TAADA VS.

TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and

laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents
are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Atienza vs Brillantes 243 SCRA 32

Topic: Retroactive effects of law

SF: An administrative case was filed by herein complainant against Judge Brilliantes
of MTC, Manila. Complainant alleges that he has two children with De Castro who
stays in Makati, Manila in the house he bought and stayed while he is in Manila.
Sometime in 1991 he saw Respondent Judge sleeping on his bed, upon inquiry, he
was told by the houseboy that respondent was cohabiting with De Castro.
Complainant further alleged that respondent was married to a certain Zenaida
Ongkiko and begot five children.

In reply respondent alleged that the complainant was not married to De Castro, he
also denied having been married to Zenaida ongkiko, however admitted having five
children with her. He stated that the marriage between him and Ongkiko was not
valid since there was no marriage license and further claimed that when he married
De Castro he believed in all good faith of its intent and purpose.

I: Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code that required nullity of previous
marriage for purpose of remarriage shall apply?

H: As a general rule provided in Article 4 of the NCC: Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided.

R: Article 40 of the Family Code provides that a Judicial Declaration of Nullity is

required before a party can enter into second marriage however the said Code took
effect only on August 3, 1988 and the marriages that respondent contracted was
1965 and 1991 however the provisions of this code shall apply regardless of the
date of the marriage, besides under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given retroactive effects in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws this is particularly
true with Article 40 which is a rule of Procedure, herein respondent has not shown
any vested rights that was impaired by the application of Article 40 ti his case.
 CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002

Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS:

As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles, one driven by Mario

Llavore Laroya and the other owned by Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino
Casupanan, two cases were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. This case was on its preliminary investigation stage when Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of
Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed the civil case. On
Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case.
Casupanan and Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by
the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore, the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this
petition. Casupanan and Capitulos contention: that if the accused in a criminal case
has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in
a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-
delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence,
and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they
point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil
action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case. Laroyas contention: that the petition is
fatally defective as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges
that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal
when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is
no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a
petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence

can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-
delict against the private complainant in the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI: The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-
delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the
dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of
dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal
expressly states that it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being silent on
the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an
order dismissing an action without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas
RTC's order dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. Laroya filed the criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal
Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act
or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on
culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based
on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And
par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111. Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal
action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-
shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. Under the present Rule 111,
the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to recover
civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such
reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not
yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The
consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages
ex-delicto. Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended
1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of
the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the "offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action." There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the
accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3
of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission.
The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the
rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the
offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the
filing of another case against his employer or guardians. Similarly, the accused can
file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the
criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a
separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is
prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately
his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period
continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed. Second, the accused,
who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of theCivil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for
quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to
deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the
law.Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper.

CANCIO V. ISIP

FACTS:

Cancio filed cases of violation of BP22 and cases of estafa against Respondent. The
BP22 cases were dismissed on the ground of failure to prosecute. As to the estafa
cases, the prosecution moved to dismiss after failing to present its second witness.
The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from
the said criminal cases. The TC granted. Cancio then filed the instant case for
collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of
the estafa cases. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending
that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further
prayed that petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping. The
TC found in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the
institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the
estafa cases; WON the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping
rule.

HELD:

NO. An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Art100 of the RPC; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising
from an act or omission complained of as felony; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.
Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject,
however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.
Under the present Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the
criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate civil
action before the prosecution starts to present evidence. Anent the independent
civil actions, under the present Rules, the independent civil actions may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a
waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action. In the case at bar,
a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based
on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Cancios cause of action is the
respondents breach of the contractual obligation. The nature of a cause of action is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. There is also no forum-
shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the
same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the
same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes
of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil
action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no
forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.

Van Dorn vs Romillo (G.R. No. L-68470)

Nationality Principle Divorce

FACTS:

Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a

citizen of the United States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently,
they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has remarried also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private respondent filed suit against
petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal property; that
petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private
respondent be declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case contending that the cause of action is barred by the judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now is the subject of
the certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the
alien spouse.

HELD:

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus,
pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled
to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own
countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera

TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera CITATION: GR No.

80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was
born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony
eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was
promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986,
private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as
early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of

adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was
already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and
nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON.
JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149,
respondents.

G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

QUISUMBING, J.:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen, married private respondent Carmen

Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. Out of their
union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine.

Carmen filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Makati
Regional Trial Court (RTC). Wolfgang filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied.

Meanwhile, Wolfgang obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance
of Hamburg-Blankenese. Said decree also provides that the parental custody of the
children should be vested to Wolfgang.

Wolfgang filed another motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as a divorce decree
had already been promulgated, and said motion was granted by Public Respondent
RTC Judge Salonga.

Carmen filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case
proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between her and Wolfgang. Judge Salonga partially
set aside her previous order for the purpose of tackling the issues of support and
custody of their children.

1st Issue: W/N Judge Salonga was correct in granting a partial motion for
reconsideration.

Ruling: Yes.

A judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained
finality, as in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court goes further to say that the court can modify or alter a
judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances
transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and
circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after
the judgment has become final and executory and when it becomes imperative in
the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.

2nd issue: W/N Judge Salonga's act was valid when she assumed and retained
jurisdiction as regards child custody and support.

Ruling: Yes.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are

recognizable in our jurisdiction. But the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care
and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as
the award of custody to Wolfgang by the German court, it must be shown that the
parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on
grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the
opportunity to challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for
declaring that judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of Wolfgang to
have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the German court
were summary. As to what was the extent of Carmens participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. Absent any finding
that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody,
care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children.

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, VS. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,

respondents December 22, 1998

Facts:

Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
May 18, 1941. No children were born out of their marriage. On July 23, 1954,
petitioner obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.
On April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. On August 31, 1972, Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the RTC for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent
Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Dandan and the
surviving children, all surnamed Padlan, opposed the petition. The RTC expressed
that the marriage between Antonio and petitioner subsisted until the death of Arturo
in 1972, that the marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo was
clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.
Issues: 1. Should the case be remanded to the lower court?

2. Who between the petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent?

Held:

If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No
dispute exists as to the right of the six Padlan children to inherit from the decedent
because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and
petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan, nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. Private respondent is not a surviving spouse that can
inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. Her marriage
to Arturo being a bigamous marriage considered void ab inito under Articles 80 and
83 of the Civil Code renders her not a surviving spouse. The decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering the remand of the case is affirmed.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2,

2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in

Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia.
However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce,
dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12,
1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of
Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact,
while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16,
1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace
filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on
March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks
marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as

evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of
bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132,
a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either: (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be: (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of
bigamy.

Tenchavez vs Escano

TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old
engineer, and exarmy officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and
go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for
a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was
single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint
for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second
Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August
8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he
alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD:

Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because
it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous
relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity
in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by
one spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal
is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez
entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2)
Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez
the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant
Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife,
the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Globe Mackay vs.CA 176 SCRA 778

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY,

petitioners vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M.
TOBIAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay in

dual capacity as purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, the respondent discovered fraudulent anomalies and
transactions in the said corporation for which it lost several hundred thousands of
pesos. The private respondent reported to his superiors including Henry, the
petitioner. However, he was confronted by Hendry stating that Tobias was the
number one suspect. He was ordered to take a one week forced leave. When he
returned to work, Hendry called him crook and swindler, and left a scornful
remark to the Filipinos. The petitioners also charged six criminal cases against the
respondentfive cases of estafa and one for violating Article 290 of the RPC
(Discovering Secrets through Seizure of Correspondence). The petitioner also sent a
poison letter to RETELCO causing the respondent to be unemployed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondent.
HELD:

Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the damage or loss which
does not constitute a violation of legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not
actionable. However, this is not applicable in this case. It bears repeating that even
granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the
abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which petitioners must be held liable. The court awarded Tobias the following: Php
80, 000 as actual damages, Php 200, 000 as moral damages, Php 20, 0000 as
exemplary damages; Php 30, 000 as attorneys fees; and, costs. Petition was denied
and the decision of CA is AFFIRMED

BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION,

petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO J. MARASIGAN,respondents.G.R.
No. 120639. September 25, 1998
FACTS:
Marasigan, a lawyer, is a BPI credit card holder. His contractual relationswith BPI
went on smoothly until October 1989, when his statement of accountamounting to
P8,987.84 was not paid in due time. BPI demanded immediatepayment, and
required him to issue a check in favor of BPI, otherwise his card willbe suspended.
Marasigan issued a post-dated check (PDC) in favor of BPI.BPI, having been
informed of the PDC only a week after receipt, already sent a letterto Marasigan,
informing him of the temporary suspension of the privileges of hiscard. He was also
told to refrain from using his card to avoid anyinconvenience/embarrassment and
that unless he settles his outstanding accountwithin 5 days from receipt of the
letter, his membership will be permanentlycancelled.On the other hand, confident
that he had settled his account with the issuance of the postdated check, Marasigan
invited some guests at Caf Adriatico (there isalso no showing that he received the
letter from BPI before he went to CafAdriatico). When he presented his credit card
to paythe bill, the it wasdishonored and one of his guests paid the bill by using her
own credit card.Marasigan asked BPI to withhold the deposit of his postdated check
and to returnthe said check to him because according to him,
BPI violated theiragreement that once Marasigan issues the check to the
to cover hisunpaid account, BPI will not suspend the effectivity of the card
.Marasigan filed a complaint for damages against BPI before the trial court, and
thetrial court ruled in favor of him. The decision was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE/S:
1.W/N BPI had the right to suspend the credit card of the Marasigan
2.W/N the trial courtand CA erred in holding BPI liable for damages

Held:
Both YES!
RATIO:
Under the terms and conditions of the credit card, signed by Marasigan,
any cardwith outstanding balances after 30 days from original billing shall
automatically besuspended. Marasigan admitted that he did not pay within
30 days for his originalbilling. BPI could automatically suspend his credit card.

Even though there was an arrangement between the parties (that

uponissuance of a check, the card wouldnt be suspended) the court
found thatMarasigan was not able to comply with his obligation.

The purpose of the arrangement between the parties was for the immediatepayme
nt of Marasigans outstanding account, in order that his credit card would
notb e s u s p e n d e d . A s a g r e e d u p o n b y t h e p a r t i e s , o n t h e f o l l o
wing day, privatere s p o n d e n t d i d i s s u e a c h e c k .
H o w e v e r , t h e c h e c k w a s p o s t d a t e d 1 5 December
1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a substitutefor money
and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does not,
byi t s e l f o p e r a t e a s p a y m e n t . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e
i n t h e c a s e o f a postdated check.Thus, the issuance by the private
respondent of the postdated check wasnot eff ective payment. It
did not comply with his obligation under thearrangement
with BPI. BPI corporation was therefore justifi ed in suspending his credit
card.While Marasigan suffered damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit
card,there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is
the illegalinvasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from theinjury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damagesuffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which theloss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establishthat such injuries resulted from a breach of
duty which the defendant owed to theplaintiff. In the case at bar, it was
Marasigan's failure to settle his obligation
whichc a u s e d t h e s u s p e n s i o n o f h i s c r e d i t c a r d a n d s u b s e
q u e n t d i s h o n o r a t C a f Adriatico

HSBC INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEE LIMITED,

petitioner,vs.
CECILIA DIEZ CATALAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 159590 & 159591 October 18, 2004|
FACTS

Frederick Arthur Thomson drew 5 checks payable to Catalan in thetotal amount

of HK$3.2 million. Catalan presented these checks to HSBC[Bank]. The checks were
dishonored for having insufficient funds. Thomsondemanded that the checks be
made good because he, in fact, had sufficientfunds.

Catalan knowing that Thomson had communicated with the Bank,asked HSBCBank
to clear the checks and pay her the said amount. HSBC didnot heed her.

Thomson died but Catalan was not paid yet. The account wastransferred to HSBC
[Trustee]. Catalan then requested Trustee to pay her. They still refused and even
asked her to submit back to them the originalchecks for verification.

Catalan and her lawyer went to Hongkong on their own expense topersonally submit
the checks. They still were not honored, leading Catalan tofile a suit against HSBC to
collect her HK$3.2M
ISSUES
Whether or not HSBC Bank and Trustee are liable to pay damages to Catalanon the
ground of Abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code

ARGUMENTS

Petitioner
: HSBC claims that they are a foreign corporation not doingbusiness in the
Philippines thus the courts do not have jurisdiction over them.Moreover, there is no
cause of action because it was not alleged in the therewas abuse of right.
Respondent:
Catalan claims that although HSBC has the right to examinethe checks, they did so
in bad faith because they required her to submit allsorts of documents and yet even
upon showing that the checks were good,the Bank still refused to release the money
to her. There was abuse of right onthe part of the Bank. HOLDING & RATIO
DECIDENDI THERE IS CAUSE OFACTION, IT NEED NOT BE EXPRESSLY STATED, THE
FACTS SUFFICIENTLYDESCRIBE THAT THERE WAS AN ABUSEOF RIGHT.
APPLICATION:
Article 19 of the Civil Code speaks of the fundamental principle of law andhuman
conduct that a person "must, in the exercise of his rights and in theperformance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observehonesty and good
faith." It sets the standards which may be observed not only in theexercise of ones
rights but also in the performance of ones duties. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with thenorms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong isthereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right,though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, maynevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected onlywhen he acts in the legitimate exercise
of his right, that is, when he acts withprudence and in good faith; but not when he
acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised for
the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right must be
in accordance withthe purpose for which it was established, and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh;there must be no intention to injure another. Thus, in
order to be liable under the abuse of rights principle, three elementsmust concur, to
wit: (a) that there is a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised inbad faith; and (c)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. HSBANK is being sued for
unwarranted failure to pay the checksnotwithstanding the repeated assurance of
the drawer Thomson as to theauthenticity of the check sand frequent directives
to pay the value thereof toCatalan. Her allegations in the complaint that the gross
inaction of HSBANK on Thomsons instructions, as well as its evident failure
to inform Catalan of the reasonfor its continued inaction and non-payment of the
checks, smack of insouciance on itspart, are sufficient statements of clear abuse of
right for which it may be held liableto Catalan for any damages she incurred
resulting therefore. HSBANKs actions orlack thereof, prevented Catalan from
seeking further redress with Thomson for therecovery of her claim while the latter
was alive

DECISION OF THE COURT:

The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
75757dismissing the petition for certiorari of the Hongkong and Shanghai
BankingCorporation Limited is
AFFIRMED
. The petition in G.R. No. 159591 is
GRANTED.
TheDecision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 14, 2003, in CA-G.R. SP No.
75756dismissing the petition for certiorari of the HSBC International Trustee Limited
is
REVERSED
and
SET ASIDE
. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Bacolod City isdeclared without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of Civil Case No. 01-11372 againstthe HSBC International Trustee
Limited, and all its orders and issuances with respectto the latter are hereby
ANNULLED
and
SET ASIDE
. The said Regional Trial Court ishereby
ORDERED
to
DESIST
from maintaining further proceedings against the HSBCInternational Trustee Limited
in the case aforestated

Garciano vs. CAGR no. 96126 (Aug 10, 1992)

Facts:
Garciano is a teacher at ICI. She filed for an indefiniteleave of absence, which was approved by
the BOD President.Before the opening of the following school year, the schoolprincipal,
through Garcianos husband, wrote her that herservices were being terminated by
the schools founder, Fr.Wiertz, concurred in by the PTA, because of (1) absence of awritten
contract of employment due to her refusal to signone; and (2) difficulty of getting a
substitute teacher for heron temporary basis since no one would accept the
postwithout a contract.Upon her return, Garciano received a letter signed bythe BOD, with the
exception of Fr. Wiertz, reinstating her toher duties and invalidating previous letters of
termination fornot being approved by the BOD. Six of nine members of
theB O D l a t e r r e s i g n e d b e c a u s e o f t h e I C I f a c u l t y s a c i d reaction to the
reinstatement of Garciano.Garciano sued for damages, discrimination, and unjustand illegal
dismissal.
Held:
There was no termination in the first place, the letterpurportedly terminating her
services being null and void forbeing invalid. Hence, Garcianos failure to report for
workeven after receiving the BODs letter should be construed asvoluntary desistance from her
teaching job, from which she isnot entitled to recover damages. Furthermore, there is
noevidence showing that the members of the faculty sheimpleaded [physically]
prevented her from reporting for work. Their threat to resign en masse does not
make them liable fordamages, for it was simply an exercise of their right of
frees p e e c h t o d i s s e n t f r o m t h e B O D s d e c i s i o n . I t w a s n o t contrary to
law, morals, good customs, or public policy.Volenti non fit injuria.Article 21 should also be
construed as granting theright to recover damages to injured persons
who are not

themselves at fault (clean hands doctrine). This was not thecase at present. Garciano
could be faulted for her indefiniteleave of absence and failure to report back in time for
regularopening of class, her refusal to sign a written contract
of employment, and her ignoring the BODs order for her toreport to duty.
 GF Equity Inc, vs. Arturo Valenzona

June 30, 2005 462 SCRA 466

Ponente: Justice Carpio-Morales

Facts:
GF Equity hired Valenzona as Head Coach of the Alaska team in Philippine
Basketball Association under contract. Under the contract Valenzona will receive a
monthly salary of P35,000, net of taxes, a service vehicle with gasoline allowance.
Although, he had consulted his lawyer for the stipulations in the contract and was
pointed by his counsel that there is an one-sidedness face still he agreed to the
contract. Later on, he was terminated from being the Head Coach on grounds that
the management believes he did not comply of all his duties as coach. Valenzona
filed in RTC of Manila against the GF Equity of breach of contract with damages. The
RTC dismissed the complaint stating that the contract was valid and that he is
aware of the bad bargain. In the CA, where he appealed, the appellate court
reversed the RTCs decision and thus ordered HF Equity liable for damages. Hence
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the contract violated the rules on mutuality of contract
resulting from breach of contract and therefore a recovery of damages can be
awarded?

Held: The CA bases their judgment on Article 19 of the Civil Code, or the principle of
abuse of rights. The same code also provides for the mutuality of contracts where
both parties are bound and must adhere to the contract. The stipulation wherein,
the management, on its sole opinion can terminate the employment of the
defendant is violative and thus is null and void. GF Equity failed to consider the
principle of abuse of right clearly stated in Article 19 of the CC. The pre-termination
is anchored which is contrary to law and thereby abusing the right of Valenzona,
entitles him of damages in consonance with Article 19 in relation to Article 20 of the
CC.
 Bunag v. CA

G.R. No. 101749 G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and

ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, REGALADO

FACTS:

On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought

plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that
evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his
grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived
together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On
September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed
their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license. Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8,
1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay
City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.

ISSUE: Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court
erred in awarding damages.

RULING:

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action
for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right
to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such
promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not
actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the
wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award of moral
damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to
paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is
intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. 10 Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of
petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge
with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her
for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good
customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary
damages, pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219,
and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code. Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact
that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he
is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint
therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office. Generally,
the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words,
criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act
or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12 In the
instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by
mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did
not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein
private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such
preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the
civil action. The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings
involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to
the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil
proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which
shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is
sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13
Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a
criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment
before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can
likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

Wassmer vs. Velez 12 SCRA 648

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ,

defendantappellant.

FACTS:
In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on
September 4 of the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the
preparations for their wedding. However, two days before their marriage, Paking
left a note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother was against it. A
day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through.
Worse, Paking did not show up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly
humiliated. The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to
file a civil suit against the former. Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral
and exemplary damages to Wassmer. Velez appealed on the court and stated that
he failed to attend the wedding day because of fortuitous events. He also insisted
that he cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of
promise to marry. He also contested the award of moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of

promise to marry suit.

HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Howver,

Wassmer has already made preparations for the wedding. Velezs failure to appear
on the wedding day is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy which is
embodied on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the law, the injured party is entitled
to moral damages as well as to exemplary damages because Velezs acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to
marry Wassmer.

NELIA A. CONSTANTINO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AURORA S.

ROQUE, PRISCILLA S. LUNA and JOSEFINA S. AUSTRIA, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOSEFA TORRES died intestate leaving a parcel of land located at Balagtas,

Bulacan. Among her heirs are respondents Aurora S. Roque, Priscilla S. Luna and
Josefina S. Austria. Sometime in 1984, the heirs of Josefa Torres, as vendors, and
petitioner Nelia A. Constantino, as vendee, entered into a contract to sell a parcel of
land with a total land area of two hundred and fifty (250) square meters. The lot,
owned in common by the Torres heirs, is being occupied by petitioners mother and
sister. An adjoining lot, also co-owned by the heirs, is being occupied by spouses
Severino and Consuelo Lim. Pursuant to their agreement, the heirs authorized
petitioner to prepare the necessary Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale.
 After having the document drafted - with several spaces left blank including the
specification as to the metes and bounds of the land - petitioner asked the heirs to
affix their signatures on the document. The heirs signed the document with the
understanding that respondent Aurora S. Roque, one of the heirs, would be present
when the latter would seek permission from the Bureau of Lands and have the land
surveyed.

However, without the participation of any of the Torres heirs, the property was
subsequently surveyed, subdivided and then covered by TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-
292266. Petitioner did not furnish the heirs with copies of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale nor of the subdivision plan and the certificates of
title. Upon securing a copy of the deed from the Registry of Deeds, the respondents
learned that the area of the property purportedly sold to petitioner was much bigger
than that agreed upon by the parties. It already included the portion being occupied
by the spouses Severino and Consuelo Lim.

On 2 June 1986, private respondents sent a letter to petitioner demanding the

surrender to them of the deed of settlement and conveyance, the subdivision plan
and the certificates of title; but to no avail. On 25 June 1986 respondents filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan an action for annulment of the deed and
cancellation of the certificates of title, with prayer for recovery of damages,
attorneys fees and costs of suit.[1]

Petitioner controverted the allegations of respondents by presenting the Deed of

Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale dated 10 October 1984 wherein
respondents agreed to divide and adjudicate among themselves the inherited
property with an area of one thousand five hundred and three (1,503) square
meters. In the same document, they caused the subdivision of the property into two
(2) lots according to Plan No. PSD-03-009105 identified as Lot 4-A with an area of
one thousand ninety-six (1,096) square meters, and Lot 4-B with an area of four
hundred and seven (407) square meters, and acknowledged the sale to petitioner of
said Lot 4-B. As a consequence, on 18 March 1985, the Register of Deeds issued TCT
No. T-292265 in the name of the heirs of Josefa Torres and TCT No. T-292266 in the
name of petitioner.

In reply, private respondents reiterated that all the heirs signed the document
before the land was surveyed and subdivided, hence, there was as yet no definite
area to be sold that could be indicated in the deed at the time of the signing. They
also claimed that they were not notified about the survey and the subdivision of the
lot and therefore they could not have agreed on the area supposedly sold to
petitioner. The respondent heirs insist that they could not have agreed to the extent
of the area actually reflected in the deed because it included the portion being
occupied by the Lim spouses, which was already the subject of a previous
agreement to sell between them and their predecessor.
 The trial court entertained serious doubts with respect to the preparation and
due execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale taking into
account that (a) while petitioner claimed that all the heirs signed before the notary
public and in her presence, she was not able to enumerate all the signatories to the
document; (b) while petitioner claimed that the document was signed only after the
survey of the land was completed, or on 10 October 1984, such fact was negated by
her own witness who testified that the survey was conducted only on 16 October
1984; and, (c) while petitioner alleged that the document was signed and notarized
in Manila no explanation was offered why the same could not have been signed and
notarized in Bulacan where notaries public abound which could have been less
inconvenient to the parties concerned. Additionally, the trial court relied heavily on
the assertions of respondents as reflected in their demand letter that they did not
give their consent to the sale of Lot 4-B.

Thus, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court on 27 September
1990 ordered the annulment and cancellation of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate with Sale, TCT Nos. T-292265 and T-292266 and Subdivision
Plan No. PSD-03-009105. It also ordered petitioner to pay private
respondents P50,000.00 for moral damages, P15,000.00 for attorneys fees, and to
pay the costs of suit.[2]

On 16 March 1994 respondent Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the

trial court,[3] and on 20 June 1994 denied the motion to reconsider its decision. [4]

Petitioner faults respondent Court of Appeals: (a) for disregarding documentary

evidence already presented, marked and identified on a purely technical ground,
and (b) for concluding that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Sale did not reflect the true intent of the parties.

Petitioner argues that the trial court should not have denied her motion to admit
formal offer of evidence merely on the basis of technicality such as late filing, citing
Siguenza v. Court of Appeals. [5] We are not persuaded. Indeed, we held in Siguenza
that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense as
they are used only to help secure, not override, substantial justice. Yet the holding is
inapplicable to the present case as the trial court had a reasonable basis for
denying petitioners motion -

On February 6, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, defendants counsel, manifested in

Court that he has (sic) no more witness to present. He asked that he be given 15
days to make a formal offer of evidence and which the Court granted. At the
scheduled hearing of April 03, 1990, Atty. Ponciano Mercado x x x x was not in
Court. Atty. Veneracion, plaintiffs counsel, called the attention of the Court that Atty.
Mercado has (sic) not yet filed and/or complied with the Court Order dated February
06, 1990, which is to file his formal offer of evidence. On motion of Atty. Veneracion,
defendants right to file a formal offer of evidence was deemed waived. Atty.
Veneracion waived the presentation of rebuttal evidence considering that the
defendant can (sic) no longer make a formal offer of evidence.

On May 11, 1990, the Court was in receipt of a motion to admit formal offer of
exhibits filed by the defendant thru counsel, Atty. Ponciano Mercado, on May 02,
1990. Considering that the same was filed out of time and the plaintiffs having filed
their memorandum already, the motion to admit formal offer of exhibits was denied
(underscoring supplied).

The trial court was correct in holding that petitioner waived the right to formally
offer his evidence. A considerable lapse of time, about three (3) months, had
already passed before petitioners counsel made effort to formally offer his
evidence. For the trial court to grant petitioners motion to admit her exhibits would
be to condone an inexcusable laxity if not non-compliance with a court order which,
in effect, would encourage needless delays and derail the speedy administration of
justice.

Petitioner also insists that the real intent of the parties was to make the
entire Lot 4-B the subject matter of the sale. She claims that during cross-
examination respondent Aurora S. Roque admitted that she signed in behalf of her
co-heirs a receipt for P30,000.00 as partial payment for the lot occupied by Ka
Baring and Lina (relatives of petitioner) and Iling (Consuelo Lim). Moreover,
according to petitioner, the assertions of private respondents to petitioner
contained in the demand letter should not necessarily be true and that the validity
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Sale was not affected by the
fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject matter thereof was
situated, citing Sales v. Court of Appeals. [6]

These other arguments of petitioner are barren and futile. The admission of
respondent Roque cannot prevail in the face of the clear evidence that there was as
yet no meeting of the minds on the land area to be sold since private respondents
were still awaiting the survey to be conducted on the premises. Obviously, the trial
court only lent credence to the assertions in the demand letter after having weighed
the respective evidence of the parties. But even without the letter, the evidence of
respondents had already amply substantiated their claims.

We ruled in the Sales case that the extrinsic validity of a document was not
affected by the fact that it was notarized in a place other than where the subject
matter thereof was located. What is more important under the Notarial Law is that
the notary public has authority to acknowledge the document executed within his
territorial jurisdiction. The ruling in Sales is not applicable to the present case. Our
concern here is not whether the notary public had the authority to acknowledge the
document executed within his territorial jurisdiction but whether respondents
indeed appeared before him and signed the deed. However, the quantum of
evidence shows that they did not.

The trial court correctly appreciated the fact that the deed was notarized
in Manila when it could have been notarized in Bulacan. This additional detail casts
doubt on the procedural regularity in the preparation, execution and signing of the
deed. It is not easy to believe that petitioner and the ten (10) Torres heirs traveled
all the way to Manila to have their questioned document notarized considering that
they, with the exception of respondent Roque, are residents of Balagtas, Bulacan,
where notaries public are easy to find. Consequently, the claim of private
respondents that they did not sign the document before a notary public is more
plausible than petitioners feeble claim to the contrary.

Likewise, we find the allegation of respondents that they signed the deed prior
to the survey, or before determination of the area to be sold, worthy of credit as
against the contention of petitioner that they signed after the survey or on 10
October 1984. As found by the trial court, such contention was contradicted by
petitioners own witness who positively asserted in court that the survey was
conducted only on 16 October 1984 or six (6) days after the signing. Quite
obviously, when respondents affixed their signatures on the deed, it was still
incomplete since petitioner who caused it to be prepared left several spaces blank,
more particularly as regards the dimensions of the property to be sold. The heirs
were persuaded to sign the document only upon the assurance of petitioner that
respondent Roque, pursuant to their understanding, would be present when the
property would be surveyed after obtaining permission from the Bureau of Lands. As
it surfaced, the supposed understanding was merely a ruse of petitioner to induce
respondents to sign the deed without which the latter would not have given their
conformity thereto.[7] Apparently, petitioner deceived respondents by filling the
blank spaces in the deed, having the lots surveyed and subdivided, and then
causing the issuance of transfer certificates of title without their knowledge, much
less consent. Thus all the elements of fraud vitiating consent for purposes of
annulling a contract concur: (a) It was employed by a contracting party upon the
other; (b) It induced the other party to enter into the contract; (c) It was serious;
and, (d) It resulted in damages and injury to the party seeking annulment. [8]

Perhaps, another compelling reason for the annulment of the document of

settlement and conveyance is that the second page thereof clearly manifests that
the number of the subdivision plan and the respective areas of Lots 4-A and 4-B
were merely handwritten while all the rest of the statements therein were
typewritten, which leads us to the conclusion that handwritten figures thereon were
not available at the time the document was formalized.
 WHEREFORE, there being no error to warrant a reversal of the decision and
resolution in question of respondent Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br. 22, the instant petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

David Reyes vs. Jose Lim

G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003

Facts: Petitioner David Reyes filed a complaint for annulment of contract and
damages against respondents. The complaint alleged that Reyes as seller and Lim
as buyer entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land located along F.B. Harrison
Street, Pasay City with a monthly rental of P35,000. The complaint claimed that
Reyes had informed Harrison Lumber to vacate the Property before the end of
January 1995. Reyes also informed Keng and Harrison Lumber that if they failed to
vacate by 8 March 1995, he would hold them liable for the penalty of P400,000 a
month as provided in the Contract to Sell. It was also alleged that Lim connived with
Harrison Lumber not to vacate the Property until the P400,000 monthly penalty
would have accumulated and equaled the unpaid purchase price of P18,000,000.
Keng and Harrison Lumber denied that they connived with Lim to defraud Reyes,
and that Reyes approved their request for an extension of time to vacate the
Property due to their difficulty in finding a new location for their business. Harrison
Lumber claimed that it had already started transferring some of its merchandise to
its new business location in Malabon. Lim filed his Answer stating that he was ready
and willing to pay the balance of the purchase price. Lim requested a meeting with
Reyes through the latters daughter on the signing of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
the payment of the balance but Reyes kept postponing their meeting. Reyes offered
to return the P10 million down payment to Lim because Reyes was having problems
in removing the lessee from the Property. Lim rejected Reyes offer and proceeded
to verify the status of Reyes title to the Property. Lim learned that Reyes had
already sold the Property to Line One Foods Corporation Lim denied conniving with
Keng and Harrison Lumber to defraud Reyes.Reyes filed a Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint due to supervening facts. These included the filing by Lim of a
complaint for estafa against Reyes as well as an action for specific performance and
nullification of sale and title plus damages before another trial court. The trial court
granted the motion. In his Amended Answer Lim prayed for the cancellation of the
Contract to Sell and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
Reyes. The trial court denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. Lim
requested in open court that Reyes be ordered to deposit the P10 million down
payment with the cashier of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque. The trial court
granted this motion. Reyes filed a Motion to Set Aside the Order on the ground the
Order practically granted the reliefs Lim prayed for in his Amended Answer. The trial
court denied Reyes motion. The trial court denied Reyes Motion for
Reconsideration. In the same order, the trial court directed Reyes to deposit the P10
million down payment with the Clerk of Court. Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals and prayed that the orders of the trial court be set aside
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. But the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition for review.

Issue: Whether on not the equity jurisdiction is an applicable law on the matter?

Held:

The instant case, the Supreme Court held that if this was a case where there is
hiatus in the law and in the Rules of Court. If this case was left alone, the hiatus will
result in unjust enrichment to Reyes at the expense of Lim. Here the court
excercised equity jurisdiction.The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in
this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution so that
substantial justice may be attained in cases where the prescribed or customary
forms of ordinary law are inadequate. The Supreme Court also state that rescission
is possible only when the person demanding rescission can return whatever he may
be obliged to restore. A court of equity will not rescind a contract unless there is
restitution, that is, the parties are restored to the status quo ante. In this case, it
was just, equitable and proper for the trial court to order the deposit of the P10
million down payment. The decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed.

Jose B. Ledesma vs Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 449 (1988)

Facts:

A student, Violeta Delmo, was not able to graduate as Magna Cum Laude, because
the president, herein petitioner Jose Ledesma, of the West Visayas College
neglected his duty to inform the student on the result of a case against the student
which has, as its punishment, the removal of awards or citations of the student. Said
case was the extension of loans to students, which the president contends to be
against the school rules and regulations, and which the student innocently
performed in her capacity as the treasurer of the Student Leadership Club and in
accordance to the Constitution and By-Laws of the club, on the belief that said
constitution was presented and approved by the president. The student appealed to
the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools after being denied for reconsideration
by the president, where upon investigation, it was found out that the student acted
in good faith and that her awards be reinstituted. The president, upon receiving said
decision, delayed action and even e-mailed the director to reverse his decision. The
student therefore graduated as a plain student and without honors and her award
as Magna Cum Laude was only entered on the scholastic records weeks after the
receipt by the president of the decision and after the graduation.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. The presidents failure to graduate a student with honors and blatant disregard
of the students rights on the account of him being embarrassed shows neglect of
duty without just cause, rendering him liable for damages under Article 27 of the
Civil Code. Undoubtedly, the student and the students parents went through a
painful ordeal brought about by such neglect. Thus, moral and exemplary damages
under Article 27 are but proper.

Padilla v CA (Torts) PADILLA v CA G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984 ROY
PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS:
1. The information states that on February 8, 1964 at around 9AM, the accused
prevented Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall located at the Public
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by subsequently
forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally demolishing and
destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise Contentions:
Vergara Family 1. accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,
being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being
policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. Roy
Padilla, et al 1. finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence 2.
the town mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and
the removal of the complainants' stall because the municipality had enacted
municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance per se
3. violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall
owners seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premise

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) Trial court: conviction. Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael Gonzalgo and Jose
Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion,
and hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months
and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory
damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and
severally, and all the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
(2) Court of Appeals: acquittal but ordered them to pay solidarily the amount of
9,000. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were denominated
coercion when they properly constituted some petitioners were acquitted
because these acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted
some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief Roy Padilla et al for
petition for review on certiorari - grounds 1. where the civil liability which is
included in the criminal action is that arising from and as a consequence of the
criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no civil
liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal
charge could be imposed upon him 2. liability of the defendant for the return of
the amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must
be raised in a separate civil action for the recovery of the said amount

ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in

requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting
them from the criminal charge.

RULING:
No, the Court of Appeals is correct. 1. A separate civil action is not required. To
require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would
mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation
with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that
when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with it. The exceptions are
when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to
institute it separately. Civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the
accused is the civil liability arising from the act as a crime. The judgment of
acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes
a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt. Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides: Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. That the
same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against the
accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising
from the act as a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict.
Either one of these two types of civil liability may be enforced against the accused,
However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA 236 SCRA 239,
September 2, 1994

Facts:

Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant, was charged with rape before

Branch 16, RTC Roxas City (Criminal Case No. C-3217). He was convicted on June 19,
1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992, at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. The Supreme
Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal in a resolution dated May 20,
1992.

Issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability?

Held:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his

criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on
a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c)
Quasi-contracts d) . . . e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as
explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need
not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably
with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. The appeal
of the late Rogelio Bayotas is dismissed with costs de oficio.