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ABSTRACT
Keywords: Investment Banking, India, SEBI, Capital, Ratio analysis, Trend analysis.
3. REVIEW OF LITRATURE
A number of researchers have been study about the banking and its different branches.
O Brien, Nichols and Lin (2005) examined whether investment banking ties
influence the speed with which analysts convey unfavourable news. They find that
affiliated analysts are slower to downgrade from "Buy" and "Hold" recommendations
and significantly faster to upgrade from "Hold," in both within-analyst and within-
issuer tests. Findings indicated that banking ties increase analysts' reluctance to reveal
negative news, and that reform efforts must carefully consider the incentives of
affiliated and unaffiliated analysts to initiate coverage and convey the results of their
research. Ellis, Michaely, OHara(2006) constructed a comprehensive measure of
overall investment banking competitiveness for follow-on offerings that aggregates
the various dimensions of competition such as fees, pricing accuracy, analyst
recommendations, distributional abilities, market making prowess, debt offering
capabilities, and overall reputation. Mullineaux, Roten (2000) examined underwriting
performances by commercial bank-affiliated firms (Section 20's) and traditional
investment banks over the period 1995-98. They found that gross spreads are
significantly lower in the case of Section 20 underwritings, but that yield spreads are
not. Their sample included a substantial number of observations following changes in
Federal Reserve policies. Livingston, Miller (2000) examined the impact of
investment banker prestige on underwriter spreads, offering yields, and other
expenses for 2,449 nonconvertible industrial debt issues offered during the period
1990 to 1997. Study found that higher prestige underwriters charge significantly
lower underwriting fees. Offering yields are also lower and offering prices are higher
for prestigious underwriter, which indicates that investment banker reputation acts to
certify the value of a debt issue to investors. Kolasinski, Kothari (2004) find evidence
that conflicts of interest arising from M&A relations influence analysts'
recommendations, corroborating regulators' and practitioners' suspicions in a setting,
i.e. M&A relations, not previously examined in research on analyst conflicts. In
addition, the M&A context allowed them to disentangle the conflict of interest effect
from selection bias. They found that analysts affiliated with acquirer advisors upgrade
acquirer stocks around M&A deals, even around all-cash deals, wherein selection bias
is unlikely. Also consistent with conflict of interest, but not selection bias, target-
affiliated analysts publish optimistic reports about acquirers after, but not before, the
exchange ratio of an all-stock deal is set. Jain, Kini (1999) examined variables which
proxy for the incentives of lead underwriters to supply monitoring post-issue. These
variables include lead investment bank reputation and whether warrants are issued to
the underwriter by the issuing firm. They found that lead bank reputation is positively
associated with the post-issue performance of IPO firms. Servaes, Zenner(1996)
compared acquisitions completed with and without investment bank advice over the
1981 to 1982 period. They found that the choice to use an investment bank depends
on the complexity of the transaction, the type of transaction (takeovers versus
acquisitions of assets), the acquirers prior acquisition experience, and the degree of
diversification of the target firm. Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Yu, Wilhelm Jr. (2001)
present evidence that firms attempting IPOs learn from the experience of their
contemporaries. These information spillovers affect revisions in offer terms and the
decision whether to carry through with an offering. The evidence also supports the
argument that IPOs are implicitly bundled as a means of promoting more equitable
sharing of information production costs. One apparent consequence of this behaviour
is that while initial returns and IPO volume are positively correlated in the aggregate,
the correlation is negative among contemporaneous offerings subject to a common
valuation factor. These findings are consistent with the Benveniste, Busaba, and
Wilhelm (2001) argument that the dynamics of volume and initial returns in primary
equity markets reflect, at least in part, an institutional response to information
externalities. Galetovic, Anand (2000) examined how the tension between
relationships and competition is resolved in the investment banking market, which for
decades has been characterized by both relationships and competition. The model
studies the impact on relationships of four different dimensions of competition: non-
exclusive relationships, competition from arm's-length intermediaries, non-price
competition, and endogenous entry. The analysis shows how market equilibrium
adjusts so that relationships are sustained in the face of such competition. Puri, M.
(1996) examined empirically the pricing of bank-underwritten securities as compared
to investment-house-underwritten securities over a unique period in the U.S. (pre-
Glass-Steagall) when both banks and investment houses were allowed to underwrite
securities. The results support a certification role for banks, which is more valuable
for junior and information sensitive securities. Baron, P. (1980) considered a model is
in which an investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is an
issuer of new securities and in which the distribution effort of the banker cannot be
observed by the issuer. The model demonstrates that there can be a positive demand
for investment banking advisement and distribution services. Willman, OCreevy,
Nicholson, Soane(2002) examined the management of traders in financial markets
from the perspectives of agency and prospect theory. Using interview data from a
sample of traders and managers in four investment banks, they argued that managers
focus on avoiding losses rather than making gains. This focus emerged from the
characteristics of managers and the nature of their role Fang, L. (2005) studied the
relation between investment bank reputation and the price and quality of bond
underwriting services. Findings of the study suggested that banks' underwriting
decisions reflect reputation concerns, and are thus informative of issue quality. He
also suggested that economic rents are earned on reputation, and thereby provide
continued incentives for underwriters to maintain reputation. Rau, RP. (1998)
investigated the determinants of the market share of investment banks acting as
advisors in mergers and tender offers. In both mergers and tender offers, bank market
share is positively related to the contingent fee payments charged by the bank and to
the percentage of deals completed in the past by the bank. Ismail, Chahine (2006)
analyzed 635 US M&A transactions from 1985 to 2004. In contrast with prior
research, they distinguished between the target and acquirer fees, and examined their
independent effects on the level of the merger premium. The study provided evidence
of a positive (negative) association between target (acquirer) fees and the level of the
premium. It indicated that the reputation of investment banks affects the level of
merger fees, but does not affect the level of the premium. The findings confirmed the
conflict of interests between target and acquirer firms where the investment banks
efforts are positively related to shareholders interest. McLaughlin, R.M (2002)
revealed through empirical analysis that investment-banker advisory fees in tender
offers average 1.29% of the value of a completed transaction, far below the levels
often alluded to in the business press. Most fees are contingent on offer outcome, with
target-firm fees typically contingent on transaction value and bidding-firm fees on the
number of shares purchased. Ljungqvist, Asker (2005) investigated this conjecture in a
sample of 5,272 equity deals and 12,453 debt deals by large U.S. firms between 1975
& 2003. Using several distinct sources of identification, they found that this
phenomenon is at least as important in determining the choice of lead underwriter as
the banks reputation or the issuing firms existing relationship with the underwriter.
They argued that this finding has important implications for understanding the nature
of competition among investment banks, the success of entrants, & the likely impact
of investment bank mergers on market power. Baum, Rowley (2004) used data on all
underwriting syndicates in Canada over nearly 40 years, and examine whether, and if
so to what extent, managers are aware of and strategic about their network positions
by comparing the effects of partner selection on network position at two levels of
complexity. Their findings showed that when investment banks managers formed
and joined underwriting syndicates, they improved their network positions by
spanning more structural holes. Vives, X. (2001) reviewed the role of competition in
banking against the background of a transforming sector. He used industrial
organization and modern financial intermediation analysis to study the relationships
between the level of competition, risk-taking incentives, and the regulatory frame. The
consequences for market structure of the liberalization process and the need for
competition policy in the sector were high-lighted.
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study relates to financial appraisal of Investment bankers in India. Out of the total
111 investment bankers registered with SEBI on 30th October 2008, depending on the
availability of data 10 non bank investment bankers namely IFCI, Almondz Global,
Arihant Capital, Brescon corporate, AK Capital Service, Fortune Financial, India
Infoline ltd, Munoth FinANCIAL services and Pioneer Investcorp were selected for
study. Various tools (Graphs, tables) have been used to depict their growth trends and
a study of their financial statements show their profitability and liquidity position.
Only secondary data was collected for meeting the objectives of the study. Data was
collected from books, journals, and internet in the form of text and financial
statements of investment bankers.
STATISTICAL TOOLS: following statistical tools has been used for the evaluation
of the data.
Trend Analysis
Trend analysis has been employed to measure the growth trends of the sample units
over the last five years through following parameters:
Income from operations
Wage bills
Owned funds
NPAs
Profit before tax
Interest
Ratio Analysis is used to substantiate Trend Analysis to know how well liquidity
and profitability has been maintained over the last five years. Liquidity and
Profitability ratios have been calculated for each of 10 merchant bankers. The
following ratios have been calculated depending upon the availability of data.
LIQUIDITY RATIO - Liquidity refers to the ability of a concern to meet its current
obligations as and when these become due.
Absolute Liquid Ratio Absolute liquid assets include cash in hand and at
bank and marketable securities which can be realised even faster than debtors
and bill receivable.
Net Profit Ratio-It establishes a relationship between net profit (after taxes)
and sales, and indicates the efficiency of the management in manufacturing,
selling, administrative and other activities of the firm.
Earning Per Share- Earnings per Share is calculated by dividing the net
profit after taxes and preference dividend by the total number of equity shares.
Comparing EPS o various companies, it gives a comparative earnings or
earnings power of a company.
This chapter shows the growth trends of the units of study over the last five years and
the comparison of units through their liquidity and profitability ratios. An attempt has
been made to identify those firms which have been able to grow in the competitive
area and have shown improved performance.
TREND ANALYSIS
Interprtation
Owned funds increased by 220% in 2008 as compared to that in 2006
After suffering loss for 3 consecutive years, it recorded profit of Rs 1262 cr in
2007 and Rs 1668 cr in 2008
The significant reduction in net NPAs in 2007 resulted from settlements,
restructuring, up gradation of assets and adequate provisioning
Interpretation
As compared to 2004, Income from operations by 81% in 2007 and there
was a light decrease in 2008
Interest shows a falling trend since 2004 due to funds given by
government, the increase since 2006 was due to stoppage of funds by
government.
After showing a decreasing trend till 2006, wage bills show a sharp
increase by 98% in 2006
NPAs were reduced by 40% in 2008 as compared to that in 2004
Interpretation
Owned funds showed a sharp rise in 2008 to Rs 86.29 cr. This was due to
increase in reserves of the company.
Income from operations increased to Rs 86 cr, an increase of 67% from 2004.
There were nil NPAs
Interest formed a small percentage of expenses, not rising significantly.
Interpretation
Wage bills in 2007 were highest in the five year period and decreased in
2008.
Profit before tax decreased in 2007 from 2006 but increased in 2008 by
147%
Owned funds did not show significant increase till 2007 and it increased
by approx 700%
3. ARIHANT CAPITAL MARKETS
Table 5: Arihant Capital Markets (Absolute figures) ABOUT TO HERE
Interprtation
Interpretation
All the parameters showed an upward trend in 2006 and 2007, signalling a
strong growth of the company. Out of these income from operations showed
the highest growth by approximately 100% growth in 2008 from 2007.
Interest paid showed increase of 650% in 2008 from 2004.
The 254% increase in owned funds from 2007 to 2008 is the second best
figure for owned funds after India Infoline, whose funds increased by 262% in
2008
Interpretation
Owned funds showed a continuous increase in the five year period which was
mainly due to increase in reserves of company whereas the equity capital
remained almost same.
Profit before tax decreased in 2007 from 2006 but rose in 2008.
Overall the company showed and improvement in operations over the previous
year.
Interpretation
Owned funds and profit before tax showed a sharp upward trend from 2007 to
2008, increasing by 128% and 208% respectively.
Income from operations showed a stabilized trend since 2006 increasing by
mere .3% in 2007 and 4% in 2008.
Wage bills grew at an average of 24% every year, not showing any significant
increase in 2007 and 2008.
Interprtation
The Company delivered superior financial performance during the financial
year ended 31March 2008 with improvement across all parameters.
Wage bills was Rs.7 cr for the financial year ended 31March 2008 as against
Rs 4 cr in the previous financial
year.
Owned funds increased due to issue of Preference shares and increase in
reserves of the company.
Interpretation
Although full data for AK Capital services was not available, the trends with
the available data depict upward trend in all the parameters. Although interest
paid increased over the years, still the company managed to earn high income
form operations.
Owned funds increased by approx 522% in 2008 from 2004, on account of
issue of preference shares.
Interpretation
The company showed increase in all parameters in 2008 from 2007.
Increase in owned funds was due to first time allotment of preference shares
Income from operations in 2008 has led to increase in the amount of reserves
of the company adding to the rise in owned funds
Interpretation
Wage bills show an upward trend since 2007, it was mainly on account of
recruitment of additional man-power due to expansion activities
Profit before tax dipped in 2007 but again rose in 2008 by 65%
There was a sharp increase in income from operations and interest during
2007-08 rising by approx100% and 700% respectively.
Interpretation
Owned funds rose by 220% in 2007 from Rs 52 cr in 2006 to Rs 168 cr in
2007 mainly due to conversion of convertible bonds into shares and allotment
of shares to employees under its ESOP scheme.
Income from operations also showed a significant increase in 2007 and 2008
being Rs 8.8 cr in 2004 to Rs 55 cr and Rs 134 cr in 2007 and 2008
respectively.
Interpretation
In 2008 owned funds increased to Rs 1049 cr, a growth of 262% in the same
period among all the 10 companies considered or the study.
Interest increased consistently since 2005 till 2008.
Wage bills showed an upward trend since 2006 rising by Rs 134 cr from 2004
to 2008.
Interpretation
Owned funds did not show any wide fluctuations during the five year period,
equity capital remained same while there were minor changes in reserves of
the company.
The company earned highest income from operation in 2006 of Rs 2 cr but
decreased in 2007 and 2008 by respectively.
Profit before tax showed an erratic trend rising and falling in alternate years.
Interpretation
The trend line of the company show an erratic trend with wide fluctuations, all
the parameters except profit before tax show a downward trend after 2006.
Profit before tax show a stable trend rising marginally over the period
Interpretation
The company recorded its lowest owned funds at Rs 8 cr, while it recorded
highest funds in 2008; it was because of share application money and increase
in reserves of the company.
Income from operations also showed huge increase in 2008 rising by 213%
from 2007
Profit before tax from Rs .32 cr in 2004 to Rs 28 cr in 2008
Interpretation
Till 2006 all the parameters were almost at same level, post 2006 all the
parameters showed an upward trend.
In 2007, interest paid was less and profit before tax was high, post 2007
interest increased, lowering the level of profits.
However income from operation increased at a steady pace.
Interpretation
Owned funds of the company increased gradually over the period, mainly due
to increase in the reserves of the company and the equity capital remained
same.
It recorded loss of Rs 15 cr in 2004 but recovered in 2005 with a profit of Rs
39 cr, an increase of 350%, but income decreased drastically in 2006 with
mild recoveries in 207 and 2008.
Company incurred loss in 2005 & 2005 and earned profits till 2008. However
profits fell in 2008 by 70% of 2007.
Interpretation
The trends of the company show inconsistency in its operations. There was a
sharp rise in profits in 2005 followed by a sharp fall in 2006, which rose
marginally in following years.
Decrease in interest paid post 2005 led to increase in profits, but profits fall
after 2007 even when the interest paid shows a decline.
Wage bills however showed rising trend can be a reason for decline in profits.
RATIO ANALYSIS
Table 21: Liquidity Ratios ABOUT TO HERE
INTERPRETATION
In 2004, Almondz Global maintained the highest current ratio at 5.02, followed by
Pioneer Investcorp at 3.64 and Fortune Financial at 3.56.
Fortune Financial showed a consistent pattern as they maintained the highest liquidity
ratios in 2004, 2005 and 2006
In 2006, India Infoline was the only company to maintain current and quick ratio
above 6, however it maintained lower levels in 2007 and 2008.
In 2007 & 2008, Almondz maintained overall highest current ratio at 8.15 and 10.18
respectively.
AK Capital Service recorded the lowest figures for liquidity ratios at .22 approx in
2008
PROFITABILITY RATIOS
Table 22: Profitability Ratios I ABOUT TO HERE
INTERPRETATION
IFCI & SMIFS gave negative returns due to loss incurred but gave positive returns
once they earned profits post 2007.
Highest NP ratio was of Brescon Corporate at 201% in 2008 followed by SMIFS at
115% in 2004, while the lowest NP ratio was of SMIFS of 947% in 2005, due to loss.
Highest ROI was recorded for Fortune Financial at 160% 2007, a 320% increase from
2006
Overall Brescon Corporate showed superior performance over the five year period
among all companies by earning consistent profits and giving out increased returns on
investment.
PROFITABILITY RATIOS
Table 23: Profitability Ratios II ABOUT TO HERE
Interpretation
The maximum EPS was of AK Capital at Rs 48.47 in 2008, lowest being of
IFCI at -51.28 in 2004. Maximum increase in EPS was for Arihant Capital, a
growth of approx 400% from Rs 7.98 in 2007 to Rs 39.05 in 2008. On the
other hand, SMIFSs EPS declined from Rs 27.99 in 2007 to Rs 10.92 in
2008.
There was no dividend paid by Munoth Financial services throughout the five
year period due to lack of sufficient profits.
6. CONCLUSION
Merchant banks and Investment Banks are used interchangeably in Indian context;
even SEBI issues guidelines for Merchant Bankers only. During 1997-1998, due to
sharp decline in the number of public issues, structural changes were introduced by
abolishing multiple categories and replacing by a single category. Thus time was ripe
to adapt, innovate and broad base their activities.
Investment Bankers assist companies on numerous issues like IPOs Project
Counselling, underwriting, Portfolio management etc. thereby reducing their cost
while providing specialized services. There are big names like Reliance, HDFC,
AXIS bank, ICICI and multinational corporations like ABN Amro, Goldman Sachs,
and JP Morgan etc carrying out Investment Banking functions in India. They have
shown exceptional growth from having a single office in a city to have presence in
major cities of India. Their profits have increased manifolds during small period of
starting their operations.
The aim of the study was to examine the extent of operations of Investment Banks in
India and importance of their services to corporate world. Analysis of the financial
statements of the sample reveals that their performance has improved over a period of
time. The companies which incurred losses successfully recovered and regained their
competitive position.
With an increase in the growth rate of the country and boom in the capital market in
2006 and 2007, they made unprecedented growth. But now when the economic
growth is shrinking and India is facing slowdown, it will be interesting to see how
their performance will be affected at a time when companies are emphasising on cost
cutting and are hesitating to start new venture. With increased presence, wider
acceptability and expanding markets the future of Investment Banking appears very
promising
7. REFERENCES
TABLE.1
Rs in crores
TABLE.2
IFCI Percentage change
Rs Crore
TABLE.4
Percentage change
NPA's - - - - -
TABLE.5
Rs Crore
NPA's - - - - -
TABLE.6
Percentage change
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Owned funds 100 116.84 163.68 22.45 685.43
Interest 100 Nil Nil Nil 1650
Income from operations 100 242.5 184.53 1292.5 2407.5
Wage bills 100 140.38 323.07 873.07 1776.92
Profit/loss before tax 100 89.89 215.66 215.65 985.85
NPA's - - - - -
TABLE.7
Rs Crore
Interest - - - - -
NPA's NA NA NA NA NA
TABLE.8
Percentage change
Interest - - - - -
NPA's - - - - -
TABLE.9
Rs Crore
TABLE.11
Rs Crore
TABLE.12
Percentage change
Rs Crore
TABLE.14
Percentage change
NPA's NA NA NA NA NA
TABLE.15
Rs Crore
Percentage change
NPA's - - - - --
TABLE.17
Rs Crore
TABLE.18
Percentage change
NPA's - - - - --
TABLE.19
Rs Crore
NPA's NA NA NA NA NA
TABLE.20
Percentage change
NPA's NA NA NA NA NA
TABLE.21
Current Quick AbsLiqui Current Quick AbsLiquid Current Quick AbsLiqui CR QR ALR CR QR ALR
ratio ratio d ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio Ratio d Ratio
IFCI
1.08 1.08 0.079 1.28 1.28 0.16 2.25 2.25 1.01 2.5 2.5 1.02 2.81 2.81 2.13
Almondz Global 5.02 .73 NA 4.61 .83 NA 3.45 1.35 NA 8.15 2.08 NA 10.1 5.29 NA
8
Arihant Capital 2.22 2.22 .25 1.59 1.59 .14 1.19 1.19 .04 1.01 1.01 .29 1.34 1.34 .58
Brescon 1.93 1.62 NA 3.77 3.26 NA 2.05 2.04 NA 2.18 2.17 NA 1.98 1.97 NA
corporate
AK Capital Service NA NA NA 1.78 1.78 .45 4.07 4.07 .80 3.64 3.64 .95 .22 .22 .19
Fortune Financial 3.56 3.54 2.5 3.35 3.34 1.21 2.69 2.69 2.12 3.91 3.91 2.91 2.02 2.02 .77
India Infoline ltd 3 3 1.03 4.19 4.19 .5 6.44 6.44 .07 1.5 1.5 .32 1.29 1.29 .31
Munoth Fin 1.93 1.89 NA 2.67 2.55 NA 2.17 2.16 NA 2.57 2.5 NA 2.53 2.27 NA
Services
Pioneer 3.64 3.58 NA 6.75 6.6 NA 3.31 3.28 NA 4.35 1.56 NA 2.96 2.04 NA
Investcorp
SMIFS 2.55 2.32 NA 2.86 2.57 NA 1.32 1.25 NA 2.41 1.42 NA 1.52 1.3 NA
TABLE.22
IFCI
NA -212 NA NA -21.4 NA NA -4.9 NA NA 46.2 NA NA 30.6 NA
Almondz 13.09 22.2 10.16 26.01 34.15 12.16 39.72 42.29 38.87 51.52 23.07 24.23 154.8 10.3 20.23
8
Global
Arihant 32.71 24 57.7 29.05 20.6 42.9 24.93 32.15 36.74 17.2 26.77 24.2 24.12 36.2 29.07
9
Capital
Brescon 19.5 27.7 15.24 38.73 30.84 31.59 59.11 30.84 51.51 75.05 23.18 62.63 201.5 33.5 110.81
5
corporate
AK Capital NA NA NA NA 32.33 NA NA 39.72 NA NA 39.35 NA NA 26.2 NA
1
Service
Fortune NA 8.35 NA NA 20.2 NA NA 38.78 NA NA 160.9 NA NA 22.1 NA
1
Financial
India NA 14.39 NA NA 33.39 NA NA 15.62 NA NA 17.99 NA NA 15.0 NA
2
Infoline ltd
Munoth Fin 20.68 3.61 29.31 18.48 2.33 27.73 36.94 8.09 22.59 9.03 1.80 34.18 30.21 6.63 36.26
services
Pioneer 4.48 .37 6.27 18.3 13.18 44.44 48.73 16.29 84.73 58 39.24 85.83 51.27 34.7 81.51
3
Investcorp
SMIFS 115.4 -31.31 85.18 -520.8 -5.31 -947.9 111.55 20.20 -8.91 91.72 26.15 53.04 6.93 9.35 3.43
TABLE.23
Pionee Investcorp .16 NA .52 NA 3.47 3.47 12.56 18.84 28.15 42.22
SMIFS -25.41 NIL -4.47 NIL 18.16 NIL 27.99 .03 10.92 .09