GENERAL INTRODUCTION

I. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS IN PUBLIC LAW A. Political Law defined

That branch of public law which deals with the organization and operation of the government organs of the state and
defines the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory. (Sinco, Philippine Political Law 1, 11th ed., 1962)

Scope of Political Law. The entire field of political law may be subdivided into (a) the law of public administration, (b)
constitutional law, (c) administrative law, and (d) the law of public corporations. These four subdivisions may be briefly
described for the time being, as follows: The first deals with the organization and management of the different
branches of the government; the second, with the guaranties of the constitution to individual rights and the limitations
on governmental action; the third, with the exercise of executive power in the making of rules and the decision of
questions affecting private rights; and the last, with governmental agencies for local government or for other special
purposes. (Sinco 1)

Macariola v Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77 (1982)

Spanish Code of Commerce Provision Disqualifying Judges from Engaging in Commerce is Part of Spanish Political Law
Abrogated by Change of Sovereignty

F: The complainant alleged that respondent judge of the CFI violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Art. 14 of the Code of
Commerce (w/c prohibited judges, among others, from engaging in commerce, either in person or in proxy or in the
financial intervention in commercial or industrial companies w/in the limits of the districts) when he associated himself
w/ the Traders Mftg. & Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and pres., said corp. having been organized to engage in
business.

HELD: Although this provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce w/c is part of the commercial laws of the Phils,
it partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges. Political law has been defined as that branch of public law w/c deals
w/ the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state w/ the
inhabitants of its territory. Specifically, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an
administrative law bec. it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees w/ respect to engaging in
business; hence, political in essence.

xxx Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to US, and later on from US to the Republic of the Phils., Art. 14 of the
said Code must be deemed to have been abrogated bec. where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not w/ those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they
are expressly reenacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears to be no enabling or affirmative act.
Consequently, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to respondent Judge.
VV.

B. Constitutional Law Defined

A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore, embodies legal rules as well as political
principles. And so when we speak of constitutional law in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of the
constitution. xxx xxx

In the sense in w/c the concept is understood in American and Philippine Jurisprudence, constitutional law is a term
used to designate the law embodied in the constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and
application made by courts of the provisions of the constitution in specific cases. xxx

Constitutional law forms a distinct branch of jurisprudence dealing w/ the legal principles affecting the nature,
adoption, amendment, and operation of the constitution. (Sinco 67.)

Types of Constitutional Law. In general, there are three (3) different types of constitutional law, namely, (1) the English
type, characterized by the absence of a written constitution (Sinco 67)

An unwritten constitution, and the power of judicial review by the courts. Thus, the courts cannot invalidate the acts of
the parliament as being unconstitutional because of "parliamentary supremacy." (Mirasol notes.)

(2) the European continental type, where there is a written constitution w/c gives the courts no power to declare
ineffective statutes contrary to it (Sinco 67.)
A written constitution but no power of judicial review by the courts. The socalled Constitutional Courts of France do not
exercise real judicial review but only render advisory opinions on constitutional questions upon the request of the
government, not of parties in actual litigation. (Mirasol notes.)

(3) the American type where the legal provisions of the written constitution are given effect through the power of the
courts to declare ineffective or void ordinary statutes repugnant to it. (Sinco 67.)

A written constitution and the exercise of judicial review by the courts, which is the power of the courts to determine
the constitutional validity of the acts of legislature and other branches of government. (Mirasol notes.)

C. Constitution Defined

It is "a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in writing." (Hamilton.)

Such a view found acceptance in the work of Tanada and Fernando:

"It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the government, distributing its powers and
safeguarding the rights of the People."

From Malcolm and Laurel:

"It is the written instrument by which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and
by which those powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit
of the body politic."

According to Schwartz, "a constitution is seen as an organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both
conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American
theory. 'The office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of governmental activity.'" (Fernando,
The Constitution of the Philippines, 2021, 2nd ed., 1977.)

Types of Constitutions Classification of Constitutions:

Constitutions are classified as follows: (1) written and unwritten, and (2) rigid and flexible. Written and Unwritten
(Classification as to when it is adopted.)

(a) A written constitution is one the provisions of w/c have been reduced to writing and embodied in one or more
instruments at a particular time. The US Constitution is a classical example of a written constitution.

Written constitutions have been also called conventional or enacted, bec. they are given definite form by a steadily
constituted body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time.

Written constitutions are either democratic or monarchical. Democratic constitutions essentially spring from the
authority of the people. Monarchical constitutions are those granted by a monarch as an act of grace to his subjects.
This class of constitutions are also called octroyed constitutions. They belong to the past age.

(b) An unwritten constitution is one w/c has not been committed to writing at any specific time but is the accumulated
product of gradual political and legal development. The English Constitution is the modern example of this class.

Unwritten constitutions have been known also as cumulative or evolved, bec. they are not formulated at any definite
time but are rather the outcome of a political evolutionary process.

Flexible and Rigid Constitutions. (Classification according to amendment process.)

The classification of constitutions into written and unwritten has been considered unscientific and inaccurate bec. no
written constitution, after having been applied for a considerable period, can remain substantially unchanged in its
original condition other than by formal amendments. xxx.

To classify constitutions into rigid and flexible is to use a basis that has to do more w/ their nature rather than their
mere form.

Rigid. A constitution is classified as rigid when it may not be amended except through a special process distinct from
and more involved than the method of changing ordinary laws. It is supposed that by such a special procedure, the
constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a greater degree of stability.
Flexible. A constitution is classified as flexible when it may be changed in the same manner and through the same
body that enacts ordinary legislation. The British Constitution is flexible.

A constitution's stability depends upon other factors than the mere rigidity or flexibility of the amending process, such
as (1) the general temperament of the people and their leaders and (2) the degree of a nation's political maturity and
social homogenity. (Sinco 6870.)The Philippine Constitution is both written and rigid (See Art. XVII on the Amendment
process).

II. THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

Historical Background of the 1987 Constitution

The history of the 1987 Constitution began on 11 April 1899, the date when the Treaty of Paris between the United and
Spain of 10 December 1898 became effective upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of both countries. But
the sources of the 1987 Constitution are (i) McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission; (ii) Spooner
Amendment; (iii) Philippine Bill of 1902; (iv) Jones Law of 1916, otherwise known as the Philippine Autonomy Act; (v)
1935 Constitution; (vi) 1973 Constitution and (vi) Freedom Constitution of 1986 and its implementing orders.

Treaty of Paris

Under the Treaty of Paris, the Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United States. Spain relinquished its sovereignty
over the Philippine Islands, and with this, all laws of a political nature were automatically abrogated.

The Treaty provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the islands was to be determined by the US
Congress.

The Philippines in turn, was not given the status of an "incorporated territory" (as to make it a candidate for statehood)
and so ex proprio vigore, the US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US Congress expressly enacted
its provisions.

McKinley's Instructions

President McKinley, legislating as CommanderinChief, issued on 7 April 1900 his "Letter of Instruction to the Second
Philippine Commission " under Taft.

It set up a "divided civil and military government" with the existing Military governor as the Executive, and a Philippine
Commission, created on 1 September 1900, as the Legislative, both representing the US President as Commanderin-
Chief.

It also extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the US Federal Constitution, except the right to
bear arms (because the country was in rebellion) and the right to a trial by jury (because the Americans distrusted the
Filipinos capacity to be a just judge of his peers). The right to jury trial of an American charged with a crime in the
Philippines was denied by the courts in US v Dorr, 2 Phil 332 (1903) by virtue of the Letter of Instruction.

This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure and limitations of the government)

of the Philippines. What it lacked, as a constitution, were the ratification by the people, and the right of amendment
(which was reserved solely to the US President).

The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and
Justice of Peace Courts.

Spooner Amendment

On 4 July 1901, the Spooner Amendment, which was actually a rider to the "Army and Navy Appropriations Act,"
changed the then "divided, military and civil government" into a fully civil government, under the US Congress. All acts
of the Philippine Commission would now begin: "Be it enacted by the authority of the US government," and no longer
by authority of the US President.

Philippine Bill of 1902

The US Congress now in control of the Philippines, ratified all the organic acts of the President, in order to prevent
disruption of government, and on 1 July 1900, passed the Philippine Bill of 1902, which was to be organic act of the
Philippines from 1902 to 1906. The organic act introduced significant provisions to constitutional history.

The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It was under the GovernorGeneral who retained all the executive
power, including the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of the Philippine Commission.

It established an elective lower house called the Philippine Assembly, composed entirely of Filipinos. It called for the
first election in the Philippines to fill up, the membership in the lower house, as soon as the Philippine insurrection
stopped and there was a condition of general peace, except in the Moro and Non Christian provinces.

A census was taken and completed on 28 March 1903 and with a certification of peace and of Filipino acceptance of
the US government made by the Philippine Commission on 29 March 1907, the election for the Philippine Assembly
was conducted on 10 July 1907, with Osmena as speaker.

The Bill also defined for the first time who the citizens of the Philippines were. They were all the inhabitants of the
Philippine islands who were subjects of Spain as of 11 April 1899, who continued to reside therein, and all the children
born subsequent thereto. This definition is still good law today.

Jones Law

On 29 August 1916, the US Congress passed the Jones Law, otherwise known as the Philippine Autonomy Act.

It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers; this was the prototype of our present setup. The
executive power was in the hands of an American GovernorGeneral, who was independent of the Legislature, and who
was given the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and impose martial law without the recommendation of the
Legislature. The Legislature was composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives, all composed of Filipinos.
The judiciary continued to be made up of the Supreme Court, the CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.

Under this setup, while the Filipinos has all the legislative power, the Americans had all the executive power and thus,
also the control of the government. Thus, in the Board of Control (National Coal Corporation) cases, the US Supreme
Court ruled, despite the dissent of Holmes and Brandeis, that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
could not vote the stocks of the NCC and elect its directors because this was a political function. Only the Governor-
General could vote the government shares, said the court.

The definition of who were citizens of the Philippines first enunciated in the Philippine Bill of 1902, was carried over by
the Jones Law.

TydingsMcDuffie Law

Although this was not an organic act, it is important in the constitutional history of the Philippines because it was to be
the enabling statute, providing the mechanism whereby the constitution of an independent Philippines could be
adopted. The law, upon its acceptance by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines, provided for (i)
the calling of a Constitutional Convention to draft a Constitution for the Philippines, (ii) the adoption of a Constitution
that established a republican government, with a Bill of Rights, and a separation of church and state, (iii) the
submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the Constitution was in conformity with the conditions
set by the TydingsMcDuffie Law, and (iv) its ratification by the people in a plebiscite. Complete independence was to
take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.

1935 Constitution

Accordingly, on 30 July 1934, an election was held to choose the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Claro M.
Recto was elected President of the Convention. On 8 February 1935, the Concon approved the draft. On 23 March
1935, the draft was certified by the President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt as conforming to the TydingsMcDuffie Law. On
14 May 1935, it was ratified by the people in a plebiscite, with the provisions on the qualifications of the President,
VicePresident and members of Congress taking effect upon ratification. In September 1935, the first election under the
1935 Constitution was conducted with Manuel Luis Quezon as President and Sergio Osmena as Vice President.

On 15 November 1935, upon the inauguration of the Commonwealth, the 1935 Constitution took effect. This
Constitution was to serve as the charter of the Commonwealth, and upon withdrawal of US sovereignty, of the
Republic.

The Constitution provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in the President who had a sixyear
term, the legislative in a unicameral National Assembly, and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFIs and Justice of Peace
Courts as before.
In 1940, it was amended to provide for (a) a bicameral Congress with a Senate and a House of Representatives; (b) a
term of four years for the President, but with reelection and (c) the establishment of an independent constitutional
body known as the Commission on Elections.

War ensued, and the Philippines was so devastated that the declaration of its independence, due 15 November 1945
had to be postponed. At any rate, on 23 April 1946, the election of the first officials of the Philippine Republic was held,
and on 4 July 1946, the Republic was inaugurated and the Philippines became "politically" independent of the US.

Theoretically, to an extent that sovereignty is never granted to a people but is earned by them as they assert their
political will, then it is a misnomer to say that 4 July 1946 was the day US granted independence to the Philippines.
More appropriately, it was the day when the US withdrew its sovereignty over the Philippines, thus giving the Filipino
people an occasion to assert their own independence.

But not "economically". On 30 April 1946, one week after the election, the US Congress passed the Bell Trade Act which
would grant Philippine prime exports entry to the US free of customs duties from 1946 to 1954, and a gradual increase
in duties from 1954 to 1974 (LaurelLangley agreement), provided that the Philippines would grant US citizens and
corporations the same privileges, and in addition, the right to explore natural resources of the Philippines in parity with
the Filipinos, and to operate public utilities. This must be accepted by Congress, embodied in an Executive Agreement,
and reflected as an amendment in the Constitution.

The Senate approval of this bill gave rise to the case of Vera v Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946). The Senate then had 11
Nacionalistas and 13 Liberals. Three Nacionalista Senatorselect (Vera, Diokno and Romero), known to be against the
Bell Trade Act, were prevented by the rest of the Senate, in what is known as "exclusion proceedings," on grounds that
their elections were marred with fraud. The political motivation was clear but the SC was conned into lifting the
injunction it issued for the withholding of the suspension, because of the unfulfilled promise that the Senate would not
carry out the suspension. With the balance of power offset, the Bell Trade Act was passed. Subsequently, the SC had to
dismiss the petition on the ground that the principle of separation of powers, it could not order a coequal branch to
reinstate a member.

The Senate authorized President Roxas to enter into an Executive Agreement, which he did on 3 July 1946, the eve of
the declaration of Philippine Independence.

Then came the amendment of the Constitution in order to include the Parity Rights Agreement, which gave rise to the
case of Mabanag v Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947). Under the Amendatory Provisions of the 1935 Constitution, Congress,
acting as constituent body, needed 3/4 vote to propose an amendment to the Constitu tion. But with the three
Senators still suspended, only the 21 remaining were used as the basis for computing the 3/4 requirement. When this
was raised in court, it begged off from ruling on the ground that it was a political question. It also used the Enrolled Bill
Theory.

So with the amendment proposed, it was subsequently ratified on 5 March 1947.

The third time the Constitution was amended (1940, 1947) was in 1967. A Resolution of both houses provided for (a)
the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention, (b) the increase of seats in the House of

Representatives to make the Concon sufficiently representative, and (c) allowing members of the House as dele gates
without forfeiting their seats. The first was approved, the second and third were rejected. This became the subject
matter of Gonzales v COMELEC.

Election of delegates to the Concon took place on 10 November 1970. Then the ConCon met on 1 June 1971. Before it
finished its work, it came up with a resolution calling for an amendment to the 1935 Constitution reducing the voting
age from 21 to 18, so that a wider base could vote in the ratification of the Constitution then being drafted. A plebiscite
was set by the COMELEC for 8 November 1971 but this was enjoined by the SC in the case of Tolentino v COMELEC, the
court ruling that a piecemeal amendment was not allowed by the 1935 Constitution since it provided that the
amendments were to be ratified at "an election" which meant only one election. The Court upheld its jurisdiction over
the ConCon by arguing that since the Concon derived its power from the Constitution, it was thus limited by the
Constitution.

But it was subsequently overtaken by Martial Law. On 30 November 1972, the Convention submitted its "draft" to the
President, who called on a plebiscite to ratify the Constitution. This was questioned in the case of Planas v COMELEC,
49 SCRA 105 (1973) on the ground that there can be no freedom of expression under Martial Law. But the case was
rendered moot and academic when the President cancelled the plebiscite and instead held a citizens' assembly on 10
to 15 January, 1973. On 17 January 1973, the President came up with a proclamation that the Constitution had come to
full force and effect after its overwhelming ratification by the people in a viva voce vote.

1973 Constitution

The validity of the ratification process was questioned in the case of Javellana v Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30
(1973) but the failure of the SC to come up with the necessary votes to declare the act as unconstitutional forced it
into the conclusion that "there are no further obstacles to considering the constitution in force and effect."

The 1973 Constitution was amended four times.

The first, in 1976, gave the President, legislative powers even if the Interim Batasang Pambansa was already operating.

The second, in 1980 was not significant. It merely raised the retirement of justices of the SC from 65 to 70 as to keep
Fernando for five more years.

The third, in 1980 changed the form of government from Parliamentary to Presidential.

The fourth, in 1984, responded to the succession problem by providing for a VicePresident.

The start of the end of the Marcos years, of course, could be treated as early as 21 August 1983. But its immediate
precursor was the Snap Election which the President was forced to call and set on 7 February 1986 to respond to the
clamor for popular mandate.

The validity of the "Snap Election Law" called by the Batasang Pambansa was raised in the case of Philippine Bar
Association v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455 (1985). The issue was raised because of the conditional letter of resignation
sent by Mr. Marcos to the Batasan, making his resignation effective only upon (i) the holding of a Presidential election,
(ii) the proclamation of a winner, (iii) the assumption into office by the winning candidate. It was contended that a
conditional resignation was not allowed under the 1973 Constitution, for it did not create a vacancy, and without a
vacancy, there was no reason to call for an election. But the SC failed to issue a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
COMELEC from preparing for the election, thus making "the initially legal question into a political one." In the
meantime, the political parties have started campaigning and the people were so involved in the election that to stop it
on legal grounds would frustrate their very will. And so, failing to come up with the majority to hold the Snap Election
Law unconstitutional, the SC could not issue the injunction prayed for. The election went ahead.

The rest is history. The results of the election were proclaimed by the Batasan, naming Marcos and Tolentino as the
winners. But the February 2 to 25, 1986, EDSA revolution took place. On 25 February, Marcos was proclaimed in
Malacanang by Makasiar, while Aquino was proclaimed in Club Filipino by Teehankee. Later that evening, Marcos fled to
Hawaii.

A. The February 1986 Revolution and the Proclamation of Provisional Constitution.

Freedom Constitution

What was the basis of the Aquino government? Did it assume power pursuant to the 1973 Constitution, or was it a
revolutionary government?

Proclamation No. 1, 25 February 1986 (Provisional government). But Proclamation No. 3 which announced the
Provisional Constitution, seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary government, since in one of its whereases it
announced that the "new government was installed, through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces," referring to the EDSA revolution.

The better view is the latter view. The Aquino government was not an offshoot of the 1973 Constitution for under that
Constitution, a procedure was given for the election of the President proclamation by the Batasan and the candidate
Batasan proclaimed was Marcos.

Lawyers League v Aquino (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22, 1986). This view was affirmed in Lawyers League v
Aquino where the legitimacy of the Aquino government is questioned on the ground that it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution. The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue and their petition states no
cause of action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have
accepted the government of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely
a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized
the legitimacy of the present government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold
the fundamental law of the Republic under her government."

The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small group revolted and succeeded in
wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state revolted and overthrew the government, so that right from the
beginning, the installation was already lawful and the government was at all times de jure.

In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution, from the
point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its government in whatever
way the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty, cannot be recognized in a Constitution,
for this would be selfdestructive. The nature of a Constitution is to setup a government and provide for an orderly way
to change this government. A revolution contradicts this nature.

Proclamation No. 3, March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution). At any rate, the Provisional Constitution or Freedom
Constitution was adopted on 25 March 1986 through Proclamation No. 3. It abrogated the legislative provisions of the
1973 Constitution, modified the provisions regarding the executive department, and totally reorganized the
government. (Its use of the 1973 Constitution, however, is not be to construed that it was a continuation thereof.) Then
it provided for the calling of a Constitutional Commission, composed of 30 to 50 members appointed by the President
within 60 days. (In our history, all major constitutions Malolos, 1935, 1971 were drafted by elected delegates.)

The President appointed 48 Commissioners, who worked on the Constitution from 1 June to 15 October 1986. The draft
was submitted to the people in a referendum on 2 February 1987. On 11 February 1987, the President, through
Proclamation No. 58, announced its overwhelming ratification by the people and that, therefore, it had come into force
and effect.

In Re: Saturnino Bermudez (145 SCRA 160)(1960). In the case of In Re: Saturnino Bermudez , the SC held, quoting the
previous case of Lawyers League v Aquino, that:

[T]he legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the
people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government
of President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de facto government but
in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government.

B. Adoption and Effectivity of the present Constitution

Provisional Constitution, Art. V.

ARTICLE V

ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION

Section 1. Within sixty days from the date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be appointed by the President to
draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than thirty nor more than fifty natural born
citizens of the Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall
be chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society.

Section 2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be consistent with the need both to
hasten the return of normal constitutional government and to drat a document truly reflective of the ideals and
aspirations of the Filipino people.

Section 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have adequate participation in
the formulation of the New Constitution.

Section 4. The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded.

Section 5. The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who shall fix the date for the
holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such
plebiscite which shall be held within a period of 60 days following its submission to the President.

1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII, sec. 27.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede the all previous Constitutions.

The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the Constitutional Commission
of 1986 on the twelfth day of October 1986, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October 1986 at the Plenary
Hall, National Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed.

Proclamation No. 58 (Proclaiming the Ratification of the 1987 Constitution), February 11, 1987 De Leon v Esguerra, 153
SCRA 602 (1987.)The 1987 Constitution took effect on 2 February 1987.

F: The case arose due to Art. III, Sec. 2 of Proclamation No. 3, which provided that: "All elective and appointive officials
and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or
executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is
made within a period of one year from 25 February 1986."

De Leon was a barrio captain in Taytay, Rizal. On 9 February 1987, he was replaced by the MLG (DLG). So the question
arose as to when the 1987 Constitution took effect. If it took effect on 2 February, the replacement was no longer valid,
since Proclamation No. 3 would have been superseded. But if it took effect on 11 February (the date of proclamation),
the replacement would have been valid.

The SC, consulting the proceedings of the Concom, ruled that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to make
it effective on the date of its ratification. Art. XVIII, Sec. 27 clearly provided that "this Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite." The 1987 Constitution was ratified in
a plebiscite on Feb. 2, 1987, superseding the Provisional Constitution. Consequently, after that date, respondent OIC
Governor could not designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Petitioners must now be
held to have acquired security of tenure.

The dissenting opinion pointed out that by contemporaneous construction, the 1973 Constitution had a similar
provision as the present one in issue (Art. XVII, Sec. 16, This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite), and yet it took effect on the day of the proclamation. The
1981 and 1984 amendments contained similar provisions (valid when approved), and yet the practice has always been
to make the date of proclamation, the date of effectivity.

Furthermore, if the effectivity was 2 February, then the appointments made by the President to CA posts after that date
would be invalid for they were not submitted to the Judicialand Bar Council. On this point, however, Teehankee noted
that the President issued the appointments in the end of January.

A concurring opinion noted the debate between Davide (date of proclamation) and Bernas (date of ratification), and
Davide's comment that he was giving up due to tyranny of numbers.

VV: The SC was correct for that was the clear intent of the framers. The ones to be blamed are the framers themselves.
Effectivity should really be the date of proclamation.

One, how can one can be expected to comply with the provisions of the Constitution when, prior to its proclamation,
there is no way to determine if it has been ratified or not? Should the Director of Prison continue the scheduled
electrocution of a death row convict on 3 February in view of the abolition of capital punishment in the 1987
Constitution; if he does, he would technically be violating the constitution under the above holding. If he does not, he
would be in dereliction of duty, in case the constitution is not ratified.

Two, no analogy can be made between the election to office of a public officer who is deemed elected on the day of
election), and the effectivity of the constitution, because a public officer, though deemed elected, does not assume
office on the day of his election, not even on the day of his proclamation.

III. THE SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTS

A. Theory of Judicial Review

Angara v Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936). In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all
members elect, with no election protest filed on or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral
Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election
protest.

Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained by the
Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. Who
prevailed?

The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission, in view of the
constitutional provision granting the Electoral Commission jurisdiction over election protests.

In justifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court allocated constitutional boundaries,
it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the obligations imposed upon
it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights which the constitution
grants to them.

Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review

In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine that judicial review can only be exercised in an
actual case and controversy.

This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutional question
raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e. an
unavoidable question.

Seven (7) rules of avoidance of constitutional questions (J. Brandeis) :

In the following cases, the court must refrain from passing on the issue of constitutionality or from exercising judicial
review:

1. Friendly, nonadversary proceedings. (no vital conflict)

2. Anticipation of a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. (premature case)

3. Formulation of a rule broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is applied.4. Existence of other grounds
upon which the case may be disposed of (not the very lis mota)5. A complaint made by one who fails to show injury as
to its operation. (no standing)6. Instance of one who has availed himself of its benefit.7. Possibility of a construction of
the statute which can avoid the resolution of the constitutional

question.Policy of strict necessity (Rescue Army case)

The court must, as much possible, refrain from exercising judicial review unless all the requirements for its exercise are
fulfilled because of :

1. The danger of exercising the function, in view of possible consequences for others stemming also from constitutional
roots.

2. Comparative finality of those consequences.

3. Consideration due to the judgment of the other repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their
authorities.

4. Necessity for each to keep within its own power.

5. Inherent limitations of the judicial process its largely negative character, and its limited resources for enforcement.

6. Withal in paramount importance of constitutional adjudication.

Thus, the following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot and academic issues, and
(iv) no standing.

Political Question

An issue is a political question when it does not deal with the interpretation of a law and its application to a case, but
with the very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political question, he is not exercising a
judicial function, but is rather supplanting his conscience to that of the political branch of the government.
Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some guidelines for determining whether a question is
political or not.

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unequestioning adherence to a political
decision already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multafarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.

Advisory Opinion

A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no actual case and controversy that demands constitutional
construction for its resolution. This may take the form of declaratory relief. It is not wise for the court to engage in an
advisory opinion because:

a) This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter) b) The
judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that draw out the meaning of the law.

Mootness

A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and heated arguments but for some reason the legal problem has
become stale. When a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and controversy. Any decision reached by the
court would not be conclusive on the parties.

Exceptions to mootness:1) If the question is capable of repetition and evasive of review.2) If there exits a mere
possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act.3) Voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the
defendant, if he is free to return to his old ways.

Ripeness

A constitutional question may come to the court either too early or prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory
opinion), or too late, so that the court's decision would no longer affect the parties (mootness). The court must resolve
constitutional issues only when they come to it at the right time (ripeness).

No Standing

A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to be benefited if the case is resolved in his favor,
and he stand to be really injured if it is decided against him.

Standing is established by two nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being questioned, or his
status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement.

The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure such concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions (Baker v Carr, supra.)

A person has standing to challenge the governmental act only if he has a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result ot its enforcement. (People v. Vera, infra.)

Philippine Practice

In re Saturnina Bermudez (145 SCRA 160, 1986)

The action was for declaratory relief to interpret Section 5 of Art. XVIII, which provides that: The six year term of the
incumbent President and VicePresident elected in the 7 February 1986 election, is for purposes of synchronization of
election, hereby extended to noon of 30 June 1991. The question was who the "incumbent President" referred to in said
provision was whether Aquino (the one in office) or Marcos (the one proclaimed by the Batasan). The confusion arose
because in Proclamation No. 3, Pres. Aquino referred to the "direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted
by the units of the new AFP" as the cause for the installation of the new government. If President Aquino was not
elected but came into office as a result of the EDSA Revolution, the she would not be the "incumbent" who was elected
in the February 7 election, referred to in the provision.
The SC ruled that (a) the petitioner had no standing, (b) the SC had no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief,
c) the suit was against the President who cannot be sued, d) the petitioner had no cause of action because, reiterating
the decision in Lawyer's League for a Better Philippines v Aquino, the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
justiciable matter but is a political question.

And yet, the SC ruled that the "incumbent" referred to was President Aquino who was in effective control of the country
and had been recognized by the rest of the world.

(The Court, disregarding the limits of judicial review, felt compelled to render a decision on the legitimacy of the
Aquino government so as to avoid any doubt as to its very own legitimacy. It must be noted, though that his case is the
entitlement of an actual case and controversy.)

Dumlao v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)

Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had received retirement pay to which he was
entitled under the law and who have been 65 years old at the commencement of the term of office to which he sought
to be elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had retired.

Dumlao filed for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the law, claiming that this was directed at him as former
governor of Nueva Vizcaya.

The SC held that (a) he had no standing, since he had not been injured by the operation of the law, no petition for his
disqualification having been filed and (b) the action was a request for advisory opinion. And yet, the SC upheld the
validity "because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose of infusing younger blood in local
government was valid. Adapted.

Igot v COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)

Sec. 4 of BP 52 also provided in part that any person convicted of subversion, insurrection or rebellion, or similar
offenses was disqualified from running for any local position, and the filing of charges for such crimes before a civil or
military court after preliminary investigation was prima facie evidence of such fact. Igot sought to question the validity
of this provision.

The SC held that he had no standing because (a) he had never been convicted nor charged of any these crimes, (b) he
had not been disqualified from being a candidate, (c) he had no personal nor substantial interest at stake, and (d) he
could not sue as taxpayer since the statute did not directly involve the disbursement of public funds. And yet, although
abstaining from ruling on the first part of the provision, the SC held that the second part regarding the presumption of
guilt was unconstitutional for violating the presumption of innocence.

Political Questions

In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review. The case was clearly a justiciable controversy. Is
the resignation submitted by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and assumption into office
by the elected President, a valid resignation as to authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could
have validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC from proceeding with the preparations for the election. But it did
not, citing its delay in deciding the case and the sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as reason
for its inaction. According to the court, what at first was a legal question became a political question because it was
overtaken by events.

VV: A Court which does not issue an injunction to enjoin an official act when it could have issued one is actually
deciding the case in favor of the validity of the act. Failure to issue an injunction is as much an exercise of judicial
review.

In Romulo v Yniguez, infra, we see another trend of judicial review. What seems like a legal question when viewed in
isolation (namely, whether the rules of the Batasan enabling it to shelf a complaint for impeachment against the
President is constitutional.) is really a political question when viewed in a broader context (i.e., that the case was filed
against the Speaker of a coequal branch to compel him by mandamus to recall the complaint from the archive, and
that the ultimate result of the case was to question the decision of the Batasan to shelve the case, a matter, that is
solely committed to that department.)

Yet, despite the really political nature of the question, the SC passed on the validity of the rules to erase doubts that
may still be entertained.
C. Functions of Judicial Review

1. Checking invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be contrary to the Constitution.2. Legitimating
(legitimizing) upholding the validity of the law which results from a mere dismissal of a case

challenging the validity of that law.

When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by declaring that the law is "not unconstitutional".
This is no mere semantics. The Court cannot declare the law constitutional for it enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect by the court would not make it more constitutional. On the other
hand, anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to show its invalidity. Declaring that the law
is not unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met the burden required.

Legitimating and Checking Aspects of Judicial Review. Dismissal of Challenge to a Law's Validity Legitimizes it.

In Occena v COMELEC, 104 SCRA 1 (1981), which sought an injunction to prohibit the COMELEC from proceeding with
the plebiscite for the proposed 1981 amendments, and in Mitra v COMELEC, 104 SCRA 59 (1981), which sought a
mandamus to compel the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify the 1973 Constitution, both prayers based on the
premise that the 1973 Constitution had not been ratified, the SC held that the failure of the Court in the Javellana v
Executive Secretary casela to muster the votes required to declare the 1973 Constitution as being invalidly ratified,
which resulted in the dismissal of the suit questioning the validity of the ratification of the Constitution, in effect
legitimated the ratification. In Occena, the Court ruled that:

"The Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done
cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the
meaning of the concluding statement in the Javellana resolution. Since then, the Court has invariably applied the
present Constitution."

3. Symbolic to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling principles and concepts on matters of great public
importance.

Symbolic Function of Supreme Court to Give Guidelines to Bench and Bar in Cases which are Moot and Academic.

In Salonga v CruzPano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), the case against petitioner for subversion which was filed by the fiscal on
the basis of flimsy testimony given by Victor Lovely was already dismissed without prejudice by the fiscal (upon
anticipation of adverse ruling). And yet, the SC noting that as the fiscal said the dismissal of the charges was without
prejudice to the filing of new ones for the same acts because the petitioner has not been arraigned and double
jeopardy does not apply, the case is not entirely moot, decided to perform its duty to "formulate guiding and
controlling constitutional principles, precepts and doctrines or rules" for the guidance of the bar and bench. It thus,
went on to lecture about its antiquated understanding of the inciting test, and how it could not be proved by a mere
photograph.

In Javier v COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194 (1986), the case was already mooted not only by the death of Evelio Javier, but
also by the abolition of Batasan, the Antique seat which he and Pacificador were contesting for. And yet the SC,
claiming to be "not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government," decided the
case anyway "for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we
must also give him justice. The 2 are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter bec. the
issue has been settled and the decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we
act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint
upon the future."In Demeteria v Alba, 148 SCRA 208, the SC struck down Sec. 44 of PD 1177, authorizing the President

to transfer funds from one department to another, on the ground that it overextended the privilege granted under Art.
VIII, sec. 16(5) of the 1973 Constitution, even if such provision was already abrogated by the Freedom Constitution.
Then, citing the Javier case on the need "not only for the vindication of an outraged right, though gone, but also for the
guidance of and as a restraint upon the future," it lectured on how this law would open the floodgates for the
enactment of unfunded appropriations, uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffusion of accountability for budgetary
performance, and entrenchment of the pork barrel system, and on how this would create temptations for
misappropriation and embezzlement.

All courts can exercise judicial review

Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2). The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:xxx(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm
on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in :(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive

agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher. (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower courts on cases with
constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide the
case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the SC. Thus, for instance an RTC can rule on the
constitutionality of the AntiSubversion Law.

In J.M. Tuason & Co. v CA, 3 SCRA 696 (1961), RA 2616, which provided for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, was
claimed to be unconstitutional. This issue said the SC, could be resolved by the CFI in the ejectment case filed before it
by the evictees of the estate, since the 1935 Constitution contemplated that inferior courts should have jurisdiction in
cases involving constitutionality issues, that it spoke of appellate review of "final judgment of inferior courts" in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC required by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restricted the
decisions of that Court only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

In Ynot v IAC, 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no authority to rule on the validity of EO
626A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases, then the
lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. The SC then struck down the law for being
arbitrary and for unduly delegating legislative power.

C. Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality

Civil Code, Art. 7.

Article 7. xxx

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.

xxx

The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law either void or voidable.

It is void if on its face, it does not enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect whatsoever, creates
no right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during the period of its operation must be remitted.

An example is BP 52 in Igot v COMELEC case, supra, providing that anyone who has been charged of rebellion, etc. is
prima facie presumed to be disqualified from running for a local post. On its face, it blatantly goes against the
constitutional presumption of innocence.

Another example is a law imposing prior restraint which is, according to Sullivan v Bantam Books, and US v New York
Times, presumptively unconstitutional.

But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it
becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the invalidation produces no
retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification.
From the time the law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid, people would have entered into various
transactions and relations, expecting and in fact compelled to presume that the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that the
law never produced any effect would penalize those who in faith believed the laws passed by their representatives to
be in accordance with their solemn duty under the Constitution.

As the court put it in Chicot County District v Baxter State Bank, the past cannot always be erased, so that statements
of principle of absolute retroactivity is not acceptable in all cases. Said the court,

"[T]he actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination, is an operative fact, and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official. xxx "The case of Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38
SCRA 429 (1971) is in point.

In 1939, Agbayani borrowed P450 from PNB secured by a realty mortgage. In 1944, the loan matured but PNB could
not collect because it was at this time of the war. In 1945, Pres. Osmena issued the Debt Morato rium Law (EO #32),
suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravages of war. In 1948, RA 342 extended the Debt
Moratorium Law for another eight years (up to 1956). In 1953, however, the SC declared RA 342 as unconstitutional in
the case of Rutter v Esteban. In 1959, PNB filed a suit for payment of the loan. Has the action prescribed?

If we take the orthodox view, the action has prescribed, since the declaration of RA 342 as uncon stitutional retroacted
to 1945 when EO 32 was first issued. Between 1944 when the loan matured and 1959, when PNB collected the loan, 15
years had elapsed.

[The orthodox view was announced by Mr. J. Field, in the case of Norton vs. Shelby County where the court held that:

"xxx. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been passed.]

But if we take the unorthodox view, as the SC did, the action could still prosper. The period from 1945 when the law
was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription
since the Debt Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed (194445, 195359).

Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law
was effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect.

Art. 7 of the Civil Code which provides that, "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern." seems to be the orthodox view on the matter.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PART ONE

I. State defined.

THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE

CIR v Campos Rueda, 42 SCRA 23 (1971). A State is a politically organized sovereign community, independent of
outside control, bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, and acting through government
functioning under a regime of law.

A state is a community of persons, more or less numerous, permanently occupying a fixed territory and possessed of
an independent government organized for political ends to which the great body of inhabitants render habitual
obedience. (Prof. Samilo Barlongay quoting Garner, Introduction to Political Law, 41.)

The elements of a state are : territory, people, sovereignty, government.

People refers simply to the inhabitants of the State.

Territory is the fixed portion of the surface of the earth inhabited by the people of the State.

Government is the agency or instrumentality through which the will of the State is formulated, expressed and realized.

Sovereignty is the supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State by which that State is governed.

II. Components of the Philippine State A. Territory The Archipelago Concept

Art. I. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas.
The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
In short, the Philippine territory consists of: (1) the Philippine archipelago, and (2) all territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.

Of all the constitutions in the world, probably only the Philippines has a definition of its territory. At first glance, this is
useless since one's territory under International Law is defined not by one's selfserving claims as to what it covers, but
by international treaties and customs. Historically, however, this definition had a valid purpose.

The 1935 Constitution needed to define Philippine territory in order to prevent its dismemberment by the US. Since,
pursuant to the TydingsMcDuffie Act, the draft of the Constitution was to be submitted to the US President for approval,
defining the national territory was a way of making the US acknowledge its extent and (to) respect its integrity.

The 1973 Constitution needed a definition of national territory in order to lay claim toSabah. The claim was originally
made by President Macapagal. Sabah was one of the territories belonging to the Philippines by historic right and legal
title. President Marcos, in 1977 on the occasion of an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore announced that the
Philippines was willing to drop its claims over Sabah; nothing was done, however to amend the Constitution.

The 1987 Constitution changed the phraseology into: "all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction." In so changing, the rationale was to remove any irritant to our relations with the Malaysia brought about
by the 1973 formulation but without renouncing the claim at the same time. Anyway, if the Philippines has the right
over Sabah under International Law, it possesses that right with or without a Constitution, the Constitution being
merely a municipal law which does not bind other states.

The 1987 Constitution, therefore, contains a definition of national territory so as not to give an impression that the
Philippines is abandoning its claim over Sabah. Removing such a definition would amount to dropping the claim
altogether, a fact not for the Commissioners to decide.

1. The Philippine Archipelago a. Treaty limits

1. Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898.

Article 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and latitude, degrees and seconds. Technical
descriptions are made of the scope of the archipelago as this may be found on the surface of the earth.

2. Treaty of Washington of 7 November 1900 between the United States and Spain. Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto and Sulu.

3. Treaty of 2 January 1930 between the United States and Great Britain.

Ceding the Turtle and Mangsee Islands.

b. Method of determining the baselines

1. RA 3046 (17 June 1961)

Determine appropriate points of the outermost Islands of the archipelago, then connect them by means of a straight
line until all islands are surrounded or enclosed by the imaginary straight lines.

"The baselines from which the territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining
appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago." (fifth whereas clause.)

2. RA 5446 (8 September 1968). Sec. 2 of the Act provides that the definition of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

Uses of the baseline:

a. Determine what is internal water (all waters inside the baseline, whether or not more than 12 miles from the shore).

b. Determine the 200 mile EEZ.

c. Archipelagic Doctrine
The basic concept of an archipelago is that body of water studded with islands, or the islands surrounded with water, is
viewed as a unity of islands and waters together forming one unit. This is in contrast to a continent which is a single
mass of land.

The main purpose of the archipelagic doctrine is to protect the territorial interests of an archipelago. If we follow the
old rule of international law, it is possible that between islands, e.g. Bohol and Siquijor, due to the more than 24 mile
distance between the 2 islands, there may be high seas. Thus, foreign vessels may just enter anytime at will, posing
danger to the security of the State. According to the doctrine, even these bodies of water within the baseline,
regardless of breadth, form part of the archipelago and are thus considered as internal waters.

The archipelagic doctine has a twofold purpose: (1) economic reasons; (2) national security. (Barlongay.)

The archipelagic doctrine is the principle that it is an integrated unit; everything within it comprises the archipelago.
(ibid.)

The Constitutional provisions embodying this doctrine are :

1. "archipelago, with all the island and waters embraced therein"

An archipelago is a body of water, studded with islands.

2. "the waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of the breadth and
dimensions, form part of internal water"

The following provisions are really superfluous:

1. "terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains"(because land, water and air space already form part of an archipelago)

2. "territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves, other submarine areas"

"Territorial sea" means water outside the baseline extending up to 12 miles.

"Internal water" refers to water within the baseline.

"Insular shelf" means the land which is submerged under water which may extend beyond 12 miles as long as it is not
more than 300 ft. deep. It is also known as intercontinental shelf. (Barlongay.)

2. Other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction

PD 1596 (11 June 1978)

Claims the Kalayaan Group of Islands as part of Philippine territory on the basis of historic rights and legal title.

The claim was made "by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in
accordance with international law. xxx"

3. The territorial sea, the sea bed, the subsoil, the insular shelves and other submarine areas 4. Exclusive Economic
Zone

PD 1599 (11 June 1978). There is established an exclusive economic zone extending "to a distance of two hundred
nautical miles beyond and from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured. Provided, That, where the
outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighboring state,
the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the state concerned or in accordance with pertinent
generally recognized principles or international law on delimitation." (Sec. 1 thereof.)

Other states shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to navigations and overflight, the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and
communications. (Sec. 4 thereof.)

Purposes:

1. Sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources, living or nonliving, renewable or
nonrenewable of the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent waters.

Economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the zone such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds.

2. Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with repect to the establishment and utilization of artificial islands, offshore
terminals, installations and structures; the preservation of the marine environment, including the prevention and
control of pollution and scientific research.

3. Such other rights as are recognized by international law. Other states are prohibited from using the zone to:

1. Explore or exploit any resources;

2. Carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations;

3. Conduct any research;

4. Construct or operate any artificial island, offshore terminal, installation, or other structure;

5. Perform any activity which is contrary to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein provided.

Other states are allowed to use the zone for: 1. Navigation and overflight;

2. Laying of submarine cable and pipelines;3. Other lawful uses related to navigation and communication.

In case of overlapping of EEZs, the common boundaries are to be detemined by (i) agreement and (ii) international
rules on delimitations.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (30 April 1982.)

The exclusive economic zone which shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines from which the breadth
of the territorial sea is measured, is recognized in the UNCLOS, of which the Philippines is a signatory. Its concept is
that although it is not part of the territory, exclusive economic benefit is reserved for the country.

B. People1. Three meanings of the word "People"The word "people" is used in at least three senses in the Constitution:

a. "People" as Inhabitants

Art. XIII, Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.

Art. II, Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, xxx

Qua Chee Gan v Deportation Board, 9 SCRA 27 (1963), infra. The right of the an individual to be secure in his person is
guaranteed by the Constitution. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of
course, indisputably applies to both citizens and foreigners in this country.

b. People as Citizens

Preamble. We, the sovereign Filipino people imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence and
democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality and peace, do ordain and
promulgate this Constitution.
Art. II, Sec. 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

Art. II, Sec. 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon
the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all "citizens" may be required to render personal military
or civil service.

Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recog nized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertinent to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizens subject to limitations
provided by law.

c. People as Electors

Art. VII, Sec. 4. The President and VicePresident shall be elected by direct vote of the people xxx.

Art. XVI, Sec. 2. The Congress may, by law, adopt a new name for the country, a national anthem, or a national seal,
which shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals, history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall take
effect only upon its ratification by the people in a national referendum.

Art. XVIII, Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between Republic of the Philippines and United States
of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress requires, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting
party.

2. Citizenshipa. Who are citizens

Art. IV, Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1) Those who are citizen of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;2) Those whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the Philippines;3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

These citizens are classifiable into (i) naturalborn citizens (covering #'s 1, 2, and 3) and (ii) naturalized citizens
(covering #4).

b. Election of Philippine citizenship

Com. Act No. 625 (June 7, 1941.) AN ACT PROVIDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE OPTION TO ELECT PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP SHALL BE DECLARED BY A PERSON WHOSE MOTHER IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN

Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), section 1, Article IV [1935
Constitution: Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect
Philippine citizenship] shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany
the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.

Section 2. If the party concerned is absent from the Philippines, he may make the statement herein authorized before
any officer of the Government of the United States (now officials of Philippine Embassy or Consulate) authorized to
administer oaths, and he shall forward such statement together with his oath of allegiance, to the Civil Registry of
Manila.

Note : The right of election permitted under the 1987 Constitution is available only to those born to Filipino mothers
under the 1935 Constitution who, had that charter not been changed, would have been able to elect Philippine
citizenship upon attaining majority age. That right is retained for them under Article IV, Section 1 (3). Obviously,
election is not necessary in the case of the child to a Filipino mother under the present constitution as she would be
considered a Filipino citizen at birth.

Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

F: Petitioners Balingit and Co and private respondent Ong were among the candidates who vied for the position of
representative in the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 1987 election. Ong was proclaimed the
winner.

Petitioners filed election protest with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal against Ong on the ground that
Ong is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the 2nd district of Samar. HRET ruled in favor
of Ong.

ISSUE: W/N Ong is a natural born citizen as to entitle him to run as congressman. RULING: YES, Ong is a natural born
citizen.

Under the 1987 Constitution:

"Sec. 1. The ff. are citizens of the Phil.: xxx

3) Those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine reaching the age of majority; and

4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

citizenship upon

Sec. 2. Natural born citizens are those who are citizens of the Phil. from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Phil. citizenship in accordance with par. 3, Sec. 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural born citizens."

The Court interprets Sec. 1 par. 3 as applying not only to those who elect Phil. citizenship after 2 February 1987 but
also those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date, as in the case of Ong. This
ruling finds support in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. The provision was framed to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a
natural born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Phil. citizenship. If
one so elected, under earlier laws, he was not conferred the status of a natural born citizen.

There is no question that Ong's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage with Jose Ong Chuan, a
Chinese who filed an application for naturalization and was granted one. Crucial to this case is whether or not Ong
elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen in order to come within the purview of the above quoted constitutional
provision.

To expect Ong to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary for the court is of the opinion that Ong was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine years old. He could not have divined
when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987, the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. An election of Philippine
citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Ong's Filipino nationality when he turned 21.

There are cases which define "election" as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In Re Mallare, the
Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of election of Phil. citizenship. In this case, Ong did not merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life
here in the Phil.

Ong was born in the rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions.

The resp. has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small
boy. Ong has worked in a sensitive position in a government agency. His profession (CPA) requires citizenship for taking
the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always
considered himself a Filipino. There is nothing to indicate any tinge of alienness. The mass of voters of N. Samar are
fully aware of Ong's parentage. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him a Filipino.

The HRET had an interesting view as to how Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when Ong was only nine years
old, his father became a naturalized Filipino. Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to
him for he was then a minor residing in the country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Phil.
citizenship for Ong by declaring him as such.

The petitioners contend that Ong's father was not validly naturalized because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship. The petitioners question the citizenship of Ong's father through a collateral approach. This cannot be done.
In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. MRM.

xxx The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship.
FOR THOSE ALREADY FILIPINOS when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be
less binding. Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of private re spondent Ong would not only have been
superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for him.

Dissenting:

Ong is not a naturalborn Filipino citizen, he having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of
his father at the time of his birth. Under the 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of Ong's birth, only those
whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were citizens of
the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino
citizens.

c. Naturalborn citizens

Art. IV, Section 2. Naturalborn citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed naturalborn citizens.

The provision granting naturalborn status even to those who were born of Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 but
elected Philippine citizenship after that date is meant to correct the anomalous situation where one born under similar
circumstances but made the election before 17 January 1973 is granted the status of naturalborn citizen by the 1973
Constitution. Simply because there was no definition of a naturalborn citizen under the 1935 Constitution, that one who
made the election after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution was

not conferred such status. The definition of a naturalborn citizen under the 1973 Constitution, therefore made a child of
Filipino mother and alien father's right depends on the fleeting accident of time, and resulted in two kinds of citizens
made up of essentially the same members.

At the same time, however, those who elected prior to 17 January 1973 could not be placed in the same footing as
those who made the election after that date, because the former already had a "vested right" to their citizenship which
could not be diminished by the 1973 Constitution.

The remedy is to place the latter in the same footing as the former. Thus, under the 1987 Constitution, this accidental
anomaly no longer exists.

To illustrate: If X was born and elected before 17 January 1973, his status under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is
that of a naturalborn citizen, because although he had to perform an act to perfect his citi zenship, he could not
otherwise be classified since there was no definition of naturalborn citizens in the 1935 Constitution.

If X was born before and elected after 17 January 1973, whether before or after 2 February 1987, he was not a natural-
born citizen under the 1973 Constitution. If not for the proviso in the 1987 Constitution, he would not have been
deemed naturalborn citizen either.

In turn the definition of "naturalborn citizen" as one who is such from (not at) birth (continuously up to the time his
citizenship is questioned), was raised about the citizenship of Quezon, et. al., under the 1935 Constitution.

Having the status of a naturalborn citizen is important for the purpose of certain political and economic rights open
only to such citizens.

a) Political: Qualification to run for the following posts:

Who must be natural born citizens:

(1) President Art. VII, Sec. 2(2) VicePresident Art. VII, Sec. 3(3) Members of Congress Art. VI, Secs. 3 and 6(4) Justices of
the SC and lower collegiate courts Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)

(5) Ombudsman and his deputies (6) Constitutional Commissions

Art. XI, Sec. 8 Art. IX, B, Sec. 1 (1)

Art. IX, C, Sec. 1(1)Art. IX, D, Sec. 1(1)

(7) Members of the Central Monetary Authority Art, XII, Sec. 20 (8) Members of the CHR Art. XIII, Sec. 17(2)
(Commission on Human Rights)

Former naturalborn citizens as transferees of private lands.

b) Economic

Art. XII, Sec. 8 xxx [A]naturalborn citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may still be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

The following are naturalborn citizens:

1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution (as of 2 February 1987).

a) Those who are citizens under the Treaty of Paris

Under Art. 9 of the Treaty of Paris, the civil and political status of the inhabitants of the Philippines was to be
determined by the US Congress.

Pursuant to this provision in the treaty, the US Congress passed the Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902, Section 4 of which
defined who the citizens of the Philippines were:

"The inhabitants of the Philippines residing therein who were subjects of Spain on 11 April 1899, and continuing to
reside therein, as well as their children born subsequent thereto."

The cutoff date of 11 April 1899 was the date of "exchange of instruments of ratification" between the US Senate and
Spain, or the date of ratification of the Treaty of Paris.

The peninsulares were given a period of 18 months to indicate if they choose Filipino or Spanish citizen ship, by filing
their election with the CFI.

This same provision was reembodied in the Jones Law of 29 August 1916.

b) Those declared citizens by judicial declaration applying the jus soli principle, before the 1957 case of Tio Tiam v
Republic.

In Roa v Commissioner of Customs (1912), during the regime of the Philippine Bill of 1902, Roa, who was born in the
Philippines in 1889 by a Chinese father and Filipino mother, was declared by the court to be a citizen by jus soli.

In Paz Chua v Secretary of Labor (1939), during the regime of the 1935 Constitution, Paz Chua who was born in Tarlac
in 1914 of Chinese father and Filipino mother, was not declared a citizen. The SC held, without alluding to the Roa case,
that the jus soli was never adopted in the Philippines.

In Torres v Tan Chim (1940), Tan, who was in the Philippines in 1893 of Chinese father and Filipino mother, was declared
a citizen. According to J. Laurel, the principle of jus soli still applied. The 1934 Concon was aware of the Roa ruling and
did not intend to overrule it.

In Tan Chong v Secretary of Labor and Lam Swee Sang v Secretary of Labor (1947), a case decided during the regime
of the Republic upon a motion for reconsideration of a prewar decision, Tan, who was born in 1915, and Lam, who was
born in 1900, both in the Philippines, of Chinese father and Filipino mother, were not declared citizens. According to J.
Padilla, the 1935 Constitution never adopted the jus soli principle; the mere fact of birth in the Philippines does not
confer citizenship on a person.

In Talaroc v Uy (1950), considering his service during the war and his having been elected mayor in Misamis, was
declared by the SC a citizen "simply due to birth", without mention of jus soli or jus sanguinis.

Finally, in Tio Tam v Republic (1957), the SC tried to resolve the flipflop rulings by stating that we follow only jus
sanguinis but that those who were judicially declared citizens on the basis of jus soli prior to this case would be
considered citizens. This is the final word on the matter.

It would be worthy to note that the flipflop in decision can be explained by the date of birth of the applicant in each
case. Those born before 11 April 1899 were the ones to whom jus soli was applied, for they very well were citizens
under the Treaty of Paris.

c) Those who were naturalized in accordance with law. (Act. No. 2927 of the Philippine Commission).

d) Those who were citizens under the 1935 Constitution.

1) Those who were citizens at the time of adoption of the Constitution (15 November 1935, the date of the
inauguration of the Commonwealth government).

2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parent, who before the adoption of the Constitution had been elected to
public office in the Philippines.

This is the socalled "Caram rule in honor of Caram, a Syrian, elected to the 1934 Constitutional Convention. The rule
was adopted to avoid the absurdity of the situation.

The rule only applies to elective positions, not appointive ones.

In Chiongbian v de Leon, the SC held that if one is considered a citizen under the Caram rule, his children would also be
considered citizens, but under the third category (those whose fathers are citizens)

3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon, reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship.

It was only beginning 17 January 1973 when children of Filipino mothers became citizens without need of election.
Children born before this date of Filipino mother and alien fathers had an "inchoate citizenship" until they elected upon
reaching 21 years.

5) Those naturalized in accordance with law.

e) Those who are citizens under the 1973 Constitution.

1) Those who are citizens as of 17 January 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. 2) Those whose
fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.That is, those born on or after 17 January 1973 of Filipino father or
Filipino mother.3) Those who elected Philippine citizenship pursuant to the 1935 Constitution

That is, those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers but reached the age of majority and elected Philippine
citizenship on or after 17 January 1973.

Note that if one was born, reached the age of majority and elected Philippine citizenship before 17 January 1973, then
he would be a citizen under e1 (those who are citizens at the adoption of the 1973 Constitution).

On the other hand, if one was born, reached 21 years, but did not or failed to elect before 17 January 1973, then he
lost his citizenship then.

4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

2.) Those born of Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers (after 17 January 1973).

3.) Those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority.

This case arose under the 1935 Constitution, children of Filipino mothers did not automatically become citizens. They
had an "inchoate citizenship" during their minority, and became fullpledged citizens only upon election at the age of
majority.

Beginning with the 1973 Constitution, however, children of Filipino mothers automatically became citizens. This
provision then covers those children born, before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution.

By January 17, 1994, this provision would have no application anymore, since the last of those born before 17 January
1973 would have reached the age of majority by then.

Case A: A Filipino woman married B, an American in 1961. The marriage made A an American citizen (which under CA
63, stripped her of her Philippine citizenship, the marriage having been celebrated before 17 January 1973). A and B
lived in the US since then and in 1962, begot C, who was automatically an American citizen by jus soli and jus
sanguinis.

In 1983, when C turns 21, can he elect Philippine citizenship? Yes, according to obiters in Cu v Republic and
Villahermosa v CID, in order to elect Philippine citizenship, at least for election purposes, it is enough that (1) the
person's mother was a Filipino at the time of her marriage to the alien father, even if she subsequently lose her
citizenship by virtue of the marriage and (2) the person be a child of that marriage, for him to elect Philippine
citizenship.

If C wants to run for Congress, is he considered a natural born Filipino? Under the 1973 Constitution, no. But under the
1987 Constitution, yes.

Note that if he were born after 17 January 1973, the child would not even be a Filipino.

d. Naturalized Citizens, Revised Naturalization Law (Com. Act No. 473, effective June 17, 1939.)

4.) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (namely CA 473, Revised Naturalization Law) (Art. IV, Sec.1 (4))

Who are qualified to be naturalized Qualifications (Sec. 2, CA 473)

A. Age

1) He must not be less than 21 years old at the date of hearing.

Barlongay: When the law uses the phase "age of majority," use 18 years old, but not when it uses the phrase "not less
than 21 years old.

B. Residence

2) He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years.

C. Character

3.) He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must
have conducted himself in an irreproachable conduct during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living.

D. Property

4.) He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000 or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation.(Test: Can he support himself and his family?)

E. Education

5.) Must be able to speak and write (not read and write) Filipino or English, and a principal dialect (as pro tanto
modified by the 1987 Constitution, since the law itself spoke of English or Spanish, and a principal dialect). Thus, a
deaf and mute is disqualified, Orestoff v Republic.
Art. XIV, Sec. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino
and, until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions
and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. xxx

6.) He must have enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by
the Bureau of Private Schools of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of him
prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen.

When is the tenyear residence requirement reduced to five (5) years? Com. Act No. 473, sec. 3.

Sec. 3. Special qualifications. The Ten years of continuous residence required under the second condition of the last
preceding section shall be understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the following
qualifications:

(1) Having honorably held office under the Government of the Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities,
municipalities, or political subdivisions. (which was allowed before by the 1935 Constitution, no distinction whether
appointive or elective posts.)

(2) Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in the Philippines. . (3) Being married to a
Filipino woman

If it were an alien woman who married a Filipino man, she would only need an administrative proceeding for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration, upon proof of marriage and according to the holding in Moy Yam
Lim, proof of nondisqualification. These are the only requirements because ipso facto, she became a Filipino herself by
marriage.

(4) Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or recognized private school not established for the
exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or
industry for a period of not less than two years.

(5) Having been born in the Philippines.

Who are disqualified to be naturalized? CA 473, Sec. 4

The applicant must not only possess the qualifications, he must not have any of the disqualifications set by law.

Section 4. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens:

(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas;

(c) Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) Persons convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

(Moral turpitude involves dishonesty, depravity. A propensity to break the law, even just traffic laws, constitute moral
depravity. While murder being a crime of passion does not involve moral turpitude, theft and estafa do.)

(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease;

(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the period of such war;

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens
or subjects thereof.