.
with the second noun (M 4.68), although this difference fell Procedure and materials. Participants first read the same
slightly short of significance, F(1, 39) 3.43, p .07, 2p .08. cover story as in Study 1. Participants were provided with minimal
In contrast, there was no difference between behaviors congruent descriptions of eight distinct individual targets, each defined by a
with the first and with the second adjective, F(1, 39) 0.18, ns, common Italian male name, age, and a descriptor. For half of the
2p .005, suggesting that the order of presentation was irrelevant targets, the descriptor referred to their athletic inclination, and for
for adjectives. the other half, the descriptor referred to their artistic inclination.
Together, three main findings emerge from this study. First, and Following the instructions outlined by Macrae et al. (1995), we
most important, this study shows that the greater tendency to infer decided to use two categories that have no semantic overlap
850 CARNAGHI ET AL.
(unlike woman and housewife) and for which it is unlikely that one
constitutes a subtype of the other (such as woman and manager).
More important, regardless of the semantic content of the descrip-
tor, each target person was labeled either by a noun (e.g., athlete
and artist) or by an adjective (e.g., athletic and artistic). After
reading a target description, participants had to estimate the prob-
ability that the target (e.g., described as athletic) may also have
another characteristic (e.g., artistic). In particular, participants
were prompted by the following question: Could you indicate the
likelihood that [the name of the target] could also be [descriptor].
Participants provided their estimates by means of a percentage
format, ranging from 0% to 100%. We counterbalanced the order
of presentation of the target description.
Results and Discussion
Data were first combined to create four indeces of participants
estimations. Specifically, two indices concerned the condition in
which the initial target descriptor was provided in noun form and
the alternative descriptor either in noun form or in adjective form,
and two additional indices were related to the condition in which
an adjective was used as the initial target descriptor and the
alternative descriptor was provided either in noun form or in
adjective form.
A 2 (initial target descriptor: noun vs. adjective) 2 (additional
descriptor: noun vs. adjective) ANOVA, with likelihood estimates
as the dependent variable, revealed a main effect for initial target
descriptor, F(1, 39) 4.07, p .05, 2p .094, showing that in
line with our hypothesis, alternative classifications were more
likely when the target had initially been described by an adjective
(M 41.25, SE 2.67) than by a noun (M 36.94, SE 2.72).
Also, a main effect for the additional descriptor revealed that
participants were more likely to consider the target as also pos-
sessing an additional characteristic when that characteristic was
expressed in adjective (M 40.63, SE 2.81) rather than in noun
form (M 37.56, SE 2.33), F(1, 39) 4.23, p .05, 2p linguistic form (adjective vs. noun) in which an individual target is
.098. Most important, the predicted interaction emerged, although
it fell slightly short of significance, F(1, 39) 3.7, p .06, 2p
.087. When the target had initially been described by a noun, the
likelihood estimate was lower when the alternative classification
was presented in noun form (M 33.87, SE 2.86) than in
adjective form (M 40.0, SE 3.06), F(1, 39) 6.43, p .015,
2p .15. Thus, participants were reluctant to assign an unrelated
characteristic to a target that had initially been described by a noun
if the new characteristic took the form of another noun but not
when the same characteristic was proposed as an adjective. Please
note that this reluctance was not found when the target had initially
been described by an adjective. If an adjective had been used as the
target descriptor, then an alternative classification of the target was
considered equally likely, regardless of whether the alternative
descriptor took the form of a noun (M 41.25, SE 3.04) or an
adjective (M 41.25, SE 2.64), F(1, 39) 0.00, ns, 2p .007.
In summary, when an individual target has been described by a
noun rather than an adjective, an alternative classification of the
same target is unlikely to occur. In line with our predictions,
nouns, more than adjectives, appear to pervade the identity of the
target, hence impeding a new classification. However, our results
also suggest that this depends greatly on the way in which the
alternative classification is expressed. When the initial target de-
scriptor takes the form of a noun, perceivers are unlikely to include
the target in an alternative classification when this potential alter-
native is also a noun, although they are willing to assign the target
a new adjective. In contrast, when an adjective is used to describe
the target initially, perceivers are equally likely to assign a new
characteristic to the target, regardless of whether the new infor-
mation is conveyed in adjective or noun form. These results may
be summarized very simplistically as follows: Assuming that
nouns assign targets to classes, whereas adjectives describe qual-
ities, participants behave as if each target can belong to only one
class (be it the initial descriptor or the alternative one) but can have
any number of additional qualities.
Study 5: Implicit Essentialism
To this point, our research project has demonstrated two inter-
related phenomena: First, nouns provide much more powerful
descriptions of people than adjectives as they induce greater ex-
pectations that the person will engage in descriptor-congruent
behaviors and, at the same time, will not engage in incongruent
behaviors. In other words, despite their great semantic and pho-
netic similarity, nouns (Carlo is a homosexual) produce more
stereotypical views of the person than do adjectives (Carlo is
homosexual). Second, nouns block alternative classifications.
However, stereotypical inferences and the inhibition of alternative
classifications may not be the only way in which nouns differ from
adjectives. Rothbart and Taylor (1992) have argued that social
categories are cognitively represented by two distinct but related
dimensions, namely stereotypicality and essentialism. Whereas
Studies 13 dealt with the former dimension, the following three
studies (Studies 5A, 5B, and 5C) focus primarily on the essential-
istic judgments that a noun, compared with the corresponding
adjective, may elicit. Therefore, these studies test whether the
described can affect the perceived strength of an individuals
preference for descriptor-congruent behaviors (for a similar para-
digm, see Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Walton & Banaji, 2004).
Study 5A
Method
Participants. Fourteen female individuals attending the Uni-
versity of Padova participated in the experiment.7 Participants
were recruited in a seminar class and completed the questionnaire
in a collective session.
Procedure. Participants read five sentences, each portraying a
different individual target. Each sentence contained the individu-
als name (e.g., Paul), the individuals description (e.g., is an
artistis artistic) and the individuals behavioral preference (e.g.,
7
Only female students participated in Studies 5A and 5C for the simple
reason that the seminar, in which participants were asked to volunteer for
the study, was exclusively attended by female students on the day of the
data collection.
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
he likes to work with plaster).8 For each sentence, the descriptive
term could be either an adjective or its corresponding noun (atleta
atletico [athleteathletic], ubriacone ubriaco [drunkard drunk],
genio geniale [genius brilliant], poetapoetico [poetpoetic], and
artistaartistico [artistartistic]). Note that if the descriptive term
was an adjective [noun], its corresponding noun [adjective] was
not included in the same questionnaire. Therefore, we created four
different versions of the questionnaire in which three individuals
were respectively described by adjectives and two by nouns and
four versions of the questionnaire in which two individuals were
described by adjectives and three by nouns.
The participants perception of the targets behavioral prefer-
ences were assessed on 9-point scales (see Walton & Banaji, 2004)
assessing strength (How strong is Xs preference for this activ-
ity?), stability (How likely is it that Xs preference for this
activity will remain the same in the next two years?), and resil-
ience (How likely is it that Xs preference for this activity would
remain the same if he was surrounded by friends who did not enjoy
the activity in question?). The first scale was anchored to very
weak (1) and very strong (7), and the second and third scales were
anchored to very likely to change (1) and very likely to remain the
same (7).
Note that the individuals behavioral preferences were always
congruent with respect to the descriptive terms. Therefore, we
expected participants to attribute greater essentialism (greater
strength, stability, and resilience) to the individuals preference
when the individual was described by a noun rather than by an
adjective.
Results and Discussion
Data were first combined within each type of descriptor condi-
tion (adjective vs. noun) and within each participants ratings on
the three scales. Therefore, we created six indices, namely one for
perceived strength, one for stability, and one for resilience of the
behavioral preference separately for the adjective and the noun
stimuli. Because the three measures had reasonable internal con-
sistency in both the adjective (Cronbachs .74) and the noun
condition (Cronbachs .63), we averaged the three measures
into two overall indices of perceived essentialism, one pertaining
to the adjectival stimuli and the other to the noun stimuli.
As the version of the questionnaire did not produce any signif-
icant effect, we analyzed participants ratings on the overall indi-
ces of perceived essentialism by means of a paired t test. In line
with our hypothesis, participants judged the targets behavioral
preferences in a more essentialist manner when the target person
was described by nouns (M 5.61, SE 0.17) rather than by
adjectives (M 5.21, SE 0.12), t(13) 2.48, p .03, d .73.
Thus, greater essentialism (defined as perceived strength, stability,
and resilience) was attributed to category-congruent behaviors
when the person had been described by a noun rather than by an
adjective. Therefore, the same congruent behavior was perceived
as a more essential and enduring feature or habit of the person
when the target was described by a noun rather than by the
corresponding adjective.9
Study 5B
The present study intended to expand the results of Study 5A
beyond the specific nounadjective pairs that had been included in
851
that experiment. In order to ensure that the findings are not
attributable to any unintended bias in the selection of the material
and, hence, to the idiosyncratic characteristics of the selected
stimulus material, the same randomly selected pairs of adjectives
and nouns of Study 1B were included in the current study. As in
Study 5A, participants were asked to evaluate the targets prefer-
ence for a descriptor-congruent behavior. It is worth noticing that
the targets behavioral preferences used in the current study were
exactly the same as the descriptor-congruent behaviors of Study 1B.
Method
Participants. Twenty-one students (14 women and 7 men)
enrolled at the University of Padova participated in the experiment.
Participants were recruited in the library and completed the ques-
tionnaire individually. One participant was excluded from the
present sample because she was not an Italian native speaker.
Procedure and material. Participants read 24 sentences, each
portraying an individual target. Each sentence contained the indi-
vidual s name (e.g., Marco), the individuals description (e.g., is
traditional vs. is a traditionalist), and the individuals behavioral
preference (e.g., he likes to send postcards for Christmas). In
contrast to the previous studies, the name of the target was kept
constant across the descriptions. For each sentence the descriptive
term could be either an adjective or its corresponding noun. The
participants perception of the targets behavioral preferences was
assessed by means of the same three-item scale that we used in
Study 5A. Finally, participants were asked to evaluate the valence
of each targets behavioral preference on a 7-point scale ranging
from 1 (very negative) to 9 (very positive). Replicating the results
of Study 5A, we expected participants to attribute greater essen-
tialism to the individuals preference when the individual was
described by a noun rather than by an adjective.
8
A small sample of students, coming from the experimental population,
judged the typicality of a series of behaviors with respects to the labels we
used in the current study and in Study 6B. Results indicated that (a) to run
during the week was considered as more typical for an athleteathletic
person (M 6.67, SE 0.17) than to sit on a sofa while watching TV
(M 2.55, SE 0.41), t(8) 8.48, p .001; (b) to find new solutions
was judged to be more typical (M 6.67, SE 0.17) for a genius brilliant
person than to watch reality shows (M 3.44, SE 0.73), t(8) 4.24,
p .003; (c) to work plaster was considered as more typical for an
artistartistic person (M 6.22, SE 0.55) than to work in a bank (M
2.55, SE 0.44), t(8) 4.49, p .002; (d) to drink wine was rated as
more typical (M 6.89, SE 0.50) for a drunkard drunk person than to
enjoy solving statistical problem (M 2.44, SE 0.11), t(9) 8.00, p
.001; (e) to write poems was rated as more typical (M 7.00, SE 0.00)
for a poetpoetic person than to solve a math quiz (M 3.38, SE
0.50), t(9) 7.28, p .001. The typical behavioral preferences were used
in Study 5A, and the atypical preferences were used in Study 5B.
9
Looking at the data separately for each type of scale, the pattern of
means (i.e., Mnoun 6.29, SE 0.11, and Madj 5.80, SE 0.24, for the
strength scale; Mnoun 5.50, SE 0.21, and Madj 5.41, SE 0.21, for
the stability scale; Mnoun 5.05, SE 0.14, Madj 4.40, SE 0.16, for
the resilience scale) generally mirrored the pattern of results displayed by
the overall index of essentialism.
852 CARNAGHI ET AL.
Results and Discussion
Because the scales had reasonable internal consistency (adjec-
tives: .76; nouns: .77), participants ratings were averaged
into two overall indices of perceived essentialism, one for adjec-
tives and the other for nouns. In line with our hypothesis, partic-
ipants judged the targets behavioral preferences in a more essen-
tialist way when the target was labeled by nouns (M 5.65, SE
0.20) rather than by adjectives (M 5.35, SD 0.18), F(1, 19)
4.95, p .04, 2p .21.
Moreover, because we intended to show that our findings could
be generalized not only across participants but also across the
adjectivenouns pairs, a repeated measures ANOVA was per-
formed on the perceived essentialism indices using the linguistic
pairs as random variables. Again, participants perception of es-
sentialism was enhanced when the target was defined by means of
a noun rather than by means of an adjective, F(1, 11) 5.70, p
.04, 2p .34.
We also wanted to investigate whether nounadjective differ-
ences in implied essentialism may vary as a function of valence of
the behavioral inferences. Therefore, participants evaluative rat-
ings were averaged to create an index of social desirability of the
behavioral preferences (M 5.05, SE 0.11). We then calculated
the difference in perceived essentialism by subtracting the essen-
tialism for adjectives from that of nouns and computed the corre-
lation between this index of differential essentialism and social
desirability, r(12) .18, p .58. This result demonstrated that
the evaluative reactions elicited by the behavioral preferences did
not moderate the advantage of nouns over adjectives in eliciting
stronger attribution of essentialism.
Finally, although the adjectives and their corresponding nouns
did not differ in terms of social desirability or in the degree of
polarization (see Study 1B), we recomputed our main analysis
involving essentialism, this time controlling for relative valence
and relative evaluative polarization. Remember that we had found
that nouns elicit greater essentialism than adjectives, F(1, 11)
5.70, p .04, 2p .34. This result did not change when either
relative valence, F(1, 10) 6.70, p .03, 2p .40, or relative
evaluative polarization were entered as covariates, F(1, 10)
5.77, p .04, 2p .37. Together, these results clearly rule out the
possibility that differential implicit valence of nouns versus adjec-
tives could account for our findings. In other words, the fact that
nouns elicit greater perceived essentialism than adjectives is
largely independent of differences in evaluative content.
Thus, greater essentialism (defined as perceived strength, sta-
bility, and resilience) was attributed to category-congruent behav-
iors when the person had been described by a noun rather than by
an adjective. The fact that these findings could be extended even
to a randomly selected sample of adjectivenoun pairs and were
largely independent of the valence of the behavioral preferences
bolstered the external validity of our data.
Study 5C
Study 5C extended the previous studies by investigating
whether the linguistic form (i.e., adjective vs. noun) in which an
individual target was described may also affect the perceived
essentialism of descriptor-incongruent behaviors (for a similar
paradigm, see Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Walton & Banaji, 2004).
In this case, we expected participants to perceive the targets
behavioral preferences as less essentialist when the target was
described by nouns rather than by adjectives.
Method
Participants. Twenty-one female individuals at the University
of Padova participated in the experiment. Participants were re-
cruited in a seminar class and completed the questionnaire in a
collective session.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Study 5A,
except for the targets behavioral preferences, which were always
incongruent with respect to descriptive terms. The dependent vari-
ables were the same as in Study 5A.
Results and Discussion
Data were first averaged within each condition (adjective vs.
noun) to create overall indices of perceived essentialism, one for
adjectives and the other for nouns (adjectives: .55; nouns:
.76).
Again, as the version of the questionnaire did not produce any
significant effect, we analyzed participants ratings on the overall
indices of perceived essentialism by means of a paired t test. In line
with our hypothesis, participants perceived the targets (incongru-
ent) behavioral preferences as less essentialist when the targets
were described by nouns (M 4.08, SE 0.20), rather than by
adjectives (M 4.39, SE 0.15), t(20) 2.07, p .052, d
.38.10
Because the data of Studies 5A and 5C had been collected
within the same experimental population on the same day and
because these experiments used very similar procedures (although,
strictly speaking, participants were not assigned in a random
fashion to experiments), we decided to analyze these data jointly;
that is, participants ratings on the essentialism scale were ana-
lyzed as a function of the type of behavioral preference, namely
congruent versus incongruent behaviors, and type of descriptor,
namely adjectives versus nouns. A 2 (condition: adjectives vs.
nouns) 2 (behavioral preference: congruent vs. incongruent)
ANOVA was conducted on participants ratings on the essential-
ism scale, with the former variable as a within-participants factor
and the latter as a between-participants variable. Confirming the
exactitude of the experimental material, a main effect of the
behavioral preference was found, F(1, 33) 29.79, p .001,
2p .47, indicating that, unsurprisingly, participants ratings were
higher for congruent (M 5.41, SD 0.17) than for incongruent
behavioral preferences (M 4.23, SD 0.14). More important for
our purpose, a significant Condition Behavioral Preference
interaction was also found, F(1, 33) 9.97, p .003, 2p .23,
indicating that participants relative ratings for congruent over
incongruent behavioral preferences were much stronger in the
noun than in the adjective condition (nouns: 5.61 for congruent and
10
Looking at the data separately for each type of scale, the pattern of
means (i.e., Mnoun 4.42, SE 0.24, and Madj 4.79, SE 0.16, for the
strength scale; Mnoun 4.16, SE 0.25, and Madj 4.50, SE 0.20, for
the stability scale; Mnoun 3.65, SE 0.22, and Madj 3.86, SE 0.24,
for the resilience scale) generally mirrored the pattern of results displayed
by the overall index of essentialism.
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
4.08 for incongruent, difference 1.53; adjectives: 5.21 for con-
gruent and 4.39 for incongruent, difference 0.82).
Together, Studies 5A, 5B, and 5C suggest that the linguistic
form of the target description reliably affects perceived essential-
ism. In line with our reasoning, behavioral habits that are congru-
ent with the descriptor are perceived as an essential part of the
person, that is, as a strong and enduring preference, when the target
is described by a noun rather than by an adjective. In contrast,
incongruent preferences are perceived in a less essentialist way
when the target person is described by a noun. Thus, nouns drive
perceived essentialism in both directions, making congruent pref-
erences appear as stable, defining features of the person but mak-
ing incongruent preferences appear weak and variable.
Study 6: Essentialist Beliefs and Linguistic Choice
In our final studies (6A and 6B), we intended to invert the logic
of the above experiments by asking when speakers will chose
nouns or adjectives in discourse. Whereas Studies 5A, 5B, and 5C
showed that nouns induce a perception of essentialism, in Study 6
we asked whether people who have more essentialist beliefs about
the characteristics of another person would also tend to rely more
strongly on nouns when describing the target person. If nouns
provide a very general, all-embracing definition of the person, then
they should represent an ideal linguistic device for communicating
that a given characteristic represents a deeply grounded and es-
sential aspect of a target person. In contrast, adjectives, describing
one of many possible qualities of a person, seem better suited for
those characteristics that are more superficial and variable. For
example, nouns may provide excellent descriptions of those char-
acteristics that are believed to have a genetic basis, whereas
adjectives may be better suited for describing acquired character-
istics that are likely to undergo change. To put it differently, with
reference to Dwecks (1999) model, nouns should be best suited to
describe characteristics perceived as stable entities, whereas ad-
jectives should fit an incremental mindset. In order to test this
hypothesis, participants in this study were asked to choose between
two possible descriptions of a target person, one formulated in
noun form (athlete) and the other in adjectival form (athletic). It is
important to note that at the beginning of the study, participants
had either been induced to adopt a genetic or an environmental
perspective. We predicted that an environmental causation mind-
set would lead people to prefer adjectives, whereas thinking about
a target person in terms of a genetic predisposition would increase
the use of nouns.
Study 6A
Method
Participants. Twenty-eight students (21 women and 7 men)
enrolled at the University of Padova were recruited in the library
and completed the questionnaire individually.
Procedure. Participants were told that the study focused on
students ability to comprehend scientific articles. Participants
were then presented with a fictitious article that had ostensibly
been taken from the Genetic Journal of Sport. Participants were
randomly assigned either to the genetic or to the nongenetic
condition.
853
Participants in the genetic condition were told the following:
Considerable empirical evidence has proven that adults who obtain
excellent results in sport competitions have a different genetic makeup
than those who do not excel in this domain. Years ago, it was
hypothesized that a protein, called proctodineasis, is present in the
genome of those who excel in sports. Recently, a team of researchers
has tested and confirmed this conjecture.
In contrast, participants in the nongenetic condition were told
the following:
Considerable empirical evidence has proven that adults who obtain
excellent results in sport competitions do not differ in their genetic
makeup from those who do not excel in this domain. Years ago, it was
hypothesized that a protein, called proctodineasis, was present in the
genome of those who excel in sports. Recently, a team of researchers
has tested and dismissed this conjecture.
Regardless of experimental conditions, participants then read
the following:
Specifically, experimenters randomly sampled two distinct groups
from the adult population, one that did and one that did not possess the
proctodineasis in their genetic makeup. Then, both groups received
the same sport training: They had to run 25 minutes two times per
week. Finally, both groups took part in a 100 m track competition.
In the genetic condition, the text continued as follows:
Results indicated that individuals who have the proctodineasis dis-
played better sport-related skills than those who did not posses the
proctodineasis in their genetic makeup. Moreover, it has been shown
that, compared to individuals that did not have the proctodineasis in
their genetic makeup, individuals who have the proctodineasis were
able to develop higher levels of sport skills, stronger resistance to
stress, and higher levels of motivation to compete even if they
invested little time in their sport training. The researchers concluded
that being good in sports is for the most part genetically determined.
Hence, what makes people have success in sports is mainly their
predisposition. Not everybody is able to achieve a good physical
condition. But only those who have a specific genetic makeup.
In contrast, participants in the nongenetic condition were told
the following:
Results indicated that individuals who had the proctodineasis dis-
played very similar sport-related skills than those who did not posses
the proctodineasis in their genetic makeup. Moreover, it has been
shown that regardless of whether one has, or does not have, the
proctodineasis in ones genetic makeup, individuals will not develop
high levels of sports skills, resistance to stress, and high levels of
motivation to compete if they invest only little time in their sport
training. The researchers concluded that being good at sports is for the
most part not genetically determined. Hence, what makes people have
success in sports is not their predisposition. In general, everybody is
able to achieve a good physical condition, regardless of his/her genetic
make up.
Note that nowhere in the text of either condition was the noun
athlete or the adjective athletic mentioned.
Coherently with the cover story, participants were provided with
a series of questions allegedly aimed at testing their comprehen-
sion of the article they had read (e.g., Do people who have the
proctodineasis develop better sport skills even at low levels of
854 CARNAGHI ET AL.
training?), and they provided their answers by means of a true
false format. Participants were then invited to take part in a further
study. Specifically, they were told that we were interested in the
way people form an impression of an individual target. Regardless
of experimental condition (genetic vs. nongenetic), participants
read the following description of the target:
Marco, is twenty-two years old. He goes running in the park twice a
week. He participates in 100 m races. When he had a physical check
up, it turned out that Marco has the proctodineasis in his genetic
makeup.
When they finished reading the description of the target, partici-
pants were provided with two labels, namely athletic or athlete (we
counterbalanced the order of the labels). Participants had to chose
the label that better described the individual target. Subsequently,
they reported their gender and their age and were fully debriefed.
Results and Discussion
A chi-square analysis revealed a significant impact of the con-
dition on participants choices (adjective vs. noun), 2(1, N
28) 4.18, p .04, showing that the likelihood that participants
would use a noun rather than an adjective was higher in the genetic
(38%) than in the nongenetic condition (7%; see Table 3). In
support of our hypothesis, people greatly enhanced their prefer-
ence for noun labels when a characteristic had been framed in
genetic terms, compared with the situation in which the same
characteristic was perceived as a transient property. This confirms
our suspicion that people prefer adjectives to describe abilities that
are developed through training (incremental theory, in Dwecks,
1999, terms), whereas nouns are reserved for describing geneti-
cally determined abilities (entity theory, in Dwecks, 1999, terms).
A potential limit of this study is that, again, a noun was used that
may imply a profession and that people may assume that others
choose professions that correspond to their naturally given incli-
nations. Although no reference was made to the targets profession
in the description, it was important to test the same hypothesis on
a nounadjective pair in which the noun does not imply an occu-
pational role. We therefore replicated the above experiment using
genio [genius] and geniale [brilliant] as stimuli.
Table 3
Participants Choices as a Function of the Experimental
Condition in Studies 6A and 6B
Choice
Noun Adjective
Study and condition n % n %
6A: atletaatletico [athleteathletic]
Genetic 5 38 8 62
Nongenetic 1 7 14 93
6B: geniogeniale [geniusbrilliant]
Genetic 8 22 28 78
Nongenetic 2 6 32 94
Study 6B
Method
Participants. Seventy students (55 women and 15 men) en-
rolled at the University of Trieste participated in the experiment.
Participants were recruited in class and completed the question-
naire individually but in a collective session.
Procedure. The study was run in class and introduced as
research assessing students ability to comprehend scientific arti-
cles. Participants were informed that they would not be evaluated
and that their responses were anonymous, hence they should not
report any personal information on their response sheet. Partici-
pants were randomly assigned to the genetic versus nongenetic
condition, which took place in two different classrooms. All the
experimental material and the dependent variables were presented
by a Power Point program on a screen. Participants provided their
answer on a questionnaire.
Participants were presented with an ostensible scientific article
published in the Genetic Journal of Human Intelligence. Partic-
ipants assigned to the genetic condition were told the following:
Considerable empirical evidence has proven that human intelligence
has a genetic basis. It has always been thought that a protein, called
proctodineasi, distinguishes the genome of very intelligent people and
that this protein is responsible for their superior brain development.
Only recently, due to the progress in genetic mapping, has it become
possible to test this hypothesis empirically. Researchers have sub-
jected 19,980 individuals, randomly chosen from the adult population,
to a test battery assessing their IQ. Based on their test results, partic-
ipants were divided into those with a high intelligence, that is, scoring
above average, and those with normal levels of intelligence. Subse-
quently, genetic maps were created for both groups. Results show that
individuals with a very high IQ display the proctodineasi in their
genome, whereas the proctodineasi was absent in the genetic makeup
of the average intelligence group. The researchers have concluded that
this protein (proctodineasi) distinguishes the most intelligent individ-
uals and that this protein accounts for their greater and faster cognitive
development.
Participants assigned to the nongenetic condition were told the
following:
Considerable empirical evidence has proven that human intelligence
does not have a genetic basis. It has always been thought that a
protein, called proctodineasi, distinguishes the genome of very intel-
ligent people and that this protein is responsible for their superior
brain development. Only recently, due to the progress in genetic
mapping, has it become possible to test this hypothesis empirically.
Researchers have subjected 19,980 individuals, randomly chosen
from the adult population, to a test battery assessing their IQ. Based
on their test results, participants were divided into those with high
intelligence, that is, scoring above average, and those with normal
levels of intelligence. Subsequently, genetic maps were created for
both groups. Results show that both individuals with a very high IQ
and those with average intelligence display the proctodineasi in their
genome. The researchers have concluded that this protein (proctod-
ineasi) is present in both highly intelligent and in normal people and
that this protein cannot account for greater and faster cognitive de-
velopment.
Coherently with the cover story, participants were given a series
of questions allegedly aimed to test their comprehension of the
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
scientific article (e.g., Do people who have the proctodineasi in
their genome develop higher levels of intelligence?), and they
provided their answers by means of a truefalse format.
Then, participants were invited to take part in a further study.
Specifically, they were told that we were interested in the way
people form an impression of an individual target. Regardless of
the experimental condition (genetic vs. nongenetic), participants
read the following target description:
Marco is twenty-two years old. When one of his friends runs into
problems with some computer software, he is very fast at identifying
the cause and making the program work properly. He is faster than
any of his friends to find the solution to any conundrum. He likes to
dedicate his spare time to new inventions, which he is sometimes able
to sell to producers. Genetic mapping revealed the presence of the
proctodineasi in Marcos genome.
After reading the description, participants were asked to choose
between two labels, namely genio [genius] or geniale [brilliant],
the one that they thought described the target more appropriately.
Participants then reported their gender and their age and were fully
debriefed and dismissed.
Results and Discussion
In support of our hypothesis, participants were more likely to
pick the noun and less likely to pick the adjective in the genetic
than in the nongenetic condition, 2(1, N 70) 3.81, p .05,
(see Table 3). In line with the results of Study 6A, participants
preference for the noun label was enhanced when the characteristic
(i.e., intelligence) was perceived as a genetically determined aspect
of the target rather than as a transient property that is largely under
the influence of environmental factors.
General Discussion
On the surface, nouns and adjectives often appear very similar,
at times distinguishable only by relatively minor variations in
suffix (Lone is a Dane vs. Lone is Danish) or by the presence or
absence of the article (Frederick is a schizophrenic vs. Frederick
is schizophrenic). Yet, the present research project suggests that
they differ predictably and systematically in the way they are used
by speakers and in the impressions and inferences they create in
the listener. It is important to note that these differences seem to
reflect systematic differences in grammatical roles played by
nouns versus adjectives.
First, Studies 1 and 2 show that nouns (compared with adjec-
tives) have a greater potential to induce inferences about the target
person that go beyond the information given, confirming findings
by Gelman, Markman, and collaborators (Gelman & Markman,
1985, 1986; Markman, 1989; Markman & Smith, as cited in
Markman, 1989). Conceptually, this finding is consistent with the
fact that nouns define classes that imply multiple properties,
whereas adjectives generally delineate a single property, thus
lending support to Wierzbickas (1986) assertion that there is
more in a noun than meets the eye; there is more in a noun than
there is in an adjective (p. 380). Note, however, that our studies
also show that the greater willingness to draw inferences is limited
to information that is stereotypically congruent with the noun
label. Inferences about incongruent behaviors or habits of the
855
target person are actually inhibited. On one side, nouns (e.g., X is
a homosexual) foster stereotypical inferences more so than corre-
sponding adjectives (e.g., X is homosexual), but on the other side,
they also tend to inhibit counterstereotypical inferences. Thus,
nouns do not simply induce inferential processing, but they chan-
nel the inferential activity so that expected behaviors appear more
likely and unexpected behaviors appear less likely. Although we
did not test this hypothesis in the present set of studies, an
interesting implication of this process is that subtle differences in
word choice in interpersonal discourse may bolster existing ste-
reotypical beliefs.
Our research also shows that the tendency of nouns to facilitate
stereotypic and to inhibit counterstereotypic thoughts is not limited
to specific word pairs, to a specific language, to specific stimuli, or
to specific response formats. We found very similar evidence in
experimenter-generated and in randomly selected word pairs and
for different kinds of labels referring to kinship or intimacy groups,
social categories, personality types, and loosely associated groups
such as professions. We also obtained comparable findings in two
different languages (Italian and German), in stimulus sentences
differing in valence and content domain, and for closed and open-
ended responses. Also, similar results were obtained for nouns and
adjectives presented in isolation and for phrases defining the same
target both by a noun and by an adjective (Study 3). Thus, it
appears that we are dealing with a robust and pervasive phenom-
enon, at least within the realm of IndoEuropean languages.
The second result of interest refers to the fact that once a person
has been labeled by a noun (e.g., Mark is an athlete), classifica-
tions of the same person along different dimensions (e.g., Mark is
also an artist) become unlikely. The fact that categorizations along
one dimension (e.g., Chinese) inhibit alternative classifications of
the same person (e.g., women) has long been known (Macrae et al.,
1995). What is new about the present approach is the role that
language plays in this process. Whereas nouns do, indeed, inhibit
alternative (noun) classifications, adjectives do not. Nouns are
exclusive in the sense that they do not easily allow that the same
person be assigned also to a different category. Adjectives, in
contrast, do not preclude that the target person also has other
qualities defined by other adjectives or by nouns. At the risk of
oversimplifying, the target person can belong to only one noun
category, but she or he may possess any number of different
properties. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical support for
Allports (1954) intuition that nouns . . . cut slices (p. 178),
thereby preventing alternative classifications.
The third major finding is that nouns imply greater essentialism
than adjectives. This is in line with the idea that there is something
deeper and more profound about a noun than the sum of the
features it entails (Wierzbicka, 1986) and that nouns are more
central to the identity of the object or person as they imply great
stability and immutability (Gelman & Heyman, 1999), and possi-
bly, also more extreme meanings than adjectives (De Raad, 1992).
Our findings extend previous observations (Gelman & Heyman,
1999; Walton & Banaji, 2004) by showing that nouns exceed not
only verbs but also adjectives in implicit essentialism.
This is remarkable if one considers that nouns and adjectives
have much greater surface similarity than nouns and verbs and
that, for the aim of the current set of studies, nouns and adjectives
were deliberately selected to ensure that they shared the same word
stem. Our findings also suggest that features that are semantically
856 CARNAGHI ET AL.
incongruent are perceived as less essentialist when the character-
istic is stated in noun rather than adjective form. Thus, just as in
the case of stereotypicality, nouns seem to polarize attributions of
essentialism, making congruent behaviors or habits appear more,
and incongruent behaviors less, essential and profound aspects of
the person.
Note that the same mechanism can also be reversed, as our last
two studies demonstrate. Here we manipulated the mindset of
people so that they adopted either a genetic or an environmental
view on athletic performance (Study 6A) or intelligence (Study
6B). They then had to describe the same stimulus person showing
success in the athletic (or intellectual) domain. In both cases,
people who considered the domain genetically determined in-
creased their use of nouns compared with those who held more
environmental views. Together, this suggests the possibility of a
subtle, self-perpetuating cycle of interpersonal communication, so
that people with highly essentialist beliefs tend to report on the
behavior of the target person in noun form, which, in turn, induces
the perception of high essentialism in the listener.
Throughout this article, we have treated the three phenomena
(stereotypical inferences, inhibition of alternative classifications,
and implicit essentialism) as logically coherent, yet distinct effects.
An interesting issue to be investigated in future research is the
possibility of a common underlying mechanism. In particular,
following the logic of Rothbart and Taylor (1992), it is conceivable
that the implicit essentialism of nouns, lending a quasi-biological
quality to socially constructed categories, is the common denom-
inator that then drives both stereotypic inferences and the inhibi-
tion of alternative classifications. Only future studies using within-
participant designs will be able to provide insights into the causal
link between the three phenomena.
Relation to Prior Theorizing
Our research findings appear largely in line with those
cognitivelinguistic approaches that conceptualize grammar as
closely linked to semantics (Evans & Green, 2006; Langacker,
1986). Yet, one may wonder how our findings relate to social
psychological approaches dealing with the language cognition
interface in the interpersonal domain, such as Semin and Fiedlers
(1988) influential LCM. Although this model does not include
nouns among its levels of abstraction and although nouns are
generally coded as equivalent to adjectives because of their func-
tional similarity (see Coenen, Hedebouw, & Semin, 2006), there
are reasons to propose that nouns be added to the model as the fifth
and highest level of language abstraction. Compared with descrip-
tive action verbs (e.g., Shira goes to the Synagogue), interpretative
action verbs (e.g., Shira observes the Jewish holidays), state verbs
(e.g., Shira feels part of the Jewish community), and adjectives
(e.g., Shira is Jewish), the noun phrase Shira is a Jew appears to
make the most general and all-encompassing statement about
Shiras religious affiliation. According to LCM (Semin & Fielder,
1988), events that are formulated in a relatively concrete form
(such as action verbs) draw perceivers attention to the specific
situational constraints of the event. However, with increasing
abstraction, there is an increasing focus on stable and dispositional
causes and a greater implicit likelihood that the described charac-
teristic generalizes across situations, behaviors, and objects and
over time. As a consequence, characteristics of an individual
described abstractedly are considered as more stable, less falsifi-
able, and more informative about the individual while providing
little information about the situation in which the event takes place.
If nouns can be considered the most abstract level of the LCM,
then the noun stimuli used in our studies should exceed the
corresponding adjectives in informativeness about the person, per-
ceived duration, and projection into the future. We tested this
possibility on a sample of 55 students, who judged six adjective
noun pairs (athleticathlete, poeticpoet, artisticartist, genius
brilliant, drunk drunkard, and hero heroic) with respect to the
three central queries, two of which were adopted from Semin and
Fiedler (1988), referring to the amount of information provided
about the protagonist, the enduringness of the characteristic, and
the likelihood that the person will be like this in the future. Results
show that nouns, compared with adjectives, were seen to provide
more information about the target person (Mnoun 3.97 vs. Madj
3.59), to imply a more enduring characteristic (Mnoun 4.49 vs.
Madj 4.03), and to allow better predictions about the future
(Mnoun 4.36 vs. Madj 3.85; ps .001). These preliminary
results suggest that nouns may legitimately be added to the LCM
as a fifth level of abstraction, representing the most general type of
assertion that can be made about a target person. In other words,
nouns seem to continue the well-established linear trend from
descriptive action verbs over interpretive action verbs and state
verbs to adjectives in terms of informativeness, enduringness, and
predictability.
However, there is one feature for which nouns may not match
the LCM and for which they may show a deviant, that is, nonlin-
ear, pattern, namely the vividness of imagery. In general, people
find it relatively easy to visually imagine the specific situation
when concrete words are used, but the capacity of concrete imag-
ing decreases with increasing language abstraction (Semin & Fie-
dler, 1988). Extrapolating from these observations, one may expect
particularly low imaging for nouns. Yet, there is evidence in the
literature that on the average, nouns are more likely to evoke
concrete visual images than adjectives and that this capacity to
arouse imagery may in part explain why nouns are more efficient
memory cues than adjectives (e.g., Di Vesta & Ross, 1971; for an
overview, see Paivio, 1991). The same may hold for the person-
descriptive nouns and adjectives used in our set of studies. As a
thought experiment, the reader may try to form, as quickly as
possible, a visual image of a person who is athletic or of one who
is Jewish [adjective] compared with an athlete or a Jew
[noun]. It is not unlikely that precise visual images, including
specific prototypical exemplars (such as Carl Lewis and Stefie
Graw or Albert Einstein and Woody Allen), come to mind more
easily when prompted by a noun rather than by an adjective. We
tested this conjecture in the above-mentioned follow-up study by
asking our participants to indicate how easy they found it to
imagine the protagonist or how quickly they had a clear image in
their minds when the protagonist was described by a noun (e.g.,
athlete) or an adjective (e.g., athletic). In line with our expecta-
tions, nouns (M 4.57) elicited vivid images more easily and
more quickly than adjectives (M 4.37; p .05). Together, this
very first evidence suggests that nouns are indeed more general
than adjectives in terms of informativeness, enduringness, and
predictability and, as such, could be integrated into LCM at the
highest level of abstraction, but they do seem to enjoy an advan-
tage in terms of imagery that makes them more similar to concrete
 NOMINA SUNT OMINA
verbs. It therefore remains for future research to investigate where
nouns may be collocated on Semin and Fiedlers (1988) abstrac-
tion dimension and whether the unique combination of high gen-
erality but also high vividness may be responsible for the great
inductive potential of nouns observed in the present set of studies.
Limits and Implications
Being the first of its kind, it is not surprising that the present
research project has a number of limitations. First, our hypotheses
were tested only with stimulus pairs that, although phonetically
and semantically similar, were easily distinguishable by suffix
(and, in one case, also by uppercase vs. lowercase of initial, i.e.,
Katholik [Catholic] vs. katholisch [Catholic]). In some languages
(such as German), adjectives and nouns are distinguishable by
definition and therefore the criteria that guided the present research
are easily met in such languages, whereas in other languages (such
as Italian), nouns and adjectives with common derivations often
differ only with respect to the article but are not distinguishable on
the bases of suffix or spelling (e.g., omosessualeun omosessuale
[homosexuala homosexual]; cattolico un cattolico [Catholica languages and the differential use of verbs, adjectives, and nouns
Catholic]). It therefore remains to be seen whether similar results
can also be obtained in the latter case in which word pairs differ
only with respect to the presence or absence of the article.
Second, although adjectivenoun differences seem very robust
as they emerged in every study we have run so far, regardless of
stimulus materials and measures, it is currently difficult to estimate
the average size of the effect. Effect sizes varied greatly across
studies from small to large, with nounadjective differences ac-
counting for as little as 8% to 9% of the variance up to almost 90%.
However, most effect sizes fell into the medium range. We ob-
served only one systematic variation in effect size, suggesting that
the facilitation of congruent inferences is generally stronger than
the inhibition of incongruent inferences, both with respect to
stereotypicality and essentialism.
Third, we assessed only conscious and deliberate reactions to
nouns or adjectives, which may or may not generalize to implicit
measures. However, the fact that practically identical results were
obtained with within- and between-participants designs suggests
that impression management was not at work. In within-
participants designs, people could easily have adjusted their sec-
ond response so as to appear coherent, which they did not do. One
may therefore suspect that participants are largely unaware of their
different reactions to nouns and adjectives, although this issue
remains to be investigated.
Fourth, and most important, our hypotheses were tested on only
two European languages, reflecting an ethnocentric bias that is
typical of much psychological research. The role of nouns may
well be different in languages that have only few adjectives
(Dixon, 1977). It is likely that nouns in these languages need to
cover both functions (namely assigning objects to classes and
defining single features of such objects) that in IndoEuropean
languages, are taken over by two distinct parts of speech (nouns
and adjectives). Also, even in languages in which adjectives are
common, they may differ in form and function from those of
IndoEuropean languages (Croft, 1991). As a case in point, two
subclasses of adjectives can be distinguished in Japanese, neither
of which resembles exactly the word class that is called adjective
in Italian, German, or English (Maass, Karasawa, Politi, & Suga,
857
2006). The first subclass, ending with the suffix i, is regarded as
relatively similar to European adjectives; whereas the second sub-
class, ending with the suffix da, represents nominal adjectives
that are grammatically similar to nouns (Uehara, 1998). To com-
plicate things further, both of these subclasses have properties that
equate them to verbs. For example, depending on their syntactic
role, they may conjugate, just as verbs do. Also, they do not
require a copula to be a predicate, and this is particularly true for
the prototypical i adjectives. Hence, the distinction between ad-
jectives and nouns may be considerably more complex in language
such as Japanese than it is in Western languages (see also Wetzer,
1996).
In addition, whereas the major word classes have highly spe-
cialized functions and are syntactically distinct in IndoEuropean
languages (with nouns describing objects or entities; adjectives
describing qualities or properties; and verbs describing actions,
states, or processes), there may be greater interclass overlap in
other languages. As a case in point, many categories can easily and
flexibly be converted into other grammatical classes in Japanese.
Thus, considering the remarkable variations of word classes across
found across cultures (e.g., Kashima, Kashima, Kim, & Gelfand,
2006; Maass et al., 2006), we caution against generalizing our
findings beyond the linguistic context in which they were gener-
ated.
Keeping these limits in mind, we still believe that our findings
can have interesting implications for a number of applied areas,
including subtle biases in mass communication as well as in
interpersonal discourse. The strategic use of nouns versus adjec-
tives may well contribute to the maintenance of socially shared
beliefs (for similar language biases, see Maass, 1999; Semin, in
press; Wigboldus, Semin, & Spears, 2000). For example, if nouns
(rather than adjectives) are used to describe negative features of an
outgroup and/or minority member this may foster stereotypical
thinking about the target (and possibly about its group). For
instance, a person learning that Paula is an anorexic may engage
in highly stereotypical and essentialist thinking about Paulas
clinical condition, which is likely to be perceived as an enduring
and possibly genetically determined aspect of Paulas personality.
Also, the listener may encounter great difficulties to envisage
Paula in ways other than her being an anorexic (e.g., as a musician,
a teacher). It may be interesting for future research to investigate
how the use of nouns versus adjectives may, in a subtle way, affect
the transmission and maintenance of stereotypic beliefs about
different social groups, such as ethnic minorities or people with
psychopathologies (an area in which nouns seem to prevail, Sauc-
ier, 2003).11
In conclusion, nouns and adjectives seem to play distinct roles
in person perception despite their apparent similarity in form and
function. Nouns are much more potent in directing peoples
thoughts, as they suggest greater essentialism and induce stronger
stereotyping while blocking alternative classifications of the same
11
In line with this reasoning, the fifth edition of the Publication Manual
of the American Psychological Association (American Psychological As-
sociation, 2001) provides a number of guidelines to avoid language bias
against persons on the basis of their gender, sexual orientation, and so on,
among which is adjectives are preferred to nouns (p. 67).
858 CARNAGHI ET AL.
person. In short, they are much more prognostic than seemingly
similar adjectives. Thus, in reference to the familiar Latin saying
that we adopted as the title of this article, nouns are, indeed,
omens.12
12
Note that the Latin saying nomina sunt omina (or the better known
singular form nomen est omen) is generally translated as names are signs
(or presages), but among the many meanings of nomen, noun also figures
(as a grammatical unit).
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Appendix
NounAdjective Stimulus Pairs Used in Studies 1B and 5B
Eroe [hero]eroico [heroic]
Internazionalista [internationalist]internazionale [interna-
tional]
Eccezione [exception]eccezionale [exceptional]
Mostro [monster]mostruoso [monstrous]
Ironista [ironist]ironico [ironic]
Tradizionalista [traditionalist]tradizionale [traditional]
Individualista [individualist]individualistico [individualistic]
Piagnucolone [whiner]piagnucoloso [whiny]
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Celebrita` [celebrity]celebre [famous]
Fatalista [fatalist]fatalistico [fatalistic]
Pacificatore [peacemaker]pacificativo [peace promoting]
Musicista [musician]musicale [musical]
Received February 12, 2007
Revision received July 29, 2007
Accepted August 1, 2007
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 860 870 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.860

Taking the Easy Way Out: Preference Diversity, Decision Strategies, and
Decision Refusal in Groups

Bernard A. Nijstad Silvia C. Kaps

University of Amsterdam University of Gottingen

It has often been argued and found that preference diversity is beneficial for the quality of group
decisions. However, this literature has neglected the fact that in many situations, it is also possible not
to choose. Further, preference diversity can be based on attractions, aversions, or both. The authors argue
that some types of preference diversity can lead to biased discussions and choice refusal (i.e., the group
refuses to choose any of the available options). In a laboratory experiment, three different patterns were
observed. When group members held different aversions before discussion, discussions were aversion
driven and group members quickly agreed to refuse all alternatives. When each alternative had both a
proponent and an adversary, discussions were longer and unbiased but still often led to refusal, which was
accompanied by relatively low levels of outcome satisfaction. Only when preference diversity was based
only on attractions did it lead to unbiased discussion, low prevalence of refusal, and high outcome
satisfaction. Implications for group decision making are discussed.

Keywords: group decision making, decision refusal, preference diversity

Many important decisions are made in groups. Because different
group members can bring unique insights, skills, and information
to the table, groups have the potential to outperform individuals
when it comes to the quality of decisions. However, although
groups can be effective decision makers (see, e.g., McGrath,
1984), various problems are also associated with decision making
in groups (also see Kerr & Tindale, 2004). For example, groups are
not very effective when it comes to sharing unique information
(e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985), groups sometimes are vulnerable to
various cognitive biases and errors (Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer,
1996; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Luthgens, & Moscovici, 2000), and
groupthink may even lead to decision fiascos (Janis, 1982).
A recurring theme in the group-decision-making literature is
that these negative effects mainly occur in (or are exacerbated by)
groups with preference homogeneity (e.g., Janis, 1982; Scholten,
Bernard A. Nijstad, Department of Work and Organizational Psychol-
ogy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Silvia C.
Kaps, Department of Psychology, University of Gottingen, Gottingen,
Germany.
Silvia C. Kaps is now at the Institute of Pedagogical Psychology,
University of Brunswick, Braunschweig, Germany.
This research was supported by Grant 452-04-311 from the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research, and their support is gratefully ac-
knowledged. Parts of the research were presented at the October 2005
annual meeting of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, San
Diego, California; at the July 2005 meeting of the European Association of
Experimental Social Psychology, Wurtzburg, Germany; and at the June
2006 INGRoup meeting, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. We thank the members
of the social decision making group of the University of Amsterdam for
their helpful suggestions and comments.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Bernard
A. Nijstad, Department of Work and Organizational Psychology, Univer-
sity of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 15, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Nether-
lands. E-mail: b.a.nijstad@uva.nl
Van Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Schulz-Hardt, Brod-
beck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006; Schulz-Hardt et al.,
2000). Preference homogeneity in general has the effect that group
members become more convinced about the correctness of their
choice, because other members apparently have independently
come to the same conclusion. This validates ones own position
and may in turn lead to high levels of confidence and a quick (and
sometimes erroneous) consensus. Thus, as we review below, re-
searchers often argue that preference diversity enhances the quality
of group decision making, because it prevents a premature con-
sensus on a bad alternative and ensures an even-handed and
unbiased discussion (e.g., Janis, 1982; Nemeth & Nemeth-Brown,
2003).
Although there is little doubt that preference diversity can
enhance the quality of group decision making, we argue that this
is not necessarily true. In particular, previous research has ne-
glected the fact that in many situations, groups do not have to reach
a decision at all but can also refuse to choose (e.g., not deciding on
a new resource allocation system within the department, not hiring
any of the job candidates). Preference diversity may lead to deci-
sion refusal rather than to constructive interactions and high-
quality decisions. Furthermore, preferences can be based on at-
tractions toward some alternatives but also on aversions against
other alternatives or on combinations of attractions and aversions.
The type of preference diversity (i.e., based on attractions, aver-
sions, or both) determines whether preference diversity leads to
constructive or biased group processes and to choice or refusal.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, we
give an overview of empirical findings that show that preference
diversity enhances the quality of group decision making. We then
introduce the possibility that groups can also refuse to choose. On
the basis of the negativity bias in judgment and decision making
and on the literature regarding group-level decision strategies, we
argue that group processes and decision refusal are dependent on

860
 GROUP DECISION REFUSAL
the type of preference diversity within groups. We report an
experiment in which different types of preference diversity are
created and effects on group processes and decision refusal are
assessed.
The Benefits of Preference Diversity
A number of studies suggest that preference diversity is bene-
ficial for the quality of group decision making, because it stimu-
lates a more even-handed and less biased consideration of infor-
mation during the decision-making process. These studies show
the benefits of preference diversity in the different stages of the
decision-making process: during the search for information, the
discussion of information, and the integration of information into
group judgments and decisions.
Schulz-Hardt et al. (2000) studied information search during
group decision making. When group members initially agreed
about the best alternative, they tended to mainly search for evi-
dence that supported their position and thus showed a strong
confirmation bias. This bias was not present in groups that had
diverse preferences, whose members searched for information on
all sides of the issue. The effect of preference diversity was
mediated by confidence and commitment: Groups with homoge-
neous preferences were more confident about their choice and felt
more committed to it than did heterogeneous groups, and this
subsequently led to a search for confirmatory evidence, ignoring
potentially relevant counterpreferential information.
Preference homogeneity also affects information sharing during
group discussion. Groups have been found to often discuss and
repeat shared information (information available to all group mem-
bers before discussion) more than unshared information (informa-
tion available to only one of the group members), which can lead
to suboptimal decisions (e.g., Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Keys,
1994; Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987). Schulz-Hardt et al. (2006)
recently found that groups in which preferences were diverse
discussed more information overall and had longer discussions
than did groups in which there was preference homogeneity.
Further, the bias toward sharing and repeating shared rather than
unshared information was weaker in groups with preference di-
versity than in groups with homogeneous preferences. Groups with
preference diversity also more often made the correct decision.
Prediscussion preference diversity thus prevented a premature
consensus on the wrong alternative and led to higher quality
decisions.
After information search and discussion, information must be
integrated into a final judgment or decision. Often, however, group
decisions simply reflect prediscussion preferences, even when
information that speaks against these preferences becomes avail-
able later (e.g., Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Postmes,
Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). In particular, when decisions cannot be
evaluated using objective criteria of correctness, initial majorities
will often determine a groups choice (e.g., Davis, 1973; Laughlin
& Ellis, 1986; Stasser, 1999). This is true because group members
may follow the consensus implies correctness heuristic (Chaiken
& Stangor, 1987; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003): If most people
have independently come to prefer the same alternative, it is likely
to be the correct choice. Often such a strategy of pooling prefer-
ences yields quick and good decisions. However, when initial
majorities are wrong, this strategy will lead the group astray. In
861
that case, preference diversity will force groups to confront their
differences and focus on arguments instead of preferences, which
eventually leads to a better decision (also see De Dreu, Nijstad, &
Van Knippenberg, in press; Scholten et al., 2007).
Taken together, these findings suggest that preference homoge-
neity may lead to a biased consideration of information and argu-
ments and sometimes to a quick consensus on the wrong alterna-
tive. Preference diversity, in contrast, is associated with longer and
less biased discussions, and diverse groups more often reach a
high-quality decision. Many authors have therefore suggested that
stimulating debate, criticism, and task conflict should lead to better
decisions (see, e.g., Janis, 1982; Nemeth & Nemeth-Brown, 2003;
Schulz-Hardt, Jochims, & Frey, 2002).1
Preference Diversity and Decision Refusal
Decision Refusal
Although the findings discussed above clearly suggest that
preference diversity can stimulate high-quality decision making,
researchers have ignored the fact that it may also lead to stalemates
and no decision being made at all. One important feature of the
research discussed above is that groups were required to make a
choice among the available alternatives. In many situations, how-
ever, groups can also decide not to choose. Indeed, decision
makers often have to choose among a nonexhaustive set of alter-
natives, because it is not possible to identify and evaluate all
alternatives (e.g., identify and interview all potential job candi-
dates). When choice sets are incomplete, decision makers can
reject all available options and decide to invest further resources to
identify more options. Corbin (1980) has called this decision
refusal. We argue that preference diversity might sometimes lead
to decision refusal. This may happen despite the fact that alterna-
tives are adequate, sometimes without an adequate assessment of
alternatives, and sometimes at the cost of lower outcome satisfac-
tion.
Before moving on, we need to note three things. First, decision
refusal should be distinguished from choosing the status quo: In
the case of refusal, one does not choose but rather decides to look
for further alternatives before making a choice, which implies that
a final decision has not been reached. Second, decision refusal is
not by definition maladaptive. Indeed, if all presently available
options are unattractive, it might be better to look for more options.
However, there is a point after which the investments in the search
for more options will no longer pay off. Thus, adaptive decision
making should depend on the balance between the costs of search-
ing and the potential benefits of finding a superior alternative (also
see Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Third, in the present study, we do not
directly examine the quality of the final group decision. Rather, we
examine biases during group discussion and the prevalence of
decision refusal (which can be more or less adaptive).
Decision Refusal and Types of Preference Diversity
To make a choice when initial preferences within a group are
diverse, group members must negotiate an alternative that is ac-
1
It should be noted, though, that downsides of preference diversity
include slower decision making, more conflict, and more stress among
group members.
862 NIJSTAD AND KAPS
ceptable to all (or most) group members. This implies that some of
the group members must concede and accept that a nonpreferred
alternative is chosen. However, when group members do not
concede, the group may resort to the refusal option as an easy way
out, even when alternatives are adequate. Indeed, some evidence
indicates that preference diversity can lead to no decision being
made when group members fail to concede. Kerr and MacCoun
(1985) studied jury decision making and found that public (as
opposed to private) polling led to more hung juries, but only for
larger juries and for close cases. The authors argued that public
polling increased the commitment of jury members to their orig-
inal verdict, making it less likely that they would give in to reach
the required unanimity. Because opposing preferences are more
likely in larger juries and with closer cases, these juries were more
often hung.
Preference diversity (or opposing factions) will not always lead
to decision refusal. This depends on the type of preference diver-
sity. A preference for a certain alternative implies that an alterna-
tive is liked more than other alternatives. This might be because
that alternative is thought to be attractive, because the other alter-
natives are seen as relatively unattractive, or both. On this basis,
we distinguish between three types of preference diversity. First,
preference diversity may be based on attractions (i.e., different
group members like different alternatives), in such a way that
different alternatives have different proponents. Second, prefer-
ence diversity may be based on aversions (i.e., different members
dislike different alternatives), in such a way that different alterna-
tives have different adversaries. Third, preference diversity may be
based on a combination of attractions and aversions (there are both
members who like and members who dislike different alterna-
tives), in such a way that alternatives have both proponents and
adversaries.
To make a choice in the case of preference diversity, some
group members must give in. When preference diversity is based
on attractions, group members have to accept that their preferred
alternative is not chosen (but another alternative is). When pref-
erences are based on aversions, some group members have to
accept that an initially disliked alternative is chosen. We argue that
this has different effects on group processes and on decision
refusal. Our argument is based on the negativity bias in judgment
and decision making and on the literature about decision strategies
in groups.
Much research has shown that people are more influenced by
negative than by positive information (the negativity bias; for
reviews, see Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). Further-
more, people are less likely to revise a negative opinion than a
positive opinion. For example, Bolster and Springbett (1961) stud-
ied hiring decisions and found that when an initial judgment
favored hiring, an average of 3.8 unfavorable bits of information
were needed to shift the decision toward rejection. However, when
an initial judgment favored rejection, an average of 8.8 pieces of
positive information were needed to shift the decision toward
acceptance. In addition, people are more confident in negative than
in positive judgments (Hamilton & Zanna, 1972). This literature
therefore suggests that group members are more likely to accept
that a preferred alternative is not chosen (i.e., when preferences are
based on attractions) than a disliked alternative is chosen (i.e.,
when preferences are based on aversions). Thus, when preferences
are (partly) based on aversions, it is more likely that groups will
refuse to choose.
Types of Preference Diversity and Decision Strategies
We further argue that different types of preference diversity lead
to different group decision-making strategies. The literature about
group decision making suggests that two broad strategies are
available for groups to make a choice (De Dreu et al., in press;
Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983; Stasser & Birchmeier, 2003).
Groups can take stock of existing preferences, assume that truth
must lie with the majority (cf. Chaiken & Stangor, 1987), and
decide accordingly (a preference-driven strategy). Alternatively,
groups can exchange and integrate information about alternatives
and use a more effortful and systematic information-driven strat-
egy. Research reviewed in the earlier sections of this article sug-
gests that preference diversity prohibits the use of a simple
preference-driven strategy. This might subsequently lead groups to
adopt an information-driven strategy to resolve their differences
and make a choice that is supported by the available information.
However, we argue that this will only happen when preference
diversity is based on attractions but not when it is based (solely) on
aversions.
A critical factor that determines whether groups will use an
information-driven strategy is the motivation of group members to
argue for and against certain alternatives instead of satisfice and
choose an alternative that appears to be good enough (see Kerr &
Tindale, 2004; see also De Dreu et al., in press). When preference
diversity is based on attractions, group members are motivated to
(continue to) argue in favor of their preferred alternative (and
against other alternatives) and to resist the rejection of this alter-
native. To convince others, they will have to use the positive and
negative information available to them and thus adopt an
information-driven strategy. We thus predict that preference diver-
sity based (partly) on attractions will lead to unbiased and rela-
tively long discussions.
However, when group members preferences are solely based on
aversions against alternatives, they will not resist the rejection of
their preferred alternative, because only their aversions but not
their attractions are strong. When adversaries against all alterna-
tives are present, groups will adopt what might be called an
aversion-driven decision strategy: There will be frequent state-
ments against the different options, and the discussion will be
biased toward negative information about decision alternatives.
Indeed, group members will argue that a certain alternative is not
suitable rather than that another alternative is suitable.
Overview and Hypotheses
In a laboratory experiment, three conditions were created in
which different types of preference diversity were manipulated. In
the attraction condition, preference diversity was based on attrac-
tions only (i.e., group members were attracted to different alter-
natives); in the aversion condition, preference diversity was based
on aversions only (i.e., group members had aversions against
different alternatives); and in the combination condition, prefer-
ence diversity was based on both attractions and aversions (group
members had both different attractions and different aversions).
Groups of 3 participants were asked to choose one of three alter-
 GROUP DECISION REFUSAL 863

natives, but they could also refuse all alternatives. Hypotheses can initially opposed). In the attraction condition, some group mem-
be derived about outcomes (group decision, agreement with the bers will accept a nonpreferred alternative because they become
group decision) and about group processes (discussion time, ex- convinced during the discussion; in the aversion condition, group
change of preferences, exchange of information, and conflict). members will agree that all alternatives should be refused.
First, we expected that refusal is least likely in the attraction
condition, followed by the combination condition, followed by the
aversion condition (Hypothesis 1). The negativity bias should lead Method
to more refusal in the aversion and combination conditions than in
the attraction condition, because group members are unlikely to Participants, Task, and Design
accept that a disliked alternative is chosen. In the aversion condi-
Participants were 135 students of the University of Amsterdam
tion, the interaction will also be aversion driven, and group mem-
(31 men and 104 women), who participated in 45 three-person
bers will convince each other that none of the alternatives are
groups (15 groups per condition). They either received course
suitable, which should lead to a high prevalence of decision
credit or were paid 7 for their participation. The average age of
refusal. However, in both the attraction and the combination con-
the participants was 20.89 years old (SD 3.10 years). Partici-
ditions, group members are motivated to defend their preferred
pants were told that they were members of a three-person group
alternative, and groups should adopt an information-driven strat-
that had to choose among three candidates who had applied for a
egy. As a consequence, some group members will concede and
teaching position at the department of psychology. They had to
accept a nonpreferred alternative on the basis of the evidence
decide whom to hire but could also decide not to hire any of the
provided. In the attraction condition, where no strong aversions are
candidates (representing the refusal option).
present, this will generally lead groups to make a choice rather
Before the discussion, participants individually received infor-
than to refuse. In the combination condition, information-driven
mation about the three candidates. Whereas the group as a whole
group interaction might lead some group members to accept that a
always received complete information about all candidates, ele-
disliked alternative is chosen on the basis of the evidence; how-
ments of the complete set of information were distributed among
ever, other group members might not concede, in which case,
group members in different ways. Some of the information was
decision refusal is the only way out.
given to only 1 group member (making it completely unshared),
Regarding group processes, it is first expected that discussion
whereas other information was given to 2 group members (making
time will be longer in the attraction and combination conditions
it partially shared). In previous research, information distribution
than in the aversion condition (Hypothesis 2A). In the former two
was used to create a hidden profile (e.g., Stasser & Titus, 1985,
conditions, discussions will be information driven, which takes
1987). In contrast, we did not create a hidden profile but used
time (cf. Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt,
information distribution to create attractions for, aversions against,
2002; Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). In the aversion condition, dis-
or neutral opinions about particular candidates.
cussions should be aversion driven, which should lead to a quick
Three conditions were used, and these conditions differed only
refusal of all options. Second, the exchange of positive versus
in which information was completely unshared and which was
negative information during discussion should be different in the
partially shared. In the attraction condition, the information given
different conditions. Information-driven interactions in both the
to group members was biased in such a way that each member was
attraction and the combination conditions should lead to both
attracted to a different candidate (i.e., each candidate had a differ-
positive and negative information being exchanged. However,
ent proponent) but was neutral toward the two other candidates. In
aversion-driven interactions in the aversion condition should lead
the aversion condition, information was biased in such a way that
to more negative than positive information being exchanged. Thus,
each group member had an aversion against a different candidate
information type (positive vs. negative) should interact with con-
(i.e., each candidate had an adversary) but was neutral toward the
dition (Hypothesis 2B). Third, differences are expected in the
two other candidates. In the combination condition, information
number of times group members state their attraction for or aver-
was biased in such a way that group members were attracted to one
sion against an option. In the attraction condition, statements of
candidate but had an aversion against another candidate (i.e., for
attraction should be made more often than statements of aversion.
each candidate there was a proponent and an adversary) and were
In the aversion condition, this should be reversed. In the combi-
neutral toward the third candidate.
nation condition, there should be many statements of both attrac-
tion and aversion. The result should be an interaction between
statement (attraction vs. aversion) and condition (Hypothesis 2C). Materials and Pretests
Fourth, because of preference diversity, there should be some
degree of conflict in all conditions. However, participants should To be able to manipulate attractions and aversions, we created
experience the most conflict in the combination condition, because candidate profiles using positive and negative information. Eight
in that condition, proponents will face adversaries (Hypothesis attributes were used for each candidate (24 attributes in total), 4 of
2D). which were positive and 4 of which were negative. For the com-
Agreement with the group decision is expected to be lower in plete candidate profiles (i.e., all 8 pieces of information per can-
the combination condition than in the other two conditions (Hy- didate), we had two requirements. First, we wanted no candidate to
pothesis 3). In the combination condition, often a preferred alter- be clearly better than another candidate, because we wanted to
native will be rejected (both when the group takes the refusal avoid having groups easily converge on a superior candidate.
option and when a nonpreferred alternative is chosen) and a Second, the candidates had to be adequate: When full information
nonpreferred alternative may be chosen (i.e., an alternative one about the candidates is available, participants should choose one of
864 NIJSTAD AND KAPS

Table 1
Candidate Profiles and Information Distribution in the Three Conditions

Information distribution
Group
Candidate Complete profile member Attraction Aversion Combination

A 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1 1, 4, 5, 6 2, 3, 7, 8 2, 3, 7, 8
2 1, 2, 4, 7 1, 2, 4, 7 1, 2, 4, 7
3 3, 5, 6, 8 3, 5, 6, 8 1, 4, 5, 6
B 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1 3, 5, 6, 8 3, 5, 6, 8 2, 4, 6, 8
2 2, 4, 6, 8 1, 3, 5, 7 1, 3, 5, 7
3 1, 2, 4, 7 1, 2, 4, 7 1, 2, 4, 7
C 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1 1, 2, 4, 7 1, 2, 4, 7 1, 2, 4, 7
2 3, 5, 6, 8 3, 5, 6, 8 1, 6, 7, 8
3 1, 6, 7, 8 2, 3, 4, 5 2, 3, 4, 5

Note. 1 clarity; 2 enthusiasm; 3 involved; 4 patience; 5 keeping order; 6 conscientiousness; 7 teaching method; 8 experience. Positive
information is indicated with a , negative with a . For example, 1 means that the candidate scores high on the attribute clarity. Unshared information
is bold, other information is partially shared.

them and not refuse all candidates. Two pretests were conducted to
establish these requirements.
In a first pretest, the eight candidate attributes were rated for
importance (on a scale ranging from 1 not important to 7 very
important) in a sample of 40 people, taken from the same popu-
lation as the participants in the main study. The attributes were
(with average importance ratings in parentheses) clarity when
explaining (6.14), enthusiasm for teaching (5.90), involved with
students (5.87), patience (5.46), ability to keep order (5.05), con-
scientiousness (4.97), use of different teaching methods (e.g.,
discussion, video; 4.40), and teaching experience (3.84). On the
basis of these attribute ratings, we created three candidate profiles,
in which negative attributes (i.e., is not very conscientious) and
positive attributes (i.e., has teaching experience) were matched for
importance, in such a way that no candidate was clearly better than
another candidate (see Table 1).
In a second pretest, the resulting profiles were given to another
sample of 40 participants, drawn from the same population as the
participants in the main study. These participants were given the
same instruction as were given to those in the main study, and they
received complete information about all candidates. Next, they
were asked to indicate their choice (i.e., choose Candidate A, B, or
C or reject all candidates). Seven participants chose to refuse all
candidates (17.5%), but a large majority (82.5%) found at least one
candidate good enough (35% chose A, 20% chose B, and 27.5%
chose C). Thus, on the whole, the candidates were perceived to be
adequate.
To create attractions, we gave some participants only the 4
positive candidate attributes of a particular candidate. To create
aversions, we gave some participants only the 4 negative attributes
of a candidate. To create a neutral opinion, we gave participants 2
positive and 2 negative attributes of a candidate. Thus, each
participant only had half the information available before the
discussion (12 attributes, 4 for each candidate). The remaining
information was always available to other group members. Fur-
ther, some of the information was given to only 1 group member
(making it completely unshared), whereas other information was
given to 2 group members (making it partially shared). In the
attraction condition, all positive information was partially shared
and all negative information was unshared. In the aversion condi-
tion, all negative information was partially shared and all positive
information was unshared. In the combination condition, half of
the positive and negative information was partially shared and the
remaining half was unshared. The last three columns of Table 1
show the exact information distribution in the three conditions.2
Procedure
All instructions were provided on paper. Participants were first
seated individually and read a general introduction. They had to
imagine that they were members of a three-person selection com-
mittee that had to decide whom to hire for a teaching position at
the department of psychology. They read that there were three
candidates who had all finished their masters degree at a Dutch
university (this would formally make them suitable for a teaching
position). They had to decide, together with 2 other participants,
whom to hire. However, they read that it was also possible not to
hire anybody but to look for further candidates. It was emphasized
that they should only do this when they really thought that none of
the present candidates were suitable for the position. They further
read that, in real life, looking for further candidates is expensive
and time consuming. They were thus instructed to hire a candidate
when they thought he or she was suitable and only reject all
candidates when they really thought that none of them were
suitable for the job.
After the general instruction, participants individually received
the candidate profiles. They had 6 min to study the profiles (this
2
By itself, this may lead to a bias in the information discussed. Previous
research has shown that the more group members initially hold a piece of
information, the more likely it is to be mentioned during discussion (e.g.,
Stasser & Titus, 1985, 1987). This might lead to more mentioning of
positive then negative information in the attraction condition (because
positive information was partially shared and negative information com-
pletely unshared) and to more mentioning of negative than of positive
information in the aversion condition (because negative information was
partially shared and positive information completely unshared). Note,
however, that we predicted only biased information sharing in the aversion
conditions, but (because of an information-driven decision strategy) no bias
in the attraction condition.
 GROUP DECISION REFUSAL
was enough for all participants) and were told that they could not
refer to these profiles during the later group discussion. They
further read that it was possible that other group members had
information different from their own. After 6 min, the experi-
menter collected the profiles and distributed a prediscussion ques-
tionnaire. Participants were asked what their individual decision at
that moment would be (hire Candidate A, B, or C or not hire any
candidate), and they were asked to rate their certainty about that
decision as well as each candidates attractiveness.
Next, they received a follow-up instruction: They were told that
they would participate in a group discussion and that they should
jointly decide whom to hire. No specific instructions were given
about decision rules (e.g., unanimity or majority). It was repeated
that they should hire a candidate when they thought that candidate
was suitable, but they could also decide not to hire any of the
candidates but look for further candidates instead. Again it was
emphasized that this would cost additional time and money. They
were next seated in one room and were provided with a group
decision sheet on which they could indicate their decision. All
group discussions were videotaped. When the group had reached a
decision, the participants were separated and individually filled out
a postexperimental questionnaire. After that, they were debriefed,
paid, and dismissed.
Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable was group choice, coded dichot-
omously as choice or refusal. We also measured discussion time.
Further, an observer blind to conditions and hypotheses coded
every video for information exchange and exchange of attractions
and aversions. For every group, it was established which of the
total number of 24 pieces of information (8 per candidate) were
mentioned accurately and at least once during discussion. Occa-
sionally, inaccurate information was mentioned (e.g., an attribute
was ascribed to the wrong candidate), but we only analyzed
accurately exchanged information. For each candidate, the ob-
server also counted instances in which participants indicated an
attraction for or an aversion to that candidate, resulting in six
frequencies for each group (e.g., the number of times an attraction
or aversion was mentioned for each candidate). A second observer
coded seven video recordings to establish interobserver agreement.
Regarding information exchange, the two observers agreed in
93.2% of the cases whether or not a particular piece of information
was mentioned, and Cohens kappa was .86 ( p .001). Regarding
the exchange of preferences, the intraclass correlation was com-
puted to establish interobserver reliability (two-way random
model, consistency definition) across the 42 frequencies (7
groups 6 frequencies), which was .75 ( p .001). Given these
high levels of reliability, the scores of the first observer were used.
The prediscussion questionnaire asked for prediscussion prefer-
ences as well as for ratings of each candidate on three items. The
three candidates were each rated on three 7-point scales (ranging
from 1 completely disagree to 7 completely agree) to assess
suitability for the job (e.g., Candidate A would be a good
teacher). The three items were averaged per candidate (for all
candidates, Cronbachs .96). Participants were also asked to
rate the degree to which they were certain about their initial
preference (1 item, using a 7-point scale ranging from 1 very
uncertain to 7 very certain).
865
These candidate ratings were again given in the postdiscussion
questionnaire (Cronbachs .94, .96, and .95 for Candidates A,
B, and C, respectively). Further, participants were asked to give
their private postdiscussion preference. Agreement with the group
decision was measured with two items (e.g., I agree with the
group decision); these were averaged into a measure of agreement
( .85). Further, task conflict was assessed with three items
(e.g., there were differences of opinion within the group;
.82). One item was used to assess the degree to which the discus-
sion had focused on negative information (during the discussion
it became increasingly clear that the candidates had more negative
than positive characteristics).
Data Analysis
Prediscussion questionnaire items were analyzed at the individ-
ual level, because these can be considered independent observa-
tions. However, after the group discussion, group members will
have influenced each other, and the ratings on the postdiscussion
questionnaire will therefore not be independent. These ratings
were therefore aggregated to the group level, by taking group
averages. Specific, directional hypotheses were tested using
planned comparisons.
Results
Manipulation Checks (Prediscussion Questionnaire)
Per group, the number of group members initially (before dis-
cussion) favoring refusal was computed (this measure could vary
from 0 to 3). The analysis of variance (ANOVA) on this measure
was significant, F(2, 42) 10.27, p .001, 2 .33. A Tukey
post hoc test showed that the number of group members favoring
refusal was significantly higher in the aversion condition (M
0.67; 10 out of 45 participants in that condition) than in the
attraction condition (M 0.00) or in the combination condition
(M 0.07, 1 out of 45 participants), both ps .01. The latter two
conditions did not differ ( p .90).
In the attraction condition and the combination condition, every
group member should prefer a different candidate (cf. Table 1). In
the attraction condition, this was the case for all 15 groups (100%).
In the aversion condition, where this should not necessarily be the
case, it was still true for 5 out of 15 groups (33%). In 8 groups, 1
(6 groups) or 2 members (2 groups) favored no choice (53%). In
the remaining 2 groups, an initial majority was in favor of a
particular candidate (13%). In the combination condition, 9 groups
were completely heterogeneous in preferences (60%). However, 5
groups had an initial majority for a candidate (33%). In the
remaining group, 1 group member favored refusal (7%).
A 3 (condition) 3 (candidate) 3 (group member) mixed
model ANOVA was performed on prediscussion candidate ratings,
with candidate as a within-participants variable. This yielded the
expected three-way interaction, F(8, 250) 140.80, p .001,
2 .82 (see Table 2). Before discussion, group members tended
to like and dislike the candidates they should have liked or disliked
given the information they had received. For example, Group
Member 1 in the attraction condition should like Candidate A and
be neutral toward Candidates B and C; Group Member 2 should
like Candidate B and be neutral toward Candidates A and C; and
866 NIJSTAD AND KAPS

Table 2
Ratings of Candidates A, B, and C Before and After Discussion

Condition

Attraction Aversion Combination

Measure GM1 GM2 GM3 GM1 GM2 GM3 GM1 GM2 GM3

Pre A
M 6.02 3.49 2.51 1.58 4.40 3.78 1.82 3.71 5.71
SD 0.70 0.92 0.64 0.57 1.03 0.97 0.91 0.93 0.49
Pre B
M 3.71 5.87 3.76 3.56 1.76 4.22 5.60 1.58 4.76
SD 0.90 0.47 1.10 1.10 0.67 1.17 0.88 0.73 0.96
Pre C
M 3.78 3.27 6.04 4.20 3.69 1.44 3.93 6.26 1.87
SD 0.84 1.16 0.50 0.94 1.13 0.54 1.03 0.69 0.71
Post A
M 4.67 3.67 3.38 2.21 3.36 3.17 2.71 3.80 4.44
SD 1.20 1.21 1.28 1.24 1.38 1.17 1.42 1.47 1.29
Post B
M 3.78 4.47 3.87 3.33 1.95 3.21 4.24 2.93 4.31
SD 1.40 1.44 1.80 1.20 0.89 1.24 1.35 1.45 1.27
Post C
M 3.73 3.36 4.36 3.38 2.83 2.40 3.40 4.29 2.67
SD 1.46 1.48 1.20 1.12 1.02 1.09 1.33 1.50 1.10

Note. Bold figures indicate candidate ratings that should be high, italic figures indicate candidate ratings that
should be low. GM Group Member; Pre prediscussion questionnaire; Post postdiscussion questionnaire.

Group Member 3 should like Candidate C and be neutral toward
Candidates A and B. In general, this was the case. Further, the
analysis showed a main effect of condition, F(2, 126) 40.36,
p .001, 2 .39. As expected, across candidates, participants
were most positive in the attraction condition (M 4.27), fol-
lowed by the combination condition (M 3.92) and the aversion
condition (M 3.18). All conditions differed from each other
according to a Tukey post hoc test (all ps .025).3
Participants were also asked to rate how certain they were about
their choice. An ANOVA on this measure revealed an effect of
condition, F(2, 123) 14.27, p .001, 2 .19. A Tukey post
hoc test showed that participants in the aversion condition (M
4.58) were less certain than the others (M attraction 5.57, M
combination 5.68, both ps .001). Given that they were not
induced to have a strong preference, this result, as well as the other
results, confirms that the manipulation has been successful.
Group Choice (Hypothesis 1)
Group choice was coded dichotomously as choice (Candidate A,
B, or C) versus no choice (none of the candidates). A chi-square
test yielded a significant effect of condition on group choice, 2(2,
N 45) 10.85, p .004, Cramers V .49. Three groups
(20%) made no choice in the attraction condition, 12 groups (80%)
did not choose in the aversion condition, and 7 groups (46.7%)
made no choice in the combination condition (see Table 3 for all
dependent variables). When these frequencies are compared with
those obtained in the pretest, in which 40 individuals received
complete information and 17.5% refused to choose, the difference
is not significant for the attraction condition, 2(1, N 55)
0.05, p .83, Cramers V .03. It is significant for both the
aversion condition, 2(1, N 55) 18.85, p .001, Cramers
V .59, and the combination condition, 2(1, N 55) 4.89,
p .03, Cramers V .30. Thus, in both the aversion and the
combination conditions, refusal was more prevalent than it was for
individuals who received complete information from the start.
Because it was predicted (Hypothesis 1) that the greatest num-
ber of groups would refuse to choose in the aversion condition,
followed by the combination condition, followed by the attraction
condition, a contrast was specified as [1, 0, 1] for these condi-
tions, respectively. This contrast had a significant effect on choice
in a logistic regression, B 1.39, SE 0.46, Wald 9.23, p
.002, Nagelkerke R2 .30. Further, to confirm that the pattern
indeed is linear, we specified a quadratic contrast as [1, 2, 1],
for the attraction, combination, and aversion conditions, respec-
tively. This contrast was not significant, B 0.05, Wald 0.04,
p .80, Nagelkerke R2 .00. These results confirm Hypothesis
1 and show that the effect indeed is linear.
We tested whether the number of group members that initially
(i.e., before the discussion) favored refusal mediated the effect of
condition. This was not the case. In a logistic regression, the effect
of condition (the contrast specified above) remained significant
(B 1.06, SE 0.50, Wald 4.51, p .03) when controlling for
3
A number of other findings emerged in this analysis, all involving the
candidate variable. Thus, there was a candidate main effect, F(2, 125)
3.15, p .05, 2 .05, showing that Candidate A was rated as less
suitable (M 3.67) than Candidate B (M 3.87) or Candidate C (M
3.83). Further, a Candidate Condition interaction approached signifi-
cance, F (4, 250) 2.24, p .07, 2 .04, and there was a significant
Candidate Member interaction, F (4, 250) 39.14, p .001, 2 .39.
However, these are not of substantive interest and are all qualified by the
three-way interaction; therefore, they are not discussed further.
 GROUP DECISION REFUSAL 867

Table 3
Dependent Variables by Condition

Condition

Dependent variable Attraction Aversion Combination

Group decision (% no choice) 20 80 46.7

Discussion time in min 8.83 (4.33) 6.41 (3.19) 8.92 (3.81)
Video coding
Exchange of positive information .76 (.27) .57 (.22) .79 (.13)
Exchange of negative .76 (.19) .74 (.18) .78 (.17)
information
Statement of attraction 8.60 (4.08) 5.20 (3.90) 8.00 (3.74)
Statement of aversion 2.33 (2.32) 6.20 (3.63) 6.07 (2.99)
Postdiscussion questionnaire
Focus on negative information 3.53 (1.19) 5.33 (1.00) 3.71 (1.04)
Conflict 2.88 (0.72) 3.12 (1.25) 3.58 (0.96)
No. group members who agree 2.80 (0.41) 2.73 (0.46) 2.33 (0.62)
Agreement with decision 6.02 (0.54) 6.09 (0.55) 5.66 (0.70)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

the effect of the number of members initially favoring refusal,
which did not have a significant effect, B 1.36, SE 1.13,
Wald 1.44, p .23. Thus, prediscussion preferences cannot
(fully) explain group choice, and group processes must have af-
fected choice.
Discussion Time and Video Coding (Hypotheses 2A2C)
Discussion time was analyzed with an ANOVA, which did not
yield a significant effect of condition, F(2, 42) 2.10, p .14,
2 .09. However, a planned comparison comparing the two
conditions for which information-driven interaction was expected
(i.e., the attraction condition and the combination condition) with
the aversion condition was significant, t(42) 2.04, p .05, d
0.67. Discussion time was shorter in the aversion condition (M
6.41 min) than in the attraction condition (M 8.83 min) and the
combination condition (M 8.92 min). This is consistent with
Hypothesis 2A.
From the video coding, the proportion of positive and negative
information mentioned was computed by dividing the number of
positive and negative items mentioned by the total number of
positive or negative items available to the group (12, in both
cases). These proportions were analyzed with a 3 (condition) 2
(information: positive vs. negative) ANOVA, with information as
a within-groups variable (Table 3). This analysis yielded an effect
of information that approached significance, F(1, 42) 3.79, p
.06, 2 .08, showing that a somewhat higher proportion of
negative information (M .76) than positive information (M
.71) was exchanged. The main effect of condition was not signif-
icant, F(2, 42) 2.43, p .10, 2 .10. However, there was a
significant Condition Information interaction, F(2, 42) 4.20,
p .02, 2 .17. In the attraction condition, there was no
difference in the exchange of positive and negative information,
t(14) 0.07, p .94, d 0.02. The same was true for the
combination condition, t(14) 0.31, p .76, d 0.07. In the
aversion condition, more negative than positive information was
exchanged, t(14) 5.03, p .001, d 0.87. This pattern of
effects is consistent with Hypothesis 2B and calibrates the idea that
group discussions in the attraction and combination conditions are
information driven and unbiased but are aversion driven in the
aversion condition.
The number of times a statement of attraction for or aversion
against a candidate was made was analyzed with a 3 (condition)
2 (statement: attraction or aversion) ANOVA, with statement as a
within-groups factor (i.e., statements were summed across candi-
dates). This yielded a main effect of statement, F(1, 42) 18.27,
p .001, 2 .30, showing that on average, more statements of
attraction were made (M 7.27) than statements of aversion (M
4.87). This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction,
F(2, 42) 14.13, p .001, 2 .40 (see Table 3). In the
attraction condition, more statements of attraction than statements
of aversion were made, t(14) 7.16, p .001, d 1.89. In the
aversion condition, the difference was reversed, but this was not
significant, t(14) 1.03, p .32, d 0.27. In the combina-
tion condition, somewhat more statements of attraction than state-
ments of aversion were made, although this failed to reach signif-
icance, t(14) 1.82, p .09, d 0.57. This pattern of findings
is largely consistent with Hypothesis 2C, although we had also
predicted that in the aversion condition, more statements of aver-
sion than statements of attraction would be made.
Postdiscussion Questionnaire: Conflict and Agreement
(Hypotheses 2D and 3)
An ANOVA on ratings of task conflict in the postdiscussion
questionnaire did not show a significant effect of condition, F(2,
42) 1.95, p .16, 2 .09 (M attraction 2.88, M aversion
3.12, M combination 3.58). However, to test the directional
Hypothesis 2D, that more conflict would be experienced in the
combination condition than the other conditions, we performed a
planned comparison. This comparison was significant, t(42)
1.86, p .05 (one-tailed), d 0.61, confirming Hypothesis 2D.
For each group, we counted how many group members after the
discussion chose the same option as the group had done (i.e.,
scores could range from 0 to 3). An ANOVA on this measure of
agreement with the group decision was significant, F(2, 42)
3.76, p .03, 2 .15. To test Hypothesis 3, we computed a
planned contrast, comparing the combination condition (M
868 NIJSTAD AND KAPS
2.33) with the other conditions (M attraction 2.80, M aversion
2.73), and this contrast was significant, t(42) 2.72, p .009,
d 0.89. Further, postdiscussion ratings of agreement with the
decision did not differ across conditions according to an ANOVA,
F(2, 42) 2.24, p .12, 2 .10 (M attraction 6.02, M
aversion 6.09, M combination 5.66). However, a planned
comparison between the combination condition on the one side
and the two conditions on the other was significant, t(42) 2.09,
p .05, d 0.68. Thus, agreement with the decision was lower
in the combination condition than in the other conditions, and
Hypothesis 3 was confirmed.
Postdiscussion Questionnaire: Additional Results
In the postexperimental questionnaire, one item asked whether
more negative than positive information came up during discus-
sion, and an ANOVA on this item yielded a significant effect of
condition, F(2, 42) 12.65, p .001, 2 .38. A Tukey post hoc
test showed that the aversion condition (M 5.33) differed sig-
nificantly from both the attraction condition (M 3.53, p .001)
and the combination condition (M 3.71, p .001), whereas the
latter two did not differ ( p .90). This finding is consistent with
the video coding data, which also showed that in the aversion
condition, more negative than positive information was ex-
changed. It is also consistent with the reasoning that interactions in
the aversion condition are aversion driven, which makes group
members converge quickly on the refusal option.
Finally, postdiscussion candidate ratings were analyzed at the
group level in a 3 (condition) 3 (group member) 3 (candidate)
mixed model ANOVA, with the latter two variables as within-
group variables. As was the case with prediscussion ratings, the
three-way interaction among these variables was significant, F(8,
76) 8.66, p .001, 2 .48. As can be seen in Table 2, the
pattern of means remained essentially the same from before to
after the discussion, only less extreme. There also was a main
effect of condition, F(2, 41) 8.95, p .001, 2 .30. A post
hoc Tukey test ( p .025) showed that, across candidates, the
ratings were lower in the aversion condition (M 2.87) than in the
attraction condition (M 3.92) and the combination condition
(M 3.64), but the latter two conditions did not differ reliably.4
Discussion
It is widely believed that preference diversity can stimulate
high-quality group decisions, because it prevents preference-
driven decision strategies (i.e., a simple pooling of initial prefer-
ences) and stimulates information-driven strategies instead (i.e.,
systematic and unbiased discussion and integration of informa-
tion). However, this literature has neglected the fact that in many
situations, groups can also refuse to choose. Further, preference
diversity may be based on attractions, aversions, or both. We
argued that information-driven strategies are only adopted when
preferences are based on attractions but not when they are based on
aversions. When preferences are based on aversions, groups may
even adopt an aversion-driven strategy, with frequent mentioning
of aversions and a bias toward exchanging negative information. In
addition, on the basis of the negativity bias in judgment and
decision making, we argued that aversions are harder to overcome
than attractions and that group members more easily accept that a
preferred alternative is not chosen than that a disliked alternative is
chosen. Aversion-driven strategies and the negativity bias might
lead groups to refuse all available alternatives, even though they
are adequate. These ideas were tested in a laboratory experiment in
which different types of preference diversity were created. It was
systematically varied whether group members held different at-
tractions (attraction condition), different aversions (aversion con-
dition), or both (combination condition) toward different job can-
didates.
In the attraction condition, in which each group member was
attracted to a different alternative and was relatively neutral toward
the other alternatives, groups were generally able to reach a deci-
sion. They had fairly long discussions, which were unbiased (i.e.,
both positive information and negative information were discussed
to the same degree). In this condition, group members more often
expressed attractions than aversions and reported having some
conflict. In the end, 80% reached a decision, and group members
generally agreed with the decision made by the group. All in all,
the pattern is indicative of an information-driven strategy, in which
the group decision reflected an integration of relevant information
and in which some group members accepted an initially nonpre-
ferred candidate on the basis of the evidence and agreed with the
group decision.
In the aversion condition, in which group members were led to
dislike different alternatives, the picture is different. Here, most
groups (80%) decided to refuse all available alternatives and to
invest more resources to look for other alternatives. Discussions
were shorter than in the other conditions, aversions were fre-
quently mentioned, and discussions were biased toward negative
information (i.e., more negative than positive information was
mentioned). Groups seemed to have relatively quickly converged
on refusal, and group members usually agreed with that decision.
The pattern of results is indicative of aversion-driven group inter-
action.
In the combination condition, in which different group members
held both different attractions and different aversions, the picture
is different still. About half of the groups chose an alternative, and
the other half decided to refuse all alternatives. Discussions were
fairly long and unbiased (i.e., as much positive as negative infor-
mation came up). Further, both attractions and aversions were
frequently mentioned. Agreement with the decision, however, was
lowest in this condition. Thus there is evidence for information-
driven interaction (long and unbiased discussions), but group
members often refused to accept a disliked alternative, leading to
lower levels of satisfaction and higher levels of decision refusal.
Our conclusion is threefold. First, preference diversity does not
necessarily stimulate information-driven decision processes. When
it is also possible not to choose but refuse to make a decision, only
preference diversity based on attractions stimulates an unbiased
consideration of alternatives. Second, because aversions are harder
to change than attractions, decision refusal is more likely when
there are adversaries against the decision options. Third, prefer-
ence diversity based on aversions alone might lead to a biased
4
As was the case with prediscussion ratings, there also was a Candi-
date Member interaction, F(4, 38) 3.66, p .01, 2 .28. However,
this is not of substantive interest and the effect is qualified by the three-way
interaction.
 GROUP DECISION REFUSAL
group decision strategy: one that is based on negative information
and the expression of aversions, leading to quick refusal decisions
(i.e., an aversion-driven strategy).
One question that has to be addressed is whether decision
refusal in the present experiment was a bad decision. Indeed, one
could argue that none of the candidates were very good: All had as
many negative as positive attributes, and they should perhaps be
refused. Speaking against this are the findings of our pretest,
showing that individuals who were given full information about
the candidates in more than 80% of the cases did make a choice
(and that this percentage was higher than in both the aversion and
the combination conditions). However, one still could argue that
groups with full information would have made a different choice,
because they are better at identifying bad alternatives. We believe
that is possible, but unlikely. In another study, Nijstad (2006)
directly studied a situation where group members received full
information from the start, and this information also contained as
many positive as negative attributes for each candidate. Groups
refused all candidates in only 20% of the casesnot dissimilar to
what we found in our pretest.
Implications
We believe that the group-decision-making literature has gen-
erally neglected two issues that were central to the present article.
The first issue is that preferences are not based solely on attrac-
tions but also on aversions. We showed that these might have quite
different effects on group interaction processes and group deci-
sions. It might therefore be useful to not only assess preferences
but more specifically assess or manipulate attractions and aver-
sions. Indeed, a preference can be weak and based on aversions
against other alternatives rather than on attraction toward the
preferred alternative. It can also be strong, when it is based on
attraction toward one alternative as well as on aversions against the
others. Potential effects of aversions versus attractions are biases in
the group discussion, failure to reach a decision, and lower levels
of outcome satisfaction.
The second issue is that cases of group decision refusal and
other forms of decision avoidance deserve more attention. As we
argued, for decision makersindividuals as well as groupsit is
often impossible to identify, discuss, and evaluate all potential
alternatives. It will therefore often be possible to decide to identify
more options, and the conditions under which decision refusal
occurs deserve more attention. Further, in this experiment, it was
possible to either choose or refuse an option. In reality, there are
different ways in which a group might avoid making decisions. For
example, it often is possible to delay decisions when group mem-
bers feel that they do not have sufficient information on which to
base their choice. Common experience (e.g., in politics) suggests
that often committees are called on to do further investigations
before the group reaches a decision. Sometimes it might even be
possible to shift responsibility for a decision to someone else, such
as higher management, in cases where groups reach a stalemate.
These all are interesting possibilities for further investigation.
Limitations and Future Directions
A potential limitation of the present study is that the decision to
refuse all candidates in our setup was not very costly. Although we
869
emphasized that in the real world, refusing all candidates is costly
and time consuming, our participants experienced no real costs. It
might be the case that no decision refusal would take place when
real costs (e.g., extra time in the laboratory) are present, and this
clearly is an issue for future research. We emphasize, however,
that making a choice similarly involved no real costs or benefits.
Our finding that not all groups quickly rejected all candidates (and
that refusal rates were different in the different conditions) indi-
cates that our participants were seriously trying to arrive at the best
decision.
Second, in this experiment, rather extreme situations were cre-
ated, in which all alternatives had proponents and/or adversaries.
Although these situations were useful in testing our hypotheses,
one may wonder whether this is realistic and how often this
actually happens. However, what might quite often happen in
real-life situations is that there are one or more adversaries to an
alternative that other group members prefer. These adversaries will
generally resist being persuaded, and will be unhappy if the group
decides to choose their disliked alternative anyway. In future
studies, researchers might create such conditions, for example,
varying the number of proponents for and adversaries against a
particular focal option. It might also be relatively common for
different factions to be in conflict. The literature about bargaining
and negotiation suggests that conflicting preferences (e.g., for
outcome allocations) can indeed lead to stalemates and impasses
(see, e.g., OConnor & Arnold, 2001). However, in this literature,
researchers usually study situations in which individual interests
rather than mere preferences conflict. We have also shown that
when there are no conflicting interests (i.e., our group members
had nothing to gain when their preferred alternative was chosen),
preference diversity may lead to stalemates.
Another issue that might be addressed in future work is the
effect of leadership. It might be expected that good leaders will
help groups overcome their differences of opinion. In past work, it
has been shown that leaders can function as information managers
in groups (Larson, Christensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996). Leaders
may prevent a biased exchange of information and prevent a
(premature) consensus on decision refusal. Leaders can also stim-
ulate more effective conflict handling by emphasizing the impor-
tance of information rather than preferences (whether they are
attractions or aversions). When less emphasis is put on prefer-
ences, group members might more easily concede and even accept
initially disliked alternatives on the basis of the evidence that is
provided during group discussion.
Although leadership might reduce certain effects, time pressure
may exacerbate them. According to Karau and Kellys (1992)
attentional focus model, groups under time pressure focus on only
a restricted range of task-relevant cues. Indeed, research has shown
that group members filter out certain information during discus-
sion when under time pressure (Kelly & Loving, 2004). When
group members mainly focus on negative information, as they did
in the aversion condition of the present study, this may lead to an
even higher prevalence of choice refusal. The effects of leadership
and time pressure thus seem promising avenues for future research.
Conclusion
In this study, we have shown that preference diversity in groups
does not necessarily lead to constructive group processes, a more
870 NIJSTAD AND KAPS
even-handed consideration of information, and unbiased discus-
sions. Instead, when preference diversity is based (partly) on
aversions, it may lead to a negative bias in information sharing,
stalemates, and decision refusal. Groups may even refuse to
choose among available options when the options on the whole are
adequate, at the cost of lower outcome satisfaction, simply because
decision refusal is an easy way out.
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 871 882 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.871

Distinguishing Between Silent and Vocal Minorities: Not All Deviants Feel
Marginal
Kimberly Rios Morrison and Dale T. Miller
Stanford University

Peoples opinions can deviate from that of the average group member in two ways. Descriptive deviants
diverge from the average group attitude in a direction consistent with the desirable group attitude;
prescriptive deviants diverge from the average group attitude in a direction inconsistent with the desirable
group attitude. Three studies tested the hypothesis that descriptive deviants are more willing to express
their opinions than either nondeviants or prescriptive deviants. Study 1 found that college students
reported more comfort in expressing descriptive deviant opinions because descriptive deviance induced
feelings of superior conformity (i.e., being different but good). Study 2 found that descriptive deviants
reported more pride after expressing their opinions, were rated as more proud by an observer, and were
more willing to publicize their opinions. Study 3 showed that political bumper stickers with descriptive
deviant messages were displayed disproportionately more frequently than were those with prescriptive
deviant messages.

Keywords: minorities, deviance, social norms

Those holding minority opinions have good reason to keep
silent. Expressing opinions that differ from those of the majority
can expose individuals to a number of forms of social punishment,
including exclusion and persecution (Kuran, 1995; Levine, 1989;
Marques & Paez, 1994). Recognizing this fact, minorities predict-
ably report feeling more uncomfortable, anxious, awkward, frus-
trated, and unhappy in group settings than do their majority coun-
terparts (Matz & Wood, 2005; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). The
best advice for someone who holds a minority opinion and wishes
to avoid trouble would thus seem clear: If you arent prepared to
modify your opinion in the direction of the majority, at least keep
silent. Indeed, evidence suggests that people holding minority
opinions take more time to express their opinions (Bassili, 2003),
when they do not avoid expressing them altogether (Noelle-
Neumann, 1984).
Not all minorities are silent, however. In her book The Spiral of
Silence, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1984) asserts that even when
supporters of different minority viewpoints are equal in numbers,
they may differ in their reluctance to make their sentiments known.
Indeed, minorities can be at least as vocal as majorities under
certain circumstances. For example, during the height of the Viet-
Kimberly Rios Morrison and Dale T. Miller, Graduate School of Busi-
ness, Stanford University.
We would like to thank Evan Morrison, Lara Tiedens, Christian
Wheeler, Debbie Prentice, Penny Visser, members of the 2004 2005
Workshop in Behavioral Research, and members of the 20052006 Miller
Lab for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this article. We also
acknowledge Becky Schaumberg, David Campos, Stephanie Lam, Kyle
Peterson, and Valerie Rios for their assistance with data collection and
coding.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kimberly
Rios Morrison, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 518
Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305. E-mail: krios@stanford.edu or
dtmiller@stanford.edu
nam War, U.S. Vice President Spiro Agnew famously claimed that
the highly visible anti-war protesters constituted a mere vocal
minority who were out of step with the larger, more representa-
tive silent majority (Noelle-Neumann, 1984).
Noelle-Neumann may be correct that some minority sentiments
are more likely to be publicized than others, but how can we
predict which minorities will voice their opinions and which will
become trapped in a spiral of silence? To begin to answer this
question, we distinguish between two features of deviant opinions:
the magnitude of deviance from the average group opinion and the
direction of this deviance. We then explain why these features
might influence patterns of opinion expression.
In this article, the terms minority and deviant neither carry
negative connotations nor imply that a person so characterized
necessarily perceives him- or herself as dissimilar from the rest of
the group. These terms simply refer to individuals whose attitudes
are objectively (i.e., statistically) different from those of most other
group members (Blanton & Christie, 2003).
Deviance: Magnitude Versus Direction
Most research on opinion expression has treated minority/
majority status as a dichotomous variable and has shown that
group members who either hold or are randomly assigned to argue
in favor of a minority opinion are less willing to speak out than
those who are in the majority (Asch, 1956; Bassili, 2003; Matz &
Wood, 2005). A smaller number of studies have allowed for the
possibility that opinion deviance can vary within a group. These
studies have generally found that the likelihood that a person will
publicize an opinion depends on the actual or perceived distance of
that opinion from the average group opinion. The greater that
distance, the more unwilling group members are to voice their
opinions (Glynn, Hayes, & Shanahan, 1997).
The magnitude of distance from the average group opinion is
not the only, nor possibly even the most important, determinant of

871
872 MORRISON AND MILLER
the likelihood that a particular opinion will be expressed. We
propose that the direction in which an opinion deviates from the
group average is also a critical determinant of whether its holder
will be vocal or silent. Conceptualizing deviance in terms of both
direction and magnitude recognizes that groups can be viewed as
often having two norms with respect to many attitudes and behav-
iors (see Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Cialdini & Trost, 1998;
Prentice & Miller, 1996). The first norm reflects the common
attitudes or behaviors of the groupthat is, what group members
actually think or do (i.e., the descriptive norm). The second norm
reflects the desirable attitudes or behaviors of the groupthat is,
what group members believe they should or ought to think or do
(i.e., the prescriptive norm). To adequately describe the deviance
of a position, then, one needs to know the relation of that position
to both the descriptive and prescriptive group norms.
In referring to the average group attitude as the descriptive
norm, we are assumingand we conducted a pretest to confirm
that the distribution of group attitudes is unimodal. Were a bimodal
distribution to exist, there would be two descriptive norms (i.e.,
two different groups) in the population. Furthermore, the average
attitude of the population would actually represent a minority
opinion within either of these two groups (see Levine & Ranelli,
1978). Supporting our assumption, people generally tend to per-
ceive social distributions (e.g., of group members attitudes and
behaviors) as normal rather than bimodal (Nisbett & Kunda,
1985), except when the group under question is unfamiliar to them
(but see Judd & Johnson, 1981).
Descriptive and Prescriptive Deviance
When the descriptive norm (average attitude) and prescriptive
norm (desirable attitude) of the group diverge, one can actually
speak of two overlapping categories of deviantsthose who de-
viate from the descriptive norm in a direction consistent with the
prescriptive norm and those who deviate from the descriptive norm
in a direction inconsistent with the prescriptive norm. We call the
former category of individuals descriptive deviants, given their
divergence from the descriptive (but not prescriptive) norm. Con-
versely, we call the latter category of individuals prescriptive
deviants, given their divergence from both the prescriptive norm
and the descriptive norm.
As an example of descriptive and prescriptive deviance, con-
sider a college campus in which the descriptive norm for political
attitudes is slightly liberal. Assuming that the prescriptive norm is
also liberal, extremely liberal students would be descriptive devi-
ants, and extremely conservative students would be prescriptive
deviants. In this example, although both descriptive and prescrip-
tive deviants hold positions that differ from that of the average
group member, only the position of prescriptive deviants under-
mines the prescriptive group norm. The position of descriptive
deviants, more than that of even nondeviants, reinforces the pre-
scriptive group norm.
Our typology of deviance bears a similarity to that proposed by
Abrams, Marques, Bown, and Henson (2000). Abrams and col-
leagues distinguished between pronorm deviants, whose values
deviate from the group in the direction of the group prototype (i.e.,
desirable group attitude), and antinorm deviants, whose values
deviate from the group in the direction away from the group
prototype. According to their model, pronorm deviants validate the
ingroups norms, and hence function to differentiate the ingroup
from other groups, to a greater extent than do antinorm deviants.
One consequence of this, demonstrated by Abrams and colleagues,
is that pronorm deviants are rated as more prototypical and are
evaluated more positively than antinorm deviants and, in some
cases, normatives (i.e., nondeviant group members; Abrams et al.,
2000; see also Abrams, de Moura, Hutchison, & Viki, 2005;
Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 2002).
Despite these similarities, the present model departs from that of
Abrams and colleagues in two ways. First, whereas Abrams and
colleagues emphasize intergroup differences (those between the
ingroup and outgroups), we emphasize intragroup differences
(those between ingroup members). For example, Abrams and
colleagues define descriptive norms as characteristics of the in-
group that distinguish it from relevant outgroups (e.g., members of
one sports team wear a certain color jersey in part to avoid being
mistaken for the opposing team; Abrams et al., 2000). By contrast,
we define descriptive norms as characteristics of most ingroup
members that distinguish ingroup nondeviants from ingroup devi-
ants (e.g., most sports fans at a game might wear a single item of
clothing in their teams color, whereas other fans might wear more
or fewer items of clothing in that color). Additionally, although
both models suggest that those who deviate from group norms in
a desirable direction will voice their opinions more readily than
those who deviate from group norms in an undesirable direction or
(in many cases) those who do not deviate at all, the reason
specified by each model is different. Abrams and colleagues would
claim that people adopt and express certain (i.e., pronorm) deviant
opinions in order to differentiate their own group from other
groups. Our model focuses on how people adopt and express
certain (i.e., descriptive) deviant opinions in order to maintain a
positive individual identity relative to other ingroup members.
Implications for Opinion Expression
We argue that the direction of difference from the group average
is critical in determining how comfortable a person with a deviant
opinion will feel expressing that opinion. Specifically, descriptive
deviants will be more comfortable and willing to express their
opinions than both nondeviants and prescriptive deviants. As noted
earlier, previous research on opinion expression has generally
classified group members into one of two categories: majority or
minority (Asch, 1956; Matz & Wood, 2005). One demonstration of
the link between minority status and opinion expression is Bassi-
lis (2003) finding that minority opinion holders were slower to
report their attitudes in a telephone survey than were majority
opinion holders, even after several different measures of attitude
strength (e.g., certainty, importance, extremity; see also Krosnick,
Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993) were controlled. Bas-
silis proposed explanation for these results was that holding a
minority opinion induces internal conflict in individuals, which in
turn leads to slower response latencies (Bassili, 2003; see also
Bassili, 1995; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 2000).
When group members opinions have instead been represented
on a continuum, the predominant assumption is that the more ones
opinion differs from that of the group average (in any direction),
the more reluctant he or she will be to express that opinion (Bassili,
2003; Glynn et al., 1997). For instance, Bassili (2003) found the
minority slowness effect (p. 261) to be especially pronounced in
 SILENT AND VOCAL MINORITIES
groups with a large majority and among group members who
perceived the size of the majority to be large. Though the relation
between deviance magnitude and opinion expression is well es-
tablished, deviance direction has yet to be examined in this con-
text. Moreover, in explaining why those who hold deviant opinions
may be unwilling to express their opinions, previous research has
focused on the factors that distinguish deviants from nondeviants,
such as perceived similarity to or anticipated liking by other group
members (Glynn et al., 1997; Hensley & Duval, 1976; Levine &
Ranelli, 1978; see also Levine, 1989). This research has suggested
that the greater the magnitude of deviance, the lower ones per-
ceived similarity to ones peers (Glynn et al., 1997) and the lower
ones chances of being well liked by ones peers (Hensley &
Duval, 1976; Levine & Ranelli, 1978).
Given our focus on deviance direction, however, we took a
different approach by examining a factor that may distinguish
certain (i.e., descriptive) deviants from both nondeviants and other
(i.e., prescriptive) deviants. Specifically, our claim that descriptive
deviance, as opposed to prescriptive deviance or nondeviance,
increases willingness to express oneself derives from the assump-
tion that people have competing psychological needs for similarity
and distinctiveness. As uniqueness theory postulates, individuals
are reluctant to accept feedback that they are either extremely
similar to or extremely different from their peers (Snyder &
Fromkin, 1980; see also Lynn & Snyder, 2002). Consistent with
this idea, optimal distinctiveness theory proposes that although
difference is generally seen as a positive attribute, the desire to be
different is balanced by desires to conform and belong to others
(Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Vignoles, Chrysso-
choou, & Breakwell, 2000).
One way in which people can satisfy their needs for belonging-
ness and distinctiveness simultaneously is by differentiating them-
selves within a group, yet still remaining members of that group
(Hornsey & Jetten, 2004). Most relevant to our purposes, peoples
quest to be both similar and different can be promoted by con-
forming even more than other ingroup members to the norms of
the ingroupthat is, by being superior conformists (see Codol,
1975, 1984). Superior conformity may be a reflection of group
members tendencies to distinguish themselves in good ways
and avoid distinguishing themselves in bad ways (Blanton &
Christie, 2003).
Some evidence that group members prefer deviating from others
in a valued direction comes from the group polarization research of
Myers and his colleagues (Myers, 1978; Myers, Wojcicki, &
Aardema, 1977). In these studies, participants shifted their opin-
ions in the direction of the prescriptive group normand away
from the descriptive group normwhen exposed to their peers
attitudes. The presumed reason for their shift was that they wanted
to be not only similar to their peers but also superior to their peers
(Myers, 1978). If being different in a positive way (i.e., superior
conformity) does indeed satisfy the competing drives for similarity
and distinctiveness, then group members who hold extreme but
desirable positions (i.e., descriptive deviants) should feel more
comfortable publicizing their opinions than both those who hold
extreme but undesirable positions (i.e., prescriptive deviants) and
those who hold moderate positions (i.e., nondeviants). According
to the foregoing analysis, this proposed relation between deviance
direction and opinion expression arises because descriptive devi-
ants believe that their opinions render them superior conformists.
873
If group members simply wanted to be similar to their peers,
nondeviants should be more vocal than deviants overall, and this
willingness to be vocal should be driven by nondeviants percep-
tions of similarity. If group members simply wanted to be different
from their peers, deviants should be more vocal than nondeviants
overall, and this willingness to be vocal should be driven by
deviants perceptions of difference, regardless of whether this
difference is good or bad.
The Present Studies
The foregoing analysis suggests that the willingness of deviants
to express their opinions should depend on whether the direction in
which they deviate from the group average is toward or away from
the prescriptive group norm. Descriptive deviants, whose opinions
are closer to the desirable (if not average) group opinion, should be
more likely to express their opinions than both nondeviants and
prescriptive deviants.
Studies 1 and 2 focused on the willingness of college students to
express their opinions on several important campus issues. For
each issue, it was possible to identify both the prescriptive norm
(the liberal position in all cases) and the descriptive norm (i.e., the
average attitude). In Study 1, the experimental procedure was to
ask participants to imagine arguing for one of three randomly
assigned positions: descriptive deviant, nondeviant, or prescriptive
deviant. This study tested the hypothesis that descriptive deviants
perception of their superior conformity would mediate the relation
between descriptive deviance and self-reported comfort in opinion
expression. Study 1 also tested three additional mediational ac-
counts for the greater comfort descriptive deviants felt in express-
ing their opinions. The first of these was that descriptive deviants,
more so than prescriptive deviants, perceive their opinions as
similar to those of the majority (Bassili, 2003; Glynn et al., 1997).
The second was that descriptive deviants are less likely than
prescriptive deviants to believe that they are different in a bad
way. The third was that descriptive deviants, more so than pre-
scriptive deviants, believe that their (deviant) opinions will make
them popular within their peer group (Hensley & Duval, 1976;
Levine & Ranelli, 1978). The first two alternative accounts, if
ruled out, would further reinforce the idea that descriptive deviants
are more comfortable not because they see themselves as similar to
their peers but rather because they see themselves as better
group members than their peers.
In Study 2, we built upon Study 1 in three ways. First, rather
than measuring participants responses to a hypothetical scenario,
in Study 2 we actually assigned participants to deliver a speech in
support of one of three different attitude positions. Second, rather
than measuring participants felt discomfort in opinion expression,
in Study 2 we measured both self-reported and observer-rated
pride, an emotion presumed to be conceptually closer to the
construct of superior conformity. Finally, Study 2 included a
measure of actual behaviornamely, participants willingness to
have their assigned position made public. The specific hypothesis
tested in Study 2 was that participants assigned to argue for a
descriptive deviant position would experience (and be rated as
experiencing) higher levels of pride, as well as be more willing to
publicize their position, than would those assigned to argue for a
nondeviant or prescriptive deviant position.
874 MORRISON AND MILLER
Study 3 was a field demonstration of opinion expression in
which we compared the proportions of political bumper stickers
with the proportions of registered voters in two different areas.
One area was a predominantly Democratic county, where the
descriptive norm was defined as slightly liberal and the prescrip-
tive norm as liberal. The other was a predominantly Republican
county, where the descriptive norm was defined as slightly con-
servative and the prescriptive norm as conservative. The specific
hypothesis tested was that the messages on the bumper stickers
compared with the actual percentages of voterswould over-
represent the descriptive deviant position and underrepresent the
prescriptive deviant position in each county.
Pretest
Our first step was to determine the normative positions among
the target group (undergraduates at Stanford University) on select
group-relevant issues. Specifically, we tested whether group mem-
bers accurately perceived where they stood on each issue relative
to their peers and whether the distributions of group members
attitudes were in fact unimodal rather than bimodal (see Nisbett &
Kunda, 1985). Only then could we claim that the average group
attitude, as opposed to an attitude on either extreme, did in fact
represent the nondeviant position on each issue. We also sought to
determine the prescriptive group norm on each issue in order to
ensure that it was different enough from the descriptive group
norm to distinguish descriptive deviants from nondeviants.
We measured descriptive and prescriptive group norms via a
survey that asked students for their attitudes on three different
issues: the wages of full-time (nonstudent) Stanford employees,
the presence of ethnic-theme dormitories on the Stanford campus,
and the use of affirmative action in college admissions decisions.
The survey included three questions on each issue, worded as
follows: (a) How would you best describe your own attitude
toward [the issue]? (b) How would you best describe the typical
Stanford students attitude toward [the issue]? and (c) How would
you best describe the attitude that Stanford students think they
should have toward [the issue], in order to fit in with their peers?
The first question was designed to assess the descriptive norm
(average group attitude) for the issue, the second question, per-
ceptions of the descriptive norm, and the third question, percep-
tions of the prescriptive norm (desirable group attitude). The third
question was particularly important, as the use of the imperative
(i.e., should) helped to establish the direction in which the
students perceived social pressure to be operating.
Twenty-eight participants responded to these questions on
9-point scales (1 much too low, 9 much too high for the wages
questions; 1 very strongly opposed, 9 very strongly in favor
for the ethnic-theme dormitories and affirmative action questions).
Lower scores on the wages issue indicated greater degrees of
liberalism, as full-time Stanford employees are viewed as being
socioeconomically disadvantaged relative to the student popula-
tion. Conversely, higher scores on the ethnic-theme dormitories
and affirmative action issues indicated greater degrees of liberal-
ism.
We predicted that the prescriptive norm for each issue would be
liberal (as compared with the scale midpoint) and that the pre-
scriptive norm for each issue would be significantly more liberal
than both students own attitude (actual descriptive norm) and their
perception of the typical students attitude (perceived descriptive
norm). Indeed, the prescriptive norms for all three issues fell on the
liberal end (i.e., as compared with the midpoint) of the scale:
t(27) 9.84, p .001 for wages; t(27) 4.77, p .001 for
ethnic-theme dormitories; and t(27) 4.88, p .001 for affirma-
tive action. Furthermore, in all but one (marginally significant)
case, the prescriptive norm was judged to be significantly more
liberal than both the actual and perceived descriptive norms, which
were at or near the scale midpoint (see Table 1 for means). The
actual and perceived descriptive norms did not differ significantly
for any of the issues. These results supported the claim that the
liberal position represents the prescriptive group norm and that the
descriptive and prescriptive norms diverge enough to classify
students who hold extreme attitudes (in a direction either consis-
tent or inconsistent with the prescriptive norm) as deviants. They
also show that students, at least with respect to these issues, have
relatively accurate perceptions of where they stand relative to their
peers (see Nisbett & Kunda, 1985).
Study 1
Study 1 experimentally tested the hypothesis that people are
more comfortable expressing descriptive deviant opinions than
nondeviant or prescriptive deviant opinions. This was accom-
plished by randomly assigning participants to imagine that they
had to argue in support of a descriptive deviant, nondeviant, or
prescriptive deviant position on an issue and then measuring their
comfort in doing so. In addition, four potential mediators were
included. One of these assessed participants perceptions of the
desirability of the two forms of deviance, thereby permitting a
direct test of the mediational claim that descriptive deviants are
more comfortable because they know that their opinions render
them superior conformists (i.e., different from their peers in a
good way). The other three measures were included to permit
tests of alternative explanations. These questions asked how well
liked and popular participants believed their assigned position
would make them, how similar they believed their assigned posi-
tion was to that of their peers, and how much they believed their
assigned position made them different from their peers in a bad
Table 1
Mean Attitudes of Participants Toward Each Issue, Pretest
Attitude
Typical
Stanford Socially
Own students desirable
Issue M SD M SD M SD
Wages 4.07a 1.51 3.43a 1.20 2.68b 1.25
Ethnic-theme dormitories 5.39ab 2.10 5.00a 1.47 6.32b 1.47
Affirmative action 5.11a 2.17 5.11a 1.42 6.36b 1.47
Note. Ratings derived from a 9-point scale: 1 much too low, 9 much
too high for the wages question; 1 very strongly opposed, 9 very
strongly in favor for the ethnic-theme dormitories and affirmative action
questions. On wages question, lower scores greater liberalism; on
dormitories and affirmative action questions, higher scores greater
liberalism. Within each row, columns with different subscripts are signif-
icantly different from one another.
 SILENT AND VOCAL MINORITIES 875

way. To the extent that descriptive deviants greater comfort was Table 2
driven by their perception of superior conformity, we would not Mean Ratings of Participants by Assigned Position and
have expected their greater comfort to depend on their perception Dependent Measure, Study 1
that they were more positively evaluated or closer to the average
group opinion than were other group members. Descriptive Prescriptive
deviant Nondeviant deviant

Method Feeling/perception M SD M SD M SD

Participants. One hundred and thirty-six Stanford students (57 Comfort/nervousness 5.50a 1.98 5.09ab 1.69 4.49b 2.12
men, 77 women, 2 unspecified) participated in this questionnaire Similarity to others 5.38a 1.69 5.33a 1.52 3.70b 2.26
Superior conformity
experiment as part of a 1-hr-long mass testing session. They were different but good 4.87a 2.50 4.18a 2.17 3.09b 2.19
paid $20 upon completion of the entire session. Different but bad 3.20a 2.05 2.91a 1.82 4.73b 2.86
Materials and procedure. The questionnaire consisted of two Liking by others 4.78a 2.07 4.20a 1.82 2.72b 1.57
pages. On the first page, participants were asked to imagine being
Note. Ratings derived from a 9-point scale (1 not at all, 9 very
required to deliver a speech to another student advocating a posi- much) indicating participants comfort/nervousness about advocating the
tion on one of the three issues used in the pretest. The assigned assigned position and the extent to which advocating the position made
position was that of a descriptive deviant (much too low for wages, them similar to, different from (in a good way and a bad way), and liked
strongly in favor for ethnic-theme dormitories and affirmative by their peers. Within each row, columns with different subscripts are
action), a nondeviant (a little too low for wages, slightly in favor significantly different from one another.
for ethnic-theme dormitories and affirmative action), or a prescrip-
tive deviant (much too high for wages, strongly opposed for
Comfort/nervousness. The overall effect of assigned position
ethnic-theme dormitories and affirmative action). Participants
was significant, F(2, 133) 3.12, p .05, 2p .045. Consistent
were further instructed to imagine that the other student believed
with predictions, those assigned to be descriptive deviants reported
that the position they took in their speech was their true attitude.
being more comfortable and less nervous than did those assigned
After reading the scenario, participants indicated how comfort-
to be nondeviants and prescriptive deviants, t(133) 2.04, p
able and nervous they would feel delivering the speech (1 not at
.05.
all, 9 very much). Responses to the two items were averaged
Similarity. The overall effect of assigned position was signif-
(and the nervousness item was reverse coded) to form a composite
icant, F(2, 133) 11.98, p .001, 2p .153. Those assigned to
(r .32, p .001). Finally, participants responded to several
be descriptive deviants felt more similar to their peers than did
questions about their assigned position, also on a scale from 1 (not
those assigned to be nondeviants and prescriptive deviants,
at all) to 9 (very much). Specifically, they indicated the extent to
t(133) 2.60, p .01.
which actually holding their assigned position would make them
Superior conformity. The overall effect of assigned position
similar to their peers (similarity), different from their peers in a
was significant, F(2, 132) 6.86, p .001, 2p .094.1 Those
good way (superior conformity), and different from their peers in
assigned to be descriptive deviants were more inclined than those
a bad way (different but bad). They also indicated the extent to
assigned to be nondeviants and prescriptive deviants to believe that
which actually holding their assigned position would make them
their positions made them superior conformists (i.e., different but
well liked by and popular among their peers. These two items were
good), t(132) 2.97, p .005.
averaged to form a liking index (r .75, p .001).
Different but bad. The overall effect of assigned position was
significant, F(2, 132) 8.14, p .001, 2p .110. However, those
Results assigned to be descriptive deviants were no less likely than those
assigned to be nondeviants or prescriptive deviants to believe that
We hypothesized that participants assigned to express descrip-
their positions made them different but bad, t(132) 1.50, p
tive deviant opinions would report feeling more comfortable and
.14.
less nervous than those assigned to express either nondeviant or
Liking. The overall effect of assigned position was significant,
prescriptive deviant opinions. To test this hypothesis, we first
F(2, 129) 16.64, p .001, 2p .205. Those assigned to be
submitted the results to a 3 (position: descriptive deviant vs.
descriptive deviants were more likely than those assigned to be
nondeviant vs. prescriptive deviant) 3 (issue: wages vs. ethnic-
nondeviants or prescriptive deviants to report that their assigned
theme dormitories vs. affirmative action) analysis of variance
positions would make them well liked and popular, t(129) 4.17,
(ANOVA). The main dependent variable of interest was the com-
p .001.
fort/nervousness composite, but we also conducted parallel anal-
Mediational analyses. To test whether the relationship be-
yses on each of the ancillary measures described earlier. Because
tween assigned position (i.e., descriptive deviance) and comfort
these analyses revealed no main effects of issue and no Position
was driven by feelings of superior conformity, as opposed to
Issue interactions, we collapsed the results across the three issues.
assumptions of similarity, feelings of being different but bad
For each dependent measure, we ran a one-way ANOVA to
(among prescriptive deviants), or liking, we conducted mediational
examine the overall effect of assigned position. We also ran a
planned contrast comparing descriptive deviants (coded as 2) to
both nondeviants and prescriptive deviants (both coded as 1). 1
The difference in degrees of freedom is due to the fact that one
(For a list of means and differences between individual conditions, participant (or more, for some of the ancillary measures) did not respond
see Table 2.) to the item.
876 MORRISON AND MILLER
analyses using multiple regression (see Baron & Kenny, 1986).
For each analysis, we regressed the comfort composite onto the
term comparing descriptive deviants to both other conditions, the
term comparing nondeviants to prescriptive deviants (to control for
differences between these two groups), and the proposed mediator.
As noted above, the relation between assigned position and com-
fort was significant, as were the relations between assigned posi-
tion and each proposed mediator except different but bad (i.e.,
similarity, superior conformity, and liking). Thus, three of the four
potential mediators satisfied Baron and Kennys (1986) first two
criteria and were submitted to mediational analyses.
When the comfort composite was regressed onto assigned po-
sition and similarity, there was no relationship between similarity
and comfort, .132, t(132) 1.44, p .15. This finding
indicates that perceived similarity did not mediate the effect of
assigned position on comfort.
When the comfort composite was regressed onto assigned po-
sition and the superior conformity measure, superior conformity
and comfort were significantly correlated, .217, t(131)
2.47, p .02. However, the relation between assigned position and
comfort was reduced to nonsignificance, .111, t(131) 1.28,
p .20. A Sobel test revealed that this reduction was marginally
significant, z 1.90, p .06. This finding, consistent with
predictions, indicates that feelings of superior conformity partially
mediated the effect of assigned position on comfort (see Figure 1).
When the comfort composite was regressed onto assigned po-
sition and liking, there was no relation between liking and comfort,
.152, t(128) 1.58, p .11. This finding indicates that liking
did not mediate the effect of assigned position on comfort.
Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that group members experimentally as-
signed to argue for a descriptive deviant position were more
comfortable expressing that position than were those assigned a
prescriptive deviant or nondeviant position. The results strengthen
the claim that the greater comfort of descriptive than prescriptive
deviants derives from descriptive deviants perception that their
position distinguishes them from their peers in a positive way,
hence rendering them superior conformists.
Study 1 also ruled out two plausible alternative routes by which
the observed relation between descriptive deviance and comfort
might arise. The first of these involves the possibility that descrip-
tive deviants greater willingness to express their opinions is due to
a perception that they are similar to the rest of the group (Bassili,
2003; Glynn et al., 1997). The present findings argue strongly
against this account. Though descriptive deviants did perceive
themselves as being more similar to their peers than did nondevi-
ants and prescriptive deviants, there was no relation between their
Superior conformity
.246** .217*
Position (2 1 1) Comfort/nervousness
.111 (.173*)
Figure 1. Mediational analysis, Study 1.*p .05. **
p .01.
perceptions of similarity and their comfort in opinion expression.
Instead, descriptive deviants were more comfortable expressing
their opinions because they clearly recognized that their opinions
differed from the group average, albeit in a direction consistent
with the prescriptive norm.
A second possibility is that descriptive deviants, relative to
prescriptive deviants and nondeviants, believe that their opinions
will make them more popular and well liked among their peers.
Consistent with previous research on reactions to opinion deviants
(e.g., Hensley & Duval, 1976; Levine & Ranelli, 1978), Study 1
did find a positive effect of descriptive deviance on anticipated
liking by others. However, this effect did not mediate descriptive
deviants greater comfort in opinion expression. It is possible that
anticipated liking may prove to be a more critical predictor of
opinion expression when nondeviants are simply compared with
deviants, as opposed to when certain (i.e., descriptive) deviants are
compared with other group members.
Study 2
In Study 2, we moved beyond a vignette methodology by
assigning participants to actually deliver a speech in support of a
particular position on a controversial issue and then measuring
both their self-reported pride and their pride as rated by an ob-
server. If descriptive deviants do in fact believe that they are
different in a good way, then they should be proud of themselves
for one-upping their peers, not merely relieved (i.e., comfort-
able) as a result of fitting in with their peers (see Myers, 1978).
Indeed, pride-related emotions are generally thought to convey
ones successes and achievements to oneself and ones group,
thereby serving to enhance ones social statusthat is, to make
one seem superior to ones peers (Tracy & Robins, 2007). Study 2
also included a behavioral measure of opinion expressionthe
extent to which participants were willing to have their assigned
opinion made public. We hypothesized that participants assigned
to argue for a descriptive deviant (relative to nondeviant or pre-
scriptive deviant) opinion would both experience more pride-
related emotions and be more willing to publicly express their
assigned opinion.
Method
Participants. Thirty-four Stanford undergraduates participated
in this experiment. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
three conditions: descriptive deviant (n 12), nondeviant (n
12), or prescriptive deviant (n 10). The experiment took ap-
proximately 30 min, and participants were paid $8. One participant
was omitted from the analyses because she had previously partic-
ipated in a similar experiment, and 3 more were excluded because
they indicated that they did not know what affirmative action was.
The data from the remaining 30 participants (17 women, 13 men)
were retained in the final sample.
Materials and procedure. Participants were tested individu-
ally. Upon arrival, they were greeted by an experimenter and given
a page of written instructions. Participants read that the purpose of
the study was to assess peoples reactions to different types of
arguments and that they would prepare a short speech on a
controversial issue. They further read that their speech would be
videotaped and shown to another Stanford student in a different
 SILENT AND VOCAL MINORITIES
experimental session. More specifically, they learned that they
would be assigned to argue in support of a particular attitude
position on an issue and that whoever viewed the videotape would
think that this position represented their true attitude. Participants
were instructed to play along as best they could with the experi-
mental deceit and to not give any indication of their real attitude
during the speech.
Next, the experimenter explained that the issue and position
were written on the next page and that participants could also use
that page for notes. In all cases, the issue was the use of affirmative
action in college admissions decisions. However, participants were
assigned to take one of three different positions: descriptive devi-
ant (strongly in favoraffirmative action is definitely a good
thing), nondeviant (slightly in favoraffirmative action is proba-
bly a good thing, though there are some potential problems with
it), or prescriptive deviant (strongly opposedaffirmative action is
definitely a bad thing). The experimenter left the room and gave
participants 5 min to prepare the speech, which, they were told,
could be as short or long as they wanted.
Once the 5 min had passed, the experimenter re-entered the
room with the video camera and recorded the speech. She then
gave participants a packet of paper-and-pencil questionnaires,
which contained two of the three dependent measures. The first
was a 7-item measure of achievement pride (Tracy & Robins,
2007). The scale items (e.g., accomplished, confident) were inter-
spersed with other pride-irrelevant emotions (e.g., critical, opti-
mistic) to disguise the purpose of the experiment. Participants
responded on a 5-point scale (1 not at all, 5 extremely)
according to how they had felt during the speech, with higher
scores reflecting higher levels of pride. The measure demonstrated
good reliability ( .92).
The second dependent variable was the behavioral measure of
public opinion expression. Following a series of filler question-
naires designed to further minimize suspicion, participants read
that ethically the researchers could not use the videotape of the
speech in future experimental sessions unless participants were
comfortable with their doing so. Participants then indicated
whether they wanted their speech to be shown to another partici-
pant (0 no, 1 yes). Participants were told that in all cases they
would be identified by participant number and not by name and
that they would receive full payment regardless of which choice
they made.
At the end of the experiment, participants completed a suspicion
probe and were fully debriefed. Specifically, they learned that their
speech would never be shown to another participant and that it
would only be used for coding purposes within the lab. They were
then paid, thanked, and dismissed. None of the participants re-
ported any awareness of the true experimental hypothesis.
Video coding. After the data had been collected, all videotapes
were viewed by a coder who was blind to the experimental
hypothesis. The coder used a 5-point scale (1 not at all, 5
extremely) to rate each participant on two pride-related emotions:
proud and confident. Because the coders two ratings were highly
correlated, r(30) .84, p .001, they were averaged to form a
composite. Participants scores on this composite were margin-
ally correlated with their self-reported pride scores, r(30) .29,
p .12.
877
Results
Self-reported pride. We hypothesized that participants as-
signed to argue for the descriptive deviant position would report
higher levels of pride than those assigned to argue for both the
nondeviant and prescriptive deviant positions. To test this hypoth-
esis, we submitted participants self-reported pride scores to a
one-way ANOVA. Paralleling the analytic strategy used in Study
1, participants in the descriptive deviant condition (coded as 2)
were compared with participants in both of the other conditions
(coded as 1).
The overall omnibus test was significant, F(2, 27) 5.62, p
.01, 2p .294. In addition, the planned contrast was significant,
t(27) 3.21, p .01, indicating that participants in the descriptive
deviant condition felt more proud during their speeches than did
those in either the nondeviant condition or the prescriptive deviant
condition (see Table 3).
Observer-rated pride. We hypothesized that participants as-
signed to argue for the descriptive deviant position would be rated
as more proud than those assigned to argue for both the nondeviant
and prescriptive deviant positions. To test this hypothesis, we
submitted participants pride scores (as rated by the coder) to a
one-way ANOVA and planned contrast, as described earlier.
The overall omnibus test was marginal, F(2, 27) 2.91, p
.07, 2p .177. However, the planned contrast attained signifi-
cance, t(27) 2.13, p .04, indicating that participants in the
descriptive deviant conditionrelative to those in the other two
conditionsappeared to an outside observer to be more proud (see
Table 3).
Behavioral opinion expression. We hypothesized that partici-
pants in the descriptive deviant condition would be more willing to
give the researchers permission to use their videotape in future
research than would participants assigned to the other two condi-
tions. This hypothesis was confirmed, 2(2, N 30) 7.08, p
.03. In total, 5 participants (50%) in the descriptive deviant con-
dition, 0 participants (0%) in the nondeviant condition, and 2
participants (20%) in the prescriptive deviant condition gave per-
mission for their videotape to be shown to another student.
Discussion
The results of Study 2 demonstrate that the relation between
descriptive deviance and opinion expression is not limited to
hypothetical situations, nor is it limited to self-reported feelings of
comfort. When participants were actually instructed to deliver a
speech on a controversial issue, those who took the position of a
Table 3
Mean Self-Reported and Observer-Rated Pride by Condition,
Study 2
Descriptive Prescriptive
deviant Nondeviant deviant
Pride M SD M SD M SD
Self-reported 2.90a 1.02 1.79b .58 2.09b .63
Observer-rated 3.35a 1.03 2.40b .66 2.85ab .91
Note. Within each row, columns with different subscripts are signifi-
cantly different from one another.
878 MORRISON AND MILLER
descriptive deviant reported feeling and were rated by an observer
as being more proud than did those who took either the nondeviant
or prescriptive deviant position. Furthermore, participants in the
descriptive deviant condition were especially willing to give per-
mission for their speeches to be used in future research.
One potential limitation of Study 2 (as well as Study 1) is the
fact that the descriptive deviant position was always the liberal
position. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that those holding extremely
liberal positions tend generally to be more comfortable expressing
their opinions than do their more conservative peers, even when
the liberal position does not represent the prescriptive group norm.
The fact that participants were more comfortable expressing de-
scriptive deviant (extremely liberal) positions when the positions
were not their own and had merely been assigned to them is
reassuring, but still it is not conclusive. A more compelling dem-
onstration would show that descriptive deviants were more com-
fortable expressing their opinions even when those opinions were
conservative. We sought to perform just such a demonstration in
Study 3. In addition, unlike Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 employed a
measure of opinion expression that occurred naturally in the field.
Study 3
One form of opinion expression (especially in political domains)
is the display of bumper stickers on ones vehicle. The aftermath
of the 2004 U.S. presidential election provided an appropriate
context in which to examine this form of opinion expression
among descriptive and prescriptive deviants. In Study 3, we ac-
complished this by recording the proportions of pro-Democratic
and pro-Republican bumper stickers in two different counties of
California: a Blue county (i.e., one with more registered Dem-
ocrats than Republicans) and a Red county (i.e., one with more
registered Republicans than Democrats).
We argue that the distinction between Democratic and Repub-
lican bumper sticker holders is not simply that between individuals
who espouse the majority and minority positions in each location.
A bumper sticker supporting a particular political candidate or
party identifies one not just as a member of a minority or majority
group but as an especially committed member of that group. Thus,
we argueindeed, we demonstrate in survey results reported
that displaying a sticker on ones vehicle in support of a candidate
is a sufficiently distinctive act that it qualifies one as a statistical
deviant, irrespective of majority/minority status. For purposes of
this study, Democratic sticker holders were classified as descrip-
tive deviants in the Blue county and prescriptive deviants in the
Red county. Conversely, Republican sticker holders were catego-
rized as descriptive deviants in the Red county and prescriptive
deviants in the Blue county.
We hypothesized that, irrespective of the prescriptive county
norm, descriptive deviant stickers would be overrepresented and
prescriptive deviant stickers underrepresented in each county.
More precisely, we expected that the ratio of descriptive deviant
stickers to prescriptive deviant stickers in each county would be
significantly higher than the ratio of descriptive deviant voters to
prescriptive deviant voters.
Method
The study was conducted at six different Target store loca-
tionsthree in Santa Clara County (the Blue county) and three in
San Diego County (the Red county) over a 2-week period in
March 2005. There were 8 days of data collection in total. To
minimize the chances that the same sticker would be counted more
than once (e.g., on different days or at different times), we as-
signed one researcher to each parking lot. On the days of the study,
the researchers spent approximately 45 min circulating around the
parking lots of each store and tallying the numbers of political
bumper stickers that were displayed. Pro-Kerry and anti-Bush
stickers were both considered to indicate Democratic voters,
whereas pro-Bush stickers were classified as indicating Republi-
can voters.2 There were no anti-Kerry stickers in either county.
To measure additional variables of potential interest, the re-
searchers put an addressed and stamped envelope containing a
short survey on all sticker-sporting vehicles. Of the 53 individuals
with bumper stickers on their vehicles, 30 (57%) returned the
survey. Respondents were asked to indicate how they themselves
felt about George W. Bush and John Kerry, as well as how they
thought the average resident of their county felt about the two
candidates. Responses to these questions were made on a 10-point
scale (1 dont like him at all, 10 like him very much). The
order in which the questions about Bush and Kerry were presented
was counterbalanced across participants.
Although participants were not asked to specify their county of
residence, the survey items were worded to pertain to either San
Diego County or Santa Clara County (e.g., How would you
describe the average San Diego [Santa Clara] County residents
feelings toward George W. Bush [John Kerry]?). Thus, we can be
reasonably assured that participants who provided answers to these
questions were from the county in which the study was conducted.
Only 1 participanta Republican sticker holder in San Diego
County indicated that he or she was not a resident of that county
and thus did not complete the survey. The data from that partici-
pant were omitted from all subsequent analyses.
Results and Discussion
Bumper sticker ratios. The results from this study were ana-
lyzed using chi-square tests and are depicted in Table 4. As a
manipulation check (i.e., establishing that descriptive deviants in
both Santa Clara and San Diego counties were more vocal than
prescriptive deviants), we first looked at the prevalence of Dem-
ocratic and Republican bumper stickers in each locale. As ex-
pected, in Santa Clara County, the number of Democratic (descrip-
tive deviant) bumper stickers exceeded the number of Republican
(prescriptive deviant) stickers. In San Diego County, however,
there were more Republican (descriptive deviant) stickers than
Democratic (prescriptive deviant) stickers. The difference between
the counties was significant, 2(1, N 52) 21.0, p .001.
Next, we tested our hypothesis that descriptive deviant stickers
would be overrepresented in both Santa Clara and San Diego
counties. To do this, we compared the proportion of descriptive
deviant (vs. prescriptive deviant) stickers to that of descriptive
deviant (vs. prescriptive deviant) registered voters in each locale
2
It would have been interesting to separate pro-Kerry and anti-Bush
stickers into different categories and compare their popularities within each
county. However, given our small sample size, we were unable to perform
such an analysis.
 SILENT AND VOCAL MINORITIES 879

Table 4
Proportions of Democratic and Republican Bumper Stickers and Registered Voters in Santa
Clara and San Diego Counties, California, Study 3

Santa Clara County San Diego County

Democratica Republicanb Democraticb Republicana

Variable % n % n % n % n

Bumper stickers 93.0 14 7.0 1 27.0 10 73.0 27

Registered voters 62.9 37.1 43.0 57.0
a
Descriptive deviant.
b
Prescriptive deviant.

(California Secretary of State, 2004).3 Consistent with our hypoth-
esis, the ratio of Democratic-to-Republican stickers was signifi-
cantly higher than the ratio of Democratic-to-Republican regis-
tered voters in Santa Clara County, 2(1, N 15) 7.10, p .01,
indicating that the descriptive deviant (Democratic) voice was
indeed overrepresented in the population. However, the
Democratic-to-Republican sticker ratio was significantly lower
than the Democratic-to-Republican registered voter ratio in San
Diego County, 2(1, N 37) 3.85, p .05 (see Table 4). That
is, there were disproportionately more descriptive deviant (Repub-
lican) stickers than prescriptive deviant (Democratic) stickers.
Survey results. The first goal of the survey was to establish
that displaying a bumper sticker identifies oneself as an extremist
(i.e., a descriptive or prescriptive deviant), regardless of majority
or minority status. To do so, we compared Democratic and Re-
publican respondents own feelings toward Bush and Kerryas
reported in the surveywith those of the average resident of their
county, using paired samples t tests. Supporting the assumption
that bumper sticker holders perceived themselves to be extreme
partisans, Democratic respondents in each county reported that
they liked Kerry and disliked Bush significantly more than did the
average resident of their county. Conversely, Republican respon-
dents in San Diego County reported that they both liked Bush and
disliked Kerry significantly more than did the average San Diego
County resident (see Table 5). We could not conduct a similar
analysis with Republican Santa Clara County residents because
there was only 1 such individual in our sample. These findings
demonstrated that both descriptive and prescriptive deviants were
aware that their opinions were statistically extreme.
The survey results also allowed us to rule out a feasible alter-
native explanation for the disproportionate sticker-to-vote ratios:
specifically, that descriptive deviants (i.e., Democrats) in Santa
Clara County are simply more extreme than prescriptive deviants
(i.e., Democrats) in San Diego County. In fact, San Diego County
Democrats liked Kerry (n 7, M 8.29, SD 0.95) just as much
as their Santa Clara County counterparts did (n 10, M 8.30,
SD 0.95), t(15) .03, ns. Further, there was no difference in
the extent to which Democrats from each county disliked Bush
(M 1.14, SD 0.38 for San Diego County; M 1.40, SD
0.85 for Santa Clara County), t(15) 1.04, ns. Given the limited
number of Santa Clara County Republicans in our sample, we
could not compare Republicans from Santa Clara County with
those from San Diego County.
Summary. Study 3 showed that descriptive deviants were more
willing to express their political opinions via bumper stickers than
were prescriptive deviants, regardless of whether descriptive de-
viance was defined as extremely liberal or extremely conservative.
This phenomenon occurred even though sticker holders in each
county had a generally accurate perception of how their feelings
toward each of the two presidential candidates compared with
those of the average resident of their county. In fact, in light of the
results of Studies 1 and 2, descriptive deviants awareness of their
superior conformity may have been what prompted them to pub-
licize their position in the first place.
General Discussion
The present research takes as its point of departure the assump-
tion that there are two norms from which group members can
deviate. The first is the descriptive or statistical norm of the group;
individual members attitudes can be closer to or further from the
average attitude. The second is the prescriptive or prototypical
norm of the group; individual members attitudes can be closer to
or further from the desirable attitude. The existence of these two
(often imperfectly correlated) standards means that deviance can
take two forms: divergence from the average attitude and diver-
gence from the desirable attitude. Members who deviate from the
descriptive norm of the group in a direction away from the pre-
scriptive norm are deviants with respect to both standards. We
have used the term prescriptive deviants to describe them. On the
other hand, members who deviate from the descriptive norm in the
direction of the prescriptive norm are deviants in relation to the
first standard, but not in relation to the second. We have used the
term descriptive deviants to describe them. The present research
thus departs from traditional perspectives on opinion expression, in
which opinions tend to be dichotomously categorized as minority/
majority (e.g., Asch, 1956; Matz & Wood, 2005) or to be defined
solely based on the magnitude of deviation from the group average
(e.g., Bassili, 2003; Glynn et al., 1997). In so doing, the present
research introduces a novel framework for classifying (and pre-
dicting the behavior of) those group members who hold deviant
opinions.
3
We used the percentages of registered voters, rather than the percent-
ages of residents who actually voted for Bush and Kerry, because the
former were available for each particular city in which data were collected.
The latter were only available countywide. Thus, the data on the percent-
ages of registered voters in each county allowed a more precise test of our
hypothesis.
880 MORRISON AND MILLER
Table 5
Bumper Sticker Holders Ratings of George W. Bush and John Kerry by County, Study 3
Self
County Party affiliation M SD
San Diego
Democratic 1.14 0.38
Republican 9.18 0.75
Santa Clara
Democratic 1.50 0.85
Note. Ratings derived from 10-point scale (1 dont like him at all, 10 like him very much).
*
p .05
The distinction between descriptive and prescriptive deviants
suggests that not all those whose attitudes diverge from the group
average will feel equally deviant. Specifically, those group mem-
bers whose opinions are statistically extreme but congruent with
the prescriptive norm will feel less deviant, and hence will be more
willing to express their attitudes, than will those group members
whose opinions are both statistically extreme and incongruent with
the prescriptive norm, as well as those group members whose
attitudes are not extreme. Our proposed explanation for this result
is that while both descriptive and prescriptive deviants recognize
that their opinions render them different from their peers, the
former but not the latteralso think that their extreme opinions
render them superior conformists (i.e., different in a good way)
relative to their peers, even their nondeviant peers. The present
studies provide strong support for this hypothesis.
In Studies 1 and 2, we found a consistent relation between
direction of deviance and opinion expression among college stu-
dents. Study 1 showed that participants were more comfortable
expressing descriptive deviant (vs. nondeviant or prescriptive de-
viant) opinions that were randomly assigned to them and that the
relation between descriptive deviance and comfort was mediated
by descriptive deviants perception of superior conformity (i.e.,
that they differed from their peers in a good way). Study 2 found
that participants assigned to argue for a descriptive deviant posi-
tion experienced more pride, were rated as being more proud by an
observer, and were more willing to publicly express their assigned
position than were participants assigned to argue for a nondeviant
or prescriptive deviant position. Study 3 replicated the first two
studies in a field context and demonstrated that descriptive devi-
ants were more vocal than prescriptive deviants, regardless of
whether the prescriptive group norm was liberal (as it was in
Studies 1 and 2) or conservative.
Deviance, Superior Conformity, and Opinion Expression
The present studies found that descriptive deviants were aware
that their opinions diverged from that of the average group mem-
ber (an indicator of difference). However, because they knew that
their opinions conformed to the prescriptive group norm (an indi-
cator of similarity), they were not rendered uncomfortable by their
Ratings
Bush Kerry
Average Average
resident Self resident
M SD t M SD M SD t
5.86 1.46 9.04* 8.29 0.95 5.57 1.13 6.45*
7.45 1.63 3.19* 1.64 1.03 3.73 1.27 5.04*
3.70 1.42 4.70* 8.30 0.95 7.30 0.95 2.37*
divergence from the average group opinion. In fact, they felt
superior to their peers and proud of themselves as a result of being
deviant (see Blanton & Christie, 2003; Myers, 1978). These find-
ings are consistent with the idea that people strive to satisfy their
competing needs for similarity and difference (e.g., Brewer, 1991;
Hornsey & Jetten, 2004; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). However, our
findings extend the idea by providing empirical evidence for a
strategy through which these needs can be satisfied. Specifically,
individuals can conform even more than other group members to
group norms (Codol, 1975)in the present context, by expressing
opinions that make them different but good.
An important conclusion of the present research is that holding
deviant attitudes will not inevitably produce conflict in people
(e.g., Bassili, 2003; Matz & Wood, 2005; Nemeth & Wachtler,
1983). Group members holding deviant attitudes will only expe-
rience marginality, and the attendant reluctance to express their
attitudes, when they perceive that their attitudes diverge not just
from the average group opinion but also from the desirable group
opinion. Those whose attitudes diverge from the average group
opinion but not from the desirable group opinion will actually feel
emboldened by the knowledge that their attitudes make them
superior conformists.
In demonstrating that descriptive deviants are more willing to
express their opinions because of feelings of superior conformity,
our research distinguishes itself from that of Abrams and col-
leagues (Abrams et al., 2000, 2002, 2005). Because a key assump-
tion of their model is that people seek to differentiate their ingroup
from outgroups, they too may have predicted that descriptive
deviants (or more generally, those who validate group norms to the
extreme) would be more vocal than either prescriptive deviants (or
more generally, those who invalidate group norms to the extreme)
or nondeviants. However, Abrams et al. did not test this prediction
directly, nor did they show that descriptive deviants seek to dis-
tinguish themselves within their group by being superior conform-
ists. Future research should determine whether descriptive deviants
exhibit higher levels of opinion expression not only because they
perceive themselves as different but good, but also because they
perceive themselves as helping to clarify the norms of the ingroup.
For example, it is possible that the relation between descriptive
 SILENT AND VOCAL MINORITIES
deviance and opinion expression is strongest when the norms of
the ingroup are made salient (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-
Taboada, 1998; Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001) or when
differences between the ingroup and a relevant outgroup are rein-
forced (Abrams et al., 2000, 2002).
Opinion Expression in Single-Group Versus Two-Group
Contexts
As noted in the introduction, the present article focused on
contexts involving a single group whose members attitudes to-
ward particular issues were roughly normally distributed. In Stud-
ies 1 and 2, we measured the willingness of college students on a
moderately liberal campus to express their attitudes toward impor-
tant campus issues to their peers. In Study 3, we measured the
willingness of county residents to display either liberal or conser-
vative political bumper stickers on their vehicles. However, be-
cause previous research has suggested that perceptions of group
members attitudes are often affected by the social context
(Doosje, Haslam, Spears, Oakes, & Koomen, 1998; Ellemers,
Spears, & Doosje, 2002), we might predict different results de-
pending on which group identity is most accessible in peoples
minds. For instance, if participants in Studies 1 and 2 had been
thinking about their political identity (i.e., as liberal or conserva-
tive) instead of their Stanford student identity, then they likely
would have perceived the distribution of student attitudes as bi-
modal rather than normal. In other words, they would have per-
ceived Stanford students to be divided into two groups with two
prescriptive norms (liberal and conservative), instead of a single
group with one prescriptive norm (liberal).
When a single group context is inferred, then descriptive devi-
antsas demonstrated in the present studiesshould be more
likely than other group members to feel emboldened because their
position as descriptive deviants sets them apart from their peers in
a direction consistent with the (single) prescriptive group norm. By
contrast, when a two-group context is inferred, the concept of
descriptive deviance should carry less relevance because group
members on either extreme would be considered nondeviants or
majorities within that population. Group members who hold mod-
erate attitudes would be considered deviants or minorities within
both populations, given their departure from both prescriptive
group norms (see Levine & Ranelli, 1978). In this situation, the
relation between descriptive deviance and opinion expression
would not necessarily emerge, nor would the relationship between
descriptive deviance and perceptions of superior conformity. In-
stead, those with extreme attitudes would simply be more willing
to express their opinions within their group than those with mod-
erate attitudes, perhaps because the former feel similar to or well
liked by other group members.
Conclusion
The present results suggest that the public discourse in groups
with strong social identities will tend to be skewed away from the
average position of the group in the direction of the desirable
position of the group. What this means in relation to Noelle-
Neumanns (1984) speculation about a spiral of silence is that
those group members whose private positions deviate from both
the descriptive and prescriptive norms are especially prone to
881
remaining silent. By contrast, those group members whose private
positions deviate from the descriptive (but not prescriptive) norm
are especially prone to voicing their opinions.
In our studies, we found that group members were reasonably
accurate in their perceptions of the distance between their own
attitude and the average group attitude. Over time, however, de-
scriptive deviants willingness to speak out could lead to pluralistic
ignorance and a mistaken sense of the group position by both
ingroup and outgroup members (Miller & McFarland, 1987; Pren-
tice & Miller, 1996). It could also induce a gradual shift in the
private opinions of group members toward the desirable opinion
(see Myers, 1978; Paicheler, 1977). The changing of descriptive
and prescriptive group norms in this manner, in turn, further
increases political and ideological extremism.
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Accepted September 8, 2007
 PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource

Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative

Kathleen D. Vohs Roy F. Baumeister

University of Minnesota Florida State University

Brandon J. Schmeichel Jean M. Twenge

Texas A&M University San Diego State University

Noelle M. Nelson Dianne M. Tice

University of Minnesota Florida State University

The current research tested the hypothesis that making many choices impairs subsequent self-control.
Drawing from a limited-resource model of self-regulation and executive function, the authors hypothe-
sized that decision making depletes the same resource used for self-control and active responding. In 4
laboratory studies, some participants made choices among consumer goods or college course options,
whereas others thought about the same options without making choices. Making choices led to reduced
self-control (i.e., less physical stamina, reduced persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination,
and less quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations). A field study then found that reduced
self-control was predicted by shoppers self-reported degree of previous active decision making. Further
studies suggested that choosing is more depleting than merely deliberating and forming preferences about
options and more depleting than implementing choices made by someone else and that anticipating the
choice task as enjoyable can reduce the depleting effect for the first choices but not for many choices.

Keywords: choice, self-regulation, self-control, decision making, executive function

The rich complexity of human social life is partly attributable to
choice. Each day millions of people make multiple decisions.
These range from momentous and far-reaching decisions, such as
what career to pursue and whether to order the troops into battle,
Kathleen D. Vohs and Noelle M. Nelson, Marketing Department, Carlson
School of Management, University of Minnesota; Roy F. Baumeister and
Dianne M. Tice, Department of Psychology, Florida State University; Brandon
J. Schmeichel, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University; Jean M.
Twenge, Department of Psychology, San Diego State University.
Preparation of this article was supported by National Institutes of Health
Grant MH12794 to Kathleen D. Vohs and Grant MH 57039 to Roy F.
Baumeister, funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council to Kathleen D. Vohs, and support from the Canada Research Chair
Council and the McKnight Land-Grant Professorship program to Kathleen
D. Vohs. We would like to thank Alison Boyce, Melissa Lassiter, Sloane
Rampton, Denise Kartchner, Krystal Hansen, Mandee Lue Chatterton,
Louis Wagner, Allison Park, Erica Greaves, Karyn Cirino, and Megan
Kimbrell for assistance conducting the studies included in this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kathleen
D. Vohs, Marketing Department, Carlson School of Management, Univer-
sity of Minnesota, Suite 3-150, 321 19th Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN
55455. E-mail: vohsx005@umn.edu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 883 898
Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association 0022-3514/08/$12.00
to relatively fleeting and inconsequential choices, such as whether
to take another cup of tea or to floss that night.
Moreover, choices have proliferated, increasing the number of
decisions people can (and must) make. The diversity of consumer
product selection has expanded exponentially, such that the aver-
age American supermarket in 1976 carried 9,000 different unique
products, whereas 15 years later that figure had ballooned to
30,000 (Waldman, 1992). It is estimated that there are currently 1
million SKUs (stock keeping units, thus unique specific products)
in the US and that the average supermarket carries 40,000 of them
(Trout, 2005). The coffee shop chain Starbucks boasted in 2003
that it offered each customer 19,000 beverage possibilities at every
store. Similar proliferations of alternatives have occurred with
television channels, dating partners, investment options, and in
countless other spheres.
Has the proliferation of choice uniformly made life easier and
better? Possibly not. Consumer behavior scientists long have ob-
served that consumers feel frustrated and overwhelmed with the
intense information demands that accompany large assortments
(Huffman & Kahn, 1998; Malhotra, 1982). Iyengar and Lepper
(2000) found that consumers who faced 24 options, as opposed to
6 options, were less willing to decide to buy anything at all, and
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.883

883
884 VOHS ET AL.
those who did buy were less satisfied with their purchase. Such
findings suggest that choice, to the extent that it requires greater
decision making among options, can become burdensome and
ultimately counterproductive. Although we do not argue that hav-
ing no choice is good, recent commentaries have denounced the
notion of ever-increasing choice, using words like relentless and
inescapable (Mick, 2005) to describe this tyranny of freedom
(Schwartz, 2000, p. 79).
The present investigation was designed to offer a possible
explanation for the detrimental effects of choosing. Our approach
was based on recent evidence that the selfs executive function
relies on a limited resource that resembles a form of strength or
energy. Past work has mainly established that this resource is
depleted in acts of self-regulation (Baumeister, 2002; Muraven,
Tice, & Baumeister, 1998; Vohs & Heatherton, 2000), but it may
also be used in other executive activities of the self, most notably
in making choices. We hypothesized that this resource is the same
as that used for self-regulation. As a result, one repercussion of
making choices could be a subsequent reduction in effective self-
regulation due to a lack of resources to put toward subsequent
tasks and challenges.
Choice and Control
By some analyses, human life is full of constant choices, insofar
as almost every time one acts, one could probably have done
something different (Sartre, 1956; but cf. Hofmann, Strack, &
Deutsch, in press). By that definition, the above Starbucks example
would entail that every customer makes 19,000 choices with every
order. We use the term choice in a more limited sense, however, to
refer to choices made by a conscious consideration among alter-
natives. Much of the time people proceed by routine, habit, and
automatic processes (Bargh, 2002). We consider the contemplation
of alternatives and selection among them to be a meaningful and
effortful internal act that involves more than habitual behavior.
The most advanced form of choosing involves weighing informa-
tion about currently available options so as to select the option that
seems most promising. This process would be the most flexible
and potentially the most adaptive in terms of promoting survival
and reproduction (especially in the multidimensional social envi-
ronment known as human culture), but it requires the most elab-
orate information-processing apparatus and the most pliant behav-
ior control systemwhich would suggest that it is a costly skill.
The cost of such choosing is our current focus.
Self-Regulatory Resource Depletion
The selfs executive function is the agent that makes decisions,
initiates and maintains action, and regulates the self by operating
on its inner states (Baumeister, 1998). We define self-regulation as
the self exerting control to override a prepotent response, with the
assumption that replacing one response with another is done to
attain goals and conform to standards. Recent findings have indi-
cated that many of the selfs activities depend on a common
resource, akin to energy or strength. This step encompasses re-
sponses designed to move the person from the current point toward
the standard (cf. operate mode in cybernetic models; Carver &
Scheier, 1990). All of these activities draw on the same resource,
which is limited and seems easily depleted.
A series of studies has provided evidence that some self-
resource is depleted by acts of self-regulation. Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice (1998) and Muraven et al. (1998)
showed that performing one act of regulating the self impaired
performance on a subsequent, seemingly unrelated act of self-
control. Presumably, the first act of self-control depleted some
common resource that would have been needed to perform better
at the second act of self-control. Depletion of the selfs resources
(also termed ego depletion) has been linked to multiple behavioral
problems, including overeating by dieters (Vohs & Heatherton,
2000), prejudicial responding (Richeson & Shelton, 2003), inef-
fective self-presentation (Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005),
intellectual underachievement (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister,
2003), inappropriate sexual responses (Gailliot & Baumeister,
2007), and impulsive overspending (Vohs & Faber, 2007).
Self-regulation and decision making may share more than sim-
ply being housed under the executive function of the self. The core
question of the present research was whether the resources that
drive self-regulation might also govern other activities of the
executive function, such as decision making (Vohs, 2006). If so,
then making choices should lead to impaired self-control after-
ward, even on tasks unrelated to making those choices.
Choice Can Impair Self-Control
There are several reasons to think that choosing would deplete
the selfs strength. These reasons also differentiate the act of
deliberation from that of choosing. Self-regulation presumably
consumes resources because the self must override one response
and then substitute a different response, and energy is needed to
perform these interrupt and initiate functions. In support of the
uniqueness of choosing, the reflectiveimplemental model (Strack,
Werth, & Deutsch, 2006) conceptualizes choosing as a quasi-
behavioral act that ties the selected option to the self via the
creation of a mental representation. The initiation of a mental link
between the active, intentional, reflective part of the self and the
desired option also suggests an energy-consuming act that would
deplete regulatory resources (Vohs, 2006).
Prior work has contained mixed findings about whether choos-
ing depletes resources. One study found evidence of depletion
using a dissonance paradigm, in which making a choice to perform
a counterattitudinal behavior resulted in subsequent impairment in
self-control (Baumeister et al., 1998). This finding could mean that
choosing depletes the selfs resources but may also mean that
dissonance-reduction processes were depleting. Moller, Deci, and
Ryan (2006) produced evidence that participants who freely chose
their favorite option showed no signs of depletion. They concluded
that autonomous choice is not depleting.
We readily accept that some choices are more depleting than
others. Pleasantness might well mitigate the impact of choosing,
especially if only a few choices are made. Still, we reasoned that
making a choice involves a special intrapersonal act. This step,
which commits the person to a course of action (Strack et al.,
2006), may take effort above and beyond merely thinking about
possible options. Hence choosing may consume some of the selfs
limited supply of energy, thereby rendering the resource less
available for further demands.
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
Pilot Study
The pilot study was designed to justify the assumptions behind
the choice procedure that was to be used in Experiments 1 4, and
it also validated a self-report measure for use in Study 5. The
purpose was to show that we could measure the exertion involved
in choosing.
Method
Participants. Participants were 34 undergraduate students (20
men) who participated in exchange for partial course credit.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either
make choices or rate products. They were given a list of specific
varieties of products, such as colored pens, scented candles, pop-
ular magazines, and colored t-shirts. Participants in the no-choice
condition were asked to indicate the extent to which they had used
each product in the past (on a scale from 1 never to 5 very
often). Participants in the choice condition were given the same list
of products but were instructed to choose between two different
versions of each product (e.g., a white t-shirt vs. a black t-shirt, a
red pen vs. a purple pen). Participants were told that they would
receive a small gift on the basis of their choices or ratings (de-
pending on condition). Thus, participants responses had poten-
tially real (though relatively minor) outcomes. Both conditions
faced a questionnaire with 60 items on it, but only in the choices
condition were the items asking for decisions.
Subsequently, participants completed the state version of the
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark,
& Tellegen, 1988) and an eight-item questionnaire that served as
the manipulation check of the methods. Two of the items asked
about the extent to which the previous task had involved making
choices, two items asked about engaging in deliberation and care-
ful consideration, one item asked if the task reflected the partici-
pants own choosing, another item asked about whether the task
involved thinking about options, and yet another asked about how
active the participant had felt during the previous task. The last
item asked for ratings of fatigue. The first seven items were
designed to tap into the different aspects of choice making that are
important in the depletion of self-resources; the last item on fatigue
was included to see whether participants reported feeling more
tired after making multiple choices. After completing the product-
task questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Results and Discussion
A factor analysis of the eight items showed that one factor
accounted for 43% of the variance in the unrotated solution (eig-
envalue 3.46), whereas the second factor (eigenvalue 1.27)
accounted for an additional 16% of variance. This principal-
components analysis extracted a two-component structure (eigen-
values over 1 selected) for the eight items on the choices ques-
tionnaire. Factor scores on each of the choice factors were derived
for each participant. Of the two factors, the larger one seemed to
correspond most closely to the act of making choices, which is to
say that the two highest loading items on this factor were percep-
tions of the extent to which participants task involved (a) thinking
about different options, followed by (b) making many choices. The
other factor seemed to relate most closely to feelings of fatigue, in
that the tiredness item made the biggest contribution to this factor.
885
Two independent t-tests, one for each factor, were used to
predict factor scores as a function of choices condition versus
frequency-rating (i.e., no choice) condition. Scores on the Choices
factor were significantly predicted by condition, t(32) 2.65, p
.02, whereas factor scores on the other factor (i.e., Fatigue) showed
no differences as a function of condition, t(32) 0.49, ns. Thus,
the main finding of the pilot study was that participants who made
choices among products reported being more active, conscious,
and deliberative during the task relative to participants who merely
rated the frequency with which they had used the products.
The choices task took about a minute longer (M 210.32 s,
SD 65.98) than did the frequency-rating task (M 146.32 s,
SD 44.02), and the difference was significant, t(32) 3.36, p
.01. Time spent on the task did not correlate with either of the two
factor scores, Factor 1: r(34) .07, ns, Factor 2: r(34) .12, ns.
As mentioned, participants first charge after the product task
was to complete the PANAS to test for potential mood differences
as a function of condition. As expected, condition did not deter-
mine positive affect (choices condition: M 24.31, SD 7.09;
frequency-rating condition: M 25.05, SD 6.61) or negative
affect (choices condition: M 13.19, SD 4.45; frequency-rating
condition: M 11.89, SD 2.25), t(32) 0.32, ns.
Experiments 1A and 1B: Consumer Choices and an
Unsavory Drink
Our theory holds that effortful, involving choices could deplete
the selfs resources and that this depletion would impair perfor-
mance on a self-regulation task. Hence in Experiments 1A and 1B,
a choice (vs. no choice) manipulation was followed by a self-
regulation task.
Self-regulatory resource depletion was measured by how much
of a bad-tasting (but not harmful) beverage people drank. Making
oneself drink an aversive beverage requires self-control insofar as
people are disinclined to imbibe it and must therefore force them-
selves to do something they do not want to do. We used a drink
made of a combination of vinegar and water to approximate a
taking ones medicine scenario, and in this way we measured
behavior and not simply responses on a questionnaire (Baumeister,
Vohs, & Funder, 2007). We predicted that people who had made
choices among products would not consume as much of the drink
as the no-choice participants would.
The two studies were nearly identical. The one main exception
was that we altered the no-choice task in Experiment 1B so as to
equalize the duration of the initial tasks. While conducting Exper-
iment 1A (and as seen empirically in the pilot study), it occurred
to us that the choices task might last longer than the frequency-
rating task, a difference that could potentially confound the results.
Hence, Experiment 1B used a different no-choice task so as to
ensure equal duration in the two conditions.
Method
Participants. Thirty undergraduate students (20 women) par-
ticipated in Experiment 1A and 30 undergraduate students (18
women) participated in Experiment 1B in exchange for partial
course credit.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to a choice
task or a no-choice task. Before completing questionnaires, par-
886 VOHS ET AL.
ticipants in the choices condition were told that at the end they
would receive a gift based on their choices during the question-
naire; participants in the no-choice condition were told they would
also receive a gift but that it would be chosen for them.
In the choices condition, participants made a long series of
choices between products, both within and across categories. Par-
ticipants made choices between items in the following categories:
t-shirts, scented candles, shampoo brands, candy, and socks. After
choosing preferred items within each product category, partici-
pants then made choices between different categories of products.
For instance, a red t-shirt may be labeled Product A and a black
t-shirt may be labeled Product B and the questionnaire would ask
them to choose between A or B, then A or C, then B or C, and so
on. Participants options for making the choices were guided by a
questionnaire (e.g., Would you prefer Product A or Product D?),
and participants were told they would be given a gift at the end of
the trial based on their responses during this first part of the
experiment. Some of the choices involved products that were
displayed in the laboratory, such as t-shirts, scented candles, sham-
poo brands, and color posters. Other categories of products (spe-
cifically, candy bars and types of socks) were listed and described
on the choices sheet, but the physical products were not present in
the laboratory. After choosing between items within each product
category, the questionnaire then asked participants to choose be-
tween different categories of products (e.g., a t-shirt or a candle).
In a final task, participants made choices among occupations
described on a sheet of paper. By the end, participants had made
292 choices.
Participants in the no-choice condition in Experiment 1A com-
pleted a questionnaire that required them to rate products and
occupations but were not asked to choose between or among items.
Participants in the no-choice condition completed a questionnaire
asking them to indicate which products they had used in the past
year; these products were by and large the same as those involved
in the choice task. Thus all participants were exposed to similar
stimuli, and all were prompted to consider their preferences, with
the main difference being rating versus choosing.
For Experiment 1B, we had participants in the no-choice con-
dition record their thoughts, feelings, and opinions about eight
advertisements, a task that also conjured up participants prefer-
ences but again did not require them to make choices. The duration
of this task was recorded for Experiment 1B (but not in Experi-
ment 1A).
After completing the product-rating task, participants entered
another room and were seated at a table on which were placed 20
small paper cups. Each cup held 1 oz of a mixture made with
orange drink mix, water, vinegar, and a small amount of sugar.
(The drink was made with two cups of vinegar and six cups of
water instead of the eight cups of water that are called for in the
standard directions.) The experimenter then told the participant
that this part of the experiment concerned motivation. This is a
drink that does not taste good to most people. It is not harmful. I
will give you a nickel for every ounce you drink; each little cup is
one ounce, and each one is identical. How much you drink is up to
you. The number of ounces each participant drank was recorded
as a measure of self-regulatory resource depletion; drinking more
ounces presumably requires more self-control (to override ones
distaste). After the vinegar-drinking task, participants were paid
for their drink consumption and given a free gift.
Results and Discussion
Experiment 1A provided evidence that making choices hampers
the selfs regulatory capacity. Participants who made a series of
choices among products and occupations later drank fewer ounces
(M 2.06; SD 2.46) of an ill-tasting drink as compared to
participants who merely rated their frequency of exposure to those
same products and occupations (M 7.67, SD 5.35), F(1, 29)
13.57, p .001.
Experiment 1B likewise found that choice reduced subsequent
self-control. Participants in the choices condition drank signifi-
cantly less of the vinegar drink than participants in the no-choice
condition (choices condition: M 1.89, SD 2.57; no-choice
condition: M 6.87, SD 6.46), F(1, 28) 7.68, p .01. Time
did not confound the results, as the duration of the tasks did not
differ by condition, F(1, 28) 1, ns. These initial data confirmed
our prediction that decision making causes a subsequent reduction
in self-control, a finding that does not appear to depend on the
duration of the initial task.
Experiment 2: Consumer Choices and Pain Tolerance
Experiment 2 was designed as a replication and extension of
Experiment 1, with several refinements. First, the choice manipu-
lation and the dependent measure were administered by separate
experimenters and presented as distinct experiments. We used two
different experimenters to avoid the possibility that participants
would try to perform well on the self-control task in order to
ingratiate themselves with the experimenter in the hopes of getting
a better gift (which was promised by the first experimenter as the
reward for the first task). Second, the experimenter for the depen-
dent measure was kept blind to condition, which eliminated the
possibility of unknowingly biasing the results. Third, we sought
convergent validity by using a different dependent measure of
self-regulation, the cold pressor task. This task requires partici-
pants to submerge their arm in frigid water for as long as possible.
Overriding the natural tendency to pull ones arm out of the
near-freezing water thus constitutes an act of self-control. We
predicted that making choices would deplete the resource needed
for self-control, leaving people less able to keep their hand in the
painfully cold water for a long period of time.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five (16 women) undergraduates partic-
ipated in exchange for partial course credit.
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to either the
choice condition or no-choice condition. In the introduction to the
experimental session, participants were told that the session would
consist of several experiments by different experimenters because
each experiment on its own was too short to justify using the whole
experimental period; therefore, experimenters across two labora-
tories arranged their experiments sequentially so as to take up one
full time slot.
In the choice condition, participants made many choices be-
tween products, both within and across categories, as described in
Experiments 1A and 1B. They were once again informed that they
would be given a gift at the end of the trial based on their responses
during this first part of the experiment.
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
In the no-choice condition, participants recorded their thoughts,
feelings, and opinions about eight advertisements taken from pop-
ular magazines. The instructions asked participants to elaborate on
their thoughts and opinions and to write detailed comments about
their reactions to the ads. Full sheets of lined paper were given to
participants to record their reactions to each advertisement. These
steps were done to equate the amount of time participants would
work at this no-choice task with the amount of time it would take
for participants in the choice condition to complete their task.
Participants in the no-choice condition were also informed that
they would be given the opportunity to select a gift for themselves
at the experiments end.
Following the manipulation (choosing vs. rating), participants
were escorted to another room where a second experimenter who
was blind to participants condition administered the cold pressor
task. For the cold pressor task, water temperature was maintained
at 1 C (approximately 34 F) using a mixture of ice and water. An
aquarium pump circulated the water so as to prevent a warm
pocket from forming around the participants hand. The room air
temperature was also maintained at a constant 72 F (22 C).
Participants first held their nondominant arm (to the elbow) in
room temperature water for 1 min to ensure an equal starting point;
then they submerged this arm up to the elbow in the ice water. The
experimenter asked the participant to hold there for as long as
possible. A stopwatch measured the length of time the participant
held his or her arm in the water, with the number of seconds
serving as the measure of self-control. After completing the cold
pressor task, participants were fully debriefed, chose a gift, and
were thanked.
Results
The length of time that participants withstood the pain of hold-
ing their arms in unpleasantly cold water was significantly reduced
among participants who had made a series of choices (M 27.70
s, SD 15.81) relative to participants in the no-choice condition
(M 67.42 s, SD 56.35), F(1, 23) 5.97, p .025. Persistence
on the cold pressor task was not confounded with time spent on the
first task because the product-rating task took no longer than the
choice task, F(1, 23) 1.76, ns.
Discussion
Experiment 2 provided converging evidence that making many
decisions impairs subsequent self-regulation, consistent with the
hypothesis that both choosing and self-control depend on a com-
mon but limited resource. The design of Experiment 2 bolstered
the findings of Experiments 1A and 1B by ruling out several
alternative explanations. We used two experimenters in the current
study, one to administer the dependent measure and one to admin-
ister the product task. Moreover, the experimenter overseeing the
dependent measure was blind to condition, thereby eliminating
concern that experimenter demand could have contributed to the
results. Also, participants in the no-choice condition were told they
would be able to choose their own gift from a standard set of
options, thereby eliminating concern that their performance on the
self-control measure was aimed at persuading the experimenter to
offer them a better gift or a more appealing set of options.
887
Experiment 3: Choosing College Courses and
Procrastination
To provide further evidence of the detrimental impact of making
choices on subsequent self-regulation, we designed Experiment 3
as a conceptual replication of Experiment 2 but with new proce-
dures for both the choice-task manipulation and the dependent
measure of self-regulation. Instead of making choices among small
household products, participants in this study either made choices,
or not, regarding the courses they would take to satisfy their degree
requirements. They were encouraged to take these choices seri-
ously as if they were actually selecting the classes they were to
take in future years, so it seems reasonable to assume that they
regarded these choices as important and relevant.
Self-regulation was measured in terms of resisting procrastina-
tion. Participants were given 15 min to study for an upcoming
nonverbal (math) intelligence test that was framed as a predictor of
many desirable life outcomes. To practice, we gave participants a
packet of sample problems. However, as a competing temptation,
they were also allowed to read magazines and play a video game.
We knew that self-regulation would be required for most partici-
pants to override the seductive pull of games and magazines and
make themselves practice arithmetic problems. Most likely, this is
a self-regulation dilemma that would be familiar to many college
students, namely, whether to push oneself to study for a test or
indulge in more pleasant pastimes. We hypothesized that choosing
ones courses would deplete the selfs resources as compared to
merely reading about courses without choosing. Hence, we pre-
dicted that participants who made choices would spend more of
their time on the time-wasting temptations of magazines and video
games and, correspondingly, would devote less time studying for
the upcoming test.
Method
Participants. Twenty-six introductory psychology students
(17 men) participated in exchange for partial course credit. Data
from 2 participants were not included in analyses (leaving 24
participants in the analyses). One participant correctly surmised
that the intelligence test was not to be administered, whereas the
other was an acquaintance of the experimenter.
Procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory individually,
where they were informed that the experiment examined whether
a persons choice of college major was related to nonverbal intel-
ligence. All participants were shown a list of general education
course requirements and a list of all the classes that would satisfy
each of these requirements. This information was taken directly
from the official undergraduate bulletin, which stated that a total of
36 credit hours (12 courses) in predetermined content areas were
required of all undergraduates regardless of major area of study.
These 12 courses must be selected from a total of over 60 distinct
courses offered at the university.
In the choices condition, participants were directed to spend 8
min indicating which courses they would choose to take to satisfy
each of the general education requirements and to write down their
selections on the response sheet they were given. If they finished
this task, participants were to consult the undergraduate course
bulletin to select and then write down the courses they would take
to satisfy their major-degree requirements. In the no-choices con-
888 VOHS ET AL.
dition, participants were instructed to peruse course requirements
and then read over the descriptions of different courses that satisfy
these requirements. These participants were also encouraged to
review course descriptions of classes in their major and to consider
courses in which they might enroll to satisfy their major-degree
requirements. These participants, unlike choice-condition partici-
pants, were not asked to make formal choices by writing them
down on a response sheet. Rather, they were simply instructed to
think about courses in which they would prefer to enroll.
After 8 min had elapsed, the experimenter asked participants to
complete the mood measure (PANAS). Participants then began the
nonverbal intelligence (math) test portion of the experiment. The
experimenter explained the format of the test and told participants
that the test was highly predictive of skills important for real-world
success. Additionally, participants were told of past research
showing that performing practice math problems for 15 min sig-
nificantly improved performance on the test but practicing for
more than 15 min did not lead to additional increases on perfor-
mance. The experimenter announced he was going to leave the
room for 15 min and gave participants a packet of practice math
problems. Participants were told they could practice for the up-
coming test for as long as they wanted during the next 15 min. The
experimenter also noted that participants could look at magazines
or play a hand-held video game (both of which were located on a
stand next to the participants work area) if they did not want to
work on the practice problems for the entire practice period.
As the experimenter left the room, a research assistant who was
blind to participants experimental condition entered an adjacent
room and observed participants through a two-way mirror. The
mirror was covered by closed vertical blinds, except for two slats
that were slightly bent at an angle that allowed the observer to
clearly view participants behavior without their knowledge. The
observer recorded participants behavior every 30 s according to
whether the participant was practicing math problems, looking at
a magazine, playing the video game, or engaging in some other
(unscripted) activity, such as sitting quietly.
When the experimenter returned, she asked participants to com-
plete a questionnaire, which contained several manipulation check
questions. Finally, participants were informed that they would not
be taking the nonverbal test and were debriefed and thanked.
Results
Our main prediction was that making a series of choices would
result in a state of ego depletion, thereby truncating persistence (or
practice) at the math problems and leading to more procrastination.
We calculated number of minutes practicing by multiplying num-
ber of times the participant was observed practicing by .5 (to
represent 30 s in terms of minutes). As expected, the choices
versus no-choices manipulation affected how long participants
practiced for the upcoming test, t(22) 2.43, p .05.
After making a series of choices, participants spent less time
practicing for the upcoming nonverbal intelligence (math) test
(M 8.39 min, SD 3.64) than did participants who did not make
choices (M 11.40 min, SD 1.66). This finding also indicates
that depleted participants spent more time playing video games,
reading magazines, and doing nothing than did nondepleted par-
ticipants. Thus, after making choices, people spent more time on
self-indulgent activities and less time on effortful studying.
Although our main focus in the current study was on the amount
of time spent on the math problems, we also checked to see
whether performance on the math problems differed as a function
of choice condition. It did not. We counted every problem partic-
ipants attempted (because sometimes participants did a bit of work
on a problem but failed to finish it) and subjected this measure to
a t-test with choice condition as a predictor. This measure showed
no difference as a function of condition, t(22) 1, ns. The number
of problems completed also showed no difference as a function of
choice condition, t(22) 1, p .60. Number of problems cor-
rectly answered also showed no differentiation by condition,
t(22) 1, p .80. Last, we conducted an analysis of covariance,
comparing the choice and no-choice conditions on number of
problems correct, with time spent practicing as the covariate. The
effect of the covariate, time spent, approached significance, F(1,
21) 4.14, p .06, but condition was not significant, F(1, 21)
1.
We assessed whether the choices manipulation influenced mood
states. Consistent with expectations, the choice manipulation did
not differentially affect mood. Reports of positive affect, t(22)
1.01, p .33, and negative affect, t(22) 1, ns, were similar in
the two groups. Further analyses confirmed that choice and no-
choice conditions did not differ with regard to self-rated difficulty
of their respective degree programs, t(22) 1.10, ns, frustration
with the tasks (t 1, ns), or stated importance of performing well
on the upcoming test, t(22) 1.44, ns. Thus, the effects of choice
were not due to mood, difficulty, frustration, or perceived impor-
tance.
Discussion
Experiment 3 conceptually replicated the finding that making a
series of decisions leads to subsequent impairment of self-
regulation. Participants in this study were given instructions either
to select courses to fill the remainder of their undergraduate
careers or to read and think about course options without choosing.
Subsequently, participants were given the opportunity to practice
for an upcoming math test said to be predictive of successful life
outcomes, but their studying was compromised by the availability
of tempting, fun alternative activities, such as video games and
magazines. Participants who had made choices about their future
coursework, as compared to those who simply read and considered
their options, spent less time studying and practicing for the math
test (and spent correspondingly more time indulging in the tempt-
ing distracter tasks). Poor or failed self-regulation is an important
contributor to procrastination (Tice & Baumeister, 1997), and thus
Experiment 3 demonstrates another way in which making many
choices can lead to a breakdown of self-control.
The fact that choosing what courses to take led to less studying
is somewhat counterintuitive. Had the opposite effect been ob-
tained, one might readily have interpreted it as indicating that
priming the idea of course work prompted people to study. The
fact that choosing courses led to less studying is thus most con-
sistent with a limited-resource model.
Experiments 4A and 4B: Course Content Choices and
Solvable and Unsolvable Problems
One ambiguity about the findings of Experiment 3 was that
participants solved the same number of problems in both condi-
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
tions, despite the difference in duration of persistence. Although
null findings are generally not entitled to substantive interpreta-
tion, one could read those results as indicating that people who
made choices were better at self-regulation (not worse, as we
found in Experiment 2), insofar as they solved approximately the
same number of problems in less time. Hence, we felt the impor-
tance of conducting a conceptual replication. Experiment 4 tested
persistence on unsolvable problems (4A) and solvable problems
(4B) after a manipulation of making choices or not.
To increase the robustness of our conclusions, we again changed
the choice manipulation, in this case to decisions about the psy-
chology course in which participants were currently enrolled.
Participants in the choices condition made a series of decisions
about the course, choices they were told (veridically) would de-
termine the way the instructor taught the course both during the
current term and in subsequent terms. It is possible that partici-
pants in Experiment 3 did not see their choices as binding because
students can and do change their minds about what courses to take.
In contrast, the choices made in Experiment 4 were irrevocable in
the sense that once students choices were communicated to the
instructor via this experiment, there was no opportunity to change
the selections, and the instructor did in fact modify the course on
the basis of students selections.
Another change in Experiment 4 was to separate the procedures
with different experimenters. When the same experimenter admin-
isters both the choice manipulation and the self-regulation mea-
sure, it is conceivable that extraneous attitudes toward the exper-
imenter could confound responses to the dependent measure, as
noted earlier. Therefore, we used the more elaborate procedure of
presenting the tasks as unrelated, including having different ex-
perimenters administer the independent and dependent variable
tasks in different rooms.
The main measure of self-regulation in this study was persis-
tence at challenging problems. Persistence requires self-regulation
insofar as the repeated failures are discouraging and frustrating,
and the participant would soon wish to be doing something
elseso one has to override the impulse to quit. Because of the
possibility that quitting fast on unsolvable problems could be
regarded as showing exceptionally good self-regulation, however,
we ran two versions of this study, one with unsolvable problems
(4A) and the other with solvable problems (4B). With the solvable
problems, we were also able to calculate performance quality by
counting correct solutions.
Method
Participants in Experiment 4A. Forty-one undergraduates (26
women) participated in exchange for partial course credit. One
participant was unable to complete the study.
Procedure for Experiment 4A. After arriving and completing
consent forms, participants were told that the first part of the study
involved reviewing instructors materials from their psychology
class, and the second, unrelated part of the study involved com-
pleting a spatial design task. As in Experiment 2, participants were
told that because each experiment in this session was rather short,
experimenters in the department combined two studies so as to
maximize efficiency in use of subject credit hours. The first
experimenter handed out the materials that contained the choices
889
manipulation. All participants were given the same materials, but
the instructions that accompanied them were different.
Instructions for participants in the choices condition asked them
to read the material and, for each section, to choose the option they
preferred. Options were always presented as a two-option forced
choice. In one example, participants read descriptions of two
possible video clips and chose which film clip they would prefer to
see. Another item involved choosing between two different styles
of a test question, and another item asked them to choose between
two paragraphs of text. Participants in the choices conditions were
also told (truthfully) that the choices they made would be reviewed
by their instructor and would affect her decisions for future lec-
tures and tests both during this semester while the participants
were taking her course as well as for future classes. In all, partic-
ipants made 35 choices, which were presented as important and
consequential for the student participants lives. Participants were
asked to complete all the choices and return the packet to the
experimenter before moving on to the next part of the experiment.
Participants in the no-choices condition were simply instructed
to read the same material that was presented to the participants in
the choices condition. They were not asked to make any choices
between the options or to rate the material in any way. They were
asked to read the material very carefully and return the packet to
the experimenter before moving on to the next part of the exper-
iment.
Next, participants moved across the hall to complete the persis-
tence part of the experiment with the second experimenter. The
persistence measure involved unsolvable tracing puzzles. This
procedure was made popular by Glass, Singer, and Friedman
(1969), and it has been used in previous studies as a measure of
self-regulation. Participants were given a packet containing two
complex figures. Participants were told that performance on these
geometric figures was predictive of future life success due to its
links with higher order cognitive abilities. Participants were given
two stacks of paper with each page displaying one of the complex
figures. The stacks of papers were given to participants so that they
could use as many sheets as necessary as they attempted the
(unsolvable) task of tracing each figure in its entirety without once
lifting the pencil from the paper or retracing any lines. They were
asked to bring their sheets back to the experimenter either when
they had finished or when they had worked as long as they could
on them and wanted to stop. The experimenter recorded how long
each participant persisted (to the nearest quarter minute).
After finishing, participants were given a manipulation check
that asked participants to rate their mood states in terms of how
happy, sad, depressed, or confident they felt (four items rated on a
scale from 1 not at all to 7 very much so). In addition, they
were asked to indicate to what extent they felt that their activities
during the initial task regarding elements of the course would alter
the content and design of the course (on a scale from 1 not at all
to 7 very much). Last, participants were debriefed and thanked.
Participants in Experiment 4B. Forty-two undergraduates (28
women) took part in exchange for partial course credit. Two
participants failed to complete the study.
Procedure for Experiment 4B. The procedure for Experiment
4B was the same as for 4A, with two changes. First, the length of
time it took participants to finish the choices or ratings was held
constant at 12 min. This was accomplished by having participants
in both conditions work through a lengthy packet of stimuli that
890 VOHS ET AL.
could not be completed in less than a certain amount of time,
which in this case was 12 min. After 12 min had elapsed, partic-
ipants were stopped and informed that they would now move to the
second experiment.
Second, we altered the operationalization of self-regulation to be
persistence at and correct solutions of solvable problems. After
being moved to a new laboratory room and greeted by the second
experimenter, participants were told that the next study involved a
test of simple mathematical calculations, which long have been
known to predict success in life. The experimenter explained that
this math test was sensitive to brief amounts of practice, and
therefore everyone was allowed practice time before taking this
test. Participants were given practice sheets of three-digit multi-
plication problems, which they were told to practice for as long as
they could up to 30 min. When participants felt they could not
practice any longer, they alerted the experimenter. The experi-
menter covertly recorded the length of time participants had
worked at the math problems (to the nearest quarter minute) and
gave participants a question asking them to rate the degree to
which their activities during the first task regarding elements of the
course would alter the content and design of the course (on a scale
from 1 not at all to 7 very much). Then, participants were
debriefed, thanked, and excused.
Results
Unsolvable puzzles (Experiment 4A). Participants who did not
have to make choices about the material but merely read through
it carefully persisted longer on the tracing task (M 12.25 min,
SD 4.31) than did participants who were asked to make many
choices about the same material (M 9.11, SD 3.00), F(1,
38) 7.12, p .05. Thus, making choices seems to have depleted
some resource, thereby reducing persistence on the second task.
Ancillary analyses confirmed that the manipulation was effective:
Participants in the choices condition reported that they believed
that the responses they made would affect their own course more
so than participants in the no-choices condition did, F(1, 38)
585.95, p .001. There were no differences on self-reports of
being happy, sad, depressed, or confident (Fs 1).
Solvable puzzles (Experiment 4B). Participants who made
choices about the course material failed to persist on the practice
items for as long as did participants who read about the same
material but who did not make choices (choices condition: M
14.70 min, SD 4.05; no-choices condition: M 17.80 min,
SD 4.66), F(1, 38) 5.00, p .05. Participants who had made
many choices also completed fewer practice problems than did
participants who had not made choices, F(1, 38) 6.23, p .05.
Making choices also appears to have led to poorer performance
on the math problems. Participants who had not made choices got
significantly more practice problems correct and marginally fewer
wrong than participants who were asked to make many choices
got, F(1, 38) 16.56, p .001 and F(1, 38) 3.81, p .06,
respectively. The difference in number of errors was probably
weakened by the fact that participants in the choice condition spent
less time and attempted fewer problems, which should cause them
to make fewer errors than they would have made on a longer
problem set. To correct for this, we computed the error rate by
dividing number of errors by number attempted for each partici-
pant. Analysis of variance on error rates confirmed that partici-
pants in the choices condition made more errors per attempt than
did participants in the no-choices condition, and this was a signif-
icant difference, F(1, 38) 5.10, p .05.
On the manipulation check, participants in the choices condition
were much more likely to believe that they were making choices
that would affect the rest of their semester in the classroom than
were participants in the no-choices condition, F(1, 38) 224.48,
p .001. Thus, again, the manipulation was successful.
Discussion
Experiment 4 showed that making choices about ones psychol-
ogy course had a significant and detrimental effect on subsequent
task performance. Those who made choices subsequently gave up
faster on unsolvable (Experiment 4A) and solvable (Experiment
4B) items, as compared to participants who did not make choices.
These findings provide further evidence that making decisions can
deplete an important self-regulatory resource, thereby making it
more difficult for the person to resist the temptation to quit while
performing a wearisome task. Furthermore, Experiment 4B con-
firmed that making choices had a negative effect not only on
persistence but also on quality of performance. Participants who
made choices got fewer math problems right and had a signifi-
cantly higher error rate than did participants who had merely
thought about the course options without making choices.
Several design features facilitate interpretation of findings. The
choices in Experiment 4 were real and consequential, in the sense
that they actually influenced the schedule for the remainder of the
course (as opposed, possibly, to what participants thought in
Experiment 3). Using two experimenters (one unaware of experi-
mental condition) diminished the likelihood that demand charac-
teristics or desire to impress the (first) experimenter influenced the
results. The amount of time spent on the first task was the same for
all participants in Experiment 4B, ensuring that persistence on the
second task was not affected by how much time had been spent on
the first task. It was also apparent that less persistence meant
poorer performance: Participants who made choices got fewer
problems correct (unlike in Experiment 3) and made more errors
than did those who did not make choices.
In sum, it appears that making choices depleted some resource
that was then unavailable to facilitate performance on both unsolv-
able and solvable tasks. Self-regulation is useful for making one-
self persist on a difficult task, for overseeing the calculation
process, and for checking and correcting errors, all of which are
weakened by previous efforts involved in making choices.
Study 5: Decision Fatigue at a Shopping Mall
To provide a field test of our central hypothesis, we approached
customers at a shopping mall and assessed the number of decisions
they had made during their shopping trip thus far. To measure
self-regulation, we then asked them to perform easy but tedious
arithmetic problems (adding three-digit numbers). This task re-
quires self-regulation because most shoppers would probably
rather do something else than perform arithmetic, and so the
impulse to quit must be overridden if they are to continue. We
predicted that shoppers whose resources were depleted by having
made a greater number of prior choices would quit faster on the
arithmetic problems.
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
A conceptual replication of the laboratory findings from Exper-
iments 2 4 was desirable for several reasons. First, this study drew
its participants from a nonuniversity sample, which increases con-
fidence in the generalizability of the results. Second, this study
avoided a potential confound of differential time spent on different
experimental tasks (and shoppers would also furnish estimates of
how long they had been shopping, which later could be controlled
for when analyzing the impact of prior choices). Third, participa-
tion in this study was not affected by a material incentive because
no reward or gift was offered.
Having shoppers perform math problems gave us two forms of
self-regulation to assess. For one, we could check for persistence
at the math problems, which is a classic measure of self-control. In
addition, as in Experiment 4, we could also check for the careful-
ness of participants work, for which self-regulation would be
involved in overseeing the rule-following mathematical process
and to check for possible errors. Hence, we predicted that the state
of ego depletion among shoppers who had made many choices
would therefore lead to poorer persistence and performance rela-
tive to shoppers who had not made choices.
Method
Participants. Ninety-six shoppers at an open-air shopping
mall in Salt Lake City, Utah were approached, and 19 women and
39 men agreed to participate (60% response rate). The age of
participants ranged from 18 years to 59 years, with 91% of
participants reporting White (non-Latino) ethnicity, 4% reporting
Asian ethnicity, and 5% Latino ethnicity.
Procedure. Shoppers were approached by members of the
research team and asked for their time in a volunteer (i.e., no
remuneration) experiment. Research assistants were instructed not
to reveal much about the experiment before participants agreed or
declined to participate, so that the details of the task (described
next) did not influence who chose to participate. Participants were
told the experiment involved answering some questions about their
shopping trip and then engaging in a cognitive task.
After a brief demographic questionnaire, participants completed
the self-report scale, which was the same as that from the pilot
study except for combining two redundant items asking about the
degree of which choices had been made. Participants were asked to
respond to questions by thinking about their behaviors during their
shopping trip and to give a numeric rating of 1 (not at all) to 10
(very much so) for the following items: How many choices did
you feel you have made on your shopping trip today?, How
personally important were the choices you made shopping today?,
How much careful consideration did you put into choices you
have made today?, How much did you deliberate before making
each choice today?, How much did you think about your options
prior to making each choice today?, How active did you feel in
making your choices today?, and How tired do you feel right
now? Participants also reported time spent shopping in hours and
minutes. Shopping times ranged from 1 min (for participants who
had just begun shopping) to 4.5 hr.
Participants were presented with 64 three-digit plus three-digit
addition problems printed across two sheets of paper. They were
asked to do as many as they could, with the understanding that they
could stop anytime they quit, finished, or decided to give up.
These instructions come from past depletion research (Vohs &
891
Heatherton, 2000) in which self-control was measured as persis-
tence on a cognitive task. Unbeknownst to participants, there was
a second research assistant standing approximately 5 ft (1.5 m)
away who surreptitiously recorded the amount of time that partic-
ipants spent on the addition problems. Then participants were
debriefed and thanked.
Results
Choices scale. First, we conducted a factor analysis on the
items from the choice scale to test whether they revealed patterns
similar to that seen in the pilot study, which they did. The data
were subjected to a varimax rotation (eigenvalues greater than 1
extracted), and a two-component structure emerged. Factor 1 ac-
counted for 49% of the variance observed and Factor 2 accounted
for an additional 17%. The items loaded onto factors similarly as
in the pilot study. That is, scale items asking about number of
choices, importance of the choices, degree of consideration, delib-
eration, and thought put into the choices, and degree of activity
involved in making those choices mainly loaded onto the first
factor, whereas the item asking about tiredness loaded strongly and
positively on Factor 2. We computed factor scores for each par-
ticipant and used them as predictors of math performance.
Performance on the math problems. Participants performance
on the math problems was the primary indication of self-control.1
As mentioned, past research has shown that one consequence of
self-regulatory resource depletion is a reduction in cognitive abil-
ities and consequently poorer intellectual performance
(Schmeichel et al., 2003). Alongside the two factor scores from the
choices scale as extracted by principal-components analysis, the
regression models included as predictors time spent shopping, age,
ethnicity, and gender (the latter four variables were centered
around their means before being entered into the model).
The overall model predicting number of problems completed
correctly was significant, F(6, 50) 2.48, p .04. More pertinent
was the significant effect of Factor 1 (i.e., the Choices factor),
.32, t(50) 2.40, p .02. The factor scores for Factor 2, which
represented mainly the tiredness item, did not significantly predict
number of correct solutions ( .04, t 1). The regression
model contained no other significant predictors of correctly solved
problems (ts 1.55), except for ethnicity, t(50) 2.44, p .02.
Discussion
Study 5 provided converging support for the hypothesis that
decision making interferes with subsequent self-regulation. Shop-
pers at an outdoor mall reported how much decision making they
had done while shopping that day and then were asked to solve
arithmetic problems. Self-regulation was measured by perfor-
mance on math problems. We found that the more choices the
shoppers had made, the worse their computations on simple arith-
1
This study had two dependent variables, persistence at the math prob-
lems in terms of duration of time spent working on them and also number
of math problems completed correctly. The two variables were highly
correlated, r(58) .71, and the regression models yielded highly similar
results. Hence a second conclusion from this study is that the more decision
making the shoppers had done, the less they persisted on the math prob-
lems.
892 VOHS ET AL.
metic problems. Moreover, the negative impact of prior decisions
on math persistence remained significant even after controlling for
how long they had been shopping, for how tired they were, and for
several demographic categories including gender, age, race, and
ethnicity.
These findings are consistent with the general hypothesis that
making choices depletes an energy resource and thereby impairs
subsequent performance. We acknowledge, however, that the cor-
relational design of this study reduces its capacity for drawing
causal conclusions. Third variable explanations are still plausible,
such as that people who enjoy making effortful decisions while
shopping might simultaneously dislike expending effort on math
problems. That said, on an a priori basis, one would likely predict
the opposite, such that people with high need for cognition would
put more thought into both shopping decisions and math problems.
In that respect, these findings are less conclusive than those of the
prior studies, but they also add valuable convergence. The deci-
sions in this study were not mandated by the experimenter but
instead occurred naturally among people during the course of their
daily lives. Additionally, interpretation of these findings is
strengthened by the fact that the sample was more diverse (in age,
education, and income) than the university populations sampled in
the preceding studies.
Experiment 6: Choosing Versus Deliberating Versus
Implementing
With Experiment 6, we began to delve into the processes and
possible boundaries of the effects of choosing. In line with the
Rubicon model of action (Gollwitzer, 1990, 1996; Heckhausen &
Gollwitzer, 1987), we conceptualized the process of choice as
involving three key phases: deliberation among options, deciding
on a plan of action (i.e., making a choice), and implementing the
chosen option. Deliberating among the options involves weighing
their pros and cons and comparing them and, perhaps crucially,
forming an ad hoc preference where none existed. Making the
choice requires actually selecting one option and committing one-
self to behave in that way. Implementing the choice involves
behaviors that execute the previously chosen option. In principle,
any or all phases of the choice process may tax the selfs resources.
Of particular interest was the possibility that choosing would
itself deplete the selfs energy, above and beyond the processes of
deliberating and implementing. Choosing is akin to forming an
implementation intention, in the sense that it sets a conditional
program for future behavior. The essence of the Rubicon model is
the transition between an initial phase of deliberating about the
various options to a phase of readiness to take action, which may
be in the immediate present or delayed. Thus, the mind undergoes
some qualitative change in order to make that transition. To use the
popular metaphor of the computer, the difference between delib-
erating and deciding resembles the difference between performing
calculations and writing the output of those onto the disk for
storage, where it can be accessed on future occasions as needed.
Performing calculations takes energy, but writing onto the disk
also consumes energy. By analogy, therefore, choosing would
require more energy than merely deliberating.
As Webb and Sheeran (2003) have shown, having such a con-
ditional program (especially in the form of an implementation
intention) helps counteract the effects of ego depletion, so a
preestablished program can conserve energy. Thus, we suggest
that the choice process expends energy now but may perhaps do so
such that the system can save energy later, not unlike the way
storing information to a disk enables the computer to retrieve and
use the result later without having to repeat the calculations.
To provide an initial test of the idea that the act of choosing is
depleting apart from the phases of deliberation and implementa-
tion, Experiment 6 compared three different conditions. In one,
participants only deliberated among options but refrained from
making a decision. In another, they made a choice (presumably
after also deliberating about the options). In a third condition, they
merely implemented choices that had been made for them by
someone else, namely a yoked participant in another condition. If
the act of choosing is itself depleting, then one should see greater
depletion in the choice condition than in the other two conditions.
This was our main prediction.
Method
Participants. Sixty-four undergraduates (36 women; 2 partic-
ipants did not complete this item) participated in exchange for
extra course credit or payment. The first 52 were randomly as-
signed among the three conditions. In response to reviewer-
suggested analyses that yielded a marginal ( p .10) and hence
inconclusive result, we resumed and ran the final 12 participants,
who were randomly assigned between the choice and deliberate-
only conditions.
Procedure. Choice condition was manipulated with differing
instructions as for how to interact with a popular computer web-
site, dell.com. The four pages on the dell.com website contained
options for making selections about the computer itself as well as
components, services and support options, and accessories. Partic-
ipants were seated in front of a computer that showed a page for
customizing a Dell Dimension desktop computer and then were
given one of three sets of instructions.
In the implement condition, participants were given sheets of
paper that were printouts of the four computer screens that they
were to see during this task. Preestablished choices had been made
and radio buttons indicated the chosen options. Participants in this
condition were simply asked to find the radio button on each page
that matched the selected radio button on the printout and click on
it with the computer mouse. Thus, they were simply implementing
a choice that had already been made by someone else. In the
deliberate condition, participants were asked to deliberate about
the options on each page and form an opinion of the information,
thinking about what [they] would prefer. Participants in this
group were instructed not to press any buttons to indicate their
selections. Participants in the choice condition were asked to
deliberate, form preferences, choose the most preferred option in
each set, and select it on the website using the computer mouse.
The experimenter timed the duration of the dell.com task for each
participant.
Participants moved away from the computer at this time and
were seated in a small room to perform the anagram task, which
was comprised of 80 five-letter solvable anagrams. Prior to start-
ing, participants were told that the anagrams constituted a test of
verbal ability, a capacity that university students believe is quite
important (Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). In line with past work in
self-regulation, participants were told to work on the anagrams
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
until they solved them all, wanted to stop, or decided to give up.
The experimenter timed their efforts directed at this task as a
measure of persistence. Last, participants were given a set of
postexperimental questions and were debriefed and thanked.
Results
As a manipulation check, we asked participants the extent to
which they had deliberated while performing the dell.com task and
found significant differences as a function of condition, F(2, 61)
10.52, p .01. As expected, the implement group (M 2.82,
SD 1.86) reported deliberating less than the other two groups
(choice condition: M 5.64, SD 2.53; deliberate condition:
M 5.82, SD 2.26). Participants reported enjoying the dell.com
task equivalently across conditions, F(2, 59) 1.04, p .30. We
had anticipated that there may be differences in the duration of the
dell.com task across conditions and the effect approached signif-
icance, F(2, 61) 2.81, p .07. Descriptively, the implement
group performed this task in the shortest amount of time (M
223.18 s, SD 90.80), compared to the deliberate (M 320.95 s,
SD 84.22) and choice conditions (M 273.24 s, SD 172.95). exercise (e.g., running for dozens of miles) is still tiring. Given the
The main test of our hypothesis was whether there was a
significant difference between choosing and not choosing on later
self-regulation. There were debilitating effects of engaging in the
full choice process on executive functioning. On anagram persis-
tence, not only was the overall test significant, F(2, 61) 3.99,
p .03, but so was the planned contrast of choosing versus not
choosing, a test that compared the choice condition versus the two
nonchoice conditions, t(61) 2.77, p .01. Comparing the
conditions individually revealed that the choice condition (M
379.24 s, SD 180.17) led to significantly less persistence than
did the implement condition (M 571.29 s, SD 286.65),
t(61) 2.66, p .01, and less persistence than did the deliberate-
only condition (M 514.0 s, SD 231.37), t(61) 2.01, p .05. situation in which there was a problem.
The difference between the deliberate-only and implement condi-
tions was not reliable (t 1, ns).
Discussion
Experiment 6 attempted to distinguish among deliberating,
choosing, or implementing a choice. Although it is possible that all
phases of the decision process can deplete some resources, we did
find significant variation among the conditions. Making choices
(presumably after some deliberating) was significantly more de-
pleting than either deliberating or implementing alone. Deliberat-
ing and implementing were not reliably different from each other.
These results point toward the conclusion that actually making the
choice itself requires effort and consumes energy, above and
beyond the process of thinking about the options and more than
expressing or implementing previously made choices.
Experiment 7: Pleasant Versus Unpleasant, Many Versus
Few Choices
Experiment 7 addressed two final questions. First, is the deplet-
ing effect of choosing cumulative such that making more choices
produces more depletion than does making only a few choices?
Second, does the subjective enjoyment of the choosing task mod-
erate how depleting the task is?
893
Regarding the quantity of choice, we reasoned that insofar as
choice requires effort, then more choosing should be more fatigu-
ing. If choosing does deplete some psychological resource, then
doing more of it should result in more severe depletion. The
difference could also address the criticism raised by Moller et al.
(2006), who found that making one or two pleasant choices was
not depleting. The amount of effort required to make a single
choice might be so small as not to produce depletion, but that small
amount of effort multiplied by many choices (even pleasant ones)
could still be depleting.
Regarding subjective enjoyment, we thought that pleasantness
of the choosing process might reduce its deleterious effects. If
depletion is caused by forcing oneself to do something, then a
pleasant task would presumably be less depleting than an aversive
one would be.
There was also reason to predict that choice quantity would
interact with subjective enjoyment. The beneficial impact of en-
joying the task will likely wane as time and exertion increases. By
analogy, people may find physical exercise to be less tiring when
they enjoy it than when it is aversive, but extended physical
robust effect of making choices on the executive system in the
previous experiments, it seemed likely that the effects of making
choices would wear down the executive system over time, such
that any positive effects of choice enjoyment would be nullified if
the task required making a great deal of choices. Hence, we
designed the experiment to have participants make choices for a
short or long period of time (4 vs. 12 min, respectively) or no
choices at all. We also obtained participants anticipated enjoy-
ment of the choice task, which was the creation of a gift registry
online. Both variables duration of choice task (no choices vs. 4
min vs. 12 min) and enjoyment of the choice taskwere expected
to have significant effects on participants active responding to a
Experiment 7 also introduced a change in the dependent vari-
able. Having shown in the preceding studies that decision making
affects subsequent self-control, we sought in this study to measure
effects on a different manifestation of the selfs executive function,
namely initiative or active responding. One previous study pro-
vided some initial evidence that responding actively instead of
passively requires the same sort of energy used for self-regulation
and is therefore vulnerable to depletion (Muraven et al., 1998). In
Experiment 7, participants were told that their next task would
entail watching a video. For each participant, however, the video
playback malfunctioned, thereby rendering the task impossible.
The measure was how long the participant (passively) sat there
before notifying the experimenter of the malfunction. In this case,
passivity was counterproductive for the participants presumptive
goals of finishing the experiment and going home because it would
not be possible to perform the task until the video was fixed.
Method
Participants. One hundred and ten students (ages 18 43
years; M 21.38, SD 3.33) at a large midwestern university
participated in the experiment for either course credit or monetary
payment. Ten participants data were removed because of various
disruptions in the experimental procedure, such as connectivity
problems with the registry website (n 8) and participants re-
894 VOHS ET AL.
ceiving calls on their cellular phones. The final participant tally
was 48 men and 52 women, for a total of 100 participants.
Procedure. Prior to arrival at the laboratory, participants had
completed a short questionnaire before participating in the exper-
iment. The questionnaire consisted of items pertaining to partici-
pants enjoyment of and past experiences with wedding gift reg-
istries. These reports showed that only two participants had prior
experience creating a gift registry and that the distribution of
scores was normal in terms of how enjoyable participants envi-
sioned the creation of a gift registry to be (M 4.21, SD 1.65
on a 7-point scale where 1 not at all enjoyable and 7
extremely enjoyable). There was, as might be expected, a gender
difference in whether participants viewed the process of creating a
gift registry enjoyable, with women reporting more anticipated
enjoyment than did men, t(97) 5.54, p .01.
Via a postexperimental question, we confirmed that participants
who anticipated that they would enjoy the gift registry creation
task indeed got more enjoyment out of the task. Participants were
fairly accurate in their predictions: There was a significant though
far from perfect correlation between how much participants
thought they would enjoy the gift registry creation task and how
much they reported enjoying the task after completing it, r(63)
.31, p .02. (Degrees of freedom are lower than that for the full
sample because one-third of the conditions did not involve creating
a gift registry.)
Upon entering the lab, participants were randomly assigned to a
no-choices control condition, a short choices condition, or a long
choices condition. Participants assigned to the choices conditions
spent either 4 min (short choices condition) or 12 min (long
choices condition) selecting options from a wedding gift registry
using the online interface at target.coms Club Wed. For their first
task, participants assigned to the no-choices control group were
instructed to think about the route they would take to get home
from the building. This is a neutral task that has been used in past
research (Vohs & Heatherton, 2001). After the choices or thought
task, participants completed the PANAS to assess mood.
Then, participants were moved to a new room and sat in front of
a VCR and television. They were told that they would be watching
a short video about which they would be answering questions later.
The experimenter left, saying she would be back when the video
was finished. The video was rigged, however, to show mostly
static with faint images of two people talking in the background,
behind the static. Given that the video was not showing a scene
that was discernible whatsoever, the most responsible action for
participants to take would be to alert the experimenter. Hence, the
dependent measure was how actively participants responded to the
problematic video, specifically in terms of duration of time that
passed before participants notified the experimenter of the prob-
lem. A 15-min ceiling was in place, such that the experimenter
entered the room if the participant had not come to alert her by this
time. Ostensibly in lieu of watching the broken video, participants
then completed postexperimental questionnaires, a demographics
form, and were debriefed.
Validation study. A separate sample of 20 participants
watched the video and rated their reactions in order to clarify the
impact of the procedure. They indicated that they thought the video
was broken and that the experimenter ought to know that the video
was having problems; furthermore, participants said that they
quickly gave up trying to watch the fuzzy video. These responses
confirmed that the optimal response during the main experiment
was in fact to notify the experimenter and that sitting in the room
was a passive and ineffectual response.
Results
In order to analyze the data, they were first coded into two
dummy variables that tested the two choice conditions (low and
high) against the no-choice (control) condition. The analytical
model regressed time spent waiting before alerting the experi-
menter (i.e., passivity) on five predictors: ratings of anticipated
enjoyment (centered), the two dummy variables, and two interac-
tion terms for which each dummy variable was multiplied by the
anticipated enjoyment factor.
Our predictions about the combined effect of choice and antic-
ipated liking of the choice task can be understood statistically as
predicting that only one of the interaction terms would be a
significant predictorthe Anticipated Enjoyment Low Choice
Condition interaction. A significant interaction term would indi-
cate that anticipated enjoyment ceases to predict passivity after
participants had made a high number of choices.
That is what we found: The effect of anticipated enjoyment on
passivity was only pertinent after participants had made few
choices, whereas after participants had made many choices, pas-
sivity scores (seconds waited before alerting the experimenter)
were unaffected by anticipated enjoyment. Statistically, there was
a significant interaction between enjoyment and the low choice
dummy variable, t(92) 3.399, p .001, .39. The
interaction of the other dummy variable (representing the high
choice condition) with enjoyment was not a significant predictor,
t(92) 1, ns, .01. The high choice dummy variable on its
own, though, was a significant predictor, t(92) 3.54, p .001,
.36, whereas the low choice dummy variable on its own was
a nonsignificant predictor, t(92) 1.84, p .07, .19, and
enjoyment was a nonsignificant main effect, t(92) 1, ns,
.04. Using the Aiken and West (1991) procedure, we created
Figure 1, which displays predicted passivity scores as a function of
the three experimental conditions (no choice, low choice, and high
choice) and at different levels of anticipated enjoyment.
Recall that we measured participants moods after the choice
task to ensure that active responses were not due to transient
changes in emotions. In line with previous work, there was no
effect of choice task on positive, F(2, 97) 1, or negative
emotion, F(2, 97) 1.10, p .30, as measured by the PANAS.
Moreover, we wanted to ensure that enjoyment of the choice task
did not alter mood states. We correlated anticipated enjoyment
with positive and negative mood as well as posttask reported
enjoyment with mood and found no correlations to be significant,
anticipated enjoyment and positive mood: r(99) .02; antici-
pated enjoyment and negative mood: r(99) .02; reported enjoy-
ment and positive mood: r(64) .23, p .06; reported enjoyment
and negative mood: r(64) .16, p .19. Hence, mood did not
play a significant role in this experiment.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 7 add several new aspects to our
understanding of the impact of choice. First, quantity of choice
contributed to depletion: Participants who made more choices
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
450
400
Waiting Passively (secs)
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1 SD Above
Figure 1. Effect of choice condition (high choice vs. low choice vs. no choice) and anticipated enjoyment of
choice task (1 SD above the mean vs. mean level vs. 1 SD below the mean) on passive waiting (Experiment 7).
Higher numbers indicate more passivity and thus worse self-control.
were more passive in the sense of waiting longer to notify the
experimenter of the equipment problem. This result suggests that
the more choices one makes, the more depleted one is. Such a
pattern is most consistent with the theory that choosing progres-
sively consumes a limited resource.
The quantity effect may seem at odds with one null result of
Experiment 1, which found no link between the amount of time
spent choosing and the degree of depletion. We think the most
likely explanation is that the extent of resource depletion is deter-
mined by the quantity rather than the duration of choosing. In
Experiment 1, all participants in the choice condition made the
same number of choices so variations in time pertained merely to
how fast they made those choices. In Experiment 7, the manipu-
lated differences in time corresponded to making more versus
fewer choices. Also, the variations in time in Experiment 1 may
have been too small to produce significant differences in ego
depletion, at least with that measure. The design of Experiment 7
ensured that some participants spent 3 times as long as others on
the choosing task.
The second finding from Experiment 7 was that subjective
enjoyment moderated the depleting effect of choice but only in the
4 min condition. Making a few enjoyable decisions was apparently
less depleting than making a few aversive decisions. But when
many decisions had to be made, the process was depleting regard-
less of whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. This finding inte-
grates the results of Moller et al. (2006) with the more general
patterns of ego depletion. Moller et al. (2006) found that making a
couple of easy, enjoyable choices that expressed the self did not
produce ego depletion, and our results are consistent with that. But
making many choices becomes depleting even when the activity is
viewed as an opportunity for positive self-expression.
General Discussion
Ambivalence about choice presents one of the great seeming
paradoxes of modern life. On the one hand, the desire for choice
895
High choice
Low choice
No choice
Mean 1 SD Below
Enjoy
seems ubiquitous. People clamor for freedom in their private and
political lives. They exhibit patterns such as reactance (Brehm,
1966; Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004) and illusions of control
(Ariely, 2000; Langer, 1975) that indicate deeply rooted motives to
maintain a feeling of having choices. The marketplace, normally a
reliable guide to what people want, offers ever more fine-grained
choices, from dozens of car makes and models to (most recently)
personalized boxes of disposable tissue paper. On the other hand,
people tire of the endless demands for choice and the stress of
decision making. In related research, there are signs that too much
choice can be detrimental to satisfaction and that people resist
facing up to the tradeoffs that many choices involve (Iyengar &
Lepper, 2000; Luce, Payne, & Bettman, 1999). One recent analysis
demonstrated that behavioral commitment (i.e., buying) initially
rose with the number of options but fell when even more options
were presented (Avni & Wolford, 2007). The present investigation
sought to shed light on the psychic costs of choice. Making choices
can be difficult and effortful, and there is a personal price to
choosing, which is seen in worse self-regulation.
The main hypothesis was that deliberate, effortful choice con-
sumes a limited resource needed for a broad range of executive
functions, including self-regulation. Participants made a series of
choices about consumer products, college courses, or class mate-
rials or in the no-choice conditions, participants read, studied,
and rated those materials without choosing among them. Making
choices apparently depleted a precious self-resource because sub-
sequent self-regulation was poorer among those who had made
choices than it was among those who had not. This pattern was
found in the laboratory, classroom, and shopping mall. It was
found with assigned choices and spontaneously made choices. It
was found with inconsequential and more consequential choices.
Having multiple experiments permitted us to employ a diversity
of manipulations and measures, so that possible ambiguities re-
garding one procedure could be remedied in another. We had some
participants make binding and irrevocable choices, whereas other
896 VOHS ET AL.
choices could be reversed later. In some studies we assigned them
to make choices or not, and in others we measured how many
choices they had spontaneously made. We allowed some partici-
pants unlimited time to choose, whereas others were required to
stop midtask after a fixed interval. We measured self-regulation in
terms of how long they could hold a hand in ice water, how much
of a bad-tasting beverage they forced themselves to drink, how
much they procrastinated while studying, how long they persisted
on unsolvable puzzles, and how long they tried and how well they
performed on solvable problems. We also employed a range of
supplementary measures, including measures of emotion and
mood, self-ratings of fatigue, and perceived difficulty of the tasks.
The most parsimonious explanation for all these findings is that
making choices depletes some important intrapersonal resource
indeed, the same resource that is needed for self-regulation.
Experiment 7 also showed the depleting effect on reduced active
responding and a corresponding increase in passivity. This pro-
vides valuable further evidence that one common resource is used
by the selfs executive function for its diverse activities. That is,
making decisions, active initiative, and self-control all appear to
depend on the same inner resource.
We attempted also to separate the act of choice itself from the
related processes of deliberating and expressing (implementing)
the choice. Experiments 1 4 showed that choosing was more
depleting than just thinking about the options. Experiment 6 found
that choosing was more depleting than was the process of putting
choices into action and was more depleting than forming a pref-
erence while considering options was. Taken together, these find-
ings tentatively argue for something special about choice. Based
on the Rubicon model, we have proposed that making a choice
produces a lasting change in the persons mental apparatus by
etching into the mind and brain the prescription for what to do. The
change in mental programming is made at the time of choosing,
regardless of whether the chosen action is to be implemented
immediately or at some unspecified future time. Making this
change requires energy and is depleting.
Alternative Explanations
The present investigation needed multiple experiments, partly
because there is no single, unambiguous measure of the constructs.
There is no single gold standard measure of self-regulatory re-
source depletion, and so we measured self-regulation in many
different behavioral spheres. The diversity of measures was espe-
cially important and helpful because of the theoretical assumption
that the same resource is used for many diverse self-regulation
activities as well as for effortful decision making.
Given that choosing can be aversive, one important alternative
explanation would be that the choosing manipulation was more
aversive than the control condition was and that bad moods con-
tributed to the various behavioral decrements afterward. Multiple
findings speak resoundingly against this view. We measured mood
in several studies and found no differences as a function of choice
condition. We also observed the depleting effect of choice even
when participants had not reported their moods. Experiment 7 did
find that aversive choices are more depleting than pleasant choices,
but pleasant choices also became depleting, and moreover the
effect of enjoyable versus aversive choosing disappeared when
participants had made choices for a relatively long time. In short,
neither subjective mood nor enjoyment can explain our findings.
In Experiments 1A and 4A, the experimenter had the informal
impression that the choice procedure seemed to take longer than
the no-choice procedure, raising the possibility that the effects on
self-regulation were caused by the longer duration of the initial
task. Experiment 7 showed that spending more time on a depleting
choice task had a stronger effect. In other studies, however, the
time for the two tasks was kept rigidly equal, which permitted the
conclusion that the depleting effects of choice were not due spe-
cifically to the time devoted to the task. The best way to integrate
these findings is to suggest that it is the amount of psychological
work rather than the simple duration of participation that accounts
for the extent of depletion.
Experiments 2 and 4 used two different experimenters and blind
testing procedures. The results remained strong, and so the effects
cannot be explained away in terms of seeking to gain favor for the
sake of getting a better gift or a sense of having discharged ones
obligation as a research participant. The two-experimenter system
also permitted blind testing, which can largely rule out explana-
tions based on experimenter bias or demand characteristics.
Last, it was important for us to confirm empirically that the
experimental manipulations about choice were effective. The pilot
experiment showed that high-choice procedures made people feel
that they were indeed engaging in decision making, as well as
putting more deliberate thought into the task, more than the low-
choice procedures. The self was more involved in the high-choice
procedure than it was in the no-choice procedure, which is why we
think that it expended more of its self-resources.
In short, although some findings may seem open to alternative
explanations, we attempted to provide evidence against these al-
ternatives with other studies in the current investigation. The most
parsimonious explanation for these findings is that making choices
depletes a valuable internal resource that is needed for self-
regulation, and thus self-regulation is impaired in the aftermath of
decision making.
Distinctiveness of Depletion
Some readers may wonder how these self-regulatory resource-
depletion effects can be distinguished from other phenomena fa-
miliar to cognitive psychology, ranging from cognitive load to
mental effort and mental fatigue. Although we are sympathetic to
efforts at integrative theorizing that may produce the most general
theories, we do note some distinctions and contrasts between the
current model and those other processes.
Studies using cognitive load, like ego-depletion studies, are
based on the assumption of a limited resource. In particular,
cognitive load is presumed to preoccupy attention, which is limited
in its capacity. In contrast to ego depletion, however, attention is
presumed to be limited only during the time of preoccupation, and
so attention reverts to its baseline (full capacity) as soon as the load
is lifted unlike self-regulatory resource-depletion effects, which
involve lasting consequences afterward. Attention and willpower
are, therefore, two different resources and operate somewhat dif-
ferently.
There are also empirical distinctions. A cognitive load impairs
the maintenance of information in short-term memory (e.g., Sz-
malec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 2005), whereas ego depletion
 DECISION FATIGUE IMPAIRS SELF-REGULATION
does not impair the maintenance of information in short-term
memory (Schmeichel, 2007, Experiment 2). Thus, ego depletion
and cognitive load have distinct effects on short-term memory,
suggesting that they are dissociable phenomena. Moreover, recent
studies by Schmeichel and Baumeister (2007) found that cognitive
load procedures produced results opposite to those of ego deple-
tion on a cold pressor task performance: Cognitive load led to
longer durations, whereas ego depletion yielded shorter durations.
Some attention-related phenomena do appear to reveal a hang-
over effect, but these are extremely short-livedthat is, on the
order of milliseconds. The phenomenon of attentional blindness,
for example, occurs when participants fail to perceive the second
of two target stimuli appearing in rapid succession (500 ms or less)
at the same location on a viewing screen (Raymond, Shapiro, &
Arnell, 1992). Similarly, repetition blindness is the failure to
perceive repetitions of stimuli presented in rapid succession (e.g.,
Kanswisher & Potter, 1989). Note that both phenomena peak and
dissipate quite rapidly. By contrast, the current research found that
the hangover effect from making choices persisted over the course
of at least a few minutes, and other research on ego depletion has
found effects up to 45 min postmanipulation. The differing time
courses suggest two resources, one that fluctuates rapidly and is
primarily attentional in nature and another that fluctuates over
longer periods of time and is primarily related to choice making,
willpower, and executive control. Our focus was on the latter.
The concept of mental fatigue is quite general and may encom-
pass some patterns of ego depletion. Nonetheless, mental fatigue
refers to something quite different. Mental fatigue is presumed to
affect a broad range of processes, extending even to exceptionally
simple and uncontrolled processes, such as perceptual discrimina-
tion (e.g., Parasuraman, 1979). It is typically induced by having
participants perform tedious tasks for very long periods of time,
such as several hours (e.g., Lorist, Boksem, & Ridderinkhof,
2005). In contrast, self-regulatory resource depletion is often in-
duced by manipulations that require less than 10 min. In the
present research, Experiment 7 found depletion occurring after just
4 min, which is probably much too brief to permit discussion of
mental fatigue in the cognitive science sense.
Concluding Remarks
The present findings suggest that self-regulation, active initia-
tive, and effortful choosing draw on the same psychological re-
source. Making decisions depletes that resource, thereby weaken-
ing the subsequent capacity for self-control and active initiative.
The impairment of self-control was shown on a variety of tasks,
including physical stamina and pain tolerance, persistence in the
face of failure, and quality and quantity of numerical calculations.
It also led to greater passivity.
Decision making and self-control are both prominent aspects of
the selfs executive function. It is therefore useful to recognize that
they draw on a common psychological resource and that one may
affect the other. In particular, making many decisions leaves the
person in a depleted state and hence less likely to exert self-control
effectively. The common resource needed for self-control, active
initiative, and effortful decision making may deserve recognition
as an important aspect of self and personality.
The human self is quite remarkably different from what is found
in most other species. One likely explanation for these differences
897
is that an escalating complexity of social life, including culture,
was a defining theme of human evolution (Baumeister, 2005).
These uniquely human social systems have conferred remarkable
advantages, ultimately including the long and happy lives enjoyed
by many modern citizens. But they require advanced psychological
capabilities, which are what set the human self apart from the
rudimentary selfhood of other animals. Self-control and decision
making are central, vital skills for functioning in human culture.
Our findings suggest that the formation of the human self has
involved finding a way to create an energy resource that can be
used to control action in these advanced and expensive ways.
Given the difficulty of these modes of action control, the resource
is shared and limited. That is presumably why decision making
produces at least a temporary impairment in the capacity for
self-control.
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Received March 13, 2007
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 899 912 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.899

Adolescent Personality Moderates Genetic and Environmental Influences

on Relationships With Parents

Susan C. South and Robert F. Krueger Wendy Johnson

University of MinnesotaTwin Cities University of MinnesotaTwin Cities and University of
Edinburgh

William G. Iacono
University of MinnesotaTwin Cities

In contrast with early theories of socialization that emphasized the role of parents in shaping their
childrens personalities, recent empirical evidence suggests an evocative relationship between adolescent
personality traits and the quality of the parentadolescent relationship. Research using behavior genetic
methods suggests that the association between personality and parenting is genetically mediated, such
that the genetic effects on adolescent personality traits overlap with the genetic effects on parenting
behavior. In the current study, the authors examined whether the etiology of this relationship might
change depending on the adolescents personality. Biometrical moderation models were used to test for
gene environment interaction and correlation between personality traits and measures of conflict, regard,
and involvement with parents in a sample of 2,452 adolescents (M age 17.79 years). They found
significant moderation of both positive and negative qualities of the parentadolescent relationship, such
that the genetic and environmental variance in relationship quality varied as functions of the adolescents
levels of personality. These findings support the importance of adolescent personality in the development
of the quality of the parentadolescent relationship.

Keywords: personality, parenting, behavior genetics, moderation

For many years, it was assumed that family environment, in-
cluding parenting quality, played a causal role in personality
development. This theory of socialization maintained that parents
played the major, if not defining, role in child development (Bell,
1968). Subsequent to this, the dynamic interactionistic paradigm
recognized that children were not simply the products of parental
behavior (Caspi & Shiner, 2006; Magnusson, 1990; Patterson,
1982; Sameroff, 1983) but that individual differences in childhood
personality also lead to variations in the quality of the parent child
relationship. Some took this position to its extreme, suggesting that
parents have little if any impact on adolescent development (Har-
ris, 1995, 1998). A reasonable synthetic perspective is that child
personality and parental behavior are related through bidirec-
tional interactive processes (Collins, Maccoby, Steinberg, Heath-
erington, & Bornstein, 2000, p. 222). In the current study, we
Susan C. South, Robert F. Krueger, and William G. Iacono, Department
of Psychology, University of MinnesotaTwin Cities; Wendy Johnson,
Department of Psychology, University of MinnesotaTwin Cities and
Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland.
This work was supported in part by United States Public Health Service
Grants AA09367 to Matthew McGue and DA05147 to William G. Iacono.
Wendy Johnson holds an RCUK Fellowship at the University of Edin-
burgh, Edinburgh, Scotland.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either
Susan C. South or Robert F. Krueger, Department of Psychology, Univer-
sity of Minnesota, N218 Elliott Hall, 75 East River Road, Minneapolis,
MN 55455. E-mail: south088@umn.edu or krueg038@umn.edu
examined whether the etiology of the parentadolescent relation-
ship changes depending on the adolescents personality by deter-
mining the moderating impact of adolescent personality on the
genetic and environmental influences on the parentadolescent
relationship.
The Role of Adolescent Personality in the Parent
Adolescent Relationship
Evidence from the literature on personality development sup-
ports the notion of temperament (Rothbart & Bates, 2006), con-
sisting of core traits (Asendorpf & Van Aken, 2003) or basic
dispositions (McCrae & Costa, 1999) that are present from birth
and have links to adult personality (Caspi et al., 2003). This is not
to say, however, that personality is set from birth. There are several
mechanisms by which individual characteristics transact with the
environment, including interpersonal relationships (Shiner &
Caspi, 2003). One of the most important relationships for person-
ality development is the parent relationship. Here, evidence sup-
ports a bidirectional influence between the temperament or per-
sonality and the parent child relationship. Negative,
inappropriate, or unskilled parenting behaviors appear to play a
particularly important role in the development of externalizing
behaviors, whereas warm and supportive parenting behaviors seem
to act as protective factors (Bates, Petit, Dodge, & Ridge, 1998;
Belsky, Hsieh, & Crnic, 1998; Rubin, Burgess, Dwyer, & Hast-
ings, 2003; Stoolmiller, 2001). Conversely, children with temper-
aments high in negative emotionality elicit less supportive parent-
ing behaviors, particularly in households of low socioeconomic

899
900 SOUTH, KRUEGER, JOHNSON, AND IACONO
status (Paulussen-Hoogeboom, Stams, Hermanns, & Peetsma,
2007).
Shiner and Caspi (2003) delineated six environmental processes
that work to shape the development of personality through ado-
lescence into adulthood: learning processes, environmental elici-
tation, environmental construal, social and temporal comparisons,
environmental selection, and environmental manipulation. Theo-
retically, all of these processes could play a part in the emerging
relationship between adolescent personality traits and relationships
with parents. There is little empirical evidence for the operation of
some (e.g., social comparisons, environmental selection and ma-
nipulation) but greater support for the ways in which personality
traits may shape the elicitation and construal of behavior from
others (Shiner & Caspi, 2003). Particularly as children mature into
adolescence, individual differences in personality evoke different
responses from parents and selection of different types and fre-
quencies of interactions with parents. It is most likely this process
of person environment transaction that contributes to the increas-
ing stability and consistency of personality during adolescence
(Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000).
Although there are a greater number of studies connecting
personality to other forms of interpersonal relationships (e.g., peers
and romantic partners), accumulating empirical evidence supports
an evocative relationship between adolescent personality and par-
ent behaviors. Branje, van Lieshout, and van Aken (2004) found a
positive, cross-sectional link between adolescents agreeableness
and perceived support from parents. Levels of conscientiousness
and openness in the older of two siblings were related to perceived
support from both parents, whereas extraversion and neuroticism
in the younger siblings were related to perceived support from the
father only. In a later study, Branje, van Lieshout, and van Aken
(2005) examined the relationship between agreeableness and per-
ceived support across all possible combinations of family relation-
ships for parents and adolescents. They found no general link
across family members between self-reported agreeableness and
perceived support; however, they did find significant
agreeablenesssupport correlations within most of the possible
family dyads (i.e., motherfather, father oldest child) except for
the motheryounger adolescent relationship. Consistent findings
for a link between personality and perceived parental support in
older siblings suggest that this association becomes stronger over
the course of adolescence.
Longitudinal studies provide a better method than cross-
sectional studies for teasing apart causal influences in the
personalityparenting association. Asendorpf and Wilpers (1998)
examined the longitudinal connections between personality traits
and interpersonal relationships in a German college-student sam-
ple. Overall, they found strong stability of personality over a
period of 18 months, compared with much greater instability of
social relationships. Personality traits influenced social relation-
ships, but not vice versa; specific to family, conscientiousness was
related to frequency of contact with parents. Further, change in
relationship status was unrelated to changes in personality. The
authors concluded that by early adulthood, the quality of relation-
ships with peers, family, and romantic partners is a function of
personality. To examine whether personality in adolescence might
be more malleable to influences from relationships, Asendorpf and
van Aken (2003) studied the association between personality and
parenting behavior between the ages of 12 and 17 years. Adoles-
cents who were higher in levels of conscientiousness reported
increasing levels of support from their fathers over this age range.
There were no significant relationships between perceived support
from parents at age 12 and personality traits at age 17. The authors
concluded that core traits, like conscientiousness, are relatively
stable and enduring traits from birth to adulthood, whereas surface
traits are more prone to influence from the environment. Their
findings also supported cross-sectional research that hinted at the
greater influence of personality on parent relationship as the age of
the adolescent increases.
Sources of Influences on the PersonalityParenting
Relationship: Findings From Behavior Genetics
Using behavior genetic methods, researchers have attempted to
explicate the nature of the relationship between personality and
parental relationship quality. For instance, some have hypothe-
sized that the association between personality and family environ-
ment is genetically mediated. At this point, it is well known that
measures of the family environment, including parenting, are
modestly heritable (Bouchard & McGue, 1990; Elkins, McGue, &
Iacono, 1997; Hur & Bouchard, 1995; McGue, Elkins, Walden, &
Iacono, 2005; Plomin & Bergeman, 1991; Plomin, McClearn,
Pedersen, Nesselroade, & Bergeman, 1988; Reiss, Neiderhiser,
Heatherington, & Plomin, 2000; Rowe, 1981, 1983). It was pro-
posed that these measures are heritable because they are influenced
by personality traits, which are, on average, 50% heritable (Bou-
chard & Loehlin, 2001). That is, a persons individual character-
istics affect how they interact with others (or, alternately, how they
think others interact with them), so the genetic influences on
environmental measures actually reflect the personality traits of
the person.
The two mechanisms through which genetically influenced
characteristics could affect measures of the environment have been
labeled evocative and active gene environment correlations (Scarr
& McCartney, 1983). Evocative correlation occurs when differ-
ences in peoples genetically influenced characteristics evoke spe-
cific responses from the people around them. Adolescents who are
highly emotionally labile, for example, likely elicit very different
reactions from their parents than do adolescents with calm, even-
tempered dispositions. Active correlation occurs when genetic
influences on personality affect the process by which individuals
select their environments (e.g., amount of time spent with parents)
or the process by which they make attributions regarding aspects
of their relationships with others. Adolescents prone to excitement
and sensation seeking may be more likely to choose to spend time
with like-minded peers rather than with parents who try to rein-
force more constrained behavior.
Multivariate genetic models with structural equation modeling
detect gene environment correlation by estimating the degree to
which genetic influences on one variable are related to the genetic
influences on a second variable. As the degree of genetic overlap
between personality and parenting increases, it becomes more
probable that genetic influences on personality are responsible for
genetic influences on parenting. To date, research has found ge-
netic relationships between personality traits and life events (Bil-
lig, Hershberger, Iacono, & McGue, 1996; Saudino, Pedersen,
Lichtenstein, McClearn, & Plomin, 1997) and risk of divorce
(Jocklin, McGue, & Lykken, 1996). Chipuer, Plomin, Pedersen,
 ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY MODERATES RELATIONSHIPS
McClearn, and Nesselroade (1993) collected measures of current
family environment, neuroticism, and extraversion in a sample of
older adult twins. They found that the association between the
personality traits and the relationship scale from the Moos Family
Environment Scale was primarily genetically mediated; however,
a significant portion of the genetic variation in family environment
was unaccounted for by personality. Krueger, Markon, and Bou-
chard (2003) investigated whether the genetic influences on child-
rearing environment, including parenting, could account for ge-
netic influences on adult personality. Using data from the Minne-
sota Study of Twins Reared Apart, Krueger et al. found that the
connections between the personality traits of negative emotionality
and constraint and the amount of cohesion in the recalled family
environment were genetically mediated. They concluded that the
same genotype that led to adult personality traits also influenced
recall of childhood rearing environment. Taken together, the re-
sults from these myriad studies would suggest that a persons
genetically influenced personality traits often influence the nature
of their relationships within the family.
Current Study
The limitation in the behavior genetic work on personality and
parenting relationship is that these bivariate quantitative genetic
models average over any group differences within the population.
This is similar to any main-effects model in statistics; for instance,
a regression equation predicting adolescent smoking behavior
from access to cigarettes averages across the sample. However,
much like an examination of moderation in that example may
reveal a smaller effect when there is greater parental monitoring, it
is also possible that the estimation of genetic and environmental
influences on one phenotype may vary as a function of differences
in another. This is a form of Gene Environment interaction, the
genetic susceptibility to environmental risk, or, alternatively, dif-
ferential genetic expression in different environments. When
Gene Environment interaction occurs, the genetic influences on
a phenotype are more or less important depending on the level of
a second trait. Examples of this work and their findings include
less genetic influence on depression in unmarried women (Heath,
Eaves, & Martin, 1998), smaller genetic influence on disinhibition
in more religious families (Boomsma, de Geus, van Baal, &
Koopmans, 1999), and greater genetic influence on IQ in families
of high socioeconomic status (Turkheimer, Haley, Waldron,
DOnofrio, & Gottesman, 2003).
Using models that allow for and quantify moderation of this
kind to address the current research topic may increase our under-
standing of how the parentadolescent relationship develops in the
context of the adolescents emerging personality. Research sug-
gests that there is a bidirectional relationship between the devel-
opment of personality and the emerging parent child relationship.
In prior work using the same sample of adolescent twins, we found
that perceptions of the parenting relationship moderated the ge-
netic and environmental influences on adolescent personality traits
(Krueger, South, Johnson, & Iacono, in press). We built on that
study by examining the other direction of influence how quali-
ties of the parentadolescent relationship, as reported by both the
parent and adolescent, result from the adolescents personality
traits. Using new modeling for biometrical moderation, we exam-
ined whether the individual characteristics of the adolescent (i.e.,
901
personality traits) can change or influence the etiology of the
personalityparenting relationship.
Method
Participants
The current study used participants from the Minnesota Twin
Family Study (MTFS), an ongoing population-based, longitudinal
study of adolescent twins and their families. Birth records and
public databases were used to locate more than 90% of twin births
in the state of Minnesota from 1971 through 1985. Families were
excluded from the study if either twin had a cognitive or physical
handicap that would preclude them from completing our daylong,
in-person assessment, or if the family lived more than 1 days drive
from our Minneapolis laboratory. Of the eligible families, 83%
agreed to participate. Although there were no significant differ-
ences between participating and nonparticipating families in re-
gard to socioeconomic status and self-reported mental health prob-
lems, parents in participating families had slightly, albeit
significantly, more education (0.25 years) than did parents in
nonparticipating families (Iacono, Carlson, Taylor, Elkins, &
McGue, 1999). Reflecting the population of Minnesota at the time
of the twins birth, approximately 98% of the sample was Cauca-
sian. Children gave informed assent, and parents gave informed
consent for themselves and their children. The research protocol
was approved by the University of Minnesota Institutional Review
Board. Further information regarding all aspects of MTFS recruit-
ment is detailed elsewhere (Iacono et al., 1999).
The MTFS uses two cohorts of twins in an accelerated longitu-
dinal design. Participants enter the study at age 11 or 17 years
(corresponding to younger and older cohorts, respectively) and
return for follow-up assessments approximately every 3 years
thereafter. The original 11-year-old cohort consisted of 756 same-
sex, reared-together monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twin
pairs: 376 male pairs (254 MZ; 122 DZ) and 380 female pairs (233
MZ; 147 DZ). The 17-year-old cohort consisted of 626 same-sex
twin pairs: 289 male pairs (188 MZ; 101 DZ) and 337 female pairs
(223 MZ; 114 DZ). For the purposes of the current study, we used
data from both cohorts at the overlapping assessment point of age
17 years: the older cohort at intake and the younger cohort at their
second follow-up visit. This included all 1,252 individuals from
the older cohort at the intake assessment and 1,320 twins from the
younger cohort who completed the second follow-up assessment
(87% of the younger cohort).
Participants were excluded from this total sample of 2,572 if
they were missing data on all of the personality variables and all of
the parenting variables (n 67) and if cotwin data were entirely
missing (n 53). This brought the final sample size to 2,452,
including 585 male twin pairs (386 MZ; 199 DZ) and 641 female
twin pairs (412 MZ; 229 DZ). The greater percentage of MZ twins
relative to DZ twins in this sample is due to an overrepresentation
of MZ twins in the population from which the sample was drawn,
as well as a somewhat higher participation rate of families with
MZ twins (Hur, McGue, & Iacono, 1995). At the time participants
completed the measures used in the current study, they ranged in
age from 16.55 to 20.12 years, with a mean of 17.79 (SD 0.65).
902 SOUTH, KRUEGER, JOHNSON, AND IACONO
Zygosity
In the MTFS, three estimates are used to determine twin zygos-
ity. MTFS staff evaluates the twins physical similarity, including
visage, hair color, and face and ear shape. Next, parents complete
a standard zygosity questionnaire. Finally, ponderal and cephalic
indices and fingerprint ridge count are measured. A previous
validation study (N 50) demonstrated 100% accuracy of zygos-
ity determination when these three estimates agree. When these
three estimates do not agree, a blood sample is requested, and a
serological analysis is performed.
Assessment of Personality
Personality was measured with the Multidimensional Personal-
ity Questionnaire (MPQ; Tellegen & Waller, in press), a 198-item
self-report personality measure designed to assess a broad range of
personality characteristics across normal populations. All partici-
pants were mailed the MPQ prior to the assessment and asked to
bring the completed inventory with them to their in-person visit. If
the MPQ was not completed upon a participants arrival for his or
her laboratory assessment or by the end of the day-long visit, the
participant was asked to take it home and return the completed
measure to the study by mail. Internal consistency reliabilities for
the MPQ range from .76 to .89 and 30-day testretest reliabilities
range from .82 to .92. The MPQ assesses 11 primary personality
domains, 10 of which load on three higher order factors (the 11th
scale, Absorption, does not load on any factor). The three higher
order factors are Positive Emotionality (PEM; a broad measure of
positive well-being and tendency to view life as a pleasurable
experience), Negative Emotionality (NEM; a propensity to expe-
rience psychological distress), and Constraint (CN; a tendency to
endorse traditional values and act in a cautious manner). PEM
subsumes the lower order scales of Well-Being, Achievement,
Social Potency, and Social Closeness. NEM is composed of Ag-
gression, Alienation, and Stress Reaction. Finally, CN is a com-
posite of Traditionalism, Control, and Harm Avoidance. Only the
higher order scales were included in the present analyses. MPQ
data were available for 2,169 individuals (nmen 1,053, nwomen
1,116) from the total sample of 2,452.
ParentAdolescent Relationship Quality
The Parental Environment Questionnaire (PEQ) was adminis-
tered to both the adolescent twins and their mothers to tap percep-
tions of parent child relationships. The PEQ was mailed to all
participants prior to the assessment. If the PEQ was not completed
upon their arrival for their laboratory assessment or by the end of
the day-long visit, participants were asked to complete it at home
and return it by mail. The PEQ asks mothers and twins to complete
50 items assessing aspects of their relationship on a 4-point scale
(1 definitely true, 2 probably true, 3 probably false, and
4 definitely false). Twins rated their relationships with their
mothers and fathers, whereas mothers rated their own relationship
with each individual twin. Items in the versions of the PEQ
completed by mothers and twins were essentially the same, with
minor changes in wording appropriate for the particular rater.
The PEQ was developed by the MTFS because the standard
measures of family environment available when the study began
failed to assess dyadic relationships within the family, instead
focusing on the overall family climate. The PEQ scales were
organized around the two broad domains of conflict (vs. nurtur-
ance/warmth) and control and correlate significantly in the ex-
pected direction with an alternative measure of the family envi-
ronment (Elkins et al., 1997). Further details regarding the
development, theoretical rationale, and psychometric properties of
the PEQ are given in Elkins et al. (1997). Five factor-analytically
derived scores are produced by responses to the PEQ: Conflict,
Parent Involvement, Regard for Parent, Regard for Child, and
Structure. The Structure scale is the only scale to assess the control
aspect; in addition, it has low internal reliability (Elkins et al.,
1997), thus, we did not consider it in this study. For the present
investigation, we used scores for the Conflict scale (12 items, e.g.,
my parent often loses her/his temper with me; .82), In-
volvement scale (12 items, e.g., I talk about my concerns and my
experiences with my parent; .74), Regard for Parent scale
(eight items, e.g., I want to be like my parent in a number of
ways; .75), and the Parent Regard for Twin scale (five items,
e.g., my parent is proud of me; .69; McGue et al., 2005).
Scores were prorated for scales missing ratings for 10% or fewer
of their items (i.e., the average of the other items was used as the
missing items score); if more than 10% of the scales constituent
items were missing, the scale was considered missing.
To create composite indices of Regard, Conflict, and Involve-
ment, we averaged ratings from mothers and twins (Burt, Krueger,
McGue, & Iacono, 2003; Burt, McGue, Iacono, & Krueger, 2006;
Burt, McGue, Krueger, & Iacono, 2005). Because twin ratings
about the mother and father were highly correlated (.80; McGue
et al., 2005), we first averaged these ratings. Significant correla-
tions were also found for (a) twin reports of Regard for Parent and
Parent Regard for Twin (r .65, p .0001) and (b) mother
reports of Regard for Parent and Parent Regard for Twin (r .41,
p .0001), so we combined scores for these two scales to form
summary scores for Regard. Separate composite indices were then
created for Regard, Conflict, and Involvement. We averaged the
twin composite and the mother report of twin to more fully capture
the relational aspect of the parentadolescent relationship (the
correlations between mother report of twin and twin report of
mother were .41 for Conflict, .29 for Regard, and .36 for Involve-
ment). This is supported by previous work in the MTFS samples
that has found that each informant uniquely contributes to the
prediction of external validity criteria, including behavior prob-
lems and grades (Burt et al., 2005). PEQ data were available for
2,364 participants for Regard (nmen 1,119, nwomen 1,245),
2,365 individuals for Conflict (nmen 1,120, nwomen 1,245),
and 2,364 individuals for Involvement (nmen 1,119, nwomen
1,245).
Biometric Analyses
We used biometric modeling to evaluate the genetic and envi-
ronmental moderation of parentadolescent relationship quality by
adolescent personality. This type of modeling makes use of twin
methodology and structural equation modeling to estimate how
much of the variance in a trait (phenotype) is due to additive
genetic effects, or the effect of individual genes summed over loci
(A); shared environmental effects, or the extent to which growing
up in the same family makes people similar (C); and nonshared
 ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY MODERATES RELATIONSHIPS
environmental effects, or the extent to which people are unique,
despite growing up in the same family (E). The standard univariate
ACE model assumes that the A, C, and E components are fixed
over the entire population from which the sample is drawn. In
other words, there is no provision for the association between the
genetic and environmental influences on personality and any other
trait.
To test our assertion that the genetic and environmental influ-
ences on the parentadolescent relationship differ as a function of
adolescent personality, we needed to use a model that allowed the
variance components of parent relationship quality to vary as a
function of adolescent personality. This type of analysis has been
referred to as a test of gene environment interaction, or the notion
that different environments can lead to different genetic expression
of a phenotype. However, this term does not completely describe
the nature of the effects we examined. In the current study, neither
the moderator variable, personality, nor the dependent variable,
parenting behavior, are wholly environmental or wholly genetic.
The advantage of the model that we used is that it is possible to
decompose the moderator variable into its genetic and environ-
mental variance components and test for gene environment inter-
action in the presence of gene environment correlation (Purcell,
2002). A genetic correlation is the amount of overlap in the genetic
influences on two phenotypes and ranges from 1 to 1; similar
types of correlations (i.e., overlap) can occur for shared and
nonshared environmental influences. Therefore, we use the more
accurate term biometrical moderation to refer to the analyses
conducted in these studies; this term better captures the goal of this
studyto determine whether the magnitude of genetic and envi-
ronmental influences on parenting depends on the adolescents
level of personality (gene environment interaction) and the extent
to which influences acting on parenting also exert influences on
personality (gene environment correlation).
We fit biometric models to the raw data using the Mx software
system (Neale, Boker, Xie, & Maes, 2003). To ease interpretation,
we recoded the parenting variables as necessary so that they would
be positively correlated with the personality variables (which
remained scored in the same direction for all models, with higher
scores corresponding to greater PEM, NEM or CN). To correct for
potential biases in model fitting, we adjusted the personality and
parenting relationship scales for effects of age and gender (McGue
& Bouchard, 1984). Each scale was regressed on age, age2, Age
Gender, and Age2 Gender, and the standardized residuals from
Table 1
Phenotypic and Twin Correlations for Parenting and Personality Measures
Relationship quality variable 1 2
1. Regard
2. Conflict .63
3. Involvement .77 .62
4. Positive Emotionality .25 .11
5. Negative Emotionality .25 .35
6. Constraint .24 .26
Note. MZ monozygotic; DZ dizygotic.
903
these regressions were used in subsequent analyses. Because not
all participants had both MPQ and PEQ data for all scales, we used
full-information maximum likelihood with the raw data, a proce-
dure that was also necessary for the moderated biometric models
we were using. This procedure relies on the assumption that data
are missing at random (Little & Rubin, 2002), an assumption that
we considered reasonable in this case, as questionnaire return
status was not linked in any way to any study measure status. Fits
of the moderation models were judged relative to the fit of a
bivariate decomposition model in which the six moderation pa-
rameters (XcM and XuM for A, C, and E) were fixed at zero, so
that aC XcM became aC (0 M) aC.
We used two indices to evaluate model fit: (a) the likelihood-
ratio test (LRT; distributed as chi squared and computed as the
difference in the 2 log-likelihood values for the two models) and
(b) the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1987). The
LRT is used as a goodness-of-fit index, representing the degree of
fit between model expectations and observed data. Statistically
significant values are associated with a relatively poor fit. Im-
provements in the models fit, from adding or omitting parameters,
can be assessed by a statistically significant change in LRT. AIC
is also conventionally used to compare the fit of alternative mod-
els. The AIC considers goodness of fit in the likelihood sense (how
well the model reproduces the observed data) but prefers models
that capture the data both accurately and parsimoniously over more
complex models. Because the aim of model fitting is to explain the
data as parsimoniously as possible, the model with the lowest AIC
value is generally considered best.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
We calculated the phenotypic correlations between personality
and parenting variables using Mplus (Muthen & Muthen, 1998
2006), which uses a maximum likelihood robust estimator to
produce confidence intervals that are adjusted for the nonindepen-
dence of the twin data. The relationships among the transformed
variables were in the expected directions (see Table 1). Regard was
positively correlated with PEM (r .25; 95% confidence interval
[CI] 0.20, 0.31; p .0001), negatively correlated with NEM
(r .25; 95% CI 0.29, 0.21; p .0001), and positively
correlated with CN (r .24; 95% CI 0.19, 0.29; p .0001).
Twin
correlations
3 4 5 6 MZ DZ
.70 .52
.72 .46
.71 .53
.29 .52 .22
.25 .10 .49 .17
.26 .17 .08 .54 .21
904 SOUTH, KRUEGER, JOHNSON, AND IACONO

Cc
Cu

Ac Ec Au Eu
cM

aU+XuM cu+XuM eu+XuM

aM eM
cC+XcM eC+XcM
aC+XcM

PERSONALITY PARENTING

Figure 1. Path diagram of a biometrical moderation model with adolescent personality (PERSONALITY)
moderating the genetic and environmental influences on parentadolescent relationship (PARENTING). The
model is a variation of the bivariate (Cholesky) decomposition model, in which the variances and covariances
of the observed variables are decomposed into the proportion of variance associated with genetic (a), shared
environmental (c), and nonshared environmental (e) components that are shared between the two phenotypes and
unique to the second phenotype. There are two sets of paths contributing genetic and environmental influences:
those common to parentadolescent relationship and the moderator (personality), and those unique to parent
relationship. The paths from the moderator (M) variable to the dependent variable are now linear functions of
the form a M, where a is the parameter for genetic influence on the variable, is a regression coefficient,
and M is the level of the moderator variable. A genetic variance, C shared environmental variance, E
nonshared environmental variance.

Conflict was negative correlated with PEM (r .11; 95% CI
0.16, 0.06; p .0001), positively correlated with NEM (r
.35; 95% CI 0.30, 0.39; p .0001), and negatively correlated
with CN (r .26; 95% CI 0.31, 0.21; p .0001).
Involvement was positively correlated with PEM (r .29; 95%
CI 0.24, 0.34; p .0001), negatively correlated with NEM (r
.25; 95% CI 0.30, 0.21; p .0001), and positively
correlated with CN (r .26; 95% CI 0.21, 0.31; p .0001).
Also shown in Table 1 are basic MZ and DZ twin correlations
for the personality and parenting measures. We computed twin
correlations using an intraclass correlation coefficient in SPSS.
These MZ and DZ intraclass correlations can be compared to
obtain a general indication of the extent to which genetic and
environmental influences operate on the phenotype. In all cases,
the MZ correlations exceeded the DZ correlations, suggesting that
both personality and parenting measures are likely to be influenced
by genetic effects. However, MZ correlations for the parenting
measures were less than double the DZ correlations, implicating
the importance of shared environmental effects.1
Biometric Moderation Analysis
We tested whether adolescent personality traits moderated the
genetic and environmental influences on the quality of the parent
adolescent relationship by fitting our variables to the biometrical
moderation model in Figure 1. There were nine combinations of
parenting and personality variables: Regard moderated by PEM,
NEM, and CN; Conflict moderated by PEM, NEM and CN; and
Involvement moderated by PEM, NEM, and CN. For each of these
nine combinations, we compared the fit of a model with all
moderation parameters fixed to zero (no moderation) to a model
with all moderation parameters estimated (A, C, and E full mod-
eration). As shown in Table 2, full ACE biometrical moderation
was significant for seven of the nine possible combinations of
parenting and personality variables. These results were supported
by both LRT and AIC. The strongest effects were for the moder-
ating effects of PEM, 2(6) 54.89, p .0001; NEM, 2(6)
1
An anonymous reviewer suggested that we augment our results by
providing MZ and DZ twin correlations for low versus high levels of
personality. If the moderator variable were the same for both twins (e.g.,
parental marital status or socioeconomic status), then it would be quite easy
to calculate twin correlations at different levels of the moderator. However,
in this study, the twin pairs are often discordant for level of personality
traits (i.e., Twin 1s level of PEM differs from Twin 2s level of PEM). So
to calculate a twin correlation at low versus high levels of personality is not
possible. Indeed, the fact that the biometric moderation models use all
individual data, and not covariances between twins, is a strength of the
study and why these models are able to calculate ACE variance estimates
at different levels of the moderator (Purcell, 2002).
Table 2
Fit Statistics From the Models of Variance Components Allowing for Gene-Environment Interaction and Correlation

Moderating Variable

Positive Emotionality Negative Emotionality Constraint

Relationship quality variable 2lnL df 2

df p AIC 2lnL df 2
df p AIC 2lnL df 2 df p AIC

ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY MODERATES RELATIONSHIPS

Regard
No moderation 10566.98 4038 2490.98 10558.10 4038 2482.10 10577.61 4038 2501.61
Only A moderation 10547.67 4036 19.31 2 0.000 2475.67 10509.91 4036 48.19 2 0.000 2437.91 10555.89 4036 21.72 2 0.000 2483.89
Only C moderation 10537.09 4036 29.89 2 0.000 2465.09 10516.23 4036 41.87 2 0.000 2444.23 10553.98 4036 23.63 2 0.000 2481.98
Only E moderation 10519.83 4036 47.15 2 0.000 2447.83 10529.69 4036 28.41 2 0.000 2457.69 10531.40 4036 46.21 2 0.000 2459.40
A and C moderation (no E) 10535.49 4034 31.49 4 0.000 2467.49 10507.58 4034 50.52 4 0.000 2439.58 10552.29 4034 25.32 4 0.000 2484.29
A and E moderation (no C) 10517.11 4034 49.87 4 0.000 2449.11 10504.38 4034 53.71 4 0.000 2436.38 10524.95 4034 52.66 4 0.000 2456.95
C and E moderation (no A) 10514.19 4034 52.79 4 0.000 2446.19 10502.93 4034 55.16 4 0.000 2434.93 10520.14 4034 57.47 4 0.000 2452.14
A, C, and E full moderation 10512.09 4032 54.89 6 0.000 2448.09 10501.57 4032 56.53 6 0.000 2437.57 10517.74 4032 59.87 6 0.000 2453.74
Conflict
No moderation 10597.12 4039 2519.12 10385.29 4039 2307.29 10491.52 4039 2413.52
Only A moderation 10596.10 4037 1.02 2 0.600 2522.10
Only C moderation 10588.46 4037 8.67 2 0.013 2514.46
Only E moderation 10595.86 4037 1.26 2 0.532 2521.86
A and C moderation (no E) 10587.26 4035 9.86 4 0.043 2517.26
A and E moderation (no C) 10584.03 4035 13.09 4 0.011 2514.03
C and E moderation (no A) 10583.78 4035 13.35 4 0.010 2513.78
A, C, and E full moderation 10581.12 4033 16.00 6 0.014 2515.12 10365.76 4033 19.53 6 0.003 2299.75 10480.89 4033 10.63 6 0.101 2414.89
Involvement
No moderation 10497.52 4039 2419.52 10505.15 4039 2427.15 10518.30 4039 2440.30
Only A moderation 10471.38 4037 33.77 2 0.000 2397.38
Only C moderation 10476.68 4037 28.47 2 0.000 2402.68
Only E moderation 10486.91 4037 18.23 2 0.000 2412.91
A and C moderation (no E) 10470.66 4035 34.49 4 0.000 2400.66
A and E moderation (no C) 10468.75 4035 36.40 4 0.000 2398.75
C and E moderation (no A) 10471.07 4035 34.08 4 0.000 2401.07
A, C, and E full moderation 10486.68 4033 10.84 6 0.094 2420.68 10467.82 4033 37.33 6 0.000 2401.82 10502.59 4033 15.70 6 0.015 2436.59

Note. 2lnL 2 log likelihood; AIC Akaikes Information Criterion; A genetic variance; C shared environmental variance; E nonshared environmental variance. Selected moderation
models are shown in bold. Empty cells indicate that no tests of specific moderation parameters were conducted because the full moderation model was not a better fit to the data than the no-moderation
model, according to either raw or transformed data.

905
906 SOUTH, KRUEGER, JOHNSON, AND IACONO
56.53, p .0001; and CN, 2(6) 59.87, p .0001, on Regard. no-moderation models are equivalent to estimates from a standard
The moderating effects of PEM on Involvement and CN on Con-
flict could be removed without a significant decrease in fit, sug-
gesting that the genetic and environmental effects on Involvement
and Conflict were the same across all levels of PEM and CN,
respectively.
Confirmation of findings with transformed data. We used two
approaches to confirm that these results were not simply the result
of nonnormality in the data. First, we again compared the no-
moderation and ACE full moderation models, this time using
transformed scores for Conflict (skew 0.436), Regard (skew
1.117), and Involvement (skew 0.571). To use the same
type of transformation on all variables, we first reverse scored
Conflict and subjected all variables to a square transformation.
Results reported above for the raw data (age and gender regressed)
were generally replicated using transformed scores for Regard,
Conflict, and Involvement; however, the effects of NEM on Con-
flict, 2(6) 7.77, p ns, and CN on Involvement, 2(6) 8.88, and Regard are displayed graphically in Figure 2. The first panel
p ns, were no longer significant.
In a second, separate attempt to confirm that our findings were
not the result of extreme data points, we truncated the raw data for
the three personality variablesPEM, NEM, and CN. After age
and gender were regressed out of the personality variables, we
trimmed the z score residuals such that anyone above 2 or below
2 was recoded to these boundaries. When these truncated per-
sonality variables were used, all seven significant effects found
with raw data were replicated.2
Further analysis of moderation models. We now turn to fur-
ther interpretation of the moderation models but limit our discus-
sion to the five models that were best supported with analyses
using raw and transformed data: Regard moderated by PEM,
NEM, and CN; Conflict moderated by PEM; and Involvement
moderated by NEM. Because the moderation of Conflict by NEM
and Involvement by CN could not be completely confirmed using
transformed data, we remain cautious in our interpretation of these
results and do not discuss these models further.
Having established that the full moderation model with all
moderation parameters freely estimated provided a better fit to the
data than did the no-moderation models for five of the combina-
tions of parenting and personality variables, we then sought to
establish which moderation parameters were driving the effect.
That is, we wished to determine whether all of the three types of
variance (genetic, shared environmental, unique environmental)
were moderated by the personality variables or whether modera-
tion occurred for some of these variance components and not
others. Starting from the no-moderation, baseline model, we added
moderation for each of the A, C, and E paths and their combina-
tions in turn. In sum, a total of six models (in addition to the
no-moderation and full moderation models) were run: (a) only A
moderation (no C and E), (b) only C moderation (no A and E), (c)
only E moderation (no A and C), (d) A and C moderation (no E),
(e) A and E moderation (no C), and (f) C and E moderation (no A).
The results for this full series of models are discussed in turn
below. The results of the full series of models are presented in
Table 2, with the best fitting moderation models highlighted in
bold.
Table 3 presents the estimated variance components (A, C, and
E) for Regard, Conflict, and Involvement from the no-moderation
models and the best fitting moderation models. Estimates from the
bivariate decomposition model such that they apply to the popu-
lation in the aggregate, regardless of level of personality. When
moderation is significant for any of the ACE components, the
variance estimates vary as functions of every level of the moder-
ator variable (here, personality); for ease of presentation, they are
shown in Table 3 at five different levels, scaled in standard
deviation units (z scored): 2, 1, 0, 1, and 2 standard deviations
away from the mean of the moderator.3 Two types of ACE
estimates are given in Table 3, for both the moderation and
no-moderation models: (a) the raw A, C, and E estimates are
shown in the first three columns, followed by the total phenotypic
variance; and (b) A, C, and E estimates expressed as proportions of
the total variance in parenting (e.g., A% A / A C E, also
referred to as h2, the heritability estimate). The final three columns
present the genetic and environmental correlations (rA, rC, and rE).
Moderation of Regard by PEM. The models based on PEM
illustrates the unstandardized variance components for Regard
from the no-moderation model decomposition of PEM and Regard.
As shown, the A (genetic) component is .40, whereas the E
(nonshared environmental) and C (shared environmental) compo-
nents are about .30, corresponding to the variance estimates given
in Table 3. As this model does not take into account moderation of
parenting by personality, the variance components are static across
the range of PEM. As shown in Table 2, the moderation model
clearly fits the data better than the no-moderation model. Further
parsing of the full ACE moderation model revealed that two
submodels of the moderation model, in which there was modera-
tion on E only, 2(2) 47.15, p .0001, AIC 2447.83, and
moderation on C and E only, 2(4) 52.79, p .0001, AIC
2446.19, technically fit better than the full ACE moderation model,
2(6) 54.89, p .0001, AIC 2448.09. However, examination
of the plot of the full ACE model revealed a clearly visible effect
of A and C, thus convincing us that the full moderation model best
represented the true nature of the moderation of Regard by PEM.
Figure 2 shows the results of estimates from the full ACE mod-
eration model, in which all three ACE variance components for
Regard vary as functions of PEM (shown as z scores from 2 to
2). As PEM increases, the genetic variance of Regard increases,
whereas both the shared and nonshared environmental effects
decrease.
With no moderation, the proportion of variance in individual
differences in Regard (from a bivariate decomposition model with
PEM) is 40.2% genetic, 31.4% shared environmental, and 28.4%
nonshared environmental. This is very similar to the results from
the moderation model at a mean level (z score of 0) of PEM (h2
.44, c2 .30, e2 .27). As Table 3 shows, however, the genetic
component of variance increases from low to high levels of PEM;
because the total phenotypic variance in Regard decreases from
low to high levels of PEM, the heritability of Regard is greatest
when PEM is greatest. At low levels of PEM, Regard is largely due
2
Results for models using the square transformed and truncated data are
available from Susan C. South.
3
Variance component estimates for parenting are presented at five levels
of personality, but they could easily be extended to any personality score
found in the population.
 ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY MODERATES RELATIONSHIPS 907

Table 3
Estimates of Unstandardized and Standardized Variance Components and Genetic and Environmental Correlations in Parent-
Adolescent Relationship Quality and the Personality Moderating Variables

Moderating variable

Variance components Proportions of variance Correlations with moderator

Relationship quality Total
variable A C E variance A(%) C(%) E(%) rA rC rE

PEM
Regard
No-moderation model 0.40 0.32 0.29 1.00 0.40 0.31 0.28 .23 1.00 .18
PEM level
2 0.22 0.69 0.43 1.34 0.16 0.52 0.32 .17 1.00 .36
1 0.31 0.46 0.33 1.11 0.28 0.42 0.30 .23 1.00 .28
0 0.42 0.28 0.26 0.96 0.44 0.30 0.27 .27 1.00 .18
1 0.55 0.15 0.20 0.89 0.62 0.16 0.22 .31 1.00 .04
2 0.69 0.05 0.15 0.90 0.77 0.06 0.17 .33 1.00 .14
Conflict
No-moderation model 0.56 0.17 0.26 0.99 0.56 0.18 0.26 .06 1.00 .15
PEM level
2 0.74 0.01 0.28 1.04 0.72 0.01 0.27 .18 1.00 .39
1 0.64 0.07 0.26 0.96 0.66 0.07 0.27 .12 1.00 .28
0 0.54 0.17 0.24 0.95 0.57 0.18 0.25 .05 1.00 .15
1 0.46 0.33 0.23 1.02 0.45 0.32 0.23 .03 1.00 .01
2 0.39 0.53 0.23 1.16 0.34 0.46 0.20 .13 1.00 .12

NEM
Regard
No-moderation model 0.40 0.31 0.29 1.00 0.40 0.31 0.28 .28 1.00 .18
NEM level
2 0.36 0.09 0.20 0.65 0.55 0.13 0.32 .35 1.00 .36
1 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.79 0.45 0.25 0.30 .35 1.00 .27
0 0.36 0.36 0.28 0.99 0.36 0.36 0.28 .35 1.00 .18
1 0.36 0.56 0.32 1.24 0.29 0.45 0.26 .35 1.00 .10
2 0.36 0.81 0.38 1.54 0.23 0.52 0.25 .35 1.00 .03
Involvement
No-moderation model 0.44 0.29 0.27 1.00 0.45 0.29 0.27 .31 1.00 .20
NEM level
2 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.78 0.31 0.36 0.33 .63 1.00 .20
1 0.32 0.28 0.26 0.86 0.38 0.33 0.30 .46 1.00 .20
0 0.44 0.28 0.26 0.98 0.45 0.29 0.26 .32 1.00 .20
1 0.60 0.28 0.26 1.13 0.53 0.25 0.23 .22 1.00 .20
2 0.79 0.28 0.26 1.32 0.59 0.21 0.19 .14 1.00 .20

CN
Regard
No-moderation model 0.40 0.32 0.29 1.01 0.40 0.32 0.28 .40 1.00 .06
CN level
2 0.44 0.54 0.46 1.44 0.30 0.37 0.32 .32 1.00 .02
1 0.44 0.40 0.36 1.20 0.37 0.33 0.30 .32 1.00 .02
0 0.44 0.28 0.27 0.99 0.44 0.28 0.27 .32 1.00 .08
1 0.44 0.18 0.20 0.82 0.54 0.22 0.24 .32 1.00 .15
2 0.44 0.10 0.14 0.68 0.65 0.15 0.20 .32 1.00 .26

Note. A genetic variance; C shared environmental variance; E nonshared environmental variance. PEM Positive Emotionality; NEM
Negative Emotionality; CN Constraint.

to shared (c2 52%) and nonshared environmental effects (e2
32%), with a smaller contribution from genetic effects (h2 16%).
At high levels of PEM, a majority of the variance in Regard is due
to additive genetic effects (h2 77%), whereas nonshared envi-
ronmental effects have decreased (e2 17%), and there are only
very small shared environmental effects (c2 6%).
Examination of the genetic correlations between Regard and
PEM reveal a somewhat stronger association between the genetic
influences on PEM and the genetic influences on Regard at high
levels of PEM (see rA in Table 3). The genetic correlation between
PEM and Regard increased from rA .17 at low levels of PEM
(2) to rA .33 at high levels of PEM (2). For adolescents who
are higher in PEM, there are more genetic influences common to
both this constellation of personality traits and the amount of
warmth in their relationship with both parents. Conversely, the
overlap between nonshared environmental influences on PEM and
Regard decreases as the level of PEM increases (where the pro-
portion of variance attributable to E is lowest). Therefore, the
908 SOUTH, KRUEGER, JOHNSON, AND IACONO

A Variance in Regard at Age 17 B Variance in Regard as a Function of

Positive Emotionality at Age 17
By Source of Variance
1.2 1.2

.9 .9
A A

Variance
Variance

.6 C .6 C

E E
.3 .3

.0 .0
-2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2
Positive Emotionality in Standard Deviation Units Positive Emotionality in Standard Deviation Units

Figure 2. A: No-moderation model of Regard and Positive Emotionality. B: Moderation model of Regard as
a function of Positive Emotionality. A genetic variance, C shared environmental variance, E nonshared
environmental variance.

variance in Regard due to nonshared environmental influences is
greater at low levels of PEM, and it is here that the nonshared
environmental correlation between PEM and Regard is greatest
(rE .36 at PEM of 2).
Moderation of Conflict by PEM. Figure 3 shows the best
fitting moderation model of PEM on Conflict. Again, although the
full moderation model was not technically the best fitting moder-
ation model according to AIC and p value (see Table 2), it was
very close, and the plot of the full moderation model showed an
effect of A that justified its designation as the best fitting model.
As PEM increased, the genetic variance component of Conflict
decreased, the shared environmental variance increased, and the
nonshared environmental variance decreased slightly (see Table
3). Thus, at low levels of PEM, the proportion of variance in
Conflict was weighted heavily toward genetic (h2 72%) influ-
ences, with the rest mainly attributable to nonshared environmental
(e2 27%) effects. At high levels of PEM, proportion of variance
due to genetic effects was much smaller (h2 34%), whereas
shared environmental effects (c2 46%) increased dramatically
and unique environmental (e2 20%) effects decreased slightly.
The nonshared environmental correlation between PEM and Con-
flict decreased as levels of PEM increased, from rE .39 at PEM
of 2 to rE .12 at PEM of 2.
Moderation of Regard by NEM. In the best fitting moderation
model of Regard and NEM, there was significant moderation of
the C and E variance components (see Figure 4). Contrary to PEM,
for which the influence of shared environment on Regard was
largely negligible at higher levels of personality, shared environ-
ment was greater than genetic and nonshared environmental ef-
fects at high levels of NEM. The C and E variance components
increased as functions of NEM; as a result, there was greater total
variance in Regard at high levels of NEM. Thus, even though the

Variance in Conflict as a Function of Variance in Regard as a Function of

Positive Emotionality at Age 17 Negative Emotionality at Age 17
By Source of Variance By Source of Variance
1.2
.9

.9
A A
Variance

.6
Variance

.6 C C
E E
.3
.3

.0 .0
-2 -1 0 1 2 -2 -1 0 1 2
Negative Emotionality in
Positive Emotionality in Standard Deviation Units
Standard Deviation Units

Figure 3. Variance in Conflict as a function of Positive Emotionality. Figure 4. Variance in Regard as a function of Negative Emotionality.
A genetic variance, C shared environmental variance, E nonshared A genetic variance, C shared environmental variance, E nonshared
environmental variance. environmental variance.
 ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY MODERATES RELATIONSHIPS
genetic variance remained stable from low to high levels of NEM,
the proportion of variance due to genetic effects declined. At low
levels of NEM (2), most of the variance in Regard was split
between genetic (h2 55%) and nonshared environmental effects
(e2 32%). However, at high levels of NEM (2), the proportion
of variance was weighted more heavily toward shared environment
(h2 23%, c2 52%, e2 25%). The overlap between unique
environmental influences on Regard and NEM were greatest at
low levels of NEM (rE .36 at NEM of 2 SD).
It is interesting that, as with the results for PEM and Conflict,
when the valence (i.e., positively vs. negatively tinged) of the
relationship and the valence of the personality trait are mis-
matched, the etiology of the relationship variable is more attrib-
utable to shared environmental effects at higher levels of the
personality trait. That is, C effects increase with increasing levels
of personality when either (a) the parenting variable measures a
positive aspect of the relationship (Regard) and the personality
variable is a relatively more negative trait (NEM) or (b) when the
parent variable measures a negative aspect of the relationship
(Conflict) and the personality trait is relatively more positive
(PEM).
Moderation of Involvement by NEM. In the best fitting mod-
eration model, only the A variance component of Involvement was
significantly moderated by NEM (see Figure 5). As the level of
Involvement increased, the genetic variance increased; because the
C and E variance components were stable across all levels of
NEM, this resulted in greater phenotypic variance and higher
heritability at high levels of NEM. At low levels of NEM, the
proportions of variance due to genetic and environmental effects
were almost equally divided (h2 31%, c2 36%, e2 33%).
The proportion of variance due to genetic effects almost doubled
from low to high levels of NEM (h2 59% at SD 2).
However, the genetic correlation between Involvement and NEM
decreased from low to high levels of NEM. Even though genetic
effects had a greater influence on Involvement at high levels of
NEM, the types of genetic effects operating on Involvement and
NEM were different.
Variance in Involvement as a Function of
Negative Emotionality at Age 17
By Source of Variance
.9
A relationship. Differences in moderation of the etiology of the
.6
Variance
C
E why results would or would not be different. Complete results for
.3
.0
-2 -1 0 1 2
Negative Emotionality in
Standard Deviation Units
Figure 5. Variance in Involvement as a function of Negative Emotion-
ality. A genetic variance, C shared environmental variance, E
nonshared environmental variance.
909
Moderation of Regard by CN. The results of moderation anal-
ysis for Regard and CN were similar to the moderation model of
Regard and PEM, although in the best fitting model for Regard and
CN, moderation was significant for C and E only. The influences
on Regard shifted from an almost equal distribution of the pro-
portion of variance among all three components at low levels of
CN to largely genetic influences at higher levels of CN (see Figure
6 and the values in Table 3, which show the ACE decomposition
of Regard as a function of CN). Estimates derived from the
moderation model show a decrease in both sources of environ-
mental variance, from c2 37%, e2 32% at low CN to c2
15%, e2 20% at high CN.
Notably different from the moderation of Regard by PEM,
however, was the finding of greater nonshared environmental
influences between Regard and CN at higher levels of CN. The
nonshared environmental correlation between CN and Regard in-
creased with increasing levels of CN. For adolescents higher in
CN, the presence of these nonshared environmental influences
common to CN and Regard suggest a within-family selection
process linking the two.
Extension of analyses to both sources of report on parent
adolescent relationship. Because we used a composite report of
parentadolescent relationship, we also conducted analyses sepa-
rately for the mothers and adolescents perspective of the rela-
tionship, to determine if the pattern of results differed depending
on the reporter. In general, the results for the composite report are
closer to the results found using adolescent report rather than
mother report. Using the raw scores for adolescent report, we
found that six of the seven moderation models that were significant
in the composite report were also significant (PEM and Regard,
Conflict; NEM and Regard, Conflict, Involvement; CN and Re-
gard), whereas for mother report of the relationship, five of the
same models that were significant for composite report were also
an improvement over the no-moderation models (PEM with Con-
flict; NEM with Regard, Conflict, Involvement; CN with Regard).
However, when transformed scores were used, moderation models
fit better for four of the same five models using adolescent-only
report as when the composite measure was used (PEM with
Regard, Conflict; NEM with Regard; CN with Regard), whereas
moderation models using mother report were significant for only
two of the same models as when the composite measure was used
(NEM and Regard, Involvement). Given the moderately strong,
but not perfect, nature of the correlation between mother and
adolescent report of the relationship, we feel that the composite
report most likely is the best way to capture the parentadolescent
parentadolescent relationship depending on the reporter are dif-
ficult to interpret, especially because there is no theory to guide
moderation analyses of the parentadolescent relationship (as re-
ported by the mother and the adolescent) can be obtained from
Susan C. South.
Discussion
In the developmental context of the family, it appears that
personality and interpersonal relationships are involved in a bidi-
rectional process of reinforcement. The goal of the current study
was to examine whether personality traits can moderate genetic
910 SOUTH, KRUEGER, JOHNSON, AND IACONO
Variance in Regard as a Function of
Constraint at Age 17
By Source of Variance
1.2
.9
Variance
.6
.3
.0
-2 -1 0 1 2
Constraint in Standard Deviation Units
Figure 6. Variance in Regard as a function of Constraint. A genetic
variance, C shared environmental variance, E nonshared environmen-
tal variance.
and environmental influences on positive and negative qualities of
the parentadolescent relationship. Specifically, we used a sample
of more than 2,400 individual twins at a mean age of 17 years to
examine whether adolescent personality traits of NEM, PEM, and
CN moderated the genetic and environmental contributions to
three aspects of the parentadolescent relationshipnamely, Re-
gard, Conflict, and Involvement. We found (a) significant moder-
ation of all three features of the parent relationship by these
personality traits and (b) changes in the genetic and environmental
correlations between personality and parenting at different levels
of personality. The present studys large sample size was a notable
strength. Of course, it is possible that with an even larger sample
size, we may have found significant moderation in the four models
in which moderation was not detected (i.e., PEM and Involvement,
NEM and Conflict, CN and Conflict, CN and Involvement).
The goal of the current study was to extend previous work
examining genetic and environmental influences on the relation-
ship between personality and parent relationship quality. Our re-
sults support previous research that attributed genetic and envi-
ronmental influences on perceptions of the family environment to
personality traits (Krueger et al., 2003). Further, our findings
suggest that whether a genotype will lead to positive or negative
aspects of the parent relationship depends on the personality of the
adolescent. Beginning with the groundbreaking work of Rowe
(1981, 1983), behavior genetic methods have been used to show
that putatively environment measures have a sizeable genetic
component. Prior work from the MTFS that examined the parent-
ing measures used in the current study found small to moderate
heritability estimates (Elkins et al., 1997) that tended to increase
with age of the adolescent (McGue et al., 2005). In accord with
these results, we found that aspects of the parent relationship were
moderately heritable. In the no-moderation models, which again
are comparable to standard bivariate decomposition models, 40%
of the variance in Regard, 56% of the variance in Conflict, and
45% of the variance in Involvement was due to genetic effects,
with the rest of the variance attributed generally equally to shared
and nonshared environment. We also found moderate genetic
correlations between aspects of the parentadolescent relationship
and adolescent personality traits, which is consistent with prior
research findings that the heritability of family and parenting
measures is due, at least in part, to the characteristics (i.e., per-
sonality traits) of the family members (Chipuer et al., 1993;
Krueger et al., 2003).
The limitation in these prior studies (and in the results of our
A
own unmoderated models) is that estimates of genetic and envi-
C ronmental influences from univariate models and estimates of
E genetic correlations from bivariate models of personality and fam-
ily environment are static and fixed across the entire population.
Newer models that test for biometrical moderation, or gene
environment interaction, examine whether genetic and environ-
mental influences may differ in different environments. Concep-
tually, the idea is similar to examining differences in the main
effect of a variable across different groups. For example, does the
effect of a reading intervention (main effect) differ between men
and women (groups)? Now, extending this idea to the realm of
biometrical modeling, we replace the main effect with genetic and
environmental influences (here, on parenting behaviors) and dif-
ferent groups with different levels of a moderator variable (here,
personality traits). Thus, we have the ability to calculate a specific
heritability estimate for an individual dependent on where that
person falls along the dimension of a second, moderating variable
(Purcell, 2002).
A major contribution of the current study was the finding that,
for aspects of warmth, conflict, and involvement in the parent
adolescent relationship, the relative contribution of genetic and
environmental influences varied as a function of the adolescents
amount of negative emotionality, positive emotionality, or con-
straint. Specifically, we found that PEM, NEM, and CN signifi-
cantly moderated the genetic and environmental influences on
Parental Regard, PEM significantly moderated the etiology of
Conflict, and NEM moderated the etiology of Involvement. Along
with variations in the proportion of variance due to genes and
environmental influences, we found different levels of genetic and
environmental correlations between personality and parenting at
varying levels of personality. These moderation models present a
fuller picture of the relative influence of genes and environment on
the etiology of the parentadolescent relationship.
When we considered only the static parameter estimates from a
no-moderation model, the etiology of Regard was weighted toward
genetic influences but with sizable shared and nonshared environ-
mental influences. Results from moderation models tell a more
nuanced story. The total phenotypic variance in Regard was gen-
erally lowest, and the heritability highest, at the most positive level
of the personality trait; that is, at high levels of positive emotion-
ality and constraint and low levels of negative emotionality. Ad-
olescents with the greatest levels of positively valenced personality
traits had a level of Regard in their relationship with their parents
that better reflected their genotype. This is an example of genes
operating differently in different environments being high in
positive emotionality or constraint (or low in negative emotional-
ity) allows for the expression of a genetic predisposition to positive
aspects of the parentadolescent relationship.
Our findings provide further empirical support for the role of
adolescent personality in the quality of the parentadolescent
relationship. The etiology of the parentadolescent relationship
appears to differ depending on the adolescents level of certain
 ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY MODERATES RELATIONSHIPS
personality traits. Shiner and Caspi (2003) outlined six possible
mechanisms that shape personality development. The unique find-
ing from the current study is that it is not simply one of these
processes at work for any given combination of personality trait
and aspect of parentingthe type of mechanism depends on the
level of the personality trait. For example, the substantial herita-
bility and moderate genetic overlap found between positive emo-
tionality and regard at the extreme high end of personality suggests
that at least some of the same genes that influence personality also
influence the parentadolescent relationship. This could simply be
an example of a more even-tempered adolescent eliciting more
positive parenting behaviors or, at least in part, construing their
parents actions in a more positive light. Alternatively, the low
heritability and substantial shared environmental influence on re-
gard found at low levels of PEM may indicate a process whereby
an adolescent with low levels of positive emotions will compare
themselves, possibly unfavorably, with their siblings, and thus, his
or her relationship with the parents will be based on common
factors shared by the parents and all siblings within the household.
One of the most consistent findings from the current analysis
was the importance of shared environment, particularly at ex-
tremely high or low levels of personality. Even in the no-
moderation models, shared environmental effects had a sizeable
influence on the variance in Regard, Conflict, and Involvement.
These effects were enhanced or diminished depending on the level
of the personality trait. For instance, at lower levels of positive
(PEM, CN) and higher levels of negative (NEM) personality traits,
the amount of Regard in the parentadolescent relationships was
more attributable to factors shared within the family than to
genetics or unique environment. When an adolescent has a less
even-tempered personality, the quality of the parentadolescent
relationship is due largely to factors that are shared in common
with other family members. Thus, a more difficult teenager may
have a relationship with his or her parent that is based on a
standard set of rules and interactions shared by all children in the
house. Shared environmental influences have been notoriously
difficult to detect across a range of phenotypes (Rowe, 1994),
leading some to conclude that family has little influence on per-
sonality development (Harris, 1995, 1998). The finding of signif-
icant shared environmental effects on individual differences in
parenting behaviors strengthens the argument for using these new
moderation models (Purcell, 2002)shared environmental effects
may be particularly important for certain people within the popu-
lation but are lost when estimates are averaged across the whole
sample.
It is well established at this point that most psychological
phenomena are heritable (Turkheimer, 2000). The field of behav-
ior genetics must now move beyond static estimates of heritability
and genetic and environmental correlations toward elucidation of
how genetic influences and environment transact. The current
article provides evidence that differences in personality can affect
the etiology of parent relationship quality. An obvious extension of
this work is to examine the dynamic influences of personality traits
on relationship quality over time. The stability of personality
generally increases from childhood to adulthood (Roberts &
DelVecchio, 2000), but personality is already more stable than
relationship quality in adolescence (Branje et al., 2004) and young
adulthood (Asendorpf & Wilpers, 1998). Further, both personality
(McGue, Bacon, & Lykken, 1993) and aspects of family environ-
911
ment (McGue et al., 2005) become more heritable over time.
Longitudinal biometric models could help to determine whether
the increasing stability in personality is related to expression of
genetic variance and articulate how genetic and environmental
transactions unfold over time.
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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2008 by the American Psychological Association
2008, Vol. 94, No. 5, 913923 0022-3514/08/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.913

Societal Threat, Authoritarianism, Conservatism, and U.S. State Death

Penalty Sentencing (19772004)
Stewart J. H. McCann
Cape Breton University

On the basis of K. Stenners (2005) authoritarian dynamic theory, it was hypothesized that the number
of death sentences and executions would be higher in more threatened conservative states than in less
threatened conservative states, and would be lower in more threatened liberal states than in less
threatened liberal states. Threat was based on state homicide rate, violent crime rate, and non-White
percentage of population. Conservatism was based on state voter ideological identification, Democratic
and Republican Party elite liberalism-conservatism, policy liberalism-conservatism, religious fundamen-
talism, degree of economic freedom, and 2004 presidential election results. For 19772004, with controls
for state population and years with a death penalty provision, the interactive hypothesis received
consistent support using the state conservatism composite and voter ideological identification alone. As
well, state conservatism was related to death penalties and executions, but state threat was not. The
temporal stability of the findings was demonstrated with a split-half internal replication using the periods
19771990 and 19912004. The interactive hypothesis and the results also are discussed in the context
of other threat-authoritarianism theories and terror management theory.

Keywords: authoritarian, conservatism, death penalty, intolerance, terror management theory

Some have argued that the United States stands out as one of the
most punitive nations in the world and that this proclivity is mani-
fested in public, legislative, and judicial endorsement of the death
penalty (e.g., Baumer, Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2003; Soss, Langbein,
& Metelko, 2003; Stenner, 2005, p. 191). But hidden within the
aggregate national statistics are wide variations in individual and state
or regional support for capital punishment (e.g., Barkan & Cohn,
1994; Baumer et al., 2003; Jacobs, Carmichael, & Kent, 2005).
Notably, research has shown that authoritarian and conservative per-
sons generally display attitudes more supportive of government-
sanctioned executions (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Moran &
Comfort, 1986; Soss et al., 2003), that conservative jurisdictions are
more likely to endorse and exercise the death penalty (e.g., Baumer et
al., 2003; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2005), and that
societal threat is associated with heightened death penalty support
(e.g., Baumer et al., 2003; Jacobs & Carmichael, 2004; Soss et al.,
2003). The present research was initiated to test the potential of
Stenners (2005) authoritarian dynamic theory (ADT) to shed further
light on the integration and interaction of these key factors that might
cause differences in the level of individual and state support for the
death penalty.
ADT
Stenners (2005) ADT uses an authoritarian personality dimen-
sion characterized at the authoritarian pole by a preference for
uniformity and insistence upon group authority and at the liber-
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Stewart
J. H. McCann, Department of Psychology, Cape Breton University, P. O.
Box 5300, Sydney, Nova Scotia, Canada B1P 6L2. E-mail:
stewart_mccann@cbu.ca
tarian pole by a preference for difference and insistence upon
individual autonomy (p. 15). Authoritarians have a worldview
that stresses conformity and obedience, constrains freedom and
autonomy, and fosters political pressure for the regulation of moral
deviants through policies of official punitive enforcement (p. 17).
They are more likely than libertarians to see capital punishment as
fair and just (p. 308).
Central to ADT (Stenner, 2005; see also Feldman, 2003; Feld-
man & Stenner, 1997) is the claim that authoritarians respond to
societal threat by showing an increase in authoritarian attitudes and
behavior, whereas libertarians do not. Threat leads to authoritarian
activation only in authoritarian persons when the manifestations
are needed by the individual. ADT assumptions are consistent
with the functional approach to the study of attitudes espoused by
Katz (1960):
The ego-defensive attitudes of authoritarianism have as their mo-
tivational basis the maintenance of some collective oneness and
sameness that serves the psychological function of providing the
individual with identity, security, meaning, and/or comfort. Accord-
ingly, those defensive stancesracial, political, and moral intoler-
anceare aroused by emotionally laden suggestions and
threats to that oneness and sameness, and modified by some
catharsis or removal of threat that relieves the emotional tension
and purges those fears. (Stenner, 2005, p. 59)
ADT also predicts a polarization effect with libertarians show-
ing less authoritarian behavior than usual in the face of threatening
circumstances. Threats challenge both authoritarians and libertar-
ians (Stenner, 2005, p. 63), and although they may not seem so
different in their tolerance-related positions in a low-threat climate,
they will suddenly sharply diverge in the stances they adopt
toward any issue touching upon diversity, dissent, and deviance
(Stenner, 2005, p. 323) when threat is elevated.

913
914 MCCANN
Normative threats are most important in ADTthreats to the
system of oneness and sameness that makes us an us (Sten- it is threatened.
ner, 2005, p. 17) such as lack of conformity to or consensus in
group values, norms, and beliefs (p. 18). Although Stenner em-
phasized normative threats, she also acknowledged that any threat
to the collective can lead to somewhat heightened intolerant be-
havior in authoritarians (p. 29) and reduced intolerance in liber-
tarians (p. 311).
The ThreatAuthoritarianism Link in Other Authoritarian
Personality Theories
Evidence for the idea that contemporaneous situational threat
heightens authoritarianism (e.g., Fromm, 1941; Rokeach, 1960;
Sanford, 1966) has accumulated in recent years (e.g., McCann,
1997; Peterson & Gerstein, 2005; Rickert, 1998), and although the
link is fairly broadly accepted (e.g., Altemeyer, 1988; Esses,
Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002; Feldman, 2003), the underlying dy-
namics have had various interpretations. Most theorists assume
that threat tends to increase everyones authoritarianism. For in-
stance, Wilkinson (1972, pp. 103111) articulated a psychody-
namic theory of authoritarian cause in which he makes it quite
clear (pp. 18, 105106) that both authoritarians and nonauthori-
tarians generally tend to show more authoritarianism when threat-
ened. To Altemeyer (1988), authoritarianism is developed and
maintained through principles of social learning, and both authori-
tarians and nonauthoritarians have the potential and the tendency
to show elevated levels of authoritarian behavior and attitudes
when there are threats to societal integrity (p. 60). Duckitt (2001)
also theorized that both authoritarians and nonauthoritarians show
rises in authoritarianism under threat but has acknowledged that
perhaps only authoritarians respond to threat in this manner (Duc-
kitt & Fisher, 2003, p. 214).
Previous threatauthoritarianism studies at the societal level
have involved aggregate authoritarian attitudes and behavior. They
have not allowed for the potential interaction of threat and author-
itarian disposition in relation to authoritarian displays (e.g., Doty,
Peterson, & Winter, 1991; McCann, 1999; Sales, 1973). As Sten-
ner (2005) has noted, such evidence for a threatauthoritarianism
link observed in the aggregate can be equally compatible with a
process that depends upon variation in individual predispositions
and one that does not (p. 30).
Terror Management Theory (TMT)
Although ADT prompted the present study, aspects of the theory
and the research scenario bear likeness to those in TMT (e.g.,
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyzszczynski, So-
lomon, & Greenberg, 2003; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyzszczynski,
1991). Inspired by Becker (1973), TMT essentially says that our
internalized worldviewwhich is an individualized but largely
shared symbolic conception of reality that involves all of our
values, norms, customs, commitments, identities, institutions, au-
thorities, and so onacts as a buffer against our biding existential
anxiety stemming from our awareness of our own mortality. Our
worldview allays existential fear by giving meaning to our lives,
by providing self-esteem if we believe that we behave in accord
with its inherent value standards, and by promising literal or
symbolic immortality if we live by its prescriptions. Consequently,
we strenuously defend our worldview whenever we perceive that
The most widely researched TMT tenet, with now over 300 dem-
onstrations (Strachan et al., 2007), is that we defend our worldview
most vigorously when our own mortality is made salient (e.g., Rosen-
blatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Another
somewhat less researched tenet is that the presence of others with
different worldviews is a threat that prompts defense of our world-
view (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990). According to TMT, striving for the
maintenance of faith in our cultural worldview to ward off mortality
anxiety is an unconscious process that functions in addition to more
immediate defensive actions such as denial and rationalization, which
we embrace when our own mortality is brought to conscious aware-
ness. The proximal defense temporally gives way to the unconscious
distal defense of preserving and bolstering the integrity of our world-
view when death-related thought is accessible but not the active object
of attention (Greenberg, Arndt, Simon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
2000).
Although no systematic empirical investigation of the potential
of TMT in regard to support for the death penalty and the carrying
out of executions has been conducted, Judges (1999) has theoret-
ically linked capital punishment to the dynamics of TMT. He sees
the death penalty as mostly a nonconscious symbolic defense
against mortality terror rather than as a rational process in the
service of retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation. To Judges, the
conditions are inherent in capital cases for the TMT process to
occur: a reminder of mortality, time to push awareness of it to the
fringes of consciousness, and an opportunity to indulge in punitive
and often authoritarian aggression against an offending target
person (p. 161).
Relevant Empirical Death Penalty Literature
Supporters of capital punishment are likely to be both more
authoritarian and more conservative (e.g., Feldman & Stenner,
1997; Moran & Comfort, 1986; Soss et al., 2003). This is not
surprising because strong parallels and intimate connections be-
tween the two constructs often have been postulated (e.g., Altem-
eyer, 1998; Eckhardt, 1991; Wilson, 1973). In addition, the close
association between the two is evident in the model of political
conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglan-
ski, & Sulloway, 2003). As well, although Stenner (2005) views
authoritarianism and political conservatism as conceptually dis-
tinct constructs that are not necessarily linked across cultures and
time (p. 89), she emphasizes the symbiotic nature of their relation-
ship and notes that their interests and concerns often converge,
making it difficult to distinguish between the two (p. 175).
Conservative jurisdictions also are more likely to support and
exercise the death penalty (Baumer et al., 2003; Jacobs & Car-
michael, 2002, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2005). Baumer et al. argued that
higher death penalty endorsement in more conservative areas may
occur because (a) there simply are more conservative individuals
in those areas or (b) because persons in those areas are exposed to
the elements of a more conservative political climate. But, of
course, the two factors are not entirely independent because a
politically conservative climate in a democracy must be put in
place and maintained by a predominantly conservative electorate.
There also is an association between authoritarianism and prefer-
 DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING
ence for conservative, authoritarian, right-wing politicians (e.g.,
Doty et al., 1991; Kemmelmeier, 2004; Stone & Smith, 1993).
One threat variable that might relate to capital punishment is
violent crime. As Baumer et al. (2003, pp. 846 847) have re-
counted, national homicide rates and death penalty support have
fluctuated somewhat similarly since the mid-1960s, leading to
speculation that the public view of capital punishment is sensitive
to elevations in homicide and violent crime. But Baumer et al.
noted a lack of evidence except for a positive correlation between
death penalty support and a 3-year lagged violent crime index
reported by Rankin (1979). Nevertheless, Baumer et al. did find
that persons living in areas with higher violent crime rates were
more likely to support capital punishment. In contrast, Jacobs and
Carmichael (2002) found no significant link between either homi-
cide or violent crime rates and whether a state had legalized the
death penalty, and Jacobs et al. (2005) found no relationship
between the number of murders and the number of state death
sentences. However, Jacobs and Carmichael (2004) and Jacobs et
al. did find that death sentences were more frequent in states with
higher violent crime rates even when homicides were held con-
stant. As well, Vidmar (1974) and Thomas and Foster (1975)
found evidence that those who felt threatened by criminal activity
were more likely to favor capital punishment.
Another variable that has received some support in this context
is racial threat. According to Baumer et al. (2003, p. 849), Whites
perceive non-Whites as threatening to their rule and influence, and
the larger the non-White proportion, the greater the pressure to
protect the status quo with enhanced crime control measures. To
Jacobs and Carmichael (2004, p. 254), Whites politically counter
non-White efforts to gain a fairer share from an inherently unequal
social order by calling for and imposing more repressive legal
measures designed to have greater impact on non-Whites than on
Whites. To Stenner (2005), the presence of a racial minority is a
normative threat, at least to authoritarians, simply because it con-
tributes to diversity and undermines their strong desire for unifor-
mity and the authority of the collective.
In line with the racial threat hypothesis, Baumer et al. (2003) found
that persons residing in areas with higher Black populations showed
heightened support for capital punishment, Jacobs and Carmichael
(2002) found that the death penalty was more likely to be legal in
states with high Black populations, and Soss et al. (2003) found that
racial prejudice (often related to authoritarianism) was a relatively
strong indicator of White support for capital punishment and that this
association was magnified by the threat of a higher proportion of
Black residents in a county. As well, Jacobs and Carmichael (2004)
showed that racial threat could account for whether a state ever used
capital punishment but not variance in the number of death sentences,
and Jacobs et al. (2005) found that states with percentages of blacks
above a threshold are more likely to use the death sentence at least
once (p. 672), but the Black percentage was not related to state death
sentence frequencies.
Three other studies also are noteworthy in the present context:
Stenner (1998) found that societal threat was related to surges in
decisions for capital punishment in Texas juries in a monthly time
series analysis for the period 1960 1982; Feldman and Stenner
(1997), using 1992 National Election Study data, found that soci-
etal threat interacted with authoritarianism, resulting in greater
support for the death penalty among threatened authoritarians; and
Stenner (2005), in work with the Cumulative General Social Sur-
915
vey from 1972 to 1994 (Davis & Smith, 1994, as cited in Stenner,
2005), found that authoritarians showed heightened support for
capital punishment during threatening periods (p. 31).
The Hypotheses of the Present Study
Although there is some evidence that authoritarianism and con-
servatism, living in a conservative jurisdiction, and being exposed
to threat might have an impact on death penalty support and death
sentencing, systematic research has not been carried out that can
furnish evidence to support or refute the effects of interactive
relationships between authoritarianism and societal threat of the
type postulated by ADT at the state level. ADT is centered on the
person, but if one assumes that genetic (e.g., McCourt, Bouchard,
Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999), cultural, and migration factors
can lead to unequal development and distribution of authoritarian
personalities throughout the nation, that there is a demonstrated
tendency for authoritarians to show strong preference for the
conservative side of the political spectrum, and that the citizens of
more conservatively oriented states tend to be more authoritarian,
then it also would seem warranted to extend the fundamental ADT
interaction to conservative and liberal states.
ADT leads to the following expectations in regard to the rela-
tionships between state conservatism, normative threat, and fre-
quency of death sentences and executions: Because of the strong
correspondence between conservatism and authoritarianism in
America, one should assume that jurors in murder trials are more
likely to be authoritarian in conservative states than in liberal
states. Similar differences are likely for other courtroom players
and those in the larger community and are apt to be reflected in the
policies, precedents, and norms of the state culture. According to
ADT, normative threats activate authoritarians to produce more
authoritarian behaviors and attitudes and activate libertarians to
produce more libertarian behaviors and attitudes. Consequently, in
threatened conservative states, there should be an even stronger
tendency for jurors to call for the death penalty than in nonthreat-
ened conservative states, and in threatened liberal states, there
should be an even weaker tendency for jurors to call for the death
penalty than in nonthreatened liberal states. Similar dynamics also
should apply to executions.
TMT can lead to the same interactive hypotheses. To begin
with, we should assume that state conservatism or liberalism is
represented in the conservatism or liberalism of jurors, other
courtroom players, and wider community members and that these
differences also are reflected in the state culture. Those with a
conservative worldview are especially inclined to impose the death
sentence because that is the fitting punishment in that worldview,
whereas those with a generally more tolerant liberal worldview are
reluctant to impose capital punishment because the values of that
worldview are in opposition to the death penalty. The components
of the composite threat measure used here (i.e., state homicide rate,
violent crime rate, non-White percentage of the population), espe-
cially when the threats are relatively high, signify that not all share
ones worldview, and this in itself increases efforts to bolster and
defend ones worldview. Therefore, even before they are selected
as murder trial jurors, those in threatened conservative and liberal
states may be somewhat more adamant and defensive about their
particular worldviews. But murder clearly is a violation of the
norms of both conservative and liberal worldviews, and being a
916 MCCANN
juror in a murder trial exposes one to a strong mortality salience
(MS) catalyst that eventually leads to the distal defense of strong
emphasis on the validity and superiority of ones worldview.
Therefore, the MS of the trial may just further accentuate world-
view defenses, resulting in the corresponding differences in the
imposition of death sentences and executions. Such bilevel TMT
dynamics lead to the same interactive hypotheses as those deduced
from ADT.
The present study covered the period 19772004. The conser-
vatism of each state was based on a composite of archival mea-
sures, and degree of threat was based on a composite derived from
estimates of the mean homicide rate, violent crime rate, and
non-White percentage of the population in each state over the
period in question. The test of the hypotheses involved the esti-
mated level of state conservatism, the estimated level of state
threat, the total number of death sentences, and the total number of
executions in each state during this period.
With statistical control for estimated mean state populations and
number of years that a state had a death penalty from 1977 to 2004,
the following hypotheses were tested:
Hypothesis 1: State conservatism is positively related to (a)
death sentences and (b) executions.
Hypothesis 2: State threat is positively related to (a) death
sentences and (b) executions.
Hypothesis 3: There is an interaction between state conser-
vatism and state threat in which the number of (a) death
sentences and (b) executions tends to be (i) higher in more
threatened conservative states than in less threatened conser-
vative states and (ii) lower in more threatened liberal states
than in less threatened liberal states.
Hypothesis 1 is based on existing death penalty research, Hy-
pothesis 2 on the conventional threatauthoritarianism link, and
Hypothesis 3 on ADT, but it could have been based on TMT.
Method
Measures
Death sentences from 1977 to 2004. The number of death
sentences in each state from 1977 to 1996 was taken from Shep-
herd (2005), and these data were supplemented by the numbers
from 1997 to 2004 as displayed in an annual state table by the
Death Penalty Information Center (2006a).
Executions from 1977 to 2004. The number of executions in
each state from 1977 to 2004 was calculated from a table presented
by the Death Penalty Information Center (2006b).
Population. State populations for the 19772004 period were
estimated by averaging the state resident populations of 1980,
1990, and 2000, provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (2001).
Death penalty years from 1977 to 2004. The number of years
from 1977 to 2004 that each state had a death penalty sentence was
taken from the state information of the Death Penalty Information
Center (2006c). Values ranged from 0 to 28.
Conservatism. To distinguish between more conservative and
more liberal states, a composite based on seven dimensions was
formed from five variables (i.e., voter ideological identification,
Democratic Party elite liberalism conservatism, Republican Party
elite liberalism conservatism, composite policy liberalism, and
religious fundamentalism) developed by Erikson, Wright, and
McIver (1993), combined with the U.S. Economic Freedom Index
(Pacific Research Institute, 2005a) and a variable based on the
2004 presidential election results. The economic freedom and
election variables pertain more directly to the latter part of the
19772004 period and provide a temporal counterbalance to the
five Erikson et al. variables.
Ideological identification was based on the state aggregates of
122 national telephone polls conducted by the New York Times and
CBS News between 1976 and 1988. Usable ideological identifica-
tions were obtained for 141,798 individuals. For all states except
Alaska and Hawaii, the percentage who considered themselves
conservative or liberal is displayed by Erikson et al. (1993, p. 16).
Extensive reliability, validity, and temporal stability evidence also
is provided (pp. 2139). For example, the estimated reliability was
.92, based on sampling theory, and .93, based on the Spearman
Brown split-half formula. In regard to temporal stability, when the
sampling period was divided into 1976 1982 and 19831988 and
sampling theory and corrected split-half formulas were applied, the
mean stability estimate was .99. For the present study, the variable
was the conservative percentage minus the liberal percentage in
each state.
Erikson et al. (1993) also determined state party elite ideological
identification for each party from data on the conservatism and
liberalism of state legislators in 1974 (Uslaner & Weber, 1974);
congressional candidates in 1974, 1978, and 1982 (Wright, 1986;
Wright & Berkman, 1986); national convention delegates in 1980
(Miller & Jennings, 1987); and local party chairpersons in 1979
1980 (Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, & Huckshorn, 1984). (Each preced-
ing reference is as cited in Erikson et al., 1993, pp. 98 99.) With
Alaska, Hawaii, Nevada, and Nebraska excluded, correlations be-
tween the four estimates ranged from .56 to .73 for Republicans
and from .52 to .69 for Democrats (Erikson et al., 1993, p. 100).
Erikson et al. (1993, p. 101) formed a composite measure for each
party by summing the standardized scores of the four components,
with lower scores indicating higher conservatism. Democratic and
Republican dimensions served separately in the present study.
As well, Erikson et al. (1993, p. 77) constructed a composite
policy liberalism index on the basis of eight policy issues that
reflect conservative and liberal differences: commitment to pro-
gressive tax policies, approaches to criminal justice, public edu-
cational spending per pupil, scope of Medicaid health provisions,
range of Aid to Families with Dependent Children health provi-
sions, degree of hesitancy to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment,
extent of legalized gambling, and responses to the consumer pro-
tection movement. The eight variables are highly correlated, load
on a single factor, and the sum of their standardized values results
in a composite with a Cronbachs alpha of .89 (pp. 76 77). The
tabled composite z scores (p. 77) were used in the present research.
It is commonly perceived that fundamentalists are relatively con-
servative (Erikson et al., 1993, p. 63), and there is empirical support
for such a relationship (e.g., Coe & Domke, 2006; Miller & Watten-
berg, 1984). Consequently, for their analysis of the relationship be-
tween state opinions and state policies, Erikson et al. (1993) estimated
the percentage of each states population (excluding Nevada) that
were fundamentalist (p. 67) from state data reported by Johnson,
 DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING
Picard, and Quinn (1974, as cited in Erikson et al., 1993, p. 65). These
estimated state percentages were used here.
The Pacific Research Institute is a conservative think tank advo-
cating freedom, opportunity, and personal responsibility for all indi-
viduals by advancing free-market policy solutions (Pacific Research
Institute, 2005b). The 2004 Economic Freedom Index was con-
structed from information for each state on 143 judicial, regulatory,
fiscal, government size, and welfare spending variables such as state
spending, environmental regulations, tax rates, occupational licensing,
number of state agencies, and income redistribution from 1995 to
2003. Lower scores indicate higher degrees of conservatism.
The events of September 11, 2001, and their aftermath left the
whole nation in a state of heightened threat. If authoritarian and
conservative tendencies are more likely to be manifested under
threatening conditions, then the degree of state support for the
Republican presidential candidate in 2004 affords another oppor-
tunity to gauge which states have the most conservative and
authoritarian voters. Consequently, the variable used here was the
percentage of the popular vote for Bush in each state in 2004 taken
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2006).
For the present study, a state conservatism composite was con-
structed in the following way: After reversing the sign for the
Democratic Party elite, Republican Party elite, composite policy
liberalism, and economic freedom variables, the seven conserva-
tism variables were standardized, averaged, and the resulting val-
ues were converted to z scores. A composite score for Nebraska
was calculated using the five available variables, but no score was
produced for Nevada, which had scores on only three of the seven
state conservatism variables. For the composite state conservatism
variable for the 46 states with scores based on complete data (i.e.,
excluding Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska, and Nevada), Cronbachs
alpha was .93. The state ideological identification variable based
on individual telephone poll results correlated with the composite
(r .92) and with each of the composites six other variables, with
correlations ranging from .61 to .84, with three .77 or over.
Threat. A composite threat index was formed by combining
information on state homicide rates, violent crime rates, and non-
White population percentages. For each state, the homicide rate
and violent crime rate constituents contained the respective mean
rates for the 19752004 period, and the non-White percentage of
the population constituent contained the mean percentage based on
the census data for 1980, 1990, and 2000. State homicide and
violent crime rates for each year from 1975 to 2000 were taken
Table 1
Correlations Between the Main State Variables in the Study
Variable 1 2
1. Sentences
2. Executions .66***
3. Conservatism composite .20 .33*
4. Conservatism (single measure) .21 .31*
5. Threat composite .56*** .31*
6. Population .71*** .35*
7. Years with a death penalty .41** .24
*
p .05. **
p .01. ***
p .001.
917
from the The Disaster Center (2006) Web site, which provides
state crime statistics of the United States Uniform Crime Report
for the years from 1960 to 2000. These were supplemented with
state homicide and violent crime rates for 2001, 2002, 2003, and
2004 from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2006). The White
percentages of the population in each state in 1980, 1990, and 2000
were averaged to form an estimate of the White percentage of the
population in each state over the 19772004 period, and this value
was subtracted from 100 to form the non-White percentage vari-
able for the present study. For 1980, the White percentage of the
population in each state was calculated from the White and total
population numbers tabled by the U.S. Census Bureau (1984). The
White percentages for 1990 and 2000 were taken from the U.S.
Census Bureau (1991, 2001).
For the 48 states, excluding Alaska and Hawaii, the three threat
variables were standardized, averaged, and the resulting values were
converted to z scores. This resulted in a state threat composite with a
Cronbachs alpha of .92. For use in determining temporal stability,
two separate composites also were constructed, the first based on the
homicide and violent crime rates from 1975 to 1990 and the mean of
the 1980 and 1990 non-White population percentages and the second
on the homicide and violent crime rates from 1989 to 2004 and the
mean of the 1990 and 2000 non-White population percentages. Cron-
bachs alpha was .90 for the first composite and .93 for the second
composite, and the two composites were very highly correlated,
r(46) .98, p .001, indicating that the relative positions of the
states on the threat composite were quite stable.
Procedure
Hierarchical multiple regression was used to test the predictions
that state conservatism would be associated with higher frequen-
cies of death penalty sentences and executions (Hypothesis 1), that
state threat would be associated with more death penalty sentences
and executions (Hypothesis 2), and that state conservatism and
state threat would be interactively related to the frequency of death
penalty sentences and executions (Hypothesis 3).
Results
Correlations between the main variables are presented in Table
1. Sentences and executions are highly correlated, as are the two
measures of state conservatism. In contrast, threat is not correlated
3 4 5 6 7
.92***
.12 .03
.32* .28 .55***
.47*** .32* .48*** .15
918 MCCANN

Table 2
Variance in State Death Penalty Sentences and Executions Accounted for by Hierarchical Regression Predictors Using Composite
Conservatism and State Ideology

Conservatism Criterion Predictor df R2 F

Composite Death sentences Population 1, 45 .502 45.40***

Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .097 10.66**
Conservatism 1, 43 .117 17.72***
Threat 1, 42 .000 0.02
Conservatism Threat interaction 1, 41 .115 28.14***
Executions Population 1, 45 .123 6.29*
Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .037 1.92
Conservatism 1, 43 .189 12.43***
Threat 1, 42 .000 0.00
Conservatism Threat interaction 1, 41 .127 9.95**
Ideology Death sentences Population 1, 45 .502 45.40***
Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .097 10.66**
Ideology 1, 43 .109 16.03***
Threat 1, 42 .002 0.29
Ideology Threat interaction 1, 41 .102 22.18***
Executions Population 1, 45 .123 6.29*
Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .037 1.92
Ideology 1, 43 .142 8.76**
Threat 1, 42 .001 0.09
Ideology Threat interaction 1, 41 .135 9.86**
*
p .05. **
p .01. ***
p .001.

with either conservatism index. Of course, correlations between
the other variables and either sentences or executions are mean-
ingless in regard to the hypotheses because they are dependent on
state population and years with a death penalty.
To test the three hypotheses for each criterion, a hierarchical
multiple regression equation was computed on the basis of a logical
order of entry. The state population control variable was entered first,
the state death penalty years control variable was entered second, the
state conservatism variable was entered third, the state threat variable
was entered fourth, and a variable containing the product of the state
conservatism variable and the state threat variable was entered last.
The decision to enter conservatism before threat was fairly arbitrary
but to some extent based on the assumption that state conservatism is
relatively more enduring and state threat potentially more transient. In
any case, as noted later, regressions also were computed with the
order of the two variables reversed.
With death sentences as the criterion (see Table 2), state popu-
lation accounted for 50.2% of the variance in death sentences, and
death penalty years accounted for a further increment of 9.7%.
State conservatism accounted for an additional 11.7% of the vari-
ance in death sentences, and the sign of the regression coefficient
was positive, indicating support for Hypothesis 1. In contrast, the
state threat variable produced a nonsignificant increment of .0%,
showing no support for Hypothesis 2. 1 With the state
conservatismthreat product term appended, the interaction of
conservatism and threat accounted for another 11.5% of the crite-
rion variance, and subsequent standardized equation computations
with 1 and 1 standard deviation values for the interacting
predictors and the mean of 0 for the others showed the expected
ordinal interactive pattern (see Figure 1), supporting Hypothesis 3.
With executions as the criterion (see Table 2), state population
accounted for 12.3% of the variance in executions, but death
penalty years only accounted for a nonsignificant increment of
3.7%. State conservatism accounted for an additional 18.9% of the
variance in executions, and the sign of the regression coefficient
was positive, indicating support for Hypothesis 1. However, state
threat again produced only a nonsignificant increment of .0%,
showing no support for Hypothesis 2 (see Footnote 1). With the
state conservatismthreat product term appended, the interaction
of conservatism and threat accounted for an additional 12.7% of
the criterion variance, and subsequent standardized equation com-
putations with 1 and 1 standard deviation values for the
interacting predictors and the mean of 0 for the others showed the
anticipated ordinal interactive pattern, similar to the one depicted
in Figure 1, supporting Hypothesis 3.2
Some readers might be concerned with the lack of statistical
controls for state demographics in the preceding analyses. In
addition to the fact that control variables reduce degrees of free-
dom substantially with an N of only 47, Erikson et al. (1993) found
that only a small amount of the variance in state ideology is related
to demographic variables such as education, income, race, religion,
gender, and age (pp. 61 62). The only two state-level demo-
graphic variables found to be particularly related to ideology were
1
To ascertain whether a different entry order would produce significant
relationships between threat and the criterion, regressions were recalcu-
lated with threat entered before the measure of conservatism. Conservatism
again was a significant predictor, but threat accounted for .0% of the
variance in the criterion.
2
Similar results were found when each of the three threat variables alone
was substituted for the composite threat variable in all of the preceding
analyses, with either sentences or executions as the dependent variable. As
well, to determine whether the preceding hypothesis tests for either sen-
tences or executions were biased by the inclusion of states without a death
penalty at any time from 1977 to 2004, the tests were repeated with such
states excluded, and essentially the same results again emerged.
 DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING
Figure 1. The interaction of state conservatism and threat, with death sentences as the criterion.
religious fundamentalism and urbanism, respective markers for
conservatism and liberalism (p. 229). Of course, fundamentalism
was incorporated into the conservatism composite here as a con-
servative element rather than as something to be controlled. How-
ever, the key tests of the hypotheses involving the full sample were
repeated with state-level controls for the 1990 percentage of per-
sons 25 and over with at least a high school diploma, disposable
personal income per capita as a percentage of the U.S. average, and
urban percentage of the population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007), all
entered as a block on the first step. The pattern and magnitude of
the relationships remained much the same. The only notable dif-
ference was a reduction by about half in the death sentence
variance accounted for by the conservatism composite. Of crucial
importance to the tested interactive hypothesis, additional regres-
sion analyses showed no interactions between threat and educa-
tion, income, or urbanism in relation to either criterion.
Because ideological identification was based on the polling of
almost 142,000 persons (see Erikson et al., 1993, pp. 12 46), it is
the most direct assessment of individual levels of conservatism in
each of the states among the seven variables in the composite state
conservatism measure. Therefore, it seemed prudent and advanta-
geous to test the hypotheses with this single index of conservatism
as well. Hypothesis test results using this sole measure were
parallel to those obtained with the full state conservatism compos-
ite (see Footnote 1 and Table 2), and the anticipated ordinal
interactive pattern, similar to the one shown in Figure 1, also was
evident for sentences and executions. When the analysis was
repeated with appropriate controls for education, income, and
urbanism, the results again were analogous to those found using
the conservatism composite.
To determine the temporal stability of the results using the
composite conservatism variable, separate analyses were con-
919
ducted on the corresponding data for 19771990 and for 1991
2004. Outcomes in each data set essentially were parallel to each
other and to those of the earlier analyses (see Table 3). Standard-
ized equation computations with 1 and 1 standard deviation
values for the interacting predictors and the mean of 0 for the
others also revealed the expected ordinal interactive pattern with
either death sentences or executions as the criterion. For example,
Figure 2 shows the interactive pattern for 19771990 with sen-
tences as the dependent variable.
Discussion
The pattern of support for the three hypotheses was clear and
consistent whether the dependent variable was the number of death
sentences or executions. For each criterion, Hypotheses 1 and 3
were supported, whereas Hypothesis 2 was not. That is, state
conservatism was positively related to both criteria, but state threat
did not show any direct connection to either. State threat, however,
did interact with state conservatism in the ADT- and TMT-
predicted manner in regard to both: Faced with higher threat, more
conservative states engaged in higher levels of death sentencing
and executions, whereas more liberal states engaged in lower
levels of death penalty sentencing and executions. Furthermore,
the support pattern remained the same whether analyses were
based on all available states or just those with a legal death penalty
for at least one of the years from 1977 to 2004, whether voter
ideology alone was substituted for the conservatism composite,
and whether analyses were restricted to 19771990 or to 1991
2004.
The association between state conservatism and capital punish-
ment found here (Hypothesis 1) is in line with previous research
results, but this is the first study to show a link between state
920 MCCANN

Table 3
Variance in State Death Penalty Sentences and Executions Accounted for by Hierarchical Regression Predictors for 19771990 and
for 19912004

Years Criterion Predictor df R2 F

19771990 Death sentences Population 1, 45 .442 35.58***

Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .129 13.22**
Conservatism 1, 43 .093 11.96***
Threat 1, 42 .000 0.01
Conservatism Threat interaction 1, 41 .101 17.58***
19912004 Death sentences Population 1, 45 .543 53.45***
Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .055 6.03*
Conservatism 1, 43 .133 21.32***
Threat 1, 42 .000 0.03
Conservatism Threat interaction 1, 41 .101 24.84***
19771990 Executions Population 1, 45 .098 4.91*
Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .062 3.22
Conservatism 1, 43 .189 12.46***
Threat 1, 42 .033 2.26
Conservatism Threat interaction 1, 41 .182 17.09***
19912004 Executions Population 1, 45 .125 6.43*
Years with the death penalty 1, 44 .021 1.08
Conservatism 1, 43 .188 12.10***
Threat 1, 42 .001 0.09
Conservatism Threat interaction 1, 41 .101 7.35**
*
p .05. **
p .01. ***
p .001.

conservatism and the number of both death sentences and execu-
tions. The complete lack of support for a direct link between higher
state threat and the number of state death sentences or executions
(Hypothesis 2), with and without statistical control for state con-
servatism, perhaps is not so surprising given that in ADT, threat is
expected to have its impact only in interactive conjunction with
levels of dispositional authoritarianism, and in TMT, MS and
threat to worldview also are expected to similarly strengthen
adherence to both conservative and liberal worldviews. However,
the strong and consistent evidence that state threat interacted with
state conservatism (essentially as a proxy for state authoritarian-
ism) in relation to state death sentences and executions in the

Figure 2. The interaction of state conservatism and threat, with death sentences as the criterion for 19771990.
 DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING
predicted fashion (Hypothesis 3) offers indirect substantiation for
a pivotal aspect of ADT and expands its theoretical sweep to
demonstrably account for relevant interactive phenomena in the
macro sphere. But the interactive results also could have been
predicted by TMT, so they also give additional confirmation to that
theory and bring the empirical realm of capital punishment into its
extensive and multifarious body of support (see, e.g., Pyszczynski
et al., 2003).
The results in regard to Hypotheses 2 and 3, however, are
somewhat problematic for explanations based on authoritarianism
threat theories that predict increases in the manifestation of authori-
tarian tendencies among both authoritarian and nonauthoritarian per-
sons facing threat (e.g., Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt, 2001; Wilkinson,
1972). Such theories lead to Hypothesis 2, which received no confir-
mation but do not lead to Hypothesis 3, which did receive support.
Furthermore, the results of previous research at the societal level,
which did show the direct threatauthoritarianism link (e.g., Doty et
al., 1991; Sales, 1973), could have been masking somewhat divergent
authoritarian and libertarian responses (Stenner, 2005, p. 30).
The TMT explanation of the Hypothesis 3 results relies on the
assumption that conservatives and liberals respond according to
the theorys two major tenets regarding the effects of MS and
challenges to worldview in a similar fashion but with ideologically
opposing outcomes, an assumption that has not gone unchallenged.
For instance, Paulhus and Trapnell (1997) have suggested that
worldview defense in the face of mortality cues may be more or
less confined to conservatives and that the usual worldview
conceptualized and assessed in TMT research really is a conser-
vative worldview (p. 43). Jost et al. (2003) also pointed out that
although proponents of TMT have claimed that MS can produce
increases in political conservatism or liberalism, whichever is
dominant, most of the demonstrated effects of MS have had a
politically conservative or intolerant flavor (p. 349).
Nevertheless, in studies conducted with the conservatism or
authoritarianism of the participants as moderating variables, the
effects of the threat of MS actually have been moderated in the
fashion suggested by TMT. For example, MS has been found to
increase dislike for dissimilar others among conservatives but to
decrease such dislike among liberals (Greenberg, Simon, Pyszc-
zynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992), to increase negative evalua-
tions of another with dissimilar attitudes among high but not low
authoritarians (Greenberg et al., 1990), to increase support for
strong military actions among conservatives but not liberals
(Pyszczynski et al., 2006), and to increase interest in reading a
one-sided rather than a two-sided article on capital punishment
among high but not low authoritarians (Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas,
2005). Such results, of course, also are readily interpretable
through the lens of ADT.
Stenner (2005) has stated that ADT can comfortably accom-
modate terror management theory, and it goes well beyond the
latter in specifying precisely the critical aggravating conditions,
and the manner in which their impact is contingent upon variation
in individual predispositions (p. 298). Her conclusion apparently
rests on the argument that the impact of MS appears to be entirely
conditional upon authoritarian predisposition (p. 298). TMT pro-
ponents might well counter that such a conclusion was premature,
that TMT does allow for the moderating effects of individual
differences related to worldview, such as authoritarian disposition,
is much more extensive in conceptual reach, more precisely stip-
921
ulates the conscious and unconscious processes underlying the
effects of mortality threat, has amassed a far greater body of
diverse affirmative empirical research results, and actually can
subsume ADT.
One apparent shortcoming of the present investigation is that
individual levels of authoritarianism were not directly assessed in
state samples. No such indices exist as far as I know. Therefore, it
must remain unknown conclusively whether the results pattern
actually occurred because there are more authoritarians in conser-
vative states, as required by the ADT explanation. The best that
can be done is to provide circumstantial evidence that supports the
reasonableness of the conclusion that the ideological variable,
based on the responses of the 142,000 state-sampled individuals,
reflects the authoritarianlibertarian dispositions of those respon-
dents and that by inference, the state conservatism composite,
which correlates .92 with the ideological variable, also highly
reflects underlying state authoritarianlibertarian differences.
New data (P. J. Rentfrow, personal communication, April 23,
2007; Rentfrow, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2006; see also Jost, 2006)
fortunately provide rich evidence of a different type that also
points to justification for using the state ideological variable as a
proxy for authoritarianlibertarian differences. Past research at the
individual level has shown that the Big Five Openness to Experi-
ence factor (McCrae et al., 2000) is consistently correlated nega-
tively with both conservatism (e.g., Butler, 2000; Trapnell, 1994)
and authoritarianism (e.g., Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997;
Trapnell, 1994; see also Stenner, 2005, pp. 144 146). However,
Rentfrow et al. (2006) obtained Openness scores for approximately
250,000 Americans in each of two Internet surveys, one in 1999
2000 and another in 20032004, and the data were aggregated at
the state level for each sample. The present state ideological
variable, which is based on 1976 1988 phone surveys, correlates
.51 and .39 with 1999 2000 and 20032004 Openness scores,
respectively, and the matching correlations for the conservatism
composite are .35 and .27 (P. J. Rentfrow, personal commu-
nication, April 23, 2007). These state-level results, coupled with
those at the individual level linking authoritarianism to conserva-
tism and both to Openness, strongly suggest that the state conser-
vatism scores in the present study also reflect state authoritarian-
ism levels based on the individual dispositions of those in the state
aggregates.
Given that differences exist between ADT and TMT, which
theory offers the best explanation of the present findings? Per-
haps the ADT account is somewhat more parsimonious in the
sense that it can predict and explain the present interactive results
using a one-step rather than a marginally more complex two-step
process to describe the dynamics involved. However, the ADT
interpretation depends on the assumption that state conservatism
reflects underlying state authoritarianism, whereas the TMT inter-
pretation needs no such assumption. But these are rather superfi-
cial advantages, and it seems evident that the results can be
successfully explained using either theory. Any present choice
between the two competing interpretations seems dependent solely
on personal preference. The research scenario and the results
simply do not appear to provide sufficient substantive information
to permit a rational empirically based superiority selection of
either ADT or TMT.
In regard to wider implications, it is evident that not only the
present results but also those of earlier works in which authori-
922 MCCANN
tarianism and conservatism have been used as moderators of the
threat of MS (i.e., Greenberg et al., 1990, 1992; Lavine et al.,
2005; Pyszczynski et al., 2006) are equally compatible with ADT
and TMT. The two theories do have key similarities, but they also
differ in several core respects. For example, the idea in ADT that
we conform to collective norms and authority in an effort to
prevent and relieve anxiety is akin to the TMT concept of adher-
ence to the social anxiety buffer, which includes worldview
contents to protect us from existential anxiety. As well, both ADT
and TMT offer a functional account: Worldview defense is acti-
vated or strengthened as needed. But there are apparent differences
in regard to what triggers worldview defense. In ADT, it is
normative threat or any threat to the collective; in TMT, it is MS
and worldview challenges. Nonetheless, the triggers in ADT and
TMT are connected and similar in regard to worldview threats and
challenges, and the trigger of MS can be seen as a catalyst to the
protection of worldview. Such shaded commonality should en-
courage future research in which ADT and TMT are pitted against
each other in critical studies to determine when and how the two
differ in their predictive capacities in various contexts and what
constitutes the boundaries of their operating domains. Ultimately,
the parallels and the divergences should prompt both ADT and
TMT proponents to conduct full and formal comparisons of these
two intriguing theories and the nature of their respective support.
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Received November 29, 2006
Revision received January 8, 2008
Accepted January 15, 2008