JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 305 THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF MORALIZATION: TOWARD A RADICAL POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION* James M. Giarelli Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey John Dewey once wrote that philosophy is the criticism of criticisms, and this essay is philosophical in this sense. The cognitive-developmental theory of moral education and development is taken as a significant contemporary attempt to address coherently the central categories of classic Wester intellectual thought, ethics, politics, and education. Both cognitive-developmental theory and some of the politically based radical criticisms offered against it are deconstructed. The elements remaining from this deconstruction may help us move toward a recon- structed theory of moral development and education. This involves examining the implications for moral education of the two theoretical-philosophical foundations of cognitive-developmental theory: Piagetian cognitive-developmental stage the- ory and Rawlsian ethical liberalism. Our theorizing about moral education will begin with a radically changed problematic, require a broader analysis and inter- pretation, and lead to a different set of solutions and strategies (see Giarelli, 1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1982c). In this essay, I will use cognitive-developmentalism to refer to a psy- chological movement associated most prominently with Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg in moral development, but encompassing an histori- cal tradition whose contributors and present practitioners have been and are involved in a wide variety of human inquiries. For Lawrence Kohlberg, who has popularized the use of the term, cognitive-develop- mentalism is based on an interactionist theory of development described metaphorically as being ‘‘dialectical’’; it is a model of the progression of ideas in discourse and conversation. The dialectical metaphor was first elaborated by Plato, given new meaning by Hegel, and finally stripped of its metaphysical claims by John Dewey and Jean Piaget to form a psycho- logical ‘‘method"’ (Kohlberg and Mayer, 1972, p. 456). Kohlberg writes, “'T have used the terms ‘‘cognitive-developmental”’ to refer to a set of assumptions common to the moral theories of Dewey(1909}, G.H. Mead(1934}, J.M. Baldwin(1906), Piaget(1932}, and myself’ (Kohlberg, 1970, p. 42}. “Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 1980 and in an invited address to the Department of Psychology, Yale University, February 1981. I would like to thank Henry Giroux for his comments on the former drafts.306 BOSTON UNIVERSITY In further elaboration of the common moral psychological assump- tions existing among cognitive-developmentalists, Kohlberg(1971} writes, All have postulated (a) stages of moral development representing (b) cogni- tive-structural transformations in conception of self and society. All have assumed (c)that these stages represent successive modes of ‘‘taking the role of others’’ in social situations, and hence that (d) the social-environmental determinants of development are its opportunities for role-taking. More gen- erally, all have assumed (e} an active child who structures his perceived environment, and hence, have assumed (f) that moral stages and their devel- opment represent the interaction of the child's structuring tendencies and the structural features of the environment, leading to (g) successive forms of equilibrium in interaction. This equilibrium is conceived as (h} a level of justice, with (i) change caused by disequilibrium, where {j] some optimal level of mismatch or discrepancy is necessary for change between the child and the environment. (pp. 183-184] On the philosophical-ethical foundations of cognitive-develop- mental theories of moral development, Kohlberg again appeals to the Dewey-Piaget tradition. For Dewey, the first stage of morality consisted in ‘behavior motivated by biological and social impulses with results for morals’’; stage two, ‘‘in which the individual accepts with little critical teflection the standards of his group,"’ and stage three, in which ‘‘con- duct is guided by the individual’s thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is good." For Piaget, the first moral stage is character- ized by no sense of obligation to rules; the second stage by literal obedi- ence to rules and an equation of obligation with submission to power and punishment; and stage three by a weighing of the purpose and conse- quences of following rules, with obligation based on reciprocity and exchange (Kohiberg,1975,p. 670). Kohlberg's own work resulted in a more extensive elaboration of these stages of moral development into a six-stage invariant sequence of levels of moral reasoning characterized by increasingly differentiated and hierarchically integrated moral structures and forms (Kohlberg, 1969,1973,1981}. Kohlberg (1975) writes, The tradition of moral philosophy to which we appeal is the liberal or tational tradition, in particular the ‘‘formalistic’’ or ‘‘deontological” tradi- tion running from Immanuel Kant to John Rawls. Central to this tradition is the claim that an adequate morality is principled, i.c., that it makes judg- ments in terms of universal principles applicable to all mankind .. . . The conception that a moral choice is a choice made in terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral philosophy that moral principles are ultimately principles of justice. In essence, moral conflicts are conflicts between claims of persons, and principles for resolving these claims are principles of justice, ‘‘for giving each his due.’”’ Central to justice are the demands of liberty, equality, and reciprocity. (p. 672; emphasis in original]JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 307 While the cognitive-developmental theory of moral development has been accepted by many as paradigmatic, a growing body of critical radical literature raises fundamental questions about its ideological foundations, political implications, and social functions. For example, the explanations offered for the renewed interest in moral development and education, especially cognitive-developmental approaches, point to competing political analyses. The waxing and wan- ing of interest in moral development and education can be associated with social and political events and especially with times of political cri- sis and uncertainty. Living through war, political instability, and the pragmatic teaching of Sophist relativism, Plato sought ethical certainty and social harmony in a world of eternal ideas. The rise of secular capital- ist culture, alienating and competitive, provided the background for Durkheim's search for a scientific morality based on an organic social solidarity and for Dewey’s attempt to develop an ethical conception of public education based on the dialectic of individuality and community, sociability and individual interest, as a replacement for the loss of face- to-face associations which accompanies modernity. Kohlberg (1978a) contributes to this association of interest in moral development and education with sociopolitical movements. Why is there a renewed interest in moral education, dead since the 1930's?... Some would argue that this interest is a reaction to crime, Watergate, and the decline of traditional sexual morality, a conservative return to the social basics of moral order and discipline . . . . 1 propose instead that the current interest in moral education rises primarily from the rediscovery by liberals of the moral principles behind the liberal faith and the realization that these principles need to enter into education. Like the liberal reaction to Water- gate, the liberal interest in moral education is a rediscovery in the seventies of the principles of justice behind the founding of our nation. (pp. 11-12} But, of course, liberals are not the only ones interested in justice, equal- ity, democracy, and principled moral and social ends. The radical politi- cal critiques of the cognitive-developmental theory of moral develop- ment, although accumulating in a variety of forms and forums, as yet have not been assembled or analyzed as a coherent whole. In the next sec- tion, I will review and analyze a number of these political critiques and move toward some integration. This is not a simple matter of liberalism vs. radicalism in moral development. Internal contradictions on both sides must be resolved if we seek a deeper and more satisfying synthesis. First, I will summarize and review several radical perspectives on cogni- tive-developmentalism which, while important in calling attention to fundamental ideological issues, remain at the level of '‘assumption”’ analysis. Finally, I move to a number of critiques which attempt to raise308 BOSTON UNIVERSITY and resolve embedded psychological and political problems within cogni- tive-developmentalism and suggest broader alternative formulations. Radical Political Critiques of Cognitive-Developmentalism A number of radical critiques take ‘‘either-or’’ positions. For exam- ple, B. A. Kaufman (1978) contrasts two models of philosophical thought in reference to their epistemological and metaphysical foundations and relates these models to competing political and educational ideologies. He traces the ‘‘materialist’’ model through Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke and then relates it to the behavioral psychology of Skinner, modern hedo- nist capitalist ideology, and the theory of education as cultural transmis- sion and reproduction. In contrast, he finds the ‘‘dialectical’’ model beginning with Hegel, refined by the American pragmatists and devel- oped fully by Piaget’s ‘‘constructivist’’ psychology, at the core of a social- ist ideology based on cooperation and use-value and an educational theory of reconstruction and reinvention. For Kaufman, cognitive-devel- opmentalism is the psychological expression of a dialectical model of humans and their world which is the cornerstone of socialism. He writes, “the Piagetian psychology of constructivism is mutually exclusive to the presuppositions of scientific materialism which form the foundations of contemporary behavioral psychology and monopoly capitalism”’ (p. 19). Kaufman's causal historical relations and neat models distort and reify dynamic theoretical traditions. But his claim that ‘‘any attempt to apply Piaget's constructivism within a pedagogical context that is founded on the ideology of capitalism is, in effect, an impossibility’ (p. 19), though overstated, raises the issue of the relations between the social determinants of educational and moral development and the social rela- tions of production, to which we will return. In direct contrast, Baumrind (1978) criticizes the cognitive-develop- mentalist theory of moral development from what she calls a '‘dialectical materialist’ perspective. She attacks the Piaget-Kohlberg approach for its “cultural universalism.’’ For Baumrind, a dialectical materialist or Marxist position is a philosophy of practice which seeks to understand the world in order to change it. Abstract ideas and ideals concerned with hypothetical circumstances are mere ‘bourgeois verbalism.’’ There can be no universal ethics; rather, all values are relative and determined by dominant cultures (pp. 62-63). Kohlberg is criticized for relying on John Rawls, whose formulation of ‘‘justice as fairness’’ is a ploy for ‘‘human- izing capitalism” (p. 67). Baumrind’s view is certainly ‘‘materialistic,’’ but it is hardly ‘‘dia- lectical."’ Her disdain for ideas and abstract thought reduces Marxism toJOURNAL OF EDUCATION 309 activism. Her thoroughgoing cultural relativism is squarely within the tradition of mainstream social science and her cultural determinism denies the possibility of emancipatory resistance or ethical opposition and degenerates into a vulgar behaviorism which is unable to explain itself. She says that differences in moral perspective exist and can be adju- dicated, but she is unable to explain their genesis except through inculca- tion (mechanics) or intuition (mystery), both of which neglect the dialec- tic of biography and history. Instead of Rawls, her alternative radical ethi- cal perspective turns out to be a form of rule utilitarianism with a faith in the ‘‘common good,’’ a thoroughly liberal view, and she either is igno- rant of the problem of justice which all teleological theories confront or disdains justice as a moral value as, some have argued, did Marx (Wood, 1972; Buchanan, 1979). Her alternative Marxist approach to moral development and education would be based on analyses of real-life exam- ples in which attitudes and sentiments would count as much as abstract reasons (p. 76). This is hardly an alternative to liberal cognitive-develop- mentalism. Indeed, this is precisely the approach used by Gilligan in her work on women’s moral development from a cognitive-developmental theoretical perspective (Gilligan, 1982); it is also the approach advocated by Dewey, the quintessential liberal, almost 90 years ago (Dewey, 1893}. Sullivan's (1977) monograph on Kohlberg attempts an ideological critique of cognitive-developmental moral psychology as an example of a liberal ideology which acts to legitimate dominant social arrangements. Many of the same criticisms are offered. Cognitive-developmental theory, as a subset of structuralism, necessarily produces a ‘‘thought/ action dichotomy that indicates the collapse of an inherently dialectical position’’ and thus is reduced to ‘‘verbalism’’ (pp. 18-19). Kohlberg’s reliance on Rawlsian formalistic ethics is criticized for its failure to con- sider class-based reality. Again, this assumes an alternative Marxian ethics, which is problematic. While Koblberg’s moral stages are criti- cized for their reliance on analytical, cognitive, and technical rationality, Sullivan argues for a kind of existential activism based on a ‘‘deeper’’ kind of philosophical reason (p. 14). It is not Marx who is referred to as a source here, but rather St. Paul’s maxim that ‘‘we work out our salvation in fear and trembling.’’ Sullivan's facile critique of structuralism neglects the influential varieties of Marxist structuralism (Althusser,1970,1971; Best and Connolly, 1979) and shows his true concerns to be more roman- tic and religious than radical. Finally, in the critical vein, Reid and Yanarella (1977) associate the renewed interest in moral development, and especially cognitive-devel- opmental approaches, with a ‘‘new middle class subjectivity’’ and a desire to ‘‘reform American capitalism and its liberal politics’’ (pp. 505-506). Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmentalism is criticized for its310 BOSTON UNIVERSITY philosophical roots in Locke and especially Kant, whose thought is char- acterized as the highest form of bourgeois liberalism (pp. 509-513). Using a ‘‘depth-historical"’ critique they conclude that the ideological under- pinnings of cognitive-developmentalism in the Lockean-liberal tradition necessarily require a separation of form from content in moral reasoning, the creation of theoretical devices to avoid the indoctrination issue, and the abstraction of moral development from human development in its totality. Indeed, this whole effort to interpret Kohlberg critically through a deep analysis of his ideological antecedents is undertaken despite the fact that his [Kohlberg’s] interpretation of the universal ethical orientation of his sixth stage as based upon the ‘‘universal principles of justice, of the reciproc- ity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons’’ would seem to mark his thought as standing outside the bounds of the liberal paradigm. (p. 511) This kind of criticism constitutes a kind of deterministic intellectual his- tory which denies the possibility of change. In fact, in some of Kohlberg’s recent work (1978b,1981] he has changed positions on the form/content and indoctrination issues, despite his Lockean-Kantian foundations. These political criticisms are important. They present alternative analyses to counter the rather easy acceptance the cognitive-develop- mental approach has received in most academic circles. Going beyond methodological criticism, which is always followed by a call for more research, they seek a radical, in the ‘‘root’’ sense, understanding of theory as a social and historical phenomenon. But while it is necessary to trace the ideological antecedents of cognitive-developmentalism (Riegel, 1976), it is not sufficient. Too often the result is a kind of ‘‘analy- sis by association’ where research and theory are evaluated on the basis of names and movements allegedly associated with their history. It would be like rejecting Marxism because of Hegel’s conservatism or lumping Marx with Spencer on the grounds of their shared appreciation of Darwin. In fact, there is ambiguity and divergence in historical antece- dents, and to deny this is to represent intellectual history as a multi- stranded but linear process of accumulation within closed systems. The historical and ideological foundations of cognitive-developmentalism need explaining in a different sense if we are to develop a political cri- tique. Susan Buck-Morss’s (1975) critique of Piagetian theory, though still engaging in some ‘‘analysis by association,’’ goes further in pointing the way toward a radical criticism. Relying on Lukacs, she argues that the ethical formalism and psychological universalism of cognitive-develop- mental theory need to be understood as reflections of specific historicalJOURNAL OF EDUCATION 31 and social conditions. That is, there is a structural identity between mind and society, between forms of moral consciousness and forms of social relations. As she writes, '‘the form of cognition is itself social content.” She asks whether ‘‘Piaget’s cognitive stages mark progressive assimila- tion of the structural principles of bourgeois industrialism’’ (pp. 37-38). Thus, it is not the universalism or abstractness of cognitive-develop- mental theories that makes them problematic, but rather their failure to examine the social and political structures they support and that are required to support them. Universal stages of moral consciousness need to be examined in relation to dominant patterns of social relations associ- ated with specific stages of social evolution. For example, we might ask, what do workers in industrialized nations, Third-World rural villagers, and women have in common? First, they exhibit ‘‘retarded’’ cognitive and moral development on Piagetian or Kohlbergian tests. And second, they clearly are linked either by their sub- ordinated social roles (with limited opportunities for genuine participa- tion or communication free from domination) or by their lack of experi- ence in formal and abstract social relations. As Buck-Morss writes, “Their experience is limited to a realm of concrete immediacy. Mean- while the workings of the larger social whole take place literally ‘over their heads.’ ’’ Buck-Morss concludes by calling for consideration of '‘the objective factor of socio-economic structure together with the subjective factor of conscious participation in the abstract levels of the social whole’ in ex- plaining cognitive-developmental stage theory and progression. Her im- plication is that direct socio-economic and political reform, in addition to educational reform, might be required for development of higher-level abstract cognitive and moral skills (pp. 46-47). This raises the problem of ‘‘motivation."’ Paralleling the acquisition of the cognitive abilities necessary for abstract moral thought is what Habermas (1979) calls motivational development: ‘‘the acquisition of interactive competence, that is, of the ability to take part in interactions (actions and discourses)’ (p. 73). Cognitive-developmental theory, in contrast to maturational or behavioral theories, considers the opportuni- ties for and experience with social interactions based on reciprocity and reversibility (e.g. role-taking, sharing, communication) to be the primary determinants of moral development. If, as Habermas (1975) claims, the motivation contributed by the socio-cultural system of advanced capital- ism is based on civil and familial-vocational privatism, does advanced capitalist society provide the structural and motivational opportunities for cognitive-developmental moral growth? This very question is addressed by Welton (1977) in his article ‘‘Is a ‘Moral’ Education Possible in an Advanced Capitalist Consumer312 BOSTON UNIVERSITY Society?’’ Welton relies on Habermas and other critical social theorists to argue that the current interest in moral development and education reflects a ‘‘crisis of legitimation’’ and a '‘crisis of motivation.’’ While the crises can be explained in different ways, of particular interest to us is growing evidence that the traditional moral basis of the state’s author- ity has collapsed (‘‘crisis of legitimation’’) along with the disintegration of those societal institutions that reproduce the ‘‘social individual’ whose goals and values converge with the System’s ('‘crisis of motivation”’.} (p. 11] Welton traces the demise of the ‘‘work ethic,’’ which gave entrepre- neurial capitalism a moral basis by associating achievement with prop- erty and moral reward, and the rise of the ‘‘consumption ethic’ of advanced capitalism. In response to the requirements of mass markets as communicated by the advertisers through media of mass culture, the “'Good’’ came to be identified with ‘‘the goods’’ (see Ewen, 1976). In such a system the effective moral educators become those interests and institutions which have shaped taste and perception into a consumer consciousness which transforms politics into public administration and ethics into economics (Welton,1977, p. 14; Horowitz, 1980; Wolin, 1981). Welton criticizes Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental theory of moral development and education for its failure to examine the effect of advanced capitalist social relations on opportunities for moral develop- ment. Where a small minority has control over roles, institutions, and interactive opportunities, how can abstract principled moral growth be developed and a just community be formed? Failing in this analysis, Kohlberg accepts the basic justness of American society and conceives the educational and political task as one of reconciling rhetoric and real- ity, getting people to live up to our stated ideals. While Welton himself sometimes confuses morality with moralizing and ends up with a cynical and deterministic dismissal of education as a force for change, his analy- sis of cognitive-developmentalism's ideological naivete is important for a structural and motivational political critique. Clark and Gintis (1978) extend this line of argument in their analysis of Rawls’s theory of justice, the moral psychological assumptions that support it, and alternative economic systems. Their analysis does not take up moral development specifically, but Kohlberg's linking of cogni- tive-developmentalism to Rawls’s formalistic ethics, and the tendency of some radical writers to dismiss cognitive-developmentalism because of this link, make the Clark-Gintis argument highly pertinent. The authors seek to demonstrate that Rawls’s criteria of justice, particularly the first principle concerning equal liberties, dictates ‘an economic system in which control of the production process resides in a democratic and par- ticipatory association of workers’’ (p. 303), namely, democratic social-JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 313 ism. Though recognizing Rawls’s roots in Kantianism, they argue that “Rawls is hardly a pale reflection of Kant’’ (p. 320). Rawls rejects the idea of presocial individuals and develops his arguments around ideas of reci- procity, social intercourse, and consciousness as a social phenomenon. Though clearly in the liberal tradition, Rawls's historical antecedents are in the “‘organic’’ liberal tradition of Durkheim, Mead, Dewey, Weber, and others who saw ‘‘individual consciousness and behavior more as a result than a cause of social organization”’ (p. 320). Thus, though Rawls’s theory may be the clearest expression of a '‘liberal theory of justice’’ (see Barry, 1973), it is a variety that allows for the dialectic of individual con- sciousness and social structure. Indeed, Clark and Gintis argue that, taken to its logical conclusion, Rawls’s theory actually requires demo- cratic socialism. And they see Rawls’s failure to develop this conclusion as a result of confusion and the improbable assumptions he made con- cerning moral psychology. Rawls’s theory rests on the assumption of a natural basis in human psycho-social development for a commitment to principles of justice. This commitment cannot be based on ‘‘reason’’ as a mental-psychologi- cal faculty, but must evolve and be supported by lived social experience. In appealing to ‘‘the general facts of moral psychology,’’ Rawls postulates a movement from a morality of constraint and authority to a morality of association and finally a morality of principles, all through opportunities for role-taking, cooperation, and shared activities open to all (Clark and Gintis, p. 315). But as Clark and Gintis write, Clearly there are aspects of capitalism which serve to stifle moral develop- ment. First, progression from the morality of authority to the morality of associations is impeded by the absence of egalitarian economic institutions and reciprocal social interaction within the sphere of production. Social relations are characterized by hierarchy and by oppression of groups accord- ing to their race, sex, and class. Thus, there is little opportunity for people to develop an ability to see the general perspective of others. (pp. 315-316) Quoting Rawls, Clark and Gintis also argue that the development of the moral stage characterized by association requires people to experi- ence ‘‘a conception of the whole system of cooperation that defines the association and the ends which it serves.” In a political economy based on the production of surplus rather than use value, dependent upon a hierarchical division and specialization of labor, there is little opportu- nity for even gaining a sense of (much less for participating in) associated cooperative production. These characteristics of capitalist production Produce intergroup and interpersonal antagonisms . . . , the limited opportunity for consolidating mutual trust through participatory planning and decision-314 BOSTON UNIVERSITY making, . . . and the often bitter competition among groups for access to fun- damentally unequal economic positions. (p. 316) They conclude that capitalist social relations provide little ‘‘motiva- tion,’’ or at least not the best social environment, for the development of the morality of association or principle. In a social structure maintained and promulgated largely by class position, it is difficult and unnatural for members of one class to accord equal status to the perceptions and aspirations of another class. Hence, they are unlikely to be in a position to objectively choose principles of justice. (p. 316) Clark and Gintis’s critique is important for liberals and radicals and for cognitive-developmentalists. They take the ethical-philosophical antecedents appealed to and go beyond a simple ideological criticism to show the theory's strengths and weaknesses. They also point the way toward constructive improvements. They do not lapse into relativism, determinism, or the supernatural in their search for an emancipatory ethics of justice and universal value transcending liberal notions of for- mal liberty, procedural democracy, and equality of opportunity. They write that they ‘accept the premise of modern liberalism that only a theory of justice which has universal and rational appeal can be relevant to a democratic society’ and that they do not ‘‘find fault with the Rawls- ian principles of justice themselves"’ (p. 324). But they do fault Rawls’s failure to situate his formal theory within a political-economic context, which results in a serious underestimation of the motivational prob- Jems—the '‘strains of commitment’'—associated with socio-moral development in a system of capitalist social relations. And, of course, to the degree that Rawls’s theory of justice draws upon cognitive-develop- mentalism for its moral psychological premises, it will be limited by the latter's failure to relate the patterns of individual cognitive and moral development to patterns of specific social and political organization. This effort has been undertaken by Habermas. Habermas's writings on moral development are part of an extensive and complex research pro- gram which cannot be summarized with any comprehensiveness. How- ever, his effort to recast Piagetian and Kohlbergian cognitive-develop- mental accounts of moral development offers, in my opinion, the most promising synthesis of the radical political critiques. Countering Sullivan’s criticism of the Piaget-Kohlberg theory of moral development for its structuralism, Habermas notes that Piaget's genetic structuralism is able to go beyond the logic of existing structures to examine the developmental logic by which structures are formed. In so doing, it opens up ‘‘the possibility of bringing different modes of produc- tion under abstract developmental-logical viewpoints,'’ and can build aJOURNAL OF EDUCATION 315 bridge to a reconstructed historical materialism as a critique of capitalist society (1979, p. 169]. Working directly with Kohlberg's theory of moral development, Habermas attempts to reformulate Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness by coordinating stages of moral reasoning with stages of interactive or communicative competence. Habermas's ulti- mate research aim is to establish a theory of the interdependence of per- sonality structure and social structure through an integration of basic psychological concepts with basic socioeconomic concepts. Combining elements of developmental psychology, symbolic interactionism, ego psychology, and psychoanalysis, all within the context of a neo-Marxist critical theory, he hopes to demonstrate and explain the interdependence of the autonomous individual and the emancipated society. While recog- nizing the dangers of comparing stages of individual and social develop- ment (pp. 102-103), Habermas believes that with certain precautions we can conceive of a dialectical relationship in which, while only social indi- viduals learn, the learning of individuals can become a resource for the formation of new social structures. As a result of a careful and extended analysis of Kohlberg’s stages of moral consciousness in reference to stages of interactive or communicative competence, Habermas con- cludes that Kohlberg’s schema of stages is incomplete (pp. 78-90). Haber- mas offers a seventh stage whose normative structure is characterized by moral and political freedom. He writes: Ican imagine the attempt to arrange a society democratically only as a self- controlled learning process. It is a question of finding arrangements which can ground the presumption that the basic institutions of the society and the basic political decisions would meet with the unforced agreement of all those involved, if they could participate, as free and equal, in discursive will-formation. (p. 186) And in describing the meaning of the transition from the sixth to the sev- enth stage, he writes that it ‘‘can be found in the fact that need interpre- tations are no longer assumed as given, but are drawn into the discursive formation of will” (p. 93). That is, ‘‘need’’ is no longer bound by existing cultural contents but is open to new interpretations which seek to recon- cile happiness and worthiness, the desired and the desirable. While working within the framework of cognitive-developmental psychology and rational universalistic ethics, Habermas adds the social and political dimension which moves Kohlberg’s theory from a mono- logic to a dialogic basis. He offers a reconstructed and socio-historically sensitive account of cognitive-developmental moral development which enables movement beyond formalistic universalized duty to a principled ideal based on moral and political freedom. He seeks to include social, political, historical, and economic factors without degenerating into316 BOSTON UNIVERSITY determinism or utilitarianism, and seeks to honor individual autonomy without embracing intuitionism or abstract formalism. Though still the- oretical, his formulations deserve serious attention from those concerned with ethics, politics, and education. Conclusions The central purposes of this paper have been to analyze the cogni- tive-developmental theory of moral development and education from a radical political perspective and to suggest the outlines for a recon- structed theory based on a new problematic. In a sense, I have tried to transcend the liberal problematic by taking it seriously. Piaget’s early work hypothesized that relations of cooperation, mutual respect, and equality are necessary for moral development and that the most likely source for these relations would be in peer culture. To Kohlberg’s credit, he has seen that relations of fundamental equality exist, or can exist, out- side peer culture and that peer culture is often vicious, hierarchical, and competitive. For Kohlberg, a transformation of the entire set of school relations is necessary to allow the kind of cooperation and role-taking moral development requires. But why stop there? Kohlberg is well aware of the problem of effecting democratic school change in a nondemocratic society (making stage 5 schools in a stage 3 or 4 world) and knows that social arrangements outside of school are just as important as those in school. His recent work and the confusion over the justifiability and prac- ticality of educating for the higher stages make this clear (Kohlberg, 1981). The failure to broaden the context of concern in which moral edu- cation occurs, the failure to take the distinction between education and schooling seriously, renders the cognitive-developmental approach necessarily limited and ineffective. Cognitive-developmental theory holds that if moral development is a product of role-taking opportunities, opportunities for free experimenta- tion in social roles, and the reconstruction of the meaning of those roles through dialogue among equals, then differences in mora] development between individuals, groups, and societies are a function of different opportunities for role-taking. Since roles are social constructions created by particular kinds of social organizations, the significant questions are: What kinds of roles are created in a social organization? How are they dis- tributed? And does everyone have a chance to experiment in a variety of social roles or does the social organization structurally allow more and more meaningful opportunities for role-taking to some, thereby increas- ing their chances for moral development, conceptual thought, and leader- ship? With these questions, the radical political critiques help us to see that advanced capitalist consumer societies systematically and structur-JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 317 ally limit opportunities for role-taking, reciprocity, and reversibility and are thus not most conducive to the kind of stage development of princi- pled morality desired by the cognitive-developmentalists. The other line of cognitive-developmental moral development the- ory appeals to Rawls for a justification of the ethical principles of justice. Here too we see that advanced capitalist social relations violate Rawls’s principles of justice. Rawls’s first principle of equal liberty rules out sys- tems of production and social relations where the liberty of some is con- trolled by others, where objects become subjects and subjects objects, and where the majority lose a substantial claim over that which is most pre- cious to them, their labor—where it will be used and for what ends. Rawls’s second principle, where inequalities are justified only when they benefit the least advantaged members of society, also is obviously vio- lated by capitalist economic and social relations. Class divisions thwart role-taking, hierarchical institutions impede nonmanipulative commun- ication, and a division of labor blocks the development of a sense of the whole. Rawls’s principles of justice require a consistently democratic political, cultural, and economic life. To say that society is educative, or more precisely, that social rela- tions are educative, does not mean that education is synonymous with socialization. ‘‘Society’’ is not one thing. Its institutions strain against each other constantly and in those strains create spaces for resistance and novelty. For Kohlberg, the school is the best place for a rearguard action, the last-gasp hope for liberalism to offer genuine opportunities for the kind of social life which will promote moral development. This has been the problematic of liberalism for the past two hundred years. In this essay I have suggested that this problematic and the effort to respond signifi- cantly to it must be broadened. The entire range of educative institutions we pass through need to be seen as moral educators, both reflecting the dominant ideology of advanced capitalist social relations and offering unique avenues for reconstruction and transformation. Habermas gives us one way to formulate this wider problem and to enable a more powerful choice of actions. He helps us to see that though our moral life is bound up in the constraints of existing patterns of histor- ically conditioned social reality, this does not make the struggle for autonomy and ethical universals moot or foolish. Instead we are empow- ered to think of moral development in a new way, as an engagement in an historical effort to form the one from the many. Where the liberal tradition has promised the space to develop indi- vidual personality and moral agency, the democratic tradition has prom- ised an equal and enabling communal life in which the autonomous per- sonality could transcend particularity and become a person with a moral point of view. The problem of moral education is here, where ethics and ethos are joined.318 BOSTON UNIVERSITY References Althusser, L. Lenin and philosophy. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Althusser, L. Reading Capital. London: New Left Books, 1970. Barry, B. The liberal theory of justice. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Baumrind, D. A dialectical-materialist's perspective on knowing social reality. In W. Damon (Ed.), Moral development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978. Best, M. & Connolly, W. Politics and subjects: The limits of structural Marxism. Socialist Review, 1978, 48, 75-99. Buchanan, A. Revolutionary motivation and rationality. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1979, 9, 59-82. Buck-Morss, 5. 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