CivPro | Splitting & joinder of causes of action

De Luzuriaga, Sr. v Adil, May 7, 1985

RELOVA, J.
Summary:
De Luzuriaga filed with the CFI an action to quiet title against Young. He later filed
another case for forcible entry with the Municipal Circuit Court. CFI Judge Adil
enjoined the MCC judge from trying the 2nd case on the ground that the cause of
action there was abated by the filing of the 1 st case pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 2. Also,
the cause of action in the 2nd case was necessarily included in the 1 st case and they
are both principally between the same parties. De Luzuriaga appealed from Judge
Adils decision.
Facts:
1. George Young was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Agho Island in
Iloilo.
2. On April 21, 1980, Roberto de Luzuriaga, Sr., together with 15 others, filed
with the CFI against Young and 19 other defendants an action to Quiet Title,
Annulment of Titles and Deeds, Declaration of Sole Heirship and/or Ownership
with Damages, involving the property titled in the name of Young. Later on
April 24, 1980, de Luzuriaga, Sr., instituted before the Municipal Circuit Court
a case for Forcible Entry with Damages against Young.
3. Young, in his answer to the complaint for forcible entry, raised three
affirmative defenses, namely: that the MCC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case; that there was a case pending between the same
parties involving the same cause of action; and, that the filing of the action
for forcible entry violated the rule on multiplicity of suits. These affirmative
defenses, being grounds for a Motion to Dismiss, Young maintained that a
preliminary hearing was a must pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 16.
4. Instead of conducting a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses, the
MCC judge ordered Young to submit a written Motion to Dismiss. Even without
having received the written memorandum of Young based on his affirmative
defenses, the MCC judge set the trial of the forcible entry case. Although in
his order setting the case for the trial, he admitted not having received the
respective memoranda of the parties, he denied the Motion to Dismiss of
Young embodied as affirmative defenses in his answer.
5. Young filed before the CFI a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
6. Sustaining Young, CFI Judge Adil said that forcible entry case pending before
the MCC should be dismissed on two procedural grounds, namely: (1) The
cause of action therein pleaded was abated by the filing of the action for
quieting of title, which was instituted first, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court; and (2) the cause of action in said case was
necessarily included in the quieting of title case, which was principally
between the same parties involved in the forcible entry case. Adil cited Sec. 1
 (e), Rule 16, which provides that a motion to dismiss will lie when there is
another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.
Summary:

Action
De Luzuriaga, Sr. filed with the CFI
an action for quieting of title.
De Luzuriaga, Sr. filed with the MCC
an action for forcible entry.
Young filed with the CFI a petition
for certiorari.
De Luzuriaga, Sr. appealed to the
SC.
Decision
The MCC judge denied the Motion to
Dismiss of Young embodied as
affirmative defenses in his answer, and
set the case for trial.
CFI enjoined the MCC judge from
proceeding with the case for forcible
entry.
Dismissed for lack of merit

Issue: Whether the inferior court had jurisdiction to try and hear the forcible entry
case where the issue of possession was intertwined with the issue of ownership
earlier raised in an action to quiet title pending before the CFI
Held: No.
In the forcible entry case, the dispute between de Luzuriaga and Young about the
possession of Agho Island arose out of their conflicting claims of ownership over the
said island. The issue of ownership was indispensably involved. In a long line of
cases, the SC have ruled that a party may institute only one suit for a single cause
of action (Section 3, Rule 2; Laperal vs. Katigbak, 4 SCRA 582). If two or more
complaints are brought from different parts of a single cause of action, the filing of
the first may be pleaded in abatement of the other or others, and a judgment upon
the merits in anyone is available as a bar in the others (Section 4, Rule 2; Bacolod
City vs. San Miguel, Inc., 29 SCRA 819). The reason for the rule against the splitting
of a cause of action is intended to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy; to protect the defendant from
unnecessary vexation; and to avoid the costs incident to numerous suits.
In the case at bar, the action to quiet title was filed on April 21, 1980, whereas the
forcible entry case was instituted before the MCC 3 days after, or on April 24, 1980.
In his complaint for ejectment, de Luzuriaga anchored his claim for rightful
possession on his alleged ownership over the subject property. Thus, it was clear
that the issue of possession was connected with that of ownership and, therefore,
CFI Judge Adil rightfully enjoined the MCC from proceeding with the trial of the
ejectment controversy.