Presumption of Fault/Negligence of the Employer

Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of
the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after selection or both.

Onus Probandi

The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Due Diligence

In Manliclic v. Calaunan,1 the Court ruled that:

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to

their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation
and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability,
employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.

In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that:

Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of
necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and

1 Manliclic, v. Calaunan, G.R. No. 150157, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 642, cited in Filipinas
Synthetic Fiber Corporation, v. De Los Santos, G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 463, 468.
 beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence
of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of
employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is
decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.

We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the

formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being
complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence
of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and
safety were followed."2

Captain of the Ship Doctrine

Under this doctrine, the surgeon is likened to a ship captain who must not only be
responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers of the vessel. The head surgeon
is made responsible for everything that goes wrong within the four corners of the operating
room. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those who are
under his physical control but also those wherein he has extension of control.

2 Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 223 SCRA 521, 540-541 (1993), cited in
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation, v. De Los Santos, G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA
463, 468.
 In Ramos v. Court of Appeals, it was found that:

Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the
proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if his
anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record
exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly
intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had
scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because
of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia
delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient.
Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition.3

Respondeat Superior

Literally translates to let the master answer, the master and servant rule is also known
as the doctrine of respondeat superior. Under this rule, the master, to escape liability, cannot
put up the defense of a good father in the selection and supervision of employees (except to
mitigate said liability, if this defense is duly proved).

In the case of Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana4 respondent PSI was found not only
vicariously liable, but also directly liable under the said doctrine. The Court held that:

In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital
for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to
the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm
all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to
perform such duty. The findings of the trial court are convincing, thus:

3 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999.

4 Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, January 31, 2007.

3
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999.
4
Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, January 31, 2007.
 x x x PSIs liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter
reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSIs part in the

3
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999.
4
Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, January 31, 2007.
 dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes. Ethical considerations, if
not also legal, dictated the holding of an immediate inquiry into the events, if not for the
benefit of the patient to whom the duty is primarily owed, then in the interest of arriving
at the truth. The Court cannot accept that the medical and the healing professions,
through their members like defendant surgeons, and their institutions like PSIs hospital
facility, can callously turn their backs on and disregard even a mere probability of
mistake or negligence by refusing or failing to investigate a report of such seriousness as
the one in Natividads case.

It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the
assistance of the Medical City Hospitals staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and
interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has
actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of
the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. In Fridena v. Evans,41 it
was held that a corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired by or notice given to its
agents or officers within the scope of their authority and in reference to a matter to which
their authority extends. This means that the knowledge of any of the staff of Medical City
Hospital constitutes knowledge of PSI. Now, the failure of PSI, despite the attending
nurses report, to investigate and inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts
to callous negligence. Not only did PSI breach its duties to oversee or supervise all
persons who practice medicine within its walls, it also failed to take an active step in
fixing the negligence committed. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but also directly liable for
its own negligence under Article 2176.

In the case of Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center5 respondent Capitol Medical Center was
absolved of negligence under said doctrine. The Court held that:

After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, the Court finds no
single evidence pointing to CMC's exercise of control over Dr. Estrada's treatment and

5 Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center, G.R. No. 142625, December 19, 2006
management of Corazon's condition. It is undisputed that throughout Corazon's
pregnancy, she was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. At the time of
 Corazon's admission at CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr.
Villaflor, who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in
diagnosing Corazon's condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at CMC, such
fact alone did not make him an employee of CMC. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to
use its facilities when Corazon was about to give birth, which CMC considered an
emergency. Considering these circumstances, Dr. Estrada is not an employee of CMC,
but an independent contractor.

However, the CMC was not automatically exempt from liability considering that Dr. Estrada is
an independent contractor-physician. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital
may be liable if the physician is the "ostensible" agent of the hospital. This exception is also
known as the "doctrine of apparent authority" to be discussed later on.