9/8/2016 G.R. No.

130003

TodayisThursday,September08,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.130003October20,2004

JONASAONUEVO,Petitioner.
vs.
HON.COURTOFAPPEALSandJEROMEVILLAGRACIA,Respondent.

DECISION

TINGA,J.:

The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement to the rider. It derives a certain charm from
being unencumbered by any enclosure, affording the cyclist the perception of relative liberty. It also carries some
obviousrisksonthepartoftheuserandhasbecomethesubjectofregulation,ifnotbythegovernment,thenby
parentalproscription.

The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of damages from the driver of the car which had
struckhim.Theargumentishingedonthecyclistsfailuretoinstallsafetydevicesonhisbicycle.However,thelower
courts agreed that the motorist himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are deceptively
simple,buttheresolutionentailsthoroughconsiderationoffundamentalpreceptsonnegligence.

The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of
Pasig City, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both courts adjudged petitioner, Jonas Aonuevo ( Aonuevo ),
liableforthedamagesfortheinjuriessustainedbythecyclist,JeromeVillagracia(Villagracia).Instead,thepetition
hinges on a sole legal question, characterized as "novel" by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil
Code,whichpresumesthedriverofamotorvehiclenegligentifhewasviolatingatrafficregulationatthetimeofthe
mishap,shouldapplybyanalogytononmotorizedvehicles.1

AsfoundbytheRTC,andaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,theaccidentinquestionoccurredon8February1989,
ataroundnineintheevening,attheintersectionofBoniAvenueandBarangkaDriveinMandaluyong(nowacity).
VillagraciawastravelingalongBoniAvenueonhisbicycle,whileAonuevo,traversingtheoppositelanewasdriving
his Lancer car with plate number PJJ 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of
Aonuevosbrother,Jonathan.AonuevowasinthecourseofmakingaleftturntowardsLibertadStreetwhenthe
collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several
timesin1989,andforcedhimtoundergofour(4)operations.

On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and
AonuevobeforetheRTC.2HehadalsofiledacriminalcomplaintagainstAonuevobeforetheMetropolitanTrial
Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge.3 Trial on the civil action
ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and
Aonuevo,orderingthemtopayVillagraciatheamountsofOneHundredFiftyThousandPesos(P150,000.00).for
actualdamages,TenThousandPesos(P10,000.00)formoraldamages,andTwentyThousandPesos(P20,000.00)
forattorneysfees,aswellaslegalcosts.4BothdefendantsappealedtotheCourtofAppeals.

InaDecision5dated8May1997,theCourtofAppealsFourthDivisionaffirmedtheRTCDecisionintoto6.Afterthe
CourtofAppealsdeniedtheMotionforReconsiderationinaResolution7dated22July1997,ProcterandGamble
andAonuevofiledtheirrespectivepetitionsforreviewwiththisCourt.ProcterandGamblespetitionwasdeniedby
this Court in a Resolution dated 24 November 1997. Aonuevos petition,8 on the other hand, was given due
course,9andisthesubjectofthisDecision.

InarrivingattheassailedDecision,theCourtofAppealsaffirmedthefactualfindingsoftheRTC.Amongthem:that
itwasAonuevosvehiclewhichhadstruckVillagracia10thatAonuevosvehiclehadactuallyhitVillagraciasleft

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midthigh, thus causing a comminuted fracture11 that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, witness for
Villagracia,Aonuevowas"umaarangkada,"orspeedingashemadetheleftturnintoLibertad12 that considering
Aonuevosclaimthatapassengerjeepneywasobstructinghispathashemadetheturn.Aonuevohadenough
warning to control his speed13 and that Aonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence
required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided.14 Notably, Aonuevo, in his current petition,
doesnotdisputethefindingsoftortiousconductonhispartmadebythelowercourts,hinginghisappealinsteadon
the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Aonuevo proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he
disputetheconclusionsmadebytheRTCandtheCourtofAppeals.Accordingly,theCourt,whichisnotatrierof
facts,15isnotcompelledtoreviewthefactualfindingsofthelowercourts,whichfollowingjurisprudencehavetobe
receivedwithrespectandareinfactgenerallybinding.16

Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting questions for resolution. Aonuevos arguments are
especially fixated on a particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by
analogytononmotorizedvehicles.17Inthesamevein,AonuevoinsiststhatVillagraciasownfaultandnegligence
servestoabsolvetheformerofanyliabilityfordamages.

ItsiseasytodiscernwhyAonuevochoosestoemploythislineofargument.AonuevopointsoutthatVillagracias
bicyclehadnosafetygadgetssuchasahornorbell,orheadlights,asinvokedbya1948municipalordinance.18
NorwasitdulyregisteredwiththeOfficeoftheMunicipalTreasurer,asrequiredbythesameordinance.Finally,as
admittedbyVillagracia,hisbicycledidnothavefootbrakes.19BeforethisCourt,Villagraciadoesnotdisputethese
allegations,whichheadmittedduringthetrial,butdirectsourattentioninsteadtothefindingsofAonuevosown
negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would
notexonerateAonuevofrompaymentofdamages.TheCourtofAppealslikewiseacknowledgedthelackofsafety
gadgetsonVillagraciasbicycle,butcharacterizedthecontentionas"offtangent"andinsufficienttoobviatethefact
thatitwasAonuevosownnegligencethatcausedtheaccident.21

Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety
gadgetsthereon.HepositsthatArticle2185oftheNewCivilCodeappliesbyanalogy.Theprovisionreads:

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligentifatthetimeofthemishaphewasviolatinganytrafficregulation.

Theprovisionwasintroducedforthefirsttimeinthisjurisdictionwiththeadoptionin1950oftheNewCivilCode.22
Itsapplicabilityisexpresslyqualifiedtomotorvehiclesonly,andthereisnogroundtopresumethatthelawintended
abroadercoverage.

Still,AonuevohypothesizesthatArticle2185shouldapplybyanalogytoalltypesofvehicles23.Hepointsoutthat
moderndaytravelismorecomplexnowthanwhentheCodewasenacted,thenumberandtypesofvehiclesnowin
use far more numerous than as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of the Code, the
legislators "must have seen that only motor vehicles were of such public concern that they had to be specifically
mentioned,"yettoday,theinteractionofvehiclesofalltypesandnaturehas"inescapablybecomematterofpublic
concern"soastoexpandtheapplicationofthelawtobemoreresponsivetothetimes.24

What Aonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit command of the legislature, as embodied in Article
2185,ataskbeyondthepaleofjudicialpower.TheCourtinterprets,andnotcreates,thelaw.However,sincethe
Courtisbeingaskedtoconsiderthematter,itmightaswellexaminewhetherArticle2185couldbeinterpretedto
includenonmotorizedvehicles.

AtthetimeArticle2185wasformulated,thereexistedawholearrayofnonmotorizedvehiclesrangingfromhuman
powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animaldrawn carts such as calesas and
carromata.Thesemodesoftransportwereevenmoreprevalentontheroadsofthe1940sand1950sthantheyare
today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of
Article 2185 with the use of the term "motorized vehicles." If Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of
Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts
historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to nonmotorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was
significantlylowerthanasitstandstoday.Thiswillbecertainlyaffirmedbystatisticaldata,assumingsuchhasbeen
compiled,muchlessconfirmedbypersonsoversixty.Aonuevoscharacterizationofavibrantintraroaddynamic
betweenmotorizedandnonmotorizedvehiclesismoreapropostothepastthantothepresent.

ThereisafundamentalflawinAonuevosanalysisofArt.2185,asapplicabletoday.Hepremisesthattheneedfor
the distinction between motorized and nonmotorized vehicles arises from the relative mass of number of these
vehicles. The more pertinent basis for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these vehicles. A
motorizedvehicleoperatesbyreasonofamotorengineunlikeanonmotorizedvehicle,whichrunsasaresultofa
directexertionbymanorbeastofburdenofdirectphysicalforce.Amotorizedvehicle,unimpededbythelimitations
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inphysicalexertion.iscapableofgreaterspeedsandaccelerationthannonmotorizedvehicles.Atthesametime,
motorizedvehiclesaremorecapableininflictinggreaterinjuryordamageintheeventofanaccidentorcollision.
Thisisduetoacombinationoffactorspeculiartothemotorvehicle,suchasthegreaterspeed,itsrelativegreater
bulkofmass,andgreatercombustabilityduetothefuelsthattheyuse.

Therelonghasbeenjudicialrecognitionofthepeculiardangersposedbythemotorvehicle.Asfarbackas1912,in
theU.S.v.Juanillo25,theCourthasrecognizedthatanautomobileiscapableofgreatspeed,greaterthanthatof
ordinaryvehicleshauledbyanimals,"andbeyonddoubtitishighlydangerouswhenusedoncountryroads,putting
togreathazardthesafetyandlivesofthemassofthepeoplewhotravelonsuchroads."26Inthesamecase,the
Courtemphasized:

A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required to use a greater degree of care than drivers of
animals,forthereasonthatthemachineiscapableofgreaterdestruction,andfurthermore,itisabsolutelyunderthe
powerandcontrolofthedriverwhereas,ahorseorotheranimalcananddoestosomeextentaidinavertingan
accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or
walking.Itisprobablymoreagreeabletosendthemachinealongandletthehorseorpersongetoutofthewayin
the best manner possible but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and an accident occurs, that the
automobiledriverwillbecalledupontoaccountforhisacts.Anautomobiledrivermustatalltimesuseallthecare
andcautionwhichacarefulandprudentdriverwouldhaveexercisedunderthecircumstances.27

Americanjurisprudencehashadoccasiontoexplicitlyruleontherelationshipbetweenthemotoristandthecyclist.
Motoristsarerequiredtoexerciseordinaryorreasonablecaretoavoidcollisionwithbicyclists.28Whilethedutyof
usingordinarycarefallsalikeonthemotoristandtheriderordriverofabicycle,itisobvious,forreasonsgrowing
outoftheinherentdifferencesinthetwovehicles,thatmoreisrequiredfromtheformertofullydischargetheduty
thanfromthelatter.29

TheCodeCommissionwascognizantofthedifferenceinthenaturesandattachedresponsibilitiesofmotorizedand
nonmotorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and
regulations.Ifsuchwereindeedtheevilsoughttoberemediedorguardedagainst,thentheframersoftheCode
wouldhaveexpandedtheprovisiontoincludenonmotorizedvehiclesorforthatmatter,pedestrians.Yet,thatwas
notthecasethustheneedarisestoascertainthepeculiaritiesattachingtoamotorizedvehiclewithinthedynamics
of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized
vehicles,arisingfromthespecialnatureofmotorvehicle,leadstotheinescapableconclusionthatthequalification
underArticle2185existspreciselytorecognizesuchhigherstandard.Simplyput,thestandardsapplicabletomotor
vehiclearenotonequalfootingwithothertypesofvehicles.

Thus,wecannotsustainthecontentionthatArt.2185shouldapplytononmotorizedvehicles,evenifbyanalogy.
There is factual and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185, and to adopt Aonuevos thesis
wouldunwiselyobviatethisdistinction.

Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply to Villagracia, this should not preclude any
possiblefindingofnegligenceonhispart.WhilethelegalargumentasformulatedbyAonuevoiserroneous,his
core contention that Villagracia was negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants serious
consideration,especiallysincetheimputednegligentactswereadmittedbyVillagraciahimself.

The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.30 However, the
existenceofnegligenceinagivencaseisnotdeterminedbythepersonaljudgmentoftheactorinagivensituation,
butrather,itisthelawwhichdetermineswhatwouldberecklessornegligent.31

Aonuevo,assertsthatVillagraciawasnegligentasthelatterhadtransgressedamunicipalordinancerequiringthe
registrationofbicyclesandtheinstallationofsafetydevicesthereon.Thisviewfindssomesupportifanchoredon
thelongstandingprincipleofnegligenceperse.

Thegenerallyacceptedviewisthattheviolationofastatutorydutyconstitutesnegligence,negligenceasamatterof
law, or negligence per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval American authorities
elucidatingontherule:

"Themerefactofviolationofastatuteisnotsufficientbasisforaninferencethatsuchviolationwastheproximate
causeoftheinjurycomplained.However,iftheveryinjuryhashappenedwhichwasintendedtobepreventedbythe
statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury." (65
C.J.S.1156)

"Thegenerallyacceptedviewisthatviolationofastatutorydutyconstitutesnegligence,negligenceasamatterof
law,or,accordingtothedecisionsonthequestion,negligenceperse,forthereasonthatnonobservanceofwhat
the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an ordinarily prudent
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manwouldobserve,and,whenthestateregardscertainactsassoliabletoinjureothersastojustifytheirabsolute
prohibition,doingtheforbiddenactisabreachofdutywithrespecttothosewhomaybeinjuredtherebyor,asit
has been otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is
negligence,negligenceperseornegligenceinandofitself,intheabsenceofalegalexcuse.Accordingtothisview
it is immaterial, where a statute has been violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation would
havebeenregardedasnegligenceintheabsenceofanystatuteonthesubjectorwhethertherewas,asamatterof
fact,anyreasontoanticipatethatinjurywouldresultfromsuchviolation.xxx."(65C.J.S.pp.623628)

"But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed
limit,forexample,wedonotinquirewhetherhisprohibitedconductwasunreasonablydangerous.Itisenoughthatit
wasprohibited.Violationofanordinanceintendedtopromotesafetyisnegligence.Ifbycreatingthehazardwhich
theordinancewasintendedtoavoiditbringsabouttheharmwhichtheordinancewasintendedtoprevent,itisa
legalcauseoftheharm.Thiscomesonlytosayingthatinsuchcircumstancesthelawhasnoreasontoignorethe
causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very
relationwhichthemakersoftheordinanceanticipated.Thiscourthasappliedtheseprinciplestospeedlimitsand
otherregulationsofthemannerofdriving."(Rossvs.Hartman,139Fed.2d14at15).

"x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or contributing toward an injury intervened between the
violationofastatuteorordinanceandtheinjurydoesnotnecessarilymaketheresultsoremotethatnoactioncan
bemaintained.Thetestistobefoundnotinthenumberofinterveningeventsoragents,butintheircharacterandin
thenaturalandprobableconnectionbetweenthewrongdoneandtheinjuriousconsequence.Thegeneralprinciple
isthattheviolationofastatuteorordinanceisnotrenderedremoteasthecauseofaninjurybytheinterventionof
anotheragencyiftheoccurrenceoftheaccident,inthemannerinwhichithappened,wastheverythingwhichthe
statuteorordinancewasintendedtoprevent."(38AmJur841)34

InTeague,theownerofavocationalschoolstrickenbyafireresultinginfatalitieswasfoundnegligent,baseonher
failuretoprovideadequatefireexitsincontraventionofaManilacityordinance.35InF.F.CruzandCo.,Inc.v.Court
ofAppeals36,thefailureofthepetitionertoconstructafirewallinaccordancewithcityordinancessufficedtosupport
a finding of negligence.37 In Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, 38the Court found that the failure of the petitioner to
register and insure his auto rustproofing shop in accordance with the statute constituted negligence perse, thus
holdinghimliableforthedamagesforthedestructionbyfireofacustomersvehiclegaragedtherein.

ShouldthedoctrineofnegligenceperseapplytoVillagracia,resultingfromhisviolationofanordinance?Itcannot
be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote
roadsafetyandtominimizetheoccurrenceofroadaccidentsinvolvingbicycles.Atfacevalue,Villagraciasmishap
was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated. Aonuevo argues that
Villagraciasviolationshouldbarthelattersrecoveryofdamages,andasimplisticinterpretationofnegligenceper
semightvindicatesuchanargument.

Butthisisbynomeansasimplecase.Thereisthefactwhichweconsiderasproven,thatAonuevowasspeeding
ashemadetheleftturn,andsuchnegligentactwastheproximatecauseoftheaccident.Thisrecklessbehavior
would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into the intersection,
whethertheyarefellowmotorists,pedestrians,orcyclists.WearehardputtoconcludethatVillagraciawouldhave
avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was
alreadyspeedingashemadetheturn,orbeforehehadseenVillagracia.EvenassumingthatAonuevohadfailed
toseeVillagraciabecausethebicyclewasnotequippedwithheadlights,suchlapseonthecyclistspartwouldnot
haveacquittedthedriverofhisdutytoslowdownasheproceededtomaketheleftturn.

Thiscourthasappreciatedthatnegligenceperse, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be
sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a
collisionbetweenatruckandaprivatelyownedCimarronvancausedthedeathofthreeofthevanspassengers.
The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple
violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code40 at the time of the accident. Among these violations: the
Cimarronwasoverloadedatthetimeoftheaccidentthefrontseatofthevanwasoccupiedbyfouradults,including
thedriverandthevanhadonlyonefunctioningheadlight.Similarasinthiscase,petitionerthereininvokedArticle
2185andarguedthatthedriveroftheCimarronshouldbepresumednegligent.TheCourt,speakingthroughJustice
Mendoza,dismissedthesearguments:

[It]hasnotbeenshownhowtheallegednegligenceoftheCimarrondrivercontributedtothecollisionbetweenthe
vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximateorlegalcauseoftheinjuryorthatitsubstantiallycontributedthereto.Negligenceconsistinginwholeorin
part,ofviolationoflaw,likeanyothernegligence,iswithoutlegalconsequenceunlessitisacontributingcauseof
the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime
certainlyincreasestheriskofaccident,"thatbecausetheCimarronhadonlyoneheadlight,therewas"decreased

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visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased its
maneuverability." However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving
clearlythatsuchallegednegligencewasthecontributingcauseoftheinjury.41

SanitarySteam42iscontrollinginthiscase.ThebarefactthatVillagraciawasviolatingamunicipalordinanceatthe
timeoftheaccidentmayhavesufficientlyestablishedsomedegreeofnegligenceonhispart,butsuchnegligenceis
withoutlegalconsequenceunlessitisshownthatitwasacontributingcauseoftheinjury.Ifanythingatall,itisbut
indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which would then be the
proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracias
negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the
partiesandthedegreeofcareandvigilancewhichtheparticularcircumstancesreasonablyrequire.43Todetermine
if Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but
imperativetoexamineVillagraciasbehaviorinrelationtothecontemporaneouscircumstancesoftheaccident.

Theruleonnegligencepersemustadmitqualificationsthatmayarisefromthelogicalconsequencesofthefacts
leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in
adjudgingliability,foritseekstoimputeculpabilityarisingfromthefailureoftheactortoperformuptoastandard
establishedbyalegalfiat.Butthedoctrineshouldnotberenderedinflexiblesoastodenyreliefwheninfactthereis
nocausalrelationbetweenthestatutoryviolationandtheinjurysustained.Presumptionsinlaw,whileconvenient,
arenotintractablesoastoforbidrebuttalrootedinfact.Afterall,tortlawisremunerativeinspirit,aimingtoprovide
compensationfortheharmsufferedbythosewhoseinterestshavebeeninvadedowingtotheconductofothers.44

Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are not grievous enough so as to negate monetary
relief.Intheabsenceofstatutoryrequirement,oneisnotnegligentasamatteroflawforfailingtoequipahorn,bell,
or other warning devise onto a bicycle.45 In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not
constitutenegligenceasamatteroflaw46butisaquestionforthejurywhethertheabsenceofproperlightsplayed
a causal part in producing a collision with a motorist.47 The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as
requiredbystatuteorordinance,mayconstitutenegligencebarringordiminishingrecoveryifthebicyclistisstruck
byamotoristaslongastheabsenceofsuchlightswasaproximatecauseofthecollision48however,theabsence
of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated by street
lights,49ifsubstitutelightswerepresentwhichclearlyrenderedthebicyclistvisible,50ifthemotoristsawthebicycle
inspiteoftheabsenceoflightsthereon,51orifthemotoristwouldhavebeenunabletoseethebicycleevenifithad
been equipped with lights.52 A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support a finding of
negligencebarringordiminishingrecoverybyaninjuredbicyclistwheresuchconditionwasacontributingcauseof
theaccident.53

The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety
practices,whetherornotimposedbyordinanceorstatute,isnotsufficienttonegateormitigaterecoveryunlessa
causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds
affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the
proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.54 Aonuevo had the burden of clearly
provingthattheallegednegligenceofVillagraciawastheproximateorcontributorycauseofthelattersinjury.

Onthispoint,thefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsarewellworthciting:

[As]admittedbyappellantAonuevo,hefirstsawappelleeVillagraciaatadistanceofaboutten(10)metersbefore
theaccident.Corrolarily,therefore,hecouldhaveavoidedtheaccidenthadhe[stopped]alongsidewithanearlier
(sic)jeepwhichwasalreadyatafullstopgivingwaytoappellee.Butaccordingto[eyewitness]Sorsano,hesaw
appellant Aonuevo "umaarangkada" and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30). This earlier (sic)
jeepatafullstopgavewaytoVillagraciatoproceedbutAonuevoatanunexpectedmotion(umarangkada)came
outhittingVillagracia(TSNMarch9,1990p.49).AppellantAonuevoadmittedthathedidnotblowhishornwhen
hecrossedBoniAvenue(TSNMarch21,1990p.47).55

By Aonuevos own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been
decelerating, as he should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample opportunity to avoid hitting
Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that Aonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate any
possibilitythattheabsenceoflightsonthebikecontributedtothecauseoftheaccident.56Amotoristhasbeenheld
liable for injury to or death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly into the bicyclist so as to cause a
collision.57

Neither does Aonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a causal connection between the safety violations
imputed to Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in
themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the onus on Aonuevo is to

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conclusivelyprovethelinkbetweentheviolationsandtheaccident,wecandeemhimashavingfailedtodischarge
hisnecessaryburdenofprovingVillagraciasownliability.

NeithercanwecanadjudgeVillagraciawithcontributorynegligence. Theleadingcaseincontributorynegligence,
1wphi1

Rakesv.AtlanticGulf58clarifiesthatdamagesmaybemitigatediftheclaimant"inconjunctionwiththeoccurrence,
[contributes]onlytohisinjury."59 To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
performedanactthatbroughtabouthisinjuriesindisregardofwarningsorsignsofanimpendingdangertohealth
andbody.60Toprovecontributorynegligence,itisstillnecessarytoestablishacausallink,althoughnotproximate,
between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only
whenitcontributesproximatelytotheinjury,andnotsimplyaconditionforitsoccurrence.61

AsbetweenAonuevoandVillagracia,thelowercourtsadjudgedAonuevoassolelyresponsiblefortheaccident.
The petition does not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to imagine that the same result
wouldnothaveoccurredevenifVillagraciasbicyclehadbeenequippedwithsafetyequipment.Aonuevohimself
admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10) meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been
sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact that Aonuevo was recklessly speeding as he
made the turn likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with the proper
brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. Moreover, it was
incumbentonAonuevotohaveestablishedthatVillagraciasfailuretohaveinstalledtheproperbrakescontributed
to his own injury. The fact that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to that effect leads us to consider such causal
connectionasnotproven.

Alltold,thereisnoreasontodisturbtheassailedjudgment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

SOORDERED.

Puno,(Chairman),AustriaMartinez,Callejo,Sr.andChicoNazario,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes
1Rollo,p.14.

2Id.at25.DocketedasCivilCaseNo.58784.

3Id.at27.

4Id.at25.

5PennedbyJusticeB.AdefuinDeLaCruz,concurredinbyJusticesG.ParasandR.Galvez.

6Rollo,pp.2539.

7Id.at52.

8DocketedasC.A.G.R.No.129966

9InaResolutiondated8December1996.

10Rollo,p.33.

11Ibid.

12Id.at3132.

13Id.at32.

14Id.at31.

15WRedConstructionv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.122648,August17,2000,392Phil.888,899(2000).

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16Engresovs.DeLaCruz,G.R.No.148727,April9,2003,401SCRA217,220.

17Rollo,p.14.

18 Id. at 18. Particularly Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1948. Section 3 thereof states: "x x x [No]
bicycleshallbeissuedaregistrationcertificateandplateunlessthebicycleisequippedwithaheadlightanda
bicyclehornorbell."
19Id.at20.

20Id.at118.

21Id.at34.

22Tolentino,inhisannotationsontheCivilCode,statesthatthearticlerestatesaprincipleenunciatedinthe
U.S.v.Crame,30Phil.2(1915).SeeA.Tolentino,VCivilCodeofthePhilippines(1999ed.),at625.While
thesaidcasedoesnotexpresslystatesucharule,itsconclusionofnegligence,derivedfromtheappreciation
ofthevarioustrafficviolationsofthedefendanttherein,isinaccordwiththeprinciplebehindtherule.
23Rollo,p.16.Hecitesthedefinitionofvehicleas"everydescriptionofcarriageorotherartificialcontrivance
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation." Id.,citingPhilippineLawDictionary,p.618
andWoodwardv.CollectorofCustoms,39Phil.516(1919).
24Rollo,p.16.

2523Phil.212(1912).

26Id.at222.

27Id.at225.

288AMJUR2d675.

29Id.,citingLutherv.State,177Ind.619,98N.E.640(1912).

30SeeArt.1173,NewCivilCode.

31SeePicartv.Smith,37Phil.809,813(1918)CivilAeronauticsAdministrationv.CourtofAppeals,G.RNo.
L51806,8November1988,167SCRA28,39Layuganv.IntermediateAppellateCourt,G.R.No.L73998,
14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 363, 372373 Leao v. Domingo, G.R No. 84378, 4 July 1991, 198 SCRA
800,804PBComv.CourtofAppeals,336Phil.667,676(1997)BPIv.CourtofAppeals,383Phil.538,555
(2000).
3265C.J.S.,p.623.SeealsoJ.CSangco,ITortsandDamages(1993),at12.

33151APhil.648(1973).

34Teaguev.Fernandez,151APhil.648,652653(1973).

35Id.at651652.

36G.R.No.L52732,29August1988,164SCRA731.

37Id.at736.

38331Phil.1019(1996).

39360Phil.199(1998).

40RepublicActNo.4136.

41SanitarySteamLaundry,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,360Phil.199,208209(1998).

42Id.

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43Corlissv.ManilaRailroadCompany,137Phil.101,107108citingAhernv.OregonTelephoneCo.,35Pac
549(1894).
44SeeM.Brazier,Streetontorts3(8thed.,1988).

458AMJUR2d678citingLongiev.Exline,659F.Supp.177(D.Md.1987)Greenv.Pedigo,75Cal.App.
2d300,170P.2d999(2dDist.1946).
46Id.citingTaylorv.Yukeic,273A.D.915,77N.Y.S.2d620Mastersv.Alexander,424Pa.225A.2d905
(1967).
47 Id. citing Howie v. Bardwell, 287 mass. 121, 191 N.E. 640 (1934) Brown v. Tanner, 281 Mich. 150, 274
N.W.744(1937)BaumanbyChapmanv.Crawford,104Wash.2d241,704P.2d1181(1985).
48Id.citingJohnsonv.RailwayExp.Agency,131F.2d1009(C.C.A7thCir.1942)Longiev.Exline,659F.
Supp. 177 (D. Md. 1987) Zachary v. Travelers Indm. Co., 533 So. 2d 1300 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988)
Haskinsv.CarolinaPowerandLightCo.,47N.Capp.664,267S.E2d587(1980)Everestv.Riecken,26
Wash.2d542,174P.2d762(1946).
49Id.citingLaCountv.Pasarich,205Cal.181,270P.210(1928).

50Id.citingLandisv.Wick,154Or.199,59P.2d403(1936).

51Id.citingAndersonv.Sterrit,95Kan.483,148P.635(1915).

52Id.citingHowiev.Bardwell,287Mass.121,191N.E.640(1934).

53Id.citingLongiev.Exline,659F.Supp.177(D.Md.1987)Greenv.Pedigo,75Cal.App.2d300,170P.2d
999(2dDist.1946).

54Supranote41.

55Rollo,p.34.

56Seesupranote42.

57TennesseeMill&FeedCo.v.Giles,211Ala.44,99So.84(1924),citedin8AMJUR2d675.

587Phil.359(1907).

59Id.at375.

60MaaoSugarCentralCo.,Inc.andAranetavs.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.83491,27August1990,189
SCRA88,93.

61Fuentesv.NLRC,G.R.No.L75955,28October1988,166SCRA752,757.

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